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Chapter 4 Authentication Applications

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Chapter 4. Authentication Applications. Outline. Threat, Vulnerability, Exploit Authentication Applications Kerberos X.509 Authentication Service Recommended reading and Web Sites. What is a threat?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Chapter 4

Chapter 4

Authentication Applications

Page 2: Chapter 4

Outline

Threat, Vulnerability, Exploit Authentication Applications Kerberos X.509 Authentication Service Recommended reading and Web Sites

Page 3: Chapter 4

What is a threat?

Threat – any circumstance or event that has potential to cause harm to a system or network.

Threat can be Internal threat External threat

It may cause destruction of data and property.

It may involve invasion of privacy

Page 4: Chapter 4

Vulnerability and Exploit ?

Vulnerability – Existence of weakness, design or implementation error that can lead to an unexpected, undesirable event compromising the security of the system.

Exploit – A program or technique that takes advantage of a vulnerability in software or system that can be used for breaking the security and attacking a host over the network.

Page 5: Chapter 4

Internal Threat

Internal threats are threats from with in the organization

These threat originate from individuals who have authorized access to the network or have an account on a server.

It can be from a disgruntled former or current employee or contractor.

Page 6: Chapter 4

Internal Threat

An internal user may attack a system for any number of reasons, including the following: Data theft Espionage Sabotage General malice

80% of reported security incidents involved inside abuse (CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey, 2004).

Page 7: Chapter 4

Internal Threat : Sniffing

One of the major internal threat is “sniffing”. Sniffing – is the process of reading the

packets that are transmitted on the network. Example:

Passwords Credit card numbers

TELNET, FTP SMTP (e-mail) packets if unencrypted can be successfully sniffed.

Page 8: Chapter 4

External Threat The threat from outside the organization, who have

no legitimate rights to corporate system or information.

External threats like “love bug” can create huge economic losses to corporate company with in a short time.

Types of external threats: Social Engineering Denial of Service attack Virus, Worm and Trojans Organizational attacks Accidental security breaches Automated attacks

Page 9: Chapter 4

Social Engineering

Social engineering “The act of obtaining unauthorized access to a network by

manipulating authorized users in to revealing their passwords and access information.”

Also refer as “People hacking” Social engineering relies on communication skills. Social engineering user’s often use telephone to

convince. Social engineering user’s use confidential data or

information for unauthorized access to network. Example of attack: - telephone scams, hoaxes and

virus e-mail

Page 10: Chapter 4

Denial of Service attack

DoS is an attack designed to prevent your computer or network from operating or commucating.

Block access to resources Flood network, degrades performance, causes

server to Fail. Result in

Loss of revenue Prestige Service to customer

Page 11: Chapter 4

Authentication Applications

developed to support application-level authentication & digital signatures

will discuss Kerberos – a private-key authentication service

discuss X.509 - a public-key directory authentication service

Page 12: Chapter 4

KERBEROS

In Greek mythology, a many headed dog, the guardian of the entrance of Hades

Page 13: Chapter 4

KERBEROS

Authentication service developed as a part of MIT’s Athena project

provides centralized private-key third-party authentication in a distributed network allows users access to services distributed

through network without needing to trust all workstations rather all trust a central authentication server

Page 14: Chapter 4

KERBEROS

An open distributed environment Any user can access services from any workstation Several security threats exists in such an

environment: A user impersonate another user A user may change the network address of a w/s and may

make it look as another w/s A user may eavesdrop on a session and mount a replay

attack later

Page 15: Chapter 4

KERBEROS : The Requirements

its first report identified requirements as: secure reliable transparent scalable

implemented using an authentication protocol based on Needham-Schroeder

Page 16: Chapter 4

KERBEROS

Provides a centralized authentication server to authenticate users to servers and servers to users.

Relies on conventional encryption, making no use of public-key encryption

Two versions: version 4 and 5 Version 4 makes use of DES

Page 17: Chapter 4

Kerberos Version 4

Terms: C = Client AS = authentication server V = server IDc = identifier of user on C IDv = identifier of V Pc = password of user on C ADc = network address of C Kv = secret encryption key shared by AS an V TS = timestamp || = concatenation

Page 18: Chapter 4

A Simple Authentication Dialogue

(1) C AS: IDc || Pc || IDv

(2) AS C: Ticket

(3) C V: IDc || Ticket

Ticket = EKv[IDc || Pc || IDv]

Page 19: Chapter 4

Version 4 Authentication Dialogue

Problems: Lifetime associated with the ticket-granting ticket If too short repeatedly asked for password If too long greater opportunity to replay

The threat is that an opponent will steal the ticket and use it before it expires

Page 20: Chapter 4

Version 4 Authentication DialogueAuthentication Service Exhange: To obtain Ticket-Granting Ticket

