china navy ii

8/9/2019 China Navy II

1/8

PART 2:

China's P lan for a Blue-Water Fleet

M a r c h 3 1 , 2 0 0 9


2/8

2

STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com

C

green-water navy into a robust blue-wfleet would take at least a generation, and

China needed a way to defend its coast

while extending its reach long before thetransition could be completed. To

accomplish this, China set out to create amaritime buffer, develop a string of

logistical hubs to support coastal vessels

farther out and learn how to deal with atechnologically superior U.S. Navy. This

effort began a decade ago, and its success

has been nothing short of dramatic.

Editors Note: This is the second part of a th

reating an entirely new navy is not something that can be done overnight. For China to transform aater

ree-part series on Chinas development of a blue-water

navy.

9, as the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) marked its 50th anniversary, Chinese

naval officials already were planning to expand the range and role of the navyIn 199

, with a clear eye toward

ncluding debate over the pros and cons

ofa carrier fleet

moving beyond a traditional coastal defense capability (the so-called green-water navy) to a true

blue-water, or oceangoing, navy. But they knew the change would be neither quick nor easy. It

would require not only new ships, but also new logistics systems, new training and newcommunications protocol in essence, an entirely new navy.

Beyond the obvious budget constraints, other hurdles loomed, i, domestic security concerns that would shift budgets and attention back to dry land

and the age-old Chinese concern over the strategic logic of an expeditionary navy.

Clearly, developing an entirely new navy would not happen overnight. Moving from a coastal fleet toan expeditionary fleet would take at least a generation, and the PLAN needed a way to maintain its

includes most of the South ChinaSea, in order to create a maritime buffer similar to the terrestrial buffers of Xinjiang and Tibet.

pment is to exert its authority over its EEZ. Basically, Beijing

claims the Yellow, East and South China seas. This area is enclosed by what China calls the first

m

ose

coastal mission while expanding its operational reach long before such a transition could be completed.To accomplish this, the PLAN undertook four steps that are not necessarily sequential; action on one

does not depend on the completion of another, nor do all the steps need to be accomplished in full.

Taken together, however, these overlapping steps create a path for China to protect its interests whilemoving toward its objective of deploying a robust blue-water navy:

Secure Chinas claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which Extend the Chinese shoreline via port agreements and island development to create a string

of logistical hubs that would enable coastal vessels to operate farther from the mainland. Develop and deploy asymmetrical countermeasures to deal with the technological gap between

China and the worlds dominant naval power, the United States.

Begin building the ships, logistics train and doctrine for a truly expeditionary navy.Creating a Maritime Buffer

The first step in Chinas naval develo

island chain running from southern Japan through the Ryukyu Islands to Taiwan, then along thePhilippine Islands to Borneo and on (almost) to the Strait of Malacca, the choke point for trade fro

the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to East Asia. But Chinese claims overlap and conflict with thof several other countries, including Japan (over the Daiyoutai/Senkaku Islands), Vietnam (over the

Xisha/Paracel Islands) and Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (over theNansha/Spratly Islands).
http://www.stratfor.com/china_deceptive_logic_carrier_fleethttp://www.stratfor.com/vietnams_risky_game_south_china_seahttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19990628_spratlys_continue_expose_southeast_asian_fragmentationhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19990304_china_and_philippines_vie_control_south_china_seahttp://www.stratfor.com/spratly_islands_tide_trouble_riseshttp://www.stratfor.com/spratly_islands_tide_trouble_riseshttp://www.stratfor.com/spratly_islands_tide_trouble_riseshttp://www.stratfor.com/spratly_islands_tide_trouble_riseshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19990304_china_and_philippines_vie_control_south_china_seahttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19990628_spratlys_continue_expose_southeast_asian_fragmentationhttp://www.stratfor.com/vietnams_risky_game_south_china_seahttp://www.stratfor.com/china_deceptive_logic_carrier_fleethttp://web.stratfor.com/images/fsu/map/Russia-Perspective.jpg


3/8

3


Ctw

claims speci

laiming control and exerting control areo very different things. While China

al rights in the Yellow, East

t,

and South China seas, these claims forthe most part are not recognized by

other countries, and China has found itdifficult to exert control in the area.

