civil law reviewer 1- persons

8/10/2019 Civil Law Reviewer 1- Persons

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 TEOXON

1 CRISELDA B. TEOXON SAN SEBASTIAN COLLEGE RECOLETOS-MANILA COLLEGE OF LAW

The Civil Code of the Philippines

-The Civil Code in force in thePhilippines is the Civil code of Spain of1889, extended to this country by Royal

decree of July 31, 1889.

- It was to take effect 20 days afterpublication in the official newspaper inthe islands.

-published in the Gaceta de Manila onNovember 17, 1889 and took effect onDecember 7, 1889.

Sources of the Civil Code

1. 1987 Constitutional provisions2. Statutes- Republic acts, executive

orders, commonwealth acts, etc.3. Implementing rules as long as

not contrary to law4. Jurisprudence / Supreme court

decisions5. Filipino Customs and traditions6. Foreign decisions

I. Preliminary title

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the"Civil Code of the Philippines."

This article refers to the official name ofthe law.

Article 2. Laws shall take effect afterfifteen days following the completion oftheir publication in the OfficialGazette, unless it is otherwise

Provided, this Code shall take effect oneyear after such publication

Revised Administrative Code (sec.18-24)

SECTION 18. When Laws TakeEffect.Laws shall take effect afterfifteen (15) days following the completion

of their publication in the Official Gazette orin a newspaper of general circulation, unless

it is otherwise provided.

SECTION 19. Prospectivity.Lawsshall have prospective effect unless thecontrary is expressly provided.

SECTION 20.Interpretation of Lawsand Administrative Issuances.In theinterpretation of a law or administrativeissuance promulgated in all the official

languages, the English text shall control,unless otherwise specifically provided.In case of ambiguity, omission ormistake, the other texts may beconsulted.

SECTION 21.No Implied Revival ofRepealed Law.When a law whichexpressly repeals a prior law is itselfrepealed, the law first repealed shall notbe thereby revived unless expressly soprovided.

SECTION 22.Revival of Law ImpliedlyRepealed.When a law whichimpliedly repeals a prior law is itselfrepealed, the prior law shall thereby berevived, unless the repealing lawprovides otherwise.

SECTION 23. Ignorance of the Law.

Ignorance of the law excuses no onefrom compliance therewith.

SECTION 24. Contents.There shall bepublished in the Official Gazette alllegislative acts and resolutions of apublic nature; all executive andadministrative issuances of generalapplication; decisions or abstracts ofdecisions of the Supreme Court and the

Court of Appeals, or other courts ofsimilar rank, as may be deemed by thesaid courts of sufficient importance to beso published; such documents or classesof documents as may be required so tobe published by law; and suchdocuments or classes of documents asthe President shall determine from timeto time to have general application orwhich he may authorize so to be

published.

The publication of any law, resolutionor other official documents in theOfficial Gazette shall be prima facieevidence of its authority.


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Executive Order 200 (sec.1 & 2)

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteendays following the completion of their

publication either in the Official Gazetteor in a newspaper of general circulationin the Philippines, unless it is otherwiseprovided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386,otherwise known as the "Civil Code ofthe Philippines," and all other lawsinconsistent with this Executive Orderare hereby repealed or modifiedaccordingly

Case: Pesigan vs. Angeles

Facts:

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L.Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported inan Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in theevening of April 2, 1982 twenty-sixcarabaos and a calf from Sipocot,

Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia,Batangas, as the destination. They havewith them permit to transport saidcarabaos, however despite the permitand certificates issued to them totransport the carabaos the same havebeen confiscated. The confiscation wasbasis on the aforementioned ExecutiveOrder No. 626-A which provides "thathenceforth, no carabao, regardless of

age, sex, physical condition or purposeand no carabeef shall be transported fromone province to another. The carabaos orcarabeef transported in violation of thisExecutive Order as amended shall besubject to confiscation and forfeitureby thegovernment to be distributed ... todeserving farmers through dispersal asthe Director of Animal Industry may seefit, in the case of carabaos".

Herein petitioners then filed againstDoctor Miranda an action for replevinfor the recovery of the carabaos. Thereplevin could not be served by thesheriff and the complaint later on wasdismissed for lack of cause of action.

The Pesigans appealed to this Courtunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court andsection 25 of the Interim Rules andpursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a

1968 law which superseded Rule 42 ofthe Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the executive order beenforced before its publication in theofficial gazette

Ruling:

We hold that the said executive ordershould not be enforced against thePesigans onApril 2, 1982because, asalready noted, it is a penalregulationpublished more than twomonths later in the Official GazettedatedJune 14, 1982. It became effectiveonly fifteen days thereafter as providedin article 2 of the Civil Code and section11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

In the instant case, the livestockinspector and the provincialveterinarian of Camarines Norte and thehead of the Public Affairs Office of theMinistry of Agriculture were unawareof Executive Order No. 626-A. ThePesigans could not have been expectedto be cognizant of such an executiveorder.

It results that they have a cause of actionfor the recovery of the carabaos. Thesummary confiscation was not in order.The recipients of the carabaos shouldreturn them to the Pesigans. However,they cannot transport the carabaos toBatangas because they are now boundby the said executive order. Neither canthey recover damages. Doctor Mirandaand Zenarosa acted in good faith in

ordering the forfeiture and dispersal ofthe carabaos.


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Case: People vs Veridiano

Facts:

Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged withviolation of Batas Pambansa Bilang22 presided by Judge Veridiano. Beforehe could be arraigned, Go Bio filed amotion to quash the information on theground that the information did notcharge an offense, which was about thesecond week of May 1979, BatasPambansa Bilang 22 has not yet takeneffect.

The prosecution opposed the motioncontending, among others, that the dateof the dishonor of the check, which is onSeptember 26, 1979, is the date of thecommission of the offense; and thatassuming that the effectivity of the law Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is onJune 29, 1979, considering that theoffense was committed on September26, 1979, the said law is applicable.

