CHAPTER ONE

'YOUTH UNREST' AND 'POLITICAL VIOLENCE': THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES· AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction:

There are two,. equally valid, perspectives on Sri Lankan political

history in recent decades which appear to point in different directions.

The first, comparative perspective, draws attention to the democratic

nature of the island's political process. . For nearly two decades after

political independence, the widely-accepted view of Sri Lanka as a "Model

Third World Democracy" had underlined the credibility of a democratic

State. This was characterized by regularly held elections, open party

competitions, orderly change of governments and acceptance of legal and

constitutional norms of parliamentary democracy.

The other, alternative perspective focuses more on the intemal

trajectory of the island's political system. Ironically, by the third decade of

independence, the State exposed the fragile nature of its "model" by

becoming the most fertile ground for youth protest and violence in the

South-Asian Region. In this transformation, for the first time, the

legitimacy of the State, its social base and its institutions, were challenged

to the point of near collapse in 1971. That challenge was led by a newly

formed youth organization, under the banner of 'Janatha Vimukthi

Peramuna' -'JVP (Peoples' Liberation Front).

The significance of this youth challenge was not so much in its

success or failure, as in the impact it had on State's institutions and

practices. Although the JVP lost the immediate battle in 1971, it was able

to shift the focus of Sri Lankan politics from peaceful parliamentary

process to its violent, disruptive and revolutionary potential. On the other

hand, one of the major consequences of that 'threat' was the resort to

systematic ·use of coercive power of the State to ensure its 'stability' and

'security'. As a result, the social conflicts and political discontent among

the youth transcended their focus on successive regimes and came to be

directed at the State as the target of attack. So, by the late Eighties,

widespread use of internally-generated violence and terror in political life

became an every day practice in Sri Lanka.

In order to understand this phenomenon in its proper context, a

broader theoretical perspective is necessary. The purpose of this chapter

is to deal with the clarification of the two, basic aspects of the study, i.e.,

youth unrest and political violence; and, to evolve an analytical framework

to the study, with reference to Sri Lanka. With this aim, the first section

of the chapter focuses upon the definition of basic aspects of the study. In

the second section, focus shifts to the analyses of various concepts of

conflict and political violence. The last section seeks to develop an

analytical approach to the study and to identify the broader question of

political violence in Sri Lanka during the period of study.

2

I. 'YOUTH UNREST' AND 'POLITICAL VIOLENCE'

Definition :

According to the dictionary meaning, the term "youth" is defined as

the state or quality of being young. 1 In social sciences and other related

disciplines, however, the 'youth' is a social phenomena which has

attracted growing attention, and, it presents a considerable problems in

definition. This is more so in developing countries where opportunities for

youth are at their initial stage. Generally, legislators bracket 'youth'

within age limits. Economically, youth is a period in the life of the

individual in which he develops his occupational skills. Culturally and

politically, youth is a period in whidl the social values and ideology of the

individual are clarified, imbibed and consolidated. Youth may, therefore,

be considered on the social level as a period of investment. Hence, in most

studies on youth, the 'youth' is conceived as the age group of 15 to 35.2

The 'Unrest' is defined as discontent, disturbance and turmoil. 3

Developing this definition further, instability, and protest exhibit the

2

3

For instance, see, A.P. Cowie, ed., Oxford Advanced Leamers' Dictionruy (Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 1989), p.1488.

Explanation based on the following studies: Arieh Levy, Youth in Ceylon (Sessional Paper 3, Government of Ceylon Press, 1967) pp. 1-3; Godfrey Gunatilleke, "Youth in Ceylon" in,~ 1972, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 51-59; and, J.R. Jayewardene, "Youth in Revolt" in, J.R. Jayewardene: Selected Speeches-1944 to 1973 (H.W. Cave and Company Ltd. Colombo, 1974) pp. 92-94.

See, J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Wiener, Oxford English Dictionruy: Second Edition (Oxford, 1989), vol. 19.

3

manner of youth 'disturbances' and 'turmoil' which is of interest to us

here. The 'protest', in tum, means, 'to give formal expression to objection

or disapproval'; or, 'to make a formal declaration against some proposal or

decision'; and, protest represents a confirmed state of opposition and

conflict. 4 Thus, the protest becomes political; (i) through the targets

chosen for demonstration; (ii) through the reaction of the targets

responsible for their protection; and, (iii) through the reaction of the

public at large.s

Political protest used here comprises such collective events as

demonstrations, general strikes, clashes and riots; and, these collective

actions are relatively short -lived. 6

The 'violence' is defined as the unlawful use of physical force.7 So,

political violence implies the unlawful physical force used for political

purposes. One useful distinction drawn between 'protest' and 'violence'

has been the former's limitation to 'formal expression of objection'

('against' some thing) and, the latter's tendency towards the use of

unlawful physical force. Conceptually, in most studies on 'Violence',

'force' denotes the actual or threatened use of violence to make a group

4

5

6

7

See, Ibid, vol. 12.

See, Ekkart Zimmermann, 'Macro-Comparative Research on Political Protest', in, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (The Free Press, New York, 1984), pp. 167-235.

