cmh_pub_10-22 corps of engineers - war against germany.pdf

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

!Jy Alfred M. Beck

Abe Bortz Charles W . Lynch

Lilia Mayo and

Ralph F. Weld

CENTER OF MiliTARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1985

Foreword

In this, the last volume dealing with the performance of the Corps ofEngineers during World War II, the Corps' support of the war in theEuropean and North African theaters is recounted in detail.

This narrative makes clear the indispensible role of the military engi-neer at the fighting front and his part in maintaining Allied armies in thefield against European Axis powers. American engineers carried thefight to enemy shores by their mastery of amphibious warfare. In build-ing and repairing road and rail nets for the fighting forces, they wrotetheir own record of achievement. In supporting combat and logisticalforces in distant lands, these technicians of war transferred to active thea-ters many of the construction and administrative functions of the peace-time Corps, so heavily committed to public works at home.

The authors of this volume have reduced a highly complex story to acomprehensive yet concise account of American military engineers in thetwo theaters of operations where the declared main enemy of the war wasbrought to unconditional surrender. The addition of this account to theofficial U.S. Army in World War II series closes the last remaining gapsin the history of the technical services in that conflict.

Washington, B.C. DOUGLAS KINNARD21 June 1984 Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)

Chief of Military History

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The Authors

Alfred M. Beck received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from George-town University. He has held several research and supervisory positionsin the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the Historical Division,Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Abe Bortz received his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in1951. After working for twelve years for the Historical Division, Officeof the Chief of Engineers, he has served since 1963 as the historian of theSocial Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland. He is the author ofSocial Security Sources in Federal Records.

Charles W. Lynch received his M.A. degree from the University ofWest Virginia in 1948. He worked for the Historical Division, Office ofthe Chief of Engineers, from 1951 to 1963 before transferring to the U.S.Army Matériel Command, the predecessor of the U.S. Army MatérielDevelopment and Readiness Command. He retired from the federal ser-vice in 1980.

Lida Mayo was a graduate of Randolph-Macon Woman's College. Sheserved as a historian at the Military Air Transport Service from 1946 to1950 and from 1950 to 1962 at the Office of the Chief of Ordnance,where she was the chief historian until that office merged with the Office,Chief of Military History, the predecessor of the U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History. She is the author of The Ordnance Department: On Beach-head and Battlefront and coauthor of The Ordnance Department: PlanningMunitions for War, both in the U.S. Army in World War II series. Hercommercially published works include Henry Clay, Rustics in Rebellion,Bloody Buna, and a number of journal articles. She retired from federalservice in 1971 and died in 1978.

Ralph F. Weld received his Ph.D. degree from Columbia Universityin 1938. He worked as a historian with the Historical Division, Office ofthe Chief of Engineers, from 1951 to 1958, when he retired from thefederal service. He continued to serve the Historical Division on shortassignments until 1964. He is the author of Brooklyn Is America and was onthe editorial staff of the Columbia Encyclopedia.

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Preface

This volume is the fourth in the series dealing with the activities ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during World War II. As a companionto an earlier history of American military engineering in the war againstJapan, this book recounts the engineer role in the campaigns in NorthAfrica, Italy, and western and central Europe that wrested those areasfrom German and Italian control.

Because of the thin neutrality to which the United States governmentclung in 1941, the first introduction of American engineer elements intoEngland was clandestine, but even with the earliest American theatercommand existing only in embryo, the need for engineers was implicit inAllied strategy. The Anglo-American decision in March 1941 to deal firstwith Germany as the most dangerous enemy required the construction ofstrategic bomber bases and huge troop cantonments in England, all withthe object of bringing Allied might to bear against Germany from thewest. The story of how this was accomplished necessarily concerns itselfwith organizational structures, operating procedures, statistical data, anddescriptions of vast logistical effort. The redirection of the entire strategyin 1942 to a second theater in the Mediterranean brought American engi-neer troops to their first encounters with a determined and skilled ad-versary in that part of the world and to a sober realization of their ownstrengths and weaknesses in combat. In sustained operations across twocontinents and through two and a half years of war, these engineers car-ried out the basic mission of the military engineer in the field.

With the measured assurance of doctrinal literature, the 1943 editionof the engineer Field Manual 5—6, Operations of Field Engineer Units, de-fined the engineer's task as support of other Army combat and supplyelements, increasing the power of forces by construction or destructionto facilitate the movement of friendly troops and to impede that of theenemy. To assert, however, that American engineers handily fulfilledthis mandate in Europe and North Africa is to overlook constant trial anderror and relearning from past experience. By the end of the war engi-neer officers and men well understood the meaning of the ancient poetwho declared that the immortals had put sweat and a long, steep waybefore excellence.

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Many hands have shaped the mass of material on which this history isbased into a comprehensive whole. The first half of the manuscript,roughly through the end of the Italian campaign, was completed by AbeBortz, William Lynch, and Ralph Weld, all of whom worked for theCorps of Engineers Historical Office. Lida Mayo set in place most of thedraft chapters covering operations in northwest Europe and Germany. Iadded several chapters and recast virtually the entire manuscript, work-ing under the discerning eye of Robert W. Coakley, a historian of sur-passing ability and a guiding spirit in the process of transforming a roughproduct into a viable history worthy of print.

The publication of a work of even such cooperative authorship as thisone would be impossible without the able assistance of a number of fineeditors who brought this book from manuscript to printed page. Joyce W.Hardyman and Edith M. Boldan began this labor, but the heavier burdenfell to Catherine A. Heerin and Diane L. Sedore, whose respect for theEnglish language and attention to detail made this account consistentlyreadable. Their patience in the tedious process of preparing a book andtheir good humor in dealing with its last author were unfailing.

The maps presented in the volume are the work of Charles L. Brittle,who took vague requests for illustrations and created a series of visualaids to guide the reader through a sometimes complicated text. Howell C.Brewer, Jr., lent his hand to this effort by producing the organizationcharts shown in the narrative. Arthur S. Hardyman, who directed thegraphic work, also gave valuable advice on the choice of photographsthat complement the text.

For all the advice and support rendered by this willing staff of assis-tants, the final responsibility for the content of this history remains thatof the authors. Collectively they bear the burden of errors of fact oromission.

Washington, B.C. ALFRED M. BECK5 January 1984

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ContentsChapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. THE ENGINEERS CROSS THE ATLANTIC, 1941-1942 . . . . 7Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Magnet Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16The Bolero Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Creation of the Services of Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24The Engineer Pyramid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Roundup Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

III. THE ENGINEER MACHINE IN MOTION IN THEUNITED KINGDOM, 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

IV. THE ENGINEERS IN THE INVASION OF NORTHAFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Engineer Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Engineer Amphibian Brigades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64The Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68The Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

V. THE TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Aviation Engineer Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Ground Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Mine Clearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Command Reorganizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Chapter Page

Atlantic Base Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IllMediterranean Base Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Eastern Base Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

VI. SICILY: THE BEACHHEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120D-day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Joss Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127Dime Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Cent Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

VII. SICILY: THE DRIVE TO MESSINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Supply Over the Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Corps and Army Support of Combat Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139Maps and Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Highway 120: The Road to Randazzo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Highway 113: The Road to Messina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Palermo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

VIII. FROM SALERNO TO THE VOLTURNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153The Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158A Campaign of Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Naples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167Peninsular Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173The Volturno Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

IX. THE WINTER LINE AND THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD . . . . . 180Minefields in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181Bridge Building and Road Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Engineers in Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188At Cassino: 20-29 January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190Anzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

X. THE ADVANCE TO THE ALPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200The Offensive Resumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208The Arno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211The Winter Stalemate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214The Final Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Chapter Page

The Shortage of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224Engineer Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226Mapping and Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Camouflage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

XI. ENGINEERS IN THE PENINSULAR BASE SECTION . . . . . . 232Port Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Petroleum: From Tanker to Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238Tasks of Base Section Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242PBS Supply and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

XII. REVIVING BOLERO IN THE UNITED KINGDOM . . . . . . . 256The Continuing Problem of Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257New Supply Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261The Manpower Shortage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269Engineers at the Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

XIII. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE CONTINENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277Engineer PROCO Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277Planning for Construction on the Continent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280Refinements in Overlord's Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286Joint Stockpiling With the British . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289Maps for the Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

XIV. PREPARING FOR D-DAY LANDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299The American Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299Beach Obstacle Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304The Engineer Special Brigades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Assault Training and Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310Marshaling the Invasion Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

XV. THE LANDINGS ON OMAHA AND UTAH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Engineers on Omaha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Opening the Exits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

Chapter Page

XVI. DEVELOPING BEACHES AND RECONSTRUCTINGPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340

Small Ports Near the Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344COMZ on the Continent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Granville and the Minor Brittany Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358The Seine Ports: Le Havre and Rouen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360Antwerp and Ghent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

XVII. COMBAT ENGINEERS IN THE BREAKOUT ANDPURSUIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

The Road to Coutances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368The Road to Periers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370The Road to St. Lo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371VII Corps Engineers in the Cobra Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376VIII Corps Engineers Aid the War of Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . 377Siege Operations in Brittany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381The Seine Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385Beyond the Seine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

XVIII. SUPPORTING A WAR OF MOVEMENT IN NORTHERNFRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

Highways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397The ADSEC Engineer Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405The Minor POL System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406The Major POL System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409The New POL Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

XIX. BREACHING GERMANY'S BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414The Siegfried Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414VII Corps South of Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415XIX Corps North of Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420The Siege of Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421From the Moselle to the Saar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423The Moselle Crossings at Mailing and Cattenom . . . . . . . . . . . . 424The Bridge at Thionville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426Advance to the Saar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429The Capture of the Saarlautern Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430Assaulting Pillboxes on the Far Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431The Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434

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Chapter Page

XX. SOUTHERN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436The Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439Base Sections and SOLOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451Map Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454Engineer Supply for the First French Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454POL Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455Preparing To Cross the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469

XXI. THE ARDENNES: ENGINEERS AS INFANTRY . . . . . . . . . . . 461The Storm Breaks in the Schnee Eifel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462Blocking Sixth Panzer Army's Drive to the Meuse . . . . . . . . . . . . 467Delaying Fifth Panzer Army From the Our to the Meuse . . . . . . . 474Stopping the German Seventh Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480Engineers in NORDWIND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484Seventh Army Through the Siegfried Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487After the Ardennes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488

XXII. THE ROER CROSSING AND THE REMAGEN BRIDGE-HEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

The Roer Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490The Ludendorff Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499The Ferries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505The Treadway and Ponton Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506Collapse of the Ludendorff Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509The III Corps Bailey Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513VII Corps, First Army, and V Corps Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514

XXIII. THE ASSAULT CROSSINGS OF THE RHINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 517Ninth Army at Rheinberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517Over the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519The XII Corps Crossing at Oppenheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525The VIII Corps Crossing at the Rhine Gorge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527The XX Corps Crossing at Mainz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530The Seventh Army Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531The Rhine Crossings in Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535

XXIV. INTO THE HEART OF GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537Ninth Army's Dash to the Elbe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538First Army's Drive to Leipzig and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541Third Army Reaches Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546

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Seventh Army to the "Alpine Fortress" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550Support of Alsos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556

XXV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 576

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583

ChartsNo. Page

1. Office of the Chief Engineer, ETOUSA, 1 July 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . 272. Theater Structure, AFHQ and NATOUSA, 8 February 1944 . . . . 2023. Office of the Chief Engineer, MTOUSA, 28 January 1945 . . . . . . 2044. Office of the Chief Engineer, ETOUSA, 1 August 1944 . . . . . . . . 3955. Office of the Chief Engineer, ETOUSA, 1 October 1944 . . . . . . . . 396

MapsNo. Page

1. Iceland, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162. Organization of SOS in the United Kingdom, July 1942 . . . . . . . . 303. North African Beachheads, 8 November 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 704. Tunisia, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955. Sicilian Landing Areas, 10 July 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1266. Sicily, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1427. Italy Invasion Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1558. Salerno Beaches, September 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1609. Anzio Beachhead, 22 January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

10. Italy: Salerno to Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21011. Northern Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23512. Peninsular Base Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24313. Engineer Supply Depots in the United Kingdom, March 1944 . . . . 27314. Major Training Sites in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

xiv

No. Page

15. The Final OVERLORD Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30116. OMAHA Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32117. UTAH Beach, June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33518. Minor Ports in the OVERLORD Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34519. The Engineers in France: Normandy to the Seine, 1944 . . . . . . . . 37820. Beyond the Seine, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40421. Railways in Use and Red Ball Express, September 1944 . . . . . . . . . 40622. POL Pipelines, September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41123. The Siegfried Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41624. Southern France Beachheads, 15 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44025. Southern France: Supply Operations, August-

November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45026. POL Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45627. The Ardennes, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46828. Roer River Crossing, 23 February 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49329. Crossing the Rhine, March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52230. Engineers in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543

IllustrationsPage

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Construction Supplies at Reykjavik Harbor, October 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . 13Engineer Troops Dumping Fill at Meeks Field, Keflavik . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, Ambassador John G. Winant, and

Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Lt. Col. Herbert Milwit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Men of the 829th Engineer Aviation Battalion Erect Nissen Hutting ... 53Paving Train at an American Bomber Field in England . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Hospital Construction Employing Prefabricated Concrete

Roof Trusses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Wrecked and Broached Landing Craft at Fedala, French Morocco . . . . 72Moroccan Labor Gang at Casablanca Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Col. Rudolph E. Smyser, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Gasoline Storage at Port-Lyautey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93German S-Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102Italian Bar Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

xv

Page

The SCR-625 Mine Detector in Action on a Tunisian Road . . . . . . . . . 104Scorpion Tank Crew Loading Bangalore Torpedoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Ponton Causeway Extending From an LST to Shore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Landing Heavy Equipment Over the Causeway at Scoglitti . . . . . . . . . . 134Construction Begins at Cape Calava To Close Gap Blown by

Retreating Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Tests the Temporary Span

at Cape Calava . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151DUKWs Head for the Salerno Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161LSTs and Auxiliary Ships Unload Men and Supply at Salerno . . . . . . . . 162Decking Placed Over Sunken Vessels in Naples Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Pence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Engineer Officer Reads Pressure Gauges at Pumping Station

at Foggia, Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174Wrecked M2 Floating Treadway on the Volturno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178Engineer Rock Quarry Near Mignano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189Removing German Charges From Buildings in Anzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196Assembling M1A1 Antitank Mines at Anzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Brig. Gen. Dabney O. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207The Rising Arno River Threatens a Treadway Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213Bailey Bridge Construction Over the Arno Near Florence . . . . . . . . . . . 214Brig. Gen. Frank O. Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217Engineers Bridging the Po River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Raft Ferries a Tank Destroyer Across the Po . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222Blasting Obstacles at Civitavecchia, June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Depot, Lancashire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264Bulldozers at the Engineer Depot at Thatcham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280Engineer Crane Stacks Lumber at Thatcham, April 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 281Models of Belgian Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290Wire Entanglements and Dragon's Teeth at the Assault

Training Center, Woolacombe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291Engineer Mapmaker Uses a Multiplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294Infantry Troops Leave LST During Exercise FABIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311Col. Eugene M. Caffey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313Tanks and Vehicles Stalled at the Shingle Line on OMAHA Beach . . . . . 322Engineers Anchor Reinforced Track at OMAHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329Teller Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336Roads Leading off the Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338Tetrahedrons at OMAHA Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341Twisted Sections of Lobnitz Piers at OMAHA Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

xvi

Page

Coaster With a Cargo of Gasoline Unloads at Isigny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Gasoline Being Pumped Ashore at Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358Clearing the Mouth of the Locks at St. Malo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Engineers Assemble an Explosive-Laden "Snake" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3803d Armored Division Vehicles Cross the Seine River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387French Barges Support Bailey Bridging Over the Seine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388982d Engineer Maintenance Company Welds Six-Inch Pipeline . . . . . . . 391Col. Emerson C. Itschner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394Decanting Area on the Oil Pipeline in Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412Rigging Charges to Demolish Dragon's Teeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417Bulldozer Seals Bunkers Outside Aachen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419Troops Float Footbridge Sections Into Place on the Moselle . . . . . . . . . 426Heavy Ponton Bridge at Uckange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438Mine Removal at Camel Red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445Probing for Explosive Charge at Marseille . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448The Aix Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453Engineers Drop Barbed-Wire Rolls To Prepare Defensive

Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465Placing Charges To Drop Trees Across Roadways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475Road Maintenance Outside Wiltz, Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477Installing a Bridge on the Ill River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486Engineers Emplace Mats To Stabilize the Banks of the Roer . . . . . . . . . 4912d Armored Division Tanks Cross the Roer Into Juelich . . . . . . . . . . . . 495Footbridge on the Roer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498The Ludendorff Rail Bridge at Remagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501Pontons Loaded for Transport to Remagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508Wreckage of the Ludendorff Bridge After Its Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51289th Division Infantry Cross the Rhine at Oberwesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521Engineers Slide Bailey Bridging Into Place at Wesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524Men Connect Bridge Sections Near St. Goar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529M2 Treadway Bridge on the Rhine at Boppard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530Heavy Ponton Bridge in the Seventh Army Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534Hauling a Tank Across the Saale River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545Pontons Headed for the Danube . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files.

xvii

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS:THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

CHAPTER I

Introduction

On the eve of American involvementin World War II, the U.S. Army Corpsof Engineers had 150 years of experi-ence in national wars and in statutoryassignment to civil works projects out-side the Army. Its veteran officers couldhark back to an unprecedented perfor-mance in World War I, when the Corpshad expanded from 2,454 officers andenlisted men to nearly 300,000—174,000 in France alone when the Armi-stice was signed.1

In unexpected measure their workson the Continent from 1917 to 1919enlarged upon traditional engineerfunctions, especially as they applied tofacilitating troop movement. In severalports where the French governmentturned over wharfage to incomingAmerican forces, the 17th and 18thEngineer Regiments, two of the firstnine engineer regiments to arrive, con-structed additions to docks, erecteddepots, and then laid new rail lines link-ing the facilities to the French nationalsystem and the Zone of the Advancethat included the front line itself. An

entire regiment spent the war in for-estry operations, providing much of thelumber for rail ties, housing, and hospi-tals for the American ExpeditionaryForces. In forward areas engineersbraved the same fire as the infantry tobuild narrow-gauge rail nets for sup-ply and troop movement, to dig com-plex trench systems, to string wire, toinstall bridging, and even to engage theenemy. Engineer flash- and sound-ranging equipment helped direct coun-terbattery artillery fire. Chemical engi-neers, the forerunners of an indepen-dent postwar Chemical Corps, releasedgas employed against the Germans inthe trenches and developed protectivedevices and procedures against enemygas attacks. Elaborate camouflagescreens and nets manufactured andpainted with the help of French labormasked American equipment and con-cealed preparations for forthcomingoperations.

Falling within the usual definitionsof engineer work in war, these activi-ties covered a far wider technical rangethan ever before in American militaryengineering experience. So complexand extensive had the operations be-come, in fact, that one regimentalcommander declared that the militaryengineer had died and his close rela-tive, the civil engineer, had taken his

1 Historical Report of the Chief Engineer, AmericanExpeditionary Forces, 1917-1919 (Washington, 1919),pp. 12-13. The report excludes from the engineertroop strength in France the separate TransportationCorps, another 60,000 men who functioned only indi-rectly under the chief engineer of the American Expe-ditionary Forces.

4 CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

place.2 For all their accomplishmentsin forging smooth lines of communica-tions from the rear to the front and inproviding invaluable services between,the engineers fought in a war distin-guished by the lack of forward move-ment of the front itself until the finalmonths of the conflict.

Events in Europe in the spring of1940 effectively demonstrated that har-nessing the internal combustion engineto new tactics gave much more rangeand speed to military operations.3 TheGerman defeat of France in six weeksand the narrow escape of the BritishExpeditionary Force at Dunkirk provedthe superiority of the Wehrmacht. Coor-dinated with aerial attacks that de-stroyed ground obstacles and threwenemy rear areas into confusion,massed armor assaults on narrow frontsoffered the antidote to static trenchwarfare and allowed rapid decision onthe battlefield.

German success with these tactics andthe subsequent bombing campaignagainst Great Britain converted a fitfulAmerican rearmament into a real mo-bilization. Congress appropriated morefunds for national defense than theArmy could readily absorb with its lim-ited plans to defend the western hemi-sphere from Axis infiltration or overtmilitary advances in 1940. Like the restof the Army under this largesse, the en-gineers accelerated their recovery fromtwenty years of impoverishment.Though the Corps had been heavilycommitted to civil works through the two

preceding decades, its separate militaryunits were few and scattered across thecontinental United States and its over-seas possessions. Given time to developadditional combat and support unitsalong older organizational lines, theengineers could expand as they had inWorld War I and take up again theirrecognized general functions of bridge,rail, and road construction or main-tenance; port rehabilitation; and morespecialized work in camouflage, watersupply, map production, mine warfare,forestry, and the administrative worknecessary to support combat forces. Buteven if engineer elements remaineddivided into general and special units,the engineers could not simply reacti-vate old units under this framework inanticipation of a new conflict. The mod-ern method of war generated new mis-sions and demanded new organiza-tional structures, new units, and newtypes of equipment to accommodate therevolution in tactics.

A reorganization of the Army wasalready under way.4 Field testing ofrevisions in the basic organization ofthe infantry division began in 1937 witha reduction of infantry regiments fromfour to three to create a flexible andmore easily maneuvered force. Theorganic engineer unit in the smallerdivision was a battalion rather than anengineer combat regiment. Numericalstrength varied in the experiments, butthree companies became the eventualstandard for engineer battalions as-signed to infantry divisions. Respond-

2 William B. Parsons, American Engineers in France(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1920), p. 5.

3 Lt. Col. Paul W. Thompson, What You Should KnowAbout The Army Engineers (New York: W. W. Norton &Company, 1942), pp. 9-10.

4 Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert E.Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment,United States Army in World War II (Washington,1958), pp. 1—63. Unless otherwise noted, the follow-ing is based on this source.

INTRODUCTION 5

ing to events in Europe in 1940, theArmy also developed two armored divi-sions from its small, scattered and ex-perimental, mechanized and armoredelements and provided each divisionwith an organic engineer battalion,eventually numbering 712 men. In imi-tation of the German organization forpanzer divisions, the American engi-neer armored unit had four companies,one a bridge company equipped with alarge variety of military bridging. Areconnaissance platoon of the bat-talion's headquarters company was toscout ahead of the advancing divisionto determine the need for bridge anddemolition work or the best detoursaround obstacles.

Engineer regiments, either for gen-eral service or for combat support, sur-vived as separate entities attached tofield armies or to corps headquarters.Consisting of two battalions and vari-ous supporting companies, these largerunits assumed many of the rear-areatasks formerly left to divisional units.The more heavily equipped general ser-vice regiment was to perform generalconstruction, maintenance, or bridgework on main routes of communi-cations, and military construction oncethe engineers assumed that responsibil-ity from the Quartermaster Corps. Thecombat regiment, with twenty-fourmachine guns in its normal equipment,was more heavily armed for work inthe combat zone but had less heavymachinery than the general serviceregiment. It was particularly suited tosupport divisional units in forwardareas and had a special role in large-scale assault river crossings.5

Experiments produced new equip-ment for the revised engineer organiza-tions. In the search for easily trans-ported and rapidly emplaced bridging,the armored force engineers copied theGerman inflatable ponton system andproduced a 25-ton ponton treadwaybridge for tanks. Other tests showedthe British-designed Bailey bridge tobe lighter and more adaptable to a warof movement than the standard Ameri-can H-10 and H-20 girder bridges.Repeated experience with constructionequipment convinced the engineers ofthe value of heavier and larger bull-dozers, scrapers, cranes, and trucks,though the conflicting demands of theAmerican industrial mobilization oftenmade these items hard to procure inthe desired quantities. As a result, anengineer unit Table of Organizationand Equipment (TOE) immediatelybefore American entry into the warcalled for much less heavy equipmentthan eventually proved necessary. De-mands for additional heavy equipmentof new design arose as the engineersencountered conditions that overtaxedthe standard machinery they broughtwith them to the theaters of war. A newbattery-operated magnetic mine detec-tor enabled the engineers rapidly tounearth mines that impeded the ad-vance of friendly troops, but there waslittle advance intelligence on the natureof Axis mines or the doctrine govern-ing German mine warfare. Engineermap production techniques improvedremarkably with the use of aerial pho-tography employing specialized multi-lens cameras and multiplex interpreta-tion systems.

Given the heavy use of tactical avia-tion and the then-current theories ofbombardment aviation, the engineers

5 Thompson, What You Should Know About the ArmyEngineers, pp. 61-62.


also expected to support the Army AirForces in any future conflict. Establishedimmediately after the spring maneu-vers of 1940, the engineer aviation regi-ment (66 officers and 2,200 enlistedmen) consisted of three battalions thatcould be employed independently.Within two years of its inception, theunit had the highly specialized missionof constructing large rear-area bomberbases and hasty forward fields for tacti-cal aircraft. The regiment carried withit all the necessary earth-moving, pav-ing, and construction machinery andwas adequately armed to thwart anenemy airborne attack on the installa-tion under construction. The unit usedanother idea from abroad—long, nar-row steel plank sections, perforated toreduce their weight and linked togetherto form temporary runways on poor orunstable soil.

The motorization and mechanizationof modern armies and the addition ofaerial components dictated increasedconsumption of gasoline and oil infuture operations. The engineers metthis likelihood with another innovationthat eventually proved its value in thetheaters of war in North Africa andEurope. The Quartermaster Corps haddistributed petroleum products in con-tainers transported to using troops byrail and truck. Though the engineersdid not displace this method entirely,they took over and improved pipelinesto lessen the load on vehicles in combatand communications zones. A highlyspecialized unit, the engineer petro-

leum distribution company, came intoexistence to build and operate pipelinesfrom major ports to the immediate rearareas of the field armies.

An engineer role in amphibious war-fare was not considered until shortlybefore the Japanese attack on PearlHarbor. In all the likely arenas of theobviously approaching war, an advanc-ing army would have to move acrossexpanses of open water. In the Pacific,where the American possessions andthe Japanese homeland were islands,the ability to seize objectives dependedupon operations across beaches. InEurope, it was apparent by mid-1940that Axis control of every major portwould make similar operations nec-essary. Though the Army began am-phibious training for two infantry divi-sions in June 1940 and established aresearch committee to examine possi-ble roles for amphibian engineers, spe-cial units for the purpose were still inthe future.6

By mid-1941, the Corps of Engineershad embarked upon an ambitious pro-gram of revising its military units andequipment. Though not fully ready tofight in an overseas theater, the engi-neers had done much to adapt to therealities of modern combat and combatsupport. This process continued as ashadow American staff structure tookshape in England.

6 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, p. 357.

CHAPTER II

The Engineers Cross the Atlantic1941-1942

In the late spring of 1941 a fewAmerican officers in civilian clothesslipped into London and established asmall headquarters in a building nearthe American embassy on GrosvenorSquare. They might have been attachesof the embassy, as far as the generalpublic could tell. Their name, SpecialObserver Group (SPOBS), like theirattire, concealed rather than expressedtheir functions, for they had muchmore urgent business than to act as neu-tral observers of the military effort of afriendly nation at war. They were organ-ized as a military staff complete withG-1 (personnel), G-2 (intelligence),G-3 (plans and operations), and G-4(logistics and supply), together with afull complement of special staff officers.The group was located in England sothat close liaison with the British HighCommand would be in effect shouldAmerican quasi-neutrality suddenlyshift into active belligerence. The group'smission was to coordinate plans, so faras circumstances permitted, for Ameri-can participation in the war, and toreceive, house, and equip Americanforces.

The engineer officer of the SpecialObserver Group was Lt. Col. DonaldA. Davison, who had been the General

Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force staffengineer in Washington.1 Barely a yearhad passed since Colonel Davison hadorganized the 21st Engineer AviationRegiment, the Army's first engineer avi-ation unit. He was an obvious choicefor the SPOBS staff, for the group wasto be concerned first of all with plan-ning facilities for future air operationsand air defense. The emphasis on airpower was apparent also in the choiceof Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, AC, tohead the group, and of Brig. Gen.Joseph T. McNarney, AC, as GeneralChaney's chief of staff.

The Special Observer Group at firstnumbered eighteen officers and elevenenlisted men. While the task of plan-ning the transportation of U.S. Armytroops, their location in the UnitedKingdom, and their shelter involved theentire SPOBS staff and their oppositesin the British Army, much of the workfell to the engineer officer. Construc-tion planning for the U.S. Army in theBritish Isles was the responsibility offive officers: General McNarney; Lt.Col. George W. Griner, Jr., ACofS,G-4; Lt. Col. John E. Dahlquist, ACofS,

1 Promoted to colonel 26 June 1941 and to briga-dier general on 16 April 1942.


G-1; Lt. Col. Charles L. Bolte, ACofSfor Plans; and Colonel Davison. InNovember 1941 Colonel Davison alsobegan to function as a member of anew technical committee, which repre-sented an expansion of the duties ofthe Special Observer Group and a steptoward closer liaison with the British.

Reconnaissance

For many weeks in 1941, Davison andofficers of the group toured those areasto which American forces would be sentif the United States entered the war.SPOBS activities were guided by thebasic American war plan, RAINBOW-5,and an agreement designated ABC— 1,which resulted from meetings heldearly in 1941 by representatives of theBritish Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staffof the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Chiefof Naval Operations. Features ofABC-1 relating specifically to initialAmerican activities in the Europeantheater included provisions for the de-fense of bases in Scotland and NorthernIreland to be used by U.S. naval forces,the establishment of a U.S. bombercommand to operate from England, thedispatch of a U.S. token force for thedefense of Britain, and American reliefof the British garrison in Iceland.

Between 27 May and 21 November

1941, representatives of the SpecialObserver Group attended eight meet-ings of the Operational Planning Sec-tion of the British Joint Planning Staff;the group had its first meeting with theBritish Air Ministry on 6 June. Thesemeetings promoted practical coopera-tion between the SPOBS staff and Brit-ish officers. Soon after the 27 Maymeeting the British War Office submit-ted a list of questions to General Chaneyconcerning accommodations for U.S.troops. This questionnaire brought upmany points considered in detail byofficers who in the summer and fall of1941 inspected areas in Northern Ire-land, Scotland, and Kent where thetoken force probably would be located.The British had already undertakenmuch of the construction necessary forthe accommodation of American troopsin those areas, but much more neededto be done to extend and improve roadsand to provide housing and other nec-essary structures for the troops.

The rush of events following PearlHarbor outdated the recommendationsand detailed planning that resultedfrom these tours. Colonel Davison andthe other SPOBS officers neverthelessobtained valuable information concern-ing resources, equipment, housing, andBritish methods. Most important, theinspection tours promoted the practi-cal teamwork with the British that waslater so essential to the war effort. Afterthe inspection tour of Northern Ire-land in July 1941, the surveyers reportedto the War Department that the chiefengineering problem in Ulster was toprovide housing for the approximately27,000 troops envisaged in RAIN-BOW-5. The British would be able tosupply all the Nissen huts required, andcrushed rock and cement could be

2 Capt S. J. Thurman et al., The Special ObserverGroup Prior to the Activation of the European The-ater of Operations, Oct 44, OCE, ETOUSA, Hist Sect;Henry G. Elliott, The Administrative and LogisticalHistory of the European Theater of Operations, vol.I, "The Predecessor Commands: The Special Observ-ers (SPOBS) and the United States Army Forces inthe British Isles (USAFBI)," Mar 46, in CMH; RolandG. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, VolumeI: May 1941-September 1944, United States Army inWorld War II (Washington, 1953), pp. 13-113. Unlessotherwise indicated, this chapter is based on thesesources.

THE ENGINEERS CROSS THE ATLANTIC, 1941-1942 9

obtained in England.3 Lumber andquarrying machinery were scarce, how-ever, and hardware would have to comefrom the United States. One engineeraviation battalion and a general serviceor combat engineer regiment would beneeded to do general construction andair field maintenance.4

The plans for Northern Ireland wereeventually carried out with minor de-viations, but this was not the case formost of the other areas surveyed in theUnited Kingdom. After American entryinto the war the bases in Northern Ire-land became more important than thosein Scotland as a new war strategy gaveless relative weight to air defense andoffense and more to preparations forinvasion of the Continent.

The SPOBS officers surveyed threewidely separated sites for prospectiveArmy installations in Scotland: CareLoch, Loch Ryan, and Ayr Airdrome.SPOBS estimated that new constructionwould be necessary to support some6,000 troops: about 860 Nissens forhousing; a hospital at Ayr; and 27 stor-age Nissens distributed among the threeareas. An American contractor was thenat work on U.S. Navy installations atCare Loch and Loch Ryan at oppositeends of the Firth of Clyde. In view ofthe serious labor problem in the UnitedKingdom, the officers suggested threealternatives: concluding an agreementwith the Navy to extend its contracts tocover the Army construction; lettingnew Army contracts with the same com-panies; or shipping one engineer gen-

eral service regiment to Scotland aheadof the first convoy to put up the hospi-tal and troop barracks using BritishNissen huts.5

The proposed token force area inEngland lay southeast of London, nearWrotham in Kent. SPOBS officerschecked the site during late August andearly September, recommending thatan engineer unit, with a plannedstrength of 543 men of the 7,600 in thetoken force, bring all TOE equipment.Engineers in this district would supportan infantry regiment in the field, buildmany new roads, and maintain or widenthe narrow, winding roads in the area.The SPOBS report pointed out thatsupplies for the building of field fortifi-cations and obstacles should be sentfrom the United States.6

SPOBS officers also inspected a con-templated supply or base area near Bir-mingham and a proposed bomber com-mand site in Huntingdonshire, both inthe Midlands. General Chaney sent tothe War Department in the summerand fall of 1941 a series of reports,based largely on studies and estimatesprepared by Colonel Davison, that sum-med up the surveys from an engineer-ing standpoint. A report of 17 Decem-ber 1941 summarized Colonel Davison'srecommendations for construction. Al-though dated ten days after Pearl Har-bor, the report was based on the earlierconcept of air strategy that had gov-erned all SPOBS activity in the UnitedKingdom in 1941.

3 The Nissen hut was a prefabricated half cylinderof corrugated iron with a cement floor. It was namedafter its designer, Lt. Col. P. N. Nissen (1871-1930).

4 Annex 4 (Engr) to Rpt on Northern Ireland, Spe-cial Observer Group, 3 Sep 41, Hist Sect, Intel Div,OCE ETOUSA.

5 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction (United Kingdom), 1946, pp. 16—18,Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547. Thisis one of twenty historical reports prepared by theOCE Intelligence Division during 1945-46.

6 Summary of Annex 4 to Rpt on Token Force Area,4 Sep 41, AG 381 - Kent Area, Token Force, OCEETOUSA Hist Records.


Unlike the earlier ones, the 17 Decem-ber report took for granted the arrivalof American troops in Britain. Britain'slimited material and labor resourceswere already severely strained, and itwas obvious that supplemental Ameri-can labor and materials would beneeded. Starting construction beforethe troops arrived was essential, but thethreat of enemy submarines and a ship-ping shortage dictated moving only aminimum of materials from the UnitedStates. Since troop labor was desirableonly if civilian labor was not available,the final report pointed out that theWar Department would have to deter-mine policy, proportions of skilled andunskilled civilian and troop labor, andmany details relating to materials, con-tracts, and transportation. Matters relat-ing to sites, construction details, andutilities would have to be handled inthe United Kingdom.7

The report provided figures on hous-ing already available together with esti-mates of housing that would have to bebuilt. Somewhat more than 11,000 stan-dard 16-by-36-foot quartering huts wereneeded, as well as nearly 500 40-by-100-foot storage and shop buildings, and442 ordnance igloos. Buildings for10,000 hospital beds would also haveto be built. Hard-surface paving con-struction for airfield access roads andfor aircraft hardstandings added up to182 miles.

Colonel Davison was better ac-quainted than anyone else with theengineering problems that the Armyhad to face in Britain and had studiedall the proposed sites in detail. He knew

the views of the SPOBS staff and thoseof the British War Office. Accordingly,on General Chaney's recommendation,he went to Washington in January 1942to help plan the movement of troopsand their accommodation in Britain.8

Iceland

In June 1941 SPOBS engineers alsoundertook a survey of locations in Ice-land, where an American occupationwas imminent. Construction of facili-ties began before Pearl Harbor as Am-ericans moved in July 1941 to replacethe British on the island.9

Iceland had great strategic impor-tance. The British occupied the islandin May 1940 to prevent its seizure bythe Germans, in whose hands it wouldhave formed a base for attack on Englishsoil and on the British shipping lifeline.Britain had acted quickly to develop airand naval bases in Iceland to protectthe North Atlantic convoy routes. Yetby the summer of 1941 British reversesin the western Sahara prompted plansto withdraw the Iceland garrison foruse in the desert and elsewhere. Talksbegun in February 1941 during theBritish-American ABC—1 meeting setthe stage for a timely invitation fromthe Icelandic Althing (Parliament) forAmerican troops to replace the British.Thus, belligerent Britain proposed toleave the defense of neutral Iceland tothe quasi-neutral United States.10

7 Summaries of SPOBS Planning, pp. 16-24; Rpt,Chaney to TAG, 17 Dec 41, AG 381 (Great Britain,U.S. troops in UK), OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.

8 Msg 24, Chaney to TAG, 22 Jan 42, NorthernIreland Const Prog, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.

9 On the planning for and occupation of Iceland in1941, see Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and ByronFairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts,United States Army in World War II (Washington,1964), pp. 459-531.

10 Lt Col William L. Thorkelson, "The Occupationof Iceland During World War II, Including the Post


On 11 June 1941, Colonel Davisonand seven officers arrived on the islandand by 18 June could report that froman engineering standpoint Iceland hadlittle to offer. Without trees there wasno lumber. Practically all supplies hadto move through the poorly equippedport of Reykjavik. Ships exceeding 470feet in length and 21 feet in draft couldnot moor alongside the two quays thatserved the harbor. The climate offereda mean winter temperature of 30°Fand a summer mean of 52°F, but rain-fall of nearly fifty inches a year andmidwinter winds of eighty miles perhour made working and living condi-tions severe. Only volcanic rock, gravel,and sand were abundant on the bleakisland. Two airdromes built by the Brit-ish were usable immediately but re-quired work to conform to Americanstandards and expansion to accommo-date heavier American traffic. Addedto Reykjavik Field in the city itself andthe Kaldadharnes Airdrome, somethirty-five miles southeast of the capital,were other rudimentary fields such asKeflavik, on a windswept point of landtwenty-five miles southwest of Reykja-vik. A grass field with a runway 1,000yards long and 50 yards wide, it wassuitable for emergency use only. TheSPOBS officers believed that another

site sixty miles southeast of the capital,known as the Oddi Airdrome, gavepromise of immediate development.Two other fields were too remote evento be visited on the hasty tour: Melgerdhiin the north, 13 1/2 miles from Akureyri,and another emergency field at Hoefnin the southeast.

Voluminous, if spotty, collections ofsimilar data reached Washington frommilitary and naval teams scanning theisland's facilities. A Navy party cameover from Greenland looking for likelynaval air patrol bases, and anotherArmy-Marine Corps party arrived afterColonel Davison's departure. GeneralChaney sent the SPOBS report to Wash-ington with Lt. Col. George W. Griner,Jr., the SPOBS G-4 who had accompa-nied Davison. War Department plan-ners compiled the information for theprojected occupation of Iceland underthe code name INDIGO.11

After some changes in planning anda revision in the concept of the opera-tion that committed American troopsto the reinforcement and not to therelief of the British 49th Infantry Divi-sion on the island, a convoy with the4,400 officers and enlisted men of the1st Provisional Brigade (Marines) underBrig. Gen. John Marston, USMC, ar-rived at Reykjavik on 7 July 1941. Armyengineer troops reached that port on 6August 1941 as part of the first eche-lon of Task Force 4 (92 officers and

War Economic and Social Effects," M.A. Thesis, Syra-cuse University, 1949, pp. 16-17, in CMH. Icelandauthorities, doubtful about Britain's staying power inthe war with Germany, had already approached theAmerican Consul in Iceland in December 1940 withsuggestions for including Iceland within the "MonroeDoctrine area." Thurman, The Special ObserverGroup Prior to the Activation of the European The-ater of Operations, p. 49; The Adm and Log Hist ofthe ETO, vol. I, "The Predecessor Commands," pp.36-37; Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds.,"The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. I,Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.122-23, 342-48.

11 Thorkelson, "Occupation of Iceland," p. 5; Rpt,Maj Gen James E. Chaney to CofEngrs, HQ, SPOBS,19 Jun 41, partially quoted in OCE ETOUSA HistRpt 17, Engineering in Iceland, Aug 45, app. 2, Liai-son Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547; The Admand Log Hist of the ETO, vol. I, "The PredecessorCommands," pp. 40—45. An emergency field waseventually built near Oddi. Rpt, Oddi EmergencyStrip, Construction and Installation, Aug 42—45;Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the UnitedStates and Its Outposts, pp. 472—73.


GENERAL BONESTEEL

1,125 enlisted men), the first U.S. Armycontingent to reach Iceland. The forceconsisted of the 33d Pursuit Squadron,which flew in from the U.S.S. Waspoffshore; an air base squadron; and anumber of special service detachmentsto contribute to the air defense of Ice-land. Engineer elements were two com-panies of the 21st Engineer AviationRegiment, soon to be redesignated the824th Engineer Aviation Battalion. On16 September 1941, the 2d Battalion,5th Engineer Combat Regiment, arrivedwith the second echelon of Task Force4; the entire American force in Icelandbecame the Iceland Base Command onthe same day. The command, underMaj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, re-mained directly subordinate to the fieldforce commander in Washington, Gen-eral George C. Marshall. Because ofBritish strategic responsibility for Ice-land, General Chaney continued toargue for the inclusion of the Ameri-

can garrison in Iceland under his con-trol, but his viewpoint did not prevailuntil the summer of the following year.12

During the first days in Iceland, theengineer troops lived in tents previouslyerected by the Marines, and other unitsmoved into Nissen huts provided by theBritish. For a few days after the land-ing of the 2d Battalion, 5th EngineerCombat Regiment, there was consider-able confusion. The base engineer, Lt.Col. Clarence N. Iry, who had comewith the Marine brigade, reported muchequipment broken by careless loadingand handling. The material and spe-cialized equipment for an entire refrig-erated warehouse were damaged be-yond recovery. Navy pressure for quickunloading did not improve matterssince there was no covered storagespace in Reykjavik waterfront areas andtoo little dump space elsewhere. In theconfusion the property of various unitswent widely astray; several weeks passedbefore the engineer battalion locatedall its belongings and assembled themin one place.13

The engineers took up a building,repair, and maintenance program wellbegun by the British. At first their worksupplemented that of the Royal En-gineers, and not until late in 1942 didthey replace their British counterparts

12 Rpt, Maj Gen C. H. Bonesteel to AG, WD, 30 Apr43, sub: Report on Historical Data, Overseas Bases,314.7 Hist, 1942-43; The Adm and Log Hist of theETO, vol. I, "The Predecessor Commands," pp.43-50; Rpt, Base Engr in GHQ, U.S. Army, INDIGO,to the Engr, 1 Sep 41, OCE 381 (INDIGO) Gr Pt; IBCRecord of Events, 14 Jul 41-20 Jun 42, p. 16; OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 17, Engineering in Iceland, pp.8-9; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, p. 19.

13 Ltr, Lt Col Iry to Col George Mayo, CE, 10 Aug41, E 381 (INDIGO) 89, WD, OQMG; Rpt, Base Engrin GHQ, U.S. Army, INDIGO, to the Engr, 1 Sep 41;1st Lt Walter H. Heldt (commanding 21st Engrs [Avn])to CO, HQ, IBCAF, 314.7 Hist Records, 1941-43.


CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES AT REYKJAVIK HARBOR, OCTOBER 1941

entirely. But the main constructionactivities of the war years were alreadyevident: building airdromes, improvingcommunications and supply facilities,and constructing adequate camp andhospital accommodations. The pro-gram, originally limited to the more set-tled part of Iceland in the vicinity ofReykjavik, extended gradually to re-mote regions along the northern andeastern coasts.

The principal problems of construc-tion lay in the forbidding terrain, highwinds, poor communications, and theconsequent difficulties of supply. Out-side the southwestern corner of thecountry, the roads—or the lack ofthem—made long-distance hauling ofbulk supplies impossible. Iceland hadno railroads. Though most shipments

funneled through Reykjavik and thenmoved on to these outposts by smallercraft, vessels from the United Statesoccasionally touched at Akureyri,Seydhisfjordhur and Budhareyri, portsthat had remained ice free year-roundsince 1918. Other than the rock, sand,and gravel obtained locally, all engineersupplies came from the United Statesand Britain. Nissen hutting, coal, andcoke were the principal supplies fromBritain; the Boston Port of Embarka-tion handled the remainder of the Ice-land garrison's needs including the inte-rior fittings for the huts and any neces-sary equipment.14

14 Rad, Navy Dept to AG, for Gross from ConsulReykjavik, 21 Jul 41, AG 320.2; Unsigned British Rptto Dir of Movements, War Office, 18 Aug 41, cited in


ENGINEER TROOPS DUMPING FILL AT MEEKS FIELD, KEFLAVIK

For storage and quarters the engi-neers followed the British example andused Nissen huts that could withstandthe wind. Standard warehouse and bar-racks construction could not stand upto the elements, and even the huts suf-fered when gales ripped the metal sheet-ing from the frames. The men bankedearth and stone against the sides of thestructures to anchor and insulate themand slung sandbags on cables across thearched roofs for stability. Any loosematerial outside in open storage had tobe staked.15

During the first weeks after TaskForce 4 arrived, the engineers rushedto complete troop housing and coveredstorage and pushed to extend the docksin Reykjavik harbor. Nearly everywherethey struggled with a subsoil of soggypeat covered with lava rock. As autumndrew on, they moved ahead with ex-panding airdromes on the island.

By late 1941 American engineers hadgradually taken over airfield construc-tion from the British. Reykjavik Fieldwas under development by a force of2,500 British engineers and Icelandicworkmen when the 21st Engineer Avia-tion Regiment arrived with its heavierconstruction equipment. The Ameri-

Adm 53, IBC Hist; Msg, Chaney to WD, 9 Aug 41,AG 320.2; Msg, Whitcomb [Consul in Reykjavik] toScowden, G-4, WD. The convoy that carried the firstechelon of Task Force 4 to Iceland deposited 11,000tons of stores at Reykjavik, including vehicles, meats,vegetables, dairy products, coal, and coke.

15 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 17, Engineering in Ice-land, app. 8, G-4 Rpt, IBC, and app. 10, Unit Hist,475th Engr Co.


cans took over the western side of thefield, their first responsibility being afoundation for a British prefabricatedhangar. In November the British pulledout of all work at the site except forsome road work on their side of theairdrome. At the end of the year, the21st was in full control of the operationand supervised the contracted Icelandiclabor on the perimeter roads surround-ing the base. The departure of theRoyal Engineers in November and De-cember 1941 also brought the 21st tothe Kaldadharnes site, and survey par-ties began laying out what became thelargest airfield in Iceland at Keflavik.16

The last of the Marine contingent leftIceland in March, and by mid-1942 theIceland Base Command numbered35,000 Army officers and enlisted men,with the requirement for engineer sup-port growing steadily. With the 824thEngineer Aviation Battalion—an off-shoot of the former 21st Engineer Avia-tion Regiment—engaged in airfieldwork, the 5th Engineer Combat Regi-ment built most of the troop quarters,laundries, kitchens, refrigeration andice plants, and hospitals for the garri-son until the arrival of the 7th Engi-neer Combat Battalion in May 1942.Work on roads to connect the outpostsestablished by or taken over from theBritish on the northern and easterncoasts developed in stride with housing

and airdrome construction. (Map 1)17

The limited stretches of hard-toppedroads in the Reykjavik area remainedserviceable, but the gravel tracks else-where took a constant beating fromheavy Army traffic. The 5th EngineerCombat Regiment regraded and metal-ized surfaces where necessary and ap-plied a top course of red lava rockmixed with a finer crushed grade of thelava, a composite also used for thehardstandings, taxi strips, and serviceaccess roads around the airfields.18

The 824th Engineer Aviation Battal-ion still employed hundreds of Iceland-ers on the perimeter roads and hangaraprons at the Reykjavik Field but grad-ually centered its efforts on the hugecomplex at Keflavik. On the wind-sweptpeninsula, two separate fields—MeeksField for bombers and Patterson Fieldfor fighter aircraft—took shape, bothready for operation in early 1943. Workhere was carried on by the 824th inearly 1942 and then taken over by aU.S. Navy contractor. Navy Seabees alsoarrived to work under Army engineersupervision after the civilian contrac-tor returned to the United States. Besetby high winds that scoured the feature-less landscape, the engineers devisedexpedients in the final phases of run-way construction. When the windchurned the powdery top surfaces ofnewly graded runway beds into duststorms, they laid on liquid asphalt. Butwith September frosts, the asphalt cooled

16 Rpt, Base Engr, IBC, to the Engr, GHQ, U.S.Army, Oct 41, OCE (12- 3-41), 381 (INDIGO) 225/2;Rpt, Base Engr, IBC, to the Engr, GHQ, U.S. Army,6 Dec 41, 381 (INDIGO) 267/1; Lt Col D. A. Morris,Notes on Aviation Engineer Operations in Iceland,July 1941 to October 1942, in USAAF pamphlet,Excerpts From Overseas Letters and Memoranda,1943, pp. 5-9, Ft. Belvoir, Va., Engr Sch Lib; CaptReginald J. B. Page (21st Engrs [Avn]) to CO, HQ,IBCAF, Camp Tripoli, Iceland, 314.7 Hist Records,1941-43.

17 IBC, ACofS, G-2, Record of Events, 14 Jun41-30 Jun 42, pp. 12-19, 314.7 Hist, 1942-43;Rpt, Analysis of Engineer Activities in Various The-aters of Operations, Based on Troop Basis, 1 Mar 43,381 (Gen) 661/1, Doc 77446, Intel files, Ft. Belvoir,Va., Engr Sch Lib.

18 Base Engr, INDIGO, to CG, SOS, Monthly Prog-ress Rpt for May 42, OCE (7-4-42), 381 (INDIGO)431.


MAP 1

and coagulated before it could pene-trate the lava deeply enough to stabi-lize it. Later experiments with a porous-mix base produced a runway ruggedenough to take heavy Navy patrol craftand Army bombers on the ferry run toEngland.19

The Iceland Base Command con-verted Iceland into a great protectivebastion for the convoy routes to Europe.Engineer-constructed facilities on theisland housed American defense forcesthat guaranteed one outpost on the way

to the embattled United Kingdom, whichbecame the principal focus of Ameri-can interest in the Atlantic area afterPearl Harbor.

Magnet Force

With the United States an active bel-ligerent, on 2 January 1942, the U.S.Army replaced SPOBS with U.S. ArmyForces, British Isles (USAFBI), a moreformal headquarters that was initiallyonly SPOBS in uniform. But creationof the headquarters made the Ameri-can officers full partners of their oppo-sites on the British staff.

On 5 January 1942, the War Depart-ment placed the engineers in charge ofall overseas construction, but it was Feb-

19 Keflavik Project Report, vol. I, Construction, 1943,pp. 7-10, 600.1; Rpt, Dir, Atlantic Div, BuY&D, toChf, BuY&D, 18 Jun 45, Naval Facilities in Iceland;Morris, Notes on Aviation Engineer Operations inIceland, p. 6; Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Opera-tions: January 1939 to August 1942, p. 346.


ruary before Colonel Davison, still inWashington, got Army approval for aUSAFBI construction program. Pres-sures to bolster home defenses and des-perate attempts to stop the Japanese inthe Pacific were absorbing the energiesof Washington officials, and still anothermonth went by before Colonel Davisoncould obtain facts and figures from theOffice of the Chief of Engineers (OCE)concerning labor, materials, and ship-ping requirements. This was hardlyaccomplished before the War Depart-ment called upon USAFBI to reduceestimated construction to the minimum,despite General Chaney's repeatedwarnings that more construction, espe-cially housing, would be required thanhad been planned in December.20

ABC-1 and RAINBOW-5 providedfor sending an American token forceto England, but America's new belliger-ent status and British needs broughtsome changes. New plans called for theearliest possible dispatch of 105,000men (the MAGNET Force) to NorthernIreland. For tactical purposes, the forcewas to be organized as V Corps, madeup of the 1st Armored and the 32d,34th, and 37th Infantry Divisions, withsupply and service troops as well as airunits. Of the total, 13,310 were to beengineers. Engineer plans for MAGNETForce gave detailed instructions onlanding, administration, depot opera-tions, and supply levels, with heavy reli-ance on the British for accommodationsand supplies. From January to June1942 engineers in the United Kingdom

concentrated on installing the MAGNETForce in Northern Ireland.21

American troops and aircraft wentto Northern Ireland to defend Ulsterfrom air raid or invasion, to lift moralein the United States and in the UnitedKingdom, and to release British troopsfor action in the threatened areas ofthe Near East and Africa.22 But carry-ing out deployments to Northern Ire-land on the scale envisaged in MAGNETForce proved inexpedient because ofthe initial deployments of shipping tomeet the Japanese onslaught in thePacific. Decisions concerning the sizeand makeup of the final MAGNET Forcechanged from time to time during theearly part of 1942. On 2 January theWar Department set the first contin-gent at 14,000; a week later the figurewas increased to 17,300, but on 12 Jan-uary it was reduced to 4,100 in orderto speed troop movements to the Pa-cific. 23

This American strategic uncertaintyafter Pearl Harbor led to contradictionsin events in the British Isles. Thoughthe decision to defeat Germany firstremained unquestioned, the impliedtroop buildup in Britain did not neces-sarily flow from that decision. Rather,as American leaders attempted to meetthe demands of a two-front global war,engineer work in Northern Ireland wasdetermined by the exigencies of themoment and not by a comprehensive

20 WD Ltr, sub: War Department Construction Pol-icy (Theaters of Operation), 5 Jan 42, AG 600.12(1-3-42) MO-D-M; Cbl, Chaney to TAG, 22Jan 42, Northern Ireland Const Prog, OCE ETOUSAHist Records.

21 Gen Annex 9 (Engr) to Operational Plan, North-ern Ireland Theater; Ltr, OCE to Engr, GHQ, 2 Jan42, sub: Northern Ireland Base Section Supplies, 1004Engr files, NIBS.

22 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 128, Logistical Build-up in theBritish Isles, 1946, p. 47.

23 Cbl 491, Marshall to Milattache, LDN, 7 Feb 42,Northern Ireland Const Prog.


GENERAL CHANEY, AMBASSADOR JOHN G. WINANT, AND GENERAL HARTLEinspect American installations in Ulster, Northern Ireland, February 1942.

construction program supporting a stra-tegic plan.24

MAGNET Force started with little no-tice. An advance party under Col. Ed-ward H. Heavey left New York secretlyon 6 January 1942; with it was Lt. Col.Donald B. Adams, the V Corps engi-neer. The party sailed from Halifax ona Norwegian ship and reached Scotlandon the nineteenth. Colonel Adams andthe other officers went to London for aweek of briefing, and the rest of theparty moved on to Belfast. A brigadierof the Royal Engineers guided Adamsalmost from the day he reached North-ern Ireland, acquainting him with Brit-

ish Army methods and with the type ofwork demanded of him in NorthernIreland.25

On 24 January the U.S. Army North-ern Ireland Forces formally came intoexistence. The first troop contingent,under Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle ofthe 34th Infantry Division, arrived onthe twenty-sixth. The troop strengthof 4,100 set for 12 January was notreached; a USAFBI report of 15 Febru-ary showed 3,904 troops and 12 civil-ians in Ulster. By mid-March, after thesecond increment had arrived, U.S.Army Northern Ireland Forces totaled11,039 officers and enlisted men. Thisforce included two engineer combat

24 Ltr, Adams to Chancy, 15 May 42, Engr files,NIBS. 25 Interv with Gen Adams.


battalions and three separate compa-nies of engineers.

The third and fourth incrementsarrived on 12 and 18 May respectively.The fourth, 10,000 troops aboard theQueen Mary, had to go ashore in light-ers, for the great vessel was too largefor Belfast harbor. Meanwhile, the 32dand 37th Infantry Divisions had beendiverted to the Pacific, and at the endof May V Corps consisted of the 34thInfantry Division, the 1st ArmoredDivision, and some corps units. Noengineer construction units were in thetheater. The final engineer componentconsisted of a combat regiment, twocombat battalions, and four servicecompanies. During May, MAGNET Forcereached its peak of 30,000 U.S. Armytroops in Northern Ireland, some 70,000fewer than called for originally.26

U.S. Army engineers had to under-take relatively little construction, fornearly all the American troops broughtto Northern Ireland moved into campsBritish units had vacated. British engi-neer officers made the arrangementsand furnished moveable equipmentand supplies such as furniture, lightbulbs, and coal. Each camp commanderappointed an American utility officerto be responsible for camp maintenanceand to provide fuel, equipment, andwaste disposal service. Arrangementswere made to have American soldiersadmitted to hospitals serving Britishand Canadian units.27

The Americans depended on theBritish for additional construction nec-

essary to house U.S. troops. In fact, theBritish did most of the planning as wellas the building. The first U.S. Armyengineer organizations, which settled inWalworth Camp in County London-derry on Lough Foyle, did not receivetheir organic equipment, including ve-hicles, until weeks after the troops ar-rived. With the "force mark" system,each unit's equipment was coded beforeshipment overseas; men and supplieswent on different ships, the equipmentusually on slower moving vessels. Thissystem plagued almost all engineerunits arriving in the United Kingdomduring 1942. Yet almost as soon as thefirst engineer troops landed, the WarDepartment called for a complete con-struction program for U.S. Army forcesscheduled to arrive in Northern Ire-land. March was over before ColonelAdams could submit a detailed study,for he had little more than a skeletonengineering staff.28

At first, the most essential projectswere building and enlarging engineerdepots. The V Corps commanders estab-lished a new depot at Desertmartin inthe southern part of County London-derry and decided to enlarge an exist-ing depot at Ballyclare in Antrim northof Belfast, adapting it to American use.Once a site was picked, the engineerswere to design the depot—type of build-ing construction, layout of buildingsand access roads, railroad service, and

26 Ibid.; ETO Gen Bd Rpt 128, Logistical Build-upin the British Isles, p. 43; Ltr, Adams to Chaney, 15May 42.

27 Memo, Bonesteel for G-4, 9 Mar 42, NorthernIreland Const Prog.

28 Cbl 410, Marshall to USAFBI, 26 Jan 42, North-ern Ireland Const Prog; Mtg, British Ministry of Com-merce with American Reps, 1942-43,1009 Sup Cont,MofC, Engr files, NIBS; Rpt, Force Engr, NIF, toOCE, 9 May 42, sub: USANIF Engr Tech Rpt No. 5,Engr files, NIBS; Rpt, Force Engr, NIF, to OCE, 3Feb 42, sub: Periodic Engr Rpts as of 1 Feb 42; ETOGen Bd Rpt 128, Logistical Build-up in the BritishIsles, p. 47.


concrete hardstandings. They under-took little actual construction, however.29

Work on enlarging the depot at Bally-clare and force headquarters near Wil-mont, south of Belfast, began early inFebruary. After the Ballyclare construc-tion was finished, a company of the107th Engineer Battalion (Combat) re-mained there to operate the depot,aided by work and guard details fromthe 467th Engineer Maintenance Com-pany. From 1 March to 31 August the112th Engineers (originally a combatbattalion and in June enlarged and re-designated a combat regiment) workedat Desertmartin except for three weeksin late March and early April when itfurnished troops to make repairs atforce headquarters. Such units as the112th Engineer Combat Regiment,Company A of the 109th EngineerCombat Battalion, the 467th EngineerShop Company, the 427th EngineerDump Truck Company, and the 397thEngineer Depot Company chiefly en-larged existing facilities to meet Ameri-can standards and needs.30

By May the supply situation, exceptfor organizational equipment, was com-paratively satisfactory. As early as 20February, engineer items were sixth onthe shipping priority list (below postexchange supplies) and using units,upon their arrival from America, re-quisitioned engineer supplies almostimmediately. Day-by-day requirementsdetermined the use of supplies, for the

engineers had no experience and nodirectives to guide them. Yet by May,Colonel Adams could report that engi-neer supplies were generally adequate.Originally, a system was established tomaintain a sixty- to ninety-day level ofsupplies, taking into account not onlythose troops already in NorthernIreland, but also those due to arrivewithin the next sixty days. Some ofthese supplies came from the UnitedStates without requisition, others byspecific requisition, still others by requi-sition of British military supplies, and acertain amount by local purchase. In-coming supplies went to the engineerdepots at Desertmartin and Ballyclare,and some equipment went to Money-more General Depot, a British deposi-tory taken over for U.S. Army use inCounty Londonderry west of LoughNeagh.31

Shortages of organizational equip-ment persisted, in part because of thedelays caused by the force mark system;at the end of March organizations inthe theater had only 25 percent of theirequipment. Five months later, 85 per-cent was on hand, but by this timeNorthern Ireland had declined in sig-nificance. Some of the equipment wasentirely too light for the constructiondemands made on it.32

On the whole, the engineers sent toNorthern Ireland had had scanty train-ing in the United States except in basicmilitary subjects, and overseas they hadlittle chance to learn their jobs. The

29 Ltrs, Hartle to COC, BFNI, 29 Jan and 3 Feb 42,1001 Engr Depot E-510, Engr files, NIBS; Intervwith Gen Adams.

30 Rpt, Force Engr, NIF, to OCE, 17 Feb 42, sub:Interim Report, O&T Br files, OCE; Ibid., 3 Feb 42,sub: Periodic Engr Rpts as of 1 Feb 42; Ltr, Adams toChaney, 15 May 42; Engr Tech Rpt 9, NIBS to OCE,SOS, 7 Sep 42, Incl 3; Rpt, Engr, NIBS, 26 Nov 42,Engr files, NIBS.

31 Rpt, Force Engr, NIF, to OCE, 9 May 42, sub:USANIF Engr Tech Rpt No. 5; Interv with GenAdams; Cbl, Marshall to SPOBS, 20 Feb 42, 3.00USAFBI Planning, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records; Rpt,Engr, NIBS, 26 Nov 42.

32 Rpt, Force Engr, NIBS, to G-4, NIF, 3 Apr 42,sub: Monthly Rpt on Engr Equipment and Supplies,1004 Sup Misc, 1942, Engr files, NIBS.


112th Engineers, a combat battalionredesignated a regiment in August 1942,was constantly engaged in constructionand was able to give only 10 percent ofits time to training outside of that re-ceived on the job. Though valuable,such work did not train the unit for themany other missions of a combat regi-ment in which it had had no real instruc-tion since September 1941. Thirty per-cent of the men in one battalion hadrecently transferred from the infantry,and many of the enlisted men in theunit had never learned any engineerspecialties.33 The men of the 107thEngineer Battalion (Combat) at Bally-clare were supposed to be undergoingtraining, but they were called on so oftento enlarge force headquarters and reha-bilitate the Quartermaster Depot atAntrim that little time remained.34

Even when time was available, thelack of space hindered training. Agri-cultural land could not easily be with-drawn from production to provide roomfor military training. Engineer organi-zations were unfamiliar with BritishArmy procedures even though afterFebruary 1942 Royal Engineer schoolswere open to American troops. Thefirst attempt to teach British ways waslimited, but eventually such instructionbecame an essential part of U.S. Armyengineer training.35

On 1 June 1942, the Northern Ire-land Base Command (Provisional) wasformed to relieve V Corps of supplyand administrative problems so that itcould, as the highest ground force com-mand in the United Kingdom, devoteits full time to tactical preparations. Thearrangement was short-lived; the com-mand soon became part of a Servicesof Supply in the newly formed Euro-pean Theater of Operations under themore normal designation of a basesection. The decisions that led to theformation of the theater presaged thedecline in importance of Northern Ire-land as a base. By the summer of 1942the main combat forces in the MAGNETForce (the 1st Armored and 34th Infan-try Divisions) had been earmarked foran invasion of North Africa, and U.S.construction in Ulster ceased com-pletely.36

Limited though they were in scope,the engineering tasks in Northern Ire-land were often difficult to accomplish.The damp, cold weather depressedtroops fresh from camps in the south-ern states, and the men complainedabout British food. Equally telling werethe insufficient, inadequate, and fre-quently unfamiliar tools. The earlyperiod in Northern Ireland was, for theengineers, a time of stumbling forward.Yet worthwhile lessons were learned,especially in planning construction andin establishing a supply system. As valu-33 The 112th Engineers was formed in August 1942

on a nucleus of one battalion from the 112th Engi-neers, 37th Division, Ohio National Guard, and an-other from the 107th Engineers, 32d Division, Wis-consin National Guard. The two battalions had hadlittle or no training for the type of constructionrequired in Northern Ireland.

34 Ltr, Adams to Chaney, 15 May 42; ETO Gen BdRpt 128, Logistical Build-up in the British Isles, p. 47.

35 Hist 397th Engr Depot Co; Rpt, Force Engr, NIF,to OCE, 17 Feb 42, sub: Interim Report; Interv withCol Anson D. Marston.

36 On 21 October 1942 there were only 292 U.S.Army engineer personnel left in Northern Ireland.SOS ETOUSA Statistical Summaries XIV, 26 Oct 42,319.25; Rpt, Engr, NIBS, to OCE, 9 Jul 42, sub: EngrTech Rpt No. 7, ETOUSA, 600 NI Gen, Engr files,NIBS; ETOUSA GO 17, 17 Jul 42; SOS ETOUSAGO 79, 9 Dec 42; Thore Bengston, Historical Resumeof Engineer Activities in the British Isles.


able as anything was the day-by-daycooperation with the British.37

The Bolero Plan

Outside of Northern Ireland, theentire engineer force in the British Isleson 1 April 1942 consisted of Maj. Char-les H. Bonesteel III, the officer incharge; a lieutenant detailed from theBritish Army; and two enlisted men onloan from the American embassy. Colo-nel Davison was still in the UnitedStates. A larger engineer buildup a-waited fundamental decisions on strat-egy that would determine troop andsupport requirements. In April thesedecisions came, though they were to bechanged again in August.

In mid-April 1942, General GeorgeC. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff,and Harry Hopkins, President Roose-velt's personal representative, on a spe-cial mission in London won Britishapproval of an American plan for across-Channel invasion in 1943. Underthe original code name BOLERO, theoperation was to have three phases—apreparatory buildup in the British Isles,a cross-Channel movement and seizureof beachheads, and finally a generaladvance into German-occupied Europe.The plan also provided for an emer-gency invasion of Europe in 1942 if theGermans were critically weakened or ifa Soviet collapse seemed imminent. Byearly July the code name BOLERO hadcome to designate only the buildupor preparatory phase; the emergencyoperation in 1942 was designatedSLEDGEHAMMER, and the full-scale 1943invasion was designated ROUNDUP.

BOLERO envisaged the developmentof the United Kingdom as a massiveAmerican base for a future invasionand for an immediate air offensive. Itchanged the dimensions of the Ameri-can task in the British Isles and shiftedemphasis from Northern Ireland toEngland. Between April and August1942 it gave the American buildup pur-pose and direction, but the originalBOLERO concept did not last longenough to permit buildup plans to takefinal form. In the end neither ROUND-UP nor SLEDGEHAMMER proved fea-sible. In late July a new strategic deci-sion for an invasion of North Africa(TORCH) made any cross-Channel inva-sion in 1942 or 1943 all but impossibleand placed the BOLERO buildup inlimbo. The engineer story in Englandduring spring and summer of 1942 isinextricably tied to the changes in direc-tion that resulted from these strategicdecisions.38

At the very least, the BOLERO plangave impetus to the development of anAmerican planning and support orga-nization in the British Isles and laid thegroundwork for the massive buildupfor an invasion in 1943—44. As a firststep, combined BOLERO committeeswere established in Washington andLondon, the task of the London com-mittee being to "prepare plans andmake administrative preparations forthe reception, accommodation andmaintenance of United States forces inthe United Kingdom and for the devel-

37 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 128 Logistical Build-up in theBritish Isles, pp. 11-12.

38 For background on ROUNDUP planning, see Gor-don A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United StatesArmy in World War II (Washington, 1951), pp. 1—45.A detailed study of strategic plans is in Maurice Matloffand Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for CoalitionWarfare, 1941-1942, United States Army in WorldWar II (Washington, 1953), pp. 32-62.


opment of the United Kingdom in ac-cordance with the requirements of the'ROUNDUP' plan." During 1942 thecommittee produced three separateBOLERO troop bases—referred to as keyplans—which provided general guidesfor the buildup, including U.S. Armyengineers. The first BOLERO Key Planappeared on 31 May 1942; a compre-hensive revision based on much moredetailed studies followed on 25 July;and a third plan was published in lateNovember reflecting the adjustmentsrequired by the TORCH decision.39

Each of the plans was based on fore-casts of American troops to be sent tothe United Kingdom and included esti-mates of personnel and hospital accom-modations, depot storage, and specialstructures they would require, togetherwith British advice on where the facili-ties would be found or built. All theseplans suffered from the lack of a firminvasion troop basis, a target date, or aspecific landing zone, but they did rep-resent tentative bases on which buildupoperations could proceed. The origi-nal plan brought to London by Gen-eral Marshall called for thirty U.S. divi-sions included within a total of aboutone million men, all to be in the UnitedKingdom in time for the spring 1943invasion. The BOLERO Key Plan of 31May called for 1,049,000 U.S. troops inBritain, but for not nearly so many divi-sions on account of the need for airand service troops. The second BOLEROPlan of July provided a troop basis of1,147,000. The third plan in Novem-ber, reflecting the abandonment ofhope for a 1943 invasion, set the short-

term goal for April 1943 at 427,000men, although it optimistically retainedthe long-term goal of the first plan—1,049,000. As 1942 ended, however, inthe face of a continuing drain for theoperation in North Africa and an acuteshipping shortage, neither the long- northe short-term goal seemed attainable.BOLERO thus proceeded with uncer-tainty in 1942 and was subject to con-stant changes.40

As the central planning agency in theUnited Kingdom, the BOLERO Com-bined Committee in London was con-cerned with high-level policy only. Sub-committees took care of intergovern-mental planning for specific tasks suchas troop housing, hospitals, and depots.Various permanent British and Ameri-can agencies in direct cooperation un-dertook the day-to-day work, and theseagencies set up special machinery thatdealt with specific problems. To theU.S. Army engineers, the most impor-tant British official at this stage of thewar was Maj. Gen. Richard M. Woo-ten, Deputy Quartermaster General(Liaison) of the War Office. Under hiscommand were two sections: a planninggroup concerned with receiving andhousing troops and another dealingwith entertainment and morale.41

Most American ground troops wereto be stationed in southern England and

39 DQMG(L) Paper 1, Administrative Planning, etc.,for BOLERO and ROUNDUP, 1943, ETO Adm files,BOLERO Misc.

40 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 66, 106; BOLERO Key Plans, BOLERO Publi-cations, ETO Hist Sect, Adm file 50, BOLERO;DQMG(L) Paper 8, 2d ed., Key Plan, 5 Jun 42, BOLEROPublications, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.

41 Maj. Gen. C. R. Moore, Final Report of Chief Engi-neer European Theater of Operations 1942—1945, p. 231(cited hereafter as Moore, Final Report); Mtgs, BritishWar Cabinet, BOLERO Combined Committee (Lon-don), OCE ETOUSA Hist Records; F. M. Albrecht,"Engineer Aspects of Operation BOLERO," The Mili-tary Engineer, XLII, no. 286 (March-April 1950), 116.


were assigned positions in that area (theBritish Southern Command) west of theprincipal British forces, for the Conti-nental invasion plan provided that theAmericans were to be on the right, theBritish on the left, when they wentashore in France. This meant that thou-sands of British troops already on theright would have to move east to newareas. Immediately after publication ofthe first BOLERO Plan, representativesof the two armies met to plan the neces-sary transfers.42

But other problems were not so eas-ily settled. Housing standards includedsuch matters as the size, shape, andequipment of structures, materials tobe used, and sewage facilities. Thesedifficulties were the product of two dif-ferent standards of living; Americanswere reluctant to accept many stan-dards that seemed to the British entirelyadequate. Another problem concernedairfield specifications and materials.These differences surfaced when theBritish turned over their own accom-modations to American forces and drewup plans for new structures. The Brit-ish view was understandable, for oneof BOLERO's chief aims was to limit newconstruction and expansion to the bar-est minimum. Moreover, all the BOLEROinstallations were to be returned to theBritish after they had served their pur-pose for the Americans.

