clark nietzsche_on_truth_and_philosophy capitulo sobre el perspectivismo

8/4/2019 Clark Nietzsche_on_Truth_and_Philosophy Capitulo Sobre El Perspectivismo

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N I E T Z S C H E O N T R U T HAND PHI LOSOPHY


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M O D E R N E U R O P E A N P H I L O S O P H YExecutive editor

R A Y M O N D G E U S S , C O L U M B I A U N I V E R S I T YEditorial board

HID ISHIGURO, BARNARD COLLEGEALAN MONTEFIORE, BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORDMARY TILES, ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

R. M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic ValueRaymond Geuss , The Idea of a Critical Theory:Habermas and the Frankfurt SchoolKare l Lamber t , Meinong and the Principle of IndependenceCharles Taylor , Hegel and Modern SocietyMary Ti les , Bachelard: Science and Objectivity

Robert S . Tragesser , Husserl and Realism in Logic and MathematicsPeter Winch , Simone Weil: The Just BalanceGary Gut t ing , Michel Foucaulfs Archaeology of Scientific ReasonFreder i ck Neuhouser , Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity


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NIETZSCHE ONTRUTHAND PHILOSOPHY

MAUDEMARIE CLARKColgate University

The right of theUniversity ofCambridgeto print and sellall manner of bookswas granted byHenry VIII in 1534.The University has printedand published continuouslysince 1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESSCAMBRIDGE

NEW YORK PORT CHESTER MELBOURNE SYDNEY


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Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of CambridgeThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011, USA10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, M elbourne 316 6, Australia Cambridge University Press 1990

First published 1990

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D ataClark, Maudemarie.

Nietzsche on truth and philosophy / Maudemarie Clark,p. cm. - (Modern European p hilosophy)

Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 0-521-34368-2. - ISBN 0-521-34850-1 (pbk.)

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 18441900 Contributions inconc ept of truth. 2. Truth. I. Title. II. Series.B3318.T78C55 1990121' .092 dc2o 90-36094CIP

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataClark, MaudemarieNietzsche on truth and philosophy. - (Modern Europeanphilosopy).1. Epistemology. Truth. Theories of Nietzsche, Friedrich1 8 4 4 - 1 9 0 0

I. Title II. Series1 21

ISBN 0-521-34368-2 hardbackISBN 0-521-3 4850 -1 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2002


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To the m em ory of my father, Vincent M. Clark(1918-1968)and of my friend and student, Bruce P. Cooper(1956-1987)

On the origin of scholars. . . . If one has trained one's eyeto recognize in a scholarly book or scientific treatise thescholar's intellectual idiosyncrasy . . . one will almost alwaysdiscover behind it the scholar's "pre-history," his family,and especially their occupations and crafts.. . . T he son of an advocate will be an advocate as ascholar, too; he w ants in the first place to prove his case righ t,in the second, perhaps, that it be right. The sons of Protes-tant ministers and school teachers may be recognized bytheir naive certainty when, as scholars, they consider theircase proved when they have merely stated it with vigor andwarmth; they are thoroughly used to being believed, as thatwas part of their fathers'job. A Jew, on the other hand . . . isleast of all used to being believed. Consider Jewish scholarsin this light: All of them have a high reg ard for logic, tha t isfor compelling agreement by force of reaso ns; they know withthat they are bound to win even when they encounter raceand class prejudices and where one does not like to believethem. For nothing is more democratic than logic; it is norespecter of persons and makes no distinction betweencrooked and straight noses. (Notice by the way that Eu rop eowes the Jews no small thanks for making peop le think m orelogically and for establishing cleaner intellectual habits . . .Wherever Jews have won influence, they have taught hu-man beings to make finer distinctions, m ore rigo rous infer-ences, and to write in a m ore lum inous an d cleanly fashion;their task was ever to bring a people "to listen to raison.")The Gay Science, 348 .


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C O N T E N T S

Preface page ixNote on texts and citations xiiChapter 1. Interpreting Nietzsche on truth 11. Th e problem of truth 12. Traditional interpretations: Kaufmann andHeidegger 53. Nontraditional interpretations: the "new

Nietzsche" 114. Sketch of a combined interpretation 215. The role of the Nachlass 25Chapter 2. Nietzsche and theories of truth 291. Nietzsche's commitment to truth ascorrespondence 312. Against the metaphysical correspondencetheory 40

3. Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche 51Chapter 3. Language and truth: Nietzsche' s early denial oftruth 631. Truths as illusions 652. Languag e as m etapho r 693. Represen tationalism and things-in-themselves 77

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V l l l CONTENTS4. The metaphysical correspondence theory in"Truth and Lie" 855. An internal critique of "Truth and Lie" 90Chapter 4. The development of Nietzsche' s later positionon truth 951. The rejection of the thing-in-itself 952. Truth and science in Nietzsche's later works 1033. T he err or of the "true world" 1094. Representationalism in Nietzsche's laterworks 117

Chapter 5. Perspectivism 1271. A neo-Kantian interpretation ofperspectivism 1282. Perspectivism and represen tationalism 1353. Perspectivism and incommensurability 1384. An alternative account of the metaphor ofperspective 1445. O ther interp retation s of perspectivism 150Chapter 6. The ascetic ideal 1591. Nietzsche's opposition to the ascetic ideal 1602. Philosophers and the ascetic ideal 1673. Metaphysics and the ascetic ideal 1714. Truth and the ascetic ideal 1805. Ov ercoming the ascetic ideal 193Chapter 7. The will to power 2051. Will to pow er as metaphysics 2052. The published argument for the world as willto pow er 2123. Philosophy and the doctrine of will to powerin Beyond Good and Evil 2174. The psychology of the will to power and itsrelation to the will to tru th 226Chapter 8. Eternal recurrence 2451. T he irrelevance of the truth of recurrenc e 2472. T he published texts 254

3. Does it matter if we recu r? 2664. Meaning, revenge against life, and theUbermensch 2705. The evaluation of Nietzsche's ideal 277Bibliography 287Index 293


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PREFACE

Nietzsche says much about truth that is interesting and quiteinfluential. As I argue in Chapter 1, it is also problematic andperhaps even self-contradictory. In this study I attempt to makesense of it, and I emphasize aspects of the problem of truth thatbear on Nietzsche's view of the role of philosophy. Th ro ug ho ut Itry to make the best case for what I take him to be saying. Moreaccurately, as far as Nietzsche's texts allow, I avoid attributing tohim positions against which th ere a re obvious objections. As willbe clear from Chapter 3, this approach does not ensure thedefensibility of his claims. I argue that Nietzsche's early positionon truth is vulnerable to fatal objections, although it is the posi-tion that has recently won him disciples and considerable influ-ence. I also argue that Nietzsche himself eventually rejected thisnow influential position and suggest that some of his greatestthinking was called forth by his attem pt to understand what waswrong with it and the source of its hold on him.I will be happy if my work contributes to efforts to show thatNietzsche was a great thinker. Of course, he was much morethan that; he was a great writer. He could do incredible thingswith language, things that most of us may be better off not eventrying to imitate. I barely touch on that aspect of his work andgenius here . While I make no attem pt to repro duce the effect of

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X PREFACEreading Nietzsche, I hope my appro ach shows that one need nottake the life out of his thought by concentrating on arguments,objections, and other truth-related matters. That life should beevident if one gets at Nietzsche's think ing , and at what he has leftfor us to think about. I hope this study also supplies some basisfor appreciating the high compliment that Ernest Jones tells usFreud paid to Nietzsche, that he had a greater self-knowledgethan any man who ever lived, or is ever likely to live.This book began as a chapter on truth that I planned to add tomy dissertation on Nietzsche's critique of morality when I re-vised it for publication. Despite my continuing belief in the im-portan ce of Nietzsche's think ing abou t morality, I found that thematerial on truth soon outgrew my original format and tookover the project. Although this book therefore contains none ofthe material from my dissertation, it has benefited greatly fromthe attention bestowed on its predecessor by the m em bers of mydissertation com mittee at the University of Wisconsin: Ivan Soil,William H. Hay, Robert Ammerman, and Max Baumer. I amvery grateful to them for their criticisms, suggestions, and en-couragem ents. I am also grateful to the m embers of the Philoso-phy Department at the University of California at San Diego forthe oppo rtunity to present to them a chapter of my dissertation.The questions they asked made clear to me the necessity ofreworking the dissertation project in terms of Nietzsche's devel-opment, and the present book carries out the same lesson inrelation to Nietzsche's view of truth.I wrote the first version of the last chapter of this book while Iwas still a graduate student, and am grateful to Claudia Card ofthe University of Wisconsin for her help and encouragementwith that early version. I read that version at Columbia Univer-sity, Indiana University, Iowa State University, and the Universityof Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, and am grateful to the mem-bers of the philosophy departments at these schools for manyhelpful comments and criticisms received on those occasions.