Ibid.

See, Oxford English Dictionary, no. 3.

4

abandon a course of action or inaction dictated by its own strong and

enduring motives and wishes. It (force) includes both, governmental use. of

force (coercion) and private use of force (violence}.8

Accordingly, collective political violence involves; (i) destructive

attacks by groups within a political community, against its regime,

authorities or policies; and, (ii) revolution has a specific connotation when

violence succeeds in creating a system of values and relationships; and

replacing it by another as desired. 9 Hence, a protest movement may be

defined as an initial stage of violent political conflict.

According to these definitions, 'protest' and 'use of force' are

positively related to the concept of 'conflicf. So, it would be worth

explaining the term Conflict in some detail. For to Johan Galtung, "an

action-system is said to be in conflict, if the system has two or more

• incompatible goal-states"; and, "conflict phenomena are the overt coercive

interactions of contending collectivities .... "10 This definition encompasses

the full range of threatening, forceful and violent interactions that occur

among social groups. Conditions such as inequalities, unsatisfied

expectations, discrimination and societal cleavages are related to the

8

9

10

See, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5, p. 191.

Almost all of the Contingency Theories of violence have accepted this approach. See, for instance, Harry Eckastein, 'Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence' in, Ted Robert Gurr, ed,. Handbook of ..... no. 5, p. 137.

Johan Galtung, 'Institutionalized Conflict Resolution', in, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 4, (International Peace Research Institute, 1965) p. 3498.

5

degrees of conflict behaviour. 11 At the same time, this perspective implies

a connection between 'conflict' and 'change'. Accordingly, outbreaks of

political protest and violence are explained as the result of domestic

political conflicts that are led by aggression. In general, aggression is

defined as, "hostile or destructive tendency held to arise from repressed

feelings of inferiority, frustration, or guilt.... It involves a desire for

change". 12

II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE:

The upsurge of radical youth movements in the 1960s brought

about a new experience to the Western world during the post-war era.

Since those movements emerged in the form of open, loosely organized,

protest movements led by students and youth, 13 they were different from

the preceding tendencies in most of the countries, including of the West.

, So, a large number of Social Scientists as well as Westem students had

paid more attention to this new trend.

From the beginning, most of the literature upon 'violence' had

emphasized on theoretical problem, that of: "why does collective political

violence occur and, why does it occur at different levels of magnitude and

11

12

13

Explained in, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political .... no. 5, pp. 1-2.

See, Simpson and Wiener, Oxford English Dictionary, no. 3, vol. 1.

Emergence and growth of 'New-Left' movements in the Sixties can be seen as an important factor for this situation. See, for details, Vander Mehden, Fred R. Comparative Political Violence, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973).

6

intensity". 14 This problem seems to be at the centre-stage of most of the

conflict-studies since the 1960s. According to successive developments, it

has been distinguished between two classes of conflict theory: those which

assume that violence is inherent in political processes and structures

(Inherency Theories) and, those which assume that it is contingent on

special and unusual combinations of conditions (Contingency Theories). 15

Those assumptions also lead to different orientations towards outcomes.

As such, it would be useful to explain these two categories briefly, under

their separate headings, for the purpose of the study.

(a) Contingency Theories of Violence:

According to this assumption, if violence is 'contingent', i.e.,

aberrant, then, the principal question is what combination of

circumstances leads to such violence? To this extent, the following three ·

approaches are important: Johan Galtung's Structural Theory or Rank­

Disequilibrium Theory; Ted Robert Gurr's Relative-Deprivation Theory;

and, Samuel P. Huntington's Institutionalization-Mobilization Theory.

(1) Structural Theory of 'Aggression' and 'Violence'

Johan Galtung's theory of aggression and violence is centered on

the structural causes. In an early Article (1964), he defines 'aggression'

14

15

See, Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches ... " in, Ted Robert Gurr, Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5.

Ibid, pp. 137-143.

7

as, 'drives towards change even against the will of others' and, extreme

forms of this phenomena are crimes - including suicide - (individual case);

intemal war or revolutions (group case). and extemal wars (case of the

nations). As a starting-point for the a~proach, he has quoted two of the

United Nations Agencies' views on aggression; for the UNESCO, war starts

"in the minds of the men"; for the FAO "in the empty barrel". Except these

two views, Galtung takes John Dollard's frustration-aggression theory

(1939) into consideration. 16 By that time, the Dollard's had been the most

influential formulation of frustration-aggression theory. The basic

postulate of it was that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always

presupposes the existence of frustration and existence of frustration

always leads to some form of aggression. 17

However, in Galtung's analysis, those causes of aggression had been

partial. "Hostile aggression is no inseparable part of the innate structure

of the 'minds of men', but added to it from the out side, i.e., through

special socialization process" .18 As he argues further, the view of the

UNESCO or Dollard's theory do not take the social context sufficiently into

consideration. And, the F AO view locates aggression at the places in the

social structure where hunger is found: in that sense, it is a structural

theory. However, in Galtung's conclusion, hunger may supply

16

17

18

Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Aggression' in, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1 (Inte+----rnational Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1964) p. 95.