Creation of the Services of Supply

BOLERO required a large American

military organization to handle the pro-posed massive buildup in the UnitedKingdom. On 2 May General Chaneycabled the War Department outlininghis own ideas on a Services of Supply(SOS) to be organized for this purposeand requested personnel to man it. Heindicated that General Davison was hischoice as SOS commander. To head aconstruction division under Davison, hesuggested Col. Thomas B. Larkin orCol. Stanley L. Scott, and his choice forDavison's successor as chief engineerwas Col. William F. Tompkins. Butthe War Department had its own ideas.General Marshall had already chosenanother engineer officer, Maj. Gen.John C. H. Lee, to head the theaterSOS, and by 5 May Lee was busilyengaged in recruiting an SOS staff inWashington. On 14 May Marshall senta directive to Chaney stipulating thatthe organization of the theater SOS wasto parallel that of the SOS recentlyformed under Lt. Gen. Brehon B.Somervell in the United States and wasto be given far broader powers thanChaney proposed. The theater head-quarters was to retain "a minimum ofsupply and administrative services"under the SOS.43

General Lee, a strong-minded, evencontroversial man, entered the theateron 24 May like a whirlwind, determinedto carry out the Marshall directive. Hisapproach provoked spirited resistanceamong General Chaney's staff, most ofwhom believed that the theater chiefsof technical services could functionproperly only if they were directly un-der the theater commander. Chaneyhad already established an SOS com-

42 Memo, HQ, USAFBI, for CofS, USAFBI, 11 Jun42, sub: Conf with HQ, Southern Command, 10 Jun42. Other meetings of DQMG(L) and U.S. Army rep-resentatives took place on 2, 4, and 24 July 1942. SeeLtr, HQ, Southern Command, sub: Operational Con-trol of U.S. Forces, Adm file 50, BOLERO, ETOUSAHist Sect.

43 Ltr, Marshall to CG, USAFBI, 14 May 42, OCEETOUSA Hist Records.


GENERAL LEE

mand in anticipation of General Lee'sarrival. The two officers appeared tohave reached agreement on the com-mand during transatlantic telephoneconversations in which General Davisontook part as well. But after Lee beganoperations in London on 24 May, itdeveloped that his conception of thescope of his command far exceededwhat General Chaney had vaguelystaked out for him. As dynamic an orga-nizer as he was a forceful personality,General Lee eventually acquired a spe-cial train, which he called "Alive," toenable him to make quick trips to solveknotty problems and to hold command-level conferences in complete privacy.44

For all his determination and dyna-mism, General Lee was not to have hisway entirely. On 8 June 1942, the WarDepartment formally established theEuropean Theater of Operations, U.S.Army (ETOUSA), to succeed the USA-FBI command. General Chaney retainedcommand temporarily but on 24 Junewas succeeded by Maj. Gen. Dwight D.Eisenhower, also General Marshall'spersonal choice. Before Eisenhower'sarrival Chaney had already tried toresolve the jurisdiction of the SOS by acompromise arrangement reflected inETOUSA Circular 2 of 13 June 1942.Eleven of eighteen theater special staffsections, including all the technicalservices, were placed under the SOScommander, but he was to carry outhis functions "under directives issued

44 USAFBI GO 17, 24 May 42; ETO Adm File 16,Alive-Special Train.


by the theater commander," and therewere other clauses to assure that thetheater command retained control oftheater-wide functions. The theaterstaff sections under the SOS were tomaintain liaison offices at theater head-quarters. The broad grant of authorityto General Lee was thus diluted by thedual nature of the relationship of histechnical service chiefs to the SOS andto the theater command. The result wasa division of supply and administrativefunctions between the SOS and Head-quarters, ETOUSA.

On assuming command, GeneralEisenhower made only small changesin the arrangement. ETOUSA GeneralOrder 19 of 20 July 1942 actually re-duced the number of staff sectionsdirectly under SOS control, probablythe result of the removal of SOS head-quarters from London to Cheltenham,physically separating it from ETOUSAheadquarters. The engineers, as wellas the other technical services, remainedunder the SOS with their headquarters,in effect, divided between London andCheltenham. It was, in the words ofthe theater's logistical historian, "acompromise solution which . . . resultedin the creation of overlapping agenciesand much duplication of effort." IfEisenhower had an impulse to changethe arrangement, he was soon ab-sorbed in planning for TORCH, an op-eration of which he was to be Alliedcommander, and General Order 19was to govern SOS-ETOUSA relation-ships for another year.45

The Engineer Pyramid

Within this framework, the EngineerService in the ETOUSA finally tookshape. When General Lee first beganassembling his SOS staff in the UnitedStates, he asked General Davison to behis chief engineer. The office Davisonwas to head really had had its startearlier. In March 1942, while Davisonwas still in the United States, eight engi-neer officers and twenty-one enlistedmen sailed for Britain to add some fleshto the skeleton force then under MajorBonesteel. Additional personnel camewith General Davison when he returnedto England in April, and others soonfollowed. In early June their distribu-tion was uncertain; no one knew howmany engineers were to make up thetotal force in the chiefs office, nor,indeed, whether there was to be onechief engineer.46

Officially, the Engineer Service, SOS,ETOUSA, came into existence on 1 July1942. The various divisions were set upthe next day: Supply, Administrationand Personnel, Construction, Quar-tering, Intelligence, and Operationsand Training. (Chart 1} General Dav-ison's tenure as head of the serviceended late in July when General Lee,carrying out a plan to decentralize hiscommand, organized base sections inthe United Kingdom and made Davisoncommanding officer of Western BaseSection. Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin(promoted 23 May 1942) then becamechief engineer, but was called away inSeptember to plan for TORCH and thento command the SOS to be establishedin North Africa. Larkin was titular chief

45 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, p. 44. The account of the evolution of theETOUSA command structure is drawn from pp.32-44.

46 Bengsten, Hist Resume; Lee Diary, entries 7 and8 May 42, Adm files 102, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


engineer until 2 November, but, in fact,he was replaced on 15 September by Col.(later Maj. Gen.) Cecil R. Moore asacting chief engineer, ETOUSA. Withthe landings in North Africa, Moorebecame chief engineer, ETOUSA, on9 November, and was named to thesame job for SOS on 23 November1942.47

Colonel Moore, widely known as"Dinty," served as chief engineer untilthe end of the war in Europe. Born 3July 1894, Moore entered the Armyfrom Virginia Polytechnic Institute in1917 and served overseas in World WarI. The period between the two warsfound him active on various dam pro-jects, primarily in the Pacific Northwestwhere, for a time, he served as the Port-land district engineer under GeneralLee, then chief of the North PacificEngineer Division. In 1940 he was incharge of the building of camps, depots,and hospitals in the Pacific Northwest,and he left this task to go to the Euro-pean theater. Arriving in the UnitedKingdom in July 1942, for some timehe did double duty in OCE and as com-mander of Eastern Base Section.48

During its hectic first months, theEngineer Service, SOS, ETOUSA, wasplagued by these rapid changes in lead-ership, uncertainties about its functions,division of its staff between London andCheltenham, and continuous person-nel shortages. When General Davisontook over, he found that an SOS direc-tive placed the engineers, along withthe other technical services, under the

supervision of G-4, SOS, and that theRequirements Branch of G-4 had re-sponsibility to "prepare policies, plansand directives for the formulation andexecution of supply and constructionprojects in terms of type, quantities, andtime schedules." This function, as faras construction was concerned, seemedto belong rightfully to the chief engi-neer; but only in December was it offi-cially transferred, although the engi-neers had long before assumed it inpractice.49The move of SOS to Cheltenham, a

famous watering spot in the Gloucester-shire countryside some ninety mileswest of London, accentuated the diffi-culties of coordination between theaterand SOS engineer sections. The chiefengineer and his division chiefs wereperforce commuters between Chelten-ham and London in their efforts tocoordinate work between the two com-plementary but often overlapping engi-neer sections. Maintaining two staffsworsened the manpower shortages ofthe engineer force in the United King-dom, a force that did not have all itsauthorized officers until 15 May 1943and enlisted men until mid-September.50

The shortages affected the progressof all the engineer command's work.Besides construction, for which Ameri-can engineers relied so heavily uponthe British, the SOS command as of 13June 1942 was responsible for railroadoperations, quartering and utilities, and

47 ETOUSA GO 19, 20 Jul 42; SOS ETOUSA GO1, 20 Jul 42; SOS ETOUSA Cirs, 1, 1 Jul 42; 2, 2 Jul42; and 3, 20 Jul 42; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1,Organization, Administration, and Personnel (UnitedKingdom), 1946, p. 6, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSAAdm file 547.

48 Moore, Final Report, p. 13.

49 SOS, Initial Directive for the Organization of theSOS, ETO, 23 Jun 42, and SOS Cir 63, 14 Dec 42;both in Compilation of Directives Relating to Engi-neer Services, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records. Com-ments by Brig Gen F. M. Albrecht.

50 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization, Admin-istration, and Personnel, p. 23. For more details, seech. III.


GENERAL LARKIN

for all the boats and landing craft sched-uled to arrive with incoming amphib-ian engineer units. In August the newTransportation Corps (TC) took overthe railroads, but the engineers still hadtoo few men to procure fire-fightingequipment for the transportation ser-vice, acquire cranes, lumber, and realestate, and build fuel pumping instal-lations. Col. Arthur W. Pence, who hadarrived with General Lee to be the dep-uty chief engineer of SOS ETOUSAfound the personnel situation highlyconfused. He could only commiseratefor the moment with General Davisonthat the twenty officers available for theOffice of the Chief Engineer in the Ser-vices of Supply command were notenough to do the job.51

Despite personnel and organizationalproblems during 1942 the engineerparts were gradually building into aworking machine, as the developmentof the "static force," or regional orga-nization, demonstrated. The need fordistrict organization such as existed inthe United States was appreciated byengineer officers—Colonel Pence, forexample—even before General Lee haddecided to set up such a system. On 9June General Lee asked the War De-partment for personnel to make uptwelve engineer district offices, and theengineers began to establish such anorganization on 3 July. This engineermachinery was absorbed on 20 July by

General Lee's reorganization of theentire SOS. He established four basesections, roughly paralleling a Britishmilitary division of the United King-dom. (Map 2) These jurisdictions—theNorthern Ireland, Eastern, Western,and Southern Base Sections—were di-vided into districts which, in turn, weredivided into areas. Each organization,from the base section down, had its ownengineer.52General Lee's aim was to employ the

base sections and their subdivisions asinstruments of the parent SOS to securecentralized control and decentralizedoperation of the whole field organiza-tion. The base sections became the

51 ETOUSA Cir 2, 13 Jun 42; SOS ETOUSA InitialDirective for the Organization of SOS, ETO; OCEETOUSA Cir 1, 1 Jul 42, sub: Responsibility of theConstruction and Real Estate Activities; SOS ETOUSAProcurement Directive 5, 17 Jul 42; 8, 19 Aug 42; 11,18 Sep 42; and 14, 2 Nov 42; OCE ETOUSA Cir 22(O&T), 16 Sep 42; SOS ETOUSA Cir 13, 19 Aug 42;Ltr, Pence to Col J. S. Gorlinski, OCE, Wash D.C., 4Jun 42; all in OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.

52 ETOUSA GO 19, 20 Jul 42; SOS ETOUSA Cirs1, 1 Jul 42; 2, 2 Jul 42; and 3, 20 Jul 42; SOS GO 10,20 Jul 42; Ltr, Pence to Gorlinski, 4 Jun 42; OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization, Administration,and Personnel, p. 4.


offices of record, while the districtswere primarily offices of supervision.The base section, district, and areastaffs were known as the static force,and each worked in close liaison withits local counterpart in the British Ar-my. Two of the four base section com-manders first appointed by GeneralLee—General Davison and ColonelMoore—were engineers.53

The base section engineer was notonly a member of the base section com-mander's special staff but was also therepresentative with the base section ofthe chief engineer, SOS. This created adifficult problem: the division of author-ity between the chief engineer and thebase section commander. When thefield system came into being, "technicalcontrol" was reserved to the chief ofeach service, but the concept was sovague that it satisfied no one. Formonths, the matter troubled the entireSOS organization, and it was nevercompletely settled. In August Head-quarters, SOS, attempted to clarify thesituation for the engineers. New con-struction and base repair shops wereremoved from the base section com-manders' jurisdiction, and ColonelMoore, chief engineer, obtained author-ity to deal directly with his representa-tives in the base sections on these mat-ters. Nevertheless, the engineers weretold to keep the base section command-ers informed concerning progress. Al-though on paper Colonel Moore haddirect authority over new construction,in practice both he and the base sectioncommanders expected the base sectionengineers to assume responsibility; leav-

ing a large measure of authority tothese subordinate officers made it pos-sible to avoid controversy.54

Roundup Planning

In addition to organizing a base inthe United Kingdom for an Allied inva-sion of the Continent, it was necessaryto plan for the operation itself. AROUNDUP Administrative PlanningStaff was set up for joint planning,holding its first meeting on 29 May1942. Of the forty original sections, sev-eral were of special concern to theengineers: port salvage and repair,development of communication lines,shops and utilities, water supply, bridg-ing, and construction and maintenanceof airfields. A U.S. Joint Staff Plannersdecision on the jurisdiction over land-ing craft also made the engineers inthe theater responsible for training boatcrews for amphibious operations inEurope.55

As deputy chief engineer at Head-quarters, ETOUSA, Col. Elmer E.Barnes headed the engineer plannersfor ROUNDUP; it was July before heobtained even a limited number of offi-cers for his staff. While chiefly con-cerned with ROUNDUP planning,Barnes' organization also maintainedcontact with the British on all engineermatters, prepared studies on construc-tion requirements for the ConstructionDivision of OCE, SOS, and maintained

53 Memo, Harwood for Moore, 30 Jul 42, Min ofMtgs 1942, USFET, Engr Sect; SOS ETOUSA Cir 3,20 Jul 42.

54 Comments by Gen Moore on MS, Engineer Opera-tions in Europe and Africa; SOS GO 10, 20 Jul 42;SOS ETOUSA Cirs 3, 20 Jul 42, and 12, 17 Aug 42.

55 Incl, Appreciation of ROUNDUP, Adm Plng Situa-tion, 4 May 43, w/ Memo, OCE for Port, Gen Const,Communications, Utilities & POL Sections of the PlngBr, Const and Quartering Div, 20 May 43, OCEETOUSA Hist Records; Mins, U.S. Joint Staff Plan-ners, 20 Apr 42, ABC 334, JSP Min, sec. 1 (2-13-42).


liaison with the Operations and Train-ing and Supply Divisions of OCE, SOS.Finally, Barnes' office coordinated engi-neer activities with other arms and ser-vices represented at ETOUSA head-quarters in London.56

Colonel Barnes and his subordinatesfaced a chronic shortage of officers andthe lack of a basic operational plan forROUNDUP in 1942. The engineer sec-tion at Headquarters, ETOUSA, una-voidably lost time and wasted effortbecause everything had to be referredfor approval to OCE, SOS, at Chelten-ham. For example, the officer dealingwith expected construction require-ments on the Continent after the inva-sion would have to send his plan andestimates to Cheltenham for approvaland suggestions, wait for the revision,and then return his second draft forfinal approval.57

When TORCH preparations went intofull swing, ROUNDUP planning was vir-tually shelved, to be taken up again ascircumstances permitted. Key person-nel were assigned to the North Africaninvasion, and a Pentagon directive of18 November that prohibited stockpil-ing of supplies and equipment forROUNDUP beyond that required for the427,000-man force further handi-capped Barnes. The British, who in-sisted on going on with their ROUNDUP

planning, wanted to continue stockpil-ing standardized supplies to be used byBritish and American forces. In onecase they tried to obtain a particularitem of petroleum, oil, and lubricants(POL) equipment from the UnitedStates, but because of the new Ameri-can policy they had to continue manu-facturing and using their own prod-uct.58

G-4, ETOUSA, continued a sem-blance of planning by requiring fromeach of the services a maintenance pro-gram for a theoretical Continental op-eration. The engineers also preparedtheir part of an invasion plan, an exer-cise that eventually proved its value inhelping to determine the necessaryengineer nonstandard heavy construc-tion—Class IV—supplies and the ade-quacy of the engineer troop basis.59

As important as any aspect of thiswork was the experience gained inworking with the British. Estimatingrequirements, for example, led to theestablishment of a joint stockpile whichcut down duplication and made supplyfacilities more flexible. The tremendoustonnages involved and the long peri-ods required for production made theimportance of the joint stockpile ap-parent. Close liaison also promoted stan-dardization of equipment. For example,the U.S. Army in December 1942 req-uisitioned from the British ROUNDUPstocks 20,000 standard 16-foot-wide56 History of the Engineer Service, p. 6, ETO Adm

file 547, Engrs; Chron. of Events (OCE ETOUSA);Memo, Barnes for Moore, 10 Jul 42, Orgn for ETOEngr Sect, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records; Rpt, OCEETOUSA CG to ETOUSA, 8 Aug 42, 319.1 OCERpts to CG, EUCOM Engr files; OCE ETOUSA HistRpt 1, Organization, Administration, and Personnel,app. 25; Memo, Harwood for Barnes, 15 Sep 42, 316Office Methods, EUCOM Engr files.

57 Memo, Barnes for Moore, 10 Jul 42; Incl, Appre-ciation of ROUNDUP w/Memo; Memo, Lord for Moore,2 Nov 42, SOS and OCE Organization, OCE ETOUSAHist Records.

58 Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 17 Nov 42, ETO 381ROUNDUP, Jul—Nov 42; Weekly Rpt, London Repr,OCE, 12 Oct and 7 Dec 42, 319.1 Engr Sect, ETOLondon Repr Rpts, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.

59 Ltr, 18 Dec 42, sub: Engr Operational Plans inConnection with G-4 Directing for ROUNDUP Plan-ning, Engr Sect, ETOUSA; Incl, Appreciation ofROUNDUP w/Memo; Rpt, A Total Tonnage Schedulefor the Nov 42 G-4 Problem, etc., Amphibious Sect,Engr Sect, ETO, ROUNDUP, OCE ETOUSA.


Nissen huts, 6 million square feet of24-foot-wide Nissen hutting, 2,000 Bai-ley bridges, 25 million sandbags, largequantities of barbed wire, and othersupplies. These requisitions were "onpaper" for future delivery and repre-sented a part of planning for the actualinvasion. In road and general construc-tion, where the problems were more orless peculiar to each force, joint actionextended only to the standardizationof materials. In addition to its otherbenefits, standardization in any formtends to reduce costs. The good rela-tions established at planning meetingswere of incalculable importance for thefuture.60

In connection with POL distribution,port reconstruction, and beach and portoperations, the engineers in the vari-ous ROUNDUP administrative planningsections in 1942 accomplished worth-while planning. Less was achieved inregard to water supply and amphibi-ous operations, little on bridging prob-lems, and almost nothing on airfieldconstruction and maintenance.61

When OCE, ETOUSA, conducted adrastic self-examination in the fall andwinter of 1942, it discovered that SOSpersonnel concerned themselves toomuch with matters in which they shouldnot have been involved beyond coordi-nating details after receiving broadoperational plans from London. TheETOUSA section was further embar-rassed by difficulty in securing well-

qualified personnel, probably becausecurrent needs, especially for construc-tion, seemed much more important thanrather indefinite planning for ROUND-UP. These were not the criticisms ofBarnes alone, but also of other impor-tant officials at SOS headquarters.

In the meantime, through the lastfew months of 1942, Colonel Barnes'group broadened its field, not only inplanning for the future, but also in pre-senting the SOS and ETOUSA engi-neer view on any new procedures adopt-ed in the theater. Finally, in November,Col. Royal B. Lord, then chief of theOperations and Training Division, de-clared that "the time has arrived to putall planning under Colonel Barnes."63

Near the end of 1942, most officersin OCE could agree that the rather arti-ficial separation of ETOUSA and SOSheadquarters impeded efficient oper-ations.64 Yet despite the problem of thedrain that TORCH imposed on engineerpersonnel and resources in the UnitedKingdom, by the end of the year veryreal progress had been made in build-ing an organization that would play animportant role in preparing for thecross-Channel invasion in 1943 and1944. Although many problems wereleft unsolved, the machinery for thebuildup to come was put together in

60 Mtgs, BOLERO Combined Committee (London);Moore, Final Report, p. 38; Daily Jnl, entry 12 Dec 42,Supply Div, OCE ETOUSA, EUCOM Engr files.

61 Rpt, Engr Sect, ETOUSA, 22 Nov 42, sub: Sum-mary of POL Activities (1 Jul-15 Nov 42), and Folder,Total Tonnage Schedule for Nov 42 Problem ROUND-UP, both in OCE ETOUSA Hist Records, Apprecia-tion of ROUNDUP.

62 O&T Informal Memo, 23 Oct 42, on relationsbetween ETO and SOS, file Organization Oct—Dec42, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records; Memo, Milwit forHarwood, 5 Nov 42, SOS and OCE Organization, OCEETOUSA Hist Records; Memo, Moore for Reybold,30 Nov 42, sub: Engr Problems in ETO, 381 WarPlans (Jun 42-Jul 43), EUCOM Engr files.

63 Memo, Barnes for Moore, 12 Oct 42, 319.1 ETO(weekly), Jul 42-Apr 43, EUCOM Engr files; Memo,Lord for Moore, 2 Nov 42.

64 Memo, Col Harwood for Div Chfs, OCE, 12 Nov42, w/replies and related material in file OrganizationOct-Dec 42, OCE ETOUSA Hist Records.


the spring and summer of 1942. Re-peated changes in SOS and engineertroop allotments upset planning, butthe organization, hurriedly assembled

in a strange land under the stress ofwar, worked reasonably well in carry-ing out a quartering and constructionprogram across the British Isles.

CHAPTER III

The Engineer Machine in Motion inthe United Kingdom, 1942

The engineer force in the UnitedKingdom spent the months followingthe formal organization of the theatercommand struggling to fulfill its obliga-tions under the BOLERO Plan, whichwas beset by problems of organizationand direction, supply, personnel,methodology, weather, and geography.Efficient management was difficult ifnot impossible given uncertain goals,insufficient personnel, and a bifurcatetheater structure. The TORCH decisiondisrupted the BOLERO program beforeit could build up any momentum andscattered the engineer effort. Never-theless, an important beginning wasmade in 1942 in creating a base inEngland for an eventual cross-Channelinvasion, and the engineer effort wasno small part of that accomplishment.1

Personnel

Engineers formed part of the ground

and air force troop bases as well as thatof the Services of Supply, but the ser-vice force engineers were supposed todo most of the static force constructionwork. Service engineers in the forcesent to Northern Ireland had beenoutnumbered by combat engineers,who consequently had to do construc-tion work for which they had not beentrained. In an effort to avoid such asituation in the whole United Kingdombuildup, the Office of the Chief ofEngineers (OCE) in Washington askedthe War Department to provide 16,000men immediately for twelve generalservice regiments and ten dump truckcompanies. They were to be sent over-seas with a minimum of basic militarytraining. Late in March General Chaneyasked for three general service regi-ments and for a like number of engi-neer aviation battalions to assist theBritish in building those airfields to beturned over to the American air force.Early in May 1942 the Office of theChief of Engineers (OCE), USAFBI,made its first formal requisition for tengeneral service regiments (13,000 men)and ten engineer aviation battalions(7,000 men) to arrive in the theaterbetween June and October. Not count-ing aviation battalions, USAFBI thenexpected there would be some 40,330

1 Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is basedon Min of Mtgs,Jun-Dec 42, USFET Engr 337; Rpts,1942-44, EUCOM Engr file 319.1; and related docu-ments in the following EUCOM Engr files: 321 Engrs,381 Supply 1942-43, 381 BOLERO, 381 War Plans,400 Maintenance, 475 Engr Equipment, and Daily Jnl(Supply and Adm Services), Jun 42-Jul 43. Othersources used throughout, but not always separatelycited, are Moore, Final Report, and Ruppenthal, Logis-tical Support of the Armies, Volume I.


U.S. Army engineers in Britain at thetime of the Continental invasion. Ofthese, the two largest groups would becombat units (11,394 men) and generalservice units (17,626 men).2

These calculations were soon out-dated by those surrounding the formalinception of the BOLERO program. Thefirst tentative BOLERO troop basisdrawn up in Washington in early Maycontemplated a force of 1,042,000 forROUNDUP, about 25 percent servicetroops. Later in May the War Depart-ment prescribed priorities for ship-ment—first air units, then essentialSOS units, then ground forces, followedby additional service units to preparefor more ground force troops. Withinthese general lines, the theater wasexpected to prescribe priorities for par-ticular types of units. The scheme waslogical enough, but it broke down inpractice in the face of shipping short-ages, lack of trained service troops, andfinally the midsummer shift in strategy.

Early in June 1942 (coincident withthe first BOLERO Key Plan) the WarDepartment submitted to ETOUSA amore detailed breakdown of a troopbasis that totaled 1,071,060 men. TheWar Department allotted just over104,000 engineers to the theater:31,648 in a total of 279,145 troops forthe Services of Supply; 54,380 in aground force troop strength of585,565; and 18,909 aviation engineersin an Air Forces strength of 206,400.General Davison argued for increasesin all categories to raise the total engi-

neer troop strength to about 147,000,but he received no concessions. Indeed,on the premise that the command coulduse quartermaster units for many jobs,the SOS allocation was reduced to29,500.3

The Operations and Training Divi-sion of the Office of the Chief of Engi-neers (OCE), ETOUSA, had madeDavison's estimates, using the capabili-ties of engineer units against the tasksto be performed. For example, depottroop requirements were calculatedfrom the number of depots and the ton-nage to be handled, and maintenancecompanies from the number of piecesof equipment to be kept in condition.But calculations depended on the troopbasis figure, which constantly changed.Not until the fall of 1943 could a defi-nite ETO troop basis be evolved foreither SOS or combat engineers. Fur-thermore, the value of these tentativetroop bases was questionable becausethe number of trained engineer troopsto support the forces involved was solimited. Planning for aviation engineerunits was originally based on one airforce, the Eighth, which included inter-ceptor, bomber, fighter, and servicecommands. After TORCH, a decisioncame to have two air forces, strategicand tactical. The Air Forces estimatedthe number of engineer aviation battal-ions required, although the chief engi-neer concurred in the proposed total.4

2 Memo, O&T Br, Trp Dir, OCE, for CofEngrs, 11Mar 42; Ltr, CG, USAFBI, 2 Apr 42; Memo, O&TDiv for CofS, USAFBI, 5 May 42; and BOLERO Move-ment Schedule, 9 May 42; all in OCE ETOUSA HistRecords.

3 Memo, Davison for Baker, 25 Jun 42; Memo,Davison for Pence, 1 Jul 42; and Memo, SOS, ETOUSA,14 Jul 42, sub: Troop Requirements; all in 321 Engrs,1942 (Jun-Sep), EUCOM Engr files.

4 Moore, Final Report, pp. 42-45; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 4, Troops (United Kingdom), 1946, p. 17,Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547;Albrecht, "Engineer Aspects of Operation BOLERO,"pp. 119-20.

THE ENGINEER MACHINE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1942 37

The problem of the shifting troopbasis was compounded by that of find-ing units to fulfill the plan of the mo-ment. Before Pearl Harbor the U.S.Army had few trained service units, andafter that day the great cry was for com-bat forces. The War Department wasslow to recognize the need for serviceforces and to start their training.5 At aMay SOS conference in WashingtonColonel Larkin said that a half-trainedman in the theater was better than noman at all. Accepting this philosophy,the War Department authorized theearly shipment of 10,000 service troopsto the ETO, many of whom were in-deed half trained.

Already plagued by the lack oftrained units and an acute shippingshortage, the whole BOLERO schedulewas thrown off by TORCH. In Augustword came from the War Departmentthat no more SOS engineers were to bestationed in the United Kingdom, whilemany of the units there were alertedfor movement to North Africa. In Sep-tember a new tentative troop basis waspublished by G-4, ETO, based on theadjustment for TORCH and the 427,000-man force reflected in the thirdBOLERO Plan. In this plan engineerswere to provide 45,000 men or 10.5percent of the total force—16,600 inan SOS force of 106,000; 6,000 in aground force of 159,000; and 23,000aviation engineers in an Air Forcesstrength of 157,000.

The actualities were somewhat dif-ferent. On 1 July 1942, of 58,845Americans in the ETO, then chiefly inNorthern Ireland, only 2,150 were en-gineers. By November the ETO totalwas 255,155 and the number of engi-neers had risen to more than 40,000,but 18,554 of them had left Englandfor North Africa by January 1943. The21,858 left represented 20 percent ofthe remaining ETOUSA command, apercentage in line with General Lee'spolicy to deploy engineers to the UnitedKingdom early to prepare the way forair and ground forces. But the actualnumber of engineers was still well belowthe 45,000 authorized to be there inthe next two months and was insuffi-cient to perform tasks under the427,000-man plan, much less the long-range plan for a million-man force.Moreover, organizing new units suchas pipeline companies and separatewater supply companies for TORCH, aswell as transfers to fill units alerted forNorth Africa, left the remaining engi-neer units in the United Kingdom witha shortage of 3,000 men.6

The problems of requisitioning engi-neers and of supervising assignmentand promotion in the Office of theChief of Engineers (OCE), SOS, werethe concern of the Personnel and Ad-ministration Division, OCE, organizedin July 1942. The division's first chief

5 On the overall problem of service troops in thetroop basis in 1942, see Richard M. Leighton and Rob-ert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43(Washington, 1956), pp. 346-52, and Kent RobertsGreenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, TheOrganization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington,1947), pp. 159-260; both in the United States Armyin World War II series.

6 Folder, Engr Serv in UK; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt4, Troops, app. 2; SOS ETOUSA Statistical SummaryXII, 12 Oct; XIV, 26 Oct; and XV, 2 Nov; StatisticalSummaries, 319.25, EUCOM Engr files; ETO GenBd Rpt 128, Logistical Build-up in the British Isles, p.47; RG 741, Gen Bd 401/13, Logistical Buildup in theUK, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, toSOS ETOUSA, 19 Dec 42, sub: New Engineer TroopBasis, 320.3, EUCOM Engr files; Memo, Moore forReybold, 30 Nov 42, sub: Engr Problems in ETO.


was Maj. J. M. Franey, soon succeededby Maj. Beryl C. Brooks. The divisioninitially edited the consolidated per-sonnel requisitions which engineer unitssubmitted and then transmitted themto G-1, SOS, whence they went toG-1, ETOUSA, and finally to the WarDepartment. This procedure provedcumbersome and slow, and OCE, SOS,ordered engineer units to submitmonthly requisitions directly to G-1,SOS, with OCE assisting in a staff capac-ity to process the requisitions throughG-1.7

The division had difficulty in obtain-ing authorized personnel. Requisition-ing officers and enlisted men by nametook too long. Early in 1942 many offi-cers assigned to OCE and to base sec-tions came from a reserve pool; manyothers were former engineer divisionand district officers from the Zone ofthe Interior (ZI). The 342d, 332d, and341st Engineer General Service Regi-ments, among the earliest engineerunits dispatched to Britain, were filledwith men experienced in civilian con-struction work, obtained under specialOCE recruiting authority.8

In July 1942 General Larkin hadcomplained of a lack of military experi-ence among engineer officers, and inOctober Colonel Moore found that 84of 271 officers in the base sections andin OCE, ETOUSA, had no previousmilitary experience. Among the re-

maining 187 officers, 170 were fromthe National Guard or the OfficersReserve Corps with little active militaryexperience. Of seventeen RegularArmy officers, four were quite youngand six were tapped for the impendingTORCH operation. Only seven experi-enced officers remained to handle theeleven important jobs of chief engineer,chief engineer's deputy, executive, divi-sion chiefs, supervisor of engineerschools, and three base section engineerposts. SOS engineer units averaged oneregular or former regular per regi-ment, and sometimes he was of juniorgrade. Most of the remaining officerswere commissioned in the Army of theUnited States (AUS).9

Aviation engineer units lacked skilledconstruction personnel. The total con-struction experience among thirty-twoofficers of one aviation battalion addedup to two years, while few battalionshad an experienced unit engineeringofficer. Conditions were no better inthe lower ranks, and inexperiencedofficers had to do much of the work ofeven more inexperienced noncommis-sioned officers. To remedy the situa-tion Colonel Moore recommended thatthe post of engineering officer in anengineer aviation battalion be raised

7 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization, Admin-istration, and Personnel, pp. 5, 17, 21—23 and app. 2;Memo, OCE, SOS ETOUSA (Personnel and AdmDiv), for Col Harwood, 14 Nov 42, Organization,Oct-Dec 42; OCE, SOS ETOUSA, Cir 2, 2 Jul 42,Orgn Charts, ETOUSA SOS Commands.

8 Ltr, Col Harwood to Col William W. Bessell, Jr.,OCE, WD, 321.02 Engr Officers (27 Jul-31 Oct 42),EUCOM Engr files; Interv, Dr. John S. G. Shotwellwith Col William W. Bessell, Jr., 9 Sep 50.

9 Ltr, Larkin to OCE, WD, 30 Jul 42, sub: EngrSupplies, Equipment, Personnel, and Units, 381 WarPlans (Jul 42-Jul 43), EUCOM Engr files; Memo,OCE, SOS ETOUSA, for G-1, ETOUSA, 13 Oct 42,321 Engr Officers, EUCOM Engr files; AUS, Armyof the United States, refers to the temporary militaryorganization established in wartime encompassing theRegular Army, the National Guard while in federalservice, the organized reserves, all draftees, and offi-cers specially appointed in the wartime establishmentbut not in any particular component. The last was thecategory in which civil engineers in great demand forwar zone or domestic projects received commissionsand rank in the military organizations they were join-ing at home or overseas.


from the rank of captain to that ofmajor.10

TORCH drew heavily on experiencedunits and key officers with executiveand administrative ability. The Officesof the Chief of Engineers, SOS, andETOUSA, and the base sections gaveTORCH sixty-five officers, includingGenerals Larkin and Davison and Colo-nel Pence and Lt. Col. Howard H. Reedof the Supply Division. Headquarters,ETOUSA, alerted four battalions of avi-ation engineers for North Africa. Tobring these units to full strength, SOShad to draw on the remaining twelvebattalions for both officers and enlistedmen. For example, the 830th gave 30men per company to the 814th; the809th, also bound for North Africa,drew 105 men from the 832d and 57from the 825th. Engineer general ser-vice regiments and combat battalionsalso helped fill out alerted units.

Training

The problems created by personnelshortages and transfers were com-pounded by the inadequate training ofengineers in the theater. Many engi-neer troops lacked not only specialisttraining but even adequate basic train-ing. The Corps of Engineers' size dou-bled in the first six months of U.S. par-ticipation in World War II, and train-ing new personnel for urgent demandswas impossible.11

Colonel Lord, deputy chief engineer,ETOUSA, concluded in December1942 that basic training had to be com-pleted in the United States. He did notstand alone in this judgment, althoughit was in conflict with Colonel Larkin'sbelief that a half-trained man was bet-ter than no man.12 Many half-trainedengineer troops reached the ETO. Sixgeneral service regiments arrived in theEastern Base Section area in the sum-mer of 1942; they had received an aver-age of ten weeks' basic training betweentheir organization in the United Statesand their departure for a port of em-barkation. Losses of cadres for newlyformed units weakened many engineerorganizations shortly before they wentoverseas. Some engineer unit officers,even commanders, were transferred toother units after reaching the port ofembarkation. However necessary it wasto build up a large force, the immedi-ate effect on particular units was oneof incalculable harm.13

Many units were brought up tostrength only at the port of embarka-tion. In 1942 the 397th Engineer DepotCompany arrived at Fort Dix, a stagingarea for the New York Port of Embar-kation (POE), with 4 officers and 68enlisted men, picking up an additional104 enlisted men at Dix. In anothercase the 830th Engineer Aviation Bat-talion received 82 percent of its enlisted

10 Memo, Moore for Reybold, 30 Nov 42, sub: Replyto Questionnaire, 381 War Plans (Jun 42-Jul 43),EUCOM Engr files; Unit Hist, 818th Engr Avn Bn.

11 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 4, Troops, pp. 2-3;Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization ofGround Combat Troops, p. 203; Ann Rpt, OCE, WD,1942, p. 3; See Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corpsof Engineers: Troops and Equipment, chs. 5, 7, 11, 15, 16for detailed treatment of engineer training in the Zoneof the Interior.

12 Ltr, Col R. B. Lord, Dep Chf Engr, ETOUSA, toCol J. H. Carruth, G-3, ETOUSA, 26 Dec 42; Memo,Col Albrecht, Construction Div, for Col R. B. Lord,13 Jan 43, 325.51 Policies and Plans, EUCOM Engrfiles; Lee Diary, entry for 18 May 42.

13 Hists: 470th Engr Maint Co; 98th, 344th, 346thEngr GS Rgts; 424th, 433d, 434th Engr Dump TruckCos; 397th, 450th Engr Depot Cos; 817th, 818th,819th, 831st, 834th Avn Bns; Ltr, Lt Col James E.Walsh to CofEngrs, 28 Dec 43, sub: Operation of GSRgt, D1784, Engr Sch Lib; Bennett interv.


men and 50 percent of its officers be-tween 29 July and 9 August 1942, be-fore entraining for Fort Dix on 11August. Units manned in such fashioncould hardly be characterized as cohe-sive.

The hope persisted that basic .train-ing could be completed in the UnitedKingdom and that the troops couldlearn their special skills on the job.Good construction experience could begained, as could some training for am-phibious operations, but not for suchcombat skills as laying and removingmines, booby traps, and other obstaclesand rapidly building and reinforcingbridges. Engineer aviation units, whichwere kept busy constructing permanentbomber bases, could not be trained forbuilding hasty airfields in forwardareas. Reports on North African opera-tions later highlighted such deficien-cies.14

The chief of engineers in Washing-ton formally recognized the vital needfor training, but practical considera-tions prevented rapid solutions. A sup-ply plan issued in September 1942 lefta loophole for tired construction unitsin England, then working seven days aweek on day and night shifts, by provid-ing that training be carried on withminimum interference to unit dutiesand tasks. Thus during 1942, trainingwas overshadowed—first by the buildupand then by preparations for TORCH.In practice, the time spent on trainingvaried from one hour in eight to one inten. Some troops took one hour for fivedays, then four hours on the sixth day.Two aviation battalions, the 818th and

the 825th, worked ten hours a day andset aside one day a week for training.Later, these and other units trained onSundays. Some general service regi-ments alerted for North Africa trainedone battalion for a week while the otherbattalion continued construction work;but, in general, training schedules, nomatter how elaborate on paper, had lit-tle actual meaning.

The chief obstacle was the buildup.Each hour spent away from actual workdelayed buildup goals. The officialviewpoint—that training was a diver-sion—affected the attitude of all per-sonnel. Even after TORCH started, theengineer troops remaining in Englandhad construction or other urgent tasksto perform, and realistic training wasnearly impossible.15

There were other obstacles. Spacewas limited in the British Isles; lumberto build training quarters was scarceand equipment hard to come by. Someunits fell back on their own resources.The 434th Engineer Dump TruckCompany, for example, set up its owncrane operator school, while other unitsdid the same for brickwork, plumbing,steel construction, and electrical equip-ment installation. Engineers from vari-ous units received valuable militarytraining at schools for enlisted men setup at Shrivenham, Berkshire, in whatbecame known as the American SchoolCenter.

Just as important was the trainingoffered by the British. Perhaps the best

14 Memo, Col Albrecht for Col Lord, 13 Jan 43;Interv, Lt Col S. A. McMillion with Col Albrecht, 11Dec 43.

15 Memo, CofEngrs and CG, SOS, WD, for G-4,SOS ETOUSA, 23 Sep 42, sub: Revision of SupplyPlan, ETO, 381 Supply 1942-43, EUCOM Engr files;Blueprint, 343d Engr GS Rgt, 15 Sep 42 entry, ColR. M. Edgar's personal files; Memo, OCE, SBS, SOSETOUSA, Lt R. A. Cosgrove for Lt Col C. J. Barker, 12Aug 42, sub: Field Notes From Southern Base Section,600 Rpts, 20 Jun 42-29 Jul 43, EUCOM Engr files.


British school open to American engi-neers was the School of Military Engi-neering at Ripon, Yorkshire, whichgave instruction in field work, bridging,electrical and mechanical work, militaryduties, and bomb disposal. Here U.S.Army engineers learned the value ofthe Bailey bridge. Courses ranged fromtwo to five weeks, and after a timeAmerican instructors, including engi-neers, augmented the staff.16 OtherBritish institutions open to U.S. Armyengineers included the railroad engi-neering school, the British staff college,a school that devoted special attentionto camouflage, a fire-fighting school, amilitary intelligence school, and a div-ing school. By the end of 1942, 47 engi-neer officers and 185 enlisted men wereattending British or American militarytraining schools in England.

Supply

The engineers in the United King-dom during 1942 were supplied by theUnited States and by local procurementin Britain, from which came the largesttonnages. Generals Chaney and Davisonrecognized the need for extensivereciprocal aid from the British, and on25 May, Headquarters, USAFBI, estab-lished a General Purchasing Board anda Board of Contracts and Adjustments.

Made up of representatives of the chiefsof each American service, the GeneralPurchasing Board issued procurementdirectives, outlined local procurementprocedure, and provided informationon available materials. Before submit-ting requisitions for materials from theUnited States, each service sent copiesto the general purchasing agent (GPA),who determined if British materialswere available.17

Local procurement took one of threeforms: materials that came direct fromBritish resources, articles that Britainmanufactured from material shippedfrom the United States, or substitutes.This third form of procurement tookplace when American materials wentto British overseas forces, principallyin the Pacific, and were exchanged formaterials produced in the British Isles.The British and Americans did notwork out a final procurement systemuntil mid-October; until then lack ofclearly defined procedures inhibitedprocurement under reverse lend-lease.The engineers frequently found it im-possible to obtain needed items throughthe seventeen official British agenciesinvolved and turned to local Britishbusinessmen, a procedure which oftenled to disagreements with the generalpurchasing agent. As late as January1943 Col. Douglas C. MacKeachie, theGPA, criticized the engineers for con-stantly ignoring "most of the policiesestablished for procurement in theUK." He declared that there had beena waste of "crucial tonnage" because the

16 Ltr, Lt Col James E. Walsh to CofEngrs, 28 Dec43, sub: Operations GS Rgts; Rpt, Engr Office,USANIF, to Engr, ETOUSA, 17 Feb 42, sub: InterimRpt, Engr USANIF, O&T Br, OCE, Northern Ire-land file; Ltr, Maj H. C. Trask to Base Sect Engr,NIBS, 14 Sep 42, sub: SME (Sch of Military Engi-neering, Brit), 103-SME-Ripon 1942-43, EUCOMEngr files; Memo, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, for Col D. B.Adams, Chf, O&T Div, OCE, SOS, 15 Aug 42, sub:Officers and Enlisted Men Attending British Schools,321.02 Engr Officers (27 Jul 42-31 Oct 42), EUCOMEngr files.

17HQ, USAFBI, 25 May 42, Establishment of a GenPurchasing Bd and a Bd of Contracts and Adjust-ments in the British Isles for the European Area; andHQ, SOS ETOUSA, 17 Jun 42, Function of the GenPurchasing Bd and the Bd of Contracts and Adjust-ments; both in USFET, Engr 008 Precedents, 1942.


engineers did not follow up, and hefelt their laxity in figuring requirementsfor reverse lend-lease items had madeit difficult for the British to plan pro-duction. The engineer defense againstthis criticism was that procurement pol-icy remained ill-defined until mid-October. In any case, ColonelMacKeachie admitted that ColonelMoore, the chief engineer of SOS andETOUSA, had generally worked outsatisfactory procedures by January1943.18

During the last seven months of 1942the British provided the engineers with211,150 long (2,240-pound) tons ofsupplies under reverse lend-lease, notincluding large quantities of construc-tion materials for sheltering and servic-ing American troops. Much of thismaterial was shipped to North Africato support American forces. Amongother important items the engineersreceived or requisitioned were Baileybridges, Sommerfeld track (a mattingmade of wire netting reinforced withsteel), lumber, and essential tools andspare parts. Thousands of British civil-ian clerks and laborers worked on con-struction, depot supply, storage, andother projects. At one time, more than27,760 civilians contributed to theBOLERO program and 20,000 to theseparate air force engineer develop-ment.19 Two factors inhibited recipro-

cal aid; the first was the limited quan-tity of raw materials available in theUnited Kingdom and the second wasthat U.S. Army equipment was stan-dardized to American specifications soas to make substitution often impossi-ble.20

During 1942 the engineers receivedfrom the United States some 75,400tons of supplies representing 11,100items in the Engineer Supply Catalog.The second half of the year saw 58,000tons arrive, the peak month being Au-gust, when 26,000 tons reached Britain.But this tonnage fell far short of pro-jected figures in BOLERO planning, andagain, some quantities were siphonedoff to North Africa. From the start andthroughout 1942, no definite priorityor allocation system existed.21

In July 1942 the Engineer Service,SOS, set up a Supply Division headedby Lt. Col. Thomas DeF. Rogers toreceive, store, and distribute engineersupplies and equipment. The division'searly days were marked with confusion,for none of the personnel initially as-signed had any experience in engineersupply operations. Ultimately the divi-sion established a depot and shopbranch as well as planning, procure-ment, requirements, and transportationbranches. Supply Division sent a repre-sentative to London to maintain liaisonwith the General Purchasing Board andsundry British agencies; this officegradually evolved into the ProcurementBranch. Liaison with OCE in Washing-ton was not always good, as evidencedby Supply Division's lack of catalogs,

18 HQ, SOS, Min of Orgl Mtg of. . . Gen PurchasingBd, 26 Jun 42, USFET, Engr 400.12 Procurement,1942; HQ, SOS, Final Rpt of Col D. C. MacKeachie,GPA, 319.1 Rpts, 1943, EUCOM Engr files; Interv,Shotwell with Col T. D. Rogers, 24 Sep 50; Moore,Final Report, pp. 189-91.

19 App. A to Memo, HQ, SOS ETOUSA, for Chiefs,Staff Secs and Servs, 20 Feb 43; AMS Min of Mtg,BOLERO Combined Committee, London, 18 Jul 42;Interv, Shotwell with Col George W. Bennett; Memo,Moore for CG, SOS ETOUSA, 11 Jan 43, 325.51 Poli-cies and Plans, EUCOM Engr files.

20 Interv, Shotwell with Col A. W. Pence.21 SOS ETOUSA Statistical Summary XXI, 14 Dec

42, pp. 15ff; Cbl, Marshall to SPOBS, 20 Feb 42, sub:Shipment of Supplies, USAFBI Planning folder 3.00.


nomenclature lists, TOEs, and TBAs.Another difficulty was the failure of theConstruction and Planning Division ofOCE, SOS, to recognize that it, and notSupply Division, was responsible forsubmitting initial lists of requirements.Supply Division worked out a compre-hensive engineer supply plan in Octo-ber, but by December the North Afri-can operation had rendered it obsoleteand had robbed the division of some ofits more experienced officers.22

Not until December did SOS, GPA,and other agencies concerned establisha stable system for securing engineersupplies from the United States. Underthis system requisitions went from theSupply Division to the deputy chiefengineer, SOS, and then to G-4, SOS.The general purchasing agent receiveda copy of each requisition to determinewhether the materials were available inthe United Kingdom. If not, the requi-sitions went to the Overseas SupplyDivision in the New York port. SupplyDivision, OCE, in Washington checkedthe quantities requisitioned and eitherapproved them or made arbitrary cutsdepending upon available stocks.

In the normal requisitioning cycle 90to 120 days passed between the timeSupply Division, OCE, processed a req-uisition and when the articles wereissued at a depot. This length of timeoften meant that requirements couldbe outdated by the time requisitions

were filled. In July 1942 the War De-partment authorized a sixty-day levelfor Class II engineer supplies (organiza-tional equipment to fill TOE and TBAallowances of units) and Class IV items(construction supplies) needed for spe-cial projects. The sixty-day level wasprescribed as the "minimum amountto be held as a reserve" over and abovequantities required for normal opera-tions, but in practice this level couldnot be maintained and shortages per-sisted throughout 1942.

Even the calculation of requirementsto meet that level was disrupted byTORCH. Requirements for Class II de-pended upon numbers and types ofunits, and the North African invasiondrained units from the United King-dom and left the future troop basisuncertain; the requirements for ClassIV supply in North Africa were obvi-ously different from those in the Brit-ish Isles. TORCH seriously depletedBritish resources, took essential mate-rial from U.S. Army engineer unitsremaining in the United Kingdom, andpractically exhausted depot stocks ofClass IV supplies in the theater.

Realizing that the lead time for pro-duction and delivery of most specialproject material was twelve to eighteenmonths, Colonel Moore, in December,sought to rebuild Class IV stockpiles inthe United Kingdom and appointed aboard to estimate future requirementsand delivery schedules. The moveseemed to fly in the face of a Somervelldirective dated 18 November 1942, stat-ing that no supplies were to be sent toBritain beyond those necessary to equipthe 427,000 men scheduled to be inEngland by spring 1943. But GeneralSomervell hardly intended this figureto be sacrosanct, for an ultimate cross-

22 Moore, Final Report, pp. 22ff; Interv, Shotwellwith Rogers, 24 Sep 50; Ltr, Moore to Col C. RodneySmith, OCE, WD, 21 Dec 42, sub: Shortage of SupplyOfficers, 475 Engr Equip, Dec 42-Dec 43, EUCOMEngr files; Ltr, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, 13 Oct 42, sub:Supply Plan, 300 Supply Plan, EUCOM Engr files;OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 3, Supply, (United Kingdom),1946, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547,and OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization, Ad-ministration, and Personnel, app. 2.


Channel invasion was still the principaltenet of American strategy.23

One of the most frequent complaintsof engineer units was that their Class IIequipment did not reach them untilweeks after they arrived in the UnitedKingdom. Most troop transports car-ried little or no equipment, sending itinstead by slow-moving freighters. Itwas almost impossible to bring men andequipment together simultaneously inthe United Kingdom. When units werestill in camp in the United States theyneeded their equipment for training.Taking the equipment from the menat least a month before departurewould have been necessary for it toarrive overseas at the same time as thetroops, and even then there would havebeen no guarantee. Some equipmentwas lost in ports or depots or sent tothe bottom by German submarines.The 817th Engineer Aviation Battalion,on its arrival in July 1942, had 1 transit,100 axes, and 100 shovels for 800 men,while several other units had nothingbut jeeps. Two months after their ar-rival in late summer, four engineer avi-ation battalions had received less thanone-third of their heavy equipment.Borrowing British equipment alleviatedproblems somewhat, but such loans

were limited. The lack of tools was amajor factor in retarding construction.24

The War Department or Headquar-ters, ETOUSA, regulated the supplyand issue of many scarce items. Thoseunder War Department allocation reg-ulation were known as controlled items;those in short supply in ETO were des-ignated critical items by the theatercommand. Throughout 1942 the sup-ply of items in both categories remainedunsatisfactory, and as late as mid-December such engineer equipment asair compressors, generators, weldingsets, compasses, mine detectors, gascylinders, gas pipeline supplies, pumps,D-7 tractors with angledozers, andtruck-mounted cranes remained inshort supply.25

Nevertheless, by the end of 1942 U.S.Army engineer units in England hadreceived 90 percent of their heavy con-struction equipment from the UnitedStates and 70 percent of their general-purpose vehicles. But few additionalengineer troops had been stationed inthe United Kingdom since 1 Septem-ber, and some serious shortagesremained—a result of the unavoidabletime lag in manufacturing heavy equip-ment in the United States and an un-foreseen heavy demand for it in alltheaters. Too few Class II items werearriving, and only about 27 percent ofitems not under special controls were

23 Ltr, HQ, SOS ETOUSA, to CG, ETOUSA, 13Dec 42, sub: Policy in Procurement of Engineer Sup-plies to Support Future Operations, 381 Supply1942-43, EUCOM Engr files; Interv, Col Barnes, 7Nov 50; Memo, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, for Col ElmerE. Barnes, 6 Nov 42, sub: Engineer Class IV Supplies,400 General (Nov 42-Feb 43), EUCOM Engr files;Lt Herbert French, The Administrative and LogisticalHistory of the European Theater of Operations, vol.III, "Troop and Supply Buildup in the UK Prior toD-Day," p. 70, in CMH; Leighton and Coakley, GlobalLogistics and Strategy, 1940-43, pp. 322-36 and app.F.

24 Unit Hist, 470th Engr Maint Co; Interv, Col B. D.Cassidy; Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. III,"Troop and Supply Buildup in the UK Prior toD-Day," p. 155; Ltr, Moore to CE, WD, 31 Oct 42,sub: Equipment for Avn Bns, 475 Engr Equip, Oct-Nov 42, EUCOM Engr files.

25 Memo, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, for G-4, SOS ETO-USA, 11 Dec 42, sub: Critical Items, atchd to Memo,sub: G-4 Logistical Book, 325.51 Policies and Plans,EUCOM Engr files.


available for initial issue requirements.With shortages already prevalent, SOShad to equip units alerted for TORCHby stripping equipment from unitsscheduled to remain in England.26

Many other supply problems arose.Poor packing in the United States oftenresulted in saltwater damage. Improperhandling caused more loss, and wornor used supplies showed up all toofrequently. Sometimes various parts ofequipment arrived in separate con-tainers, and in other cases some partsnever arrived at all. Vague and ambigu-ous ship manifests caused countlesshours to be spent in sorting equipment.Equipment lost for long periods had tobe requisitioned again. Spare parts inlarge quantities left the United States,yet months later some units had notreceived a single box. In July a machinetraining detachment (a captain andtwelve sergeants) began working atLiverpool, the chief freight port, super-vising the unloading and loading of allengineer equipment and greatly re-duced the confusion. This and othersteps improved matters so that byNovember engineer equipment reachedthe proper units ten days after itlanded.27

The depot system serving Americanforces in the United Kingdom ex-panded slowly, laboring under the sameorganizational, geographic, and man-power restraints that hobbled the entireETOUSA operation in its early stages.The engineers had specified areas forsupply in general depots, or they setup their own depots. The system beganto take shape with Desertmartin inNorthern Ireland and eventuallyamounted to ten installations in the firstyear. As shipments from the UnitedStates increased, American planners inthe theater moved depot operationsinto large warehouses in Liverpool,Bristol, and other smaller ports onBritain's west coast. In June 1942 theBritish turned over to U.S. Army con-trol, under the general command ofChief Quartermaster Brig. Gen. Rob-ert McG. Littlejohn, several existingBritish Army depots, among them arecently constructed facility at Ash-church, just south of Liverpool. Engi-neer supply in the summer of 1942 wasconcentrated at this general depot andat a former Royal Ordnance depot atThatcham-Newbury, sixty miles duewest of London, also shared with otherservice arms. A small, exclusively engi-neer depot was established in Britishquarters at Huntingdon, sixty milesnorth of London, to supply airfield con-struction units in the Eastern Base Sec-tion with building materials. But theplanned storage capacity for the troopbuildup under BOLERO still awaitedconstruction. If the consolidation ofsupply requests was the province of thequartermaster, providing the storagespace and the physical fixtures was theresponsibility of the chief engineer.28

26 Rpt, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, 7 Jan 43, sub: StatusRpt, CE 319.1, Status Rpts, OCE, Dec 42 -Jul 43; UnitHist, 470th Engr Maint Co; Rpt, HQ, EBS, 12 Apr44, sub: Rpt of Activities of the Eastern Base Section,Hist of the Office of the Base Section Engr, EUCOMEngr files; Ltr, OCE, ETOUSA (C. Rodney Smith), toEngr, SOS ETOUSA, 22 Sep 42, sub: Maint of Engr319.1 (9-11-42), QG14-1942-44, USFET Engrfiles.

27 Entries Aug-Oct 42 in Quartering Div, OCE,ETOUSA, Daily Jnl and Supply Div Daily Jnl, EUCOMEngr files, Ltr, OCE, ETOUSA (C. Rodney Smith), toEngr, SOS ETOUSA, 22 Sep 42, sub: Maint of EngrEquipment in the ETO, Supplies Misc 1942, file 1004,NIBS Engr files; Interv, Col A. L. Hartfield, 19 Sep50.

28 Moore, Final Report, pp. 179-80; Ruppenthal,Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, p. 152.


Decisions on the location of newdepots were complicated by the neces-sity to share buildings with the Britishand by the lack of space at more desir-able sites. The threat of German airattack induced the British governmentto disperse depot installations in un-likely spots. American engineers fol-lowed this principle to some extent, but,also influenced by the plan for a largeBOLERO static force, they gave somethought to locating the depots so as tosupport both the buildup and the sub-sequent invasion of Europe.

By the end of 1942, the engineershad constructed additional depots inthe English interior. All of them suf-fered problems of transport. Inter-depot shipments were made impracti-cal by circuitous and slow rail serviceand by an inventory system that failedto show changes in the location of mate-rial; by fall of 1942, theater policy for-bade movement of materiel between thedepots. In September the Thatcham-Newbury installation had 85,000 tonsof engineer supplies on hand with the450th Engineer Depot Company therehandling the supply needs of the South-ern Base Section. The Engineer Sec-tion at Ashchurch not only became aspare parts repository but also took careof the general engineer supply for west-ern and northern England. Thoughlimited in space, another general depotassociated with Cardiff and Newporton the Bristol Channel was the onlyport depot in the system and contrib-uted in the fall of 1942 to the directflow of materiel into the Southern BaseSection from the United States.

Shortages in trained supply techni-cians and the absence of a standardnomenclature list for items of supplyposed other problems. Through the

summer, the 450th Engineer DepotCompany at Thatcham-Newbury, com-plemented by British civilians, was theonly unit in the country handling engi-neer depot supplies. The civilians werelargely untrained in wholesale stockmanagement, and the depot companyfound conditions and procedures total-ly different. The demands of TORCHwere particularly felt here. Six depotcompanies were scheduled to arrive inEngland by the end of the year; of thetwo that came, one shipped out imme-diately for Africa, and the experienced450th found itself in Algeria in lateNovember 1942. Stock records anddaily tally-in and -out cards were unre-liable. Illegible and ambivalent nota-tions made some records useless, andinventories at various locations differedin the description of identical itemsuntil the ETOUSA chief engineer'soffice produced a standard depot man-ual in February 1943 and a combinedBritish-American nomenclature list thefollowing month. Difficulties in stockand depot control brought the directattention of the chief engineer to thelowest levels of the command, an unde-sirable situation since directives and ver-bal instructions then bypassed the basesection commands having jurisdictionover the areas in which individualdepots were located.29

Another serious problem in 1942 wasequipment maintenance. Normally, fiveechelons of repair existed for heavy engi-neer and other equipment. The using

29 Moore, Final Report, p. 180; Ltr, Col J. S. Gorlinski,O&T Br, Trps Div, OCE, WD, to Col Chorpening,Supply Div, OCE, WD, 2 Jul 42, sub: Depot Compa-nies for BOLERO, 381 BOLERO, folio I, O&T Div (Rec-Ret), OCE files; Supply Div, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, 1Sep 42, Control Folder, and SOS ETOUSA GO 7, 11Jul 42.


units took care of first and secondechelons, mainly preventive mainte-nance such as lubrication, cleaning,tightening, and minor replacements.Engineer maintenance companies tookcare of third and fourth echelon work,which involved major assembly replace-ments and technical repairs; engineerheavy shop companies undertook fifthechelon maintenance—salvaging, re-building, and reconditioning. This wasthe prescribed procedure, but underconditions existing in Britain in 1942the engineers could not fully implementit. Maintenance operations were slowin getting under way and proved unsat-isfactory throughout the period.30

The 467th Engineer MaintenanceCompany, the first engineer mainte-nance unit to arrive in the theater,reached Northern Ireland in March1942 as a skeleton organization madeup of company headquarters and onemaintenance platoon. In early Novem-ber the unit moved to the Eastern BaseSection where it performed not onlythird and fourth echelon maintenancefor which it was trained but also fifthechelon work. In August, after only afew weeks of training, the 470th Engi-neer Maintenance Company arrivedfrom the United States as a completeunit and set up at Ashchurch. With onlyhalf of its equipment, the company hadto borrow tools and parts from the471st Engineer Maintenance Company,which had arrived in England at thesame time. Moreover, the companyrepeatedly had to provide cadres fornew units. OCE, SOS, never issued anydirectives defining the company's func-tions, and few engineer troops outside

the immediate Ashchurch area wereaware that it existed and that it couldaid them. The company left Englandfor North Africa late in November1942.

The October supply plan had calledfor maintenance shops at Ashchurch,Shrivenham in Berkshire, and Brain-tree in Essex. For lack of equipment,these shops were not close to operatingat full capacity by the year's end. Indi-vidual engineer units felt shortages inmaintenance equipment just as acutelyas did the shops. Aviation and otherengineer units constantly called formobile shops, tools, and tool sets.Though schedules called for mainte-nance machinery to be used eight toten hours a day, shortages compelledengineer units to use them at times formore than twenty hours.

Despite these handicaps the engi-neers took on considerable mainte-nance work and occasionally the dutiesof the Ordnance Department. In thelate fall of 1942, engineers in the South-ern Base Section were responsible notonly for maintaining engineer equip-ment but also for operating most of themotor vehicles. Even with shortages ofrepair parts and operating manuals,most men did their best to keep theirequipment in good condition. Thedearth of facilities and tools forced mento do things on their own, to employexpedients, and to learn the intricaciesof each tool, machine, or vehicle. Onthe other hand, losses and damagesinevitably resulted because so manyoperators lacked adequate training.31

30 Engr Supply Precedents, Engr Sch Lib text, pp.222-26, Engr Sch Lib.

31 Ltr, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, 13 Oct 42, sub: SupplyPlan, 400 Supply Plan, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, OCE,ETOUSA (C. Rodney Smith), to Engr, SOS ETOUSA,22 Sep 42, sub: Maint of Engr Equipment in the ETO,Supplies Misc 1942; Ltr, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, to OCE,


A critical shortage of spare parts be-came apparent early. Although in Junethe War Department had authorized ayear's automatic supply of spare partsfor overseas operations, OCE, WD,reported that spare parts stock for thefollowing six months would not be readyfor shipment until October and that abalanced twelve-month depot stock,then being assembled, would not beready until the close of the year. Norwere the prospects brighter that unitsoverseas would soon get a three- to six-month supply of critical spare parts.The situation became so serious in theEastern Base Section that depots issuedsome items only upon presentation ofthe parts to be replaced. In September,OCE, SOS, formed a spare parts depoton the nucleus of an engineer baseequipment company at Ashchurch, withsubdepots at Egginton in Derbyshireand Huntingdon in Huntingdonshire.October saw some improvement, butstocks were far from balanced.32

The quality of equipment providedto the engineer units was good, thoughsome was unsuited for larger tasks. Theearth auger and the medium tractorwith angledozer proved too light formuch of the work for which they wereused, and they frequently broke down.The 1 1/2-ton dump truck was alsoinadequate and wore out much soonerthan the larger and more rugged 2

1/2-ton truck. But with their heavygraders, bulldozers, paving machines,post-hole diggers, and other efficientmachinery, American engineers couldusually outperform British engineers,who generally had lighter equipment,although the British machines oftenexcelled in muddy conditions.33

Intelligence

In late 1942 engineer intelligence wasstill unprepared for the tasks loomingahead. Intelligence functions were re-lated to ROUNDUP, but Continentaloperations were a hope for the futurerather than an imminent reality. Tostaff officers responsible for buildingup engineer forces in the United King-dom, intelligence and mapping ap-peared less urgent than construction.When the intelligence organization ofOCE, SOS, became an independentdivision in midsummer 1942, its staffconsisted of only a few officers and evenfewer enlisted men. Lt. Col. HerbertMilwit, formerly with the 30th Engi-neer Topographic Battalion and anexpert in mapping and photogram-metry, remained division chief through-out the war in Europe. Not until Decem-ber 1942 did sufficient personnel arrivein Britain to make possible more thanextremely limited operations.34

In spite of the importance of map-

WD, 13 Jan 43, sub: Maint of Engr Equipment inETO, 400, 402, EUCOM Engr files.

32 Ltr, AGO, WD, 11 Jun 42, sub: Automotive PartsPolicy, Engr Cons, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, OCE,ETOUSA (C. Rodney Smith), to Engr, SOS ETOUSA,22 Sep 42, sub: Maint of Engr Equipment in the ETO,Supplies Misc 1942; Interv, Col A. L. Hartfield, 19Sep 50; Ltr, Engr Sect, ETOUSA, to G-4, SOSETOUSA, 8 Oct 42, sub: Initial GIV Periodic Rpt,319.1 GIV Monthly Rpt, 1942-43-44, USFET Engrfiles.

33 Memo, SOS, WD, and Ltr, CofEngrs, 17 Aug 42,sub: Recommended Changes in Engr Equipment,ETO 400.34, OCE C and R files; Rpt, USANI BaseCommand (Prov), Office of Base Engr, to CofEngrs,USANIBC, in Engr Tech Rpt No. 7, 600 NI Gen(Current), NIBS Engr files; Albrecht, "EngineerAspects of Operation BOLERO," p. 119.

34 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and To-pography (United Kingdom), 1946, pp. 1-10, LiaisonSect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547; Intel Div,OCE, SOS ETOUSA, Status Rpts for Sep, Oct, Nov,and Dec 1942 and Jan 1943, EUCOM Engr files.


COLONEL MILWIT

ping as a branch of engineer intelligence,Americans in the European theater atfirst assumed little responsibility for it.In May 1942 the British and Ameri-cans concluded the Loper-Hotine Agree-ment to divide mapping responsibilitythroughout the world. The British a-greed to take care of most of WesternEurope and the Middle East, leavingNorth and South America, the Far East,and the Pacific to the Americans. TheDirectorate of Military Survey of theBritish War Office provided Americanswith maps, equipment, housing, andstorage facilities. This British agencyalso aided in training a small but vitalengineer model makers detachment,whose model beaches were to proveuseful in planning amphibious opera-tions.35

The Loper-Hotine Agreement recog-nized that the British would requireAmerican help in compiling and repro-ducing maps for American forces andin providing photomaps for those partsof northwest Europe not covered byreliable large-scale maps. The agree-ment also specified that American topo-graphic units and staffs would supportmajor American forces. Though Ameri-can topographical battalions arrived inBritain in the latter part of 1942 with-out adequate equipment, by the closeof the year Colonel Milwit's units wereproducing maps in considerable quanti-ties and were building up a worthwhilemap library.36

For a time, relations with the Britishwere better than with the Army AirForces. OCE, WD, had arranged withthe Air Forces at Wright Field outsideDayton, Ohio, to train a B-17 squad-ron to carry out photomapping in coop-eration with the engineers. After monthsof negotiating over the type of plane,the need for an escort, and the flyingaltitude, the scheme failed. Engineermapmakers thus had to rely upon theslower, less accurate methods of theRoyal Air Force.37

35 OCE, SOS ETOUSA, Topo Memo No. 1, 15 Oct43, Topographic Experience in the Theaters; IntelDiv, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, General Mission statement,4 Oct 44, sub: Model Makers Detachment, Model Mak-ers Detachment folder; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal,The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, pp. 445ff.

36 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and To-pography, pp. 3-5 and app. 9; Ltr, Col Loper toCapt G. F. Hahas, Survey Liaison Office, HQ, WASC,

13 Jan 44, 061.01 Mapping, Intel Div, OCE, SOS; Ltr,Milwit, 14 Aug 53.

37 Memo, Milwit for Conrad, G-2, AAF, ETOUSA,20 Dec 42, sub: Trimetrogen Topographic Mapping,and Ltr, Air Ministry (BR) to Milwit, S 2898, 1/A.D.Maps; both General 061, EUCOM Engr files. OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Topography,pp. 15-19 and apps. 5, 10, 11, 12.


Construction

As the BOLERO plans developed, itbecame apparent that without consider-able assistance the British would not beable to house the American force sched-uled to arrive in the United Kingdom.General Davison pointed out in June of1942 that the difference between whatthe Americans would need and whatthe British could provide in new andexisting facilities would constitute theengineer construction program. Deter-mining American needs was difficultbecause of the uncertainty in 1942 asto how many American troops wouldcome, when they would come, and howthey would be used in the invasion. Theorderly development of the quarteringand construction programs—at first inseparate divisions but in mid-Octobercombined—suffered because of theseuncertainties.38

Until enough American "static force"engineers arrived, the British handledeverything connected with quartering.British Army and Air Force officers metU.S. Army units as they arrived, directedthem to assigned areas, and arrangedfor various services, including utilities,medical facilities, and the Navy-Army-Air Force Institution (NAAFI, the Brit-ish equivalent of the post exchange).In at least one instance a British advanceparty remained with the U.S. troops toaid in maintaining equipment and draw-ing supplies, to make the Americansfamiliar with British military procedure,and to provide laundry, shoe repair,and tailoring services. In the early sum-mer of 1942, when the SOS was too

new and undermanned to handle thesematters, such British assistance wasvital.39

Americans gradually took over manyof these functions, though the Britishrole remained great. Aviation engineerbattalions which had to construct siteson grain fields or pastureland withoutfacilities (mostly in Eastern Base Sec-tion) put up tents for those who camenext. In Southern and Western BaseSections, the British could usually turnover existing facilities, at least for theearly arrivals. To meet U.S. Army re-quirements, however, these facilitiesoften had to be altered or enlarged byeither the British or the Engineer Con-struction Division. If no housing existed,one or the other had to put up newstructures.40

The Engineer Construction Division,a subsidiary of the chief engineer'soffice at Cheltenham, was set up in mid-June with two officers and two enlistedmen headed by Col. Frank M. Albrecht.As more officers arrived in the ETOthe organization grew, and in Octoberit absorbed the Quartering Division.Before TORCH, tasks consisted mainlyof planning and liaison. In designingand constructing buildings the Britishpredominated because they ultimatelywere to own all installations. In somecases, especially in airfield construction,Americans attempted to lower Britishspecifications in the interest of speedand economy, but, in general, the Brit-ish held to their point of view.

38 Memo, Davison for Lee, 28 Jun 42, 400 General(May-Oct 42), EUCOM Engr files; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 8, Quartering (United Kingdom), 1946, pp.5-6, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547.

39 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 8, Quartering, pp. 13-17.

40 Ltr, Henderson to Air Ministry, 8 Aug 42, sub:Advance Parties for Engr Bn (Avn) and Ltr, Maj T. F.Bengston, XO, C&T Div, to Base Sect Engr, 27 Aug42, sub: Transmittal of Orders to Arriving Organiza-tions; both in 321 Engrs, EUCOM Engr files.


General Lee's policy of centralizedcontrol and decentralized operationsgoverned administrative procedures inbuilding facilities of all types. Engineerofficers of the "static force" had author-ity to approve or disapprove construc-tion projects in accordance with esti-mated costs. Unit utility offices couldapprove maintenance and utility pro-jects originating within such units asground force battalions if the projectscost less than $825, which at World WarII exchange rates amounted to £100.American district engineers could auth-orize projects involving less than$20,600, while base section engineerscould approve new construction cost-ing under $164,800. For projects above$164,800 the base section engineers hadto secure the approval of the chiefengineer, SOS, ETOUSA.

Since all installations were ultimatelyto be turned over to the British, area,district, or base section engineers hadto obtain approval for each projectfrom their opposites in the local Britishmilitary hierarchy. The British werereluctant to delegate the authority toapprove even minor construction, andsome projects costing as little as $410had to go to the War Office for approval.

General Lee constantly pressed theWar Office to modify the British sys-tem, arguing that new constructioncosting less than $164,800 could andshould be disposed of at a much lowerlevel than the War Office. Not until wellinto the fall of 1942 did the War Officeacquiesce. Thereafter, British comman-ders had the same approval powers asAmerican base section, district, and areacommanders.41

Under the new arrangement, if acamp, depot, or hospital was to costmore than $164,800 the chief engineerasked the British War Office to recom-mend suitable sites, and the base sec-tion engineer then selected a site board.For camp and hospital sites, such boardsincluded an engineer, a medical officer,and representatives of each unit, arm,or service concerned. The board in-spected the proposed sites and reportedtheir selection to the chief engineer.Although only the chief engineer or hisrepresentative had authority to requestsites or facilities from the British, OCEmade no objection to informal agree-ments, subject to the chief engineer'sapproval, entered into by other armsand services.42

Differences between American andBritish methods, organization, and no-menclature posed seemingly endlessproblems. A requisition was an "indent,"a monkey wrench was a "spanner"; nailswere designated by length rather thanweight, rope by circumference ratherthan diameter. Large American truckshad difficulty traversing the narrow,sharply curved British roads. Ameri-can electrical equipment would not

41 Memo, Albrecht for Moore, 1 Oct 42, 600-A-Con, EUCOM Engr files: Jnl entry 1430, 14 Oct 42,

C&Q Div, OCE, SOS, Oct-Dec 42; Ltr, Albrecht toBase Sect Engr, EBS, 30 Oct 42, sub: Requests forConstruction Work, 337 (Min of Mtgs 1943), USFETEngr Serv files; SOS ETOUSA Cir 12,17 Aug 42, sub:Instructions Concerning Base Sections; MS, Maj GenA.G.B. Smyser, Engineer Eighth Air Force History.For the general construction story, see OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 6, Air Force Construction (United Kingdom),1946, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547,and OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction. These two reports are general sourcesfor the remainder of this section.

