cleaver v mutual reserve

1Q. B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 147

disputes to arbitration. This, however, is not a higher interpre- 1891 tation than was necessarily put on the language of the old Act, BAKEB under which it was the universal practice to refer these cases, v * ' m , and does not mean that in all cases the written agreement to FlRE AND

. . . LlL''E ASSUIt-refer must be signed by both parties. I t is quite unnecessary AXCE CO. to say more as to the decision in Caerleon Tinplate Co. v. A. L. smith, j . Hughes (1) than that it turned entirely upon the peculiar facts of the case; for I am convinced that the learned judges who gave that decision would decide the present case in the same way that we are deciding it. My brother Charles at chambers was quite right, and his decision must be upheld.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for plaintiff: Smiles & Co., for Beleher, Cardiff. Solicitors for defendants : Bell, BrodricJc,

148 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1892]

C A. The facts as al leged by the pleadings were as follows: 1891 The s ta tement of claim s ta ted t ha t J ames Maybrick effected

CLEAVER an insurance on his life with the defendants for 2000Z., in favour MUTUAL ^ u ^ s w ^ e > Florence E l i zabe th Maybrick. The policy stated tha t , EESEHVE for tfie considerations the re in ment ioned, t h e Mutua l Eeserve

FUND LIEE ASSOCIATION. Fund Life Association received James Maybrick as a member of

the said association, and that there should be payable to Florence E. Maybrick, his wife, if living at the time of the death of the said member, otherwise to the legal representatives of such member, the sum of 2000Z., within ninety days after receipt of satisfactory evidence to the association of the death of the said member. James Maybrick died on May 11, 1889. By his will he appointed Thomas Maybrick and Michael Maybrick his exe-cutors. On August 1, 1889, Florence E. Maybrick assigned by deed to the plaintiff Cleaver the said policy and all her interest thereunder, and notice of such assignment was duly given to the defendants before the action. On August 30, 1889, Cleaver was duly appointed administrator of the property and effects of Florence E. Maybrick under 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 9 (the Act to Abolish Forfeitures for Treason and Felony). The plaintiffs, as such assignee or administrator and executors respectively claimed payment of the insurance money.

By the statement of defence it was alleged that James Maybrick died from poison, intentionally administered to him by Florence E. Maybrick, and that she was, at the assizes held at Liverpool on July 25, 1889, tried and convicted upon an indictment charging her with the wilful murder of James Maybrick. The sentence of death passed upon Florence E. Maybrick was afterwards commuted to penal servitude for life.

The question of law to be decided was whether, if it were proved that James Maybrick died from poison intentionally administered to him by Florence E. Maybrick, that would afford a defence to the action; (a) as against the plaintiff Cleaver as assignee of the policy from Florence E. Maybrick; (J) as against the plaintiff Cleaver as administrator under 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 9 ; (c) as against the plaintiffs, Thomas Maybrick and Michael Maybrick, as executors of James Maybrick.

1 Q. B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 149

The Divisional Court (Denman and Wills, J J.) gave judg- C.A. ment for the defendants. 1891

CLEAVEB Nov. 2 and 3. Sir Charles Russell, Q.C., and Reginald J. Smith, v.

for the plaintiffs. The executors of James Maybrick are entitled RESEUVE to recover on the policy. This policy was a perfectly valid policy ASSOCIATION. in its inception. So the case has no analogy to a case like Prince of Wales Association v. Palmer (1), which was decided on the ground that the insurance was a fraud ab initio. I t is clear that the event happened upon which by the terms of the policy it was .to become payable. The argument for the defendants is that public policy may be invoked to relieve the defendants from performing their contract. But it is contended that no question of public policy arises as between the executors and the defendants; if any such question comes in at all, it is at a later stage. The contract of the defendants was with the insured, James Maybrick. The right to recover on the policy vests in his executors, and it is only when it is a question as to the application of the money by them that considerations of public policy arise. I t is argued by the defendants that the policy makes the money payable to the wife only. That is not so. I t must be read by the light of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. The contract was with James Maybrick, and, there being no trustee appointed under the 11th section, the policy, and all rights under it, vested in his legal personal representatives. They hold in trust for the wife so far only as any trust for her is legally recognisable; but if the trust for her benefit cannot legally be performed by reason of a rule of public policy, the money will form part of the insured's personal estate. Whether that be so or not, however, does not concern the defendants. They have nothing to do with the application of the money. There can be no rule of public policy that prevents the executors from recovering the money which the defendants contracted with the insured to pay upon his death, and in respect of which they have received the con-sideration. The rule of public policy acted upon in Amicable Assurance Society v. Bolland (2), applies only to cases where the insured, with whom the contract is made, by his own crime

(1) 25 Beav. 605. (2) 4 Bli. (N.S.) 194 (Fauntleroy's Case).


