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PART 2:
China's P lan for a Blue-Water Fleet
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C
green-water navy into a robust blue-wfleet would take at least a generation, and
China needed a way to defend its coast
while extending its reach long before thetransition could be completed. To
accomplish this, China set out to create amaritime buffer, develop a string of
logistical hubs to support coastal vessels
farther out and learn how to deal with atechnologically superior U.S. Navy. This
effort began a decade ago, and its success
has been nothing short of dramatic.
Editors Note: This is the second part of a th
reating an entirely new navy is not something that can be done overnight. For China to transform aater
ree-part series on Chinas development of a blue-water
navy.
9, as the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) marked its 50th anniversary, Chinese
naval officials already were planning to expand the range and role of the navyIn 199
, with a clear eye toward
ncluding debate over the pros and cons
ofa carrier fleet
moving beyond a traditional coastal defense capability (the so-called green-water navy) to a true
blue-water, or oceangoing, navy. But they knew the change would be neither quick nor easy. It
would require not only new ships, but also new logistics systems, new training and newcommunications protocol in essence, an entirely new navy.
Beyond the obvious budget constraints, other hurdles loomed, i, domestic security concerns that would shift budgets and attention back to dry land
and the age-old Chinese concern over the strategic logic of an expeditionary navy.
Clearly, developing an entirely new navy would not happen overnight. Moving from a coastal fleet toan expeditionary fleet would take at least a generation, and the PLAN needed a way to maintain its
includes most of the South ChinaSea, in order to create a maritime buffer similar to the terrestrial buffers of Xinjiang and Tibet.
pment is to exert its authority over its EEZ. Basically, Beijing
claims the Yellow, East and South China seas. This area is enclosed by what China calls the first
m
ose
coastal mission while expanding its operational reach long before such a transition could be completed.To accomplish this, the PLAN undertook four steps that are not necessarily sequential; action on one
does not depend on the completion of another, nor do all the steps need to be accomplished in full.
Taken together, however, these overlapping steps create a path for China to protect its interests whilemoving toward its objective of deploying a robust blue-water navy:
Secure Chinas claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which Extend the Chinese shoreline via port agreements and island development to create a string
of logistical hubs that would enable coastal vessels to operate farther from the mainland. Develop and deploy asymmetrical countermeasures to deal with the technological gap between
China and the worlds dominant naval power, the United States.
Begin building the ships, logistics train and doctrine for a truly expeditionary navy.Creating a Maritime Buffer
The first step in Chinas naval develo
island chain running from southern Japan through the Ryukyu Islands to Taiwan, then along thePhilippine Islands to Borneo and on (almost) to the Strait of Malacca, the choke point for trade fro
the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to East Asia. But Chinese claims overlap and conflict with thof several other countries, including Japan (over the Daiyoutai/Senkaku Islands), Vietnam (over the
Xisha/Paracel Islands) and Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (over theNansha/Spratly Islands).
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Ctw
claims speci
laiming control and exerting control areo very different things. While China
al rights in the Yellow, East
t,
and South China seas, these claims forthe most part are not recognized by
other countries, and China has found itdifficult to exert control in the area.
Tensions occasionally flare up as a resulusually involving a naval patrol and
fishing or commercial vessels. Boats and
ships are sometimes detained, damagedor even sunk. In 2005, for example,
Chinese ships opened fire on Vietnamesefishing vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin,
leaving several Vietnamese injured ordead. Beijing claimed the Vietnamese
fishermen were pirates. Click map toenlarge
China also has tried more cooperative
approaches to reduce direct competition for use and control of the South China Sea, includingjointventures for energy exploration and fishing agreements. Indeed, China has made an effort to shift its
a that threatens to dominate the region to a cooperative
s
ntly
ryay
image in Asia from that of a rising Chin
China that could be an economic partner. In the process, it has managed to reduce tensions with itneighbors and support a rising tide of Pan-Asianism that portrays the United States and the West as
bigger threats to the region than China.Chinas efforts to create a maritime buffer also extend into the realm of international law warfare,
part of the unrestricted warfare paradigm expounded by two senior colonels in the Peoples
Liberation Army in 1999. They advocated using a broader spectrum of national power such asleveraging the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to compensate for Chinese
shortcomings in relation to the United States. Regarding the UNCLOS, China is trying to work withother East Asian powers to coherently redefine certain legal distinctions like the EEZ. An EEZ curre