42 Ltr, Larkin to CG, AA Comd, ETOUSA, 30 Jul42, sub: Construction, Utilities Work, and Use ofFacilities, 600-N-General, EUCOM Engr files. Theseinstructions were repeated almost verbatim in the sub-sequent Ltr, Moore to CG, V Corps, 1 Dec 42, samesub, 600 General, 1-31 Dec 42, EUCOM Engr files.


operate on British current; the USAAFrequired more hardstandings, quarters,and facilities than RAF airdromes pro-vided; and American commanders foundBritish special facilities for noncomshard to reconcile with U.S. Army prac-tices.43

A problem stemmed from the factthat the Air Ministry was a separate armof the British War Office. The engi-neers wanted to separate the USAAFfrom construction channels—a policythat found little favor with either theAir Forces or the British Air Ministry.With ETOUSA support General Leefinally succeeded in his efforts to coor-dinate all U.S. construction under oneoffice, gaining by fall both Air Forcesand British Air Ministry acquiescence.The Air Forces stated requirements;the engineers did the construction. TheAir Ministry agreed not only to dealdirectly with the engineers but to grantits subordinate commands powers ofapproval paralleling those of the Ameri-can static force.44

Another general working agreementwas that American engineer units wouldundertake the larger construction pro-jects to make better use of their heavyequipment. ETOUSA also agreed thatU.S. Army camps would remain assmall as possible so that local municipalutility systems could serve them. The

British and Americans prepared stan-dard layouts for camps for 600, 750,1,000, and 1,250 men and hospitals for750 and 1,000 beds. The need for con-serving shipping space, the scarcity ofwood, and the necessity for speed inconstruction all dictated the choice of16-foot-wide Nissen huts for housingand 35-foot-wide Iris huts for storageand shop space. The British agreed tomanufacture these units from billetsteel imported from the United States.The huts provided good semiperma-nent quarters that could be erected eas-ily and quickly.45

As the machinery for constructionand quartering evolved, the EngineerConstruction Division and engineerconstruction units turned their ener-gies toward camps and depots in theSouthern Base Section and air installa-tions in the Eastern Base Section. InMarch 1942 the British indicated thatthey would need help in providingfields for American Air Forces; Gen-eral Davison immediately cabled Wash-ington for ten aviation engineer battal-ions and soon afterwards raised thenumber to twenty. The first of thesebattalions arrived in June. Late in JulyEighth Air Force set its requirementsat 98 airdromes, of which the Britishalready had built 52; they would build29 more and the U.S. aviation engineers

43 MS, Lt Gen J.C.H. Lee, Invasion Prelude—TheSOS in Britain, 10 Apr 44; Hist 332d Engr GS Rgt, 1Jan-31 Dec 44, Supply Sect; Memo, 1st Lt E. W.McCall for Chf, Reqts Br, sub: Trip Rpt, 319.1 Rpts,EUCOM Engr Sect; Moore, Final Report, p. 238.

44 Ltr, Larkin to CG, AAF, 10 Aug 42, sub: Con-struction and Utility Work w/lst Ind, 25 Aug 42, andMemo, Albrecht for Moore, 10 Oct 42; both in 600-A-Gen, EUCOM Engr files. Ltr, Albrecht to Wooten,18 Sep 42, sub: Command Approval of ConstructionProjects, 600 Gen 43, EUCOM Engr files.

45 Engr 817, SU-RE, Jun 42-5 Jul 45, Air Univ,Maxwell Field, Ala; OCE ETOUSA Cir 6, 16 Jul 42,extracted from OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field andService Force Construction, pp. 58—59. This direc-tive provided the working basis for U.S. and Britishagencies concerned with construction. The Britishcounterpart was reproduced in OCE ETOUSA Cir10, 27 Jul 42; Incl 3, Scales of Accommodations, 1stInd, Albrecht to Col G. A. Lincoln, Chf, Planning Con-trol Br, G-4, 10 Dec 42, sub: Construction Program;OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, app. 7.


MEN OF THE 829TH ENGINEER AVIATION BATTALION ERECT NISSEN HUTTING

17. By 1 September the U.S. figure hadrisen unofficially to 38.46

Although the construction programwas neither formally approved norcoordinated, by 1 September unofficialfigures listed new camps for 77,346men, 53 hospitals, and 16 convertiblecamps, in addition to the 38 new air-dromes. SOS building operations werealready well under way. Eight general

service regiments had arrived and wereemployed on thirty-one projects. Fiveof these regiments were in SouthernBase Section, one building railroadspurs and four building shelters. Bycontrast, little had been done in West-ern Base Section. Although three gen-eral service regiments arrived there inAugust and began shelter construc-tion, in September all were diverted toTORCH.47 In Eastern Base Section the809th Engineer Aviation Battalion, thefirst SOS engineer unit to do construc-

46 Ltr, Gen Carl Spaatz, CG, 8th AF, 8 AF 600.1 toCG, ETOUSA, Jul 42, sub: Eighth Air Force Air-drome Construction Program; Ltr, Gen Larkin toCofEngrs, Washington, D.C., 30 Jul 42, sub: Engi-neer Supplies, Equipment, Personnel, and Units, 381War Plans (Jun 42-Jul 43), EUCOM Engr Sect;Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I,pp. 38, 95, 113; MS, Notes on Staff and CommandConference, 17 May 43, p. 6, Engr Serv in the ETO,Hist Br Liaison Sect.

47 Station List, Engr Units, 9 Sep 42, DispositionLists; Engr Units and files, and OCE, SOS, Sitrep, 1Aug 42; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and ServiceForce Construction, p. 71; His Red of Engr Serv,WBS, 20 Jul 42-15 Mar 44; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt4, Troops, app. 22, sheet 1.


PAVING TRAIN AT AN AMERICAN BOMBER FIELD IN ENGLAND

tion in England, began work at GlattonAirdrome on 5 July. By September six-teen aviation battalions were at work inthat area, although only six had beenat their job sites more than a few days.48

The British heavy bomber airdromewas accepted as the standard for eachfield to be constructed by the Ameri-cans, with few modifications and a rela-tively tight clamp on local adjustments.Three runways, each 150 feet wide,were set in a generally triangular formwith intersecting legs. The main run-way was 6,000 feet long, the other two4,200 feet each. A fifty-foot perimeter

track encircling the runways connectedsome fifty hardstandings. In addition,at each field a 2,500-man "village" hadto be built complete with utilities suchas sewage—no small problem in the flatlands of East Anglia. At Matching Air-drome buildings included 214 Nissenhuts (16 by 36 feet) arranged in sevenliving sites, with attendant washhousesand latrines. The technical site adjacentto the runways included some forty-oddbuildings for administration, operations,and maintenance. Other structures in-cluded hospitals, recreation halls, andmesses. Away from these areas was a"danger site," where a score of build-ings housed bombs, fuses, and otherordnance.

Agreement on layouts and construc-tion standards was a minor issue com-

48 Status Rpts, Col Moore to CG, ETOUSA, 31 Oct42 (dated 8 Nov 42) and 30 Nov 42 (dated 6 Dec 42),both 319.1 Rpts, OCE Rpts to CG, EUCOM Engrfiles.


pared to problems in the actual work.Though the Air Ministry provided air-field and village construction plans andarranged for locally supplied materials,British equipment was often too lightand too little. Other considerationsplagued the Americans—a lack of expe-rienced construction workers, strangeBritish nomenclature and methods,rains beginning in mid-October thatturned fields into bogs and companyareas into quagmires, and finally thedisruptions of TORCH. Because of de-lays in the arrival of the heavy organiza-tional equipment, aviation battalionsbegan clearing land with hand tools;one unit had only a small-scale map tolocate and chart the runways it was toconstruct. All units had to train menon the job. Even those with some con-struction training were at a loss in theUnited Kingdom where virtually noconstruction was of wood—every piececame under the control of a separateBritish Timber Control Board. Oneunit traded food for enough lumber tobuild concrete pouring forms. The cor-rugated curved steel Nissen, Iris, andRomney huts were enclosed at the endswith masonry, and a number of struc-tures on airdromes were entirely ofbrick. Engineer units had to train largenumbers of masons, using men experi-enced in the trade as teachers.49

Even when heavy equipment arrived

more regularly in late 1942, aviationengineer battalions had few men famil-iar with it. Operators needed intensivetraining. One method divided the laborinto specialized tasks: one companyhandled the runway preparation andpaving; another roads and taxiways;and the third the huts, drainage sys-tems, and ancillary tasks. Methods andschedules varied from battalion to battal-ion, but nearly all worked double shiftsto take advantage of the long summerdays. As daylight hours shortened inthe fall, units worked under lights; two,and sometimes three, shifts kept thevital heavy equipment running day andnight.

Engineer aviation units were armedand organized to defend their airfieldsshould the need arise. In the early daysmen marched to work with their rifles,stacking them at the job site. Alerts andblackouts punctuated the nighttimework as German bombers passed overon their way to metropolitan areas, butairdrome construction proceeded withlittle interference. Some attempt wasmade to disguise the characteristic out-line of runways with a wood chip cover-ing and that of buildings with paint,but camouflage did not become animportant consideration.

In the end, the progress demandedof the engineer aviation battalions inthe first year of construction work inEngland proved beyond those partiallytrained, underequipped, and often un-dermanned units. Airfields that OCE,SOS, originally estimated would takeone battalion six months to build tooka year or more.50

49 Unit histories of sixteen engineer aviation battal-ions in the United Kingdom before December 1942,especially those of the 809th, the 817th, the 818th,and the 826th and histories of the 833d and 834th;Memo, Lt Col H. H. Reed, Actg Chf, Supply Div, SOS,for XO, Engr Serv, 4 Sep 42, sub: Revision of SupplyPlan, ETO; Unit Hist, 332d Engr GS Rgt, 1 Jan 44-31Oct 44, Supply Sect; Ltr, Albrecht to Base Engr, EBS,20 Oct 42; Memo, Moore for Reybold, 30 Nov 42,sub: Engr Problems in ETO; Memo, Moore for Lee12 Nov 42.

50 Moore, Final Report, pp. 259-61; Work Like Hell,Play Like Hell, p. 11, Engr 825-Hi, Apr 42-Aug 45;Engr 833-Hi, 10 Aug 42-25 Sep 45, Air Univ.


The decision to invade North Africadealt a blow to BOLERO constructionfrom which it did not recover until wellinto the spring of 1943. In September,just when the arrival of more engineerconstruction units made possible anincrease in building activity, many ofthe engineer units were alerted forTORCH; others had to support the of-fensive, mainly in depot operations,because TORCH called for a greatlyincreased volume of supplies from theUnited Kingdom.51

The diversion of supplies and troopsfor North Africa dictated new meansfor tapping the labor supply. Early inOctober SOS, ETOUSA, provided forlabor pools in each of the base sections,with a general service regiment or equiv-alent serving as a nucleus on which toform organizations for freight handlingand various other tasks at depots andsimilar installations. Aviation engineersalso performed these duties. On 1 Octo-ber Colonel Adams of the Operationsand Training Division, OCE, SOS, re-ported that three aviation battalions hadjust arrived but had only 20 percent oftheir heavy construction equipment.General Littlejohn, General Lee's de-puty, pointed to this as a justificationfor adding these units to the laborpools, emphasizing that 5,000 SOS engi-neers had already been diverted fromconstruction.52

In November the British, who werescraping the bottom of their own con-struction labor barrel, removed 2,843pioneer troops from depot work. Colo-nel Albrecht of the Construction Divi-sion, OCE, SOS, argued to no avail thatit was ridiculous to transfer unskilledpioneer labor to construction if thisforced more skilled American units toperform unskilled work. At the end ofNovember, a peak of 4,000 SOS, 1,160aviation, and 1,100 ground forces engi-neers were in labor pools. Large num-bers continued at depot work throughMarch 1943. In spite of repeatedrequests from the chief engineer,ETOUSA, for more civilian aid, theBritish could do little. And, with apolo-gies, Colonel Moore had to explain tothe Eighth Air Force that the success ofTORCH depended upon keeping avia-tion engineers on unskilled depotwork.53

General Lee recognized that return-ing engineers to construction or build-up tasks should have high priority, withaviation engineers heading the list, assoon as the TORCH emergency passed.In the meantime, as the labor pool sys-tem functioned, engineers had to do thework of other services. They carriedon the entire operations of many ord-

51 Ltr, Albrecht, 4 Nov 53; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt7, Field and Service Force Construction, p. 73; Memo,Moore for Brig Gen E. S. Hughes, 17 Nov 42, BC 1,BOLERO Combined Committee.

52 Ltr, SOS ETOUSA to Chfs of Supply Services,Base Sect COs, and Depot COs, 9 Oct 42, sub: LaborPools for Depot Opns, 319.1 Rpts (Labor), Sep-Nov42, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, OCE, SOS ETOUSA,Col Donald B. Adams, Chf, O&T Div, to Col E. E.Barnes, London OCE Rep, 1 Oct 42, sub: Rpt onEngr Bns (Avn) and Airport Cons, 322.030; Ltr, SOSETOUSA, Littlejohn, to CG, Eighth Air Force, 4 Oct

42, sub: Use of Avn Bns; both in 321 Avn Units,EUCOM Engr files. Ltr, SOS ETOUSA to CG, ETO-USA, 6 Oct 42, sub: SOS Troop and Labor Situation,BOLERO SOS Overall Plan.

53 Ltr, SOS ETOUSA to CG, ETOUSA, 6 Oct 42,sub: SOS Troop and Labor Situation; Memo, Albrechtfor Chf Engr, 1 Nov 42, and Memo, Cons Div for CE,14 Nov 42; both in 231.4 Custodian (Labor), EUCOMEngr files. OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 4, Troops, app. 2,sheets 4-8; Memo, OCE ETOUSA for G-4, SOSETOUSA, 24 Oct 42, sub: SOS Troops and LaborSituation, 321 Aviation Units, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr,HQ, VIII Bomber Command, to CG, Eighth AirForce, sub: Proposed Status List, w/4th Ind, OCE,SOS, to CG, Eighth Air Force, 10 Oct 42.


HOSPITAL CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYING PREFABRICATED CONCRETE ROOF TRUSSES

nance depots, and they supplied a largepart of the personnel for quartermas-ter depots. The labor pool system origi-nally established for the TORCH emer-gency aided materially in getting theNorth African invasion on its way intime. But the system seemed to haveexpanded beyond reason. With only105,000 troops in the entire theater,Colonel Moore could not understandwhy it was necessary to have 15,500men (not all of them engineers) carry-ing on supply functions. 54

In the spring of 1943, SOS abolished

the labor pool system and engineerunits returned to their normal jobs.Although necessary, labor pools hadmarkedly affected ETO constructionprogress. ROUNDUP plans had to bethrust aside, and work on airfields,depots, troop accommodations, andhospitals was thrown off schedule. Someconstruction had continued, but on agreatly reduced scale. Morale droppedand disciplinary problems increased,because men were doing jobs with whichthey were not familiar and for whichthey had no training. Moreover, manyunits had to be divided into small groups,with a resulting loss of unit integrityand pride.5554 Ltr, Lee to CG, Eighth Air Force, 12 Nov 42, sub:

Engr Avn Bns, and 1st Ind, Eighth Air Force to CG,SOS, 4 Jan 43; both in 320.2 General, EUCOM Engrfiles, Memo, Moore for Reybold, 30 Nov 42, sub: EngrProblems in the ETO.

55 Memo, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, for Col W. G. Wea-ver, Actg CofS, SOS, ETOUSA, 17 Dec 42, sub:


The British continued to executetheir part of BOLERO construction,largely by contract, but the future ofthe American program hung in thebalance. Many doubted that construc-tion on the scale of the long-rangeBOLERO Plan would ever be needed.The general agreement was that addi-tional camp construction would not benecessary during the winter, but depotand airfield programs were not substan-tially decreased. The engineers couldnot cope with this construction programso they sought a clear statement ofresponsibilities. Lacking such a state-

ment, they used General Somervell'sorder of 17 November, which sharplylimited materials and supplies to thenew, short-term 427,000-man troopbasis. But this order did not look beyondthe spring of 1943 and placed the Amer-icans in the awkward position of seem-ing to block preparations in the UnitedKingdom for a cross-Channel attack.The ETOUSA publication in mid-January 1943 of a modified construc-tion program left this situation basicallyunchanged. The unqualified revival ofthe buildup had to await agreement ona strategic program for 1943—44.56

Attachment of Engr Troops to Other Services, 321Engrs, EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, Office of the Engr,Southern Base Sect, to Chf Engr, ETOUSA, 20 Oct42, sub: Progress on Construction; Memo, Col R. B.Lord for Chf Engr, 24 Jan 43, 231.4 Custodian(Labor), EUCOM Engr files.

56 Ltr, Albrecht, 4 Nov 53; Ltr, Moore to Base SectEngrs, 13 Jan 43, sub: Modifying Plan for BOLEROConstruction Program w/related papers, 600 Gen, 1Jun 43-31 Aug 43, and 600-A-Gen; Memo, Moorefor Reybold, 30 Nov 42, sub: Engr Problems in ETO,w/related papers; Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 17 Nov 42.

CHAPTER IV

The Engineers in the Invasion ofNorth Africa

While the BOLERO program in theUnited Kingdom took second place,Allied planners turned their attentionto an assault on the periphery of Ger-man power and began detailed consid-eration of landings in North Africa.The hurried planning for TORCH of-fered an object lesson in disorderlypreparation and brilliant improvisation.Though the timetable called for land-ings before the end of the year, theforce envisaged did not have an overallcommand until the Combined Chiefsof Staff named General EisenhowerCommander in Chief, Allied Expedi-tionary Force, on 13 August 1942. TheAllied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)that Eisenhower headed came into exis-tence officially only on 12 Septemberbut was already a closely integratedorganization. General Sir Kenneth A. N.Anderson commanded the Britishground forces and Admiral Sir AndrewB. Cunningham the naval forces. Thevarious general and special staff sec-tions were Allied organizations, withAmerican and British officers inter-spersed throughout in various positionsof command and subordination. Maj.Gen. Humfrey Gale (British) becamethe chief administrative officer at AF-HQ. Of three task forces, Western Task

Force (WTF), which was to sail directlyfrom the United States to Casablanca,was under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton,Jr. Center Task Force (CTF), with theprimary mission of capturing the portof Oran, was under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.Fredendall. Eastern Task Force (ETF),with responsibility for seizing Algiersand the Blida and Maison BlancheAirfields, was largely British but re-tained an American commander, Maj.Gen. Charles W. Ryder, to confuse theFrench defenders of North Africa as tothe nationality of the invading force.l

Engineer Plans and Preparations

The Engineer Section of AFHQ cameinto being when Col. Frank O. Bow-man arrived in London toward the endof August 1942. This small sectionworked closely with the Engineer Sec-tion of Center Task Force, headed byCol. Mark M. Boatner, Jr., of the 591stEngineer Boat Regiment, in preparingplans for the CTF landing at Oran.AFHQ's G-4 section was responsible

1 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,1940-43, p. 455; George F. Howe, Northwest Africa:Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army inWorld War II (Washington, 1957), pp. 15, 32-35.


for planning engineer supply, and un-der G-4 were SOS groups attached tothe two U.S. task forces. The CenterTask Force (II Corps), SOS, assembledin England under Brig. Gen. ThomasB. Larkin, former ETOUSA chief en-gineer. After the landings, Larkin'sorganization was to become the Medi-terranean Base Section.

Western Task Force planning tookplace in the United States. Its EngineerSection, headed by Col. John F. Con-klin, developed along the lines of anaugmented corps-level engineer orga-nization. The section received valuableassistance from OCE (which was justone block away), particularly the Sup-ply Division, and from the Army MapService.2

Early in the fall the first elements ofthe future Atlantic Base Section (initiallydesignated SOS Task Force A) assem-bled in the United States under Brig.Gen. Arthur R. Wilson as the SOS forthe Western Task Force. The EngineerSection, SOS, WTF, under Col. FrancisH. Oxx, obtained considerable aid fromthe Plans and Distribution Division,OCE, WD, as well as from engineers ofWTF themselves. OCE, WD, was respon-sible for engineer supply for the firstfour WTF convoys, the engineer alloca-tion being 2,000 tons per convoy. Theengineers planned that requisitionswould be submitted first to the NewYork Port of Embarkation (NYPOE);in case of losses at sea, NYPOE woulddetermine priority of replacement andshipment.3

The fact that Allied forces were toundertake the landings complicated

supply planning for TORCH in the Unit-ed Kingdom. Most of the engineer ClassIV items (heavy construction equipment)would come from the British, while theremainder of Class IV and all Class IIand V items would come from Americansources. A joint stockpile established inEngland helped to avoid confusion andduplication. British elements would han-dle logistics for WTF, while SOS,ETOUSA, would supply the CTF andthe American components of the ETF.After late December (about D plus 40)supplies for all American elements ofTORCH were to come directly from theUnited States. Planners expected tobuild up supplies in North Africa to a14-day level by D plus 30, a 30-day levelby D plus 60, and a 45-day level by Dplus 90. Classes II, IV, and V itemswere to be resupplied automatically forthe first two months because the taskforces could not be expected to estab-lish adequate inventory control and req-uisition procedures until base sectionsbecame operational. Estimates by thechiefs of the technical services at ASF,WD, were to form the basis for the auto-matic resupply program, but the planalso permitted limited requisitioningfrom the NYPOE.

From the engineers' point of view,one of the most disturbing events dur-ing the planning was a high-level deci-sion to cut authorized vehicle alloca-tions. Cutting the number of vehiclesby 50 percent freed the drivers andcrews for duties in fighting formations.The cut applied not only to the engi-neers' trucks but also to special engineervehicles of all types. Maj. Gen. MarkW. Clark, deputy commander in chieffor TORCH, believed the decision wouldnot seriously affect the WTF, whose pri-mary mission was to establish and de-

2Ltr, Col John A. Chambers to EHD, 5 Apr 56.3 History of Atlantic Base Section to June 1, 1943

vol. I, p. 5, in CMH.

THE ENGINEERS IN THE INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA 61

fend a line of communications, but the50 percent cut meant a reduction of10,000 vehicles for Center Task Forcealone. Afterwards, Brig. Gen. DonaldA. Davison, Colonel Bowman's succes-sor as AFHQ engineer, observed thatengineers without vehicles became mere-ly underarmed and improperly trainedinfantry, unable to perform their tech-nical missions.4

Supply plans had to be made beforeinformation concerning importantphases of the invasion was available.Arriving at a fixed troop basis wasfundamental, but the Allies could notcome to an agreement on one untilplanning was well along. Even after afigure for the total invasion force wasat hand the allocations among service,ground, and air forces changed contin-ually. Furthermore, no outline plan ofattack became available until long aftersupply preparations were under way.

Requirements for special engineerequipment included such diverse itemsas bulldozers, tractors with detachableangledozers, amphibious tractors, minesand mine detectors, beach and airfieldlanding mats, camouflage equipmentand supplies, lighting plants, well-dig-ging machinery, water trucks, watercans (by the thousands), hand carts,portable air compressors, fumigationvaults, asphalt, magnifying glasses, un-bleached cotton sheeting, cotton sack,cord, rope, insect repellent, cable cut-ters, and grappling hooks. As it turnedout, the engineers managed to satisfymost of their supply demands exceptfor vehicles. On 17 October engineerunits of CTF reported that they had

secured 80 percent of their supplyrequirements, and on 22 October the1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade re-ported 99 percent of its engineer equip-ment on hand. However, many of themissing items were important ones.

The engineers of both task forcesunderstood in general, but not in detail,what clearing obstacles from the beach-es would involve. They were, for exam-ple, unable to obtain sea-level, offshorephotographs of the Barbary coastline.5

British photo reconnaissance of someof the beaches proved helpful, andplans were adjusted after submarineswent in close for a final investigation.

The engineers knew that the rainyseason would begin about the time ofD-day and that mud would limit theuse of roads and airfields. They alsoknew there were few rivers to cross, sothey would need little bridging equip-ment. However, they would need muchmachinery to maintain and repair roads,airfields, and railroads. The meagernatural resources of North Africa wouldnot aid construction, and the engineerswould have to maintain water supply,sewage, gas, electricity, and transit sys-tems.

Requirements for certain items ofsupply had to be studied in collabora-tion with other services. The EngineerSection, SOS, WTF, worked with theTransportation Section in requisition-ing railway equipment and petroleumpipeline and negotiated the procure-ment of the pipeline. Many unknownsremained. The engineers had to esti-

4Memo, D. A. Davison, 3 Jan 43, sub: Lessons ofOpn TORCH (hereafter cited as Davison Memo), 381War Plans (Jun 42-Jul 43), 300.162 AFHQ Engr Sect.

5Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of the United StatesNaval Operations in World War II," vol. II, Operationsin North African Waters (Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1950), p. 26.

6AFHQ (U.S.) Engr Sect (Sept-Oct 42); Ltr, BrigGen W. A. Carter to EHD, 8 Feb 56.


mate the amount of pipe that would beneeded to transport petroleum prod-ucts to storage tanks in cities and atairfields in North Africa. They had toconsider, among other things, the prob-able amount of petroleum that wouldhave to be moved by rail or truck aswell as the probable storage facilities,and their estimate had to be based onintelligent guesswork rather than onspecific knowledge.7

The American high command hadbarely begun to appreciate the practica-bility and utility of a military pipelinesystem when the United States becameinvolved in the war.8 Well before TORCHbegan, the Army had placed orderswith American industry for equipmentneeded to build military pipelines. Mili-tary requirements called for materialsthat could be easily transported andreadily erected in the field, and duringthe year of peace the petroleum indus-try had produced such equipment. Fromthe military standpoint, the importantdevelopment was the "victaulic" coup-ling, named for one of the fabricators,the Victaulic Company of America.This coupling consisted of a gas-resis-tant gasket of synthetic rubber and ametal clamp. The gasket fit into groovescut around the ends of two lengths ofpiping and was held in place by theclamp, a two-piece steel collar boltedtight to hold the gasket. This type ofcoupling could be fitted more quicklyand was less rigid than either threadedor welded joints. The steel welded-seam

pipe came in twenty-foot lengths. Earlyin the war this standard length was fourinches in inside diameter and weighed168 pounds. American industry laterdeveloped a four-inch pipe—"invasiontubing"—which weighed only sixty-eight pounds per length.

The engineers adapted other itemsof military pipeline equipment from themost portable items in commercial oilfields—pumps, engines, ship dischargehoses, fittings, and storage tanks. TheArmy used six sizes (ranging from 100-barrel to 10,000-barrel capacity) ofbolted steel tanks for semiportable stor-age. These tanks, consisting of shapedsteel plates fitted together with bolts,could be shipped "knocked down" assets—complete with valves and fittings—for onsite assembly.9

Maps were essential to the success ofthe North Africa invasion. The BritishGeographical Section, General Staff,supplied most of the maps CTF andETF used. The Intelligence Division,OCE, SOS, ETOUSA, helped distrib-ute the maps—some 500,000 itemsweighing approximately forty tons.Twenty tons were sorted, wrapped, andbundled in coded rolls for distributionaboard ships. Some 400,000 additionalphotomaps required careful handlingand packing.10

7 History of Atlantic Base Section to June 1, 1943,vol. II, ch. XIV, p. 4.

8 Ltr, C. W. Karstens to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, 29 Jan54, with attached comments signed by Karstens; seeColl, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 418ff.

9Many factors could vary the amount of gasolineactually pumped through a pipeline; six-inch pipe hada rated capacity of 400 gallons a minute, or 480,000gallons in a normal (20-hour) operating day. Engi-neer School Special Text (ST-5-350-1), MilitaryPipeline Systems (Fort Belvoir, Va., 1950), pp. 23, 32,198.

10 Ltr, Col Martin Hotine, Geographical Sect, Gen-eral Staff, to Col Herbert Milwit, 27 Nov 42, 319 ChfEngr, EUCOM Engr files; Status Rpt, 4 Nov 42, IntelDiv, 319.1 Rpts, EUCOM Engr files; Coll, Keith, andRosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equip-ment, pp. 445-46; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelli-gence and Topography, pp. 31—32.


The engineers in WTF did not haveenough maps, and on short notice re-production alone posed serious prob-lems, not the least of which was security.The Army Map Service reproducedmaps for WTF at its plant just outsideWashington, D.C., but even there secu-rity risks existed, for only a few of the800 workers could be screened in time.The maps were then taken to Hamp-ton Roads by a detachment from the66th Engineer Topographic Company,which kept them under constant sur-veillance. The l:25,000-scale maps ofthe beachheads, issued to the troopsbefore they sailed, had place namesblacked out and carried a false north.Only the commanding generals of theindividual subtask forces received truemaps before departure from the UnitedStates. Each of the subtask forces mak-ing up the WTF had an attached mobilemapmaking detachment from the 66thEngineer Topographic Company, andeach detachment carried a 250-poundreserve stock of maps. WTF sailed withsome sixty tons of maps of many differ-ent types—ground force maps on ascale of six inches to the mile, air corpstarget maps, colored mosaics of suchharbors as Port-Lyautey and Casablancaand the airdrome of Sari—and hun-dreds of photographs.11

The hurried attempt to produce mapsfor TORCH had poor results. On bothsides of the Atlantic, maps of the targetareas had to be printed from availablesources, and little opportunity existed

to bring them up to date or to producethem at the scales required for groundand close air support operations. Insome cases major military operationshad to be based on l:200,000-scalemaps with ground configuration shownby spot elevations and hachures. Low-grade photomaps, neither rectified fortilt nor matched for tone, substitutedfor large-scale maps of limited areas.The lack of good base maps of the tar-get area, coupled with too little leadtime, ruled out satisfactory maps forthe North Africa invasion, while thesecrecy that enveloped invasion plansseverely limited the amount of mapwork that could be undertaken in time.

British and American agencies aidedeach other in preparing intelligencematerial vital to TORCH; one examplewas a bulky work that the StrategicEngineer Studies Section in the Strate-gic Intelligence Branch, OCE, WD,compiled in September 1942. Materialcame from the British as well as fromAmerican construction companies, con-sular agents, geologists, even peoplewho sent postcards depicting scenes inNorth Africa. The volumes containeda wealth of information on North Africa,including descriptions of roads andrailroads, port facilities, bridge capac-ities, water supply, construction ma-terials, forests, airfields, electric power,and the layout of known minefields.13

Engineer beach models were in greatdemand on both sides of the Atlantic.Large plaster of paris models weremade at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, andmodels of Moroccan beaches came tothe United States from England. TheBritish model beaches originated from

11OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Top-ography, app. 5; "The North African Campaign,"Reader's Digest (February 1943), 98-99; Hist 66th EngrTopo Co; Engr Comment on Map Supply Opn TORCH,TF 3-0.3 (47844), 8-11 Nov 42, apps. 8 and 2; MajWilliam C. Frierson, Preparations for TORCH, pp. 1 -3,63.

l2Ltr, Col Herbert Milwit to EHD, 31 Jan 56.13 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:

Troops and Equipment, p. 450.


information the British Inter-ServiceInformation Series (ISIS) gleaned fromreports by the British military staff.Two American engineer officers who,posing as airline officials, had visitedBathurst on the western coast of Africaearly in 1942 furnished useful informa-tion, particularly on coastal surf. Otherinformation came from tourist guide-books and from recent visitors to NorthAfrica. Some of the model beachesdepicted the terrain a mile or moreinland.14

Engineer Amphibian Brigades

Engineer training for the invasion ofNorth Africa concentrated heavily onmethods of landing on hostile shores.Japanese occupation of Pacific islandsand German control of nearly all theworthwhile harbors on the Europeancontinent forced the War Department'sattention to the possibility of Armybeach crossings and to means of inva-sion and logistical support that did notrely entirely on seizing strongly de-fended ports at the outset. Amphibi-ous warfare had been the preserve ofthe Navy for two decades before Ameri-can entry into the new conflict, and, infact, had become the raison d'etre of theU.S. Marine Corps. An agreement in1935 defined the responsibilities of eachservice in landing operations and lim-ited the Army to stevedoring at estab-lished ports. Clearly based on the experi-ence of World War I, in which the Navycould deliver goods to French ports thatwere intact and secure from enemy

interdiction, the arrangement was nowpasse. Though the issue remained openthroughout the war, the Navy contin-ued to lobby for the exclusive right tooperate across beaches. However, theArmy did take over a large share ofthis function in the spring of 1942because the Navy could not supplysmaller landing craft or provide enoughmen to operate boats or train other cox-swains and crews. Out of the necessityto prepare for Army amphibious oper-ations grew the engineer amphibianbrigades.

The Army's earliest conceptions forthe brigades in 1942 reemphasized anancient method of moving troops ontoa hostile shore. The Navy's prewarexperimentation with amphibious oper-ations relied almost entirely upon aship-to-shore method of deployment tothe beach in which combat troops andcargo were unloaded offshore into smal-ler craft that made the run from deeperwater to the shore. Hazardous underany circumstances, the ship-to-shoresystem was a near impossibility at nightand in heavy seas. With the introduc-tion of larger, shallow-draft vessels thatcould plow up to the beach and dis-gorge men and equipment dry-shod,Army and Navy planners could readilysee the advantage of the shore-to-shoreamphibious operations. The shore-to-shore alternative treated each opera-tion as a major river crossing and pre-supposed that landing craft making theassault would embark units and equip-ment on the near, or friendly, shoreand transport them directly, withoutthe confusion of a deepwater transfer,to the far, or hostile, shore. Unsaddledwith earlier doctrine in the field, theArmy favored the latter method as themeans of crossing the Channel to the

14 H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation andthe Conquest of North Africa, Jan 45, pp. 42, 80, inCMH; Ltr, Milwit to EHD, 31 Jan 56, and Interv, MajGen Frank O. Bowman, 9 Feb 56.


Continent. Though the major landingsof the war employed combinations ofboth methods, Army engineer training,organization, and equipment in theamphibian brigades created in 1942 fol-lowed shore-to-shore doctrine.15

The Army started relatively late toform amphibian units. Formally estab-lished on 10 June 1942 under Col. Dan-iel Noce, the Engineer Amphibian Com-mand as an SOS organization paralleledan Army Ground Forces command, theAmphibious Training Command, atCamp Edwards, Massachusetts. TheEngineer Amphibian Command speci-fied the organizational shape of the firstunits, the 1st and 2d Engineer Amphib-ian Brigades, activated on 15 and 20June, respectively. Each consisted of aboat regiment, a shore regiment, andsupport units. Later additions to thestandard TOE included signal units anda quartermaster battalion. Each shoreregiment consisted of three battalions;each battalion included two far-shorecompanies responsible for marking andorganizing hostile beaches and movingsupplies across them to invading forcesand one near-shore company chargedwith loading combat troops a n d m a t é r i e l .The Army made constant changes

in the standard unit composition in anattempt to perfect the concept and toprovide the brigades with a flexiblestructure to meet the conditions of theassault. The 2d, 3d, and 4th Brigades,eventually known as engineer specialbrigades, each had three boat and shoreregiments. Because no larger craft wereavailable when Colonel Noce took overthe Engineer Amphibian Command,

the engineers had as standard equip-ment 36-foot LCVPs and 50-foot LCM-3s. Though experimentation with the50-foot boat produced the LCM—6, alonger, more commodious, and slightlyfaster boat using the originally designedengines, the command knew that noneof its models was a match for the chop-py waters of the English Channel andnone could negotiate larger expansesof open ocean. Engineer amphibiantraining at Camp Edwards and later atCamp Carrabelle on the Florida GulfCoast centered on the 36- and 50-footcraft as they became available fromNavy stocks or from factories. But evenbefore the 105-foot LCT-5 becameavailable, the Navy reemphasized itsprerogatives on amphibious warfareunits and on training responsibilities inthat field.16

In July 1942 the Navy reaffirmed thevalidity of the 1935 agreement, arguingfor control of amphibious operations.Though it could not prevail every-where—the Army retained commandand control of the brigades for the mostpart in the Southwest Pacific—the Navyofficially took over all boats and main-tained its responsibility for training boatcrews elsewhere outside the UnitedStates. Thus, the Army's AmphibiousCorps, Atlantic Fleet, consisting of the3d and 9th Infantry Divisions and the2d Armored Division under Maj. Gen.Jonathan W. Anderson, was subordi-nate for training to Rear Adm. H. KentHewitt, though it was a part of GeneralPatton's Western Task Force. A King-Marshall agreement then delineated the

15 Morison, Operations in North African Waters, pp.270-71; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps ofEngineers: Troops and Equipment, p. 362.

16 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 364—65; Brig. Gen. WilliamF. Heavey, Down Ramp! The Story of the Army AmphibianEngineers (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947),p. 12.


Navy's responsibility for operating andmaintaining all landing boats in theEuropean Theater of Operations. Theagreement worked to the detriment ofthe 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigadewhen it arrived in the theater on 17August 1942, only six weeks after itsformation, to complete its training withthe 1st Infantry Division. It interferedfurther with the assault training sched-ule for the Center Task Force laid outin a meeting on 25 August among Brit-ish Lt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson, ViceAdm. J. Hughes-Hallett, and Maj. Gen.J. C. Hayden and American Maj. Gen.Mark W. Clark.

The engineer brigade, under Col.Henry C. Wolfe, operated in Englandunder a number of constraints, muchas the engineer units that had precededit into the theater. Most obvious as asource of grief was the command struc-ture resulting from the Army-Navyagreements. ETOUSA headquarters,following the lead from home, estab-lished the Maritime Command underRear Adm. Andrew C. Bennett to pro-vide naval supervision for the brigade'sactivity. The Maritime Command, hast-ily put together on 11 August while thebrigade was still at sea, had virtually nopersonnel experienced in amphibiouswarfare and no equipment to carry outtraining exercises. Admiral Bennett,acting with no clear statement of thescope of his command, was forced toask Colonel Wolfe for several of his boatcrews to train junior naval officers insmall boat handling so that they, inturn, could teach future Navy crews.Bennett's command also resorted tosplitting up the brigade elements. Theunit, designed as an integral organiza-tion of 366 officers, 21 warrant officers,and 7,013 enlisted men to support an

entire division, found itself spread onboth sides of Britain's North Channel.Though later designated principal mili-tary landing officer for Center TaskForce, Colonel Wolfe served on Ben-nett's staff once the Maritime Com-mand headquarters had moved fromLondon to Rosneath, Scotland. His ownheadquarters company and the 531stEngineer Shore Regiment went to Lon-donderry while two battalions of the591st Engineer Boat Regiment settledin Belfast with the brigade medicalbattalion. The brigade managed to se-cure some basic training and shakedown its organization, but it receivedno training in far-shore unloading, andmuch of its equipment arrived afterdelays at six widely scattered portsaboard sixty-five different ships.

When Brig. Gen. Daniel Noce touredthe amphibian training centers in theUnited Kingdom in September, hefound them all inadequate. Constantrain reduced training time; the terrainbehind the available beaches was notsuited to the brigade's needs; landingbeaches were too constricted, windswept,and rocky. Noce saw boat crews cau-tiously approach the beach for fear ofdamaging their craft instead of comingin rapidly as they would have to dounder enemy fire. A lack of tools,equipment, and personnel hamperedthe training program, and campsites forthe men were poor. Large unit train-ing was infeasible with the small facili-ties available. A reserve of boats had to

17 ETOUSA GO 27, 11 Aug42; Heavey, DoumRamp!The Story of the Army Amphibian Engineers, pp. 10—19;Memo, Engr Sect, ETOUSA, for Brig Gen T. B.Larkin, Chf Engr, 24 Aug 42, sub: Weekly Rpt ofActivities, 319.1 ETOUSA, EUCOM files; 1st EngrAmphib Bde, Rpt of Opns with Center Task Force,29 Nov 42.


GENERAL NOCE (Photograph taken in 1944.)

be overhauled and carefully protectedagainst damage in preparation forTORCH, which took the craft temporar-ily from training use. The brigade'sengineers spent considerable time as-sembling new craft shipped in cratesfrom the United States. Much of thisproduction went to equip British unitsbefore American engineer organiza-tions received their standard equip-ment. Between 22 September and 5October, all landing craft were with-drawn from training units to be pre-pared for the invasion.18

In various parts of the United King-dom the brigade's 591st Engineer BoatRegiment received some infantry train-ing and considerable stevedore and

hatch crew experience. Because of Brit-ish manpower shortages, one battalionwas to supply 35-man hatch crews forten of the twenty-three cargo vessels inthe assault wave to the CTF. Two offi-cers and fifteen enlisted men of themaintenance company of the 591st En-gineer Boat Regiment received someexcellent training in repairing landingcraft when they were attached to Brit-ish naval contingents of the ETF atInverary on Loch Fyne, Scotland. Themen of the brigade's 561st Boat Mainte-nance Company had earlier repairedapproximately one hundred landingcraft at the U.S. naval base at Rosneath,in the Glasgow area. The company wasfortunate in having the necessary equip-ment to do the job.19

For units other than boat mainte-nance and stevedore crews, training inthe United Kingdom consisted chieflyof physical conditioning and instructionin infantry fundamentals. Only eightweeks were available between the timeunits were alerted for TORCH andmoved to the port area for final re-hearsal, and for some engineer unitsconstruction work interrupted eventhat short period.

Training in the 19th Engineer Com-bat Regiment and the 16th ArmoredEngineer Battalion (the 1st ArmoredDivision's organic engineer unit) maybe taken as an example. The 19th Engi-neer Combat Regiment had sufficientphysical hardening but received noammunition or mines for training andno instruction in the use of the Baileybridge, British explosives, or antitank

18 Memo, AFHQ for Gen Clark, 26 Sep 42, sub:Observation at Amphibian Training Centers in Scot-land by Brig Gen Daniel Noce, EAC 353 (Training);Ltr, Lt Col John B. Webb to EHD, 23 Apr 56.

19Ltr, Col Kenneth W. Kennedy to EHD, 9 Apr 56;Heavey, Dawn Ramp! The Story of the Army AmphibianEngineers, pp. 20-21.


mines.20 The 16th Armored EngineerBattalion fared somewhat better. Whilestationed in Northern Ireland, the 16threceived some comprehensive bridgeand ferry training. The unit used theBritish Bailey bridge, its value havingbeen recognized by officers who at-tended the British military engineer-ing school. The 16th, likewise, becamefamiliar with other British equipment,including Sommerfeld track, mines,booby traps, and demolitions. The bat-talion also launched a treadway bridgefrom a modified maracaibo boat offNewcastle.21

During the summer and fall of 1942,engineer units went through invasionrehearsal drills in both the United Statesand the United Kingdom. In the Zoneof the Interior the WTF split into threesubtask forces, X, Y, and Z, and car-ried out amphibious drills. Since load-ing went slowly, supplies were delayed,and because beach capacity was limited,one subtask force began rehearsals whilethe others continued loading. From thestart there were mixups because loadswere stowed aboard wrong ships andammunition and gasoline were not un-loaded for fear of explosions and fire.The result was a landing exercise lim-ited to the loading and unloading ofvehicles and other bulky items. WhileY was loading, X and Z forces partici-pated in the same type of exercise.Another serious deficiency was a lackof rigorous night training, which wasto prove costly during the landings. Thevalue of all WTF exercises also was lim-ited by the fact that they took place dur-

ing near ideal conditions—a tide thatvaried little and a relatively calm sea—hardly the situation to be expectedalong the Atlantic coast of North Af-rica.

CTF and ETF held rehearsals likethose of the WTF on 19-20 Octobernear Loch Linnhe on the northwestcoast of Scotland. Their objectives wereto practice landing-craft techniques atnight, rehearse the seizure of objectivesup to ten miles inland, test communica-tion among groups landing on a widefront, arid promote cooperation amongcarrier-borne aircraft, naval bombard-ment vessels, and ground troops. Theengineers gained some experience inlaying out shore installations and com-munications but learned almost noth-ing about unloading vehicles and sup-plies. The rehearsals were final; noopportunity existed to correct errors.23

Only the experience of an actual inva-sion could provide an understandingof the problems involved, and only thenwould it be clear that a close-knit beachorganization was required to coordinatethe work of engineer shore regimentsand of the Navy.24

The Landings

Western Task Force

WTF had the mission of taking the

20 Hist 19th Engr C Rgt; AFHQ, compilation RptsOpn TORCH, CTF, Incl 1, 29 Dec 42, Lesson fromOpn TORCH, HQ, 19th Engr Rgt.

21 Hist 16th Armd Engr Bn. The forerunner of theLST, the maracaibo was converted from shallow-draftoil tankers used on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela.

22Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,1940-43, p. 444; Dunham, U.S. Army Transporta-tion and the Conquest, pp. 35-37, 73-78; Interv,Shotwell and Gardes with Chabbock, 4 Nov 50; U.S.Atlantic Fleet Amphib Force to CofS Amphib Force,18 Nov 42, sub: Observation of Landing Opns at PortLyautey, EAC folder African campaign.

23Ltr, Brig Gen John F. Conklin, 25 Jan 56; TheAdministrative and Logistical History of the Euro-pean Theater of Operations, vol. IV, "OperationsTORCH and the ETO," pp. 61-62, in CMH; 1st EngrAmphib Bde, Rpt of Opns with Center Task Force.

24 MLtr, Col John A. Chambers to EHD, 5 Apr 56.


port and adjacent airfield at Casablancaand then establishing communicationwith CTF at Oran. If Spain shouldintercede, the WTF was to join withCenter Task Force and secure SpanishMorocco. Casablanca itself was toostrongly defended to be taken by directfrontal assault. Instead, it was to be cap-tured from the rear with three subtaskForces landing close enough to the cityto take it before reinforcements couldarrive. This plan required the early useof medium or heavy tanks, for which aport was essential since landing craft tocarry such heavy loads were not thenavailable. Also, if land-based aircraftwere to support the attack, an airfieldhad to be captured quickly.

The three subtask forces were calledBRUSHWOOD, GOALPOST, and BLACK-STONE. The first, commanded by Maj.Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson and madeup of the 3d Infantry Division, a por-tion of the 2d Armored Division, andsupporting troops, was to provide themain blow by capturing Fedala, a resortthirteen miles north of Casablanca, andthen moving on to Casablanca. Maj.Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., headed theGOALPOST force, which was made upof part of the 9th Infantry Division andelements of the 2d Armored Divisionalong with supporting units. Its goalswere the capture of Mehdia (eightymiles from Casablanca) and the Port-Lyautey Airfield with its hard-surfacedrunways. BLACKSTONE, the third sub-task force, was under Maj. Gen. ErnestN. Harmon and had parts of the 9thInfantry and 2d Armored Divisions. Itsinitial mission was the capture of Safi, asmall port about 150 miles south ofCasablanca. (Map 3)

The main engineer forces of theWTF were distributed among the three

task forces. The 1st and 3d Battalionsof the 36th Engineer Combat Regimentwere with BRUSHWOOD, and the 1stand 2d Battalions of the 540th Engi-neers were with GOALPOST and BLACK-STONE, respectively. All were to act asshore parties. The 15th Engineer Com-bat Battalion (9th Division) with GOAL-POST, the 10th Battalion (3d Division)with BRUSHWOOD, and elements of the17th Armored Engineer Battalion (2dArmored Division) with BLACKSTONEwere to carry out normal combat engi-neer duties. The 2d Battalion of the20th Engineer Combat Regiment, as-signed to BRUSHWOOD, was to remainon board ship as a reserve force to becalled in when needed.25

The main objective of the WesternTask Force on D-day was Fedala, wherelanding beaches were exposed to thedouble hazard of enfilading coastaldefense batteries and dangerously highsurf. When successive waves of landingcraft approached the shore, many sweptoff course to founder on reefs or rocks.Others, only partly unloaded and stran-ded during ebb tide, were not able toretract because following landing craftwere too close. The pounding surfwrecked many stranded craft. The in-adequacy of the shore parties, made upchiefly of combat engineers of the 36thEngineers assisted by naval beach par-ties, also created dangerous delays.

The toll of landing craft was high atthe Fedala beachhead, and the landingof troops and supplies became badlydisorganized. Barely more than 1 per-cent of the supplies was ashore as lateas 1700 on D-day. Engineer officers,badly needed on the beaches to control

25HQ, WTF, Engr, 8 Jan 43, sub: Engr Annex toFinal Rpt of Opns of WTF, 8 Nov 42.


WRECKED AND BROACHED LANDING CRAFT AT FEDALA, FRENCH MOROCCO

and direct the engineers of the shoreparties, could not get ashore. No cen-tralized coordination of supply activi-ties for the different landing operationsexisted. The G-4 section of WTF didnot get ashore at Fedala until the thirdmorning, and the G-4 himself was notwith this group of only two officers andthree enlisted men. General Patton,however, was at the beach before day-light on D plus 1 and remained thereuntil after noon because of his disgustover conditions. He condemned whatseemed to him the lack of enterprise ofthe Army shore parties and took mea-sures to divert the small craft from thebeaches, where they had to fight themenacing surf, to the port of Fedala.

The chaos with which the Western

Task Force had to contend drove homethe lesson that trained service troopsshould always accompany invasion for-ces to assume the burden of supply andservice functions, allowing the task forcecommander to concentrate on tacticalproblems. As it was, Patton had heldback SOS Task Force A, and the SOSdid not reach Casablanca until 24 De-cember.26

The employment of engineers as pro-visional assault and defensive units inthe Western Task Force was exempli-fied by the experience of Company C,15th Engineer Combat Battalion and1st Battalion, 540th Engineer ShoreRegiment, supporting a regimental com-

26History of Atlantic Base Section to June 1, 1943,vol. I, ch. XIV, p. 9.


bat team of the 9th Infantry Division inGOALPOST—the attack on Mehdia northof Casablanca and on Port-LyauteyAirfield. In addition to weapons andhand tools, the engineers in the assaultcarried mine detectors, bangalore tor-pedoes, and flame throwers to enablethem to push through minefields andother obstacles and to reduce pillboxes.

A provisional assault company ofengineers made up of detachmentsfrom Company C, 15th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, the 540th Engineer ShoreRegiment, and the 871st Engineer Avi-ation Battalion participated in an attackon 10 November on the Kasba, an oldstone fortress that stood on a cliff abovethe mouth of the Sebou River andblocked the approach to Mehdia andthe airfield upriver. Shouting Frenchdefenders stood on the walls firingdown at the Americans but Americaninfantry attacks along the ridge andengineer attacks along the river took theKasba. Then a small detachment fromCompany C of the 15th Engineer Bat-talion rendered the fort's guns useless.The destroyer Dallas, with a specialraiding detachment aboard includingpart of a Company C platoon, thenentered the Sebou, and, after the engi-neers had removed a cable net, pro-ceeded upriver and captured Port-Lyautey Airfield. After the destroyer'sguns had silenced enemy artillery, theengineers began repairs on the airfield.That afternoon, the 888th AirborneEngineer Aviation Company relievedCompany C's elements.

After the occupation of Casablancaon D plus 4, supply operations beganto center there, and an almost hopelesstangle quickly developed. The first taskof the WTF engineers was to resolvethis problem, and the 175th Engineer

General Service Regiment tackled thejob. The regiment reached Casablancaon 16 November 1942 in the D plus 5convoy and found a dump location thatwas eventually to be expanded to 160acres. All supplies brought ashore,whether engineer, quartermaster, orordnance, went into this dump, where,before any systematic attempt could bemade to institute depot procedures,more supplies of all sorts began arriv-ing. Every type of vehicle that could beused for the purpose, including jeeps,was pressed into service to move sup-plies from the ships. The rush to unloadwas so great that materials were castoff railroad cars and trucks without sys-tem or order, and there were timesafter the December rains began whensupplies stood a foot deep in water.

The 175th Engineer General ServiceRegiment had the extraordinarily diffi-cult task of operating the engineerdepot under such chaotic conditions,and it had to undertake an around-the-clock job for which it was not trained.For days the regiment had no opportu-nity to rest and no chance to consoli-date its units. The engineer depot officeforce was housed in a sixteen-foot tentduring the first week. For more than amonth supplies of all description spreadover the dump area without adequateshelter, while guards had to be postedto prevent pilfering by natives. Theengineers improvised shelter for per-ishables by turning landing barges up-side down. Late in December ware-house construction was possible, andthe engineer dump, which the 175thoperated throughout the winter months,gradually began to assume the charac-teristics of an orderly depot.27

27 Hist 175th Engr GS Rgt, Feb 42-Oct 45.


Center Task Force

The mission of Center Task Force,consisting of the 1st Infantry Division,Combat Command B of the 1st Ar-mored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat-talion, was to capture Oran and its adja-cent airfields, to establish communica-tion with the WTF, and, in the event ofSpanish intervention, to cooperate withGeneral Patton in securing SpanishMorocco. Finally, CTF was to establishcommunications with ETF at Orleans-ville, Algeria. Around Oran, four land-ings were scheduled, with a frontalassault on the port itself as the keyobjective. The Ranger battalion was todevelop the smaller port of Arzew,thirty miles east of Oran, while CombatCommand B, designated Task ForceRed, and the 16th and 18th Regimen-tal Combat Teams of the 1st InfantryDivision went ashore on Beach Z, justeast of Arzew. Armored forces were toslice inland to seize the airfields atTafaraoui and La Senia, as the 16thand 18th Regimental Combat Teamsclosed Oran from the east. The 26thRegimental Combat Team, 1st Infan-try Division, was to land at Les Anda-louses and advance on Oran from thewest. The fourth group, a smaller com-ponent of Combat Command B, was tocome ashore at Mersa Bou Zedjar, moveinland to Lourmel, seize the airstripthere, and then advance on the La SeniaAirfield just south of Oran. Brig. Gen.Henry C. Wolfe, commanding themuch-dispersed 1st Engineer Amphib-ian Brigade, was to operate Arzew as aport and bring supplies and troopsacross the adjacent Beach Z. He gavethe responsibility for unloading theD-day convoy to the 531st EngineerShore Regiment, which was to co-

operate with Royal Navy units on thebeaches.28

The 531st Engineer Shore Regiment,attached to the 1st Infantry Division,provided one battalion at Les Anda-louses and two battalions at Arzew. The2d Battalion of the 591st Engineer BoatRegiment had shore engineer supportduty for Combat Command B of the1st Armored Division, split between twobeaches. The 1st Battalion of the 591stfurnished hatch crews, while the 16thArmored Engineer Battalion (1st Ar-mored Division) and the 1st EngineerCombat Battalion (1st Division) were tocarry out normal combat engineerfunctions.29

The experience of Company F of the591st Engineer Boat Regiment illus-trated much that was learned aboutcombat engineer support at Oran. At-tached to Force GREEN (Combat Com-mand B of the 1st Armored Division),Company F supervised the landing ofmen and supplies at Mersa Bou Zedjar(called X-Ray Beach), some twenty-eight miles west of Oran. Its 9 officersand 186 enlisted men, commanded byCapt. Kenneth W. Kennedy, were toaid in landing 108 officers, 2,158 en-listed men, 409 wheeled vehicles, 54tracked vehicles, and 430 tons of sup-plies. The company organized into aheadquarters platoon of 2 officers and30 enlisted men; a defense platoon of 1officer and 40 enlisted men; a medicaldetachment of 1 officer and 6 aid men;and 2 construction and unloading pla-toons, each composed of 55 enlisted

281st Engr Amphib Bde, Lessons from Opn TORCH,30 Dec 42, Incl 1 to Rpts on Opn TORCH, CTF, 16 Jan43.

291st Engr Amphib Bde, Rpt of Opns with CenterTask Force; Hists, 1st Engr C Bn and 16th ArmdEngr Bn.


men, one with 3 officers and the otherwith 2. Available landing craft consistedof 10 LCAs, 14 LCP(R)s, 4 LCM(I)s, 2LCM(III)s, and 1 LST.30

Plans called for routing all vehiclesoff the LST directly onto a road lead-ing to the village of Bou Zadjar. As soonas waterproofing could be removed, thevehicles were to move out along theroad. All other vehicles coming ashorewere to gather in an assembly area forremoval of waterproofing, and this ini-tial assembly area was also to serve as adump to keep both beaches clear. Atnight wheeled vehicles were to be guidedacross the beach to the area by a line ofshaded green lights held by guides,while tracked vehicles were to be guidedto the same area by orange lights alonganother route. Personnel could followeither color.

A high rocky point divided X-RayBeach into two sections, Green andWhite beaches, about a fifteen-minutewalk apart. Company F had to be splitinto two complete units, each with itsown defense and construction sections,unloading details, and even medicaldetachments. Green Beach was 100yards long and almost 30 yards deepand rose steeply to high sand dunesand a hill of 500 feet. The only possibleexit was to the east, a climb up a steepgrade over deep sand. Because of sand-bars, landing craft had to be halted 300yards from the beach. Much of WhiteBeach was difficult for landings becauseof a narrow approach and dangerousrocks in the water along the shore.

During the landings little went accord-

ing to plan. When the operation startedat 0145, the weather was clear and thesurf moderate. Captain Kennedy andthe men of his company headquarters,who were supposed to land on GreenBeach at H plus 15 minutes, were tenminutes late. They remained alone onthe beach for almost an hour, becausethe British naval beach party, which wasto put the markers in place, had not yetlanded. The contingents of the shoreparty that were to land at H-hour dis-embarked on Green Beach at H plus90 minutes and White Beach at H plus30 minutes.

Captain Kennedy and his group metno French opposition. They carried outthe reconnaissance which was to havebeen directed by the missing assistantshore party commanders on the beachand for some distance inland. Whenthe markers were finally put down, thefirst few waves of landing craft failedto land between them, and many craftwere damaged and vehicles mired. Ear-ly in the operation an LCP(R) caughtfire and lit up the area for miles around,revealing the site of operations. Thevessel finally sank under the fire of a.50-caliber machine gun of CompanyF, but for some time thereafter oil con-tinued to burn.

At approximately H plus 3 the navalbeach party notified the engineers itwanted to land its maracaibo on GreenBeach according to plan. To unload atthis spot Company A of the 16th Ar-mored Engineer Battalion had to erect300 feet of treadway bridging, as ex-pected. At H plus 4 the maracaibo wasalmost ready for unloading, but noSommerfeld track for preparing an exitroad was yet on hand. Without thisflexible mat as a base, trucks would sinkto their axles in the sand. By the time

30 This account for Company F derives from CaptKenneth W. Kennedy, Rpt on Amphib Opn by Co F,591st Engr Boat Rgt, 27 Feb 43, in Hist 591st EngrBoat Rgt, 1943-44; Ltr, Lt Col Kenneth W. Kennedyto EHD, 9 Apr 56.


the track arrived from White Beach andwas in place, it was H plus 5, four hoursbehind schedule.

Landing craft continued to founder,and at noon on D-day Captain Ken-nedy had to close the beach. From thathour all landing operations took placeat better protected White Beach. ButWhite Beach had only two narrow exits,and in one of these, seventy-five yardsfrom the landing points, only trackedvehicles could be used. By H plus 6,1,500 barracks bags and other supplieshad been dumped on the sands, andtoo little room remained to put downSommerfeld tracks; as a result, all sup-plies had to be carried from the water'sedge on sleds. At 1300 the first combatunit had moved out with its equipment,but an hour and a half later the beachhad become completely blocked by gaso-line cans, barracks bags, and ammu-nition.

By 1800, with the aid of Arabs andtwenty-five men from units alreadyashore, Kennedy and his men finallyhad relieved the congestion. It was thenpossible to lay Sommerfeld track andget two trucks on the beach simultan-eously. Thereafter, the beach remainedclear, and by 1900 enough equipmentwas ashore to send an additional com-bat unit forward.

Captain Kennedy called for thirtymen from units already ashore to aidin a night unloading shift. As darknessfell, with serials coming in more slowlyand inexperienced crews contributingto the boat casualties, the whole opera-tion lagged further behind schedule.Next morning, 9 November, unload-ing continued at a still slower pace asthe number of serviceable landing craftdwindled. Naval forces tried to compen-sate for the small craft losses by load-

ing an LST directly from the cargo ves-sels and then beaching it. As anotherexpedient, a ponton bridge served as afloating lighter to bring ashore sometwenty light tanks. That night nearlyall the LCMs had their propellers tan-gled with landing lines or had broached.Broached craft lay broadside to the seaon the sand and open to the poundingsurf; even undamaged, they were ofno use until they could be pushed offthe shore and put back into action. Notuntil 1900 on 10 November was thebeach closed and beach operations de-clared complete—twenty-three hoursbehind time.

With little training in shore opera-tions, with only three vehicles at itsdisposal, and with the many problemsof unloading, Company F managed toaccomplish its task by dint of continu-ous hard work and cooperation withthe British beach party—the fruit ofjoint exercises in the United Kingdom.Since a definite line of responsibilitybetween the two had not been drawn,each could, and did, perform almostidentical tasks; the shore party aiding,for instance, in retracting the boatsfrom the beach and the beach partyhelping to unload the boats.

While the Rangers were capturingthe French fort above Arzew and silenc-ing Arzew's harbor defenses, the 1stInfantry Division (less the 26th Regi-mental Combat Team) landed on thebeaches adjacent to Arzew, the 531stEngineer Shore Regiment (less the 3dBattalion) assisting. Supplies began tocome ashore, with ammunition giventop priority. The 531st Engineer ShoreRegiment had enough trucks to clearthe beaches initially but did not havethe manpower to keep up the pacewithout relief, and unloading slowed


perceptibly after D-day. However, ton-nage stacked along and near the beacheswas never in danger of getting wet sincethe tide in the Mediterranean variedonly about a foot. The 1st Division'scapture of the port of Arzew decreaseddependence upon the beaches, and byD plus 3 ships were at dockside beingunloaded rapidly. The beaches thenclosed and 531st Engineer Shore Regi-ment personnel, along with their trucks,became available for unloading partiesin the town.

The lack of trained supply person-nel was a serious handicap from thebeginning. After the armistice with theFrench, the confusion increased with ascramble to secure sites for depots anddumps. By D plus 3 staff officers were"scurrying in all directions" to find loca-tions for supplies coming in from "thetangled mess at Arzew" and to get readyfor those discharged from a convoyarriving that day.31

The first echelon of the Mediterra-nean Base Section (MBS) organizationcame ashore near Oran on 11 Novem-ber. Within a month, with the arrivalof later echelons and service troopsfrom the United States, this base sec-tion was operating with comparativesmoothness. Its Engineer Service con-sisted of three groups of men that leftEngland on 12, 22, and 27 November.During November the first two groups,totaling fifteen officers and thirty-eightenlisted men detached from SOS, ETO-USA, served as part of the II Corpsengineer's staff. Upon landing at Orantheir most immediate jobs were acquir-ing real estate, establishing water points

and engineer depots, and handlinggasoline and oils from ship-to-shorestorage and tank cars.

On 8 December, two days after thethird group arrived, and the day MBSwas activated, Headquarters, EngineerService, MBS, was formally set up toincorporate all three groups. DuringDecember the Engineer Service had anaverage strength of fifty-seven officers,one warrant officer, and sixty-threeenlisted men assigned and four offi-cers and enlisted men attached.32

Eastern Task Force

Two hundred fifty miles to the eastwas the Eastern Assault Force (EAF),at first under the command of GeneralRyder of the 34th Division, later thenucleus of the British First Army underLt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson. This attackforce, after occupying Algiers and adja-cent airfields, was to establish commu-nication with CTF at Orleansville, south-west of Algiers, and to advance towardTunis. For the seizure of Algiers, EAFdevised a plan like that CTF employed.The landings were to take place out-side the Bay of Algiers, on beaches westand east of the city, while two smallergroups were to take Maison BlancheAirfield, ten miles southeast of Algiers,and Blida Airfield, twenty-nine milessouthwest of the city. A special landingparty (TERMINAL) prepared to make adirect assault on the port itself to fore-stall sabotage of harbor installations.EAF was about one-half American,chiefly the 39th Regimental CombatTeam (9th Division) and the 168th Regi-

31Ltr, Brig Gen W. A. Carter, Engr, U.S. ArmyForces, Far East, and Eighth U.S. Army (Rear), to LtCol David M. Matheson, Chf, 8 Feb 56.

32 Rpt, HQ, MBS, Ofc of the Engr, to ACofS, G-2,17 Dec 42, sub: Organization Hist, Engr Service,10-30 Nov 42, 314.7 History 1942-48, Ofc of Engr,North African Service Command.


mental Combat Team (34th Division).Company C of the 109th EngineerCombat Battalion was with the 168thRegimental Combat Team; CompanyA of the 15th Engineers (9th Division)and the 2d Battalion of the 36th Engi-neers were with the 39th RegimentalCombat Team.33 U.S. engineers partici-pated less in ETF than in the WTF andCTF landings, nor were they neededas much, for Algiers was captured onD-day.

The Assessment

The invasion of North Africa, byfar the largest amphibious operationattempted to that time, developed in avery brief time, and from the very be-ginning much went wrong. In a numberof instances, as on Green Beach atOran, unloading fell hours behindschedule. Engineer units landed three,five, even ten and more hours behindschedule. Not only were inexperiencedtroops late in disembarking from thetransports, but equally inexperiencedRoyal Navy crews, approaching thecoast in darkness from points far off-shore, beached their craft many yards—even miles—from designated landingspots. In one extreme case a landingcraft missed its mark by twelve miles.Some of the landings were so scatteredthat supplies were spread out all alongthe beaches, and the small engineershore parties had difficulty governingthe flow to advancing troops inland.

Another delaying factor was the poorseamanship of Navy crews in handlinglanding craft at the beaches. All threetask forces had high losses: WTF lost

34.3 percent of its craft, CTF 28 per-cent, and EAF 94 percent. So manyboats broached or swamped that sched-ules for following boat waves fell apart.The Navy claimed, with some justice,that help from those on shore, includ-ing engineers, might have reduced thelosses; nevertheless, one of the chiefcauses of boat losses was the failure ofthe naval beach parties to place mark-ers properly or in time to guide theboats. In some cases the beach partiesemplaced no markers at all.34

The division of responsibility betweenthe two services was not well defined,especially as to the time and place atwhich the beach commander was totransfer his authority to the shore com-mander. Naval officials afterwards com-plained that the engineers refused toaid in unloading supplies and clearingboats from the beaches; the engineersmade similar criticisms of certain navalpersonnel. Both accusations had somebasis; neither service clearly understoodthe other's particular problems or du-ties.

A better preventive measure might

33 The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. IV,"Operations TORCH and the ETO," p. 86; AFHQ,Outline Opn TORCH, an. 4, ETF.

34The following assessment of engineer operationson 9-11 November 1942 is based on Operation, 1stProv Bde (WTF), an. 3; Rpts of 1st Engr Amphib Bde(CTF); 591st Engr Boat Rgt; Co F, 36th Engr C Bn;Co A, 15th Engr C Bn; 109th Engr C Bn; 19th EngrC Bn; 3d Inf Div, an. 2; U.S. Atlantic Fleet AmphibForce (Port Lyautey), an. 8, app. 1; Rpts by Lt ColC. F. Tank, CE (WTF), 18 Jan 43; A. R. Wilson(Atlantic Base Sect), 17 Jan 43; Brig Gen S. C. God-frey (HQ, USAAF, Ofc Dir of Base Services, EngrSect), 4 Jan 43; all in folder African Campaign, FAC.Davison Memo; Hists, 1st Engr Spec Bde, Jan 42-Sep45; 591st Engr Boat Rgt, 1943-44; 561st Engr BoatMaint Co; 19th Engr C Rgt; Morison, Operations inNorth African Waters; Intervs with Lt Col Houghton,30 May 50; Lt Col Chubbock, 4 Nov 50; Lt Col PhilipY. Browning; and Col William Powers, 13 Feb 51;Ltrs, Lt Col J. B. Chubbock, 12 Mar 56; Col A.T.W.Moore, 9 Mar 56; Col R. C. Brown, 20 Mar 56; ColJohn A. Chambers, 5 Apr 56; Lt Col Kenneth W.Kennedy, 9 Apr 56.


well have been experience: more train-ing exercises before the landing. If astrict division of responsibility was in-deed essential, it should have been clearto all. On the other hand, the difficultymight have been overcome had suffi-cient authority been given one indi-vidual. This did not happen. Engineershore party commanders were uncer-tain of their authority and did not knowhow to meet the inevitable unexpecteddevelopments. The WTF task forceengineer, who might have directed thelanding activities, did not arrive ashoreuntil the emergency had passed. AtFedala, Safi, and Mehdia experiencedSOS personnel, who might have madeit possible to use the ports earlier, alsoremained aboard ship.

Worse still was the situation at theBay of Arzew. Units involved in theoperation included the 1st InfantryDivision; a port battalion operating withshore, boat, and combat engineer units;and a naval unit, all with no clear divi-sions of responsibility among them.Communication here and elsewherebetween the men at the port and thevessels lying offshore was far fromperfect. Engineer shore partiesdepended upon the naval beach par-ties for communications with the ships.This may explain complaints that land-ing craft appeared to be idle, lying atanchor or merely cruising about, whenthey were needed to land men andequipment. Communication was alsopoor among elements ashore. Loud-speakers often could not be heard abovethe firing, the shouting, and the din ofthe beaches. In such an intricate opera-tion many things could go awry, andmany did; even British accents overloudspeakers confused the relativelyfew Americans on EAF beaches.

At all the beaches, when the engi-neers were ready to move supplies tomore permanent dumps they faced anacute transportation shortage, one thatshould have been expected after the 50percent cut in vehicles. For many engi-neer units (already understrength toperform all their assigned tasks effi-ciently), this cut had created anotherhandicap: many engineers of the shoreparties were specialists, whereas land-ing operations with little transportationand heavy equipment called for un-skilled labor. General Noce of the Engi-neer Amphibian Command later rec-ommended that the shore parties beenlarged by as much as 30 percent.

The bulldozer was the most valuablemeans of moving supplies and equip-ment across the beaches; too few wereavailable and many arrived too late ornot at all. Some vehicles landed with-out their drivers, or drivers landed with-out their vehicles. The whole unload-ing process lagged when a great dealmore than anticipated had to be doneby hand.

Some of the blame for the delaycould be charged to loading and someto unloading. Often combat, shore,aviation, and service engineers foundthat their equipment had not been com-bat loaded at all, especially in the CTFshipping. Combat loading meant thattroops were shipped with their equip-ment and were ready for combat whenthey disembarked. Though not econom-ical in terms of ship space, the practicewas all important in saving time duringoperations ashore. Convoy-loaded equip-ment had to be assembled for use afterbeing deposited on the beach. More-over, ship unloading plans often didnot coincide with actual loadings, whilepriority lists for unloading were all too


often ignored. In one case the lightersunloading the U.S.S. Leedstown wereordered to report to the U.S.S. Chasewhen only half the prime movers loadedon the Leedstown—equipment badlyneeded to clear the beaches—had beenlanded. One battalion of the 36th Engi-neer Combat Regiment lost most of itsequipment and tools when the Leedstownwas torpedoed on D plus 2. Hatch crewsfrequently were not familiar with theirships. (Later criticism pointed out thatthese crews should have had 60 per-cent more men.) Yet there were instancesof rapid and efficient work. The 1stBattalion of the 591st Boat Regimentreceived a commendation from thecommanding general, CommunicationsZone, NATOUSA, for the work of itshatch crews and unloading details onten of the CTF's twenty-three trans-ports.

Part of the delay in unloading un-doubtedly could be attributed to theinexperience of officers and men, andsometimes delays had serious conse-quences. By H plus 96 the 1st EngineerAmphibian Brigade should have landed80 percent of its assigned cargo and allof its assigned personnel. Actually, only75 percent of the vehicles and 35 per-cent of the total cargo were ashore onschedule, although all personnel hadlanded. In this instance, and in severalothers, the forward movement of com-bat troops was retarded.

Engineers made many errors duringthe early phases onshore. Throughignorance or demands for speedy un-loading, they often set up dumps tooclose to the water's edge and then hadto move them when the tides came in.Training exercises which had takenplace in ideal tide conditions and calmseas both in the United States and in

the United Kingdom did little to pre-pare the engineers for the Moroccantides, rising as much as fourteen feet,or for the rough seas that interruptedunloading at several beaches. Had theengineers been more familiar with con-ditions, they could have closed beachessooner, moved on to the captured ports,and saved boats and equipment.

Another cause for delay in gettingsupplies forward, at least in the Casa-blanca area, was piling all items—eng-ineer, signal, medical, ordnance, andthe five different classes—into commondumps. This mingling made it difficultto find certain much-needed suppliesquickly, and the engineers claimed thatthey had neither the time nor the man-power to sort supplies properly. Evenin dumps where segregation was at-tempted, faded package markings oftenhindered distribution. Frequently, sup-plies belonging to combat and shoreparty engineers were thrown togetherwith those belonging to aviation engi-neers. The shore party engineers com-plained that packaging materials andcrates were often too flimsy; corrugatedpaper or cardboard containers provedof no value whatever. Another com-plaint was that too often equipment wasshipped in boxes too large and bulkyfor easy handling.

Unloading and other shore opera-tions could have proceeded with muchgreater dispatch had full advantagebeen taken of native labor. The engi-neers made some effort to employ localworkers on the beaches and at theports; the 591st Boat Regiment, bydoing so, cut discharge time in half atthe Arzew quays. But the Americanswere too trustful and lax in supervision.At Safi, natives thronged the beaches,unloading landing craft for a cigarette,


MOROCCAN LABOR GANG AT CASABLANCA HARBORa can of food, a piece of cloth. Twodays later tons of ammunition and ra-tions were found on Arab fishing ves-sels. American planning and prepara-tions had made too little provision forusing this vast labor pool or studyingits peculiarities. Civilian workers wantedto be paid in goods, not in local cur-rency. Nor did they look with favorupon the weekly pay system, and manyquit in disgust after a day's work. Oncethe engineers arranged to pay in cloth,sugar, tea, bread, and the like, willingworkers became available.