Issue:

Whether or not at the time of theissuance of the check BP 22 was alreadyin effect

Ruling:

No. BP 22 is not yet in effect.

The penal statute in question was madepublic only on June 14, 1979 and not onthe printed date April 9, 1979.Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was thedate of publication of Batas PambansaBilang 22. Before the public may bebound by its contents especially itspenal provisions, the law must bepublished and the people officiallyinformed of its contents and/or its

penalties. For, if a statute had not beenpublished before its violation, then inthe eyes of the law there was no suchlaw to be violated and, consequently,the accused could not have committedthe alleged crime.

The effectivity clause of Batas PambansaBilang 22 specifically states that "ThisAct shall take effect fifteen days afterpublication in the Official Gazette." The

term "publication" in such clause shouldbe given the ordinary acceptedmeaning, that is, to make known to thepeople in general. If the BatasangPambansa had intended to make theprinted date of issue of the Gazette asthe point of reference in determining theeffectivity of the statute in question,then it could have so stated in thespecial effectivity provision of BatasPambansa Bilang 22.

When private respondent Go Bio, Jr.committed the act, complained of in theInformation as criminal, in May 1979,there was then no law penalizing suchact. Following the special provision ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 22, it becameeffective only on June 29, 1979. As amatter of fact, in May 1979, there was nolaw to be violated and, consequently,

respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commitany violation thereof.

Case: Tanada vs Tuvera

Facts:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus tocompel respondent public officials topublish, and/or cause the publication in

the Official Gazette of variouspresidential decrees, letters ofinstructions, general orders,proclamations, executive orders, letterof implementation and administrativeorders.

Respondents contend that publication inthe Official Gazette is not a sine qua nonrequirement for the effectivity of lawswhere the laws themselves provide fortheir own effectivity dates. It is thussubmitted that since the presidentialissuances in question contain specialprovisions as to the date they are to takeeffect; publication in the Official Gazetteis not indispensable for their effectivity.


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Issue:

Whether or not publication of a law maybe dispensed with when the law itself

provides for its own effectivity date

Ruling:

Article 2 does not preclude therequirement of publication in theOfficial Gazette, even if the law itselfprovides for the date of its effectivity.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall bepublished in the Official Gazette[1] all important legisiative actsand resolutions of a public natureof the, Congress of thePhilippines; [2] all executive andadministrative orders andproclamations, except such ashave no general applicability;

xxx..

The clear object of the above-quotedprovision is to give the general publicadequate notice of the various lawswhich are to regulate their actions andconduct as citizens. Without such noticeand publication, there would be no basisfor the application of the maxim"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would

be the height of injustice to punish orotherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law of which he hadno notice whatsoever, not even aconstructive one.

xxx Thus, without publication, thepeople have no means of knowing whatpresidential decrees have actually beenpromulgated, much less a definite wayof informing themselves of the specific

contents and texts of such decrees.

Case: MRCA vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed acomplaint against private respondentsspouses (who were defendants in saidcivil case). Said case was dismissed bythe trial court due to the non-paymentof proper filing fees when petitionerfailed to include include in the complainthe amount of moral damages,exemplary damages, attorney's fees andlitigation expenses sought to berecovered.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmedsaid ruling, hence the petitioner comesto SC by petition for review. Petitionercontends that the Manchester rulingdoes not apply to the case since saidcourt decision was not published in theOfficial Gazette. It should be noted thatpetitioner filed said complaint tenmonths after the promulgation of the

Manchester ruling

Issue:

Whether or not publication of a courtruling is a prerequisite for its effectivity

Ruling:

xxx Publication in the Official Gazette isnot a prerequisite for the effectivity of a

court ruling even if it lays down a newrule of procedure, for "it is a doctrinewell established that the procedure ofthe court may be changed at any timeand become effective at once, so long asit does not affect or change vestedrights."

Case: Yaokasin vs Commissioner

Facts:

The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000sacks of refined sugar owned bypetitioner Yaokasin, which were thenbeing unloaded from the M/VTacloban, and turned them over to the


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custody of the Bureau of Customs. OnJune 7, 1988, the District Collector ofCustoms ordered the release of thecargo to the petitioner but this order

was subsequently reversed on June 15,1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the IntegratedReorganization Plan under P.D. 1,which provides that in protest andseizure cases where the decision isadverse to the government, theCommissioner of Customs has thepower of automatic review.

Petitioner objected to the enforcement ofSec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87contending that these were notpublished in the Official Gazette. ThePlan which was part of P.D. 1 washowever published in the OfficialGazette.

Issue:Whether or not Circular orders such as

CMO 20-87 need to be published inorder to take effect

Ruling:

No. Article 2 of the Civil Code, whichrequires laws to be published in theOfficial Gazette, does not apply to CMONo. 20-87 which is only anadministrative order of the

Commissioner of Customs addressed tohis subordinates. the customs collectors.

CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors ofcustoms to comply strictly with Section12 of the Plan, is an issuance which isaddressed only to particular persons or aclass of persons (the customs collectors)."It need not be published, on theassumption that it has been circularized

to all concerned"

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excusesno one from compliance therewith.

If, through mistake or ignorance of thelaw, a person does an act which

prejudices himself and the injury cannotbe remedied without impairinganothers rights, the mistake cannot becorrected to the prejudice of the latter.

Ignorance of a fact may excuse a partyfrom the legal consequences of hisconduct but not ignorance of the law.

A lawyer cannot be disbarred for anhonest mistake or error of law.

Case: Kasilag vs Rodrigues

Issue:

Whether the petitioner should bedeemed a possessor in good faithbecause he was unaware of any flaw inhis title or in the manner of itsacquisition by which it is invalidated.

