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CHAPTER – 4

US’ IRAQ POLICY WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON IRAQ WAR

2003

Over the centuries there had been many clues to the presence of large oil

deposits in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. Travellers’ tales and Arabic literature

made references to black oily substances. In 1869 oil was discovered in Egypt and in

1908 the massive Masjid-i-Suleiman well in Persia began to flow. Thirty years later

the first highly productive well in Kuwait was discovered. These and the many

discoveries of oil resources in the region ensured that Kuwait, Persia(Iran), Saudi

Arabia, Iraq and the other regional states would become the focus of foreign

imperial ambition for decades to come. Since then it has been obvious that the oil-

rich nations of the Middle East could not escape the predatory designs of powerful

Western nations in a shrinking and energy- hungry world1.The British took keen

interest due to their commercial, maritime and strategic interests in present day Iraq

as early as in seventeen century. The British East India Company established a

factory at Basra in 1739, and a British residency was permanently established in

Baghdad in 1798. The period of 1834-1914 was characterised by a great expansion

of British interest in Mesopotamia. In 1862, a British service between Iraq and India

was instituted and telegraph lines were laid to connect Basra, Baghdad with

Bombay, Constantinople and Tehran. By 1800, the British had a resident at Basra

and in 1802, a consulate at Baghdad. The establishment of an agency of the East

India Company at Basra gave the British an upper hand. This was reinforced by the

deep personal interest of King William IV, which was largely responsible for

obtaining a concession for British-owned vessels to use the Iraqi waterways for

trade. Telegraph line and postal services were also established. By the beginning of

twentieth century, Britain had extracted concessions from nominally independent

Iran for exploration and extraction of Iranian oil for a British businessman, William

Knox D’Arcy. William Knox was mainly instrumental in creating concessionary

company, Anglo-Persian (later Iranian) Oil Company. This enterprise drilled its first

oil well at Masjid-i-Sulaiman, near the Gulf coast in 1908. Interestingly, as said

1 Geoff Simons, Future Iraq- US Policy in reshaping the Middle East, New Delhi, Viva books, 2006,p 251.

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earlier, oil was discovered in Czarist Russian controlled Iran (Azerbaijan) as far

back as in 1842 and the first oil refinery were already built in Baku in 1863. The US

oil industry was almost a contemporary of that of Czarist Russia.2 Iranian type

concession soon followed first in Iraq, then in Saudi Arabia and in other parts.

Involved in the process were British, Dutch, American and French oil interests. Thus

oil turned into a major attraction for outside powers in the Middle East.3

US interest in the Middle East originated with Britain’s Belfour Declaration

of 1917 on a Jewish home in Palestine and Anglo-French plans on the division of

Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. President Woodrow Wilson sent a commission

to the Middle East in 1919, even when Britain and France had declined to co-

operate. This was a two-member commission comprising Charles R. Crane, the

Chicago millionaire and a friend and Dr. Henry Churchill King. The commission

went to the Middle East in 1919, interviewed a cross-reaction of Arab opinion. The

commission reported to the President on one unanimous opinion found among the

Arabs of the region against settlement of Jews in Palestine. Later Robert Crane

merged in 1930 as one of the originators of idea of developing US stakes in a

possible oil wealth of Eastern and Northern Arabia. The American successfully

persuaded King Abdul Aziz of Arabia to sign a deal in early May 1933. Thereafter

the story of US stakes in oil in Saudi Arabia really began; oil started to flow on May

1, 1939.4

In 1949, NATO was established, while Baghdad Pact and SEATO followed.

Going by the war-time experience of “strategic shortage” of US oil reserves,

President Truman had accorded top priority to ensuring an uninterrupted flow of the

Middle East oil to his European allies, and to his own growing Cold War militancy

machine around the globe. Oil from Saudi Arabia was then of course under direct

US control through US oil giant Aramco with Saudi Arabia getting small cut on its

oil under the concession agreement. Saudi oil, like Iraqi oil, is of good quality and

very cheap to produce. US and its allies were thus not to feel threatened again by

any “strategic shortage” of oil even if the Cold War might have gone out of control.

However, huge oil reserves in countries like Iraq were alluring.5 It was at this stage

2 Zafar Imam, Iraq – 2003: The Return of Imperialism, Aakar Books, Delhi, 2004, p. 29. 3 Ibid. 4 Zafar Imam, n. 2, pp.28-29. 5 Ibid., p.33.

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that the US companies began to show real interest in Iraqi oil. In the reconstructed

IPC, 23.5 percent share each was owned by British, Dutch, French companies and

jointly by two US oil corporations; the remaining 6 percent was held by Partex

owned by Portuguese businessman of Ottoman-Armenian descent, Calouste

Gulbenkian, rightly perhaps regarded as father of Iraqi oil. IPC negotiated

successfully further concessionary terms with suppliant Iraqi government in 1938

under pressure from Britain.6 The US companies had thus made a small beginning in

Iraqi oil.

By 1943, the US realised that it being the main source of energy supply to

the allies during the war was “pumping 63 percent of the entire world oil

consumption everyday from her own reserves; it was 3.8 million per day” a little

more than a third of Saudi Arabia’s 10.3 million per day in 1931. The experts had

calculated that US national oil reserves were dropping at the rate of 3 percent per

year.7 In February 1945, President Roosevelt played gracious host to the Saudi

King at a US warship, and the deal was sealed within two days. The British were

unhappy as they had been financing the Saudi King sine he had staged a revolt

against the Ottoman rule in 1916-17 at their instigation. The USA had thus come to

the Middle East for oil and it certainly intended to stay, come what may. From Saudi

oil to Iraqi oil was a convenient logical jump after the Second World War. Iraq was

already known to have the second largest reserves of oil in the region.8

By the time Second World War ended, the US State Department had rightly

noted that oil “has historically played a large part in external relations of the United

States, than any other commodity.”9 It was noted that the Middle East was “a

stupendous source of strategic power and one of greatest material prices in world

history. As the post Second World War unfolded with growing intensity of Cold

War, US preoccupation with the Middle East oil also grew. Not that the USA was

dependent on import of oil from the Middle East or elsewhere, it had its own oil and

gas10

. Much cheaper, perhaps of better quality and readily available, was oil from

the Middle East. Burning of foreign oil and saving its own reserves became an

6 Ibid. 7 Robert Lacey, The Kingdom, London, Fontana Paperbacks, 1982, p.362. 8 Zafar Imam, n.2, p.31. 9 Anthony Arnove (ed.), Iraq under Siege, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2002, p.18. 10 Ibid., p.71.

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article of faith in the USA. By early 1970s, there were five companies that

dominated the world oil industry; two US based, two primarily UK based and one

primarily based on France. US based Exxon Mobil loomed largest in the world.

Consequently, the USA ranked first in corporate oil sector, UK second and France

trailing behind as a distant third.11

In the aftermath of Iranian revolution US Middle East policy faced odds as

the anti US sentiment was running high. Ayatollah Khomeini the Shia cleric gained

immense prestige and following not only among the Iranian masses but Shia

Muslims worldwide. He held no public office, his authority as a spiritual leader was

unquestioned12

. Meanwhile hostility between Iran and Iraq became the high point of

the politics of the region. It led out of various factors like border demarcation,

divergent religious beliefs and Kurdish tensions and also the Iranian Revolution of

1979. On September 22 Saddam launched a full ground invasion of Iran, officially

starting this devastating war, described by his ambassador at the UN at the time as

an exercise in self-defence.13Iran decided to go on with the war, with Ayatollah

Khomeini declaring that Iran would not stop fighting until Saddam Hussein was

overthrown. Iraq assigned the guilt of war and made to pay war reparations to Iran.

After this historic and momentous declaration by Khomeini; came as it did against

the background of not only concerted efforts by the US to isolate Iran but also

increasing inclination of the United States towards Iraq. Thereafter the US not only

provided Saddam with intelligence and aerial reconnaissance pictures of Iranian

troop movements and amassing of its Armour which posed a threat to its military,

but the US State Department, Pentagon, together with most of the Anglo-American

media went overboard in assigning the major responsibility of the death and

destruction that followed on the government of Iran. They surprisingly continued to

do so despite the significantly higher number of civilian casualties of Iran and the

use in the years to come of chemical weapons by Iraq against both Iranian military

and civilian targets.14

From 1980-88 Iraq fought Iran to a standstill. Following that

ceasefire, it was expected that, exhausted, Iraq would accept peace and rebuild. But

11 Ibid. 12 Albert Jiirgen, Iraq War- The History Behind The Conflict, Calcutta, Sparrow Publication, 2004, p.57. 13 UN Security Council Doc. S/14191, September 22, 1980, 113-114. 14Albert Jiirgen ,n.12, p.70.

133

it did not, having forced Iran to accept peace on its terms; it then blocked the peace

process by raising new demands, in particular for the revision of the Shatt al- Arab

river boundary, and began to assert itself more forcefully in the Arab world. Iraq

sought hegemony, not coexistence.15

When Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, 1980 the UN Security Council

waited four days before holding a meeting. Even thereafter, the US dragged its feet

on the tabling and wording of a resolution. On September 28th it passed a Resolution

479 calling for an end to the fighting. Significantly however the UN did not

condemn nor ever mentioned the Iraqi aggression and did not call for a return to

international boundaries. The Council deliberately ignored Iraq's action in

September 1980 because it had a very negative view of Iran. The US delegate to UN

pointed out that Iran having violated Security Council resolutions on the US

Embassy hostages’ episode could hardly complain about the council’s lacklustre

response. Iran rejected Resolution 479 calling it one sided. A few more unfruitful

Security Council meetings were held into but no US initiative was forthcoming,

there were no meetings on the subject of war despite the immense carnage until July

198216. The attack by the Iraqi military that Saddam unleashed on Iran, went for

eight long years and served US interests as it slowly but steadily weakened Iran. The

prolonged war resulting in victory for none in a way suited the US as it believed that

in this desperation Iran would put aside its historical prejudices and theocratic

impediments and bend over back backwards in trying on its own to restore relations

with the US which had been soured greatly in the aftermath of the revolution.

Another positive strategic outcome of the Iran- Iraq war was that the

dislocations of the war might give the US a better chance to carry out covert

operations in both Iran and Iraq as the geopolitical conditions warranted. An added

advantage would be that other Gulf States would become more susceptible to the US

pressure for military co-operation. US arms exports to both the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait jumped greatly. The smaller Gulf monarchies found the US more

acceptable and the presence of US warships in the Persian Gulf region and naval

ships and marine detachments visiting their shores got intensified17.

15 Fred Halliday, “The Gulf war and its aftermath: first reflections”, International Affairs, Cambridge University Press, vol.67, No.2, 1991, p.224. 16Albert Jiirgen ,n.12, p. 67. 17Albert Jiirgen ,n. 12, p.62-64.

134

Using oil revenues to fund a huge missile technology procurement network

and exploiting tacit US backing for Iraq Saddam was able to obtain several missile

technologies both legally and illegally. The Iraq– Iran War was extremely costly in

lives and material, one of the deadliest wars since World War II. Both countries

were devastated by the effect of the war. It cost Iran an estimated 1 million

casualties, killed or wounded, and Iranians continue to suffer as a consequence of

Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Iraqi casualties are estimated at around 250,000 to

500,000 killed or wounded. Thousands of civilians died on both sides in air raids

and ballistic missile attacks. The financial loss was also enormous, at the time

exceeding US$600 billion for each country (US$1.2 trillion in total). But shortly

after the war it turned out that the economic cost of war is more profound and long-

lasting than the estimates right after the war suggested. Economic development was

stalled and oil exports disrupted. These economic woes were of a more serious

nature for Iraq that had to incur huge debts during the war as compared to the very

small debt of Iran, as Iranians had used bloodier but economically cheaper tactics

during the war, in effect substituting soldiers’ lives for lack of financial funding

during their defence. This put Saddam in a difficult position, particularly with his

war-time allies, as by then Iraq was under more than $130 billion of international

debt, excluding the interest in an after war economy with a slowed GDP growth.