The engineers' slowness to begin sal-vaging equipment lost or damaged onthe beaches, in turn, slowed unloading.The engineers were not trained for sal-vage work, nor had they been assignedit in the plans. But, they did help torecover a considerable amount of equip-

ment and supplies. Some tractors usedin futile attempts to salvage equipmentfrom the water were lost. LCVPs provedinadequate; tank lighters, although bet-ter adapted, were little used. Sleds ofwood or metal, some of them impro-vised, proved most useful on thebeaches. A sled designed to carry largerloads would have been more useful, anda reserve of sleds, cables, and chainswould have improved salvage work andgeneral movement of equipment andsupplies.

A further impediment to rapid prog-ress on the beaches was the inadequacyof the maps issued to the shore engi-neers. These maps indicated the con-tour of the terrain only a short distancebehind the beaches, and the informa-tion was sometimes inaccurate. In sev-eral areas engineers found unexpect-


edly high dunes that obstructed egressto the inland plateau and that forcedthem in one case to build a road with ahairpin turn; at Blue Beach (Mehdia-Plage) engineers had to construct a roadthrough a mile of deep, soft sand.

Troops and equipment moved offthe various beaches on quickly impro-vised roads and bridges substantialenough to withstand heavy militarytraffic but emplaced in a constant strug-gle with poor construction material,equipment, procedure, and inexper-ience. In general, engineers concludedthat the British Sommerfeld track,chicken wire netting, and cyclone wirewere all inadequate, for they sank intothe soft sand after traffic passed overthem. They found cyclone wire of somevalue, provided burlap bags were usedas a base. The bulldozer, the most use-ful piece of equipment landed, was putto various uses such as clearing exitsthrough sand dunes and other obsta-cles, pulling equipment from lightersand across the beaches, and afterwardsbuilding and repairing roads as well asrunways at airfields. Unfortunately,some bulldozers proved mechanicallydefective. Waterproofing would have in-creased their utility, and they all shouldhave been equipped with winches, soeffective in pulling out mired vehicles.Light cranes, had they been present tooperate with the bulldozers, would havemade unloading, as well as rescuingstranded boats and vehicles, more effi-cient. A lack of spare parts was stillanother factor in cutting down theeffective use of vehicles and other engi-neer equipment, even some weapons.

Shore party engineers complained ofthe heavy individual load of equipmentthey had to carry, a problem commonto all troops in the TORCH operation.

Much might have been left behind forlater shipment or left on board ship tobe distributed at a more convenienttime. Engineer officers and noncom-missioned officers complained espe-cially of the heavy submachine gun. Onmany occasions soldiers were forced tojump into the water some distance outto keep boats from broaching. Men bur-dened with their heavy loads stumbledand fell in the surf trying to wadeashore through water that was in someplaces two to four feet deep.

In summing up his observations dur-ing TORCH somewhat later, an experi-enced engineer officer entered an oft-repeated plea for enough service troops,including guard units, fire-fightingunits, bomb disposal companies, depotcompanies, and labor units, especiallyin the early waves of an invasion force."When this is not done, either combattroops must be diverted to service tasksfor which they are not trained, [thusreducing] the effective combat strengthby more men than would have beennecessary if trained service troops hadbeen available; or the combat troopswill not be supplied, in which case theycease to be effective."35

The dilemma was classic and contin-uing. The experience the engineersgained in the invasion of North Africastood them well in future landings inthe Mediterranean and European the-aters and made superior veterans ofthem. Lessons derived on the litteredbeaches were enlarged upon in newprocedures and organizations, but manyhad to be learned again in the face offar stronger resistance than the Frenchdefenders offered in Algeria and Mor-occo.

35Rpt, Col Morris W. Gilland, Dep Engr, MBS, toCG, MBS, 27 Dec 42, sub: Lessons from Opn TORCH,Pence Papers, Dec 42-Jan 43, MBS.

CHAPTER V

The Tunisian Campaign

As soon as the Allies concluded anarmistice with the French, British unitsof the Eastern Task Force struck by air,sea, and land toward Tunis. With thisport in Allied hands, the Axis hold onNorth Africa would be broken. On 12November 1942, British commandosand paratroopers converged on Bone,135 miles west of Tunis, but Germanunits had begun flying into Tunisiafrom Sicily and the mainland of Italythree days earlier; by the twelfth theywere arriving by sea.1 Before the monthwas out the British 78th Division withits Blade Force (which resembled a U.S.armored combat command and includ-ed an American armored battalion)drove to the outskirts of Djedeida, lessthan sixteen miles from Tunis. But fivemonths would pass before the Alliesreached Tunis. The rapid Axis buildupand a lack of air support (Allied planeswere mired in the mud of fair-weatherfields) brought the British offensive toa halt. By Christmas Day AFHQ hadcanceled immediate attack plans, for amuch larger push was in prospect. TheAllies were faced with building suffi-

cient strength in Tunisia to crush theexpanded German and Italian forces.

The British First Army, moving overthe long land route east from Algiers,built up its strength in the hill countryaround Bedja. Elements of the Ameri-can II Corps arrived from farawayOran to take up positions east of Tebessawhence they could threaten centralTunisia; poorly equipped French forceswere deployed along the Eastern Dor-sal as a link between the British and theAmericans. By mid-January II Corpselements had concentrated in the Teb-essa-Kasserine region, and on the eigh-teenth the enemy began exerting pres-sure against the center of the Alliedline, which the French held. Theseoperations, continuing until early Feb-ruary, pulled additional American unitsinto action but weakened Allied defen-sive positions along the Eastern Dorsal.The stage was being set for a swift, hardblow by enemy armored units, and theGerman-Italian Panzer Army had reacheda strong defensive position (the MarethLine) near the southeastern Tunisianborder. Since it would be weeks beforethe British Eighth Army under Gen-eral Sir Bernard L. Montgomery couldmount an offensive against this posi-tion from the east, German panzer unitsfrom the north and south teamed upfor an assault designed to overrun II

1 For a detailed account of combat operations inTunisia, see Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 277ff, whichprovided background material for this account. Formore general treatment, see Commander in ChiefsDispatch, North African Campaign, 1942—43 (here-after cited as Eisenhower Dispatch).


Corps and force the British First Armyinto a general withdrawal westward.

The main attack poured throughFaid Pass on 14 February, sweeping ele-ments of the U.S. 1st Armored Divi-sion before it and isolating Americantroops on solitary mountains: When theassault began, three U.S. divisions werein Tunisia, all rather fully committedalong some one hundred miles of front.Before it ended eight days later, enemytanks had swept through Kasserine Passand struck some seventy miles deep intoII Corps territory, coming dangerouslyclose to a large Allied supply dump atTebessa and a key road center atThala. Allied armored reinforcements,along with increasing support from theXII Air Support Command (U.S.) andMontgomery's buildup against the Mar-eth Line in southeastern Tunisia, com-bined to compel a German withdrawal,which began 23 February.

Two more phases of the campaign,both offensive, followed for II Corpsin Tunisia. On 17 March the bulk of IICorps, aided by air strikes, pushedthrough Gafsa toward Maknassy andGabes. This limited offensive was timedto draw off German reserves from theMareth Line while Montgomery crackedthrough from the south. Montgomery'soffensive began on 20 March and dur-ing the next three weeks drove theenemy back into a small bridgeheadaround Tunis and Bizerte.

Squeezed out of the action by EighthArmy's advance, II Corps moved northacross the British First Army supplylines to take over British 5 Corps posi-tions near Bedja. On 24 April the Amer-ican force began the final phase of theTunisian campaign, an attack throughthe hills near the north coast of Tuni-

sia toward Bizerte. On its right, the Brit-ish First Army, also driving eastward,pressed the attack on Tunis in conjunc-tion with Eighth Army, pushing northfrom positions near Enfidaville. On 7May American units first entered Bizer-te. Tunis fell to the British, and by thethirteenth organized Axis resistance inAfrica had ended.

Engineer support of air and groundoperations in Tunisia had to take intoaccount the terrain and the weather.In central Tunisia, where the mainAmerican effort took place, the terrainwas quite different from the hilly areaaround Bizerte and Tunis in the north,where the British First Army began itsbuildup. From a wide, semi-arid pla-teau of sandstone and clay rose tworidgelines, the Eastern and WesternDorsals, which came together at a pointsouth of Pont-du-Fahs. The EasternDorsal extended almost due south fromPont-du-Fahs for over 125 miles toMaknassy; the bolder Western Dorsalangled away to the southwest towardFeriana. Clay roads snaked through ata few points and two ribbons of as-phalt macadam crossed to the sea, onethrough Sbeitla to Sfax, the otherthrough Gafsa to Gabes. Except for bitsof verdure, the landscape offered littlecolor. Central Tunisia had no peren-nial streams and few trees except for apine forest that hugged the hills fromBou Chebka through Kasserine Passand north toward Thala.

Control of the passes through the tworidgelines was the key to hundreds ofsquare miles of wadi-scarred tablelandthat lay between. Once through thepasses, armor could range cross-countrywith comparative ease during dry weath-er. During the winter months rainfall

THE TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN 85

turned the flats into mud and madevehicular movement difficult on all buta few hard-topped roads.

By the time II Corps began to moveinto Tunisia early in January, the rainyseason was more than a month old.Northern Tunisia and Algeria have anannual rainfall of about twenty-five tothirty inches, almost all between lateNovember and early March. Theserains were instrumental in keepingAllied planes on the ground and halt-ing the first Allied drive on Bizerte andTunis. The nearest hard-surfaced Al-lied airfield was a small one near Bone,in Algeria. Allied planes at hastily grad-ed airstrips nearer the front soon be-came hopelessly mired in mud, whereasAxis planes, flying from hard-surfacedairfields only minutes from the battle-ground, ranged virtually unopposedover the front. Until drier fields couldbe found or all-weather ones built,Allied airpower could do little towardwinning superiority or cutting the ene-my's air and sea supply routes fromSicily.2

Aviation Engineer Support

The North African invasion em-ployed American aviation engineer unitsavailable in England or summarily as-sembled in the United States, and inthe days after the successful landingsthey foundered amid a number of un-controlled circumstances. The 809th,814th, 815th, and 817th Engineer Avia-

tion Battalions landed with the CenterTask Force. From the United Statescame a battalion of the 21st EngineerAviation Regiment, the prototype of itskind, and the 887th Engineer AirborneCompany and the 888th Airborne Engi-neer Aviation Company. With the ex-ception of the 21st Engineer AviationRegiment, the units were hastily formedand sketchily trained. The 809th, thoughexperienced in airfield construction inEngland, had to draw 150 enlisted menfrom the 832d and 157 from the 825thin the United Kingdom to achieve itsallotted strength. The 887th and the888th were thrown together in theUnited States just weeks before the con-voy sailed, and none of the units hadany inkling of the conditions of for-ward airfield construction in a fluidcampaign.

Charged first with resurfacing dam-aged runways near the larger citieswithin the landing zones, the Ameri-can units were to support air opera-tions including patrols over Allied linesof communications along the coast westof Algiers; east of that city, accordingto the invasion plan, British AirdromeConstruction Groups were responsiblefor forward fields supporting the movetoward Tunisia. Within this division oflabor, the American aviation engineerswere to construct six fields ringing theborders of Spanish Morocco on the pos-sibility that the Axis might mount anoffensive against the Allied bridgeheadthrough the Iberian peninsula and intothe Spanish dependency.

Aside from training deficiencies, theaviation engineers' foremost problemwas the fate of their equipment, espe-cially that coming from England. Load-ed on different ships from the units,with some ships sailing in different

2 Eisenhower Dispatch; General Omar N. Bradley,A Soldier's Story (New York: Holt, 1951), p. 22; Ltr,Col W. A. Carter, 8 Feb 56; Wesley Frank Craven andJames Lea Cate, eds., "The U.S. Army Air Forces inWorld War II," vol. II, Europe: TORCH to POINT-BLANK (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949),pp. 91, 116.


convoys, engineer paraphernalia fromheavy machinery to hand tools oftenfailed to arrive with the troops. The815th's equipment was lost at sea offOran with a torpedoed vessel, and theship transporting part of the 809th'sbelongings returned to England withengine trouble two days after sailingwith the invasion convoy. Heavy con-struction equipment was often divertedto other use or to other engineer unitsas it came ashore. Some of the 809th'smateriel arrived intact because mem-bers of the battalion traveled on thesame ship and supervised its unloading,but the unit's trucks, in a later convoy,arrived stripped of spare tires, all can-vas supports, and the tools packed a-board them for embarkation. As late asJanuary 1943, the 2d Battalion of the21st Engineer Aviation Regiment, work-ing at Craw Field near Port-Lyautey,had to use secondhand French tools orimprovised equipment. All the neces-sary equipment did not arrive untilMarch 1943.3

The existing airfields in North Africawere ill-suited for the heavy invasiontraffic. Of the French fields in the land-ing areas, only four had hard-surfacedrunways: those at Port-Lyautey on theMoroccan coast north of Rabat; at Taf-araoui near Oran; at Maison Blanche,close to Algiers in the Eastern TaskForce zone; and at Bone, fifty milesshort of the Tunisian border. With itsmain strip and a crosswind leg, Ta-faraoui became the focus for incomingAmerican aircraft of all description

belonging to Brig. Gen. James H. Doo-little's Twelfth Air Force, and the result-ing glut of planes on the field slowedoperations to a crawl. When the sea-sonal rains commenced in late Novem-ber, everything in the dispersal areasoff the runways sank into mud "likeliquid reinforced concrete of bottom-less depth."

In an attempt to give maneuveringroom to some 285 mired planes, theTwelfth Air Force flew its B-26 medi-ums to Maison Blanche, where the809th Engineer Aviation Battalion, leav-ing two detachments behind at Taf-araoui and other smaller dirt fields inthe area, began work on 29 Novemberon a second runway, taking up wherethe French builders of an intersectingrunway to the main macadam strip hadleft off. The same insidious mud ham-pered operations; however, the engi-neers were able to lay gravel-clay taxi-ways and hardstands in a large dispersalarea.

German air resistance to further Al-lied advances into Tunisia also broughta radical change to the arrangementthat confined American aviation con-struction to the area west of Algiers.When General K. A. N. Anderson de-clared on 4 December that a lack of aircover had cost him the opportunity tomove further against the Germans,American aviation engineers were al-ready heading eastward in an attemptto bring Allied air power closer to thefront lines.

British efforts to construct airfields be-hind their advancing lines suffered evenmore from inadequate heavy equip-ment than did the American efforts.Beginning on 20 November, detach-ments of a British airdrome construc-tion unit attempted to build a fighter

3 Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK,pp. 117-18; Hist 809th Engr Avn Bn; Rpt, Brig GenS. C. Godfrey to CG, AAF, 4 Jan 43, sub: Report onAirdomes and Avn Engrs in North Africa, OCE 370.2(MTO), hereafter cited as Godfrey Rpt; Hist 2d Bn,21st Engr Avn Rgt, 8 Nov 42-1 Jul 43, Engr 21 HI,Maxwell AFB.


field in Tunisia in the neighborhood ofSouk el Arba, eighty miles west of Tunis,but the December rains defeated them.Their Sommerfeld mat, well-suited toEnglish sod fields, sank out of sight inthe Tunisian mud, and pierced steelplank was in short supply in the theater.They had better success with the sandysoil nearby at Souk el Khernis, but theBritish still had too few fields to sup-port a concentrated aerial offensiveagainst German strength in Tunisia.4

Early December marked the whole-sale departure of American aviationengineers from northwest Africa forsites in eastern Algeria. On 2 Decem-ber, acting on French advice that dryweather prevailed there, Brig. Gen.Donald A. Davison flew to Telergma, avillage by a large bowl on a 3,500-foot-high plateau in the mountains south-west of Constantine. On the field guard-ed by French troops, Davison found aplatoon of the 809th Engineer Avia-tion Battalion already working, havingreached the prospective field by forcedmarch from Maison Blanche. Anothercompany of the battalion moved in byplane and truck, and, assisted by sev-eral hundred Algerians, the engineersscraped out a compacted earth runwaythat began handling B-26 traffic justten days after Davison's first visit. Withthis single runway, a well-drained stripof loam, caliche, and gravel, the 809th,the first American unit of its kind towork east of Algiers, began developinga complex of medium bomber fields inthe Telergma area.5

Heavy bombers found a home far-ther south on the fringes of the Saharaat Biskra, a winter resort. Though Bisk-ra and Telergma lay close to rail lines,the disruption in French train controland traffic forced most supply to thebases, especially Biskra, to go by air.Accordingly, the engineer unit chosento develop the Biskra base was the887th Airborne Engineer AviationCompany, its troops and light, air-transportable equipment carried to thesite from Morocco, a thousand milesaway, in fifty-six aircraft. Landing on13 December, the company completedtwo new fields of compacted earth forB-17s and B-24s in four days to givethe heavies a dry toehold within easystriking range of the enemy. Appar-ently vindicating the faith placed in theairborne aviation engineer concept byits developers in Washington, the 887th'sperformance still could not redeem thefailure of its sister company flown intoTebessa from Port-Lyautey to expandand improve advance fields at whatbecame a main supply base in the driveinto Tunisia. Here the 888th AirborneEngineer Aviation Company's midgetbulldozers could do little in the roughterrain, and the company took two longweeks to carve out a single runway,though it was supposed to reconditiondirt fields lying as far away as Gafsa,across the Tunisian border. Eventuallythe 814th Engineer Aviation Battaliontook over the job.6

The aviation engineers shared theirproblems of lost and inadequate equip-ment with other engineer units but

4 Interv, A-2 with Brig Gen Donald A. Davison, 1Jun 43, 142.052-38, 8 Jun 43, USAF Hist Div Ar-chives; Hist Sect, AAFC MTO, History of the Avia-tion Engineers in the MTO, 12 Jun 46, Maxwell AFB,hereafter cited as Avn Engrs in MTO; Godfrey Rpt.

5 Davison interv, 1 Jun 43; Avn Engrs in MTO, pp.12-14; Hist 809th Engr Avn Bn.

6 Unit Hists, 887th, 888th Abn Engr Cos, and 814thEngr Avn Bn; Wesley Frank Craven and James L.Cate, eds., "The U.S. Army Air Forces in World WarII," vol. VII, Services Around the World (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 249-50.


wrestled with problems of commandstructure peculiar to them. From theoutset it was not clear whether theCorps of Engineers or the Army AirForces (AAF) would control the avia-tion engineers. Field service regulationsfor 1942 did not fix responsibility forbuilding airfields in the theater ofoperations, but in October 1942 AFHQgave the job to the engineer, TwelfthAir Force, with the ruling that the avia-tion engineers were "an organic part ofthe air force." Following the invasion,the Twelfth Air Force engineer, Col.John O. Colonna, assumed operationalcontrol of all the American aviationengineers in North Africa. In the con-solidation after the invasion, adminis-trative control of the aviation engineerspassed to individual commanders ofservice areas established at Casablanca,Oran, and Constantine, subordinate, inturn, to the new XII Air Force ServiceCommand (AFSC), of which ColonelColonna was also the engineer. Chaf-ing under the division of control overthe aviation engineers, Colonna saw toit that Twelfth Air Force issued ordersfor airfield construction directly to theconstructing units without going throughthe service command. But the servicecommand area commanders, in guard-ing their own prerogatives, frequentlycountermanded orders from TwelfthAir Force. The divided control createdobvious and serious delays in construc-tion projects for the aviation engineers.7

On 30 December 1942, Brig. Gen.Thomas B. Larkin, commanding thenewly established Mediterranean BaseSection, proposed that all requests fornew airfield construction be submitted

to base section commanders throughAFHQ and be carried out by base sec-tion engineers, arguing that logisticalagencies should control all construction,including that of airfields. Colonnastrongly opposed this stand and recom-mended that the aviation engineers beremoved from the administrative con-trol of the service command and trans-ferred into the Twelfth Air Force. Whileconceding that Services of Supply (SOS)control might be feasible in a staticsituation, Colonna was convinced thatbase section control would not work ina fluid situation like that in NorthAfrica. He also opposed a proposalGeneral Davison made to General Eisen-hower on 13 February 1943 that allengineer troops, including aviation en-gineers, be placed under the chief en-gineer, AFHQ; Colonna pointed outthat airfield construction was "intimate-ly associated with shifting strategic andtactical situations" and should be "di-rectly under the Air Force Comman-der."8

Davison's plan found no effectivesupport. The activation on 18 Febru-ary of the Northwest African Air Forces(NAAF) under the command of Maj.Gen. Carl W. Spaatz with Colonna asaviation engineer provided an opportu-nity to keep airfield construction underthe control of the Air Forces. In addi-tion, the fast-moving situation after theGerman breakthrough at Kasserineconverted Davison to the principle ofAir Forces control; early in March Davi-son joined Spaatz's staff as aviationengineer, with Colonna as his deputy.

A growing concern in Washingtonlest the AAF should, in effect, detach

7 AFHQ Opn Memo 27, as quoted in Avn Engrs inMTO. 8 Avn Engrs in MTO, p. 16.


the aviation engineers from their or-ganic connection with the Corps ofEngineers and thus from their adminis-trative subordination to Army ServiceForces (ASF), the new name taken bythe SOS on 12 March 1943, led to anASF proposal in the spring of 1943 toabolish the aviation engineers and toreorganize all engineer constructionunder ASF. But the AAF was firm inopposing any such solution. Moreover,by April 1943 the AAF had become tooimportant an element of the armedforces and its performance in NorthAfrica too impressive a demonstrationof its potential for successful opposi-tion on a matter that it held vital to itsfunctions in a theater of war. The hotlycontested argument reached a firmsolution only at the end of 1943.

In the closing two months of the cam-paign in North Africa, the aviationengineers improved and expanded therear area construction and providednew fields, especially fighter fields, forswiftly changing tactical situations. Forexample, five fields the 814th EngineerAviation Battalion built in the Sbeitlaarea were usable in seventy-two hoursand complete in four days. By the endof March, with the arrival of 837th,838th, and 845th Engineer AviationBattalions and the 3d Battalion of the21st Engineer Aviation Regiment, theAmerican construction force in the the-ater amounted to nearly 9,000 troops,three times the number in the BritishAirdrome Construction Groups activearound the Souk el Arba—Souk elKhemis area. With ten American battal-ions and two separate companies avail-able in North Africa, engineers estab-lished a first priority for fields behindthe front, a secondary importance forthe bomber fields in western Algeria

and eastern Morocco. The new arrivalsworked in the rear area but also wereinvolved in transferring the large bomb-er base at Biskra, an untenable site inthe heat and dust storms of the spring,to constantly expanding facilities atTelergma. The 814th carried most ofthe responsibility for forward airfieldconstruction, though British engineersfrom Souk el Arba added their man-power to the projects, and in late Apriltwo platoons from the 21st EngineerAviation Regiment scraped out a dryweather field at Djebel Abiod, on thecoast north of Souk el Khemis andeighty miles west of Tunis.9

The arrival in Tunisia in the springof heavy machinery necessary for air-field construction over and above theTable of Basic Allowance (TBA) of theaviation engineer battalions made pos-sible such accomplishments. Anotherimportant factor was a Northwest Afri-can Air Forces order of 5 March set-ting forth new and realistic specifica-tions for airfield construction. The newspecifications called for the barest es-sentials—in the forward areas, oneearth runway per field, with loop taxi-ways and dispersed hardstands. Thedirective also assumed that no build-ings would be required, that bomb andgasoline dump areas would be servedby existing roads, and that occupyingtroops would provide dugouts andtrenches. Construction shortcuts andheavy machinery used on a scale un-known in any other Army found theirfirst combined application to aerial war-fare in the Tunisian campaign. Heavybomber and fighter airfield construc-tion could keep pace with the move-

9 Davison Interv; Hist 2d Bn, 21st Engr Avn Rgt, 8Nov 42-1 Jul 43.


ment of the ground forces in a rapidlydeveloping campaign. In May GeneralSpaatz stressed the contribution of theaviation engineers to the impressiveperformance of the AAF in NorthAfrica. He termed the Air Forces andits aviation engineers a team able to"work smoothly and efficiently duringthe stress of battle."10

The heavy equipment set the Ameri-can engineers apart from the BritishAirdrome Construction Groups in theirachievements; even with 3,000 Britishairdrome engineers in Tunisia, theirefforts remained concentrated aroundtheir two main RAF bases at Souk elKhemis and Souk el Arba, the complexthere consisting of around a dozenfields. This compared with the Ameri-can construction of over a hundredfields throughout the theater.11

Their efficiency was all the moreremarkable since the frustrating divi-sion of control over the aviation engi-neers continued until the end of thecampaign in North Africa. The plan-ning, the preparation of constructionstandards, and the issuance of workdirectives were in the hands of theengineer, NAAF, but the execution ofall engineer work for the Air Forcesand the administration of aviation engi-neers was the responsibility of the engi-neer of the North African Air ServiceCommand (NAASC), an NAAF subor-dinate command that came into beingalong with NAAF in February 1943.The dual command hampered the pro-

curement of heavy equipment andspare parts. Orders had to be processedthrough the service command staff,causing delay and confusion, and thedivided control interfered with replace-ment and rotation of personnel andpromotion of officers. At times "theaviation engineer officers and men con-sidered themselves . . . neglected andforgotten troops not belonging to anyparticular command."12

The unsatisfactory command ar-rangements in North Africa were anobject lesson to planners in Englandconcerned with the employment of avi-ation engineers in the coming invasionof Europe. During the spring of 1943the planners undertook studies aimedat resolving problems of administration,discipline, and supply, and in August1943 Col. Rudolf E. Smyser, Jr., engi-neer of the Eighth Air Force, went toNorth Africa to study the commandsituation in the Mediterranean Theaterof Operations (MTO). His observationsconfirmed his opinion that all engineeraviation units should be under the com-plete administrative as well as opera-tional control of a single agency subor-dinate only to the Air Forces, a conclu-sion that played an important part inthe later creation of the IX EngineerCommand in England. General Davisonconvinced Lt. Gen. Carl W. Spaatz ofthe necessity of setting up a separateaviation engineer command, and theXII Air Force Engineer Command,MTO (Provisional)—changed 1 Janu-ary 1944 to Army Air Forces EngineerCommand, MTO (Provisional)—cameinto being.13

10 AAFC MTO, Hist of Policies Affecting Avn Engrsin the Mediterranean Campaign, p. 22; Col. A. E.Harris, "Colonel Harris Reporting" [feature column],The Air Force Engineer, no. 17 (November 1944), 15;Ltr, Spaatz to CG, AAF, 6 May 43, MTO Comd-Engr638.129, Jan-Jun 43, 900.3, EUCOM Engr files.

11 Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINT-BLANK, p. 170.

12 Avn Engrs in MTO, p. 19.13 Col R. E. Smyser, Jr., Origin of the IX Engineer

[Air Force] Command; 1st Lt. Lloyd F. Latendresse,"Narrative History," The History of IX Engineer Com-mand (Wiesbaden, Germany, 1945), pp. 11ff.


COLONEL SMYSER

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Supply

Engineer construction for POL sup-ply was of several types: pipelines fromship to shore, bulk storage tanks andconnecting pipelines, and extensivelines with pumping units leading to-ward the front. In North Africa exist-ing port facilities had to be improved,tank farms had to be built at conve-nient points, and many miles of pipe-line had to be constructed. Initially, nocentralized control for the distributionand use of POL projects existed inNorth Africa, for each task force ofTORCH was responsible for its own POLsupply. Confusion, duplication of ef-fort, and waste resulted. Gradually,early chaos gave way to an integratedsystem of control and the establishmentof a common Allied POL pool fromwhich products could be released to the

British and American armed forces aswell as to the French military and civil-ian agencies.14

The 2602d Engineer Petroleum Dis-tribution Company, which reachedOran on the D plus 3 convoy, immedi-ately went to work to rehabilitate andoperate existing French POL facilitiesat the port. Next, the company installeda seven-mile-long, four-inch victaulicpipeline from the Victor Hugo StorageDepot at Oran to airfields at La Seniaand Tafaraoui. The same convoy alsobrought fifty miles of four-inch pipethat had reached England just in timeto be loaded for TORCH. Delayed forweeks by heavy rains, the engineerseventually erected bolted steel tanks atthe airfields for aviation gasoline; theyalso installed feeder lines and dispens-ing racks to service Air Forces trucks.The available storage at La Seniaamounted to 462,000 gallons, atTafaraoui 651,000 gallons. Anotherfour-inch line, from Arzew to Perre-gaux, furnished a truck convoy connec-tion with the airfields in the latter area.Such construction exemplified what wassoon to be undertaken in other portareas in Algeria and Morocco.15

On 24 December 1942, a conferenceon petroleum supply, held at Algiers,determined the network of pipelines inAlgeria and Tunisia. From the port ofPhilippeville a six-inch pipeline was torun to the heart of the airfield regionin eastern Algeria, with bulk storage at

14 Rpt, Capt M. D. Altgelt to Lt Col S. A. Potter, Jr.,Chf, C&A Planning, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, coveringtrip to North Africa (POL Inspection). The paragraphsrelating to administration in this section are largelybased on this report.

15 Ltr, Lt Col Cabel Gwathmey, Engr, MBS, to Engr,MTOUSA, 6 Dec 44; Engr MTOUSA file 679.11,Pipeline History, 1944 and 1945; Engr Sch Spec Text(ST-5-350-1), Military Pipeline Systems, 1950.


Ouled Rahmoun and lateral four-inchlines from there west to the Telergmafields and east to Tebessa. Eventually,the planners envisaged extending theTebessa pipeline branch east to the portof Sousse and southeast to the port ofSfax. The ports of Bizerte, Tabarka,and Tunis would also be used.

Extensive pipeline construction gotunder way in earnest in February 1943,when two parallel four-inch lines werebuilt from Philippeville to OuledRahmoun, one of them a V-80 linefor motor gasoline.16 This project in-cluded plans for erecting bolted steeltanks for bulk storage at existing air-fields and for building a tanker unload-ing line and a tank farm at Philippeville.Execution involved coordinating theactivities of American engineers,French Army contractors, and locallabor, and assembling extensive andcomplicated equipment as well as ob-taining rights-of-way. The pipeline en-gineers had to supplement materials atMediterranean Base Section (MBS) withadditional stocks requisitioned from theAtlantic Base Section (ABS) and theRoyal Engineers.17

By 18 February pipe extended morethan twenty miles, with constructionactually complete for only some threemiles. Then the work virtually halteduntil more pipe and other materialsarrived in the forward area.The fate ofthe project hung on transporting bulkyand easily damaged materials from thebase sections in spite of severely lim-

ited cargo space and enemy air andnaval interference. To complete thesystem, additional materials had to beshipped by risky sea routes because ofthe bottlenecks in overland transpor-tation.

The 2004th Engineer Petroleum Dis-tribution Company completed the proj-ect in mid-April, and on the sixteenththe first American tanker discharged its64,000-barrel cargo into storage tanksat Philippeville. Pumps took the aircraftfuel fifty-five miles through the pipe-line to Ouled Rahmoun. In this con-struction job alone the engineers couldclaim a solid share in neutralizing theenemy's air menace and hastening hisfinal capitulation in North Africa.

On the same day that gasoline firstflowed to Ouled Rahmoun, the 702dEngineer Petroleum Distribution Com-pany began work on a second impor-tant pipeline, closer to the front. Thisline ran southeast from the port ofBone in Algeria to Souk el Arba, Tunisia,with a branch line to Souk el Khemis.The whole system, involving ninetymiles of four-inch pipe and nine pumpstations, was completed in a month.During construction, petroleum engi-neers had the help of the 144th NativeLabor Company, a working force ofuncertain value, which furnished anaverage of 148 men a day.

Neither enemy action nor hostilenatives impeded construction. The onlynecessary road work was that throughmountains. Ample tools and supplieswere on hand. Pipe had to be hauledan average of sixty-six miles, but the702d Engineer Company had a fleet offorty-five vehicles, including twenty-five2 1/2-ton trucks and ten pole trailers.The weather was cool, rainfall moder-ate. Enlisted men engaged in all phases

16 History of the Eastern Base Section, Jun—Sep 43.17 Memo, Engr, MBS, for Engr Pipeline Co (Sep)

(Prov), 10 Jan 43, sub: Movement of Troops; Memo,Maj C. L. Lockett for Col Donald B. Adams, Engr,MBS, 14 Jan 43; Memo, Col Morris W. Gilland, XO,MBS, for Pipeline Co (Sep) (Prov), 10 Jan 43; all inOil-Pipeline (Gen), vol. I, 679.11, MBS file.


GASOLINE STORAGE AT PORT-LYAUTEY

of the operation, including such skilledengineering jobs as coupling, testing,tying-in and connecting, and workingon pump stations. Natives did workrequiring no special skill or training,such as clearing and grading for themain line to Souk el Arba, stringingpipes, and ditching and backfilling.

At the other extreme of the commu-nication line, in French Morocco, theArmy Transport Command and theNorth African Training Command atMarrakech in March 1943 estimatedtheir combined need for gasoline to be800,000 to 1,200,000 gallons permonth. Rail tank cars to haul thisamount were urgently needed else-where, and the obvious solution to theproblem was a pipeline from Casa-

blanca to Marrakech. Since materialswere locally available to build this sys-tem, including terminal storage atMarrakech, the engineers laid a four-inch line 160 miles long. Four-inch linesfrom Casablanca and Fedala also sup-plied airfields at Mediouna, Sale, andPort-Lyautey, and another line con-nected Casablanca and Fedala. The345th General Service Regiment, a unitthat had no previous experience inbuilding pipelines, did the work.18

18 Rpt on Pipeline, Bone to Souk el Arba, AFHQEngr Sect, 21 Jul 43; Ltr, M. F. Grant, AG, ABS, toCG, SOS, NATOUSA, 13 Mar 43, sub: Pipeline toMarrakech, Oil-Pipeline (Gen), vol. I, 679.11, ABSfile; Rgtl Jnl and Hist 345th Engr GS Rgt.


Ground Support

Before the Kasserine breakthrough,the total combat engineer force with IICorps was three divisional battalionsserving with the 1st and 34th InfantryDivisions and the 1st Armored Division,and, as corps troops, the 19th EngineerCombat Regiment. During the threeweeks between the German withdrawalfrom Kasserine and II Corps' attack onGafsa, other engineer units joined IICorps: Company B of the 601st Engi-neer Camouflage Battalion, the 15thEngineer Combat Battalion (9th Infan-try Division), the 175th Engineer Gen-eral Service Regiment, the 518th Engi-neer Water Supply Company, and the62d Engineer Topographic Company.A few days after the II Corps' attack onGafsa started, the 20th Engineer Com-bat Regiment arrived from Casablanca,followed late in March by a platoon ofthe 470th Engineer Maintenance Com-pany. Shortly before the Tunisian cam-paign ended, the 10th Engineer Com-bat Battalion (3d Infantry Division) alsojoined II Corps.19

Since the Allied forces were on theoffensive during most of the Tunisiancampaign, the most important engineerfunction was to provide and maintainroads over which motorized groundtroops could roll and to keep theseroads clear of enemy mines. This func-tion turned around in mid-February,when the Germans struck through theFaid and Kasserine Passes. At that timethe engineers worked on roads leadingto the rear, sowed mines in the path ofthe enemy, erected roadblocks, andfought as infantry. On the north, for

example, the 109th Engineer CombatBattalion made possible the withdrawalof its parent 34th Infantry Division toSbiba; on the south, the 19th EngineerCombat Regiment fought as infantryat Kasserine. (Map 4)

At daylight on 7 February the 109thEngineer Combat Battalion pulled intoa bivouac near Maktar after a six-daytrip through the mountains fromTlemcen, near Oran. A cold rain hadchanged intermittently to snow at night,and the lead trucks found the twistingclay roads into the bivouac area slip-pery with mud and clogged with bro-ken-down French vehicles. German air-craft strafed the end of the convoy, stillon the road at daybreak.

For a few days the battalion improvedbivouac area roads and reconnoitered.The first task was to improve the road-net for troops holding the Pichon-Fondouk el Aouareb Pass area, a criti-cal opening where many thought theimpending German attack would come.Engineer reconnaissance found a 35-mile trail across semi-desert flats, rock-ribbed ridges, and sand dunes fromSbiba east to El Ala that could be madepassable for six-by-six trucks in a week.By 14 February the companies of the109th had spread out along the route.Men of Company C, responsible for themiddle section of the road, discoveredwarm springs near their bivouac, andmany had their first good bath in morethan two weeks.

On the night of 16 February, Maj.Vernon L. Watkins, the battalion exec-utive officer, carried alarming newsover the rough route. German armorhad cut the main road forward (Sbeitla—Hadjeb el Aioun) and, while the frontcould bend without serious loss, a breakthat allowed mobile enemy units into

19 Rpt of Engr Opns, Lt Col W. A. Carter, II Corps,15 Mar-10 Apr, dated 1 May 43.


sensitive rear areas could be disastrous.The engineers were to convert the trailleading west to Sbiba into a road the34th Infantry Division could use bynoon the next day.

Promptly at noon on the seventeenththe last large fill necessary to make therough trail passable was in place, andtwo hours later the first divisional vehi-cle passed over it. Traffic stretched halfthe length of the road when rain madethe fresh grades treacherous. By darkcongestion was mounting. At troublespots all along the road small parties ofengineers waited with tractors, half-tracks, and winch-trucks, and through-out the night they pulled and shovedvehicles. Finally, about daybreak, thedivision reached new defensive posi-tions near Sbiba, where the tired,drenched engineers found many otherpressing jobs waiting for them: digginggun emplacements, laying mines, erect-ing wire, building supply and accessroads, and freeing stuck vehicles.20

At Kasserine, the 1,200 men of the19th Engineer Combat Regimentformed the nucleus of a force defend-ing a road leading northwest to Te-bessa. The force included an infantrybattalion, three artillery batteries, anda tank destroyer battalion—about 2,000men. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry,defended the road leading north toThala.

Since their arrival in Tunisia on 6January, the 19th Engineers hadworked almost exclusively on improv-ing and maintaining corps supply roadsinto divisional areas. When the Germanattack began, one company was still inthe Gafsa area with Task Force Raff,

paratroopers with whom they had beenoperating for several weeks. Anothercompany tunneled bombproof sheltersfor II Corps headquarters into a hill-side near Bekkaria. The rest of theregiment, bivouacked near Bou Cheb-ka, maintained II Corps roads leadingout of Tebessa toward the front.

On 16 February, well before dawn,the 19th Engineers began a 3 1/2-hourmove into Kasserine Pass. Fog and rainslowed the column, but at 0530 the regi-ment reached an assembly point onemile west of the pass, where the regi-mental commander selected defensivepositions. The men spent that day andthe next digging in and laying minesacross their front, interrupting worklong enough on the seventeenth tocover the withdrawal of 1st ArmoredDivision units. Fog and intermittentrains that had enveloped the battlefieldfor several days continued.

On the evening of 17 February, Lt.Edwin C. Dryden of the 19th Engineersreceived orders to supervise the instal-lation of a minefield in front of aninfantry battalion's position. Along withtwo noncoms, he loaded a truck withmines and proceeded to Headquarters,Company C, 26th Infantry, arrivingafter midnight. At the infantry com-mand post the engineers found nowork detail ready to emplace the mines,nor anyone who knew where the mineswere to go or what part they were toplay in the defense. In the end, theengineer lieutenant, who had neverseen the terrain in daylight, had toselect the site and instruct a makeshiftwork party in laying and arming themines. Work began after 0330. Thelight entrenching tools of the infantryproved useless in the rocky ground, andin order to finish by daylight the work20 Hist 109th Engr Bn, 2 Jan-15 May 43.


party had to leave the mines unburied,strung across the road from a hill onone side to an embankment on theother.

Enemy artillery fire started to fall onthe American positions at Kasserine on18 February. Engineers from CompanyA, 19th Engineers, had begun to gradea lateral road across the rear of thedefenses, but the enemy took the bull-dozer under fire and the grading hadto be abandoned. That evening the IICorps commander, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.Fredendall, instructed Col. AlexanderN. Stark, Jr., commander of the 26thInfantry, to "Go to Kasserine right awayand pull a Stonewall Jackson. Take overup there." Colonel Stark assumed com-mand of a provisional force (Task ForceStark) early on 19 February, about thetime the first German probe enteredthe pass. This initial thrust turned back,and the rest of the morning passedwhile the enemy reinforced. During theearly afternoon several more compa-nies of American infantry and a fewtanks arrived in Kasserine, some ofthem before the Germans renewedtheir attack in midafternoon.

About 1600 the enemy's third attackof the day drove Company D, 19thEngineers, from its positions. A coun-terattack failed to dislodge the enemytroops, and the day ended with theengineer positions seriously weakenedbut still holding. A French 75-mm. bat-tery was in position to support theengineers, but no heavier American105s.

The Germans attacked again beforedawn, falling mainly on the 26th In-fantry. When the infantry positionscollapsed, the engineers used reservesgathered for a counterattack to protectan exposed left flank, but the leverage

exerted on the 19th Engineer's exposedflank soon proved too great. Germaninfantry, infiltrating behind well-directedartillery fire, took over the rest of theCompany D positions and then droveback Company E. The regimental com-mand post had to move, but the Ger-mans brought the new position undermachine-gun fire and the defensesquickly crumbled. Company F man-aged to keep control of its platoons untillate afternoon, but the rest of the engi-neers made their way to the rear as bestthey could as platoons, squads, andindividuals. When the regiment assem-bled again, it counted its losses in thethree-day battle at 11 killed, 28wounded, and 88 missing.

As the members of the provisionalforce, beaten and bloodied, found theirway to the rear, few probably knewwhat they had accomplished. Field Mar-shal Erwin Rommel was operating on atight time schedule, for Montgomerywould soon fall on German positions insouthern Tunisia. The rebuff at Sbibaand the delay at Kasserine gave IICorps time to assemble the strength tostop the German-Italian Panzer Army afew miles north along the road to Thala.

Analyzing the preparation and con-duct of the defense at Kasserine, Col.Anderson T. W. Moore, commandingthe 19th Engineers, pointed out seri-ous defects. Foxholes and gun emplace-ments had not been dug deep enough;few alternate positions had been pre-pared; barbed wire was delivered lateand used little; and leadership and con-trol left much to be desired. But theengineers had performed creditably fora partially trained unit. The 19th Engi-neers had not even completed rifletraining before going overseas, andonly one man in the regiment was known


to have been in combat before. Theirexperience at Kasserine underscored alesson taught repeatedly in Tunisia:engineer units sent to meet German vet-erans in combat required hard, realis-tic training.21

One of the most persistent irritationsfor engineer officers was the use oftheir troops in other than engineercapacities. Standard doctrine permittedthe use of engineers as fighting menunder certain conditions, but in NorthAfrica the procedure and the criteriafor attaching engineer units to fightingunits were hardly consistent or uni-formly applied. Engineer units fre-quently undertook nonessential jobssimply because they were at hand. As aresult, essential engineer tasks wentundone. Furthermore, attachment some-times tied up valuable pieces of engi-neer equipment where they were notneeded. The II Corps engineer, Col.William A. Carter, Jr., carried on hisarguments against using engineers with-out weighing the disadvantages in tak-ing them away from support duties,especially in offensive operations. Bythe end of the campaign, only one ofthe four American divisions resortedto attaching engineer troops.22

After the Germans retired from Kas-serine, many of the roads in the IICorps sector were virtually impassable.The clay surfaces, softened by frequentrains, had deteriorated rapidly underthe heavy military traffic. The enemyhad little or no hope of regaining thisarea and left behind scattered mines,cratered roads, and demolished bridges.Fortunately, there was little of value todestroy. New roads could be built eas-ily across the central Tunisian plateau,and ruined bridges could be bypassedby fords or culverted fills, for therewere not perennial rivers to cross. Therains had done more damage than theenemy.

Engineer road work on a consider-able scale was necessary before II Corpscould launch its attack through Gafsa.To move the 1st Infantry Division andthe 1st Armored Division in this of-fensive, ninety-five miles of trail had tobe made into two-way dirt roads. Grad-ing these roads was no great problem.Using two D-7 bulldozers, two R-4bulldozers, and two graders, CompanyC, 19th Engineers, with one platoon ofCompany B attached, in three daysimproved a rough fifteen-mile road tothe last infantry outpost east of Thelepteand graded twenty-four miles of newroad from there joining the Sbeitla-Gafsa road. Other units made similarprogress. The main problem was keep-ing existing roads open in the heavyrains.

During the attack through Gafsa (17March-10 April) corps engineers had341 miles of other road to keep open,including a 140-mile bituminous mac-adam route from Ain Beida to Gafsa

21 Hist Record of the 19th Engr Rgt, 20 Oct 42-1Oct 43; Hist 19th Engr Rgt, pt. A, Prior to Arrival inItaly, 1944—45; Memorandum of Combat Operationsof Engineer Troops Under Second U.S. Army Corps,prepared by Lt Col Carter, Corps Engr, and given toGen Noce during recent trip to Africa, dated 24 Mar43, African Campaign, EAC files; Eisenhower Dis-patch, pp. 24—36; Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers,ed., B. H. Liddell Hart (London: Collins, 1953), pp.400, 404; Opns Rpts, 26th Inf Rgt, 11 Nov 42-14Apr 43.

22 Brig Gen D. O. Elliott to CofEngrs, Washington,D.C., 19 Jul 43, Rpt on U.S. Engrs in the TunisianCampaign, Doc 1547, hereafter cited as Elliott Rpt,19 Jul 43; Annex 16, Lt Col H. C. Rowland, 20 Apr43, in AAR, 1st Engr C Bn, 8 Nov 42-14 Mar 43; 5thInd, HQ, NATOUSA, 30 Oct 45 to AAR, 16th Armd

Engr Bn, 3 Sep 43; Memo, Lt Col W. A. Carter, IICorps Engr, for Engr, AFHQ, 23 May 43.


and five dirt roads that required con-stant maintenance. As divisional com-bat engineers became involved in minework, they had little time left for roadmaintenance, and that task fell to thecorps engineers. At this time the 20thEngineer Combat Regiment made thelong trip from French Morocco to aidthe 19th Engineers. The 175th Gen-eral Service Regiment was also sent in-to the II Corps area to help.23

Again, during II Corps' attack onBizerte in late April and early May,road work was vitally important, al-though once the rainy season was past,maintenance was less a factor. Thecorps roadnet consisted of about 100miles of rough, water-bound macadamand about 260 miles of dirt roads, somelittle more than cart tracks. Offsettingthe advantage of dry weather was thehilly terrain. Here, enemy mines anddemolitions were more effective becausethe avenues of approach ran throughthe narrow valleys, and the bridges inthese valleys could not be so easilybypassed. The attack in the northavoided the valleys when possible andgenerally followed the high ground.Some seventy-six miles of new roadswere built from the main supply routeto pack mule trails to reach infantrypositions on the hills. Bypasses arounddemolished bridges accounted for someof this mileage.24

While no major, radical changes inengineer TBA resulted from experi-ence in Tunisia, some additions ap-peared eminently desirable. For ex-ample, a definite need developed thateach combat engineer battalion have atleast one of the large D-7 bulldozers.More road graders and dump truckswould have proved useful in certainsituations, but it was debatable whetherthis was a matter of changing the Tableof Basic Allowances or of providingmore Class IV equipment. One of themost needed Class IV items was thepower shovel, for there was little pointin providing a combat engineer regi-ment fifty-four dump trucks to haulroad fill unless the means existed forproviding crushed rock and for load-ing it on the trucks. Road maintenancetook up a disproportionate share of thecombat engineers' time in Tunisia be-cause mechanical means for loading fillwere lacking. The only exception was acivilian-owned steam shovel the 19thEngineer Combat Regiment put intoservice. In the final days of the cam-paign the 20th Engineer Combat Regi-ment also made good use of a shovel—probably the same one. If so, only oneshovel was available to the combat engi-neers in all Tunisia.25

Central and southern Tunisia hadwet-weather wadis aplenty but no per-manent streams. Except after very heavyrains, combat unit vehicles could crosswet-weather streams as soon as engi-neers bulldozed dry fords or built by-passes around demolished bridges. Innorthern Tunisia, on the other hand,there were permanent streams, andbridge building was an important engi-

23 Rpt of Engr Opns, Carter, II Corps, 15 Mar-10Apr, dated 1 May 43; File, ENGP-19-0.3 (23568)Master Historical Record- 19th Engr C Gp, Oct 42-Jan 44, MRS, DRB, AGO; File, 301 -Eng-0.3 (22313)AAR, 1st Engr C Bn, 8 Nov 42-14 Mar 43, HRS,DRB, AGO; Rpt, HQ, II Corps (Patton) to AG, USA,Washington, D.C. thru 18 Army Gp, 15 Mar—10 Apr43, dated 10 Apr 43, Bx 49768 KCRC; Capt GeorgeE. Horn, The Twentieth Engineers, 1 Jul 43.

24 Rpt, Lt Col W. A. Carter, II Corps Engr, 28 May43, sub: Rpt of Engr Opns II Corps, 22 Apr-8 May.

25 Ibid.; Elliott Rpt, 19 Jul 43; AAR, 16th ArmdEngr Bn, 3 Sep 43.


neer activity. During this campaign theBritish Bailey bridge first proved its tac-tical value to Americans.

During the closing days of the cam-paign, the 9th Infantry Division em-ployed a compromise plan that provedsatisfactory. Under this plan the regi-mental combat teams (RCTs) had thesupport of one company of combatengineers each, with each company sup-porting its combat team in three eche-lons. In the vanguard, a small group ofreconnaissance engineers accompaniedforward infantry elements. Not farbehind, a platoon of combat engineerscleared mines and prepared paths overwhich mules carried rations and ammu-nition to the front. The rest of the engi-neer company helped the artillery todisplace forward; built roads, andcleared minefields. The 3d RegimentalCombat Team had only one platoon ofcombat engineers attached; being inreserve, this team moved less than theothers. The rest of the engineer battal-ion remained under division control,to be used where most needed.26

Engineer combat battalion manpowerincreased from 634 to 745 in the yearsbefore 1942. In 1943 Army GroundForces redesigned the American infan-try division, reducing its organic engi-neer support to a battalion of 647 men,and cut the armored engineer battal-ion by 40 percent. North African expe-rience argued for substracting thebridge company formerly assigned toengineer battalions, especially in ar-mored divisions. Though highly enthu-siastic about its Bailey bridge sets, the16th Armored Engineer Battalion car-

ried the equipment for three monthsin central Tunisia before putting it tohard use in the closing weeks of thecampaign. The NATOUSA engineeralso found that he rarely had enoughreconnaissance forces either at corpslevel or below. The new organizationgave each combat battalion a 22-manreconnaissance section equipped withthree SCR—511 portable radios, bino-culars, and compasses.27

Mine Clearing

As the Germans withdrew throughthe Kasserine Pass and Sbeitla to theEastern Dorsal, clear skies enabled Al-lied planes to harry their retreat. Onthe ground American pressure boggeddown, partly because at Kasserine Amer-ican troops encountered '"mines anddemolitions on such a scale as to sug-gest a new weapon in warfare." Behinda covering screen of thousands of mines,the enemy broke contact and withdrewunmolested by ground troops.28

The engineers were as ill preparedas the infantry for mine warfare, al-though they had responsibility for minelaying and mine clearing. One engineercombat company commander, who "hadnever seen a German mine, picture, ormodel before entering combat in Tu-nisia" had to rely on one noncom, whohad attended a British mine school inthe theater, to train company officersand key men only a few days before hisunit encountered its first live minefield.29

26 Lt. Col. Frederick A. Henney, "Combat Engineersin North Africa, Pt. II, Operations in Tunisia," TheMilitary Engineer, XXXVI, no. 220 (February 1944),40-42.

27 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organizationof Ground Combat Troops, pp. 309, 331, 374, 446; ElliottRpt, 19 Jul 43; AAR, 16th Armd Engr Bn, 3 Sep 43;Ltr, Brig Gen D. O. Elliott to AGF Board (G-3Training) AFHQ, 8 Jul 43, sub: G-4 Engr Questionsfor AGF Observers, 071.01 AGF file, Jul 43-Dec 44.

28 Eisenhower Dispatch, p. 36.29 Ltr, Lt Col Webb (190th Engr C Bn), 23 Apr 56;

Ltr, Lt Col Wallace (15th Engr C Bn), 17 Jan 56.


Antitank mines were customarilyplaced in staggered rows, checkerboardfashion, spaced far enough apart toavoid sympathetic detonation. Theywere laid according to specific patternfor two reasons: an enemy tank or othervehicle missing mines in the first rowwould stand a good chance of comingto grief on the second, third, or fourthrow; and, when necessary, friendlytroops could more easily locate and liftmines laid in a pattern. This secondconsideration was important, for armedmines played no favorites. Minefieldshad to be charted and marked withcare.

During their retreat in Tunisia theGermans were hardly concerned withhaving to relocate mines, so they scat-tered them indiscriminately anywhereAllied troops and vehicles were likelyto travel. Since Allied trucks and motor-ized equipment were confined mainlyto roads or to occasional stretches offthe road, the Germans mined shoulders,particularly where the roads narrowed;they also mined road junctions, likelyturnouts, probable bivouac areas, andwadi crossings. The Germans used manytricks to deceive and slow down minedetection teams: they booby-trappedsome mines and buried others two andthree deep; around some they scatteredbits of metal that Allied mine detectoroperators had to mark for investigation.One of the enemy's most effective trickswas to bury mines too deep to be de-tected. In this way scores of trucks couldpass safely over a road and then, whenruts became deep enough, a mine wouldexplode. Such methods had a heavypsychological effect on attacking troopsand delayed the advance more effec-tively than pattern mining could have.In such circumstances, even though

only a few mines might have been laidin some areas, many miles of roadwayhad to be swept. All antitank mines hadto be handled as if booby-trapped, eventhough only a small percentage actu-ally were. And no matter how slowly ormethodically mine clearance teamsworked, they could never guarantee aclear route.30

The land mines that the engineershad to deal with fell into two categories,antitank (AT) and antipersonnel (AP).AT mines were generally pressure-activated—a man's weight would notdetonate them, but that of any militaryvehicle would. They contained severalpounds of explosives which could de-molish a jeep or immobilize a tank bybreaking a track and damaging bogie-wheels. AP mines were smaller chargesof explosives set for the unwary. Acti-vated by sensitive push-pull, pressure,or pressure-release devices, they re-quired much more delicate handlingthen AT mines. Varieties of these twotypes, and the subterfuges with whichthey could be employed, were endless.

The antitank Teller mine ("plate" inGerman) was the mine the Germansused most in Tunisia, although theyalso employed others of Italian, French,and Hungarian manufacture as well ascaptured British and American mines.Four different models of the Tellermine found in North Africa had thesame general characteristics: disc

30 II Corps Intel Info Summary 2, 18 Jan 43; Ltr, LtCol Ellsworth I. Davis to XO, The Engr Bd, 26 Apr43, sub: Report of Trip to UK and NA with Ref to ATMines, Demolitions and Airborne Engrs; Ltr, Lt RalphM. Ingersoll to CG, Engr Amphib Cmd, 14 Apr 43,sub: Memorandum on Opns with AT & AP Mines inthe Tunisian Campaign, African Campaign file, EAC;Military Attache Rpt 59181, MID WDGS, sub: Battleof Tunisia, 22 July 1943, AFHQ Engr Intel Summa-ries beginning Jan 43.


GERMAN S-MlNE. The activated canister burst from the earth and fired over 300 steelpellets in all directions.

shaped, about a foot in diameter, threeto four inches thick with a zinc or steeljacket encasing eleven pounds of TNT,and a total weight of about twentypounds. Teller mines had three igniterwells, one on top for a shear-pin typepressure igniter and others on the sideand bottom for more sensitive andmore varied booby-trap igniters. Theseextra wells, and the igniters to fit them,gave the mines a built-in antilifting fea-ture that no American mines couldmatch. American engineers had to as-sume that every Teller mine was booby-trapped.

The German antipersonnel "S" minewas a particularly clever innovation.Nicknamed "Bouncing Betty" by Brit-ish troops, the mine's activation deto-

nated a small black powder charge,throwing a grapeshot canister out ofthe earth. Exploding at waist or chestlevel, the canister discharged a murder-ous hail of steel ball bearings in alldirections.

The Germans made widespread useof booby traps with blocks of explosivesrigged to houses, equipment, or evenbodies—anything curious or unwarytroops were likely to touch, move, orwalk on. AFHQ engineer intelligencebulletins promptly circulated informa-tion on various types of reported boobytraps, sometimes before they could beconfirmed. For example, reports of awater bottle that exploded when thecork was withdrawn, a German whistlethat exploded when blown, and a booby-


ITALIAN BAR MINES. The opened casing shows the simple pressure detonating device.

trapped cake of soap were publishedthroughout the command; how manyothers—real and unreal—circulated byword of mouth can only be conjec-tured.31

In Tunisia a large part of the combatengineers' time was given to laying,lifting, and clearing mines, often to theneglect of other work such as roadmaintenance. The 16th Armored Engi-neer Battalion, for example, spent vir-tually half its time on mine work, as didcombat engineers with infantry divi-sions. To compensate, corps-level engi-neers had to push their road mainte-nance and minefield clearance workwell forward into divisional areas. Al-

though the engineers were better pre-pared to deal with mines than was theinfantry, engineer training in the sub-ject left much to be desired.32

While the engineers often had to usethe slow and tedious method of prob-ing with bayonets for mines, they gen-erally relied on the magnetic mine detec-tor (SCR-625) for speed on longstretches of roads, in bivouac areas, andon airfield sites. The detector was a 71/2-pound instrument consisting of aset of earphones and a search plate

31 AFHQ Engr Intel Summaries 1, Jan 43, to 14,May 43.

32 Ltr, Ingersoll, 14 Apr 43, sub: Memo on Opnswith AT & AP Mines; AAR, 16th Armd Engr Bn, 3Sep 43; U.S. Engrs in Tunisian Campaign, Engr Sect,AFHQ, 19 Jul 43; Rpt, Maj Gen W. H. Walker to CG,AGF, 12 Jun 43, sub: Report of Visit to North AfricanTheater of Opns, 319.1/84, AGF file (F.O.), binder 1,Observer Rpts, 1 Jan-20 Jul 43.


THE SCR-625 MINE DETECTOR in actionon a Tunisian road.

mounted on a wooden disc at the endof a six-foot handle. Dry cell batteriesinduced a magnetic field around thesearch plate and produced a low humin the operator's earphones. The sol-dier "swept" a wide arc before him withthe instrument. In the presence ofmetal buried less than a foot deep, thehum in the operator's ears continuallyincreased in pitch until it became anear-shriek when the detector was di-rectly above a mine. Engineers in themine-clearing party marked the spot,and other engineers, following behind,unearthed and deactivated the mines.They dug out but did not deactivatemines unfamiliar or suspected of beingbooby-trapped. They sometimes placeda block of explosive beside these minesand relied on sympathetic detonation;more often they attached a length ofwire and pulled the mines out of theirholes from a safe distance.33

The SCR-625 was a valuable pieceof equipment when it worked but hadtwo serious shortcomings: it was notwaterproof and was quite fragile. Theinstrument shorted out in wet weatherand required such careful handling anddelicate tuning that normally about 20percent were broken or out of adjust-ment. In spite of these drawbacks, afterKasserine Pass the magnetic detectorbecame one of the most sought-afterpieces of equipment in the Army. The16th Armored Engineer Battalion urgedthat the allocation be increased from

eighteen to seventy-one. Experience inTunisia prompted most engineer unitsto ask that one detector be providedper squad, with some provision for abattalion reserve.34

Experiments conducted in the Medi-terranean theater as well as in the UnitedStates sought to find a faster way ofdetecting or eliminating mines, particu-larly under fire. The demand arose forlarger magnetic detectors, mounted onvehicles, that could sweep long sections

33 Ltr, Ingersoll, 14 Apr 43, sub: Memo on Opnswith AT & AP Mines. For background on the develop-ment of this detector, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal,The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, pp.54—55. Rpt of Engr Opns, Carter, II Corps, 15Mar-10 Apr, dated 1 May 43; Rpt, Maj Gen C. P.Hall to CG, AGF, 24 Apr 43, sub: Report of Visit toNATO, 319.1/84, AGF file (F.O), binder 1, ObserverRpts, 1 Jan-20 Jul 43.

34 Ltr, Ingersoll, 14 Apr 43, sub: Memo on Opnswith AT & AP Mines; AAR, 16th Armd Engr Bn, 3Sep 43; U.S. Engrs in Tunisian Campaign, Engr Sect,AFHQ, 19 Jul 43.


of road rapidly. Engineers of I ArmoredCorps in French Morocco experimentedwith mechanical means, explosives, andfire to make gaps in pattern minefields.They found that tanks could push longsections of explosive-filled pipe acrossa minefield and that when detonatedthese "snakes" cleared a path wideenough for a tank to pass through. Ban-galore torpedoes and nets made ofprimacord also tested well. But mine-clearing explosions alerted the enemy,and bulky devices occupied a great dealof shipping space. Nearby concussionsalso made more sensitive the unex-ploded mines which the snakes leftalongside their path. Engineer unitscarried snakes in Tunisia but did notuse them to blow gaps in minefields.35

Two mechanical means of detectionand detonation offered some promise.The British Eighth Army developed theScorpion—lengths of chain attached toa revolving axle suspended well in frontof a tank. As the tank moved forward,the chain flailed the ground. The Scor-pion exerted enough ground pressureto explode mines and could absorb atleast the initial concussions; however, italso created clouds of dust and destroyedthe chain flails quickly. The machinemoved about one thousand yards intoan active minefield before the blaststook so many links from the ends ofthe chains that they no longer struckthe ground. The enemy could counter-act the flails with wire entanglements,and the whirling chains often activateddelayed-action mines that destroyed fol-lowing vehicles. In the end, the onlyantimine innovation that American engi-

neers employed in Tunisia was a "pilotvehicle" the 16th Armored EngineerBattalion and 1st Armored Divisionordnance personnel developed, an M-3tank with concrete-filled, spiked steeldrums mounted in front. Its purposewas to find the forward edge of a mine-field without needless searching. Usedtwice during the last days of the cam-paign, the vehicle revealed a seriousdefect—the mines demolished the rol-ler. The first time the engineers em-ployed the vehicle they replaced theroller under fire, but the second timethey had to withdraw.36

American engineer officers in Marchand April 1943 studied British mine-field clearing techniques and othermine warfare methods. Training teamsfrom the British Eighth Army, madeup of men with two years of experi-ence in mine warfare, provided valu-able aid. Before the major attack dur-ing the third week of April, about fortyAmerican officers and more than ahundred noncoms attended a mineschool that the British First Army con-ducted with instructors brought to Tuni-sia from the British Eighth Army. Othermine schools sprang up. Experiencedengineers taught the less experienced,and they trained instructors from in-fantry, artillery, and other units. FifthArmy established a Mine Warfare Schoolat Ain Fritissa that drew a few instruc-tors from the British Eighth Army.

35 Data from I Armd Corps, 26 Jun 43, Engr SchLib, 7641; see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps ofEngineers: Troops and Equipment, pp. 476ff, for effortsin the United States to develop mine-clearing devices.

36 AFHQ Engr Intel Summary 14, May 43; Rpt,Carter, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt of Engr Opns II Corps,22 Apr-8 May; Address by Col Edwin P. Lock, Staffand Faculty, Engr Sch, Ft. Belvoir, Va., 31 May 43,"Reduction of Obstacles and Fortifications," ETOUSAMAS file, Assault Trng Ctr Conf. For efforts of theOrdnance Department to develop a satisfactory mineexploder, see Constance M. Green, Harry C. Thomson,and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: PlanningMunitions for War, United States Army in World WarII (Washington, 1955), pp. 387-94.


SCORPION TANK CREW LOADING BANGALORE TORPEDOES

One of the prime difficulties in con-ducting mine training was obtainingdeactivated enemy mines. Althoughthousands of German and Italian mineswere deactivated in the combat zone,they were scarce in the rear areas.There were exceptions. Some mineswere sent to England for training pur-poses, and Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark'sprivate plane ferried some from thefront to the Fifth Army mine school.But most mine training had to be car-ried out without enemy mines. Themain reason was the danger involved,which the theater command believedoutweighed the advantages. Besidesthe normal hazards of handling un-familiar varieties of live explosives, ex-plosive sensitivity increased with age. In

one incident on 30 March 1943, a 109thEngineer Combat Battalion truckloaded with 450 neutralized mines ex-ploded, killing an entire twelve-mansquad.37

German patterns of mining contin-ued superior to American in most re-spects, as did the German system ofcharting and recording minefields.Where American units kept sketchyrecords or none at all in local unit files,German engineers carefully plottedeach mine barrier and sent records to acentral office in Germany.

37 Ltr, Ingersoll, 14 Apr 43, sub: Memo on Opnswith AT & AP Mines; Ltr, Lt Col E. I. Davis, 26 Apr43, Rpt of Trip to UK and NA; Ltr, Lt Col John A.Chambers, 5 Apr 56; Hist 109th Engr C Bn TunisianCampaign, 2 Jan—15 May 43.


The SCR—625's noncollapsible han-dle forced the operator to stand upright,often in sight of an enemy covering theminefield with small-arms fire. What-ever reliability the detector promisedfor the future, it was useless in findingthe German nonmetallic Schu mines,encased in wooden boxes, that appearedin small numbers in North Africa andwould become more plentiful on theContinent. Out of their experience theengineers also demanded a new anti-tank mine that would do real damageto enemy armor; the German Teller,with twice the explosives of the Ameri-can models, usually destroyed the hulland undercarriage of any tank strikingit, while the American mine would onlydamage a track, leaving a salvageablevehicle.38

The magnetic mine detector, thebayonet, and a sharp, suspicious eyewere the antimine measures that engi-neers relied upon most in Tunisia.From late February, when the Germansfell back to the Eastern Dorsal, until 13April, American engineers found over39,000 mines. In the area from Thalaand Bekkaria through Kasserine toSbeitla and along the road fromThelepte to Gafsa mine detection par-ties removed 10,750 enemy mines, andin the Gafsa area they found 8,700more. Around El Guettar they lifted12,450 and found 7,300 more in theMaknassy-Sened area.39

Water Supply

Because reliable sources were scarce,the provision of water came next toroad work and mine clearing in impor-tance to combat engineers in Tunisia.Water supply involved three principaljobs: locating sources, testing and puri-fying, and distributing water to thetroops. The engineers were concernedprimarily with the first two; the armsand services usually provided their owntrucks to haul water from engineerwater points.

Each combat engineer battalion car-ried equipment to establish four waterpoints and normally set up two forwardand one or two back. As the divisionsmoved forward the rear water pointsleapfrogged over the forward ones.Combat engineer regiments providedsimilar service to corps units, as did gen-eral service regiments for units in areasto which they were assigned, althoughin rear areas much of the work wasdone by engineer units specifically or-ganized and equipped for water supply.When II Corps' offensive through Gafsawas impending, the 518th EngineerWater Supply Company moved for-ward to supplement the work combatengineers had done to establish waterpoints, for the approaching end of therainy season promised to make the jobmore difficult.40

The first step in activating a waterpoint was to locate a stream, well, pond,or spring. In Tunisia most of the sourceswere wells, which were marked in the

38 WD Pub, "Lessons Learned from the TunisianCampaign," 15 Oct 43; AAR, 16th Armd Engr Bn, 3Sep 43; I Armd Corps, Data file, 26 Jun 43; AFHQEngr Intel Summary 7, Mar 43; Coll, Keith, andRosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment,pp. 479-80; AFHQ Engr Intel Summary 10, Apr 43;Herchal Ottinger, Engineer Agency for ResourcesInventories, "Landmine and Countermine Warfare,"North Africa, 1940-1943 (Washington: Corps of Engi-neers, 1972), pp. 255-62.

39 Rpt of Engr Opns, Carter, II Corps, 15 Mar-10

Apr, dated 1 May 43; Rpt, Carter, 28 May 43, sub:Rpt of Engr Opns II Corps, 22 Apr-8 May.

40 Hist 109th Engr C Bn, Tunisian Campaign; Rptof Engr Opns, Carter, II Corps, 15 Mar-10 Apr,dated 1 May 43; Henney, "Combat Engineers in NorthAfrica, Pt. II," pp. 40-42.


central and southern parts of the coun-try by clusters of trees. The next stepwas to test the water for potability,turbidity, and poison. An engineer tech-nician carried a kit of test tubes andchemicals for this purpose. If he ap-proved a particular source, a squadbrought in a truck loaded with a motor-ized pump, a sand filter, a chlorinator,and a collapsible 3,000-gallon canvastank which when erected stood aboutfour feet high. Within about thirty min-utes the squad had water pumpingthrough the filters. The engineers usedchemical disinfectants, principally chlo-rine gas or sodium hypochlorite. Thepurification equipment proved entirelyadequate, even for water that was highlyturbid and contaminated.41

During the Tunisian campaign theengineers continually put in and tookout water points. Some sources had tobe abandoned because pumps suckedthem dry, others because the units theysupplied had moved. During II Corps'offensive through Gafsa between 17March and 11 April, the 518th Engi-neer Water Supply Company had tankertrucks haul over three million gallonsof water to forward distribution pointscalled dry points. Trucks from the armsand services came to these dry points,as they would to any other water source,to fill five-gallon cans for their units.During the offensive the 518th alsorepaired a generator and a diesel wellpump, which the Germans had dam-aged, to put the Gafsa and Station deSened water systems back into oper-ation.

In mountainous northern Tunisiaduring the final phase of the campaign,hauling water was less a problem sincesources were more numerous. Combatengineers were able to operate severalpoints in their own areas, while the518th operated sources for corps troopsand hospitals. The large number ofenemy troops captured in the closingdays of the campaign precipitated some-thing of a water crisis, and all availabletankers were needed again to haul waterto prisoner of war enclosures. On itspeak day during this period the 518thdistributed 72,840 gallons of water.42

Camouflage

Engineer performance in camouflagewas less successful than in water supply.Before the invasion AFHQ had speci-fied that each army, corps, and majorair force headquarters would have aqualified camouflage officer and thateach unit down to the battalion and sep-arate company level should name a unitcamouflage officer. These officers be-came so burdened with additional du-ties during the campaign that unit cam-ouflage suffered. To remedy this situa-tion II Corps obtained Company B,601st Engineer Camouflage Battalion,and for three weeks before the Gafsaattack had instruction teams teach corpsunits camouflage techniques. But, inthe combat zone, more than teachingwas essential, for camouflage was proba-bly better understood than enforced.43

41 Capt. Ralph Ingersoll, The Battle Is the Payoff (NewYork: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943), pp. 48-49; Lt.William J. Diamond, "Water Supply in North Africa,"The Military Engineer, XXXV, no. 217 (November1943), 565-66.

42 Rpt of Engr Opns, Carter, II Corps, 15 Mar-10Apr, dated 1 May 43; Rpt, Carter, 28 May 43, sub:Rpt of Engr Opns II Corps, 22 Apr-8 May; Henney,"Combat Engineers in North Africa, Pt. II."

43 AFHQ Opns Memo 20, Camouflage Policy, 17Oct 42; Memo, Maj Fred K. Shirk, U.S. CamouflageOfficer, Engr Sect, AFHQ, Comments on CamouflageOperations During the North African Campaign (8


Camouflage was a command respon-sibility, and many commanders tried toenforce it. Covered windshields did notglint, and dusty, muddy vehiclesblended with the terrain. Some unitsdraped camouflage nets over their ve-hicles, some used the nets for bedding,and some did not use them at all. Unitsseldom attempted camouflaging vehi-cle tracks, for the barren North Afri-can landscape made it virtually impossi-ble to conceal the army's bulky motor-ized equipment, particularly when itwas in motion. The best hope was tomask equipment identity. Toward theend of the campaign, as the Alliesgained superiority in the air, camou-flage discipline relaxed almost com-pletely.44

Maps

The II Corps engineer was responsi-ble for distributing maps to Americanunits in Tunisia, with British First Armyproviding the maps according to stocklevels set for the corps. The systemworked well. Five men of the 62d Engi-neer Topographic Company issued "allmaps, using a 2 1/2-ton, 6-by-6 that the470th Engineer Maintenance Companyconverted into a mobile map depot.

Old French maps provided the basefor the maps II Corps used in Tunisia;

the corps' engineer topographic com-pany overprinted more recent infor-mation. The maps often proved inaccu-rate on important points. Scales variedfrom the 1:10,000 town plan of Bizerte(useful during mine clearing and recon-struction work) to 1:200,000 road maps.Those most in use were 1:200,000 forsouthern Tunisia and 1:100,000 fornorthern Tunisia. These scales weresatisfactory for regimental and higherheadquarters but not for lower levelunits and artillery. Two days before theattack got under way in the north, Brit-ish First Army furnished II Corps 1,000copies of a 1:25,000 edition and a fewdays later 2,000 more copies contain-ing revised intelligence data. This large-scale map proved valuable, as did a1:50,000 operational series.45

Aerial photographs could have donemuch to correct and supplement themaps, but those available in Tunisiawere wholly inadequate. Enlargedsmall-scale maps were poor substitutesfor large-scale tactical maps. Good aerialphotography was needed for intelli-gence and high altitude photomappingfor map substitutions. The British FirstArmy furnished some aerial photo-graphs, but II Corps was never able toget enough. Wide-angle, high-altitudephotomapping was not available at all.46

Nov 42-8 May 45); Rpt, 601st Engr Camouflage Bnto CG, II Corps, 26 May 43, sub: Resume of Opns; allin file Camouflage, 2 Jul 43, Intnl AFHQ, A-1434,Engr Sch Lib. Rpt, Engr Sect, AFHQ to CofEngrs,WD, 19 Jul 43, U.S. Engrs in the Tunisian Campaign.

