civ pro case digest

7/23/2019 Civ Pro Case Digest

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JUDICIAL HEIRARCHY

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,-ver! - HEIRS O" "ERNANDO "# CA$ALLERO, re%reente& 'i &*!+ter, JOCELYN G# CA$ALLERO, Re%on&ent# G#R# No#./0/

Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registeredowner of a residential lot. On the said lot, respondent built aresidential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.On March , !"#$, Fernando and his wife, %&l'ia Caballero, secured a

loan from petitioner %% in the amount of *2+,+++.++, as e'idencedb& a promissor& note. Fernando and his wife liewise e-ecuted a realestate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the aforestatedpropert& as securit&. Fernando defaulted on the pa&ment of his loanwith the %%. ence, the mortgage was foreclosed and the same wassold at a public auction where the petitioner was the onl& bidder.

For failure of Fernando to redeem the said propert& within thedesignated period, petitioner e-ecuted an 0ffida'it of Consolidation ofOwnership on %eptember 1, !"1. *etitioner wrote a letter toFernando, informing him of the consolidation of title in its fa'or, andreuesting pa&ment of monthl& rental in 'iew of Fernando3s continuedoccupanc& of the sub4ect propert&. n repl&, Fernando reuested thathe be allowed to repurchase the same through partial pa&ments.5egotiation as to the repurchase b& Fernando of the sub4ect propert&went on for se'eral &ears, but no agreement was reached between theparties.On 6anuar& !#, !"$", petitioner scheduled the sub4ect propert& forpublic bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando3s daughter,6ocel&n Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of *71+,+++.++,while Carmelita Mercantile 8rading Corporation (CM8C) submitted abid in the amount of *91+,+++.++. %ince CM8C was the highest bidder,it was awarded the sub4ect propert&. On Ma& !#, !"$", the :oard of8rustees of the %% issued Resolution 5o. !"" confirming the awardof the sub4ect propert& to CM8C.

;ue to the foregoing, Fernando, represented b& his daughter andattorne&infact, 6ocel&n Caballero, filed with the Regional 8rial Court(R8C) of


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awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the samehas been left for determination b& the court, the additional filing feetherefor shall constitute a lien on the 4udgment. t shall be theresponsibilit& of the Cler of Court or his dul& authori=ed deput& toenforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.L

n 0&ala Corporation '. Mada&ag, the Court, in interpreting the thirdrule laid down in %un nsurance Office, @td. '. 6udge 0suncionregarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held that thesame refers onl& to damages arising after the filing of the complaint orsimilar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shallconstitute a lien on the 4udgment.

8he amount of an& claim for damages, therefore, arising on or beforethe filing of the complaint or an& pleading should be specified. Bhile itis true that the determination of certain damages as e-emplar& orcorrecti'e damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is thedut& of the parties claiming such damages to specif& the amountsought on the basis of which the court ma& mae a properdetermination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriatedocet fees. 8he e-ception contemplated as to claims not specified orto claims although specified are left for determination of the court islimited onl& to an& damages that ma& arise after the filing of thecomplaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for theclaimant to specif& nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

*etitioner3s claim for pa&ment of rentals collected b& Fernando fromthe CM8C did not arise after the filing of the complaint hence, the rulelaid down in %un nsurance finds no application in the present case.

;ue to the nonpa&ment of docet fees on petitioner3s counterclaim,the trial court ne'er acuired 4urisdiction o'er it and, thus, there is noneed to discuss the second issue raised b& petitioner.

B?R?FOR?, the petition is ;?5?;. 8he ;ecision and theResolution, dated ;ecember !, 2++2 and 0pril 2", 2++7, respecti'el&,of the Court of 0ppeals in C0.R. CD. 5o. 9"7++, are 0FFRM?;. %OOR;?R?;.

G#R# No# 012// Se%te3'er , 2/4ERNESTO DY, Petitioner, v# HON# GINA M# $I$AT- PALAMOS, iner 5*%*5it * Prei&in+ J!&+e o6 te Re+ion*7 Tri*7 Co!rt,$r*n5 18, M*9*ti Cit, *n& ORI: METRO LEASING AND "INANCECORPORATION, Re%on&ent#

*etitioner ?rnesto ;& and his wife, @ourdes ;&, were the proprietors of@imchia ?nterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. n!""+, @imchia ?nterprises, with @ourdes as comaer, obtained a loanfrom Ori- Metro @easing and Finance Corporation to fund itsacuisition of M/D *ilar, a cargo 'essel. 0s additional securit& for theloan, @imchia ?nterprises e-ecuted the ;eed of Chattel Mortgage o'erM/D *ilar.

;ue to financial losses suffered when M/D *ilar was attaced b&pirates, %pouses ;& failed to mae the scheduled pa&ments asreuired in their promissor& note. 0fter recei'ing se'eral demandletters from respondent, %pouses ;& applied for the restructuring oftheir loan.

On 0ugust !$, !""2, respondent filed the Complaint and *etition for?-tra4udicial Foreclosure of *referred %hip Mortgage under*residential ;ecree 5o. !12! with Argent *ra&er for 0ttachment with

the R8C. Following the filing of an affida'it of merit and the posting ofbond b& respondent, the R8C ordered the sei=ure of M/D *ilar andturned o'er its possession to respondent. On %eptember 2$, !""9,respondent transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, asmortgagee, in M/D *ilar to Colorado %hip&ard Corporation(Colorado).

On 6ul& 7!, !"", the R8C rendered a decision in fa'or of %pouses ;&,ruling that the& had not &et defaulted on their loan because respondentagreed to a restructured schedule of pa&ment. 8here being no default,the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/D *ilar was premature.8he R8C ordered that the 'essel be returned to %pouses ;&. 8his wasaffirmed b& the Court of 0ppeals (C0).

Conseuentl&, on 0ugust !, 2+!+, petitioner filed a motion fore-ecution of 4udgment with the R8C. n the inter'ening period,Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated 6ul& 2", 2+!+, informingthe R8C that M/D *ilar, which was in its possession, had sustainedse'ere damage and deterioration and had sun in its ship&ard becauseof its e-posure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permissionfrom the court to cut the sunen 'essel into pieces, sell its parts anddeposit the proceeds in escrow. n his Comment/Ob4ection, petitionerinsisted that he had the right to reuire that the 'essel be returned tohim in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfull&sei=ed b& respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another'essel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/D*ilar be deli'ered. Colorado, howe'er, responded that the 'essel hadsuffered se'ere damage and deterioration that refloating or restoring itto its former condition would be futile, impossible and 'er& costl& andshould petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be refloated, it

should be done at the e-pense of the part& ad4udged b& the court topa& the same.

8he R8C issued its uestioned ;ecember !7, 2+!+ Order granting themotion for e-ecution but den&ing petitionerNs pra&er for the return ofM/D *ilar in the same state in which it was taen b& respondent. n soresol'ing, the R8C ratiocinated>First, the 4udgment of the %upreme Court does not reuire the deli'er&of M/D *ilar in the state the defendants wanted it to be. %econdl&, said4udgment has now become final and it is a-iomatic that after 4udgmenthas become e-ecutor&, the court cannot amend the same, e-cept> - -- 5one of the three circumstances where a final and e-ecutor&

4udgment ma& be amended is present in this case. 0nd third, thepresent deplorable state of M/D *ilar certainl& did not happeno'ernight, thus, defendants should ha'e brought it to the attention ofthis Court, the Court of 0ppeals or the %upreme Court after it becameapparent. 8heir inaction until after the 4udgment has become final,e-ecutor& and immutable rendered whate'er right the& ma& ha'e toremed& the situation to be nugator&.

*etitioner mo'ed for reconsideration but the motion was denied b& theR8C in its March , 2+!! Order.ence, this petition.

8o be succinct, onl& two central issues need to be resol'ed> (!)whether petitioner was 4ustified in resorting directl& to this Court 'ia apetition for certiorari under Rule #1 and (2) whether petitioner isentitled to the return of M/D *ilar in the same condition when it wassei=ed b& respondent.

8he CourtNs Ruling> 8he Court finds the petition to be partl&meritorious.

ierarch& of Courts ;irect Resort 8o 8he %upreme Court 6ustified

*etitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct in'ocation of thisCourtNs 4urisdiction in the interest of 4ustice. Moreo'er, as pointed outb& the R8C, what is in'ol'ed is a 4udgment of the Court which thelower courts cannot modif&. ence, petitioner deemed it proper to bringthis case immediatel& to the attention of this Court. @astl&, petitionerclaims that the present case in'ol'es a no'el issue of law that is,whether in an action to reco'er, a defendant in wrongful possession ofthe sub4ect matter in litigation ma& be allowed to return the same in adeteriorated condition without an& l iabilit&.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should ha'ebeen filed with the C0, following the doctrine of hierarch& of courts. tpointed out that petitioner failed to state an& special or importantreason or an& e-ceptional and compelling circumstance which wouldwarrant a direct recourse to this Court.

Ander the principle of hierarch& of courts, direct recourse to this Courtis improper because the %upreme Court is a court of last resort andmust remain to be so in order for it to satisfactoril& perform itsconstitutional functions, thereb& allowing it to de'ote its time andattention to matters within its e-clusi'e 4urisdiction and pre'enting theo'ercrowding of its docet.

5onetheless, the in'ocation of this CourtNs original 4urisdiction to issuewrits of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the groundof special and important reasons clearl& stated in the petition, such as,(!) when dictated b& the public welfare and the ad'ancement of public

polic& (2) when demanded b& the broader interest of 4ustice (7) whenthe challenged orders were patent nullities or (9) when analogouse-ceptional and compelling circumstances called for and 4ustified theimmediate and direct handling of the case.

8his case falls under one of the e-ceptions to the principle of hierarch&of courts. 6ustice demands that this Court tae cogni=ance of this caseto put an end to the contro'ers& and resol'e the matter which hasbeen dragging on for more than twent& (2+) &ears. Moreo'er, in light ofthe fact that what is in'ol'ed is a final 4udgment promulgated b& thisCourt, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original 4urisdictionand see final clarification.

