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A.M. No. 99-7-250-RTC April 5, 2000

CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE RETIRED JUDGEMAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR. RTC-BRANCH 53, MANILA.

R E S O L U T I O N

BUENA, J .:

This administrative matter arose as a result of, among others, the non-resolution within the reglementary period of several criminal and civil casesbefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53 then presided byExecutive Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.

As borne by the records, the antecedent of the instant administrative matterare as follows:

On 14 March 1999, Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. compulsorily retiredfrom the judicial service. As required, Judge Savellano rendered MonthlyReports of Cases in Branch 53, the last of which was for the month ofNovember 1998. In the Monthly Report, no entry was made in the spacereserved for cases submitted for decision.

1

Subsequently, Lawyer Froilan S. Dayco, Clerk of Court of Branch 53,submitted to the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator(OCA), a list of cases "reportedly long submitted for decision before JudgeSavellano, but which were only recently decided by the latter." Additionally,Clerk of Court Dayco submitted a separate list of unresolved cases by JudgeSavellano allegedly due to non-submission of the memoranda by the parties,as required by the court.1wphi1.nt

On the basis of the status report submitted by Clerk of Court Froilan Dayco,the OCA, in a memorandum dated 09 July 1999, gathered the followingobservations, to wit:

a) In six (6) cases2, Judge Savellano issued subsequent ordersnear his retirement date extending the period given to the parties tosubmit memorandum although there was a marked non-compliancefor an unreasonable period;

b) There were four (4) cases3which were left unresolved/undecidedby Judge Savellano despite the lapse of an unreasonable length oftime.

c) There were ten (10) cases4(Four criminal cases and six civil

cases) which were decided by Judge Savellano after a lapse of the90 day reglementary period to decide.

Curiously, the 1998 Monthly Reports of Branch 53 (January-November '98) made a scant mention of only six (6) of these cases:

Criminal Case Nos. 90-82501-02; 94-132490 appeared in theJanuary '98 Reports of Cases; Civil Case Nos. 94-70515; 94-70807; 93-64694; 91-57048 reflected in the May '98 Report ofCases.

In an En BancResolution dated 03 August 1999, this Court resolved amongothers to require Judge Savellano and Clerk of Court Froilan Dayco to

explain within ten (10) days the improper reporting of nine (9) civil cases5and ten (10) criminal cases6in the Monthly Reports of Cases of RTC-Manila,Branch 53.

Further, in the same resolution, this Court required Judge Savellano toexplain his possible violation of Administrative Circular No. 28, dated 03 July1989, as a result of the handling of certain civil

7and criminal

8cases and for

having decided several cases9beyond the 90-day reglementary period

provided by the Constitution.

In an Explanation dated 14 August 1999, Judge Savellano invoking ArticleVII, Section 15 (2) of the Constitution, posited that the subject cases werenot yet submitted for decision inasmuch as the parties had yet to submit theirrespective memoranda, as required and ordered by the court. According toJudge Savellano, he "awaited the fil ing of the required memoranda and evenissued subsequent orders giving (the parties) additional time to do so inorder to enlighten the court on issues to be raised and discussed by them,but they failed to do so

10."

Moreover, Judge Savellano submitted that "every case has its own peculiarfacts and circumstances necessitating clear and lucid discussions thereof inthe required memoranda.

11

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Notwithstanding, Judge Savellano averred that in many instances, hedecided cases pending before his court even in the absence of the requiredmemoranda based on "personal notes taken by him during the t rial."

Further, Judge Savellano explained that as an Executive Judge whoconcurrently handled a special criminal court, he was burdened withadditional duties that affected the speedy disposition and resolution of casesbefore his court.

In a Memorandum dated 24 January 2000, the OCA recommended that afine of P15,000.00 be imposed on Judge Savellano, on the ground of unduedelay in rendering decisions in the subject cases and for violation ofSupreme Court rules, directives and circulars.

Except for the amount of the fine which the Court finds too high, therecommendation of the OCA is well-taken.

On this score, Administrative Circular No. 28, dated 03 July 1989 finds

pertinence, thus:

1) As a general rule, the submission of memoranda is notmandatory or required as a matter of course but shall be left to thesound discretion of the court. A memo may not be filed unlessrequire or allowed by the court. . . . .

x x x x x x x x x

3) A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admissionof the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. Theninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run

from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; incase the Court requires or allows its filing, the case shall beconsidered submitted for decision upon the filing of the lastmemorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever isearlier . . . .

4) The court may grant extension of time to file memoranda, but theninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall not be interruptedthereby.

In light of these clear provisions, the proffered explanation of JudgeSavellano, as to the delay in the resolution of the subject cases and rendition

of judgement thereon, loses persuasion and fails to absolve him fromadministrative liability.

Verily, judges should decide cases even if the parties fail to submitmemoranda within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is nota part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much lessindispensable pleading before a case may be submitted for decision. As it ismerely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the decision inaccordance with law and evidence which even in its absence the courtcan do on the basis of the judge's personal notes and the records of thecase non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver ofthe privilege.

12

Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judgesto dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within theperiods fixed by law

13, that is three (3) months from the fil ing of the last

pleading, brief or memorandum.14For delay in the disposition of caseserodes faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers itsstandards and brings it into disrepute.

15

Beyond this, Judge Savellano, in his Explanation admitted that in severalinstances, he resolved cases and rendered judgement thereon utilizingpersonal notes transcribed in the course of trial, regardless of the lack ofrequired memoranda from the parties.

In addition, although this Court is aware and considered the fact at the timeof his retirement, Judge Savellano acted concurrently as an Executive Judgeand a judge of a Special Criminal Court, we must reiterate nonetheless thatthe designation as an Executive Judge is a privilege and a form ofrecognition of his leadership qualities, and does not excuse him fromcomplying with his constitutional duty to decide cases within ninety (90) days

from the time they were deemed submitted for decision.