44 AFHQ Opn Memo 20, Camouflage Policy, 17 Oct42; Ltr, Lt Col E. I. Davis, 26 Apr 43; Rpt, Hall to CG,AGF, 24 Apr 43, sub: Rpt of Visit to NATO; Bradley,A Solider's Story, pp. 37, 40; Rpt, Lt Col G. E. Lynch,Observer from HQ AGF, for Period 30 Dec 42-6Feb 43, ca. 5 Mar 43, 319.1/84, AGF file (F.O.), binder1, Observer Rpts, 1 Jan-20 Jul 43.

45 Rpt, Carter, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt of Engr Opns IICorps, 22 Apr—8 May; 26th Inf Rpt, Lessons Learnedin the Gafsa-El Guettar Opns, 13 Apr 43; Memo, ColMichael Buckley, Jr., for CG, AGF, 17 May 43, sub:Observer Rpt, II Corps, Tunisia, 21-26 Apr 43; Rpt,Maj Gen William H. Simpson to CG, AGF, 7 May 43,sub: Rpt on Visit to North African Theater (hereaftercited as Simpson Rpt); both in 319.1/84, AGF file(F.O.), binder 1, Observer Rpts, 1 Jan-20 Jul 43.

46 Rpt, Carter, 28 May 43, sub: Rpt of Engr Opns IICorps, 22 Apr-8 May; Rpt, Maj Gen Walker to CG,AGF, 12 Jun 43, sub: Rpt of Visit to North AfricanTheater; Simpson Rpt.


Command Reorganizations

With the Allies moving on an increas-ingly isolated but still dangerous enemyin Tunisia, the chief abiding difficultyin engineer supply in North Africa,apart from expected delays in ship-ments from the United States, was thetangled command structure that evolvedin the area. In the attempts to resolvethe awkward relationships betweenAFHQ and the ETOUSA headquartersin London, the War Department pushedfor and General Eisenhower acceptedthe idea of a theater command in NorthAfrica. A reorganization on 30 Decem-ber 1942 centralized control of theAtlantic and Mediterranean Base Sec-tions directly under AFHQ, relievingWestern Task Force and II Corps ofport and supply line operation. On 4February 1943, taking advantage of themomentary lull in the Tunisian cam-paign, the War Department directedthe establishment of the North AfricanTheater of Operations, U.S. Army(NATOUSA), to consolidate and ad-minister all American affairs in NorthAfrica. General Eisenhower headedAFHQ and the new theater but actedon all theater administrative detailthrough his deputy commander, Brig.Gen. Everett S. Hughes. GeneralHughes, attempting to clarify his posi-tion for American forces, requestedthat he be designated commanding gen-eral of the Communications Zone,NATOUSA (COMZ, NATOUSA), sinceno American doctrine specified theoffice of deputy theater commanderthat Eisenhower had conferred uponhim. Formally instituted on 9 February1943, COMZ, NATOUSA, existed as agraft onto AFHQ, with senior Ameri-can AFHQ officers doing triple duty as

the staff for the COMZ command, forthe NATOUSA headquarters, and forAFHQ.

Further complicating the structureafter 14 February 1943 was the SOS,NATOUSA, command, establishedover arguments against maintaining aheadquarters G-4, a communicationszone command, and a separate servicesof supply organization in the sametheater. Under the command of Brig.Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, former headof the Mediterranean Base Section,SOS, NATOUSA, was another level ofcommand between the theater head-quarters and the base sections; how-ever, while the directive establishing hiscommand assigned to Larkin all U.S.Army logistical functions except high-level planning and policy making, itfailed to give him adequate control ofthe base sections. Already an anomalyunder the current field service regula-tions, since American doctrine did notenvisage a communications zone and aservices of supply in the same theater,Larkin's command entered into infor-mal agreements with the base sectioncommanders that placed overall con-trol of supply, construction, mainte-nance, and transportation with SOS,NATOUSA. But COMZ, NATOUSA,did not confirm this arrangement; theagreements existed only as policy guide-lines, which base section commanderscould circumvent. Since SOS, NATO-USA, had to issue all directives to thebase sections through COMZ, NATO-USA, General Larkin's plans were al-tered or delayed in accord with otherplans and priorities. Though the the-ater command tried to untangle thechannels of command, the end of theTunisian campaign found the lines ofresponsibility between COMZ, NATO-


USA, and SOS, NATOUSA, and be-tween SOS, NATOUSA, and AFHQ'sG-4 still unclear. The AFHQ G-4,acting as planner for the inter-Alliedstaff and also in his NATOUSA capa-city, frequently operated in the field ofsupply and dealt with the base sectionsdirectly where SOS authority shouldhave prevailed. This command chainpersisted for another year until the dis-solution of COMZ, NATOUSA, andthe consolidation of logistical operationsunder SOS, NATOUSA, on 20 Febru-ary 1944. Within that chain, Brig. Gen.Donald A. Davison, as AFHQ engineer,also acted as chief engineer to theNATOUSA and the COMZ, NATO-USA, commands. As with other Ameri-can staff officers similarly situated, hehad to remember in which capacity hewas acting in any given matter.

Other complications continued toplague the U.S. Army logistical systemin North Africa. The chiefs of U.S.Army technical services remained atAFHQ/NATOUSA instead of transfer-ring to SOS, NATOUSA, as might havebeen expected. This arrangement fur-ther circumscribed Larkin's span ofcontrol and authority. Finally, SOS,NATOUSA, had to set up its headquar-ters at Oran, the principal Americansupply base in North Africa, althoughAFHQ/NATOUSA headquarters in-stallations lay at Algiers, over 200 milesto the east. Communications over thisdistance often slowed logistical reactiontime.

The establishment of SOS, NATO-USA, created a new set of personnelproblems for the engineers. The Engi-neer Section of SOS, NATOUSA, in-formally came into being in Februarywith six officers and seven enlisted menborrowed from the 1st Engineer Am-

phibian Brigade. Not until April didthe section receive an allotment of fiveofficers and fourteen enlisted men andreturn the borrowed personnel to thebrigade. Initially, the principal functionof the small SOS, NATOUSA, Engi-neer Section was to control and editrequisitions for engineer supplies thatthe base section engineers drew on theUnited States or the United Kingdom.In turn, the main tasks of the base sec-tion engineers during the Tunisiancampaign were to construct and main-tain supply routes and to operate engi-neer supply depots.47

Atlantic Base Section

All along the long line of communica-tions from Casablanca east, prepara-tions went forward with all possiblespeed for the decisive battles in Tunisia.Engineer supplies and equipment cameinto Atlantic Base Section (ABS) atCasablanca at the rate of 2,000 tonsper convoy, and ABS issued largeamounts of engineer supplies to unitsstaging for Tunisia. The depot respon-sibilities taxed the ABS engineer sup-ply personnel (built around the 451stEngineer Depot Company) to the limit,and local labor could not meet theemergency. In April the arrival of anengineer general service company easedthe problem at the ABS engineer depot.

47 Leo J. Meyer, The Strategy and Logistical History:MTO, chs. VI-VII, MS in CMH; History of AlliedForce Headquarters, pt. I, Aug-Dec 42, pp. 61—62;and pt. II, sec. 1, p. 200; G-4 Staff, MTOUSA,Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA (Naples: G.Montanio, 1945), p. 24; Memo, Lt Col O. B. Beasley,XO, Engr Sect, AFHQ, for CG, NATOUSA, 27 Mar43, sub: Orgn of the Engr Sect, AFHQ/NATOUSA,NATOUSA Engr Sect, 320.2 (2); WD, Field ServiceRegulations, Administration, FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40,pp. 20-23.


Unit demands for many items inexcess of Table of Basic Allowances,together with a growing need for vastlymore material for housing, hospitals,and sanitary facilities than originallyplanned, placed most items in ABSengineer dumps in the "critical" cate-gory. Construction supplies from theUnited States lagged far behind requisi-tions and procuring locally such itemsas cement, lumber, and electrical andplumbing equipment was difficult. Amajor drop in imports since the out-break of war in Europe in 1939 hadcreated a serious shortage of construc-tion supplies of all types throughoutFrench Morocco, and local merchantsand manufacturers tended to hold backmaterials that might later bring higherprices; however, centralized purchas-ing for engineer supply items largelyovercame the local procurement prob-lem.

By mid-May, at the end of the Tuni-sian campaign, ABS engineers had vir-tually completed their own constructionprogram and had issued tons of locallyprocured construction material. At thesame time, less than half the construc-tion supplies ABS engineers had requi-sitioned from the United States hadreached Casablanca. Much of the miss-ing materiel that began to arrive dur-ing succeeding weeks was no longerneeded. By late June ABS engineerdumps contained 10 million board feetof unwanted lumber.48

Mediterranean Base Section

At Oran, the site of both Mediterra-nean Base Section (MBS) and SOS,

NATOUSA, personnel problems weremuch the same as those at ABS. Fourengineer supply depots were in theOran area by late December 1942, butonly the 450th Engineer Depot Com-pany (less one platoon) was available tooperate them. As early as December anengineer dump truck company and twocompanies of the 1st Engineer Amphib-ian Brigade had to be diverted to depotoperations, and the depots also em-ployed about 800 local laborers. In mid-winter the understrength (1 officer and80 enlisted men) 715th Engineer DepotCompany joined the force. By March,when the 460th Engineer Depot Com-pany reached Oran from the Zone of theInterior (ZI), the MBS engineer depotswere employing approximately 1,500local laborers. In April the 462d Engi-neer Depot Company arrived from theZI. Nevertheless, the MBS engineerconstantly had to add nonsupply engi-neer detachments to the depot force.These detachments generally had nosupply training and had to learn on thejob to unload, handle, store, and accountfor engineer supplies.49

Shortages of equipment, especiallyvehicles, also plagued engineer supplyoperations within MBS. As of Febru-ary 1943 the 450th Engineer DepotCompany, the first such unit in theOran area, was 30 percent short of itsTBA vehicles, the 715th Engineer De-pot Company 60 percent short, andother engineer units assigned to depotoperations an average of 31.5 percent

48 History of the Atlantic Base Section to June 1,1943, vol. I, pp. 29-32.

49 Memo, Col George D. Pence, G-1, MBS, for CG,MBS, 24 Jan 43, sub: Status, Shipments of U.S. Unitsand Casual Personnel; Rpt, Col Morris W. Gilland,Dep Engr, MBS to CG, MBS, 27 Dec 42, sub: Lessonsfrom Operation TORCH, HQ, MBS; Rpt, Lt Col R. W.Colglazier, Jr., Asst XO, Engr Sect, to CG, MBS, 24Jan 43, sub: Current Status Rpt, Engr Serv, MBS.


short. The most serious need was dumptrucks, and the MBS engineer con-stantly tried to obtain more of them. Inlate January 1943 he requested thehighest shipping priority for dumptrucks, pointing out that they repre-sented a very small percentage of engi-neer tonnage.50 The Tunisian campaignended, however, before the problemwas solved.

During January 1943 MBS engineerdepots shipped an average of 250 tonsof engineer supplies per day eastwardto support operations in Tunisia. Thefigure rose to 400 tons in February, 500tons in March, and 900 tons in April;however, the end of the Tunisian cam-paign in mid-May brought that month'saverage down to 450. While the MBSengineers were issuing supplies, theyalso had to handle increasingly largereceipts. In February, for example,MBS engineer depots received an aver-age of 600 tons of supplies and equip-ment per day, and at the end of themonth engineer depot stocks approxi-mated 35,000 tons. The receipt aver-age for March was about 700 tons aday, for April approximately 1,400tons, and for May 1,375 tons. At theend of May, MBS engineer depots heldmore than 100,000 tons of engineersupplies and equipment.51

Eastern Base Section

NATOUSA established the EasternBase Section (EBS) on 13 February

1943 to support II Corps in Tunisia.The commander was Col. Arthur W.Pence, and the chief of the EngineerSection was Col. Donald B. Adams. Thecommand organized and undertookplanning at Oran, and on 23 Februarybegan moving eastward to Constantine,in Algeria, about 100 miles short of theTunisian border. The organization ofEBS nearly coincided with significantchanges in tactical command withinAllied forces in North Africa. On 7March Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.,took over command of II Corps fromMaj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, and IICorps passed from the control of theBritish First Army to that of 18 ArmyGroup, General Sir Harold R. L. G.Alexander commanding. The BritishFirst and Eighth Armies constituted theother major components of 18 ArmyGroup.

The principal problems EBS engi-neers faced were receiving, storing, andissuing materiel; repairing and main-taining supply roads; building adequatedepot facilities and shops; and rehabili-tating ports at Philippeville and Bone,on the Mediterranean coast north fromConstantine. The necessity of quickreaction to changes in the progress ofthe ground campaign differentiatedEBS from ABS and MBS.

In March the principal EBS engineerdepot lay at Tebessa, close to the Tuni-sian border, about 110 miles southeastof Constantine and within relativelyeasy supporting distance of II Corps.When II Corps suddenly moved tonorthern Tunisia in April, EBS engi-neers followed suit. They concentratedat a partially constructed EBS generaldepot at Mondovi, about twenty-fivemiles south of Bone, and rapidly set upadvance engineer dumps at La Calle

50 Rpt, Colglazier to CG, MBS, 24 Jan 43, sub: Cur-rent Status Rpt; Portfolio entitled Nov 42-Jan 43,MBS.

51 Monthly Rpts, Engr Serv, MBS, Mar, Apr, May,and Jun 43, 314.7 Hist, 1942-44, North African Ser-vice Comd file; History of the Mediterranean BaseSection, Sep 42-May 44, in CMH.


and Tabarka, on the coast east fromBone. Employing eight-ton and sixteen-ton trailers, among other vehicles, engi-neers rushed forward engineer suppliesand equipment not only from Tebessaand Mondovi but also from EBS depotsat St.-Charles and Ouled Rahmoun.The rapid, 24-hour-a-day engineer dis-placement played a large part in mak-ing II Corps' swift advance towardBizerte possible.52

For all the engineer units involved,

one of the greatest practical drawbacksin applying the experience of NorthAfrica was the short period in which todetermine required changes in doc-trine, organization, and practice.Though much of this knowledge wascumulative and was absorbed from thefirst in the theater, the process of learn-ing was uneven. Some units, the engi-neer amphibian brigade in particular,were shunted into duty in rear areaswhere they could not gain experiencein a unique mission. Nevertheless, thelessons of past shortcomings were ap-plied to the planning for the invasionof Sicily, scheduled for mid-July 1943,only seven weeks after the close of theTunisian battles that ended Germanand Italian military influence in Africa.

52 History of the Eastern Base Section, Feb— 1 Jun43, in CMH, Rpt, Engr, EBS, to CofEngrs, WD, Activi-ties of the Engr Serv, EBS, 2 Nov 43; Rpt, Lt ColRobert B. Gear, AFHQ Engr Sect, to Chf Engr,AFHQ, Rpt of Supply Inspection Trip to Tunisia,333, Rpts on Visits and Inspections, NATOUSA Engrfile.

CHAPTER VI

Sicily: The Beachhead

The British and American CombinedChiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed at Casa-blanca in January 1943 that Sicily wouldbe the next major Allied target in theMediterranean after Tunisia.1 Soonafterward AFHQ named several offi-cers to Allied planning staffs forHUSKY, the code name of the Sicilianventure. They met on 10 February1943 in Room 141 of the St. GeorgeHotel in Algiers and took the covername Force 141. The group operatedas a subsection of G-3, AFHQ, until15 May, when it merged with the deac-tivated headquarters of 15th ArmyGroup to become an independent oper-ational and planning headquarters. OnD-day of HUSKY, the merged organiza-tion became Headquarters, 15th ArmyGroup, General Sir Harold R. L. G.Alexander commanding. Force 141prepared a general plan, and separateAmerican (Force 343) and British(Force 545) task forces worked outdetails. Force 343 evolved into Head-quarters, Seventh U.S. Army, underGeneral Patton, and Force 545 into

Headquarters, British Eighth Army,under General Montgomery.

The engineer adviser to Force 141during the early planning months wasLt. Col. Charles H. Bonesteel III, wholater became deputy chief engineer(U.S.) at Headquarters, 15th ArmyGroup. Despite the limited Force 141planning, the force engineers and theEngineer Section at AFHQ from thefirst sought to line up the engineerunits, equipment, and supplies thatwould be required once detailed prepa-rations got under way. The engineerplanners also compiled supply lists forthe elements of Forces 343 and 545 thatwould be mounted in North Africa andgave them to SOS, NATOUSA, and theBritish Engineer Stores for procure-ment.

Supplies not available in the theaterhad to come from the United States, aprocess that would take ninety days formany items. Anticipating a mid-Julytarget date for HUSKY, SOS, NATO-USA, asked that requisitions be in by18 April. Since this date was well be-fore detailed plans for the assault werecompleted, the requisitions Force 141and AFHQ prepared were aimed atproviding a general reserve from whichthe task forces could draw later. Theoriginal supply lists were predicated onthe assumption that the port of Paler-mo would be in use about D plus 8, but

1 The general sources for this chapter are: Lt. Col.Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicilyand the Surrender of Italy, United States Army in WorldWar II (Washington, 1965); History of Allied ForceHeadquarters, pt. II, Dec 42-Dec 43, sec. 1; HQ,Force 141, Planning Instr 1, in Rpt of Opns, SeventhU.S. Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul—17 Aug43 (hereafter cited as Seventh Army Rpt Sicily).


in May tactical planners changed thelocation of assault. Earlier planning hadto be revised completely, and, for themost part, supply requirements had tobe increased. The result was oversup-ply of some items and shortages ofothers. Supply planners made up theshortages by drawing from units thatwould temporarily remain in NorthAfrica.2

Force 141 and the AFHQ EngineerSection also drew up a troop list in aneffort to assure that the necessarytroops reached the theater. Engineerplanners were able to get approval foran engineer allocation of about 15 per-cent of the total HUSKY ground forces.They asked for several special engineerorganizations, including a headquartersand headquarters company of a portconstruction and repair group, anequipment company, a utilities com-pany, and two "Scorpion" companies.3

In the meantime engineers laboredunder two major unknowns—the timeand the place of the assault. Not until13 April did the Combined Chiefs ofStaff approve a target date of 10 July,and the decision on where to land onSicily came even later. Messina, onlythree miles from the Italian mainland,was the final objective, but was consid-

ered too strong for direct assault. TheAmericans and British would have toland elsewhere and move overlandagainst Messina. Ground forces wouldneed ports to ensure their supply lines,and airfields close enough to providefighter cover.

The chief ports and airfields on Sic-ily clustered at opposite ends of theisland. In the northwest lay Palermo,the largest port, and nearby were sev-eral airfields, while another group ofairfields lay along the southeasterncoast. The assumption that Palermohad to be seized early shaped HUSKYplanning for months, but GeneralMontgomery, commanding the BritishEighth Army, insisted that the landingsbe concentrated at the southeast cor-ner of the island, and on 3 May Gen-eral Eisenhower approved Mont-gomery's plan.

The new plan called for the simulta-neous landing of eight divisions alonga 100-mile front between Licata andSyracuse. The British Eighth Army,landing on the east, was to seize Syra-cuse and other moderate-sized portsnearby. The American Seventh Army,under General Patton, was to landalong the shores of the Gulf of Gela,far from any port of consequence. Sev-enth Army would depend upon supplyover the beach for as much as thirtydays, a prospect that would have beenconsidered impossible only a few weeksearlier.

During the latter part of 1942 theproduction of landing ships and craftaccelerated, reaching a peak in Febru-ary 1943. Force 141 had ordered all ofthese vessels it could get, and when theybecame available in some numbers sup-ply over the southern beaches began to

2 Seventh Army Engr Rpt Sicily; Col Garrison H.Davidson, Preliminary Rpt of Seventh Army Engr onthe Sicilian Opn, 23 Aug 43; Ltr, Brig Gen D. O. Elliottto AFHQ, 21 Sep 43, sub: Administrative LessonsLearned from Opns in Sicily from the Engr Viewpoint;latter two in 370.212 Sicily, Rpts of Opns, Aug 43 toOct 43, AFHQ files. Ltr, Lt Col Bonesteel to Brig GenC. R. Moore, Chf Engr, ETOUSA, 22 Jul 43, 321Engr Units 42-43, AFHQ files.

3 Ltr, Bonesteel to Moore, 22 Jul 43. During thecampaign engineer troops, including aviation engi-neers, made up 10.5 percent of Seventh Army strengthin Sicily. See Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Notes on EngrOpns in Italy, no. 6, 1 Jan 44.

SICILY: THE BEACHHEAD 117

PONTON CAUSEWAY EXTENDING FROM AN LST TO SHORE

seem feasible.4 The new amphibiousequipment included DUKWs, navalpontons, and new types of landingcraft. The DUKW was a 2 1/2-ton am-phibious truck that could make fiveknots at sea and normal truck speedson land. It offered great promise, for itcould bridge the critical gap betweenthe ships offshore and the supplydumps behind the beach.

New types of shallow-draft landingcraft featured hinged bows and rampsforward. Flat-bottomed, without pro-jecting keels, they were difficult to

maneuver in a high cross wind or surfbut could come close enough to shoreto put men and vehicles in shallowwater. The 36-foot LCVP, which couldcarry thirty-six combat-equipped in-fantrymen or four tons of cargo, swunginto the water off an invasion beachfrom a larger vessel in a ship-to-shoreoperation. Newer LSTs (Landing Ship,Tank), coming into production inDecember 1942, were designed forshore-to-shore amphibious assaults.The American model was 328 feet long,had a 50-foot beam, and on ocean voy-ages accommodated up to 1,900 tonsof cargo or 20 medium tanks; 163combat-ready troops could find ade-quate, if sparse, berthing aboard.British-built versions were slightlylarger and drew more water at the stern

4 Richard M. Leighton, "Planning for Sicily," U.S.Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVIII, no. 5 (May1962), 90-101; Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, pp. A-5 toA-8; Col A. H. Head, Notes on the Planning, Train-ing, and Execution of Operation HUSKY, Misc PapersNEPTUNE, HQ, ETOUSA, files.


than at the bow and so tended to groundon the gradually sloping shelves andshifting sandbars in front of the Medi-terranean beaches. Navy steel pontonsrunning from the ship's bow to shorewould serve as causeways to dry landfor cargo and vehicles aboard the LSTs.Two intermediate-size landing craftthat served as lighters for the LSTs andfor larger attack transports and auxilia-ries were the 50-foot LCM (LandingCraft, Mechanized) and the 150-footLCT (Landing Craft, Tank). Both hada speed of ten knots and drew littlemore than three feet of water fullyloaded. The LCM took on 1 mediumtank, 30 tons of cargo, or 120 troops.The invaluable LCT could transportfive thirty-ton tanks or a comparableload of cargo or troops.5

Plans and Preparations

Eisenhower selected Headquarters, IArmored Corps, at Rabat as the head-quarters for Force 343, and the IArmored Corps engineer, Col. Garri-son H. Davidson, was named the Force343 engineer. On 25 March he beganplanning for HUSKY, but unlike Force545 (the British task force), I ArmoredCorps still had some operational dutiesin North Africa. Not until 13 June didForce 343 issue a complete engineerplan outlining boundaries and settinggeneral policies. Each subtask force

commander, who was to control hisassault area for the first few days,worked out his own detailed assault andengineer plans.6

Planning for HUSKY was difficult.The time and place of the assault werefixed late. AFHQ's preoccupation withthe Tunisian campaign meant that thelist of major combat units to be used inHUSKY could be determined only afterAxis forces in North Africa capitulatedearly in May. Also, AFHQ wrappedheavy security around the comingoperation. Engineer unit commanderswere briefed on HUSKY only after em-barking for Sicily, too late for realisticpreinvasion training. Even in the higherengineer echelons, essential informa-tion was slow in coming. Though Head-quarters, I Armored Corps, was namedthe task force headquarters for theinvasion in early March, no one toldthe corps engineer of his new assign-ment for another three weeks. On 19March Colonel Davidson also belatedlylearned of the decision to redirect theassault to the southeastern beaches ofSicily instead of the town of Palermoon the north shore.7

Another impediment to planning wasthe great distances that separated theseveral staffs. The Force 141 (15thArmy Group) plan called for assaultlandings by three American divisions,with a strong armored and infantryreserve to be held close offshore on theleft flank of the American sector. Foursubtask forces were set up: the threereinforced assault divisions, JOSS (3d

5 Fifth Army Training Center History; ONI 226, 7Apr 44, Allied Landing Craft and Ships, and Supple-ment 1 to ONI 226; Robert W. Coakley and Rich-ard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943 —1945, United States Army in World War II (Washing-ton, 1968), apps. B-1, B-2, pp. 827-29; Samuel E.Morison, "History of United States Naval Operationsin World War II," vol. IX, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January1943-June 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown Company,1957), pp. 30-32.

6 Ltr, AFHQ to Fifth Army, 5 Mar 43, sub: Orgn ofWestern Task Force, 320.2 Orgn and Tactical Units(1942-43), AFHQ files; Rpt of Seventh Army EngrSicily.

7 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Ltr, Brig GenDabney O. Elliott, AFHQ Engr, to AFHQ, 21 Sep 43.


Infantry Division), DIME (1st InfantryDivision), and CENT (45th InfantryDivision) and, a reserve force, KOOL(2d Armored Division less CombatCommand A, plus the 1st Division's18th Regimental Combat Team).SHARK (Headquarters, II Corps) wasto coordinate DIME and CENT. Duringthe planning stage, these and higherheadquarters were scattered across thebreadth of North Africa. AFHQ was atAlgiers, the British task force headquar-ters (Force 545) at Cairo, and Force 343at Rabat in Morocco until the latter partof April when it moved to Mostaganemin Algeria. JOSS headquarters was atJemmapes, SHARK at Relizane, andDIME at Oran. Western Naval TaskForce headquarters remained at Al-giers, which seemed to Army authori-ties too far from Force 343, but the twoservices cooperated well.8

According to the instructions Force141 issued in April, U.S. engineers wereresponsible for breaching beach obsta-cles, clearing and laying minefields,supplying water and bulk petroleumproducts, repairing ports and airfields,and rebuilding railways. The instruc-tions emphasized the importance ofrepairing airfields as soon as possible.The Transportation Corps was to deter-mine requirements for railway recon-struction and request the engineers todo the work, but the Seventh Armyengineer staff worked with G-4 ofForce 141 in actual preparations. Troopaccommodations were to be an "abso-

lute minimum," and hospitals were touse existing buildings or tents. Engi-neers were to provide light, water, andlatrines.9

While all the subtask forces had com-mon engineer missions, each also hadspecial missions. SHARK engineers wereto prepare a landing strip at Biscari assoon as possible after the assault, haverunways ready at Comiso and PonteOlivo Airfields by D plus 8, repair ajetty at Gela, and build bulk storage andpipelines to the airfields. By D plus 4the 2602d Engineer Petroleum Distri-bution Company was to be ashore atDIME beaches and ready to handle over1,000 tons of gasoline per day. JOSSengineers were to repair the small portof Licata and a landing strip at a nearbyairfield. KOOL engineers were to beready to rehabilitate Porto Empedocle,a small harbor thirty miles west of theJOSS beaches.

The engineers were to rely largelyon local materials for repairing railwayand electrical installations and buildingtroop barracks. Lumber was to be pro-vided for hospital flooring and fortwenty woodframe tarpaulin-coveredwarehouses. All civilian labor was to behired and paid by the using arm orservice. Until D plus 3 real estate was tobe obtained either by "immediate occu-pancy" or by informal written agree-ments between unit purchasing andcontracting officers and owners. Animportant engineer responsibility wasproviding water, known to be scarce inSicily during the summer. The mini-mum water requirement was set at oneU.S. gallon per man per day. Waterenough for five days was to be carried

8 II Corps Bull Y/l, Notes on the Planning andAssault Phases of the Sicilian Campaign, by a MilitaryObserver, Oct 43, 1st ESB files; Seventh Army RptSicily, p. A-2; Rpt, Vice Adm H. K. Hewitt, WNTFin Sicilian Campaign; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 108;Hist 1st Engr C Bn Rpt, Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul-Dec 43.

9 HQ, Force 141, Planning Instr 11, Engr Require-ments for HUSKY, 12 Apr 43.


in five-gallon cans on the D-day convoyor in Navy bulk storage.10

In accordance with the Loper-HotineAgreement, the Geographical Section,General Staff, British War Office, wasresponsible for revising maps forHUSKY, but AFHQ was responsible forreproduction. The Engineer Section,AFHQ, established a large field mapservice organization, the Survey Direc-torate, in a suburb of Algiers. Thedirectorate furnished general tacticalmaps for all HUSKY forces except CENT,which, staging in the United States, ob-tained its maps through OCE in Wash-ington.

In February the 66th Engineer Topo-graphic Company, formerly with I Ar-mored Corps, joined HUSKY. Whilepreparing some tactical maps, the 66thconcentrated on such secret materialsas visual aids, naval charts, loadingplans, photo mosaics, city plans, har-bor layouts, and convoy dispositioncharts. The bulk of the company re-mained in North Africa under the Sur-vey Directorate throughout the Sicilycampaign, with only its survey platoon,essentially a field unit, going to Sicilyfor survey and control work.

In addition to tactical and strategicmaps, the topographic engineers pro-duced a number of special issues: townplans, an air map, and defense andwater supply overprints. Combat unitsgot valuable information from the de-fense overprints, particularly thosemarking enemy positions covering thebeaches and issued to the subtask forcesbefore the invasion began, as did engi-neers from the water supply overprints,which pinpointed probable sources of

fresh water. The HUSKY maps wereconsiderably better than those for theTunisian campaign.

HUSKY saw continued progress insolving map-handling and distributionproblems that had been so vexing inTunisia. Two new thirteen-man units,the 2657th and 2658th Engineer MapDepot Detachments, were responsiblefor storing maps and for distributingthem in bulk at division, corps, andarmy levels. The two units set up a mapdepot at Constantine on 5 June andimmediately began to receive largestocks. Security considerations, the scat-tered deployment of assault units acrossNorth Africa, the drastic change in thebasic HUSKY plan, and the tardy arrivalof maps from England hampered dis-tribution. AFHQ and Force 141 had tohelp the depot detachments sort mapstocks, and truck convoys loaded withmaps had to be given priority alongNorth African roads to get the mapsout in time. Final deliveries to ships andstaging areas began on D minus 11 andwere completed to assault units on Dminus 8, but last minute distributioncontinued aboard ship until D minus1.11

Training

The subtask forces had decentralizedresponsibility for training their owntroops for the assault. The SeventhArmy (Force 343) Engineer Sectioninspected the training of engineer unitsassigned to the subtask forces, gener-

10 Seventh Army Engr Plan, Sicilian Opns, Joss TaskForce (8-12 Jul).

11 Ltr, Bonesteel to Moore, 22 Jul 43; II Corps EngrRpt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43, particularly an. 3, Map Sup-ply and Distribution; II Corps Bull Y/l, Notes on thePlanning and Assault Phases of the Sicilian Campaign,Oct 43; HQ, Force 141, Planning Instr 15, Maps andCharts.


ally supervised that of shore regiments,and guided that of SOS, NATOUSA,engineer units scheduled to join thetask force later. The troops underwentrefresher and special amphibious train-ing. Refresher training emphasizedphysical conditioning, mines, marks-manship, and other combat techniques.Experience in Tunisia had demon-strated that nearly all engineer unitsneeded such training; but, with theexception of mines, little of it could begeared directly to the coming opera-tion. There was not much time to trainunits for HUSKY, nor could what timethere was be used to best advantage. Inthe main, engineers in the subtaskforces, other than shore engineers, hadto get by with general engineer instruc-tion.12

Early in March AFHQ decided to usethe 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigadein the invasion of Sicily. The earlyHUSKY plan had given the brigade avital role; the final plan made it evengreater. The new plan called for thebrigade to support three assault divi-sions and the floating reserve. It alsocalled for the supply of all SeventhArmy forces in Sicily for as long asthirty days over the beaches andthrough such tiny ports as Licata andGela. The brigade itself was to func-tion as the sole American base sectionin Sicily and handle all supplies for thefirst month on the island.

It was quite apparent that the tech-niques employed during the TORCHoperation would not suffice against thedetermined opposition expected on

Sicily. New techniques, with new equip-ment especially designed for amphibi-ous operations, would be necessary.Army and Navy efforts had to be coor-dinated, and such problems as offshoresandbars and man-made underwaterobstacles had to be overcome. The 1stEngineer Amphibian Brigade hadmuch to do to prepare for its role onSicily, a role on which the entire under-taking could well depend. But AFHQremained preoccupied with the Tuni-sian campaign.

Brigade participation in planning forHUSKY began on 23 April when Brig.Gen. H. C. Wolfe, then commander ofthe headquarters unit known as the 1stEngineer Amphibian Brigade, attendeda conference of unit commanders atRabat.14 At the time the brigade con-sisted of less than a hundred officersand enlisted men, for it had all butpassed out of existence after TORCH,its units spread out in support roles inNorth Africa. In February one battal-ion of the 531st Engineer Shore Regi-ment and another of the 591st Engi-neer Boat Regiment assumed identitiesas provisional trucking units and oper-ated in support of II Corps until theend of the Tunisian campaign. The36th and 540th Engineer Combat Regi-ments, which had participated in theTORCH landings, had construction andlabor assignments in Morocco throughApril. Only the 2d Battalion of the531st, attached to the Fifth Army'sInvasion Training Center at Port-aux-Poules in Algeria, remained associatedwith amphibious warfare in the earlymonths of 1943. An entirely new orga-

12 Ltr, Bonesteel to Moore, 22 Jul 43; Seventh ArmyEngr Rpt Sicily.

13 1 st ESB Rpt of Action Against the Enemy, 10-13Jul 43, Sicily; Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, 1st ESBfiles; Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45.

14 On 25 May 1943 General Wolfe became deputyG-3, NATOUSA, and Col Eugene Caffey becamethe brigade commander.


nization had to be formed to carry outArmy responsibilities in support of theHUSKY landings.15

In the Pacific, engineer brigades fol-lowed the pattern conceived for themat the Engineer Amphibian Command.They operated landing craft as well ashandling their duties on the beaches.These brigades had a unity of com-mand not enjoyed by those in the Medi-terranean and European theaters, foron the Atlantic side landing craft be-longed to the Navy. Thus, naval respon-sibility in amphibious operations ex-tended to the shoreline, whereas Armyengineer responsibility began at thewaterline and extended inland. Bothservices accepted this line of demarka-tion in principle, but many specificquestions remained. Army and Navyrepresentatives tried to spell out an-swers in detail during HUSKY planning,but neither in North Africa nor in lateramphibious operations were they com-pletely successful. The definition ofArmy-Navy amphibious responsibilitiescontinued to be a source of frictionthroughout the war in Europe.16

In the end, U.S. Army engineersdeveloped a new type of engineer am-

phibian brigade for HUSKY. With noassignment in the assault waves, thenewly designated 1st Engineer SpecialBrigade consisted of four shore groups:one for each of the three infantry divi-sions making the assault and the fourthheld offshore as part of the reserveforce (KOOL). An engineer regimentformed the backbone of each task-organized shore group, and eachgroup's other assigned or attached unitsincluded such organizations as a medi-cal battalion, a quartermaster DUKWbattalion, a naval beach battalion, a sig-nal company, and an ordnance mainte-nance company. A number of smallerunits, such as dump-operating detailsfrom each of the several technical ser-vices, were attached according to antici-pated need. Still other attachmentsoperated local facilities such as railways,furnished specialized services such aswater supply and camouflage, or rein-forced the brigade in some area suchas trucking.17

The organization of the new brigadestarted toward the end of April, whentwo engineer combat regiments (36thand 540th) and an engineer shore regi-ment (531st) assembled at Port-aux-Poules, twelve miles east of Arzew. Thefourth shore group, built around the40th Engineer Combat Regiment, re-ceived amphibious training in theUnited States and arrived at Oran withthe 45th Infantry Division on 22 June.18

15 Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45.16 RG 110 A48-139, Notes on War Council, CofS

files 1941-42; AFHQ Incoming Msg, Marshall toEisenhower and Andrews, 5 Mar 43; Rpt, ACofS G-4,EAC, to CG, EAC, Rpt on Opn and Maint of LandingCraft in North Africa and European Theaters, 13Apr 43; A Memorandum of Agreement between theChief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Commander in Chief,U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22March 1943, defined the primary responsibilities ofthe Army and the Navy for amphibious training. Forbackground on the development of amphibious doc-trine, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps ofEngineers: Troops and Equipment, ch. XVI. For a fullaccount of amphibious operations in the SouthwestPacific, see "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941 -45," vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer Operations (Washing-ton, 1959).

17 The 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade was redes-ignated 1st Engineer Special Brigade on 10 May 1943and reorganized under TOE 2-510-S, 21 April1943. 1st ESB Rpt of Action Against the Enemy,10-13 Jul 43, Sicily; Memo, HQ, 1st ESB, 31 May43, sub: Beach Group Organization and Functions.

18 Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45. The 591st Engi-neer Boat Regiment, which had no boats, became sur-plus to the needs of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade(ESB), and during the remainder of its stay in the


The 36th Engineer Shore Group wasthe largest of the four and when finallyassembled for the invasion totaled 4,744officers and enlisted men. Its nucleuswas the 2,088-man 36th Engineer Com-bat Regiment, plus the 2d Battalion,540th Engineer Combat Regiment (623men). A naval beach battalion (413men) was attached to make hydro-graphic surveys, maintain shore-to-shipcommunications, and coordinate thebeaching of landing craft and LSTs. A322-man quartermaster battalion (am-phibious), to operate trucks andDUKWs, and the 56th Medical Battal-ion (505 men) were added, as were anumber of smaller units. These lastincluded a signal company to provideradio and wire networks on the beach,a military police company to controlmotor traffic and guard prisoners, afour-man engineer map depot detach-ment to handle reserve map stocks, anda detachment from an ordnance main-tenance company to repair ordnanceequipment. An ordnance ammunitioncompany, detachments from two quar-termaster units, and an engineer depotcompany were included to operatebeach dumps. The 531st Engineers'shore group consisted of 3,803 troops,its composition similar to that formedaround the 36th; the 40th Engineers'group had approximately 4,465 offi-cers and men. The smallest shoregroup, from the 540th, was with KOOLForce and had a strength of about2,815. The total strength of the fourshore groups was approximately15,825, including 1,270 naval person-nel with three naval beach battalions.

U.S. Army engineer troops representedabout 52 percent of the 1st EngineerSpecial Brigade as organized for theassault. Later accretions on Sicily wouldbring the brigade's strength to nearly20,000.19

Some differences existed between the531st Engineer Shore Regiment and theengineer combat regiment that formedthe nucleus of the other three shoregroups. Although the total strength ofthe shore regiment was about the sameas that of a combat regiment, the for-mer had more officers, more specialists,and more specialized engineering equip-ment. The shore engineers knew allthat combat engineers did, even forcombat operations inland, but not viceversa. The combat engineers had moreorganic transportation, but they alsohad much organizational equipmentnot needed for beach operations. Ifthey left the equipment behind, theyalso had to leave men to guard andmaintain it, thus weakening the com-bat regiment.20

In accordance with an AFHQ direc-tive, Fifth U.S. Army trained Force 141units in amphibious operations at itstraining center at Port-aux-Poules.21

When the 1st Engineer Special Brigadecame together there, less than 2 1/2months were left until D-day. The shore

Mediterranean worked primarily in port operations.The unit was disbanded at Naples on 1 November1944.

19 Rpt, Col Eugene Caffey, Shore Engineers in Sicily,app. A. This and a number of other valuable reportson HUSKY are contained in Rpt, HQ, ETOUSA, toFUSAG and others, 3 Dec 43, sub: Notes on the Sicil-ian Campaign and Extracts from Reports on Opera-tion HUSKY, (cited hereafter as Notes and Extracts,HUSKY); Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Notes on EngrOpns in Sicily, no. 3, 10 Sep 43, and Notes on Work-ing of Sicilian Beaches, 10 Jul 43; Rpt of SeventhArmy Engr Sicily, apps. to an. 12.

20 Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, 1st ESB files.21 Ltr, Lt Col Bonesteel to Brig Gen D. O. Elliott,

Chf Engr, AFHQ, 17 Jul 43, 353-A Training Policy,AFHQ files.


groups had to be organized, equipped,and trained. Experiments had to deter-mine how to deal with a number ofproblems, such as breaching obstacleson the beaches. Troops had to becomefamiliar with DUKWs and with the newtypes of landing craft. Combat troopsand naval units had to train togetherand rehearse landings.22

The 1st Engineer Special Brigadecarried out extensive experiments tolearn the characteristics of landing craftjust being introduced into the theaterand to establish procedures for land-ing supplies across the beaches. Allthrough May regular training took abackseat to tests and experiments, thosewith landing craft and others geared tosuch problems as offshore sandbars.23

The discovery of sandbars off manyof the beaches on Sicily raised seriousdoubts about the whole HUSKY under-taking. The typical sandbar lay about150 feet offshore under two or threefeet of water; only the most shallow-draft landing craft could ride overthem. Water often deepened to ten feetshoreward of the bars, and naval pon-ton causeways were to get troops andvehicles aboard LSTs across this gap.Another problem, water supply for thebeaches, was solved by equipping twentyLSTs to carry 10,000 gallons of watereach. Shore parties equipped with can-vas storage tanks and hoses were topump this water ashore.24

On 3 June Col. Eugene M. Caffey,commanding officer of the 1st Engi-neer Special Brigade, became responsi-ble for organizing, equipping, and train-ing the shore units, and, by the fif-teenth, engineer regimental shoregroups were attached to the subtaskforces for combined training and re-hearsals. As during TORCH, the brigadehad to train with other Army organiza-tions and with the Navy before it couldprepare its own units adequately.25

Rehearsal landings took place be-tween 22 June and 4 July, for JOSS inthe Bizerte-Tunis area and for DIMEand KOOL in the Arzew area. CENTForce, which came from the UnitedStates, rehearsed near Oran. To Admi-ral Hewitt, whose Western Naval TaskForce was to land the Seventh Army,these hurriedly conceived exercises wereat best a dry run on a reduced scale.They had some value for assault troopsbut virtually none for the engineershore groups. The CENT rehearsals, forinstance, ended before any shore partyequipment had been landed or any sup-plies put across the beach.26

Limited time and opportunity madethe training of many other engineerunits just as meager, while security pre-vented specific training for HUSKY.The Fifth Army mine school and theBritish Eighth Army mine school at

22 Davidson, Preliminary Rpt of Seventh Army Engron the Sicilian Opn, 23 Aug 43; Rpt of Seventh ArmyEngr Sicily.

23 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Seventh ArmyRpt Sicily, pp. G-2 and D-3; Ltr, Col Eugene M.Caffey, CO, 1st ESB, to CG, First U.S. Army, 16 Jan44, 310.2 Opns, 1st ESB files; Rpt, Shore Engineersin Sicily, 1st ESB files; Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45;Ltr, Bonesteel to Moore, 22 Jul 43.

24 Col A. H. Head, Notes on the Planning, Training,and Execution of Operation HUSKY, 25 Jul 43.

NEPTUNE, HQ, ETOUSA, files; Building the Navy's Basesin World War II, 2 vols. (Washington, 1947), vol. II, p.86; Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Brief of EngrPlan, Incl 1 to Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Interv,Maj Gen Charles H. Bonesteel III, 10 Feb 60.

Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, 1st ESB files; Rptof Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Ltr, Caffey to CG, FUSA,16 Jan 44; Hist 1st ESB.

26 Hewitt Rpt, WNTF in Sicilian Campaign, p. 31;Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, 1st ESB files; Ltr,Caffey to CG, FUSA, 16 Jan 44; 40th Engr C Rgt, Rptof Engr Opns, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43.


Tripoli trained instructors who couldreturn to their units and pass on theirknowledge, but most such training waswithout the benefit of enemy mines.Warnings from the U.S. chief ordnanceofficer at AFHQ that aging explosivescould become dangerously sensitiveproved justified in a British attempt toship enemy mines to the United States;while the mines were being loadedaboard a small coaster at Algiers theentire lot blew up, sinking the coasterand firing an ammunition ship at thenext berth.27

On the whole, the troops scheduledfor HUSKY were far better prepared todeal with mines than were those inTunisia. Concern arose in some quar-ters lest overemphasis on mine warfaredamage troop morale, but engineerswere convinced that thorough instruc-tion was the best answer. Nor did theyconcur in the decision to restrict theuse of live enemy mines in training. Col-onel Davidson believed that "realism intraining [was] essential regardless of therisk to personnel and equipment," aview with which 15th Army Groupagreed and which AFHQ accepted.28

Toward the end of June assault unitsbegan moving into their embarkationareas: CENT Force (45th Infantry Di-vision) at Oran, DIME (1st InfantryDivision) at Algiers, and JOSS (3d Infan-try Division) at Bizerte. The initial as-sault—Seventh Army would have 82,502men ashore in Sicily by the end of

D-day—included approximately 11,000engineers scheduled to land with thesubtask forces, plus nearly 1,200 morein the floating reserve. Engineers withDIME Force numbered nearly 3,200.Another 4,300, plus Company A of the17th Armored Engineer Battalion, werewith JOSS Force and 3,500 with CENTForce. About 1,350 engineer vehiclesaccompanied these troops on D-day.Additional engineer troops and vehi-cles were to reach the JOSS and DIMEareas with the D plus 4 and D plus 8convoys. In North Africa 22 engineerunits totaling 7,388 men stood by, readyto be called forward as required.29

The convoy carrying CENT Forcesailed from Oran harbor on 5 July, andas it moved along the North Africancoast DIME and JOSS Force convoysjoined. The faster ships feinted southalong Cape Bon peninsula, while theslower vessels proceeded by more directroutes to a rendezvous area off theisland of Gozo. On the ninth a steadywind began to blow out of the northand increased during the afternoon,piling up a heavy sea and raising seri-ous doubts that the invasion could pro-ceed. Then, during the night, the winddropped. As H-hour approached theseas began to settle and prospects for asuccessful landing brightened.30

D-day

Before dawn on 10 July 1943, the

27 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Seventh ArmyRpt Sicily, p. A—4.

28 Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. C-4; Davidson, Pre-liminary Rpt of Seventh Army Engr on the SicilianOpn, 23 Aug 43, and 1st Ind, HQ, 15th Army Gp, 6Sep 43; Ltr, AFHQ to AG, WD, 2 Oct 43, sub: Prelimi-nary Rpt of Seventh Army Engr on the Sicilian Opn,370.212 Sicily, Rpts on Opns, Aug 43 to Oct 43, AFHQfiles.

29 Seventh Army strength on Sicily on 23 Augusttotaled 165,230 men, exclusive of 11,900 USAAFtroops also on the island. Ltr, HQ, Seventh Army, toCG, NATOUSA, 22 Nov 43, sub: Date for LogisticalPlanning; Final Engr Troop List, Seventh Army, byConvoys, Engr Units Only, 28 Jun 43, G-3 MiscPapers, 1st ESB files.

Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 62—63, 65,67-68.


MAP 5

assault waves of three American infan-try divisions landed along a forty-milestretch of Sicilian beach. (Map 5) Onthe west the 3d Infantry Division (JOSSForce) straddled the small port of Licata,landing on five separate beaches. In thecenter, about seventeen miles east ofLicata, the 1st Infantry Division (DIMEForce) went in over six beaches just eastof Gela, and on the division's left aRanger force landed directly at Gela.The 45th Infantry Division (CENT Force)beached at eight points extending fromScoglitti halfway to Gela. Farther east,the British made simultaneous landingsalong another stretch of the Siciliancoast extending from Cape Passeroalmost to Syracuse. DIME Force wentin on time at 0245, but weather slowedthe other two forces. The wind haddropped to about fifteen miles an hour,

but a 2 1/2-foot surf still ran along mostbeaches and a considerably higher oneat Scoglitti. The initial landings on somebeaches in the JOSS and CENT areascame just as dawn was breaking at0550.31

Enemy strength on Sicily consistedof about ten divisions. The equivalentof about five were disposed in or nearcoastal defenses, and five were in mobilereserve. Most of the troops were dispir-ited Italians; only two divisions, bothin reserve, were German.32

31 Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. 6—4; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 78; Combined Operations (Br), Digestof Some Notes and Reports from Opn HUSKY, repro-duced Oct 43 by Information Sect, Intel Div, OCE,SOS ETOUSA.

32 Brig Gen A. C. Wedemeyer, Extracts from Rpton Opn HUSKY, 28 Dec 43, Notes and Extracts, HUSKY.


American assault troops sweptthrough enemy shore defenses with lit-tle trouble. A few strands of barbedwire stretched across most of thebeaches, and on some a few bands ofantitank mines, but there were no man-made underwater obstacles and fewantipersonnel mines or booby traps.Many concrete pillboxes, cleverly camou-flaged, well supplied, and well providedwith communication trenches, existed,some so new that wooden forms stillencased them. None proved very trou-blesome, mainly because the Italiansmanning them had little disposition tofight.

Here and there infantrymen skir-mished briefly along the shoreline be-fore pushing inland, and at a numberof points shore engineers joined in toclean out scattered pockets of resis-tance.33 At some points the enemy hadsections of beach under small-arms fireas the shore engineers came in, but forthe most part only intermittent artil-lery fire and sporadic enemy air actionharassed the beaches. No enemy strong-point held out stubbornly, and shoreengineers were soon free to go aboutorganizing their beaches. By nightfallall three subtask forces had beachheadsthat stretched two to four miles inland,and they had taken 4,265 prisoners.The cost had been relatively small: 58killed, 199 wounded, and 700 missing.34

Joss Beaches

From west to east JOSS beaches werenamed Red, Green, Yellow, and Blue.The first two lay west of Licata, theother two east of it, and all were theresponsibility of the 36th EngineerShore Group. Along the 4,500-yardlength of Red Beach ran a sandbar, andbetween the sandbar and beach was arunnel 100 to 300 feet wide and, inmany places, more than 6 feet deep.

About 0440, nearly two hours afterthe first wave of infantrymen hadsplashed ashore from LCVPs, shoresearchlights that had been playing overthe water off Red Beach winked out.At 0510 heavy fire broke out along thebeach and a destroyer began shellingshore positions. An LCT carrying engi-neers of the 36th Engineer Shore Groupjoined five others carrying mediumtanks to make the run in to the beach,covered by two destroyers coursing alongthe shoreline belching out a smokescreen as dawn broke. The six LCTsgrounded successfully, the tanks lum-bered off into 31/2 feet of water andwaded ashore. The engineers discov-ered that the beach, in places onlytwenty feet wide, consisted of soft sandstrewn with large boulders. Behind itrose cliffs fifteen to sixty feet high, withonly one exit road usable for wheeledvehicles, a steep, sandy wagon track thatled through vineyards and fields ofripening tomatoes and melons to thecoastal highway some three miles away.The first six LCTs did better than craftof successive waves. Some stuck on theoffshore bar and discharged trucks intowater that drowned them out—thirty-two of the sixty-five vehicles that disem-barked for Red Beach from nine LCTsfailed to bridge the water gap.

33 On CENT beaches, two officers and two enlistedmen, 1st Lt. Keith E. Miller, 2d Lt. George S. Spohn,T/5 Robert L. Beall, and Sgt. Warren W. Beanish ofthe 40th Engineers won Distinguished Service Crossesfor their part in taking pillboxes that had the beachunder fire.

34 Seventh Army GO 3, 25 Jan 44; 1st ESB GO 8, 27Aug 43; USMA study, Opns in Sicily and Italy—Invasion of Sicily.


Ashore, congestion and confusionmounted. Tractors had to drag vehi-cles over the sandy beach exit roadwhile recovery of stalled vehicles wasslow and unorganized, for no definitepreparations for this work had beenmade. Some sections of beach becamechoked off completely. T-2 recoveryunits, tanks, and DUKWs tried to un-ravel the problem; D-7 dozers, wellsuited to the task, were inland workingon beach exit roads, but the smallerR—4s proved ineffective in the softsand. Vehicles stalled or awaiting bet-ter exit routes soon jammed the beacheswith supplies. As congestion increasedand more landing craft broached, manymen stood idle, uncertain what to do.

Offshore an LST tried to unload itsponton floats, but the surf was toorough and the floats washed ashore.The craft then tried to get nearer thebeach to discharge without the cause-way but grounded fifty to sixty feet outin about four feet of water. The firsttruck off stalled ten feet from the LST'sramp. Two DUKWs recovered the truck,but a motor crane stalled in about thesame place. When DUKWs could notmove the crane, the LST pulled off-shore for the night. Next morning twoD-7 tractors spent some five hourspulling the crane ashore and then suc-ceeded in moving the naval pontoncauseway into position.

Here, as at other beaches, the cause-ways proved of great value once theywere in use. Vehicles were driven ashoreover them, and an LST could unloadin about two hours. But the causewaysdid not always hold head on againstthe shore. As one LST pulled off, thecauseways tended to broach beforeanother LST could come up. Afterforty-eight hours broached craft and

stalled vehicles still choked Red Beach,and on D plus 3 it was abandoned. Theonly enemy opposition had been Mes-serschmitt 109s, each carrying a singlebomb, that made eight bombing andstrafing raids during D-day. The air-craft had caused delays but no casualties.

Halfway between Red Beach andLicata lay Green Beach, also difficultbut selected because it could take assaultunits within close striking distance ofthe port of Licata. Green consisted oftwo half-moon beaches, each about1,000 feet long, separated by a point ofland jutting out from the shore. Thecoastal highway was about 11/2 milesaway. Offshore bars were no problembut exits were, for behind the beachestowered abrupt bluffs more than 100feet high. One platoon of Company C,36th Engineers, along with a navalbeach detachment and some medicalpersonnel, supported the landing of the2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the 3dRanger Battalion. As expected, exitdifficulties ruled out Green Beach forsupply operations, and twelve hoursafter the initial landings the beach wasclosed. The small engineer shore partythere rejoined the 1st Battalion, 36thEngineers, on Red Beach, taking alongtwenty-six captured Italian soldiers. ButGreen Beach paid off, for the menlanded, took Licata, a small port thatoffered facilities for handling five LSTssimultaneously, and by 1600 on D-dayan LST was unloading.

At Yellow and Blue beaches thingswent much better. Yellow Beach, cen-tering about six miles east of Licata,was probably the best American beach.The sand there had no troublesomeboulders, and the main coastal high-way lay only some 400 yards away acrossslightly rising sandy loam planted in


grapes and tomatoes. Blue Beach, be-ginning about a mile farther east, wasalmost as good. After the initial assaultmost of JOSS Force landed over thesetwo beaches, and those elements of the36th Engineer Shore Group that sup-ported landings on the other JOSSbeaches soon moved to Yellow andBlue. Some LSTs sent vehicles ashoreover a naval ponton causeway, but moststood one-half to three-quarters of amile out and unloaded on the LCTs orDUKWs. DUKWs were the workhorseson the beach, invaluable because theycould eliminate much of the man-han-dling of supplies. Nearly all carriedmore than their rated 21/2 tons, andsome went in with so little freeboardthat the wake of a passing landing craftcould have swamped them. At least one,overloaded with 105-mm. shells, sankas soon as it drove off a ramp.

The 36th Engineer Shore Groupheadquarters landed at 0714 on D-dayand established itself on a hill overlook-ing both Blue and Yellow beaches. Bynoon the shore group had consolidatedbattalion beach dumps into regimentaldumps behind the two beaches. Shoreengineers worked throughout the nightand into D plus 1 with only temporaryhalts during enemy bombing raids.During the afternoon of D-day, the 2dBattalion, 540th Engineers, landed alongwith two platoons of the 2d Naval BeachBattalion, and before noon on 11 Julyunits of the 382d Port Battalion (TC)entered Licata port to clear LST ber-things. As order emerged and suppliesbegan to move smoothly, it became evi-dent that Seventh Army could be sup-plied across the beaches so long as theseas remained calm. During the firstthree days 20,470 men, 6,614 tons ofsupplies, and 3,752 vehicles landed at

Licata or across the JOSS beaches. Inthe same period, more than 200wounded and over 500 POWs wereevacuated to North Africa.35

Dime Beaches

Seventeen miles east of Licata a waveof Rangers went in at Gela at H-hour(0245), a second wave following withina few minutes. One-half hour later twowaves of the 39th Engineer CombatRegiment were ashore preparing toclear away beach obstacles and demol-ish pillboxes. Some mortar men, pro-viding support for the Rangers, com-prised the fifth wave, which went inabout H plus 1, while shore engineersfrom the 1st Battalion, 531st Engineers,landed in the sixth wave. By dawn(0515) Rangers and the 39th Engineerswere digging in on their objective onthe north edge of Gela, and shore engi-neers were preparing the beaches foran influx of cargo.36

Just to the east the 16th and 26thRegimental Combat Teams, 1st Infan-try Division, landed simultaneously withthe Rangers, while the 18th Regimen-tal Combat Team and elements of the2d Armored Division lay offshore infloating reserve. In these landings divi-sional engineers, attached by platoonsto infantry battalions, went in with theassault waves. The 1st and 2d Platoons,Company A, 1st Engineer Combat Bat-talion, landed with the 16th Regimen-

35 Opns Rpt, 36th Engr C Gp, 10-18 Jul 43, 1 Aug43; Notes and Extracts, HUSKY; Maj Roy C. Conner,First Partial Rpt, Observations, in HUSKY—Joss TaskForce (8-12 Jul)—Rpt of Observations, EUCOM Engrfiles; Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45; Hewitt Rpt, WNTFin Sicilian Campaign; Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, pp.6-10.

36 Hist 39th Engr C Rgt; Hist 1st Bn, 531st EngrShore Rgt.


tal Combat Team; the 1st and 2d Pla-toons, Company C, were with the 26thRegimental Combat Team. These engi-neers were to clear enemy obstructions,but they found little wire, few antiper-sonnel mines, and no artificial under-water obstacles. Enemy resistance waslight, and combat engineers soon disap-peared inland with the infantry. Someof them removed demolition chargeson bridges leading into Gela.37

DIME beaches were much like Yel-low and Blue beaches in the JOSS sec-tor except in one important respect—the main coastal highway was nearly twomiles away. Enemy defenses in the areawere somewhat more developed thanat other points on the southern shore,but pillboxes gave little trouble to in-fantry-engineer assault teams, and theonly underwater obstacles were off-shore sandbars.

Mines proved somewhat troublesome,largely for want of SCR—625s. Minedetectors belonging to the 39th Engi-neers were on trucks or other vehiclesthat did not land until D plus 1, whilethe 531st Engineers carried a numberof detectors ashore only to find thatsalt spray had short-circuited many ofthem. Most of the mines lay in regularpatterns and were not booby-trapped,but some were buried as deep as fivefeet. On one Gela beach, engineersfound six rows of Teller mines spacedthree yards apart; five Navy bulldozerswere lost in this mine belt. Mines al-so destroyed a number of trucks andDUKWs—some because operators ig-nored the warning tapes the engineershad put down. No antipersonnel mines

were found on the beaches themselves,where, said one observer, they wouldhave been "horribly effective," but somein the dunes and cover just back of thebeaches caused casualties.38

While the 1st Battalion, 531st Engi-neers, landed at Gela in support of theRangers, the 2d and 3d Battalions fol-lowed the assault waves of the 16th and26th Regimental Combat Teams ashore.The infantry moved inland as rapidlyas possible, while the shore engineersremained behind to organize thebeaches. The shore engineers landedbefore dawn, but not until midmorn-ing could landing craft stop ferryingmen ashore and start bringing in cargo.In the interim shore engineers cut exitroads, cleared away mines and otherobstacles, set up beach markers to guidelanding craft, established beach com-munications systems and traffic controlmeasures, and organized work parties.39

As at JOSS, mishaps caused craft tobroach and vehicles to stall in the wateroff DIME Beach, but the primary dis-ruption was an enemy counterattackthrough most of D plus 1.40 During the

37 Hist 531st Engr Shore Rgt, 11 Jun-16 Jul 43;Maj. T. T. Crowley and Capt. G. C. Burch, Eight Starsto Victory, Operations of 1st Engineer Combat Battalion inWorld War II, pp. 45, 47.

38 Chf Engr, Combined Opns (Br), Lessons Learnedfrom HUSKY, 25 Aug 43, app. B, Description of Cer-tain Beaches, G-3 Misc Papers, 1st ESB files. Theforegoing is the primary source for all beach descrip-tions in this chapter. Hist 1st Bn, 531st Engr ShoreRgt; Ltr, Bonesteel to Moore, 22 Jul 43; Davidson,Preliminary Rpt of Seventh Army Engr on the Sicil-ian Opn, 23 Aug 43; Hist 39th Engr C Rgt, 10 Jul-18Aug 43; HQ, Seventh Army, Lessons Learned in Sicil-ian Campaign; Hewitt Rpt, WNTF in Sicilian Cam-paign, p. 56.

39 Brig Gen N. D. Cota, Landing Data, DIME Beach,app. 5 to Observation of Opn HUSKY, 4-31 Jul 43,G-3 Misc Papers, 1st ESB files; Hist 531st Engr ShoreRgt, 11 Jun-16 Jul 43; Hist 1st Bn, 531st Engr ShoreRgt.

40 Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. 6—4; Crowley andBurch, Eight Stars to Victory, pp. 47-48; Hist 531stEngr Shore Rgt; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 99,103ff; Comments on HUSKY—Joss Task Force (8-12

Jul)—Rpt of Observations.


early hours of D-day Italian guns laidintermittent artillery fire on the beaches,destroying a pier at Gela that plannershad counted on for unloading LSTs.Then at 0830 enemy armor startedmoving south out of Niscemi towardGela. One column drove to within amile or two of the coastal highwaybefore paratroopers, elements of the16th Infantry, and the guns of thecruiser Boise and the destroyer Jeffersstopped it. In the meantime, a secondcolumn of about twenty-five light Ital-ian tanks approached Gela from PonteOlivo. The destroyer Shubrick knockedout three but others came on, and thedefense section of the 1st Battalion,531st Engineers, moved forward toreinforce the Rangers and the 39thEngineers. In the ensuing fight theshore engineers scored several hits withbazookas, and when nine or ten Italiantanks drove into Gela, the Rangersdrove them off.

With enemy armor in the vicinity, thegreatest need ashore was for tanks andartillery, most of which were still aboardLSTs. Early on D-day LST-338 ran aponton causeway ashore. The cause-way's crew rigged it amid falling shells,and by 1030 the LST had unloaded andpulled away. But before another LSTcould take its place the causeway beganto drift, and repositioning it cost valu-able time. The lack of adequate anchorsfor the seaward ends of the pontoncauseways was especially felt on DIMEbeaches, where plans for using the Gelapier had limited the number of cause-ways to three. Artillery pieces had to beferried ashore by DUKWs while tanks,too heavy for DUKWs, came in onLCTs and LCMs. As the afternoonwore on, the surf became littered withabandoned vehicles and broached land-

ing craft and the beach clogged withstalled vehicles and piles of materiel.

Late in the afternoon of D-day Gen-eral Patton ordered ashore KOOL Force,the floating reserve consisting of the18th Regimental Combat Team andtwo combat commands of the 2d Ar-mored Division. The movement did notget under way until about 1800; by0200 on 11 July men on the beach,exhausted after working around theclock, began to drop off to sleep, stall-ing KOOL landings until daylight. Inthe meantime the enemy, now rein-forced by larger German tanks of theHermann Goering Division, prepared tolaunch a new attack on Gela.

Few antitank guns or 2d ArmoredDivision tanks were ashore when theenemy struck on the morning of D plus1, and the only American tanks engagedwere five Shermans an LCT hadbrought ashore about 1030. The Ger-man tanks fanned out across the Gelaplain, overran American infantry guard-ing the beachhead perimeter, and rol-led on toward the beaches, some lob-bing shells into the mass of vehicles,materiel, and men assembled there.Divisional artillery, an infantry cannoncompany, the five Sherman tanks, andfire from cruisers and destroyers haltedthe Germans. At 1130 two causewayswere operating and tanks rolled ashoreover them. The enemy attack falteredshortly after noon, but sporadic fight-ing continued into the night.

On the beaches conditions had alreadybegun to improve, and by 1600 on Dplus 2 the D-day convoy had completelyunloaded. By D plus 3 order prevailed,and, with the arrival of the 540th Engi-neer Combat Regiment (less one bat-talion), the shore engineers of the 531stwere able to concentrate on keeping the


beaches clear. Casualties in the 531stwere somewhat higher than in anyother shore regiment during the land-ings: as of 16 July the regiment hadlosses of 22 men killed, 68 wounded,and 2 missing.41

The 540th Engineers took over re-sponsibility for road work, mine re-moval, beach dump operations, andother jobs inland from the beaches. Italso operated the tiny port of Gela,where U.S. Navy engineers had an-chored two ponton causeway sectionsalongside the damaged pier for unload-ing LCTs and LSTs.

The 531st Engineers' beach opera-tions settled down to routine: clearingthe beaches, operating dumps, guard-ing POWs, removing waterproofingfrom vehicles, and protecting the beacharea. One of the most efficient meansof moving supplies across the beacheswas cargo nets which enabled DUKWsto be unloaded with one sweep of acrane. DUKWs equipped with A-frames,a nonstandard item manufactured andinstalled in the theater, proved particu-larly valuable.42

After 11 July enemy strafing andbombing attacks subsided, and, favoredby ideal weather, supply across JOSSand DIME beaches could have contin-ued indefinitely except for very heavyequipment. But Palermo fell on 22 July,and the beaches lost their importancerapidly. They continued to functionduring the first week in August, but

DIME averaged less than a hundred tonsa day. On 7 August DIME beaches closeddown in favor of JOSS beaches and cap-tured ports on the north coast.43

Cent Beaches

Two groups of beaches ten milesapart provided the landing sites for the45th Infantry Division in the CENTarea. One group of beaches (Red, Green,and Yellow) north of Scoglitti had beenchosen for proximity to Biscari Airfield,about eight miles inland; the groupsouth of Scoglitti (Green 2, Yellow 2),for proximity to Comiso Airfield, somefourteen miles away.

The 120th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, attached by platoons to infantrybattalions, began landing on the north-ern beaches at 0345, H-hour havingbeen set back sixty minutes in this sec-tor because of heavy seas. The engi-neers hastily cleared sections of thebeaches, reconnoitered for exit routes,and knocked out enemy pillboxes. Bynoon two companies of the 19th Engi-neer Combat Regiment had come a-shore. Though earmarked to repairinland airfields, they helped on thebeaches until the airfields were taken.The men of the 19th Engineers weredoubly welcome because of their threerare D-7 bulldozers and three roadgraders, but most of this equipmentcould not land until the following daybecause of high seas and trouble withcauseways.44

The landings on CENT beaches werethe most difficult in Sicily. One trouble41 Cota, Landing Data, DIME Beach; Hist 531st Engr

C Rgt.42 Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, 1st ESB files; Hist

531st Engr C Rgt; Information from Capt Napp, S-3,540th Engr Shore Rgt, contained in HUSKY—Joss TaskForce (8-12 Jul)—Rpt of Observations; Rpt of Sev-enth Army Engr Sicily; Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, pp.6-10.

43 Rate of Discharge in Long Tons from Ports andBeaches in Sicily, app. D to Seventh Army Adm Sitrep,10 Jul 43-18 Aug 43; Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily,1st ESB files; Hist 531st Engr C Rgt.

44 Hist 19th Engr C Gp, Oct 42-Jan 44.


was the loading plan, which followedthe U.S. amphibious standing operat-ing procedure, calling for assault battal-ions to be unit-loaded aboard a singleship. This plan did not apply to the120th Engineer Combat Battalion,which sailed aboard nineteen differentships, but it did apply to the assaultunits to which the combat engineerswere attached.45 The system had obvi-ous theoretical tactical advantages, butat Sicily practical disadvantages tendedto outweigh them. No single ship car-ried enough landing craft to put a fullassault wave in the water. As a result,landing craft from one ship had togrope about in the predawn darknessseeking other ships or the landing craftthat formed the rest of the assault wave.

Waves and surf higher and rougherthan in the JOSS and DIME areas madeoffshore rendezvous at the CENTbeaches more difficult. Well-trainedlanding craft crews might have beenequal to the offshore problems, but atleast half the 45th Infantry Division'scoxswains had been replaced just as thedivision left the United States. The highsurf took a fearful toll of landing craft.By noon on D plus 1, in one sector 109LCVPs and LCMs out of an original175 were damaged, stranded, sunk, ormissing. Along one stretch of beach onecraft was stranded an average of everytwenty-five yards.46

Many of the landing craft that reachedshore missed their mark because of

heavy surf, too few landmarks, and astrong southeast current; part of oneregimental combat team (including thecommander) landed six miles northwestof its assigned beach. The 40th En-gineers' shore group, mounted in theUnited States, had not instructed itscomponents to develop whatever beachthey landed on. When men of the 40thfound themselves on the wrong beaches,many searched along the shoreline forthe right ones. But even those whostayed where they landed and set towork on exit routes could not buildroads fast enough to handle the cargocoming ashore. Exits had to cross a beltof sand dunes up to a thousand yardswide, and the main coastal highway wasseveral miles away.

The CENT beaches soon became heav-ily congested, and many shore engineerunits shifted their location—some sev-eral times—to find better exit routes.Each move cost the shore groups time,control over their organization, discip-line, and equipment. Naval beach bat-talions, for instance, had heavy equip-ment that could not be shifted abouteasily.47

D-7 angledozers had to build mostexit roads at the beaches, for the smallerR—4s again proved too weak for eitherroad construction or vehicle salvage.The engineer regiments working thebeaches had two D —7s per letteredengineer company and could easilyhave used a third. Cyclone wire and

45 Opns Rpt, 120th Engr C Bn, 1 May-31 Oct 43.46 HQ, Combined Operations (Br), Bull 4/1, Notes

on the Planning and Assault Phases of the SicilianCampaign; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 127-28,138, 140; Hist 40th Engr C Rgt, 1 Apr 42-11 Feb 44;AFHQ, Notes on HUSKY Landings, 23 Jul 43, G-3Misc Papers, 1st ESB files; Hewitt Rpt, WNTF in Sicil-ian Campaign, pp. 39, 48.

47 AFHQ, Notes on HUSKY Landings, 23 Jul 43;Memo, Brig Gen A. C. Wedemeyer, Chf, Strategy andPolicy Gp, WDGS, for CofS, 24 Aug 43, sub: Ob-server's Rpt, 319.1, binder, AGF files; Hewitt Rpt,WNTF in Sicilian Campaign, p. 59; Hist 40th Engr CRgt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43; Memo, HQ, 1st ESB, for UnitCommanders, 2 Jun 43, sub: Remarks on LandingOpns.


LANDING HEAVY EQUIPMENT OVER THE CAUSEWAY AT SCOGLITTI

Sommerfeld mat that came ashore onsleds were used to surface sandy roads.Engineers also cut and laid cane tomake sandy roads passable.

DUKWs carried most supplies inland.Bleeding the tires to ten pounds ofpressure enabled the craft to cross thesandy beaches but cut tire life to about3,500 miles. Other supplies had to bemanhandled, mostly by POW volunteers,and dragged to the dumps on sledshauled by bulldozers. Not much wentinto the beach dumps on D-day, andbefore D plus 1 ended CENT beacheswere hopelessly jammed. That nightand the next day the original Green,Red, and Yellow beaches were aban-doned, and unloading moved somethree miles to the southeast, where theinland roadnet was more accessible.

Operations continued at new beachesin the Scoglitti area for another weekbefore events inland and farther westalong the coast closed the CENT beachespermanently.48

During the first three days of theinvasion 66,235 men, 17,766 dead-weight tons of cargo, and 7,416 vehi-cles went ashore over Seventh Armybeaches, while 666 U.S. Army troopsand 614 POWs were evacuated. By theend of July the 1st Engineer SpecialBrigade had put ashore 111 ,824 men,

48 Hist 40th Engr C Rgt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43; Cota,Landing Data, DIME Beach; AFHQ, Notes on HUSKYLandings, 23 Jul 43; Information from Capt Kennedy,CO, 361st QM Co (DUKW), in HUSKY—Joss TaskForce (8-12 Jul)—Rpt of Observations; Info Sect,Intel Div, OCE, SOS ETOUSA, Answers to EngrsQuestionnaire, 15 Sep 43, North African Opns.


104,734 tons of cargo, and 21,512vehicles, and had shipped out to NorthAfrica 1,772 wounded and 27,939POWs. The performance quieted fearsthat the beaches would be unable tosupport the Seventh Army.49 Around17 July the 1st Engineer Special Brigade,on orders from General Patton, beganto gather all Seventh Army supply activi-ties and many service units under itscommand, taking over all unloadingand supply at DIME, CENT, and JOSSbeaches. The brigade's beach opera-tions on Sicily demonstrated that Alliedplanners would not have to be so closelybound by requirements for ports in pre-

paring for future moves against theContinent.