After the war, Kuwait started to over-produce oil keep Iraq's economy down,

Iraq also accused Kuwait of sland drilling and stealing oil which lead to the invasion

of Kuwait which made it worse to Iraq's financial situation, but it also made it much

worse as United Nations Compensation Commission awarded reparations amounting

more than $200 billion dollars to victims of the invasion including Kuwait, United

States, individuals and companies among others, to be paid by Iraq in oil commodity

as well as putting Iraq under a complete international embargo. Also the Islamic

Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalized that had serious implications for

the region as well as for outside powers involved there18

.Saddam Hussein had

mortgaged Iraq’s extensive oil resources far into the future to pay for a war that

brought Iraq none of the territorial gains or battlefield glories that he had promised.

Moreover a large part of the scarce resources were spent on maintaining a large

military machine. The sharp fall in the oil prises further aggravated Saddam

18 www.wikipedia.com

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Hussein’s innumerable problems. Under the changed milieu the US needed

contingency plans for the Middle Eastern region. This was to be done for ensuring

that arms and armament industries, largest foreign exchange earner for the US

economy that was plagued by balance of payment of problems needed a boost in

exports in the Middle East, its largest overseas market. They also wanted lucrative

contracts for the US military, which was forced to scale down the weapons

acquisitions due to domestic economic concerns and the thaw in superpower

relations as the Cold War was nearing its end. Oil companies in the US were

struggling for an increase in profits, at a time when oil prices were due to oversupply

after Iran- Iraq war had ended. The disintegration of USSR in 1990-1991 was seen

by US administration as a golden chance to establish a permanent military presence

in the Middle East to control its oil resources.

Saddam Hussein summoned US Ambassador April Glaspie to apprise her

of Iraqi stand in the dispute and seek the opinion of US. Glaspie stated that the US

stands as an uninterested partner and assured him “we have no opinion on Arab-

Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Thus the US deliberately

lured Saddam into invading Kuwait so that the US could garner world opinion to

support its ulterior intentions of unleashing its military might and high- tech

weaponry on Iraq. The decision to invade Kuwait came against this background.

This was related to impasse with Iran. Iraq’s attempt to impose peace on Iran did

not succeed and also Iran refused to renegotiate the Shatt al- Arab frontier or to

release Iraqi prisoners of war. After the new Iranian government had consolidated in

late 1989 after Khomeini’s death, it was clear that Iraq had been blocked on its

eastern frontiers. The seizure of Kuwait offered a solution at several levels- a

distraction from domestic resentment at economic mismanagement, the possibility

of acquiring Kuwaiti assets and investments, and the seizure of the oil wells. Cold

war having come to end and with the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern

Europe, the US posture hardened making Saddam critical and suspicious of

Washington’s intentions. He now saw benefit in confronting the West. In this

explosive situation, negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq failed to make progress19.

On 19 July, 1990 the Kuwait ruler, sent a letter to the UN Secretary General for

Saddam Hussein’s attacks and open military threat, which made Iraq more furious.

19Albert Jiirgen, n.12, p.226.

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The US surprisingly maintained silence in the wake of sudden escalation.

The Americans by July 21, 1990, learnt of Iraqi troop concentration on the Kuwaiti

border but concluded that Saddam Hussein was merely sabre-rattling to raise oil

prices and extort more money from the oil sheikhs. Egypt’s President Hosni

Mubarak was the first to sense danger and rushed to Baghdad to mediate the dispute.

He got “assurances” from Saddam Hussein that Iraq would not resort to force in

settling its disputes with Kuwait, as long as negotiations were under way.

Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, intervened and talked to both Saddam Hussein

and the Kuwaiti Emir. Arab mediation was bringing some positive response from

both sides, but US intervention aggravated and escalated the crisis. On July 24, the

US deployed six combat vessels in the Gulf for joint manoeuvres with the UAE.

Moreover, the Bush administration warned Iraq that there was no place for coercion

and intimidation in a civilized world. The US Senate on July 27, decided to cut off

food supplies and to prohibit the transfer of military equipment and technology to

Iraq. The Senate vote meant denial of $800 million in official US credit to Iraq.

Saddam Hussein told the US that her country had no opinion on Kuwaiti-Iraqi

problems, Saddam Hussein finally made up his mind to invade Kuwait. Meanwhile

Egypt, Jordon, PLO, Saudi Arabia, realising the gravity of the problem intervened

and arranged for a meeting between the two parties in Jeddah. Kuwaiti rulers were

banking on Arab mediation, and Arab diplomacy to work in defusing the crisis.

Kuwait calculated that Saud Arabia, because of its close ties with Baghdad. Much to

their dismay, the Kuwaiti found the Saudis not very firm and decisive in their

willingness to defend Kuwait. Kuwait was still convinced that after Iran- Iraq war,

Saddam’s hands were still tied due to huge debt. The Kuwaiti rulers were also firmly

confident that their friends in the West, especially the US will rescue them.

On 2 August 1990 Iraq launched the invasion by bombing Kuwait City, the

Kuwaiti capital. In spite of Iraqi sabre-rattling, Kuwait did not have its forces on

alert, and was caught unaware. Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first

to prepare for the major units which began the attack at the stroke of midnight.

Saddam was complaining against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for

the plight of the post-war Iraqi economy because they continued to produce oil as

they wished, exceeding the OPEC quotas and so drastically reducing Iraq's oil

revenues. In addition Iraq charged that Kuwait was taking excessive amounts of oil

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from the Rumeila oilfield, which extends into Kuwait, and refused to transfer or

lease the two islands of Warbar and Bubiyan, which dominate the estuary leading to

Iraq's southern port of Umm Qasr. In the context of these and other grievances

Saddam had little reason to believe that the United States, despite some

unsympathetic worlds, would take action following an Iraqi move against Kuwait to

forestall the ultimate collapse of the Iraqi economy20.

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and US delegations requested a

meeting of the UN Security and Council passed Resolution 660 condemning the

invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August the Arab league

passed resolution which called for a solution to the conflict from within the League,

and warned against outside intervention. On 6 August UN Resolution 661 placed

economic sanctions on Iraq. United Nations Security Council Resolution 665

followed soon after, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the economic

sanctions against Iraq. It said use of measures commensurate of the specific

circumstances as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping

in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict

implementation of resolution 661.

One of the main concerns of the West was the threat Iraq posted to Saudi

Arabia. Following the conquest of Kuwait, the Iraqi army was within easy striking

distance of Saudi oil fields. Control of these fields, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi

reserves, would have given Hussein control over the majority of the world's oil

reserves. Iraq also had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had

lent Iraq some 26 billion dollars during its war with Iran. The Saudis backed Iraq, as

they feared the negative influence of Shia Iran on its own Shia minority. After the

war, Saddam said that his country should not repay loans as stopping Iran was

favour to Saudis. He argued that the US supported Saudi the state that was an

illegitimate and unworthy guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

By November 1990, the United Nations had passed Resolution 678,

championed by President Bush, calling for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait

by 15 January 1991. The crisis in the Persian Gulf region was the first of its kind

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Bush envisioned that the United States,

as the sole surviving superpower, would lead the United Nations in an effort to

20 Geoff Simons, n.1, pp.246-247.

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enforce order in the international community. As the deadline drew closer, Hussein

release his foreign hostages as concessions, and the Coalition attempted to cow Iraq

into submission by displaying its quantitative and qualitative superiority. When

Hussein's attempt to create goodwill failed, he mimicked the Coalition's show of

force by threatening the Mother of All Battles and daring the Coalition to do its

worst. These bitter exchanges and miscalculations on the part of Bush and Hussein –

both believed the other would blink at the moment- initiated the transition from

Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm. On 17 January 1991, the

Coalition air force struck Baghdad on 23 February, the land war commenced. By 3

March, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Tariq Aziz, accepted terms for

cessation of hostilities21

. The US led forces won a decisive victory against Iraq as

Kuwait was liberated. On a different score, however, the Coalition in the Gulf failed

to achieve its objective. Despite the fact that Iraq's armed forces were reduced and

its military installations largely destroyed, Saddam Hussein remained in power.

Adding insult to injury, Hussein turned his military set back of into a moral victory

by claiming to have resisted the combined might of the West. Moreover, liberated

Kuwait had been left behind in a ruinous state by the Iraqi occupiers. Several

hundred oil wells were set ablaze and retreating Iraqi troops caused a massive oil

spill in the Persian Gulf22.

The UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, made it very clear that it was

not a war of the UN. The UN Security Council, through its Resolution 678,

authorised the use of all the “necessary means” to implement the Security Council’s

Resolution 660 and the subsequent resolutions. In a way it was only a UN authorised

war. The 14th extraordinary session of the GCC Ministerial Council, which met in

Riyadh on January 26, 1991, in order to clear the doubts, emphasised that the war to

liberate Kuwait was based on international legitimacy, represented in the UN

Security Council resolutions, adopted in accordance with paragraph seven of the UN

Charter.23 Iraq accepted all the UN Security Council resolutions on the issue. It

has been argued that the procedural validity of Resolution 678 could be questioned

on the ground that China, a permanent member of the Security Council, abstained

21 Andreas Wenger & Doron Zimmermann, International Relations- From the Cold War to the Globalized World, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006, p232-3 22Ibid., p. 234.

23 Geoff Simons n.1, p.58.

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from the vote. There is said to be no alternative to the conclusion that abstention by

a permanent member on a non-procedural vote constitutes a veto. Resolution 678,

therefore, cannot be said to have been validly adopted because of the abstention of

China24.

The Security Council is right body for implementing such action. But

Resolution 678 did not do that. The basic postulate of Chapter VI1 is that the

Council not individual state decides on the question on the use of military force.

That is why Cuba objected that this resolution violated the Chapter of the United

Nations by authorizing some States to use military force in total disregard of the

procedures established by the Charter. While the Security Council has thus wide

powers to take action under Chapter VII, there is no doubt that it has also got an

obligation to direct and control that action. Article 42 by providing that the Council

"may take such action", also requires that the Council direct that action, define

military objectives that it wants to achieve, and decide when to terminate

hostilities25. Resolution 678, however, did not provide for Security Council control.

It only required States to "keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of

actions" they might take. In fact the US did not want to be dissuaded in its

determination to wage a war against Iraq. As President Bush himself declared. "I

might have said, to hell with the UN" and sent the US troops into Kuwait anyway

even if the Council had not authorized the use of force against Iraq26. The Resolution

678 and the conformational path it reflected was shaped more by a desire to go to

war than by a desire to prevent one27. In a press conference on 10 February 1991, the

Security General, Perez de Cuellar, helplessly pointed out that the Persian Gulf War

was not "a classic United Nations war in the sense that there is no United Nations

control of the operations, no United Nations flags, blue helmets, or any engagement

of the Military Staff Committee28

. In other worlds, in name of the United Nations or

UN sponsored action, the United States and Its coalition forces continued their own

war without any regard to the limitations imposed by the Charter for the attainment

24 John Quigley, “The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or Disorder”, Cornell International Law Journal, vol.25. 1999, p.29. 25 Ibid., p.25. 26 Gazi Ibdewi Abdulghafour, United Nations’ Role in the Gulf Crisis, New Delhi, 1991, pp.54-55. 27 Burns H. Weston, “Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision-making : Frecarious Legitimacy”, American Journal of International Law, vol.85,1991, p.532. 28 John Quigley, n.24, p.28.