Ruling:

Yes.

xxx gross and inexcusable ignorance oflaw may not be the basis of good faith,but possible, excusable ignorance maybe such basis.

It is a fact that the petitioner is notconversant with the laws because he isnot a lawyer. In accepting the mortgageof the improvements he proceeded onthe well-grounded belief that he was notviolating the prohibition regarding thealienation of the land. In takingpossession thereof and in consenting toreceive its fruits, he did not know, asclearly as a jurist does, that thepossession and enjoyment of the fruitsare attributes of the contract ofantichresis and that the latter, as a lien,was prohibited by section 116. Theseconsiderations again bring us to the

conclusion that, as to the petitioner, hisignorance of the provisions of section116 is excusable and may, therefore, bethe basis of his good faithxxx


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We, therefore, hold that the petitioneracted in good faith in taking possessionof the land and enjoying its fruits.

Article 4. Laws shall have noretroactive effect, unless the contrary isprovided.

A retroactive law is one intended toaffect transactions which occurred, orright which accrued, before it becameoperative and which ascribes to themeffects not inherent in their nature, inview of the law in force at the time oftheir occurrence.

All statutes are to be construed ashaving only a prospective operation,unless the purpose and intention of thelegislature to give them a retrospectiveeffect is expressly declared or isnecessarily implied from the languageused.

Exceptions:

1. When the law itself so expresslyprovides.

Exceptions:

a. When the retroactivity of apenal statute will make itan ex post facto law

b. When the retroactive effectof the statute willconstitute an impairmentof the obligation ofcontract.

2. In case of remedial statutes

Well settled doctrine that theprocedure of the court may bechanged at any time by law tobecome effective at once so longas it does not change or affect

vested rights.

3. In case of curative statutes

Curative statutes are those whichundertake to cure errors andirregularities.

Limitations:

They cannot violate constitutionalprovisions nor destroy vested rights

of third persons. They cannot affect ajudgment that has become final.

4. In case of laws interpreting others5. In case of laws creating new

rights

New law shall not have retroactiveeffect only governs rights arising fromacts done under the rule of the formerlaw; if a right be declared for the first

time by a new law it shall take effectfrom the time of such declaration, eventhough it has arisen from acts subject tothe former laws, provided it does notprejudice another acquired right of thesame origin.

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effectin so far as they favor the accused whois not a habitual criminal, even though

at the time of the enactment of such law,a final sentence has already beenrendered.

Article 5. Acts executed against theprovisions of mandatory or prohibitorylaws shall be void, except when the lawitself authorizes their validity.

Case: Puzon vs Abellera

Facts

The oppositor appellee AlejandraAbellera (substituted upon her death byDomondon) was the owner of thesubject 2-hectare parcel of land situatedin Baguio City, a land which waspreviously part of the public domainbut was titled pursuant to RA 931. Inanother case Republic v Pio Marcos, the

Supreme Court declared that all titlesissued under RA 931 are null and voidsince the said Act was applicable only toplaces covered by cadastralproceedings, and not to the City ofBaguio which was covered by atownsite reservation.


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This same ruling was subsequentlyincorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 withthe title "An act nullifying decrees ofregistration and certificates of title

covering lands within the BaguioTownsite Reservation pursuant to RA931 which took effect on December 22,1977. PD 1271 considered as validcertain titles of lands that are alienableand disposable under certain conditionsand for other purposes. Hence, the lot inquestion was reverted to the publicdomain.

The subject lots were sold in an auctionsale due to the non-payment oftaxes.\Petitioner took interest andsubsequently won the bid. A year after,a certificate of sale was issued. In thisconnection, the petitioner filed a case toconsolidate his ownership of the lots.Meanwhile, Domondon found out aboutthe auction sale and filed an oppositionto the petition for consolidation filed bypetitioner. The trial court ruled that said

auction sale is null and void and that theassessments were illegally made. Thiswas affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Hence this petition with petitionercontending that the tax assessmentswere valid and that PD 1271 has acurative effect.

Issue:

Whether or not PD 1271 may be appliedretroactively

Ruling:

xxx the intent of the law is to recognizethe effects of certain acts of ownershipdone in good faith by persons withtorrens titles issued in their favor beforethe cut-off date stated, honestlybelieving that they had validly acquiredthe lands. And such would be possibleonly by validating all the said titlesissued before 31 July 1973, effective ontheir respective dates of issue. However,the validity of these titles would notbecome operative unless and after the

conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.Hence, the phrase "upon a showing, andcompliance with, the followingconditions," (Sec. 1, PD 1271)

While it may be argued that Article 4 ofthe New Civil Code prohibits theretroactive application of laws unlessexpressly provided therein, such ruleallows some exceptions xxx As pointedout above, PD 1271 falls under one ofthe exceptions.

Case: Acosta vs Plan

Facts:

petitioners filed an accion publiciana inthe Court of First Instance of Isabelaagainst the private respondentBernardino Magday

After the parties had submitted astipulation of facts, the court, uponplaintiffs' motion for judgment on the

pleadings and/or summary judgment,which the defendant did not oppose,rendered judgment dismissing thecomplaint with costs against theplaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed a motion forreconsideration which was denied sothey filed a motion for leave to appeal aspaupers which was granted.

Believing that as pauper litigants theydid not have to submit a record onappeal, they waited for the trial court toelevate the entire records of the case tothe Court of Appeals, respondent Judgedismissed the appeal for failure to file arecord on appeal. A motion forreconsideration was filed but it wasdenied.

Hence, this petition for certiorari

Issue

Whether for the perfection of an appealby a pauper litigant, the timely


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submission of a record on appeal isrequired.

Ruling:

Under the Rules of Court then in force, arecord on appeal was indeed required tobe filed by a pauper appellant althoughit did not have to be printed.

