chapter 3 - shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/18338/10/10...movement in india....
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CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ROLE OF THE MILITARY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter has discussed the issues during the growing conflict and political crisis
during 1950's, 60's and 90's to the beginning of the 21st century. The study will look
upon the period of the democratic governments. And, also deal with the external
influence on the Nepalese Army. This study further examines whether the military can
accommodate the social character and political development of Nepal in the process of
making nation-state or not? Further, it will analyze whenever the government sets the
goal and allocates the resources to be used to attaining the goal does it maintain the
theoretical background of civil-military relations or not? This study also examines
strengths of military institution in Nepal. It will further observe whether the Nepalese
Army is accountable to the elected government or not being as apolitical professional
organization.
3.2 Evolution ofNepalfs political system
The modem history of Nepal is traced back to the latter half of the eighteenth century
when King Prithvinarayan Shaha of the Gorkha principality expanded its domains of
neighboring small hill principalities. Kathmandu valley was brought under the control
and made its capital in 1769. The rapid expansion of the Gorkhas had brought a number
of influential high caste families into the system (Rose 1980:26). By the end of the
eighteenth century, the political control of the ruling family had been considerably
marginalized by a number of Chhetri families struggling for power. In the process many
of these families were absorb into the central political system. As a result, the courtier
families undermined the Gorkha-based noble families' position.
The political system in this period was characterized by "a highly segmented, pyramidal
structure dominated by the handful of Chhetri families and assisted by a number of
Brahmin families". The involvement of the Brahmin in the oppositional politics "took the
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form of behind the scene efforts to persuade the rulers to adopt certain courses of action
or, alternatively, of participation in sub rosa intrigues and conspiracies aimed at the
ruling groups." Politics was confined to Kathmandu alone; the political elite did not think
it wise to take politics down to the people. As a consequence, the people of hills and the
Tarai were unable to identify themselves with the country's political process. During this
period the Shaha dynasty though never completely lost is political prerogative, the above
factors facilitated the task of Jang Bahadur Rana to acquire power in 1846 by violent
means (Kot Massacre). The entire event takes place with the help of army or the
personnel (Joshi and Rose 1996: 57).
In order to strengthen the Rana regime, Jung Bahadur eliminated his potential rivals and
in order to curb the king's popularity, the king was virtually put under the permanent
palace arrest and monarchy during this period beCame as a defunct institution. As outside
faction were considerably weakened, oppositional politics came from Rana families
itself. Opposition to the Rana system received a new dimension which, in the later part of
the nineteenth century "developed out of two kinds of politics: the politics of revenge and
the politics of self-aggrandizement. The principal actors in the politics of revenge were
the external opponents of the system within the ruling family and Thapa, Pandey and
Basnyat families, their accessories were usually the dissident elements among the Ranas
(Ibid).
With the highly stratified political system of the Ranas, the people were separated from
the political process. The political culture during the Rana rule was distinctively
characterized by the institutionalized differences of dress, speech and manners between
the Ranas and non-Ranas. These differences help the Rana to perpetuate their rule over
the common people (Baral 1977:21). Thus, the vast majority of the people were kept
away from the politics at the national level.
3.3 Struggles for Democracy
Struggle for democracy in Nepal began with the formation of political parties in the
1930s, previously unknown in Nepali politics. The people were separated from political
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process that was dominated by the Brahmin and Chhetri families. The traditional pattern
of court politics underwent a change in the 1930s. The conspiracy-formulating family
politics of the Rana developed along with ideological oriented anti-Rana movement. The
anti-Rana activity was carried on by the Nepali youth who were aware of the democratic
movement in India. Throughout history of struggle for democracy, Madhesis and their
land Tarai contributed major role but lacked leadership in the movement and in the
different political parties that had deprived them to get due share in the state politics
(Kumar 2003: 16).
3.3.1 Formation of Political Parties
As already noted, opposition in the form of political parties in Nepal began in the mid
1930s. Factors that contributed to this development are the Indian national movement
which encourage the Nepali youths in India to form their own political parties and the
support and cooperation received from the 'C' class Ranas. The first political
organization was Praja Parishad, an underground organization formed in 1936 in
Kathmandu. The members of this party later suffered capital punishment and life
imprisonment for anti Rana activities. Rehabilitating problems of the 2nd World War
veterans both form Nepalese army and Gorkha regiments of British India. British India
government has demobilized perhaps 200,000 veterans quickly and with minimal
financial assistance. At this time educated Nepalese wrote and talk about social and
economic conditions of their country in Indian newspaper and journals and welcoming
the growth of consciousness of Nepali nationalism against the tyrannical Rana regime
and its alliance with British (Shaha : 1991). Some educated youth were closely associated
with independence movement of India. The organization had considerably worked
towards raising the political awareness among the masses. Although this organization
succeeded in fulfilling its objectives in the initial phase it soon lost its importance as it
lacked the skill necessary in running of clandestine organization but its contribution in
raising the political awareness among the general masses cannot be ignored (Ibid).
The Praja Parishad movement had three distinctive features; first, it was the first
organized movement by the commoner against the Ranas, with its great symbolic value
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for the coming generation. Second, it indicated the beginning of a new oppositionist
tradition in the history of the country, and it was not a product of familiar feuds or
conspiracies of contending factions' intent on seizing power. It was inspired by higher
sense of mission. Finally, it showed that in an autocratic regime, where peaceful means of
political opposition were outlawed, a violent method was the only alternative to
overthrow it (BaralI977:36). It would therefore, be hard to minimize the importance of
the Praja Parishad movement "in the historical context" for it not only "infused a new
courage and confidence in the anti-Rana elements, ''but also set the stage for the
successive struggles on a larger scale" (Gupta 1964:28).
3.3.2 Anti-Ran a movement
During this time, the educated Nepali youth became politically aware and welcomed the
growth of Nepali nationalism. However, due to the arrest of several leaders the
organization suffered serious setback. In 1946, the anti-Rana movement got a shot in arm
when B.P. Koirala and some other youths established a new political party called the
Nepali National Congress (NNC), which pledged to help the Indian people achieve
national independence, at the same time hope to bring political change in Nepal. The
main objective of NNC was to replace the Rana regime by a constitutional Monarchy
through non-violent means (Koirala 2008: 46). The Nepali Congress called for a labour
strike in the same year in support of the striking mill workers in Biratnagar. The
assurance of Padma Shumsher for constitutional reforms helped in calling off the strike.
• In August 1948, two prominent members of 'C' class Ranas, Subarna Shumsher and
Mahavir Shumsher along with others formed the, Nepali Democratic Congress at
Calcutta in India This party later on merged in the Nepali national Congress and in 1950,
the Nepali Congress was come into being with the objective of bringing an end t() the
autocratic regime of the Ranas. Apart from the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of
Nepal (CPN) was also formed in exile in 1949 in the leadership of Pushpalal Shrestha
(Ibid).
At that time top ranking Ranas such as the then Commander-in-chief Babar Shamsher,
Commanding General Bahadur Shamsher and most of the 'A' category Ranas were not
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dumb spectators to the events. At the very late hour of their existence in power, they tried
to terrorize the general masses of the Kathmandu and other cities letting loose their
personal guards, who would roam the city in bands, brandishing naked khukuris. They
gave themselves the name and style of 'Bir Gorkha Dal' (Brave Gorkha Battalion).The
people in turn named this band the Khukuri Dal and would contain it by the same
(Koirala 2008: 173).
Nepal's interests, both political and economic, had suffered a grievous injury in the 1905-
45 periods. The trade with Tibet now flowed almost exclusively through the Sikkim
Chumbi route, made secure after 1905 by the establishment of British trade agencies in
Tibet. During this period, Nepal's foreign relations were solely with British India and
Tibet, thus depriving Kathmandu of even the limited flexibility it had enjoyed prior to
1912. Hitherto Nepal's importance in British frontier policy was equidistance with
Kathmandu and Lasha (Rose 1971 :169-70).
Bhim Shamsher encouraged cotton cultivation in the Tarai and the production of
homespun cloth. Jute and cotton mills were established in the Tarai; also a match and
sugar factory there. Industrial exhibitions were held to encourage manufacturers. The
establishment of a bank, a number of co-operative societies, a board for the development
of handloom of cottage industries and a training centre for the manufacture of handloom
fabrics were some other measures. Land laws were revised, an ambitious scheme, which
provided for the distribution of rent free land was intended to attract not only the
hundreds of retired Gorkha soldiers but all hill people to settle in Tarai (Mojumdar
1975:54).