But, above all else, this book bears the stam p of the time I spen tin the Philosophy D epa rtm ent at Columbia University. It was con-ceived and largely written while I was teach ing at Columbia, and Iam very grateful for ideas, insp iration , criticisms, and encourage-ments from many colleagues and students, and for the influenceof countless philosophers who presented colloquia at Columbia.


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PREFACE XIIt would be a po orer book, and in some cases, a very different one ,if I had not been influenced at close range by the thought ofA rth ur Danto, Isaac Levi, Sidney M orgenbesser, and C harles Par-sons, and if I had not had to try to deal with some difficult ques-tions concern ing tru th posed to me by Charles Larm ore and Nor-bert Hornstein. And without many conversations on truth withSue Larson, and great en coura gem ent from Mary Mothersill andHide Ishiguro, I am sure it would not have been written.My colleagues in the Department of Philosophy and Religionat Colgate University provided an especially supportive environ-ment in which to finish the book. I am very grateful for that, andfor their helpful comments on material from Chapters 5 and 8.As will be evident, I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitudeto many Nietzsche scholars whose work has m ade mine possible.I am particularly grateful for the support given me by the com-munity of North Am erican Nietzsche scholars. T he No rth Am eri-can Nietzsche Society gave me the opportunity to try out earlyversions of many of the ideas in this book on audiences of suchscholars, and I have learned much on these occasions. T he earlyversions were published as "On 'Truth and Lie' in the Extra-Moral Sense" in International Studies in Philosophy 16, no . 2 (1984),"Nietzsche's Perspectivist Rhetoric" in International Studies in Phi-losophy 18, no . 2 (1986), and "Nietzsche's D octrines of the Will toPower" in Nietzsche-Studien 12 (1983). I am grateful to the edito rsof these jou rn als for permission to make use of revised versionsof this m aterial in C hap ters 3, 5, and 7.1 am also grateful to Jo hnWilcox and Kenneth Westphal for their lengthy comments onthe m anuscript at various stages of its composition, and to BerndMagnus, Alexander Nehamas, and Richard Schacht for theirgenerous encouragement of the project at times when I mostneeded it.

Finally, I want to thank Raymond Geuss, the editor of theseries, for his indispensable support and comments on the manu-script, and Connie Jones, who has discussed all of its materialwith me over many years and many more walks in RiversidePark.


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N O TE O N TEX TS A N D CI TA TI O N S

In order to minimize footnotes and to eliminate the inconve-nience of endnotes, I have incorporated almost all references tosecondary sources into the text, citing only the author's name(unless it is clear from the context), the page number of thework, and the publication date (unless I cite only one work bythat author). The works cited are listed in the Bibliography.For Nietzsche's works, I have used Sdmtliche Werke. KritischeStudienausgabe in 15 Bdnden, edited by G. Colli and M. Montinari(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980). I generally follow th e excellent transla-tions listed below, and the alterations I have made are usuallyminor. I cite Nietzsche's works by the initials of the ir English titlesand the section number. In the case of "Truth and Lie in theExtra-Moral Sense," I have supplied pag e num bers because of theabsence of a convenient division into sections. I give the page ofthe English translation first, followed by the corresponding pageof Volume 1 of the Studienausgabe. Chapte r 1, section 5, suppliesmy justification for the choice of the specific works on which Ibase my interp retation.I list here the abbreviations used in the text and the works towhich they refer, followed by the publication date of the firstedition. If Nietzsche did not himself publish the work (in the

X l l


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XIV NOTE ON TEXTS AND CITATIONSWP Der Wille zur Macht {The W ill toPower) Notes from the1880's*

Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.New York: Viking, 1968.Z Also Sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 1883-85Translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche.


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I N T E R P R E T I N G N I E T Z S C H EO N T R U T H

Nietzsche's philosophy has recently generated a significantamount of interest and excitement, much of it centered aroundhis position on truth. Considerable hope exists, and much con-viction, that Nietzsche has something important to say abouttruth. This study begins with the problem that confronts any-one with such hopes, namely, that Nietzsche's claims abouttruth seem hopelessly confused and contradictory. This chaptersets out the problem and gives an overview of the four mostinfluential ways in which those sympathetic to Nietzsche havetried to solve it. After explaining why these solutions seem un-satisfactory, it sketches a solution to the problem that will bedefended in the remainder of this book. This solution stressesthe development in Nietzsche's position. It will be argued thatNietzsche's position was contradictory in its early and middleformulations, but that he progressed toward and finally arrivedat a coherent and defensible position in the works of his finaltwo years.

1. The problem of truthNietzsche's position on truth seems to amount to a denial thatany human belief is, or could be, true. He proclaims, for exam-


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2 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYpie, that " tru ths a re illusions we have forgo tten are illusions" (TL84; WL 88 0-1) , that "tru th is the kind of erro r w ithout which acertain kind of being could not live" (WP 493), and that there are"no facts," but "only interpretations" (WP 481). Although theseclearest statements of Nietzsche's denial of truth are all from theNachlass, the works he published contain many statements appar-ently designed to make the same point. He denies, for instance,that we have any organ for knowledge or "tru th" (GS 354), claim-ing that we engage in a "constant falsification of the world bymeans of numbers" (BG 4) and that even physics is "only aninterp retatio n" (BG 14). He suggests that science at its best keepsus in a "simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed andsuitably falsified world" (BG 24) and that the world that con-cerns us is a "fiction" (BG 34). Finally, in his polemic against theascetic ideal (GM I II ), he offers a detailed analysis of the belief intru th as the latest expression of that ideal.Such claims have made Nietzsche, once associated with thepolitical right, a rallying point for the epistemological left - forthose who attack with revolutionary fervor traditional beliefsand attitudes concerning truth, science, philosophy, and theroles of argument and theory. Many assume that Nietzsche hasdemonstrated that there are no facts and no truths, but "onlyinterp retations," or "different perspectives" on reality. It is there-fore appa rently a mistake to attem pt to give the correct interpre-tation of any thing, includ ing , if not especially, of Nietzsche's ownphilosophy. Only the misguided, it seems, will even take Nietz-sche to be offering arg um en ts or theories, since that would makehim captive of the belief in truth that he rejected. His writingscan only be suppo sed to offer a model of what lies on the o the rside of philosophy - the liberated intellect playing joyfully withitself, ra ther than engaged in the ascetic activity of offering argu-ments and theories, or even attempting to say something true.While this view of Nietzsche and truth may be embraced onlyby the most radical of contemporary intellectuals, Nietzsche'sclaims about truth have undoubtedly exerted great influence inmore respectable circles. Richard Rorty, whose recent essays(1982 and 1986) em phasize his agreem ent with Nietzsche's denialof truth, even suggests that we think of the history of twentieth-century Continental philosophy not in terms of the distinctionsand transitions between such movem ents as phenomenology, exis-tentialism, structuralism, an d p ost-structuralism, but as a series of


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 3attempts to come to terms with Nietzsche's claim that truth, likeGod, is dead. Although the history of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy would reveal no comparable Nietzscheaninfluence, striking resemblances between Nietzsche's view oftruth and that of the early Am erican pragmatists have been noted(by Danto , e.g.), as well as resemblances to Wittgenstein and suchcontemporary philosophers as Quine, Sellars, Goodman, andPutnam (by West, e.g.). Furthermore, there can be no questionthat Nietzsche's epistemological and anti-metaphysical viewshave exerted enormous influence on the contemporary intellec-tual scene in both Europe and the United States, perhaps espe-cially am ong literary critics, to such an ex ten t th at h e is plausiblyregarded as "the central figure of postmodern thought in theWest" (West, 242).The problem with this influential view of truth is that it seemsto lead Nietzsche into hopeless self-contradiction. There is, firstof all, the problem of self-reference. If it is supposed to be truethat there is no truth, then there is apparently a truth after all;and if it is not supposed to be true, it seems that we have noreason to take it seriously, that is, accept it or its alleged implica-tions. I shall not at this point consider attempts to meet thisobjection, for even if it can be met, an equally (or even more)important objection would remain. Despite the recent emphasison his claims about truth, few would deny that Nietzsche's ulti-mate im portanc e is connected to what he has to say about values,especially to the challenge he offers to received values. His chal-lenge to received values, and received opinion about values,seems to rest on such claims as the following: that morality is anexpression of resentment and of the negation of life; that lifeitself is will to power; that philosophy, religion, and morality areamong the more refined forms of this will; that Western civiliza-tion is in grave danger from the death of God and the nihilismbound to grow out of it. It is not my concern here to explainexactly how such claims challenge received values, but it seemsclear that they cannot do so unless they are taken to be true.Nietzsche explicitly grounds his denial of morality on the claimthat morality is based on error (D 103), and bases his demandthat the philosopher "take his stand beyond good and evil andleave the illusion of m oral jud gm en t beneath himself" (TI VII, 1)on the claim that moral ju dgm en t involves illusion. But if truth sare illusions, the illusion involved in moral ju dg m en t can hardly


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4 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYgive us reason to abandon it, assuming, as we must, that Nietz-sche does not dem and that we abstain from jud gm en t altogether.Nietzsche's apparent nihilism in regard to truth thus threatensthe coherence of his critique of morality, and of his entirephilosophy insofar as the latter commits Nietzsche to certaintruths while at the same time it denies that there are any truths.Nietzsche's own practice is apparently at odds with his theory.A related inconsistency between theory and practice threatenshis critique of metaphysics. Although his first book, The Birth ofTragedy (1872), seems comm itted to Schopenhauer's metaphysics,Nietzsche's enormous influence on twentieth-century Continen-tal philosophy is inseparab le from the rejection of metaphysics heannounced in Human, All-Too-Human (1878) and developed inlater works. His passionate claims as to the importance of over-coming metaphysics and its often hidden rem nan ts set him ap artfrom most other critics of metaphysics and account for m uch ofhis abid ing influence. Yet his own doctrines of etern al recurrenceand will to power seem obviously "metaphysical" on any reason-able construal of that term . Nietzsche's ma ture philosophy seemsto make claims to metaphysical t ru th while at the same time reject-ing all such claims.