140

of objectives that they deemed appropriate. By endorsing the right to self-defense

under Article 51 of the Charter in Resolution 661 the Security Council seemed to be

approving the US Gulf operations without any control over them. The Security

Council's role was clearly marginalized.

There was speculation all around that the US objective was to kill the top

Iraqi leadership29. US Secretary of State James Baker argued that removing

President Saddam Hussein might fall within the authorization of Resolution 67830.

The purpose of US assault was to damage the Iraqi forces sufficiently and shatter its

best divisions so that Iraq would be left with "no offensive capacity". This was

surely beyond the call of Resolution 678 by any reckoning, but not for the United

States31

.

Aftermath of Iraq- Kuwait War

On 2nd March 1991, the UN Security Council laid down conditions which

stipulated that Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction should be destroyed and war

reparations paid to Kuwait before sanctions on Iraq are lifted. The US and UK

delineated no- fly zones for Iraqi planes in northern and southern Iraq supposedly to

protect the Shias in the south and Kurds in the north from Saddam’s military. The

reason given by US for this step was enforcing UN Resolutions in patrolling the no-

fly zones. Surprisingly no- fly zones were not sanctioned by any UN resolution.

They were forcibly imposed by the US and supported by UK for deriving strategic

advantages later as the 2003 Iraq war proved32.Soon after the liberation of Kuwait in

February, 1991, it appeared that Saddam Hussein and the Baath party had been

sufficiently discredited by the massive destruction suffered during the war. The

subsequent civil war involving Shias, Kurds and the government further led to

destruction. On one hand Iraqi opposition leaders demanded for a democratic system

with autonomy for the Kurdish population, on the other front the Iranian- backed

anti- government Shia Muslim group, called the Supreme Assembly for Islamic

Revolution in Iraq headed by Ayatollah Bakr Hakim that played a crucial role in the

Shia uprisings in two Southern provinces. The Western World also became very

29 Ibid., p.49. 30 Ibid. 31 John Quigley, n.24, p.45. 32 Albert Jiirgen, n.12, p.114.

141

optimistic particularly the US, with President Bush talking about a New World

Order based on Democratic system. It was felt that due to massive destruction

inflicted on Iraq, its future was in dismay. This opinion was strengthened due to

Kurds and Shias uprisings.

US participated in Iraq- Kuwait war not for democracy, but to prevent

Saddam Hussein from controlling half the world’s oil. It wanted to reduce Iraq’s

military and economic infrastructure, which it did in the 1991 war. But Iraq

consolidated its power despite its eight year long ruinous war with Iran.Soon after

the war, Iraq was condemned on various counts, like using chemical weapons

against its Kurdish population and violations of human rights. It was also accused of

secretly developing nuclear weapons. No wonder economic sanctions were imposed

on Iraq and more importantly they were retained primarily at the behest of US and

its allies (the GCC states) in order to reduce Iraq to an insignificant power. Thus,

Iraq has accused the US of turning the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

into a tool for “fulfilling tendentious and rancorous imperialistic objectives”33.

Unable to overthrow Saddam from power, the US, marking the first

anniversary of the war against Iraq, denounced Saddam Hussein and his “pariah”

regime and called for his overthrow. It urged the Iraqi people and military to

overthrow him. The White House spokesman, Mr. Marlin Fitzwater, said, “The

United States reiterates its pledge to the Iraqi people and the Iraqi military that we

stand ready to work with new regime, a new leadership in Baghdad that accepts the

UN resolutions and is willing to live in peace with its neighbours”. He added, “Its

people will find a partner in the US, one willing to seek to lift UN sanctions and help

restore Iraq to its rightful place in the family of nations.” But he also said that the

US had no military plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein and added, “Our actions last

year were all under the UN resolutions. We don’t anticipate anything unilateral.”34

The sanctions against Iraq were imposed in response to the country’s

invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 199035

. Essentially they prohibited the

import of Iraqi goods into all states, which in practice meant oil and oil products,

and the sale or supply of all products to Iraq except for supplies strictly intended for

33 A.K. Pasha, Iraq – Sanctions and Wars, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, pp.1-2. p. 84. 34 Times of India, January 18, 1992, p.18. 35 UNSC Resolution 661.

142

medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. As a means to

bring about an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait they applied these sanctions but once

the Gulf war (Desert Storm) had achieved that objective, the sanctions were left in

place to force Iraq’s full compliance with the cease- fire conditions, especially with

regard to the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of Iraq’s WMD36.

During the Gulf war most of Iraq’s power plants, oil refineries, pumping

stations and water treatment facilities had been destroyed, and the sanction regime

resulting into economic hardships. The statistics issued by UNICEF in 2001

indicated that in the period 1900-9, Iraq had suffered an increase in child mortality

of 160 percent, the highest of all 188 countries reviewed37

. As the humanitarian toll

of the Iraq sanctions grew, Russia, France and China increasingly criticized the

indefinite duration and rigidity of the regime, arguing in future sanctions decisions

for a date at which a regime would lapse, unless affirmatively extended by the

Security Council. The case of humanitarian crisis was also brought by the Secretary

General, to the attention of the Security Council in the Ahtisaari Report of March

20, 1991. In response, it was agreed that the UN should develop a plan for using

Iraqi oil revenues to finance humanitarian relief. In August and September 1991

respectively, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 706 and 712 establishing the

oil- for- food programme38.

The Iraq continued to reject the Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712,

the so called Oil for Food Resolutions, as it claimed that the proposed procedures

were a violation of its sovereignty. In April 1995 the Security Council made

concessions to these Iraqi concerns by adopting Resolution 986, which gave

Baghdad primary responsibility for the distribution of humanitarian goods with the

exception of the Kurdish areas in the north, where distribution was kept under direct

UN control. In May 1996, finally Iraq accepted the program, but preparations for its

implementation were interrupted in August 1996 when Iraqi military forces marched

into Kurdish zones. But in December 1996, this resolution officially came into force

and food and medicine began to be delivered in the first months of 199739

. Over its

36 UNSC Resolution 687. 37 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children, New York, UNICEF, 2001. 38 Peter Van Walsum, “The Iraq Sanctions Committee”, in David M. Malone (ed.) The UN Security Council- From the Cold War to the 21

st Century, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006, p.182.

39 Ibid.

143

lifetime, OFF handled $64 billion worth of Iraqi oil revenues, and served as the main

source of sustenance for 60 percent of Iraq’s estimated twenty- seven million people,

reducing malnutrition among Iraqi children by 50 percent40.

Tariq Aziz was sent to New York to get the economic sanctions lifted

partially, if not entirely and he informed the UNSC that Iraq no longer possessed

weapons banned by Resolution 687. He said that economic sanctions were causing

pain and agony to the Iraqi people. But Tariq showed no flexibility on the issue of

destroying equipment used in the manufacture of Iraqi offensive arms41. In June

2001, the United States and the United Kingdom advocated a move toward ‘smart

sanctions’ that would have traded off stricter controls on Iraqi military procurement-

including through an extended list of prohibited imports, and stricter border controls

stemming the illicit flow of oil out of Iraq- in return for relaxation of controls on the

civilian economy42

.In his first days in office in early January 2001, President George

W. Bush linked the sanctions regime against Iraq to Swiss cheese- both full of

holes43. The largest hole appeared to be in the area of oil smuggling. Over the

course of the Volker inquiry, allegations emerged of sanctions- busting in a wide

range of sectors, by an equally wide range of individuals and groups, including

inside Iraq44. This sanction- busting by Saddam Hussein involved not only arms but

also other goods45.

Alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq had long been a

source of international concern. While in power, Saddam Hussein showed complete

disregard for peace and security in the region. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran and began

the Iran–Iraq War, which lasted until 1988. During the war, Hussein used chemical

weapons on at least 10 occasions, including attacks against civilians. On June 19,

1981, the Security Council strongly condemned Israel’s destruction of Iraqi’s

nuclear reactor at Osiraq, which Israel claimed was being used for preparation of

nuclear weapons- an ironic response in light of later developments, but one very

40 www.oilforfoodfacts.com/faq.aspx. 41A.K. Pasha, n.33, p.90. 42 George A. Lopez, “Toward Smart Sanctions on Iraq”, Kroc Policy Brief #5, April 2001. 43 David E. Sanger and Frank Bruni, “ In His First Days, Bush Plans Review of Clinton’s Acts”, New York Times, January 14, 2001, p.1. 44 Claudio Gatti and Mark Turner, “ Dealing with Saddam’s regime: how fortunes were made in Iraq through the UN’s oil-for-food program”, Financial Times, April 8, 2004, p.17. 45 Douglas Jehl, “US Report Finds Iraqis Eliminated Illict Arms in 90’s, New York Times, October7, 2004, p.1.

144

much in keeping with international conceptions of sovereignty and aggression

during the Cold war years.46 In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and began the Persian

Gulf War. After the war, Iraq repeatedly violated 16 different UNSC resolutions

from 1990 to 2002. The Iraq Survey Group interviewed regime officials who stated

Hussein kept weapon scientists employed and planned to revive Iraq's WMD

program after the inspections were lifted, including nuclear weapons.

WMD theory and the perception that Saddam had been for long supporting

terrorists in Palestine by giving money to families of suicide bombers and gave

refuge to other terrorist groups against neighbouring states in the region helped the

US focus on the Iraq. In 1991 after the Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait, the

regime of Saddam Hussein cracked down the Kurdish uprisings in the north and

Shia in the south. By 1991, Iraqi possession of WMD was widely perceived as a

threat to the region and even to Iraq’s own people, as Saddam’s use of chemical

weapons at Halabja in 1988 had earlier demonstrated47.The use of chemical weapons

against Iran and the Kurdish population, the US and Israel could project the threat

for the neighbouring countries and the whole region effectively48. It is stated

between this time over 40,000 Kurds and 60,000 Shiites were killed by the Iraqi

regime of Saddam. In 2000, two human rights groups, International Federation of

Human Rights Leagues and the Coalition for Justice in Iraq, released a joint report

documenting the indoctrination of children into a fighting force. These children as

young as five were recruited into the Ashbal Saddam or Saddam's Cubs. Parents

objecting to this recruitment would be executed and children jailed if they failed to

comply.

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established by the Council to

deal with biological, chemical and missile weapons The IAEA set the task of

supervising the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) system aimed at

ensuring that Iraq did not reconstitute the prohibited programs49

. By the end of the

Gulf War in 1991 the Iraqi government agreed to Security Council Resolution 687,

which called for weapons inspectors to search locations in Iraq for chemical,

46 UNSC Resolution 487, June 19, 1981. 47 “Whatever Happened To The Iraqi Kurds?”, Human Rights Watch report, March11, 1991. 48 Pascal Teixeira Da Silva, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Iraqi Case”, in David M. Malone(ed.) The UN Security Council- From the Cold War to the 21st Century, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006, p.205. 49 Ibid., p.206.

145

biological and nuclear weapons, as well as weapons that exceeded an effective

distance of 150 kilometres. After the passing of resolution 687, thirteen additional

resolutions (699, 707, 715, 949, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, 1205,

1284) were passed by the Security Council reaffirming the continuation of

inspections, or citing Iraq's failure to comply fully with them. On September 9, 1998

the Security Council passed resolution 1194 which unanimously condemned Iraq's

suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM

The Iraq put up innumerable obstacles to UNSCOM and the IAEA’s work

and never granted full and unrestricted access as required by the Security Council.