Cited, in Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, USA, 1970) p. 33.

Johan Galtung Journal of Peace Research, no. 16, p. 95.

8

motivational energy, but it must be combined with a position in the social

structure that gives a view to better life situations and resources. This is

where the minds of men enter; a theory of aggression should combine the

perceiving aggression as a possible way out of the frustrating situation. 19

Through this approach, he develops a structural theory of aggression

between individuals, groups and nations.

Galtung's theory sees a social system as a system of units, and

multi-dimensionally stratified according to a number of rank dimensions.

Thus, in a social system, there will be a division of labour: and the

elements will tend to be ranked. Also, the relative position of the elements

will have a certain stability. In this context, "stratification seems to be a

universal phenomenon and the distance from 'high' to 'low' can be

reduced, but, it can not be declared to be non-existent". Accordingly, his

hypothesis is: aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank­

disequilibrium, i.e., the elements with some positions high and some

positions low. And, the most aggression-provoking case is the dimension

of unfulfilled promises. 2o

When locating periods of aggression, the theory highlights a

connection between radicalism and youth. The youth may be at the place

of "institutionalized disequilibrium with education high and most other

dimensions low.... This is the age where 'change' seems logical, inevitable

19 Ibid. p. 96.

20 Ibid, pp. 97-99 (All emphases in the original).

9

and desirable ... "21 Besides, in the broader analysis, he explains the

'Welfare State' as · an example of the institutionalization of rank-

compensation.

On the approach of Violence', in 1968, Galtung defined that

"violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their

actual realizations are below their potential realizations". So, violence is

defined as the case of the difference between the potential and the actual;

The potential level of realization is that which is possible with a

given level of insight and tesources. If ·insight and/ or resources are

monopolized by a group ... or, are used for other purposes, the

actual level falls below the potential level and violence is present in

the system. In addition to these types of indirect violence, there is

also the direct violence where means of realization are not withheld,

but directly destroyed ... 22

Here, Galtung's distinction between direct (or, personal) and indirect

(or, structural) violence is based upon the actor: direct violence is the use

of unlawful physical force to affect, or in response to, the actions of other

human beings. Structural violence, on the other hand, is the result of

social structures which affect people indirectly. In his words, "there may

21

22

Ibid, p. 105.

See, Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' in, Journal of Peace Research, val. 6, (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1969) pp. 168-69 (emphases are original).

10

not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure.

The violence is built into the structure and shows-up as unequal power

and consequently as unequal life chances".23 So, he refers to the

conditions of structural violence as social injustice. Furthermore, a sub­

type of structural violence is analysed as institutional violence;\4 formal

and true violence is thus embedded in social institutions. Hence, in both,

structural and institutional violence, the basic concern is with

in~quality. "24

In such a context, according to Galtung's approach, on the one

hand, when the structure is threatened, those who benefit from the

structural violence, will try to preserve the status guo so well geared to

protect their interests. But one has to observe carefully for those most

interested in the maintenance of status guo may not come openly to

defense of the structure; they may push their mercenaries in front of

them. In other words, they may mobilize the police, the army, the thugs

against the sources of disturbance and remain themselves more discrete.

So, social injustice is maintained by means of highly manifest personal

violence. On the other hand, structures in the way in which they operate,

undergo permanent tension. When that tension becomes too great, the

institutions and structures are transformed. In both ways, the regime

tries to maintain status guo, whether it means forceful maintenance of

23 Ibid, p. 171.

24 For the full text, see, Ibid. pp. 175-179.

I I

traditional social injustice that may have lasted for generations, or the

forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice brought in by an

attempt to overthrow the old system.25

As such, according to this theozy, social injustice and poverty-in

particular, broad differences of access to wealth - are structural violence.

For instance, the figures approving widespread poverty in a given society

are not structural violence per se. But, the rules organizing the unequal

distribution of wealth constitute structural violence. In addition, there are

several other social rules that are also structural and institu tiona!

violence; namely, the inefficient administration of justice, a society

organized for 'silence', authoritarianism, discrimination and/or distortions

in the socialization process.26 So, direct violence is an event and

structural violence is a process. In this way, Galtung implies aggression

as direct violence and domination as indirect or structural violence; and,

he develops the concept, "violence breeds violence" by explaining a causal

flow from structural to direct violence. His ~ssumption is that,

25

26

violence 1s needs deprivation: needs-deprivation is serious: one

reaction is direct violence: but that is not the only reaction ..... .

There could also be a feeling of hopelessness .............. those who

Ibid. pp. 179-180.

For details, see, Ibid, and, Felipe E. MacGregor and Marcial Rubio, "Rejoinder to the Theory of Structural Violence", in Kumar Rupesinghe and Marcial Rubio, ed., Culture of Violence (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1994), pp. 42-58.

12

tend to prefer 'govemability' to trouble, anarchy.......... They love

' t bill" ' 27 sa ty ...... .

So, one of the comer-stones of the definition of violence proposed by

Galtung is its consequence; the reduction of the potential for performance.