Tensions occasionally flare up as a resulusually involving a naval patrol and

fishing or commercial vessels. Boats and

ships are sometimes detained, damagedor even sunk. In 2005, for example,

Chinese ships opened fire on Vietnamesefishing vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin,

leaving several Vietnamese injured ordead. Beijing claimed the Vietnamese

fishermen were pirates. Click map toenlarge

China also has tried more cooperative

approaches to reduce direct competition for use and control of the South China Sea, includingjointventures for energy exploration and fishing agreements. Indeed, China has made an effort to shift its

a that threatens to dominate the region to a cooperative

s

ntly

ryay

image in Asia from that of a rising Chin

China that could be an economic partner. In the process, it has managed to reduce tensions with itneighbors and support a rising tide of Pan-Asianism that portrays the United States and the West as

bigger threats to the region than China.Chinas efforts to create a maritime buffer also extend into the realm of international law warfare,

part of the unrestricted warfare paradigm expounded by two senior colonels in the Peoples

Liberation Army in 1999. They advocated using a broader spectrum of national power such asleveraging the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to compensate for Chinese

shortcomings in relation to the United States. Regarding the UNCLOS, China is trying to work withother East Asian powers to coherently redefine certain legal distinctions like the EEZ. An EEZ curre

is defined as an area running 200 nautical miles from a countrys coastline within which the counthas rights over exploration and extraction of mineral resources, although ships of other countries m

pass freely through the area for peaceful purposes and to carry out certain economic and scientificactivities (e.g., laying undersea cables). Not every country abides by the UNCLOS or agrees with the

definition of an EEZ, and China would like to make it more difficult legally for U.S. ships toapproach its coastline.Despite these cooperative moves, Beijing never stopped its more direct military actions, and it has

actually stepped up patrols in the waters out to the first island chain. In 2008, China more than

doubled its submarine patrols, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates, with several forays into

and around Japanese waters.On March 8, 2009, a PLAN intelligence collection ship along with several other Chinese-flagged patr

vessels and trawlers

ol

confronted the USNS Impeccable some 75 miles off Hainan Island, claiming theU.S. ship was carrying out unlawful military activity. The confrontation topped off days of escalating

Chinese activity around U.S. surveillance ships, a maritime parallel to the more aggressive air

interdictions that led to the collision between a Chinese Jian-8 fighter and a U.S. EP-3E Aries IIsurveillance aircraft in 2001. In both cases, it appears the United States was monitoring Chinese

submarine developments off Hainan.Chinas latest move to assert itself in its claimed EEZ came on March 10, when the China Yuzhen

311, Chinas largest ocean surveillance vessel, set sail from Guangzhou on its maiden voyage to pChinas claimed waters in the South China Sea. The ship is a 4,450-ton former navy support vessel

g

atrol

transferred in 2006 to the South China Sea Fishery Administration Bureau under the Ministry ofAgriculture, now tasked with asserting Chinese claims to contested fishing grounds, islands and reefs

in the South China Sea. The bureau plans to launch a 2,500-ton maritime surveillance vessel in 2010

that will carry a helicopter to enhance patrol capabilities.
http://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081022_china_reports_increased_naval_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081022_china_reports_increased_naval_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090309_china_u_s_naval_incident_and_wider_maritime_competitionhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090309_china_u_s_naval_incident_and_wider_maritime_competitionhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090309_china_u_s_naval_incident_and_wider_maritime_competitionhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090309_china_u_s_naval_incident_and_wider_maritime_competitionhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081022_china_reports_increased_naval_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081022_china_reports_increased_naval_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpghttp://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/China_Pacific_India_LG.jpg


4/8

4


Expanding Green Water

Aggressive rhetoric and patrols by a single ship or two are insufficient to make Chinas claimed EEZ an

ads to the second step in the PLAN strategy: establishment of

logistics bases and ports in strategic locations to push the navys zone of operation farther from the

effective buffer, however. This le

mainland. In 1996, there were calls for the PLAN to develop at-sea replenishment capabilities in order

to extend the navys reach. Four years later, the Chinese navy was conducting operations with smallermissile boats much farther from shore to test alternative ways of expanding the range of naval

operations with existing hardware and in accordance with current doctrine. While China began work ona logistics capability for extended overseas operations in the 1990s, it was not a capability that could

be quickly and easily implemented. As a stopgap measure, China simply began moving its coastfarther out.