Despite the generally favorable con-ditions for amphibious operations inSicily, the engineers still suffered fromtheir own inexperience. The frequentinability to adapt existing plans and pro-cedures to new conditions in the midstof a developing situation led to contin-ued delays in supply movement off thebeaches. The haste of preparations andthe curtain of security for the Sicilianlandings also brought many engineerstheir first glimpse of new types of equip-ment on the busy beaches. They soonwould have to apply what they learnedin new thrusts onto the Italian main-land against a still determined Germanenemy.

49 Rpt, Shore Engineers in Sicily, app. B, 1st ESBfiles; Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. E-12.

CHAPTER VII

Sicily: The Drive to Messina

By 15 July the Allies held a beach-head stretching from Syracuse to Licata,and Seventh Army, strengthened by theD plus 4 convoy, was preparing to breakout of its beachhead. General Pattoncreated the Provisional Corps, consist-ing of the 3d Infantry Division, the 3dRanger Battalion, the 5th ArmoredField Artillery Group, and elements ofthe 2d Armored and 82d AirborneDivisions, to sweep around the westerncoast of Sicily and to move againstPalermo from the south and southwest.The II Corps, initially consisting of the1st and 45th Infantry Divisions, was tostrike across central Sicily to the northcoast east of Palermo. The attacks be-gan on 17 July.1

During Provisional Corps' drive onPalermo, which met little opposition,combat engineers speedily bypassedseveral destroyed bridges and removedexplosives from others captured intact.Divisional engineer bulldozers and minedetectors paced the corps' advance, fora time without corps engineer support,because Provisional Corps originallyhad no corps engineer organization.On 20 July the 20th Engineer CombatRegiment joined Provisional Corps; one

battalion supported 3d Division engi-neers, the other 2d Armored Divisionengineers.2

Palermo fell on 22 July. Allied bombshad left the port with only 30 percentof its normal capacity. Forty-four ves-sels—ships, barges, and small craft—laysunk in the harbor, and bomb craterspitted quays and railway tracks. On 23July the 20th Engineer Combat Regi-ment set about providing berths forthirty-six LSTs and fourteen Libertyships, and naval personnel began sal-vage work in the roadstead and shipchannels. At the port engineers bull-dozed debris from pier areas and exitroutes, filled bomb craters, and cutsteps into the masonry piers to accom-modate LST ramps; they also clearedcity streets of debris, leveled badly dam-aged buildings, and laid water lines tothe piers. They cut away superstruc-tures of some ships sunk alongside thequays and built timber ramps across thescuttled hulks. Eventually Liberty shipsmoored alongside the derelicts andunloaded.3

1 In addition to Garland and Smyth, Sicily and theSurrender of Italy, the general sources for this chapterare: Seventh Army Rpt Sicily; Rpt of Seventh ArmyEngr Sicily; II Corps Engr Rpt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43.

2 Rpts, 20th Engr C Rgt to CG, 3d Div, 18, 22, and28 Jul 43, sub: Action of 20th Engineer CombatRegiment, 10-17 Jul 43, 3d Inf Div files; Hist Reds,Prov Corps, Seventh Army, 15 Jul-20 Aug 43.

3 Hist 20th Engr C Bn, 17 May-17 Jun 45. (Orga-nized in August 1942, the 20th Engineer Combat Regi-ment was broken up on 15 January 1944, with theregiment's 1st Battalion being redesignated the 20thEngineer Combat Battalion.) Chf Engr, 15th Army

SICILY: THE DRIVE TO MESSINA 137

On the morning of 23 July, the dayafter Provisional Corps captured Paler-mo, elements of II Corps reached thenorth coast of Sicily. A regimental com-bat team of the 45th Infantry Divisionentered the town of Termini Imerese,thirty-one miles east of Palermo onHighway 113, the coastal road betweenPalermo and Messina. The 1st Divisionreached Petralia on Highway 120, aninland road about twenty miles southof Highway 113.

That same day, General Alexanderchanged the direction of Americanforces. He had originally ordered Pat-ton's Seventh Army to Palermo and thenorth coast to protect the left flank ofMontgomery's British Eighth Armydrive on Messina. On 23 July, becom-ing aware that Montgomery's forceswere not strong enough to overrun theGermans in front of Eighth Army,Alexander directed Patton to turn hisarmy to the east and advance on Messinaalong the axis of Highways 113 and120. Patton lost no time. The two divi-sions of Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's IICorps, already in position athwart thetwo highways and soon to be bolsteredby units of the Provisional Corps, werein motion before nightfall.

Supply Over the Beaches

At the outset supplies for the Ameri-can drive on Messina had to come fromdumps at small ports and beaches on thesouth coast—Porto Empedocle, Licata,and Gela—because the first coasters didnot reach Palermo until 28 July. Theagency responsible for logistical support

was still the 1st Engineer Special Brigade,acting as SOS, Seventh Army, underthe general supervision of the army'sG-4.4

Once the attack out of the beachheadbegan, the most critical supply prob-lem was not unloading supplies but mov-ing them forward to the using troops,a problem compounded by prearrangedshipments that did not reflect reality.The 1st Engineer Special Brigade soonwas burdened with unneeded materiel.

Trained and equipped to unload sup-plies across the beaches and throughthe small ports on Sicily's southern shore,the 1st Engineer Special Brigade per-formed efficiently after overcomingearlier problems at the beaches. But thebrigade also had to stock and operateSeventh Army depots inland at pointsconvenient to the combat forces, andthere were never enough trucks onSicily.5

Railroads became important in mov-ing supplies inland to support the rapidadvance. Lines from Porto Empedocleand Licata converged not far fromCaltanissetta, a town near the center ofthe island and about thirty miles inland.Seventh Army captured the lines intact,and Transportation Corps railwaytroops had supplies rolling over themfrom the beaches immediately. Thedumps were opened at Caltanissetta on19 July. Beyond this point Germandemolitions limited the use of railways,and supplies had to be trucked to for-ward corps dumps.

The using services, even the engi-

Gp, Notes on Engr Opns in Sicily, no. 3, 10 Sep 43;Brig Gen C. R. Moore, Rpt of Observations in NorthAfrica and Sicily, 9 Sep 43.

4 HQ, Force 343, FO 1, 18 Jun 43, Engr Annex;Rpt, Caffey, Shore Engineers in Sicily; Moore, Rpt ofObservations, 9 Sep 43.

5 Ltr, HQ, Seventh Army, to CG, NATOUSA, 22Nov 43, sub: Data for Logistical Planning; Bradley, ASoldier's Story, p. 145.


neers, were critical of the 1st EngineerSpecial Brigade's inland dumps, com-plaining that they could not find neededitems. The 1st Engineer Combat Bat-talion, supporting the 1st Infantry Divi-sion, reported sending its trucks backto the beaches for needed materiel noless than four times. Ordnance officerscomplained that forward dumps wereoverstocked with small-arms ammuni-tion (which the brigade moved firstbecause it was easiest to handle), whilethey urgently needed artillery ammuni-tion.6

Whatever the deficiencies, thebeaches, especially at Porto Empedocleand Licata, carried a heavy supply re-sponsibility throughout the Siciliancampaign, mainly because the cam-paign was short and the rehabilitationof Palermo slow. An early and impor-tant activity at the beaches was supply-ing aviation gasoline to the Ponte Olivoand Comiso Airfields. The chief engi-neer, 15th Army Group, termed thework of the 696th Engineer PetroleumDistribution Company in building fuelpipelines and tanks at Gela "the out-standing new engineer feature of thecampaign."7

A small reconnaissance party of pe-troleum engineers landed on DIMEbeaches on D-day, and by 18 July allthe men and equipment of the 696thwere ashore. Engineers used the dam-aged Gela pier to berth shallow-drafttankers in about seventeen feet of water.The company laid discharge lines along

the pier, erected two 5,000-barrel bolted-steel storage tanks on shore, and by 21July completed a four-inch pipeline toPonte Olivo Airfield, about seven milesaway. The first tanker, originally sched-uled to arrive off Gela on 18 July, didnot actually begin to discharge until 24July. Two days later a 22-mile pipelineto Comiso Airfield was also completed.About the same time a detachmentfrom the 696th erected facilities forreceiving, storing, and canning gaso-line at Porto Empedocle.

The petroleum engineers had wantedtheir equipment shipped in two equalparts on two coasters, each accompa-nied by some of their experts, but theequipment arrived in seven differentships at several different beaches—someas far afield as the British port of Syra-cuse. Workers at the beach dumps wereunfamiliar with the POL equipmentand had so much difficulty gathering itthat the 696th had to send men tosearch for items along the beaches. Aslate as 21 July the company had foundonly 60 percent of its materiel and hadto improvise elbows and other fittingsto complete the pipelines.8

Bailey bridges had proven their worthin the final days of the Tunisian cam-paign. Seventh Army brought severalsets to Sicily, though some arrived withvital parts missing. The main advan-tage of the Bailey—one of the most val-ued pieces of equipment in World WarII—was its adaptability. It was made ofwelded lattice panels, each ten feet

6 Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. E-7; Hist 1st Engr CBn, Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul—Dec 43; Lida Mayo,The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront,United States Army in World War II (Washington,1968), p. 167.

7 Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Notes on Engr Opns inSicily, no. 3, Sep 43.

8 Rpt, Capt M. D. Altgelt to Lt Col S. A. Potter, Jr.,Chf, C&Q Planning, 5 Oct 43, sub: Report CoveringTrip to North Africa (POL Inspection) with extractsfrom six important documents pertaining toHUSKY POL; Hist 696th Engr Pet Dist Co, 1 Sep 42-30 Apr 44.


long, joined together with steel pins toform girders of varying length andstrength. The girders could be up tothree panels wide and high. The Baileycould accommodate a great variety ofloads and spans; it could be erected tocarry twenty-eight tons over a 170-footspan, or as much as seventy-eight tonsover a 120-foot span. The bridges weredesignated according to the number ofparallel panels and stories in each girder.A double-single (DS) Bailey was twopanels wide and one story high, a triple-double (TD) three panels wide and twostories high. Engineers could assembleand launch these bridges entirely fromthe near shore. A light falsework ofpaneling served as a launching nose andthe bridge itself as a counterweight.9

The Bailey was especially valuable inSicily because of the terrain. Along thecoast from Palermo to Messina ran anarrow littoral flanked by the sea onone side and by Steep, rocky mountainson the other. Here and there, wherethe mountains crowded all the way tothe sea, Highway 113 was no more thana winding, shoulderless road chippedinto headlands. For the most part ve-hicles—and sometimes even foottroops—were roadbound. The Ger-mans had demolished bridges and cul-verts across the numerous ravines. Tothe south and inland, Highway 120 ranthrough rugged mountain ranges nearlydue east from Petralia through Nicosia,Troina, and Randazzo to the east coast.Since maneuvering off this road wasdifficult at best, blown bridges couldstop forward movement. After II Corpsengineers established their dump inNicosia, Baileys accounted for over 90

percent of the 298 tons of fortificationsmaterial, bridging, and road mainte-nance supplies the dump issued dur-ing the campaign.10

On 29 July II Corps engineers estab-lished a bridge dump at Nicosia andorganized a provisional Bailey bridgetrain. The 19th Engineer Combat Regi-ment outfitted one of its platoons withnine trucks and seven four-wheeledGerman trailers. Each of the cargotrucks carried all the components for aten-foot, double-single bay of Baileybridging. The bridge train carried 100feet of double-single Bailey plus mate-rial for a seventy-foot launching nose,and the bridge unit had enough extraparts for two eighty-foot Class 40bridges.11

Corps and Army Support ofCombat Engineers

At the time II Corps began slicingacross Sicily to the north coast on 17July, German forces were falling backto stronger defensive positions, using acovering screen of mines, booby traps,and demolitions to delay pursuit. Ex-cept for brief stands at Caltanissetta andEnna to gain time to consolidate newdefenses to the east, the enemy aban-doned western Sicily. But by 23 July,when the 45th Division reached the


10 II Corps Engr Rpt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43.11 Davidson, Preliminary Rpt of Seventh Army Engr

on the Sicilian Opn, 23 Aug 43; II Corps Engr Rpt,18 Aug 43, ans. 5 and 7; Ltr, Elliott to AFHQ, 21 Sep43, sub: Administrative Lessons Learned from Opnsin Sicily from the Engr Viewpoint; Hist 19th Engr CGp, Oct 42-Jan 44. (The 19th Engineer Combat Regi-ment was broken up on 1 March 1945; Headquartersand Headquarters Company became Headquartersand Headquarters Company, 19th Engineer CombatGroup; the 1st Battalion became the 401st EngineerCombat Battalion; the 2d Battalion became the 402dEngineer Combat Battalion.)


north coast, evidence was mountingthat the enemy would soon make astand. The 1st Division, on the rightand inland, ran into sharp fighting andincreasing numbers of mines and demo-litions near Alimena, northwest of Enna.To the east the British Eighth Armystalled before powerful German de-fenses south and southwest of Mt. Etna.(Map 6)

Up to this point the work load fordivisional engineer battalions had notbeen heavy. Their main tasks duringthe establishment of the beachhead hadbeen to help build exit roads and tohelp the infantry take and destroy pill-boxes. There had been mines to searchout and a few roadblocks to clear, butfor the most part divisional engineerformations had organized and occupieddefensive positions alongside the infan-try units to which they were attached.During the subsequent advances acrossSicily, divisional engineers spent mostof their time probing for mines andbypassing blown bridges by cuttingroads down banks and across dry stream-beds.

The 120th Engineer Combat Battal-ion opened the way for the 45th Divi-sion along Highway 113, the 1st Engi-neer Combat Battalion for the 1st Divi-sion along Highway 120, where minesand demolitions were somewhat denser.By the end of July the 1st EngineerBattalion had repaired or bypassedtwenty-three bridges, nineteen largecraters, and several bomb or shell holes.They also had cleared away wreckedvehicles, rubble, and roadblocks andhad swept the route for mines.12

Backing up the divisional engineers

in II Corps was the 39th Engineer Com-bat Regiment, one battalion behind the120th and another behind the 1st. Corpsengineers in close support improvedbypasses and, where bypasses were im-practical, erected Bailey bridges. Theyalso cleared more mines, reducedgrades, and eliminated traffic bottle-necks. A battalion of the 19th Engineersjoined II Corps to handle work the 39thEngineers could not do because muchof the regiment's equipment and manyof its vehicles had not yet arrived. Thisbattalion had been working on ComisoAirfield and had with it several roadgraders, bulldozers, six-ton trucks, andsixteen-ton trailers.13

Behind II Corps, the 20th EngineerCombat Regiment on Highway 113 andthe 343d Engineer General ServiceRegiment on Highway 120 shared roadmaintenance responsibility within thearmy area. Most main roads were inexcellent condition: surfaced with blacktop or water-bound macadam, wideenough for two-way traffic, and moder-ately graded and curved. Towns, withtheir sharp turns and narrow streets,were the principal bottlenecks. Second-class roads were usually in fair condi-tion but were narrow with sharp curvesand steep grades; Seventh Army madegood use of them by making them one-way and by controlling traffic. Dryweather made the engineers' job easier.Road repair machinery such as rollersand portable rock crushers were cap-tured in many localities, while stock-piles of crushed stone and asphaltenough for initial repairs were foundalong all main roads.

By the time army engineers took over

12 Hist 120th Engr C Bn, May 44; Hist 1st Engr CBn, Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul-Dec 43.

13 II Corps Engr Rpt, Sicilian Campaign; Hists, 39thEngr C Rgt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43, and 19th Engr C Gp,Oct 42-Jan 44.


main supply routes from corps engi-neers, they generally found the roadsin excellent condition. After removingroadblocks, widening bottlenecks, andimproving some bypasses, they builtculverts, paved the slopes of fills, andbuilt wooden trestle bridges. The 20thEngineers improved eighteen bypasseson Highway 113 between Palermo andCape Orlando, and the 343d Engineersdid similar work on twenty-one bypasseson roads from Cape Orlando to Mes-sina and Randazzo. The two regimentsalso cleared minefields and rebuilt sixrailroad bridges.14

Between Highways 113 and 120 laythe rugged Madonie-Nebrodi ranges,with peaks over 6,000 feet high. Fewroads crossed these mountains, and lat-eral roads connecting 113 with 120were some fifteen miles apart. At theend of July traffic between the 1st and45th Divisions had to make a long triparound to the rear. Engineers of the45th Division began reopening High-way 117, running south out of SantoStefano. As soon as Santo Stefano fellinto American hands, Company B, 120thEngineer Battalion, went to work at ademolished bridge two miles north ofMistretta. Engineers grading a bypassthere lost two bulldozers to enemy mines,although the site had been checked.Afterward, engineers spent more timeon mine clearance work and paid par-ticular attention to areas around demo-litions, for the Germans, impressed bythe speed with which American bull-dozers cut bypasses, were bent on mak-ing the most likely bypass routes thedeadliest ones.15

After II Corps turned east, enemymining became more plentiful and moredeliberate. The Germans planted minesin potholes and covered them with hotasphalt to resemble patches. They alsobooby-trapped antitank mines, as manyas 90 percent of them in places. Beforeroads and trails could be opened, divi-sional engineers had to sweep trafficlanes and shoulders thoroughly. Forthis job they needed many more SCR-625 mine detectors than the fifteen allo-cated to each of the engineer combatregiments, divisional engineers, sepa-rate combat battalions, and armoredengineer battalions. The 19th Engi-neers carried forty-two detectors, andafter the campaign both Seventh Armyand AFHQ recommended that the num-ber provided as organic equipment forinfantry and armored divisional engi-neer battalions be raised to forty-twoand fifty-four, respectively.16

SCR—625s proved as valuable in Sic-ily as in Tunisia—and less troublesome.Since rain fell only once in the II Corpsarea, the only trouble with moistureshorting out the detectors came fromsea spray during the initial landings.The detectors were fragile, however,and seldom were more than 75 percentworking. Sweeping with the SCR-625was slow and tedious, but neither soslow nor so tedious as probing. Engi-neers relied heavily on the SCR—625s,but doubt was growing as to how longthey could continue to do so. In Sicilythe Germans used two types of minesthat SCR—625s could not detect undermore than an inch of soil. One was a

14 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily.15 Hist 120th Engr C Bn in Sicilian Campaign, May

44.

16Opns Rpt and S-2 Jnl, 120th Engr C Bn, 10Jul-31 Oct 43, in Hist 120th Engr C Bn, 31 May-Nov43; Ltr, Engr Sect, AFHQ, to CofEngrs, 28 Nov 43,sub: Changes in T/E, 370.212 Sicily, Rpts on Opns,Aug 43 to Oct 43, AFHQ files.


German wooden box mine that had ametal detonator, the other an impro-vised mine made of plastic explosivewrapped in paper or cloth and equippedwith a bakelite detonator. Around Ran-dazzo, where enemy mines were foundin great numbers, the high metallic con-tent of the soil made SCR—625s useless.The less sensitive British mine detectorwas of some use, but the only sure wayto find mines there was by probing forthem with a bayonet.17

Before the invasion the 17th ArmoredEngineer Battalion obtained four Scor-pion mine exploders mounted on M-4tanks for clearing lanes through mine-fields protected by enemy fire. Theylanded at Licata on 14 July. Because notrailers or prime movers were availablefor transporting the often trouble-pronetanks, they had to be walked into posi-tion over mountainous roads, and aftertwenty miles their bogeys wore out.They were never used in the heavilymined fields along the north coast be-tween Cape Orlando and Milazzo onHighway 113 toward the close of thecampaign because when they finallyarrived after their lone road march, allneeded major repairs.18

The arrival in early August of the39th Engineers' vehicles and heavyequipment, as well as missing elementsof the 19th Engineers, made it possiblefor a full engineer combat regiment to

support each attacking division. The IICorps engineers also received sixteengreatly needed D-7 and D-8 heavybulldozers from southern beaches; the19th Engineer Combat Regiment gotfive to go with its three organic D—7s,and two divisional engineer combat bat-talions got two each.

Only three sixteen-ton trailers wereavailable to move heavy bulldozers, andthey were too light, breaking down sooften that most of the time bulldozershad to be driven from one construc-tion site to another. The larger bulldoz-ers proved invaluable, however, for thethree R—4s allotted divisional engineerswere too light for many jobs. For theengineers' requirements on Sicily, wroteone engineer battalion commander, hisunit needed six R-4s, three D—7s, aprime mover, and a twenty-ton trailer.After the campaign Seventh Army rec-ommended that divisional engineer bat-talions be issued one D-7 as organiza-tional equipment and engineer combatregiments three. D—7s no longer ex-ceeded the "division load" limitation,but production was a problem. In July1943 engineer regiments appeared tobe at least nine to twelve months awayfrom getting more heavy bulldozers.19

Maps and Camouflage

The map used most in Sicily was a

17 II Corps Engr Rpt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43; SeventhArmy Rpt Sicily, pp. 1-3 and C-42; Hist 1st Engr CBn, Sicilian Campaign. (This unit reported that theAmerican detector could, with accurate tuning, locatethe new German wooden box mines.) Hist 19th EngrC Rgt, 20 Oct 42-1 Oct 43; Comments collected byCapt Alden Colvocoresses, 24 Aug 43, in HUSKY—JossTask Force (8-12 Jul)—Rpt of Observations.

18 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Opns of CCA,2d Armd Div, 21 Apr-25 Jul 43; Hist 17th ArmdEngr Bn.

19 Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; II Corps EngrRpt, 10 Jul-18 Aug 43; Ltr, Lt Col L. L. Bingham,CO, 10th Engr C Bn, to CG, 3d Div, 29 Jul 43, sub:Engr Recommendations and Lessons Learned fromSicilian Campaign, 10th Engr C Bn files; Hist 19thEngr C Gp; Davidson, Preliminary Rpt of SeventhArmy Engr on the Sicilian Opn, 23 Aug 43, and in-dorsements by HQ, 15th Army Gp, 6 Sep 43, andAFHQ, 2 Oct 43; Incl to Ltr, Col Robert H. Burrag,Actg Chf Opns and Trng Br, Troops Div, OCE, WD,to Col Donald P. Adams, HQ, EBS, 9 Jul 43; Hist 10thEngr C Bn in Sicilian Opn, 31 Jul-18 Aug 43.


multicolored one in the 1:100,000 serieswhich in twenty-six sheets offered com-plete coverage of the island. Such cov-erage was not available in the tactical1:50,000 and 1:25,000 series, but the1:50,000 maps were accurate, and artil-lery used them with good results whenno 1:25,000 sheets were to be had. The1:10,000 beach mosaic was of some useduring the initial landings, but its qual-ity was poor and its coverage inade-quate. Photomaps on a scale of 1:25,000,the product of air sorties before andduring the campaign, were of little usebecause many areas were blank anddetail and contrast were frequentlylacking.

More overprints were needed dur-ing the latter stages of the campaignwhen enemy resistance stiffened. Twophoto interpreters from the 62d Engi-neer Topographic Company came toPonte Olivo Airfield to copy informa-tion on enemy defenses in the north-eastern areas from aerial photographs.They were able to spot routes of ad-vance, pick bypass routes, evaluate en-emy demolitions, and even estimatelengths of bridging that would be neededat certain places. The aerial informa-tion was printed on base maps preparedin advance, and copies went to everyinterested division as well as to armyheadquarters, corps headquarters, corpsartillery, and the Naval OperationsBoard. The value of this work for front-line units in Sicily was limited, however,because they moved so rapidly thatground reconnaissance often was possi-ble before the photo-interpreters' re-ports reached them.20

The only camouflage units in theSicilian campaign were Company B,601st Engineer Camouflage Battalion,and a platoon of the 904th EngineerAir Force Headquarters Company.Company B of the 601st reached Sicilylate in July and was attached by pla-toons to the assault divisions. Its onlyassignments during the campaign in-volved camouflaging the Seventh Armycommand post and building a dummyrailhead. However, the campaign endedbefore the railhead task could be fin-ished. The 904th Company's platoonfor a time painted deceptive patternson planes and trucks but later relied ondispersal to reduce losses at airfields.

Apart from the work of these twounits the engineers' part in camouflagewas chiefly supplying materials and giv-ing instruction in their use. BeforeHUSKY got under way, engineers fur-nished reversible nets for each TBAvehicle scheduled to go to Sicily andadditional oversize nets to build up areserve of 250 on each of the threebeachheads. One side of each net wassand-colored to blend with barren land-scape; the other side was green-tonedfor verdant areas. The nets were put togood use, notably in concealing artil-lery from Luftwaffe attacks during thebattle for Troina.21

Highway 120: The Road to Randazzo

Late in July the 39th Infantry, 9thDivision, which was to replace the 1stInfantry Division along Highway 120,arrived at Nicosia. Maj. Gen. Terry dela Mesa Alien, commanding the 1st

20 II Corps Engr Rpt, 10 Jul- 18 Aug 43, an. 3, MapSupply and Distribution; HQ, Force 141, PlanningInstr 15, Maps and Charts.

21 Hist 601st Engr Camouflage Bn, 1943; Hist, TheAviation Engineers in the MTO, Hist Sect, AAF EngrCmd, MTO (P), 12 Jun 46, p. 183, Maxwell AFB.


Division, expected relief with the fallof Troina, the next main objective.Leading the advance, the 39th Infan-try took Cerami on 31 July, but the fol-lowing day heavy German fire stoppedthe regiment about four miles short ofTroina.

Though the Germans were with-drawing, they had determined to delaypursuit at Troina, which was ideal fortheir purpose. The highest town inSicily, Troina perched atop a 3,600-footmountain dominating the countryside,a natural strongpoint and "a demoli-tion engineer's dream" because ap-proaches could be blocked by blownbridges and mines.22 On 2 August Gen-eral Alien committed his 26th Infantry,but its attack proved fruitless. Anotherpush by the reinforced 16th Infantry,1st Division, also made little progress.

On 4 August, the fifth day of thebattle for Troina, the 9th Division's 60thInfantry arrived on the scene and begandeploying to outflank German defenseswell north of Troina. Farther south, the39th Infantry, 9th Division, and the26th Infantry, 1st Division, were to con-tinue efforts to encircle Troina fromthe northwest and north; the 16th In-fantry, 1st Division, was to drive east-ward on the town across virtually track-less hills; the 18th Infantry, 1st Division,was to outflank it on the south. Com-pany A, 1st Engineer Combat Battalion,had the mission of bulldozing a roadalong the 16th Infantry's axis of advance,while the 9th Division's 15th EngineerCombat Battalion had a similar missionin support of the 60th Infantry.

Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, com-manding the 9th Division, intended that

the 60th Infantry push generally eastfrom Capizzi across Monte Pelato andCamolato and then, striking from thenorth, drive toward Cesaro, on High-way 120 east of Troina, in an attemptto cut off German forces withdrawingfrom the Troina sector. The attackbegan on the morning of 5 August, withthree light R-4 angledozers of the 15thEngineer Battalion soon struggling tobuild a new road along the infantry'saxis of advance. In the afternoon twoD-7 heavy bulldozers arrived fromcorps; one broke down almost immedi-ately, but the other did yeoman work.

During the night of 5—6 August theGermans abandoned Troina and fellback behind a cover of mines and de-molitions. The next day the 9th Divi-sion replaced the 1st along Highway120, and the 15th Engineer CombatBattalion took over from the 1st Engi-neer Combat Battalion. Some of theheaviest German mining and demoli-tions were along Highway 120 betweenTroina and Randazzo, the next mainobjective. Nowhere during the cam-paign was mine clearance and bypassconstruction more important, becauseRandazzo lay high on the slopes of Mt.Etna. Just as important was buildingnew roads through the mountains.23

On 8 August Company B, 15th Engi-neer Battalion, withdrew from the newroad to Mt. Camolato to support the47th Infantry on Highway 120 east ofTroina. By this time the new road wasopen to Colle Basso, perhaps two-thirdsof the way to Mt. Camolato, but the

22 Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy,p. 329.

23 This account is drawn from: Hists of the 15thEngr C Bn, Sicilian Campaign, 23 Aug 43, and the 1stEngr C Bn, Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul—Dec 43; Sev-enth Army Rpt Sicily, pp. 6-17; ETOUSA EngrObservers Rpt 3, 18 Feb 44, 319.1, binder 1, 1944,AFHQ files.


15th faced difficult problems. CompanyA's R-4 broke down, and mist and rainbegan to hinder the work. Company Cpushed the road to completion at 1700on 9 August. Earlier that day CompanyA moved off to repair the Mt. Camo-lato—Cesaro road and to build a north-south bypass around Cesaro, using aD-8 bulldozer that had just arrivedfrom corps.

After joining the 47th Infantry on 8August, Company B cleared mines towithin a mile of Cesaro, where enemyshell fire halted the work. Next morn-ing the company used a repaired D-7to build a four-mile-long east-west by-pass, which for 11/2 miles followed theTroina River bed and detoured aroundboth Cesaro and three demolished brid-ges east of Troina. Company C ulti-mately extended to forty miles the 60thInfantry's road through the mountainsnorth of Troina and Cesaro.

Slowed by mines, the 9th Division didnot enter Randazzo until the morningof 13 August; shortly thereafter theBritish 78th Division entered from thesouth. The 1st Infantry Division cameback into the line at Randazzo, and the9th Division swung north and north-east toward the north coast. In anticipa-tion of this shift, engineers had alreadyscouted a narrow road that ran northfrom Highway 120 at a point a fewmiles west of Randazzo, and CompanyB, 15th Engineer Battalion, began open-ing the road on 13 August. Two demol-ished bridges and two road craterscaused little trouble, but a quarter mileof abatis was heavily strewn with S-minesand Teller mines, one of which claimeda D-8 bulldozer. Nevertheless, Com-pany B opened the road to one-waytraffic shortly after noon. Elements ofthe battalion then moved to Floresta,

and the next day Company A opened aone-way road as far as Montalbano. Atthis point all 9th Division engineer workhalted—with the campaign almost over,the 9th Division came out of the line.

The 15th Engineer Battalion hadbeen in action fifteen days. During thattime the battalion built 45 miles of newsupply roads through mountains, re-paired 14 miles of existing roads, by-passed 15 demolished bridges, filled 4major craters, cleared a quarter mile ofabatis, and searched 30 miles of roadfor mines. The unit's water points sup-plied over 1,500,000 gallons of puri-fied water. There had been twelve cas-ualties, ten (including two deaths) causedby two S-mines near Cesaro on 11August.

On 13 August the 1st Engineer Com-bat Battalion came back into action withthe rest of the 1st Division. CompanyB and a platoon of Company A workedthroughout the night improving theroad through and east of Randazzo forthe 18th Infantry to use the next morn-ing. The engineers found nine bridgesdestroyed within a few miles and workedcontinuously until 15 August bypass-ing them. At one site a forty-foot bankrose on the near side—a perfect spotfor Bailey bridging, but none was avail-able. During its thirty-one days in theline, the 1st Engineer Combat Battal-ion bypassed thirty-nine bridges, filledtwenty-eight road craters, and searchedout hundreds of mines. The battalionsuffered 30 casualties: 4 killed, 3 missing,and 23 wounded.

Highway 113: The Road to Messina

After fighting its way into the northcoastal town of Santo Stefano on 31July, the 45th Division went into reserve


and the 3d Infantry Division took overon Highway 113. As the 3d Divisionadvanced east along the north coast, itwas confined to a single road even morethan was the 9th Division along High-way 120. On the left was the sea, on theright mountainous terrain fit only formules and men on foot. Maj. Gen.Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., commandingthe division, sent one element forwardastride Highway 113 to clear spursoverlooking the road and to protect theengineers who were making a paththrough demolitions and minefields sothat artillery and vehicles could moveforward. He sent other elements withpack animals (he was to use more than400 mules and 100 horses) over moun-tain trails on the right and inland tostrike the enemy's flank and rear.24

An advantage Highway 113 had overHighway 120 was the possibility of land-ing men and supplies by sea. Suppliescame ashore from LSTs at Torremuzzabeach near Santo Stefano at an unload-ing point the 2d Battalion, 540th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, opened on 3August. This same battalion also fur-nished a platoon and a D-7 to clearmines and wire from a beach at Sant'Agata when Truscott attempted a smallamphibious operation to outflank theSan Fratello position, the first majorGerman strongpoint east of SantoStefano.25

At Monte San Fratello, a 2,200-footpeak about fifteen miles east of SantoStefano, the 3d Division was stoppedfrom 3 to 8 August, as effectively as the1st Division had been at Troina andfor the same reason—the Germans were

buying time for their withdrawal. Whenheavy fire and dense minefields haltedthe 15th Infantry, two battalions of the30th and the entire 7th had to be com-mitted before any progress could bemade, and that progress was madepartly because the Germans were thin-ning out their defenses. A battalionleapfrogged behind the San Fratelloposition at Sant' Agata in an amphibiouslanding before dawn on 8 August, thebattalion landing team including a pla-toon of the 3d Division's 10th EngineerCombat Battalion and a platoon of the540th Engineer Combat Regiment. Theoperation failed to cut off the Germansbut did hasten their withdrawal.

Resuming the advance, which heavymining and considerable demolitionwork slowed, the 3d Division encoun-tered a second strong line at Naso ridgenear Cape Orlando on 11 August. Asecond end run, attempted early on thetwelfth near Brolo, twelve miles behindthe enemy's lines, almost proved disas-trous. The enemy boxed in the landingforce and inflicted heavy casualtiesbefore relief arrived by land. Two engi-neers of the 10th Engineer Combat Bat-talion were killed and two werewounded; two engineers of the 540thplatoon were killed and three werewounded.26

Five or six miles beyond Brolo alongthe coastal highway, the 30th Infantry,leading, halted on 12 August before themost formidable roadblock Germandemolition engineers had yet put up.Overcoming it was to be "a landmarkof American engineer support inSicily."27

24 Lt. Gen. L. K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions(New York: Dutton, 1954), pp. 230-31.

25 HQ, Seventh Army, Adm Sitreps, Jul and Aug43, app. D; Interv, Capt Napp, S-3, 540th Engr CRgt; Hist 540th Engr C Rgt, 1942-45.

26 Hist 10th Engr C Bn in Sicilian Opn, 26 Aug 43;Rpt of Seventh Army Engr Sicily; Bradley, A Soldier'sStory, pp. 158-59; Hist 540th Engr C Rgt, 1942-45.

27 Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy,p. 406.


About fifty feet beyond a tunnel atCape Calava the Germans had blownout 150 feet of the road that ran along ashelf carved out of a sheer rock cliffrising abruptly from the sea. Infantry-men could pick their way one by oneacross the steep rock face, and gunsand supplies could be ferried by sea.But the division's supply trucks andheavy guns had to use the road, forlanding craft were in short supply.Grading could close two-thirds of thegap, but any fill dumped into the cen-ter would roll down to the sea, 200 feetbelow. This section had to be bridged,but no Bailey bridging was available.With captured timbers, the 10th Engi-neer Combat Battalion "hung a bridgein the sky"—and did it in twenty-fourhours.28

Shortly after noon on 13 August, sev-eral engineer officers halted their jeepat a roadblock on Highway 113 fourmiles west of Cape Calava and hiked tothe break in the road. They computedwhat would be needed to do the job,ordered up the necessary men andequipment, and estimated they couldbridge the gap by noon the next day.Within an hour or two, men from Com-pany A, 10th Engineer Battalion, wereon hand, breaking rock with jackham-mers. Trucks and trailers loaded withheavy timber beams and flanks beganto move forward. In the meantime abulldozer was needed on other demoli-tions farther east. To get one forward,engineers built a raft on two fishingsmacks, loaded a bulldozer aboard, andused an amphibious jeep to tow the

makeshift ferry five miles around CapeCalava.29

At the constricted bridge site, Com-pany A could put only one platoon at atime on the job. All night the unitlabored to meet the deadline. At dawnthe gaping hole remained, but the foun-dations for a bridge had been laid.Engineers swung a heavy timber intothe gap and set it upright on a seat cutinto the cliff. They laid another beamfrom the top of this upright to anotherseat chipped out of the rock and pinnedthe two timbers together to form a bent.Then they looped a steel cable aroundthe upright and anchored it to pins setin the cliff. The cable prevented thebent from sliding downhill when heavy,spiked-timber girders were worked intoplace. Twenty-man teams picked up thegirders one by one and slid them intoposition.

A rickety bridge began to take shape.As the last floor plank was spiked downand the final touches added to theapproaches, General Truscott climbedaboard his jeep. Promptly at noon on14 August men of Company A steppedback and watched the division com-mander test the newly completed span.Other light vehicles loaded with ammu-nition and weapons for frontline troopswere waiting to follow. After they cross-ed, the bridge was closed so that engi-neers could strengthen it to take 2 1/2-ton trucks. At 1700 the bridge was re-opened and cargo trucks—even a bull-dozer—began to cross.

Beyond Cape Calava the 3d Division's7th Regimental Combat Team advancedso rapidly that an amphibious landingby the 157th Regimental Combat Team,

28 This account of the Cape Calava bridge is drawnfrom Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: Henry Holt,1944), pp. 65-71, and Hist 10th Engr C Bn in Sicil-ian Opn, 26 Aug 43.

29 Merrill Mueller, NBC War Correspondent Over-seas, Letter to the Editor, Look Magazine, March 20,1944.


CONSTRUCTION BEGINS AT CAPE GALAVA to close gap blown by retreating Germans.

45th Division, during the night of 15—16August at Bivio Salica fell miles shortof the advance infantry elements. Dark-ness found the 7th Regimental CombatTeam pushing strong patrols into Mes-sina. By dawn, organized resistance inSicily had ended and American artil-lery was dueling with enemy guns acrossthe Strait of Messina.

A measure of the German demoli-tions in the mountains rising from thesea was the time it took Truscott's forcesto traverse the coastal road. The 3dDivision took sixteen laborious days toreach Messina; on the morning of 20August General Truscott made thereturn journey from Messina to Palermoin just three hours.30

In the drive along the coast the 10thEngineer Combat Battalion took casual-ties of four men killed and twenty-threewounded; most of the casualties werefrom mines. Lt. Col. Leonard L. Bing-ham, commanding the battalion, thoughtthe unit had been used improperly inthe later stages of the campaign. At theoutset, on 1 August, its three line com-panies were strung out along Highway113, all working under division engi-neer control. Two companies leapfrog-ged each other from demolition site todemolition site, while the third com-pany provided mine removal parties fordivisional units. Headquarters, Head-quarters and Service Company, main-tained the division, engineer supplydump, established water points, ser-viced engineer vehicles, and operated30 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 244.


GENERAL TRUSCOTT TESTS THE TEMPORARY SPAN AT CAPE CALAVA

the battalion aid station. But this ar-rangement did not last, and soon manyunits of the 10th Engineer Battalion—frequently whole companies—were at-tached to infantry units. This proce-dure had officers who were not engi-neers directing the platoons and com-panies and cost the engineers theircohesiveness within the division.31

Palermo

After the capture of Palermo on 22July, Seventh Army had no sooner

established headquarters and main sup-ply dumps when requests for workbegan to pour in to Col. Garrison H.Davidson, the army engineer. No for-mal construction program was estab-lished, and army engineer troops han-dled mine sweeping, road clearing, andconstruction requests as they came in.Space was urgently needed for offices,billets, storehouses, laundries, bakeries,and maintenance shops, while hospi-tals set up in unoccupied buildings hadto have window screens and more waterand sewage facilities. The municipalwater and sewage systems needed re-pairs, and generating plants at Palermoand Porto Empedocle had been bombedout of operation.

Several engineer units had a part inrehabilitating Palermo. The 20th Engi-

31 Hist 10th Engr C Bn in Sicilian Opn, 26 Aug 43;Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, pp. 6-20 and E-2; Ltr,Bingham to CG, 3d Div, 29 Jul 43, sub: Engr Recom-mendations and Lessons Learned from Sicilian Cam-paign.


neer Combat Regiment began workthere on 23 July but left a week later toextend the railroad line to Santo Stefano.On this job the regiment rebuilt fourbridges and repaired one tunnel and aconsiderable amount of track. For onebridge the 20th Engineers used prefab-ricated trestling found in the Palermoshipyards; for another, Bailey highwaybridging was used, with planking be-tween the rails so trucks as well as trainscould use the bridge, and for others,captured timbers were used. On 9August the railroad was open to a for-ward railhead at the junction of High-ways 117 and 120 near Santo Stefano.In the first five miles beyond this rail-head were four demolished bridges;therefore, the engineers made no at-tempt to extend rail service east ofSanto Stefano.32

The 540th Engineer Combat Regi-ment (less one battalion) worked brieflyat Palermo, then moved on to operatebeaches at Termini Imerese. The 343dEngineer General Service Regiment,whose responsibility for Palermo wasalso brief, replaced the 540th on 30July. The 1051st Engineer Port Con-struction and Repair Group, organizedespecially for such work, took over theassignment on 11 August. The group'sequipment did not arrive for some time,and in the interim it had to use what-ever captured equipment it could find.

Italian POWs did most of the workunder the 1051st's supervision.33

The 1090th Engineer Utilities Com-pany, which arrived in Palermo on 7August, handled most of the repairson utilities. The principal project wassteam power plants. The unit employedan average of 120 POWs and 100 civil-ians and used borrowed tools and cap-tured equipment, including two 5,000-kilowatt turbines. A new type of engi-neer unit, the 1090th had been hastilyactivated for HUSKY. The company wasin Sicily a month before its organiza-tional equipment arrived, and one-thirdof its men never caught up with theparent unit there.34

After its surrender, Sicily becamepart of the British line of communica-tions in the Mediterranean. The U.S.6625th Base Area Group (Provisional)handled American interests until Sev-enth Army units could be shipped outand American installations closed. On1 September 1943 the 6625th BaseArea Group was redesignated IslandBase Section (IBS). Operating directlyunder NATOUSA, IBS supervised thesteadily diminishing American activitieson the island. The principal engineertask after the campaign ended wasreplacing bypasses with bridges and cul-verts in preparation for the fall rains.35

32 Seventh Army Rpt Sicily, p. E-15; 1st ESB Rptof Action Against the Enemy, 10-13 Jul 43; Hist20th Engr C Bn, 17 May-17 Jun 45.

33 HQ, Seventh Army, Adm Sitreps 22, 1 Aug 43;23, 3 Aug 43; and 25, 5 Aug 43; Hist 343d Engr GSRgt, 1942-45; Interv, Col Dickerson, XO, 1051st EngrPC&R Gp, and Capt Napp, S-3, 540th Engr ShoreRgt, HUSKY—Joss Task Force (8-12 Jul) —Rpt ofObservations.

34 Hist 1090th Engr Utilities Co, 7 Aug-6 Oct 43.35 History of Island Base Section, in CMH.

CHAPTER VIII

From Salerno tothe Volturno

At the TRIDENT Conference in Wash-ington in May 1943, the British andAmericans agreed that after Sicily theyshould undertake further operations inthe Mediterranean "calculated to elimi-nate Italy from the war and to containmaximum German forces."1 That state-ment glossed over disagreements be-tween British and Americans about therelative emphasis to be given the Medi-terranean, the British insisting thatresources should be concentrated therein 1943 while the Americans wanted toprepare for a cross-Channel attack in1944. As the Allies swept through Sicily,however, growing signs of Italian col-lapse produced agreement on an imme-diate invasion of Italy to follow up onthe victory in Sicily. On 16 August Gen-eral Eisenhower decided to move Brit-ish Eighth Army forces across the Straitof Messina at the earliest opportunityand to launch Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark'sFifth Army (with a British corps at-tached) on a major invasion of the Ital-ian mainland on 9 September.

Engineer preparation for the inva-sion began with the establishment ofFifth Army headquarters on 5 January

1943 at Oujda, French Morocco. Thearmy engineer, Col. Frank O. Bowman,had organized his section on paper amonth earlier, but his staff, drawnlargely from the American II Corpsengineers, was hardly versed in engi-neer planning at the army level. Bow-man provided what direction he couldfrom his experience as the AFHQ engi-neer in England and in North Africa,but his temporary reassignment fromApril to August 1943 as SOS, NATO-USA, engineer left the section to Col.Mark M. Boatner, Jr., who presidedover the interim work on other pro-posed invasions in the Mediterranean.

Fifth Army headquarters considereda number of proposals, and the engi-neers contributed map plans, supplyschemes, and terrain studies to nearlyall of them. An inherited plan, Opera-tion BACKBONE, called for a foray intoSpanish Morocco should Spain changeits nominally neutral stance in the war.In the summer of 1943 the engineerstaff entered the planning for BRIM-STONE, the invasion and occupation ofSardinia. Several plans involved a thrustinto Italy itself, and many of the accu-mulated concepts coalesced into thefinal assault plan. BARRACUDA aimeddirectly at the harbor of Naples, GANG-

1 CGS 242/6, 25 May 43, sub: Final Rpt to Presidentand Prime Minister.


WAY at the beaches immediately northof the city. MUSKET would have broughtFifth Army into Taranto and requireda much longer overland campaign tothe Italian capital. Operation BAY-TOWN was the British move across theStrait of Messina to Reggio di Calabria.The Combined Chiefs of Staff ruledout BRIMSTONE on 20 July, and afterthe twenty-seventh the main featuresof BARRACUDA and GANGWAY werecombined into planning for AVA-LANCHE. Through August the FifthArmy staff wrestled with choosing a tar-get for the invasion. General Clarkfavored the Naples operation for theleverage it would provide in landingslightly farther north and cutting offGerman forces in southern Italy. Withthe cooperation of British engineersfrom 10 Corps, scheduled to make thelanding as part of Fifth Army, and withreliance upon American terrain analy-ses and British Inter-Service Informa-tion Series (ISIS) reports, Colonel Bow-man formulated his own recommen-dations, leaving room for the attacknear either Naples or Salerno, 150 milessouthwest of Rome on the Italian coast.Since Naples lay just outside the ex-treme range of Allied fighters operat-ing from Sicilian airfields, the beachesat Salerno, just within range, becamethe primary choice for the assault.2

The Salerno beaches had advantagesand disadvantages for the invaders.(Map 7) Slightly steeper than those inthe Gulf of Naples, they afforded trans-port craft closer access to the shore.Sand dunes at Salerno were low andnarrow and tended to run easily intobeach-exit routes. The topography be-

hind the beaches was suited for dis-persed supply dumps, and a roadnetclose to shore could support forwardtroop and supply movement. Thoughthere were no clearly organized defen-sive positions in the area, the moun-tains behind the beaches formed a nat-ural amphitheater facing the sea. Ene-my observation posts would detect anymovement below, and artillery fire fromthe high ground could reach the attack-ing forces easily. Once ashore, troopswould find the way to Naples ob-structed by the rugged Sorrento ridge,which sloped out into the sea on thenorthern arm of the Gulf of Salerno.The actual landing zone was split almostexactly in two by the mouth of the SeleRiver, which would hinder communica-tion between the two halves of thebeachhead until the engineers couldbridge the stream.

Enemy strength in the area was con-siderable. Under the command of TenthArmy, German forces were withdraw-ing from the southern tier of the Ital-ian boot throughout the latter part ofAugust in accordance with rough plansto concentrate a strong defense justsouth of Rome. The movement acceler-ated after the British jump into Italyearly in September, with the XIV Pan-zer Corps, composed of the reconstitu-ted Hermann Goering Division, the 16thPanzer Division, and the 15th PanzerGrenadier Division, strung along the Ital-ian west coast from Salerno north toGaeta.

Recognizing that the Salerno beacheswere suitable for an Allied incursion,the 16th Panzer Division's engineers inthe area emplaced mines and beachobstacles along the dunes from Salernoto Agropoli, at the southern extent ofthe bay—but not so extensively as might2 Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 3-4.

FROM SALERNO TO THE VOLTURNO 155

MAP 7

have been expected. The Germans,regarding the Italian will to fight as neg-ligible amid rumors of imminent defec-tion, took over the coastal defenses ofthe Salerno area, executing the pro-testing commander of an Italian divi-sion in the process. They supplementedlocal batteries with their own heavypieces in the mountains behind thebeaches, especially on the imposing3,566-foot Monte Soprana. They alsoemplaced a series of strongpoints in the

foothills fronting the sea, with a partic-ularly heavy concentration back of thesouthern complex of beaches in thearea eventually chosen for the VI Corpsattack. Panzer forces were expected tosupport these points with mobile coun-terassaults and supplementary fire. AnItalian minefield offshore completedthe defenses of the beaches.3

3 Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, United StatesArmy in World War II (Washington, 1969), p. 67;Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 260.


Unit assignments for the invasionforce continued all summer. In the finaloperation plan of 26 August, the Ameri-can VI Corps, with five divisions, wasto seize the right-hand half of the land-ing zone south of the Sele River aroundthe Roman ruin of Paestum while theBritish 10 Corps assaulted the north-ern half of the beachhead closer to thetown of Salerno. All veterans of thetheater, the 3d, 34th, 36th, and 45thInfantry Divisions would accompany the1st Armored and 82d Airborne Divi-sions. Apart from the support providedfor the invasion, each division had itsassigned organic engineer battalion, the10th Engineer Battalion with the 3dDivision, the 109th with the 34th Divi-sion, the 111th with the 36th, and the120th with the 45th; the 1st ArmoredDivision had the services of the 16thArmored Engineer Battalion, and theairborne division had the 307th Air-borne Engineer Battalion. As one ofthe most practiced units in amphibi-ous attacks, the 36th Infantry Divisionwas assigned the actual beach assault.The division's 141st Infantry Regimentwas on the extreme right, landing onYellow and Blue beaches, where a medi-eval stone tower at Paestum afforded agood point of reference for incomingboats. The 142d Infantry, to land onRed and Green beaches to the left ofthe 141st, covered the area north to anartificial waterway, the FiumarelloCanal; the two regiments were assault-ing an expanse of 3,740 yards of contig-uous beach front.

A Navy beachmaster was to maintainall communications with the ships andcontrol all the operational landings. Aport headquarters, consisting of twoTransportation Corps port battalions,was to coordinate all unloading into

small craft offshore, hut the pivot ofbeach supply operations was the 531stEngineer Shore Regiment and the540th Engineer Combat Regiment, theformer assuming responsibility duringthe assault phase. The 531st, a compo-nent of the 1st Engineer Special Bri-gade for the invasion, replaced the343d Engineer General Service Regi-ment, which was trained in beach sup-port operations but had neither theexperience nor the equipment to carryout this function. Alerted in Sicily onlytwo weeks before the invasion, the 531sttraveled to Oran, the staging area forpart of the invasion force, while the540th reported to the assembly area ofthe 45th Infantry Division aroundPalermo. Neither regiment participatedin the planning for the invasion, nordid their officers see the maps for theoperation or the stowage plans for thevessels to be unloaded off the beaches;for the most part, they saw the troopsthey were supporting for the first timeon the sand under German fire.4

In other respects engineer prepara-tions for the Salerno invasion weremore thorough. Fifth Army andNATOUSA engineers requisitionedsupplies, trained engineer troops, ana-lyzed terrain, and produced detailedmaps. After the final selection of theSalerno site the engineer mapping sub-section, Fifth Army, studied in detailthe terrain of the region, its ridge anddrainage systems, communications,water supply, ports, and beaches. Thesestudies gave the engineers vital infor-mation for annotating maps.

4 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 5; Hist 531stEngr Shore Rgt, 29 Nov 42-Apr 45; AGF Bd Rpts,NATOUSA, 15 Nov 43; Interv, Brig Gen George W.Gardes, 5 Nov 59.


Planning for engineer supply at Saler-no rested ultimately with the engineerof SOS, NATOUSA. On 25 July Maj.Irving W. Finberg, chief of the FifthArmy Engineer Supply Section, re-ported to the SOS engineer as FifthArmy liaison officer to prepare requisi-tions covering the estimated needs ofFifth Army engineers. Within two weeksFinberg submitted the basic require-ments. Wherever possible, his listingbecame the basis for freeze orders onSOS, NATOUSA, stocks in NorthAfrica, which eventually reserved10,545 long tons of engineer supply forthe invasion. Base section depots re-ported items not available in the the-ater pipeline, and units in the theaternot scheduled for the forthcoming op-eration gave supplies and equipmentto units going into the assault. The SOS,NATOUSA, command made up short-ages by ordering critical items directlyfrom the New York Port of Embarka-tion, requisitions amounting to 3,638long tons. Confusion still reigned insome quarters, especially since engi-neer, quartermaster, and ordnance sup-ply was intermixed in theater stocks,and inadequate inventory proceduresfrequently led to ordering materielalready on hand but unidentified.5

As the supply planning and acquisi-tion proceeded, Fifth Army operatedeight training schools. At Port-aux-Poules, near Arzew in Algeria, Brig.Gen. John W. O'Daniel opened theFifth Army Invasion Training Centeron 14 January 1943. Relieved of itsfunction in Sicily late in the summer,the 1st Engineer Special Brigade prac-ticed combined operations with naval

units and coordinated air cover overbeach areas serving the center. The17th Armored Engineer Battalion, the334th Engineer Combat Battalion, the540th and 39th Engineer Combat Regi-ments, and two separate engineer battal-ions, the 378th and the 384th, took partin training exercises with live fire, theobject being to make men battle-wise inthe shortest possible time. Outside thecenter, elements of the 16th ArmoredEngineer Battalion, the 109th EngineerCombat Battalion, and the 1st EngineerSpecial Brigade headquarters had jointand combined training in beach opera-tions which included mine-clearingwork. The 16th Armored EngineerBattalion also ran two mine schools atSte.-Barbe-du-Tlelat for the men of the1st Armored Division and organized itsown refreshers in infantry tactics,bridging, and field fortifications.

A separate engineer training centeropened on 12 March 1943, near AinFritissa in French Morocco at an aban-doned French Foreign Legion fort.Under Lt. Col. Aaron A. Wyatt, Jr., theschool concentrated on practical workunder simulated battle conditions. Brit-ish Eighth Army instructors taughtmine and countermine warfare. Thefinal problem, usually undertaken atnight, split the students into two groups,one of which planted mines for the sec-ond to unearth. Though the minesemployed were training devices withonly igniter fuses attached, several liveand armed standard charges were in-terspersed with the dummies. As theengineer students struggled in the dark-ness, assembled tanks and infantry fired37-mm. shells and automatic and small-arms rounds overhead, and instructorsstationed in towers detonated buriedartillery shells on the field. By the time5 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 58.


of the invasion over a thousand offi-cers and noncoms had completed thecourses at the engineer center, withtwenty-seven casualties and one fatalityduring the exercises.

An adjunct to the center was a re-search and development staff that in-vestigated and tested new mechanicalmine-clearing devices such as the Scor-pion flail as it became available fromBritish sources. As soon as they ap-peared in the theater, the German Schumines were also the object of the staffsattention. Though the center operatedwith unqualified success, it labored con-stantly under the disadvantages ofbeing an ad hoc organization with nostandard organization tables. Originallyblessed with one armored engineercompany and four combat engineercompanies as demonstration units, Col-onel Wyatt could rarely keep on handenough veteran technicians in minewarfare and never had enough trans-portation.

The engineers produced maps andcharts by the thousands for the Ameri-can invasion force. Originally relyingon existing small-scale charts on hand,some of foreign manufacture, the map-makers found their enlargements poor.Urgent requisitions for new maps scaledat the standard 1:25,000, 1:50,000,1:100,000, and 1:250,000 soon suppliedadequate coverage for nearly the wholeof the south-central Italian peninsulafrom the latitude of Salerno to that ofAnzio. Larger scale maps, 1:500,000and 1:1,000,000, covered the areanorth of Rome. Finally the engineersobtained detailed road maps of theNaples area and beach defense over-lays for Salerno which gave annotatedlegends for points of concealment, linesof communications, water supply, and

ridge lines in the immediate area ofassault. A single map unit, the 2699thEngineer Map Depot Detachment (Pro-visional), attached to the 531st Engi-neer Shore Regiment for the operation,spent most of the time before the inva-sion virtually imprisoned in a largegarage in Oran while it packed 1:50,000and 1:1,000,000 maps, fifty to thesealed roll. The map depot detachmentcarried enough maps into the invasionto resupply each combat unit with 100percent of its original issue.

Amphibious exercises in the twoweeks before the invasion sufferedfrom too little realism. In COW-PUNCHER, run from 26 to 29 August,the 36th Infantry Division acted asattacker at Port-aux-Poules and Arzewagainst the defending 34th InfantryDivision. Loath to expose vessels toenemy submarine attacks during theexercise, the Navy could not supportthe rehearsal in detail, and only a tokenunloading of vehicles, supply, and muni-tions over the beaches was possible. On29 August Company I, 531st EngineerShore Regiment, demonstrated beachorganization procedure to 1,000 sailors;three days later Company H partici-pated in a simulated beach exercise withthe Navy, but no small boats were used.On Sicily, the 45th Infantry Divisionstaged one rehearsal for the cominglanding.

The Invasion

On 3 September the British EighthArmy struck across the Strait of Mes-sina, and the long and bitter Italiancampaign was under way. On 5 Sep-tember the first of the invasion con-voys for AVALANCHE left Oran andMers-el-Kebir, and at precisely sched-


uled intervals thereafter, convoys movedout of other ports in North Africa andSicily. They came together north ofPalermo and converged on the Gulf ofSalerno during the evening of 8 Sep-tember. Aboard were the U.S. VI Corps'36th Division, the British 10 Corps'46th and 56th Divisions, three battal-ions of American Rangers and two ofBritish commandos, and a floatingreserve, the American 45th Divisionless one regimental combat team. The141st had the southern Yellow and Bluebeaches as assault targets; the 142d wasto take the northern Red and Greenbeaches on the left, closer to the Fiu-marello Canal. (Map 8)

Fortune seemed to favor the land-ings. As the convoys approached themainland under air cover, the ships'radios picked up the voice of GeneralEisenhower declaring that "hostilitiesbetween the United Nations and Italyhave terminated, effective at once."When the assault began shortly before0330 on 9 September, the weather wasgood, the sea was calm, and the moonhad set. As the first wave of LCVPscarrying VI Corps' troops groundedsouth of the Sele River, the men sawflashes of gunfire to the north wherethe British were landing, but their ownbeaches were dark and silent. Then, asthey were leaving their craft and mak-ing their way ashore through the shal-lows, flares suddenly illuminated theshoreline, machine-gun and mortar fireerupted from the dunes, and from thearc of hills enclosing the coastal plainartillery shells rained down.

The heaviest concentration of Germanfire fell on the southernmost beaches,Yellow and Blue. The 3d Battalion ofthe 531st Engineer Shore Regiment,coming in on the second wave in sup-

port of the 141st Infantry, was unableto land on Yellow and had to turn toBlue, where things were not much bet-ter. No boats could land on Blue afterdaybreak, and for most of the day theengineer battalion's Company I waspinned down. At one time the com-pany's command post was only 300yards from a point where the infantrywas fending off a German attack.

The regiment's 2d Battalion, sup-porting the 142d Infantry, was able toland on Red and Green beaches. Theunit suffered several casualties but re-ported at 0530 that Red Beach wasready for traffic. Landing craft andDUKWs floundering offshore con-verged on Red, but the concentrationdrew heavy artillery fire that knockedmany of them out. The disruption madeit impossible to open any of the beachesfor several hours; much of the engi-neers' equipment was scattered or sunk,and the mine-clearing and constructioncrews could not land as units. The delayin opening the beaches, as well as en-emy fire on boat lanes, prevented VICorps from landing tanks and artillerybefore daylight, as had been planned.

At daylight another menace appeared.A German tank came down to the shorebetween Yellow and Blue beaches andfired on each landing craft that ap-proached. More enemy tanks began fir-ing from the main road behind thedunes. The landing parties, withouttanks and heavy artillery, had to repelthe Germans with 40-mm. antiaircraftguns, 105-mm. howitzers, and bazoo-kas, an effort in which the engineers ofthe 531st played an important part.When five Mark IV tanks tried to breakthrough to Blue Beach, seven engineersof Company I helped to repel themwith bazookas. At Yellow Beach, where


DUKWs HEAD FOR THE SALERNO BEACHES

40-mm. antiaircraft guns and 105-mm.howitzers had been hastily set up at thewater's edge, a bulldozer operator ofCompany H, T/5 Charles E. Harris,pulled the guns into position in thedune line. He was wounded by machine-gun fire from a German tank but con-tinued to operate his bulldozer until itwent out of action. On all the beachesthe big bulldozers were easy targets,their operators working under constantfire.

The first beaches open were Red andGreen. Not until shortly after noonwere landing craft discharging at Yel-low, while Blue remained closed mostof the afternoon. By nightfall all werein operation, and tanks, tank destroyers,and heavy artillery were landing and

moving out of the beachhead. The engi-neers cut through wire obstructions,laid steel matting, and improved exitroads, while the 36th Division's infan-try regiments advanced inland. Thatnight two companies of the 36th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, landing onD-day as part of 36th Division's infan-try reserve, served as a screen againstarmor along the Sele River.6

Next morning German planes cameover Red Beach and dropped a bombsquarely on the command post of the531st Engineers' 2d Battalion, killing

6 Hist 531st Engr Shore Rgt, 29 Nov 42-Apr 45;2d Bn, 20 Aug-30 Sep 43; 3d Bn, 20 Aug-30 Sep43; Comments of Brig Gen George W. Gardes, Incl toLtr, Gardes to Jesse A. Remington, 8 Dec 59.


LSTs AND AUXILIARY SHIPS UNLOAD MEN AND SUPPLY AT SALERNO

two officers and seriously woundingtwo others. Artillery shells also fellon the beachhead, but there was noground fighting in the American sec-tor near Paestum on 10 or 11 Septem-ber. The Germans were concentratingtheir forces in the north against theBritish 10 Corps.

General Clark became concernedabout a group of American Rangersthat had landed on the west flank of 10Corps on the Sorrento peninsula be-tween the tiny ports of Amalfi andMaiori to help the British secure themountain passes leading to Naples. OnClark's orders a task force built aroundan infantry battalion moved by sea fromthe VI Corps' beaches to support theRangers. Aboard the eighteen landing

craft that started north on 11 Septem-ber were two companies of engineers,one from the 36th Engineer CombatRegiment and the other from the 540thEngineer Combat Regiment, the latterhaving landed with the 45th Divisionon D plus 1.7

The bulk of the 540th pitched in toaid the 531st in organizing the beaches.Goods of all description crowded theshoreline, barracks bags accumulatedon the narrow beachhead, and the con-gestion finally forced the closing of Redand Green beaches. Unsorted stacks ofammunition, gas, food, water, and

7 Gardes comments, 8 Dec 59; Hist 540th Engr CRgt, 11 Sep 42-15 Feb 45.


equipment extended seaward into sev-eral feet of water, while ships offshorecould not unload. This situation im-proved somewhat after a new beach,Red 2, opened to the left of Red Beachand north of the Fiumarello Canal.8

Naval officers criticized engineer op-eration of the beaches and attributedtraffic jams to poor beach exits and thefailure of some engineers to make ade-quate arrangements to transfer suppliesfrom the beaches to dispersal areas far-ther inland. A major Navy complaintwas that Navy boat crews had to domost of the unloading with little assis-tance from the engineers, whose re-sponsibility it was. The Navy beach-master estimated that during the assaultphase Navy crews unloaded or beached90 percent of the supplies and equip-ment.9

In fact, the beach engineers could notpossibly have handled all the tonnagethat came to the beaches during theassault phase. Combat units and equip-ment grew out of all proportion to ser-vice troops. The 531st went ashore onthe morning of D-day more than 200men understrength and soon was weak-ened further by casualties. To assist the531st in unloading, setting up dumps,maintaining roads, and clearing mine-fields, a battalion of the 337th Engi-neer General Service Regiment, a FifthArmy unit, landed on Red Beach at1630 but could accomplish little becauseits equipment did not come in for sev-eral days. Both the 531st and the 540thEngineer Regiments arrived short of

equipment, notably mine detectors andtrucks. Few engineer supplies beganarriving before D plus 1, and most ofwhat came in was not what was mostwanted. The first engineer supply itemashore was a forty-gallon fire extin-guisher, while other items landed earlywere sandbags, lumber, and tools. Later,a few cranes came in. Once ashore, thetwo regiments felt they did not getenough information from the Navybeachmaster as to what LSTs or car-goes were arriving and where theywould land. As in TORCH and HUSKY,the line between Army and Navy re-sponsibility remained vague.10

The Fifth Army engineer, ColonelBowman, came ashore on D plus 1 andset out in a jeep to find a suitable placefor the army command post. He turnednorth from the congested beachhead,and near the juncture of the Sele andCalore Rivers, not far from the bound-ary between VI Corps and 10 Corps,he found the house of Baron RobertoRicciardi, set in a lovely Italian garden.

In the next three days, the sound ofartillery fire in the north, where theGermans were concentrating against 10Corps, came close; and it was in thissector between the two corps that engi-neer troops first manned frontline posi-tions. On a warning from General Clarkthat a German counterattack might hitthe north flank, the VI Corps com-mander, Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Dawley,reinforced two regiments of the 45thDivision with the 3d Battalion of the36th Engineer Combat Regiment. The

8 VI Corps Hist Record, Sep 43; WNTF Action Rptof Salerno Landing, Sep-Oct 43, p. 152; AGF BdRpt 279, MTO, 24 Jan 45.

9 WNTF Action Rpt of Salerno Landings, pp. 151 -52; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 264, 269.

10 Rpt of SOS Observer of Opn AVALANCHE, 9-21Sep 43, SOS NATOUSA; Rpt, HQ, 1st ESB, to CG,NATOUSA, 29 Oct 43, sub: Operation of ShoreEngineers, Italy; Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp.18, 19.


engineers moved into the line a fewmiles north of the Sele River shortlyafter midnight on 12 September, alongwith a battery of 105-mm. howitzers;by dawn they were in contact with Brit-ish 10 Corps patrols. At 1000 the divi-sion launched an attack. The Germanscounterattacked with tanks and artil-lery, killing two engineer officers, andby dusk had infiltrated and cut off aforward body of engineers that includedthe battalion commander. The engi-neer regimental commander, Lt. Col.George W. Gardes, took over the bat-talion. Before daybreak on 13 Septem-ber the battalion attained its objective,which turned out to have been one ofthe strongpoints of the German defensesystem.11

During 12 September German fireincreased in the American sector andan enemy attack dislodged a 36th Divi-sion battalion from its position on hillsnear Altavilla, south of the Calore River.The increased German pressure resultedfrom the reinforcement of the 16th Pan-zer Division, which had borne the fullforce of the invasion, by the 29th Pan-zer Division, moving up from Calabria.Not only divisional engineers of the111th Engineer Combat Battalion butalso corps and even army engineers bol-stered 36th Division defenses. On 13September two battalions of the 531stEngineer Shore Regiment were calledoff beach work for combat. One wentinland to act as reserve, the other tookup defensive positions on high groundsouth and southeast of the beachhead.12

The situation worsened during theday, indicating that the Germans were

trying to break through to the beach-head, and the 36th Engineer CombatRegiment had to furnish another bat-talion to act as infantry. Moving out atmidnight, the regiment's 2d Battalionoccupied high ground along the southbank of the Calore River astride a roadleading into the beachhead from Alta-villa. This position came under heavyartillery fire throughout 14 and 15September, and tank and infantry at-tacks also menaced it. On the afternoonof 14 September German tanks clankedover a stone bridge spanning the Caloreand began to move up a narrow, one-way road winding toward the engineers'position. The engineers were ready forthem. From a quarry recessed into thehillside, they fired a 37-mm. cannonand a .50-caliber machine gun point-blank at the lead tank, knocking it outto form a roadblock in front of the fol-lowing tanks, which then withdrew un-der American artillery fire. The nextafternoon the engineers saw Germaninfantrymen getting off trucks on thenorth side of the river, apparentlyreadying for an attack. The engineersbrought the German infantry underfire, inflicting observed losses.

In the 45th Division sector north ofthe Sele River, a tank-infantry attackhit the 3d Battalion, 36th Engineers,on 14 September. German tanks over-ran part of one company's position, butthe engineers stayed in their foxholesand stopped the following infantrywhile U.S. tank destroyers engaged thetanks. Another company of the 3d Bat-talion stopped a Mark IV tank withbazookas and that night captured a Ger-man scout car and took three prisoners.During the day the battalion was rein-forced by part of the 45th Division's120th Engineer Combat Battalion, all

11 Gardes comments, 8 Dec 59.12 Hist 531st Engr Shore Rgt, 29 Nov 42-Apr 45.


of which had operated as infantry since13 September.13

General Clark, who had hastily movedColonel Bowman's command post tothe rear, was so concerned about a Ger-man breakthrough to the beachheadthat at one point on 13 September hecontemplated a withdrawal to the 10Corps' zone. But the lines held longenough for reinforcements to comefrom Sicily. Parachute troops of the 82dAirborne Division, dropped on thebeachhead in the early hours of 14 Sep-tember and trucked to the southernflank, turned the tide. When the 3dInfantry Division began landing fromLSTs on the morning of 18 Septemberthe enemy was withdrawing.

Plans for the advance beyond Salernowere determined at a conference Gen-eral Clark called on 18 September.Naples on the west coast, one of thetwo prime objectives, was to be the tar-get of Fifth Army; the other objective,the airfields around Foggia near theeast coast, was to be the target of Gen-eral Montgomery's Eighth Army, whichby 18 September was in a position tomove abreast of Fifth Army up the Ital-ian peninsula. In the Fifth Army effort,10 Corps was to move north along thecoast to capture Naples and drive tothe Volturno River twenty-five milesbeyond while VI Corps made a wideflanking movement through the moun-tains to protect the 10 Corps advance.

A Campaign of Bridges

In addition to active German resis-

tance, terrain was a principal obstaclein the flank march that opened on 20September. Maj. Gen. John P. Lucastook over the VI Corps advance just asit started, arraying the 3d Division onthe left and the 45th on the right, butfound his troops entirely roadbound.Italian terrain was far worse for mili-tary maneuver than that in Sicily; cross-country movement was next to impos-sible, not only over mountain heightsbut even in the valleys, where vehicleswere likely to be stopped by stone walls,irrigation ditches, or German mines.The enemy had blown all the bridgescarrying roadbeds over the numerousgullies, ravines, and streams. Forwardmovement in Italy became for the engi-neers a campaign of bridges.

According to policies Colonel Bow-man laid down, divisional engineerswere to get the troops across streamsany way they could: bypasses whenpossible, fills when culverts had beenblown, or Bailey bridging. Corps engi-neers were to follow up, replacing thesmall fills with culverts and the bypasseswith Bailey bridges. Army engineerswere to replace the larger culverts andthe Baileys with fixed pile bridges. Allbridges were to be two-way, Class 40structures.

Even veteran units had rough going.The 10th Engineer Combat Battalion,supporting the 3d Division in the ad-vance to the Volturno, was the battal-ion that had built the "bridge in thesky" in Sicily. The divisional engineersof the 45th Division, the 120th Engi-neer Combat Battalion, had also hadhard service in the mountains duringthe Sicily campaign. The corps engi-neers behind them came from the 36thEngineer Combat Regiment, which haddistinguished itself in the defense of

13 Gardes comments, 8 Dec 59; Engineer History,Mediterranean, pp. 20, 22.

14 Donald G. Taggart, ed., History of the Third Infan-try Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1947), p. 80.


the beachhead. Yet it took these exper-ienced, battle-hardened engineers tendays to get the troops sixty miles overthe mountains to the first major VICorps objective, Avellino, a town abouttwenty-five miles east of Naples on theNaples-Foggia road.

The Germans had blown nearly everybridge and culvert, made abatis of treetrunks, sown mines, and emplaced boobytraps. Demolitions, shelling, and bomb-ing had cratered road surfaces. In thetowns, rubble from destroyed stonebuildings blocked traffic. But the weath-er was still good, so engineers couldbulldoze bypasses around obstructions."There was no weapon more valuablethan the engineer bulldozer," GeneralTruscott attested, "no soldiers moreeffective than the engineers who movedus forward." Bypasses around blownbridges saved the time required to bringup bridging. In the advance to theVolturno the 10th Engineer CombatBattalion constructed sixty-nine by-passes but only a few timber and Baileybridges.15

The Bailey seemed made for thesteep-banked, swiftly flowing rivers andthe narrow gorges of the Italian coun-tryside. It could be launched from oneside or bank without intermediate sup-ports. In the early phase of the Italiancampaign the Germans did not com-prehend its potential, so they were satis-fied with destroying only parts of longbridges instead of all the spans andpiers. The engineers quickly used thoseparts left standing to throw a Baileyover a stream or ravine 16

The Bailey became all the more es-sential when the engineers discoveredthat timber for wooden bridges wasscarce, at times as much as seventy-fivemiles distant. Yet the supply of Baileyswas woefully inadequate. The 36thEngineer Combat Regiment built morethan eighty bridges and sizable culvertsbetween the breakout at Salerno andthe end of December but during thattime received only three Baileys.17 Inthe first month after the landings, theFifth Army engineers had only five setsof the much sought after 120-foot dou-ble-double Baileys.

One major reason for the shortageof bridging in this early stage of theItalian campaign was a faulty estimateby planners at AFHQ. They had fore-seen that highway destruction would betremendous, had assumed that the en-emy would demolish all bridges, andhad figured that an average of thirtyfeet of bridging per mile of main roadwould be required. But the estimate didnot take into account the secondaryroads that had to be used to supportthe offensive.18

A shortage of bridge-building mate-rial and heavy equipment also ham-pered the work of engineers building abridge over the Sele River to carryHighway 18 traffic northward from thebeachhead to Avellino. This bridge wascrucial because the beaches continuedto be the main source of supplies forFifth Army for a considerable time afterNaples fell.