16

Analogously, in a recent pronouncement17,we invariably held that beingdesignated Acting Presiding Judge of two other salas is insufficient reason tojustify delay in deciding a case since the judge could have asked for anextension of the period within which to decide it.

The standing rule then is that the ninety-day period for deciding casesshould be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additionaltime.

18Judges when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them

from disposing their cases within the reglementary period may, with leave ofthis Court, ask for additional time.

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After all, it is not uncommon for the Supreme Court, upon proper applicationand in meritorious cases, especially when difficult questions of law orcomplex issues are involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional timeto decide beyond the ninety-day period.

19

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Maximo A.Savellano, Jr., liable for undue delay in the rendition of judgement and forviolating Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 28 and Canon 3, Rule3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.1wphi1.nt

ACCORDINGLY, this Court hereby imposes upon him a fine of P5,000.00 tobe deducted from the amount of P30,000.00 already set aside from hisretirement benefits, to answer for any liability for which he may be heldaccountable.

THEREUPON, the Financial Management Office, OCA is hereby directed torelease with dispatch the remaining P25,000.00 to Judge Savellano.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Memorandum of Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, dated

09 July 1999.

2Civil Case Nos. 93-64694; 96-77866; 91-57048; Criminal Case

Nos. 92-111825; 94-137245; 94-69609.

3Criminal Case Nos. 90-82501; 94-132490; 94-137350; 94-

137045.

4Criminal Case Nos. 96-150718; 95-146046; 90-86036; 95-142174-5; Civil Case Nos. 82-13979; 93-64357; 97967; 94-70515;95-70807; 87-39671.

5Civil Case Nos. 93-64694; 96-77866; 91-570-48; 82-139-79; 93-64357; 97967; 94-70515; 95-70807; 87-39671.

6Criminal Case Nos. 92-111825; 94-137045; 94-69609; 90-82501;

94-132490; 94-137350; 96-150718; 95-146046; 90-86036 and 95-142174-5.

7Civil Case Nos. 93-64694; 96-77866 and 91-57048.

8Criminal Case Nos. 92-111825, 94-137245; 94-69609.

9Criminal Case Nos. 96-150718; 95-146046; 90-86036; 95-

142174-5; Civil Case Nos. 82-139-79; 93-64357; 97967; 94-70515;95-70807; 87-39671.

10Explanation of Judge Maximo Savellano, Jr., p. 2.

11

Ibid.,p 3.

12Salvador vs. Salamanca, 144 SCRA 276.

13Re: Report of Justice Felipe B. Kalalo, 282 SCRA 61.

14Abarquez vs. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109.

15Ibid.

16Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC, Branch 4 and 23, Manila291 SCRA 10.

17Re: Report on the Judicial Audit of Cases in the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 35, Iriga City, 299 SCRA 382.

18Sanchez vs. Vestil, 298 SCRA 1.

19Lambino vs. De Vera, 275 SCRA 60.

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G.R. No. 130907 November 27, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the PhilippineHuman Resources Development Center and Construction ManpowerDevelopment Foundation),petitioner,vs.HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge of RTC-Cavite,Branch 22, Imus, PHILIPPINE WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY and HELENA Z.BENITEZ, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Orders issued by Hon. Cesar A.Mangrobang, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 055-96. Petitioner seeks to annul and set asidethe order

1dated April 14, 1997, consolidating Civil Case No. 055-96 with

Civil Case No. 1277-96, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Imus,Cavite, Branch 20; and the order

2dated August 26, 1997 denying

petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents to this petition are as follows:

Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, a former Senator, is the owner of twoparcels of land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite, coveredby TCT No. 14701, with an area of 483,331 square meters more or less.

On March 30, 1983, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through thePhilippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), signed aMemorandum of Agreement with Benitez whereby the latter undertook tolease her property in favor of PHRDC, for a period of 20 years and/or sell aportion thereof which shall be no less than ten hectares. PHRDC in turn

agreed to lease within the same period and/or buy said property site.

On September 22, 1983, private respondent Philippine Women's University(PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the landin question and to undertake land development, electrical and road networkinstallations and other related works necessary to attain the latter'sobjectives. Pursuant thereto, the Construction Manpower DevelopmentFoundation (CMDF)

3took possession of the property and erected buildings

and other related facilities necessary for i ts operations.

A lease contract was thereafter signed by PWU and PHRDC on a tenhectare portion of the land-which stipulated, among others, a rental ofP200,000.00 per annum for an initial term of four years, from January 1,1984 to January 1, 1988, with an option granted to PHRDC to renew thelease upon agreement of both parties, for a further period of up to but notexceeding 20 years from the expiration of the initial term thereof.

PWU's participation in the above transactions stemmed from its being adonee of the property involved, as embodied in a deed of donation, whichdeed was executed by Benitez in its favor only in December 1984.

At the end of the initial four-year term of the lease, negotiations began forthe purchase of a seven-hectare portion of the property. In a series ofletters,4Benitez made the offer to sell the property at a price of P70.00 persquare meter.

In view of the on-going negotiations for the eventual sale of the lot, Benitezand PHRDC, through its General Manager Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that

the payment of rentals would cease effective July 1, 1989.

5

Benitez howevercontends that no such agreement was entered into; in fact, she saidpetitioner simply failed to pay rentals from July 1, 1989 up to the presentdespite repeated and friendly demands made by private respondents.

6

PHRDC had by then already prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale, for thesignature of Benitez as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF as vendees.However, Benitez refused to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale since,according to her, there was never any perfected contract or agreement tosell the property.7

In a letter dated August 15, 1995, Benitez and PWU demanded fromPHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises within thirty days

from notice.

Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Benitez and PWU filed an ejectmentcase based on alleged unlawful detainer8against PHRDC and CMDF beforethe Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite.

In the meantime, petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry,to which the CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain,pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035,9which case is nowpending before the RTC, Branch 20 of Imus, Cavite and docketed as CivilCase No. 1277-96.