C. A. causes his death. The rule in such a case is that it is against 189] public policy that the assignees of the contracting party should

CLEAVEU receive benefit from the contract through his crime. That has MUTUAL n o application where the death is caused by the crime of a person EESKHVK

who is not a party to the contract: Waineivriqlit v. Bland. (1) ASSOCIATION. [They also cited Horn v. Anglo-Australian Insurance Co. (2);

Moore v. Woolsey. (3) ] Sir E. Clarice, 8.G., and Hextall, for the defendants. This

insurance was obviously effected under s. 11 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and it gives the whole benefit of the insurance-money to the wife, if she survives the insured. I t has been held in such a case that the insurance money goes to the wife, not the husband's trustee in bankruptcy : Holt v. Everall (4). I t is against public policy that a person should profit through his or her own criminal act. I t was held in Amicable Assurance Society v. Bolland (5) on that principle that the assignees of a man who died through his own crime by the hands of justice could not recover on a policy of insurance upon his life. The policy must be read as subject to an implied exception of the case where the insured dies by the hands of his wife. The legal interest in the policy may be vested in the executors ; but under the Married Women's Property Act, they would be trustees of the money for the wife: see Be Dash; King v. Barley. (6) The Court will not allow her through other persons to obtain a benefit which it is against public policy that she should obtain. By the terms of the policy and the 11th section of the Married Women's Property Act, the wife is the only person interested in the policy money. The trust in her favour cannot be said to have been performed. I t remains unperformed. But the money cannot be recovered by her or any person suing as her trustee, because the death of the husband was caused by her criminal act. The case is similar in principle to the case where a man insures his own life and then commits suicide feloniously.

Sir Charles Bussell, Q.C., in reply. Cur. adv. vult.

(1) 1 Mood. & Bob. 481. (4) 2 Ch. D. 266. (2) 30 L. J. (Ch.) 511. (5) 4 Bli. (N.S.) 194. (3) 4 E. & B. 243. (6) 57 L. T. (N.S.) 219.


Dec. 8. LORD ESHEE, M.E. In this case the executors of the ' C. A. will of James May brick in that capacity sue the defendants upon a 1891 policy of life insurance granted by them to the testator. James ~\ ~ Maybrick is dead, and the. defendants admit that during his v. lifetime they granted him the policy ; but they insist that they RESERVE are not liable to pay the sum insured to his executors, because ^"JJ^QJ^IQ^-they would hold it in trust for the wife of James Maybrick, and his death was occasioned by the criminal act* of his wife, that is to say, she murdered him. ' They say that it.would be contrary to public policy that under such circumstances they should be compelled to pay this money to the plaintiffs, and therefore that public policy excuses them from that which would otherwise be the due fulfilment of their contract. No doubt there is a rule that, if a contract be made contrary to public policy, or if the performance of a contract would be contrary to public policy, performance cannot be enforced either at law or in equity; but when people vouch that rule to excuse themselves from the performance of a contract, in respect of which they have received the full consideration, and when all that remains to be done under the contract is for them to pay money, the application of the rule ought to be narrowly watched, and ought not to be carried a step further than the protection of the public requires. This policy of insurance is in a somewhat peculiar form, which I suppose is of recent invention. I t does not state on the face of it with whom it is made, but states that for the considerations therein mentioned the defendants make the insured a member, and promise that on his death the policy money shall be pay-able to Florence Maybrick his wife, if then living, otherwise to his legal personal representatives. I will first consider what the legal effect of such a policy would be apart from the Married Women's Property Act, and if no such act had been passed. The contract is with the husband, and with nobody else. The wife is no party to it. Apart from the statute, the right to sue on such a contract would clearly pass to the legal personal representatives of the husband. The promise is one which could only take effect upon his death, and therefore it must be meant to be enforced by them. The condition on which the money is to become payable is the death of James Maybrick.


C. A. There is no exception in case of his death by the crime of any 1891 other person, not even by the crime of the wife. Therefore the

CLEAVEU condition expressed by the policy, as that on which the money MUTUAL *S ^ become payable, has been fulfilled. Consequently, so far, RESEHVE

arj(i jf n 0 question of public policy came in, there would be no FUND LIFE U . .