However, under B.P. Blg. 129, which hasovertaken this case before it could bedecided, a record on appeal is no longerrequired for the perfection of an appeal.This new rule was given retroactiveeffect xxx

Case: BPI vs IAC

Facts:

Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife, ShirleyGorospe, maintained in COMTRUST,Quezon City Branch, a dollar savingsaccount and a peso current account.

An application for a dollar draft was

accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia,Assistant Branch Manager ofCOMTRUST Quezon City, payable to acertain Leovigilda D. Dizon in theamount of $1,000.00. In the application,Garcia indicated that the amount was tobe charged to Dollar Savings ofZshornack, no indication of the name ofthe purchaser.

A check was issued in the name of

Dizon. When Zshornack noticed thewithdrawal of US$1,000.00 from hisaccount, he demanded an explanationfrom the bank. In its answer,COMTRUST claimed that the peso valueof the withdrawal was given to Atty.Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother ofRizaldy

Ruling:

The object of the contract betweenZshornack and COMTRUST was foreignexchange. Hence, the transaction wascovered by Central Bank Circular No.20, Restrictions on Gold and ForeignExchange Transactions, promulgated on

December 9, 1949, which was in force atthe time the parties entered into thetransaction involved in this case.

Since the mere safekeeping of the

greenbacks, without selling them to theCentral Bank within one business dayfrom receipt, is a transaction which isnot authorized by CB Circular No. 20, itmust be considered as one which fallsunder the general class of prohibitedtransactions. Hence, pursuant to Article5 of the Civil Code, it is void, havingbeen executed against the provisions ofa mandatory/prohibitory law. More

importantly, it affords neither of theparties a cause of action against theother. "When the nullity proceeds fromthe illegality of the cause or object of thecontract, and the act constitutes acriminal offense, both parties being inpari delicto, they shall have no cause ofaction against each other. . ." [Art. 1411,New Civil Code.] The only remedy isone on behalf of the State to prosecute

the parties for violating the law.

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unlessthe waiver is contrary to law, publicorder, public policy, morals, or goodcustoms, or prejudicial to a third personwith a right recognized by law.

3 elements of a right:

1. Subjectsa. Persons

2

kinds of subjectsi. Active- entitle to

demand theenforcement of theright

ii. Passive- duty bound tosuffer it enforcement of theright

2.

The object3. The efficient cause- The facts that gives rise to the

legal relation.


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Kinds of rights

1. The rights of personality- Human rights and arise from

the fact of being a man.

-Include all rights intended toprotect the human personalityin its existence, integrity, anddevelopment, in its physical,intellectual and moral aspects.

2. Family rights- Includes all the rights of a

person as a member of afamily

3. Patrimonial rights

-Property as their object. Theytend to the economicsatisfaction of me and aremeasurable pecuniarily

- i.e right of indemnity

Waiver- the relinquishment of a knownright with both knowledge of itsexistence and an intention to relinquishit.

-The right, benefit, advantage must existat the time of waiver, there must beactual or constructive knowledge ofsuch existence; an intention torelinquish it

-It may be express or implied. Inimplied waiver, there must be a clear,unequivocal and decisive act of a partyshowing such purpose.

Requirements of waiver

1. he must actually have the rightwhich he renounces

2. he must have the capacity tomake the renunciation

3. the renunciation must be made ina clear and unequivocal manner

Scope of waiver

The doctrine is generally applicable toall rights and privileges to which aperson is legally entitled.

Prohibited waiver

Laws cannot be renounced, although therights arising therefrom may berenounced. The right itself cannot bewaived, if such waiver is contrary to

public interest or public order to moralsgood customs to the right of thirdpersons.

There can be no waiver of rights if it willprejudice the rights of third persons,prejudice which will result in injury to aright which such person may have

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only bysubsequent ones, and their violation or

non-observance shall not be excused bydisuse, or custom or practice to thecontrary.

When the courts declared a law to beinconsistent with the Constitution, theformer shall be void and the latter shallgovern.

Administrative or executive acts, ordersand regulations shall be valid only

when they are not contrary to the lawsor the Constitution.

Laws are promulgated by the competentauthority and they can only cease tohave effect only through the will of theState.

As long as the statute remains in thebooks its legal force and effect subsists,notwithstanding any practice or usage

to the contrary.

A law may expressly provide by theirown terms as to when it will lapse.

Two kinds of repeal of laws:

1. express or declared repeal- it is contained in a special

provision of a subsequent law2. Implied or tacit repeal

-Takes place when theprovisions of the subsequentlaw are incompatible orinconsistent with those of anearlier law.


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If there is a conflict between the old andnew law, the conflict must be resolvedin favor of the later law.

Implied repeals are not to be favored,

because they rest only in thepresumption that because of theincompatibility of the old and new law,there is an intention to repeal the oldlaw.

2 requisite of implied repeal:

1. The laws cover the same subjectmatter

2. The latter is repugnant to theearlier

Where they merely apply to the samesubject matter but there is noincompatibility between them, they canboth stand together, one does notimpliedly repeal the other.

In all cases where two statutes cover, inwhole or part, the same matter, but theyare not absolutely irreconcilable, theduty of the court- no purpose to repealbeing clearly indicated or expressed, ifpossible to give effect to both.

When there are two acts or provisions,one of which is special and particularand includes the matter in question, andthe other general, which if standingalone, would also include the samematter and thus conflicts with the

special act or provisions, the specialmust be taken as intended to constitutean exception to the general act orprovision.

The repeal of a statute cannot affect orimpair any vested right, act done,penalty accrued or judgment alreadyfinal before the repeal.

In criminal cases, the repeal of a penal

law during the pendency of a criminalprosecution under it has the effect ofdepriving the court jurisdiction tofurther proceed with the case, whichmust be dismissed.