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The MTC of Dasmarias rendered a decision10dated September 2, 1996 infavor of PWU and Benitez, ordering the defendants therein to vacate thepremises, pay arrearages in rentals, reasonable compensation for theircontinued stay in the premises and attorney's fees.

The decision was appealed by PHRDC and CMDF to the RTC of Imus,Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 055-96, raffled off andassigned to the RTC, Branch 22, which was presided over by respondentJudge Mangrobang.

On October 24, 1996, PWU and Benitez filed a Petition for Consolidation11ofthe appealed Civil Case No. 055-96 with Civil Case No. 1277-96. PHRDCand CMDF opposed

12the petition.

On April 14, 1997, respondent Judge issued the Order13granting the petitionfor consolidation, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby referred to Branch

20 of RTC, Imus, Cavite to be jointly tried/resolved together withCivil case No. 1277-96 entitled Republic of the Philippines(represented by the Department of Trade and Industry) vs. HelenaZ. Benitez.

SO ORDERED.14

PHRDC and CMDF filed a Motion for Reconsideration15

of the above order.Respondent Judge denied the same through an Order

16dated August 26,

1997.

Petitioner is now before us with this petition on the ground that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND FACTUALBASIS, HE ORDERED THE CONSOLIDATION/JOINT TRIAL OFTHE TWO (2) CASES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THATTHEY INVOLVED DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION, ISSUESAND EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.

For resolution is whether or not an appealed case emanating from thedecision of a Municipal Trial Court in an ejectment case and now pending

before a Regional Trial Court can be consolidated with an original action foreminent domain pending before another branch of the RTC.

The legal basis of an order for consolidation of two cases is Section 1, Rule31 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a commonquestion of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order ajoint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions;it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make suchorders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoidunnecessary costs or delay.

Petitioner argues against consolidation, contending that the ejectment caseis an appealed case where the RTC exercises its appellate jurisdiction, whilethe case for eminent domain is an original action where the RTC exercisesoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the issue in the ejectment caseis only of possession while the expropriation case will involve the issue of

ownership. In addition, petitioner contends that the trial stage of theejectment case was already over in the MTC while the expropriation casehas yet to begin trial before the RTC.

Thus, petitioner contends that since the two cases are separate, distinct andindependent from each other, whatever decision will be given in theappealed ejectment case will not affect proceedings in the eminent domaincase.

17

In moving for consolidation, private respondents contend that there is norequirement found in the rules that both cases should be of the same natureand cause of action, nor that they should involve a similar exercise ofjurisdiction.

18

Both parties submit that at the very least Rule 3 Section 1, requires thatthere be common questions of fact or law between the cases sought to beconsolidated.

Respondent Judge cites judicial economy, convenience of the parties, aswell as the avoidance of the issuance of conflicting decisions by two (2)branches of the RTC as reasons for granting the motion for consolidation.According to him, consolidation would insure a more orderly proceeding andadministration of justice. He states that both refer to a common or similarissue, which is possession of the same property.

19

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In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,20

wedeclared:

The main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congesteddockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessarycosts and expense.21

While nothing in the rules expressly prohibits the consolidation of anappealed case with a case being heard originally, consolidation of the twocases involved herein would serve none of the purposes cited above.

First, it would only delay the resolution of the two cases. Note that by itselfejectment is summary in nature for it involves "perturbation of social orderwhich must be restored as promptly as possible."22Similarly, speedy actionis essential in expropriation, hence the rule that the plaintiff in anexpropriation case may already take or enter upon possession of theproperty after depositing with an authorized government depositary an

amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.

23

But consolidationof these two diverse cases would not necessarily expedite either of them.

The ejectment case instituted by private respondents against PHRDC andCMDF was decided by the municipal trial court on September 2, 1996. Nowthe resolution of the appeal before the RTC remains pendingnotwithstanding the lapse of over five years. In regard to the case foreminent domain, we have already ruled on the propriety of the issuance of awrit of possession in favor of herein petitioner, in the case of Republic v.Tagle, decided in 1998. Three years have already passed despite the urgentnature of the case. To begin consolidation of the two cases at this timewould only exacerbate the delay.

Second, as pointed out by petitioner, the two cases raise dissimilar issues,though the facts are evidently intertwined. In the ejectment case, the issue ispossession of the disputed property, while in the eminent domain case, theissue is the taking by the State of the property by virtue of its power ofeminent domain. Note, however, that the decision in one will not necessarilyaffect the decision in the other.

Third, it does not appear certain that consolidation is a wise step where oneor both cases had already been partially heard. I t might just complicateprocedural requirements. The judge to whom the consolidated case will beassigned would not have had the opportunity to observe first hand the

witnesses in one of the cases.24Fairness and due process might behampered rather than helped if these cases were consolidated.

As a general proposition, the propriety of consolidation rests upon the sounddiscretion of the trial court judge. But in this instance, however, we are of theconsidered view that the exercise of such discretion in order to consolidatethe ejectment case with the eminent domain case was less than judicious.We are constrained to agree with petitioner that, given the circumstancesherein cited, public respondent's discretion has been gravely abused.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 14and August 26, 1997, issued by public respondent are hereby SET ASIDE.Let the cases for ejectment and for eminent domain proceed independentlyand be resolved with despatch separately.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo, p. 23.

2Id. at 25.

3

An agency created by the PHRDC to implement its programs.

4Letters dated August 31, 1989 and February 4, 1991.

5Supra, note 1 at 9.

6Id. at 61.

7Id. at 9.

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8On grounds of expiration of lease period, non-payment of rentalsand violation of the contract of lease. Records, Vol. I, p. 2.

9Entitled "Providing the Procedures and Guidelines for the

Expeditious Acquisition by the Government of Private RealProperties or Rights Thereon for Infrastructure and OtherGovernment Development Projects", effective June 25, 1985, 81O.G. 3721 (August 26, 1985).