Brong Mode of 0ppeal ?-ception

*etitioner asserts that the R8C committed gra'e abuse of discretionwhen it failed to rule in his fa'or despite the fact that he had beendepri'ed b& respondent of his propert& rights o'er M/D *ilar for thepast eighteen(!$) &ears. Moreo'er, the change in the situation of theparties calls for a rela-ation of the rules which would mae thee-ecution of the earlier decision of this Court ineuitable or un4ust.0ccording to petitioner, for the R8C to allow respondent to return theship to him in its se'erel& damaged and deteriorated condition withoutan& liabilit& would be to reward bad faith.!$Con'ersel&, respondent submits that there was no gra'e abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the R8C as the latter merel& obser'ed dueprocess and followed the principle that an e-ecution order ma& not'ar& or go be&ond the terms of the 4udgment it sees to enforce.!"Respondent adds that the proper remed& should ha'e been anordinar& appeal, where a factual re'iew of the records can be made to


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determine the condition of the ship at the time it was taen frompetitioner, and not a special ci'il action for certiorari.

8here are considerable differences between an ordinar& appeal and apetition for certiorari which ha'e been e-hausti'el& discussed b& thisCourt in countless cases. 8he remed& for errors of 4udgment, whetherbased on the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legalsoundness of a decision, is an ordinar& appeal. n contrast, a petitionfor certiorari under Rule #1 is an original action designed to correcterrors of 4urisdiction, defined to be those Jin which the act complainedof was issued b& the court, officer, or uasi4udicial bod& without or ine-cess of 4urisdiction, or with gra'e abuse of discretion which is

tantamount to lac of in e-cess of 4urisdiction.J22 0 court or tribunalcan onl& be considered to ha'e acted with gra'e abuse of discretion ifits e-ercise of 4udgment was so whimsical and capricious as to beeui'alent to a lac of 4urisdiction. 8he abuse must be e-tremel& patentand gross that it would amount to an Je'asion of a positi'e dut& or to'irtual refusal to perform a dut& en4oined b& law, or to act at all incontemplation of law, as where the power is e-ercised in an arbitrar&and despotic manner b& reason of passion and hostilit&.J

8herefore, a misappreciation of e'idence on the part of the lower court,as asserted b& petitioner, ma& onl& be re'iewed b& appeal and not b&certiorari because the issue raised b& the petitioner does not in'ol'ean& 4urisdictional ground. t is a general rule of procedural law thatwhen a part& adopts an inappropriate mode of appeal, his petition ma&be dismissed outright to pre'ent the erring part& from benefiting fromhis neglect and mistaes. 8here are e-ceptions to this otherwiseironclad rule, howe'er. One is when the strict application of procedural

technicalities would hinder the e-peditious disposition of this case onthe merits, such as in this case.

*etitioner 5ot :arred from ;emanding Return of the Dessel in itsFormer Condition

*etitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear theresponsibilit& for the deterioration of the 'essel because the latter,despite ha'ing in its possession the 'essel M/D *ilar during thependenc& of the foreclosure proceedings, failed to inform the court andpetitioner himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel totae effect, there must be nowledge of the real facts b& the part&sought to be estopped and reliance b& the part& claiming estoppel onthe representation made b& the former. n this case, petitioner cannotbe estopped from asing for the return of the 'essel in the conditionthat it had been at the time it was sei=ed b& respondent because he

had not nown of the deteriorated condition of the ship.

8his Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutabilit& of 4udgments.Bhen a 4udgment becomes final and e-ecutor&, it is made immutableand unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in an& respecteither b& the court which rendered it or e'en b& this Court. ts purposeis to a'oid dela& in the orderl& administration of 4ustice and to put anend to 4udicial contro'ersies. ?'en at the ris of occasional errors,public polic& and sound practice dictate that 4udgments must becomefinal at some point.

0s with e'er& rule, howe'er, this admits of certain e-ceptions. Bhen asuper'ening e'ent renders the e-ecution of a 4udgment impossible orun4ust, the interested part& can petition the court to modif& the4udgment to harmoni=e it with 4ustice and the facts. 0 super'eninge'ent is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance which de'elopsafter a 4udgment has become final and e-ecutor&. 8his includes

matters which the parties were unaware of prior to or during trialbecause the& were not &et in e-istence at that time.

n this case, the sining of M/D *ilar can be considered a super'eninge'ent. *etitioner, who did not ha'e possession of the ship, was onl&informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated6ul& 2", 2+!+, long after the %eptember !!, 2++" ;ecision of this Courtin Ori- Metro @easing and Finance Corporation '. M/D J*ilarJ and%pouses ?rnesto ;& and @ourdes ;& attained finalit& on 6anuar& !",2+!+.

B?R?FOR?, the petition is *0R80@@R058?;. Respondent isordered to pa& petitioner the 'alue of M/D *ilar at the time it waswrongfull& sei=ed b& it.

JANE DUARTE v# MIGUEL SAMUEL A#E# DURAN,Se%te3'er 8, 2/

8his petition arose from a suitG1H for collection of sum of mone& filed b&respondent Miguel %amuel 0.?. ;uranG#H against petitioner ?lena 6ane;uarte with :ranch 1 of the Municipal 8rial Court in Cities (M8CC),Cebu.0ccording to respondent, on Februar& !9, 2++2, he offered to sell alaptop computer for the sum of *!1,+++.++ to petitioner thru the help ofa common friend, 6osephine ;& (;&). %ince petitioner was undecided,respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two da&s. On Februar& !#,2++2, petitioner told respondent that she was willing to bu& the laptopon installment. Respondent agreed thus, petitioner ga'e *1,+++.++ asinitial. On Februar& !$, 2++2, petitioner ga'e her second installment of*7,+++.++ to ;&, who signed the handwritten receipt allegedl& made b&

petitioner as proof of pa&ment. :ut when ;& returned to get theremaining balance on March !1, 2++2, petitioner offered to pa& onl&*2,+++.++ claiming that the laptop was onl& worth *!+,+++.++. ;ue tothe refusal of petitioner to pa& the remaining balance, respondent thrucounsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated 6ul& 2", 2++2.*etitioner, howe'er, denied writing the receipt dated Februar& !$, 2++2and recei'ing the demand letter dated 6ul& 2", 2++2. *etitionerclaimed that there was no contract of sale. *etitioner said that ;&offered to sell respondents laptop but because petitioner was notinterested in bu&ing it, ;& ased if petitioner could instead lendrespondent the amount of *1,+++.++. *etitioner agreed and in turn, ;&

left the laptop with petitioner. On Februar& !$, 2++2, ;& came to getthe laptop but petitioner refused to gi'e it bac because the loan wasnot &et paid. ;& then ased petitioner to lend an additional amount of*7,+++.++ to respondent who allegedl& was in dire need of mone&.On 6une 2, 2++7, the M8CC rendered a ;ecision in fa'or ofrespondent. t found the receipt dated Februar& !$, 2++2 and thetestimonies of respondent and his witness, ;&, sufficient to pro'e thatthere was a contract of sale between the parties. On appeal, theRegional 8rial Court (R8C) of Cebu, :ranch !2, re'ersed the M8CC;ecision> this Court finds the alleged receipt issued b& the witness6osephine ;& GinH her own handwriting a mere product of machination,tricer& and selfser'ing. t shows no proof of conformit& oracnowledgment on the part of the defendant that indeed she agreedon the stipulations. 8hus, it cannot be gi'en an& credence andultimatel&, did not bind her.

On 6une !, 2++9, respondent filed a *etition for Re'iew with the C0.Finding the petition meritorious, the C0 re'ersed the R8C ;ecision andreinstated the ;ecision of the M8CC. *etitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration which the C0 denied in a Resolution dated Ma& 22,2++#.%ummed up, the issues boil down to> (!) the timeliness of the filing ofthe *etition for Re'iew with the C0 (2) the e-istence of a contract ofsale.

*etitioners 0rguments>*etitioner contends that the filing of the *etition for Re'iew with the C0on 6une !, 2++9 was be&ond the reglementar& period.G9!H Recordsshow that respondent recei'ed a cop& of the R8C ;ecision on March21, 2++9, filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 0pril !2, 2++9 since0pril " and !+ were holida&s and 0pril !!, 2++9 was a %unda&, and

recei'ed a cop& of the R8C Order den&ing his Motion forReconsideration on Ma& 2, 2++9.G92H 8hus, he onl& had one da& leftfrom Ma& 2, 2++9 within which to file a *etition for Re'iew with theC0.G97H*etitioner liewise denies the e-istence of a contract of sale, insistingthat the laptop was not sold to her but was gi'en as a securit& forrespondents debt. 8o pro'e that there was no contract of sale,petitioner calls attention to respondents failure to present a writtencontract of sale.

Respondents 0rguments>Respondent, on the other hand, argues that his *etition for Re'iewwas timel& filed with the C0 because he has !1 da&s from receipt ofthe R8C Order dated Ma& !7, 2++9 within which to file a *etition forRe'iew with the C0 under %ection !G1+H of Rule 92 of the Rules ofCourt. Respondent defends the ruling of the C0 b& arguing that the

receipt dated Februar& !$, 2++2 is an actionable document, and thus,petitioners failure to den& under oath its genuineness and duee-ecution constitutes an admission thereof. n addition, petitionersdenial of the receipt of the demand letter dated 6ul& 2", 2++2 cannoto'ercome the presumption that the said letter was recei'ed in theregular course of mail. Respondent liewise points out that the %tatuteof Frauds does not appl& in the instant case. Finall&, respondent claimsthat the award of attorne&s fees and litigation e-penses are note-cessi'e and that the factual and legal bases of the award werestated in the bod& of M8CC ;ecision.