1987 Constitution Art. XVIII Section3.All existing laws, decrees, executiveorders, proclamations, letters ofinstructions, and other executive

issuances not inconsistent with thisConstitution shall remain operativeuntil amended, repealed, or revoked.

Case: Guingona vs Carague

Facts:

The petitioner seeks the declaration ofthe unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No.

1967. The petition also seeks to restrainthe disbursement for debt service underthe 1990 budget pursuant to saiddecrees.

Respondents contend that the petitioninvolves a pure political question whichis the repeal or amendment of said lawsaddressed to the judgment, wisdom andpatriotism of the legislative body and

not this Court.

Petitioners argue that the saidautomatic appropriations under PD81, PD 1177 and PD 1967 of thenPresident Marcos becamefunctusoficio when he was ousted in February,1986; that upon the expiration of theone-man legislature in the person ofPresident Marcos, the legislative power

was restored to Congress on February 2,1987 when the Constitution was ratifiedby the people; that there is a need for anew legislation by Congress providingfor automatic appropriation, butCongress, up to the present, has notapproved any such law; and thus thesaid P86.8 Billion automaticappropriation in the 1990 budget is anadministrative act that rests on no law,and thus, it cannot be enforced.

Moreover, petitioners contend thatassuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D.No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did notexpire with the ouster of PresidentMarcos, after the adoption of the 1987


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Constitution, the said decrees areinoperative under Section 3, Article XVII

Issue:

Whether or not said decrees have beeninoperative, revoked and repealed uponthe ouster of then President Marcos

Ruling:

No.

The argument of petitioners that thesaid presidential decrees did not meet

the requirement and are thereforeinconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 ofArticle VI of the Constitution whichrequires, among others, that "allappropriations, . . . bills authorizingincrease of public debt" must be passedby Congress and approved by thePresident is untenable.

Certainly, the framers of the

Constitution did not contemplate thatexisting laws in the statute booksincluding existing presidential decreesappropriating public money arereduced to mere "bills" that must againgo through the legislative million Theonly reasonable interpretation of saidprovisions of the Constitution whichrefer to "bills" is that they meanappropriation measures still to be

passed by Congress. If the intention ofthe framers thereof were otherwise theyshould have expressed their decision ina more direct or express manner.

Well-known is the rule that repeal oramendment by implication is frownedupon. Equally fundamental is theprinciple that construction of theConstitution and law is generallyapplied prospectively and not

retrospectively unless it is so clearlystated.

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the laws or theConstitution shall form a part of thelegal system of the Philippines.

Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline torender judgment by reason of thesilence, obscurity or insufficiency of thelaws.

Customs

-the juridical rule which results from aconstant and continued uniform practiceby the members of a social community,with respect to a particular state of facts,and observed with a conviction that isjuridically obligatory.

Requisites of custom:

1.

Plurality of acts, or variousresolutions of a juridical questionraised repeatedly in life;

2. Uniformity or identity of the actsor various solutions to thejuridical question;

3. General practice by the greatmass of the social group;

4. Continued performance of theseacts for a long period of time;

5.

General conviction that thepractice corresponds to a juridicalnecessity or that it is obligatoryand;

6. The practice must not be contraryto law, morals, or public order.

Art. 10. In case of doubt in theinterpretation or application of laws, itis presumed that the lawmaking bodyintended right and justice to prevail.

The rule is to be applied only in case ofdoubt, and when all other interpretationfails. When the law is clear, and there isn doubt as to its meaning, the judgecannot go above the law but must applyit, even if it does not conform to hisconcept of right and justice.

Art. 11. Customs which are contrary tolaw, public order or public policy shall

not be countenanced.

Art. 12. A custom must be proved as afact, according to the rules of evidence.


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Case: Martinez vs Van Buskirk

Facts:

On the 11th day of September, 1908,

Carmen Ong de Martinez, was ridinga carromatain Ermita, Manila when adelivery wagon owned by the defendant(used for the transportation of fodderand to which two horses are attached),came from the opposite direction, whiletheir carromata went close to thesidewalk in order to let the deliverywagon pass by. However, instead ofmerely passing by, the horses ran into

thecarromataoccupied by the plaintiffwith her child and overturned it,causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffshead.

The defendant contends that thecochero, who was driving his deliverywagon at the time of the accident, wasactually a good servant and wasconsidered a safe and reliable cochero.He also claims that the cochero wastasked to deliver some forage at CalleHerran, and for that purpose thedefendants employee tied the drivinglines of the horses to the front end of thedelivery wagon for the purpose ofunloading the forage to be delivered.However, a vehicle passed by the driverand made noises that frightened thehorses causing them to run. Theemployee failed to stop the horses since

he was thrown upon the ground.

From the stated facts, the court ruledthat the defendant was guilty ofnegligence. The court specifically cited aparagraph of Article 1903 of the CivilCode. Hence, this is appeal to reversesuch decision.

Issue:Whether or not an employer who hasfurnished a gentle and tractable teamand a trusty and capable driver is, liablefor the negligence of such driver inhandling the team

Ruling:

No.

The cocheroof the defendant was not

negligent in leaving the horses in themanner described by the evidence inthis case. It is believed that acts orperformances which, in a long time,have not been destructive and which areapproved by the society are consideredas custom. Hence, they cannot beconsidered as unreasonable orimprudent.

The reason why they have beenpermitted by the society is that they arebeneficial rather that prejudicial. Onecould not easily hold someone negligentbecause of some act that led to an injuryor accident. It would be unfair thereforeto render the cochero negligent becauseof such circumstances.

The court further held that it is auniversal practice of merchants duringthat time to deliver products throughhorse-drawn vehicles; and it is alsoconsidered universal practice to leavethe horses in the manner in which theywere left during the accident. It has beenpracticed for a long time and generallyhas not been the cause of accidents orinjuries the judgment is thereforereversed.