10Records, Vol. 1, pp. 159-163.

11Supra, note 1 at 27-28.

12Id. at 29-31.

13Id. at 23.

14

Ibid.

15Id. at 32-37.

16Id. at 25.

17Id. At 35-36.

18Id.at 51.

19Id. at 23 and 25.

20G.R. Nos. 102370-71, 209 SCRA 844 (1992).

21Id., at 849-850.

22J Y. FERIA and M.C.S. NOCHE, Civil Procedure Annotated Vol.

2, p. 615 (2001 ed.).

23RULES OF COURT, Rule 67, Section 2.

24Supra, note 20 at 850.

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G.R. No. 101941 January 25, 1996

EDMUNDO QUEBRAL,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and UNION REFINERY CORPORATION,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The main question answered in this Decision is: what are the effects of areversal by an appellate court of a trial courts order of dismissal based on ademurrer to evidence? Secondarily, when and how does the Supreme Courtreview factual findings of the Court of Appeals?

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rulesof Court to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals1promulgated on

July 29, 1991, in CA-G.R. CV No. 24954, which ordered petitioner to payprivate respondent various sums of money.

This case was originally assigned to the First Division, but by a resolutiondated November 13, 1995, it was transferred to the Third Division. Afterdeliberating on the petition, comment, reply, and memoranda of the parties -as well as the records of the case in both the Court of Appeals and in theRegional Trial Court, this Court assigned the writing of this Decision to theundersignedponente.

The Facts

A complaint for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachmentwas filed by private respondent Union Refinery Corporation againstpetitioner and Higidio B. Gay-ya, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court, Branch172,

2Valenzuela, to collect the amount of P102,991.54, representing the un-

paid oil products allegedly purchased by them from private respondent (CivilCase No. 2664-V-87).

The complaint alleged that on August 6, 1984, private respondent, acorporation engaged in refining, sale and distribution of oi l, gasoline andlubricants, approved the credit application filed by petitioner which wouldallow him to sell private respondents products in La Union, Ilocos Sur, Abraand Baguio City. Sometime in October, 1984, petitioner and Gay-ya, doing

business under the name Taurus Commercial, represented to privaterespondent that they had closed a sale to Susan Lo of Basic Shell ServiceStation in Mayumbo, Dagupan City of ten drums of "Uniplus" oil products forthe amount of P34,201.54, which private respondent delivered as evidencedby Sales Invoice No. 4106 dated October 22, 1984. Petitioner and Gay-yahad also caused the delivery of twenty drums of "Uniplus" oil products

costing P68,790.00, including freight charges allegedly to the service stationof Joseph Li in Mangaldan, Pangasinan as evidenced by Sales Invoice No.4060 dated October 8, 1984.

The complaint further alleged that since demands for payment of thedeliveries were unheeded by petitioner and Gay-ya, private respondentfound out, upon inquiry, that the duo had "connived and conspired" witheach other under the business name Taurus Commercial in defraudingprivate respondent because Susan Lo and Joseph Li never ordered anyproducts of private respondent; rather, the said orders were actually sold bythe petitioner and Gay-ya to third persons.

Alleging further that petitioner and Gay-ya were intending to leave the

country thereby exposing private respondent to irreparable damages, thesame complaint prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.It also prayed that petitioner and Gay-ya be held jointly and severally liablein the amounts of P102,991.54 plus interest thereon, P100,000.00 asdamages, and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

After hearing, the trial court granted the prayer for a writ of preliminaryattachment upon private respondents filing of a bond in the amount ofP103,000.00. In compliance with the order of attachment duly issued by thecourt on December 28, 1987, a parcel of riceland and a house in VillaQuirino, San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, declared by petitioner and his wife as theirown for tax purposes, were attached. Personal properties owned by Gay-yawere also attached.

Contending that he was merely a sales agent of petitioner, Gay-ya filed amotion to dismiss the complaint and to lift the attachment of his proper-ties.Private respondent opposed the motion asserting that Gay-ya "x x xconverted to his own use the proceeds of the oil products" amounting toP100,000.00. Annexed to the opposition was a copy of Gay-yas letter datedJuly 19, 1985 addressed to the Credit and Collection Manager of privaterespondent, referring to the "account of Mr. EDMUNDO V. QUEBRAL in theamount of P102,991.54" and admitting personal liability for the following:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jan1996/gr_101941_1996.html#fnt1

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"21 (I/200) Drums Uniplus at P3,500.00 per Drum - P73,500.00

Personal loan from E.V. Quebral - 18,404.73

Total accountability due URC &/or E.V. Quebral - P91,904.73"

In the promissory note dated July 19, 1985 appended to the aforesaid letter,Gay-ya obligated himself to pay the total amount of P91,904.73 to privaterespondent under a schedule of payments showing that the payments wouldbe made between August 30, 1985 and May 30, 1986. Both the promissorynote and the schedule of payments bore the signature of petitioner under theword "Conforme."

On April 11, 1988, the trial court denied Gay-yas motion to dismiss and to liftthe attachment. On April 19, 1988, private respondent moved that petitionerbe declared in default but on April 26, 1988, petitioner filed an answer withcounterclaim.

In his answer, petitioner categorically denied that he was a business partnerof Gay-ya but admitted that he was Gay-yas erstwhile co-employee at theGetty Oil Philippines. He averred that Gay-ya "transacted business" withprivate respondent without his knowledge and consent while using his "goodname and credit standing" with private respondent. He asserted that he didnot benefit from the business transactions between private respondent andGay-ya and denied that he was leaving the country to abscond. Heinterposed a counterclaim against private respondent for the "malicious andgroundless action" brought against him which allegedly caused him mentalanguish. He therefore prayed for reasonable damages plus attorneys feesaside from the crossclaim for damages he filed against Gay-ya.

Upon motion of private respondent, Gay-ya was declared in default in theorder of June 17, 1988.