The anti-Rana movement came to end in February 1951. As a result of compromise, a
settlement, commonly known as the "Delhi Settlement" was reached between the king
and Rana Prime Minister and the political parties through the efforts of the Indian
government. The proclamation made of King Tribhuvan on 18 February, 1951 stated that
government of the people should be carried on according to democratic norms and values
prepared by a constituent assembly elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage. But
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... '-' .•..
he passed away in 1955 and this commitment could never be materialized (Nepali and
Subba 2005: 82).
In 1958, a new constitution was promulgated and the first democratically elected
government of B P Koirala came to the power after 1959 elections. During the 18 months
of government (June 1959-December 1960), the B P Koirala government had faced two
major difficulties. The assertion of King Mahendra to dictate politics created a major
setback in the functioning of the government. The second problem came from within the
government and the political parties. Inter and intra feuds had not allowed the
government to work effectively. The Democratic process was interrupted and the rule of
Koirala government cut short by King Mahendra in December 1960. Following the
dissolution of parliamentary system, the king re-establishes his strong hold over the
country's politics. King Mahendra introduced a new constitution (1962) and set up party
less Panchayat system. Under this system, all political organization and their activities
were banned (Baral 1977:31). In practice, the Pancayat system institutionalized the
absolute power of the king and suppressed cultural and religious diversity within the
country (Valentin 2005: 55).
As a consequence, the existing political parties had to go underground and carried out the
struggle for democracy. Some leader of Nepali Congress decided to launch an armed
struggle against the royal regime. As of 15 February 1962, the activities of the Congress
rebels were intensified in eastern districts and cities-Taplejung, Jhapa, Biratnagar,
Janakpur, Okhaldhunga, Ramechap and, southern and western districts and cities-Palpa,
Mustang, Dang, Salyan, Deilekh, Surkhet, Kailali, Bellauri and Kanchanpur. Despite the
temporary setback, the Nepali Congress went with its activities. Several clashes between
the Royal Nepal Army and the rebels occurred in different parts of the country. Nepali
Congress employed 'hit and run' tactics in the course of insurgency. Insurgent partly
operated from their based in India. However most of the time they concentrated their
activities in places near the Indian border. This prompted the authorities to brand them as
'anti national' elements. The authorities were increasingly concerned at these activities
which looked like being patterned on communist tactics in some of the Southeast Asian
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countries (Baral 1977:72). The 8 to 10 thousand Nepal army men are hardly capable to
tackling this problem, which shows signs of becoming more serious everyday. The Nepal
army and Police were not trained in the hit and run tactics, they were fmding it difficult to
deal with the 'anti national elements' (Ibid).
Under the pressure of strong student movement and "outlawed" political parties, the king
in 1980 proclaimed a referendum to choose between a reformed party less system or
multiparty system. Because of the ban on political activities and campaign; the low level
of educated people among the masses and lack of awareness; interference of government
officials and misutilization of government resources led to the failure of establishing a
multiparty democracy in favour of the Panchayat regime (Ibid).
3.3.3 Performance of Political Parities
The reintroduction of democracy in 1990 brought into focus the many deep-rooted socio
economic problems in Nepal. There are gender discrimination, discrimination against
disadvantaged groups, unemployment, regional imbalance and corruption. However,
political parties often talk about these issues, have largely failed to sincerely address
them. The parties are accused of failing to link citizen's preferences with public policies.
They have failed to mobilize masses by granting collective incentives, such as ideology,
policies, program's and personal leadership. Instead they have been pre-occupied with
party building, by granting power, status money, jobs and other material rewards to their
parties' clients. The political parties have come to revolve around a circle of vested
interest catering the needs of particular group such as business community.
The gap between the parties and people has been widened by the system of patronage
adopted by the political parties. Instead of maintaining direct contact with masses, the
party leaders have come to rely on small groups of educated and articulated activists to
consolidate their influence. Only party activists benefit from patronage of party leaders.
Political parties have revived the 'Chakri' or sycophancy system of favoritism and
nepotism (Kumar 1996:31). The concept of democracy as people's participation in
governance is yet to take roots in Nepal.
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Although the international situation was not favourable, the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) had discerned the weaknesses of the internal system and they believed the
moment of opportunity they had been waiting for so long had arrived. On 13 February
1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) formally launched the 'people's war'. The
Maoist insurgency brought the Nepalese Army, an institution that was largely shielded
from public glare and criticism in the past, under close scrutiny due to its re-emergence as
an important factor in national life. The Nepalese Army has passed through a one of the
most crucial phase of its history, is deployed in the field to curb Maoist, and the issue of
civil-military relations has generated interest and concern (Bhatt 2008: 104).
3.4 1990's Movement for Restoration .of Democracy
Nepal in the late 1980s was not only affected by internal struggles but was also greatly
influenced by the democratic wave that was taking place all over the world. In 1989 when
India did not agree to renew the treaties of trade and transit between two countries
leading to the closure trade and transit points, many common Nepali people were
severely affected due to restriction of supply on consumer goods and petroleum products.
Taking advantage of the uneasiness amongst the people against the regime and strained
Indo-Nepal relation, Nepali Congress and the left parties blame the regime for
perpetuating the crisis without taking any serious step to resolve it (Muni 1992: 84).
In December 1989, on the occasion of B P Koirala anrnversary, Nepali Congress
launched a peoples' awareness program. The left alliance known as the United Left Front
(ULF) extends its support to Nepali Congress in its campaign for democracy. On January
18, 1990, the Nepali Congress held a conference in which leaders of various countries
and members of foreign press were invited. Leaders from India and other countries
extended their support to the movement. Inspired by the international moral support and
the democratic movement occurring throughout the world, the Nepali Congress and ULF
launched a mass movement on February 18 to end the Panchayat regime and installed an
interim government represented by the various parties and people. On April 16, the
Panchayat government was dismissed and a Royal proclamation was issued the next day,
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which dissolve National Panchayat, the panchayat policy, and evolution committee and
the class organizations. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai became the Prime Minister of interim
government consisting of Nepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist
Leninist)-CPN (ML), Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) and independent members
(Adhikari, 2001: 71).
The major achievement of the interim government was drafting and adoption of
constitution (1990), which considers people as the source of the sovereign authority and
declared the king as a constitutional monarch. It also provided multiparty democracy with
the executive power vested in the elected government headed by the Prime Minister and
the legislative functions to the parliament (The Constitution of Nepal 1990). In
accordance with the new constitution, the elections were held in 1991 (Ibid).
The 1990 People's movement had instituted a democratic dispensation in Nepal. High
hopes and aspirations were raised among the people. There was a hope that the dalit,
women, janjatis or ethnic minorities and Madhesi and people of marginalized regions
such as Karnali and Seti-Mahakali zones, people would have a more respectable life.
There was a hope that the traditional ruling elite would, at the least, accommodate the
hitherto relegated people into the decision-making of the state. There was a hope that the
ruling elite would realize the problems of all these groups. All these hopes have remained
only aspirations even after more than one and half decade of the re-establishment of
democracy in 1990 (Roka 2007: 12).
3.5 The Political Strength of the Military
The idea of fighting to win, rather than merely to avoid defeat, played a central in the
army. The main objectives of the Nepalese army have undergone a change after the end
of tyrannical Rana rule in1950. Its objectives have become to protect country, people and
Crown, preserve the natural resources of the country, engage public welfare works, and
participate in peacekeeping activities in the international arena. With the advent of
democratic system in Nepal, all-round changes in the organization and infusion of
modem technology in the Army have gradually taken place. In some cases, the military
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necessary to make sure that at all times all organs will carry out their duty. For the soldier there exists neither the hamlet, nor the region, nor the province, nor the colony: there is for him nothing but the national territory. He has no family, no relatives, no friends, and no neighbors: only the people who live and work in the national territory. He has only-in a word-the fatherland; the fatherland in all its material expressions, in the totality of its sentiments and traditions, in all the beauty of its historical evolution and its future ideal. To it he must surrender all; safety, peace, family and life itself.
There are different experiences can drawn from the Southasia, especially, India, where
the civil-military relations are permanent reminder, where strategic decisions are
essentially made by civilian politicians and bureaucrats, the military is under tight fiscal
control, and it certainly has no broader sense of mission or purpose. In Pakistan, the army
is in a figurative salient: the 'enemy' is on three sides, and it runs a risk with further
political involvement; yet the road back to the barracks is also closed, for an immediate
retreat would bring down the wrath of an embittered civilian population, tired of martial
law (Cohen 1993: 106).