Beyond that, the Council had a difficult choice: accommodating Iraq’s complaints

that its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and dignity were infringed-

a move that could undermine the efficiency of the disarmament process. In 1996, the

Council accepted view point of UNSCOM’s executive chairman that recognised

Iraq’s concerns with regard to its sovereignty and national security that paved the

way for working out special- softer- modalities for inspecting so called sensitive

sites. On several occasions, the Council warned Iraq that failure to comply would be

regarded as a material breach of its obligations and lead to serious

consequences.50Richard Butler, who had taken over as UNSCOM Executive

Chairman on July 1, 1997, made the alarming assertions that Baghdad had enough

biological weapons and missiles ‘to blow away Tel Aviv’.51 Security Council

members, who had been presented with no such evidence, were shocked. Offering

his good offices, Kofi Annan now stepped in and took a position as a neutral

peacemaker between the Council and Iraq. The US government failed to display

much appreciation of his mediation efforts.

There were some lacunas in the disarmament process launched in 1991

which included the two complementary goals set by the Security Council. The first

aimed at ridding of WMD and the other ensuring that Iraq did not reconstitute these

prohibited capabilities. But it was impossible to determine with 100 percent

certainty that Iraq completely eliminated WMD52

. Also the time frame set by the

Council in Resolution 687 was tight, but the process dragged on for many years.

50 Ibid., pp.207-8 51 Christopher S. Wren, “Weapons Inspection Chief Tells of Iraqi Tricks”, New York Times, January 27, 1998, p.6. 52 S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, sec.27.

146

Even there arose question on the working and integrity of the UNSCOM. The

Richard Butler wrote a final UNSCOM report for the Security Council on 14

December 1998. His central conclusion was that Iraq's conduct over the previous

month had ensured that 'no progress' was made either in disarmament or in

accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes. Therefore, he recorded that

UNSCOM 'is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it

by the Security Council."53 Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector, alleged

the Clinton's advisers deliberately provoked a showdown with the Iraqis by

manipulating Mr Butler and UNSCOM.54

Iraq- US stand-off continued towards the end of 1998 when Iraq blasted US

President Clinton on November 16, 1998 for his call for a new government in

Baghdad. The US launched 40 hours bombardment of Iraq in response to Iraq’s

decision to stop cooperation with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and IAEA

over arms inspection issue. When the UNSC was discussing UNSCOM report on

Iraq in December 1998, the US launched air attacks on Iraq in an operation dubbed

Desert Fox, without prior notification. This was a clear contempt for the UN. For

four days, the US and UK forces conducted roughly 650 air strikes against

approximately 100 Iraqi targets, with the US launching 400 cruise missiles55. Aziz

‘strongly’ condemned Clinton’s call. “This is a flagrant violation of UNSC

resolutions as well as international law”, he said56. With little support for the

bombing campaign among UN members, the US was now in a weak position to

defend UNSCOM effectively. Ultimately, Washington sacrificed UNSCOM in order

to protect the sanctions regime, which it saw more vital to its ability to contain the

Iraqi government’s capacity to destabilize its region. UN Resolution 1154, passed in

March 1998, stated that any failure to allow 'immediate unconditional and

unrestricted access' to UN inspectors 'would have the severest consequences for

Iraq'. Paragraph 5 of this Resolution holds that the Security Council 'Decides, in

accordance with its responsibility under the Charter, to remain actively seized of the

matter, in order to ensure implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and

53 Gurdian, 27 February 2002, p. 2. 54 Daily Telegraph, 12 March 2002, p. Financial Times, 12 March 2002, p. 2; Financial Times, 18

March 2002,p. 2.. 55 Tom Clancy, Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready, New York, G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 2004. 56 A.K. Pasha, n. 33, p.109.

147

security in the region'. In other words, any further violations of the inspection

regime would be dealt with by the Security Council itself. There was no phrase that

could be interpreted as delegating the use of force to any individual state.

The planned air strikes were supposed to be provoked by the collapse of the

inspection process. It was therefore necessary to withdraw the inspectors to build the

political case for military action. So UNSCOM was ejected from Iraq to facilitate a

four-day bombing campaign. The following day, as Mr Butler was making his

formal report to the Security Council, the UN received news that the Anglo-

American bombardment of Iraq had begun. After the bombing started Lavrov the

Russian representative said that the crisis had been 'created artificially by the

irresponsible acts of Richard Butler', while the Chinese representative at the Security

Council said Mr Butler had played a 'dishonorable role' in the confrontation.57

Ritter

has pointed out that 'regardless of UNSCOM's ability to verify Biological Weapons

programs, the major Biological Weapons production facility at Al Hakum had been

destroyed by June 1996, and 'extensive monitoring of Iraq's biological infrastructure

could find no evidence of continued proscribed activity'. He suggested that 'If

weapons inspectors are once again allowed back into Iraq to resume monitoring

along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no reason to doubt that similar

findings would be had, with the same level of confidence’. Scott Ritter points out

that, 'Most of UNSCOM's findings of Iraqi non-compliance concerned either the

inability to verify an Iraqi declaration or peripheral matters such as components and

documentation, which by and of themselves do not constitute a weapon or a

program'. By December 1993, 'Iraq had, in fact, been disarmed to a level

unprecedented in modern history, but UNSCOM and the Security Council were

unable-and in some instances, unwilling-to acknowledge this accomplishment.'58

Iraq's long-range missile programme was entirely destroyed by December 1992,

according to an UNSCOM report.59

As far as nuclear weapons were concerned the

'massive infrastructure' Iraq had built up in its nuclear weapons programme 'had

57 Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2002, p. 8; Financial Times, 9 May 2002, p. 3; Times, 9 May 2002, p. 14. 58 Scott Ritter, 'Redefining Iraq's Obligation. The Case for Qualitative Disarmament of Iraq', Arms

Central Today, June, 2000. 59 UNSCOM Report cited in Scott Ritter, 'Redefining Iraq's Obligation'.

148

been eliminated by 1995' by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).60 The

UNSCOM working paper also noted that such weapons were destroyed.'61 In other

words, the disarmament of Iraq had been completed by the mid 90s. There was a

clear split between the US and UK on the one hand, and France, Germany, and

Russia, on the other the latter wanted to relax the sanctions. It speaks volumes of the

clout the US got in the Security Council to pass another resolution 1284 in

December, 1999 making it abundantly, clear to Iraq that, there was no possibility of

the lifting of sanctions even it cooperated fully. Iraq also had to take note of

America’s Iraq Liberation Act 1998 that made it clear that regime change in Iraq

was the goal of US policy. It was clear to objective observers that the American

objective was to pass resolutions, insulting to Iraq hoping that Iraq will fail to

comply and thereby provide a good reason for attacking it62

.UNSCOM never

returned to Iraq after being withdrawn on US instructions. Baghdad didn't destroy

UNSCOM. Washington did. That Operation Desert Fox terminated the inspection.

President Clinton himself said in November that one reason for not launching the air

assault then was that this would make the end of UNSCOM.63 Inspection teams were

withdrawn before the Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign and did not return

for four years. To the United Nations no-fly zone enforced by the United States,

United Kingdom, Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan responded instructing

Iraqi military to attack all planes in the no-fly zone. In late 2002, after international

pressure and more UN Resolutions, Iraq allowed inspection teams back into the

country. In November 2002, a new round of inspections had been initiated to resolve

key remaining tasks in the disarming of Iraq”64. Although the inspection

organization was now operating at full strength and Iraq seemed determined to give

it prompt access everywhere, the United States appeared as determined to replace

inspection force with an invasion army. After the terror attacks on New York and

Washington on September 11, 2001 the containment policy of keeping Saddam in

60 Scott Ritter, 'Redefining Iraq's Obligation. The Case for Qualitative Disarmament of Iraq', Arms

Central Today, June, 2000. 61 Guardian, 5 March 2002, p. 16. 62 K.P.Fabian, US, UN and Iraq, World Focus, vol.25, no.8, August 2004, p.20-21. 63 Daily Telegraph, 20 November 1998, p.1. 64 Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, New York, Pantheon Books, 2004, p. 3.

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checks and ensuring the disarmament of Iraq through UN inspections was deemed

inadequate.65

The Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted on November 8, 2002 gave

Iraq only a limited time and a last opportunity to cooperate to attain disarmament or

else face "serious consequences". Some members in the Security Council wanted the

process of inspections to continue. Confronted by this ‘final opportunity’, on

November 13, 2002, Iraq agreed to the return of weapons inspectors.66 In early

December, Iraq presented its ‘currently accurate, full and complete declaration’. The

US pointed to omissions in this declaration as material breaches in themselves.

National Security Adviser Rice later described the document as a ‘12,200 page

lie’.67

But most Council members were disposed to give UNMOVIC and the IAEA a

genuine chance. The weapons inspectors quickly set to work, conducting 237

inspections at 148 sites between November 2002 and March 2003.

They supervised the destruction of two Al Samoud 2 missiles, bringing the total

number destroyed a seventy-two. The path of inspection had been blocked by the US

the UK and Spain, and a resolution implicitly blessing armed intervention had been

blocked by the majority of states in the Security Council. The UK said that the draft

resolution, which it had sponsored in the Council, would not be put to a vote. This

was a tacit admission that it could not have passed. If the resolution had been

submitted to a vote and rejected, the negative vote would have further undermined

the doubtful claim by the sponsors that earlier resolutions by the Council authorized

them to use armed force if and when they deemed that Iraq was in non-fulfilment.

The US confirmed the advice that the UN should take expeditious action to

withdraw staff68.

France declared its opposition to any resolution that would authorize force

and rejected the view that individual members could use armed force without

Council authorization. France wanted UNMOVIC to present its work program for

inspections and suggested the Council meet - perhaps at ministerial level, as Russia

had urged. A time line should be set after which the Council would evaluate the

65 Ibid., p. 3-4. 66 Letter dated 2002/11/13 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (UN Security Council Document S/2002/1242), November 13, 2002. 67 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Why We Know Iraq is Lying’, New York Times, February 23, 2003, p. 25. 68 Ibid.,pp.8-9.

150

results of the inspections. Mexico also said that there was no justification for the use

of force in Iraq. Washington had been deliberately restraining and undermining

UNMOVIC, and intervening to derail the negotiations that could secure the return of

the new inspection agency to Iraq. World opinion favoured a renewal of inspections

and the re-entry of UNMOVIC, as a solution to the mystery around Iraq's weapons

programmes. The US, on the other hand, had divisively turned against inspections.69

US Secretary of State Colin Powell made it clear that the US intended war,

whatever was the version of the inspectors: 'US policy is that, regardless of what the

inspectors do, the people of Iraq and the people of the region would be better off

with a different regime in Baghdad. The United States reserves its option to do

whatever it believes might be appropriate to see if there can be a regime change.'

The issue of the inspectors is a 'separate and distinct and different' matter from the

US position on Saddam Hussein's leadership, said Powell'.70

While Powell

expressed desire to see inspectors to return, the Administration line was that 'regime

change' was the key agenda. In a televised speech on March 17, President Bush

issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq with his family within forty-

eight hours. Vice President Dick Cheney said that an offer by Iraq to disarm was no

longer an option. Referring to Saddam Hussein, he said, "We believe he has, in fact,

reconstituted nuclear weapons.71

Many people have suggested that the war was decided in Washington in the

summer of 2002 and that UN inspections were allowed only as a way to fill the time

until the military was ready. The Bush administration decided in the summer of

2002 that, following the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, to strike any

identified enemy which it feared might pose a threat to the US. It saw Saddam

Hussein as personifying evil, as successfully having thwarted the search for and

elimination of weapons of mass destruction by UN inspection, as possibly shielding

or cooperating with international terrorists and as one of the stalwarts against peace

with Israel. It was evident that the President, having declared war on terrorism,

needed to eliminate this perceived threat well before the next presidential election72

.