In its order of September 23, 1988, the trial court granted petitioners motionto lift the order of attachment citing as reasons therefor private respondentsfailure to substantiate its claim that petitioner was leaving the country toabscond and to prove that there were no sufficient securities for theenforcement of its claims.

The possibility of an amicable sett lement between petitioner and privaterespondent being re-mote, the case was heard in due course. On June 15,1989, after the private respondent had presented its evidence, petitioner

filed a demurrer to evidence contending that private respondent had failed topresent "material and competent evidence sufficient to hold (petitioner) civillyliable" for the claims against him. Petitioner averred that private respondentsevidence failed to prove that: (a) his credit application was duly approved;(b) granting that such application was approved by private respondent, thedeliveries, per the invoices presented in evidence, were outside of the

named areas of coverage appearing in the application, and (c) he neversigned any purchase order in relation to the subject of the claims.

On June 26, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision holding that there wasno evidence of petitioners participation in the transactions involved, as hehad not received the goods and the deliveries were made in places outsideof La Union, Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra and Baguio City. It also found thatpetitioners conformity to Gay-yas promissory note and schedule ofpayments did not make him liable because it merely showed his "conformityto the assumption by defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. of such liability." Itdisposed of the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the case as against

Edmundo Quebral is hereby dismissed. On the other hand,judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and againstdefendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. ordering him to pay plaintiff:

1. The sum of P102,991.54 plus interest at legal rate from October8, 1984 until the full amount is paid;

2. To pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of attorneys fees;

3. Declaring the writ of preliminary attachment against the propertyof defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. permanent; and

4. Defendant to pay the costs of suit."

Gist of Appellate Courts Decision

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on July 29,1991, rendered its Decision finding that, contrary to petitioners al legation inhis demurrer to evidence, it was not necessary for private respondent toprove the approval of petitioners credit application because the fact of suchapproval was alleged in paragraph 3 of the complaint, and petitioner hadadmitted in paragraph 2 of his answer said paragraph of the complaint. The

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appellate court ruled that by such judicial ad-mission, petitioner could nolonger dispute the fact of the approval of his credit application.

On petitioners denials that he was the business partner of Gay-ya and thathe had not known about nor consented to Gay-yas transactions with privaterespondent, the Court of Appeals said:

"Defendant Quebral, however, denied in his answer that the otherdefendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. was his business partner. This denialmight be true, but in his credit application Exh. "B" or "1", heexpressly named Gay-ya together with himself as the PERSONSAU-THORIZED TO RECEIVE GOODS/DELIVERIES from plaintiff-appellant corporation; and in his letter to appellants officialEfrenVargas Exh. K, defendant Quebral introduced Gay-ya to Vargasas my representative. Hence, although Gay-ya might not havebeen defendant Quebrals partner, he (Quebral), however,expressly made known to appellant corporation that Gay-ya was hisduly authorized representative in his business, and he could not,therefore, blame appellant for regarding Gay-ya as such.

"Defendant Quebral also denied in his answer knowledge of orconsent to the transactions represented by the unpaid SalesInvoices Exhs. C and D dated October 8, and 22, 1984,respectively, claiming that it was only his defaulting co-defendantHigidio B. Gay-ya, Jr. who transacted said sales with plaintiff-appellant corporation. And Quebral later claimed in his demurrer,which the lower court sustained, that plain-tiff-appellants evidencehad failed to show that he knew of and was equally liable with Gay-ya for the value of the unpaid sales invoices. We are of the opinion,though, that contrary to defendant Quebrals claim and the ruling ofthe lower court in his favor, plaintiff-appellant corporation hadsufficiently established by its evidence defendant Quebrals

knowledge of and liability for the unpaid sales invoices in question,and as said defendant opted not to present evidence for himselfand to rely solely on his demurrer to plaintiff-appellants evidence,then the latters evidence in this case stands uncontradicted andunrefuted and should, therefore, be taken as true."

The Court of Appeals noted petitioners ad-mission to the sheriff of hisliability. As reflected in the sheriffs return, upon receiving the order ofattachment, petitioner "proposed an arrangement wherein he undertook tosettle his obligation with the plaintiff corporation within reasonable time," forwhich reason the sheriff, in good faith, did not effect the attachment

immediately. As regards Gay-yas promissory note bearing petitionersconformity and signature, the Court of Appeals held that such "conforme toGay-yas personal assumption of responsibility for P91,904.73 out of theP102,991.54 which the latter even referred to in his covering letter as theaccount of Mr. EDMUNDO V. QUEBRAL, only binds Gay-ya and himself butdoes not necessarily bind appellant corporation who does not appear to

have agreed to Gay-yas promissory note assuming personal liability for P91,904.73 out of Quebrals account of P102,991.54 and his (Gay-yas)proposal to pay said amount on installment x x x." Therefore, the Court ofAppeals concluded that petitioner is still liable to private respondent for theamount of P102,991.54 "inspite of Gay-yas promissory note, and especiallyas said promissory note also has remained unpaid." Furthermore, it wasimmaterial that the t ransactions involved were made in areas outside of thecover-age of the credit application for, as testified to by the privaterespondents comptroller, petitioner could also sell in nearby provinces.

The Court of Appeals considered as the "most telling documentary evidenceyet" against petitioner his own handwritten letter dated January 19, 1985 toEfren Vargas, an official of private respondent, which reads:

"1-19, 1985

"MR. EFREN VARGASUNIOIL

Dear Mr. Vargas,

Bearer is Mr. HB Gay-ya, Jr., my representative. He isaccompanying Mr. DICK COSUE, operator of SHELL SS inCarmen, Rosales, Pang. He is the cousin of Mr. W. T. KHO. He isinterested in buying 20 drums of PROCESS OIL 150. He is asking

for 30 days term and will give you his personal check. His presentterms with SHELL is M-30. If you can accomodate him, bill himdirectly at P3100.00/drum. You may send Mr. Gay-ya to the plant toinsure correctness of invoicing.

