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CHAPTER- IV
INDIA'S DIASPORA POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO MALAYSIAN INDIANS
India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-IV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians
CHAPTER-IV
INDIA'S DIASPORA POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MALAYSIAN INDIANS
The Indian Diaspora ranks third after the British and the Chinese Diaspora. People of
Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRis) are present in all parts of the
globe. While the history of the Indian Diaspora dates back to the pre-Christian era,
large-scale emigration of Indians took place mainly in the 19th and 20th centuries that
can be divided into four phases The colonial period witnessed unprecedented
emigration of indentured and other laborers, traders, professionals and employees of
the British government to the European (British, French and Dutch) colonies in Asia,
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. However, it was only in the post-World
War II period that the most far-reaching emigration of Ihdians took place, mainly of
professionals, to the developed countries namely England, U.S.A., Canada, Australia
and New Zealand. The oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s saw millions of Indians
migrating to the Gulf and West Asian countries. In today's globalised world, Indians
in various sectors like IT, Medicine, and Trade are finding opportunities abroad,
which also include a large number of students seeking admission in developed
countries, thereby adding to the numbers of the Diaspora.
The chapter will recount the brief history of the Indian Diaspora and also trace· the
evolution of India's Diaspora policy. It examines the pre-modern period, the colonial
and pre-independence policies concerning Indian Diaspora. In order to understand
contemporary India's policy towards the Diaspora, a survey of the developments of
the Nehruvian Diaspora policy is undertaken. The aim is to analyse and explore
Nehru's effect on India's Diaspora policy, keeping in mind that India in the 21st
century has undergone tumultuous change. _In past six decades since independence,
Indian population has more than trebled and fresh energies and innovation have been
unleashed into what is acknowledged as India's success as a fast growing economy.
The chapter focuses on following broad themes; pre-modem period, colonial/British
period, India after Independence and the proactive period of cultivating the Diaspora
which began in the 1990s and continues. This chapter critically analyses the impact of
India's Diaspora policy on ethnic Indians in Malaysia. This chapter seeks to answer
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the following questions: What bearing has India's contemporary Diaspora policy had
on the Indian Diaspora in general and on Malaysian Indians in particular?; What is the
fallout of "India's Look-East Policy" on the Indian Diaspora in Malaysia?; and Does
India differentiate between the "old" and the "new" Diaspora in the sharp societal
cleavages in countries like Malaysia?
4.1.: Emigration in the Pre-Modern Period
Indians have had a long history of emigration to other parts of the worl& India's links
with Europe dates back to the lOth Century BC with ships moving between the mouth
of the river Indus and the Persian Gulf. The Old Testament records that ivory, apes
and peacocks were used for the decoration of the palaces and temples of King
Solomon. Even the Queen of Sheba 1 brought spices as gifts to King Solomon and the
pepper of the Malabar Coastwas known to ancient traders (Abraham 1993: 269).
Fifty years after Buddha's death (483 BC), his disciples went to the neighboring
countries to spread Buddhism and settled there. The Mauryan Empire spread through
the Indian sub-continent and North up to the Hindu-Kush Mountains. King Ashoka
(268-239 BC) embraced Buddhism and sent monks to Central and East Asia to spread
Buddhism. For the first time, entire South Asia, and beyond, was brought under the
influence of one unified political and religious system (Tinker 1990: 7). King
Kanishka (1st century AD) was another champion of Buddhism and during his rule .
Buddhism spread to southern India, Eastern Iran, Central Asia, China, Greece,
Kandahar (now in Afghanistan), and Southeast Asia (Motwani, Jyoti 1993: 33).
Indians settlements were in existence in north-eastern Africa at the time of Alexander
the Great (356-323 BC), when Alexander was advised by Aristotle to establish a
colony of Greeks in Sokotra Island off northeastern Africa. Alexander's army
conquered the island in which Indians were living (Pankhurst 1979). The famous
work Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (a 1st century Greek guide for sailors) mentions
that the Indian ships were arriving along the east African coast. Several Indian gold
1 Sheba was a southern kingdom mentioned in the Jewish scriptures (Old Testament) and the Qur'an. The actual location of the historical kingdom is disputed between southern Arabia and the Hom of Africa. The kingdom may have been situated in either present-day Ethiopia or present-day Yemen, or both.
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coins were found at Dabra Damma, dating from the 3rd century, established evidence
of the existence of trade relations between Ethiopia and India (Narayan 1998).
India had a long-standing mercantile connection with the world as a part of the
ancient network of the Indian Ocean. Geographical proximity facilitated by the
monsoon winds made India, for over two thousand years, a ·very important central
market for gold, ivory, and slaves and the most important source for cotton, cloth,
beads and sundry manufactured articles (Desai 1993: 118). The Greek also mentions
India's trade relations with Rome, Malay and China. Arikanedu in Tamil Nadu was a
Roman settlement where muslin was made for exports to Rome. It was also an entree
spot for the ships to Malay and China carrying Indian goods to Rome. Romila Thapar
attributes the Roman use of this port from the first century BC to the early second
century AD. The imports from India were luxury items like spices, jewels, textiles,
parrots, peacocks and apes. Initially, trade with Southeast Asia was mainly due to the
demand for spices which. sent Indian merchants as middlemen to Malaya, Java,
Sumatra, Cambodia and Borneo which were a treasure-trove of various spices. Larger
trade developed when Indians settled in Southeast Asia; with South Indian traders
dominating the trade together with prominent merchants from Kalinga and Magadha.
During this period, trade with China also increased with the use of Chinese cloth and
bamboo in India. The routing of Chinese silk through the northwestern towns, Taxila
and Broach· added to the prosperity of northwestern part of India. Thaper traces the
colonisation of the Irrawaddy Delta in Burma and various parts of Java to the
Kalingans; and the introduction of Indian/Hindu culture to Cambodia to an Indian
Brahmin named Kaundinya who married a Cambodian princess (Thapar 1966).
There were permanent settlements of India~ traders along the coast of East Africa.
The other dominant trading community was of the Arabs. Arabs developed
Mogadishu and Mombasa as great trading centers. Indian traders, manufacturers and
clove cultivators were concentrated in Zanzibar Island. They were both Hindus
(mainly Vaishyas) and Muslims (Ismailis ai1d Bohras) (Narayan 1998). The Venetian
traveler Marco Polo has a word of praise, for the Gujarati and Saurashtrian merchants
on Africa's east coast, "the best and most honorable that can be found in the world"
(Travels of Marco Polo written in 1260 A.D). Vasco de Gama touched East Africa on
his historic voyage to India. He reached Malindi in 1497 A. D. and found Indian
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merchants in Mozambique, Kilwa and Mombasa. He hireda Guajarati mariner named
Kanji to take him to the shore of India. Indian traders had also settled in Aden and the
Persian Gulf (Tinker 1977 :2).
Indian presence on the east African seaboard was quite substantial up to the beginning
of the 16th century when the western maritime powers arrived in the Indian Ocean.
The use of Indian system of weights and measures, the use of Indian cowries as
currency, and a great demand for Indian goods points to the fact that Indians were
playing a key role in the area. However, there is nothing to indicate that they had
penetrated into the interior or made contacts with its Bantu state systems. Indian
traders, laborers, adventurers and junior administrators took part in the Portuguese
penetration into the interior (Desai 1993: 119).
India has more than two thousand years history of cultural and commercial relations
with Southeast Asia. Commercial relations had a longer history than cultural contacts.
According to Brian Harrison "from at least the sixth century BC onwards Indian
traders were sailing to those lands, and down through those islands, in search of gold
and tin" (Harrison 1966: 1-0). Java was colonised by the Hindus between the 1st and
7th century. In the 7th century; the Javanese converted to Hinduism and an elaborate
Hindu culture developed by the lOth century. The Hindu kingdom (8th-13th
centuries) covered much of Indonesia (New Webster's Dictionary 1992). The Chola
king Rajaraja the Great (AD 985-1018) conquered South India and extended his hold
over Ceylon. Under his son, Rajendra (AD 1 018-35) the Chola power reached out to
threaten the empire of Sri Vijaya in Java and Sumatra. (Sri Vijaya kingdom was
founded in Sumatra before the fourth century AD, it rose to prominence towards the
close of the seventh century AD). The Cholas were expelled from Ceylon in 1070
(Tinker 1990: 12). In the fifth centUry AD Hindu kingdoms were formed in Java
(Majumdar 1988). The people of Java came to share with the·Indians their· religions;
languages; art and architecture; cultural mores; and legal and political ethos and forms
(Arora 1982: 119). This area was exposed to "the heaviest Indianisation" (Wales
1951: 195). Majority of the people of Bali Island still practice Hinduism.
Brahminical and Buddhist influences spread through the intervening culture areas to
islands of Borneo as well as Mindanao and the Vaishyas in the Philippines. They
gradually penetrated even to the northernmost island of Luzon. There are traces of
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Indic influences in the languages, literature and social customs in the Philippines (Rye
1982: 144). In Indochina the kingdoms of Funan, Champa, Karnbujadesa
(Kampuchea), Angkor and Laos were greatly influenced by Indian culture and
civilisation. From the beginning of the Christian era, the Indian merchants,
adventurers, princes and priests, spread the Indian language and literature; religion
and philosophy; art and architecture; and customs and manners in these countries.
The deep imprint of which is visible even today. Later they grew into small kingdoms.
Within two to three hundred years nearly the whole of Indo-China and Indonesia,
comprising Burma, Siam, Malay Peninsula, Cambodia and Annam in the mainland
and the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, Borneo, Celebes and perhaps many others were
scattered with a less organised kingdoms and settlements. Some of these kingdoms
like those of Funan and Champa grew very powerful. These contacts lasted for more
than a thousand years (Reddi 1982:155; Sardesai 1997).
The migration from India in the early stages to Southeast Asia involved limited but
important movement of priests and traders. These people were not part of any massive
wave of population movement. Instead, by their command of specialist knowledge,
they carne to fill vitally important roles in the emerging South East Asian states
thereby able to implant the Indian cultural contribution to Southeast Asia's historical
development. However, the South East Asian classical world does not seem to have
been one marked by large-scale voluntary migration. A limited but highly important
number of Indians settled in the area (Lal2006).
Afghanistan had mainly Hindus and Buddhists followers. It was ruled by the Hindu
kings till the end of the seventh century when the Arabs conquered it and people
embraced Islam. The Banjaras (Gypsies) migrated from India in the lOth century to
several European countries. Their language Romani has a resemblance to Indian
languages. It is spoken in widely varying dialects (Narayan 1998).
Romani is spoken by the descendants of a population which left India at the end of the
first millennium AD and made their way into Europe via Persia and the Byzantine
Empire, arriving there some time during the thirteenth century. The identity of the
first population and the circumstances of their exodus have been the subject of
scholarly debate since the 1780s. Late 20th century research, some of it being
undertaken in India, suggests strongly that the original population consisted of
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different Indo-Aryan descent (in particular Dravidians and the Pratihara migrant
population who had settled in India from north) who formed part of the Rajput armies
to resist the Islamic incursions into India led by Mohammed Ghaznavi. As these
armies moved further west, they were again caught up in, and displaced by the spread
of Islam as it overtook the Byzantine Empire. It was the westward movement which
pushed the Romani population up into Europe. The common name for Romani
population is Gypsy (like Gitano in Spanish) originates in the misassumption that the
population had come from Egypt (Hancock 1993). The Gypsies are spread all over in
Europe. Their population in Europe was about 8 million in 1993 (New York Times,
May 5, 1993), of them 2.5 million lived in Romania and five hundred thousand in
Hungary (Motwani 1994: 3).
The Chettiyars who were bankers and traders of south India and Ceylon from
medieval times, gradually extended their activities to Burma, Malaya, Thailand,
Indonesia and Mauritius (Tinker 1977: 3). Before the Portuguese arrival in the Indian
Ocean, the merchants of Gujarat, Malabar, Coromandel, and Bengal looked to the
east, to the Indonesian archipelago, for direct voyages organised with their own
shipping and capital. From the sixteenth century, the orientation was suddenly
reversed and turned westwards, towards the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Hindu
merchants were to be found all through the Middle East in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. The Sikh empire was spread up to Peshawar and Khyber. The
Gurkhas of Nepal carried out a sub-montane Himalayan empire which stretched from
Da:tjeeling to Shimla. The emigration that took place from India to various parts ofthe
world did not result in any significant permanent settlements (Narayan 1998).
According to Indian Diaspora report (2001), early Indian migration is a subject of
debate among scholars. There is, however, a general agreement that it took place both
by land and sea routes. Different views have been expressed about the causes of
Indian migration to the other parts of the world .. There is considerable merit in the
view that the primary motive for migration was economic. Initially, the mineral
wealth of different parts especially Southeast Asia appears to have been a major
attraction for Indians. The deep imprint of intense interaction is visible even today in
the language and literature, religion and philosophy, art and architecture, customs and
manners of the whole of Indo-China, Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), Thailand,
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Malaysian peninsula and other part of the world. The famous Angkorwat and other
Hindu temples in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, etc. are well
known. However, it is not so well-known that the first royal Shiva Linga in Southeast
Asia was established at Mi-Son near Da Nang in Vietnam, the oldest Sanskrit
inscription was found in a village named Vo Canh near Nha Trang in the southern
part of Vietnam and Hindus are visible in Indonesia's Bali Island.