is defined as an area running 200 nautical miles from a countrys coastline within which the counthas rights over exploration and extraction of mineral resources, although ships of other countries m
pass freely through the area for peaceful purposes and to carry out certain economic and scientificactivities (e.g., laying undersea cables). Not every country abides by the UNCLOS or agrees with the
definition of an EEZ, and China would like to make it more difficult legally for U.S. ships toapproach its coastline.Despite these cooperative moves, Beijing never stopped its more direct military actions, and it has
actually stepped up patrols in the waters out to the first island chain. In 2008, China more than
doubled its submarine patrols, according to U.S. Naval Intelligence estimates, with several forays into
and around Japanese waters.On March 8, 2009, a PLAN intelligence collection ship along with several other Chinese-flagged patr
vessels and trawlers
ol
confronted the USNS Impeccable some 75 miles off Hainan Island, claiming theU.S. ship was carrying out unlawful military activity. The confrontation topped off days of escalating
Chinese activity around U.S. surveillance ships, a maritime parallel to the more aggressive air
interdictions that led to the collision between a Chinese Jian-8 fighter and a U.S. EP-3E Aries IIsurveillance aircraft in 2001. In both cases, it appears the United States was monitoring Chinese
submarine developments off Hainan.Chinas latest move to assert itself in its claimed EEZ came on March 10, when the China Yuzhen
311, Chinas largest ocean surveillance vessel, set sail from Guangzhou on its maiden voyage to pChinas claimed waters in the South China Sea. The ship is a 4,450-ton former navy support vessel
g
atrol
transferred in 2006 to the South China Sea Fishery Administration Bureau under the Ministry ofAgriculture, now tasked with asserting Chinese claims to contested fishing grounds, islands and reefs
in the South China Sea. The bureau plans to launch a 2,500-ton maritime surveillance vessel in 2010
that will carry a helicopter to enhance patrol capabilities.
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Expanding Green Water
Aggressive rhetoric and patrols by a single ship or two are insufficient to make Chinas claimed EEZ an
ads to the second step in the PLAN strategy: establishment of
logistics bases and ports in strategic locations to push the navys zone of operation farther from the
effective buffer, however. This le
mainland. In 1996, there were calls for the PLAN to develop at-sea replenishment capabilities in order
to extend the navys reach. Four years later, the Chinese navy was conducting operations with smallermissile boats much farther from shore to test alternative ways of expanding the range of naval
operations with existing hardware and in accordance with current doctrine. While China began work ona logistics capability for extended overseas operations in the 1990s, it was not a capability that could
be quickly and easily implemented. As a stopgap measure, China simply began moving its coastfarther out.
Beijing did this in part by building docks
line
and facilities in the Nansha/SpratlyIslands. This led to a flare-up in tensions
in 1998 between Manila and Beijing overChinese construction on Mischief Reefin
the Spratlys, with Manila attempting to
draw the United States into the spat. In
addition, China began expanding its
relations with various Pacific islandnations in order to gain access to
monitoring and port facilities that couextend the PLANs reach farther eas
along
ldt,
routes heavily traversed by theU.S. Navy and global maritime
commerce.
China also began looking west,developing port facilities between the
Strait of Malacca and the Arabian Sea.
al trade-
r
tes
meways be seen as an extension of Chinas shoreline, serving a
extending the range of a green-water navy that still needs anSeveral of them would also be critical as ports for replenishm
the
The third step in Chinas naval development is to find ways to counter the U.S. Navys technologicalvolution is under way. In its simplest form, this builds on the previous
steps with the deployment of tracking stations and anti-ship missile installations on Chinas string of
Operating primarily under bilater
promotion agreements, China funded the
dredging and improvement of deepwate
ports in Sittwe (Myanmar), Chittagong(Bangladesh), Gwadar (Pakistan) andHambantota (Sri Lanka), creating a string
of ports along the northern edge of
Chinas vital supply lines and trade roufrom the Middle East through the Indian
Ocean. Each of these ports can in sos repair and logistics hubs and thus
umbilical connection to the mainland.ent ships to sustain Chinese blue-water
forces in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea just as the United States relies on friendly ports inregion to supply its own blue-water fleet.
Asymmetrical Counters
dominance while Chinas naval e
maritime stepping-stones. This could enable China to delay (if not stop) a U.S. naval response to a
conflict between China and Taiwan, for example, or to deter or complicate any U.S. attempt toblockade Chinese ports or interdict trade routes.
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More ambitiously, China has added asymmetrical countermeasures in the form of Russian-builtdestroyers and submarines armed with anti-ship missiles, already laying the groundwork, in a s
for building out a new blue-water fleet as well as
ense,
for countering the U.S. presence on the open seas.China has acquired four Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, each carrying eight
built
SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missiles (of which China is the only export recipient).