The obvious conclusion to draw is that there is somethingseriously w rong with Nietzsche's philosophy. At the very least, itseems that we must reject either his general claim about truth orthe specific claims (especially regarding values) that have estab-lished him as a thinker to be reckoned with. An interpreter whoholds that Nietzsche has something important to teach us aboutboth truth and values must explain how this is possible in theface of the apparently self-contradictory nature of his positionon truth. Two main strategies seem available: to show that theself-contradiction is only appa ren t, o r to adm it the con tradictionbut to argue that its presence in Nietzsche's work teaches ussomething about truth. We find both of these strategies in theliterature on Nietzsche. But we also find two very different viewsof truth attributed to Nietzsche. Since each of the strategies canbe coupled with either view of truth, we find four basic ap-proaches in dealing with the problems posed by the apparentcontradictions in his position.11. The suggestion is that all interpretations that offer a solution to the problemun der consideration can be situated in relation to the four categories of inter-pretation set up h ere, not tha t each fits neatly into one of them. In particular,


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 52. Traditional interpretations:Kaufmann and Heidegger

Traditional interpretations attribute to Nietzsche the traditionalunderstanding of truth as correspondence to reality, and thebelief that his own views are true in this sense. The two mostimportant traditional interpretations are the empiricist versionadvanced by Kaufmann and defended more recently by Wilcox,and Heidegger's metaphysical version. Twenty years ago, itcould be said that Kaufmann's interpretation was "almost com-pletely dominant in America" (O'Brien, 5), whereas Heidegger'sdominated Continental discussion of Nietzsche. Although thisdominance has ended, the state of Nietzsche interpretation to-day owes much to these two interpretations and has been in-spired in large part by the desire to find an alternative to them.Kaufm ann's strategy is to show that th e contradiction in Nietz-sche's position is merely apparent, that Nietzsche does not denythe existence of truth, and that he does not put forward anymetaphysical theor ies. Taking Socrates as Nietzsche's ideal, Kauf-mann emphasizes those passages in which Nietzsche seems com-mitted to both the existence and the overriding value of truth.He attem pts to explain away Nietzsche's appa ren t denial of tru thas a denial of what Nietzsche called the "true world," the su-persensuous and eternal world of the Platonic forms or theKantian thing-in-itself. Kaufm ann's Nietzsche denies the possibil-ity of transcen den t or m etaphysical tru th, which would be corre-spondence to the way things are in themselves, but affirms theexistence of empirical truth. To affirm the existence of truth issimply to say that some statements, propositions, sentences, orutterances are true. According to Kaufmann's interpretation,then, Nietzsche denies that any metaphysical statements are truebut accepts many empirical statements as true. Kaufmann candeny any inconsistency between Nietzsche's theory and his prac-tice, for he interprets Nietzsche as putting forward his ownviews, including the doctrines of eternal recurrence and will topower, as empirical truths. He stresses Nietzsche's claim that the

two imp ortant recent interpre tations, those of Richard Schacht and A lexanderNehamas, attemp t to combine the advantages of two or more of the interp reta-tions I distinguish, which is also my own approach. I sketch my approach laterin this chapter, and deal with Schacht and Nehamas at length in Chapters 5and 7.


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6 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYeternal recurrence is "the most scientific of all possible hypothe-ses" (WP 55), and interp rets the will to power as an unfo rtunateextension of an empirical hypothesis regarding human motiva-tion (see Chapter 7). Finally, Kaufmann handles the problemposed by Nietzsche's analysis of the faith in truth as an expres-sion of the ascetic ideal by insisting that Nietzsche accepts boththe ascetic ideal and the faith in truth (see Chap ter 6).A nu m ber of factors have made it difficult for recent interpre t-ers to accept Kau fman n's interpre tation. In th e first place, if oneinterprets will to power and eternal recurrence in traditionalterms as straightforw ard claims abou t the n atu re of reality, asclaims that are supposed to correspond to reality - it seems im-plausible to deny their metaphysical character (see Chapters 7and 8). Further, in many passages Nietzsche clearly rejects muchmore than metaphysical truth or the thing-in-itself. He appearsto deny that the re a re even any things and to insist that all of ou rso-called truths are therefore really illusions since they presup-pose, state, or imply the existence of things (Megill, 207 ff.).Kaufmann's interpretation does not therefore seem consistentwith the Nietzschean texts. Its insistence that Nietzsche embracesboth the belief in truth and the ascetic ideal also seems to make itincapable of explaining Nietzsche's belief in the radical characterof his position on truth. From beginning to end, Nietzsche'swritings convey his belief that he is saying something about truththat is of the utmost importance for understanding human lifeand that sets him at odds with the whole philosophical tradition(GM II I, 2 3 -8 , e.g.).Wilcox defends an interpretation that is very close to Kauf-mann's, but actually gives us reason to look for an alternative. Inthe first place, he admits that he cannot explain away all of thepassages in which Nietzsche appears to deny the existence oftruth. He argues that, on balance, we have more evidence thatNietzsche accepts the existence of empirical truths than that herejects all truth. Secondly, although Wilcox agrees with Kauf-mann that much of Nietzsche's apparent denial of truth is only arejection of the "true" world, that is, of metaphysics, he thinksthat it has another source in Nietzsche's view that concepts al-ways falsify reality. I will argue in Chapter 4 that Wilcox heremakes an im por tant con tribution to the und erstan ding of Nietz-sche's position. However, it also gives us reason to reject the view,which Wilcox shares with Kaufmann, that Nietzsche allows for


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 7the possibility of obtaining empirical truth, since such truth isobtainable only by means of concepts. If Nietzsche believes thatconcepts always falsify reality, it is difficult to see how we canexplain away his denial of tru th .Heidegger offers a version of the traditional interpretationinsofar as he insists that Nietzsche's claims about truth presup-pose the correspondence theory of truth (1961, I, 621) and thatthe doctrines of eternal recurrence and will to power are putforward as truths in this traditional sense (I, 621-55). But hisreading is not vulnerable to the objections raised above to Kauf-mann's. In the first place, he rejects an empiricist construal ofthe will to power and the eternal recurrenc e. Although he consid-ers Nietzsche the great critic of metaphysics, he believes thatthese central Nietzschean doctrines are themselves metaphysical,that they are answers to the traditional questions of metaphysicsconce rning th e essence and existence of what is. Secondly, ratherthan attempting to explain away Nietzsche's denial of truth, hepresents it as the ultimate consequence of Nietzsche's acceptanceof the "metaphysical" conception of truth as correspondence toreality (Einstimmigkeit mit dem Wirklichem). Final ly , Heidegger hasperhaps done more than anyone to bring out the radical char-acter of Nietzsche's claims about truth through his attempt toshow their connection to nihilism an d to the m odern "technologi-cal" attitude towards the world.