Beijing did this in part by building docks

line

and facilities in the Nansha/SpratlyIslands. This led to a flare-up in tensions

in 1998 between Manila and Beijing overChinese construction on Mischief Reefin

the Spratlys, with Manila attempting to

draw the United States into the spat. In

addition, China began expanding its

relations with various Pacific islandnations in order to gain access to

monitoring and port facilities that couextend the PLANs reach farther eas

along

ldt,

routes heavily traversed by theU.S. Navy and global maritime

commerce.

China also began looking west,developing port facilities between the

Strait of Malacca and the Arabian Sea.

al trade-

r

tes

meways be seen as an extension of Chinas shoreline, serving a

extending the range of a green-water navy that still needs anSeveral of them would also be critical as ports for replenishm

the

The third step in Chinas naval development is to find ways to counter the U.S. Navys technologicalvolution is under way. In its simplest form, this builds on the previous

steps with the deployment of tracking stations and anti-ship missile installations on Chinas string of

Operating primarily under bilater

promotion agreements, China funded the

dredging and improvement of deepwate

ports in Sittwe (Myanmar), Chittagong(Bangladesh), Gwadar (Pakistan) andHambantota (Sri Lanka), creating a string

of ports along the northern edge of

Chinas vital supply lines and trade roufrom the Middle East through the Indian

Ocean. Each of these ports can in sos repair and logistics hubs and thus

umbilical connection to the mainland.ent ships to sustain Chinese blue-water

forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea just as the United States relies on friendly ports inregion to supply its own blue-water fleet.

Asymmetrical Counters

dominance while Chinas naval e

maritime stepping-stones. This could enable China to delay (if not stop) a U.S. naval response to a

conflict between China and Taiwan, for example, or to deter or complicate any U.S. attempt toblockade Chinese ports or interdict trade routes.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_calls_development_sea_replenishment_capabilitieshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas_new_naval_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas_new_naval_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20000420_china_takes_firm_stance_spratly_islandshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20000420_china_takes_firm_stance_spratly_islandshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_looks_south_pacifichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981211_u_s_congressman_takes_provocative_flight_over_disputed_spratlyshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/19981204_tensions_between_philippines_and_china_continue_simmerhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20000420_china_takes_firm_stance_spratly_islandshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20000420_china_takes_firm_stance_spratly_islandshttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas_new_naval_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas_new_naval_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_calls_development_sea_replenishment_capabilities


5/8

5


More ambitiously, China has added asymmetrical countermeasures in the form of Russian-builtdestroyers and submarines armed with anti-ship missiles, already laying the groundwork, in a s

for building out a new blue-water fleet as well as

ense,

for countering the U.S. presence on the open seas.China has acquired four Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, each carrying eight

built

SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missiles (of which China is the only export recipient).

Designed by the Soviets to better penetrate the defenses of U.S. carrier battle groups, these missileshave been carefully studied by Chinese engineers, who undoubtedly will try to improve upon and

replicate them. Although the destroyers are not impervious to American carrier-based aviation, theycan be used as part of a sea denial strategy. In addition, Beijing has acquired a dozen Russian-

Kilo-class diesel-electric patrol submarines, which are now being armed with the SS-N-27 Sizzlersupersonic anti-ship missile a weapon senior U.S. naval officers are deeply concerned about. Th

submarines are known to be very quiet and could pose a threat to U.S. carrier and expeditionary strikgroups (and the Kilo design is being incorporated into the development of Chinas latest domestic

patrol submarine).

Beijings current focus on asymmetrical naval warfare includes a novel way of overcoming advancedanti-ship missile defenses: the use of ballistic missiles. These missiles approach from a near vertica

trajectory, and their

ese

e

l

relatively simple guidance systems can still distinguish between a modern

American carriers four-and-a-half-acre flight deck and the open ocean. Ballistic missiles are alsos,thought to exceed the engagement envelope for some of the core defensive systems on U.S. warship

increasing the Pentagons desire to field Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers in the

Pacific that are capable of ballistic missile defense. China appears to be working with medium-ran

ballistic missiles, which have a longer range than its more conventional anti-ship missiles.

