chapter vi, veto player, george tsebelis, 2002 luca vezzoli, eps 2013

16
REFERENDUMS Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

Upload: gervais-owen

Post on 13-Jan-2016

225 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

REFERENDUMSChapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis,

2002

Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

Page 2: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

REFERENDUM

Introduction The result of referendum Median voter preferences Direct and mediated democracy: different outcome Classification of Referendum Referendum agenda power Veto Player Refendum Popular Initiatives Popular Vetoes Conclusion

Page 3: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

INTRODUCTION

Referendum is a form of direct democracy. Rousseau was one of the most important

supporter of direct democracy: «Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same

reason that it cannot alieneted […] No act of theirs (the deputies) can be law, unless it has been ratified by the people in person; and without ratification nothing is law.»

Page 4: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

THE RESULT OF REFERENDUM

The referendum can be introduces the preferences of the population in the policymaking process.

The referendum can have different results:• In single dimension the result is the preference

of median voter• In multiple dimension a median voter rarely

exist.

Page 5: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

MEDIAN VOTER PREFERENCES IN REFERENDUM

The winset of the SQ is between two circle (Y, d+2r) and (Y, d-2r)

If the number of voter increases, the radius of the yolk (r) decreases. This simplifies the problem of identification of the median voter and the winset of the SQ because the winset of the SQ is approximate by a circle of radius d.

Page 6: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

DIRECT AND RAPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: DIFFERENT OUTCOME

The result of the policymaking process in a direct democracy is different from the result in a rapresentative democracy.

The outcome in the parliament is Y but the outcome of the referendum is Y’.

Also the winsets of the SQ are different. W(SQ) for mediated democracy and W’(SQ) for direct democracy

Page 7: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

DIRECT AND RAPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY:DIFFERENT OUTCOME (2)

Referendums create one addictional veto player: the people.This implies that:• The change of the status quo becomes more

difficult• The final outcome of the referendum

approximate the preferences of the median voter

So the final outcome is located in the intersection of the parlamentary and the popular winsets.

Page 8: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENDUM

Required referendum: the document has to be ratified by the people.

VP referendum: an actor has decide to hold a referendum.

Popular Veto: the trigger actor may be the population at large or some minority in the parliament

Popular initiative: referendum is a proposal by some political groups the collected the required signatures

Page 9: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

REFERENDUM AGENDA POWERThe referendum agenda is diveded in two parts “who ask the question” and “who trigger the referendum”.

If both part are controlled by only one player: player uses this power to eliminate the other veto players (VETO PLAYER REFERENDUM)

If agenda setting process is delegated through a competitive process: the preferences of the public will be better approximated

Page 10: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

VETO PLAYER REFERENDUM

We condider two possible cases: «Parliamentary» government: coalition between

parties A, B and C «Presidential» system: with any possible winning

coalition among A,B,C,D and E is possible

In each one we will consider two possible agenda setters: party A and E

Page 11: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

VETO PLAYER REFERENDUM (2):A CONTROL THE AGENDA

In parliamentary goverment: A’ is the unanimity core of the governament coalition A,B ,C. In any case A obtains A’, with or without the referendum.

In presidential system: A chooces the coalition A, D E. This coalition is the only one can approve point in the circle (A, AA’).

A’

Page 12: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

VETO PLAYER REFERENDUM (3):E CONTROL THE AGENDA Parliamentary

governament: E tryes to negotiate a different government. If the goverment doesn’t change E will trigger referendum and obtain E’

Presidential system: three possible coalition ABE ADE CDE. And E chooses ADE.

Page 13: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

POPULAR INITIATIVE

The agenda setter power is delegate to the winner of a competitive process.

Different groups can become agenda setters in a referendum by winning the right to present their question to the electorate.

The whole legislative process is replaced by referendum

Page 14: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

POPULAR VETOES

Non-Veto Players will select a referendum if the government proposed result is not inside the winset of the median voter.

But the existing Veto Players can capturing the preferences of the median voter.

Page 15: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

CONCLUSIONS

Referendum alters the rules and the outcome of the legislative proces. Because it introduces an extra veto player.

The differences among referendum depend on who control the agenda.

Median voter preferences results will be better approximated in the following order:

1) Popular initiative2) Popular veto3) VP referundum or mandatory referendum

Page 16: Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

THANK YOU FOR THE

ATTENTION!!