Yet, Heidegger escapes the difficulties of the empiricist inter-pretation only at the cost of doing n othin g to dissolve the ap par-ent contradictions in Nietzsche's positions on tru th and metaphys-ics. His Nietzsche remains caught in the net of the correspon-dence theory of truth, and of metaphyjsics in general, even whilehe delivers his fatal objections to them. This does not give ussufficient reason to reject Heidegger's interpretation, since hedoes not claim that Nietzsche's position is internally consistent.But it does give us reason to be very careful since Heidegge r hasso little incentive to look for an account that would dissolve theapparent contradictions in Nietzsche's philosophy. His use ofNietzsche's philosophy to support his own depends on interpret-ing it so that Nietzsche's claims about truth and metaphysics areinconsistent with his practice.Heidegger's later philosophy is directed toward a recovery ofthe sense of Being, the acknowledgement of Being as Being.This acknowledgement, he tells us, "means allowing Being to


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8 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYreign in all its questionableness . . . ; it means persevering in thequestion of Being" (II, 338; trs. 201). His early philosophy hadalready insisted that Being had been forgotten or suppressedwithin the metaphysical tradition of previous philosophy. Meta-physics m ight seem to be concerned exclusively with B eing, sinceit asks not about a particular kind of being (or about some aspectof such), but about beings as such, that is, the Being of beings.Heidegger claimed, however, that in their efforts to ascertain theBeing of beings, philosophers have covered up the prior ques-tion as to what Being itself is. They had taken for granted anunderstanding of Being for example, as enduring presence which they failed to recognize as such.Heidegger presents the phenomenological analysis of Beingand Time as preparation for a "fundamental ontology" thatwould provide the. missing account of B eing itself by uncoveringthe original experiences of it that have been covered up in andby the philosophical tradition . Th at this project is abando ned , orat least transfo rm ed, in H eidegger's later philosophy is indicatedby his insistence that "any discussion of 'Being itself must alwaysremain interrogative" (II, 338; trs. 201). Rather than giving anaccount of Being, Heidegger now insists only on keeping alivethe question of Being, which includes prom oting the recognitionthat the question can never be closed, that thinking m ust rem ainopen to the possibility that more primordial or new determina-tions of Being may always be disclosed. Of course, this presup-poses that some determination of Being has been disclosed.Heidegger agrees, claiming that metaphysics is itself the historyof Being, a h istory in which Being discloses itself as withdrawn orconcealed. Through his reading of the history of philosophy asthe history of Being, Heidegger aims at a recovery of the senseor mystery of Being, which is at the very least a sense of a powerthat cannot be brought under human control or domination.Such a recovery would also involve a recovery of the original andnonmetaphysical sense of truth as the unconcealment of Being,and a conception of human beings (Daseiri) as shepherds of themystery of Being, keepers of the house of Being - that is, as oneswhose role it is to let Being be, to let the Being of beings discloseitself, instead of insisting on the domination or mastery of be-ings, in accord with the spirit of technology that Heidegger con-siders the fulfillment of metaphysics.

Since Nietzsche calls Being an "empty fiction" (TI III, 2), he


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE gwould seem m ore likely to consider Heidegger's position nonsen-sical tha n to offer su pp or t for it. Th ings look somewhat different,however, once Nietzsche's positions are taken to be contradictoryin the way Heidegger claims. If the great critic of metaphysicswas himself a metaphysician, something about the nature ofmetaphysics must have escaped him. If Nietzsche's denial oftruth is the ultimate consequence of his acceptance of the corre-spondence theory of truth (I, 622), and yet he cannot refrainfrom presenting his own doctrines as true, we need a differentconception of truth. These points open the door for Heideggerto present his own account of m etaphysics as an explanation forNietzsche's blindness, and his own attitude towards Being andconception of tru th as the direction in which Nietzsche points us.Heideg ger suggests that Nietzsche's blindness concern ing tru thand metaphysics is the blindness to Being characteristic of meta-physicians. Nietzsche's understanding and rejection of meta-physics is itself metaphysical, according to Heidegger, for it ig-nores Being and understands metaphysics instead in terms ofvalues. T ha t is, Nietzsche u nd ers tan ds metaphysics as the accep-tance of a true or transcendent world that devalues this world,and eventually leads to nihilism, when the values protected bymetaphysics are devalued. Nietzsche aims to overcome nihilismby overcoming metaphysics, apparently by means of his doctrinesof the eternal recu rren ce, which rules out a transcenden t world,and of the will to power, which provides the principle for a newvaluation. However, Heidegger insists that these doctrines arethemselves metaphysical since they offer Nietzsche's answer tothe question con cern ing the Being (will to power as the essence,eternal recurrence the mode of existence) of beings. Since onemight defend Nietzsche, as Kau fmann does, by claiming that willto power and eternal re curre nce do not have the features of m eta-physics to which N ietzsche objects - the acceptance of a transcen-dent w orld which devalues this world Heidegger needs a deeperreason for considering Nietzsche's doctrines metaphysical. Heoffers such a reason by claiming that Nietzsche's doctrine of thewill to power reduces Being to the status of a value, and is there-fore p art and parce l of the metaphysics of subjectivity initiated byDescartes.

According to Heidegger, with Descartes the human being orDasein is transfo rm ed into the subject - the substance or underly-ing supp ort, that which lies at the foun dation of beings. Given the


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1O NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYpro ced ure of doubt followed in the first Meditation, the decision asto what is to count as a being comes to rest with human beings:only what can be presented to them as indubitable counts as abeing; only what they can be certain of is true . H um an beings arethus established "in a position of dom inance" in relation to every-thing that is (II , 146; trs. 100). Since Nietzsche attacks Descartes'subject as a fiction of logic, he would hardly seem to be a followerin this regard. According to Heidegger, however, he does followDescartes in that he makes hum an beings the subject or founda-tion of things, the difference being only that the Nietzscheansubject is not a spiritua l ego, but th e body, interp re ted as a cente rof drives and affects, that is, as will to power. Like its Cartesiancounterpart, this Nietzschean subject disposes over the whole ofbeings, providing the "measure for the beingness [Seiendheit] ofevery individual being" (II, i 7 i ; t r s . 121). T he will to power is th eother side of the metaphysical coin of Nietzsche's claims abouttruth. In positing error as the essence of truth (i.e., in claimingthat truth s ar e illusions), according to Heidegger, Nietzsche "fash-ions for the subject an absolute power to enjoin what is true andwhat is false," and thus what is and what is not a being (I I, 199; trs.145). In o the r w ords, Nietzsche rega rds truths as illusions insofaras, in accord with th e do ctrine of the will to power, he denies thatthe Being of things places any limitation on w hat is tru e. Instead ,what allows anyth ing to count as true is that it serves the interestsof the subject, o r is posited as true by the subject in accord with itsessence as will to power. By means of the doctrine of the will topower, therefore, Being is degraded to the status of a value, "acondition of the preservation and enhancement of the will topower" (II, 232; trs. 176).

The doc trine of the will to power thus leads directly not only tothe claim that tru ths are illusions, but also to Nietzsche's character-ization of Being as "an em pty fiction," "the last smoke of evaporat-ing reality" (TI II, 2, 4). This is why Heidegger considers it thecompletion of metaphysics: by reducing Being to a value, thedoctrine of the will to power makes the nihilism of the metaphysi-cal tradition, the assumption that Being itself is nothing, a m atterof principle. Heidegger understands the nihilism Nietzschewanted to overcome - the sense of emptiness and purposeless,the devaluation of the highest values and devotion to frenziedconsumption as a loss of any sense of Being and the consequentfocus on beings, ultimately as the withdrawal of Being itself.Heidegger also regards the feature of metaphysics to which


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 1 1Nietzsche most obviously objected, the acceptance of a transcen-dent world, as due to the withdrawal of Being. Insofar as aquestion is raised concerning the Being of beings, it is presup-posed that beings are not their own foundation, that they are tobe explained in terms of something beyond themselves. But inthe absence of a sense of Being, the request for a ground ofbeings could only lead philosophers to another being, though ithad to be a special kind of being, a transcen den t being - forexample, the Platonic ideas, on the side of essence, and a firstcause, God or absolute spirit, on the side of existence. Accordingto this account, the aspect of metaphysics that Nietzsche mostobviously rejects the acceptance of a transcendent or trueworld - derives from a more fundam ental feature that Nietz-sche's own philosophy exemplifies: the loss of a sense of, thewithdrawal of, Being. According to Heidegger, N ietzsche un de r-stands Being in terms of values because Being has totally with-drawn. And he thus brings to completion metaphysics, the his-tory of Being in its withdrawal.

Already in Being and Time (section 44), Heidegger treats thecorrespondence theory of truth as a symptom of the withdrawal(there, the forgetfulness) of Being , a covering over of the idea oftruth as the unconcealment of Being. He is therefore able totreat it in Nietzsche as part and parcel of the metaphysical under-standing that finds its completion in the denial of Being, whichmakes truth s in the sense of corresp ond ence impossible, in Nietz-sche's terms, "errors" or "illusions."The contradictions in Nietzsche's account of truth and meta-physics thus allow Heidegger to give Nietzsche a place in hishistory of metaphysics, and to view him as pointing the way toHe idegger's own philosophy. Heidegger's is a powerful interpre-tation that has understandably exerted tremendous influence onthose working within the Continental tradition. However, as Iexplain in the next section, interpreters have become increas-ingly unwilling to draw Heideggerian lessons from the apparentcontradictions in Nietzsche's philosophy.3. Nontraditional interpretations:the "new Nietzsche"

The weaknesses in Kaufmann's interpretation and the searchfor an alternative to Heidegger's have contributed to the rise ofthe "new Nietzsche," a Nietzsche with nontraditional ideas con-