In addition, China has begun to focus its attention on a key element of U.S. technological superiority:

space. Having begun an ambitious space program of its own in recent years, China is looking toenhance its communications, guidance and observation capabilities. It is also looking to spa

ge

ce for moreovert military applications. Chinas January 2007 anti-satellite test demonstrated an alternative abilityto deal with a maritime threat by disrupting the guidance systems of sophisticated precision-guided

weapons. In line with Chinas 1999 comment that its neutron bombs were more than enough to handleU.S. aircraft carriers, the anti-satellite test was meant to show that China had the options and

creativity to narrow the technology gap if push came to shove with the U.S. Navy.

A Toe in Blue Water

The first three steps in many ways are happening simultaneously, and they allow China to increase itsrange and capabilities while preparing to take the fourth step: building a robust blue-water navy. The

ld be its own aircraft carrier, something naval officials continue to discussdespite the cost and difficultiescrown jewel for Beijing wou

associated with it. (Recently, this ongoing discussion appears to have

moved beyond talk to action.) But before an aircraft carrier can be effectively deployed, the PLANmust demonstrate the ability to conduct extended operations far from home. This is where Chinas

recent participation in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia comes in.

Chinas testing of extended operations abroad could easily lead to concern about Chinese militaryexpansionism and accelerate the development of countercapabilities by Chinas neighbors. The

Somalia operation, however, has given Beijing a chance to conduct a long-term deployment in awelcoming environment where no one is seen as a threat (except, perhaps, by the pirates). Chinese

otate

her

naval officials have made it clear that their December 2008 deployment of two guided-missiledestroyers and a supply ship to Somalia will not be a short one, and that they are preparing to ra new squadron of similar size into the area in order to sustain the Chinese presence. This will furt

test their command, control and logistical coordination, as well as afford opportunities to practiceunderway replenishment and maintenance.

The Somalia deployment must be understood not as a one-off event, but as a fundamental doctrinalshift rooted in geopolitical realities. There is only one way the PLAN is going to gain experience in

naval force projection far afield by doing it. And as Beijing is finding out, the U.N.-sponsored
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threathttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threathttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090108_u_s_bmd_atlantichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090108_u_s_bmd_atlantichttp://www.stratfor.com/chinas_offensive_space_capabilityhttp://www.stratfor.com/space_and_sea_lane_control_chinese_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/space_and_sea_lane_control_chinese_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/china_deceptive_logic_carrier_fleethttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090217_china_roadmap_carrier_fleethttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090217_china_roadmap_carrier_fleethttp://www.stratfor.com/china_deceptive_logic_carrier_fleethttp://www.stratfor.com/space_and_sea_lane_control_chinese_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/space_and_sea_lane_control_chinese_strategyhttp://www.stratfor.com/chinas_offensive_space_capabilityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090108_u_s_bmd_atlantichttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threathttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threat


6/8

6


Somalia operation is one in which it can closely observe the behavior of more experienced navies whipracticing its own operational procedures in a nonthreatening way.

But in terms of developing a naval force-projection capability, the U.N.-sponsored mission in the Gulfof Aden represents the shallow end of naval conflict more green w

le

ater than blue. A robust

expeditionary navy must be able to fight peer forces as well as pirates, and the PLAN has a long wayto go before it can deploy a credible blue-water fleet. Complex challenges ranging from damage

control (even the British Royal Navy had trouble in this essential area during the Falkland Islan

in the early 1980s) to anti-submarine warfare will occupy PLAN planners for decades to come. WhileChina has started to narrow the gap in terms of

ds War

anti-ship missiles and submarine development,

matters as mundane as the shape and machining of a submarines screw (propeller) are the productsof extensive study and investment, and China has much to learn in these areas.

Nothing complicates the PLANs expeditionary efforts more than Chinas lack of a naval tradition. Bycontrast, the modern U.S. Navy is the product of a maritime tradition that predates its own founding

and has strong roots in the even more established maritime tradition of the British Royal Navy. More

niorsin their art. In the case of U.S. carrier aviation, for example, this oversight can be traced

through hard-won operational experience all the way back to the USS Lexington (CV-2), which was

rs

Chinese aviators instructors or landing signal officers have ever landed or trapped a fixed-wing

rs

amen. This puts it at a distinct disadvantage, and it is easy to see why it has long deferred thiscourse.

it, the PLAN and its expeditionary vision should not be discounted.le to pull a naval tradition out of thin air, but it is in a good position to begin one.