Our Ruling> 8he *etition @acs Merit8he *etition For Re'iew Bas 8imel& Filed Bith 8he C08o standardi=e the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunit& toappeal their cases, we ruled in 5e&pes '. Court of 0ppeals that litigantsmust be gi'en a fresh period of !1 da&s within which to appeal,counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial ormotion for reconsideration under Rules 9+, 9!, 92, 97 and 91 of theRules of Court. 8his ruling, as we ha'e said in Fil?state *roperties,nc. '. omenaDalencia, retroacti'el& applies e'en to cases pendingprior to the promulgation of 5e&pes on %eptember !9, 2++1, therebeing no 'ested rights in the rules of procedure.%ince the instant case was pending in the C0 at the time 5e&pes waspromulgated, respondent is entitled to a fresh period of !1 da&s,counted from Ma& 2, 2++9, the date respondent recei'ed the R8COrder dated Ma& !7, 2++9 den&ing his motion for reconsideration ofthe R8C ;ecision dated March !", 2++9 or until 6une !!, 2++9, withinwhich to file his *etition for Re'iew with the C0. 8hus, we find that


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when he filed the *etition for Re'iew with the C0 on 6une !, 2++9, hisperiod to appeal had not &et lapsed.

8here Bas 0 Contract Of %ale :etween 8he *arties0s to whether there was a contract of sale between the parties, wehold that there was, and the absence of a written contract of sale doesnot mean otherwise. 0 contract of sale is perfected the moment theparties agree upon the ob4ect of the sale, the price, and the terms ofpa&ment. Once perfected, the parties are bound b& it whether thecontract is 'erbal or in writing because no form is reuired. Contrar& tothe 'iew of petitioner, the %tatute of Frauds does not appl& in thepresent case as this pro'ision applies onl& to e-ecutor&, and not to

completed, e-ecuted or partiall& e-ecuted contracts. n this case, thecontract of sale had been partiall& e-ecuted because the possession ofthe laptop was alread& transferred to petitioner and the partialpa&ments had been made b& her. 8hus, the absence of a writtencontract is not fatal to respondents case. Respondent onl& needed toshow b& a preponderance of e'idence that there was an oral contractof sale, which he did b& submitting in e'idence his own affida'it, theaffida'it of his witness ;&, the receipt dated Februar& !$, 2++2 and thedemand letter dated 6ul& 2", 2++2.B?R?FOR?, the petition is hereb& ;?5?;. %O OR;?R?;.

DOCTRINE O" JUDICIAL STA$ILITY

ATTY# TOMAS ONG CA$ILI v# JUDGE RASAD G# $ALINDONG,A5tin+ Prei&in+ J!&+e, RTC, $r*n5 ., M*r*;i Cit, A#M# No#RTJ-/-222 (6or3er7 A#M# OCA I#P#I# No# /0-4.2-RTJ)

On 5o'ember 2", !"", the ligan Cit& R8C rendered a ;ecision,holding the M%A liable for damages amounting to *2,2#,!$"."+. 8heCourt of 0ppeals (C0) affirmed the ligan Cit& R8C decision and the C0decision subseuentl& lapsed to finalit&. On 6anuar& !", 2++", ?ntr& of6udgment was made.On March !+, 2++", the ligan Cit& R8C issued a writ of e-ecution. 8heM%A, howe'er, failed to compl& with the writ thus, on March 29, 2++",%heriff erard *eter a4e ser'ed a 5otice of arnishment on theM%As depositor& ban, the @and :an of the *hilippines (@:*),Marawi Cit& :ranch.8he Office of the %olicitor eneral opposed the motion for e-ecution,albeit belatedl&, in behalf of M%A. 8he ligan Cit& R8C denied theopposition in its March 7!, 2++" Order. 8he M%A responded to the

denial b& filing on 0pril !, 2++" a petition with the Marawi Cit& R8C, forprohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of atemporar& restraining order (8RO) and/or preliminar& in4unction againstthe @:* and %heriff a4e. 8he petition of M%A was raffled to the R8C,Marawi Cit&, :ranch $, presided b& respondent 6udge.8he respondent 6udge set the hearing for the application for theissuance of a 8RO on 0pril $, 2++". 0fter this hearing, the respondent6udge issued a 8RO restraining %heriff a4e from garnishing*2,2#,!$"."+ from M%As @:*Marawi Cit& :ranch account. On 0pril!, 2++", the respondent 6udge conducted a hearing on theapplication for the issuance of a writ of preliminar& in4unction.8hereafter, he reuired M%A to file a memorandum in support of itsapplication for the issuance of a writ of preliminar& in4unction. On 0pril2!, 2++", %heriff a4e mo'ed to dismiss the case on the ground of lacof 4urisdiction. 8he respondent 6udge thereafter granted the motionand dismissed the case.

On Ma& $, 2++", complainant 0tt&. 8omas Ong Cabili, counsel of thepri'ate plaintiffs in Ci'il Case 5o. +#2"19, filed the complaint chargingthe respondent 6udge with ross gnorance of the @aw, ra'e 0buseof 0uthorit&, 0buse of ;iscretion, and/or ra'e Misconduct *re4udicialto the nterest of the 6udicial %er'ice for interfering with the order of acoeual court, :ranch # of the ligan Cit& R8C, b& issuing the 8RO toen4oin %heriff a4e from garnishing *2,2#,!$"."+ from M%As @:*Marawi Cit& :ranch account.n its ;ecember 7, 2++" Report, the Office of the Court 0dministrator(OC0) found the respondent 6udge guilt& of gross ignorance of the lawfor 'iolating the elementar& rule of noninterference with theproceedings of a court of coeual 4urisdiction. t recommended a fineof *9+,+++.++, noting that this is the respondent 6udges secondoffense.8he Courts Ruling> 8he Court Finds 8he OC0 Recommendation Bell8aen8he doctrine of 4udicial stabilit& or noninterference in the regularorders or 4udgments of a coeual court is an elementar& principle inthe administration of 4ustice> no court can interfere b& in4unction withthe 4udgments or orders of another court of concurrent 4urisdictionha'ing the power to grant the relief sought b& the in4unction. 8herationale for the rule is founded on the concept of 4urisdiction> a courtthat acuires 4urisdiction o'er the case and renders 4udgment thereinhas 4urisdiction o'er its 4udgment, to the e-clusion of all othercoordinate courts, for its e-ecution and o'er all its incidents, and tocontrol, in furtherance of 4ustice, the conduct of ministerial officersacting in connection with this 4udgment.

8hus, we ha'e repeatedl& held that a case where an e-ecution orderhas been issued is considered as still pending, so that all theproceedings on the e-ecution are still proceedings in the suit. 0 courtwhich issued a writ of e-ecution has the inherent power, for thead'ancement of 4ustice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers andto control its own processes. 8o hold otherwise would be to di'ide the4urisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidentsarising in e-ecution proceedings. %plitting of 4urisdiction is obno-ious tothe orderl& administration of 4ustice.8o be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court

ma& 'iolate the law in issuing a writ of e-ecution and ha'e recogni=edthat there should be a remed& against this 'iolation. 8he remed&,howe'er, is not the resort to another coeual bod& but to a highercourt with authorit& to nullif& the action of the issuing court. 8his isprecisel& the 4udicial power that the !"$ Constitution, under 0rticleD, %ection !, paragraph 2, speas of and which this Court hasoperationali=ed through a petition for certiorari, under Rule #1 of theRules of Court.n the present case, the respondent 6udge clearl& ignored the principleof 4udicial stabilit& b& issuing a 8RO to temporaril& restrain %heriff a4efrom enforcing the writ of e-ecution issued b& a coeual court, :ranch# of the ligan Cit& R8C, and from pursuing the garnishment of theamount of *2,2#,!$"."+ from M%As account with the @:*, MarawiCit& :ranch. 8he respondent 6udge was aware that he was acting onmatters pertaining to the e-ecution phase of a final decision of a coeual and coordinate court since he e'en uoted M%As allegations in

his 0pril $, 2++" Order.8he respondent 6udge should ha'e refrained from acting on thepetition because :ranch # of the ligan Cit& R8C retains 4urisdiction torule on an& uestion on the enforcement of the writ of e-ecution.%ection !#, Rule 7" of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the courseof the Courts deliberations, finds no application to this case since thispro'ision applies to claims made b& a third person, other than the4udgment obligor or his agent a thirdpart& claimant of a propert&under e-ecution ma& file a claim with another court which, in thee-ercise of its own 4urisdiction, ma& issue a temporar& restrainingorder. n this case, the petition for in4unction before the respondent6udge was filed b& M%A itself, the 4udgment obligor. f %heriff a4ecommitted an& irregularit& or e-ceeded his authorit& in the enforcementof the writ, the proper recourse for M%A was to file a motion with, or anapplication for relief from, the same court which issued the decision,

not from an& other court, or to ele'ate the matter to the C0 on apetition for certiorari. n this case, M%A filed the proper motion with theligan Cit& R8C (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seerecourse through another coeual court presided o'er b& therespondent 6udge.t is not a 'iable legal position to claim that a 8RO against a writ ofe-ecution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing6udge. 0 8RO en4oining the enforceabilit& of a writ addresses the writitself, not merel& the e-ecuting sheriff. 8he dut& of a sheriff in enforcingwrits is ministerial and not discretionar&. 0s alread& mentioned abo'e,the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ beforethe issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, tosee redress through a higher 4udicial bod&. %ignificantl&, M%A did fileits opposition before the issuing court ligan Cit& R8C which denied thisopposition.

