MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME110Docket: Ken-20-169 Argued: July28,2020Decided: August13,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,andHORTON,JJ.

CLAREHUDSONPAYNEetal.v.

SECRETARYOFSTATEetal.PERCURIAM

[¶1] This case is before us on report from the Superior Court

(KennebecCounty,Murphy, J.) pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(a). The report

submits three questions of law concerning a people’s veto effort seeking to

suspend P.L. 2019, ch. 539, entitled “An Act To Implement Ranked-choice

VotingforPresidentialPrimaryandGeneralElectionsinMaine,”throughthe

November3,2020, general election. See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(2)

(“TheeffectofanyAct,bill,resolveorresolutionorpartorpartsthereofasare

specifiedinsuchpetitionshallbesuspendeduponthefilingofsuchpetition.”).

Thisopinionislimitedtothesequestionsanddoesnotaddressanysubstantive

issuespresentedbyranked-choicevotinginMaine.SeeMe.Senatev.Sec’yof

2

State,2018ME52,¶1,183A.3d749. Weacceptthereportandanswerthe

threequestionsasfollows:

I.Thesessionofthe129thLegislatureinwhichL.D.1083(129thLegis. 2019)was “passed” by the Legislature pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt.3,§§16-17,isthatoftheSecondRegularSession.

II.PublicLaw2019,ch.539,wasnoteffectiveonJanuary12,2020.III.Title21-AM.R.S.§901(1)(2020)permitsthefilingofanapplication

forapeople’svetopetitionwiththeDepartmentoftheSecretaryofState prior to the adjournmentof the legislative session inwhich theAct in questionwaspassed.

[¶2]Accordingly,weremandthemattertotheSuperiorCourtforfurther

proceedings.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶3] The story of ranked-choice voting in Maine has included many

twistsandturnssincethesystem’sintroductionin2016.Wedonotrecount

theearlierchaptersofthatstoryhere,seegenerallyMe.Senate,2018ME52,

¶¶3-13, 183 A.3d 749; instead, our focus is on the Legislature’s recent

enactmentofP.L.2019,ch.539,extendingranked-choicevotingtopresidential

primaryandgeneralelections,andthepeople’svetopetitionopposingthatlaw.

[¶4]Thepartiesagreeuponthefacts.Inspring2019,theFirstRegular

Sessionofthe129thLegislatureintroducedanddebatedL.D.1083,“AnActTo

Implement Ranked-Choice Voting for Presidential Primary and General

3

ElectionsinMaine.”TheMaineHouseofRepresentativesvotedinfavorofthe

bill, but the bill remained unfinished business in the Senatewhen the First

RegularSessionofthe129thLegislatureadjournedsinedieonJune20,2019,

and was carried over pursuant to a Joint Order. On August 26, 2019, the

one-day First Special Session of the Legislature convened, and the Senate

concurred in enacting L.D. 1083, as amended by Committee Amendment A.

SeeComm.Amend.AtoL.D.1083,No.S-313(129thLegis.2019).Thatsame

day,theLegislaturepresentedthebilltotheGovernorandadjournedsinedie.

[¶5]OnSeptember6,2019,theGovernorannouncedherintenttoallow

L.D. 1083 to become lawwithout her signature in January 2020 during the

SecondRegularSessionofthe129thLegislature.SeeStateofMaineOfficeof

GovernorJanetT.Mills,GovernorMillsStatementonRankedChoiceVotingfor

Presidential Primary and General Elections in Maine (Sept. 6, 2019),

https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-statement-ran

ked-choice-voting-presidential-primary-and-general-elections-maine.

[¶6] On September 10, 2019, counsel for Demitroula Kouzounas, the

intervenorinthepresentmatter,communicatedwithDeputySecretaryofState

Julie L. Flynn. Referencing a 1979 opinion of the Attorney General, Flynn

opined that L.D. 1083 would not be considered “passed” until “it has been

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signedbytheGovernor,vetoedwiththeLegislaturethenoverridingtheveto,

or allowed to become law without the Governor’s signature.” See

Op.Me.Att’yGen. 79-170. Citing article IV, part 3, section 2 of the Maine

Constitution,Flynnexplainedthat,withouttheGovernor’ssignature,thelaw

would not be “passed” until the “fourth day after . . . this Legislature

reconvenes.”FlynntoldKouzounasthattheperiodwithinwhichshecouldfile

apeople’svetoapplicationpursuant to21-AM.R.S.§901(1)wouldnotstart

untilafterthelawbecamechapteredin2020.However,Flynnrecognizedthat

“someonemighttakeacontrarypositionandarguethatthe10-businessday

periodforfilinganapplicationtocirculateapeople’svetoposition,pursuantto

21-A M.R.S. § 901(1), started to run once the special session ended on

August26th,” inwhichcase “thedeadline for filinganapplicationunder this

statutewouldbetoday.”FlynntoldKouzounas’scounselthatshouldshedecide

tofileanapplicationthatday,“wearewillingtokeep[theapplication]onfile,

but...wouldnotconsidertheapplication‘complete’untilafterthelegislation

hasbecomeachapteredpublic law. Thismeanswewouldnotdraftaballot

question or create a petition form for circulation, pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.

