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BPAM214 Topic 4: Case Study [I] -- China

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Page 1: China

BPAM214

Topic 4: Case Study [I] -- China

Page 2: China

Outline

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong2

1. Historical background leading to its authoritarian ruling

2. Basic organization: interlocking relations between party and state

3. Can and will China be democratized under the persistence of the authoritarian rule?

Page 3: China

Political framework of a/an (semi-) authoritarian regime

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong3

Economic liberalization???

Page 4: China

History [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong4

History/civilization shape politicsChina: most populous nation with long civilization of

over 5,000 yearsLegacies of imperial China:

1. Tradition of unified rule under strong rulerFirst emperor of Qin dynasty unified China in 221 B.C. (built

Great Wall, implying a self-defensive mentality)Emperor Qinshi believed in a unified China under strong

central rule: Opposed federalism, decentralization, and separatism

Page 5: China

History [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong5

2. Developed bureaucratic structure to maintain power centralization

• 1 official for every 11,000 in 1650• 1 for every 20,000 in 1850

3. Bureaucracy staffed by officials trained in Confucianism• Scholar-officials: emphasized virtuous rule, harmony, morality,

and rule by men (not by law)

4. Examination system tested candidates to master Confucian classics through rote learning

• Created legacy of educated elites

5. Bureaucrats came from scholar-gentry class whose members attained social status via scholarship/wealth

Page 6: China

History [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong6

Peasant’s son moved up political/social ladder via exam, conferring wealth/status upon family

Many scholar-gentry officials stayed in local areas, some as secretariesOverall, the traditional China was a static and stable

society. Dynastic, rather than political/institutional, changes took place repeatedly until 1912

Despite the communist revolution in 1949 and a series of political campaigns thereafter, do you think the traditional mentality and practices remains unchanged? The mentality of the national unification, resisting power

decentralization/sharingBureaucracy , combining party and stateConfucianism Socialism + Economic pragmatismScholar-officials/gentries were replaced by local party cadres

Page 7: China

Party-State Insitutions

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong7

CCP as the source of political powerhierarchical, centralistDetermines social, economic and political goals for

society4 main levels of organizations

1. central 2. Provincial3. county or district4. basic/primary (schools, factories, villages)

Page 8: China

Structure of the CCP & PRC

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong8

PARTYCentral Committee (中央委員會 )

Politburo Standing Committee (政治局常務委員會 )

Politburo (政治局 ) *Central Military Commission (中央軍事委員

會 ) ↓Provincial Party Committees

↓District Organizations (Xian Party

Committees)↓

City and Town Party Organizations↓

Party sections in villages factory, neighborhood cells, workplace

↓Individual Party members

STATE

President↓

State Council↓

National’s People Congress↓

Local’s People Congresses

Page 9: China

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong9

Page 10: China

Party [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong10

• CCP as the core– When it came to power in 1949, it faced the

breakdown of political authority in China, foreign humiliation of the country, and failure of the old political order

– succeeded in establishing and upholding the international status, enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese

– also inherited nationalism: use it to develop China economically, as with Great Leap Forward (大躍進 )

Page 11: China

Party [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong11

CCP originally clandestine [secretive], hierarchical1982 constitution abolished chairman position to

prevent another person dominating like MaoReform era: top party post has been general secretary,

but real powers in the hands of Deng and other eldersHu Yaobang as general secretary from 1980 to 87, but

ousted and replaced by Zhao ZiyangZhao also ousted after 1989 Tiananmen

Page 12: China

Party [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong12

• Supreme leader generally serves on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC): – Composed of about seven to nine people who belong to

inner circle of political power– Late 1970s to 1987: Deng served on PSC but generally did

not rule through it– Deng insisted on being the third ranking member after Hu

and Zhao– Much authorities were shifted to the CCP Secretariat from

late 1970s to 1987– Since 1987, power shifted back to PSC– This has been true in the Jiang era (as general secretary)

and the current Hu Jintao era

Page 13: China

Party [4]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong13

Each member of Politburo has functional responsibilities Highest ranking PSC member usually deals with

overall party affairs and militarySecond or third ranking deals with premier of State

Council (like Prime Minister in the West) and economic affairs

Another leader deals with legal/security issuesOthers take charge of propaganda and organization

Page 14: China

Party [5]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong14

This division of labor reflects six major systems in Chinese politics (systems: xitong)

1. Party affairs2. Organization/Personnel3. Propaganda/Education4. Political/Legal Affairs5. Finance/Economics; 6. Military

Page 15: China

Party [6]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong15

• Politburo has 25 members currently, selected by the Central Committee with about 200 members– Central Committee (CC) elected by Party Congress

held every 5 years– Since 1987, more candidates for CC than the seats in

CC– Inner-party democracy: debates are permitted, but

consensus should be made after decision-making

Page 16: China

Party [7]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong16

Central Committee: has supreme power to govern party affairs and

enact party policies as Party Congress not in session

As a collective body, it seldom initiates Party policy, but it approves policies, programs and membership changes of leading central organs

Usually hold annual plenary sessionsPlenums are forums for discussion and ratification

of policies and programsSteady increase in CC size

1956: 97 members2007: 204 members.