Therefore, not all 'force' is violence, only that which produces this result in

human-being.28

Thus, according to Galtung, if the concern is with peace, and, peace

is absence of violence, then action should be directed against personal as

well as structural violence. In his approach on Peace, peace has two

sides: absence of personal violence and absence of structural violence. He

refers to them as negative peace and positive peace respectively. Hence,

importance of vertical economic development in such a way that there is a

multi-dimensional growth is emphasized to eliminate violence. This

means that "peace theozy is connected not only with conflict theozy, but

27 See, Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence' in, Joumal of Peace Research (Intemational Peace Research Institute, Oslo,) vol. 27, no. 3. 1990, pp. 2895-96.

In this Article, Galtung defines "violence" as, "avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence". Here, he has classified four classes of basic-needs: survival needs (negation-death) well-being needs (negation-misery); identity, meaning needs (negation-misery); and, freedom needs (negation-repression) And, a fifth column is seen to be added as- 'ecological balance'. The sum of all five, according to Galtung, will define 'peace'. In addition, here he explains a 'triangle of violence', i.e., cultural, structural and direct violence. However, since 'cultural violence' is not relevant to the present study.J{tlid not pay attention to the 'triangle'. For details, see, pp. 291-305.

28 See, Kumar Rupesinghe and Marcial Rubio, Culture of Violence, no. 26, pp. 26-27.

13

equally with development theory......... The former more relevant for

negative peace and the latter more relevant for positive peace". 29

(II) Relative-Deprivation Theory of 'Civil Strife' and Violence

Even though the Galtung's theory had been presented before the

Ted Robert Gurr's Relative-Deprivation theory, the latter can be

considered as the most widely used in the literature on aggression and

violence. Following the hypothesis set forth by Dollard and his colleagues

in 1939, Davies (1962, 1969), Feierabend and Feierabend (1966), and,

Feierabend, Feierabend and Nosvold (1969) developed the general

frustration-aggression argument to specifically political aggression.30 With

the help of those hypotheses, Gurr developed the idea that "expectations

can be pegged to the level of some attractive goals achieved by a reference

group". The reference group is defined as those others with whom a

person identifies and compares himself. A broader standard of

comparison is the level of some attractive goals to which a person feels

rightfully entitled (just deserts). Through this interpretation of

comparison, Gurr identifies "relative deprivation" as the necessary pre-

condition for civil strife.3I

29

30

31

For details, see, Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', no. 22, pp. 183-189; and, "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution", no. 10 p. 350-383.

For details of those theories, see, Edward N. Muller, 'The Psychology of Political Protest and Violence~n, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5, pp. 70-72.

Ibid, p. 72.

14

As the 'Causal Model of Civil Strife' (1968) explains, "a psychological

variable, relative deprivation, is the basic pre-condition for civil strife of .

any kind and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among

members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or

another form".32 Relative deprivation is defined as a perceived discrepancy

between men's value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to

which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities

(the amount of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to

get and keep). The underlying causal mechanism is derived from

psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to

perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a

motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying

response.33

The relationship between discontent and participation in strife is,

however, mediated by a number of intervening social conditions. There

are three such variables which are explored here; coercive potential of .the

regime, institutionalization, and social facilitation. There is a fourth

variable suggested, namely, the legitimacy of the political system in which

3 2 See, Ibid.

33 See, Ted Robert Gurr, 'A Causal Model of Civil Strife' in, American Political Science Review, vol. 62, (Published by the American Political Science Association, 1968), pp. 1104-1105.

15

strife occurs. Accordingly, a three-fold typology of civil strife is employed;

i.e., turmoil, conspiracy and internal war.34

The advancement of that theory to "political violence" is seen in Why

Men Rebel (1970). As it explains, "political violence is a specific kind of

response to specific conditions of social existence. The capacity, but not a

need, for violence appears to be biologically inherent in men". 35 In the

explanation, political violence refers to all collective attacks within a

political community against the regime, its actors or its policies. The three

forms of violence concerned here also are turmoil, conspiracy and internal

war. The primary causal sequence in political violence is; the development

of discontent (arising from the perception of relative deprivation), the

politicization of that discontent, and, finally, its actualization in violent

action against political objects and actors. Thus, discontent arising from

the relative-deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants

in collective violence; and, these three stages in the process of political

violence are each dependent on the preceding one.36 In this context, the

initial preposition about political violence is that "the greater the intensity

and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of political

violence". 37

34

35

36

37

Ibid, p. 1107; For the full text of proposed relationship of variables, see, pp. 1105-1109.

See, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, no. 17, pp. 4-11. This book was the revised version of his Ph. D. Thesis on Genesis of Violence: A Multivariative Theory of Civil Strife ( 1965).

See, Ibid, p. 9.

16

However in the final analysis, even if the members of political

community are motivated to violent action against political objects,

political violence does not necessarily occur. The patterns of coercive

control, institutional support and attitudes and beliefs are the fmal

determinants in the causal sequence linking hostile motivations to the

magnitude and forms of political violence.38

In summary, according to Gurr's theory, (i) no political violence can

occur without political discontent; (ii) no discontent will exist unless

somebody feels deprived; (iii) politicization involves both, normative and

utilitarian considerations, and, even so, little or nothing will happen when

facilitative and coercive resources available to dissidents and authorities

are distributed one sidedly.