§901(4) [(2020)], until after the public law is filed with us in January.”

5

Kouzounasfiledanapplicationforpeople’svetoregardingL.D.1083thatsame

day—onSeptember10,2019.

[¶7]InaccordancewithMaine’sbienniallegislativesystem,theSecond

Regular Sessionof the129thLegislature convenedon January8, 2020. The

GovernordidnotreturnL.D.1083totheLegislature“within3daysafter”the

beginning of the Second Regular Session, and the bill was chaptered as

P.L.2019,ch.539,withouthersignatureonJanuary12,2020.Me.Const.art.IV,

pt.3,§2. OnJanuary16,2020,Kouzounasfiledanapplicationforapeople’s

vetoregardingchapter539withtheDepartmentoftheSecretaryofState.On

February3,2020,theSecretaryapprovedtheapplicationandprovidedpetition

formswithwhichtocollectsignatures.

[¶8]OnMarch3,2020,theSecretaryofStateadministeredpresidential

primaryelectionswithouttheuseofranked-choicevotingfortheDemocratic

candidates,andJosephR.BidenJr.wasdeclaredthevictorbasedonaplurality

ofthevote.InlightoftheCOVID-19pandemic,theSecondRegularSessionof

the129thLegislatureadjournedsinedieonMarch17,2020.

[¶9]InApril2020,ClareHudsonPayne,PhilipSteele,FrancesM.Babb,

andtheCommitteeforRankedChoiceVoting(collectively,theCommittee)filed

a complaint in the Superior Court against the Secretary of State seeking a

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declaratory judgment (1) that the people’s veto petitionwas invalid on the

groundsthatthelawhadtakeneffectonJanuary12,2020,andapeople’sveto

wasthusuntimely,or(2)alternatively,thatthepeople’svetoapplicationwas

improperly filed because 21-A M.R.S. § 901(1) prevents the filing of an

application prior to the adjournment of the Legislature. The Committee

requestedinjunctivereliefthatwouldpreventtheSecretaryfromacceptingor

ballotingthepeople’svetomeasurefor theNovember2020generalelection.

Inits complaint, the Committee noted that, pursuant to article IV, part 3,

section17(2) of the Maine Constitution, the Secretary’s acceptance of the

petitionwould“[have]theeffectofsuspendingthe2019[ranked-choicevoting]

Law,whichwouldalterandimpactMainevotinginthe2020generalelection

forthePresidentoftheUnitedStates.”Kouzounasmovedtointerveneinthe

suit.

[¶10] On June 15, 2020, the 90th day after the recess of the Second

RegularSession,proponentssubmittedapeople’svetopetitioncontaining,on

itsface,morethanthe63,067signaturesrequiredinordertoplaceaproposed

vetoofchapter539ontheballotatthegeneralelectioninNovember2020.See

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(1)(stating“Uponwrittenpetitionofelectors,the

numberofwhichshallnotbelessthan10%ofthetotalvoteforGovernorcast

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in the lastgubernatorialelectionpreceding the filingofsuchpetition . . . .”);

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(3)(providingthatapeople’svetomeasureisvoted

on“atthenextstatewideorgeneralelection,whichevercomesfirst,not less

than60daysafter”thepublicproclamationannouncingsuspensionofthelaw).

[¶11]ThepartiesagreedtostipulatedfactsintheSuperiorCourtmatter.

InanordersignedJune15,2020,theSuperiorCourtgrantedareporttousto

resolvethefollowingthreequestionsoflawpursuanttoM.R.App.P.24(a).

I.Whichsessionofthe129thLegislaturewasthesessionatwhichL.D. 1083, An Act to Implement Ranked-choice Voting forPresidentialPrimaryandGeneralElectionsinMaine,waspassedforpurposesofMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§16and17?II.WasP.L.2019,ch.539effectiveJanuary12,2020?III. Does 21-AM.R.S.A. § 901(1) permit filing of a people’s vetoapplicationwiththeDepartmentoftheSecretaryofStatepriortoadjournmentofthelegislativesessionatwhichtheActinquestionwaspassed?

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12] When the trial court reports questions pursuant to M.R.