India did not show any political ambitions or expansionism in neighbouring Southeast
Asia and other part of the world hence the Indian culture, religion and philosophy
were welcome. Mostly because of the above mentioned reason, after the extensive
emigration during the pre-modem period, India did not have any policy or certain
provision related to their emigrants. One of the most important reasons is that during
the per-modem period India was divided in small kingdoms and each of them
followed their own individual goals therefore in the pre-modem period. Their existed
a high possibility of assimilation of the Indian emigrants in the countries of the
adoption. Due to the movement of people and ideas, Indian influence was important
throughout Asia and Europe before the 19th century. However, it was in the 19th and
20th centuries that the large-scale migration from India across the world took place. It
is from this migration that the Diaspora was formed.
4.2.: The Colonial Period
The British colonial rulers invented an ingenious. method of recruiting much needed
plantation labor, popularly known as indenture system, following the Abolition of
Slavery in 1833 and the emancipation of African slaves. The unscrupulous ways of
labor recruitment by fraud & by force and the treatment meted to them, both during
the long journey and in plantations is best described as "A System of Slavery in
disguise" {Hugh Tinker 1993).
Despite the voices raised by freedom fighters in India against the indenture system,
the practice continued unabated for nearly a century from 1834 until January 1, 1920.
Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the most critical among the Members of Imperial Legislative
Council in Delhi, stated that the "worst feature" of indenture system was that the
plantation labor was "placed under a special law, never explained to them before they
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left the country, which is in a language which they do not understand and which
imposes on them a criminal liability for the most trivial breaches of the contracts, in
place of the civil liability which usually attaches to such breaches. Thus, they are
liable under this law to imprisonment with hard labour, which may extend to two and
in some cases to three months, not only for fraud, not only for deception, but also for
negligence, for carelessness and - will the Council believe it? - for even an
impertinent word or gesture to the manager or his overseers" (Report of The High
Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001).
Thus, the poor and helpless left the shores of India in thousands, undertaking long
journeys with uncertainty and hope to be the victims of such horrendous system of
labour under the British planters. The worst sufferers of this treacherous system were
the migrants from the Bhojpuri region (Bhat 2003: 17).
Though the Colonial Government enacted a few legislative directives for the
protection and wellbeing of the indentured laborers in plantation barracks, they were
only violated rather than followed. The Colonial Government of India had persuaded
the Secretary of State for Colonies to appoint a few Commissions of Inquiry in order
to seek justice against discrimination and exploitation of Indian labour but the reports
of various commissions rarely mitigated their plight. Some of these Reports were so
damning that they were not made public for fear of shame (e.g. West Indies Royal
Commission 1940). The only policy that the government followed was to export
sufficient low paid work force to run the plantations. The British encouraged the
indentured laborers to settle down in their island colonies following the ban on
indenture system, to serve essentially the interest of British plantations, a better device
than the damning exploiting indenture system. The British left most of their colonies
with the legacy of hatred between the descendents of emancipated African slaves and
the Indian indentured labour that they called "coolies" (Bhat 2003: 17).
The British Empire had favoured and even encouraged the migration of Asians for
labour or commerce~ The Indian Diaspora in Africa represented only a small fraction
of the total local population (2.3 percent in Kenya; 1 percent in Tanzania and
Uganda), yet the fortunes of the Indian community in East Africa along with those in
South Africa have loomed large in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, in a fashion
that has quite overshadowed the troubles of Indians in Ceylon or South East Asia
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(Twaddle 197 5: 16). Although the troubles faced by the Indian Diaspora in South East
Asia were directly related to their difficult working conditions, the community in East
and South Africa were more of a political and social nature. However, the deportee
Asians in East and South Africa were more an urban, middle class element, capable of
complaining whilst the Indians in Asia remained manual, agricultural labour, and
were not so vocal about their problems.
Before 1860, the Indian interest in Africa had been limited to the economic interests
of the merchants in the coastal cities, who traded spice in Zanzihar, Dar-es,.Salaam
and Mombassa. In 1860, the first indentured labourers reached Natal, and with this
started an extensive Indian settlement in South and East Africa (Grover 1992: 33).
This was also the start of an interest throughout India in political and social
developments in Africa. The overseas Indians became a part of the imperialist system
where white settlers had established their superiority over the indigenous population.
From relatively small beginnings they developed a vast network of trade throughout
the region. The protection of the British administration led to the recruitment of a
large number of Indian immigrants and allowed them to expand into the interior of the
country. The rapid growth of the white settler community in the first two decades of
the twentieth century posed a fundamental challenge to the Asians residing there.
Soon questions emerged about residential rights and other aspects of racial
segregation. The two settler communities lived uneasily next to each other, but could
not do without each other (Lall 2001: 77-78).
Indians went through three contradictory phases: first, they aspired to become like the
whites, claiming to be British citizens in Africa. Secondly, they relied on mobilising
the support of the Indian government through Indian nationalism. However, the
Colonial office strictly opposed both moves. Thirdly, they were pressured to become
citizens of the places they had chosen to live in, something which was unacceptable to
most of them. The Indian government paid attention to all the difficulties and
grievances experienced by the Diaspora and most of the efforts to help them were
undertaken at the beginning of the twentieth century. The domestic public opinion and
Indian nationalists were particularly critical of the indenture system, which brought
with it as many problems as it did economic benefits. It became a big issue both for
the public and the politicians. It is noteworthy that between 1914 and 1948, Indian
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interest m Africa was purely nationalistic, concerned solely with the fate and
problems of the Indian overseas community. No effort was made to include the
African community in the fight for equality (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 301).
According to the High Level Committee Report on Indian Diaspora 2001,
discrimination against Indians was particularly harsh in South Africa. There had been
a split between the Union government and the British government when the
authorities in Natal openly sided with the colonists and planters at the end of 1880. In
1894, the Natal government disenfranchised the Indians and in 1906 the Black Act
made registration and carrying registration papers for Indians mandatory. Gandhi
started a protest movement (Satyagraha) to draw local and imperial attention towards
the plight of the Indian population. Gandhi was concerned not only with the problems
of the South African Indians, but with the lot of Indians all over the world (Letter to
Gokhale 18.10.1898).
Gokhale made two trips back to India during which he wrote the 'green pamphlet' and
addressed the Indian National Congress, the Chambers of Commerce and other
organisations to rally support for their Indian countrymen, especially in South Africa.
Gandhi's campaign in South Africa had the objective of bettering the fate of the
Indian community there. During this time the Indian government maintained pressure
on the Union government as well as on the Colonial authorities in England to improve
the treatment of the South African Indians (Indian Diaspora Report 2001: Chapter-7).
In 1914, the Smuts-Gandhi agreement was signed, promising equal treatment in the
future, but interpreted by the South African Government as a guarantee that most
Indians residing in South Africa would return to their country of origin. In the eyes of
the South Africans they were only temporary residents, despite the fact that earlier Sir
George Gray had clearly stated that the Indian families would remain as settlers after
their term of indenture was over. In fact, the Government of India would not have
allowed Indian emigration to Africa had there been any suggestion that they might be
transported back to India against their will (Ghai 1970: 247-274).
The Indian position was that the immigrants had acquired rights in their new country
and that on top of everything else they were 'British nationals' in South Africa long
before the Dutch and the Germans became nationals (Joshi 1942: 303). The Indian
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government responded to Smut's view by stopping indentured emigration to South
Africa and subsequently abolishing the entire system. This was due to unrest in
Bombay (now Murnbai), which was becoming more and more intense, resulting in
resolutions and memorandums to the Viceroy (Grover 1992: 35). The last emigrants
left India in January 1917 (Twaddle 197 5: 17).
In the East African region, the problems resulted first from discrimination imposed by
the Colonial authorities, then by the antagonism between Africans and Indians. They
were denied proportional representation in the legislative, executive and municipal
councils and were subjected to inferior transport, medical, prison and educational
facilities (Grover 1992: 37). The agitation for equality in East Africa started at the end
ofthe First World War. An East African Indian National Congress was set up and a
list of grievances was sent to the local and imperial governments. A deputation was
sent to India to enlist the support of the Congress and the Viceroy. The expatriate
Indians felt that they were backed by nationalists back horne, some of whom, such as
G.K. Gokhale or Mrs. S. Naidu, advocated an Indian protectorate in German East
Africa, Tanganyika .
. .. East Africa is one of the earliest legitimate territories of the Indian nation going so
far back as the first century of the Christian era. . .. East Africa is therefore the
legitimate colony of the surplus of the great Indian nation, whether they went forth to
colonise these unknown lands from an economic point of view or to satisfy their
desire for venture ... (Sarojini Naidu 1924).
Several political parties, one of them being the Jana Sangh, claimed to establish a
little India wherever there were people of Indian origin. The fact that the Indian
Diaspora in East Africa might suggest that India administer their region, greatly
alarmed the European community in East Africa (Ghai 1970: 331).
Before 1914, the British government was neither consistent nor united in its attitude
towards India's problem in Africa. The Wragg Commission reported in 1887 that
Indian traders had a right to go to any part of the British Empire, since by trading even
in the most remote areas they were providing the white population with a useful
service. The report also noted that the majority of white settlers wanted Indians to be
indentured for as long as they stayed in the colony. They were afraid that the Indians
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would provide fierce competition in both agriculture and commerce (Ghai 1970: 281).
In general, the governors and other officials in the colonies had the interest of the
white settlers at heart, but the colonial office in London had to juggle with pressures
coming from the India Office and the Government of India as well. Some Secretaries
of State such as Chamberlain supported the European interests, whilst others such as
Lord Granville pressed Indian claims (Grover 1992: 35).
During the passive resistance struggle in India the Viceroy, Lord Harding, criticised
the South African racial policies, and was almost recalled to Britain. Yet in upholding
Indian interests, the Viceroy had the support and approval of the India office (Lall
2001: 81).
The British position was that the Indians were simply citizens of whichever colony
they lived in. When India later applied to appoint agents in the West-Indies and Fiji to
help monitor the grievances of the Diaspora, the Colonial Office refused on the
grounds that the Indians there were permanent residents 'enjoying harmonious
relations with other sections ofthe local population' (Twaddle 1975: 21).
But soon Britain found itself caught in an inter-imperial quarrel, where white settlers
were pitched against the Indian population. There were also differences between the
Indian government with other colonial governments and the Foreign and India office.
In response the Foreign Office determined that in Kenya, as in the rest of East Africa
'the interests of the African natives must be paramount and that if, and when those
interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail' (Grover
1992: 309).
This was spelled out in the 1923 White Paper, also known as the Devonshire
declaration. Yet the White Paper also denied the Indians equality of status with the
Europeans in Kenya, causing outrage back in India. By 1923, racial friction was out
of control and the European settlers threatened to secede from the empire if no action
was taken (Grover 1992: 38).
Subsequently, a bill to regulate immigration and employment was introduced into the
Kenya Legislative Council in 1923. It gave wide powers to the immigration
authorities and prohibited the entry of all persons who were unable to produce a
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certificate of employment before landing. However, the white population demanded
controls andrestrictions on continuing Indian immigration. (Khilnani 1984: 58).
The colonial Government of India's position in the 1911 Imperial Conference India
made sure that the overseas Indians problem figured prominently on the agenda. India
did not gain full representation until 1921, her membership having been debated at the
Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918. India also raised the issue of
discrimination against overseas Indians at the Imperial Conference of 1917. The
reciprocity act (Resolution XXII of 1917) ensured that the governments of the British
Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of their own
population by means of restriction of immigration and that British citizens domiciled
in any British country should be admitted into any other British country for visits and
temporary residence (Lall 2001: 81-82).
After the First World War, India became an independent member of the League of
Nations, and with it, several other League and para-League organisations (although
until 1929 the Indian delegation was led by non-Indians). The government of India
used its voice at all international meetings to protest against the treatment of its
overseas population. In 1919, at the Amritsar Congress, it was declared that this
Congress is of the opinion that the anti-Indian agitation now going on in East-Africa
is utterly unscrupulous and trusts that the government of India will safeguard the right
of free and unrestricted emigration from India to East-Africa and the full civic and
political rights of the Indian settlers in East-Africa including the East-African territory
conquered by Germany (Purshotamdas 1971: 24).
At the Imperial conference of 1921, the Indian Government lobbied for the overseas
Indian population living in the Dominions, to be granted equal rights with the British.
Although New Zealand, Canada and Australia were ready to accept Indian equality,
especially in view of the enormous contribution to the war effort, the British did not
support the proposal. In 1923 L.B. Shastri appealed against the colour bar in the
colonies, but no to avail. The Indians were continuously denied the right of settlement
in the Kenyan highlands which were reserved for the white population. At the 1923
Imperial Conference, the issue of discrimination in South Africa was again taken up
by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. In the case of South Africa the principle of reciprocity was
not respected and the Government of India wanted to send an agent to South Africa to
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protect Indian nationals there. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa
explained that in South Africa-it was not a question of colour, but that a different
principle was involved, namely 'that the attitude of thinking men in South Africa was
not that the Indian was inferior because of his colour or on any other ground - he
might be their superior.- but the question had to be considered from the point of view
of economic competition'. In other words, the white community in South Africa felt
that the whole question of the continuance of western civilisation in South Africa was
involved (Ollivier 1954: 15).
The British imperial authorities were not particularly interested in helping, the Indian
communities who were being discriminated against. It became evident in the case of
the Canadian Sikh community in 1908 when the British government upheld Canadian
legislation to limit Indian immigration into Canada. It was therefore left to the
Government of India to fight for the rights of overseas Indians. Since India was not a
national government, it could maintain an interest in the welfare of the overseas
Indian community, but could not do more than lobby with the Imperial powers or ban
the export of labour to the Dominions. India's lobbying at the Imperial Conferences
had some success as it overcame a reluctance to discuss the problem of emigrant
Indians in general and made it one of the Conference's major issues. It seemed that the
empire could no longer lightly dismiss the problem, even if that did not lead to any
dramatic results (Fraser 1978: 155-166).