8hat the respondent 6udge subseuentl& rectified his error b&e'entuall& dismissing the petition before him for lac of 4urisdiction isnot a defense that the respondent 6udge can use. is lac of familiarit&with the rules in interfering with the acts of a coeual courtundermines public confidence in the 4udiciar& through hisdemonstrated incompetence. n this case, he impressed upon theligan public that the ind of interference he e-hibited can be done,e'en if onl& temporaril&, i.e., that an official act of the ligan Cit& R8Ccan be thwarted b& going to the Marawi Cit& R8C although the& are coeual courts. 8hat the complaining law&er, 0tt&. 8omas Ong Cabili,subseuentl& re'ersed course and manifested that the respondent6udge is basicall& a good 6udge, and should onl& be reprimanded,cannot affect the respondent 6udges liabilit&. 8his liabilit& and thecommensurate penalt& do not depend on the complainants personalopinion but on the facts he alleged and pro'ed, and on the applicablelaw and 4urisprudence.Bhen the law is sufficientl& basic, a 4udge owes it to his office to nowand to simpl& appl& it. 0n&thing less would be constituti'e of grossignorance of the law.Ander 0.M. 5o. +!$!+%C or the 0mendment to Rule !9+ of theRules of Court Re> ;iscipline of 6ustices and 6udges, gross ignoranceof the law is a serious charge, punishable b& a fine of more than*2+,+++.++, but not e-ceeding *9+,+++.++, suspension from officewithout salar& and other benefits for more than three (7) but note-ceeding si- (#) months, or dismissal from the ser'ice. Consideringthe attendant circumstances of this case, the Court after prolongeddeliberations holds that a fine of *7+,+++.++ is the appropriate penalt&.8his imposition is an act of lenienc& as we can, if we so hold, rule for


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the ma-imum fine of *9+,+++.++ or for suspension since this is therespondent 6udges second offense.B?R?FOR?, respondent 6udge Rasad . :alindong, 0cting*residing 6udge, Regional 8rial Court, :ranch $, Marawi Cit&, is hereb&FOA5; A@8 of ross gnorance of the @aw and F5?; in theamount of *7+,+++.++, with a stern B0R55 that a repetition of thesame will be dealt with more se'erel&. %O OR;?R?;.

JIMMY T# GO v# THE CLER? O" COURT AND E:-O""ICIOPROVINCIAL SHERI"" O" NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

8he present contro'ers& stemmed from the e-ecution of the ;ecisionof R8C, :acolod Cit&, :ranch 91 in a complaint for collection of a sumof mone& doceted as Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9.

On 0ugust !+, !""$, respondent Multi@uc Corporation (Multi@uc)filed a collection suit against 0lberto 8. @oo&uo (@oo&uo) as soleproprietor of 5oah3s 0r Merchandising nc. (50M). 8he complaintpertained to three (7) dishonored Anited Coconut *lanters :an(AC*:) checs with an aggregate amount of *$,"$1,99+.++ issued b&@oo&uo/50M to Mamertha eneral Merchandising. 8hese checswere indorsed to Multi@uc, who claimed to be a holder in due courseof such checs.

On 6anuar& 2, 2+++, upon Multi@uc3s motion for 4udgment on thepleadings, the :acolod R8C rendered a ;ecision ordering@oo&uo/50M to pa& Multi@uc the 'alue of the three (7) AC*:

checs. @oo&uo/50M did not file an appeal. ence, the ;ecisionbecame final and e-ecutor&.

Apon Multi@uc3s motion, the :acolod R8C issued a writ of e-ecutiono'er a house and lot co'ered b& 8C8 5o. 8!2#1!" registered in thename of @oo&uo and one share in the 5egros Occidental olf andCountr& Club, nc. in the name of 50M. 8he auction sales werescheduled on 5o'ember !+, 2+++# (for the house and lot) and5o'ember #, 2+++ (for the stoc certificate), respecti'el&.

On October 21, 2+++, petitioner filed a complaint for in4unction with apra&er for temporar& restraining order and/or writ of preliminar&in4unction against respondents before the R8C, *asig Cit&, :ranch2##, where the case was doceted as Ci'il Case 5o. #$!21.$ 8hecomplaint alleged that petitioner is a Jbusiness partnerJ of @oo&uo andthat the former coowned the properties of @oo&uo/50M including the

properties sub4ect of the aforementioned auction sales. t was furtheralleged that the intended public auction of the sub4ect properties wouldundul& depri'e him of his share of the propert& without due process oflaw considering that he was not impleaded as a part& in Ci'il Case 5o."$!+9+9.Multi@uc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, thatthe *asig R8C had no 4urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter of petitioner3sclaim and o'er the public respondent sheriffs as well as o'er Multi@uc.

n the Order dated October 7+, 2+++, the *asig R8C grantedpetitioner3s pra&er for issuance of a 8emporar& Restraining Order(8RO). 8hereafter, in the Order dated 5o'ember 27, 2+++, the *asigR8C issued a writ of preliminar& in4unction en4oining public respondentsheriffs Caponpon, 6r. and Dillanue'a, 6r. from holding the publicauction.

n the Order dated ;ecember , 2+++, the *asig R8C deniedrespondents3 motion to dismiss.Multi@uc mo'ed for the reconsideration of the 5o'ember 27, 2+++and ;ecember , 2+++ Orders but both motions were also denied b&the *asig R8C in separate Orders both dated Februar& 2, 2++!.Multi@uc ele'ated the case to the C0 'ia a petition for certiorari andprohibition with pra&er for the issuance of restraining order and/orin4unction.

0s pre'iousl& stated herein, in the ;ecision dated 0pril 7+, 2++2, theC0 granted Multi@uc3s petition and re'ersed the ruling of the *asigR8C. 8he C0 ruled that the 5o'ember 27, 2+++ Order issued b& the*asig R8C interfered with the order of the :acolod R8C, which is a coeual and coordinate court. 8he C0 held that the *asig R8C gra'el&abused its discretion when it granted the in4uncti'e relief pra&ed for b&petitioner despite the glaring lac of a clear legal right on the part of thelatter to support his cause of action. *etitioner filed a motion forreconsideration but the C0 denied the same in its euall& challengedResolution dated 6ul& 7!, 2++2.

ence, this present *etition for Re'iew on Certiorari .

*etitioner theori=es that since he was a JstrangerJ to Ci'il Case 5o."$!+9+9, he should be considered a Jthird part& claimantJ pursuant toRule 7", %ection !# of the Rules of Court. Corollaril&, whate'er4udgment or decision rendered in the Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9 did notbind him or his properties. *etitioner adds that as a coowner of allproperties and monies belonging to @oo&uo/50M, he was undul&pre4udiced b& the ;ecision in Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9. *etitionerinsists that he should ha'e been impleaded in Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9so that there could be a final determination of the action as to him. e

argues that the principle on Jnoninter'ention of coeual courtsJ doesnot appl& where, as here, a third part& claimant is in'ol'ed.

Be are not persuaded.

Be ha'e time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has thepower to interfere b& in4unction with the 4udgments or orders of anothercourt of concurrent 4urisdiction ha'ing the power to grant the reliefsought b& in4unction.!# 8his doctrine of noninterference is premisedon the principle that a 4udgment of a court of competent 4urisdictionma& not be opened, modified or 'acated b& an& court of concurrent4urisdiction.! 0s correctl& ratiocinated b& the C0, cases wherein an

e-ecution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all theproceedings on the e-ecution are still proceedings in the suit.!$%incethe :acolod R8C had alread& acuired 4urisdiction o'er the collectionsuit (Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9) and rendered 4udgment in relationthereto, it retained 4urisdiction to the e-clusion of all other coordinatecourts o'er its 4udgment, including all incidents relati'e to the controland conduct of its ministerial officers, namel& public respondentsheriffs. 8hus, the issuance b& the *asig R8C of the writ of preliminar&in4unction in Ci'il Case 5o. #$!21 was a clear act of interference withthe 4udgment of :acolod R8C in Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9.

8he 4urisprudential Je-ceptionJ ad'erted to b& petitioner, i.e. %antos '.:a&hon, !"" %CR0 121 (!""!), finds no application in this case. n%antos, we allowed the implementation of a writ of e-ecution issued b&the @abor 0rbiter to be en4oined b& order of the R8C where a thirdpart& claimant had filed his action to reco'er propert& in'ol'ed in thee-ecution sale, since the @abor 0rbiter had no 4urisdiction to decide

matters of ownership of propert& and the ci'il courts are the proper'enue therefor. n the case at bar, the :acolod R8C had 4urisdictionand competence to resol'e the uestion of ownership of the propert&in'ol'ed had petitioner filed his claim with the said court.

0s to petitioner3s argument that he was undul& pre4udiced b& the;ecision in Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9 as a coowner of all propertiesand monies belonging to @oo&uo/50M, the Court finds the same tobe without basis.

%ection 7, Rule 1$ of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds forthe issuance of a preliminar& in4unction>%?C. 7. rounds for issuance of preliminar& in4unction. 0 preliminar&in4unction ma& be granted when it is established>(a) 8hat the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the wholeor part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or

continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in reuiring theperformance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetuall&(b) 8hat the commission, continuance, or nonperformance of the actor acts complained of during the litigation would probabl& wor in4usticeto the applicant or(c) 8hat a part&, court, agenc& or a person is doing, threatening, or isattempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act oracts probabl& in 'iolation of the rights of the applicant respecting thesub4ect of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the 4udgmentineffectual.

*ursuant to the abo'e pro'ision, a clear and positi'e right especiall&calling for 4udicial protection must be shown. n4unction is not a remed&to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights it will notissue to protect a right not in esse and which ma& ne'er arise, or torestrain an act which does not gi'e rise to a cause of action. 8heremust e-ist an actual right. 8here must be a patent showing b& the

complaint that there e-ists a right to be protected and that the actsagainst which the writ is to be directed are 'iolati'e of said right.

8he purpose of a preliminar& in4unction is to pre'ent threatened orcontinuous irremediable in4ur& to some of the parties before theirclaims can be thoroughl& studied and ad4udicated. 8hus, to be entitledto an in4uncti'e writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish thefollowing reuisites>(!) a right in esse or a clear and unmistaable right to be protected(2) a 'iolation of that right(7) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessit& forthe writ to pre'ent serious damage.

8o bolster his claim of interest on the attached properties, petitionerpresented the 0greement dated Februar& ", !"$2. owe'er, the Courtnotes that the authenticit& and the due e-ecution of these documentsare presentl& under litigation in other proceedings which are notpending before the *asig R8C.