(1) C AS: IDc || IDtgs ||TS1

(2) AS C: EKc [Kc,tgs|| IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 || Tickettgs]

Ticket-Granting Service Echange: To obtain Service-Granting Ticket

(3) C TGS: IDv ||Tickettgs ||Authenticatorc

(4) TGS C: EKc [Kc,¨v|| IDv || TS4 || Ticketv]

Client/Server Authentication Exhange: To Obtain Service

(5) C V: Ticketv || Authenticatorc

(6) V C: EKc,v[TS5 +1]

Page 21: Chapter 4

Overview of Kerberos

Page 22: Chapter 4

Kerberos Realms

a Kerberos environment consists of: a Kerberos server a number of clients, all registered with server application servers, sharing keys with server

this is termed a realm typically a single administrative domain

if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers must share keys

and trust

Page 23: Chapter 4

Request for Service in Another Realm

Page 24: Chapter 4

Difference Between Version 4 and 5

Encryption system dependence (V.4 DES) Internet protocol dependence Message byte ordering Ticket lifetime Authentication forwarding Interrealm authentication

Page 25: Chapter 4

Kerberos Encryption Techniques

Page 26: Chapter 4

PCBC Mode

Page 27: Chapter 4

Kerberos - in practice Currently have two Kerberos versions:

4 : restricted to a single realm 5 : allows inter-realm authentication, in beta test Kerberos v5 is an Internet standard specified in RFC1510, and used by many utilities To use Kerberos: need to have a KDC on your network need to have Kerberised applications running on all participating systems major problem - US export restrictions Kerberos cannot be directly distributed outside the US in source format

(& binary versions must obscure crypto routine entry points and have no encryption)

else crypto libraries must be reimplemented locally

Page 28: Chapter 4

X.509 Authentication Service

Distributed set of servers that maintains a database about users.

Each certificate contains the public key of a user and is signed with the private key of a CA.

Is used in S/MIME, IP Security, SSL/TLS and SET.

RSA is recommended to use.

Page 29: Chapter 4

X.509 Formats

Page 30: Chapter 4

Typical Typical Digital Digital Signature ApproachSignature Approach

Page 31: Chapter 4

Obtaining a User’s Certificate

Characteristics of certificates generated by CA: Any user with access to the public key of the CA

can recover the user public key that was certified. No part other than the CA can modify the

certificate without this being detected.

Page 32: Chapter 4
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CA Hierarchy if both users share a common CA then they are assumed to

know its public key otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy use certificates linking members of hierarchy to validate other

CA's each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent

(backward) each client trusts parents certificates enable verification of any certificate from one CA by users of all

other CAs in hierarchy

Page 35: Chapter 4

X.509 CA Hierarchy

Page 36: Chapter 4
Page 37: Chapter 4

Revocation of Certificates

Reasons for revocation: The users secret key is assumed to be

compromised. The user is no longer certified by this CA. The CA’s certificate is assumed to be

compromised.

Page 38: Chapter 4

Authentication Procedures

X.509 includes three alternative authentication procedures: One-Way Authentication Two-Way Authentication Three-Way Authentication

all use public-key signatures

Page 39: Chapter 4

One-Way Authentication

1 message ( A->B) used to establish the identity of A and that message is from A message was intended for B integrity & originality of message

message must include timestamp, nonce, B's identity and is signed by A

may include additional info for B eg session key

Page 40: Chapter 4

Two-Way Authentication

2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also establishes in addition: the identity of B and that reply is from B that reply is intended for A integrity & originality of reply

reply includes original nonce from A, also timestamp and nonce from B

may include additional info for A

Page 41: Chapter 4

Three-Way Authentication

3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which enables above authentication without synchronized clocks

has reply from A back to B containing signed copy of nonce from B

means that timestamps need not be checked or relied upon

Page 42: Chapter 4

Authentication Procedures

Page 43: Chapter 4

X.509 Version 3

has been recognised that additional information is needed in a certificate email/URL, policy details, usage constraints

rather than explicitly naming new fields defined a general extension method

extensions consist of: extension identifier criticality indicator extension value

Page 44: Chapter 4

Certificate Extensions

key and policy information convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus

indicators of certificate policy certificate subject and issuer attributes

support alternative names, in alternative formats for certificate subject and/or issuer

certificate path constraints allow constraints on use of certificates by other

CA’s

Page 45: Chapter 4

Recommended Reading and WEB Sites

www.whatis.com (search for kerberos) Bryant, W. Designing an Authentication

System: A Dialogue in Four Scenes. http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/dialogue.html

Kohl, J.; Neuman, B. “The Evolotion of the Kerberos Authentication Service” http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/papers.html

http://www.isi.edu/gost/info/kerberos/