India had a big advantage in the leadership of Nehru over twenty years. Later during his
daughter's period once they saw that the other party is no good, and then they ran back to
her. So they have big advantage, whereas we have been a little unfortunate. At the time of
partition our political leader's-we had a reversal. The Jinnah had died, the other Prime
Minister, Liaquat Ali was assassinated and then the cult was mediocrity; the politicians
were not trained and we had political confusion for ten or fifteen years. People thought
the country is gone! And that is the reason this professional army called in, because there
was some leadership in it. These martial laws have come in and they have been very hard
on the army, but there was no way out (Ibid). It show the lacking the willingness and
commitment of leadership to horizontal political transformation and development process
army see itself as a best option to deal with.
In 1979, India faced a mini revolt by the paramilitary forces. The Indian army was called
out to quell the incident. At that time, Government of India drew up norms wherein it was
accepted that the police, the paramilitary forces and the army would form an inter-cadre
but non-linearly linked hierarchy with the military as the lead service. In the recent
development sixth central pay commission recommendations are about pay structure
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simmer dissatisfaction. This event is seen as the controversy creating in civil-military
relations in India over the last 60 years of its independent history. Where the electronic
media gives the sense of military is resorting to trade union tactics to obtain redress
(Mehata 2008: 11).
3.6 The Political Weaknesses of the Military
The two weaknesses of the armed forces are, one is the technical inability to administer
any but the most primitive community and the second is their lack of legitimacy: that is to
say, their lack of a moral title to rule. The more primitive the economy, the easier it is for
the armed forces to administer it by purely military men and measures. Modem armies
are a microcosm of the state; they possess their own separate and self-contained systems
of provisioning, supply, engineering, communications, even of education. The army did
likewise in Peru, Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina during 1940,s and 50s (Lieuwen
1960: 137). In primitive economies they may therefore be even better technically
equipped than the civil sector. As societies become more complicated, however, so the
technical skills of the armed forces lag further behind them. Armies could - or do - easily
dominate such primitive societies. All they have to provide is law and order, and
communications (Finer 1988:26).
When an economy advances, as the division of labor becomes more and more extensive,
as the secondary and then the tertiary services expand, and as the society requires the
existence of a trained professional bureaucracy, of technicians, labor organizations and
the like - so the army ceases to be able to rule by its own resources alone. Its aim must be
to cajole or to coerce the civilians and their organizations into collaboration. Moreover, to
some extent that it has to depend on them, so to that extent is it weakened (Ibid).
Nepalese army supported the King and his coup against the democratic forces in 1950,
1960, 1990s and King's step in 2005 and during his direct rule for near a year, to repress
the people's movement of 2006, popular will to restore democracy. But in terms of
'revolution in military affairs' and 'military technical revolution' and most recently,
'military transformation' (Cohen 2004:395) Nepalese army doesn't occur any radical shift.
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Still, technology and transformational change does not entered in Nepalese army
organization.
3.6.1 Unionization of the Military
Originating in .the Scandinavian countries, because that is where forms of industrial
democracy first developed in the civilian sector, in the early years of the 20th century,
union representation of military personnel was initially considered a private matter,
tolerated by the state, despite some initial conflict, in the general framework of the broad
liberties insured by those advanced democracies. Only later did military union
organizations begin to be recognized by the state and regulated by it, in a way not
dissimilar form the other occupational unions. This process in the Scandinavian countries
was gradual and can be considered to have more or less reached completion but the time
of the Second World War (Carorio 2003: 311).
At the same historical time the fall of the totalitarian reglffies and the wider
democratization of Western Europe, the disappearance of the guarantee function that
some forms of governments like monarchy or regime like Nazism had for professionals
in uniform, and the general demilitarization of the individual national societies extended
the issue of union representation of military personnel to just about all continental
European countries where free expression of citizens' needs and desires was possible.
With this debate about the "secularizing of soldiering" (Bhatt 2008: 106) came and a
clear line was drawn between conservative tendencies, which considered any form of
unionization incompatible with the military institution, and innovative tendencies, which,
with the disappearance of the royal army or the caste army, deemed an alignment of the
military profession with the other professions and occupations both possible and
necessary (Idid).
3.6.2 Push for Unionization
Harries Jenkins writes 'the mood to unionize in the armed forces as in other
organizations, arises when the general feeling of individual deprivation is converted into
the rare sense of collective deprivation' (Jenkins 1977: 63). On the other hand some
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authors argued 'the continuing decline of the standard of living in the military, combined
with the general trend towards relations of a new type between a superior and his
subordinates, is beginning to produce new expectations among military personnel'
(Mandeville 1976: 12). Manigart writes the process of unionization of the armed forces is
part of the general evolution of labour relations in Western societies. This evolution is
characterized by greater participation by citizens, by their propensity to defend their
interests, and by a supplanting of individual labour relations with collective labour
relations (Manigart 1984: 4).
As a consequence of social change, the internal connotations of soldiering have changed
as well. According to Harries Jenkins, a change in the basis of authority and discipline in
the military establishment by virtue of shift from authoritarian domination to grater
reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. And the changes social
extraction of officers meant that they were coming in ever greater numbers from those
classes or social sectors where unionization had long been-entrenched (Jenkins 1977: 56).
However, that it must not be forgotten that the push towards unionization in the armed
forces in not created by the unions; it is not unions that create discontent and frustrations:
these factors are inherent in daily working conditions and depend on the possibility or
capability that the chain of command has to come to terms with the problems of the
various categories of personnel (Ibid).
One can put the classification of the objectives of the union representation in this order
a) defend moral and professional interests b) enhance the profession in the eyes of public
opinion c) inform commanders on the problems of the personnel d) inform public opinion
on national defense, and e) participate in bodies for social and cultural promotion. These
things are important to inform officers and oversight bodies.
3.6.3 The Opposition to Unionization
The fundaI?ental reason to oppose to collective bargaining system for military personnel
came much closer with the establishment of civil society. As David R. Segal has written
that 'because of its unique social function-the legitimate management of violence-the
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military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required
by other modem organizations' (Segal and Kramer 1977: 28). Military personnel, unlike
their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer.
They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment ant time they wish. They are subject
to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed.
They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and
must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work
more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in
time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives.
Obviously, the man on the firing line required to make a commitment of a different order
from that made by the worker on the assembly line (Ibid).
An offIcer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a 'call',
consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare,
acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to
the military profession (Boene 1990: 56). Military always lies in the area of risks where
each combatant has to expose according to situation. In that situation they have to
demonstrate a much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of
civilian management.
3.7 Power and Ideology
The military aspect of associative life is as old as Homo sapiens, Auguste Comte
observes: Humans' first tools are weapons and the authority established in the group is
that of the military chief; cooperation between humans is imposed as a necessity and a
social value, especially for the needs of war (Caforio 2003:8). The role of the military in
society has been frequently discussed in terms of 'civilian control'. This concept of
power and the analysis of this go back, of course, to Machiavelli and Aristotle.
The basic problem is defining civilian control and how can military power be minimized
or the civilian control is achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is
reduced. Huntington, (1967:67) stated about subjective civilian control and maximizing
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civilian power is 'the simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the
maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military'. He further added
the objective civilian control or maximizing military professionalism as 'it is that
distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most
conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of
the officer corps' (Ibid).
Nepalese army never treated left forces as democratic force while Communist Party of
Nepal (UML) has faced three parliamentary election and two local government elections
and committed to people's multiparty democracy-documented. UML has succeeded to
form a minority government between 1994 and 1995, and a coalition government in
1997-982004,2006 onwards and remains a major party in national politics. At the same
time other small left parties playa key role in Nepal's democratic movement during
Panchayat, during and after 1990 and people's movement of 2006-Jan Andolan-2. But
Nepalese always remain reluctant to accept them as democratic forces (Adhikari 2005:
2).