Art. 13. When the laws speak of years,months, days or nights, it shall beunderstood that years are of threehundred sixty-five days each; months, ofthirty days; days, of twenty-four hours;and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name,they shall be computed by the number ofdays which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first dayshall be excluded, and the last dayincluded.


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Week

-when computed according to thecalendar, means a period of seven days,beginning on Sunday and ending on

Saturday

- where the word is used simply as ameasure of duration of time andwithout reference to the calendar, itmeans a period of seven consecutivedays without regard to the day of theweek in which it begins.

Month

-A period composed of thirty days.

Rule 28 of Rules of Court

- In computing any period oftime prescribed or allowed bythe Rules of Court, by order ofa court or by any applicablestatute, the day of the act,event or default after whichthe designated period of time

begins to run is not to beincluded, unless it is aSunday or a legal holiday inwhich event the time shallrun until the end of the nextday which is neither aSunday or a holiday.

When the act or period are contractual,not required by law, court order or ruleof court, the exception referring toSundays and holidays does not apply,and the act must be done on the last dayeven if the latter is a Sunday or holiday.

This is without prejudice to special lawson the particular contract involved, suchas negotiable instruments.

Case: Armigos vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Cristito Mata, filed a complaint againstthe herein petitioner with the MunicipalCourt of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketedas Civil Case No. 971, for the collectionof damages and attorney's fees. Aftertrial, judgment was rendered in favor of

the private respondent and against theherein petitioner. A copy of the decisionwas received by the petitioner on 8 June1977, and the following day, 9 June

1977, he filed a notice of appeal with thesaid municipal court, and on 24 June1977, he completed the otherrequirements for the perfection of anappeal, including the filing of an appealbond and the payment of the appellatecourt docket fee. However, when thecase was elevated to the Court of FirstInstance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) forthe consideration of the appeal, thepresiding judge thereof ruled that theappeal was filed beyond thereglementary period; consequently, hedismissed the appeal.

The petitioner filed a petition forcertiorari, mandamus with preliminaryinjunction to the Court of Appeals andcontended that the computation of theperiod to appeal should commence onthe hour he received copy of the

decision, so that the first of the 1 5-dayperiod comprising 24 hours is from 4:00o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the lastday, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.

The Court of Appeals, however, rejectedthe novel interpretation suggested as itwould result in many confusingsituations and many unreliable

testimonies as to the time a copy of adecision, order or pleading is received

Issue:

Whether or not Armigos was correct inhis interpretation of the date of hisreceipt of the decision on the lowercourt and the same is within thereglementary period to file for an appeal

Ruling:

No.

We find no merit in the petition. Therule stated in Article 13 of the CivilCode to the effect that "In computing a


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period, the first day shall be excluded,and the last day included" is similar, butnot Identical to Section 4 of the Code ofCivil Procedure which provided that

"Unless otherwise specially provided,the time within which an act is requiredby law to be done shall be computed byexcluding the first day and includingthe last; and if the last be Sunday or alegal holiday it shall be excluded", aswell as the old Rule 28 of the Rules ofCourt which stated that "In computingany period of time prescribed orallowed by the Rules of Court, by orderof a court, or by any other applicablestatute, the day of the act, event ordefault after which the designatedperiod of time begins to run is not to beincluded. The last day of the period socomputed is to be included, unless it is aSunday or a legal holiday, in whichevent the time shall run until the end ofthe next day which is neither a Sundayor a legal holiday." In applying this rule,the Court considered the day as

synonymous with the date and we findno cogent reason to adopt a differentview.

Case: Namarco vs Teczon

Facts:

On November 14, 1955, the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila renderedjudgment entitled "Price Stabilization

Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson andAlto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,"

Copy of this decision was, on November21, 1955, served upon the defendants insaid case. On December 21, 1965, theNational Marketing Corporation, assuccessor to all the properties, assets,rights, and choses in action of the PriceStabilization Corporation, as plaintiff inthat case and judgment creditor therein,

filed, with the same court, acomplaint, against the same defendants,for the revival of the judgmentrendered.

Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved todismiss said complaint, and it wasdismissed due to prescription.

The National Marketing Corporation

appealed from such order to the Courtof Appeals

Issue:

Whether or not the present action forthe revival of a judgment is barred bythe statute of limitations.

Ruling:

The very conclusion thus reached byappellant shows that its theorycontravenes the explicit provision ofArt. 13 limiting the connotation of each"year"-- as the term is used in our laws--to 365 days.[The action to enforce a judgment whichbecame final on December 21, 1955prescribes in 10 years. Since the CivilCode computes "years" in terms of 365days each, the action has prescribed onDecember 19, 1955, since the twointervening leap years added two moredays to the computation. It is not thecalendar year that is considered.

Art. 14. Penal laws and those of publicsecurity and safety shall be obligatoryupon all who live or sojourn in thePhilippine territory, subject to theprinciples of public international law

and to treaty stipulations.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rightsand duties, or to the status, conditionand legal capacity of persons arebinding upon citizens of the Philippines,even though living abroad.

Two theories for determining whatpersonal laws will apply:

1. Domiciliary theorya.

The personal laws of aperson are determined byhis domicile.

2. Nationality theorya. The citizenship or

nationality of the


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individual determines hispersonal law

b. The individuals privateright should be

determined not by hisphysical location but byhis political allegiance,owes its origin to theawareness of nationalidentity

Case: Barreto vs Gonzales

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant, both Filipinocitizens, were married in the Philippinesand had their domicile in the City ofManila. After some years of married life,they agreed to separate, the husbandbinding himself to pay a monthlyallowance and transfer some propertiesto the wife. The husband then went toReno, Nevada, USA and secured adivorce on the ground of desertion.After the divorce, he married another

woman, also a Filipino citizen andreturned to the Philippines. After hisreturn to the Philippines, his wife filedan action asking the court to confirmand enforce the divorce decree of Renocourt and to order the husband todeliver to her her share of their conjugalproperty.