We are consolidating collection of the drums delivered to Joseph Li& Ms. Susan Lo. Mr. Gay-ya will explain to you further.

By the way, 1 drum delivered to Ms. Lo is leaking. It was half thecontent already when I last visited her in Dagupan.

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We will remit our collection soon.

Thanks & Regards,

Ed"

On this piece of evidence, the Court of Ap-peals said:

"Defendant Quebral did not deny, as he could not have denied, hisforegoing personal letter to appellants official Efren Vargas whoapproved his credit application with said corporation. All he statedin his demurrer to plaintiff-appellants evidence with respect to saidletter is that it is worthless and does not have probative value inrelation to the purpose for which it is being offered considering thatit was never duly established. The alleged addressee of the letterwas never presented to properly identify the same. (p. 180, Rec.)We find this contention incorrect, however, since said letter which

was addressed to appellants official Efren Vargas, was presentedby appellant as its Exhs. K and K-I and identified by its witnessMilagros Po during her direct and additional direct examination tohave been received by their office from defendant Quebral by wayof reply to their collection letter and telegram which they had sent tothe latter (pp. 2-3, tsn. Jan. 10, 1989; pp. 16-17, tsn Feb. 21, 1989).There was no need for Efren Vargas then to identify said letterhimself since it was written to him by Quebral not in his personalcapacity but in his capacity as an officer of appellant corporationand in connection with its business dealings with Quebral, andespecially as the very contents of said letter shows that it waspersonally delivered to Vargas by defendant Quebralsrepresentative, the other defendant Higidio Gay-ya. In fact,appellant corporation would not have been able to present saidletter of Quebral as evidence in this case if it did not receive thesame from the latter in the ordinary course of business. Asdefendant Quebral had failed to present any contrary evidence toshow that his said letter Exh. K had not been actually received byor delivered to appellant corporation, therefore, we believe and sohold that appellant corporation had sufficiently proved its receipt ofsaid letter from Quebral."

Interpreting petitioners letter, the Court of Appeals drew the followingconclusions: petitioner had indeed ordered oil products which he sold toJoseph Li and Susan Lo, and he himself promised to collect from said

customers and to remit the collections to private respondent. Noting that inthe letter, petitioner was introducing Gay-ya while in-voices involved weredated before the letter was sent, the Court of Appeals held that it could nothave been possible for Gay-ya to make the particular orders manifested bythe invoices. Thus, were it not for Gay-yas promissory note, petitionershould be held liable for the total amount of P102,991.54 because he acted

upon the authority given him by the petitioner. Accordingly, the Court ofAppeals disposed of the appeal as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from herein is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE, and another judgment is entered herein:

On appellants complaint:

(1) Holding both defendants Edmundo Quebral and thedefaulting defendant Higidio Gay-ya, Jr. liable to appellantcorporation for the amount of P91,904.73, plus legalinterests thereon until said amount is fully paid, with theright on the part of appellant corporation to collect saidamount from either defendant Quebral or Gay-ya;

(2) Ordering defendant Edmundo Quebral to pay appellantcorporation the amount of P11,086.81, which is thedifference between the amount of P91,904.73 covered bydefendant Gay-yas promissory note of Exh. J-2 and theamount of P102,991.54, which is the aggregate value ofthe Sales Invoices Exhs. C and D;

(3) Ordering defendant Quebral to pay appellantcorporation 25% attorneys fees on the amount ofP102,991.54, as stipulated in the Sales Invoices Exhs. C

and D; and

(4) Ordering both defendants Quebral and Gay-ya to paythe costs of this suit.

On defendant Quebrals cross-claim:

(1) Ordering defendant Gay-ya to pay his co-defendantQuebral whatever principal amount the latter would becompelled to pay appellant corporation, up to the amount

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of P91,904.73, plus legal interests thereon until saidamount is fully paid; and

(2) Ordering defendant Gay-ya to pay one-half of theattorneys fees and costs that defendant Quebral wouldlikewise be compelled to pay appellant corporation in this

case."

Alleged Errors of the Court of Appeals Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of Appealsdecision but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition charging the Court ofAppeals with "patent and manifest" error in: (a) admitting and consideringExhibit K as the basis for the finding that Gay-ya was petitionersrepresentative; (b) finding that there were purchase orders made bypetitioner; (c) finding that petitioner had sufficient knowledge of and liabilityfor the unpaid sales invoices, and (d) relying upon and giving weight to thereport/explanation of the deputy sheriff.

The foregoing alleged errors are attacks on factual findings of the appellatecourt, which normally are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule45. However, since the factual findings of the respondent Court are atvariance with those of the trial court, we decided to go over the records ofthe case both in the Court of Appeals and in the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner asserts that he "vigorously objected" to the admission of Exhibit Kprimarily because its original was not "produced and introduced in court norwas the supposed addressee presented as a witness to testify and be cross-examined on said exhibit."

The Courts Ruling

We find such assertion to be an attempt on the part of petitioner to foist afalsehood and to mislead this Court. The same attempt to mislead isrepeated in petitioners blatant statement that "a careful scrutiny of therecord of Civil Case No. 2664-V reveals that theres no indication that saidoriginal was ever produced in court." However, extant in the folder ofExhibits in Civil Case No. 2664-V-87, specifically page 7 thereof, is ExhibitK. It is the originalletter itself, handwrittenby petitioner on a piece ofstationery the upper lefthand corner of which bears this printed identification:"From the desk of: E.V. Quebral," which was marked as Exh. "K-2".