A company of the 16th Armored En-gineer Battalion put in the first bridgeover the Sele, a floating treadway, on10 September. It was replaced the fol-15 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 25; Truscott,

Command Missions, p. 259.16 VI Corps Hist Record, Sep 43, The Mounting of

AVALANCHE, p. 14; Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Noteson Engr Opns in Italy, no. 6, 1 Jan 44.

17 Gardes comments, 8 Dec 59.18 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 10.


lowing day by a 120-foot trestle tread-way to carry forty-ton loads. During 12and 13 September a battalion of the36th Engineer Combat Regiment em-placed two more floating bridges, andon 22 September the 337th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment began build-ing the first fixed bridge the U.S. Armyconstructed in Italy over the Sele. Itwas of trestle bent construction, 16spans, and 240 feet long. In spite ofthe equipment shortage, the job wascompleted by 28 September.19

However, the bridge was underminedby the shifting sands of the river bot-tom and from the start required con-stant maintenance. When heavy rainsfell early in October, making a rushingtorrent of the normally sluggish Sele,the bridge went out. The 531st Engi-neer Shore Regiment altered the rail-road bridge over the Sele to take trucksso that the vital supply line would notbe interrupted. Then they repaired theroad bridge by driving piling throughthe floor and jacking the bridge up andonto the new pile bents. After thisexperience, engineers abandoned tres-tle construction in favor of pile bridges.In the construction of a 100-foot pile-bent bridge about halfway betweenSalerno and Avellino, near Fisciano, theengineers of the 531st improvised a piledriver, using the barrel of a German155-mm. gun and a D-4 tractor.20

Naples

When Naples fell on 1 October 1943,

Fifth Army's supply situation was dete-riorating rapidly. Truck hauls from theSalerno beaches were becoming longerand more difficult. Unloadings over theSalerno beaches were at the mercy ofthe elements, and the elements had juststruck a blow for the enemy. A violentstorm that blew up on 28 Septemberhalted unloading for 2 1/2 days andwrecked a large number of landingcraft and ponton ramps. Supplies dwin-dled. On 6 October the army had onlythree days' supply of gasoline, and dur-ing the first half of October issues ofClass I and Class III supplies from armydumps outstripped receipts. The earlyreconstruction of Naples and of trans-portation lines was of prime impor-tance.21

Naples, with a natural deepwaterharbor, was the second ranking port inItaly and had a normal discharge capac-ity of 8,000 tons per day.22 The wateralongside most of its piers and quayswas thirty feet deep or more, enoughto accommodate fully loaded Libertyships. There was virtually no tide; thewater level varied only a foot or two, aresult of wind swell as much as tidalaction.

Naples was the most damaged portU.S. Army engineers had yet encoun-tered during the war. Allied aerial bom-bardment had probably caused one-third to one-half the destruction in theport area and more than half that inthe POL tank farm and refinery areas.Carefully planned German demolitionhad been effective. Damage to the quays

19 Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 20, 22; Hist of Activities of the337th GS Rgt with the Fifth Army in Italy, 9 Sep43-1 Nov 44.

20 Interv, Shotwell with Brig Gen Frank O. Bowman,19 Jan 51; Hist 531st Engr Shore Rgt, 29 Nov 42-Apr45.

21 Fifth Army History, vol. I, p. 66.22 Except as otherwise noted, this section on Naples

is based on Rpt on Rehabilitation of Naples and OtherCaptured Ports, by Col Percival A. Wakeman et al., 28Nov 43.


and piers was slight, for they were builtof huge blocks of masonry and not eas-ily demolished. Most of the damage tothem came incidentally from demoli-tions that destroyed pier cranes andother port-operating equipment. TheGermans had directed their destructiontoward cargo-handling equipment, andthey blocked the waters with every pieceof once-floating equipment available.When Fifth Army troops entered thecity, thirty-two large ships and severalhundred smaller craft lay sunk in Na-ples harbor, blocking fifty-eight of thesixty-one berths available and cuttingthe normal capacity of the port by 90percent.23

On the land side, a wall of debris iso-lated the dock area from the rest of thecity; Allied bombing and German de-molitions had destroyed most of thebuildings near the docks. Only steelreinforced buildings stood, and mostof them were badly damaged and lit-tered with debris. The enemy destroyedall of some 300 cranes in the port area;in many cases the demolition chargeswere placed so as to tip the structureinto the waters alongside the quays.Tons of rubble from nearby buildingswere also blown into the water to blockaccess to the quays.24

Despite the widespread destruction,engineer and survey parties had rea-sons for optimism. Sea mines werefound only in the outer harbor. Also,the enemy had sunk ships adjacent tothe quays or randomly about the har-bor, not in the entrance channels where

they could have denied the Allies useof the port for weeks, perhaps months.

Within the city debris blocked sev-eral streets. Rails and bridges on themain lines had been systematically de-stroyed. Ties and ballast, on the otherhand, were generally undisturbed inNaples itself. Most of the large publicbuildings were either demolished orgutted by fire, and others were minedwith time-delay charges. Large indus-trial buildings and manufacturing plantsgenerally were prepared for demoli-tions, but most charges had not beenfired. No booby traps were found inthe harbor area and not a great manythroughout the city.

Public utilities—electricity, water,sewage—were all disrupted. With thegreat Serino aqueducts cut in severalplaces, the city had been without waterfor several days, for most of the wellswithin the city had long since been con-demned and plugged. The only elec-tricity immediately available came fromgenerators Allied units brought in.Local generating stations were dam-aged, and transmission lines from theprincipal source of power, a hydroelec-tric plant fifty miles south of Naples,were down. The distribution systemwithin the city was also damaged, anddemolitions had blocked much of thesewer system.

Fifth Army engineer units enteringthe city from the land side started clear-ing debris from the port. Detachmentsof the 111th Engineer Combat Battal-ion (divisional engineers of the 36thDivision) went to work clearing a roadaround the harbor. The 540th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, bivouacking ina city park overlooking the Bay of Na-ples, had the job of clearing the harbor.With dynamite, bulldozer, torch, crane,

23 PBS, Public Relations Sect, Tools of War: An Illus-trated History of the Peninsular Base Section (Leghorn,Italy, 1946); Fifth Army History, vol. II, p. 66.

24 History of Restoration of Port of Naples, 1051stEngr Port Construction and Repair Gp, 10 Dec 43,Engr Sch Lib.


and shovel, the men of the 540th filledcraters, hacked roads through debris,cleared docks, and leveled buildings.Within twenty-four hours the har-bor was receiving LSTs and LCTs, andexit roads were making it possible forDUKWs to bring cargoes inland fromLiberty ships in the bay.25 The 1051stEngineer Port Construction and RepairGroup, attached to the Fifth Army BaseSection, arrived on 2 October but coulddo little more than survey the chaosuntil base engineer troops came on thescene.

The engineers working on the docksundertook their tasks in three phases.The first, based on quick estimates, wasthe clearing of debris to provide accessto those berths not blocked by sunkenships. The second involved expedientconstruction, and this the engineersundertook after a reasonably compre-hensive survey made it feasible to planfor future activities. The third phase,reconstruction, involved more time-consuming projects that started onlyafter the possibilities of providing facili-ties by expedient construction had beenexhausted.

The first phase, which occurred from3 to 5 October, was the most criticalone. Since demands for berthing andunloading space were urgent, there wasno time for deliberate, planned activity.All available army and base sectionengineers and equipment had to becommitted against obstacles blockingthe initial unloading points. Navy sal-vage units, equipped with small navalsalvage vessels and aided by Royal Navysalvage units with heavy lifting equip-ment, entered the harbor on 4 October

to locate ships and craft that obstructedberthing space. Coordinating with thenaval units, the 1051st Engineer PortConstruction and Repair Group sur-veyed landward obstructions.

Although only 3 1/2 Liberty berthswere available on 7 October, berthingspace grew rapidly with the expedientconstruction. On 16 October, 6,236 tonsof cargo came ashore, a figure thatincluded 263 vehicles. By the end ofthe month 13 1/2 Liberty berths and 6coaster berths were available for use(the goal set early in October was 15Liberty berths and 5 coaster berths by1 November). The most urgent require-ments had been met, and supplies inthe dumps amounted to 3,049 tons.

Ramps of standard naval pontons,laid two units wide, were built farenough out into the harbor to accom-modate Liberty ships. These rampswere easy to build and feasible enoughin tideless waters, but they were too nar-row for cargo and were used only forunloading vehicles. More widely usedwere steel and timber ramps whichengineers were able to construct acrossthe decks of sunken ships alongside thepiers. These ramps became the trade-mark of the engineers in the rehabilita-tion of Naples.

All but two of the large ships block-ing the piers were too badly damaged topatch and float aside immediately; butmost of them lay alongside the quays,with their decks above or just below thesurface of the water. When engineerscleared away the superstructures andbuilt timber and steel ramps across thedecks, Liberty ships could tie up along-side the sunken hulks and unload di-rectly onto trucks on the ramps. As arule T-shaped ramps ten to fifteen feetwide were built at each berth and spaced25 Hist 540th Engr C Rgt, 11 Sep 42-15 Feb 45.


DECKING PLACED OVER SUNKEN VESSELS to enable loading in Naples harbor.

to correspond with the five hatches ofa Liberty ship. The head of the T wastwenty to twenty-five feet long, allow-ing room on the ramp for temporarycargo storage and for variations in thespacing of hatches on individual ships.At first these ramps went out only overships sunk on an even keel; later theywere built on ships that lay on theirsides or at an angle to the quay. Eventu-ally engineers filled the spaces betweenthe ramps with decking to provide moreworking room.

Another improvisation made thelarger of two dry docks into a Libertyberth. The caisson-type gates had beendamaged and two ships lay inside thedock. Leaks in the gate were sealedwith tremie concrete, which cures

under water, and the ships were bracedto the sides of the dock. The basin wasthen emptied so the ships could bepatched. Since the walls of the dockswere not perpendicular, steel scaffold-ing had to be built out over the steppedmasonry walls and covered with timberdecking. After the ships were refloatedand pulled away, both sides of a Libertyship could be unloaded at the same timein the dry dock. The smaller dry dockwas used for ship repairs once a sunkendestroyer had been patched and floatedout.

At the foot of one pier a cargo vessellay sunk with one side extending eightto ten feet above water. The vessel wasflat bottomed, so a Liberty ship couldcome in close alongside. Engineers built


GENERAL PENCE

a working platform on the ship with abridge connecting to the pier. At an-other pier, where a large hospital shiplay sunk with its masts and funnels rest-ing against the quays, walkways andsteps leading across the hulk and downto the pier made a berth for discharg-ing personnel.

Clearing away underwater debris alsoreleased berthing space. Floating andland-based cranes removed debrisalong the piers and quays, while portconstruction and repair group diverswent down to cut loose sunken cranesand other steel equipment.

Peninsular Base

With the arrival of more servicetroops from North Africa, the FifthArmy Base Section assumed more re-sponsibility for supply in the army'srear. Through summer 1943, FifthArmy's support organization was onlya skeleton, designated 6665th BaseArea Group (Provisional) and modeledafter the NATOUSA Atlantic Base Sec-tion. It changed its provisional charac-ter and its name to the full-fledgedFifth Army Base Section on 28 August.Under Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Pence, anadvance echelon accompanied FifthArmy headquarters to Italy, landingat Salerno on D plus 2. GeneralPence established his headquarters atNaples the day after the city wascaptured, and on 25 October his com-mand became the Peninsular Base Sec-tion, with its Engineer Service underCol. Donald S. Burns.26

By 10 October the first full-sized con-

voy brought the 345th Engineer Gen-eral Service Regiment to the base sec-tion. The Base Section Engineer Ser-vice also had at its disposal the 540thEngineer Combat Regiment, two engi-neer general service regiments (the345th and 94th), the 386th EngineerBattalion (Separate), one company of awater supply battalion (attached fromFifth Army), an engineer port construc-tion and repair group, an engineermaintenance company, a depot com-pany, and a map depot detachment—inall, about 6,000 engineers.27

Colonel Burns ran all engineer func-tions in the base section area, was re-

26 History of the Peninsular Base Section, NorthAfrican Theater of Operations, 9 Jul 43-1 May 44,vol. I, pp. 6-8.

27 Ltr, Pence to Truesdell, 26 Nov 43, sub: Organi-zation of PBS; Hist PBS, 28 May 44; Hist of the PBS,Phases II and III, 28 Aug 43-3 Jan 44; PBS EngrHist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. I, Chronological Summary;Col. Joseph S. Gorlinski, "Naples: Case History inInvasion," The Military Engineer, XXXVI (April 1944),109-14.


sponsible for building and operatingbulk petroleum installations, and wasalso responsible for new railroad con-struction without regard to the armyrear boundary. When the army's ad-vance was slow, base section engineerswere able to carry both pipeline andrailroad work well into the army area.As for air force construction, the Engi-neer Service was responsible not onlyfor bulk POL systems in the vicinity ofairfields, but it also was to provide com-mon engineer supplies to aviation engi-neers operating in the area. All engi-neer units assigned to the base area,except for fire-fighting detachments(under the base section provost mar-shal), were under the command of thebase section engineer.28

The Engineer Service had sixbranches: administration, operations,construction, supply, real estate, andpetroleum. An important function ofthe administrative branch involvednegotiating with the Allied MilitaryGovernment Labor Office (AMGLO)and with the labor administration officeof the base purchasing agent for civil-ians to work with engineer units andfor office personnel to work at engi-neer headquarters. By the end of 19433,126 civilians worked directly for engi-neer units or on contracts the base sec-tion engineers supervised. Workersemployed by individual engineer unitswere paid semi-monthly by speciallyappointed agent finance officers atwages the AMGLO established.

The operations branch was responsi-ble for issuing administrative instruc-tions to engineer units, coordinating

engineer troop movements, and keep-ing strength, disposition, and statusreports of personnel and equipment.It also issued orders to engineer unitsfor minefield clearance.

The construction branch, heart of theEngineer Service organization, appliedthe Engineer Service's resources againstthe mass of requests for constructionthat poured in. It provided technicalassistance to engineer units, allocatedpriorities among jobs, and establishedand enforced standards of construction.The number of jobs was staggering:reconstructing the Naples port area;restoring public utility services inNaples and removing public dangerssuch as time bombs and building skele-tons; reopening lines of communica-tions; providing troop facilities such ashospitals, rest camps, replacementcamps, quarters, stockades and POWenclosures, laundries, and bakeries;building supply depots and mainte-nance shops; and helping local indus-tries get back into production.29

The supply branch received materialrequirements estimates from the FifthArmy engineer, the III Air ServiceArea Command, the petroleum branch,and, later, from the various branchesof the Engineer Service, PeninsularBase Section. It consolidated these req-uisitions for submission to the engineer,SOS, NATOUSA, through the base sec-tion supply office (G-4). Fifth Armyhad requisitioned supplies for a thirty-day maintenance period and had fore-cast its needs through November.Thereafter, responsibility for requisi-tioning engineer supplies rested with

28 Extracts from Report on Peninsular Base Section,NATOUSA, 10 Feb 44, sec. VIII, Engr Service, 381NATOUSA, EUCOM Engr files.

29 PBS Engr Hist, pt. I; Hist of the PBS, Phases IIand III.


the base section engineer. Except foremergency orders, engineer requisi-tions were submitted monthly and werefilled from depots in North Africa;items not available there were requisi-tioned from the New York POE. Thesupply branch also coordinated localprocurement.

Responsibility for requisitioning realestate for all military purposes in con-nection with U.S. base section forcesalso rested with the engineer. Ulti-mately, a separate real estate branchwas established.

The designation of a petroleumbranch underscored the importance ofthis new engineer mission. POL prod-ucts represented nearly half the grosstonnage of supplies shipped into Italy,and engineer pipelines were the princi-pal means for moving motor and avia-tion gasoline once it was dischargedfrom tankers at Italian ports.30

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

Petroleum facilities in Naples wereheavily damaged. Allied bombers hadhit the tank farms as early as July 1942,and many tanks and connecting pipe-lines had been pierced by bomb frag-ments; others had buckled or had beensevered by concussion. German demoli-tionists had added some finishingtouches at important pipe connections,discharge lines, and tanker berths. How-ever, existing petroleum installations inNaples were large and much could besalvaged.31

Sixteen men from the 696th Engi-

neer Petroleum Distribution Companyentered Naples on 2 October. Thisadvance party surveyed existing instal-lations, recruited civilian petroleumworkers, and began clearing awaydebris and salvaging materials. The345th Engineers furnished teams ofmine sweepers. After the main body ofthe 696th arrived two weeks later, theconnecting pipelines in the terminalarea were traced, patched, cleaned, andtested, and new threaded pipe was laid.One after another the huge steel stor-age tanks were patched and cleaned.This work often involved cutting a doorin the bottom of a tank, shoveling outaccumulated sludge, and scrubbing thewalls with a mixture of diesel oil andkerosene.

Some of this early work proved waste-ful. It began before any master planfor the POL terminal was available.Engineers repaired some tanks withfloating roofs before they discoveredthat the tanks were warped. The 696thhad no training or experience in suchwork, and plates welded over smallholes cracked when they cooled untilthe company learned how to correct theproblem. Other practices,, such as thebest method for scrubbing down tanks,had to come from trial and error.32

Not until 24 October did the 696thcompany have the terminal ready toreceive gasoline, and the first tanker,the Empire Emerald, did not actually dis-

30 PBS Engr Hist, pt. 10, sec. 1.31 Extracts from Rpt on PBS, NATOUSA, 10 Feb

44, sec. VIII. Engr Service; PBS Engr Hist, West ItalyPipelines, pt. I, sec. IV, 1943-45.

32 Extracts from Rpt on PBS, NATOUSA, 10 Feb44, sec. VIII, Engr Service; Observers Rpt on theEngr Service, SOS NATOUSA, Lt Col William F. Pow-ers (ca. Mar 44), 370.2 (MTO-NA), EUCOM Engrfiles; Ltr, Col C. Kittrell, SOS NATOUSA Engr, toChf Engr, AFHQ, 10 Aug 44, sub: Cleaning of Stor-age Tanks, and 1st Incl by Engr, PBS, 9 Jun 44 to Ltr,HQ, SOS NATOUSA, 8 May, same sub, 679.11, OilPipelines, MTOUSA files.


ENGINEER OFFICER READS PRESSURE GAUGES at pumping station, Foggia, Italy.

charge its cargo until five days later. Inthe meantime engineers set up dispens-ing and refueling stations in the termi-nal area, and once the Empire Emeralddischarged, Fifth Army and base sec-tion units were able to draw some oftheir fuel supply from the bulk instal-lations. The petroleum engineers didnot limit their operations to providingfacilities for ground force units. The696th company readied separate linesand storage tanks to receive 100-octaneaviation fuel, as well as storage tanks,discharge lines, and fueling facilities fornaval forces.

The engineer work to make possiblethe discharge of POL and other sup-plies at Naples became increasinglyurgent as October advanced. By the end

of the first week in October advanceelements of Fifth Army were at theVolturno River, and a week later thecrossings began.

The Volturno Crossings

To the engineers involved in gettingthe troops across the river, where allbridges were down, the most impor-tant feature of the Volturno was that itwas shallow. From 150 to 220 feet wide,the river was normally only 3 to 5 feetdeep; even after the rains of early Octo-ber began, spots existed on the VICorps front where men could wadeacross and tanks could ford. The VICorps crossings were to be made by the3d and 34th Divisions abreast between


Triflisco (the boundary with British 10Corps on the west) and Amorosi, wherethe Volturno, flowing down from thenorthwest, joins the Calore and turnswest toward the sea. The corps' 45thDivision was east of Amorosi in a sectoradjoining British Eighth Army andwould not be involved in the Volturnocrossings.

By 6 October the 3d Division was atthe river, but for days rains and stiffen-ing German resistance made it impossi-ble to bring up the 34th Division, aswell as 10 Corps, which was to crosssimultaneously with VI Corps. Floodedswamplands and enemy demolitionsheld the British back; and in the pathof the 34th Division the fields were sodeep in mud that cross-country move-ment was impossible. Punishing mili-tary traffic deepened the mud on thefew roads and continually ground downand destroyed surfaces already crateredfrom heavy shelling. Enormous quanti-ties of gravel and rock had to be used,even timber for corduroy cut from thebanks of the Volturno.33

The 3d Division made good use ofthe week's delay. Reconnoitering thebanks, patrols found wheel tracks wherethe Germans had crossed. At nightpatrols waded or swam the Volturnoand marked fording spots. The troopswere to cross in assault boats or wade,in either case holding on to guide ropesanchored to trees on the opposite bank.Heavy weapons were to be carried inassault boats. The 3d Division's 10thEngineer Combat Battalion rounded upfive miles of guide rope and foundsome life jackets in a Naples warehouse.Some assault boats had to be impro-

vised. Naval officers in Naples providedsome life rafts; other rafts were manu-factured and floated by oil or waterdrums; and rubber pontons from tread-way bridges came in handy.

At the place where waterproofedtanks were to ford, the engineers builta road to the riverbank. Bridges wouldbe required for vehicles unable to ford.A railway yard in the neighborhoodyielded material for a prefabricatedcableway and some narrow-gauge rail-road track which, overlaid with Som-merfeld matting and supported byfloats, made a usable bridge for jeeps.34

Waiting on the mountain heightsbeyond the now racing, swollen Vol-turno, the Germans were prepared torepel the crossings. They had emplacedheavy artillery, laid mines, dug gun pits,and sighted machine guns to cover theriverbanks with interlocking fields offire. They killed many men probing forcrossing sites, but still did not knowwhere the attack would come. GeneralTruscott misled them into thinking themain crossing would be made on theAmerican left at Triflisco Gap, thencrossed the river in the center, spear-heading the advance with the 7th In-fantry of his 3d Division.

At 0200 on 13 October, after a heavypreliminary bombardment of Germanpositions, troops of the 7th Infantryentered the river under a smoke screen,one battalion in rafts and assault boats,

33 Fifth Army History, vol. II, 7 Oct-15 Nov 43, pp.15-16, 49.

34 Taggart, History of the Third Infantry Division inWorld War II, pp. 88-89; Nathan William White, WarDepartment, Military Intel Div, From Fedala to Berch-tesgaden, (Brockton, Mass.: Keystone Print, Inc., 1947),pp. 51-52. Details of the crossings are taken fromthese two sources as well as Blumenson, Salerno toCassino, pp. 196-206; and War Department, MilitaryIntel Div, From the Volturno to the Winter Line (6 Octo-ber-15 November 1943), American Forces in ActionSeries (Washington, 1944), pp. 27-54.


two battalions wading the icy waters andholding their rifles above their heads.The men in the boats had the worst ofit; many of the trees anchoring theguide ropes tore away from soddenbanks; rafts broke up in the swift cur-rent; and the rubber boats tended todrift downstream and were held backonly with great difficulty by a partyfrom the 39th Engineer Combat Regi-ment. Despite the struggle against theriver, daylight found all the combattroops of the initial waves on the farbank picking their way through theminefields.

By 0530 General Truscott had wordthat all of the 7th Infantry was over theriver and that two battalions of the 15thInfantry had crossed in the same man-ner and with much the same problems.On the right of the 3d Division two bat-talions of the 34th Division had crossedthe Volturno with relative ease.

Truscott's main worry was a delay ingetting the tanks across. At the ford inthe 7th Infantry sector, bulldozer oper-ators at first light had begun trying tobreak down the riverbank so the tankscould get to the water's edge withouttipping over; but the bulldozers wereunarmored, and enemy shelling causedso many casualties among the opera-tors that the work stopped. Around1000, Truscott learned from the com-manding officer of the 7th Infantry,Col. Harry B. Sherman, that Germantanks were advancing toward the rifle-men on the far bank and that the enemywas probably about to launch a coun-terattack.

Leaving Sherman's command post,Truscott encountered a platoon of engi-neers from Company A of the 111thEngineer Combat Battalion on theirway to the site where work was starting

on the division bridge. "In a few briefwords," Truscott later recalled, "Ipainted for them the urgent need forcourageous engineers who could leveloff the river bank even under fire sothat tanks could cross and prevent ourinfantry battalions being overrun by theenemy. Their response was immediateand inspiring. I left them double-timingtoward the river half a mile away tolevel off the bank with picks andshovels—which they did, while tanksand tank destroyers neutralized enemyfire from the opposite bank."35 By 1240fifteen tanks and three tank destroyershad reached the opposite bank andwere moving to the aid of the riflemen.

By that time the jeep bridge in the7th Infantry area, being built by Com-pany A of the 10th Engineer CombatBattalion, was almost finished. But workthe battalion's Company B was doing onthe division bridge in the 15th Infan-try area to the east had been stoppedby German artillery fire, which causedcasualties among the engineers, punc-tured pontons, and damaged trucks.General Truscott hurried to the site andtold the engineers they would have todisregard the shelling and finish thebridge. The company "returned to workas nonchalantly as though on some engi-neer demonstration" and completed thebridge that afternoon, although shell-ing continued to cause casualties.36

Sites for the division bridge and fora thirty-ton bridge to carry tanks, corpsartillery, and heavy engineer equip-ment had been selected entirely fromaerial photographs. Later, ground re-

35 Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 271-72.36 Ibid., p. 43; War Dept, Mil Intel Div, From the

Volturno to the Winter Line, pp. 31, 40.


connaissance justified this method ofselection.37

The thirty-ton corps bridge went innear Capua about 500 yards from ablown bridge that had carried High-way 87 across the river at Triflisco.Aware that this site was the only onesuitable for a heavy bridge, the Ger-mans stubbornly dominated the heightsall through the day on 13 October, andnot until the next day could work begin.To build the 270-foot-long treadway VICorps had to call on the 16th ArmoredEngineer Battalion, which had tread-way equipment and experienced men.Engineers from the 10th EngineerCombat Battalion and the 39th Engi-neer Combat Regiment prepared theapproaches across muddy fields con-necting the bridge with Highway 87.Construction began under a blanket ofsmoke which seemed to draw artilleryfire. In spite of casualties and damagedpontons the engineers finished thetreadway early in the afternoon, in onlysix hours. Later that same afternoonGeneral Clark changed the boundarybetween VI Corps and British 10-Corps,giving the British responsibility for the3d Division's objective on the left flank.This change gave the bridge to theBritish. In its first five days the tread-way carried 7,200 vehicles across theVolturno.38

In the 34th Division's zone to the east,south of Caiazzo, the task of building adivision bridge over the Volturno fellto Company A of VI Corps' 36th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, the regiment

that had helped repel German counter-attacks after the Salerno landing andhad contributed its Company H to theRangers at Amalfi. Company H hadmarched into Naples with the Rangersto clear mines and booby traps. At theItalian barracks where the company wasbilleted, a German delayed-action demo-lition charge exploded on 10 October,killing twenty-three men and wound-ing thirteen.

Misfortune also dogged the effortsof Company A to build the divisionbridge over the Volturno at Annunziata.According to plan, infantrymen on thefar bank were to have taken a firstphase line, including heights whereGerman artillery was emplaced, beforethe engineers moved forward to theriver from their assembly area threemiles to the rear. On orders, the engi-neer convoy got under way at 0700 on13 October, with trucks carrying floatsalready inflated to save time. But thehigh ground had not yet been taken,and no one had informed the engi-neers.

At Annunziata an enemy barragebegan, and by the time the first threefloats were launched the German firehad become so accurate that all weredestroyed. During the day engineer cas-ualties amounted to 3 men killed, 8wounded, and 2 missing. Not until wellafter dark did the infantrymen take thefirst phase line. By that time the engi-neers had found another site upstream.Working under a smoke screen that (asat Triflisco) attracted enemy fire, theywere able to finish the bridge by mid-morning on 14 October. That after-noon a company of the 16th Armored37 Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Notes on Engr Opns in

Italy, no. 8, 1 Feb 44, app. A-1, p. 4; Hist 1554thEngr Heavy Ponton Bn, 1 Jan 45-8 May 45.

38 Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 268, 274; EngineerHistory, Mediterranean, p. 33.

39 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 40.


WRECKED M2 FLOATING TREADWAY ON THE VOLTURNO

Engineer Battalion began building nearCaiazzo a 255-foot, 30-ton treadwaybridge and finished it before midnight.Next morning, although German planesmade several passes at it, the bridgewas carrying the 34th Division's heavyvehicles over the Volturno.40

From the time troops crossed thelower Volturno at Capua and Caiazzoto the time they crossed the upperVolturno a few weeks later at Venafroand Colli, the engineers were so shortof bridging material that they had to

resort to low-level bridges, sometimesconstructed of any material they couldscrounge from the countryside. Theyspeedily slapped temporary bridges(largely treadways) across the river.Flash floods in November and Decem-ber washed them out. On one occasionwhen the Volturno rose eighteen feetin ten hours, all the bridges but onewere out for some time. Alternateroutes—long, difficult, and circuitous—slowed supplies and added to trafficcongestion. The one bridge sturdyenough to resist the torrent was a semi-permanent structure the 343d EngineerGeneral Service Regiment built atCapua between 16 October and 9November. This pile bridge was for sixmonths thereafter a major link in the

40 Hist 36th Engr C Rgt, 1 Jun 41 -23 Jun 44, includ-ing Ltr, 1st Lt Thomas F. Farrell, Jr., to CO, 36thEngr C Rgt, 28 Oct 43, sub: Volturno River Crossing;Hist 109th Engr C Bn, 10 Feb 41-8 May 45, app. I,pt. III; Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 32, 33, 40;Gardes comments in Ltr, 5 Nov 59.


Fifth Army lifeline. It was 32 feet high,some 370 feet long, and was classifiedas a two-way Class 40, one-way Class 70bridge. In the first twenty-four hoursafter the bridge opened to traffic,10,000 vehicles crossed; during thecampaign, a million.41

In spite of this experience at theVolturno the engineers built a numberof temporary bridges too low to with-stand the swift currents of Italianstreams and lost several more to flashfloods. Any floating bridge was built atthe existing level of the river or stream.As the rivers rose or fell, floating orfixed spans had to be added or re-moved. When Italian streams rose rap-idly the engineers could not alwaysextend the bridge fast enough to saveit. The height of the bridge also de-pended upon the availability of con-struction materials, hard to come by inItaly. As the supply of Baileys im-

proved, longer and higher structureswere built.42

During the early part of Novemberthe enemy reinforced his units in frontof the Fifth Army in an attempt toestablish and hold the "Winter Line,"increasing their strength from three tofive divisions. By 15 November the Brit-ish 10 Corps was stopped on a frontapproximately sixteen miles from thesea to Caspoli, while VI Corps wasstalled on a front extending throughthe Mignano Gap past Venafro andnorth to the Eighth Army's left wingnear Castel San Vincenzo. General Alex-ander called a halt and General Clarkset about regrouping Fifth Army. Allow-ing the 34th and 45th Divisions time torest and refit, he sent the 36th Divisioninto the line and withdrew the 3d Divi-sion, which, slated for Anzio, came tothe end (as General Truscott remarked)of "fifty-nine days of mountains andmud."43

41 Gardes comments in Ltr, 5 Nov 59; EngineerHistory, Mediterranean, p. 51.

42 Comments, Brig Gen D. O. Elliott, in Ltr to Dr.Jesse A. Remington, 18 Mar 60.

43 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 285.

CHAPTER IX

The Winter Line and theAnzio Beachhead

The region of Fifth Army operationsduring the winter of 1943-44 wasadmirably suited for stubborn defense.Its topography included the narrow val-leys of rivers rising in the Apenninesand emptying into the Tyrrhenian Sea,irregular mountain and hill systems,and a narrow coastal plain. The dividebetween the Volturno-Calore and theGarigliano-Rapido valleys consisted ofmountains extending from the crest ofthe Apennines southward about fortymiles, averaging some 3,000 feet abovesea level and traversed by few roads ortrails. The slopes rising from the rivervalleys were often precipitous and for-ested, and all the rivers were swollenby winter rains and melting snow. Inthese mountains and valleys north andwest of the Volturno, German delayingtactics slowed and finally halted FifthArmy's progress. The engineers had tofight enemy mines and demolitions aswell as mountains and flooded streams.

Before the Allies launched an attackon the Winter Line on 1 December1943, the U.S. II Corps took its placein the Fifth Army center near Mignano.The British 10 Corps and U.S. VI Corpsoccupied the left and right flanks, re-spectively. Early in January VI Corpswithdrew from the Fifth Army front toprepare for the Anzio operation, andthe French Expeditionary Corps (FEC),initially consisting of two divisions from

North Africa, took its place. A numberof Italian units, including engineers,also joined Fifth Army. But these addi-tions did not assure rapid progress.The army pushed slowly and painfullythrough the mountains until it came toa halt in mid-January at the enemy'snext prepared defenses, the GustavLine, which followed the courses of theRapido and Garigliano Rivers for mostof its length. Opposing Fifth Army andthe British Eighth Army was the Ger-man Tenth Army.1

In January Fifth Army attacked ontwo fronts. VI Corps' surprise flankattack in the Anzio landing (SHINGLE)of 22 January penetrated inland an aver-age of ten miles, but then the GermanFourteenth Army contained the beach-head, and for the remainder of the win-ter VI Corps was on the defensive. Inthe mountains to the south Fifth Armycould gain little ground. When an at-tack began on 17 January, II Corps heldthe Fifth Army center along the Rapidoand tried repeatedly to smash throughthe Gustav Line. By the thirty-first IICorps had penetrated some Germanlines but failed to capture Cassino, keyto enemy defenses. The opening of thesecond front at Anzio had reduced the

1 For terrain and tactical details, see Blumenson,Salerno to Cassino, chs. XIII-XV, and Fifth Army History,vol. II, pp. 2-3; vol. III, p. 2 and an. 5; vol. IV, pp. 2,4, 187-88.

THE WINTER LINE AND THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD 181

length of the inland front Fifth Armycould hold; hence, in February threedivisions moved from Eighth Army totake over the Cassino-Rapido frontwhile Fifth Army units concentrated inthe southern half of the line, along theGarigliano. Despite heavy casualties, thegains in the winter campaign were neg-ligible, and a stalemate existed until theoffensive resumed in the spring.

Minefields in the MountainsApproaching the Volturno, the Allies

had run into increasingly dense and sys-tematic minefields which included un-familiar varieties of mines and boobytraps. The German mine arsenal inItaly contained the "S" (or "BouncingBetty") and Teller plus many new typesincluding the Schu and the Stock, mineswith detonations delayed up to twenty-one days, and mines with improvisedcharges. Nonmetallic materials such aswood and concrete in many of thenewer mines made detection more dif-ficult and more dangerous.

Allied troops dreaded the Schu mineespecially. Approximately 6-by-4-by-2inches, this mine consisted of a 1/2- to2-pound block of explosive and a sim-ple detonating device enclosed in light-weight pressed board or impregnatedplywood. It could be carried by any footsoldier and planted easily in great num-bers; it was most effective placed flushwith the ground and covered with alight layer of dirt, grass, and leaves. TheSchu did not kill, but as little as fivepounds of pressure would set it off toshatter foot, ankle, and shin bones.

At the Volturno the enemy had re-covered from the confusion of retreat,and to the end of the Italian campaigneach successive German fortified linehad its elaborate mine defenses. The

Germans frequently sowed mines with-out pattern and used many confusingmethods. Distances, depths, and typesvaried. A mine might be planted aboveanother of the same or different typein case a mine-lifting party cleared onlythe top layer.

The scale of antipersonnel miningincreased as the campaign progressed.Booby traps were planted in bunchesof grapes, in fruit and olive trees, inhaystacks, at roadblocks, among felledtrees, along hedges and walls, in ra-vines, valleys, hillsides, and terraces,along the beds and banks of streams, intire or cart tracks along any likely ave-nue of approach, in possible bivouacareas, in buildings that troops might beexpected to enter, and in shell or bombcraters where soldiers might take ref-uge. The Germans placed mines in bal-last under railroad tracks, in tunnels,at fords, on bridges, on road shoulders,in pits, in repaired pot holes, and indebris. Field glasses, Luger pistols, wal-lets, and pencils were booby-trapped,as were chocolate bars, soap, windows,doors, furniture, toilets, demolishedGerman equipment, even bodies ofAllied and German civilians and sol-diers.2

In areas sown with S-mines bulldozeroperators wore body armor, and eachcombat battalion had four "flak" suits.More than fifty bulldozers struck minesduring the campaign. In many casesthe operators were thrown from theirseats, but none was killed. Some hadbroken legs, but had they been in cabswith roofs many would have had theirnecks broken or skulls fractured.3

2 Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 34, 36, 42; Bow-man notes, 31 Mar 44, Fifth Army Engr files.

3 Hist 10th Engr C Bn, 1944; Hist 313th Engr C Bn,1944-45; Interv, Col John D. Cole, Jr., CO, 310thEngr C Bn, 1959.


Although detecting and clearingmines was not exclusively an engineerfunction, the engineers were primarilyresponsible. But they were not ade-quately trained. As late as September1944 engineers in the field complainedthat no organization or procedure hadbeen established for collecting enemymines for training.4

Infantrymen retained the dread ofmines that had been so marked in NorthAfrica. To ease that dread and to passon proper procedures for lifting mines,the engineers emphasized that mineswere one of the normal risks of war;only one man should deal with a mine;skilled help should be called in whenneeded; ground should be checkedcarefully in a mined area; all roads andshoulders should be cleared and accu-rate records made of such work, withroads and lanes not cleared beingblocked off and so reported; and largeminefields should not be cleared excepton direct orders.5

The engineers often found that in-fantrymen did not comprehend thetime required to check an area. Check-ing and clearing mines were slow andcareful processes, requiring many menand involving great risks even whenthere was no enemy fire. For example,the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion inthe Formia-Gaeta area, north of Naples,suffered fifty-seven casualties, includ-ing fifteen deaths, in clearing 20,000mines of all types during a period ofsixteen days. Often a large area con-tained only a few mines, but the num-ber found bore little relation to the timethat had to be spent checking and clear-ing. Furthermore, much of the work

had to be done under artillery, machinegun, and mortar fire. Ordinarily theinfantry attacked with engineers in sup-port to clear mine paths, and engineercasualties were inevitable.6

New problems in mine detection a-rose during the Italian campaign. Withthe increasing number of nonmetallicenemy mines, the SCR-625 detectorbecame less dependable and the prodmore important. Italian soil containedheavy mineral deposits and large con-centrations of artifacts buried over theages.7 A detector valuable in one spotmight be useless a mile away, wherethe metallic content of the soil itself pro-duced in the instrument a hum indistin-guishable from that caused by mines.Shell fragments and other scraps ofmetal scattered in many areas causedthe same confusion.

The wooden Schu mine was difficultfor the SCR-625 to spot. Since the fusewas the only metal in the mine, thedetector had to be carefully tuned andthe operator particularly alert. Theprod was a surer instrument than thedetector in this work, but it had to beheld carefully at a thirty-degree angleto avoid activating the mine. The Schucharges were too small to damage bull-dozers seriously, but ordinarily the Ger-mans placed these mines in areas inac-cessible to bulldozers. However, Schumines in open fields or along pathswere often interspersed with S-mines,which could be costly to bulldozers andoperators. One solution was to sendsheep or goats into the minefield to hittrip wires and detonate the mines.8

4 AGF Bd Rpt, Lessons Learned in the Battle fromGarigliano to North of Rome, 21 Sep 44.

5 Fifth Army History, vol. VIII, p. 91.

6 Hist 126th Engr C Bn, 1944-45; Hist 10th EngrC Bn, 1944.

7 Comments, Warren E. Graban, geologist, Water-ways Experimental Station, Vicksburg, Miss., 30 Apr59.

8 36th Div Opns Rpt, Jan 44, an. 14; Hist 111thEngr C Bn.


The fact that the SCR-625s were notwaterproof continued to limit theirusefulness. They had difficulty findingmines buried in snow, and any lengthyrain usually rendered them useless.However, covering the detector with agas cape protected it somewhat againstrain and snow. The 10th EngineerCombat Battalion (3d Division) had asmany as ninety detectors on hand atone time, but at times most were unser-viceable. Its use was limited near thefront, because the enemy often couldhear the detector's hum, especially atnight when much of the work was doneand when the front lines were compara-tively quiet.9

The engineers tried out new types ofdetectors at various times. The FifthArmy received the AN/PRS-1 (Dinah)detector in August 1944. It was less sen-sitive than the SCR-625 and in a seven-day test proved not worthwhile. A ve-hicular detector, the AN/VRS-1,mounted in a jeep, was also tested andrejected as undependable.

Of numerous other countermine de-vices and procedures tried, a few proveduseful. The best of these were prima-cord ropes and cables. The 48th Engi-neer Combat Battalion developed a sim-ple device for clearing antipersonnelmines—a rifle grenade that propelleda length of primacord across a mine-field. The exploded primacord left awell-defined path about eighteen incheswide, cutting nearly all taut trip wiresand sometimes detonating Schu mines.In all cases the engineers cleared theground of any growth or underbrushto reveal mines or trip wires.

On the Cisterna front, fifteen milesnortheast of Anzio, the 16th Armored

Engineer Battalion used six Snakes toadvantage when the Allies broke out oftheir perimeter. Segments of explosive-filled pipe that could be assembled intolengths up to 400 feet, the Snakes threwthe enemy into momentary panic andpermitted Combat Command A (CCA),1st Armored Division to advance; Com-bat Command B, which did not use thedevices lost a number of tanks in itsbreakout. In practice, the Snakes wereeffective only over flat, heavily minedground. They were susceptible to rainand mud, slow to build, difficult totransport and vulnerable to artillery fireand mine detonations.10

Other devices and methods for find-ing and removing mines in Italy in-cluded aerial detection—especially val-uable along the Garigliano River andat Anzio—D-7 bulldozers with rollers,bazooka shells, bangalore torpedoes,and grappling hooks that activated anti-personnel mine trip wires.11

Bridge Building and Road Work

In the winter campaign, the steeltreadway and the Bailey (fixed andfloating) were the tactical bridges theengineers used most, and the Baileyproved the more valuable. In the opin-ion of the Fifth Army engineer, it was"the most useful all-purpose fixed bridgein existence." Its capacity and lengthcould be increased speedily by addingtrusses and piers. It could be usedwhere other bridges could not, particu-larly over mountain streams where flashfloods quickly washed out other tempo-rary bridges. There were never enough

9 Hist 120th Engr C Bn, 31 May-Nov 43; Hist 10thEngr C Bn, 1944.

10 Hist 48th Engr C Bn, 1944-45; Hist 16th ArmdEngr Bn, May 44.

11 Hist 337th Engr C Bn; Hist 111th Engr C Bn, an.14 to II Corps Rpt, Rapido Crossing, Jan—Feb 44.


Baileys. An early attempt to supplementthe British supply with Baileys manu-factured in America failed. The engi-neering gauges sent from England toAmerican factories were improperlycalibrated, and the sections that cameto Italy from the United States wereincompatible with the British-manufac-tured parts in use; bridges assembledfrom American parts would not slideas well as the British bridges. Upon dis-covering the discrepancies, GeneralBowman outlawed the American bridgesets in the Fifth Army area.12 Tread-ways, both floating and trestle, werealmost as well suited to Italian condi-tions as Baileys, but the constant short-age of Brockway trucks needed to haulthem limited their usefulness. The tread-ways were too narrow to accommodatelarge equipment carriers such as tanktransporters and heavy tanks.13

The engineers of Fifth Army erectedmany timber bridges, usually as replace-ments for Baileys or treadways. Thetimber structures could carry loads ofover seventy tons. Made not to stan-dard dimensions but to the needs ofthe moment, they consisted ordinarilyof a series of steel or timber stringerspans with piers of single or double pilebents. The acquisition of the Ilva SteelWorks at Bagnoli, after Naples fell,increased the use of steel stringers.Timber floor beams or steel channelsrested on the stringers and supportedwood decking of two layers, the upperlaid diagonally to decrease wear. Fromthe Ilva steel mill also came a light, steel-riveted lattice-type girder, suitable for

semipermanent bridges, which becamestandard equipment.14

When Fifth Army engineers had tobuild abutments, they usually spikedlogs together to make hollow cribs andthen filled the cribs with stone. Theyhad learned through experience that adirt-fill abutment that extended into thechannel restricted normal stream flow,which, in turn, scoured the abutment.Abutments needed to be well cribbed,and timber was the best expedient.

During the winter campaign the engi-neers devised new methods and newuses for equipment in bridge building.The 16th Armored Engineer Battalionclaimed credit for first putting craneson the fronts of tanks or tank-recoveryvehicles to get various types of treadwaybridges across small streams or drycreek beds; the cranes enabled engi-neers to install bridges under heavyenemy fire. When a treadway across theVolturno at Dragoni almost washedaway in November 1943, a company ofthe 36th Engineer Combat Regimentanchored it with half-track winches. Onthe night of 15 November the 48thEngineer Combat Battalion used thewinches of Brockway trucks as hold-fasts to save another bridge at Dragoni.Engineers saved time by building Bai-leys with raised ramps on each end toput the bridge roadway two to threefeet above the normal elevation. Theycould then build a more permanentbridge directly under the Bailey with-out closing the bridge to traffic andcould quickly lay the flooring and wear-ing surface of the new bridge after theyremoved the Bailey.15

12 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 549, 551.

13 Fifth Army History, Mediterranean, app. J; Hist1108th Engr C Gp, 1944-45; Hist 317th Engr C Bn,Oct-Dec 44.

14 Hist 175th Engr GS Rgt, Feb 42-Oct 45; AGFBd Rpt, NATOUSA, Second Orientation Conf at HQ,Fifth Army, 15 Nov 43.

15 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 41; Comments,Col K. S. Anderson in Ltr, 8 Jun 59.


Bridge companies were in short sup-ply throughout the Italian campaign,and for a time the treadway companyof the 16th Armored Engineer Battal-ion was the only bridge company in FifthArmy. The companies were needed notonly to construct, maintain, and dis-mantle bridges but also to carry bridgecomponents. The treadway company ofthe 16th served as a bridge train fromthe first but could not meet the de-mand. As a stop-gap measure two com-panies of the 175th Engineer GeneralService Regiment were equipped withenough trucks (2 1/2-ton and Brock-way) to form bridge trains, and latertwo more bridge train companies wereorganized from the disbanded bridgetrain of the 16th Armored EngineerBattalion. In addition, Fifth Army fromtime to time employed bridge compa-nies of 10 Corps for bridge trains. Ele-ments of the 1554th Engineer HeavyPonton Battalion and Companies A andC of the 387th Engineer Battalion (Sep-arate) also served as bridge train units.The main problem all units convertingto bridge trains faced was to find ex-perienced, reliable drivers for theirtrucks.

Such was not the case for the 85thEngineer Heavy Ponton Battalion,which could unload its ponton equip-ment and, by carefully reloading, han-dle Bailey bridge components. Onecompany of the 85th could carry twostandard Baileys, and the ponton trail-ers also hauled piling and steel beamsto engineer units replacing temporarybridging. One problem remained—thelarge, ungainly trailers could not tra-verse many Italian roads.

Since the speed with which wreckedbridges were rebuilt or replaced oftendetermined the Fifth Army's rate of

advance, much of the bridge equipmenthad to be kept on wheels. Some equip-ment, such as Brockway trucks, wasalways in short supply. In the latter partof October 1943 the 85th EngineerHeavy Ponton Battalion established abridge depot near Triflisco, operatingdirectly under the Fifth Army engineerand sending bridging to the corps onbridge trains. It was a tactical depot,with stocks kept to a minimum for quickmovement. The depot stocked fixedand floating Baileys, steel treadways,infantry support and heavy pontonbridges, and other stream-crossingequipment. Tactical Bailey and tread-way bridges replaced with fixed brid-ges were returned to the army bridgedepot, where they were reconditionedand put back in stock.16

In reconnoitering for bridge sites, animportant engineer function, experi-enced photo interpreters, studying aer-ial photographs of the front lines, wereable to save much time. During thestalemate before Cassino, Lt. Col. JohnG. Todd, chief of the Mapping andIntelligence Section; Col. Harry O.Paxson, deputy Fifth Army engineer;and Capt. A. Colvocoresses worked outa plan to use aerial photos for engineerreconnaissance. One officer and oneenlisted man specially trained in photointerpretation remained at the airfieldwhere the photos were processed, andthey could obtain copies of all aerialphotos taken in front of the Americanlines. Those covering the front to adepth of ten miles went forward imme-diately to the Engineer Section, FifthArmy, and there Captain Colvocoressesrecorded on a map everything thatmight help or hinder Fifth Army's ad-

16 Hist 85th Engr Heavy Ponton Bn, Dec 44.


vance: locations, characteristics, anddimensions of all bridges; possible bridgeor crossing sites; places along roadswhere enemy demolitions could causeserious delays; locations of enemydumps; and marshy ground that couldprohibit tanks. This information Col-vocoresses sent to the army G-3 andthe army engineer's operations andsupply sections. Meanwhile, the officerand the enlisted man at the airfield didthe same type of work for the areabeyond the ten miles in front of thelines, though in much less detail. Asanother result of the photo-interpreta-tion process, Colonel Paxson repre-sented the Fifth Army engineer on thetarget selection board for heavy artil-lery.

Aerial photographs helped plannersto estimate the material, equipment,and troops needed for bridge work.Information on blown bridges wentback to the engineer supply section atarmy headquarters and forward to thefrontline troops, who could prepare fornecessary repairs. Engineers could thenhave the bridging on hand when anattack went forward. Aerial photo-graphs were especially important whereenemy fire forestalled close groundreconnaissance.

Building bridges under fire was diffi-cult at best—sometimes impossible. Butengineers did build bridges under with-ering fire. In December 1943 CompanyH, 36th Engineer Combat Regiment,put a Bailey across a tributary of theVolturno, a few miles to the west ofColli al Volturno, and in February 1944the 109th Engineer Combat Battalionbridged the Rapido in two hours.

Some engineers built bridges at nightto escape enemy fire. Insofar as possi-ble they put material together some-

what to the rear and brought forwardpartially prefabricated bridges in thedark. Others, trusting to Allied airsuperiority, preferred to build bridgesby daylight under the protection ofcounterbattery fire that aerial recon-naissance directed. Another protectivedevice was a dummy bridge to drawfire away from the real site.17

Winds and floods caused havoc. On30 December a company of the 344thEngineer General Service Regiment wasbuilding a Bailey across the Volturnonear Raviscanina. While the engineerswere putting concrete caps on the stonepiers of the demolished span, a highwall of water plunged down the river,quickly washing away concrete andequipment. On the thirty-first highwinds and subfreezing temperaturesended all work for several days. Thegale ripped down company tents andblew away, buried, or destroyed per-sonal equipment.18

During the winter campaign divi-sional engineers worked rapidly to clearrubble-clogged village streets, removeroadblocks and abatis, and fill crateredroadways to take one-way traffic. Some-times they built roads over demolitionsinstead of clearing them. On severaloccasions they used railbeds cleared ofties and rails as emergency roads. InDecember 1943 the 48th Engineer Com-bat Battalion built one such road at theCassino front under artillery fire. Thebattalion suffered many casualties whileextending the road for six miles fromMignano to the flank of Monte Lungoand on to a point 200 yards in advanceof infantry outposts.

17 Hist 334th Engr C Bn, 21 Sep-31 Oct 43; Hist109th Engr C Bn, 21 Sep-31 Oct 43.

18 Hist 344th Engr GS Rgt, 1942-45.19 Hists, 344th Engr GS Rgt and 1108th Engr C Gp,

1944-45.


Corps engineers normally followeddivisional engineers to widen one-laneroads and bypasses for a freer flow oftraffic, finish clearing rubble, removedebris from road shoulders, eliminateone-way bottlenecks, check each side ofthe road for mines, post caution anddirectional signs, and open lateral roads.Fifth Army engineers finished fillingcraters and resurfaced and widenedroads to take two-way traffic.

The policy was for divisional engi-neers to concentrate on the immediatefront; they could ask corps engineersto take over any other necessary workin the division area. Similarly, as corpsengineers took over work in the divi-sional areas they could ask army engi-neers to take over work in the corpsareas. These requests were never turneddown, although there were some com-plaints of work unfinished in the armyarea. The system worked better thanretaining specified boundaries and con-tinually shifting engineer units amongdivision, corps, and army as the workload varied.

Much road repair and construction—especially that undertaken by divisionand corps engineers—was done underheavy enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire. At times, engineer troopshad to slow or even stop work becauseof enemy fire or had to abandon oneroute for another. Such experiencesgave rise to engineer complaints of lackof infantry support, and frequently theengineers provided their own protec-tion, especially for dozer operators.Avoiding enemy fire by working atnight had serious drawbacks, especiallyin the mountains. Only the most skilledgraders and dozer operators could feeltheir way in the dark. Also, the noise ofthe equipment often drew enemy fire,

even through the smoke screens thatprovided protection. The engineers setsmoke screens for themselves, withvarying success, and on numerous occa-sions Chemical Warfare Service unitsfurnished excellent screens.

The engineers had to contend notonly with the enemy but also with heavysnows, mountain streams that rainsturned into raging torrents, water pour-ing into drainage ditches from innu-merable gullies and gorges, and tons ofmud clogging ditches and coveringroad surfaces. At times, engineersworked waist deep in mud. Army vehi-cles hauled huge quantities from sideroads and bivouacs. The only answerwas "rock, plenty of rock."20

For proper drainage crushed rock orgravel, or both, had to cover the wholesurface of a road, and the crown had tobe maintained. When engineer unitsassumed responsibility for a new areaone of the first things they did was tofind a ready and reliable source of rockand gravel. In most parts of Italy sup-plies were plentiful. Rubble from dem-olished stone houses—even Carraramarble quarried from the mountain-sides—supplemented rock.

Quarries sometimes operated dayand night. In December 1943 a 235thEngineer Combat Battalion quarry onHighway 6 east of Cassino worked twen-ty-two hours a day, lit at night by gianttorches "after the fashion of a Romanfestival in Caesar's time," though "thetorches attracted a not inconsiderableamount of attention from Germanplanes and artillery."21 The engineersdumped and roughly spread rock; thenItalian laborers used sledges or small

20 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 43.21 Ibid.


portable rock crushers to break up thelarger stones.

Engineers drained water from thewide shoulders along secondary roadsby digging ditches across the shouldersat intervals or by using various types ofculverts. Steel pipe culverts of twelve-inch diameter worked effectively, andthe engineers had little difficulty find-ing local pipe for them. Curved sheetsof corrugated iron made excellent formsfor masonry culverts. During the fight-ing at the Winter Line, Lt. Col. FrankJ. Polich of the 235th Engineer Com-bat Battalion designed a prefabricatedhexagonal culvert. Sixteen feet longwith two-foot sides and steel reinforce-ments, it was intended for emergencyjobs but proved so successful that FifthArmy adopted it as a standard engi-neer item. The culvert could be throwninto gaps in the road at the site of ablown bridge, over a bomb crater, or atassault stream crossings to make a pass-able one-way road. The culvert sus-tained the weight of 32-ton mediumtanks without any earth covering yetcould be loaded and transported com-paratively easily; it weighed two to threethousand pounds depending upon thekind of wood used in its construction.Other engineer units built similar cul-verts of varying lengths.23

Of the roads leading forward to thearea of the Winter Line campaign, onlythree were first-class: Highways 7, 6,and 85. As a result, Fifth Army had todepend on unsurfaced secondary roadsand on tracks and trails. While theengineers' main problem during thisperiod was maintenance (the VI Corpsengineer, for instance, reported that the

36th and 39th Engineer Combat Regi-ments devoted almost all their time inDecember to revetments and drainagecontrol), they built numerous jeep andfoot trails through the mountains tosupplement the inadequate road sys-tem.24

A very large part of VI Corps' trafficpassed through Venafro, a bottleneckthrough which an average of 4,000vehicles moved every day during De-cember 1943. To lighten the load onHighway 85 and a narrow road to Poz-zilh, the 120th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, 45th Division, built two addi-tional roads from Venafro to Pozzilli.The engineers eventually extended theseroads beyond Pozzilli well into the moun-tains, where mules or men with pack-boards had to take over.25

Engineers in Combat

In the midst of helping combat troopsmove over difficult terrain in winterweather, engineers sometimes fought asinfantry during the drive on Rome. Per-haps the most spectacular instance wasthe commitment of II Corps' 48th Engi-neer Combat Battalion at Monte Por-chia during the first week of January1944.

Although Monte Porchia was not aprimary objective for II Corps, it wasneeded to protect 10 Corps' right flankin a projected operation to cross theGarigliano. A small elevation comparedwith the mountainous terrain generallytypical of central Italy, Monte Por-chia's isolated position commanded lowground lying between the Monte Mag-giore—Camino hill mass to the south

22 Ltr, Col William P. Jones, Jr., 1 Jun 59.23 HQ, 34th Inf Div, Lessons Learned in Combat,

1944.

24 Fifth Army History, vol. III, p. 4.25 Hist 120th Engr C Bn, 31 May-Nov 43.


ENGINEER ROCK QUARRY NEAR MIGNANO

and Monte Trocchio to the northwest.From this observation point the enemycould survey the Allied line along theGarigliano. The British 10 Corps heldthe Allied left, while the U.S. 34th Divi-sion was in the mountains to the right.In the center, astride the only two roadsinto Cassino, the U.S. 1st Armored Divi-sion had massed Task Force Alien andits attached units. Enemy observationposts on Monte Porchia were able todirect punishing fire on all Allied instal-lations in the valley. It was vitally impor-tant to take this hill, and at 1930 on 4January the attack began.

The weather was cold, wet, and win-dy. The 6th Armored Infantry Regi-ment led off, but German mortar and

artillery fire was so concentrated thatby daylight the 2d Battalion of the 6thArmored was back at its starting point.More wind-driven snow fell on 5 Janu-ary as the 48th Engineer Combat Bat-talion was attached to Task Force Alien,placed in reserve, and told to be readyto go into the line. During 7-9 January,in three days and two nights, when agap developed on the left flank of thetask force, Companies A, B, and C ofthe 48th went forward. They helpedsecure the flank and drive the enemyoff. For its work in this action the 48threceived a Presidential Unit Citation,as did the 235th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, which also took part in the en-gagement. Individual awards to men


of the 48th included 3 DistinguishedService Crosses, 21 Silver Stars, and 2Bronze Stars. The highest award, theCongressional Medal of Honor, wasawarded posthumously to Sgt. JosephC. Specker, Company C, for his brav-ery on 7 January in wiping out anenemy machine-gun nest single hand-edly despite severe wounds.2

The 235th Battalion was to open andmaintain axial supply routes for TaskForce Allen. The work of the battalion,often under heavy fire, enabled armorto move forward in support of theinfantry. The 235th also fought as in-fantry, twice driving the enemy fromstrongly fortified positions to clearroutes for the armor.27

At Cassino: 20-29 January 1944

In mid-January Fifth Army reachedthe enemy's Rapido-Garigliano defens-es. The removal of VI Corps from theAllied line left II Corps as the only U.S.Army corps on this front. For the assaultagainst the Gustav Line, II Corps wasin the center, opposite the Germans'strong position at Cassino. Plans for theattack called first for the 36th Divisionto cross the Rapido south of Cassino.

The 36th began the operation lateon 20 January. The enemy's defenseswere formidable and his position verystrong. Along that part of its course inthe division's sector the Rapido was anarrow stream flowing swiftly betweensteep banks, in places no more thantwenty-five feet wide and elsewhereabout fifty. The Sant' Angelo bluff orpromontory, from which the enemycould survey the immediate area, rose

forty feet above the river's west bank,but there were no comparable vantagepoints east of the river. Between 20 and22 January the 36th Division made twoattempts to establish a bridgehead butsuffered a costly defeat. The 36th thenwent on the defensive while the 34thDivision between 26 and 29 Januarypushed across the Rapido north of Cas-sino and made a slight but importantbreach in the Gustav Line.28

During these attacks engineers wereto clear mines at crossing sites, buildand maintain bridges and bridge ap-proaches, and find and maintain tankroutes. They also were to maintainroads and clear mines in seized bridge-heads. The 36th Division's 143d Infan-try was to attack south of Sant' Angelo,and its 141st was to cross north of thebluff. The 111th Engineer CombatBattalion, reinforced by two companiesof the 16th Armored Engineer Battal-ion, was to clear enemy mines beforethe crossings. During the night of 19January the 1st and 2d Battalions ofthe 19th Engineer Combat Regiment,a II Corps unit, were to spot footbridgeequipment and assault boats for theattack. The 1st Battalion, during thenight of 20 January, was to build aneight-ton infantry support bridge in thearea of the 143d and the 2d Battalion asimilar structure in the attack zone ofthe 141st.29

The Gustav Line was heavily mined,with box mines notably more numerous.At the Rapido the Fifth Army encoun-tered a mine belt a mile in length,chiefly of the S, Teller, and woodenbox types. German patrols interruptedmine clearing, and they crossed the

26 History of II Corps; Hist 48th Engr C Bn, 7 Ap43-Jun 44; Hist 1108th Engr C Gp, 1944-45.

27 Hist 235th Engr C Bn, Jan-Dec 44.

28 Fifth Army History, vol. IV, pp. 39-48, 57; Ltr,Jones, 1 Jun 59.

29 II Corps Rapido Crossing, Jan-Feb 44.


river and emplaced more mines so thatmarkers indicating the safe passagemeant little. Poor reconnaissance re-sulted partly from the position of theinfantry which was 500 yards from theriver. When the 141st began to advance,the lanes were difficult or impossible tofollow because of heavy fog or becausemuch of the white tape had been de-stroyed, some by German fire.30

The enemy met the several attemptedcrossings with intense and continuousartillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire,which destroyed assault boats and frus-trated the engineers in their attemptsto build floating footbridges. The engi-neers had no standard floating bridgeequipment and had to improvise allfootbridges over the Rapido. In the141st Infantry zone artillery fire toreto shreds several footbridges made fromsections of catwalk placed over pneu-matic boats, while floating mines de-stroyed another. Most of Companies Aand B of the 141st got across on oneintact footbridge that the 19th Engi-neers had managed to put together fromthe remnants of others. This bridge,although almost totally submerged, re-mained usable for a time because theengineers strung four ropes across theRapido to form a suspension cable thatsupported the punctured boats.31

Dense fog hampered the whole oper-ation, but the 1st Battalion, 19th En-gineers, was able to guide troops of the1st Battalion of the 143d Infantrythrough the minefields. By 0500 on 21January, the 19th Engineers had in-stalled two footbridges in the 143d'sarea south of Sant' Angelo, but one was

soon destroyed and the other damaged.The infantry battalion neverthelesscrossed in boats or over the bridges butsuffered heavy casualties, and its rem-nants had to return to the east bank toescape annihilation. Fog confused troopsof the 19th Engineers who led the boatgroup of the 3d Battalion of the 143dInfantry. The engineers and infantrystumbled into a minefield, where theirrubber boats were destroyed. Enemyfire completed the disorganization ofthe infantry battalion and defeated itsattempt to make a crossing.

During the 36th Division's secondattempt to break through the enemyline the 19th Engineers succeeded ininstalling several footbridges, but the16th Armored Engineer Battalion, inthe face of artillery and mortar fire,could make no headway with the instal-lation of a Bailey. The action ended indefeat.32

Reviewing the failure to build theRapido bridges as planned, ColonelBowman pointed out that the nearshore of the river was never entirelyunder Fifth Army control, so reconnais-sance, mine clearance, and approachpreparation were incomplete. He con-cluded that the attempt to build anduse a Bailey as an assault bridge wasunjustified. Some engineer officers onthe scene blamed a shortage in bridgeequipment, bad timing, and one infan-try regiment's lack of training with theengineers supporting it. Others claimedthat the terrible raking fire from well-placed artillery and small arms directlyon the sites made bridge constructionall but impossible.

The success of the 34th Division'sRapido crossing north of Cassino de-30 Interv, Col J. O. Killian, CO, 19th Engr C Rgt,

and Ltr, Jones, 1 Jun 59.31 Ltr, Jones, 1 Jun 59; Engineer History, Mediter-

ranean, p. 39. 32 Fifth Army History, vol. IV, p. 45: Killian interv.


pended greatly on getting tanks overnarrow muddy roads and then acrossthe river. The crossing itself was less aproblem than that to the south becauseterrain and other factors were morefavorable. The Germans had divertedthe Rapido and flooded the small valley;now the American engineers preparedthe dry riverbed for a tank crossing.On the morning of 27 January, afterartillery preparation, tanks of the 756thTank Battalion led the attack. Some ofthem slipped off the flooded trail andothers stuck in the mud, but a few gotacross the river.33

Engineers of the 1108th EngineerCombat Group and two companies ofthe 16th Armored Engineer Battalionstarted building a corduroy route southof the tank trail. On that day and thetwenty-eighth the infantry was able tohold some ground west of the Rapido.Meanwhile, the engineers worked toimprove the tank routes. The attackagainst enemy strongpoints resumed onthe morning of the twenty-ninth. Bythat time the engineers had tank routesready for the advance, and the infantry,aided by armor, captured two strong-points on 30 January. Next day theinfantrymen took Cairo village, head-quarters of an enemy regiment. Afterthe 34th Division had broken throughthe enemy's outpost line and occupieda hill mass north of Cassino, the 109thEngineer Combat Battalion improveda main supply route by constructing twoone-way roads that led across the Rapidofrom San Pietro to Cairo.34

Anzio

To the north, the landing at Anzio

(SHINGLE) was under way. Planning andtraining were compressed into littlemore than two months. In mid-Novem-ber 1943 a planning group with threeengineer representatives assembled atFifth Army headquarters in Caserta.Here Colonel Bowman, having reviewedthe findings of engineer aerial photointerpreters and having studied harborsfrom Gaeta to Civitavecchia, recom-mended Anzio for the projected land-ing of an Allied flanking force. Col.Harry O. Paxson, the Fifth Army Engi-neer Section's expert on evaluatingtopographic intelligence, also had a partin choosing Anzio. As General Eisen-hower's topographic intelligence offi-cer at AFHQ in 1942 he had learnedfrom the British a method of analyzingoffshore terrain that enabled him andothers to find an opening in the sub-merged sandbars off the coast at Anzio.

AFHQ based the final decision toland at Anzio on the existence of suit-able beach exits and good roads lead-ing twenty miles to the Alban Hills, amountain mass rising across the ap-proaches from the south to Rome andaffording access to the upper end ofthe Liri valley. Here was a possibility ofcutting off German forces concentratedon the Cassino front. At the very least,AFHQ hoped that a flanking opera-tion at this point, as part of a greatpincer movement, would force an enemywithdrawal northward and that Romewould fall quickly into Allied hands.35

Beginning on 4 January near Naples,VI Corps underwent intensive amphibi-ous training which culminated in apractice landing below Salerno. Earlyon 21 January over 250 ships carryingnearly 50,000 men moved out of Naples.

33 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 45.34 Ibid, pp. 45-46.

35 Interv, Col Harry O. Paxson, May 59; Fifth ArmyHistory, vol. IV, pp. 21, 85.


To keep the enemy from suspecting itsdestination and to avoid minefields, theconvoy veered to the south on a widesweep around Capri. After dark it turnedtoward Anzio and dropped anchor justpast midnight. The enemy was caughtalmost completely off guard, and theAllies met only token coast defenses.The Germans had been aware of Anzio'spossibilities as a landing beach but hadweakened defenses there in order tohold the Cassino front.36

Good weather and a calm sea favor-ed the operation. The landings beganpromptly at H-hour, 0200, 22 January,and went rapidly and efficiently. (Map9) U.S. troops (X-Ray Force) went ashoreover beaches south of Nettuno, a fewmiles southeast of Anzio, and over Yel-low Beach, near Anzio. The port fellquickly. Meanwhile, the British (PeterForce) landed six miles north of Anzio.The smoothness and dispatch thatmarked the U.S. 3d Division landingand the rapid organization of thebeaches was helped by the 540th Engi-neer Combat Regiment's experience inbeach operations. By daylight thebeaches were ready to receive vehicles.In addition to the 540th, beach troopsincluded the 1st Naval Beach Battalion,the 36th Engineer Combat Regimentat the port, and the British 3d BeachGroup on the Peter beaches. All wereunder Col. William N. Thomas, Jr., VICorps engineer.37

All assault troops from LCVPs andLCFs debarked on the beaches on sched-ule. The port of Anzio was taken almostintact, and by early afternoon the 36thEngineers had cleared it sufficiently toreceive landing craft. Except for a brief

period on D-day, the beaches werenever congested. Excellent 1:10,000scale beach maps, distributed at thebeachhead by the 1710th Engineer MapDepot Detachment, helped avoid confu-sion. Beach crews with attached serviceunits reported directly to assigned areasand began organizing their respectivedumps. After midafternoon Americansupplies could move on 2 1/2-ton trucksor DUKWs directly to corps dumps,which were accessible to the gravel-surfaced roads inland. All beach dumpsexcept ammunition were "sold out" ormoved to corps dumps inland.. On Dplus 1 the 540th found the two bestbeaching channels and favorable exitroads and consolidated unloading attwo American beaches. The regimenteliminated the British Peter beaches byD plus 3, and British supply rolled inover the American beaches as well.38

One obstacle to hasty unloading wasshallow water, which made it necessaryto anchor the Liberty ships two milesoffshore. Cargoes therefore came in onLCTs or DUKWs. The average load ofall LCTs was 151 long tons; of DUKWs,three tons. Cargo from Liberty shipsbegan to reach the beaches on the after-noon of D plus 1, and the VI Corpsdumps (one mile beyond the beach)opened at 2300 the same day. All theD-day convoys of LCTs and LSTs werecompletely unloaded by 0800 on 24January, D plus 2. But even their rapiddischarge could not obviate the fact thatthe scarce LSTs supplying the Anziobeachhead had to remain on the sceneuntil spring, long past the time allotted.Their continued stay in the Mediterra-nean to serve shallow-water ports denied

36 Fifth Army History, vol. IV, pp. 59-62; Paxsoninterv.

57 Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 85-86.

38 Hist 36th Engr C Rgt, 1 Jun 41-23 Jun 44;Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 100; Hist 540th EngrC Rgt, 1942-45; Paxson interv.


them to the BOLERO planners in Eng-land, who were bent on accumulatingat least half the assault shipping re-quired for the invasion of the Conti-nent by the beginning of 1944.39

The 540th owed its performance atAnzio to several factors. The men ofthe unit had been able to plan forSHINGLE at Caserta with the 3d Division,and they had practiced landings withthe division and its attached units. Dur-ing 17-19 January the final exercise,WEBFOOT, involved the 3d U.S. and1st British Divisions, a Ranger force,and attached supply troops. The re-hearsal was not full scale; LSTs did notcarry vehicles and LCTs were onlytoken loaded, but the assault units didget some training in passing beachobstacles, unloading personnel andequipment, combat firing, and generalorientation.40

The 540th had been able to obtainextra 1/4- and 3/4-ton trucks, D-7angledozers, sixteen- and six-ton primemovers, cranes, mine detectors, beachmarkers, and lights. The D-7s provedespecially valuable on D plus 1 in pull-ing out 100 vehicles mired down in thedewaterprooflng area. Compared withprevious landings, the 540th Engineershad a better system of recording thenumbers of vehicles and personnel andquantities of supplies by class. Theseadvantages helped to nullify mistakesin planning and deficiencies in training.Not until the 540th was about to leaveNaples for Anzio did its attached units

report—after loading plans were com-plete. Since the 540th had to plan forthe embarkation on the basis of TOEsrather than actual unit strengths, it wasdifficult to load units properly. Theloading plan was faulty in that beachgroups went aboard by units instead ofby teams.41

Supplies landed late at the port ofAnzio on D-day, when LSTs did notenter from the outer harbor until eighthours after naval units had signaledthat the harbor had been swept formines. The Navy beachmaster wouldnot take the responsibility of acting onthe signal, and the deadlock was bro-ken only when two Army officers ap-pealed personally to Admiral Hewitt.

Officers of the 540th Engineers some-times found working with the Britisheasier than working with the U.S. Navy,possibly because there were more oppor-tunities for friction with the U.S. Navy.Its responsibility for unloading extend-ed to the beaches, whereas the RoyalNavy's jurisdiction ended when thecraft hit the beaches. Teamwork wasoften poor between floating and shoreU.S. Navy echelons. Furthermore, thecommanding officers of the naval beachbattalion had been reluctant to trainand live with the Army. The navalbeach group did not have enough bull-dozers and needed Army help for sal-vage work. The Navy also needed bull-dozer spare parts, but these the Armycould not provide because the Navyused Allis-Chalmers bulldozers, whichthe Army did not have.42

At the beach the principal engineerwork was to improve exit roads oversoft, boggy clay soil. Engineers had to

39 Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Trans-portation Corps: Operations Overseas, United States Armyin World War II (Washington, 1957), p. 58; Coakleyand Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45,p. 233.

40 Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1950), pp. 268-69.

41 Hist 540th Engr C Rgt, 1942-45.42 Rpt, Col D. A. Newcomer, 28 Jun 44, in AGF Bd

Rpt 162, NATOUSA.