Despite the creation of the separate department of overseas Indians under an Indian
member of the viceroy's executive council, there was no substantial enlargement of
the role of the Government of India. The separate department of overseas Indians had
at its head Dr N.B. Khare.2 He declared with reference to the Pegging Act and other
anti-Indian measures that: 'Some means must be found for maintaining the dignity
and prestige of Indians and the government of India even in wartime. . .. Had India
been independent she would have considered this a casus belli against South Africa'
(quoted in Twaddle 1975: 22). The sanctions, which India could apply, were of
2 Dr. N. B. Khare was an Indian politician. Before India's Independence, he served as Prime Minister in the flrst elected government of the Central Provinces and Berar in 1937-1938. He resigned at the request of the Indian National Congress leadership. He served on the Viceroy of India's Advisory council from 1943 to 1946. After Indian Independence, he served in the Lok Sabha from 1952 to 1955. He also worked for the welfare of overseas Indians.
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marginal value (Bahadur Singh 1979: 57-58). This, it was felt encouraged the
Dominions to maltreat the Diaspora (Sundaram ·1944: 231 ).
It was only in 1943 that a Reciprocity Act was passed enabling Government of India
to 'institute counter measures'. However, it was to prove not very useful in practical
terms. In fact, India retaliated by issuing a notice that the rights of South Africans
residing in India would be reduced in the same way as those of Indians in South
Africa. After the war in 1946, the Pegging Act in South Africa was reconfirmed and
the Indian population was still represented by Europeans. Subsequently, the Indian
government decided to terminate the Indo-South African · trade agreement, and
announced a trade boycott. This was meant to harm South Africa economically,
especially, since during the war India had become South Africa's third most important
source of imports. In fact, India was exporting five times high as they earlier
importing, but a major item being imported was coal from Natal which was already in
short supply (Appasamy 1943: 61-80).
Despite this, the trade boycott came into force. Direct relations between the two
countries came to a halt after nearly fifty years of negotiations on the Indian Diaspora,
numbered 282401 in 1946 (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 305).
It is noteworthy that India raised the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa at
the United Nations before the advent of Indian independence. At that time the
Diaspora was still very much in the picture of Indian politics. India also raised issues
with respect to the discrimination against Indians for a number of years before calling
for the abolition of apartheid as a system, which then included the blacks and
coloured in the anti- discrimination campaign. It is also notable that India did not raise
the South Africa issue at the Commonwealth meetings in the early years of
independence. Nehru was aware that if he challenged South Africa m
Commonwealth, he would give Pakistan an excuse to raise the Kashmir issue, as this
meant raising domestic matters, which might threaten the integrity of the association
(Jha 1984: 97).
There was a major change in policy, as the issue of South Africa had regularly
featured on the agendas of the Imperial conferences, which were the predecessor of
the Commonwealth meetings (Miller 1974: 129).
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Shastri became the spokesman for India at the League of Nations. He primarily
presented the Indian case for equality, but soon found that the Indians were also
dedicated to an emphasis of African interests. Shastri agreed to assert that Indian and
European claims should yield to the interests of the African population. In this aspect,
he agreed with the Devonshire declaration. Yet the reiteration of the segregation
policies this document also contained made him and Indian public opinion furious. To
him putting African interests first did not mean continuing discrimination against the
Indians. The 38th Indian National Congress annual session in December 1923
declared that unless India became independent, the grievances of the Indian Diaspora
could not be properly remedied (Raj 1979: 63-66).
As far as the nationalists' claims in East Africa were concerned, they were not
advocated by the Indian government, yet it still stood up for the rights of the overseas
coinrimnity when it· came to the discriminatory land and franchise policies in that
region. Indian agitation secured the end of certain policies of segregation in 1922, but
restrictions on residence of non-Europeans on European owned plots remained in
force till 1945. The Indian government did not intend to use the Diaspora as a fifth
column to support anti-Imperial movements in the British dominated African and
Asian countries. Yet right from the start of India's own independence movement India
felt it had to lead a new blockof states and Nehru hoped that the Indian Diaspora
would play a significant role in bringing about de-colonisation (Grover 1992: 570).
Before the Second World War, India maintained a nationalist policy. The Government
of India recognised that it bore responsibility for its overseas population, and used its
voice in all forums to propagate this claim. It also recognised the Diaspora as being
part of the nationalist movement, which was to free India from colonialism. To this
end the Government of India sent deputations to various parts of the .Empire. This
policy remained constant until independence in 1947. Various missions were sent to
different parts of the Empire to report on particular problems concerning the Indian
Diaspora(Lal12001: 85).
172
Sr. No. I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. 8.
9.
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TABLE: 4.1. Missions of Congress Members to the Colonies
Persons deputed Country Year Purpose of mission GcK. Gokhale South Africa· 1910 To discuss the Indian question with South
African Authorities. C.F. Andrews & South Africa 1916 To investigate conditions oflndian Labour. W.W. Pearson &Fiji C.F. Andrews & Malaya & 1923 To examine Indian immigration Ill all its B.D. Chaturvedi Ceylon aspects. M.A. Arulanandam, Ceylon 1923 To investigate into the conditions of life to A.V. Dias, which the South Indian labourers in Ceylon Periasundaram, were subjected. L. Muthukrishna Sarojini Naidu & Kenya 1923 To attend the Indian Congress in Kenya; to George Joseph study the situation and to advise the Indian
Community there on the steps they should take in carrying on their struggle against the insults and injustices heaped on them.
Shridhar Ganesh Kenya 1924 To inquire into conditions oflndian Settlers. & B.D. Chaturvedi C.F. Andrews Zanzibar 1934 To study conditions oflndian settlers. Jawaharlal Nehru Ceylon 1939 To confer with the authorities and
representative associations and individuals on behalf on behalf of the Congress Working Committee and do all that may be possible to effect adjust and honourable settlement.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Ceylon 1939 To assure the Ceylon Indian Congress of the C.Rajagopalachari, full sympathy of the Congress for the cause of A. Aryanayakam & Indians in Ceylon and to take necessary steps to G. Ramachandran secure redress for their grievances by
investigating the matters in dispute. Source: Reports of Annual Sess10n of the Indtan National Congress and Proceedmgs of the All Indta Congress Committee, 1885-1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
These missions, especially the ones in the 1920s and 1930s not only checked on
specific problems of the Diaspora, but also rallied them to the cause of Indian
independence. At the time of independence, India had to review its position in several
areas. This included its future relationship with the former colonial power Britain, its
membership in the Commonwealth and the Diaspora, which was mainly located in the
Commonwealth. At independence India debated whether or not to dissociate itself
from the Commonwealth in their fight against racial discrimination. For decades there
had been in India a widespread and standing grievance against racial discrimination,
especially with regard to People of Indian Origin (PIO) in parts of the British Empire
Commonwealth. An association with an organisation where such racial discrimination
prevailed could be considered an affront to the national dignity of newly independent
India. However, in 1947 the Indian leaders came to feel that by joining the club of the
five white nations, they were actually converting the Commonwealth into a new
multi-racial association, thus enabling other non-white nations to follow later. As a
result of this move the relationship between India and Britain was also fixed, since by
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joining the Commonwealth, India implicitly accepted Britain as a friend and ally
(Rajan 1990: 20).
While discussing the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi it becomes apparent that the initial
response of India on Indian Diaspora was directed towards PIOs. South African
Indians, for whom Mahatma Gandhi struggled in South Africa, a cause, India took to
the UN even before becoming independent and sacrificed its substantial trade relation
with South Africa, was a very special issue for India. Discriminatory treatment in
racially structured society of South Africa had drawn Mahatma Gandhi into active
politics when he had gone to South Africa in late 19th century. Because of Mahatma
Gandhi's struggle for the betterment of overseas Indians in South Africa the colonial
Indian Government and the Indian Government after the independence give more
attention to the plight of ethnic Indians in South Africa than anywhere else in the
world. Later Indian nationalists of all shades had demanded improvement in working
and living conditions of Indians settled abroad. Indian settlers protest began to be
articulated in East Africa also. The East African Indian National Congress, based on
model of Indian National Congress was founded in 1914. A.M. Jeevanjee had started
voicing the grievances of Indian settlers in East Africa. He had gone to the extent of
advocating "the annexation of African territory" (Tangynika) to the Indian Empire
"arguing that it had been an Asiatic kingdom in ancient times".
Indians in Africa formed middle section in three-tier society, whites at top and blacks
at the bottom. However, their presence was more apparent to Africansas they came
directly in contact with them through their retail shops and business. At the same
time, they were aggressive in commercial sector. Similarly, in Mauritius and Fiji,
Mahatma Gandhi had sent Manilal Doctor, while coming back from South Africa, to
mobilise them for education and for giving very high importance to educate their
children (Tinker 1974: 226-43). But more importantly he advised them to actively
participate in local politics and demand legitimate share in the governance and
economy of their new home. Indians also used nationalism to mobilise the Indian
Diaspora around the world to get Indian independence. They were ·exhorted to
identify with India cause as 'only a free India could hope to protect and safeguard
their interest'. Since most of them were taken under a coercive colonial rule, they
were visualised by Gandhi as a segment of emerging Indian independence where they
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will share the· socw cultural space within India. Therefore, it was a policy of
identification and association but it was by and large Gandhi's view. Nehru who since
1930 became official in-charge of foreign policy of India within Indian National
Congress had different views (Dubey 2003: 117-145).
4.2.1.: The Indian National Congress and its Leadership on Indian Diaspora
India's Nationalist Leadership first turned its attention to the issue of Indians overseas
as early as the 1890s. Several founding figures ofthe Indian National Congress (INC)
travelled abroad to study or work and many of them experienced first-hand, the
disadvantages that overseas Indians faced. Racial discrimination and restrictive
immigration policies in the colonies aided the forging of an emotional bond between
Indians overseas and the emerging nationalist leadership. Both groups came together
as they were engaged in opposing colonial regimes (Lal 2006: 82).
As early as 1896, the INC in its Calcutta session recorded 'its most solemn protest
against the disabilities imposed on Indian settlers in South Africa, and the unpleasant
and humiliating distinctions made between them and the European settlers; at the
Ahmadabad session in 1902, it noted 'with regret' the 'Imperialistic spirit of the British
colonies'; and at the Madras session in 1903, it viewed with grave concern and regret
the hard lot of His Majesty's Indian subjects living in the British colonies in South
Africa, Australia and elsewhere. The INC also registered its outrage 'against the
treatment of Indians by the Colonies as backward and uncivilised races'. 'In view of
the great part the Indian settlers have played in the developm_ent of the Colonies', it
called for 'all the rights and privileges of British Citizenship in common with the
European subjects' to be granted to Indians. The Benares session in 1905 upheld 'the
great constitutional importance of the principle of equal treatment of all citizens of the
Empire anywhere in the King's dominions,' and called for a ban on indentured labour
emigration; the ·Calcutta session in 1906 recorded 'deep regret and indignation' at
Indians being· 'subjected to harassing and degrading restrictions and denied the
ordinary rights of British. citizenship in His Majesty's Colonies'; and at the Allahabad
session in 1910, the INC leadership admired 'the intense patriotism, courage and self
sacrifice of the Indians, in the Transvaal, Mohammedan and Hindu, Zoroastrian and
Christian who, heroically suffering persecution in the interests of their countrymen,
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are carrying on their peaceful and selfless struggle of elementary civil rights against
heavy and overwhelming odds' (as recorded in the Reports of Annual Session of the
Indian National Congress and Proceedings of the All India Congress Committee,
1885-1947)-
Subsequently, the first decade ofthe 20th Century marked the beginning of a vital
ideological link between Indian political leadership and Indians overseas, · a
relationship that would only strengthen in ensuing decades. In its annual sessions in
1911 and 1912, the INC asserted its solidarity with Indian settlers in Africa. At
Karachi in 1913, its leaders expressed 'warm and grateful appreciation of the heroic
struggle' being waged by Gandhi and his co-workers, and called upon 'the people of
this country of all classes and creeds to continue to supply them with funds.' Indians
responded generously to the South African struggle: the donations included Rs.
25,000 by J. N. Tata. In 1915, at its Bombay session, the lNC demanded the swift
abolition of indentured emigration, condemning it as 'a form of slavery which,
socially and politically, debases the labourers and is seriously detrimental to the
economic and moral interests of the country.' In 1916 at Lucknow, it expressed its
'ever-growing sense of dissatisfaction at the continued ill-treatment of Indian settlers.'
By then, sympathy for Gandhi's decade-long campaign for the cause of Indians in ·
South Africa was spreading. Gandhi had attended the 1901 session of the INC as a
delegate from South Africa. His personal contacts with Indian nationalist leaders,
most prominently the veteran, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, encouraged the INC to show
solidarity with Indian communities not just in South Africa but also in Zanzibar, Fiji,
Malaya, Burma and Ceylon. Gokhale contributed decisively by galvanising Indian
public opinion in support of Gandhi's struggle, mobilising funds and directing
Empire-wide publicity for Gandhi's activities. By touring South Africa, Gokhale
signaled to the South African authorities that the weight of Indian political opinion
was·solidly behind Gandhi. This helped· to bring Gandhi's South African campaign to
fruition (Reports of Annual Session ofthe Indian National Congress, 1885-1947).