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1 2 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYcerning truth. I classify as radical or nontraditional interpreterswho take Nietzsche's claim that truths are illusions to state hisultimate position on truth, and who deny that he accepted thetraditional understanding of truth as correspondence, or re-garded his own doctrines as true in this sense. Like the tradi-tionalist, the radical interpreter has two basic options for deal-ing with the apparent contradiction in Nietzsche's position ontru th : to explain it away or to insist that we can learn somethingfrom it. Danto's analytic approach exemplifies the former op-tion, whereas the deconstructionist readings of Derrida and hisstudents embody the latter.The analytic approach rests on the distinction between theo-ries or conceptions of truth, that is, competing sets of beliefsabout the n atu re of tru th . Th e m ajor op tions available (see Ch ap-ter 2 for a detailed discussion) are the correspondence, prag-matic, and coherence theories of truth. The idea is to dissolvethe apparent contradiction in Nietzsche's position by saying thathe denies the existence of truth in the sense of denying thathuman beliefs correspond to reality, but he affirms the truth ofhis own claims in the sense specified by the pragmatic or coher-ence theories. Danto does remove some of the appearance ofcontradiction in this way (see Chapter 2). His Nietzsche callstruths "illusions" because he denies that our truths correspondto reality, yet he affirms the truth of certain theories and beliefsin the pragmatic sense of truth, which, according to Danto,means only that they "facilitate life" (71). However, even if Nietz-sche is a pragmatist in this sense about empirical theories (seeChapter 2 for reason to doub t this), Danto himself adm its that heis not when it comes to the doctrines of eternal recurrence andwill to power. The se doctr ines , Dan to makes clear, are metaphysi-cal doctrines and are supposed to correspond to reality (96 ff.).Danto makes no a ttem pt to show how this can be reconciled withNietzsche's critique of metaphysics. Danto's interpretation thusseems to warrant Rorty's conclusion that "James and Nietzschemade parallel criticism of nineteenth-century thought," but that"James' version is preferab le, for it avoids the 'metaphysical' ele-ments in Nietzsche which Heidegger criticizes, and, for that mat-ter, the 'metaphysical' elemen ts in Heidegg er which Derrida criti-cizes" (1982 , xviii).

Bernd Magnus has done more than any other proponent ofthe analytic strategy to avoid construing Nietzsche as a metaphy-


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 1 3sician. Inte rpr etin g the eternal re curren ce as an imperative anda myth (see Chapter 8), and the will to power as a meta-philosophical doctrine about the nature of philosophy andtheory, Magnus avoids construing either as a metaphysical doc-trine. But he admits that his account does not remove all app ear-ance of contradiction, since Nietzsche would still have to regardthe will to power as simply true (1978, 201)-that is, as corre-sponding to the nature of philosophy and theory. Since thisseems inconsistent with Nietzsche's denial of truth, the analyticstrategy seems unable to explain away the apparent contradic-tions in his position.The deconstructionist strategy admits the contradictions, butdenies that they pose a problem . Derrida formulates the basis forthis strategy as follows:

There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics inorder to attack metaphysics. We have no language no syntaxand no lexicon - which is alien to that history [of metaphysics]; wecannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not al-ready slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulationof precisely what it seeks to contest (1978, 280).

Derrida here responds to Heidegger's interpretation. If meta-physical assum ptions ar e built into our g ram m ar and vocabulary,and we canno t therefo re utter a single proposition w ithout pre-supposing them, Nietzsche could not reject metaphysics withoutat the sam e time b eing caug ht up in it. Th is implies that it is onlyto be expected that Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics wouldinvolve him in self-contradiction, but that this does not indicatehis failure to think deeply enough about the nature of metaphys-ics, or the need to go beyond Nietzsche to Heidegger.Equating Nietzsche's "critique of metaphysics" with "the cri-tique of the concepts of Being and truth" (1978, 280), Derridaevidently thinks Nietzsche criticizes as metaphysical any beliefthat is presented as the truth or that attributes to the world astable being or presence. Since this seems to make metaphysicscoextensive with rational-discursive thought in general, it seemsclear why Nietzsche could not simply reject or abandon meta-physics. T he idea seems to be that the world is a ceaseless flux ofbecoming in which nothing is anything long enough to allowtrue beliefs abou t it. Tha t metaphysics is built into our language


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1 4 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYthus amounts to the claim that our language is not suitable forportray ing this Heric litean w orld, tha t it always introduces stabil-ity and the presumption of truth. But why not conclude, then,that Nietzsche was simply confused when he tried to reject m eta-physics, that we are simply stuck with metaphysics in the wid-ened sense in which the term is used here? Deconstructionistsresp ond tha t Nietzsche's writings show us that we can reject m eta-physics, by undermining it from within.Paul de Man has offered one of the m ost persuasive accountsof how Nietzsche can consistently reject metaphysics by decon-structing it, subverting it from within.2 He seems to rely on animplicit distinction between what a statem ent literally asserts andwhat it does or shows. We find in Nietzsche's writings statem entswith obvious metaphysical content, and if we are only concernedwith what is literally asserted, we must interpret Nietzsche as ametaphysician who was unable to rem ain consistent with his owncritique of metaphysics. If we concentrate instead on what isbeing done by means of language, de Man suggests, we discoverthat these metaphysical statements actually underm ine their ownauthority and reveal their own inadequacy. Statements are thusable to show what they cannot literally assert without falling intoself-contradiction: for example, that all language is metaphorical(based in rhetoric rather than logic) and that statements aretherefore unable to correspond to anything nonlinguistic (or, inNietzsche's terminology, are "illusions"), contrary to what meta-physics would require (see Chapter 3). De Man seems to thinkthat we can show the limits of rational-discursive thought byrevealing its origin in rhetoric or metaphor, but that this origincannot simply be asserted because the assertion would presup-pose the validity or autonomy of rational-discursive thought.The apparent contradictions between Nietzsche's theory andpractice of metaphysics do not, the refo re, reveal any inadequacyin his philosophy, since only by means of such contradictions canthe illusions of metaphysics be exhibited.

But we should not take this to mean that Nietzsche, or we2. See Clark, 1987, for an attempt to show the plausibility of de Man's approach,as well as reasons for rejecting it, in the case of BT. My forthcoming paper,"Language and Deconstruction," attempts to strengthen the case against deMan's deconstructive appro ach by combining the argum ent of the 1987 pap erwith the one I give against de Man's interpretation of TL in Chapter T hre e ofthis study.


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 15ourselves, can th erefore possess the t ru th . If we could, N ietzschewould be wrong when he claims that truths are illusions. AndNietzsche's own situation would once again be inconsistent withhis assertions: he would possess the truth while claiming that weare all caught in error. To avoid thereby rendering Nietzsche'sphilosophy inconsistent, de Man insists that Nietzsche remainscaught in the same err or s he exposed. Nietzsche himself inevita-bly claims to possess the truth (including, I presume, when heclaims that truth s are illusions). His own work therefo re remainssteeped in the errors it denounces, but it thereby remains inter-nally consistent. Thus, according to de Man, the "allegory oferrors" we find in Nietzsche's writings is "the very model ofphilosophical rig or" (118).Sarah Kofman, also writing under Derrida's influence, sug-gests a way of m aking Nietzsche's rejection of m etaphysics consis-tent with his practice without accusing him of error when shedenies that his apparently metaphysical doctrines are supposedto be true. She denies metaphysical status to the doctrine of thewill to power, for instance, on the grounds that it is not designedto give us "the t ru th of Being" (136) but is instead a metaphoricalexpression, based on a political model, of a method of dealingwith in terpreta tions (1367), one which treats them as symptom sof instincts, sets of values, and, finally, of health or illness. Thedoctrine of the will to pow er is a hypothesis about interp retation sand is therefore itself an interpretation rather than the assertionof a truth. Yet we cannot consider it merely "one hypothesisam ong oth ers" (203) because Nietzsche clearly regard s it as supe-rior to other interpretations or hypotheses. But according toKofman, this is not because it represents the truth, b ut because itpermits the greatest "enrichment and embellishment of life"(202). The will to power is therefore "not a revelation but ajustification of Being" (201), in the sense that it affirms life in itsfullness, that is, in the multiplicity of its possible interpretations.It does this by allowing every interpretation its own place andjustification in the overall economy of life, as the expression ofsome particular set of instincts or constellation of life. Kofmancan therefore say that Nietzsche's preference for the hypothesisof the will to power is based on his belief tha t it affirms life and isindicative of the fullness of life, ju st as she has earlier said thisabout his preference for the m etaphorical over the "demo nstra-tive" (rational-discursive) style:


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l 6 NIETZSCHE ON TRU TH AND PHILOSOPHYthe metaphorical style indicates the fullness of life, just as the"demonstrative" style indicates its poverty. To deliberately usemetaphor is to affirm life, in the same way that favoring conceptsreveals a will to no thingness , an adh erence to the ascetic ideal (33;trs. 210).