Page 17: China

Party [8]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong17

CC memberships as reward to loyal supporters of Party and governmentRepresentation of workers/peasants increasedNow CC members younger, more educated technocratsMembers from military, technocrats, provincial gov’t elites,

and people from mass organizations like intellectuals and workers

Democratic centralismParty decisions discussed at lower level first before decision.

Once decision made, all party members carry it outReality, more centralism than democracyUnder CC, the Secretariat that drafts document is crucial (as

in the Soviet case)

Page 18: China

Party [9]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong18

Central Military Commission (CMC)CMC: controls military and accountable to the

PolitburoMao head of the CMC, later Deng, recently Jiang and

now HuJiang as first civilian leading the CMC

Page 19: China

Party [10]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong19

Local party organizationsEach of China’s 30 provinces is headed by a party

committee with a standing committee and a party secretary

Below provinces, party organizations exist at each county, township and village

Recent years, some local party organizations are loose

Page 20: China

Party [11]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong20

Party organizational techniques affect the life of every ChineseUnder the danwei (unit) system, all citizens are attached

to specific bureaucratic, industrial or agricultural organizations

Organizations affect individual life greatly, offering medical care and other welfare

Employment was for life Difficult to move from one place to anotherIn recent years, the danwei system has begun to loosen

as economy diversifies and labor mobileIn rural areas, peasants allowed to travel and migrate in

recent years, unlike the past when they were tied to the land

Page 21: China

Party [12]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong21

The danwei system enforced by household registration system (hukuo) and dossier systemCitizen assigned a household registration assigning

him or her to a specific locationDossier maintained on each citizen, like family

background, education history, one’s political thought and activities

Combination of danwei, hukuo and dossiers let the state control population

Recently the systems have been weakened (dossiers less threatening), but at high levels of party/gov’t, dossiers allow Organization Dept to control promotion of cadres/officials

Page 22: China

State [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong22

The state apparatus has two parts: administrative and legislative

Administratively, the State Council and its ministries (departments) run daily affairsLed by Premier, vice-premiers, heads of national ministries

and commissions Premier usually second or third ranking person in Politburo,

showing that party control of the stateAdministers gov’t through functional ministries and

commissionsStable composition: technocrats and administratorsMany departments under State Council, like national defense,

foreign affairs, trade, family planning, national audit, IT, water resources, public security and national affairs, etc

Page 23: China

[Party-]State [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong23

Party Control of the Stateis done through the nomenclatura systemachieved through party cells or groups (dangzu)

existing at different levels of state bureaucracyMinister usually the party secretary of the

ministry’s party group or cellParty group sets policy for the ministry

Page 24: China

State [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong24

At the legislative level, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is crucialNPC members elected every five years through a multi-

tiered representative electoral system. Delegates are elected by the provincial people's

congresses, who in turn are elected by lower level congresses, and so on through a series of tiers to the local people's congresses which are directly elected by the electorate.

Page 25: China

State [4]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong25

Highest gov’t organ and similar duties as parliamentsUpon PRC President’s recommendation, NPC designates

and may remove premier and other members of the State Council, and can elect President of Supreme People’s Court and the Chief Procurator

Delegates from mass organizations, the CCP and non-CCP members

Page 26: China

State [5]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong26

• Receives (amends) gov’t report, consider legislation, supervise gov’t – Delegates divided into groups, submit motions, ask

questions, raise suggestions on a variety of topics– Criticisms and praise on the quality of legislators in

recent years– Some heated debate on bankruptcy law– When NPC not in session, its Standing Committee is

the executive body– SC can declare martial law

Page 27: China

Problems in Party-State Institutions

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong27

1. Interlocking relations between Gov’t and Party Needs reforms Hua Guofeng as chair of CCP, premier of central gov’t and

chair of MAC in 1977-78 Major economic ministries in hands of ministers who

were members of either Politburo or CC2. Overstaffing problem in gov’t needs streamlining

work3. Political reforms are lacking: needs to consolidate

legal system, democratize NPC, separate power between gov’t and Party Not easy to implement all these reforms (Zhao

envisioned reforms but he was disposed)

Page 28: China

China’s Democracy: Social Tensions in the Mainland and Political Change in Greater China

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong28

IntroductionThe quest for democracy—citizens are masters

determining their own affairs—has become a major theme in the political development of modern China

Chinese political culture, some argue, has an element of democracyMencius (a Confucian thinker): “The people are the masters,

the country is of secondary importance, and the monarch is of least importance.”