ASSOCIATION-, defence to an action against the defendants by the executors of Lord Esher,M.R. James Maybrick. Apart from the statute, what would be the

effect of making the money payable to the wife ? I t seems to me that as between the executors and the. defendants it would have no effect. She is no party to the contract; and I do not think that the defendants could have any right to follow the money they were bound to pay and consider how the executors might apply it. I t does not seem to me that, apart from the statute, such a policy would create any trust in favour of the wife. James Maybrick might have altered the destination of the money at any time, and might have dealt with it by will or settlement. If he had done so, the defendants could not have interfered. I think that, apart from the statute, no interest would have passed to the wife by reason merely of her being named in the policy; and, if the husband wished any such interest to pass to her, he must have left the money to her by will or settled it upon her during his life, otherwise it would have passed to his executors or administrators. The question might arise how such a policy would have to be treated at law, apart from the statute. Supposing such a policy were made in favour of some person other than the person effecting the insurance, and not being any of the persons named in s. 11 of the Married Women's Property Actas, for instance, a nephew or nieceand supposing that the person, in whose favour the policy had been made, or to or upon whom the insurance money had been left by will or settled, became the criminal cause of the death of the insured, it would then be necessary to consider, independently of the statute, what the effect of the policy would be, and whether the insurance company could vouch this doctrine of public policy as a defence to the action. That the person who commits murder, or any person claiming under him or her, should be allowed to benefit by his or her criminal act, would no doubt be contrary to public policy.


But this doctrine' ought not to be stretched beyond what is c. A.. necessary for the protection of the public; and, if the matter 1891 can be dealt with so that such person should not be benefited, I CLEAVER ~ do not see any reason why the defendants in such a case should .., " be allowed to say, though they might have received premiums RESERVE perhaps for thirty years and still retained the same, that public ASSOCIATION. policy forbade their paying the sum of money which they had

Lord E9her> M.R,

contracted to pay. I t seems to me that this question of public policy does not arise as between the executors and the defend-ants. The question arises at a later stage. When the money is in the hands of the executors, the question arises how, under the circumstances, they must deal with it. If, in consequence of the death of the insured having been caused by the crime of a person in whose favour the policy is expressed to be made, or to or upon whom the policy-money is left by will or settled, such person is not entitled to insist on its being paid to him, but he nevertheless claims the money from the executors, they may then vouch the doctrine of public policy, and may say that by reason of it such person has forfeited his or her right to the money. What would be the consequence of that? The exe-cutors cannot be entitled to keep the money themselves. I t seems to follow as a necessary result that they would hold it as part of the estate of the testator. If the Married Women's Property Act had not been passed, or if the policy had made the money payable to some person other than the insured's wife or children, I should say that, on the true construction of the policy, the only persons who could claim under it, and give a valid receipt for the money insured, were the executors of the insured; that as between them and the insurers the rule of public policy referred to could have no application, and, there-fore, that the insurers must pay the money to the executors, and it would be for them to deal with it subject to the rules of public policy; but the insurers would have nothing to do with the application of the money after they had paid it. That would be a matter entirely between the executors and any person, claiming the money under any will or settlement made by the insured.

But this case must be considered further with reference to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. Sect. 11 of that Act

VOL. I. 1892. M 2


C. A. provides that a policy of insurance effected by any man on his 1891 own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of his wife or of his

CLEAVEU children, or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall create MUTUAL a * r u s t i n favour of the objects therein named, and the moneys RESERVE payable under such policy shall not, so long as any object of the

ASSOCIATION, trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured LordEsher.M.R. or be subject to his debts. Therefore, it is not provided that

such moneys shall never form part of the insured's estate, but only that they shall not form part of his estate so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed. That gives rise to the necessary implication, that, when no object of the trust remains unperformed, the money is to. form part of his estate. Then it is provided that " t h e insured may, by the policy or any memorandum under his hand, appoint a trustee or trustees of the moneys payable under the policy, and, in default of any. such appointment of a trustee, such policy shall, immediately on its being effected, vest in the insured and his legal representatives in trust for the purposes aforesaid." Under this provision, no trustee having been appointed, the policy vests in the executors who are trustees for the purposes of the trust in favour of the wife, but only as long as the object of the trust remains unper-formed. When the object of the trust no longer remains unper-formed, the policy is to form part of the estate of the insured. Suppose the wife had died before the husband, the defendants could not have said that they would not continue the policy or receive any more premiums, and that the policy was at an end. In that case the performance of the trust for the wife would have become impossible. I take it that the proper reading of the section is that, if the performance of the object of the trust has become impossible, it must be treated as if it had been per-formed ; and, therefore, there would in such case be no object of the trust remaining unperformed. Applying the rule of public policy to this, construction of the section, the wife here has by her crime rendered the trust in her favour incapable of per-formance. I t must, therefore, be treated as if it did not exist; an object that cannot be performed cannot, for the purposes of the section, be said to remain unperformed. Then, by necessary implication, according to the section, the policy forms part of