App.P.24(a),1“weindependentlydeterminewhetheracceptanceofthereport

1MaineRuleofAppellateProcedure24(a)states,

(a)ReportbyAgreementofImportantorDoubtfulQuestions.Whenthetrial court is of the opinion that a question of law presented to it is of sufficientimportanceordoubttojustifyareporttotheLawCourtfordetermination,itmaysoreportwhen:

8

isconsistentwithourbasicfunctionasanappellatecourtorwouldimproperly

placeusintheroleofanadvisoryboardduetothelackofafinaltrialcourt

judgmenttoreview.”Me.Senate,2018ME52,¶14,183A.3d749(quotation

marksomitted).AlthoughwerecognizethatRule24operatesasanexception

to the final judgment rule and “should be used sparingly,” Liberty Ins.

Underwritersv.EstateofFaulkner,2008ME149,¶5,957A.2d94(quotation

marksomitted),wegrantthereport in thepresentmatterbecauseallofthe

criteriaforapplicationofRule24(a)havebeenmet,seeMe.Senate,2018ME52,

¶14,183A.3d749.

A. QuestionsIandII

[¶13] The parties dispute which legislative session, the First Special

SessionortheSecondRegularSession, isthesessioninwhichL.D.1083was

“passed”withinthemeaningofsections16and17ofarticleIV,part3,ofthe

MaineConstitution.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§16-17.Theuniqueprocedural

circumstances of the present matter, coupled with a paucity of evidence of

legislativeintent,makethisquestionoffirstimpressionadifficultone.

(1)allpartiesappearingagreetothereport; (2)thereisagreementastoallfactsmaterialtotheappeal;and (3)thedecisionthereonwould,inatleastonealternative,finallydisposeoftheaction.

9

[¶14]Sections16and17provideinrelevantpart,

Section16.Actsbecomeeffectivein90daysafterrecess;exception;emergencybilldefined.NoActorjointresolutionoftheLegislature...shalltakeeffectuntil90daysaftertherecessofthesessionoftheLegislatureinwhichitwaspassed,unlessincaseofemergency.... Section17.Proceedingsforpeople’sveto. 1. Petitionprocedure;petitionforpeople’sveto. Uponwrittenpetitionofelectors,thenumberofwhichshallnotbelessthan 10% of the total vote for Governor cast in the lastgubernatorial election preceding the filing of such petition, andaddressedtotheGovernorandfiledintheofficeoftheSecretaryofStatebythehourof5:00p.m.,onorbeforethe90thdayaftertherecessoftheLegislature,orifsuch90thdayisaSaturday,aSunday,ora legalholiday,bythehourof5:00p.m.,ontheprecedingdaywhichisnotaSaturday,aSunday,oralegalholiday,requestingthatone ormoreActs, bills, resolves or resolutions, or part or partsthereof,passedbytheLegislaturebutnotthenineffectbyreasonoftheprovisionsoftheprecedingsection,bereferredtothepeople....

Me.Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §§16-17(1). TheCommittee argues that section17

requires that the phrase “passed by the Legislature” be limited to an

understanding inwhich “passed”means the final passage by theHouse and

Senate and does not contemplate later presentment to and action by the

Governor.TheCommitteeurgesthatbyexpresslyincludingtheword“bills”in

section17,theframersofthepeople’svetoenvisionedthepresentsituation.In

advancingthetheorythatsections16and17refersolelytoactionstakenby

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the Legislature, the Committee points to a number of other places in the

Constitutioninwhichtheword“pass”isusedtodescribelegislativeconduct.2

Thesereferences, theCommitteesuggests,generate thenegative implication

thattheranked-choicevotinglawcouldnothavebeen“‘passed’byanyaction

orinactionoftheGovernor,”whoseroleisnotto“pass”lawsbutto“approve”

them.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2(explainingthatwhenabillis“presented

to the Governor, and if the Governor approves, the Governor shall sign it”

(emphasisadded)).

[¶15] In opposition to the Committee’s view, the Secretary and

KouzounassuggestthatdeterminingthesessionoftheLegislatureinwhicha

law was “passed” within the meaning of sections 16 and 17 cannot be

accomplishedwithoutalsoconsideringtheGovernor’sroleintheenactmentof

laws,asspecifiedinsection2ofarticleIV,part3,oftheMaineConstitution.In

their view, “passed” must be interpreted to refer to the completion of the

legislativeprocessratherthanbeinglimitedtotheLegislature’sactionswithin

2 See, e.g.,Me.Const. art. IV, pt. 1, §1 (observing thepeople’s “power at their ownoption to

approveorrejectatthepollsanyAct,bill,resolveorresolutionpassedbythejointactionofbothbranchesoftheLegislature”(emphasisadded)),pt.3,§2(“Everybillorresolution,havingtheforceof law . . .which shall havepassedbothHouses, shall bepresented to theGovernor,”wherebyaGovernor’svetoreturningthebilltotheHouseinwhichitoriginatedmaybeoverturnedif“2/3ofthat House shall agree to pass it” before sending the measure to the other House for approval(emphasisadded)),pt.3,§19(statingthattheGovernor’svetopower“shallnotextendto.. .anymeasureinitiatedbythepeopleandpassedbytheLegislaturewithoutchange”(emphasisadded)).