8he attached real properties are registered solel& in the name of@oo&uo and 50M. Corollaril&, petitioner had no standing to uestionthe :acolod R8C3s 4udgment as he is a stranger to Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9 and he has no clear right or interest in the attached propert&.@iewise, the stoc certificate is registered in the name of 50M.Moreo'er, the checs sub4ect of Ci'il Case 5o. "$!+9+9 were made inpa&ment for obligations incurred b& @oo&uo in the course of thebusiness operation of 50M. ?'en assuming for the sae of argumentthat indeed, petitioner coowns 50M, whate'er obligation the businessincurred in the course of its operation is an obligation of petitioner as apart owner. n effect, petitioner was merel& forestalling the


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implementation of a final 4udgment against the corporation which hepurportedl& coowns.

8o recapitulate, once a decision becomes final and e-ecutor&, it is theministerial dut& of the presiding 4udge to issue a writ of e-ecutione-cept in certain cases, as when subseuent e'ents would rendere-ecution of the 4udgment un4ust. 8he present case does not fall withinthe recogni=ed e-ceptions. n *aper ndustries Corporation of the*hilippines '. ntermediate 0ppellate Court, we declared that a courthas no 4urisdiction to restrain the e-ecution proceedings in anothercourt with concurrent 4urisdiction.

B?R?FOR?, the petition is hereb& ;?5?;. 8he assailed ;ecisiondated 0pril 7+, 2++2, and Resolution dated 6ul& 7!, 2++2 of the Courtof 0ppeals in C0.R. %* 5o. #997 are 0FFRM?;. Cost againstpetitioner. %O OR;?R?;.

ESTOPPEL

G#R# No# L-28/ A%ri7 , 01.SERA"IN TIJAM, ET AL#, %7*inti66-*%%e77ee, v# MAGDALENOSI$ONGHANOY *7i* GAVINO SI$ONGHANOY *n& LUCIA$AGUIO, &e6en&*nt, MANILA SURETY AND "IDELITY CO#, INC#(CE$U $RANCH) 'on&in+ 5o3%*n *n& &e6en&*nt-*%%e77*nt#

On 6ul& !", !"9$ P barel& one month after the effecti'it& of Republic0ct 5o. 2"# nown as the 6udiciar& 0ct of !"9$ P the spouses %erafin8i4am and Felicitas 8agalog commenced Ci'il Case 5o. R##+ in theCourt of First nstance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno%ibonghano& and @ucia :aguio to reco'er from them the sum of*!,"+$.++, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of thecomplaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. 0s pra&ed for inthe complaint, a writ of attachment was issued b& the court againstdefendants3 properties, but the same was soon dissol'ed upon thefiling of a counterbond b& defendants and the Manila %uret& andFidelit& Co., nc. hereinafter referred to as the %uret&, on the 7!st ofthe same month.

0fter being dul& ser'ed with summons the defendants filed theiranswer in which, after maing some admissions and denials of thematerial a'erments of the complaint, the& interposed a counterclaim.8his counterclaim was answered b& the plaintiffs.

0fter trial upon the issues thus 4oined, the Court rendered 4udgment infa'or of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and

e-ecutor&, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ ofe-ecution against the defendants. 8he writ ha'ing been returnedunsatisfied, the plaintiffs mo'ed for the issuance of a writ of e-ecutionagainst the %uret&3s bond, against which the %uret& filed a writtenopposition upon two grounds, namel&, (!) Failure to prosecute and (2)0bsence of a demand upon the %uret& for the pa&ment of the amountdue under the 4udgment. Apon these grounds the %uret& pra&ed theCourt not onl& to den& the motion for e-ecution against its counterbond but also the following affirmati'e relief > Jto relie'e the hereinbonding compan& of its liabilit&, if an&, under the bond in uestion.J8he Court denied this motion on the ground solel& that no pre'iousdemand had been made on the %uret& for the satisfaction of the4udgment. 8hereafter the necessar& demand was made, and uponfailure of the %uret& to satisf& the 4udgment, the plaintiffs filed a secondmotion for e-ecution against the counterbond. On the date set for thehearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the %uret&3s counsel,granted the latter a period of fi'e da&s within which to answer the

motion. Apon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted themotion for e-ecution and the corresponding writ was issued.

%ubseuentl&, the %uret& mo'ed to uash the writ on the ground thatthe same was issued without the reuired summar& hearing pro'idedfor in %ection ! of Rule 1" of the Rules of Court. 0s the Court deniedthe motion, the %uret& appealed to the Court of 0ppeals from suchorder of denial and from the one den&ing its motion for reconsideration.ts record on appeal was then printed as reuired b& the Rules, and indue time it filed its brief raising therein assignment of errors.

5e'ertheless, not one of the assignment of errors P it is ob'ious Praises the uestion of lac of 4urisdiction, neither directl& nor indirectl&.

0lthough the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of 0ppeals, on;ecember !!, !"#2, decided the case affirming the orders appealedfrom.

On 6anuar& $, !"#7 P fi'e da&s after the %uret& recei'ed notice of thedecision, it filed a motion asing for e-tension of time within which tofile a motion for reconsideration. 8he Court of 0ppeals granted themotion in its resolution of 6anuar& !+ of the same &ear. 8wo da&s laterthe %uret& filed a pleading entitled MO8O5 8O ;%M%%, allegingsubstantiall& that appellees action was filed in the Court of Firstnstance of Cebu on 6ul& !", !"9$ for the reco'er& of the sum of*!,"+$.++ onl& that a month before that date Republic 0ct 5o. 2"#,otherwise nown as the 6udiciar& 0ct of !"9$, had alread& becomeeffecti'e, %ection $$ of which placed within the original e-clusi'e4urisdiction of inferior courts all ci'il actions where the 'alue of thesub4ectmatter or the amount of the demand does not e-ceed*2,+++.++, e-clusi'e of interest and costs that the Court of First

nstance therefore had no 4urisdiction to tr& and decide the case. Aponthese premises the %uret&3s motion pra&ed the Court of 0ppeals to setaside its decision and to dismiss the case. :& resolution of 6anuar& !#,!"#7 the Court of 0ppeals reuired the appellees to answer the motionto dismiss, but the& failed to do so. Bhereupon, on Ma& 2+ of thesame &ear, the Court resol'ed to set aside its decision and to certif&the case to As. 8he pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows>

t would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is asuit for collection of mone& in the sum of e-actl& *!,"+$.++ e-clusi'eof interest, was originall& instituted in the Court of First nstance ofCebu on 6ul& !", !"9$. :ut about a month prior to the filing of the

complaint, more specificall& on 6une !, !"9$, the 6udiciar& 0ct of!"9$ too effect, depri'ing the Court of First nstance of original4urisdiction o'er cases in which the demand, e-clusi'e of interest, isnot more than *2,+++.++. (%ecs. 99GcH and $#GbH, R.0. 5o. 2"#.)

Be belie'e, therefore, that the point raised in appellant3s motion is animportant one which merits serious consideration. 0s stated, thecomplaint was filed on 6ul& !", !"9$. 8his case therefore has beenpending now for almost !1 &ears, and throughout the entire proceedingappellant ne'er raised the uestion of 4urisdiction until after receipt ofthis Court3s ad'erse decision.

8here are three cases decided b& the onorable %upreme Court whichma& be worth& of consideration in connection with this case, whereinthe onorable %upreme Court frowned upon the 3undesirable practice3of appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the4udgment, if fa'orable, but attacing it for lac of 4urisdiction when

ad'erse.

Considering, howe'er, that the %upreme Court has the Je-clusi'eJappellate 4urisdiction o'er Jall cases in which the 4urisdiction of an&inferior court is in issueJ (%ee. !, *ar. 7G7H, 6udiciar& 0ct of !"9$, asamended), we ha'e no choice but to certif&, as we hereb& do certif&,this case to the %upreme Court.

t is an undisputed fact that the action commenced b& appellees in theCourt of First nstance of Cebu against the %ibonghano& spouses wasfor the reco'er& of the sum of *!,"+$.++ onl& P an amount within theoriginal e-clusi'e 4urisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with thepro'isions of the 6udiciar& 0ct of !"9$ which had taen effect about amonth prior to the date when the action was commenced. 8rue also isthe rule that 4urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter is conferred upon thecourts e-clusi'el& b& law, and as the lac of it affects the 'er& authorit&

of the court to tae cogni=ance of the case, the ob4ection ma& beraised at an& stage of the proceedings. owe'er, considering the factsand circumstances of the present case P which shall forthwith be setforth P Be are of the opinion that the %uret& is now barred b& lachesfrom in'oing this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulinge'er&thing done heretofore in the case with its acti'e participation.

0 part& ma& be estopped or barred from raising a uestion in differentwa&s and for different reasons. 8hus we spea of estoppel in pais, orestoppel b& deed or b& record, and of estoppel b& laches.@aches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonableand une-plained length of time, to do that which, b& e-ercising duediligence, could or should ha'e been done earlier it is negligence oromission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting apresumption that the part& entitled to assert it either has abandoned itor declined to assert it.

8he doctrine of laches or of Jstale demandsJ is based upon grounds ofpublic polic& which reuires, for the peace of societ&, thediscouragement of stale claims and, unlie the statute of limitations, isnot a mere uestion of time but is principall& a uestion of the ineuit&or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

t has been held that a part& cannot in'oe the 4urisdiction of a court tosure affirmati'e relief against his opponent and, after obtaining orfailing to obtain such relief, repudiate or uestion that same 4urisdiction(;ean 's. ;ean, !7# Or. #"9, $# [email protected]. "). n the case 4ust cited, b&wa& of e-plaining the rule, it was further said that the uestion whetherthe court had 4urisdiction either of the sub4ectmatter of the action or ofthe parties was not important in such cases because the part& isbarred from such conduct not because the 4udgment or order of thecourt is 'alid and conclusi'e as an ad4udication, but for the reason thatsuch a practice can not be tolerated P ob'iousl& for reasons of publicpolic&.