the insured's estate. As I have said, the rule of public policy is C. A. not to be carried further than is necessary to ensure its object. 1891 On this construction of the section, it is unnecessary, under these CLEAVER circumstances, to vouch the rule as between the executors and the ^iv^UAh defendants. The defendants must pay the money to the execu- RESERVE

T 1 'UNDLIFE tors, and then it will be for the executors to deal with it according ASSOCIATION. to their duty as executors. They would be trustees of it for the LordEsher.M.R. wife if she had not forfeited i t ; but her interest being forfeited, it forms part of the insured's estate. If there are creditors, it will go to them so far as may be necessary to satisfy their claims. If anything is left, it will go to the children of the insured if there are any. The rule of public policy in such a case prevents the person guilty of the death of the insured, or any person claiming through such person, from taking the money; but the children would not claim through the mother, but through the father. What is there against public policy in such a result ? I think that, if the Court were to deprive the children of the insured, who do not claim through the mother, of the insurance-money under such circumstances, on the ground of public policy, it would be a gross injustice. Any one claiming through the wife is shut out by the rule of public policy ; so tha t any assignee from her, or other person claiming through her, cannot recover the money; but the rule of public policy does not apply as between the executors representing the estate of the insured and the defendants, and, therefore, their rights and liabilities must be governed by the contract. That contract does not make any exception in the case of the death of the insured being caused by the crime of any other person. Conse-quently, I think that the suggested defence fails so far as the executors of the insured are concerned. So far as regards the assignee claiming through the wife, he has no title, and has not made out his claim. For these reasons, I think that the decision of the Divisional Court was wrong, and that the appeal should be allowed.

FKY, L.J. Of the questions stated by the order of the master in this .case one only has been argued before usnamely, whether the murder of James Maybrick by his wife Florence, if

M 2 2


C. A. proved, would afford a defence to this action brought by the exe-1891 cutors of James Maybrick. This question has been answered in

CLEAVEH the affirmative by the Divisional Court, and the judgment has MUTUAL teen maintained before us by the same line of argument as was BESERVE adopted by the Court, which is shortly as follows: The executors

FUND LIFE A J . J

ASSOCIATION, of James Maybrick, it is said, are suing as trustees for Florence, Fry, L.J. and can have no better title than their cestui que trust : it is

against public policy to allow a criminal to claim any benefit by virtue of his crime; she is, therefore, disentitled to claim the proceeds of the policy in question, and the executors, who are her trustees, are equally disentitled. This line of argument appears to me equally untenable whether there be or be not such a principle of public policy as that stated. If there be not, there is no objection to the action; if there be, it disqualifies Florence Maybrick from asserting that she is the cestui que trust of the executors, and negatives the proposition that the plaintiffs are suing for her benefit. They may be suing for their own benefit or for the benefit of the estate of the deceased or of some other person; but if the principle be valid, they cannot possibly be suing for her benefit.

These observations are to my mind sufficient to dispose of the case; but, considering its importance and the fulness with which it has been argued, I shall descend somewhat more on detail. The principle of public policy invoked is in my opinion rightly asserted. I t appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly resulting to the person asserting them from the crime of that person. If no action can arise from fraud, it seems impossible to suppose that it can arise from felony or misdemeanour. , I t may be that there is no authority directly asserting the existence of the principle; but the decision of the House of Lords in Fauntleroy's Case (1) appears to proceed on this principle, and to be a particular illustration of it. This principle of public policy, like all such principles, must be applied to all cases to which it can be applied without reference to the particular character' of the right asserted or the form of its assertion. In Fauntleroy's Case (1) it was held to prevent the

(1) 4-Bli. (N.S.) 194.


assignees of a forger from claiming the benefit of a policy on his C. A. death at the hands of justice by reason of his forgery. I t would 1891 equally apply, it appears to me, to the case of a cestui que trust CLEAVEU asserting a right as such by reason of the murder of the prior jfUT'UAL tenant for life or of the assured in a policy: and it must be so KKSEBVB

. . . T i i F U N D L I F E

far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament that ASSOCIATION. general words which might include cases obnoxious to this FryTiTj-principle must be read and construed as subject to it.