Historical reviewThe 1919 May Fourth Movement: students were triggered by

nationalism to demand for better, stronger, more open and democratic government (Mr. Democracy & Mr. Science)

The 1989 Tiananmen Incident (“Massacre”): People’s Liberation Army mobilized to crush/suppress student demonstrators

Page 29: China

Factors [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong29

Factors shaping China’s democratic development1.Historically, China remained a traditional dynasty in which political power is concentrated at the top. Dynastic cycle in Chinese history has not changed this feature, including the current Communist regime•Long history/recent global emergence may reinforce Chinese civilization:

– China has 3,000 years of recorded history. Not only do the people feel proud of their civilization, but the leaders are naturally resistant to Western values

Page 30: China

Factors [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong30

The 19th century: China learned Western technology to strengthen itself, but not Western values (retaining the traditional values)

Chinese historically are afraid of luan (chaos): The successive political chaos from 1900 to 1976

Recent entry into the WTO and the successful bid in holding the 2008 Olympics means PRC leaders are keen to restore China’s “greatness”, and reinforces Chinese values

Page 31: China

Factors [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong31

2. Ethnically, China has a heterogeneous population although Hans are the majority. There are 56 nationality groups, implying that democracy, if mismanaged, may lead to separatism and ethnic nationalism

3. From central-local or central-provincial perspective, democracy may have the danger of exacerbating provincialism, a historical problem in Chinese history that was once punctuated by warlordism and provincial struggle against central government (Revolutionary movements led by Sun Yat-sen was begun in Guangdong)

Page 32: China

Factors [4]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong32

4. From economic perspective, China’s political leaders often emphasize economic liberalization rather than political democratization. They are Marxist-Leninists who believe in the leadership of the Communist Party, and in Marx’s assumption that economic change is the “base” affecting superstructure like politics/culture/society

Page 33: China

Factors [5]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong33

5. The nature of one-party state in China: it means hegemony of CCP has to be maintained. Any social/political force independent of the state has to be suppressed, like Falun Gong (religious sect)

Although social groups have emerged since reform era, like business groups, they are not really challenging the power of the state

Workers are coopted into official trade unions

Page 34: China

Factors [6]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong34

6. Ideologically: democracy has been viewed as dangerous, separatist and un-Chinese concept toppling the regime in power. Tiananmen incident as well as Falun Gong were cases.

“socialist democracy” is different from capitalist democracy.

China is resistant to Western democracy because ideologically it is associated with capitalism, not socialism

Socialism remains the official ideology

Page 35: China

Factors [7]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong35

7. Culturally, Chinese (Sinic) civilization different from Western civilization

Chinese civilization: harmony, hierarchy, political authoritarianism, group interests and obedience to authority (Huntington)

Western civilization: conflicts, equality, political pluralism, individualism and autonomy

Although more Chinese may exhibit “Western” values, the Chinese civilization remains slow in its process of transformation

Page 36: China

Tensions [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong36

Social Tensions in Mainland China and the CCP Response•A survey conducted by Institute of Macro-Economic Studies of State Planning Committee and the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2001 found urban residents identified 5 sources of social instability

(1) Rising unemployment/lay-offs, (2) bureaucratic corruption, (3) widening gap between rich and poor,(4) declining social morality,(5) deteriorating law and order

•Social tensions can be seen in gap between rich & poor, and conflicts between villagers/workers/the powerless & cadres/the police/the powerful

Page 37: China

Citizens Assessment of Stability

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong37

Urban Residents Rural ResidentsRank % Rank %

Rising unemployment/lay-offs 1 79.1 5 45.4 Bureaucratic corruption 2 75.1 2 62.9 Widening rich-poor gap 3 64.5 3 61.1 Declining social morality 4 61.5 4 50.2 Deteriorating law/order 5 47.0 7 38.7 Widespread fake products 6 41.4 6 39.1 Pollution of environment 7 40.4 8 38.4 Heavy burden of peasants 8 21.3 1 65.0 Tension between cadres/masses 9 17.3 9 17.2 Tension amongst ethnic groups 10 7.9 10 3.5 Sample size (N) 1,425 574

Page 38: China

Tensions [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong38

Middle-class citizens become more independent of the government; some are vocal/criticalAs economy grows, more middle-class members

emerge and CCP may find it difficult to co-opt all of them into political institutions

Some form anti-Japanese groups, protest groups, AIDS concern groups, but most of them are quickly suppressed