Since Gurr's theory is based on psychological and behavioural

causes~ his conclusion is that, "this disposition to violence, discontent,

can be tempered by socially implanted attitudes that condemn violence,

facilitated and focussed on the political system by similarly derived

doctrines and experience that suggest its justifiability and utility" .39

38

39

Gurr develops two basic hypotheses for the purpose: normative justification (the attitudes and beliefs men hold about the intrinsic desirability of taking such action) and, utilitarian justification (the beliefs men hold about the extent to which the threat or use of violence will enhance their value position). See, Ibid, pp. 155-156: However, in his later works, the basic model is as follows: Magnitude of political violence =RD (RD+ .JUST x BALANCE) +e RD = Relative Deprivation .JUST = .Justification c = ~~n·or tem1 For dt>tails, see, Ted Gurr, Handbook ...... , no. 5, p. ~Oil,

St~e, Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel. no. 17, Conclusion, p. 317.

17

(ill) Institutionalization - Mobilization Theory of 'Political Order' and 'Political Decay'

Among contemporary researchers, most influential member of the

family of contingency theories, next to Gurr, is. Huntington. In

Huntington's hypothesis, the cause of deprivation and aggression ts

political. As he argues, revolutions and lesser forms of collective political

violence are artifacts of rapid socio-economic modernization.

Modernization is defined as a multifaceted process involving changes in all

areas of human thought and activity. Those aspects of modernization,

according to Huntington, can be broadly grouped into two categories;

social mobilization and economic development. Such modernization

'mobilizes' people and induces them to enter the arena of political conflict.

No harm will be done if political channels can handle their demands. But,

if political development lags, blockages occur and aggressive modes of

· action are generated.4 o

However, as he examines m Political Order in Changing Societies

(1969), Huntington's primary concern is with political order and social

change. Hence, he examines the 'violence' and 'instability' under the

theme of political decay. As he describes, in the Sixties, of the

modernizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the political

community was fragmented against itself and political institutions had

little power. In many cases, govemments simply did not govern. For that

40 Set~, SamUt~l, P. Huntington, Political Order m Changing Societit>s, (Yale University Press. 1969) p. 7-8.

18

problem, his approach is that it was in large part, the product of rapid

social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled

with the slow development of political institutions.41 Thus, according to

Huntington, in modernizing societies, if social and economic changes

undermine and destroy traditional bases of association, the achievement

of a high level of political development depends upon the capacity of the

people to develop new forms of association. The achievement of a high

level of political development depends upon the capacity of the people to

develop new forms of association for participation in politics. The result of

the absence is a "motivation-organization vacuum" that makes democracy

difficult. 42

In this context, Huntington examines the hypothesis of violence. As

he accepts, more modern societies are generally more stable, suffer less

domestic violence than less modern societies. So, he comes to the

conclusion that economic and social backwardness is responsible for

instability and, modernization is the road to stability. In his approach,

"modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability" .43

Concerning 'Gap hypothesis', Huntington's view is as follows: the

ability of a modernizing (transitional) society to satisfy new aspirations

mcreases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves.

4! Ibid.

Ibid, pp. 10-11, and 31.

43 For details, see, Ibid, pp. 41-53.

19

Consequently, a gap develops between aspirations and expectations, want

formation and want satisfaction or, aspirations function and the level of

living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction.

In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political

instability. The reason for this relationship between social frustration and

political instability is, due to the absence . of two potential intervening

variables: opportunities for social and economic mobility and adaptable

political institutions. This social frustration leads to demands on the

government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those

demands. The political backwardness of the country, in terms of political

institutionalization, however, makes it difficult, if not impossible. Hence,

the increase in political participation gives rise to political instability.

The impact of modernization, thus, involves the follm.ving

relationship;

Social mobilization 1. Social frustration ·

Economic development

Social frustration 2. Political participation

Mobility opportunities

Political participation 3 Political instability44

Political institutionalization

-14 For details, see, Ibid, pp. 54- 57.

20

THESIS 320.0835095493

At814 Si

lll/111/lllll//llll/l/111 .... - . ~f-i6822

In summary, Huntington's thesis on instability and political violence

depends upon the importance of organization in the polity. In his words;

Social and economic modernization disrupts old patterns of

authority and destroys traditional institutions. It does not

necessarily create new authority patterns or new political

institutions. But, it does create the overriding need for them ........... .

Organization is the road to political power, but it is also the

foundation of political stability and thus precondition of political

· liberty ............ In the moderruzing world, he controls th~ future who

organizes its politics. 4 5

As a whole, as dicussed above, (see, p. •1 no. 15), according to J

contingency theory, the fundamental disposition of individuals or groups

in politics is towards 'peace' - the resolution or avoidance of violent

conflicts. Satisfaction of political values is normally sought through

pacific competition (through electoral process, etc.). That tendency may

be blocked and diverted under specific and special (aberrant) conditions.