3.7.1 Changes in Location of Power
Democracy was established in 1950 in Nepal. King Tribhuwan appointed high military
posts to his confident and good will wishers. Political leadership rarely existed due the
fact that they were common people. He trusted on the elite family who have had handled
military leadership. The military power did not keep much interest on Prime minister the
lacking of proper leadership. King appointed Nepali Congress president Matrika Prasad
Koirala as Prime Minster in 1951 who became the first commoner at the post in Nepal's
history. Military leadership did not follow his orders then he requested the king to allow
him wear uniform along with the use of Four Star General. He realized that the Prime
Minister with General or Commander in Chief is more powerful. He wants keep the
Generals under his control and they should obey him. King conferred on him the title of
Honorary General. Prime Minister Matrika reached the Royal pavilion in the army
uniform but he again found was not obeyed by the generals. Since then he never wore the
army uniform (Basnyat 2005:137). King Tribhuvan assumed the role of the Supreme
121
Commander as the Chief of the Nepalese Anny after Nepali Congress rebel leader K I
Singh's attempt to capture power. He attempted with the help of 1200 Raksha Dal, Mukti
Sena (Liberation Anny)-Rebellion Anny with Nepali Congress later kept separately as
Raksha Dal, along with both of the Nepalese army and police (Adhikari 2001:104).
Later the army had been re-organized and restructured to become efficient and
competent. The most important change took place in 1952 when some battalions and
companies were dissolved and re-established. With the change in the political system, in
particular, the end of the Rana's tyrannical system, the monarchy changed the
institutional base of army with the help of Indian Military Mission. However, economic
constraints did not allow the strength of the Anny to be raised in proportion to the
population of Nepal. But the Rana clan continued to dominate the top jobs. However, it
changed when Surendra Bahadur Shaha became the first Commander-in-Chief of army in
1965, who was outside the Rana family after Jang Bahadur Rana (Ibid). The Rana family
held this post for 119 years.
Anny was considered as a notorious toddler of the Ranas and fearful element ro the
people. After the introduction of democracy, one of the Rana family members was
appointed for anew leadership to bring about reform in the military rank and file. Some of
the appointed Rana generals were ousted and expelled person by the Ranas in power and
they themselves had a thirst for power and lUXury. But dissenter of the expelled Ranas
colonel Toran Shamsher Rana was promoted to Lieutenant General from ex-colonel,
topping three posts in between, wanted to the crown when he became Commander-in
Chief in 1956. That was the blunder of democratic leaders like B P Koirala and Ganesh
Man Singh. Under the help of Indian Military Mission (IMM) the Nepalese army was
modernized and had started to show a different outlook than the army under Ranas. India
continued to provide basic facilities and benefits to the armed forces in Nepal. Till 1960,
all army's terminologies were mostly in English but that was replaced with Nepalese
words. In 1962, King Mahendra changed the name of Nepal Anny to Royal Nepalese
Anny (RNA). According to Dhruba Kumar, "the Royal title was given to the Nepalese
122
anny because it helped to repeal democracy in 1960" (Researchers interview with Dhruba
Kumar 17 January 2008).
In the process of modernization, the anny officers were sent to India to participate in
high-level training camps. During his visit to Delhi in August, 1963 King Mahendra
requested India to reorganization and modernization the Royal Nepalese Army (Vaidya,
1993). The Government of India (GOl) expressed willingness to provide the neFessary
assistance. King also proposed that the GOl should assist Nepal in the raising and
equipping of a new brigade group (Muni 1992: 196). The GOl undertake to supply anns,
ammunition and equipment for the entire Nepalese Army on the basis of a total strength
of about 17000 men, comprising four reorganized brigades and the existing Himal troops,
Home Guards, Household Troops and Militia companies. The GOl further undertake to
replace the existing Nepalese stock by modem weapons and to provide the maintenance
of and replacement for the equipment to be supplied by them (Muni 1992: 196). When
Indian Military Check Posts were allowed to operate on Nepal-China border and started
to train young officers. It left limited opportunity for Nepal to interact with the rest of the
world on security matters (National Security framework, 2004: 11). Therefore, the treaty
provided an institutional basis for the preservation and protection of mutual security
interests of both the countries.
Before 1950's political change, Nepalese Army was very small in size, the whole infantry
was not even more than a division. The main objectives of the Nepalese anny have
undergone a change after the despotic Rana rule. Its objective became to protect the
country, people and Crown, preserve the natural resources of the country, engage in
public welfare works, and participate in peacekeeping activities in the international arena.
The barrack system was introduced in 1952 and the 9000 total anny strength was all
round changes is the orgnaisation and infusion of modem technology was introduced
(Vaidya 1993: 23).
Later during the Panchayat system - a direct rule of King where the political party's
were band, anny was increased up to 40,000 in 1988. Before 1952, soldiers stayed at
123
home and attended duty only when called for. In case of emergency and disaster, bagpipe
call or drum beating from Dharhara, a tower located at central Kathmandu, served as a
signal to the soldiers. It was only in 1952 that king Tribhuvan requested India to train and
reorganize the Nepalese Army (Vaidya 1993:612) after the rebellion action of Dr. K I.
Singh, of Nepali Congress. The process of modernizing the Nepalese Army began with
the assistance from Indian Military Mission (IMM), which was established in
Kathamandu in January 1952, and stayed there till 1970. A military officer of the rank of
Major General, along with twenty senior army officers (Thapaliyal 1998:87), and she
added the military mission. At one time, India had established 21 joint borders check
posts on the Nepal-Tibet border (Mehta 2005: 59).
The GOI undertake to provide all training facilities required for the Nepalese armed
forces personnel in the training establishment in India, as necessary, and also by sending
training personnel to Nepal. During their training in India adequate funds will be made
available to enable them to meet expenses on parity basis as incurred by the Indian
military personnel of equivalent rank by the GOI. During the period of training, Nepalese
officers ~ill be given an allowance to enable them to defray the cost incidental expenses,
while other ranks will be provided with free messing (Mehta 2005:57).
In most countries armed forces have to be reformed to meet the challenges of a rapidly
transforming world. They must adapt to a totally different global political-strategic
change. Change within the military should correspond to transformations within a
society.
3.7.2 Problem of National Identity and Integration
Until 1951, even the people from the Tarai region of Nepal needed a permit from their
own government to visit Kathmandu. They were not employed in the military and police
service and only few of them were accommodated in the civil services. At least two
weeks take to people arrive Kathmandu, the capital city from Kamali and Seti-Mahakali
zone. These regionally marginalized people didn't have any feeling of national identity
and integration in the real sense; except they have no other country to say their
124
motherland. These considerations together with the fact that the Tarai people, dalits and . ethnic groups and people from marginalized region Seti-Mahakali and Karnali regions
were only marginally involved in the national adventures connected with territorial
expansion in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries have created for them a
problem of identification in psychological terms (Shaha 1982: 1 05). The Tarai people
have genuine grievances in so far as they are not adequately represented in the power
structure of Nepal, be it in the army, police, administration and national legislature or the
cabinet.
Now when Nepalese army is showing its competence in the world through peacekeeping
missions their exposure and professionalism is getting better. They are getting the
opportunity to illustrate the intercultural competence in these fronts. Intercultural
competence is also necessary in the daily operating of many military organizations since
they are becoming more internally diverse in terms of ethnicity, gender, and religion
(Winshlow, Heinecken and Soeters 2003:299).
For armed forces, the pace of change since the end of the Cold War in 1990 has been
extraordinary. Even though a major world war no longer seems to pose a serious threat to
international peace and stability, militaries find themselves operating in more diverse
environments than ever before. They also have to deal with a host of international actors
in the theater of operations, including representatives of multilateral organizations, the
media, anq Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). And they must do this in a foreign
cultural environment, in a country devastated by war, far removed from family and
friends. Such conditions demand a high level of intercultural competence (Ibid).
3.7.2.1 Religious Discrimination
Prithvinarayan Shaha had the dream of creating Nepal as a real Hindu state and his
successors, along w~th his advisors and other associates, vehemently tried to create Nepal
as a Hindu Kingdom. The Rana rulers also identified themselves as patrons of Hindu
religion. A hierarchical· caste system, based on classical Hindu Varna model for the
whole country was strengthened by their successors. Such a process reached its climax
125
during the Rana regime through the enforcement of 1854 Country Code of Jang Bahadur
Rana that placed nationalities below the Brahmin, Thakuri, Khas, Chhetri and other
sacred thread wearers as Matwalis (alcohol drinking castes and ethnic groups). Some
categories of nationalities, especially those who did not serve the palace, were classified
as 'ensalvable' groups or collectivities, a dehumanized status unimaginable even by
untouchables (Hofer 2004:61). The Hindu belief system emphasizes time and again that
the king is the incarnation of God Bishnu and associate his kingdom with Hinduism to
kingdom's affairs through Brahmin-Chhetris coalition (Burghart 1996:14).