On Kofman's interpretation, Nietzsche's practice, his use of thewill to power, is consistent with his theory that there are notruths but only interpretations precisely because Nietzsche doesnot regard it as a truth. And Kofman makes this plausible, atleast initially, because she supplies a reason Nietzsche would havefor preferring the will to power to other interpretations withoutcommitting him to its truth. On her account, it is not a privilegedhypothesis - it's just like all the oth ers, a symptom of a set ofinstincts, values, and ultimately, health or illness, rather than arevelation of Being. But this does not deprive Nietzsche of abasis for preferring it to other interpretations, because he pre-fers life-affirming interp retation s, ones expressing health rath erthan illness.The re are , however, problem s with Kofman's account. As Da-vid Hoy (1981) has argued, it makes the will to power a second-order principle that explains and demands the multiplication offirst-order interpretations, but evidently rules out any way ofdistinguishing between better and worse first-order interpreta-tions. According to Kofman, Nietzsche prefers the will to powerbecause it calls for the acceptance and multiplication of all inter-pretations and thereby affirms life, unlike interpretations thatimpoverish life by ruling out other interpretations. But if Nietz-sche's affirmation of life requ ires him to accept all first-orderinterpretations, it is inconsistent with preferring one first-orderinterpretation to any other, for example, an interpretation ofnihilism or of morality. Yet, he clearly prefers the inte rpretationsof nihilism and depression offered in GM to the religious inter-pretations (in terms of sin) of the same phenomena.Kofman might insist tha t Nietzsche can consistently prefer onefirst-order interpretation to another, namely, as long as he doesso in terms of health rather than truth. But, on her account,Nietzsche's only basis for regarding an interpretation as healthyappears to be that it encou rages th e multiplication of in terpre ta-tions. Kofman might respond that an interpretation is healthy ifit is life-affirming. But th e ju dg m en t that one in terpre tation is


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 1 7m ore life-affirming than a no ther seems to requ ire for its justifica-tion claims p resen ted no t simply as life-affirming, bu t also astrue. Nietzsche regards his own philosophy as life-affirming be-cause he believes it prom otes th e affirmation of life, the ability tofind value in hu m an life (C hap ter 8 discusses this at length). Butthis interpretation of his philosophy seems to rest upon manyclaims he rega rds as tru e. Am ong these, I will arg ue later (Chap-ters 7 and 8) are claims about depression and the ability to affirmlife. He cannot prefer his own claims about the psychologicalprerequisites for affirming life simply on the grounds that theyare life-affirming, since unless he knows the tru th about what isrequired for the affirmation of life, he can have no basis forconsidering an interpretation more life-affirming than another.Th ere fo re, Kofman gives us no basis for denying what otherwiseseems obvious: that Nietzsche regarded, for instance, his inter-pretation of depression in terms of the will to power not only asm ore life-affirming tha n an account in terms of sin, bu t also astruer. In this (and in many other cases), the will to power is usedto offer a first-order interp reta tion that competes with and th ere-fore rules out other such interpretations rather than demandingthe proliferation of interpretations.

A final problem is that Kofman evidently puts forward herown interpretation as true of Nietzsche's philosophy, for exam-ple, that Nietzsche's preference for the will to power hypothesisis based on the belief that it affirms and justifies life, not that itrepresents the truth about it. But if we can have a correct inter-pretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, why not a correct account ofBeing or life? If there is a truth about Nietzsche's philosophy,why not abou t the rest of the w orld? De Man seems more success-ful with this problem. As Nietzsche remains caught in the errorshe denounces, de Man suggests that his own blindness (whichwould certainly include th e assumption that he has the truth) willbe revealed by other interpreters, whose errors will need to beexposed by still others.D errida offers a somew hat different solution to the same prob -lems when he treats all of Nietzsche's writings on a par with thefollowing sentence included in Nietzsche's Nachlass: " 'I have for-gotten my umbrella.' " Since there is no context to provide helpin interpreting this fragment, Derrida can plausibly concludethat its meaning is undecidable, and that it is undecidablewhether it has any (other than surface) meaning. But he also


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l 8 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYtreats this fragment as a model for the totality of Nietzsche'swritings (1979, 133). On the interpretation Derrida thereby sug-gests, Nietzsche's philosophy remains consistent with his denialof truth since we have no way of deciding what the tru th about itis, or even whether there is any truth about it. In the latter case,Nietzsche's writings would be what Derrida describes elsewhereas "the joyo us affirmation of the play of the world and the inno-cence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs withoutfault, without truth" (1978, 292). Finally, Derrida himself re-mains faithful to Nietzsche's denial of truth since he suggeststhat w hat he himself is saying is undecidab le - and that the remay be no true interpretation of it.But even if it suggests how Nietzsche and Derrida can remainconsistent with Nietzsche's denial of truth, Derrida's fragmentseems a bad model for the interpretation of Nietzsche's pub-lished writings. Unlike a single sentence cut off from any connec-tion to others, each section of Nietzsche's published works isembedded in a very rich context constituted by other sections ofthe same work, and, usually, by earlier and later works. Thiscontext provides a basis for checking interpretations that is com-pletely missing for Derrida's umbrella fragment. Derrida insiststhat no m atter how far we have carried out a conscientious inter-pretation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the totality ofNietzsche's writings might be of the type "I have forgotten myum brella" (1979, 133)- If this is true , it is because no m atter howgood our interpretation, we cannot have the kind of certaintyDescartes demanded concerning its truth. But we can find inNietzsche's writings strong reason to deny the hypothesis thatthe totality is of the type "I have forgotten my umbrella." Adenial of certainty rules out neither the possibility of truth, northe right to claim one has discovered it (see Chapter 2).

Some will think that I am missing the point in worrying aboutthe truth of the undecidability thesis, that the appropriate ques-tion concerns its value rather than its truth (e.g., Draine, 434).Derrida would probably base the value of the undecidabilitythesis on the same grounds Kofman offers in support of the willto pow er: that it offers us gre ate r freedom to play with the text -as exemplified, for instance, by his own very playful readings ofNietzsche in Spurs - and encouragement to produce readingsand misreadings that will give rise to more of the same, therebykeeping the gam e of inte rpre tation alive. I see two serious prob-


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 1 9lems with this. In the first place, it is not at all clear that theundecidability thesis makes a gre ater contribu tion to the gam e ofinterpretation than would the reverse belief. New generationsalways seem to come up with new interpretations, despite their"belief in truth," and the motivation to offer new interpretationsmay well depend on the belief that they are closer to the truththan previous ones.Secondly, even if the proliferation of playful interpretations(ones unconcerned with truth) would be encouraged by theundecidability thesis, we would be left with the question as towhy playing with the text is more valuable than attempting todiscover the truth about it. The assumption as to the greatervalue of playful interpretation rests to a large extent, I believe,on the acceptance of Nietzsche's critique of the belief in truth asan expression of the ascetic ideal (see Chapter 6), which he con-siders a life-negating ideal that threatens the human race withnihilism. Those attracted to Derrida's undecidability thesis andplayful interpretations seem to assume that they reform intellec-tual practice in the manner demanded by Nietzsche's critique ofthe belief in truth as an expression of the ascetic ideal. Playingwith the text is supposed to be an unascetic or anti-ascetic activ-ity, the opposite of looking for the truth, or pretending to havefound it. Thus Derrida's abundant use of erotic elements andimagery in his playful interpretations of Nietzsche, for the eroticseems opposed to the ascetic.

I believe that this is the new Nietzscheans' underlying objec-tion to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche: that it is tooascetic, and takes insufficient account of both the playful ele-ments in Nietzsche and of his critique of the ascetic ideal. Underthe influence of Heidegger, these interpreters have discoveredthat Nietzsche's claims about metaphysics and the belief in truthcapture what is wrong with previous philosophy, and, in somecases, what is amiss in Western civilization. But they regardHeidegger's idea of letting Being be or becoming shepherds ofBeing his vision of those w ho have left m etaphysics behind andwith it the obsession with mastery an d technology th at drives ou rcivilization - as too ascetic a resp onse, and prom ote as the ir alter-native the more Nietzschean vision of playing with the text in-stead of attempting to discover the truth about it (e.g., Derrida,1978, 278-93; 1982, 109-36).There is, then, a great deal at stake in the opposition to


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2O NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYHeidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. In their playful, nonar-gumentative, often erotic and outrageous interpretations ofNietzsche, many of the new Nietzscheans suppose that they offera model for a better, less ascetic, and there fore m ore Nietzscheanresponse th an the one H eidegge r offers to the problems of West-ern civilization and for an affirmative attitude toward life thatthey think may be our only chance to keep from extinguishinglife on earth altogether. However, if my understanding of itsund erlying assum ptions is correct, th eir position is vulnerable tothe same objections I have already raised against Kofman. Itpresupposes, in the first place, that they have interpreted cor-rectly N ietzsche's claims about th e ascetic ideal, its relation to theproblems of Western civilization, and its implications regardingthe reform of intellectual practice; and, in the second, that Nietz-sche's claims concernin g the ascetic ideal, its relation to the decayof Western civilization and to the belief in truth and intellectualpractice, are tr ue . Only on the basis of these presuppositions canthe deconstructionists explain Nietzsche's (and their own) beliefin the importance of his attacks on truth and metaphysics. Evenif it is possible to avoid making any claim to truth for their owninterpretations or for Nietzsche's claims, it would be at the costof depriving both of their interest and importance.