8he facts of this case show that from the time the %uret& became auasipart& on 6ul& 7!, !"9$, it could ha'e raised the uestion of thelac of 4urisdiction of the Court of First nstance of Cebu to taecogni=ance of the present action b& reason of the sum of mone&in'ol'ed which, according to the law then in force, was within theoriginal e-clusi'e 4urisdiction of inferior courts. t failed to do so.nstead, at se'eral stages of the proceedings in the court a uo as wellas in the Court of 0ppeals, it in'oed the 4urisdiction of said courts toobtain affirmati'e relief and submitted its case for a final ad4udicationon the merits. t was onl& after an ad'erse decision was rendered b&the Court of 0ppeals that it finall& woe up to raise the uestion of4urisdiction. Bere we to sanction such conduct on its part, Be would ineffect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present


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case since it was commenced on 6ul& !", !"9$ and compel the4udgment creditors to go up their Cal'ar& once more. 8he ineuit& andunfairness of this is not onl& patent but re'olting.

A*O5 0@@ 8? FOR?O5, the orders appealed from are hereb&affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila %uret& and Fidelit&Compan&, nc.

G#R# No# 8@8/1 J!7 8, 2//.VENANCIO "IGUEROA CERVANTES, Petitioner, v# PEOPLE O"THE PHILIPPINES, Re%on&ent#

On 6ul& $, !""9, an information for recless imprudence resulting inhomicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional 8rialCourt (R8C) of :ulacan, :ranch !$. 8he case was doceted asCriminal Case 5o. 2271M"9.1 8rial on the merits ensued and on0ugust !", !""$, the trial court con'icted the petitioner as charged. nhis appeal before the C0, the petitioner uestioned, among others, forthe first time, the trial courtNs 4urisdiction.

8he appellate court, howe'er, in the challenged decision, consideredthe petitioner to ha'e acti'el& participated in the trial and to ha'ebelatedl& attaced the 4urisdiction of the R8C thus, he was alread&estopped b& laches from asserting the trial courtNs lac of 4urisdiction.Finding no other ground to re'erse the trial courtNs decision, the C0affirmed the petitionerNs con'iction but modified the penalt& imposedand the damages awarded.

;issatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for re'iew on

certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution>

a. ;oes the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of4urisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed b&the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches inrelation to the doctrine laid down in 8i4am '. %ibonghano&,notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediatel& raised inpetitionerNs appeal to the onorable Court of 0ppeals Con'ersel&,does the acti'e participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case,which is initiated and filed not b& him but b& the public prosecutor,amount to estoppel

0pplied uniforml& is the familiar rule that the 4urisdiction of the court tohear and decide a case is conferred b& the law in force at the time ofthe institution of the action, unless such statute pro'ides for aretroacti'e application thereof.!+ n this case, at the time the criminal

information for recless imprudence resulting in homicide with 'iolationof the 0utomobile @aw (now @and 8ransportation and 8raffic Code) wasfiled, %ection 72(2) of :atas *ambansa (:.*.) :lg. !2"!! had alread&been amended b& Republic 0ct 5o. #"!.!2 8he said pro'ision thusreads>%ec. 72. 6urisdiction of Metropolitan 8rial Courts, Municipal 8rial Courtsand Municipal Circuit 8rial Courts in Criminal Cases.P?-cept in casesfalling within the e-clusi'e original 4urisdiction of Regional 8rial Courtsand the %andiganba&an, the Metropolitan 8rial Courts, Municipal 8rialCourts, and Municipal Circuit 8rial Courts shall e-ercise>- - - -(2) ?-clusi'e original 4urisdiction o'er all offenses punishable withimprisonment not e-ceeding si- (#) &ears irrespecti'e of the amount offine, and regardless of other imposable accessor& or other penalties,including the ci'il liabilit& arising from such offenses or predicatedthereon, irrespecti'e of ind, nature, 'alue or amount thereof>*ro'ided, howe'er, 8hat in offenses in'ol'ing damage to propert&

through criminal negligence, the& shall ha'e e-clusi'e original4urisdiction thereof.

0s the imposable penalt& for the crime charged herein is prisioncorreccional in its medium and ma-imum periods or imprisonment for 2&ears, 9 months and ! da& to # &ears, 4urisdiction to hear and tr& thesame is conferred on the Municipal 8rial Courts (M8Cs). Clearl&,therefore, the R8C of :ulacan does not ha'e 4urisdiction o'er CriminalCase 5o. 2271M"9.

Bhile both the appellate court and the %olicitor eneral acnowledgethis fact, the& ne'ertheless are of the position that the principle ofestoppel b& laches has alread& precluded the petitioner fromuestioning the 4urisdiction of the R8CPthe trial went on for 9 &earswith the petitioner acti'el& participating therein and without him e'erraising the 4urisdictional infirmit&. 8he petitioner, for his part, countersthat the lac of 4urisdiction of a court o'er the sub4ect matter ma& beraised at an& time e'en for the first time on appeal. 0s undue dela& isfurther absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.

8o settle once and for all this problem of 4urisdiction 'isQ'is estoppelb& laches, which continuousl& confounds the bench and the bar, weshall anal&=e the 'arious Court decisions on the matter.

0s earl& as !"+!, this Court has declared that unless 4urisdiction hasbeen conferred b& some legislati'e act, no court or tribunal can act ona matter submitted to it. 6urisdiction o'er the sub4ectmatter in a 4udicialproceeding is conferred b& the so'ereign authorit& which organi=es thecourt it is gi'en onl& b& law and in the manner prescribed b& law andan ob4ection based on the lac of such 4urisdiction cannot be wai'ed b&the parties. - - -

@ater, in *eople '. Casiano,! the Court e-plained>9. 8he operation of the principle of estoppel on the uestion of4urisdiction seemingl& depends upon whether the lower court actuall&had 4urisdiction or not. f it had no 4urisdiction, but the case was triedand decided upon the theor& that it had 4urisdiction, the parties are notbarred, on appeal, from assailing such 4urisdiction, for the same Jmuste-ist as a matter of law, and ma& not be conferred b& consent of theparties or b& estoppelJ. owe'er, if the lower court had 4urisdiction, andthe case was heard and decided upon a gi'en theor&, such, forinstance, as that the court had no 4urisdiction, the part& who induced itto adopt such theor& will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an

inconsistent positionPthat the lower court had 4urisdiction. ere, theprinciple of estoppel applies. 8he rule that 4urisdiction is conferred b&law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearingthereon.

8hus, Corpus 6uris %ecundum sa&s>Bhere accused has secured a decision that the indictment is 'oid, orhas been granted an instruction based on its defecti'e characterdirecting the 4ur& to acuit, he is estopped, when subseuentl&indicted, to assert that the former indictment was 'alid. n such case,there ma& be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the formerprosecution was good or bad. %imilarl&, where, after the 4ur& wasimpaneled and sworn, the court on accused3s motion uashed theinformation on the erroneous assumption that the court had no4urisdiction, accused cannot successfull& plead former 4eopard& to anew information.

Bhere accused procured a prior con'iction to be set aside on theground that the court was without 4urisdiction, he is estoppedsubseuentl& to assert, in support of a defense of pre'ious 4eopard&,that such court had 4urisdiction.J

:ut in *indagan 0gricultural Co., nc. '. ;ans,!" the Court, in notsustaining the plea of lac of 4urisdiction b& the plaintiffappelleetherein, made the following obser'ations>t is surprising wh& it is onl& now, after the decision has been rendered,that the plaintiffappellee presents the uestion of this CourtNs4urisdiction o'er the case. Republic 0ct 5o. 2#!7 was enacted on0ugust !, !"1". 8his case was argued on 6anuar& 2", !"#+.5otwithstanding this fact, the 4urisdiction of this Court was ne'erimpugned until the ad'erse decision of this Court was handed down.8he conduct of counsel leads us to belie'e that the& must ha'e alwa&sbeen of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic 0ct

2#!7 this Court has 4urisdiction of the case, such conduct being bornout of a con'iction that the actual real 'alue of the properties inuestion actuall& e-ceeds the 4urisdictional amount of this Court (o'er*2++,+++). Our minute resolution in .R. 5o. @!++"#, &son 8an, etal. 's. Filipinas Compaa de %eguros, et al., of March 27, !"1#, aparallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiffappellee in thiscase, thus>- - - that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to theCourt of 0ppeals for decision, without uestioning the latterNs4urisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered asha'ing 'oluntaril& wai'ed so much of his claim as would e-ceed the4urisdiction of said 0ppellate Court for the reason that a contrar& rulewould encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submittingtheir cases for decision to the Court of 0ppeals in e-pectation offa'orable 4udgment, but with intent of attacing its 4urisdiction shouldthe decision be unfa'orable> - - -

8hen came our ruling in 8i4am '. %ibonghano& that a part& ma& bebarred b& laches from in'oing lac of 4urisdiction at a late hour for thepurpose of annulling e'er&thing done in the case with the acti'eparticipation of said part& in'oing the plea. Be e-pounded, thus>0 part& ma& be estopped or barred from raising a uestion in differentwa&s and for different reasons. 8hus, we spea of estoppel in pais, ofestoppel b& deed or b& record, and of estoppel b& laches. @aches, in ageneral sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable andune-plained length of time, to do that which, b& e-ercising duediligence, could or should ha'e been done earlier it is negligence oromission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting apresumption that the part& entitled to assert it either has abandoned itor declined to assert it.

8he doctrine of laches or of Jstale demandsJ is based upon grounds ofpublic polic& which reuires, for the peace of societ&, thediscouragement of stale claims and, unlie the statute of limitations, isnot a mere uestion of time but is principall& a uestion of the ineuit&or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

t has been held that a part& cannot in'oe the 4urisdiction of a court tosecure affirmati'e relief against his opponent and, after obtaining orfailing to obtain such relief, repudiate or uestion that same 4urisdiction(;ean 's. ;ean, !7# Or. #"9, $# [email protected]. "). n the case 4ust cited, b&wa& of e-plaining the rule, it was further said that the uestion whetherthe court had 4urisdiction either of the sub4ect matter of the action or ofthe parties was not important in such cases because the part& isbarred from such conduct not because the 4udgment or order of thecourt is 'alid and conclusi'e as an ad4udication, but for the reason thatsuch a practice cannot be toleratedPob'iousl& for reasons of publicpolic&.