Even if it were true that Exhibit K consisted of a mere photocopy and not theoriginal of the petitioners letter, petitioner nevertheless failed to make timelyobjection thereto. As to when an objection to a document must be made, theCourt ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles:

3

"Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time

it is formally offered, not earlier. The identification of the documentbefore it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offerof the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objectionto the identification and marking of the document is not equivalentto objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it isformally offered as an exhibit." (Italics supplied)

In the case at bench, no such timely objection was ever made.Consequently, the evidence not objected to became property of the case,and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable orunfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. As it was, instead ofobjecting to said document, petitioner simply filed a demurrer to evidence, in

the manner described in his own words, as folIows:4

"Said EXH. K was never admitted in evidence as the record shows. Whenthe court a quo directed defendant (herein petitioner) Edmundo Quebral tofile a written comment on the exhibits submitted by plaintiff (respondentherein), before it could make any ruling on their admission, defendantQuebral filed instead a demurrer to evidence which the court sustained thatled to the dismissal of the case insofar as herein petitioner Quebral isconcerned."

Contrary to petitioners claim, however, Exhibit K was in fact produced,introduced, and offered as evidence. This is reflected in the transcript ofstenographic notes as follows:

"ATTY. QUINONES:

xxx xxx xxx

"Q In your additional direct examination last time, you presented aletter from Mr. Edmundo Quebral, which was marked as Exhibit K.Kindly show it to the Court..

A (Witness producing..)

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COURT: Mark it.

ATTY. QUINONES:

And likewise, this portion which was identified by the

witness, "Thanks and regards Ed" be bracketed andmarked as Exh. K-3, your Honor.

COURT: Mark it.

ATTY. QUINONES:

May I then go back to redirect examination, your Honor."

Exhibit K was formally offered in evidence by private respondent on June 8,1989 together with other exhibits. Asked by the lower court to comment onthe exhibits offered, petitioner instead re -quested that he be formallyfurnished with copies of the documents and that he be given seven days tocomment. The court, however, gave him only five days. As earlier stated,petitioner did not file the required comment - he opted to file a demurrer toevidence. Such move proved to be costly error.

Section 1, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section. 1. Effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. - Afterplaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, thedefendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the eventthe motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the groundthat upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right torelief. However, if the motion is granted and the order of dismissal

is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to presentevidence in his behalf."

A demurrer to evidence abbreviates proceedings, it being an aid orinstrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion todismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.5However,whoever avails of it gambles his right to adduce evidence.

6Pursuant to the

aforequoted provisions of Rule 35, if the defendants motion for judgment ondemurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed onappeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because themovant loses his right to present evidence.

7

Petitioners contentions before this Court are premised on the erroneousappreciation by the Court of Appeals of private respondents evidence in thetrial court. Since such appreciation and the appellate courts conclusionsthereon, as mentioned earlier, are contradictory to that of the trial court, thecase at bench falls under the exception to the general rule that factualfindings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive.

8

Accordingly, the Court closely examined the records, only to find out thatthere is no reason to overturn the findings of the Court of Appeals which areamply supported by sufficient evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIEDand the decision ofthe Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Fourth Division, composed of J. Alicia V. Sempio Diy, ponente, JJ.

Vicente V. Mendoza, chairman and Oscar M. Herrera, member;Rollo, pp. 15-28.

2Presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.

3186 SCRA 385(June 6, 1990).

4cf Reply to the comment on the petition, p. 4; rollo, pp. 72-77, at p.

75

5Nepomuceno vs. Commission on Elections,126 SCRA 472, 478

(December29, 1983).

6Bagnas vs. Court of Appeals,176 SCRA 159 (August 10,1989).

7Cruz vs. People,144 SCRA 677, 680 (October 9, 1986).

8Calde vs. Court of Appeals,233 SCRA 376 (June 27, 1994).

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G.R. No. 121517 March 31, 2000

RAY U. VELASCO, JOSEYMOUR P. ECOBIZA, WILHELM BARLIS ANDBERNABE ALABASTRO,petitioners,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FIRMWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONAND STA. CLARA HOUSING INDUSTRIES, INC.,respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:

This is a petition for review on certioraripraying for the reversal of thedecision of the Court of Appeals

1which affirmed the orders of the trial court

granting private respondents' separate motion for summary judgment withprayer for damages.

A civil action was filed sometime in 1987 with the Regional Trial Court of

Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 18567-87, by Naty Dy, Sencio Dyand Denver Builders Supply, Inc., against Nordy Diploma, Corazon Diploma,George Diploma and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. The complaintalleged that on 31 October 1987 Naty Dy of Denver Builders Supply(DENVER for brevity) and Nordy Diploma of Sta. Clara Housing Industries,Inc. (STA. CLARA for brevity) entered into a "joint partnership venture"agreement to operate the Sta. Clara plant in Davao City; that Naty Dycontributed a huge sum of money to the partnership which still owed herP13,623,265.69; that defendants unilaterally dissolved the partnership andstarted to dispose the goods and stocks thereof so that plaintiffs sought ajudicial termination of the partnership as well as for accounting anddamages. Plaintiffs also prayed for a temporary restraining order and writ ofpreliminary injunction against defendants including STA. CLARA, which was

granted by the trial court in an order issued on 8 June 1987.

The defendants and STA. CLARA questioned the order in a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petitionand set aside the writ of preliminary injunction. Not satisfied with the decisionof the Court of Appeals however, the Dy spouses and DENVER elevated thematter to this Court. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 79586, elicited on 4September 1987 a temporary restraining order against the Diplomas andSTA. CLARA enjoining the latter, their agents, representatives and/or anyperson or persons acting upon their orders or in their place and stead fromwithdrawing and/or further disposing of the plywood inventory in Sta. ClaraHousing Industries, Inc. plant or warehouse as litigated in CA-G.R. SP No.

12167, Nordy P.Diploma, et al.,petitioners, v. Hon.Anita Alfelor Alagaban,etc., et al., respondents.

Based on reports that several crates of plywood were being hauled out ofthe premises of STA. CLARA by the Diplomas in violation of the temporaryrestraining order issued by this Court, Joseymour Ecobiza, Deputy Sheriff of

RTC-Br. 13, Davao Ci ty, accompanied by Atty. Bernabe Alabastro, causedto be seized on 26 October 1987 eleven (11) crates of plywood allegedlybeing transported to Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. These crates hadthe markings of STA. CLARA and Firmwood Development Corporation(FIRMWOOD for brevity). Deputy Sheriff Joseymour Ecobiza executed anaffidavit that the seizure was effected pursuant to the temporary restrainingorder issued by this Court against the Diplomas and STA. CLARA.