Collective political violence, thus, is contingent on special and unusual

combinations of conditions. The fundamental question of this theory, as

such, is why it occurs as often as it does. In this direction, Gal tung's and

Huntington's theories are macro-cosmic (societal) and Gurr's micro-cosmic

45 See, Ibid, p. 176.

21

(individual) in emphasis; but all the three converge at the explanation of

collective political violence.46

(b) lnherency Theory of Violence:

Contrary to contingent, something is inherent, i.e., normal which

always exists and actually can only be obstructed. Thus, according to

inherency theory, the fundamental disposition of individuals or groups in

politics is to maximize influence or power over political decisions. The

disposition may flow through numerous channels, of which collective

violent action is one; extreme but normal.47

I I

However, inherency theories of collective political violence are less

common than contingency theories. But, they seem more numerous due

to the prolifer~tion of various names for the same-thing: resource­

mobilization th1ory, political process theory, strategic interaction models,

collective actioJ theory and political contention theory. Among those, the 1.

widely-used word in conflict research is Collective Action theory because '

the approach is that "violent collective action is not aberrant but only one .....

of many alternative channels of group activity" .48

46

47

48

'

For details, see, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5. pp. 139-147.

See, Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (Massachusetts, 1978) pp. 3-6, and, Ibid, p. 143.

See, Ted Robert Gurr, Handbook. No.5, p. 146.

22

Collective-Action theory is chiefly the work of Charles Tilly and his

associates. Tilly's From Mobilization to Revolution (1978) is seen as the

most important work in this context. According to Tilly's description,

polities have members, who have formal access to the political decision

making process, and, also challengers who do not. All are contenders for

power. Members use their resources in a game to enhance their power.

To be allowed to play, there are entrance fees. The higher the fees, the

greater the pressure needed to become members; and, at some point of

cost-efficiency, violent action among contenders occurs, with revolution as

the most extreme. Also, before any collective action (a strike, election,

demonstration, riot, etc.), can occur, there must be confluence of shared

interests. The interests must possess organization. Beyond this,

organized interests must be mobilized. By 'mobilization', Tilly means the

possession and use of resources that may help achieve goals. However, I

even at this point, according to the theory, collective action will not occur,

', unless there is sufficient opportunity for it. This is essentially a matter of

power of the government to prepare or, to make collective action costly:t9

In th,is theory, however, there remains the question of what (like '

'anger' or 'strain') activates violent collective action. The answer, in the I

broader seJse is an 'historical process' from organization to action. So, in

' summary, fue sequences of the process are: (i)some . groups want

something, but it does not have; (ii) a fair number of people agree that

49

' '

See, Carles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, no. 47. pp. 4-6.

23

their claim is justified; (iii) the group is not successfully suppressed to

begin their collective action; and, (iv) the group controls some resources

(and wants to control more).so

Tilly and his associates, however, have not succeeded in finding

'reliable procedures' for enumerating contenders, measuring mobilization

and specifying the relationship of groups to existing structures of .power.

But, according to Tilly's solidarity or "group-centered" approach, he stress

that the other theories of violence neglect the struggle among classes and

power blocs which constitute the bulk of political conflict. Tilly, as such,

calls the other theories as 'break-down' theories.51

Ill. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:

Throughout the present study, 'Youth' is conceived as the age-group

of 14 to 35. Such a concept is based on the following considerations and

requirements;

In Sri Lanka,

so

51

(a) Eompulsory education is upto 14;

(b) Labour laws consider the age of 14 as the minimum age for work;

(c) Full citizenship-rights are accorded at the age of 18;

(d) The period of 14 to 35 is the most turbulent in the life of the

individual; and,

Ibid, pp. 50-55.

For explanation, see, Ted Robert Gurr, Hand Book of Political Conflict, no. 5. pp. 219-221, and, Ibid, p. 55.

24

(e) The provisions made by the State for the 14 to 35 years old, in

comparison with provisions made for other age groups are far

below par.

In this context, the youth in Sri Lanka can be considered in two

aspects: firstly, the individual aspect which concerns the psychological

and social conditions of the youth; and, secondly, the social aspect which

concerns society as a whole; those are the expectations of society,

especially at the levels of economic, cultural and political institutions. In

the individual aspect, education and employment are the most urgent

needs of the youth. The state of their uncertainty leads to anxiety and

frustration. Consequently, such youth is exposed to the influence of

negative elements.s2

Concerning expectations in society, those expectations concentrate

on the State and the government in power. In economic expectations, it is

the youth which is expected to provide human element for expansion of

agriculture and industry. In cultural expectations, the determining factor

in the rate of progress of cultural revival is youth. In political

expectations, youth political involvement may prove fatal not only to

government but also to other institutions and social processes.53

Accordingly, "Unrest" and its implications may be defmed as

dissatisfaction and as a form of collective protest action which involves

52

53

For inst<mce, see, Arieh Levv, Youth in Ceylon, no. 2, pp. 28-29.

Ibid, pp. 29-46.