A US inspired resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council in

69 New Yorker, 24 December 2001, p. 63. 70 Guardian, 6 May 2002. 71 Hanx Blix, n.64, pp. 7-8. 72 Ibid., p.12.

151

November 2002, submitting Iraq to demands which, if not fully respected, could

justify armed action.73 At their historic meeting in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002,

British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S President George W. Bush affirmed their

decision to launch a military assault on Iraq. In a press conference together,

President Bush said, 'I explained to the Prime Minister that the policy of my

Government is the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the all options are open."74

President said, 'I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go. That's about all I'm

willing to share with you.'75 The US President went on to say, 'men with no respect

for life must never be allowed to control the ultimate instruments of death'. The only

problem with making bold claims is that at some point they must be backed up with

evidence.76

In March 2002, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said there was 'still no

evidence that Iraq has, or may have, weapons of mass destruction.'77

Hans Blix, head

of UNMOVIC, the new UN weapons inspection agency which has replaced

UNSCOM, said he 'does not accept as fact the US and UK's repeated assertions that

Baghdad has used the time to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction': It would be

inappropriate for me to accept and adopt this position, but it would also be naive of

me to conclude that there may be no veracity-of course it is possible, I won't go as

far as saying probable,' said Mr Blix.78

The events of 2001 were of a different order and have had profoundly

different impacts. First, the attack on the US homeland caused a shift in the national

psyche, i.e. an ideational transformation. Of equal import, the attacks marked a

change in the structural order of the international system as well. They brought

home the realization that the threats presented by non-state, terrorist actors could not

be addressed through traditional patterns of inter-state security relations. In effect,

when confronted by actors who cannot be constrained through "normal" patterns of

relations, the logic of the "institutional bargain" to attain security by and for states

breaks down. Rather than establishing any new pattern in the international order, the

Iraq war of 2003 instead should be viewed as reinforcing trends and highlighting

73 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 74 Sunday Times, 7 April 2002, p. 28. 75 Guardian , 17 June 2002, p.1. 76 Ibid., 12 March 2002, p. 17; Observer editorial, 7 April 2002 p. 26. 77 Financial Times, 20 March 2002, p. 11. 78 Ibid., 7 March 2002, p. 20.

152

paradoxes set in motion over the previous half-decade. The Iraq war was not a

surprise; Saddam Hussain's time in power was destined to be short after President

G.W. Bush assumed office. Nor was the immediate outcome unexpected.

The Iraq War 2003

Despite the unprecedented scale and scope of the Iraq anti-war movement-

the largest anti-war demonstrations in history, a campaign of global dimensions, a

sophisticated and wide-reaching media effort-the Bush administration ignored the

pervasive opposition to war and went ahead with its planned invasion. Given the

administration's determination to remove Saddam Hussein by force, the movement

probably had little chance of halting the march to war. The administration's decision

to take its case to the United Nations was a victory for the advocates of diplomacy in

the United States and around the world. Hard-liners in the administration would

have preferred to bypass the Security Council and proceed directly to military

action, but the administration needed at least the appearance of seeking UN

involvement to gain political legitimacy in Congress and elsewhere. Once the UN

debate began, France, Russia and other countries were successful in forcing

substantial changes in the draft resolution submitted by the United States and United

Kingdom in October 2002. The resulting resolution in November, Security Council

Resolution 1441, lacked the explicit authorization for military action that

Washington and London had sought.

In the even more intense debate about Iraq from summer 2002 onwards,

members of the Bush administration variously suggested that military action was

necessary and justified because of the urgent need for an end to the repression of the

Iraqi people, for regime change, for preventive war to stop a possible future threat

and for pre-emptive attack against an imminent threat. They also spoke of Iraq as the

‘next phase’ of the war on terrorism. Finally, they stressed the importance of

securing the implementation of Security Council resolutions on Iraq, particularly

those relating to biological, chemical and nuclear disarmament.79

The legal

justification for the US-led military action initiated in March 2003 would have been

significantly simpler, and therefore more persuasive, if the US and UK had

succeeded in their efforts to get the UN Security Council to follow up with a so-

79 Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force After Iraq”, Survival, Vol.45, No.2, Summer 2003, p39.

153

called ‘second resolution’ which would actually have been the eighteenth regarding

the use of force and Iraqi compliance with disarmament terms. Such a resolution

would have determined that Iraq was in breach of its obligations, and might also

have explicitly authorised the use of force.

When the Bush administration returned to the Security Council in February

2003 to seek authority for war, it was decisively rebuffed. France, Germany and

Russia and six non-permanent members that is Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Guinea,

Angola and Pakistan refused to support the US proposal. The opposition of the non-

permanent members was especially significant, given their political and economic

dependence on the United States. The strength of worldwide anti-war sentiment

prevented the Bush administration from gaining UN support for its planned invasion

and forced the administration to abandon efforts to win UN endorsement.80

The first

time since the United Nations was founded that the United States, on an issue that

mattered to it, could not get a majority on the Security Council".81 Kofi Annan

remarked, as he left the meeting and announced the withdrawal of UN personnel

from Iraq in view of the imminence of war: ‘I have also said if the action is to take

place without the support of the Council, its legitimacy will be questioned and the

support for it will be diminished’.82 President Bush's alleged that the United Nations

had no backbone and courage. It was the Bush administration's impatience with the

Security Council process and unwillingness to abide by it that led it to initiate an

unauthorized attack on Iraq in violation of international law.

US President George W. Bush didn't need the United Nations going into

Iraq, but he needed the United Nations' help to get out. The United Nations faced

more existential questions. The Iraq war was a direct challenge to the organization's

role in maintaining international peace and security in the wake of world's most

powerful state prompting the Secretary-General to appoint a high-level panel on

threats and challenges and to rethink the very idea of collective security in a world

where states also felt the most vulnerable.83

80 Phyllis Bennis, "Bush Isolated, Launches Terrifying Attack", War Times, April, 2003, www.war-times.org/current/9art1html (accessed 24 November 2003. 81 Immanuel, Waller stein, "U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for-Hegemony". Monthly Review, Vol.55, No. 3 (2003), p. A1. 82 http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusnesiraq.asp.,2003. 83 Ibid.

154

The Iraq crisis, which climaxed in the US-led invasion of 20 March 2003,

was by many reckonings evidence of a disintegration of the existing UN-centred

world order. This world order is the product of the formal institutions centred on the

United Nations and the norm and perceptions. The United Nations being confronted

"with us or against us" choice of the United States created virtually crisis situation

for the UN.

The Rationale of the War and Implications

The two main justifications offered by the Bush administration for the war

against Iraq prior to its inception have by now been completely discredited. First,

administration repeatedly pointed to an imminent threat that Iraq would use weapons

of mass destruction against the United States or its allies, or would transfer these

weapons to terrorist organizations. UN weapons inspectors in Iraq prior to the war

reported that they did not find weapons of mass destruction and needed more time to

complete their inspections. The Bush administration, however, continued to assert

that Iraq had such weapons, despite a lack of credible corroboration, and finally

warned the UN inspectors to leave Iraq before the United States initiated what it

called a "pre-emptive" war. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his presentation to

the United Nations Security Council, asserted that the United States had knowledge

of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and proceeded to produce intelligence

photographs of the sites where they were being manufactured and stored.84 His

assertions turned out to be false.

The US Government did intimate the general contours of its position on

legitimate use of force against Iraq, over the period spanning President George W.

Bush’s address to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2003 and the

outbreak of war in late March 2003. The Bush administration also announced a new

strategic doctrine of pre-emptive use of force in respect of weapons of mass

destruction and terrorism85

. Pre-emption comes in many forms and depends on the

circumstances. One state may not strike another merely because the second might

someday develop ability and desire to attack it. For centuries, international law

84.U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Address the U.N. Security Council", 5 February 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html>. 85 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002.

155

recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action

to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal

scholars and international law often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on

the evidence of an imminent threat a most often a visible mobilization of armies,

navies and air forces preparing to attack. The notion of pre-emption is inherent in the

right of self-defence, recognizing the need to adapt the concept of imminence to the

capabilities and objectives of adversaries. In case of Iraq, President Bush made clear

that the United States could always proceed in the exercise of its inherent right of

self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is also difficult to justify

the invasion of Iraq as an exercise of classic anticipatory self-defence. Within the

traditional framework of self-defence, a pre-emptive use of proportional force is

justified only out of necessity. The concept of necessity includes both a credible,

imminent threat and the exhaustion of peaceful remedies. Operation Iraqi Freedom

was conducted in a specific context. This context included the “naked aggression”

by Iraq against its neighbours, its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), its record of having used such weapons, Security Council action under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and continuing defiance of the Council’s

requirements.

In his speech before the United Nations on September 2002 President George

W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce

the Security Council resolutions and to eliminate threat to international peace and

security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found

Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened

serious consequences for further intransigence86. When Iraq refused fully comply

with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that

invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended

the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. The United States has assumed

the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as

recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483. In the aftermath of the war,

despite extensive efforts by UN inspectors and US military personnel, no weapons

of mass destruction were located in Iraq. The second justification for the war made

by the Bush administration prior to initiating the war was that there was a link

86 SCR 1441, Nov. 8, 2002.

156

between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. The evidence establishing this

link has also proven to be false or, at best, extremely tenuous. This led the United

States to come up with new post hoc justifications for the war, such as the assertion

that Saddam Hussein was a bad man and evil dictator; even though the United States

supported him despite his poor human rights record when it believed that it served

its interests to do so. Washington hawks made strenuous efforts to link Iraq to the

terrorist attacks on 11 September. A leading figure in this effort has been former

CIA director James Woolsey, who said within days of the atrocities that there had

been 'state sponsorship' of the attacks, and mentioned Iraq as a suspect. Launching

his own personal search for corroboration, Mr Woolsey flew to London to seek out

the Iraqi opposition, unearthing a rumour that Osama bin Laden had sent an al

Qaeda delegation to Baghdad on 25 April 1988, to celebrate Saddam Hussein's

birthday. The delegation was said to have secured a promise of training for al Qaeda

recruits and established a joint force of al Qaeda elite fighters and Iraqi intelligence

agents.87

President Vladimir Putin of Russia said, 'We know which nations'

representatives and citizens were fighting alongside the Taliban, and where their

activities were financed from. Iraq is not on the list.'88 'British intelligence sources

pointed out that despite attempts by the CIA and FBI to find links between Osama

bin Laden's al Qaeda network and Iraq, the British dossier did not refer to them

because there was no evidence to back up the US claims.' While the CIA had

suggested a link, 'British intelligence officials were sceptical.' Britain's most senior

intelligence officer suggested that there was no evidence linking Iraq to the

September 11 attacks or to Osama bin Laden's terror networks'89.The key piece of

'evidence' used to link Baghdad to 11 September was the supposed meeting of the

ringleader of the suicide hijackers, Mohamed Ata, with an Iraqi intelligence agent in

the Czech Republic in 2001. It turned out that another man by the name of

Mohammed Ata did visit Prague in 2001, but according to a Czech interior ministry

source, 'He didn't have the same identity card number, there was a great difference in

their ages, their nationalities didn't match, basically nothing.

87 Guardian, 13 September 2001, p. 1; Daily Telegraph, 26 October, 2001, p. 13. 88 Ibid.,15 February, 2002, p.2. 89 Ibid.,10 April, 2002, p.8.