James Maybrick insured his life in the policy in question in the year 1888, and by the proposal which was made part of the policy he expressed the .policy to be effected for the benefit of his wife, and in the policy itself she is named as the payee of the policy-moneys in the event, which happened, of her surviving her husband. Independently of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the effect of this transaction was, in my opinion, to create a contract by the defendants with James Maybrick that the defendants would, in the event which, has occurred, pay Florence Maybrick the 2000Z. assured; it would be broken by non-payment to her; but the cause of action resulting from such breach would vest in the executors of the assured, and not in the payee. She was, independently of the statute, a stranger to the contract; it might have been put an end to by the contracting parties without her consent, and the breach of it would have given her no cause of action against any one.

The 11th section of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, deals with policies like the present, effected for the expressed benefit of a wife, and, amongst other things, contains these alternative provisions. I t enables the insured to appoint a trustee or trustees of the moneys payable under the policy ; in default of such appointment, it provides that the policy shall vest in the assured and his legal personal representatives. I t is impos-sible to consider the insertion of the name of Florence Maybrick in the policy as the nomination of her as trustee for herself; there is no nomination of any other trustee; consequently the statute applied, and, in spite of her nomination as payee, vested the policy in James Maybrick and his legal personal represen-tativesnamely, the plaintiffs. The section in question goes further, and declares the trusts on which such a policy is to be


0. A. held. According to its language, the effecting of this policy 1891 created a trust in favour of the object namedthat is, Florence

CLEAVEK Maybrickand the section enacted that the moneys payable MUTUAL under it should not, so long as any object of the trust remained un-KESERVE performed, form part of the estate of the insured. Now, the trust

FUND LIFE r r

ASSOCIATION, thus created by statute, and the language of the statute creating Fry, L.J. it, must, in my opinion, be both subject to the principle of public

policy which I have statednamely, the trust is one which can-not be enforced by a murderess of her husband, and the language of the statute must be read as if 'it contained an exception of such a case. Consequently the trust which the statute was in-tended to create has either never arisen or it has, by the act of the cestui que trust, become incapable of enforcement. If the executors of the insured were in such a case as the present to refuse to sue the office, it is inconceivable to me that the mur-deress could maintain >a suit against them to enable her to use their names; or,- in fact, that she could be allowed to sue in any way in aCourt of Equity as cestui que trust of a fund which she had created by her crime. - But if the executors are not trustees for Florence Maybrick,-for whom are they'trustees?' 'This ques-tion seems to admit of'an easy answer. Whenever'there is property produced by the payments of A. which is held in trust for B., and that-trust fails or is satisfied, a resulting trust arises for A. or his estate. This resulting trust is recognised by the section of the Act in question, because it takes the property out of the estate of the insured so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed: language which implies, if it does not assert, that when no object of the trust remains to be performed the policy-moneys form part of the estate of the insured. If it be suggested that this view only removes the difficulty a step further off, and that the possible right of the wife under her husband's will or intestacy forms an objection to the action by the executors, the reply is obviousthat the principle of public policy must be applied as often as any claim 'is made by the murderess, and will always form an effectual "bar to any benefit which she may seek to acquire as the result of her crime. ' I t follows from the view which I -have expressed that I think it needless to inquire what the particular trusts may be on which

1Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 159

the convict's property is held by the administrator appointed C. A. under the statute of 1870. He took only the property which 1891 Florence Maybrick had in the moneys in question ; and as she CLEAVEE took nothing, in my judgment, by reason of her crime, he takes MUTUAL nothing likewise. RBSEBVB

. FUND L I F E I t may be argued that having regard to the fact that ASSOCIATION.

Mrs. Maybrick is the prime object of the insurance, and that Fry, L.J. she is named on the face of the policy as payee, the contract of insurance must be taken to imply an exception of the case of the death of the insured when caused by the crime of the person so named; and it is suggested that Fawitleroy's Case (1) in the House of Lords supports this contention. This argument does not appear to me to be tenable. The policy is effected under, and therefore affected by, a statutory enactment, the effect of which in the present case is to vest the policy in. the executors of the insured as trustees in the event of Mrs. May brick's being entitled to claim in trust for her, and in every other event in trust for the estate of James Maybrick;just in'the same way as if before the statute a policy had been'taken out by James Maybrick, and he had by a separate instrument declared the like trusts of it. Now, it is to my mind illogical to make the crime of one cestui que trust a bar to the claim of another, or of the trustees for that other cestui que trust; and if the supposed defence were to prevail we should so hold. If Mrs. Maybrick had inflicted a mortal, but not immediately fatal, wound on her husband, had then committed suicide, leaving him surviving, and his executors had claimed on his death, it appears to me that the crime which caused his death would have furnished no