25

disturbances either against the existing order in its totality or against

some aspect of it. Further, it would be worth considering the approach of

the Presidential Commission on Youth (1990)-directed to investigate the

youth unrest in Sri Lanka after the second JVP rebellion. It defines 'youth

unrest' as "disquiet and social discontent among a section or sections of

the youth", and, special attention is paid to the "grievances existing or

perceived among a section or sections of the youth in relation to

educational or employment prospects" .54

"Political Violence" or violent creation in the State can be examined

in the context of continuous use of force by government as well as by

groups in the civil society for political purposes. In general, it can be

argued that the greater the involvement of the State, its institutions and

its actors in a society, the greater the tendency for protest and violence in

that society to become 'political'. The use of violence on behalf of

protesters also increases the probability that their action will be judged as

political, because the legal norms of behaviour and, the State

responsibility of the 'rule of law' are violated.ss

54

55

See, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth (Sessional Paper, No. 1, 1990, Govt. Printing, Colombo, 1990) The President's letter to the Commission and the Preface.

See, Edward N. Muller, The Psychology of Political Violence', in, Ted Gurr, ed., • Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5, pp. 168-170. And also; according to some observers, the view that 'govemment is the only institution in modem societies which has the right to use physical force to make people obey its decisions' is relevant to this 'political' concept. For details, see, John L. Seitz, The Politics of Development (Basil, Black well Ltd., USA, 1988) Preface; and, Nicos Poulantzas, State-Power-Socialism (NLB and Verso, London, 1978) Chapter 3.

26

However, in the broader sense, conclusions of the Youth

Commission seem to be further helpful in analysing the Sri Lankan

phenomena. As it emphasized, "to restore enduring peace" in Sri Lanka,

" ......... fundamental changes required for the establishment of a fair and

equitable social equilibrium........... If this can be achieved, then, those

many thousands who have sacrified their lives in the bitter confrontations

of the last decade would not have died in vain .......... "56 This view signifies

an approach to the present study with the help of the differently surveyed

literature on the subject that we have explored in the preceding section.

When all the approaches are concerned, it seems clear that the

strong claims about contingency; and, frustration-anger-aggression or

relative deprivation being the 'root' cause of protest and violence must be

modified. For example, as Edward N .Muller explains, the pure availability

of time for protest and violence afforded by unemployment, by being- a

student, or by being ·unmarried, plays a vital role in determining

propensity for protest and violence.57 However, conditions of relative-

deprivation may be considered as a strong background factor which in the

presence of additional conditions leads to violent creation in a civil society.

Hypotheses on the impact of socio-economic development, socio-economic

56

57

See, Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth, no. 54 Preface.

See, Ted Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, no.S, p.97 And also, K.M. de Silva and G.H. Peiris, ed, University System of Sri Lanka : Vision and Reality (Intemational Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka, 1995) p.56; As K.M. de Silva argues, in the late eighties, in student protests, at the university of Peradeniya, it was Engineering Students who took the lead; at the Colombo, it was principally the students in the Faculty of Science. This vi,~w helps in changing the relative-deprivation concept.

27

inequality, State coercion, and normative and utilitarian justifications on

protest and violence, can be considered as important in this context. The

realization that deprivation and sufferings in various walks of life that

have long been identified as social injustices are in fact a form of violence

(Galtung), is more relevant to the Sri Lankan situation in the broader

sense. But, as most of the researchers have seen, no single approach

provides a comprehensive expalanation to civil strifes in a society.

Macrostructural conditions and changes as well as behavioural causes

stressed in the theorizing of Galtung, Gurr, Huntington, Tilly and others

must be analysed with special reference to the conditions in the country

concerned.58 As such, in the approach of the present study, while

particular attention is given to the Galtung's structural and personal

violence concept, the relevance of other perspectives to the Sri Lankan

situation also deserve to be examined.

A brief explanation to the rationale of this approach seems

necessary. As explored in the preceding section, in Galtung's definition,

he sees the cause of difference between the 'actual' and 'potential' as

'social injustice' or unequal power and unequal life chances. In his final

analysis, he defmes structural violence as a part of the social system and,

direct violence as one of the reactions of it. In Galtung's words, structural

violence is the 'ripples on waves' or, 'waves on tranquil waters ........ .'50 To

58

59

For explanation relevant to the statement, see, David Apter, Political Change (London, 1 973), pp. 3-5

See, ,Johm1 Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' in, ,Joun1al of Peace Research, No. 22, p. 173.

28

this extent, his remedy for violence in a political system has been different

from others' conclusions and, has emphasized a vertical economic

development and equilibrium of the society. As stated earlier, conclusions

of the Youth Commission point towards this reality in the Sri Lankan

context. Besides, almost all of the theories including Galtung's, have been

developed in the context of democratic politics. They concerned

democracy as 'open politics' and, have examined the relationship between

democracy and protest. Thus, in their analyses, they ask the question

'whether protest is the price democracies must pay for their long-term

survival'?60

Political violence in Sri Lanka needs to be examined in that context.