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Furthermore, it has also been held that after 'oluntaril& submitting acause and encountering an ad'erse decision on the merits, it is toolate for the loser to uestion the 4urisdiction or power of the court(*ease 's. Rathbun6ones etc., 297 A.%. 27, #! @. ?d. !1, 7 %.Ct.2$7 %t. @ouis etc. 's. Mc:ride, !9! A.%. !2, 71 @. ?d. #1"). 0nd in@ittleton 's. :urgess, !# B&o. 1$, the Court said that it is not right for apart& who has affirmed and in'oed the 4urisdiction of a court in aparticular matter to secure an affirmati'e relief, to afterwards den& thatsame 4urisdiction to escape a penalt&.

Apon this same principle is what Be said in the three cases mentioned

in the resolution of the Court of 0ppeals of Ma& 2+, !"#7 (supra)Ptothe effect that we frown upon the Jundesirable practiceJ of a part&submitting his case for decision and then accepting the 4udgment, onl&if fa'orable, and attacing it for lac of 4urisdiction, when ad'erse.

For uite a time since we made this pronouncement in %ibonghano&,courts and tribunals, in resol'ing issues that in'ol'e the belatedin'ocation of lac of 4urisdiction, ha'e applied the principle of estoppelb& laches. 8hus, in Calimlim '. Ramire=, we pointed out that%ibonghano& was de'eloping into a general rule rather than thee-ception.

n %ibonghano&, the defense of lac of 4urisdiction of the court thatrendered the uestioned ruling was held to be barred b& estoppel b&laches. t was ruled that the lac of 4urisdiction ha'ing been raised forthe first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (!1) &ears afterthe uestioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea ma& no longer

be raised for being barred b& laches. 0s defined in said case, laches isJfailure or neglect, for an unreasonable and une-plained length of time,to do that which, b& e-ercising due diligence, could or should ha'ebeen done earlier it is negligence or omission to assert a right within areasonable time, warranting a presumption that the part& entitled toassert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

n Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the pleaof lac of 4urisdiction was the one who in'oed the courtNs 4urisdiction,and who later obtained an ad'erse 4udgment therein, we refused toappl& the ruling in %ibonghano&. 8he Court accorded supremac& to thetimehonored principle that the issue of 4urisdiction is not lost b& wai'eror b& estoppel.

et, in subseuent cases decided after Calimlim, which b& sheer'olume are too plentiful to mention, the %ibonghano& doctrine, as

foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the e-ception.

8he ruling in %ibonghano& on the matter of 4urisdiction is, howe'er, thee-ception rather than the rule. ?stoppel b& laches ma& be in'oed tobar the issue of lac of 4urisdiction onl& in cases in which the factualmilieu is analogous to that in the cited case. n such contro'ersies,laches should be clearl& present that is, lac of 4urisdiction must ha'ebeen raised so belatedl& as to warrant the presumption that the part&entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. 8hat%ibonghano& applies onl& to e-ceptional circumstances is clarified inCalimlim '. Ramire=, which we uote>0 rule that had been settled b& unuestioned acceptance and upheld indecisions so numerous to cite is that the 4urisdiction of a court o'er thesub4ectmatter of the action is a matter of law and ma& not beconferred b& consent or agreement of the parties. 8he lac of4urisdiction of a court ma& be raised at an& stage of the proceedings,e'en on appeal. 8his doctrine has been ualified b& recent

pronouncements which stemmed principall& from the ruling in the citedcase of %ibonghano&. t is to be regretted, howe'er, that the holding insaid case had been applied to situations which were ob'iousl& notcontemplated therein. 8he e-ceptional circumstance in'ol'ed in%ibonghano& which 4ustified the departure from the accepted conceptof nonwai'abilit& of ob4ection to 4urisdiction has been ignored and,instead a blanet doctrine had been repeatedl& upheld that renderedthe supposed ruling in %ibonghano& not as the e-ception, but ratherthe general rule, 'irtuall& o'erthrowing altogether the timehonoredprinciple that the issue of 4urisdiction is not lost b& wai'er or b&estoppel.ndeed, the general rule remains> a courtNs lac of 4urisdiction ma& beraised at an& stage of the proceedings, e'en on appeal. 8he reason isthat 4urisdiction is conferred b& law, and lac of it affects the 'er&authorit& of the court to tae cogni=ance of and to render 4udgment onthe action. Moreo'er, 4urisdiction is determined b& the a'erments of thecomplaint, not b& the defenses contained in the answer.

0lso, in Mangaliag '. Catubig*astoral, e'en if the pleader of lac of4urisdiction acti'el& too part in the trial proceedings b& presenting awitness to see e-oneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine inCalimlim, said> *ri'ate respondent argues that the defense of lac of4urisdiction ma& be wai'ed b& estoppel through acti'e participation inthe trial. %uch, howe'er, is not the general rule but an e-ception, bestcharacteri=ed b& the peculiar circumstances in 8i4am 's. %ibonghano&.n %ibonghano&, the part& in'oing lac of 4urisdiction did so onl& afterfifteen &ears and at a stage when the proceedings had alread& beenele'ated to the C0. %ibonghano&is an e-ceptional case because of thepresence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect foran unreasonable and une-plained length of time to do that which, b&e-ercising due diligence, could or should ha'e been done earlier it is

the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,warranting a presumption that the part& entitled to assert hasabandoned it or declined to assert it.

Clearl&, the factual settings attendant in %ibonghano& are not presentin the case at bar. *etitioner 0tt&. Regalado, after the receipt of theCourt of 0ppeals resolution finding her guilt& of contempt, promptl&filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courtNs 4urisdictionbased on procedural infirmit& in initiating the action. er compliancewith the appellate courtNs directi'e to show cause wh& she should notbe cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effectcould not be considered as an acti'e participation in the 4udicial

proceedings so as to tae the case within the milieu of %ibonghano&.Rather, it is the natural fear to disobe& the mandate of the court thatcould lead to dire conseuences that impelled her to compl&.

8he Court, thus, wa'ered on when to appl& the e-ceptionalcircumstance in %ibonghano& and on when to appl& the general ruleenunciated as earl& as in ;e @a %anta and e-pounded at length inCalimlim. 8he general rule should, howe'er, be, as it has alwa&s been,that the issue of 4urisdiction ma& be raised at an& stage of theproceedings, e'en on appeal, and is not lost b& wai'er or b& estoppel.?stoppel b& laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courtNs absenceor lac of 4urisdiction, onl& super'enes in e-ceptional cases similar tothe factual milieu of 8i4am '. %ibonghano&. ndeed, the fact that aperson attempts to in'oe unauthori=ed 4urisdiction of a court does notestop him from thereafter challenging its 4urisdiction o'er the sub4ectmatter, since such 4urisdiction must arise b& law and not b& mereconsent of the parties. 8his is especiall& true where the person seeing

to in'oe unauthori=ed 4urisdiction of the court does not thereb& securean& ad'antage or the ad'erse part& does not suffer an& harm.

0ppl&ing the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in nowa& estopped b& laches in assailing the 4urisdiction of the R8C,considering that he raised the lac thereof in his appeal before theappellate court. 0t that time, no considerable period had &et elapsedfor laches to attach. 8rue, dela& alone, though unreasonable, will notsustain the defense of Jestoppel b& lachesJ unless it further appearsthat the part&, nowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them untilthe condition of the part& pleading laches has in good faith become sochanged that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights bethen enforced, due to loss of e'idence, change of title, inter'ention ofeuities, and other causes.7# n appl&ing the principle of estoppel b&laches in the e-ceptional case of %ibonghano&, the Court thereinconsidered the patent and re'olting ineuit& and unfairness of ha'ing

the 4udgment creditors go up their Cal'ar& once more after more orless !1 &ears. 8he same, howe'er, does not obtain in the instant case.

ndeed, the 4urisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected b& thedefenses or theories set up b& the defendant or respondent in hisanswer or motion to dismiss. 6urisdiction should be determined b&considering not onl& the status or the relationship of the parties butalso the nature of the issues or uestions that is the sub4ect of thecontro'ers&. - - - - 8he proceedings before a court or tribunal without4urisdiction, including its decision, are null and 'oid, hence, susceptibleto direct and collateral attacs.

Bith the abo'e considerations, we find it unnecessar& to resol'e theother issues raised in the petition.B?R?FOR?, premises considered, the petition for re'iew oncertiorari is R058?;. Criminal Case 5o. 2271M"9 is hereb&;%M%%?; without pre4udice. %O OR;?R?;.

G# R# No# 12422 M*r5 8, 2/2REPU$LIC O" THE PHILIPPINES, - ver! - $ANTIGUE POINTDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Re%on&ent#8his Rule 91 *etition reuires this Court to address the issue of theproper scope of the delegated 4urisdiction of municipal trial courts inland registration cases.

On ! 6ul& !"", respondent :antigue *oint ;e'elopment Corporationfiled with the Regional 8rial Court (R8C) of Rosario, :atangas anapplication for original registration of title o'er a parcel of land with anassessed 'alue of 9,77+, !,"2+ and $,#+, or a total assessed 'alue of !9,"2+ for the entire propert&, more particularl& described as@ot $+#+ of Cad 917;, %an 6uan Cadastre, with an area of more orless !+,72 suare meters, located at :aranga& :arualte, %an 6uan,:atangas.

*etitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registrationon $ 6anuar& !""$ while the records were still with the R8C.On 7! March !""$, the R8C Cler of Court transmitted motu propriothe records of the case to the M8C of %an 6uan, because theassessed 'alue of the propert& was allegedl& less than !++,+++.8hereafter, the M8C entered an Order of eneral ;efault andcommenced with the reception of e'idence. 8hereafter, it awarded theland to respondent Corporation.