Gandhi's return to India, on 9 January 1915, and his growing stature in Indian politics
increased awareness of the anti-racist struggles of Indians Overseas. The INC became
more receptive to their plight and showed greater affinity with their cause. The work
of Charles Freer Andrews and other activists brought into sharp focus the situation in
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various colonies. Between 1915 and 1920, strong public sentiment developed within
India, leading to demands for the abolition of the indenture system in Fiji, followed by
other British colonies. Abolishing indentured emigration could not have been possible
without strong, sustained support from the INC leadership. In the early 1920s, as the
INC revamped itself into an effective mass nationalist organisation, it also formalised
its links with Indians overseas. It affiliated with Indian organisations in other
countries, enabling them to participate in and contribute to the deliberations at its
annual sessions. Among its early beneficiaries were the British Indian Association of
Johannesburg, the British Indian League of Cape Town and the Point Indian
Association ofDurban. By the late 1920s, several such groups enjoyed INC affiliation
(Reports ofthe Indian National C~ngress, 1885-1947).
Soon, the consciousness of an organic link between Indians overseas and the anti
colonial struggle in India grew. In his presidential address to the 1926 Gauhati
Congress, Srinivas Iyengar declared "The lineaments of our great ancestry reveal
themselves in the today ... the adventurous spirit of early India which built up long ago
a greater Bharat Varsha to the East and to the West, to the North and to the South is
not extinct. It is now seen in the greater India which our brethren, in humble and
laborious fashion, are building for us in far off lands against unparalleled odds. The
status of Indians abroad, whether in South Africa or Kenya; in Fiji or Guinea (sic:
Guyana), in Ceylon or Malaya, in America or Australia, depends inevitably upon the
status of Indians in their own land; and the Swaraj for India depends in its tum upon
the brave and unfaltering spirit of our kith and kin across the seas" (Reports of Annual
Session of the Indian National Congress and Proceedings of the All India Congress
Committee, 1885-1947).
Iyengar, noted with satisfaction that 'with patience and perseverance, our brethren are
solving me question of racial equality all over the world. We can help them only by
winning Swaraj for India.' He even suggested that the INC hold an .annual session in
South Africa to reinforce its solidarity. For the INC leadership, the cause of Indians
overseas was an extension of the anti-imperialist struggle in other parts of the Empire
and presented an opportunity to highlight colonialism's underlying racist dimension.
In 1929, the INC institutionalised this aspect by setting up an Overseas Department
under Jawaharlal Nehru, who showed a special interest in international affairs. The
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department would stay 'vigilantly aware of all the legislations and enactments that
adversely or otherwise affect Indian settlers abroad'. Among the prominent leaders
who undertook visits and study missions to report on the conditions of Indians
overseas were 'Charlie' Andrews, a close associate of Gandhi, who visited South
Africa and Fiji in 1916; Hridayanath Kunzru, who visited Fiji in 1923; Sarojini Naidu,
who went on a mission to Kenya in 1923; V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, who visited Fiji and
Australia in the 1930s; and Nehru, who visited Malaya, Ceylon and Burma in 1936
and 1939. Political leaders with non-INC ideologies also identified with the cause. In
1929, E. V. Ramaswami Naicker 'Periyar', founder of the Dravidar Kazhagam and the
Self-Respect Movement in Southern India, visited Malaya and Singapore to spread his
message among Tamil migrants. Similarly, Communist leader A. K. Gopalan visited
Malaya in 1939 (Lal 2006: 83).
Though much of the nationalist leaders' concern was focused on migrant indentured
labourers, miners and plantation workers, it also extended to merchant and trading
communities w~o featured prominently in the Diaspora. In the 1930s, when European
interests discriminated againstlndian clove traders in Zanzibar, INC leaders raised the
issue in the Central Legislature and called for a boycott on cloves, forcing the
authorities in Zanzibar to end discrimination. In the early 1940s, INC leadership took
up the cause of the Chettiar and Marwari merchants when their substantial business
interests in Burma were affected by discriminatory trade agreements in 1941. Gandhi
himself took up the issue, compelling colonial authorities to retract the unfair
proposals (Reports of Annual Session of the Indian National Congress and
Proceedings of the All India Congress Committee, 1885-1947).
In the 1940s, World War II and its adverse effects on Indian communities in
Southeast Asia elicited widespread sympathy. Subhash Chandra Bose's formation of
the Indian National Army (INA) and his call to Indians overseas to take up arms to
liberate the motherland boosted the patriotic sentiments that Indians at home felt with
regard to the overseas communities. After independence, B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a
veteran INC leader and official party historian, observed, 'Indians abroad, it may look
like a paradox to say so, paved the way really for Indian emancipation. It was the
gospel of passive resistance that was conceived, developed and implemented in
Transvaal in 1908 ... [that] paved the way for the development of non-cooperation,
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passive resistance, civil disobedience and satyagraha ... We therefore owe all that we
are to the initiative, the originality, the daring and the sacrifice of the Indians abroad'
(Consolidated Annual Report on the working of the Indian Emigration Act: 1922,
1934-1940, 1944-1950, 1953-1957).
4.3.: Evolution and Impact of Nehru's Diaspora Policy
After India's Independence Jawaharlal Nehru, became the first Prime Minister of
India. India's participation in Asian affairs in the 1940s and 1950s was inspired as
much by the sentiment of common identity, as by the hope of keeping the region free
from external interference. The Asian Relations Conference, the Conference on
Indonesia and the Bandung Conference, recognised the necessity of cooperation
among the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia, He had long ago visualised
the clash of interests of Indians overseas and local inhabitants. In 1957, Nehru stated
"Indians abroad always should give primary consideration to the _interest of the
people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be placed in a
position of exploiting the people of those countries; in fact, we have gone thus far and
said, if you cannot be, and if you are not, friendly to the people of that country, come
back to India and do not spoil the fair name of India. " This quote reflects the
importance that he attached to the positive role the overseas Indians could play by
assimilating themselves in the host countries. He did not wantthe presence of these to
become a negative issue in India's relations with the host countries. Although, the
involvement was more with Indians who had migrated to Burma, Malaya and Sri
Lanka, initiative was taken by Nehru for evolving a general policy towards Indians
settled abroad including those in the Caribbean· and Africa. As ·way back in 1927,
when he was appointed secretary of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), - he
prepared a paper titled 'A Foreign Policy of India' for AICC. In this paper for the first
time, he categorically outlined the policy of INC regarding Indian settlers in other
colonial countries, the role India wanted them to play in their country of adoption and
the kind of support they could expect from India. He asked the most vexed questions
in the paper, "What is the position of Indians in the foreign countries today?"
Providing an answer he stated that Indian overseas went, as "a hireling of exploiter"
i.e. British government and he wanted this position to be changed. Regarding the
complex relationship between the overseas Indians and the host countries, in a
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persuasive argument he suggested that "an Indian who goes to other countries must
co-operate with people of that country and win for himself a position by friendship
and service ... The Indians should co-operate with Africans and help them, as far as -
possible and not claim a special position for themselves" (Selected Works of
Jawaharlal Nehru 1972: 353-68).
However, there was no consensus in the INC, another stream of Congress comprising
of C.F. Andrew, Srinivas Shastri and HN Kunzru, M.M. Malaviya, B.G. Gokhale
were mainly concerned with discrimination of Indians in Africa and other places and
wanted for them a parity with white settlers. Many of them visited worker
recruitment centres and talked to them about their problems. The agitation of
Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa was also confined to the betterment of Indian
settlers cause. In succeeding years, the issue of discrimination of Indians in South
Africa became a sentimental issue for Indian nationalists, as Mahatma Gandhi was
very closely associated with it. Nehru represented the left wing tendency in the
Congress. He differed with the conservative wing whose demand was confined only
for betterment of Indian overseas. Nehru believed in cooperation between Indians and
Africans, however until late 1940, his sympathy and worry were also confined, only
for Indians in South Africa. This contrasted with his general policy of Indian support
to combined struggle of Indian settlers and Africans in which African cause was
paramount. Nehru's special support to Indian settlers in South Africa was very
obvious. In a message to INC of South Africa, Nehru wrote in 1939, "India is weak
today and cannot do much for her children abroad but she does not forget them and
every insult to them is a humiliation and sorrow for her and a day will come when her
long arm will shelter and protect them and her strength will compel justice for them"
(Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 1976: 618). Those days still appear distant! It is
this duality between Nehru's policy and the presence of two wings (conservative and
left) in Congress, which help us to understand the change and continuities in Indian
support to Indian settlers in Africa. However, by early 1950's it was Nehru policy
towards East African Indians that ultimately prevailed even in South Africa and other
countries. Congress had set up an overseas department in 1929 and a slender contact
was established with local Congress organisations in South and East Africa. Nehru
took over foreign relations when an interim nationalist government was formed under
him on 2 September 1946. He took the issue ofindian discrimination in South Africa
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beyond Commonwealth to United Nations. After independence, Nehru expressed his
views on the position of Indians in Africa and other places in free India. Speaking in
the Constituent Assembly on 8th March 1948 he said, "Now these Indians abroad
what they are? Are they Indian citizen - are they going to be citizen of India or not?
If they are not, then our interest in them becomes cultural, humanitarian and not
political... either they get the franchise of the nationals of the other country or treat
them as Indian minus franchise and ask for them the most favourable treatment given
to an alien". He advised Indian immigrants, "If you cannot be, and if you are not
friendly to the people of that country, come back to India and do not spoil the fair
name oflndia" (Selected WorksofJawaharlal Nehru 1976: 618.)
An immediate question that arose after independence was related to citizenship. A
statement by Nehru prior to independence illustrates the change that carne about on 18
March 1946; Nehru arrived in Singapore for what was considered a historic visit.
Addressing a crowd of over 10,000 Indians, and referring the nationality issue, he
promised, 'When India attains independence, she would immediately decide who her
nationals were and Indians overseas would be Indian nationals unless they choose to
be otherwise.' Nehru and other leaders had of course not foreseen the Partition of
194 7 and the large-scale uprooting of minorities and forced migration it would entail.
Before 1947, Nehru's view of citizenship hinged on a loose, undefined notion of the
affinity of individuals to the motherland. Following the Partition, the Indian concept
of citizenship was framed on the basis of territory. The 'country of birth' criterion
could no longer be applied as millions had been uprooted from their birthplaces to
become citizens of India or Pakistan, based primarily on religious identity. India's
Constituent Assembly had to frame the nation's citizenship laws under such
extraordinary and troubled times. Due to Independent India's need to cultivate a more
bounded sense of itself as a nation, the framing of citizenship became an issue. The
Indian Constitution of 1950 merely laid down the principle that all those born in
undivided India, or those with parents born there, could claim Indian citizenship;
leaving to parliament the actual task of formulating citizenship laws, and in doing so,
not ruling out the possibility of dual citizenship. However, citizenship laws in
independent India could not be framed for the first eight years. Meanwhile, the
government invited Indians overseas to register with their nearest missions,
instructing the missions to register all Hindus and Muslims, whether born in Indian or
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Pakistani territory, as Indians if they expressed the desire. This left the legal status of
Indians overseas undecided, causing much uncertainty and anxiety, as in the case of
East Africa, where several Indians registered for citizenship with Indian missions. In
the early 1950s, when they were offered British Commonwealth citizenship, they
assumed that India would allow dual nationality. The Indian envoy in Nairobi
reportedly assured them that they 'would not lose their Indian citizenship by acquiring
that of the UK.' However, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 specified that anyone
who had 'voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country should cease to be a
citizen of India.' By disallowing dual citizenship, India had disappointed overseas
Indian communities. The overseas Indians became aliens like any other foreigner and
the Government of India restricted their rights in buying/owning property and
investing in their country of origin. In a single stroke, the Indian state cut itself loose
from its Diaspora (Report of The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001:
507-534).
Post-colonial India;s policy towards the Diaspora was deeply informed by Nehru as
the country's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Convinced that it was in the best
interest of overseas Indians to integrate into their host societies, he repeatedly argued
for them to 'identify themselves with and integrate in the mainstream of social and
political life of the country of their domicile.' There were many reasons for India's
policy of disengagement and distancing. In the Cold War era, India's foreign policy
was based on ideas of neutrality from the 'great power blocs' and solidarity.with the
'Third World', in which friendship with newly liberated Africa and Asia was highly
valued. Nehru's aspiration to propel India onto the world stage through its leadership
of the Non-Aligned Movement depended on the goodwill ofAfro-Asian countries,
which hosted many Indian communities. Accordingly, India cultivated good relations
with Asian and African states, though it meant neglecting the Diasporas interests. It
did not adopt an interventioirist policy on behalf of overseas Indians, lest India be
seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of other states (Lal 2006: 86). It culminated
in the Panchsheel, a declaration of world peace and cooperation. This was to unitethe
Asian and African Nations under a common foreign policy, which was described by
Nehru as the recognition of sovereignty and integrity of a: country, non-aggression,
and non-interference in other countries either for political or ideological reasons,
mutual respect and peaceful coexistence (Grover 1992: 43). In the long run this was to
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consolidate Nehru's aim of an Afro-Asian voice and voting bloc in the UN. In fact,
had Nehru's government pressed on expatriate Asian rights and privileges, it would
have disrupted possible future cooperation between India and the relevant host
countries (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 289).
From 1950 onwards, under Nehru's influence, India followed an economic model of
planned development aimed at reducing income disparities, curbing the concentration
of economic power, regulating private capital and encouraging reliance on the state.
The goal of national self-sufficiency led Indian policy-makers towards the framework
of a closed economy, which did not value links with Indian mercantile communities
overseas (Lal 2006: 86).