Mter Independence, accountability of political power had been dependent

upon the participatory democracy. Constitution has been the basic law of

the Sri Lankan State. As depicted by the first constitution in 1948, rule of

law, separation of powers, and, division of responsibilities were the salient

features of that constitution. Meantime, over the years after independence,

Sri Lanka had been undergoing extensive and fundamental changes. Like

most of the newly iridependent and developing States, she had been

engaging in furthering national progress with the impact of those changes.

Declared aims of successive governments, as such, had been directed at

developing the country and maintaining political stability. At the same

60 For details, see, Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict, no. 5, p. 231-232.

29

time, those attempts seemed to have impinged on the interests and

prospects of the Youth.

However, by the Seventies, stresses and failures of the State policies

had become increasingly evident. Besides colonial heritage, several

factors relating to socio-economic aspects of the country appeared to have

had a bearing on the circumstances. More specifically, increased socio­

economic divisions and gaps between social groups created this situation.

The sections of youth perceived this reality as 'social injustice' and

consequently, were directed against the prevailing system, on the path of

violence for changing the system. The first youth uprising in 1971

reflected this phenomena. It was the 1971 youth uprising which for the

first time drew the attention of the State to the problem of youth unrest in

Sri Lanka. Since then until late eighties, it is clear that on the OJ;le hand,

successive governments tried to lessen their 'political burden' through

constitutional devices; and on the other hand, increased dissatisfaction

and conflict among social groups created a violent political culture in Sri

Lanka. For instance, in the former aspect, in 1972, the United Front

Government defined the Republican Constitution and Socialist form of

Government as an attempt to promote equitable development and social

justice.61 However, after it was routed in 1977 by the popular vote, the

/

61 See, The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972, Chapter V.

30

UNP which came to power, explained the change of governance-through

the 1978 Constitution-as the framework for a "free and just society" .62

In practice, however, with the steady expansion of State activity,

salient features of the constitution had been changed. For example, the

concept of Rule of Law, i.e., supremacy of law, had been extended from the

aim of protecting the individual from arbitrary power to dynamic aspects

of the rule of law. These dynamic aspects were emphasized by ensuring

that it depends not only on the provisions of adequate safeguards against

abuse of power, but also on the existence of an effective government

capable of maintaining law and order and, of achieving social and

economic development. With this enlarged concept of rule of law, several

other basic as.pects of the constitution have also been changed - resulting

in the concentration of authority in the hands of the political executive .

. The governments however, have justified such changes in the name of

'stability' and 'development',63

Hence, it is useful to examine the form and content of such

'development' in some details. According to the 'United Nation' 1986

Declaration on the Right to Development, 'development is a comprehensive

62

63

For instance see, J. R. Jayewardena A New Path (State Printing, Sri Lanka, 1978) pp. 2-3.

For an explanation about the extended concept of Rule of Law, see, K.C. Gopalakrishnan, "Administration and Law" in, Indian Journal of Public: Administration, vol. XLI, no. 4, (Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1 qq;:;), pp. 695-96; And, for the Sri Lankan background, see, Douglas Greenburg and others, ed., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-21 and 159-170.

11

economic, social, cultural and political process which aims at the constant

well being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of

their active, free and meaningful participation in development and fair

distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.64

Ironically, after all the endeavours of successive governments, by

the late Eighties, Sri Lanka had a situation of something like seven million

people of the State out of a total population of 16 million on food stamps

given by the government, as a means of social welfare service.65 That

meant basically that nearly half of the population was below the line of

poverty. This factor implied the nature of "development" in Sri Lanka

since independence.

In such a context, discontented youth groups began to explain

successive governments' attempts as tactics used to protect their own

interests. Hence, causal relationships involving: 1971 uprising and 1972

Constitution; strength of popular vote and five-sixths majority government

in 1977; political and economic re-structuring after 1978 with the UNP

regime's "Free and Just Society" concept; Presidential Election and

Referendum in 1982 and consequent political developments; socio-

economic crises and coercive methods of the government; and eventual

64

65

Cited and described in, Andreas Thimm, "Development, Human Rights and Democracy" in, Law and State, vol. 52, (Institute for Scientific Co-operation, Germany, 1995) pp. 89-90.

See, Neville Jayaweera, "Premadasa Policies" in, Economic Review, April 1990, (Publication of the Peoples' Bank, Sri Lanka), p. 5.

32

violent creature of the State may be seen as manifestations of structural

violence. Recall Galtung's approach in this respect when he says;

On the one hand, when the structure is threatened, those who

benefit from structural violence will try to preserve the status

quo:....... On the other hand, structures in the way in which they

operate undergo permanent tension. When that tension becomes

too great, the structures are transformed..... In both ways, the

regime tries to maintain status quo ...... It is maintained by means of

highly manifest personal violence ..... 66

Hence, through an in-depth analysis of the political and socio-

economic developments in Sri Lanka; and, the place given to the youth in

national politics, an attempt is made in the following chapters to evaluate

the hypotheses of the present study.

66 Pe.o.c.~

See, Johan Galtung, 'Violence-Peace and Research' in, Joumal of Peace A..

Research,no.22,pp. 179-180.

33