The same claim can plausibly be made of de Man's interpreta-tion. In line with the rest of his interpretation, de Man deniesthat there is any progress from blindness to insight (or truth)over the course of Nietzsche's writings, insisting (118) that theirstructure "resembles the endlessly repeated gesture of the artist"Nietzsche himself described as "one who does not learn fromexperience and always falls again in the same ditch" (TL 91, WL890). But then what is the value or importance of the kind ofintellectual activity in which Nietzsche engages? I believe de Manthinks th at Nietzsche's practice can be life-affirming only if hiswritings repeat the same errors rather than making progresstoward truth. In part, at least, this is because Nietzsche analyzesboth the desire for an ultimate end and the desire for truth asexpressions of the ascetic ideal (see Chapter 6), and characterizesthe eternal recurrence as the highest formula for the affirmationof life (see Chapter 8). But if these considerations underlie hisinterpretation , d e M an is presup posing both that the re is a tru thabout Nietzsche's writings and that they teach us som ething tru e.I do not therefore believe that the deconstructionists have of-


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 2 1fered a convincing alternative to Heidegger's interpretation ofNietzsche. Although I agree that Heidegger does not take suffi-cient account of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal and thatthe lessons he would have us draw from Nietzsche are too ascetic,I do not see how these charges can be made openly without admit-ting that sometimes, at least, N ietzsche is m aking o rdina ry asser-tions, that is, presenting something as the truth and not merelyfor the p urpo se of contradicting or deconstructing it. It has ther e-fore not been shown how one can escape the implication ofHeidegger's interpretation: that Nietzsche's philosophy is contra-dictory on the topic of truth in a way that shows the need to gobeyond him . An d for anyone w ho does not find H eidegger's phi-losophy plausible, the deconstructionists have not even shownthat Nietzsche's claims about truth are worth taking seriously.

4. Sketch o f a combined interpretationAlthough my own approach to Nietzsche differs greatly fromthe new N ietzscheans', it follows in the ir footsteps in a num ber ofways. It is, to begin with, another attempt to contribute to thecontinuing debate between Nietzsche and Heidegger and an-other attempt to defend Nietzsche against Heidegger. I will ar-gue that Nietzsche's ultimate position on truth and metaphysicsis defensible and coherent, and that it is not undermined by hisown practice. Unlike the deconstructionists, I separate sharplyNietzsche's critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth. Iargue that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually over-comes it in his own work, but that he ultimately affirms theexistence of truths, and therefore does not undermine his owntheory when he claims truth for his own positions.In this defense of Nietzsche, I attempt to combine the advan-tages of the inte rpretatio ns discussed above. My general strategyfor rendering Nietzsche's mature position on truth consistentwith his practice follows Kaufmann and Wilcox. I take Nietzscheto reject the existence of metaphysical tru th - corre spondence tothe thing-in-itself but not truth itself. This allows Nietzsche toput forward as truths the kind of claims about history, philoso-phy, the ascetic ideal, and the affirmation of life that can givehim the claim on our interest that the new Nietzscheans think hedeserves. To defend this strategy, however, I must explain thefollowing better than Kaufmann did: 1) the passages in which


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2 2 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYNietzsche claims to deny all truth, 2) Nietzsche's belief in theradical character and importance of his claims about truth, and3) the compatibility between Nietzsche's critique of metaphysicsand his doctrines of eternal recurrence and will to power. Forhelp with these issues, I make use of elements suggested bynontraditional in terpreters.My proposed solution to the first problem involves payingcloser attention than previous interpreters to the development inNietzsche's position on truth . It also makes use of Danto's distinc-tion between different theories of truth. The development ofthis distinction in Chapter 2 provides much of the philosophicalbasis for my interp retatio n and allows me to argue in later chap-ters that when Nietzsche rejects metaphysical truth in his earlyand middle works, he rejects not merely a kind of truth, buttruth itself. Th is is because he accepts a theory of tru th such thatall truth is metaphysical, that is, is correspondence to things asthey are in themselves. In Chapter 3, I show that Nietzsche'searly denial of truth results from his acceptance of this meta-physical corre spo ndence theory, the conception of truth as corre-spondence to the thing-in-itself. I also argue that Nietzsche'searly position on truth was internally inconsistent and that hehad reason to reject it in his later works. In Chapter 4,1 explainthat he is nevertheless forced to retain his early metaphysicalconception of truth in works up to and including Beyond Goodand Evil because of his continued acceptance of a representa-tional view of knowledge. This explains one of the factors thatotherwise counts against Kaufmann's interpretation: that Nietz-sche continued his denial of truth even in works in which herejects as incoherent the very idea of the thing-in-itself. I arg uethat without the thing-in-itself, he has no basis for denying tru th ,but that he recognizes this clearly only after Beyond Good and E vil.This explains why he continued to deny truth when he had lostall basis for doing so and why there are no signs of such a denialin the books after Beyond Good and Evil. In Chapter 5, I arguethat Nietzsche's mature perspectivism gives him an alternative to

the representational model of knowing and thereby allows himto affirm the existence of truth while denying metaphysicaltruth.If I seem to be saying that what appears as radical in Nietz-sche's position on tr uth is actually mistaken or confused and thatit disappears from his later philosophy, this is in fact what I


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 2 3believe about much of what has generated the greatest amountof recent excitement about Nietzsche. But I agree that even inhis late works, Nietzsche writes as if his position on truth isradical (in the sense of setting him apart from others in thephilosophical tradition) and important. If he has guessed anyriddles, he suggests, it is in his analysis of the belief in truth asthe latest expression of the ascetic ideal (GM III, 24). In Chapter6, I therefore attempt to account for the radical character andimportance of Nietzsche's later position on truth (and thus tosolve the second problem listed above) in terms of his analysis ofthe relation between metaphysics, truth, philosophy, and the as-cetic idea l.As I interpret him, Nietzsche rejects metaphysics not simplybecause it lacks truth, but because it expresses the nihilistic as-cetic ideal. In rejecting metaphysical truth and the thing-in-itself, therefore, he rejects not merely a theory of truth, but alsoa life-devaluing ideal and set of valuations that he claims consti-tute a threat to human life. This is why Nietzsche still screams atus to the end to pay attention to what he has to say about truth.Not because he thinks the re is no tru th, b ut because if we under-stand why philosophers have been caught up in the dream ofmetaphysical truth, we understand something he thinks impor-tant for our future. In fact, I will argue that according to Nietz-sche's analysis of the ascetic ideal, his own earlier denial of tru this one of its expressions. If my analysis is correc t, the new N ietz-scheans are still too caught up in what Nietzsche later rejected asan expression of the ascetic ideal. According to this analysis, thedenial of truth, not its affirmation, is life-devaluing or ascetic.The Nietzschean ideal of affirmation does not requ ire us to aban-don logic, argument, or the commitment to truth, nor to em-brace contradiction or metaphor as the only cognitive modes.

However, when Nietzsche analyzes the "belief in tru th" as "thelatest expression of the ascetic ideal," he cannot mean the belief inmetaphysical truth, for he has already rejected metaphysics as anearlier expression of the ascetic ideal. I interpret him as claimingthat the com m itmen t to truth - which his own work exemplifies,and which has led to atheism and the denial of metaphysics - isitself the latest expression of the ascetic ideal. The radical char-acter of Nietzsche's th ou gh t is also evident here, when he so consis-tently applies his analysis of the philosophical tradition to his ownwork. I will argu e, however, that his analysis requ ires him to aban-


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2 4 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYdon neither his belief in the existence of truth, nor his commit-ment to truth. T h e upshot of his analysis is instead that we need anew ideal, that philosophers must supply and come to philoso-phize in the nam e of a new idea l, an alternative to the ascetic ideal.My. solution to the third problem how to account for thedoctrines of eternal recurrence and will to power in the light ofNietzsche's rejection of metaphysics borrows once again fromthe nontraditionalists. I admit that the doctrines in questionwould have to be interpreted as metaphysical if they are putforward as truths - if Nietzsche asserts that the world is will topower r ecur rin g eternally in its exact configurations. But I denythat Nietzsche asserts this, and, therefore, that these "doctrines"are supposed to correspond to reality. I think we can learn fromradical interpreters to read Nietzsche better, to recognize themasks he uses, and to see that he is not always doing somethingas straightforward and traditional as making assertions or de-fending philosophical claims.