Ruling:

The entire conduct of the parties clearlyindicates a purpose to circumvent thelaws of the Philippines regardingdivorce, and to secure for themselves achange of status for reasons and underconditions not authorized by thedivorce law in the Philippines. Byreason of the provisions of articles 15and 17 of the Civil code, it is a seriousquestion whether any foreign divorce,

relating to citizens of the Philippines,will be recognized in this jurisdiction,except it be for a cause and underconditions for which the courts of thePhilippines would grant a divorce.

Capacity to contract

If under the law of the State which aparty to a contract is a citizen, he isalready of age at the time he enters into

the contract, he cannot set such contractaside on the ground of minority even ifunder the laws of the Philippines he isstill a minor.

Art. 16. Real property as well aspersonal property is subject to the law

of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary

successions, both with respect to theorder of succession and to the amount ofsuccessional rights and to the intrinsic

validity of testamentary provisions,

shall be regulated by the national lawof the person whose succession is under

consideration, whatever may be thenature of the property and regardless ofthe country wherein said property maybe found.

Real property- Every question affecting title

to land must be governed bythe law of the space where theland is situated.

Personal property

- The law of the place wherethe subject property issituated

Law on Succession

The execution of the will:

- Generally governed by thelaw of the place of execution

Distribution of estate

- Governed by the law of the

nation of the deceasedThe ff: are governed by the law of thenation of the decedent irrespective ofthe nature and location of the propertiesleft by him at the time of his death:


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1. the order of succession in case ofintestacy

2. the intrinsic validity of thetestamentary succession in cases

of testate succession3. The extent or amount ofproperty which each heir isentitled to inherit.

When a foreign law is involved it mustbe alleged and proved.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities ofcontracts, wills, and other publicinstruments shall be governed by thelaws of the country in which they are

executed.

When the acts referred to are executedbefore the diplomatic or consularofficials of the Republic of thePhilippines in a foreign country, thesolemnities established by Philippinelaws shall be observed in their

execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons,their acts or property, and those whichhave, for their object, public order,public policy and good customs shallnot be rendered ineffective by laws orjudgments promulgated, or bydeterminations or conventions agreedupon in a foreign country.

Matters commenced with theperformance of contracts are regulatedby the law prevailing at the place ofperformance.

Validity and effects of obligations:

First, the law designated by the partiesshall be applied;

If there is no stipulation on the matter,

and the parties are of the samenationality, their national law shall beapplied;

If otherwise, the law of the place ofperfection of the obligation shall govern

its essence and nature and the law of itsperformance shall govern its fulfillment

If the places are not specified and cannotbe deduced from the nature and

circumstances of the obligation, then thelaw of the domicile of the passivesubject shall apply.

Case: Tenchavez vs Escano

Facts:

On 24 February 1948 Vicenta Escao, 27years of age exchanged marriage vowswith Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age

before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. MoisesLavares, in the house of one JuanAlburo in the said city. The marriagewas the culmination of a previous loveaffair and was duly registered with thelocal civil register.

The parents of Vicenta learned about themarriage and asked the advice of acertain Fr. Reynes for advice who thensuggested a revalidation of the marriageas the chaplain was not authorized toofficiate. Due to certain circumstances,the wedding did not push thru and Asof June, 1948 he newlyweds werealready estranged. Vicenta had gone toJimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escapefrom the scandal that her marriagestirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyerfiled for her a petition, drafted by thenSenator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her

marriage. She did not sign the petition.

Vicenta applied for a passportindicating herself as single and with noconsent from his husband in order tostudy abroad.

On 22 August 1950, she filed a verifiedcomplaint for divorce against the hereinplaintiff in Nevada and On 21 October1950, a decree of divorce, "final andabsolute", was issued in open court bythe said tribunal.

Mamerto and Mena Escao filed apetition with the Archbishop of Cebu toannul their daughter's marriage toPastor and she married an American,


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Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada and nowlives with him in California.Sheacquired American citizenship on 8August 1958.

on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiatedthe proceedings at bar by a complaint inthe Court of First Instance of Cebuagainst Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,Mamerto and Mena Escao. He askedfor legal separation and damages. Theappealed judgment did not decree alegal separation, but freed the plaintifffrom supporting his wife and to acquireproperty to the exclusion of his wife.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the marriagebetween Pastor and Vicenta werestill valid and subsisting despitethe absolute divorce decree sheobtained in Nevada

2. Whether or not the absolutedivorce decree could be givenforce and effect under Philippine

laws

Ruling:

1. It is equally clear from the recordthat the valid marriage betweenPastor Tenchavez and VicentaEscao remained subsisting andundissolved under Philippinelaw, notwithstanding the decreeof absolute divorce that the wife

sought and obtained on 21October 1950 from the SecondJudicial District Court of WashoeCounty, State of Nevada, ongrounds of "extreme cruelty,entirely mental in character." Atthe time the divorce decree wasissued, Vicenta Escao, like herhusband, was still a Filipinocitizen.4 She was then subject to

Philippine law, and Article 15 ofthe Civil Code of the Philippines(Rep. Act No. 386), already inforce at the time

2. The Civil Code of the Philippines,now in force, does not admit

absolute divorce, quo ad vinculomatrimonii; and in fact does noteven use that term, to furtheremphasize its restrictive policy

on the matter, in contrast to thepreceding legislation thatadmitted absolute divorce ongrounds of adultery of the wifeor concubinage of the husband(Act 2710). Instead of divorce, thepresent Civil Code only providesfor legal separation (Title IV, Book1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even inthat case, it expressly prescribesthat "the marriage bonds shall notbe severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts torecognize and give recognition oreffect to a foreign decree ofabsolute divorce betiveenFilipino citizens could be a patentviolation of the declared publicpolicy of the state, specially inview of the third paragraph of

Article 17 of the Civil Code thatprescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerningpersons, their acts or property,and those which have for theirobject public order, policy andgood customs, shall not berendered ineffective by laws orjudgments promulgated, or by

determinations or conventionsagreed upon in a foreign country.