2

On 18 November 1987 respondent FIRMWOOD filed with the Regional TrialCourt of Davao City a complaint for delivery of personal property anddamages as well as attorney's fees, docketed as Civil Case No. 18841-87,against herein petitioners Ray U. Velasco, ex-officio sheriff of the RegionalTrial Court of Davao City, Joseymour Ecobiza, Deputy Sheriff of Davao City,Wilhelm Barlis, former Commanding Officer of the 439th Infantry Battalion inToril, Davao City, and Atty. Bernabe Alabastro, counsel for plaintiffs Naty Dyand Sencio Dy in Civil Case No. 18567-87. FIRMWOOD alleged in itscomplaint that since it owned the eleven (11) crates of plywood seized bypetitioners it had the right to the possession thereof or to the payment of thevalue of the plywood seized in case delivery could not be made. It alsoprayed for reimbursement of its expenses of P5,000.00, P50,000.00 fortemperate damages, another P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and stillanother P50,000.00 for attorney's fees.

On 11 January 1988 this Court set aside the temporary restraining order itissued on 4 September 1987 in G.R. No. 79586.

On 28 February 1988 petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim in CivilCase No. 18841-87 alleging that respondent FIRMWOOD was not the ownerof the eleven (11) crates of plywood they seized but respondent STA.CLARA, hence, FIRMWOOD was not entitled to the recovery thereof.Petitioners contended that they had the authority to seize the crates ofplywood and put them under custodia legisby virtue of the temporaryrestraining order issued by this Court on 4 September 1987 in G.R. No.79586.1wphi1.nt

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On 26 May 1988 respondent STA. CLARA filed a complaint in interventionalleging that it had a legal interest in the matter in litigation it beinganswerable for damages arising from a warranty to deliver the goods torespondent FIRMWOOD; that the latter was the true and lawful owner of the

eleven (11) crates of plywood which were milled for it by respondent STA.CLARA; and, that since the temporary restraining order issued by this Courthad been lifted, respondent STA. CLARA continued to enjoy the conduct ofits regular business without interference from any person, entity or evencourt.

3

Petitioners also filed their answer to the complaint in intervention denyingownership of respondent FIRMWOOD over the crates of plywood andasserting STA. CLARA's ownership thereof.

On 30 August 1988 respondent FIRMWOOD filed a Motion for SummaryJudgment alleging that aside from the amount of damages due it there wasno genuine issue as to any material fact of the case, STA. CLARA havingconfirmed FIRMWOOD's ownership over the eleven (11) crates of plywood.On 12 September 1988 respondent STA. CLARA also filed a Motion forSummary Judgment alleging the same grounds raised by FIRMWOOD andfurther contending that petitioners did not have the authority to hold theproperty in custodia legis.

On 29 November 1988 the trial court granted private respondents' motionsfor summary judgment and ordered petitioners and their privies and agents

to release from their possession and custody the eleven (11) crates ofplywood and deliver the same to respondents FIRMWOOD and/or STA.CLARA, or in case of loss, to pay their declared value of P140,000.00 orsuch amount as may be proved during the hearing for the purpose only ofdetermining their actual value as well as the total amount of damages privaterespondents could prove against petitioners.4

On 7 February 1989 the trial court issued another order directing petitionersto pay the amounts incurred by respondent FIRMWOOD in filing the

complaint, i.e., P390.00 for filing fee, another P390.00 for the JudiciaryDevelopment Fund, P25.00 for sheriff's fee, plus attorney's fees ofP20,000.00 for respondent FIRMWOOD and P30,000.00 for respondentSTA. CLARA.

Petitioners appealed the two (2) orders of the trial court to the Court of

Appeals which however dismissed the appeal and affirmed the questionedorders. The appellate court held that the pleadings, annexes and affidavits ofprivate respondents in support of their respective motions for summaryjudgment were sufficient to overcome petitioners' opposition and to justifythe finding that there was no legitimate defense to the action. It also heldthat the Court's resolution of 11 January 1988 lifting the temporaryrestraining order issued in G.R. No. 79586 had mooted whatever claimpetitioners had over the seized property. The Court of Appeals alsosustained the award of damages by the trial court to respondentFIRMWOOD whose property was wrongfully attached or seized under Rule60, Sec. 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Petitioners now allege before us that the Court of Appeals erred in the

appreciation of the facts of the case and in deciding the legal questionscontrary to law and jurisprudence. In support thereof petitioners assert thatrespondent FIRMWOOD is not the true and lawful owner of the eleven (11)crates of plywood; hence its representations in its complaint for delivery ofpersonal property before the trial court were false and made in bad faith.Petitioners also contend that the crates of plywood seized by petitionerDeputy Sheriff Joseymour Ecobiza pursuant to the temporary restrainingorder of this Court in G.R. No. 79586 were still in custodia legisand couldnot be the subject of an action for replevin; and, that the temporaryrestraining order issued by this Court was lifted only on 13 January 1988 orlong after the complaint for replevin was instituted on 11 November 1987.Petitioners further contend that their admission that the owner of theplywood at that time was respondent STA. CLARA cannot be the basis for

summary judgment because there are triable issues that need to beresolved, namely: (a) whether the seizure of the plywood by petitionerEcobiza by virtue of this Court's temporary restraining order was lawful; (b)whether the subject plywood can be replevied even if it were in custodialegis; and, (c) whether respondent FIRMWOOD has any cause of actionagainst petitioners.

The crux of the controversy is whether the summary judgment rendered bythe trial court in favor of private respondents was proper and, consequently,whether the award of damages to private respondents was correct.

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