Nehru made it clear in 1950, "In many parts of Africa-East, West, South- there are
considerable number of Indians, mostly business people. Our definite instructions to
them and to our agent in Africa are that they must always put the interest of
indigenous populations first. We want to have no vested interests at the expense of the
population of those countries". He emphasised the same view repeatedly. He said
about Indians abroad, "if they adopt the nationality of that country we have no
concern with them. Sentimental concern there is, but politically they cease to be
Indian national (Nehru's reply to debate on foreign policy in Lok Sabha 2 September
1957). Nehru asserted in 1953, "About Africa and Indians there, I may tell you, the
policy we have pursued for many years .... We have told them very definitely and
precisely that we as government do not encourage or support them in anything they
might want and which goes against the interests of the Africans. We have made that
perfectly clear". Nehru was very clear that any overt move by Indian government for
PIO would do more harm than good to them. He was not against people-to-people
contacts or non-governmental association. Nevertheless, Nehru also talked· about
double loyalty of Indians overseas. "During Indo-Chinese war India welcomed
contributions from Asians of East Africa to help boost its defence efforts. When
questioned on this Nehru told to a foreign journalist that- "Indians overseas have dual
loyalty, one to their country of adoption and other to their country oforigin" ·(Gupta in
Twaddle ed. 1975: 134).
The one exception to the Nehruvian policy was the case of Ceylon where Nehru quite
unsuccessfully tried to haggle out a deal for the Indians resident in this neighbour
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country. India strongly protested against the Ceylonese Citizenship Act which decreed
that nationality could only be claimed by descent or registration (registration requiring
continuous residency since at least 1946 or earlier) which excluded most of the
Ceylonese Indians. Ceylon wanted India to take back a sizeable portion of their
emigrant population. The fate of the Burmese Indians was quite similar, yet in this
case India did not put any pressure on the Burmese Government and even signed a
Treaty of Friendship in 1951. Needless to say both cases became quite messy over
time and because of their geographical proximity could not be ignored and found their
way into Indian politics frequently (Tinker 1976: 339-342).
Malaysia was another controversial case where the attitude of the Government of
India shortly after independence was not altogether consistent: the Nehruvian message
of expatriate Indians identifying with the country of their adoption had not been
clearly communicated to the Malaya Indians during Nehru's visit in 1946. When given
the choice of Malaysian citizenship most Indians chose Indian citizenship although
half of them were eligible for Malaysian citizenship (Tinker 1976: 351-352).
Nehru. also stood for primacy of Africans if there interest was to clash with Indian
settlers, however, when Asian Relation Conference was organised, two South African
Indian leaders - Y.M. Dadoo and G.M. Naicker were invited but there was no black . .
participants from South Africa. Even during Nehru's Prime Ministership when the
issue of racism in South Africa was taken up in U.N., it was only the case of Indians
discrimination in South Africa that was India's concern, though soon India had to
change its policy to include black Africans also. This caused great misgiving in
Africans. During 1960-66 the vacuum between India and Indian settlers abroad
widened as India came to believe that Indians were more of an obstacle than an asset
in its diplomatic relations with Africa. In urgency after Chinese attack, it seemed a
matter of smaller consequences if PIOs were to face some degree of discrimination
(Dubey 2003: 138).
When Nehru formulated India's position on Indians overseas, most of the countries in
the Third World were under colonial rule. Before independence, the Indian concern
about the treatment of Indian settlers abroad was with the intention of making British
rulers of our country responsible for the welfare of overseas Indians and securing for
them fair treatment and justice in relation to white settlers. The assumption that such
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responsibility continued was occasionally expressed in Parliament and the media.
Immediately after India's independence, the Government of India was not in a
position to assist India settlers in their quest for full justice. Moreover, the leaders of
white settlers in Kenya and South Africa had seen Indian independence as a threat to
British rule in Africa. They called Nehru, a Hindu communist who wanted to replace
European rule by Indians.3 Their propaganda about sinister Indian designs on African
colonies, where Indians were in substantial number and the image of Indian settlers in
Africa as an exclusive community, whose only interest in Africa was economic
exploitation, made Indian leaders very sensitive on question of Indians overseas. The
condition of Indian migrants in neighbouring countries like in Burma, Malaysia, and
Uganda were ignored. In fact the problem of PIO indifferent countries were so
diverse, the positioning and status so different and the reach of India so varied that a
nascent Indian state did not find itself equipped and strong enough to address the
Diaspora issues head on beside this Nehru had other priorities like mobilisation of
Afro-Asian countries to keep them away from cold war rivalries. Nehru's policy of
exhorting Indians to identify themselves with locals in Asia and Africa was not based
only on his ideological commitment. In Kenya, the presence of Indian settlers was
larger than European community and Kenyan European wanted to keep Kenya as
Whiteman's country. A strong anti-Indians campaign was being pursued by Whites in
Africa and several riots broke out in Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa involving
Indians and Africans during 1944-49. If African's struggle· was to be weakened and
divided, there was every likely-hood that White Kenyan settlers could have extended
South African model· in East Africa. Therefore, it was necessary that Indian settlers
joined hand with blacks in opposing white settlers even sacrificing their short-term
gains. The Caribbean Indian was so far off that knowing their problems and
marginalisation by black Diaspora community as· well as by Colonial rulers was
ignored. Unlike the problems of Indians in Ceylon or in Burma or in Malaysia or even
in Africa, it created little pressure from Indian leader and masses at home. Therefore,
it was the distance, the absence of connectivity with India that led to the maximum
neglect of the Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean by Nehru and Indian leaders (Report
3 Group Captain IR Brigg, the conservative White settler leader in Kenya asserted about India that they want to squeeze us out and make it an Indian colony. The Times, (4 August 1954: London). Again South African High Commissioner in London had stated in 1954 "IfNehru.could weaken European influence in Africa then it will mean Africa for Indians." V. Me Kay Africa in World Politics (New York 1963)p,170.
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ofThe High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001).
Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly on 9th August 1948, "The Indian Commis
sioner will not be entitled to discharge consular function in respect of Indians who
may not be considered to be (Indian) national, that is permanent resident in those
territories or to act as spokesman of such Indians''. When Mau Mau rebellion 4 (1952-
60) broke out in Kenya, very few Indian settlers in Kenya sided with the British and
they were accused of being with rebels. "There were few Europeans in Kenya who do
not insist that New Delhi through its official and non-official representatives in Africa
has encouraged and added the rebellion of Mau-Mau" (Michael Blundell New York
Times 19 July 1953). Aba BPant was charged in the British Parliament for fomenting
Mau-Mau trouble.5 Unlike what it did in South Africa, India took a softer stand and
recalled Pant under pressure. During late 50s, Indians were considered as hurdles in
consolidating Indo-African relations and this continued even after the India-China war
of 1962 when Indian isolation was exposed. Mrs. Indira: Gandhi in her capacity as
official delegate toured- African- countries in 1964 and continued to emphasise that
Indian settled in Africa must identify themselves completely with the African people
and make their fullest contribution to the societies in which they lived. However, as
seen by her tour programme in Africa, besides her official engagements, she made it a
point, not to neglect Indian settlers, leaders and members of the community though
only in certain small location where the numbers did not even exceed fifty (Gopal
1984: 15). She also called Indian settlers as 'Ambassador of India' in Africa.
Similarly while touring Fiji, Mrs Gandhi sai<:l that "I feel like a mother concerned
about the welfare of a married daughter who has set up home far away' (Thakur 1985:
356). It shows a subtle departure from Nehru policy, as Indian settlers became now a
useful instrument for generating goodwill for India. Their position. as ambassador of
India' implied that they were no more excluded from policy considerations of India.
4 The Mau Mau Uprising of 1952 to 1960 was an insurgency by Kenyan peasants against the British colonialist rule. The core of the resistance was formed by members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, along with smaller numbers of Embu and Meru. The uprising failed militarily, though it hastened Kenyan independence and motivated Africans in other countries to fight against colonial rule. It created a rift between the white colonial communit)r in Kenya and the Home Office in London that set the stage for Kenyan independence in 1963. It is sometimes called the Mau Mau Rebellion or the Mau Mau Revolt, and, in official documents, the Kenya Emergency. 5 Lord Alport raised the question concerning "the contribution made to prevailing conditions of transition and unrest in Kenya during Mau-Mau rebellion by the staff of Indian High Commission office". Alport demanded that government of India should be asked to withdraw its staff from Kenya Britain: House of Commons Debates, Vol.518, and 29 July 1953.
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These shifts became more noticeable in many areas when Mrs. Gandhi became the
Prime Minister of India. However in 1972, when Uganda's Idi Amin expelled Indians
from the country, the Indian government continued its policy of non-involvement, not
offering any effective help (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Annual
Reports 194 7 -1995). This perceived apathy evoked widespread criticism within India.
4.3.1.: Pro-Diaspora Policies in the 1970s and 80s
East Africa: In 1967, government of Kenya started the Kenyanisation of its
economy when all non-citizens, largely Indians, were asked to take work and
residence permit. It allowed them to trade only in restricted areas and items. Though
it was a purely internal policy measure of Kenyan government, India advised them to
surrender British passport and get local citizenship. Indian diplomats mobilised PIO in
favour of this move but not many responded to it. For PIOs, accepting the advice to
mix with African meant giving their daughters in marriage to local Africans. PIOs
were not willing to migrate to England because of social insecurity and degeneration
of their children in western culture. Going back to India and being trapped in vicious
trap of poverty, filth and unemployment was out of question (Gupta in Twaddle ed.
1975: 130). Partly Indian policies also did not allow them to forget their old links as it
appealed to them thrice in two years, for financial. help for defence fund to contain
China and Pakistan. A large number of visitors from India, religious leaders, fund
collectors for charity and politician kept coming and made contact with PIO. All these
were strengthening the feelings of mutual dependence. When they were in crisis this
time India did not react in the same way as it used to do.6 The Indian Parliament
discussed the issue at length and Mrs. Gandhi made Intervention during debate to
assure the members that government was monitoring the situation7•
The then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, B.R. Bhagat was sent to
Nairobi carrying personal message of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Kenyatta. Bhagat when
returned to India accepted in parliament that there was rampant rumour in Kenya that
India was going to interfere in internal affairs of Kenya because "he was going there
6 Nehru used to say that if they are not ready to become citizen and not welcomed there they should
come back to India. 7
Indian parliament was told that there were 186,000 people of Indian origin in Kenya. Out of this, 130,000 were British citizen, 44,000 Kenyan and only 4,000 were Indian nationals.
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to ask them to slow down their policy" (India Lok Sabha debate 25 March 1968).
Bhagat had a prior appointment with President Kenyatta but the latter cancelled the
appointment when Bhagat reached Nairobi. Bhagat met vice-president and other
officials but came without delivering Mrs. Gandhi's letter to Kenyatta. Indian
Parliament felt that cancellation of Bhagat's appointment was to snub India. New
Delhi suspected British hand as Britain was propagating that India wanted to interfere
in Kenya's internal affairs (ibid). Public opinion was raged in India as well as in
Nairobi. The Times of India on 26 March 1963, wrote "But if the implication is that
president Kenyatta fell into a trap laid for him by a third party, it does little credit to
his political acumen". Justifying the cancellations of appointment Daily Nation
(Nairobi) criticised Bhagat's decision to not hand over the message for Kenyatta to
somebody else and called his conduct as bad tempered. 8 The, then, Indian High
Commissioner, Prem Bhatia narrated the incident in his book later. "My opposition
made no difference. I was informed that the move was based on political decision and
that it had already been announced as a government commitment. In the event I had
no alternative but to prepare myself to make the best ofa bad job" (Bhatia 1973: 130).
Nevertheless, Government of Kenya extended the permit to non-citizen for a longer
period varying from one to two years with prospect of renewal.
The Indian govel11111ent had started economic initiatives at bilateral level to bring
Indian settlers in Kenya within the policy framework of India. It proposed to establish
Africa-India Development Corporation with Kenyan PIO and Indian capital, its aims
was to seek integration of the Indian co111munity in the economic life of Kenya, thus
fortifying the foundation of a multiracial society (AICC Economic Review Review
October 1966). Finally it could not materialise, due to the reasons of Indian
disinterest, but it did show the shift, which was coming in Indian policy for PIOs in
Africa.
Uganda was another country in East Africa where India's policy on Indian settlers
demonstrated the shift. When Idi Amin came to power in January 1971 in Uganda, he
8 Daily Nation wrote - "The head of state is a busy person with many calls on his time and Mr. Bhagat should have been quick to appreciate this fact. Cancellation of the appointment however did not imply refusal to receive the message. He declined, preferring to return to India, with the message. He may argue that he was right in his decision. That is-his right We respect it. We feel that his decision was wrong and his conduct bad tempered." Daily Nation (Nairobi) 27-3-68 reproduced in Africa Diary Vol. VIII, No. 20, 1968, pp. 3921-2.
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wanted to put the entire Ugandan economy in the hands of Ugandans of African
origin. He said that 80,000 Asians in Uganda were sabotaging the economy and
encouraging corruption and therefore there were no rooms for them in Uganda (Africa
Digest 1972: 96). All PIOs who were Kenyan citizen, British and Indian passport
holder had to leave in 90 days before November 8, 1972. Amin called the expulsion
ofPIO "as part ofthe war ofliberation". Indian Deputy Minister of external affair said
in parliament, "We are in touch with the Ugandan authorities and I can assure the
house that we shall do everything we can to protect the interest of Indians there". The
Indian president while in Lusaka denounced the expulsion and stated, "The
happenings in Uganda have a heavy cloud of doubt and uncertainty over the minds of
many people of Indian origin in several countries of Africa, ... The pernicious doctrine
of racialism may permeate even free Africa" (quoted in Gupta 1974: 322).
Though public opinion was aroused in India, it refuted strongly and ridiculed Amin's
allegation that India was planning to invade Uganda along with Tanzania and Zambia.