Case: Van Dorn vs Romillo

Facts:

Petitioner Van Dorn is a citizen of thePhilippines while respondent Upton is acitizen of the United States; that theywere married in Hongkong in 1972; that,

after the marriage, they established theirresidence in the Philippines; that theybegot two children; that the parties weredivorced in Nevada, United States, in1982; and that petitioner has re-marriedalso in Nevada, this time to TheodoreVan Dorn.


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Private respondent filed suit againstpetitioner stating that petitioner'sbusiness in Ermita, Manila is conjugalproperty of the parties, and asking that

petitioner be ordered to render anaccounting of that business, and thatprivate respondent be declared withright to manage the conjugal propertyPetitioner moved to dismiss the case onthe ground that the cause of action isbarred by previous judgment in thedivorce proceedings before the NevadaCourt wherein respondent hadacknowledged that he and petitionerhad "no community property" TheCourt below (presiding judge: Hon.Romillo) denied the Motion to Dismissin the mentioned case on the groundthat the property involved is located inthe Philippines so that the DivorceDecree has no bearing in the case. Thedenial is now the subject of thiscertiorari proceeding.

Issue:

What is the effect of the foreign divorceon the parties and their alleged conjugalproperty in the Philippines?

Ruling:

For the resolution of this case, it is notnecessary to determine whether theproperty relations between petitionerand private respondent, after their

marriage, were upon absolute orrelative community property, uponcomplete separation of property, orupon any other regime. The pivotal factin this case is the Nevada divorceof theparties.

The Nevada District Court, whichdecreed the divorce, had obtainedjurisdiction over petitioner who

appeared in person before the Courtduring the trial of the case. It alsoobtained jurisdiction over privaterespondent who authorized hisattorneys in the divorce case, Karp &Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce onthe ground of incompatibility in the

understanding that there were neithercommunity property nor communityobligations.

There can be no question as to thevalidity of that Nevada divorce in anyof the States of the United States. Thedecree is binding on private respondentas an American citizen. For instance,private respondent cannot suepetitioner, as her husband, in any State ofthe Union. What he is contending in thiscase is that the divorce is not valid andbinding in this jurisdiction, the samebeing contrary to local law and publicpolicy.

Thus, pursuant to his national law,private respondent is no longer thehusband of petitioner. He would haveno standing to sue in the case below aspetitioner's husband entitled to exercisecontrol over conjugal assets. As he isbound by the Decision of his owncountry's Court, which validly exercised

jurisdiction over him, and whosedecision he does not repudiate, he isestopped by his own representationbefore said Court from asserting hisright over the alleged conjugal property.

Case: Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

On September 7, 1979, petitionerImelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino

citizen, and private respondent ErichEkkehard Geiling, a German national,were married before the Registrar ofBirths, Marriages and Deaths atFriedensweiler in the Federal Republicof Germany. The marriage startedauspiciously enough, and the couplelived together for some time in Malate,Manila where their only child, IsabellaPilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,1980.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, withmutual recriminations between thespouses, followed by a separation defacto between them and privaterespondent initiated a divorce


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proceeding against petitioner inGermany before the Schoneberg LocalCourt in January, 1983. He claimed thatthere was failure of their marriage and

that they had been living apart sinceApril, 1982.

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed anaction for legal separation, support andseparation of property before theRegional Trial Court of Manila. OnJanuary 15, 1986 Schoneberg LocalCourt promulgated a decree of divorceon the ground of failure of marriage ofthe spouses.

More than five months after theissuance of the divorce decree, privaterespondent filed two complaints foradultery before the City Fiscal of Manilaalleging that, while still married to saidrespondent, petitioner "had an affairwith a certain William Chia as early as1982 and with yet another man namedJesus Chua sometime in 1983 which was

later on dismissed due to lack ofevidence.

Issue:

Whether the private respondent has thelegal standing to file a complaint foradultery against petitioner after adivorce decree has been obtained

Ruling:

American jurisprudence, on casesinvolving statutes in that jurisdictionwhich are in pari materiawith ours,yields the rule that after a divorce has beendecreed, the innocent spouse no longer hasthe right to institute proceedings against theoffenderswhere the statute provides thatthe innocent spouse shall have theexclusive right to institute a prosecution

for adultery. Where, however,proceedings have been properlycommenced, a divorce subsequentlygranted can have no legal effect on theprosecution of the criminal proceedingsto a conclusion.

xxx We are convinced that in cases ofsuch nature, the status of thecomplainant vis-a-vis the accused mustbe determined as of the time the

complaint was filed. Thus, the personwho initiates the adultery case must bean offended spouse, and by this ismeant that he is still married to theaccused spouse, at the time of the filingof the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that privaterespondent obtained a valid divorce inhis country, the Federal Republic ofGermany, is admitted. Said divorce andits legal effects may be recognized in thePhilippines insofar as privaterespondent is concerned 23in view ofthe nationality principle in our civil lawon the matter of status of persons.

Under the same considerations andrationale, private respondent, being nolonger the husband of petitioner, had nolegal standing to commence the adultery

case under the imposture that he wasthe offended spouse at the time he filedsuit.

Art. 18. In matters which are governedby the Code of Commerce and speciallaws, their deficiency shall be suppliedby the provisions of this Code.

On specific matter, a special law shall

prevail over a general law, which shallbe resorted to only to supplydeficiencies in the former.

Exceptions:

1. In the contract of transportationby common carriers

2. Contract of loan, when usurious3. In the title on preference of

credits when the properties of the

debtor are not sufficient for hisdebt

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