Two im por tant recent inte rpre ters (Nehamas, 1985, and Mag-nus, 1988) who have learned such lessons from the nontradi-tionalists use them to deny that Nietzsche offers us an ideal (seeChapter 6). I argue, to the contrary, that learning to read Nietz-sche better allows us to recognize that he defends the doctrinesof eternal recurrence and will to power not on the grounds oftheir truth, but rather on the grounds that they offer a newideal, the needed alternative to the ascetic ideal (see Chapters 7and 8). W hat m akes them able to offer this new ideal is, at least inpart, that they a re life-affirming. Bu t it would be a mistake toextend this kind of interpretation to all of Nietzsche's claims, tosuppose tha t N ietzsche's justification for his positions is alwaysthat they are life-affirming, and never th at they are tru e. For theclaim tha t these doctrin es a re life-affirming is itself supp osed tobe true, and it is accepted by Nietzsche on the basis of otheralleged truths.Despite my heavy borrowings from their approaches, manynontraditionalists will consider my interpretation of Nietzschetoo concerned with traditional questions and argumentativeforms of persu asion, and will accuse me of "betray ing the new bycloaking it in the garb of the old" (Zanardi, 69). But th e real issuebetween radical interpretations and my combined app roach con-cerns what actually is new in Nietzsche's thought, and what is abetrayal of it. If I am correct, the nontraditionalists have not


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 2 5caught up with Nietzsche, and are betraying the self-analysis andinsight of his later thought by their emphasis on early positionshe himself overcame and considered expressions of the asceticideal. T he only way to decide between these com peting in terp re-tations, as far as I can see, is in terms of the kind of textual andphilosophical considerations I put forward in the rest of thisbook.

5. The role of the NachlassMost interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy rely heavily onthe notes and fragments that m ake up his Nachlass, especially onthose collected by Nietzsche's sister and others under the title ofThe W ill to Power. Some assume, following Heidegger, that theNachlass is sup erio r to the books Nietzsche published as a sourceof his final philosophy, whereas others seem to agree with Der-rida's suggestion that the two sources are of equal value. I as-sume, to the contrary, following K aufmann, Alderm an, and Mag-nus, that Nietzsche's published writings (the books he publishedor prepared for publication, as in the cases of The Antichrist andEcce Homo) are far superior sources of his philosophy, and I relyon them almost exclusively for my interpretation.Kaufmann argued for the relative importance of the pub-lished writings on the grounds that they are surely more reliableindicators of what Nietzsche believed th an are notebooks contain-ing much that he rejected and nothing he specifically approvedfor publication. Magnus has recently added a persuasive argu-m ent tha t by the end of 1888, Nietzsche had given up any inten-tion of publishing a work called, or bearing any resemblance to,The Will to Power, and that the work he earlier planned to publishun de r tha t title is very different from the one of which in terp ret-ers m ake such use (1988 , 21835). M agnus poin ts out tha t Kauf-mann himself relied heavily on The Will to Power and argues thathe would have had little basis for interpreting the eternal recur-rence and will to power as truths about the universe if he hadnot.Th ose wishing to justify use of the Nachlass might respond tothese arguments by agreeing that the published writings are asuperior basis for the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy,although insisting that the unpublished writings can be usedwhen the published ones do no t tell us enough . O r they may insist


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2 6 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYthat because the task is to interpret a body of texts, and the au-thor's inten tions have no privileged status when it comes to decid-ing which are the important ones, Kaufmann and Magnus fail toshow why we should em phasize the published w orks. I thereforeoffer two further reasons for greater restraint in the use of theNachlass. In the first place, it seems a good idea to hold off on theuse of the Nachlass as long as possible since the published writingsprovide much more of a context for specific passages and there-fore many more checks on the accuracy of interpretations.Kuenzli's view (106) seems plausible, that in terprete rs have reliedso heavily on the Nachlass precisely because they "could qu ite eas-ily reproduce their own self-reflection in these rearrangeablenotes. The labyrinthians have found their labyrinth, the system-atizers their system." The mass of material combined with thepaucity of order and arrangement prevent the Nachlass from of-fering the many checks on interpretations provided by the pub-lished works. Th e latter may be used in the same way, of course -as notes or fragments with no context that need be taken intoconsideration and this is often done, as Kaufmann never tiredof complain ing. Bu t I find it difficult to see how anyone who didnot place high value on the Nachlass could find this a plausibleprocedure.

A second reason for confining attention largely to the pub-lished works (as Alderman [6] also suggests) is philosophical. Ibelieve that where Nietzsche's notes suggest a position differentfrom that suggested by the published writings, it is usually aphilosophically weaker one. I obviously cannot argue for such alarge claim in advance of my interpretation. This whole studyattempts to supply part of what is necessary by defending onboth philosophical and textual grounds an interpretation of thetexts Nietzsche actually published. I therefore give the Nachlass avery secondary status, using it only when it provides the founda-tion for an interpretation against which I am arguing or when ithelps to support an interpretation of a specific passage in thepublished writings for which the latter also provide evidence(e.g., my interpretation of GS 354 in Chapter 4, section 4). Itmay be that Nietzsche's notes should not be relegated to thissecondary status. However, we can determine this only if wehave an interpretation of Nietzsche's books with which to com-pare ones that give the Nachlass equal or superior status. I at-tempt only the first task here. But if I succeed in making a


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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE 2 7convincing case for the claim that there is a development to adefensible and consistent position in Nietzsche's published writ-ings, the plausibility of g ran ting equal or superior status to Nietz-sche's notes should be greatly lessened.


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N IE T Z S C H E A N D T H E O R IE SO F T R U T H

As my first chapter suggests, much of the disagreement regard-ing Nietzsche's position on truth stems from differences in thephilosophical views of his interpreters. Heidegger provides onlythe most obvious example. Philosophical views affect not onlythe texts interpreters draw from, but also the way in which theyinterpret them. Finding the nihilism with which they sympathizein Nietzsche's early works and the Nachlass, nontraditionalistsinterpret his later books in terms of it. Those with more tradi-tional sympathies, on the other hand, can find in Nietzsche'slater work a commitment to both the existence and value oftruth, and therefore minimize the importance of the Nachlass.There is nothing regrettable about this situation. Reasonableinterp retatio n clearly dem ands that we attribu te to a text the bestposition compatible with the relevant evidence about its mean-ing. But only what the interpreter takes to be true or reasonablecan function as the stan dard for the best position.1 Appeal to theinterpreter's own standards will be necessary not only wheni. Davidson argues for a much more radical principle of charity, namely, thatinterpretation can take place only if we regard most of the beliefs of theperson being interpreted as true. For philosophical texts, this may not benecessary, because usually only beliefs that are "u p for grabs," i.e., that ar e notamong the "most" we must consider true, are u nd er consideration.


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3 0 NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHYthere are two equally plausible interpretations of a given text,but also for the purpose of selecting which texts to interpret orconsider as evidence. No interpretation can take explicitly intoaccount every preserved sentence Nietzsche wrote. Interpreterscan choose passages to consider in terms of their centrality toNietzsche's main points, of course, and should also consider pas-sages that appear to conflict with their interpretations. But thismeans tha t the choice of passages upon which to base an inte rpre-tation is informed by what one takes to be reasonable, if notcorrect, positions on questions dealt with in the text.2

Unfortunately, Nietzsche's interpreter s too often confine them -selves to assembling passages to supp ort a particular interp reta-tion and fail to make explicit the philosophical commitments thatmotivate the selection and interpretation of these passages. Al-thou gh we may not be able to make all of our principles explicit,adequate evaluation of interpretations and the existence ofproduc tive - or even meaningful - disagreem ent am ong inter-preters seems impossible without efforts to make explicit thephilosophical comm itments underly ing interp retations (cf. West-phal, 343-4)-In this chapter I therefore endeavor to make explicit the posi-tion on truth I consider the m ost defensible one we can attributeto Nietzsche, given certain general and largely uncontroversialaspects of his philosophy. My considerations center around thecorrespon dence theory of truth, which three of the four interpre-tations discussed in Chapter 1 claim N ietzsche rejects or showswhy we should reject. I argue that we can defend Nietzsche'sposition (his apparent denial of truth) only if we distinguish a2. I take a major principle of selection for relevant passages to be that theycohere so as to suggest a position on some issue that the interpreter findsworthy of our serious consideration either because it seems reasonable andmay indeed be a correct account, or because it is very different from our ownviews, but not easy to combat, and therefore may force a rethinking of theseviews, or because it seems obviously wrong, but well worth combating for anynum ber of reasons. Th er e may be many other bases for finding a view worthyof serious consideration - and different bases may, of course, be combined, as

in Heidegger's Nietzsche but it seems that they must all involve some evalua-tion of the position in relation to what one takes to be at least reasonable, andperhaps correct, answers to the relevant questions. In the best cases, one'sbeliefs will be chang ed thro ug h one's interaction w ith the text and the positionone find s in it, but this seems most likely to hap pen (given that one is interp ret-ing a rich and important text) precisely when one self-consciously uses asprinciples of selection and interpretation one's own beliefs concerning theissues with which the text deals.


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THEORIES OF TRUTH 3 1metaphysical from a common sense version of the correspon-dence theory and take him to reject only the former. This givesus what I call a neo-Kan tian un de rsta nd ing of truth, which is theconception I attribute to Nietzsche on textual grounds in theremainder of this study.The first section below argues that Nietzsche must accept thecommon sense version of the correspondence theory, the secondsection uses contem porary discussions of realism to formulate themetaphysical version of the theory he coul

clark nietzsche_on_truth_and_philosophy capitulo sobre el perspectivismo

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