The 1990 Constitution has defined Nepal as a Hindu state. According to 2001 census,
over 20 percent of the population practice faiths other than Hinduism, such as Islam,
Buddhism, Christianity and other 'indigenous' religions. Thus critics points out that 'by
declaring Nepal a Hindu state, the Constitution discriminates against other native
religions. The Constitution itself is, hence, communal. Hindu norms and values have
become the norms and values of the state. Many of the festivals and traditions have been
interpreted as Hindu culture'. Critics are of the view that 'the government allocates
budgets every year in promotion for Hindu religion but does not allocate any resources
for other religions. Books on Hindu religion is published and distributed by the Royal
Nepal Academy whereas books in other religions are not. Hindu religion gets 90 percent
of the time allocated for religion in the state owned Radio Nepal while some religions do
not get any time at all' (Kumar 2004: 112).
3.7.2.2 Hinduization of Barracks
Hinduism remained the state religion maintaining Nepal's status of a Hindu State and
remains so even under 1990 Constitution. Though the 1963 legal code gave religious
freedom, yet nobody is allowed to preach Islam and Christianity to destroy the dharma
practiced by the Hindu people. If anybody attempts to convert people, he should be
imprisoned for three years. Thus, the Constitution is become a protector of one religion at
the cost of other religion in the country. In this construction of Hindu state, the military,
along with religion, plays a fundamental role, especially before the emergence of the
126
pluralistic sense, civil aspects of society and diversity of religion, language and ethnicity
(Bhatt 2008: 102).
Now after the successful people's movement of April 2006 restored the democracy;
dissolved parliament and extended with CPN (Maoist), has promulgated the country a
secular state on 17th May 2006. Till now every barrack have a temple of Hindu God or
Goddess, having post of Hindu Pandit at Jamdar Level, a non commissioned officer, to
worship. every morning and distribute the prasad to all. All symbols and names of
companies are kept in the name of Hindu God and Goddess's. Every personnel and
officer has to take an oath of the office in the name of Hindu God or Goddess.
Astonishingly, the barracks established for the ethnic groups have to follow the same
rules (Chamling 2007: 13). There is no space for other religion followers. But there are
some Buddhist temples inside the barrack; especially in the high hilly districts because of
the population (Researchers interview with NA spokesperson Brigadier General
Ramindra Chhetri on 17th May 2007).
All the flags, symbols and names of barracks are Hindunized in Nepal. Every one has to
take oath of the office in the name of Hindu God and Goddesses. All and every barrack
have a Hindu temple and a priest. He performs a Hindu bhajans (songs devoted to God
and Goddesses) at every morning traditional Hindu ritual, rite-Karmakands and Chndi
Paath. Even this is a regular for routine for the Platoons made in the name of indigenous
or ethnic people (Chamling 2007: 14).
3.7.2.3 Linguistic Discrimination
Article 6(1) of the Constitution declares Nepali 'in Devnagari script' as 'the official
language'. While, 'all the languages of the nation' as 'national languages' [Article 6(2)]
the Constitution is 'ambiguous in its treatment of language'. 'By categorizing Nepali
differently, it bestows special importance to it'. The Constitution also has 'differentiated
between Nation's Language and National Language'. The Supreme Court judgment that
annulled the declaration of Nepal Bhasa (language spoken by Newar community) in
Kathmandu Metropolis and Maithili in Dhanusa District Development Committee and
127
Rajbiraj Municipality as additional languages in 1 June 1999 IS a clear linguistic
discriminatory status of ethnic languages (Yadav 2003: 71).
Article 18(2) of the Constitution says: 'Each community shall have the right to establish schools for imparting education in the mother tongue of the concerned child'. However, the Constitution is 'inexplicit as to how these national languages would be promoted and protected'. The constitution also provides no 'guarantee of support from the state for their development'. The 'Article 18(2) of the Constitution does not sanction native language instructions in schools beyond primary level. It does not even recognize education conducted at madrassas and Buddhist monasteries. On the other hand, the government spends millions of rupees for the Sanskrit pathshaala's and the Sanskrit University whose beneficiaries are male Brahmins. In addition, by imposing compulsory Sanskrit all over the country, the state is systematically imposing Hindu values and ways on non-Hindu communities'.
3.8 National Security and Military Policy
The unspoken tension was brewed fIrst during the B P Koirala's fIrst ever-elected
government during 1959-60s who was dismissed by the Royal coup of King Mahendra
on 15 December 1960. Retrospectively summarizing his experience he stated that the
'most ominous blunder committed by us, when in government, was the neglect of the
army, we never tried to democratize the army nor had we thought about any alternative
option' (Kumar 2005:142). He had further mentioned that the 'top army brass was the
most conservative constituency comprising the members of thoroughly undemocratic
family who had resisted any opening for the entry of commoners in the offIcer corps.
Frederick Gaige had also noted that 87 percent of the offIcer ranks from caption and
upward was confIned to the three dominant caste groups constituting Brahmin, Chhetri
and Newar of which 74 percent belonged to the Chhetri group in 1967 in his study on
Nepal (Gaige 1975:172).
After 1990, Nepal's polity scarcely talked about the role of the then Nepalese army.
Army was considered quite indifferently among the government employees during this
period. Political leaders thought military top brass is unapproachable and did not try to
reorganize completely military institution. Nepal's national security debate is wrapped
in the flag. We have tended to regard military matters not only as non-partisan, which
they surely are, but also as too sacred to be discussed publicly (Kumar 2006: 176). Thus,
128
unlike in many other democracies, in Nepal there is absolutely no public debate on
defense issues. We should have occupy ourselves with defense matters sporadically -
involved with them in moments of grave danger and withdrawing from them once the
threat has passed like other democracies but there is no such circumstance challenged us
in the extended past.
There is a debate about new Nepal; but the problems of national security and defense
remain. The nation must be made secure against a variety of threats; and one way of
securing the nation is through the military. The both of Nepal's neighbor are nuclear
power thus there is believe that national security extended beyond the threat or use of
force against any of the nation have very limited possibility and therefore that defense is
no longer necessarily the key issue of security. On the other hand, Brigadier General
(Rtd.) Gopal Singh .Bohara said; if the problem of organizing the nations defense
remains, a growing concern is that it should be organized in the most affordable way
possible. He further added 'this is an opportune time to think hard and seriously on
defense from a second point of view, especially Nepal's recent military experiences and
security concerns (Researchers interview with Rtd. Brigadier General Gopal Singh
Bohara on 11 th May 2008). The resources available for defense seem increasingly
limited.
Given the necessities of security, most of Nepalese will take a more than budgetary
perspective of defense. Security, it can be argued, is more than the protection of territory
and citizens. The state must control its land and the fruits of the land and must safeguard
the lives of those who reside within it from the destruction and violence of others. If not,
it has abnegated or failed in its primary function. But the state must do more than this.
Surely, it must protect other values - the freedom to choose its friends and enemies and to
commend and condemn the actions of other states; internal peace and stability; and a
certain way of political, economic and cultural life. The land may be sage from external
adversaries; and the lives of citizens may not be in danger from guns and bombs. But this
is not enough (Ibid).
129
The draft constitution that was completed on 10 September, 1990 was handed over to the
king by COCRC for the approval of prime minister later because of the rumors of a
planned conspiracy the palace. A new draft constitution was circulated by the palace in
order to know the reaction of the people. Surprisingly the king delivered a speech by
saying that he was "studying the draft" and would "receive suggestions personally from
interim government" that would bring a "strong multiparty system under the
constitutional monarchy" in between two great Hindu festivals Dashain and Tihar (John
1995:194). Surprisingly, a counter-constitution that was completely dissimilar from the
one drawn by the CRC was handed over to prime minister by the palace. Consequently,
the palace issued a statement on 23 October by claiming that the draft had been circulated
after continuous discussion and consultation with the Prime Minister (Hachethu
1995:37).
National security is defined as the capacity to survive as a political entity, or as the
condition of freedom from external physical threat which a nation enjoys. It has also been
defined as the capacity to clear the nation's· 'way oflife' (Lider 1983:6). The state centric
security, when broken into basic components, conceptually it includes territory, people,
sovereignty and government. The security of these components must therefore include
the security of the people and anything that affects that security including environmental
degradation and disasters (Muni 2001:112). One can say that the goals and objectives of
national security and national defense are seen in a related development in every nation.
Military policy usually means the theory and practice of the military activities of the state
including, in the first place, military doctrine and force posture (Lider 1983:7). The
military can protect social, economic, political and environmental sectors if they feel
urifairly threatened by another military power. As such, the military is an important
component of the overall security policy (Maury 1996: 11).