Designed by the Soviets to better penetrate the defenses of U.S. carrier battle groups, these missileshave been carefully studied by Chinese engineers, who undoubtedly will try to improve upon and
replicate them. Although the destroyers are not impervious to American carrier-based aviation, theycan be used as part of a sea denial strategy. In addition, Beijing has acquired a dozen Russian-
Kilo-class diesel-electric patrol submarines, which are now being armed with the SS-N-27 Sizzlersupersonic anti-ship missile a weapon senior U.S. naval officers are deeply concerned about. Th
submarines are known to be very quiet and could pose a threat to U.S. carrier and expeditionary strikgroups (and the Kilo design is being incorporated into the development of Chinas latest domestic
patrol submarine).
Beijings current focus on asymmetrical naval warfare includes a novel way of overcoming advancedanti-ship missile defenses: the use of ballistic missiles. These missiles approach from a near vertica
trajectory, and their
ese
e
l
relatively simple guidance systems can still distinguish between a modern
American carriers four-and-a-half-acre flight deck and the open ocean. Ballistic missiles are alsos,thought to exceed the engagement envelope for some of the core defensive systems on U.S. warship
increasing the Pentagons desire to field Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers in the
Pacific that are capable of ballistic missile defense. China appears to be working with medium-ran
ballistic missiles, which have a longer range than its more conventional anti-ship missiles.
In addition, China has begun to focus its attention on a key element of U.S. technological superiority:
space. Having begun an ambitious space program of its own in recent years, China is looking toenhance its communications, guidance and observation capabilities. It is also looking to spa
ge
ce for moreovert military applications. Chinas January 2007 anti-satellite test demonstrated an alternative abilityto deal with a maritime threat by disrupting the guidance systems of sophisticated precision-guided
weapons. In line with Chinas 1999 comment that its neutron bombs were more than enough to handleU.S. aircraft carriers, the anti-satellite test was meant to show that China had the options and
creativity to narrow the technology gap if push came to shove with the U.S. Navy.
A Toe in Blue Water
The first three steps in many ways are happening simultaneously, and they allow China to increase itsrange and capabilities while preparing to take the fourth step: building a robust blue-water navy. The
ld be its own aircraft carrier, something naval officials continue to discussdespite the cost and difficultiescrown jewel for Beijing wou
associated with it. (Recently, this ongoing discussion appears to have
moved beyond talk to action.) But before an aircraft carrier can be effectively deployed, the PLANmust demonstrate the ability to conduct extended operations far from home. This is where Chinas
recent participation in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia comes in.
Chinas testing of extended operations abroad could easily lead to concern about Chinese militaryexpansionism and accelerate the development of countercapabilities by Chinas neighbors. The
Somalia operation, however, has given Beijing a chance to conduct a long-term deployment in awelcoming environment where no one is seen as a threat (except, perhaps, by the pirates). Chinese
otate
her
naval officials have made it clear that their December 2008 deployment of two guided-missiledestroyers and a supply ship to Somalia will not be a short one, and that they are preparing to ra new squadron of similar size into the area in order to sustain the Chinese presence. This will furt
test their command, control and logistical coordination, as well as afford opportunities to practiceunderway replenishment and maintenance.
The Somalia deployment must be understood not as a one-off event, but as a fundamental doctrinalshift rooted in geopolitical realities. There is only one way the PLAN is going to gain experience in
naval force projection far afield by doing it. And as Beijing is finding out, the U.N.-sponsored
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Somalia operation is one in which it can closely observe the behavior of more experienced navies whipracticing its own operational procedures in a nonthreatening way.
But in terms of developing a naval force-projection capability, the U.N.-sponsored mission in the Gulfof Aden represents the shallow end of naval conflict more green w
le
ater than blue. A robust
expeditionary navy must be able to fight peer forces as well as pirates, and the PLAN has a long wayto go before it can deploy a credible blue-water fleet. Complex challenges ranging from damage
control (even the British Royal Navy had trouble in this essential area during the Falkland Islan
in the early 1980s) to anti-submarine warfare will occupy PLAN planners for decades to come. WhileChina has started to narrow the gap in terms of
ds War
anti-ship missiles and submarine development,
matters as mundane as the shape and machining of a submarines screw (propeller) are the productsof extensive study and investment, and China has much to learn in these areas.