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George Bush admitted that Saddam Hussein had no hand in the 9/11 terror

attacks, but he asked Americans to support a war in Iraq that he said was the

defining struggle of our age. “I am often asked why we are in Iraq when Saddam

Hussein was not responsible for the 9/11 attacks,” Bush said. "The answer is that the

regime of Saddam Hussein was a clear threat. My administration, the Congress, and

the United Nations saw the threat and after 9/11, Saddam’s regime posed a risk that

the world could not afford to take”. “The world is safer because Saddam Hussein is

no longer in power.”90

This was supposed to be a 'war on terrorism' the focus on Iraq has not much

justification. Despite the best efforts by the US intelligence services, no link

between Iraq and international terrorism has been discovered. The famously

'delayed' British intelligence dossier on Iraq dissented sharply from the CIA rumour

mill. It was said that 'Tony Blair is to be told by Britain's most senior intelligence

official that there is no evidence linking Iraq to the September 11 attacks or to

Osama bin Laden's network.'91 The report compiled by John Scarlett, chair of the

Joint Intelligence Committee, 'disputes claims that Saddam Hussein financed or

gave refuge to Al-Qaeda fighters'.92 British intelligence sources say that despite

attempts by the CIA and FBI to find links between Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda

network and Iraq, the British dossier does not refer to them because there is no

evidence to back up the US claims-such as the meeting between Mohammed Atta

the September 11 hijacker, and an Iraqi intelligence officer.'93

US eye on Iraqi oil (over 112 billion barrels plus high quality, low cost of

production), strategic location in between Syria and Iran (to curb Tehran’s options of

taking independent action) and to protect Israel's regional supremacy and its

monopoly of weapons of mass destruction, were some of the real war aims, besides

asserting US global supremacy. Some analysts see an economic dimension to the US

invasion of Iraq. The war in Iraq is actually the US and Europe going head to head

on economic leadership of the world. Since Iraq started at France's persuasion to

trade in Euros for Its oil from 1999 replacing US dollar, other states like Iran, Russia

and Venezuela also started thinking of switching over to Euro from dollar for their

90 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 2006. 91 Sunday Times, March 2002 92 Sunday Times, 10 March 2002, p. 2. 93 Guardian, 10 April, 2002, p. 8.

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oil trade. US had to nip this in the bud as the dollar’s grip on oil trading and,

consequently on world trade in general, was under serious threat94. So, apart from

other reasons, the US goal in going to war in Iraq is also to “safeguard the American

economy by returning Iraq to trading oil in US dollars; so the dollar is once again

the exclusive oil currency.” The purpose was to “send a very clear message to any

other oil producer just what will happen to them if they do not stay in the dollar

circle.”95 It was, after all, partly a war about securing American control over Iraqi

oil. The US will now be able to function as what Christian Parenti (2003) calls an

“energy gendarme” over key oil supplies to East Asia and Europe. Others in national

circuits of American capitalism benefited from the War. For example, Kellogg

Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney's Halliburton that

helped the Pentagon orchestrate the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, received

generous contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure using proceeds from Iraq’s

“liberated” oil sales96.

The American ambitions in the post-Soviet world are truly global and

multifaceted: the aim is to achieve ‘full spectrum dominance’ by whatever means.

The war in Iraq was the manifestation of such a mindset.

The Illegality of the Iraq War

The 2003 fought without UN Security Council authorization led states and

international lawyers to be the be critical of US-led military action in Iraq termed it

as unlawful.97

Since this action was not a case of self-defence against an actual

armed attack by Iraq, and did not have specific authorization of the UN Security

Council, it could easily be viewed as having at best a doubtful basis in international

law. The UN Charter is clear that wars of aggression are prohibited. Article 2(4)

states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or

in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".98 This

94 N.S.Rajaram, “The Shadow War: Euro vs Dollar”. The Hindu, April 22, 2003, p.14. 95 Ibid. 96 John Agnew, “American Hegemony Into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”, Antipode, 2003,p.888. 97 Letter from sixteen international law teachers, The Guardian, London, 7 March 2003, p.29. 98.Art. 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

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prohibition on the use of force finds an exception in Article 51 of the Charter, which

allows for the possibility of self-defence.99

Article 51 states, “Nothing in the present

Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an

armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be

immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the

authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take

at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore

international peace and security".100

It should be emphasized that this exception to

the general prohibition against the use of force is valid only in the event of "an

armed attack" and only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to

maintain international peace and security".

In the case of the US war against Iraq, there was no armed attack against the

United States by Iraq, nor any substantiated threat of armed attack. There was no

credible evidence that Iraq had any relationship to the 11 September 2001 terrorist

attacks against the United States. There was, therefore, no appropriate justification

for the invocation of the self defence exception to the UN Charter's prohibition

against the use of force. Further, the matter of Iraq's failure to complete the

disarmament obligations imposed upon it by the Security Council following the

1991 Gulf war was actually placed before the Security Council by the United States

for action, and the Security Council resisted US pressure to provide the United

States with authorization to use force. The Bush administration, at the urging of

Secretary of State Colin Powell and over the objections of other administration

officials, sought a Security Council mandate to initiate what the United States called

a "pre-emptive war", but was actually a "preventive war" since it involved no

imminent threat of attack but sought only to prevent the imagined possibility of a

future attack against Iraq. “Pre-emption,” the term at the heart of recent debates, is

based on the idea of preventing an attack by disabling a threatening enemy. It can

99.Ibid., Art. 51. 100.Ibid.

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encompass both anticipatory self-defence (military action against an absolutely

imminent threat) and preventive military action (to nip a future threat in the bud).

Any “unilateral” use by states of preventive war is particularly hard to square with

existing international law. The Bush doctrine suffers from a number of defects. The

peremptory manner of its emergence added to the confusion surrounding it. The

however the United State failed to consider the consequences for international

relations if there were widespread claims by states of a right to act pre-emptively. It

also failed completely to mention the non-intervention norm. By transforming the

problem of how the United States might address a few hard cases into general

doctrine, it appeared to undermine the non-intervention norm more directly than was

necessary. Coupled with the proclamation of the “Axis of Evil” in Bush’s January

2002 State of the Union speech, its effect internationally may have been to cause

more anxiety and opposition than reassurance101

The Security Council did agree to one resolution, UNSC Resolution 1441,

which called on Iraq to disarm its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and

cooperate with the UN inspectors but did not include an authorization of the use of

force against Iraq.102

When the United States went back to the Security Council of a

second and follow-up resolution to 1441, this one to provide authorization to

proceed to war against Iraq, the Security Council refused to comply with the US

demand for such authorization on the grounds that it wanted to give the UN

inspectors more time to finish their work. In justifying the 2003 war in Iraq, Bush

administration officials continued to rely upon the Security Council resolutions

preceding the immediately following the 1991 Gulf war. These officials further

argued that the provision in Resolution 1441 indicating that Iraq was in "material

breach of its obligations" to cooperate with UN inspectors on WMD inspections

under previous resolutions, including Resolutions 678 and 687 allowed the United

States legally to initiate its attack on Iraq.103 In fact, however, Resolution 1441

101 Adam Roberts, The Use of Force, in David M. Malone(ed.) The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2006,p.145. 102. Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, 42 ILM 250 (2003). 103. William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, "Preemption, Iraq and International Law" American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3 (July 2003), p. 559.

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offered Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations",104 and

Iraq was doing so. Most important, though, Security Council Resolution 1441 stated

that the Security Council would remain seized of the matter, thus indicating that,

without further council authorization, there was no legal justification for the United

States and its allies to proceed to war against Iraq.105

The Security Council could have chosen to act under Article 39 of the UN

Charter to authorize the use of force against Iraq if it determined that there had been

a breach of the peace of an act of aggression. Article 41 refers to actions the Security

Council can take that do not involve the use of force. Article 42 refers to acts of

force the Security Council can take if it finds the measures under Article 41 to be

inadequate. These include "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be

necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".106 It should be

understood that, even if there had been weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, this

alone would not have been a sufficient justification for pre-emptive war. The mere

presence of weapons of mass destruction, absent evidence of imminent intent to use

them, would be insufficient to justify a pre-emptive war, let alone a preventive war.

Although many Iraqi citizens are pleased that Saddam Hussein was

dislodged from power, the result of the Iraq war has been the death of some 100,000

innocent civilians, severe injury to tens of thousands more, and enormous

destruction of the infrastructure of the country.107

Iraqi society has been devastated

by warfare and its citizens subjected to death, injury, torture and humiliating abuse

such as were revealed at Abu Ghraib prison. The price for regime change has been

very high in terms of death and destruction. Iraq will now have to struggle with re-

establishing itself as a sovereign state, finding its own means of governance in a

post-Saddam and Post-US occupation country. As part of this struggle, it will have

to come to terms with its relationship to the United States, which undoubtedly seeks

104 Security Council Resolution 1441, operative paragraph 2 states: "Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council". 105 Security Council Resolution 1441, operative paragraph 14 states: "Decides to remain seized of the matter". 106 Article 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter. 107 Elisabeth Rosenthal. "Study Puts Civilian Toll in Iraq at Over 100,000", International Herald Tribune, 30 October 2004.

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to ensure special privileges with Iraq with regard to Iraqi oil supplies and the

continued presence of US troops in the region, particularly on newly established US

military bases in Iraq itself. Of course, the United States has also paid a price for the

war in terms of its financial costs, currently estimated at over US$200 billion, the

death and injury of its soldiers, the spreading thin of its armed forces to levels

considered dangerous by leading US military figures, and the loss of respect for and

credibility of the United States in the world community. A major problem in the

international system related to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction is the double standard on nuclear weapons that the permanent members

of the UN Security Council attempt to uphold individually and collectively.

Although these states continue to maintain nuclear arsenals, all seek also to prevent

other states from developing these weapons. In the end, such double standards

cannot be maintained.

There is nothing in Resolution 1441, voted by the Security Council in

November 2002 that suspended the force of the earlier resolution.108 To the contrary,

Resolution 1441 recorded the Council's finding that Iraq "has been and remains in

material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution

687". Iraq was permitted a "final opportunity" to come into compliance, beginning

with an "accurate, full, and complete declaration" of its programmes. But the

resolution warned that false statements and omissions would, in themselves,

“constitutes a further material of Iraq obligations". The hawks holding positions of

responsibility at the White House and in the Department of Defence were

determined to do whatever it took, with whoever would want to join the coalition, no

ring down, Saddam Hussein.109 To them, going through the United Nations was ill

advised. This view was not universally shared in the Republican administration.

Secretary of State Colin Powell epitomized those who favoured building support for

the US policy towards Iraq via the United Nations.110

He managed to convince the

President. In the powerful speech that he delivered to the UN General Assembly on

12 September 2002, George W. Bush stressed that his administration would work

with the Security Council to adopt new resolutions as the instrument for forcing

108 Rugh Wedgwood, "The Fall of Saddam Hussein, Security Council Manadates and Preemptive Self Defense", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97 (2003), p. 25, 29. 109 "The Shadow Men", The Economics, 26 April-2 May 2003, pp. 27-29. 110 Bill Keller, "The World According to Powell", New York Times Magazine, 25 November 2003.

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Saddam Hussein to disarm or, if he refused, as the basis for military action.111 He

also wanted the United Nations that it risked becoming irrelevant it if allowed Iraq

not to comply with the Security Council resolutions. Bush's tactic worked. After a

few weeks of intense negotiations, the Security Council unanimously passed a

resolution with teeth. The war was launched on 20 March 2003 without Security

Council backing.112 With this, the White House showed that it was ready to bypass

the multilateral rules of the game to pursue its objectives. True to its credo of

limiting the role of the United Nations of US needs, in the immediate aftermath of

the war the Bush administration also rejected the idea of the United Nations taking

the lead in the post-war reconstruction of the country and having a say in the

modalities of the transition towards the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty. The

appointment, in May 2003, of a Special Representative of the UN Security General

for Iraq, who did not have much power, was the greatest involvement from the

United Nations allowed by the Bush administration.113

The US and the UK decision to go to war sidelined the UN. Addressing the

Security Council, Kofi Annan asserted that ‘we must all feel that this is a sad day for

the UN and the international community.’114 The way forward for the UN, and the

role it would play in Iraq, were not clear. In early April, Annan appointed

Rafeeuddin Ahmed, a low-key, senior Pakistani UN official with development

experience, as a Special Adviser, to coordinate thinking on the role the UN could

play in post-conflict Iraq. This was potentially controversial, as any UN presence

could be seen as legitimating the Coalition's actions. However, at a senior level the

majority UN view was that the UN could not shirk its humanitarian and peace-

building vocations in Iraq. The Coalition, however, early on seemed uninterested in

any significant UN role beyond humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, a divorce

between the United States and the United Nations would be likely to increase global

instability. Since most countries favour a multilateral approach, resentment towards

111 Remarks by the President in Address in the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 12 September 2002. <http://www.whitehouse-gov/news/release/2002/09/2002091-1.htm>, 112 Michael Byers, "Agreeing to Disagree : Security Council Resolution 1441 and International Ambiguity", Global Governance, Vol. 10, NO. 2 (April-June 2004). 113.UN Security Council Resolution 1483, adopted 22 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1483(2003), requested the Secretary -General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq, with rsponsibiliti8es for coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by UN agencies and between UN agencies and non-governmental organizations. 114 Security Council, 58th year: 4721st meeting (UN Security Council Document S/PV.4721), March 19, 2003), 22.