After the unification of Nepal, several kings, queen and military leaders campaigned for
further expansion of its territory. However, Nepal's history suggests thatthe feudal rulers
did not allowed openness in the society and majority of the society was utterly neglected.
131
Nepal's national security perceptions had been guided by the geo-political reality and
adjustment with the changing global and regional political milieu (Kumar 2003: 16).
Earlier, many of the Nepalese battalions fought for British-Indian allies in the first and
second World Wars. In 1947, on the British withdrawal from India, the Gorkhas were
divided into the British and Indian army through a tripartite agreement, which was signed
by the Government of Nepal, the Government of India and the Government of United
Kingdom on 9th November 1947. Nepalese continue to serve in the British and Indian
Armies (Thapaliyal 1998:38) Nepal became a member of United Nations in 1955. This
was an important step for any nation concerned to have its sovereignty internationally
respected.
Defense officials say the army is also necessary for internal security, and recall the 1974,
when the army was asked to put down the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -funded
Nepal based Khampa rebels who were making things difficult for the Chinese in Tibet
(Thapa 1996:21). One battalion was involved evicting Khampa rebels from Nepalese soil
under their commander Wangdi (Mehata 2005:16). Given the ethnic, regional and
ideological aspirations simmering just below Nepal's seemingly calm political surface, a
strong deterrent is essential in the fonn of an army (Thapa 1996:21), they say.
During the Panchayat system Nepal's monarchy tired to deal with equal-proximity policy
between India and China. King Birendra declared Nepal as Zone of Peace (ZOP) in
February 1975, during party-less Panchayat system. The theme of ZOP was to maintain
neutrality in all possible regional conflicts without legally becoming a neutral state like
Austria or Switzerland (Muni 1992:66). During this period, Nepal also tried to manage
neutral status in the world political affairs. Indian military check posts were removed,
IMM was phased out from Kathmandu and officers of Nepalese Anny got larger
exposure for education and training in various military academies of the world. l In 1986,
His Majesty's Government of Nepal put forward a Rastriya Mool Niti - The National
Restructuring National Security Policy: Perspective on internal and External Parameters, (Kathmandu: 2004) An unpublished approach paper prepared for the National Security Framework by the experts. One of the members provided the source to researcher and requested to hide his name.
132
Basic Policy, based on the recommendations of the Raj Shabha. This mentioned about
defense policy of Nepal for the first time (Ibid).
Nepal's military spending during 1990's was not sufficient for the modernization of
army. So in 1990, Nepal with the help of India again undertook to modernize the force
with 500 (IRs.) crore military equipment packages, which was revived in a big way in
end 2001, after the Maoist attack on the Nepalese Army in its barrack at Dang district
headquarter. The Indian Army's training and re-equipment assistance together with the
formation of the India-Nepal bilateral group on security are the cornerstones of Nepalese
Army's conversion from a ceremonial army into a counterinsurgency force (Mehata
2005:8).
3.8.2 Nepalese Army during the Panchayat System
King Mahendra ascended the throne in 1955 and took power after dismissing the first
popularly elected government of the Nepali Congress, headed by B P Koirala in 1960 and
introduced the party-less Panchayat System on the line of guided democracy. He quickly
moved to centralize power and tighten personal control of the military by taking a
number of steps. 'Following his father's footsteps as supreme Commander-in-Chief of
the army, King Mahendra carefully weeded out overly ambitious officers and cultivated
loyalties by taking a personal interest in the careers of those in the senior ranks.
Moreover, he ensured that the army continued to be well paid' (Gayley 2002:10). Some
senior army officers were retained from active military service and appointed in the civil
administration. Many former army officers went on to become the bureaucratic heads of
the crucial Home and Defense Ministries and enabled the palace to tighten its grip of the
civil administration.
Among the Chettri, Thakuri, Gurung and Magar castes career in the army remained a
socially prestigious profession as it is still identified with the monarchy and continued to
be projected as a profession that offer for social mobility. 'King Mahendra wooed the
army while simultaneously emasculating it as a political force' (Gayley 2002: 11). The
military secretariat, which was established in the palace in 1954, was the principal
133
mechanism by which the palace sought to keep the army under close control and prevent
any ambitious generals from establishing an independent power base. The secretariat
vetted the list of promotions and po stings from the military headquarters that are
forwarded to the Ministry of Defense that had little say on it. This enabled the palace to
influence the command structure of the army. The military secretaries and senior military
aides to the king, became very powerful because of their direct and regular access to the
king during the more 'institutionalized governance' adopted by King Birendra. The
emergence of key actors, who functioned in many ways as. more powerful alternative
power centers to the formal command structure, distorted the chain of command and
caused resentment within the regular army circles (Nepali and Subba 2005:86). However,
care was taken to provide the Army Chiefs by the way of rewarding with honours and
diplomatic postings after their retirement.
There is no system of reservation in the army but the increase in the intake of officer
cadets and soldiers is rapidly expanding the army and accelerate the ongoing process of
change in its class structure and ethnic composition. Many of the old practices and
customs are in discordance with a more educated and sophisticated army. These changes
will require the army to overcome its traditional conservatism and undertake a shift from
its peacetime practices and military culture (Ibid).
3.S.3 The Military-Industrial Complex
Jang Bahadur, in 1946, after his rise soon started modernization of Nepalese army with
latest weapons. He mobilized local resources and technology to produce lead, sulphur,
saltpetre charcoal and import steel and flint to produce gun, bullets, magazines for
muskets and other arsenals. During the Rana period some people were bringing up from
learn technology to Britain, India, Japan and Germany. During the time of Prime Minister
Jang Bahadur Rana, arms and ammunitions manufactured in India and Britain got their
way to Nepal through different channels (Hamal 1995:64). However, these initiatives
were discouraged during Rana oligarchy and King's rule because it is very sturdy to
maintain equipped armory with the pace of changing technology. For this king of effort
there is need to develop industries in this area, which could not possible, form Rana
134
autocracy. A large increase in military expenditure was not possible due to their luxury
and poor economic growth (Adhikari 2001: 211).
During the King Gyanendra's direct rule, as the recent developments in military history of
Neopal, the Nepal government has granted permission to the Nepalese Army to run
industries, set up companies and launch projects in partnership with national or
multinational companies (Rajdhani, Nepali Daily, 27 October 2004). It shows the
Nepalese Army is involved in the increasing monetary stakes and profit making ventures.
Where the military actors are able to make and enforce a claim for participation in the
decision making process. The involvement of the Nepalese Army in government's
decision-making level and commitment to professionalism will lead situation towards
Pakistan's circumstances and create the military hegemony. In the past army was
involved in construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and nature conservation,
protection of national parks and wildlife reserves (Kantipur, 22 September 2003: 2).
Nepalese Army is engaged in developmental activities since long time along with this
army have run petrol pumps, a big amount has been drawn form the salary of the army
personnel and officers who are joining peacekeeping operations. The amount is more
than a billion. Army Welfare Fund under the Army Welfare Planning Directorate
manages this fund. Same way the money is collected in the name of Army Officers
Wives Association earlier which is known as Army Wives Association nowadays after
Nepal government has changed its name. Similarly, Nepalese army planning to
investment in several hydropower projects if government allows in near future
(Researchers interview with NA spokesperson with Brigadier General Ramindra Chhetri,
10th May 2007). However, there are no possibilities of big 'military-industrial complex'
MIC as seen in the industrialized and developed countries.
3.8.4 Location of Power and Renewal of Military Activity
This is the first time after Nepal's unification, that the army was task to undertake
offensive with the imposition of the state of emergency on November 2001, when the
army was deployed to curb the Maoist insurgency. Before this, it has never been clear
135
whether the NA seriously involved in planning any operation. For example, their
deployment is 1973-74 in Okhaldhunga district and in some districts of Tarai to curb the
armed cadres of Nepali Congress during the early 1960's. The operational concept was to
fight delaying battles in the plains and mountains with independent companies,
battalions, and brigades which were the mainstay of the army before the Maoist induced
reorganization' (Nepali and Subba 2005:89).
The Military Act 1959 defmes the Royal Nepalese Army as His Majesty' army. The
loyalties of the uniformed security elites are therefore unquestionably inclined towards
the tradition of monarchy. This reality is reflected both in the perception and behaviour of
public leaderships in dealing with the army. Though the army has always been a powerful
organ of the state, it functioned primarily in its ceremonial role rather than as a war
fighting machine because the country's foreign policy has not been militarized. The
upkeep of the army itself has been a problem because of the financial crunch
notwithstanding its materiel needs. Procuring arms from abroad was not only
economically a mirage but restrictive to sources other than India because of the
agreement that Nepal has signed with India in 1965 (Kumar 2004: 135).