defence. In a word, I think that the rule of public policy should be applied so as to exclude from benefit the criminal and all claiming under her, but not so as to exclude alternative or inde-pendent rights. In Fauntleroy's Case (1) the plaintiffs were the assigns of the criminal, and were claiming through him. In the present case the plaintiffs are the assigns in law of the innocent husband, and are claiming through him. The authority, there-fore, of that case goes to shew that neither Florence Maybrick nor the administrator of her estate, who claims through her, can'

(1) 4 Bli. (N.S.) 194.


C. A. take any benefit. B u t t ha t appears to me to throw no impedi-1891 men t in the way of a suit by those who claim with clean hands

OLEAVEU themselves and as assigns of the innocent insured. I n a word, MUTUAL ^ appears to me t ha t the crime of one person may prevent t ha t RESERVE person from the assertion of what would otherwise be a r ight , and

FUND LIEE . . . ASSOCIATION, may accelerate or beneficially affect the rights of third persons,

Fry, L.J. but can never prejudice or injuriously affect those rights. In my opinion, therefore, public policy prevents Florence Maybrick from asserting any title as cestui que trust of this fund, and thereby brings into operation the resulting trust in favour of the estate of the insured, and so enables the executors to maintain an action as plaintiffs without any taint derived from the crime committed by Florence Maybrick.

LOPES, L.J. The action is brought by the personal represen-tatives of James Maybrick, and the question we have to consider is whether the crime of his wife, Florence Maybrick, incapacitates them from recovering upon the policy of insurance effected by the husband with the defendants the amount of the policy-money, which, by the terms of the policy, is made payable to the wife if she survive the husband. The contract was between the hus-band and the defendants. The husband died by the criminal act of the wife. The right of action upon the contract passes to the legal personal representatives upon his death. I do not doubt that the principle of public policy would prevent the wife from recovering the amount of the policy money from them, and so reaping benefit from her crime; because no trust can be enforced which contravenes the law. The simple answer to the defence set up is that the executors are entitled to say that they are suing for the benefit of the estate of the deceased husband; and, therefore, no question of public policy arises. I t appears to me clear that such would have been the case, if the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, had not been passed. I agree with the Master of the Eolls and Lord Justice Fry, that the effect of the section of that Act which has been referred to is to create a resulting trust in favour of the husband's estate which takes effect when by reason of the crime of the wife the trust in her favour becomes incapable of being performed in consequence of


the rule of public policy. The trust in favour of the wife must C. A. then be regarded as struck out, and, that being so, a resulting 1891 trust in favour of the husband's estate arises. For these reasons, CLEAVER I agree that the appeal should be allowed. '

M *

Appeal allowed. ]?UND LIFE ASSOCIATION.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs: Sh'arpe, Parkers, & Co., for Cleaver, Eolden, & Co.

Solicitors for the defendants: Robinson & Stannard. E. L.

RADCLIFFE v. BARTHOLOMEW. Nov. 9. JusticesJurisdictionTime within which Complaint must be made

12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 14. By s. 14 of the Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (12 & 13

Vict. c. 92), every complaint under the provisions of the Act is to be made " within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise." On June 30 an information was laid against the appellant in respect of an act of cruelty alleged to have been committed by him on May 30. An objection to the jurisdiction of the justices having been taken, on the ground that the complaint had not been made within one calendar month after the cause of complaint had arisen :

Held, that the day on which the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from the computation of the calendar month within which the com-plaint was to be made; that the complaint was therefore made in time, and the justices had jurisdiction to hear the case.

CASE stated by justices. An information under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2, was laid on

June 30, 1891, by the respondent against the appellant, charging him with ill-treating certain sheep on May 30, 1891. By s. 14 of that Act it is enacted that " every complaint under the provi-sions of this Act shall be made within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise." At the hearing before the justices a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the appellant that, as the offence was alleged to have been com-mitted on May 30 and the information was not laid until June 30, the complaint had not been made " within one calendar month " after the cause of complaint had arisen, and that therefore the justices had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The justices

cleaver v mutual reserve

Documents

maybrick j

michael maybrick

thomas maybrick

i zabe th maybrick

e florence e

plaintiff cleaver

effects of florence

said association