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the United States would grow. Moreover, the rest of the world (including the

Europeans) is neither willing nor able to take up the task of collective security on its

own, without the United States. The mission of preserving international security

cold end up facing two opposite but equally challenging predicaments: too much

concentration or too much diffusion of power. In the first case, the United States

alone would be more or less in charge of global security, with the various associated

dangers. These dangers could include making US power a global scapegoat for

whatever went wrong. In the second case, left to the goodwill of local actors, the

international order might largely remain unattended to.

There was a certain irony in the fact that while Washington was urging Iraq

to observe its UN obligations the United States was showing its contempt for the

international organisation. The US had already effectively sabotaged the UN

Biological Weapons Convention by rejecting the ‘verification protocol’ essential for

the banning of bio weapons. The United States had also violated the verification

terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and managed to have the worthy Jose

Bustani, head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

(OPCW), fired from his job because he refused to do America’s bidding. In the same

way Dr Robert Watson lost his job as chairman of the UN-sponsored

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, because the White House supported

Exxon Mobil’s hostility to the ‘aggressive agenda’ – that is, pushing for climate-

protection policies – espoused by Watson. Washington had also made it clear to

Kofi Annan that the term of Mary Robinson, UN Human Rights Commissioner,

should not he extended because she seemed to think that the US should observe

human rights. And Washington had already vetoed the second term of UN

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali because he insisted on publicising Israel’s

bombing of civilians and us derelictions elsewhere. Boutros-Ghali himself quoted

Madeleille Albright, then US ambassador to the UN, as saying: ‘I will make Boutros

think I am his friend; then I will break his legs.’115

The continued significance of the UN as the preeminent vehicle for

approving and coordinating international action, including certain uses of force, was

indicated in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war by the passage of Resolution 1483, which

resolved that the UN “should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the

115 Boutros Boutros- Ghali, Unvanquished: a US-UN Saga, London, I.B. Tauris, 1999, p.304.

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reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local

institutions for representative governance,” provided for the ending of sanctions, and

recognized the role of the UK and the United States as occupying powers.116 The

UN therefore remains damaged but not destroyed, as one vehicle for reaching

decisions on the use of force. Paradoxically, even when attempts to obtain UN

authorization for force fail, the appeal to UN principles may have considerable

value. In both the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2003 Iraq crisis, the US-led coalitions

presented as a key part of the legal justification for the use of force the fact that the

military intervention had the purpose of ensuring implementation of UN Security

Council resolutions. In the case of Iraq there was the additional claim of continuing

authority from the UN Security Council to use force. These claims were more than

the tribute that vice pays to virtue: they were recognition that even in the new

circumstances and hard cases of the twenty-first century, force has an unavoidably

close relationship to law. The end of the Cold War seemed to revive faith in the

Charter system, almost giving it a rebirth. Now, however, in the new millennium,

after a decade's romance with something approximating law-abiding state behaviour,

the law-based system is once again being dismantled. In its place we are offered a

model that makes global security wholly dependent on the supreme power and

discretion of the United States and frees the sole superpower from all restraints of

international law and the encumbrances of institutionalized multilateral diplomacy,

as has been sadly observed .The failure of the UN Charter’s normative system is

tantamount to the inability of any rule, such as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to

have much control over the behaviour of states. National self-interest, particularly

the national self-interest of the superpower, has usually won out over treaty

obligations. This is particularly characteristic of this age of pragmatic power politics.

It is as if international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been

demythologized.117

Defending the removal of Saddam Hussein on humanitarian grounds

undoubtedly became more pronounced following the failure to find weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). But it would be wrong to think that such claims were not

116 Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003. 117 Thomas M. Frank, “ What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq”, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, AJIL, vol.97, 2003, p.607.

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invoked by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (the three states

that contributed combat forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom) in the months preceding

the military action. Speaking on 28 January 2003 in his State of the Union Address,

Bush addressed the Iraqi people in the following terms: "Your enemy is not

surrounding your country - your enemy is ruling your country… And the day he and

his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation".118 And, three

days before initiating military hostilities, the President made the following promise

to Iraqis: "we will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a

new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of

aggressions against your neighbours no more poison factories, no more executions

of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms".119

In fact after 11

September 2001 it soon emerged that the United States was prepared to use torture

as an element in national policy in alleged ‘war against terrorism’. The journalist

Alsasdair Palmer spoke to CIA and FBI officers in New York and Washington and

noted the prevailing attitude: ‘They were in no doubt what they would have to do:

they would have to torture people.’120 Some American lawyers were then advocating

the introduction of ‘torture warrants’, with the FBI required to apply for them in the

same way they obtain search warrants.

Jamie Feiner, US director of Human Rights Watch, commented: ‘How can

the US descend to the level of using terror in the war on terror? What sort of victory

is that? This is illegal and it is appalling.’121 And the torture was compounded by

many other violations of international law. Moazzam Begg, seized in Pakistan and

smuggled to Bagram, was denied access to a lawyer, a Red Cross official and any

member of his family122. In mid-May 2003 former Iraqi prisoners of war accused

British and American troops of torturing them for long periods. Amnesty

International, interviewing 20 former detainees, was told about men being kicked,

beaten and subjected to electric shocks at Basra and Nasiriyah. One Amnesty

118. President George W. Bush, "State of the Union" Address, 28 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2003/01/2003128-19.html> (accessed 10 June 2004). 119. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation, 17 March 2003, (http://www.whithouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7html) (accessed 10 June 2004). 120 The Sunday Telegraph, 15 December 2002 121 Geoff Simons, Future Iraq: US Policy In Reshaping The Middle East, New Delhi, 2006, p.297. 122 Ibid.

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International researcher reported a man who was beaten through the night, denied

water, until he was bleeding and his teeth were broken.123

The Iraq War documents leak is the leak of a collection of 391,832 United

States Army field reports, also called the Iraq War Logs, of the Iraq War from 2004

to 2009 to several international media organizations and published on the Internet by

WikiLeaks on 22 October 2010124. The files record 66,081 civilian deaths out of a

total recorded death toll of 109,000125. It is the biggest leak in military history of the

United States,126 surpassing the Afghan War documents leak of 25 July 2010127. The

logs contain numerous reports of previously unknown or unconfirmed events that

took place during the war. According to the Iraq Body Count project, a sample of the

deaths found in about 800 logs, extrapolated to the full set of records, shows around

15,000 civilian deaths that had not been previously admitted by the US government.

66,000 civilians were reported dead in the logs, out of 109,000 deaths in total128

. The

figure cannot be relied upon as a complete record of Iraqi deaths. A widely quoted

2006 report by The Lancet says that there were about 650,000 "excess deaths"

caused by the first 3½ years of the war129. The Guardian stated that the logs show

"US authorities failed to investigate hundreds of reports of abuse, torture, rape and

even murder by Iraqi police and soldiers". It stated that was "a formal policy of

ignoring such allegations", unless the allegations involve coalition forces130.

Sometimes US troops classified civilian deaths as enemy casualties. For

example, the July 12, 2007, Baghdad airstrike by US helicopter gunships which

killed two Reuters journalists along with several armed men suspected to be

insurgents. They, including the journalists, were all listed as "enemy killed in

action"131. Wired Magazine said that even after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse

123 The Guardian, 17 May 2003. 124 Davies, Nick; Steele, Jonathan; Leigh, David "Iraq war logs: secret files show how US ignored torture". The Guardian,22 October 2010. 125 "WikiLeaks website publishes classified military documents from Iraq". CNN. 22 October 2010. 126 "The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs: Greatest Data Leak in US Military History". Der Spiegel. 22 October 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,724845,00.html. Retrieved 23 October 2010. 127 Phil, "WikiLeaks data shows U.S. failed to probe Iraqi abuse cases". Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69L54J20101023. Retrieved 23 October 2010. 128 "Iraq War Logs: What the numbers reveal". Iraq Body Count project. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/warlogs/. Retrieved 23 October 2010. 129 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War_documents_leak 130 Davies, n,124. 131 Ibid.

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incident came to light in 2004, abuse of prisoners or detainees by Iraqi security

forces continued; in one recorded case, US troops confiscated a "hand cranked

generator with wire clamps" from a Baghdad police station, after a detainee claimed

to have been brutalized there.132 One report analyzed by the Bureau of Investigative

Journalism seems to show that "the US military cleared an Apache helicopter

gunship to open fire on Iraqi insurgents who were trying to surrender".133According

to Wired Magazine, "WikiLeaks may have just bolstered one of the Bush

administration’s most controversial claims about the Iraq war: that Iran supplied

many of the Iraq insurgency’s deadliest weapons and worked hand-in-glove with

some of its most lethal militias. The documents indicate that Iran was a major

combatant in the Iraq war, as its elite Quds Force trained Iraqi Shiite insurgents and

imported deadly weapons like the shape-charged explosively formed penetrator

bombs into Iraq for use against civilians, Sunni militants and U.S. troops."134

It was

reported in the Boston Globe that the documents show Iraqi operatives being trained

by Hezbollah in precision military-style kidnappings. Reports also include incidents

of US surveillance aircraft lost deep in Iranian territory.135

A number of the documents, as defined by Al Jazeera English, describe how US

troops killed almost 700 civilians for coming too close to checkpoints, including

pregnant women and the mentally ill. At least a half-dozen incidents involved Iraqi

men transporting pregnant family members to hospitals. 136 The New York Times

said the reports contain evidence of many abuses, including civilian deaths,

committed by contractors. The New York Times points out some specific reports,

such as one which says "after the IED strike a witness reports the Blackwater

employees fired indiscriminately at the scene." In another event on 14 May 2005, an

American unit "observed a Blackwater PSD shoot up a civ vehicle" killing a father

132 http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/10/chemical-weapons-iranian-agents-and-massive-death-tolls-exposed-in-wikileaks-iraq- 133 Stickler, Angus, "US Apache guns down surrendering insurgents". iraqwarlogs.com, 22 October 2010. 134 n. 132. 135 "Leaks shine light on Iran’s role as backer of Iraq’s Shi’ite militias". The Boston Globe. 23 October 2010. http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/10/23/leaks_shine_light_on_irans_role_as_backer_of_iraqs_shiite_militias/. Retrieved 23 October 2010. 136 Carlstrom, Gregg "Iraq files reveal checkpoint deaths". Al Jazeera English, 23 October 2010. http://english.aljazeera.net/secretiraqfiles/2010/10/2010102216241633174.html. Retrieved 23 October 2010.