11

thatprocess.AsKouzounasandtheSecretaryexplain,pursuanttosection2,a

billcannotbecomeoperativeuntiltheGovernorisinvolved.

[¶16]Section2providesinrelevantpart,

Every bill or resolution, having the force of law, . . . shall bepresented to the Governor, and if the Governor approves, theGovernor shall sign it . . . . If the bill or resolution shall not bereturnedbytheGovernorwithin10days(Sundaysexcepted)afteritshallhavebeenpresentedtotheGovernor,itshallhavethesameforce and effect as if the Governor had signed it unless theLegislaturebytheiradjournmentpreventitsreturn,inwhichcaseitshallhavesuchforceandeffect,unlessreturnedwithin3daysafterthenextmeetingofthe sameLegislaturewhichenacted thebillorresolution;ifthereisnosuchnextmeetingoftheLegislaturewhichenactedthebillorresolution,thebillorresolutionshallnotbealaw.

Id.(emphasisadded).Here,theLegislaturepreventedtheGovernor’sreturnof

the bill when it adjourned from its one-day First Special Session on

August26,2019, after passing L.D. 1083. Because the same biennial

Legislature(the129th)convenedon January8,2020, for itsSecondRegular

Session—“the next meeting of the same Legislaturewhich enacted the bill”

pursuanttosection2—theGovernorhaduntilJanuary12,2020,toapproveor

returnthebill.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2.TheGovernortookneitheraction

duringthatwindow,andthusthebillacquired“thesameforceandeffectasif

theGovernorhadsignedit”onJanuary12.Id.TheSecretaryandKouzounas

alsoarguethatthebilldidnotbecomeeffectiveuntil June15,2020,90days

12

aftertherecessoftheSecondRegularSession,thelegislativesessioninwhich

thebillbecamelawwithouttheGovernor’ssignatureandthereforethesession

inwhichthebill“passed.”SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§16-17.

[¶17]WheninterpretingprovisionsoftheMaineConstitution,“welook

primarilytothelanguageused.Becausethesameprinciplesemployedinthe

construction of statutory language hold true in the construction of a

constitutional provision, we apply the plain language of the constitutional

provision if the language isunambiguous. If theprovision is ambiguous,we

determinethemeaningbyexaminingthepurposeandhistorysurroundingthe

provision.” Voorhees v. Sagadahoc County, 2006ME 79, ¶ 6, 900 A.2d 733

(citationsomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶18] When construing the plain language, we interpret the

Constitution’s words in light of what meaning they would convey to an

“intelligent, careful voter.” Allen v. Quinn, 459 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Me. 1983)

(quotationmarksomitted).Section20ofarticleIV,part3,whichwasenacted

atthesametimeassections16and17aspartofAmendmentXXXI,definesa

numberofwordsandphrasesusedinarticleIVbutdoesnotdefinetheword

“pass.” SeeMe. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 20 (providing definitions including

“electors,”“people,”“recessofLegislature,”“statewideelection,”and“written

13

petition”); Resolves 1907, ch. 121 (effective Jan. 6, 1909). Nor is the verb

defined elsewhere in the Constitution. Dictionary definitions from the time

when the initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution were

enactedcutinfavorofbothinterpretationsanddonotresolvethequestionat

hand.3

[¶19]TheCommittee’sobservationthatsection17enablesindividuals

to submit “Acts, bills, resolves or resolutions” to a people’s veto,

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(1) (emphasisadded),althoughcorrect,doesnot

persuadeusthattheLegislatureincludedtheword“bills”incontemplationof

thepresentproceduralthicket—wheretheLegislaturepassedalawbutwhere

thelawremainedinoperativeformorethanninetydaysaftertherecessofthe

session in which both Houses passed the bill. The Committee fails to

acknowledgethecircularityofthatinterpretation.Takenliterally,itisdifficult

tocomprehendameaningfuldistinctioninthiscontextbetweensection17’s

“Acts”and“bills.”Evenassumingthata“bill”isa“proposalforalaw”whereas

3See,e.g.,Pass,Webster’sNewInternationalDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage(1909)(“13.To

advancethroughallthestepsnecessarytovalidityoreffectiveness;tobecarriedthroughabodythathaspowertosanctionorreject;toreceivelegislativesanction;tobeenacted;as,thebillpassed.”);Passage,id.(“8.Ofameasureorlaw:Actofpassing;sanction;enactment.Ordinarilypassagereferstothefinalaffirmativeactionbywhichtheassemblyenactsthelaw;butithasbeenalsosometimesusedtodesignatethetimeoftakingeffectoftheact;orthefinalactnecessarytomakeitavalidlaw,asthesigningorapprovingbythegovernororotherexecutive.”(citationsomitted)).