In the early 1980s, India began to pursue a more muscular regional foreign policy. Indian
security experts argued that the Nepal is unable to protect its own security. These trends
seem to have led to a renewed emphasis on Nepal's traditional defence posture. After
friction began to develop with India in the mid - 1980s' the Nepalese Army, keeping in
mind the possibility of an attack from the south, established the No.6 and 7 Brigades in
Baireni and Chanwon - to the west and south - east of Kathmandu in Dhading and
Makawanpur districts. The army was strategically oriented towards protecting
Kathmandu, it is best equipped, and most battle ready troops such as the Special Forces
Brigade were stationed within the valley (Ibid).
On the power of king over the military, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990
clearly lays down that National Defense Council (NDC) headed by the Prime Minister
will guide the Royal Nepalese Army and the two members are Defense Minister and
136
objectives: one is to endow the individual with the necessary expertise to function in the
profession; the other one is to transfonn the anticipatory socialization into a true and
complete professional socialization (Caforio 2003:256). As Bhimsen Thapa and
Jangbahadur Rana introduced their close and faithful relatives in the anny high- ranking
it went on deep rooted in Nepal's military history. Rana oligarchy executes the whole
power structure and marginalized other diversities.
3.10 COAS as Military Commander
According to the tradition and chronicles of the Kirat dynasty, the Kirats started ruling
Nepal before the Christian era. They came from the plains of tarai with strong anny.
They defeated King Bhuwansingh of Ahir dynasty who was a very pathetic ruler of
Nepal. Yalamber was the first king ruler and founder of the Kirat dynasty in Nepal. H~
was a great warrior and led anny himself in the battlefields and conquered the vast area.
During his period the eastern hilly region was divided into 10 sub-states known as
Lumbuvan. The Kirat's were defeated by the Lichhavi's (Khatri 1999: 17).
In the many dynasties the King was sopposed as the anny commander who lead action to
suppress insurgencyies; it was heppend in Nepal in case ofKirat rebels to establish peace
in country. King himself used to lead the troops in the battlefield and the Crown prince
was his deputy of the anny who used to sign and take part in any fonnal agreement on the
treaty of the country as a result of war. The Senapati or commander occupied an
important role in the government and anny rank and file after royal family (Ibid).
After the Lichhavi period, the situation of the Nepal deteriorated. Samant's of remote
areas announced themselves autonomous. They started to fight each other. Ari MalIa was
the first Malla king after Lichhavi and he was all in all of the anny. The military chief
was addressed as Samanta, Jodhapati, Sardar and Senapat who used to lead the troops in
the battlefield to support the king. The Malla rulers faced many threats fonn north west
and south of the country during 1200 to 1350. Yaksha MalIa, Pratap Malla and
Jayaprakash MalIa were of the renowned Kings as well as military commanders of that
period (Vaidya 1993:6).
139
In Gorkha the first civilian Chief of army staff was Kaji Kalu Pandey, son of Bhimraj
Pandey, born in Gorkha, who had played vital role during the unification of Nepal under
Prithvi Narayan Shah a in the initial stage. He fought four major battles ofNuwakot-1744,
Naldum and Mahadev Pokhar-1745, Sirancholwk Garhi-1755 and Kirtipur-1757 to unify
small principalities. The second and third army chiefs were both elder and younger son of
Kalu Pandey-Kaji Vansaraj Pandey and Kaji Damodar Pandey. Both of them fought
major battles during unification with heroic performance. Vansaraj Pandey fought the
battle of Makaeanpur-1762, Haripur Garhi-1762, Sindhuli Garhi-1767, Conquest of
Kirtipur-1766 and Conquest of Lamjung-1771. . While Damodar Pandey capture Parbat
successfullyin1786, conquest of Jumla-1789, conquest of Doti-1790 and he guided the
directly to Kazi Amarsingh Thapa during the battle of Kumoun in 1790. He fought
Nepal-Tibet-China War of 1791 (Hamal 1996:176).
Avimansingh Basnet, born in Gorkha, became the fourth commander of Nepal army, who
was the third son of Shivaramsingh Basnet. His contribution played during the unification
of Nepal is highly appreciated in military history of Nepal. He led the troops personally
in the campaign of unification in east and west of Nepal. After him Bhimsen Thapa
became the commander and he introduced the post of Commander-in Chief of Nepal
army. He started his military profession from the post of Subedar and Aide of then
prince- Surendra Bikram Shaha, was the fifth Commander-in-Chief of army staff with the
portfolio of prime minister, head of the both civil government and military institution.
Thapa was grand son of Balbhadra Thapa and son of Amarsingh Thapa. Both were highly
honored for their militarily courage and contribution not only by the Shaha dynasty of
Nepal but "Imperial British in India". Sixth Commander Kaji Ranajang Pandey, third son
of Damodar Pandey and grandson of Kalu Pandey. Seventh chief of Nepal Army was
Mathbarshing Thapa, Grandson of Amarsingh and nephew of Bhimsen Thapa (Kahtri
199:42-61).
In the period of the Rana oligarchy, their family members commanded the military in the
basis of role of succession propounded by Jang Bahadur Rana in 1846, though coup and
. 140
counter coup have been hatched by the strongest Rana member to get the chance even
before his role of succession. Thus, there could not be rotational changed as its spirit but
the command could not be possible to go out of hand of the Ranas, because only
members of Rana family occupied the top most ten ranks of the military and their loyal
relatives subordinated by them had no access in this level from which they could exercise
for getting the power using military might. Rest of the subjects was served in the military
as sipahi (soldier) for their service (Ibid).
During the Rana Ruling System (1846-1950) Commander-in-Chief was the second
position of the governing hierarchy of the state just under his highness, Sri Tin Maharaj,
who was supreme Commander-in-Chief by virtue. Sixteen members on the basis of
seniority were in the rotational queue of the military hierarchy. Most of them were
brothers of lang Bahadur Rana, then his sons. JB Rana was the first Commander-in-Chief
and his highness of Rana family then Krishna Bahadur Rana, Ranodip Singh Rana, lagat
Shamser Rana, Dhir Samsher respecticely had guaranteed and commissioned later in the
post of Commander-in-Chief. Sixth Commander-in-Chief of army from Rana family was
lit lang Rana, 2nd son of lang Bahadur Rana. Then five sons of Dhir Shamser (Khadga,
Rana, Dev, Chandra, Bhim and ludda respectively) were continuously one after another
commissioned in the post through coup and counter coup disrespecting the role of
succession. Again sons of Chandra, Mohan, Babar and Keshar-commanded military
using the same method until military was reformed with the help of Indian military
mission after 1950 (Hamal 1995: 39).
All most all military chief before the Rana oligarchy are members of noble families
originated from Gorkha principality-Thapa, Basnet, Pandey, Rana(Kunwar) and Shaha
who had contributed during the unification involving not only in the military organization
but civil administration as well. King was in the top and all in all in the system. His
Bhardars (novels) were under him who had his strong faith and were mobilized in
between subject and the king. That is why no direct contact between the Raja and Praja
was possible in the state running process (Khatri 1999: 57).
141
The state structure on the basis periodical bureaucratic hierarchy restricted the genuine
people to perfonn his capacity directly in front of the king who being impressed by his
capacity could include him in civil-military functionary of the state from the out of the
circle of Gorkha Bhardars. People having no chance to influence king could not be
provided the chance to serve in civil and military institutions which were main decision
making body of the then state. The situation not only created gulf between Raja and
Praja but provided the safeguard to the handful family of Gorkha originated people
creating a monopoly in the state power leaving no alternative from out of circle (Ibid).
Thus, no common people positioned then as "subject Class" whether he is from Gorkha
or from any other part of the country has got the chance to be chief of army staff even
after 1950 because of the deep rooted feudal tradition in accordance with which no one
can be commissioned in the post of COAS without having strong linkage with Shaha
family- royal family-and its allies-Darb arias-till today. As their general claim is that the
state is the output of the king's forefathers and by virtue he has inherent right to rule the
country and military is for the safety for him, his rule and country. So, the military is the
domain of the king and COAS should be his confidential personality positioned within
the core group of senior officers. As a result, several other people such as Gurung,
Mager, Rai, Limbu, Newar, even Chetri Khadka who have been equally contributing in
militarily in the state from the unification to till the date, could not get the chance to
control and command the military till today (Basnyat 2004: 163).