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and wounding his wife and daughter137. A document from December 2006, as

defined by The Australian, describes a plan by a Shia militia commander to kidnap

US soldiers in Baghdad in late 2006 or early 2007." Also, The Australian reports

that "detainee testimony" and "a captured militant's diary" are cited among the

documents, in order to demonstrate "how Iran provided Iraqi militias with weapons

such as rockets and lethal roadside bombs."138 According to The New York Times, a

number of the documents "portrays the long history of tensions between Kurds and

Arabs in the north of Iraq and reveals the fears of some American units about what

might happen after American troops leave the country by the end of 2011."139

The UN's chief investigator on torture, Manfred Nowak, states that "if the

files released through WikiLeaks pointed to clear violations of the United Nations

Convention Against Torture the Obama administration had an obligation to

investigate them."140

The Convention, according to Nowak, forbids the US from

turning over detainees to the Iraqi government, if doing so meant they might be

subjected to torture.141 In response to the allegations of torture by Iraqi soldiers

under US oversight, US General George Casey, in command of the Iraq War

between 2004 and 2007, said that "[o]ur policy all along was if American soldiers

encountered prisoner abuse, to stop it and report it immediately up the US chain of

command and up the Iraqi chain of command."142 Two American soldiers described

in gruesome detail how their comrades killed three blindfolded Iraqi detainees, one

of whom was covered in brain matter and another who spit blood during his dying

moments. The shootings have dealt another blow to the reputation of US soldiers in

Iraq and fuelled anger against the coalition presence. US soldiers and Mariners have

been accused of a string of civilian deaths in Iraq, including the alleged massacre of

dozens in Haditha. Another hearing was scheduled for soldiers allegedly involved in

the rape and killing of a 14-year-old girt. Earlier in the hearing, another witness,

Spc. Micah Bivens, recalled hearing the shots fired during the mission, but did not

137 Glanz, James; Lehren, Andrew "Use of Contractors Added to War’s Chaos in Iraq". The New York Times, 23 October 2010. 138 "WikiLeaks confirms influences on Iraq". The Australian. 25 October 2010. 139 Gordon, Michael R. "Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line". The New York Times, 23 October 2010. 140 Batty, David; Doward, Jamie "Iraq war logs: UN calls on Obama to investigate human rights abuses",The Guardian, 23 October 2010. 141 Ibid. 142 "US rebuffs Wikileaks Iraq torture claims". BBC News. 25 October 2010.

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see the soldiers’ fire. Bivens said as he approached, he knew immediately that two

were no longer living based on their wounds. Referring to one victim, he said:

“There is no way that he could have been alive considering there was brain on the

ground.” 143

When the trial of Saddam Hussein was being choreographed by the United

States two directors of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, Hanny

Megaly and Paul Van Zyl, pointed out, “It is also not clear whether international

humanitarian law authorizes an occupying power to establish such as tribunal.

Justice dispersed by an occupying power will therefore be of “dubious legality and

questionable legitimacy.”144

The capture of Saddam Hussein had created its own set

of problems for the Bush administration. It has wide-scale repercussions not only in

Iraq and the United States but also in the rest of the Arab world as well as the Third

World145

. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) had been set up and the prospect of

Saddam’s return to power had been eliminated. However, most Shias have resorted

to massive anti-American demonstrations. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said

on March 20, 2003 that the United Nations will do whatever it can to bring

assistance and support to the Iraq people and called on all parties in the conflict to

scrupulously observe the requirements of international humanitarian law. He also

stressed that the leaders of the world should solve their problems within the UN

framework146. The report of Secretary-General enumerated the activities the UN will

carry out in the areas of humanitarian assistance, facilitation of national dialogue,

assistance with the electoral processes and human rights, to be coordinated under a

new UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)147. It also identified other areas

consistent with Security Resolution 1483, adopted in May 2003, where the UN

could provide assistance in the future, including constitutional process, judicial and

legal reform, police training, demobilization and reintegration of former military

forces, public administration, economic reconstruction and sustainable development,

and technical assistance and advisory service to Iraqi ministries148

. Operation Iraqi

143 “American soldiers have killed Iraqi detainees”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 4, 2006. 144 A.G.Noorani, “ A murder’s been arranged,” Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Jan.,2004, p.12. 145 Dilip Hiro, “ End of the Beginning”, India Today, vol.XXVIII, No. 52, Dec.23-29, 2003, pp.34-36. 146 UN Newsletter, vol.58, no.12, 22-28 March, 2003, p.1. 147 UN Newsletter, vol.58, no.30, 26 July- 1 August, 2003, p.1. 148 Ibid.

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Freedom fits into the picture of marginalization and instrumentalization of the

collective security system because the Security Council’s involvement has remained

limited, both in authorizing the use of force and in reconstructing Iraq149

Concluding Observations

The war on Iraq in 1991 witnessed unprecedented international cooperation

for the management of war. Coming soon after the conclusion of the Cold War,

Operation Desert Strom, which drove Iraq from Kuwait, heralded US President

George H.W. Bush in to an era of newly activist Security Council that outlined an

expanded agenda for itself and the United Nations. It was invoking Chapter VII very

frequently. Bush decided to invade Iraq in April 2001 pleading that 'Iraq remained a

destabilising influence to the flow of oil to international markets

from the Middle East'. This was unacceptable to the newly reborn superpower

and therefore the US 'military intervention' became necessary."150

The decision for

military action did not have much to do with 9/11, the war on terrorism, the UN

weapons inspections, weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi human rights that the

US government invoked in the wake of war for its justification. The US involvement

with Saddam Hussein in the years before 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included

large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front

company, and facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors –

are well known and well documented facets of US foreign policy.

Ironically the US and its allies like Great Britain continued to claim that the

reason for making war against Iraq was to prevent it from possessing weapons of

mass destruction though it became clear right at the time of waging war that

evidence in this regard utterly lacked. The credible evidence lacking serious doubts

were raised by the international community on the issue of justification of the war

on Iraq. A pre-emptive attack on Iraq was illegal as under international law, military

action is not allowed except in defence. Scott Ritter, who resigned from the UN

weapons inspection team in 1998, explained to Iraq's government that America's

case for war against Iraq was built upon fear and ignorance, as opposed to the reality

149 Carsten Stahn, “ Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq”, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, AJIL, vol.97,no. 4, Oct. 2003, p.809. 150 Sunday Herald newspaper ,"Official: US oil at the heart of Iraq crisis", UK, 6 October 2002.

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of truth and fact. He pointed out that Iraq had no part in the attacks against America

on September 11th and was in fact active in suppressing the fundamentalist extremist

elements who were blamed for attack on the United States. It was authoritatively

stated by the UN sources that Iraq did not pose the threat perceived by the US and

Britain.

The UN Charter provides a complete framework to deal with threat to peace,

breaches of peace and acts of aggression endangering international peace and

security. It has given Security Council primary responsibility to maintain

international peace and security and only Security Council is competent to determine

whether such threat to international peace exists and what measures should be taken

in the wake of such threat151

. The US attempt to justify its action on the basis of

previous condemnation by Security Council was an attempt to cover its illegal and

unilateral act because the Security Council had already rejected its request to

authorize use of force against Iraq. The US action was unlawful punitive reprisal

aimed to deter potential adversaries. The Security Council resolution 1441 did not

authorize the use of force, it merely provided for enhanced inspection regime. It

provided that “the Security Council shall remain seized of the matter”. The SC was

alone competent to monitor the implementation of its resolutions. The US argument

of implied authorization could not be accepted because UN weapon inspectors were

working with Iraqi regime even after the passing of resolution 1441 and were

sending reports to The UN. The Security Council had not yet considered the option

of resorting to force while the US President had already declared his intentions to

resort to force even if it was not authorized by the Security Council. Iraq war 2003

witnessed a trend for disregard for collective decision-making of the UN Security

Council if there was divergence of opinions. If this is allowed to continue the

Security Council would not be in a position to even condemn a belligerent state in

future, because member states would fear that their condemnation might be taken to

mean as an implied authorization to use force152

.

The US invasion of Iraq not only violated Article 2(4) of UN Charter but

also called into question collective security system established by U.N Charter.

There is a difference of opinion among states about future implications of US breach

151 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, 2003, p. 714. 152 Thomas M.Franck, “What happens now? The U.N After Iraq”, AJIL 97, 2003, .p.607.

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of fundamental Charter provisions, majority of the states believe that prohibition is

dead and UN Charter system is no more effective. It is argued that US claim of right

to use force as a measure of preventive self-defence practically seeks to remove all

constraints on the use of force by sole super power. It makes security of the world

dependent upon the US perception of threat. The US does not consider itself

subservient to UN system as it showed in Iraq war 2003 that it could use force when

such use serves its national self interest even if it is not authorized by UN. As the US

President himself stated publicly, that “we will continue to enlist support of

international community but we will not hesitate to act alone if our national security

requires it”. Such statements indicate United States disregard for collective decision

making process and its willingness to bypass UN system whenever it perceived it as

a obstacle in the realisation of its agenda. US inclinations to act unilaterally are also

evident from its reluctance to support world opinion on the issues of environment,

landmines and International Criminal Court. The UN system is truly in danger of

being abrogated, as US does not treat other members of world community at par

with itself. In addition to that Security Council’s inability to impose sanctions

against a major power for its violations of prohibition makes it a hostage body. It

leads us to conclude that a super power is over and above the UN Charter and

prohibition on the use of force is meant for smaller states. National self-interest of

super power has overridden Charter obligations. Under Security Council resolution

687 the cease fire obligations of Iraq were to be implemented and monitored by

Security Council and only Security Council was competent to decide what action

could be taken in case of non compliance, however, this role was unlawfully

assumed by US in disregard of the Charter. The UN Charter System gives power to

US to veto any collective action and it also obligates US not to use force except in

self defence, it was acceptable to U.S in 1945 but no more in Iraq war 2003 as it

resulted into death of article 2(4)153

. A few states supporting action in Iraq argue that

the UN charter is a dynamic document which is designed to meet the new threats to

peace and security. It is an ever evolving and now regards humanitarian crisis and

overthrow of democratic government as threats to international peace. After the

terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 the Security Council unanimously

recognized US right of self-defence in response to terrorist attacks by non-state

153 Ibid.

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actors. Although Iraq war 2003 was a poorly defended campaign yet it was not

totally illegal as it was based upon US right of self defence duly recognized by SC in

resolution 1373. The threat of unified Security Council action was a very effective

deterrent to compel Iraq to fulfil its disarmament obligations. However

announcement by France to Veto any resolution authorizing force against Iraq and

US unwillingness to adopt alternative course created the major obstacles in evolving

consensus amongst members of Security Council and this led to the deadlock.154

The decision to invade Iraq was not reached through consensus; rather it was

a unilateral decision. At the time of invasion the US failed to enlist the support of

majority of Security Council members. Before and after submission of case to

Security Council, the US President signalled his intentions to use force even without

authorization of the Security Council. This way Iraq war 2003 appears to be a gross

violation of prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, as the

US action has been condemned by general public and majority of the states it is too

early to conclude that prohibition has lost force, in view of strong disapproval of its

action by world community, the unlawful act of the United States may not give rise

to new state practice. International norms are shared views of states and if they are

violated the transgressor is not only required to explain its conduct before

community of states but is also obliged to satisfy world public opinion.155 The

Security Council in its post war resolution 1483 instead of condemning the

aggressor had recognized that U.S. and U.K. have major role in restructuring of

Iraq.156 This kind of unjust decision of a body entrusted with the task of expressing

collective will of the world is highly deplorable as it develops sense of insecurity

amongst smaller and weaker states. The only explanation for this is failure of the

world to challenge US hegemony in the post Soviet era

154 Jane E. Stromseth, Law and force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 2003 AJIL 97.p.628 155 Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for international law and order in the wake of Iraq, 2003 AJIL 97 p.621. 156 John Yoo, International law and the War in Iraq, 2003 AJIL 97, p.563