However, India made it clear that it was going to support any international move,
which would persuade Amin in extending the expulsion deadline. India did not take
the tougher line because Indian move against a purely racial issue would have been
interpreted as Indian interference and designs in Africa. Indian support for Afro-Asian
solidarity was another constraint. But the main consideration of Indian in not taking a
tougher lime on the issue seemed, since "there is nothing to be gained by using strong
words, if they cannot be backed by meaningful action in Uganda, any show of strong
sentiment may trigger off an anti-Asian wave" (Times of India 6 October 1972).
Years later India faced same constraints when Bavadra government was dismissed in
Fiji and anti-PIO moves started there (Kaul 1991 ).
Ugandan crisis made India realise that the leadership and political system of African
states vary considerably from country to country and Indian support to Afro-Asian
solidarity had to be qualified by longer national interests. These expulsions brought
home another point to India. Despite Indians consistent support to African
decolonisation and Afro-Asian solidarity, none of the African countries, howsoever,
friendly to India and opposed to Idi Amin's action, offered to accommodate expelled
Indians even in small number as a gesture to sympathise with India. As far as India
was concerned, it was never its policy to debar entry of PIO if they wanted to resettle
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in India with their saving and assets. Government of India made special provisions
and gave inducement for Asians to resettle in India with their saving and assets.
Despite such offer, none of them opted to return to India. The restraint approach of
India, however, succeeded in getting Amin agree to pay compensation for business
and properties ·of Indian passport holders, which was not given to Indians of other
nationalities (Dubey 2003: 130-131).
Sri Lanka: Newly independent Ceylon wanted to get rid of nearly 800,000 Indians
Tamils in the country. India took the stand that it would accept only those Indian
Tamils who qualified for citizenships under Article 8 of the Indian Constitution.
Those who did not qualify would be treated as stateless and would be the
responsibility of Sri Lanka where they domiciled. The then Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri changed the policy and entered into an agreement with Sirimavo
Bandaranaike in 1964. India agreed to take 50,025,000 stateless Indian Tamils and Sri
Lanka agreed to grant citizenship to 300,000 of them. In 1974, Indira Gandhi and
Bandaranaike agreed to take fifty per cent each of the remaining 150,000 Indians. The
two agreements could not, however, be implemented because of the reluctance of
Indians Tamils to move to India. The ethnic violence in Sri Lanka thereafter halted
the process. The Sri Lankan parliament eventually passed legislation in 1988 to
enable all Indian Tamils to get Sri Lankan citizenships. Therefore the Government of
India faced severe criticism (Sharma 2008: 7).
Fiji: Subsequent to East African, experience was the expenence of Fiji. The
changing attitude of the Government of India got reflected in 1987 military coup in
Fiji. The changing Indian attitude was visible in media. The issue of overthrow of pro
Indian Fijian government was aggressively reflected in press and other media. India
did not have capacity to forcibly change the situation. It decided to mobilise the
regional powers like Australia to side with India in its effort to change the situation in
Fiji. The NAM Summit, the Commonwealth group, the UN and other forum were
utilised by India to highlight the discrimination and injustice to Indian Diaspora. This
was in clear contrast to what India was doing so far on PIO discrimination issues
(Kaul 1991 ).
South Africa: Indian settlers in South Africa had been a separate case for India.
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Long before Mahatma Gandhi used his tactics of non-cooperation, civil disobedience,
satyagarh and peaceful protests in Indian freedom struggles in 1920 he evolved and
made maidenuse of many ofthesemethods in South Africa in late nineteenth century.
The personal insult heaped on him in South Africa and his strong feeling against
racial discrimination of Indians in South Africa became a sentimental issue for the
followers of Gandhi in the Indian freedom struggle. The racial discrimination of
Indians in South Africa received constant condemnation from Indian leaders and the
cause of Indians in South Africa always remained high in Indian foreign policy
consideration (Dubey 2003: 126).
The Asiatic Land Tenure Act also known as Ghetto Act became law in June 1946. It
was directed against Indians confining them to specified areas alone. On 3rd
September 1946, in the United Nation General Assembly session started, the Indian
representative Chhagla articulated Indian concerns in the UN subcommittee. He
condemned South Africa's "discriminatory treatment of Asiatics in general" as a
denial of human rights and the Ghetto Act, both of which impaired friendly relations
between India and Africa. The Franco-Mexican resolution supported by India - calling
for treatment of Indians in South Africa to be in conformity with international
obligations and charter of United Nation was passed. Indian approach of special
support to Indian settlers in South Africa lasted until late 50s. Till then resolution of
Indian National Congress used to articulate and strongly support Indian settlers cause
in South Africa though it used to express support to South African non-Indian
sufferers also but in general terms (Indian National Congress Resolutions on Foreign
Policy 1946-66).
Once India raised the issue of South African Indian settlers exclusively within the
U.N. based on human rights clause; it soon realised that it was not possible to keep the
issue confined to Indian settlers alone. Because of the provisions of non-racial
treatment, India had to extend support to all groups and communities subjected to
racial discrimination in South Africa. Further, the policy of exclusively supporting
Indian settlers was in contrast to Nehru's policy of advising Indian settlers in other
parts of Africa, where he counselled of African cause and advised Indian settlers to
integrate themselves with African cause and aspiration and not to seek special
position or privilege. Meanwhile the Group Area Act of 1950 had formally
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institutionalised the Apartheid policy affecting Indians as well as Black Africans.
These considerations started a shift in Indian approach on South African issue. India
started associating discrimination of Black and Indians together. Indian President Dr.
Rajendra Prasad in his address explained the shift to Parliament in 1952. He said,
"The question is no longer merely one of Indians of South Africa; it had already
assumed a greater and wider significance. It is question of racial domination and
racial intolerance. It is a question of Africans more than that of Indians in South
Africa". India mobilised twelve other countries, raised the question of racial conflict
in South Africa resulting from apartheid policy, and succeeded in appointment of a
U.N. commission to study the racial situation in South Africa. From then onward, the
issue of Indians in South· Africa was merged with larger issue of apartheid policy in
South Africa, which involved both Indians as well as Black African. Indian policy
then worked for establishment of majority rule in South Africa and merging of Indian
settlers cause with that ofBlack Africans" (Dubey 2003: 126).
During interim Prime Minister Ship in March 1946, Nehru recommended termination
of trade agreement and breaking up of diplomatic ties with South Africa. Lord
Wavell, the Indian viceroy did it immediately.9 This strong step was taken when India
was though free in foreign relations but not free internally. The stakes involved were
high. India at the time of independence needed economic support from all quarter but
this decision deprived India 5 percent of its trade. India's PIO remained the main
concern until late 50s. The defeat of India in 1962 India-China war and its isolation in
Africa changed Indian priorities. Diplomatic support vis-a-vis China and Pakistan
became the most important consideration. By the time India overgrew its inferiority
complex by becoming self sufficient in food, creating Bangladesh, detonating atomic
bomb and launching satellites, it also emerged as country having third largest skilled
and trained manpower. Its economic consideration became paramount in third world
countries like Africa where its technology and skills can be sold at very competitive
prices. The South-South umbrella suits India to sell its manufactured and value added
goods in Africa. The issue ofPIO has receded to background since it does not fit in or
helps in contemporary concern of India. The current euphoria of India on the end of
apartheid is not just, because Indian settlers and Blacks have become free from
9 Indian High Commissioner did not returned to South Africa since 1946 when Ghetto Act was passed But India used to maintain a small office in Durban which was finally closed in 1954 and thereafter all direct link between Indian and South Africa ceased.
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racialism. It is also largely because India wants to convert its goodwill for South
Africa, this time, into economic favour by having a favourable access to its large and
strong economy. Whether this expectation will be reciprocated or not is a different
question but this time India does not expect as return of its contribution to struggle
against apartheid, a favourable treatment to South African Indian settlers (Lal 2006).
Both domestic and international changes have altered the priority and agenda of
India's policy towards PIOs. The major concern of India during colonial rule in Africa
was to see to it that the colonial government gave equal privileges to PIO compared to
European settlers. It advised PIO to join black Africans in freedom struggle and to
become one of them without seeking special privilege or status. With abolition of
colonialism, both internal and external, such imperatives do not exist. Second, in post
colonial phase of Africa, India by its experience realised that expectation of 'dual
loyalty' and inclusion of PIO in policy framework neither wins them over for Indian
investment or other economic needs nor does it pleases African governments . who
have to deal strongly with PIO according to domestic imperatives and pressures. Even
the PIO after their experience in Zanzibar, Uganda, Zambia and other countries have
realised that Indian support for their protection is going to be limited because India's
own capacity to intervene is limited. Even during their crisis, the PIOs themselves did
not respond to Indian offer to come and invest in India and get Indian citizenship.
Thirdly, PIOs have historically and politically become a part of African states and the
issue of PIO has receded as major concern. Therefore, it is not surprising that in
aggressive diplomatic and economic initiatives of Indian government during 1970s
and 80s the issue of PIO hardly got an important place. Perhaps India learnt through
its East African experience that it is unrealistic and counterproductive to expect extra
care for South African Indian settlers from South African government as a reciprocal
gesture for Indian contribution to struggle against apartheid. The real test of this
policy will come when Indian settlers may have to share the burden of economic and
social restructuring programme in South Africa. Such pressures and demands from
black groups have already started surfacing openly. However, because of the long
isolation ofSouth Africa from India they will not have, unlike East African Indian a
'dependency' attitude towards India. Therefore, India does not have to respond to a
non-existent expectation of PIO. But it does not mean that PIOs have no place in
Indian policy (Dubey 2003: 133-134).
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The Dollar Reliable Diaspora in the Gulf region: The oil boom of 1970s enabled a
large number of Indians rushing to the Gulf region. They remained employed for a
long period though they had no chance of getting settled or acquiring local
citizenship. As a result, they have to repatriate all their earning and savings to India . .
under compulsion. This benefited India's foreign exchange reserve, which was a very
scarce resource. The government of India strongly moved on this aspects and created
better banking & other facilities for repatriation of foreign exchange. It raised the
., interest rate on foreign exchange deposits. It took up the issue of welfare of its
migrant workers in west Asian countries. It came out with policy and enactment to for
compulsory registration of recruitment agents of labours to avoid exploitation and
deportation of the work force. Recently Indian Government under its changed
Diaspora policies announced special insurance scheme of Indian Diaspora in the gulf
region (Lal 2006).
4.3.2.: India's Policy towards Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia did not play a major part in India's Foreign Policy calculations during
the 1960s, a period when India was facing major security threats from Pakistan and
China. The exigencies of the Cold War, political and economic considerations at
home had a hand in the shaping of India's policy towards the region. This occupation
with its immediate neighourhood held· back India from formulating a policy towards
ethnic Indians. The Indians in Southeast Asia do not evoke the suspicion and hatred of
the indigenous peoples. They are small in number, politically they do not have much
influence and most of them belong to the weaker economical society.
TABLE 4.2.: Population of Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia
Country Population NRis PIOs Stateless %of the population
Brunei 331,000 7,000 500 100 2.3% Cambodia 11,340,000 150 150 Nil Negligible Indonesia 200,000,000 500 50,000 Nil Negligible Laos 5,100,000 107 18 NA Negligible· Malaysia 22,890,000 15,000 1,600,000 50,000 7.3% Myanmar 46,500,000 2,000 2,500,000 400,000 5% Philippines 76,000,000 2,000 24,000 12,000 Negligible Singapore 3,160,000 90,000 217,000 Negligible 9.71% Thailand 62,000,000 15,000 70,000 Nil .07% Vietnam 78,000,000 320 Nil 10 Negligible
Source: Report of The High Level Committee On .the Indian Diaspora (2001), Indian Council of World Affairs: New Delhi, p. 253.
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Prof. V. Suryanarayan briefly illustrates the two examples that are given below to
examine India's policy towards Overseas Indians in Southeast Asia. The first relates
to the status of Indians in Burma, where, unfortunately New Delhi attached greater
importance to the improvement of state-to-state relations rather than protecting the
legitimate interests of the Indian community. Soon after independence, the Burmese
Government initiated radical land reforms, which hit the interests of the Indian
Chettiar community. A total of 27 lakh acres of land, 14 percent of the total cultivable
land in Burma, was nationalised. The market value of the land was estimated at Rs. 70
crores. Despite t~e excellent equations between New Delhi and Rangoon, India could
not persuade Burma to pay adequate compensation to the landlords. According to
informed estimates, by the end of 1961, only Rs. 1.75 crores had been paid as
compensation. During the second wave ofnationalisation in the 1960's under General
Ne Win, in furtherance of the Burmese Way to Socialism, Rangoon nationalised the
petty retail shops owned by the Indians- 12,000 shops with assets worth Rs. 15 crores
were taken over by the government. What is more tragic, the Indians were not even
allowed to repatriate their savings. The repatriates complained of demonetisation of
currency notes, expropriation of properties, confiscation of valuables and
unimaginable humiliations. According to a Policy Note issued. by Government of
Tamil Nadu, from June 1963 onwards, 1,44,353 repatriates from Burma have returned
to India. Even after a lapse of forty years, the compensation due to these people has
not been settled. New Delhi's official stance had been that nationalisation was strictly
a matter of domestic jurisdiction (Suryanarayan 2003: 80-81).
The PIOs who had to flee Burma were very disappointed with the government's
policy. The hard reality was that India was hardly in a position to provide any reliefto
them in the wake of the 1962 conflict with China. Indian also needed Burma's help to
tackle the Naga Insurgency. Military intervention was not an option and the
isolationist General Ne Win was not concerned about international opinion (Sharma
2008: 7).