14

an“Act”isa“[b]illpassedorenactedbybothchambersthatbecomesapublic

law,”4 when applying the Committee’s narrow construction, any relevant

distinction between the two dissolves in the context of section 17 because

section17ascribesto“bills”and“Acts”alikethenotionthattheyhavealready

been“passedbytheLegislature”bythetimeapeople’svetopetitionhasbeen

filed.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(1).

[¶20] We disagree with the Committee’s contention that the plain

language resolves the presentmatter and conclude that themeaning of the

word “passed” in sections 16 and 17 is ambiguous. We turn, therefore, to

examinetheprovisions’historyandpurpose.SeeVoorhees,2006ME79,¶6,

900A.2d733.

[¶21] These provisions derive from Amendment XXXI to the Maine

Constitution, which established Maine’s initiative and referendum process

during a nationwide proliferation of direct popular democracy in the early

twentieth century. SeeResolves1907, ch. 121;Farris ex.Rel.Dorsky v.Goss,

143Me.227,230-31,60A.2d908(1948);DavidSchuman,TheOriginofState

ConstitutionalDirectDemocracy:WilliamSimonU’Renandthe“OregonSystem,”

4 Act & Bill, State of Maine Legislature Glossary of Terms,

https://legislature.maine.gov/LawMakerWeb/glossary_of_terms.asp(lastvisitedAug.6,2020).

15

67Temp.L.Rev.947,948(1994).Wehaveobservedthatthebroadpurposeof

the referendum is “obvious”: to render “the legislative power not final but

subjecttothewillofthepeople.”Moultonv.Scully,111Me.428,448,89A.944

(1914); see Lawrence L. Pelletier, The Initiative and Referendum in Maine,

16Mun.Res.Series(BureauforRes.inMun.Gov’t,BowdoinC.),Mar.1951,at

8-9.Thattheamendmentwasintendedtoeffectuatea“fundamentalchangein

the existing form of government,” Farris, 143 Me. at 230, 60 A.2d 908, is

reflectedinitsotherprovisions5aswellasinthehighpitchofthelegislative

debateinthesessionsleadinguptoitspassage.SeeLegis.Rec.638-649(1907);

cf.LegisRec.775-82,841-42(1905).

[¶22]Thehistoryandpurposeoftheseprovisionsshedsomelightonthe

“complicatedmachinery” of their text. Moulton, 111Me. at 448, 89 A. 944.

Consideringtheninety-dayperiodthatismirroredinsections16and17,itis

clearthatthe“purposeofthe90daysuspensioninsection16istoallowtime

inwhichlegislativeactsorresolvesmaybesubjectedtothepeople’svetounder

section17.”OpinionoftheJustices,682A.2d661,666(Me.1996);seeTinkle,

5Forinstance,theamendmentalsochangedthestylingofMaine’slaws.Priortoitsenactment,

laws were entitled, “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in Legislatureassembled”;eversince,lawsbearthetitle,“BeitenactedbythePeopleoftheStateofMaine,”suchthatthe“peopleandnottheLegislature[are]therealarbitersofthelawstobefinallyaccepted.”Moultonv.Scully,111Me.428,448,89A.944(1914).

16

TheMaineStateConstitution98-99(2ded.2013).Indeed,thelegislativehistory

of Amendment XXXI—although sparse and, on its own, inconclusive on the

specificproceduralissuebeforeus—reflectsatacitunderstandingamongthe

amendment’senactorsthattheninety-dayperiodinsection17wasmeantto

correspondwiththeninety-dayperiodinsection16,thelatterbeingthepoint

at which laws passed by the Legislature generally become effective.6 See

Legis.Rec.640-645(1907);Legis.Rec.775,830(1905).Otherinterpretations

overtheyearshavejoinedinthisunderstanding. See,e.g.,Op.Me.Att’yGen.