Bhimsen Thapa for the first time tenned Commander-in-Chief of Anny or COAS of
military organization, and then only 35 COAS served in NA except General Rukmangat
Katuwal. Among them 16 were Rana, 7 were Chhetri but one Basnyat, Thapa and Pandey
families and only two are Thakuri, Shaha (Chautariya family). General Katuwal, even if
he was given birth in a simple family of remote area of Nepal, was adopted by King
Mahendra and Queen Ratna as their son who could not be generalized as genuine people
of Nepal because of his history of his nurture, education and socialization in palace as a
member of the royal family (Ibid). What really seems that the transitional phase of
changing class of leadership in military organization of Nepal has been started, General
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However, with the end of Cold War and expansion of the processes of globalization, the
agenda and the definition of national security threats have tended to widen and deepen.
The global security problematique, it is often argued, now encompasses much more than
the contest for political supremacy in the process of superpower rivalry (Dalby 1997:3).
There are many new dimensions and issues which have now become the prime concerns
in the study of security. While the state centric security concern has tended to be
underplayed, the non-traditional threats to security (human security) are increasingly
highlighted. These newer threats encompass a range of situation including ethnic and.
religious conflicts, terrorism, migration, environmental degradation, contagious diseases,
democracy, human rights violation, gender, crime, poverty, hunger and deprivation. In
contrast to the orthodox concept of security the basic referent object of the non-traditional
security threat is human beings and related insecurity. As Khosla states that today, states
are not only bound to defend their territorial integrity and political independence but also
are increasingly asked to ensure and protect their citizen's freedom, economic
independence, social stability and cultural identity (Khosla 2003:22).
During the early 1990s UN raised the 'collective security' is 'Agenda for Peace' (Ghali
1992) was a triumph of new world order hopes over Cold War era experience. The
'collective security understood as the maintenance of international peace and security is
therefore superfluous in respect of small states'. Collective security is predicated on
decisive leadership and requires multilateralism; successful military operations require
centralized command and control. This collective security approach can not indicate free
role of calculations of national interest. Then 'cooperative security' is described as the
central sustaining idea for international efforts to secure peace (Ibid).
The threats to territorial integrity and political order must be reckoned not just from other
states but also from various non-state actors and even natural catastrophes. This much
more expanded notion of security, which broadens the nature and sources of threat,
known as comprehensive security. The notion of security cannot be restricted to the well
being of the state. From this perspective, implicit in the classical formulation of security
is the protection and welfare of the state, whereas what is central-or should be central-is
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the protection and welfare of the individual citizen or human being. A conception of
security that is centered above all on the sanctity of the individual is known human
security (Bajpai 2002:2).
The concept of human centric security Issue became more prommence after the
publication of the Human Development Report in 1994, an annual publication of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). According to this report, the concept
of security "has for too long been interpreted narrOWly: as security of the territory from
external aggression, or as protection of national interest in foreign policy or as global
security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. In all forgotten were the legitimate concerns
of ordinary people who sought security in their lives". This broader theme and idea of
security have gradually drawn a large number of scholars and institutions across the
world to examine the empirical and operational validity in a range of issues including that
of human security, energy security, environment security and food security (Human
Development Report 1994: 17).
Many territorially 'secured' states achieved their national security at the expenses of the
security of the individual or people in terms of their political, social, environmental,
economic, and cultural rights and choices. There are many countries around the world
where people are still deprived of their basic rights and forced to compromise their
freedom for the sake of 'national interests' and sovereignty. Today, almost all the
countries across the world are faced with one or another forms of threats resulting from
the migratory movements, environmental degradation, attacks from the terror groups,
outbreak of contagious diseases, ethnic, racial or religious conflicts, abject poverty
situation, ineqUality etc (Buzan 1987:245). These threats are different from the ones
generated by inter-state rivalries and conflicts. Non-traditional threats to security have the
potential to destabilize states and whole regions.
South Asian region has been a major theatre of non-traditional security threats. The
region has some of the poorest people in the world plagued by illiteracy, ethnic discord
and other oppressive social orders. The economic underdevelopment and feeble
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These emerging changes in the perception of the nature and trends of threats could be
largely attributed to both internal dynamics and external atmosphere. Internally, Nepal
has gone through a major change in its political structures in the last two decades (The
Kathmandu Post, 3 March 2006, p.6).
The 1990's democratic transition has generated enormous amount of political
consciousness and social awareness among the Nepalese people. The freedom of speech,
right to organize and the flourishing of media have played significant role for the
empowerment of the general public. People have become more attentive on their rights
and issues that relate to their day-to-day lives. Problems like political instability, failure
to maintain law and order, social discrimination, development disparity, lacks of
inclusiveness, failure to institutional delivery and inefficient governing system have
generated enormous interests. In the past decades successive government's failure to
address these problems have played instrumental role for the ultra-left forces like Maoists
and other terror and criminal groups to consolidate and expand their strengths and
activities. This has caused armed conflicts for the last 10 years, which has led the country
to the state of chaos, instability and violence (Kumar 2008: 9).
During the Maoists insurgency in the country more than 13603 people have lost their
lives, tens of thousands of them have been injured and a larger number of people have
been displaced from their native places precipitating an internal refugee crisis. People's
desire for peace and democracy resulted in a massive uprising in April 2006 which has
forced the King to surrender power to the political parties and reinstate the earlier
dissolved parliament. The Government of Nepal today is under tremendous pressure in
freeing its people from the clutches of violence and securing their basic needs such as
maintaining law and order, providing sufficient food, shelters, education, health care,
human rights, political stability and security (Upreti 2008: 11). One of the biggest
challenges to the state today is to manage Maoist combatants and ex-combatants under
the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the government
and the CPN (Maoists) in November 2006 (Appendix 4).
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3.11.2 Need of the Moment
Similarly, the last 10 years of conflictual situation has triggered many other social and
environmental crises in Nepal. For instance, due to the escalation of violence in the rural
areas forced migration has been taking place and this has precipitated large number of
internal refugees The forcedly migrated Bhutanese refugees whose number is about
125000 have been languishing in various camps in two eastern districts Morang and
Jhapa since last almost two decades. There are also about 25000 Tibetan refugees taking
shelter in different parts of Nepal. Both of these refugees and the internally displaced
persons are producing variety of social problems in the country (Budhthoki, 2009: 81).
Implying terror tactics to assert their own political and social agendas by the extremist
groups have become quite common in Nepal these days. Apart from the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoists), the small armed-groups who were split earlier from them are also
involved in arbitrary killing, abduction, intimidation and harassment to the common
people in the mid and eastern-Terai districts of Nepal. Their increasing such activities has
posed a serious challenge for maIntaining law and order in those districts and
surroundings areas (Ibid). Therefore, the threat to security in Nepal is not confmed within
the very traditional views of protecting its territories but more important today is to
protect the lives of common people and safe environment where public security has
become the utmost important issue.
3.12 Conclusion
With the changing discourse on political and social system along with the globalization
and nation-state orientation for the army is also changing. For the first time in the modem
Nepal's history Nepalese army was facing such ambivalent changes. How do the civilian
authorities and the military perceive security and the role of the politicians of the state in
the changed context? There are many things to explore at various levels among political
elites, among military specialists, between specialists, between elites and public, between
military and political leadership, and between both of immediate neighbors. There is need
to internalize the changing role of the nation-state in security policy. And, of course there
148
can be alternative ways of democratic control of armed forces with reference to civil
society and NGO's with regard to functioning of militaries.
Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and successfully
holding of the Constituent Assembly Election in last April, Nepal enters into a new era of
political and social transformation. In this new and changed political landscape of the
country it requires reviewing and updating of its past policies and programs. Out of many
issues, the issue of national security is one of the areas where the past successive regimes
did not pay sufficient attentions and develop coherent policies and programs. In absence
of proper planning and institutionalization, the security policy of the country was
basically guided by the ad hoc policies and programs.
No governments and other agencies conducted a regular study in the past on security. As
a result there seem a huge gap in comprehending about the broadening defmition and
changing security dynamics. Even the institution like National Defense Council (NDC)
has never been institutionalized and persuaded to engage in organizing study, planning,
developing policies and executing the programs. How aid and humanitarian agencies
interact with military forces, both at the policy-making level domestically and on the
ground. For the transformation of security sector with the social transformation these
could be the research framework to give the democratic control of armed forces approach
and national orientation.
149