As the American historian and theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued, a naval tradition is rooted in a

than simply a matter of subtleties like esprit de corps, such tradition goes to the heart of militaryproficiency.

American and British naval officers and petty officers have trained under the careful tutelage of sewell-schooled

commissioned in 1927 and the oldest carrier to deploy fixed-wing aircraft at the start of World War II.

In the Chinese navy, aviators have no such operational depth to tap, nor do they have aircraft carrie

from which to fly. Save for perhaps a handful of Russian advisers with limited experience, few if any of

aircraft on a carrier flight deck at sea. Pilots must practice the exacting and unforgiving art of carrier-

based flight by simulating takeoffs and landings on paved runways on land instead of on a movingship.

As the Chinese navy ventures into blue water, it is necessarily doing so with less-experienced office

and se

Going Forward

In spite of the many hurdles beforeChina may not be ab

commercial maritime tradition, and China has surpassed the United States in terms of the size of its

merchant fleet and in its contribution to global civilian shipbuilding.

Ultimately, with an extensive intelligence and espionage capability, firsthand experience with Russiantechnology (essentially late-Soviet technology, which in areas like submarine propulsion was quite

exceptional) and a new focus on gaining operational experience, the PLANs trajectory is clear. Chinesenaval expansion and improvement over the last decade has been nothing short of dramatic, and the

factors that have enabled it will only build upon themselves in the coming years.

Of course, modernizing a navy in East Asia will not occur in a vacuum. The PLANs blue-water plan willinexorably move forward as long as other, unrelated forces do not interfere. Barring significant

economic or political crises at home or the emergence of a threat along Chinas long land periphery,

al and

the PLAN is setting the stage to become a much more potent naval force over the next decade. And as

China focuses on the seas to defend its vital supply lines, it will inevitably clash with other regioninternational maritime powers, most notably Japan, India and the United States.
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threathttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_cybersecurity_and_mosaic_intelligencehttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_cybersecurity_and_mosaic_intelligencehttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090204_china_more_submarine_activityhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threathttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navyhttp://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081125_military_building_navy


7/8

7


Next: When grand strategies collide


8/8

STRATFOR is the world leader in global intelligence. Our team of experts collects and analyzesintelligence from every part of the world offering unparalleled insights through our exclusively

published analyses and forecasts. Whether it be on political, economic or military developments,STRATFOR not only provides its members with a better understanding of current issues and events,but invaluable assessments of what lies ahead.

Renowned author and futurologist George Friedman founded STRATFOR in 1996. Most recently, heauthored the international bestseller, The Next 100 Years. Dr. Friedman is supported by a team of

professionals with widespread experience, many of whom are internationally recognized in their ownright. Although its headquarters are in Austin, Texas, STRATFORs staff is widely distributed

throughout the world.

Barrons has consistently found STRATFORs insights informative and largely on the money-as has thecompanys large client base, which ranges from corporations to media outlets and government

agencies. - Barrons

What We Offer

On a daily basis, STRATFOR members are made aware of what really matters on an internationalscale. At the heart of STRATFORs service lies a series of analyses which are written without bias or

political preferences. We assume our readers not only want international news, but insight into the

developments behind it.

In addition to analyses, STRATFOR members also receive access to an endless supply of SITREPS

(situational reports), our heavily vetted vehicle for providing breaking geopolitical news. To completethe STRATFOR service, we publish an ongoing series of geopolitical monographs and assessments

which offer rigorous forecasts of future world developments.

The STRATFOR Difference

STRATFOR members quickly come to realize the difference between intelligence and journalism. Weare not the purveyors of gossip or trivia. We never forget the need to explain why any event or issue

has significance and we use global intelligence not quotes.

STRATFOR also provides corporate and institutional memberships for multi-users. Our intelligenceprofessionals provide Executive Briefings for corporate events and board of directors meetings and

routinely appear as speakers at conferences. For more information on corporate or institutionalservices please contact [email protected]

8

STRATFOR 700 L S S i 900 A i TX 78701 T l 1 512 744 4300 f
http://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.phpmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.php

china navy ii

Documents