79-170;Pelletier,TheInitiativeandReferenduminMaine,16Mun.Res.Series

(BureauforRes.inMun.Gov’t,BowdoinC.),Mar.1951,at16(“Statutesenacted

by the legislature, with certain exceptions, do not become effective until

ninetydaysaftertherecessofthesessionapprovingthemeasure,andduring

6Notonlydoesthereexistacleartextualconnectionbetweensection16’ssuspensionofeffective

dates “until 90 days after the recess of the session of the Legislature inwhich [legislation]waspassed” and section 17’s 90-day periodwithinwhich to file a people’s veto petition challengingmeasures“passedbytheLegislaturebutnotthenineffectbyreasonoftheprovisionsof[Section16]”as those constitutional provisions were enacted, but an earlier version of the initiative andreferendumamendment,whichgarneredmajorityvotesinbothhousesbutnotbythetwo-thirdsrequiredforaconstitutionalamendment,seeLegis.Rec.785,834-35,855(1905),hadlikewisebeenexplicitaboutthesynchronybetweentheperiodbeforealawbecomeseffectiveandtheperiodinwhichareferendumpetitionmaybefiled.Thatbillprovidedasfollows:

No act of the legislature not passed to be enacted by a two-thirds vote of eachhouse...shalltakeeffectuntilninetydaysaftertherecessofthelegislaturepassingit. Anyact, if tenpercentof thevoters . . . ,bypetitionsignedand filedwith thesecretary of state within said time, shall so request, shall be submitted to thepeople....

S.D.244(72ndLegis.1905)(emphasisadded).

17

this period it is possible for the people to invoke a referendum on the

proposal.”).

[¶23] Although thispurposeofthereferendumisclear,neitherof the

parties’interpretationsofthetextoftheseprovisionsisperfectlyreconcilable

withthatpurpose.ThelanguageofMaine’sConstitutionmeasurestheperiod

beyondwhichareferendumpetitionmaynotbefilednotfromthedateanact

becomes lawbutrather from“therecessof thesessionof theLegislature in

whichitwaspassed.”Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§16.ButseeMass.Const.,art.48,

TheReferendum,III,§3(measuringthedurationfromwhen“thelawthat is

thesubjectofthepetitionhasbecomelaw”(emphasisadded)).Ordinarily,by

thecloseoftheninety-dayperiodfollowingtheLegislature’spassageofabill,

theGovernorwouldhaveweighedinpursuanttoMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2.

ButMaine’sConstitutioncontainsauniqueproceduralprocess; itgrants the

Governorathree-daywindowinwhichtoactonabill—afterarecess—when

thesameLegislature’searlyadjournmentpreventedtheGovernorfromhaving

tendaystorespondtothebill. SeeMe.Const.art. IV,pt.3,§2. Thisunique

processisnotfoundinotherstateconstitutionswithotherwisesimilarpeople’s

vetoschemes.7

7UsingtheNebraskaConstitutionasanexample,asectionsimilartoMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17

provides thatapeople’sreferendumpetitionmustbe“filed in theofficeof theSecretaryofState

18

[¶24]ThetroublewiththeCommittee’spositionisthatitleadstoaresult

wherebythedeadlineforinvokingapeople’svetoofalawwouldfallbeforethe

datethelawcouldtakeeffect.Itisunlikelythattheframersintendedaresult

inwhichpeoplewereexpectedtopetitionforapeople’svetobeforeitisclear

thattheact inquestionwillbeapproved; if theGovernoroptstovetoanact

duringthethree-daywindowafterthe“nextmeetingoftheLegislaturewhich

enactedthebill,”Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2,theworkinvolvedinthepetition

wouldhavebeenwhollyunnecessary,seeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§2,16-17;

Op.Me.Att’yGen.79-170.

[¶25]WerecognizethatbecausetheGovernor’sdecisiontoallowthebill

tobecomelawwaseffectivelydelayeduntilthefirstthreedaysoftheSecond

RegularSession,theeffectivedateoftheActwasalsodelayeduntilninetydays

followingtheSecondRegularSession’sMarch17,2020,recess.Thisextended

thevetopetitiondeadlinetoJune15,2020(adatethatwouldverylikelyhave

withinninetydaysaftertheLegislatureatwhichtheactsoughttobereferredwaspassedshallhaveadjournedsinedieorformorethanninetydays.”Neb.Const.art.III,§3.SimilartoMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§16,theNebraskaConstitutionstatesthat“[n]oactshalltakeeffectuntilthreecalendarmonthsaftertheadjournmentofthesessionatwhichitpassed,unlessincaseofemergency.”Neb.Const.art.III,§27.However,Nebraska’sConstitutiondoesnotmirrortheuniqueprovisionfoundinMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2providingtheGovernorathree-daywindowduringthenextmeetingofthesameLegislatureshouldtheLegislature’sadjournmentpreventtheGovernor’sreturnofthebill.Instead,itprovidesthatwheretheLegislaturepreventstheGovernor’sreturnofthebillbyitsadjournment,the Governormay file the bill “in the office of the Secretary of Statewithin five days after suchadjournment,or[thebill]become[s]alaw.” Neb.Const.art.IV,§15. Hence,theextensionoftheGovernor’sopportunitytoresponduntil thenextmeetingof theLegislature found inthepresentsituationwouldnotoccurundertheNebraskaConstitution.