0cting on an appeal filed b& the Republic, the C0 ruled that since theformer had acti'el& participated in the proceedings before the lowercourt, but failed to raise the 4urisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is


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thereb& estopped from uestioning the 4urisdiction of the lower court onappeal. 8he C0 further found that respondent Corporation hadsufficientl& established the latters registrable title o'er the sub4ectpropert& after ha'ing pro'en open, continuous, e-clusi'e and notoriouspossession and occupation of the sub4ect land b& itself and itspredecessorsininterest e'en before the outbrea of Borld Bar .;issatisfied with the C0s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instantRule 91 *etition and raised the following arguments in support of itsappeal>.8? R?*A:@C C055O8 :? ?%8O**?; FROM EA?%8O558? 6AR%;C8O5 OF 8? MA5C*0@ 8R0@ COAR8 OD?R 8?

0**@C08O5 FOR OR50@ R?%8R08O5 OF @05; 88@??D?5 FOR 8? FR%8 8M? O5 0**?0@. 8? MA5C*0@ 8R0@ COAR8 F0@?; 8O 0CEAR?6AR%;C8O5 OD?R 8? 0**@C08O5 FOR OR50@R?%8R08O5 OF @05; 88@?.G!H8he Courts RulingBe uphold the 4urisdiction of the M8C, but remand the case to thecourt a uo for further proceedings in order to determine if the propert&in uestion forms part of the alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain.

. 8he Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of 4urisdiction inthis case.0t the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped fromuestioning the 4urisdiction of the lower court, e'en if the former raised

the 4urisdictional uestion onl& on appeal. 8he rule is settled that lacof 4urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter ma& be raised at an& stage of theproceedings. 6urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter is conferred onl& b&the Constitution or the law. t cannot be acuired through a wai'er orenlarged b& the omission of the parties or conferred b& theacuiescence of the court. Conseuentl&, uestions of 4urisdiction ma&be cogni=able e'en if raised for the first t ime on appeal.

8he ruling of the Court of 0ppeals that a part& ma& be estopped fromraising such G4urisdictionalH uestion if he has acti'el& taen part in the'er& proceeding which he uestions, belatedl& ob4ecting to the courts4urisdiction in the e'ent that the 4udgment or order subseuentl&rendered is ad'erse to him is based on the doctrine of estoppel b&laches. Be are aware of that doctrine first enunciated b& this Court in8i4am '. %ibonghano&.

8he facts are starl& different in this case, maing the e-ceptional rulein 8i4am inapplicable. ere, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition tothe application for registration when the records were still with theR8C.G21H 0t that point, petitioner could not ha'e uestioned thedelegated 4urisdiction of the M8C, simpl& because the case was not &etwith that court. Bhen the records were transferred to the M8C,petitioner neither filed pleadings nor reuested affirmati'e relief fromthat court. On appeal, petitioner immediatel& raised the 4urisdictionaluestion in its :rief.G2#H Clearl&, the e-ceptional doctrine of estoppel b&laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

. 8he Municipal 8rial Court properl& acuired 4urisdiction o'er thecase.n assailing the 4urisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republicraised two points of contention> (a) the period for setting the date andhour of the initial hearing and (b) the 'alue of the land to be registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acuire 4urisdictiono'er the application, because the R8C set the date and hour of theinitial hearing be&ond the "+da& period pro'ided under the *ropert&Registration ;ecree.

Be disagree.8he *ropert& Registration ;ecree pro'ides>%ec. 27. 5otice of initial hearing, publication, etc. 8he court shall,within fi'e da&s from filing of the application, issue an order setting thedate and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than fort&fi'e da&s nor later than ninet& da&s from the date of the order. - - -.8he R8Cs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of theinitial hearing within fi'e da&s from the filing of the application forregistration, as pro'ided in the *ropert& Registration ;ecree, did notaffect the courts its 4urisdiction. Obser'ance of the fi'eda& period wasmerel& director&, and failure to issue the Order within that period didnot depri'e the R8C of its 4urisdiction o'er the case. 8o rule thatcompliance with the fi'eda& period is mandator& would mae4urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter dependent upon the trial court.6urisdiction o'er the sub4ect matter is conferred onl& b& theConstitution or the law.G71H t cannot be contingent upon the action orinaction of the court. 8his does not mean that courts ma& disregard thestatutor& periods with impunit&. Be cannot assume that the lawdeliberatel& meant the pro'ision to become meaningless and to betreated as a dead letter. owe'er, the records of this case do not showsuch blatant disregard for the law. n fact, the R8C immediatel& set thecase for initial hearing a da& after the filing of the application forregistration, e-cept that it had to issue a second Order because theinitial hearing had been set be&ond the "+da& period pro'ided b& law.

8he delegated 4urisdiction of the M8C o'er cadastral and landregistration cases is indeed set forth in the 6udiciar& Reorgani=ation0ct, which pro'ides>%ec. 79. ;elegated 6urisdiction in Cadastral and @and RegistrationCases. Metropolitan 8rial Courts, Municipal 8rial Courts, andMunicipal Circuit 8rial Courts ma& be assigned b& the %upreme Courtto hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases co'ering lotswhere there is no contro'ers& or opposition, or contested lots wherethe 'alue of which does not e-ceed One hundred thousand pesos( !++,+++.++), such 'alue to be ascertained b& the affida'it of theclaimant or b& agreement of the respecti'e claimants if there are more

than one, or from the corresponding ta- declaration of the realpropert&. 8heir decision in these cases shall be appealable in the samemanner as decisions of the Regional 8rial Courts. (0s amended b&R.0. 5o. #"!) (?mphasis supplied.)

8hus, the M8C has delegated 4urisdiction in cadastral and landregistration cases in two instances> first, where there is no contro'ers&or opposition or, second, o'er contested lots, the 'alue of which doesnot e-ceed !++,+++.8he case at bar does not fall under the first instance, becausepetitioner opposed respondent Corporations application for registrationon $ 6anuar& !""$. owe'er, the M8C had 4urisdiction under thesecond instance, because the 'alue of the lot in this case does note-ceed !++,+++.

Contrar& to petitioners contention, the 'alue of the land should not be

determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, %ection 79 of the6udiciar& Reorgani=ation 0ct pro'ides that the 'alue of the propert&sought to be registered ma& be ascertained in three wa&s> first, b& theaffida'it of the claimant second, b& agreement of the respecti'eclaimants, if there are more than one or, third, from the correspondingta- declaration of the real propert&.

n this case, the 'alue of the propert& cannot be determined using thefirst method, because the records are bereft of an& affida'it e-ecutedb& respondent as to the 'alue of the propert&. @iewise, 'aluationcannot be done through the second method, because this methodfinds application onl& where there are multiple claimants who agree onand mae a 4oint submission as to the 'alue of the propert&. ere, onl&respondent :antigue *oint ;e'elopment Corporation claims thepropert&.

8he 'alue of the propert& must therefore be ascertained with referenceto the corresponding 8a- ;eclarations submitted b& respondentCorporation together with its application for registration. From therecords, we find that the assessed 'alue of the propert& is 9,77+,

!,"2+ and $,#+, or a total assessed 'alue of !9,"2+ for the entire propert&.G97H:ased on these 8a- ;eclarations, it is e'ident that the total'alue of the land in uestion does not e-ceed !++,+++. Clearl&, theM8C ma& e-ercise its delegated 4urisdiction under the 6udiciar&Reorgani=ation 0ct, as amended.B?R?FOR?, premises considered, the instant *etition for Re'iew is;?5?;. @et this case be R?M05;?; to the Municipal 8rial Court of%an 6uan, :atangas, for reception of e'idence to pro'e that thepropert& sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain.%O OR;?R?;.

E:CLUSION O" DAMAGES

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioner,- ver! -HON# EDIL$ERTO T# CLARAVALL, in i 5*%*5it * Prei&in+J!&+e o6 $r*n5 1/, Re+ion*7 Tri*7 Co!rt o6 $*+!io Cit, *n& VITAN# ?ALASHIAN,Re%on&ent# G#R# No# @40On 0pril 1, 2++9, respondent filed before the R8C of :aguio Cit& acomplaint for damages against petitioners. n her complaint, docetedas Ci'il Case 5o. 1"9R, respondent alleged that while she wasinside the *olice %tation of 5ati'idad, *angasinan, and in the presenceof other persons and police officers, petitioner rene %ante utteredwords, which when translated in ?nglish are as follows, ow man&rounds of se- did &ou ha'e last night with &our boss, :ert ou fucinbitchS

8hus, respondent pra&ed that petitioners be held liable to pa& moraldamages in the amount of *7++,+++.++ *1+,+++.++ as e-emplar&damages *1+,+++.++ attorne&s fees *2+,+++.++ litigation e-pensesand costs of suit.

*etitioners filed a Motion to ;ismiss on the ground that it was theMunicipal 8rial Court in Cities (M8CC) and not the R8C of :aguio, thathad 4urisdiction o'er the case. 8he& argued that the amount of theclaim for moral damages was not more than the 4urisdictional amountof *7++,+++.++, because the claim for e-emplar& damages should bee-cluded in computing the total claim.

On 6une 29, 2++9,G#H the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.0ggrie'ed, petitioners filed on 0ugust 2, 2++9, a *etition for Certiorariand *rohibition, doceted as C0.R. %* 5o. $19#1, before the Court


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of 0ppeals. Meanwhile, on 6ul& !9, 2++9, respondent and her husbandfiled an 0mended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damagesfrom *7++,+++.++ to *!,+++,+++.++. *etitioners filed a Motion to;ismiss with 0nswer 0d Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial courtdenied their motion in an Order dated %eptember !, 2++9.

ence, petitioners again filed a *etition for Certiorari and *rohibitionbefore the Court of 0ppeals, doceted as C0.R. %* 5o. $1#7,claiming that the trial court committed gra'e abuse of di

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