A crisis in Malaysia on the question of work permits was averted by New Delhi,
thanks to the behind the scenes diplomacy by the Indian Government. In order to
solve the acute problem of unemployment, the Malaysian Government in 1968
introduced the system of work permits for non-citizens in specialised categories. In
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1969, Kuala Lumpur announced that the work permits would not be renewed, which,
for all practical purposes was a warning to non-citizens to quit their jobs. If the
Government had strictly enforced the rules, 55,000 Indian labourers would have lost
their jobs. The Government of India and the representatives of the Malaysian Indians
were able to persuade the Government to make modifications in the regulations.
Kuala Lumpur agreed to speedily dispose-off the applications for citizenship; those
who applied for citizenship would be given employment passes. Those who were
eligible for citizenship could also apply for it during the work permit period. If the
citizens were not forthcoming, non-citizens could continue in their jobs. The last
concession was a boon for the Indians, because Malays at that time were unwilling to
work in the plantations. A few months later, the Malaysian Government extended the
work permits of all those who had applied for citizenship. However, the communal
violence, which took place in Malaysia in May 1969, had a traumatic impact on the
minority groups. Nearly 60,000 Indians voluntarily returned to India during this
period (Suryanarayan 2003: 80-81).
A. Mani argues in his new released book on "Rising India and Indian Communities in
East Asia" (2008), that Thailand and the Philippines; the Indian migration was mostly
from the Punjab and the Sindh. As non-Muslims from these areas were extremely
conscious of their ethnicity vis-a-vis Islam, they preserved their religious identity as
Hindus and Sikhs after migration by maintaining close kinship ties, points out A.
Mani. But Tamils in Thailand have been assimilated into Thai society through inter
ethnic marriage as they were small in number and felt no compulsion to zealously
protect their Indian or Hindu identity.
4.3.3.: From Active Disassociation to Active Association
In 1977, when a non-Congress government led by the JanataParty assumed power,
the first signs of an official rethink vis-a-vis the Diaspora appeared. That, official
policies strike a balance between safeguarding India's foreign policy interests and
show legitimate concern about Indians overseas was clearly a priority. There were to
be changes in the entry laws allowing overseas Indians to return to the 'motherland',
even if they were foreign nationals. The government sponsored a seminar on overseas
Indians and declared that henceforth· the Indian Council for Cultural Relations would
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get involved ..... The new policy seemed to be a seeking of balancing of interests of
India while at the same time expressing legitimate concem about overseas Indians
(Dutt 1981: 296-297).
The concem was pertinent as by this time Indian workers were employed in the Gulf
region and their remittances brought in significant foreign exchange, especially for
states such as Kerala. Indian parliamentarians raised questions about the welfare of
Indian workers in the Gulf, obliging the government to adopt a more proactive policy
towards the Gulf States so that it could effectively safeguard the interests of Indian
communities there. Remittances from the Gulf also made Indian policymakers more
aware of the economic potential of Indians overseas and so they formulated a range of
investment incentives for them, hoping to channel foreign exchange eamings into
state-sponsored savings schemes. Limited banking reforms were introduced to
facilitate foreign exchange inflow. In fact, it was in the early 1980s, when the volume
of remittances grew, that the term 'nonresident Indian' (NRI) increasingly entered the
official lexicon. Terms such as 'Indians abroad', 'person of Indian origin' (PIO), even
'expatriate Indians' also continued to be used, but were not clearly defined, However,
the overall investment framework was still not entirely conducive to Indians overseas
as Indian policy-makers were still hesitant about the role NRis could play in the
national economy. Even so, it was clear from the 1980s onwards that economic
imperatives rather than ideological considerations would unmistakably shape the
changing dynamics of the motherland and it's Diaspora (Lal2006: 86-87).
Although the Janata government did not remain in power for very long, the debate on
expatriate Asians had restarted within the Indian government. With regard to the
problems conceming the rights to own property in India, to be able to reside there and
to invest, policies varied over ·time. Although by law they were aliens, some
difference between them and non NR1s were made by the government with regard to
the above areas. NRis already in the mid 1980s were allowed to buy and own
property, although only in specified areas. NRis had to pay for the property in foreign
exchange, could own no more than two at a time, which again were subject to a three
year lock-in period before resale, and could use the property for personal residence or
renting out only. If any of these properties were rented out the proceeds could not be
repatriated, yet if the NRI wished to sell the property after the lock in period, he could
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repatriate the original investment from the sale proceed, 'but capital gains calculated
at the rate of 20 percent of resale consideration shall not be allowed· to be repatriated'
(Economics Times: 1.8.1988).
These guidelines had been set up during the 'liberalisations' of the early 1980s. The
news was that NRis with Indian passports did not need the approval of the Reserve
Bank of India to buy property, which was still a requirement for other foreigners,
foreign companies, or NRls with foreign passports. Allowing NRls to own properties
it was hoped, would fuel investments flowing into the country, yet despite this, there
were few investment proposals as the procedures for granting approval to the NRI
project was intensely cumbersome (Goswami 1988).
Other facilities which were developed or improved in the same period were the
holding of stocks and shares, and the holding of bank accounts in India. Any NRI
could invest in Government securities and units of Unit Trust of India and the
National Savings Plan Certificates of the Government of India through an authorised
foreign exchange dealer. The acquisition of shares was subject to approval of the
Reserve Bank of India, who allowed it only 'if the non'-resident investor furnishes an
undertaking binding himself, his heirs,' executors, successors, and assigns not to seek
repatriation of capital invested or income earned thereon, irrespective of the manner
of payment ofthe investment' (Lall2001: 101).
When Rajiv Gandhi· became the Prime Minister in 1984, definite signs showing the
government's shift in direction foreshadowed an imminent, larger policy shift. The
government built up its agencies for dealing with the Diaspora. In 1985, it set up a
Special Coordination Division in the Ministry of External Affairs as a nodal point to
manage actions relating to Indians overseas. In 1986, ·it established a Consultative
Committee for Non-Resident Indians, comprising representatives from different
ministries, trade and industry, and a dozen NRis from across the globe. It also
attempted to develop a database on Indians overseas and formed an lndo-NRI
Chamber of Commerce and Culture to promote investment and foster trade links in
1987.
That same year, when a political crisis erupted in Fiji, Indians were deeply interested
in reports of ethnic discrimination against the Indian community there. India's official
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response this time was proactive, in marked contrast to the Ugandan crisis of 1972 or
racial riots in Malaysia 1969. In 1988, an Indian official delegation, led by Shankar
Dayal Sharma, who was then the vice-president, visited Guyana to participate in
celebrations marking the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Indians. The delegation
also visited Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago to strengthen cultural and emotional
ties with Indian communities there. The Indian government showed further support
when the first Global Convention of Overseas Indians (New York, 1989) pioneered
efforts to bring together people of Indian origin on a single platform, 'to discuss
common problems and issues.' In 1990-91, when over 150,000 Indians were stranded
in Kuwait and Iraq following the Gulf War, the Indian government promptly arranged
for their evacuation. All these events were signs that 'India' was taking note of 'India
Abroad' (Government of India, MEA Annual Reports 1947-1995).
4.4.: Proactive Period Since 1990s
Contemporary attitudes shape the identity of the "new Diaspora", and old notions of
what constitutes a community are being constantly challenged; therefore adjusting in
various countries has not been a problem for the Indian Diaspora. No longer does the
new Indian immigrant feel he is in exile, nor does he need to cling to his community
for assurance. The stereotype images do not apply to the highly professional Indian
Diaspora and the "one size fits all" approach is not applicable to them. Today, global
identities are being forged, especially by second-generation migrants in the antipodes
and elsewhere. It is these Indians who are benefiting from the transnational networks,
which gives them a platfonn to forge links with other Indian immigrants spread across
the globe. However, "Indian identity" is no longer inward looking, new Indian
immigrant is now more like Pico Iyer's description of the woman fi:om Australia
whose first name was Spanish, her last name was Hungarian but was born in Italy,
and was travelling to India. (Pico Iyer, 2001). Thus notions of identity cannot be
based on the assumption of a single identity, thus as aptly described by Amartya Sen:
"The same person can be of Indian origin, a Parsee, a French citizen, a US resident,
a woman, a poet a vegetarian, an anthropologist, a university professor, a Christian,
a bird watcher, and an avid believer in extraterrestrial life and of the propensity of
alien creatures to ride around the cosmos in multicoloured UFO 's. Each of these
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collectivities, to all of which this person belongs, gives him or her particular identity"
(Sen 2005: 350).
India's re-engagement with the Diaspora really took off only after 1991, when the
Indian economy faced an unprecedented crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its
foreign exchange reserves .. As is well known, the crisis triggered a process of
economic reforms as India prepared itself to exploit the opportunities and counter the
threats arising from globalisation. There was now a deep realisation that India needed
to reinvent itself economically for it badly needed investment in infrastructure, which
neither the Indian state nor private business had the capacity to mobilise. If India
intended to develop economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalising
world, it had to aggressively pull in foreign direct investments and readily allow for
the infusion of new technologies. It was in this new context oflarger policy shifts that
India re-engaged with its Diaspora in the 1990s. 'NRI' became a buzzword in India in
the 1990s as overseas Indians and their lifestyles captured popular imagination.
However, though Indians at home became increasingly receptive towards the
Diaspora, domestic political instability decelerated the pace of official policy changes.
But the Congress government of India was cautious and slow towards this segment.
Because of its historical position, it was over cautious in inCluding PIOs under overt
policy framework. When Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power Indian policy
changed very fast for this segment. Historically Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh
(RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Pari shad (VHP), a support base for BJP, had maintained
very close people-to-people contact through its branches among Hindu overseas
settlers. In contrast to Nehru's policy of active dissociation of PIOs from Indian
foreign policy objectives, BJP stood for active and overt association of PIOs for
foreign policy objectives of India (Dubey 2003: 141 ).
In 1998, the government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee
at its helm, announced the introduction of a 'PIO Card' for Indians settled in specified
countries, promising visa-free travel and privileges in matters of investment and
education. In 2000, the government set up a High Level Committee on Indian
Diaspora chaired by L. M. Singhvi, a parliamentarian, jurist and former diplomat
responsible for assessing the issues concerning Indians overseas, suggesting new
policy and organisational frameworks, and recommending a country-specific agenda
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to intensify India's engagement with its Diaspora. In 2001, the Indian Prime Minister
formally inaugurated the 6th Convention of the Global Organisation of People of
Indian Origin (GOPIO) in New Delhi. On the recommendation of the Singhvi
committee, the government implemented numerous novel policy initiatives, including
the decision to celebrate the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and institute the Pravasi
Bharatiya Samman. Perhaps the most significant initiative was the Indian
government's announcement, at the inaugural Pravasi Bharatiya Divas held in January
2003, of sweeping changes to the country's 48-year-old Citizenship Act, granting
Indians living in Britain, Canada, Australia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands
and the US the privilege of claiming dual citizenship. The restriction of dual
citizenship to only one constituency of the Diaspora the NRis settled in affluent
Western countries-led to widespread criticism from other NRI segments, especially
from the West Indies and countries such as Fiji, South Africa Malaysia and Mauritius,
where Indian communities are not well..:endowed. In 2004, when an Congress-led
coalition spearheaded by Manmohan Singh assumed power, it adopted two significant
measures: it established a separate Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs; and at the
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas held in January 2005, it declared that dual citizenship would
be extended to all Indians overseas who migrated after the inauguration of the Indian
Union on 26 January 1950, subject to the laws prevailing in their home countries, thus
eliminating the basis of criticism of the earlier policy. However, dual citizenship
would be granted without voting rights (Lal 2006: 82-89).
India's engagement with globalisation has been a cautious one. Triggered by an
unexpected crisis, this engagement has been marked by anxiety and uncertainty in
dealing with the dramatic forces that globalisation might and does unleash. Decades
spent behind a closed economy, together with a deep sense of commitment to the idea
of swadeshi and national self-sufficiency, have played major roles in shaping the
mind set of Indian policymakers, making them look upon multinational corporations
(MNCs) and foreign capital investors with distrust. There exists the fear that MNCs,
once they invest in a big way in the Indian economy, may attempt to dictate the terms,
undermine national sovereignty and negatively influence Indian culture. The Indian
state's attempts to cultivate the Diaspora must be seen within this context. It is widely
perceived that Indians overseas are better endowed with investments, technological
know-how, and entrepreneurial and managerial skills. It is also believed that they are
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capable of greater commitment to the cause of India's. development. Furthermore, as
the nation embraces globalisation, Indians at home have come to realise that Indians
overseas are more compatible in cultural terms and more attuned to local sensitivities
than they assumed.
The Indian political leadership's engagement with its Diaspora has come full circle. In
its nationalist, anti-colonial phase, the leadership showed genuine sympathy towards
Indians overseas. After 1947, post-colonial India developed a more bounded sense of
itself as a nation state as it framed its citizenship laws. Its foreign and economic
imperatives dictated a policy of disengagement from the Diaspora. Now, as India
reinvents itself as a global economic player, the state increasingly looks upon Indians
overseas as assets. At the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, a leader from India Inc. said,
'the overseas Indians would scout opportunities, represent 'Brand India', network for
Indian initiatives. They would be the flag bearers. They will help India shift from
being a local player to being a global leader'. Contemporary attitudes shape the
identity of the "new Diaspora", thus notions of what constitutes a community, is being
constantly challenged, the stereotype image do not apply to the highly professional
Indian Diaspora. India's is one of the leading countries having finest IT professionals
in the world. It is acknowledged by experts that India is 'probably the most successful
developing country attracting ICT - enabled services'. India's software industry is
'growing strongly'. Describing the Indian model for growth in ICT, it has been
observed: "The second model, followed in India, involving having low-cost, high
quality engineers to attract outsourcing work from global players in the industry,
competing in the labor-intensive, cost-sensitive areas of coding, testing, web services,
and technical support. This model is increasingly difficult to follow as more countries
and regions attempt to compete ... Nonetheless, East Asian countries with a strong
base of human capital and low wages, such as China, may choose to emulate it"
(Yusuf2003: 338.:343).