19

occurredevenlaterhadtheLegislaturenotbeenforcedtoadjournduetothe

COVID-19pandemic).Whetherthisresultwasanticipatedorintendedbythe

draftersofMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§16and17,itistheresultrequiredbythe

language,purpose,andhistoryofthosesections.

[¶26]Notwithstandingthispossibleshortcoming,weconcludethatthe

Secretary’sunderstandingisthebetterconstruction. Wehaveobservedthat

“[c]onstitutional provisions are accorded a liberal interpretation in order to

carryouttheirbroadpurpose,becausetheyareexpectedtolastovertimeand

arecumbersometoamend.”Allen,459A.2dat1102.Thisliberalinterpretation

isespeciallyimportantinthecontextofthepeople’s“absolute”right“toenact

legislationandapproveordisapprovelegislationenactedbythe[L]egislature,”

a right that “cannot be abridged directly or indirectly by any action of the

Legislature.”Farris,143Me.at231,60A.2d908.

[¶27]Thisprincipleofconstruction,coupledwiththeclearpurposeof

theninety-dayperiodtoaffordthetimetoinvokeapeople’svetountilalaw’s

effectivedate,leadustoconcludethattheword“passed”insections16and17

ofarticle IV,part3,of theMaineConstitutionsignifies thecompletionof the

legislativeprocessratherthantheLegislature’sactionswithinthatprocess.Cf.

Moulton, 111Me. at 448, 89 A. 944 (observing, in holding that a resolution

20

callingfortheremovalofasheriffwasnotsubjecttothereferendumprocess,

thatthereferendumprocesswas“intendedtoapplyonlytoactsorresolves...

havingtheforceoflaw...whicharepassedbybothbranches[and]areusually

signedbythegovernor,”andcitingforthatpropositiontheforceoflawclause

inMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§2(emphasisomitted)(quotationmarksomitted)).

ThelegislativeprocessforenactmentisnotcompleteuntiltheGovernorhas

had the opportunity to consider the bill.8 SeeMe. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2;

Stuartv. Chapman, 104Me.17,23,70A.1069 (1908) (“Theapproval of the

governorwasthelastlegislativeactwhichbreathedthebreathoflifeintothese

statutesandmadethemapartofthelawsoftheState.”). Thus,inanswerto

reported Question I, we conclude that the Second Regular Session of the

129thLegislatureservedasthe“sessionoftheLegislatureinwhich[thelaw]

waspassed,”Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§16,pursuanttosections16and17.And

weanswerQuestionIIinthenegativeandholdthatP.L.2019,ch.539,wasset

to become effective on June 15, 2020, “90 days after the recess of” the

SecondRegularSession,Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§16,andwassuspendedupon

thefilingofthepeople’svetopetition,seeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§17(2).

8WeagreewithKouzounas’sstructuralobservationthattheplacementoftheprovisionregarding

presentmenttotheGovernorwithinarticleIVpart3,entitled“LegislativePower,”Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,supportsourunderstandingthattheGovernor’sroleisthelastnecessarystepinthelegislativeprocess.

21

B. QuestionIII

[¶28] Inthealternative,theCommitteearguesthattheapplicationfor

thepeople’svetoviolated21-AM.R.S.§901(1).TheConstitutionenablesthe

Legislaturetoenactlaws“notinconsistentwiththeConstitutionforapplying

the people’s veto and direct initiative” and for establishing “procedures for

determinationofthevalidityofwrittenpetitions.”Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§22;

seeMcGeev.Sec’yofState,2006ME50,¶9,896A.2d933. TheConstitution

directsthatacompletedpeople’svetopetitionmustbe“filedintheofficeofthe

SecretaryofStatebythehourof5:00p.m.,onorbeforethe90thdayafterthe

recess of the Legislature” in which the challenged act was passed.

Me.Const.art. IV, pt. 3, § 17(1). The Constitution does not dictate timing

requirements for filing an initial application for a people’s veto petition.

Instead, to regulate the filing of an application, the Legislature enacted

subsection 901(1), entitled “Limitation on petitions,” which provides in

relevantpart,

An application for a people’s veto referendum petition must befiledintheDepartmentoftheSecretaryofStatewithin10businessdaysafteradjournmentofthelegislativesessionatwhichtheActinquestionwaspassed.

21-A M.R.S. § 901(1) (emphasis added). The Committee contends that the

phrase “within 10 business days after” must be construed to establish not

22

simplyanenddatebutalsoastartdate—theLegislature’sadjournment—for

filinganapplicationforapeople’sveto.Thus,itsuggeststhatKouzounas,who

filedapplicationsonSeptember10,2019,andonJanuary16,2020—butnotin

theten-business-daywindowfollowingtheadjournmentoftheSecondRegular

Session—didnot filea validvetoapplication. Incontrast, theSecretaryand

Kouzounasarguethatsection901(1)setsonlyanenddateandnotabeginning

cutoff,andtherefore,Kouzounas’searlyfilingwasvalid.