Nothing complicates the PLANs expeditionary efforts more than Chinas lack of a naval tradition. Bycontrast, the modern U.S. Navy is the product of a maritime tradition that predates its own founding
and has strong roots in the even more established maritime tradition of the British Royal Navy. More
niorsin their art. In the case of U.S. carrier aviation, for example, this oversight can be traced
through hard-won operational experience all the way back to the USS Lexington (CV-2), which was
rs
Chinese aviators instructors or landing signal officers have ever landed or trapped a fixed-wing
rs
amen. This puts it at a distinct disadvantage, and it is easy to see why it has long deferred thiscourse.
it, the PLAN and its expeditionary vision should not be discounted.le to pull a naval tradition out of thin air, but it is in a good position to begin one.
As the American historian and theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued, a naval tradition is rooted in a
than simply a matter of subtleties like esprit de corps, such tradition goes to the heart of militaryproficiency.
American and British naval officers and petty officers have trained under the careful tutelage of sewell-schooled
commissioned in 1927 and the oldest carrier to deploy fixed-wing aircraft at the start of World War II.
In the Chinese navy, aviators have no such operational depth to tap, nor do they have aircraft carrie
from which to fly. Save for perhaps a handful of Russian advisers with limited experience, few if any of
aircraft on a carrier flight deck at sea. Pilots must practice the exacting and unforgiving art of carrier-
based flight by simulating takeoffs and landings on paved runways on land instead of on a movingship.
As the Chinese navy ventures into blue water, it is necessarily doing so with less-experienced office
and se
Going Forward
In spite of the many hurdles beforeChina may not be ab
commercial maritime tradition, and China has surpassed the United States in terms of the size of its
merchant fleet and in its contribution to global civilian shipbuilding.
Ultimately, with an extensive intelligence and espionage capability, firsthand experience with Russiantechnology (essentially late-Soviet technology, which in areas like submarine propulsion was quite
exceptional) and a new focus on gaining operational experience, the PLANs trajectory is clear. Chinesenaval expansion and improvement over the last decade has been nothing short of dramatic, and the
factors that have enabled it will only build upon themselves in the coming years.
Of course, modernizing a navy in East Asia will not occur in a vacuum. The PLANs blue-water plan willinexorably move forward as long as other, unrelated forces do not interfere. Barring significant
economic or political crises at home or the emergence of a threat along Chinas long land periphery,
al and
the PLAN is setting the stage to become a much more potent naval force over the next decade. And as
China focuses on the seas to defend its vital supply lines, it will inevitably clash with other regioninternational maritime powers, most notably Japan, India and the United States.
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Next: When grand strategies collide
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STRATFOR is the world leader in global intelligence. Our team of experts collects and analyzesintelligence from every part of the world offering unparalleled insights through our exclusively
published analyses and forecasts. Whether it be on political, economic or military developments,STRATFOR not only provides its members with a better understanding of current issues and events,but invaluable assessments of what lies ahead.
Renowned author and futurologist George Friedman founded STRATFOR in 1996. Most recently, heauthored the international bestseller, The Next 100 Years. Dr. Friedman is supported by a team of
professionals with widespread experience, many of whom are internationally recognized in their ownright. Although its headquarters are in Austin, Texas, STRATFORs staff is widely distributed
throughout the world.
Barrons has consistently found STRATFORs insights informative and largely on the money-as has thecompanys large client base, which ranges from corporations to media outlets and government
agencies. - Barrons
What We Offer
On a daily basis, STRATFOR members are made aware of what really matters on an internationalscale. At the heart of STRATFORs service lies a series of analyses which are written without bias or
political preferences. We assume our readers not only want international news, but insight into the
developments behind it.
In addition to analyses, STRATFOR members also receive access to an endless supply of SITREPS
(situational reports), our heavily vetted vehicle for providing breaking geopolitical news. To completethe STRATFOR service, we publish an ongoing series of geopolitical monographs and assessments
which offer rigorous forecasts of future world developments.
The STRATFOR Difference
STRATFOR members quickly come to realize the difference between intelligence and journalism. Weare not the purveyors of gossip or trivia. We never forget the need to explain why any event or issue
has significance and we use global intelligence not quotes.
STRATFOR also provides corporate and institutional memberships for multi-users. Our intelligenceprofessionals provide Executive Briefings for corporate events and board of directors meetings and
routinely appear as speakers at conferences. For more information on corporate or institutionalservices please contact [email protected]
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STRATFOR 700 L S S i 900 A i TX 78701 T l 1 512 744 4300 f
http://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.phpmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.stratfor.com/next100years/index.php