Page 39: China

Tensions [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong39

China also has large number of floating population, who are migrant workers in provinces. They are a source of crime: Robbery, kidnapping,

theft, secret societies???Urban unemployment can become a source of

instability as many state-owned enterprises lay off workers

Ethnic minorities’ relations with the Hans are political: Tibet and Xinjiang are sensitive regions, more Hans populated there than before

Page 40: China

Tensions [4]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong40

• China’s social interactions with the outside world, esp. HK/Taiwan have complicated internal social relations– Mainland workers confront HK/Taiwan factory owners;

mainland Chinese in Guangdong more participative in protests and strikes (influenced by HK media)

– Some mainlanders are also influenced by criminal elements in HK/Taiwan/Macau

– Number of protests, according to Ministry of Public Security, increased from 8.700 incidents in 1993 to 11,000 in 1995, and to 32,000 in 1999

– Social tensions have increased over time, but they do not necessarily promote democracy although the state does respond (after Tiananmen, anti-corruption work has been enhanced but achieved so limitedly)

Page 41: China

Tensions [5]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong41

CCP response: 1. Co-opt capitalists into the Party; 2. channel middle-class participation into institutions

(like Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences and provincial congresses),

3. suppress middle-class organizations independent of the state;

4. Co-opt workers/women into officially sanctioned unions;

5. closely monitor ethnic minorities while localizing the bureaucracy in Tibet, co-opting ethnic representatives into NPC;

6. urge village cadres to continue using “mass line” to listen to views of the masses;

7. introduce village elections to increase openness and accountability of elected representatives to the public

Page 42: China

Tensions [6]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong42

Village elections held in China in 1987 but the election law was revised in 1998 so that there could be free nomination of candidates, secret ballot and transparent ballot counting

Elected cadres need support of villagers to stay in office, and also check the power of the village’s Party secretary

Village elections can be seen as a means of democratizing the countryside, but in urban cities, CCP maintains a hard-line policy toward any political dissent

Page 43: China

Tensions [7]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong43

Democratic change in Taiwan/Hong Kong constitutes a threat to the national security and one-party rule in China

Taiwan’s democratization direct election of President since 1996Universal suffrage of Legislative Yuan counselors, city

manors in Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as heads in cities, counties and townships

Page 44: China

Tensions [8]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong44

Democratization in Taiwan is characterized by(1) changes from one-party dominance to multi-party

competition,(2) the rotation of party in power (KMT to DPP, and then

KMT again), (3) the persistence of money politics (but this has been

under the severe criticism from the public under the Chan Shui-bian’s administration)

(4) growth of strong Taiwan identity (not Chinese identity)De-Chiangization (e.g., the removal of Chiang Kai-shek’s colossus,

the retitling of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as Liberty Square)De-sinicization (e.g., Taiwan’s history is NOT a part of Chinese

history; China is regarded as a potential and an immediate threat to Taiwan)

Page 45: China

Tensions [9]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong45

• These features are politically unacceptable in the PRC– Taiwan’s capitalist and liberal democracy is rejected by the

PRC’s one-party authoritarianism• HKSAR’s gradual democratic reform in the colonial era

(now the Chief Executive is elected by a 800-member Election Committee) and the protest by half a million people in July 2003 against the government have alarmed Beijing– The large-scale protests in 2003 were shocking to PRC leaders

(Premier Wan Jiabao) who visited HK at that time– Beijing is concerned about impact of HK democratic

development on provinces like Guangdong and Xinjiang, and on regions like Tibet (the Dalai Lama exile government calls for the adoption of HK model of “one country, two systems”)

Page 46: China

Conclusion [1]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong46

1. Difficulties of China’s transition are perhaps common in many developing states: influence of history, culture, tradition; one-party authoritarianism; presence of economic reform without political democratization; strong state vs. weak society; the interventionist role of the military if necessary (Tiananmen incident, suppression of Tibetan protests)

Page 47: China

Conclusion [2]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong47

2. Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and HK’s democratic aspirations are huge challenges to Beijing

– The PRC regime is now keen to contain the spread of democracy from Taiwan/HK to the mainland, thus determining to restrain democratic development in HKSAR whereas criticizing Taiwan’s democratization as the path to independence

– Beijing: does not want to see the Chief Executive directly elected by all HK people in 2007 and the direct elections of the entire Legislative Council in 2008

Page 48: China

Conclusion [3]

BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong48

3. Because of China’s long history, culture and political tradition, perhaps it is difficult to foresee a democratic breakthrough in the PRC in the years to come

Yet, it should be noted that the intentional resistance of democratization, corresponding with socio-political unrest (polarization, ethnical conflicts, corruption and power abuse) under a partial economic flourishing, may produce a volatile effect that goes beyond the CCP’s expectation and prevention.