[¶29] Weagreewith the lattercontentionandnote that, althoughwe

have not interpreted section901(1)before,we findpersuasive theSuperior

Court’s interpretationinRemmelv.Gwadosky,No.AP-97-112(Me.Super.Ct.,

CumberlandCty.,Nov.21,1997).Justasweinterpretconstitutionalprovisions

“liberally...tofacilitate,ratherthantohandicap,thepeople’sexerciseoftheir

sovereignpowertolegislate,”Allen,459A.2dat1102-03,sotoodoweafforda

liberal interpretation to statutes regulating that right, see Hernett v. Meier,

173N.W.2d907,911-12(N.D.1970).

[¶30] In Allen, we examined whether the constitutional provision

governingthepeople’sinitiative,whichrequiredthataninitiativepetitionbe

“filedintheofficeoftheSecretaryofState...onorbeforethefiftiethdayafter

thedateofconveningoftheLegislatureinfirstregularsession,”prescribeda

23

starting date before which applications could not be filed. 459 A.2d at

1098-1101,1099n.5(quotationmarksomitted)(citingMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3.,

§ 18(1)). We affirmed our principle of construing constitutional provisions

liberallyinordertoeffectuatetheirbroadpurpose,observingtheprocedural

specificity theLegislatureprovided the initiativeprocess,whichextended to

“prescribing five o’clock p.m. as the hour of the filing deadline for initiative

petitions.”Id.at1102-03.Weconcludedthat“acourtmustbecharyofreading

anothertimelimitationintosection18(1)byimplication”andshouldrequire

additionalprocedures“onlyiftheyareclearlynecessarytoachieveconsistency

withotherconstitutionalprovisionsor toaccomplish thegeneralpurposeof

the direct initiative.” Id. at 1103. Finding no such necessity, we held that

section18(1)didnotprohibittheearlyfilingofanapplication.Id.

[¶31] The Superior Court inRemmelwas guided by a decision of the

NebraskaSupremeCourt, inwhich that court concluded that language in its

state constitution dictating that referendum petitions must be “filed in the

officeoftheSecretaryofStatewithinninetydaysaftertheLegislatureatwhich

theactsoughttobereferredwaspassedshallhaveadjournedsinedieorfor

morethanninetydays,”Neb.Const.,art.III,§3(emphasisadded),createdonly

an end date and did not fix a starting cutoff, see Klosterman v. Marsh,

24

143N.W.2d744, 749 (Neb. 1966); Remmel v. Gwadosky, No. AP-97-112

(Me.Super.Ct.,CumberlandCty.,Nov.21,1997). Othercourtshave likewise

construed“within”tosetonlyanenddateandnotastartdate.See,e.g.,District

of Columbia v. Gantt, 558 A.2d 1120, 1122-24 (D.C. 1989); Southall v. State,

796S.E.2d261,265(Ga.2017)(collectingcasesandstatingthat“[t]heword

‘within,’whenusedwithreferencetotime,isgenerallyawordoflimitationthat

means‘notbeyond’or‘notlaterthan’—fixingtheend,butnotthebeginning,of

aperiod”).

[¶32]Finally,weareunpersuadedbytheCommittee’spolicyargument

thatfairnessdemandsthateverypeople’svetoproponentbeallottedanequal

ten-dayperiod inwhich to file anapplication. As theSecretary responds, a

people’s veto application process is not a “horse race.” Different groups of

citizensmaywishtochallengedifferentbillsfordifferentreasonsandarenot

in direct competition with one another. In addition, early filing of an

applicationmaybea“boon”ratherthana“burden”totheSecretaryofState’s

officeinprocessingapplications.Allen,459A.2dat1101.

[¶33]Insum,weconstrue21-AM.R.S.§901(1)tosetonlyanenddate

forthefilingofapplicationsforapeople’svetoandnotastartingcutoffthat

25

would prohibit the early filing of an application prior to the Legislature’s

adjournment.WethereforeanswerreportedQuestionIIIintheaffirmative.

Theentryis:

Report accepted. Remanded to the SuperiorCourtforentryofjudgment.

JamesG.Monteleone,Esq.(orally),EvianaL.Englert,Esq.,andGlennIsrael,Esq.,BernsteinShur,Portland,forappellantsClareHudsonPayneetal.AaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andPhyllisGardiner,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeSecretaryofStateAnnR.Robinson,Esq.,andJoshuaD.Dunlap,Esq.(orally),PierceAtwoodLLP,Portland,forappelleeDemitroulaKouzounasKennebecCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2020-50ForClerkReferenceOnly