In such changed scenario, the proactive interest of India in 90s does not have any
element of imperialist design or racist preference as was likely to be construed during
Nehru period.
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4.5.: Malaysian Indians in India's Diaspora Policy and India's Look· East Policy
Moreover, the presence of the ''new Indian Diaspora", which consists ofhighly skilled
people has enhanced India's image in Southeast Asia. The Government of India is
taking great interest in the Indian Diaspora, which is evident from the Report of the
High Level Committee. Increased growth in trade and investment between India and
ASEAN has had a positive effect with a surge of skilled workers, professionals and
business people to almost all the countries of ASEAN. There is a great demand and
respect for these Indian professionals who are so different from the Indian immigrants
who went to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, especially under the indenture
system. The Indians who came as indentured labourers were no better than slaves.
There was no question of their having political rights: they were used as tools for the
advancement of British commercial interests. They were loyal and industrious and
gave no trouble as long as they were allowed to live as separate entities, maintaining
their links with "Mother India" (Kaul1982: 23-24).
As previously discussed, after independence India followed the policy of
disassociation related to its Diaspora. The basic principles of India's Foreign Policy
were laid at Independence under the Prime Ministership of Nehru. Subsequently there
was noticeable continuity and change which subsequent governments blindly
followed Nehru's path. The proactive Diaspora Policy or from 'active-disassociation'
to 'active-association' started especially after 1991, when the Indian economy faced
severe crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its foreign exchange reserves. The crisis
triggered a process of economic reforms as India prepared itself to exploit the
opportunities to counter the threats arising from globalisation and liberalisation. There
was deep realisation that India needed to restructure itself economically and needed
investment for infrastructure restructuring, and neither the Indian state nor private
sector had the capacity to counter the drastic situation. If India intended to develop
economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalised world, it had to
·aggressively pull Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the infusion of new
technologies. In this context, the larger policy shifts appears in the re-engagement of
India with its Diaspora in the 1990s because only affluent section of the overseas
Indians i.e. Non-Residential Indians (NRI's) can became a safeguards for the Indian
economy in the 1990s. This was the same time when India also initiated its 'Look
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East Policy' under the P. V. Narasimha Rao's Congress Government. The Rao's
proposal had instant and successful fallout with India becoming a sectoral dialogue
partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nation) in January 1992 and full
dialogue partner in December 1995. In July 1996, India became a member of ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF). As a result, it interacts with ASEAN in various bodies and
meetings, which now includes the ten countries of Southeast Asia (Kaul 2001: 41 ).
When India's initiated its Look East Policy towards the Southeast Asian Countries
then the large presence of the ethnic Indians in the region are unquestionably in the
minds of the foreign policy makers but unfortunately India could not explore its
Diaspora aspects in the strengthening bilateral as well as multilateral relations with
the ASEAN countries. India also missed the opportunity to constructively engage its
Diaspora and gratifying its aspiration and inspiration of the Diasporic community.
As history speaks itself, the Indian leadership totally ignored Indian Diaspora but
occasionally with their 'own-convenience', they addressed few oftheDiaspora issues.
The recent example of Malaysia's unrest, on 25th November 2007, when HINDRAF
internationalised the wretched condition of the ethnic Indians in Malaysia, the
Government of India's initial response was tight-lipped but after the opposition
leaders like L. K. Advani and Rajnath Singh of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
expresses concern over the plight of Indians. "The BJP has taken a serious note of the
incidents and seeks immediate diplomatic intervention from the UP A government on
this issue. The government should register its protest with the Malaysian envoy in
New Delhi and also convey its displeasure on the developments in Malaysia. The BJP
expresses its solidarity with the people of Indian origin (PIO) in Malaysia and hopes
that their struggle against the injustice and inequality would reach to a logical
conclusion. The BJP statement said the party believes that India has a moral
obligation to take up the case of injustice and persecution of Malaysian Hindus and
PIOs with the authorities in Kuala Lumpur. The UP A government cannot shirk from
this responsibility either out of its commitment to anti-Hindu pseudo-secularism or
under the pretext that this is an internal matter of Malaysia". An ally of the UPA, the
DMK has expressed its concern over the plight of the Tamil Malaysians and
demanded the centre's intervention in the matter. In fact the exodus of Tamils from
Malaysia has united the parties across the spectrum in Tamil Nadu. The AIADMK
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leader J. Jayalalitha and MDMK leader Vaiko have also asked the centre to take up
the matter with Malaysian government. Hindu Rights Action Force, an apex body of
30 organisations, has approached all political parties pleading for support but Waytha
Moorthy, only got the chance to meet the leader of the Opposition, L K Advani. (as
appears in the various Indian newspaper in the month of November and December
2007).
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi wrote a letter to Prime Minister
Manornhan Singh (Appendix-6), expressing deep concern over the treatment meted
out to ethnic Indians in Malaysia. In the letter, Karunanidhi said that the people of
Tamil Nadu are disturbed over the happenings in Kuala LUUipur, and pointed out that
Tamils constitute the largest percentage of the Indian minority in Malaysia.
Karunanidhi added that he was much perturbed that the Malaysian police used water
cannons and tear-gas shells to disperse the Indian/Tamil demonstrators. Karunanidhi
said, the Malaysian police had detained 240 ethnic Indians. The protesters were
carrying poster-size pictur~s of Mahatma Gandhi, he pointed out. The Chief Minister
urged Prime Minister Singh and the central government to take appropriate action to
end the sufferings and ill treatment meted out to Malaysian Tamils (Hindustan Times;
Indian Express; The Hindu 27th-28th November 2007).
In a statement by the Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee in the
Parliament on November 30 2007, said, "Government remains deeply solicitous for
the welfare of People of Indian On gin living abroad. As members are aware, there is a
large community of People of Indian Origin in Malaysia who are citizens of that
country. We have friendly relations with Malaysia and we are in touch with the
Malaysian authorities in the related matter", ·(press release of MEA, GOI on 30
November 2007; Appenix-7).
Indian Prime Minister Manrnohan Singh said New Delhi was disturbed by reports
about the use of force against the protesters in the multicultural Islamic country. "This
is a matter which does concern us," Singh told a joint news conference with European
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in New Delhi. "Whenever Indian citizens
abroad or People of Indian origin living abroad run into difficulties, that obviously are
a source of concern to us," he added. "The matter is being taken up through
diplomatic channels," junior Parliamentary Affairs Minister Suresh Pachouri told
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India's Parliament, where MPs have accused Malaysia of mistreating ethnic Indians
(www.malaysiakini.coril Accessed on 1 December 2007).
In the seventh Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), 7-9 January 2009 held at Chennai, the
Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) circulated a fiery report on the plight of
Malaysian Indians. It urged the Indian government to slap trade sanctions on
Malaysia, including a boycott ofthe country's palm oil, until Malaysia's government
stopped discriminating against the Indian minority. The report couched its demands in
the same rhetoric invoked by the Indian government, appealing to the shared heritage
of Indians. But commori descent does not translate into common cause. Before the
day was over, Datuk Seri Samy V ellu, the President of the Malaysian Indian
Congress, called a press conference of his own to rubbish the report (The Economist,
14th January 2009).
During the 9 March 2003 incident, when nearly 300 Indian citizens, mostly IT
professionals in Kuala Lumpur, were 'maltreated' and 'interrogated' by the Malaysian
authorities, the Indian government reacted sharply and warned that any repeat of such
incidents would affect bilateral ties. The Government of India indicated that it would
re-examine bilateral agreements and other trade related concessions given to
Malaysia. Foreign Regional Registration offices (FRROs), including the one m
Bangalore, were ordered to verify the credentials of Malaysian nationals registered
here. India also expressed its inability to host Malaysian Health Minister towards the
end of March 2003. During the visit of the Malaysian Entrepreneur Development
Minister, his talks with Indian Ministers were confined to the harassment of Indian IT
professionals, instead of the proposed agenda. Similarly, the Ministry of Sports in
consultation with the External Affairs Ministry ordered a last minute pull-out of the
Indian hockey team from the prestigious Azlan Shah Cup hockey tournament that
year (Singh 2007).
If both the incidents of March 2003 and November 2007 are compared, in each case
the Indian government acted as a mute spectator of the whole episode or just involved
only in lip-service as the recent protest (November 2007) involved PIOs and the
pervious one (March 2003) was related to the affluent NRis. The Indian
Government's biasness and dissociation policy towards the PIOs was once again
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witnessed. The same issues also haunted the Indians Government especially in the
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.
Shekhar (2007) argues that Southeast Asia is the home of the largest number of Indian
Diaspora and Malaysia has the largest presence. Malaysia is the India's second largest
A SEAN trading partner but remained out of the central focus of the Look East Policy.
Given Malaysia's preference for an Islamic outlook in its foreign policy, there is a
need to approach Malaysia as the second largest 'Muslim democracy' in the world.
Such an approach can help in removing the misgivings between the two countries,
facilitate greater people-to-people contact between the two countries and also connect
the Indian Diaspora with the mainstream host society and economy.
Lal (2006) notes, the Indian community has divided views on the Indian
Govemment's current policy of developing links with wealthy and successful overseas
Indian communities and its celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas. In 2003, MIC
President Datuk Seri Samy V ellu was awarded. the Indian Diaspora Award, but some
Malaysian Indians feel that poorer overseas Indian communities have been neglected.
Likewise, the Indian government's dual citizenship policy for non-resident Indians is
sometimes seen as restrictive and confined largely to Indians residing in affluent
Western countries. The economic and technological rise of India brings benefits to the
Indian Diaspora, especially those who have been neglected long time. The rise of
India has provided powerful linkages for selected groups of Indians situated outside
India but it remains to be seen how this new global Diasporic exchange will benefit
the whole Indian community. The time has changed; hence, a more pro-active
Diaspora policy is required. India has the moral duty to address the concerns of the
ethnic Indians anywhere in the world, without jeopardising the relations with the host
countries. Ohly then, the condition ofPIOs as well as India will improve globally, as
PIOs constitutes more than 75 percent of the Indian Diaspora.
From January 2003 onwards India hosted seventh Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) but
it seems just only a yearly ritual because during the initial age of PDB there is plenty
of expectation from the Indian Government especially towards the plight of People of
Indian Origin in the host countries and the report of the Singhvi Committee is also a
imperfect document on Indian Diaspora. The Indian Government action and reaction
related to the concerns of PIOs in the host countries is a great need of the hour
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however that does not, as of now, seem at all likely. These kinds of trends also
appears in the recent racial attacks on Indian students in Australia where the
Government of India watched the whole episode just as a mute spectator and engage
themselves only in lip-service to pressurise the Australian authority.
The fact that the overseas Indians had been economically successful in some societies
does not mean that they were a success everywhere they settled. In general they had a
difficult life. The expatriate Indians of Fiji Guyana, Malaysia and Uganda were the
victims of state oppression and, fierce racist policies at different points in time in the
past (namely early 1960s Guyana, late 1960s Malaysia, 1971 Uganda, and 1986-87
Fiji). There were a number of reasons why in some cases the story of the Diaspora
ended in tears: first they did not integrate with the local population and they were not
organised in a way to collectively fight repression. Amongst themselves religious and
caste differences were prevalent, and caused internal schisms; they were not a
homogeneous group in language, cultural traditions or religious affiliations. They also
felt that first they had done so much for the development of their country of residence
and then they had fought side by side with the locals against the white oppression.
They felt that there was a certain amount of injustice when they subsequently became
targets of discrimination and oppression by the local population. In fact they had
simply become the victims of rising local nationalism. As early as 1965-6 the Indians
in East Africa had come to realise that their days were numbered, 'but . they were
willing to wait and see how fate shaped their destiny' (Twaddle 1975: 132),
In fact it was the lack of integration, which caused both the rift with the host society
and the problems with the newly independent India. The Diaspora could easily blame
the colonial organisation which had kept them segregated from the local population,
yet their internal social structure did not allow for Asian-local relations to go beyond
the shopkeeper-customer or master-servant level. The economic barriers one can add
the deep. differences in culture· and ways of life, which did not encourage informal
social contacts between the Indians and the Africans. TheDiaspora saw its way oflife
in a pluralistic society that did not require the radical process of assimllation: In that
sense the African and Asian publics were usually at odds with each other: one group
demanded 'cultural fusion', the other 'cultural separation'. As a result they were seen
as foreigners, even legacies of the British imperial system, which made them an
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India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-IV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians
unwelcome segment in the host societies. Younger Indians knew that the future would
lie in cooperationwith the local population, not in the hope for protection from either
India or Britain (Ghai 1970: 218-272).
India's Diaspora Policy is not static. It has evolved in during various political phases
India's political history, the sensitivities of the nationalist struggle, the winning of
independence, and the trauma of partition and the creation of the Republican
constitution of the Indian Union, engendered important changes in India's relations
with the Diaspora. A concern for the treatment of Indian migrant labourers during the
nationalist phase was replaced by post-colonial disavowal after independence of any
lingering responsibility for those who were now part of a separate nation 'overseas',
and later, a tendency to view the skilled migrants who left India as a brain drain.
However, by the last decade of the century, during the period of rapid economic
liberalisation, the value of the Diaspora was rediscovered, and India adopted a
constructive approach towards the Indian Diaspora.
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