36TH ENGINEER COMBAT REGIMENT TROOPS REMOVE GERMAN CHARGES frombuildings in Anzio,

use corduroy because they did not haveenough rock, even after taking as muchas possible from the rubble-strewn townsof Anzio and Nettuno. They used Som-merfeld matting, which the 540th Engi-neers modified for beach roads, to someextent. They made the rolls lighter andthe footing better by removing four outof every five lateral rods and usingthe extra rods as pickets to hold downthe matting. The engineers tried brushon the roads, but corduroy proved thebest substitute for rock.43

On 7 February the enemy began aseries of assaults that threatened to splitthe bridgehead within a fortnight. Engi-neers went into the line as infantry,holding down both extreme flanks ofthe Anzio enclave, the 39th EngineerCombat Regiment on the right and the36th Engineer Combat Regiment, acorps unit, taking over the British 56thInfantry Division's responsibility in asector about nine miles northwest ofAnzio on the extreme left. In the linefor forty-five days through Februaryand March, the 36th held 5,600 yardsof front along the Moletta River with2,150 men, its reserve almost constantlyemployed. The engineers spent 1 1/2days training mortar men and consider-

43 Notes on Landings in Operation SHINGLE, 8 Feb44, in Hist 1st ESB, Jan-Dec 44; Maj Gilbert T.Phelps, Observations in Amphibious Landing, Anzio,in AGF Bd Rpt 120, NATOUSA; Hist 540th Engr CRgt.


able time afterward gathering necessarysniper rifles, automatic weapons, and37- and 57-mm. antitank guns.44

Though the 39th performed well, thehard-pressed 36th quickly showed itsinadequate infantry training. Conspicu-ous was its failure to seize prisoners dur-ing night patrolling in the early com-mitment to the line. Upon a corps orderto send out one patrol each night fromeach battalion on the front, the engi-neers blackened their faces and reversedtheir clothing to camouflage themselvesand left their helmets behind to avoidmaking noise in the shrubbery. Whenthey sallied out into the darkness, how-ever, they lost two men to the Germansand captured no prisoners in return.One observer remembered that themen were not "prepared to kill" andseemed afraid to fire their rifles in fearof drawing the attention of the wholeGerman Army to themselves. The reg-iment's inexperience also showed incasualty figures, which reached 16 per-cent. Seventy-four men were killed inaction, 336 wounded, and 277 hospita-lized.45

During the fighting at Anzio destroy-ing bridges was more important to theengineers than building them. A bridgeVI Corps engineers blew up at Car-roceto on the afternoon of 8 Februarykept twelve German tanks from break-ing through to the sea. On the tenth theengineers staved off a possible Germanbreakthrough by destroying a bridgeover Spaccasassi Creek.

When the Allies were forced on the

defensive at Anzio the engineers laidextensive minefields for the first timein the Italian campaign. They plantedmines haphazardly and made inaccu-rate and incomplete records. They laidmany mines, both antipersonnel andantitank, at night in places with no dis-tinct natural features. Some of this hasteand inefficiency was attributed to insuf-ficiently trained men, including somewho were not engineers and who werenot qualified for mine-sowing. Troopsdisregarded instructions 15th ArmyGroup issued early in the campaign onrecording friendly minefields. The re-sult was a marked increase in casualties.

As the Anzio beachhead stabilized,haphazard methods became more delib-erate and careful. Fields were markedand recorded before mines were actu-ally laid. After 10 February VI Corpsinsisted that antipersonnel mines beplaced in front of protective wire andthat antitank mines be laid behind thefinal protective line, both in order toguard against night-lifting by the en-emy. At regular intervals the VI Corpsengineers issued a map overlay num-bering and locating each antipersonneland antitank minefield on the beach-head.47

No standard method of planting minesexisted, but the system developed bythe 109th Engineer Combat Battalionwas representative. The battalion usedfour men to a row, with teams made upof a pacer who measured the distance,a driver who placed the mines, and twoarmers who activated the mines. AtAnzio in April 1944 a platoon of the109th in one day devoted 240 man-hours to planting 2,444 antitank mines

44 Hist 36th Engr C Rgt, 1 Jun 41 -23 Jun 44.45 Ibid.; Rpt, Newcomer, 28 Jun 44, in AGF Bd Rpt

162, NATOUSA.46 Dept of the Army, Historical Div, Anzio Beachhead,

(22 January-25 May 1944), American Forces in ActionSeries (Washington, 1947), pp. 83-84, 97.

47 AGF Bd Rpt 465, MTO, 9 Jun 45; Rpt, Newcomer,28 Jun 44, in AGF Bd Rpt 162, NATOUSA.


SOLDIER FROM THE 39TH ENGINEER COMBAT REGIMENT ASSEMBLES M1A1ANTITANK MINES AT ANZIO

and 199 antipersonnel mines. A sepa-rate squad took ninety-six man-hoursto mark these minefields.

One of the most serious mistakes inplanting mines was laying them tooclose together. For example, the 39thEngineer Combat Regiment laid a largeminefield that a single mortar shelldetonated. The experience of manyunits proved that a density of 1 1/2 anti-tank mines per yard of front was theoptimum for regularly laid out fieldsto avoid sympathetic detonation. Theengineers obtained this density by lay-ing several staggered rows of mines, anapproximation of the German pattern.The AFHQ engineer specified widerspacing for antipersonnel mines, a rule

of thumb that established one mine perthree to five yards of front, assumingthe use of trip wires.48

Once the Germans stopped trying toeliminate VI Corps' beachhead, theAnzio front settled down into stalemate.The 39th Engineers, with assistancefrom the 540th, then had an opportu-nity to improve all roads within thebeachhead. Good macadam roads ranthrough the area in wagon-spoke style,and a few smaller gravel roads branchedoff. Engineers bulldozed additional dirtroads across the open fields, but trucksusing them had to drop into very low

48 Hist 109th Engr C Bn, 1943-45; AFHQ EngrTechnical Bull 15, 10 Feb 44.


gear to plow through the mud. Theengineers maintained only about thirty-one miles of road at the beachhead, butconstant enemy bombing and shellingcompelled continuous inspections andsurface repair. Engineers built a consid-erable number of bridges in the beach-head area; the 10th Engineer CombatBattalion, for instance, built 2 Baileys,9 treadways, and 19 footbridges.49

During the breakout from the Anziobeachhead, the 34th Division's 109thEngineer Combat Battalion had the taskof opening and maintaining roads tothe front lines, clearing lanes throughAllied minefields up to the front, andopening gaps in Allied wire on the frontto ensure the safe and uninterruptedpassage of another infantry division, the1st Armored Division, and the 1st Spe-cial Service Force through the 34thDivision's sector. Work started duringthe night of 14 May; enemy observa-tion forced the engineer units to workonly after dark. Many of the minefieldshad been under heavy enemy fire fromsmall arms, machine guns, and artillery.The mines became extremely sensitiveand were likely to detonate under theslightest pressure. The engineers com-pleted most of the mine clearing dur-ing the night of 20 May, but they hadto wait to remove wire and to mark gapswhich would disclose the direction ofthe corps attack. On the night of 22May the engineers removed the wire

from the gaps and marked each lanewith tracing tape and luminous mark-ers. The breakout was a complete suc-cess.50

On 31 May Peninsular Base Sectiontook over the Anzio port after fourmonths and twenty-five days of opera-tion by the 540th Engineer Combat Reg-iment. Supply had been slow throughmuch of February and March becauseof bad weather and enemy air raids.The shallow offshore gradients and thesmall beaches hampered the use ofregular cargo ships and coasters. Suchvessels were excellent targets for Ger-man aircraft, so shallow-draft craft wereused as much as possible. The wholeprocess of delivering supplies speededup in March with the use of preloadedtrucks, which discharged from the LSTsand other vessels directly onto Anzioharbor's seawalls and pier and moveddirectly to the dumps. Liberty ships car-rying supplies unloaded onto LCTs orDUKWs. In turn, the LCTs unloadedonto DUKWs offshore or directly ontowharves in Anzio harbor; the DUKWswent directly to the dumps. Between 6and 29 February, 73,251 tons were dis-charged at Anzio; between 1 and 31March, 158,274 tons. The 7,828 tonsthat came in on 29 March made Anzioport the "fourth largest in the world."51

49 Hist 39th Engr C Rgt, Jan-Dec 44; Hist 10thEngr C Bn, 1944.

50 Hist 109th Engr C Bn, 1943-45.51 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 86; Bykofsky

and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Over-seas, pp. 223-24.

CHAPTER X

The Advance to the Alps

By the time the Allied armies collidedwith the German Winter Line defensesin late 1943, the American theater com-mand had changed considerably. In theaftermath of the North African inva-sion the need to reorganize had beenclear; the issue of new command ar-rangements was a lively one at theAmerican headquarters, but the de-mands of combat kept it pending untilthe downfall of Axis forces in Tunisiaand Sicily.

The chief defect still lay in the over-lapping and sometimes contradictoryauthorities in the administrative andsupply chain. A new theater engineer,Brig. Gen. Dabney O. Elliott, contin-ued to exercise his advisory and stafffunctions in three separate com-mands—AFHQ; NATOUSA; andCOMZ, NATOUSA—an arrangementthat bypassed the Services of Supplycommand. No formal controls of theengineering function existed betweenSOS, NATOUSA, and the chief engi-neer of the theater as they did in Gen-eral Lee's SOS, ETOUSA, jurisdictionin the United Kingdom. Maj. Gen.Thomas B. Larkin as chief of the SOS,NATOUSA, command had only nomi-nal control over the base sections thenexisting in the theater and virtually nosay in the flow of supply once materielmoved out of the bases for the frontlines. Larkin's relationship with theAFHQ G-4 was unclear and in many

ways duplicative through the period ofoperations in North Africa; it improvedonly after his concerted efforts to revisethe command situation met with somesuccess.1

Reorganization

In March 1943, one month after theformation of the theater, General Lar-kin began a campaign to eliminate theanomalies and duplications that weak-ened or destroyed his effectiveness assupposed chief of all American supplyoperations in the theater. He madesmall headway against the resistance ofthe staff officers at NATOUSA andAFHQ who insisted upon retainingtheir acquired authority, citing in theirown behalf the dangers of repeatingthe-bitter disputes over the SOS, ETO-USA, empire under General Lee. Inhopes of reducing the manpower drainsin theater-level headquarters, the WarDepartment sent an Inspector General'ssurvey team to North Africa and toEngland in late spring 1943. The team'sreport, in effect, recommended a 50percent reduction in the number ofoverhead personnel in the theater staffsin NATOUSA, a solid impetus for reor-ganization and economy in manpower.

1 See ch. V. This section is based upon Meyer, TheStrategy and Logistical History: MTO, ch. VII, exceptas otherwise noted. General Elliott was succeeded astheater engineer on 1 September 1944 by Maj. Gen.David J. McCoach, Jr.

THE ADVANCE TO THE ALPS 201

Various plans originating at AFHQand NATOUSA undertook to eliminatethe command discrepancies and to re-duce the manpower surpluses in head-quarters' staffs. Their authors usuallyproceeded on the assumption that vastchanges were necessary in any staff ele-ment but their own. After a summerand fall of conflicting suggestions in1943, the SOS, NATOUSA, commandhad no increased authority to deal withits increased responsibilities, which nowspanned the Mediterranean and ex-tended to a new base section in Italy.Headquarters, NATOUSA, insistedupon the continued control of person-nel in the base sections, denying toLarkin efficient use of manpower andtimely use of specialty units when heneeded them.

The arrival of a new theater com-mander broke the impasse and pre-saged the decline of Headquarters,NATOUSA, and the disappearance ofCOMZ, NATOUSA, in early 1944. On31 December 1943, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.Devers relieved General Eisenhower,who returned to ETOUSA. When De-vers arrived in North Africa on 8 Janu-ary 1944, the War Department hadimposed a deadline of 1 March for therevision of the NATOUSA commandstructure. Devers' arrival also roughlycoincided with another exchange be-tween SOS, NATOUSA, and Head-quarters, NATOUSA, about more menfor the burgeoning supply responsibili-ties in the theater. Within a week inlate January General Larkin receivedtwo contradictory orders from NATO-USA. The first instructed him to tapthe existing base sections for man-power, a course he was reluctant to takesince it would rob already shorthandedorganizations in his nominal chain of

command; the second canceled theauthority to secure manpower fromeven that source and removed man-power allocations authority for base sec-tions entirely to the NATOUSA level.

On 14 February Devers called the con-ference that restructured the theaters.(Chart 2) His NATOUSA General Or-der Number 12, effective 24 February,transferred all duties and responsibili-ties of COMZ, NATOUSA, originallyset up only as a rationale to support theposition of deputy theater commander,to SOS, NATOUSA. In the month afterthe meeting the NATOUSA staff tookmuch of the theater reduction in man-power.2 While the staff did not disap-pear altogether, its functions becamealmost entirely identified with theAmerican side of AFHQ. Headquarters,NATOUSA, concerned itself with mat-ters of broad policy at the theater level,and General Larkin formally assumedcommand of all base sections in the the-ater and the service and supply func-tions between them and the combatzones.

Consistent with this general transferand with a subsequent NATOUSA staffmemorandum, the AFHQ-NATOUSAengineer retained only policy and plan-ning responsibility. He could initiatebroad directives, recommend theater-wide engineer stock levels, write train-ing directives and standards, recom-mend troop allocations in the com-munications zone, maintain technicaldata on Allied or enemy engineer equip-ment or doctrine, and provide analysesof operations plans and American engi-neer commitments in the theater. The

2 NATOUSA GO 12, 20 Feb 44; History and Com-position of the North African/Mediterranean Theaterof Operations, 12 Sep 42-2 Dec 47, p. 67.


broader engineer aspects of Alliedmilitary government also fell within hispurview.

In General Larkin's SOS, NATO-USA, executive agency, the SOS engi-neer had unfettered jurisdiction overoperational engineer matters in the the-ater COMZ. He controlled engineerunits assigned to that command, gov-erned the issue of nonstandard equip-ment to all American engineer troops,ruled on all requests to exceed accom-modation scales, and handled all Amer-ican real estate questions. He also con-trolled the issue of engineer supply toAllied forces, coordinating with AFHQonly on British requests. He was re-sponsible for taking general operationaldirectives emanating from AFHQ andpreparing supply requisitions and billsof materials to support stated theaterprograms and policies.4

When the Fifth Army Base Sectionat Naples became the Peninsular BaseSection (PBS) on 25 October 1943, itpassed from Fifth Army control to thestill divided American theater com-mand in North Africa. Until February1944 the base section in the Mediterra-nean came under NATOUSA head-quarters for command and administra-tion but answered to General Larkin'sSOS, NATOUSA, organization for sup-ply. General Pence's PBS command alsohad some responsibilities to the 15thArmy Group in administrative areas,especially those affecting the Italianpopulation.

As Fifth Army moved north, base sec-tion jurisdiction grew: the army rearboundary was always the PBS forwardboundary. The base section engineer,Col. Donald S. Burns, submitted hisfirst consolidated estimates for the sup-ply requirements of the Fifth Armyengineers, the III Air Service AreaCommand, and various other branchesof the PBS Engineer Service and thePetroleum Branch on 15 October 1943,but the Fifth Army G-4 continued toprepare engineer requisitions until De-cember, when the responsibility shiftedentirely to PBS for Fifth Army and basesection engineer supply. Requisitionsthen went directly from PBS to SOS,NATOUSA, and its successor com-mand, designated CommunicationsZone, NATOUSA, on 1 October 1944.Exactly one month later the theatercommand changed from NATOUSAto Mediterranean Theater of Opera-tions (MTOUSA). On 20 November theCOMZ structure was eliminated and itsfunctions passed to the G-4 and thespecial staff of the MTOUSA head-quarters, which then handled engineerrequisitions and other supply for thetheater. (Chart 3)5

While the theater reorganization wasbringing order to the higher echelonson the American side of AFHQ and itsimmediately subordinate commands,several important changes also oc-curred in Fifth Army's command andadministration of its engineers andother service troops. Col. Frank O.Bowman, the Fifth Army engineer, pro-moted to brigadier general on 22 Feb-ruary, became convinced by early spring3 NATOUSA Adm Memo 2, 20 Feb 44; NATOUSA

Staff Memo 14, 21 Mar 44, app. B.4 NATOUSA Staff Memo 14, 21 Mar 44, app. B;

History of Allied Force Headquarters and Headquar-ters NATOUSA, pt. III, Period of the Italian Cam-paign from the Winter Line to Rome, sec. 4, pp.968-73.

5 Ltr, Brig Gen Arthur W. Pence, CG, PBS, to MajGen Karl Truesdell, CG, C&GSC, 26 Nov 43, sub:Organization of PBS; Periodic Rpt, SOS NATOUSA,G-4, 31 Dec 43.


of 1944 of the necessity of obtainingdirect command of all Fifth Army engi-neer troops. Other technical servicestaff officers shared this idea, particu-larly General Clark's ordnance officer,Col. Urban Niblo.6

On 26 March 1944, all corps andarmy engineer units were assigned to anew Fifth Army Engineer Command.Corps engineer units, however, re-mained attached to their respectivecorps. Accordingly, though GeneralBowman obtained administrative andsupply control over all engineer unitsexcept those organic to divisions, he didnot have operational control over thoseattached to corps. His headquarters,designated a major command of theFifth Army, had an operational andadministrative status similar to a gen-eral staff division, and he had the au-thority he considered necessary to meethis responsibilities. He could move ar-my engineer troops from point to pointon his own authority and could trans-fer Fifth Army engineers from Ameri-can to British sectors and back.7

Below General Bowman in the FifthArmy engineer organization were corpsengineer sections, each with a TOE call-ing for only six officers and fourteenenlisted men. Some attempt was madeto obtain approval for corps-level engi-neer commands patterned after Gen-eral Bowman's, but the corps com-manders preferred that the corps en-gineer remain a staff officer only.8

The engineer combat regiment wasthe mainstay of corps-level engineerstrength at the start of the Italian cam-

paign, but in December 1942 War De-partment planning revised the formaland rigid structure of Army units, elimi-nating the "type army" and "type corps"conceptions. The redivision of forcesthat followed placed engineer units byfunctions, under Army Ground Forcescontrol if they supported combat unitsor under Army Service Forces controlif they had primarily service supportassignments in base sections or the com-munications zone. Engineer units werefrequently hard to classify since the na-ture of their assignments and trainingcarried them across the boundariesestablished in Army Ground ForcesCommander Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair'sreorganization.

Further revision of the unit classifica-tion continued through 1944; at theend of the year only divisional engi-neers were listed as combat troops, withnondivisional engineers supportingfighting units being listed as combatsupport. At the same time GeneralMcNair pushed for economies in ser-vice forces and in staff overheads infield commands. He strove to separatenondivisional service regiments, includ-ing engineers, into their componentbattalions and to impose a group head-quarters capable of handling four bat-talions at once in place of the formaland traditional regimental headquar-ters in the field.9 The group headquar-ters had no units assigned organicallybut controlled the movements and workassignments of each battalion as anattached unit.

In the summer of 1943, McNair out-lined his new organizational precepts

6 Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead andBattlefront, pp. 187-89, 218.

7 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 266.8 Hist 1108th Engr C Gp, Feb-Oct 44; Comments,

Col L. B. Gallagher, II Corps Engr, May 59.

9 WD Memo WDGCT 320 (17 Dec 42) for CG, AGF,24 Dec 42, sub: Reorgn of Units of the Army, 320.2/5816; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Eng-ineers: Troops and Equipment, p. 222.


in a letter to all training commandsunder his control. He recommendedthat to manage troops engaged in com-bat the higher level headquarters dividethe administrative load, making thecorps solely a tactical headquarters andlimiting field army headquarters tooverall tactical supervision with re-sponsibility for supply and all otheradministrative functions. The new pro-gram did make for marked economiesin manpower, and at the end of thewar the revisions had contributed to farmore efficient combat units. But Gen-eral McNair's innovations were notreceived with favor everywhere, norwere they applied consistently. Thetechnical services, notably the engi-neers, had already anticipated someaspects of the reform, but as the dis-tance from Washington increased therevision tended to become watereddown or compromised with provenlocal practice.

Resistance to the group concept be-gan at the top of the Fifth Army Engi-neer Command in Italy. When the WarDepartment authorized the establish-ment of group headquarters for all ser-vice units in October 1943, the rate ofconversion was left to the theater com-mand. General Bowman, with the con-currence of General Elliott, the AFHQengineer, slowed down the adoption ofgroups, keeping "the correspondenceabout the change bouncing betweenItaly and Washington." Bowman be-lieved that the group organization hurtmorale because the attachment of sin-gle battalions to larger units lasted foronly brief periods. Some engineer regi-

ments continued to operate as suchuntil 1945.11

Even after all the combat engineerregiments had converted, argumentscontinued over the value of the change.General Bowman also believed that thevarious group headquarters added toadministrative overhead and reducedeven further the amount of construc-tion equipment available, thereby ag-gravating an already critical problem.The II Corps engineer, Col. LeonardB. Gallagher, held that the group oper-ated less efficiently than the regiment.Lt. Col. William P. Jones, Jr., com-mander of an engineer battalion at-tached to II Corps' 1108th EngineerCombat Group, contended that thegroup wasted scarce trained engineerofficers and specialists. There were,however, strong defenders of grouporganization who stressed the gain inflexibility and pointed out that a groupheadquarters could control more bat-talions than could a regimental head-quarters. The 1108th Combat Groupin 1945, for example, had under it asmany as seven units at one time andfor a period supported five divisions.The quality of the group or regimentalcommander and the experience of hismen were the keys to the effectivenessof both organizations. In any case, theself-contained battalion became a work-able organization.12

The divisional engineers had bothstaff and command responsibilities.Unlike the G-3, who thought mainlyin terms of objectives, a division engi-neer was largely concerned with suchmatters as routes of approach, crossingsites, and covered assembly areas for

10 Ltr, Lt Gen L. J. McNair to Comding Generals,21 Jul 43, sub: Orientation with Reference to RevisedOrganization, 320.2/6031 (R) (21 Jul 43), GNGCT.

11 WD Cir 256, 16 Oct 43.12 Paxson comments.


GENERAL ELLIOTT

equipment. Since building and main-taining roads in the division area as wellas supporting three regimental combatteams were necessary, the three compa-nies of each divisional engineer battal-ion had to be divided among four mis-sions. This dispersion made the battal-ion less efficient and overburdened themen. Consequently, from the very be-ginning of the campaign, corps engi-neer units answered constant requeststo move forward into divisional areas.13

General Bowman believed that thosein command needed convincing thattactical boundaries between divisionsand corps could not apply to engineerwork. The division engineer could—and did—ask the corps engineer to takeover work in division areas that the divi-sion could not do with its own forces.In fact, army engineers sometimesworked well into divisional sections.The belief was quite common that thedivisional combat battalion was simplytoo small to do all the work required ofit.

Throughout the long campaign theengineers of Fifth Army, especially thosein the divisions, resisted attachment tocombat teams. In the 313th EngineerCombat Battalion, 88th Division, theline companies normally supported thesame infantry regiment all the time,with the engineer company commanderbecoming practically a member of theregimental staff. The companies neverwaited for the engineer battalion todirect them to perform their normalmission, so infantry regimental com-manders rarely insisted on having theengineer companies attached to them.But by the end of the war attachmentwas rare in other divisions because the

infantry commanders finally becameconvinced that engineer support wouldbe where they wanted it when theyneeded it.14

Most engineer officers favored a dailysupport system in the belief that onceengineer troops became attached to aforward echelon they could not easilybe transferred again. They believed itimpossible to forecast accurately theamount of engineer work required inthe areas that lay ahead; any specificnumber of engineers attached wouldbe either too large or too small. Addi-tionally, improvised task forces and

13 Comments, Col Hugh K. Burch, 16 Jun 59.

14 Summary of Opns, 19th Engr C Rgt with II Corps,1944-45; Bowman comments; Comments, Cole, 25Feb 59, and Armogida, 27 Apr 59.


regimental combat teams in general didnot have the staff organization to con-trol engineer work, so lost motion andconfusion became common. The engi-neers also maintained that subordinatecommanders retained engineer unitsafter their specific task was done.

The nature of engineer tasks oftensplintered engineer units—regiments,battalions, and detachments alike. De-pot, camouflage, maintenance, anddump truck companies were more sus-ceptible than others. In June 1944 the16th Armored Engineer Battalion cametogether for the first time in more thanfour months. Such dispersion inevitablyaffected performance, discipline, andmorale, caused duplication of effort,and made administration more diffi-cult.15

The Offensive Resumed

When the Allied offensive resumedin May 1944, the main Fifth Army linesouth of Anzio was to drive north upthe coast to meet VI Corps troops break-ing out of the static bridgehead. Northof Anzio, other VI Corps units were tostrike for Rome. Preparations for therenewed offensive began in March witha shift of British Eighth Army unitswestward to take over the Cassino andRapido fronts, leaving in their place agarrison force on the eastern Italiancoast. Thus relieved, and with replace-ments arriving to bring its divisions upto strength, Fifth Army consisted of theAmerican II Corps and the FrenchExpeditionary Corps concentrated on

a thirteen-mile front between the Ital-ian west coast and the Liri River, withII Corps holding the left flank of theline. Two fresh but inexperiencedAmerican divisions, the 85th and the88th, would bear the brunt of the drivealong Highway 7 to effect a junctionwith the forces at Anzio, now reinforcedto a strength of 5 1/2 divisions.16

A devastating artillery bombardmentcommencing at 2300 on 11 May sparkedthe offensive on the southern front, andat dawn the Mediterranean Allied AirForces rained destruction on the enemyrear. The Anzio breakout began on 23May, and on the twenty-fifth VI Corpswas advancing toward the Alban Hills.The same day, after II Corps had driv-en sixty miles through the mountains,the beachhead and the Fifth Armymain line were linked for the first timewhen men of the 48th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, II Corps, shook handswith the engineers of the 36th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, VI Corps, out-side the demolished village of BorgoGrappa. The linkup was part of thecampaign that smashed the GermanGustav Line and the less formidable Hit-ler Line, which the enemy had thrownacross the Liri valley and the mountainranges flanking it.

The nature of the terrain and thescarcity of roads made the Fifth Army'soffensive on the southern front largelymountain warfare, in which the experi-enced French corps bore a major shareof the burden. The only good roadavailable to Fifth Army, Highway 7,crossed the Garigliano near its mouth

15 Comments, Armogida, Bowman, Cole, Burch, andKillian; Hists, 423d Engr Dump Truck Co, 15 Apr42-1 Sep 45, and 16th Armd Engr Bn, Jun 44. Unithistories of separate, specialized engineer units bearout these conclusions.

16 For tactical details see Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., FromCassino to the Alps, United States Army in World WarII (Washington, 1977), pp. 29-38; see also Lt. Col.Chester G. Starr, From Salerno to the Alps: A History ofthe Fifth Army (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,1948), pp. 176-77.


and followed the coast to Formia. Fromthere it bent northwest and passedthrough mountains to Itri and Fondi,then along the coastal marshes to Ter-racina, where it turned again to thenorthwest, proceeding on a level andnearly straight course through the Pon-tine marshes to Cisterna. Beyond Cis-terna the road led toward Rome by wayof Velletri, skirting the Alban Hills tothe south.

Highway 7 lay at the extreme left ofthe line of advance, but it was II Corps'sole supply route. Apart from this high-way Fifth Army had the use of two orthree lateral roads, a few second- andthird-class mountain roads in the Frenchcorps' area, and some mountain trails.Insufficient as the roadnet was, it wasspared the sort of destruction that theenemy might have been able to visitupon it in a less hasty withdrawal.

After the breakout began, the engi-neers labored night and day to openthe roads and keep them in shape un-der the heavy pounding of militarytraffic. At first the engineers' chief con-cerns were to erect three additionalClass 40 bridges over the Garigliano,two for the French and one for IICorps; to strengthen to Class 30 a bridgein the French Expeditionary Corpszone; and to build several assault brid-ges for troops and mules. Then engi-neers began improving trails into roadsfor jeeps, tanks, and 2 1/2-ton trucks,often under artillery fire. Starting aboutthe middle of May the principal engi-neer work was clearing and repairingHighway 7 and a road leading acrossthe northern slopes of the AurunciMountains to Pico on lateral Highway82. (Map 10)17

The 313th Engineer Combat Battal-ion, 88th Division, undertook swift con-struction to outflank the Formia corri-dor on Highway 7. In one day the menof this battalion opened a mountainroad that the Germans had spent twoweeks preparing for demolition. Thisroad connected with a trail two mileslong that the 313th built in nine hoursover steep hills that vehicles had neverbefore traversed. A few men workingangledozers through farmland and brickterraces and along mountain slopes didthe work. A German engineer colonel,captured a few hours after the battle andevacuated over the road, was amazed,for no road had been there twenty-fourhours earlier.18

At Itri on Highway 7 a platoon ofCompany A of the 310th EngineerCombat Battalion, 85th Division, builta 100-foot Bailey and turned over itsmaintenance to the 19th Engineer Com-bat Regiment. The 235th EngineerCombat Battalion, a II Corps unit thatnormally supported the 310th, followedup the 310th's repair and clearancework along Highway 7. The Germanshad destroyed many bridges betweenFondi and Terracina, and the Ameri-can engineers had to build bypasses andculverts. At a narrow pass between themountains and the sea east of Terra-cina, tank traps and roadblocks, cov-ered by German fire from nearby hills,slowed the advance along the highway.When a blown bridge along this stretchhalted American tanks, armored bull-dozers of the 235th and 310th Engi-neer Battalions and the 19th EngineerRegiment, all under fire, built a bypassthat made it possible to resume theadvance. Lt. Col. Alien F. Clark, Jr.,

17 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 82; Fifth ArmyHistory, vol. V, pp. 6-8, 98-99.

18 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 113; Comments,Armogida, 27 Apr 59.


commanding the 235th, operated oneof the bulldozers.19

When the advance slowed at Terra-cina the 310th Engineer Combat Battal-ion immediately started on an alternateroute to connect the highway with Son-nino. A road capable of carrying thetraffic of an entire division had to becut into the rocky slopes of the AusoniaMountains. The engineers' road-build-ing machinery had done remarkablethings in the mountain chain duringthe drive from the Garigliano, but thisjob required much hand work and manydemolitions, explosives for which hadto be carried by hand up rugged moun-tain slopes. The engineers had cut sixmiles of the new road, with only onemile left, when a breakthrough at Ter-racina made it unnecessary to finish thealternate route. The work was not en-tirely lost, for the road reduced theneed for pack-mules and made it possi-ble to move division artillery fartherforward to interdict the road junctionat Sonnino.20

Beyond Terracina the highway ranthirty miles straight through the Pon-tine marshes to Cisterna. All the engi-neers available worked around the clockrepairing and maintaining three routesthrough the marshy flats. The Germanshad attempted to flood much of thisregion but were only partially success-ful; the water was low in the streamsand canals. Nevertheless, the engineershad to do considerable filling along themain routes as well as some bypassingand bridging. When Highway 7 and thesupplementary routes were open to theAnzio beachhead, troops and supplies

came up from the southern front in anuninterrupted stream. Fifth Army'smomentum was so great that after thecapture of Rome on 4 June the ad-vance proceeded beyond the city with-out pause.

The Arno

During the summer advance to theArno, about 150 miles, the Fifth Armyfront reached inland approximately 45miles. Two main national highways rannorthward in the army zone. Highway1 ran northwest up the coast through asuccession of important towns, includ-ing Civitavecchia and Leghorn, to Pisa,near the mouth of the Arno. For mostof its length the highway ran along acomparatively flat coastal plain, no-where more than ten miles wide, butbetween Cecina and Leghorn, Highway1 twisted over mountains that reacheddown to the sea. The other main road,Highway 2, wound through hills, moun-tains, and river valleys along a routethat led from Rome through Siena toFlorence. There were five good two-way lateral roads in the area betweenRome and the Arno; numerous smallerroads were, for the most part, narrowand unpaved.

During the advance to the Arno thearmy had to cross only two rivers ofany size, the Ombrone and the Cecina,both at low water. The port of Leg-horn fell to the 34th Division, II Corps,on 19 July. Beyond Leghorn lay numer-ous canals, but engineers quickly brid-ged them. Four days later the 34th Divi-sion reached Pisa. The march in thedry summer weather took place in cloudsof dust that drew artillery fire andchoked the troops. Soldiers wore gog-gles over their eyes and handkerchiefs

19 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 110; Comments,Cole and Killian.

20 Comments, Armogida, 27 Apr 59.


across their noses and mouths. Someof the roads, surfaces ground throughby military traffic, were six to eightinches deep in dust. Sprinkling theroads with water was the best way to laythe dust, but water tanks were so scarcethat only the most important roadscould be sprinkled. Sometimes the engi-neers applied calcium chloride, but itwas also scarce and its value question-able. Engineers had some success withused oil, but even that was in shortsupply.21

During the June and July drive tothe Arno much of Fifth Army's forcesdeparted to prepare for ANVIL, theinvasion of southern France. The armylost VI Corps and the French Corps.That loss amounted to seven full divi-sions, and the loss of separate combatunits amounted to another division.The nondivisional engineer units split-ting away at that time included the 36thand 540th Engineer Combat Regi-ments, the 48th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, and the 343d and 344th Engi-neer General Service Regiments. On 1June Fifth Army's assigned strengthhad been approximately 250,000; on 1August it was little more than 150,000.Making up the losses were the Japanese-American 442d Regimental CombatTeam (which arrived in May but leftfor France in late September); two newand inexperienced U.S. Army infantrydivisions, the 91st and 92d; and the firstelements, about a regimental combatteam, of the untried Brazilian Expedi-tionary Force, which was to grow to thesize of a division. In August GeneralClark gained control over the veteran

British 13 Corps consisting of fourdivisions.

From mid-July to mid-August FifthArmy made little forward progress; itpaused to rest, to build up supplies, andto prepare for the ordeal ahead. TheII and IV Corps held the 35-mile sec-tor along the Arno, IV Corps occupy-ing the greater part of the line whilethe major portion of II Corps was inthe rear preparing for the coming of-fensive. The troops received specialinstruction in river crossing and moun-tain warfare. Engineer detachmentsgave instruction in handling footbridgesand boats, in scaling steep banks withgrappling hooks and ladders, and indetecting and clearing mines.

The Italian campaign resumed inearnest on 24 August with an EighthArmy attack on the Adriatic front. TheFifth Army crossed the Arno on 1 Sep-tember, and on 9 and 10 September IICorps launched an offensive north ofFlorence. With 13 Corps beside it, IICorps battled through the mountains,capturing strongpoint after strong-point, and on the eighteenth reachedthe Santerno valley by way of Il GiogoPass. The 88th Division outflankedFuta Pass, key to the enemy's GothicLine defenses, and on the twenty-seconda battalion of the 91st Division securedthe pass. Fifth Army had breached oneof the strongest defense lines the enemyhad constructed in Italy. The attack hadbeen well timed, for the Germans haddiverted part of their strength to theAdriatic front to ward off an EighthArmy blow. With Futa Pass in the handsof Fifth Army troops, the way was clearto send supplies forward by way ofHighway 65 and to prepare for anattack northward to Bologna.

Rain, mud, and many miles of moun-

21 Hists, 313th Engr C Bn, 387th Engr C Bn, 11thEngr C Rgt, 1108th Engr C Gp, and other unithistories.


THE RISING ARNO RIVER THREATENS A TREADWAY BRIDGE in the 1st ArmoredDivision area, September 1944.

tain terrain combined to aid the enemy.Highway 65 was the only completelypaved road available to II Corps, andoff that highway 2 1/2-ton trucks mireddeep in mud. Such conditions made amockery of mechanized warfare. Mulesand men had to carry food and ammu-nition to the front. Nevertheless, IICorps troops pushed steadily on andbrought the front to a point two milesfrom Bologna by mid-October. By 23October the forward troops were withinnine miles of Highway 9 and could lookdown upon their objective in the Povalley. But here the fall offensive fal-tered. Exhaustion and heavy rains forceda halt, and II Corps dug in.

The fall rains had given the engineersan enormous task. In September theArno west of Florence in IV Corps'zone flooded its banks and on one occa-sion rose six to eight feet at the rate ofeighteen inches an hour. Late in themonth the Serchio also overflowed itsbanks north of Lucca, at Lucca itself, andat Vecchiano. So much bridge equip-ment was lost that the IV Corps engi-neer had to divert engineers from bridgeconstruction and road work to salvageoperations.22 Mountain streams thathad dwindled to a trickle in the sum-

22 IV Corps Engr Rpt, Sep-Oct 44; Killian com-ments.


BAILEY BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION over theArno near Florence.

mer changed in a few hours to ragingtorrents. Through most of October therain continued unabated, becoming atorrential downpour by the end of themonth. Cross-country movement virtu-ally ceased, and great quantities of mudwere tracked onto the main roads fromsecondary roads and bivouac areas. Cul-verts and fills washed out, fords wereimpassable, and roads softened untilthey could not withstand heavy mili-tary traffic.

Engineer vehicles and equipmentdeteriorated from constant haulingthrough deep mud over very roughroads. Breakdowns were so numerousand the supply of spare parts so lowthat at times some engineer units hadto operate with only half of their or-ganic equipment. Because divisionalengineers had to devote all their efforts

to supporting frontline troops, corpsengineers had to maintain supply routesin the divisional zones.23

More floods came in November, andat one time or another during thatmonth all the principal highways wereblocked with high water. The 39thEngineer Combat Regiment reportedfourteen major road breaks along a six-mile stretch of Highway 6 northwest ofFlorence, making necessary the con-struction of four Bailey and three tim-ber trestle bridges. The autostrada, afour-lane superhighway that carved anarc through the Arno valley, connect-ing Florence with Pistoia, Lucca, andthe coastal road north from Pisa, wascovered for miles with water as deep astwo feet. As the campaign ground to ahalt, the whole Italian front settleddown into mud.24

The Winter Stalemate

The stalemate continued throughoutthe winter of 1944-45. To permit sup-plies to be brought forward, the engi-neers had to work unceasingly on theroads. On Highway 65—the direct roadto Bologna from the south, the mainsupply route for the Fifth Army's cen-tral sector, and the only fully pavedroad in the II Corps zone—jeeps, truckstanks, and prime movers rolled alongalmost without letup day and night.Already in bad condition and cut inplaces by the enemy, Highway 65 suf-fered serious damage from rain, snow,and the constant pounding of thou-sands of vehicles, many of them equip-ped with tire chains. Army, corps, and

23 IV Corps Engr Rpt, Sep-Oct 44; Hist II CorpsEngr Activities, 10 Sep-Nov 44; Burch comments.

24 Hist 39th Engr C Rgt, Jun-Dec 44.


divisional engineer units had constantlyto maintain the whole length of theroad, especially north of Futa Pass,where the pavement virtually disap-peared. The main inland supply routefor IV Corps, Highway 64, runningfrom Pistoia to Bologna, carried lesstraffic than Highway 65 and thereforeremained in somewhat better con-dition.25

In preparation for winter, the engi-neers placed snow fences and stockpiledsand. They speeded clearance aftersnowfalls to prevent ice formation andduring thaws to prevent drainage prob-lems. Foreseeing that the greatest dif-ficulty with snow would come in thepasses leading to the Po valley, AFHQdeveloped a plan involving joint trans-portation and engineer operations toclear the roads. The plan included con-trol posts, road patrols, and a specialcommunications system to report con-ditions throughout each day. The Engi-neer Section, Fifth Army, prepared amap that indicated the areas wheretrouble could be expected, includingareas the Germans held. The engineerand transportation units involved piledsand along the roads where the mostsnow could be expected and parkedsnow-removal equipment at strategicpoints along the roads.

The plan worked in the II Corpsarea, where winter conditions were themost severe. In addition to Americanand British troops, hundreds of Ital-ians, both civilian and military, workedto keep the roads open. Large rotarysnowplows augmented jeeps, graders,bulldozers, and wooden and conven-tional snowplow attachments fitted to 2

1/2- and 4-ton trucks. Some Germanand Italian equipment the enemy hadleft behind also proved useful. Unfor-tunately, the plan did not develop suc-cessfully all along the front. IV Corpswas not able to set up a system compar-able to the one II Corps employedbecause IV Corps did not have any-thing like the snow-removal equipmentof II Corps. Instead, IV Corps unitshad to drop whatever they were doingwhen snow began to fall and clear theroads with whatever equipment wasavailable. Only a few roads in IV Corps'area were seriously menaced by snow,however, and most lay in the coastalplain.26

During the fall and winter the engi-neers were able to open mountain trails.Soft banks and shoulders gave wayreadily before bulldozers, which wid-ened roads, provided turnouts on one-lane sections, and improved sharp curvesand turns. Huge quantities of rock wererequired to keep these roads open to avolume of traffic never before contem-plated. The 19th Engineers used 25,000cubic yards of rock to rebuild a 101/2-mile stretch of secondary road adja-cent to Highway 65 in the Idice valley.Keeping the improved trails open asroads necessitated unending work, in-cluding draining, graveling, revettingsoft shoulders, removing slides, andbuilding rock retaining walls. The great-est problem was drainage maintenance,for the mountain creeks, gullies, gorges,and cascades, when not properly chan-neled, poured floods upon the roads.Two months of constant work by thou-sands of civilians and soldiers using

25 Hist 185th Engr C Bn, 1944-45; Killian com-ments; Jones comments.

26 Engr Tech Bull 28, 28 Feb 45; Chf Engr, 15thArmy Gp, Notes on Engr Opns in Italy, no. 26, Mar45; Hist 39th Engr C Rgt, 1945; Hist 175th Engr GSRgt, Feb 42-Oct 45; Comments, Bowman and Jones.


both hand labor and machinery notonly kept the roads open but improvedthem. In forward areas infantry unitstook over the maintenance of some ofthe lateral roads leading to their dis-persed forces.27

The first of the units reorganizedaccording to the new group conceptbegan operations in December 1944.To improve control over miscellaneousengineer units operating under theFifth Army engineer, General Bowmanorganized the 1168th Engineer Com-bat Group, with Lt. Col. Salvatore A.Armogida in command. The cadre forthe new command came from an anti-aircraft headquarters, and under it weresuch engineer units as a map detach-ment, dump truck companies, a heavyequipment company, a maintenancecompany, a fire-fighting detachment, acamouflage company, a topographiccompany, and a water supply company.Also attached were some Italian engi-neer battalions and a number of otherunits under an Italian engineer group.28

The Final Drive

Exceptionally mild weather begin-ning in mid-February enabled engi-neers to make substantial progress inrepairing and rehabilitating the road-nets and improving and extendingbridges. With snow rapidly recedingfrom the highlands, a company of the126th Engineer Mountain Battalion,organic to the 10th Mountain Division,built a 1,700-foot aerial tramway overMonte Serrasiccia (located 18 milesnorthwest of Pistoia) on 19 February.

Built at an average slope of 18 to 20degrees, the tramway was finished inten hours despite enemy fire. Casual-ties could come down the mountain-side in three minutes instead of six toeight hours. The tramway hauled bloodplasma, barbed wire, emergency Krations, water, and ammunition up themountain. Another timesaver the bat-talion contributed was a 2,100-footcableway constructed on 10 March,when the 10th Mountain Division wasattacking over rugged terrain. Sup-ported by two A-frames and built in sixhours, the cableway saved a six-mile tripfor ambulances and supply trucks.29

Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.,became commander of the Fifth Armyin December when General Clarkmoved up to command the 15th ArmyGroup. Before the spring offensivebegan, the Fifth Army received rein-forcements of infantry, artillery, andreserves. Its divisions were overstrengthand its morale high as the troops lookedforward to a quick triumph over thesagging enemy. The British 13 Corpshad returned to Eighth Army, but FifthArmy's reinforcements helped balancethat loss.

In April the two Allied armies, care-fully guarding the secrecy of the move-ment, went forward into positions fromwhich they could strike a sudden, dev-astating blow against the enemy. TheFifth Army front was nearly ninetymiles long, reaching from the Ligur-ian Sea to Monte Grande, ten milessoutheast of Bologna. The IV Corpsheld the left of this line—indeed, thegreater part of it—stretching from thesea and through the mountains as faras the Reno River, a distance of aboutseventy miles. The II Corps crowded

27 Hists, 1108th Engr C Gp, Sep-Dec 44, and1138th Engr C Gp, 1944-45; Fifth Army History, vol.VIII, pp. 21-22, 26; Bowman, Burch, and Colecomments.

28 Bowman comments. 29 Ltr, Col Robert P. Boyd, Jr., 8 Jun 59.


GENERAL BOWMAN

into a twenty-mile sector, and to its rightthe Eighth Army, with four corps, ex-tended the line to the Adriatic.

Formidable mine defenses lay ahead.Typical was a minefield just west ofHighway 65 that consisted of six toeight rows of antitank mines laid in analmost continuous band for two miles.Before the final Allied offensive couldbegin it was necessary—after passingthrough the Allies' own defensive mine-fields— to cut through or bypass suchdefenses, clearing German wooden box,Schu, and other mines that were diffi-cult to detect, notably the Topf, with itsglass-enclosed chemical igniter.30

The final battle of the campaigns inItaly began early in April with a 92dDivision diversionary attack on the ex-treme left, followed by an Eighth Armyblow on the extreme right. Reeling, theenemy began to fall back, and troopsof the Fifth and Eighth Armies cap-tured Bologna on 21 April. The twoarmies moved into the Po valley behindarmored spearheads and once acrossthe river spread out swiftly in pursuitof the disorganized enemy.

In the broad valley the roadnet wasgood, in some places excellent, withmany paved highways connecting thecities, towns, and villages scattered overthe plain, a rich and thriving region innormal times. Most of the secondaryroads were graveled and well kept,affording alternate routes to almost anypoint. Roughly parellel main arteriesran from east to west across the valley,while others ran north and south. Withsuch a large, spreading roadnet andwith secondary routes sometimes offer-ing shortcuts for the pursuing forces,the fleeing enemy could do little toimpede the Allies' progress. As the cam-paign drew swiftly to its close, little roadmaintenance was necessary and wasmostly confined to primary routes. Theprinicpal engineer task was crossing thePo, and that had to be done quickly tokeep up the tempo of the pursuit andcut off enemy escape routes.31

The Po is a rather slow stream withmany bars and islands and is generallytoo wide for footbridges. In front ofFifth Army its bed varied in width from330 to 1,315 yards, the actual water gap

30 Fifth Army History, vol. VI, pp. 84-85; Clark,Calculated Risk, p. 385; Jones comments. No true plas-tic mines were found in the Mediterranean theater,although rumors persisted throughout the war thatthe Germans were using them. All enemy mines hadat least a small amount of metal in them. The rumorhad begun in Sicily where a single improvised mine

made of plastic explosive with a standard detonatorwas found. The nearest approach to the plastic minewas an Italian mine resembling the German Tellerbut made of bakelite.

31 Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 231-32.


extending from 130 to 490 yards. Alliedair strikes had destroyed the perma-nent high-level and floating highwaybridges. The Germans maintained com-munication across the river by ferriesand by floating bridges, many of whichthey assembled from remnants of per-manent floating bridges after dark anddismantled before daylight.

The engineers knew that a hugeamount of bridging would be necessaryto cross the Po. Treadway bridging wasin limited supply. The 25-ton pontonsof the 1554th Engineer Heavy PontonBattalion would be essential, as wouldmany floating Baileys, which Fifth Armycould borrow from the British. Thewidth of the Po required storm boats aswell as assault boats, heavy rafts, infan-try-support rafts, and Quonset bargesassembled from naval cubical steel pon-tons and powered by marine motors.

Fifth Army engineers were confidentthat they could build bridges on pileseighty feet deep or more despite thesoft mud of considerable depth thatformed the Po's bed. Such piles camefrom U.S. engineer forestry units work-ing in southern Italy, and the long trail-ers of the 1554th Heavy Ponton Battal-ion brought them to the front.

On 22 September 1944, Fifth Armyengineers distributed a special engineerreport on the Po throughout the army.The report consolidated all availableinformation, and revised editions cameout from then until the actual crossing.The 1168th Engineer Combat Groupcontrolled camouflage, maintenance,depot, and equipment units and pro-vided administrative service for someengineer units not under its operationalcontrol. The 46th South African Sur-vey Company carried its triangulationnet into the Po valley, while early in

1945 the 66th Engineer TopographicCompany issued 1:12,500 photo-mosaicsheets covering the area and special1:10,000 mosaics of possible crossingsites. The 1621st Engineer Model Mak-ing Detachment produced a number ofterrain models of the Po valley.32

Special river-crossing training concen-trated mainly on II Corps engineerunits, but close to the actual crossingday Fifth Army switched bridging toIV Corps.33 The engineer units hadthoroughgoing drills, and a group ofII Corps' combat engineers got specialinstruction in all the assault and bridg-ing equipment the army stockpiled dur-ing the winter. This group was to oper-ate with the troops ready to make themain movement across the Po, whetherof II or IV Corps. Fifth Army had esti-mated that a floating Bailey would berequired in both II Corps and IV Corpsareas; the 1338th Engineer CombatGroup's 169th Engineer Combat Bat-talion was to build the II Corps bridgeand the 1108th Engineer CombatGroup's 235th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, the IV Corps bridge. DuringMarch and April the 169th EngineerCombat Battalion sent several of its mento the British Floating Bailey BridgeSchool at Capua, and in April the entirebattalion moved to a site on the Arnowest of Pisa for training in building thebridges. The 235th Combat Battaliongot only a few days of training—andeven that for only part of the battalion.34

Estimating that the Germans wouldexpect II Corps to make the main attack

32 Jones comments.33 Killian comments.34 Engr Hist II Corps, p. 248; Hists, 39th Engr C

Rgt, Jun-Dec 44; 169th Engr C Bn, 1 Nov 44-8 May45; and 235th Engr C Bn, Jan-May 45; Comments,Killian and Jones.


ENGINEERS BRIDGING THE WIDE BUT PLACID PO RIVER

along the axis of Highway 65, FifthArmy determined to surprise them byhaving IV Corps deliver the first heavyattack along Highway 64. To avoidwarning the enemy General Bowmandecided to keep major bridging equip-ment at Florence and Leghorn, approxi-mately 125 miles from the Po, ratherthan establish a forward bridge dump.Moreover, no suitable areas for bridgedumps existed along the parts of High-ways 64 and 65 that Fifth Army held.To make dumps would have requireda great deal of earth moving in the mid-dle of winter, would have diverted engi-neers from other important jobs, andmight have given away the plans forthe attack. Because he expected theGermans to make a stand at the Po,

Bowman believed he would have plentyof time to bring bridging to a place inthe valley where it would be availablefor either corps.35

The German retreat was so precipi-tous that much of the planning proveda handicap rather than an advantage.The three leading divisions of IV Corpswere at the river on 23 April, in advanceof any II Corps units. Enemy resistancehad become so weak that each divisiontried to get across the Po as fast as possi-ble to keep up the chase without inter-ruption. Engineers had to work fever-ishly to push the troops across by allmeans available.36

35 Bowman comments.36 Hist 39th Engr C Rgt, Jun-Dec 44; Comments,

Bowman and Killian.


The II Corps engineers diverted toIV Corps during the crossing opera-tion included operators for storm boatsand Quonset barges, a company of the39th Engineer Combat Group's 404thEngineer Combat Battalion to operatefloating equipment, the 19th EngineerCombat Group's 401st Engineer Com-bat Battalion, and the 1554th HeavyPonton Battalion.37 During the morn-ing of the twenty-third all II Corps'bridging that was readily available, in-cluding an M1 treadway bridge, 60DUKWs, 4 infantry support rafts, and24 storm boats with motors, moved inconvoy to IV Corps. At Anzola fiftyassault boats belonging to IV Corpsjoined the convoy, which went forwardto the 10th Mountain Division andarrived at San Benedetto on the morn-ing of 24 April. On the night of thetwenty-second, fifty other IV Corpsassault boats had also reached the 10thMountain Division.38

The crossing began at noon on 23April, when troops of the 10th Moun-tain Division ferried over the Po in IVCorps assault boats operated by divi-sional engineers of the 126th EngineerMountain Battalion. Some of the menof the 126th made as many as twenty-three trips across that day. Starting atnoon the engineers used the only equip-ment available to them—fifty sixteen-man wooden assault boats. By 2000 the126th had ferried across the 86th and87th Mountain Infantry Regiments plus

medical detachments and two battalionsof divisional light artillery (75-mm.pack). Only twelve boats were left, mostof the rest having been destroyed byheavy German fire. The engineers suf-fered twenty-four casualties, includingtwo killed.39

The 85th Division followed close be-hind. All assault river-crossing equip-ment the divisional engineers (the 310thEngineer Combat Battalion) had heldhad been turned over to IV Corps engi-neers in April before the Po crossing.When the division reached the Po itsengineers had only nine two-man rub-ber boats and had to use local materialsto build four infantry support rafts andthree improvised rafts. On these, withthe help of the 255th Engineer Com-bat Battalion of the 1108th EngineerCombat Group, the 310th crossed allreconnaissance and combat units of thedivision except medium artillery. Thecrossing took forty-eight hours, but inspite of enemy artillery fire the engi-neers suffered no casualties.40

The IV Corps engineers had notexpected to be in the vanguard cross-ing the Po and had to cope with prob-lems for which they were not prepared.During the afternoon of 24 April the401st Engineer Combat Battalion, a IICorps organization on loan to IV Corps,started building a treadway bridge nearSan Benedetto. Working all night, withthe help of the 235th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, the 401st completed the950-foot span at 1030.41

37 On 1 March 1945, Headquarters and Headquar-ters Company (HHC), 19th Engineer Combat Regi-ment, became HHC, 19th Engineer Combat Group.The regiment's 1st Battalion was redesignated the401st Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 2d Battal-ion became the 402d Engineer Combat Battalion.

38 II Corps Hist, Gen Staff Confs, 23 Nov 44-5 May45; Comments, Burch and Jones.

39 Ltr, Col Robert P. Boyd, Jr., CO, 126th Mtn EngrBn, 8 Jun 59; Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 237.

40 Hists, 310th Engr C Bn, 1 Nov 44-8 May 45, and255th Engr C Bn, Apr-Jun 45; Engineer History, Medi-terranean, p. 242; Comments, Jones, Boyd, and Burch.

41 Engineer History, Mediterranean, pp. 244-45; Hist401st Engr C Bn, Jan-Aug 45; Killian comments.


Late on the afternoon of 24 Aprilthe 1554th Heavy Ponton Battalion (IICorps) started work three miles up-stream on a heavy ponton bridge eventhough much of the equipment did notarrive until after the bridge had beencompleted with improvised equipment.When finished on the afternoon of thetwenty-fifth the bridge was 840 feetlong and consisted of 56 pontons, 49floats, and 4 trestles. A ferry of NavyQuonset barges, which could haul two2 1/2-ton trucks, had operated all dur-ing the night of 24 April. Day andnight, for forty-eight hours after thecompletion of these first two bridgesover the Po, two IV Corps divisions andpart of a II Corps division went overthe river; within the first twenty-fourhours some 3,400 vehicles crossed thebridges.42

Meanwhile, II Corps' engineers seri-ously felt the diversion of men andequipment to IV Corps, which left themwith no floating bridges or assault equip-ment. Much equipment supposedly stillavailable to II Corps was lost, misplaced,defective, or still in crates. During thenight of the twenty-third bridging equip-ment began to arrive, but treadwayequipage was loaded on quartermastersemitrailers instead of Brockway trucks.On the morning of the twenty-fourththe II Corps engineer, Col. Joseph O.Killian, reported to General Bowmanthat he had no bridging available andthat he had no idea when it would beavailable since treadway constructiondepended upon Brockways with theirspecial facilities for unloading. TheBrockways had gone to IV Corps, and

Colonel Killian had to depend uponFifth Army engineers for other equip-ment. Also, many motors for Quonsetbarges that reached the river were de-fective. These conditions held up opera-tions for almost a day. The confusionappreciably reduced II Corps engineersupport to division engineers and ledto last-minute changes in plans and hastyimprovisations. The M2 treadway andferries remained the chief means forcrossing the Po in the II Corps areauntil missing parts for the Quonsets ar-rived from Leghorn.

After the Po the hard-pressed IICorps engineers had two more majorstreams to cross, the Adige and theBrenta, and again bridging equipmentwas late getting to them. An almostintact bridge II Corps troops seizednear Verona proved sufficient untilother bridges could be erected. At theBrenta River bridging arrived with theadvance guard of the 91st Division. Oneof the first elements across a tempo-rary trestle treadway at the Brenta wasa section of the bridge train movingahead with forward elements of the 91stDivision to the next crossing. In the IVCorps sector German defenders of abridge across the Mincio at Governolaheld up the forward drive on the twenty-fourth only momentarily. Althoughdamaged, the bridge proved usable,and the 37th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, which for more than two daysand nights had been working with littleor no rest, had it open for traffic in afew hours.43

The drive rolled on, led by the 88thDivision. The 10th Mountain Divisionand the 85th Infantry Division pushed

42 Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 254; II CorpsHist, Gen Staff Conf, Apr-May 45; Hist 401st EngrC Bn, Jan-Aug 45; Jones comments.

43 II Corps Hist, 1 Apr-2 May 45, an. 6; Comments,Bowman and Killian.


RAFT FERRIES A TANK DESTROYER ACROSS THE PO

on to Verona, and the 1st ArmoredDivision helped to seal off all escaperoutes to the north with an envelopingsweep to the west. These moves, in con-junction with those of the Eighth Army,brought about the capitulation of theenemy and an end to the Italian cam-paign.

The Shortage of Engineers

From the landings at Salerno to theend of the war in Italy, a shortage ofpersonnel affected practically all engi-neer work in Fifth Army and Peninsu-lar Base Section areas. Experiencedmen were constantly drained off as thewar progressed: too few engineers wereallocated to the theater at the start; War

Department policies worked to the det-riment of engineer strengths; unitswent to Seventh Army and the inva-sion of southern France; and the engi-neer contingent in Italy suffered cas-ualties. The effect showed up not onlyin numbers but also in fluctuating train-ing levels, varying proficiency in stan-dard engineer functions, and problemsof supply common to the theater. Notthe least important for the engineerswas the loss of experienced leaders.

In its search for skilled manpower,the War Department imposed strictureson the theaters in addition to the organi-zational one of the group concept. Tobuild new engineer units around soundcadres the department often orderedexperienced engineer officers home to


form a reserve pool of knowledgeablemen for new units but did not replacethem in overseas units with men ofequal ability. Replacements in Italy wereusually deficient in engineer back-grounds, and some had no technicalknowledge at all. Between 6 October1943 and 11 May 1944, forty-eight offi-cers of company and field grade wentback to the United States as cadre, Gen-eral Bowman agreeing that they couldbe replaced by first and second lieuten-ants from training schools at home.Only some 50 percent arrived duringthat period, and the replacement sys-tem never made up the shortage. Inthe fall of 1944 the War Departmentstopped shipping individual engineerreplacements, and the engineers turnedto hastily trained elements such as anti-aircraft gun crews left in rear areas,usually ports, to protect traffic therefrom nonexistent Axis air raids. FromSeptember 1944 to April 1945, newengineer units formed from nonengi-neer organizations included three com-bat battalions, one light equipmentcompany, one depot company, onemaintenance company, two engineercombat group headquarters, and twogeneral service regiments. One generalservice regiment and two combat engi-neer regiments already existing becamegroup organizations, and another twogeneral service regiments were reorgan-ized under new tables of organizationand equipment. But with the exceptionof some separate companies, none ofthe new units ever attained its author-ized strength. The constant rotation ofofficers to the United States reducedsome of the existing units to 85 percentof their usual strength.

The number of engineer units drawnoff by the Seventh Army in the spring

of 1944 was somewhat counterbalancedby the reduction of Fifth Army's respon-sibilities when the British Eighth Armytook over a major part of the front.But the units lost at the time were whatremained of the best, for General Clarkallowed Seventh Army to take any engi-neer unit it wanted.

Casualties also took an expected toll.Of the peak engineer strength of 27,000in June 1944, 3,540 officers and menwere lost. Of the 831 who died, 597were killed in action, 140 died fromwounds received in action, and 94 diedfrom other causes. Of the 2,646 wound-ed in action, 786 were wounded seri-ously and 1,860 only slightly. Somethirty-six were taken prisoner, and thir-ty remained missing in action. Thenumbers varied from unit to unit de-pending on proximity to the front lineand the type of work performed. Inforty-five days of combat at Anzio, the36th Engineer Combat Regiment lost74 men killed and 336 wounded. Onthe same front, where it was difficult todistinguish front lines from rear, the383d Battalion (Separate) in five monthssustained casualties of four officers andeleven enlisted men killed and threeofficers and fifty-eight men wounded.Enemy artillery brought down the mostengineers. For example, the 109th Com-bat Battalion between 20 September1943 and 11 May 1944 had seventy-one battle casualties, 90 percent fromartillery blasts or shell fragments, and10 percent from mine blasts and small-arms fire. At other times the losses fromartillery were fewer, as low as 61 per-cent, but artillery always remained thechief culprit.44

44 Hist 185th Engr C Bn, Sep 44; Fifth Army Rpt ofArmy Commanders Weekly Confs, 24 Mar-14 Apr45; Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 163; Summary


Training

To offset inexperience, the engineersconcentrated on training troops cominginto the North African theater. Unitshad no choice but to accept troops with-out engineer training, and they tookmen with only basic military training.They had to be satisfied, in fact, withonly a small percentage of Class II per-sonnel (categorized as rapid learners ininduction tests), with the remainderClass III (average learners) and ClassIV (slow learners). New officers wereassigned to four to six weeks of dutywith rear area general service engineerunits before being thrust into work withcombat engineers.

Each engineer unit tried to maintaina reserve of trained specialists to fillany vacancies that occurred and to keepup job training. Even so, engineer unitsin the Fifth Army did not have enoughtrained operators and mechanics, espe-cially for heavy equipment. A goodoperator could do three to five timesthe work of a poor one.

Training in bridging, river crossing,mine techniques, heavy equipment,motor maintenance, surveying, intelli-gence techniques, mapping, photog-raphy, scouting and patrolling, moun-tain climbing, driving, marksmanship,and the use of flame throwers and gre-nade launchers went on throughout thecampaign, most of it within the engi-neer groups, regiments, battalions, orcompanies. Many units trained at night.For example, the 19th Engineer Com-bat Regiment, before the spring offen-sive of May 1944, spent a third of itstraining time on night practices. One

company of a battalion might performassigned missions while the rest of thebattalion trained.45

When the time was available, almostevery unit practiced bridge construc-tion. The 235th Engineer Combat Bat-talion spent five days at the Arno build-ing floating treadways. Experiencedunits trained the inexperienced: the16th Armored Engineer Battalion in-structed the 36th and 39th EngineerCombat Regiments and the 10th Engi-neer Combat Battalion in building steeltreadways, and the 1755th TreadwayBridge Company trained a number ofunits, including the 19th Engineer Com-bat Regiment. In August and Septem-ber 1944 the 175th Engineer GeneralService Regiment conducted a schoolfor the British in building timberbridges. In April 1944 each companyof the 310th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, 85th Division, built and disman-tled a 100-foot double-single Bailey.

As early as November 1943 FifthArmy established a school in river cross-ing at Limatola, near the Volturno, andhere a number of units practiced forthe Rapido crossing. During a fortnightin January 1944 the 16th ArmoredEngineer Battalion practiced assaultcrossings with the 6th Armored Infan-try Regiment, 1st Armored Division.Four companies of the 19th EngineerCombat Regiment practiced between 10and 15 January 1944 with elements ofthe 36th Division at Pietravairano, six-teen miles north of Capua, instructingthe infantry in the use of river-crossingequipment during both daylight anddarkness. The engineers conductedsimilar training in preparation for theArno and Po crossings.

of Activities (Statistical) Mediterranean Theater, vol.XV, p. 18.

45 Hist 19th Engr C Rgt, 1944. The following is basedon histories of the units mentioned.


Engineers also learned by attach-ment. Units just arriving in the FifthArmy zone sent officers and enlistedmen—or whole units—to work with,observe, and learn from engineers whowere more experienced. Elements ofthe 310th Engineer Combat Battalionwere attached to the 313th CombatBattalion, elements of the 316th Com-bat Battalion to the 10th and 111thCombat Battalions, and elements of the48th Combat Battalion to the 120thCombat Battalion.

The engineers also instructed non-engineer units in a number of otherskills, most notably recognizing, laying,detecting, and removing mines. TwoFifth Army engineer mine-trainingteams supplemented the instructionthat divisional engineer battalions gaveto the infantry. The 16th ArmoredEngineer Battalion subjected the 92dDivision to rigorous drill, requiring thewhole division to go through a liveminefield.

Early in the campaign the Britishestablished a Bailey bridge school, opento Americans, at Capua, where someunits felt the instruction was better thanthat provided at the American school.46

Americans gave some supplementaryinstruction at the British School of Mili-tary Engineering at Capua. Most of theAmerican schools in the theater weresubordinate to the Replacement andTraining Command, MTOUSA. In thesummer of 1944 MTOUSA establishedan American Engineer Mines and BridgeSchool along the Volturno in the vicin-ity of Maddaloni. As the Fifth Armymoved northward and out of touch, theschool shifted its emphasis to convert-ing American antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

troops into engineers and to trainingthe Brazilian Expeditionary Force andthe 92d Division.47

Lacking engineer troops, Fifth Armyemployed thousands of Italians. SomeItalian engineer troops participated inthe campaign, but most of the laborerswere civilians who bolstered almost allthe U.S. Army engineer units, especiallythose at army and corps level. Each unitrecruited its own civilian force with helpfrom Allied military government detach-ments. At one time the 310th EngineerCombat Battalion had more than threetimes its own strength in civilian labor-ers. The work of the Italians, while notalways up to the standard desired bythe American engineers, released thou-sands of engineers and infantrymen forother tasks. Some three thousand man-ual laborers worked for the engineersduring the winter of 1944-45; in April1945 army and corps engineer unitshad employed 4,437 Italian civilians,most of them on road work. The Ital-ians loaded, broke, and spread rock;worked at quarries; cleared ditches andculverts for use of mule pack trains;and hand-placed rock to build up firmshoulders and form gutters. Thosemore skilled rebuilt retaining walls andmasonry ditches along road shoulders.48

A specialized Italian civilian group,the Cantonieri, was the equivalent ofU.S. county or local road workers. These

46 Jones comments, 1 Jun 59.

47 Engr Service, PBS, Work Accomplished, 2 Oct43-1 Sep 44; Comments, Jones, 1 Jun 59; Fifth ArmyRpt of Army Commanders Weekly Confs, 24 Marand 14 Apr 45; Engineer History, Mediterranean, p. 163;Summary of Activities (Statistical) MediterraneanTheater, vol. XV, p. 18.

48 Comments, Jones and Armogida; Engineer History,Mediterranean, pp. 31, 164, 267; Fifth Army History, vol.VIII, p. 26; Fifth Army Rpt of Army CommandersWeekly Confs, 10, 24 Feb; 3, 10, 17, 24, 31 Mar; 7, 14,21 Apr; and 14 May 45.


workers became available as the frontlines moved forward and were espe-cially valuable in rapidly moving situa-tions when engineer road responsibili-ties increased by leaps and bounds. Thechief of the Cantonieri of a given areadid the same tasks on his section ofroad (about twelve miles) that he haddone for his government. Truckloadsof crushed rock and asphalt were un-loaded along the road as required, andthe Cantonieri patched pavements anddid drainage and other repair jobs.49

Engineer Supply

Fifth Army was not in Italy longbefore defects in the engineer supplysystem became evident. The engineersacted rapidly on the invasion plans thatcalled for them to make the most usepossible of locally procured material.Soon after Naples fell, reconnaissanceparties scoured the area for supplies,making detailed inventories of plumb-ing and electrical fixtures, hardware,nails, glass, and other small standarditems. Italian military stocks, especiallythose at the Fontanelle caves, were valu-able sources of needed materiel, andprefabricated Italian barracks served ashospital wards until American hutsarrived. Though American engineerssequestered and classified over a hun-dred different types of stock and placedorders on Italian industry through theAllied military government that spurredthe local economy and saved criticalshipping space, control of requisitionand issue of supply suffered from toofew qualified men.50

The strain was particularly manifest

closer to the combat elements. No orga-nization existed at Fifth Army corps ordivision levels to allocate engineer sup-ply, and the individual units drewdirectly from army engineer depots.Though the Fifth Army engineer triedto keep the dumps as far forward aspossible, the using units had to send theirown trucks back to collect supplies sincethe depots frequently did not have thetransportation to make deliveries. Thetime needed for supply runs varied withthe distances involved, the road condi-tions, and the frequent necessity fortraveling blacked out. The average wasone day, but the 313th Engineer Com-bat Battalion reported that trips of upto 250 miles required two days for theround trip.51

Many engineer units could ill affordeither the time or the transportationrequired for frequent trips back toarmy dumps, so they began to main-tain small dumps of their own, stock-ing them with supplies from army engi-neer dumps and with material capturedor procured locally. The only condi-tion Fifth Army imposed on these dumpswas that all stocks be movable. It wascommon practice for each company ofa divisional engineer combat battalionto set up a forward dump in the infan-try regimental sector, and such dumpsoften leapfrogged forward as the divi-sion moved. In the 45th Division, the120th Engineer Combat Battalion in amobile situation always kept its dumpabout 1 1/2 miles behind its own com-mand post.52

49 Bowman comments.50 Engr Service, PBS, Work Accomplished, p. 275;

PBS, Public Relations Sect, Tools of War, p. 22.

51 Bowman comments; Hists, 39th Engr Rgt, Jun-Dec 44; 313th Engr C Bn, 1944-45; 337th Engr GSRgt, 9 Sep 43-1 Nov 44; and 120th Engr C Bn, 9 Sep43-1 May 44.

52 Hists, 132d Engr C Bn, 16 Sep 44-5 May 45, and337th Engr GS Rgt, 9-15 Sep 43; AGF Bd Rpt 162,NATOUSA, 28 Jun 44.


There were never enough depottroops to operate army engineer sup-ply dumps. Before the breakout in May1944 Fifth Army had only one platoon(one officer and forty enlisted men) ofthe 451st Engineer Depot Company,while the rest of the company remainedwith PBS. The platoon had to moveoften to stay close to the front but stillmanaged to fill an average of seventy-five requisitions every twenty-four hours.Frequently, the platoon operated morethan one depot simultaneously—threein May 1944. When the 451st concen-trated at Civitavecchia in June, it took500 trucks, enough for seven full-strength infantry regiments, to movethe unit's stock and equipment north.Help in depot operations came fromother engineers as well as from British,French, and Italian military units. Sev-eral companies of Italian soldiers wereregularly attached to the 1st Platoon asmechanics, welders, carpenters, andlaborers. Italian salvage crews repairedtools and equipment, manufacturedbridge pins, and mended rubber boats.53

The shortage of engineer depot unitsmade it impossible to open new engi-neer dumps as often or as rapidly asdesirable, particularly after the May1944 breakout. As a result the supplyfurnished to engineer units deteriora-ted, and in June one platoon of the450th Engineer Depot Company hadto be made available to Fifth Army. InAugust, however, the platoon revertedto Seventh Army, and for the next fewmonths Fifth Army again had only oneplatoon for engineer depot support.Finally, in December 1944, MTOUSA

formed the 383d Engineer Depot Com-pany from the 1st Platoon, 451st, andmen from disbanded antiaircraft units.Through the rest of the campaign FifthArmy engineer units could count onsupply support from this company,aided by Italian Army troops trainedin engineer supply procedures.54

Mapping and Intelligence

Planners had estimated that FifthArmy would need a full topographicbattalion, plus one topographic com-pany per corps, to reproduce and revisemaps; yet there were never more thantwo topographical companies availableat any one time. The 66th EngineerTopographic Company served for nine-teen months; the 661st served onlyeight months, mainly with VI Corps.Both, from time to time, had to get helpfrom South African and British surveycompanies.55

The 66th Topographic Company wasthe American unit on which Fifth Armyplaced its chief reliance. Upon arrivalin Italy in early October 1943, the menof this unit went to work revising mate-rial derived chiefly from aerial photo-graphs. Photo mosaics and detaileddefense studies covering the projectedattacks along the Volturno and Sacco-Liri Rivers were made and reproduced.

In November the 66th was assignedto II Corps but continued to revise andreproduce maps for the Fifth ArmyEngineer Section. This company con-sisted of four platoons: a headquartersor service platoon; a survey platoon,which as a field unit performed the sur-

53 Rpt, Engr Fifth Army, 25 Jun 44, Engineer Les-sons from the Italian Campaign; Hist 451st EngrDepot Co, May-Dec 44.

54 Hists, 450th Engr Depot Co, May-Aug 44, and383d Engr Depot Co, 1944-45.

55 Bowman comments.


vey and control work; a photomappingplatoon responsible for drafting as wellas planning and revising maps; and areproduction platoon responsible forthe lithographic production of the print-ed sheet. In January 1944 the companyfurnished men for two provisional engi-neer map depot detachments, one atAnzio and the other on the main front.When the two fronts merged in May itwas possible to establish forward andrear map depots, and NATOUSA for-mally activated the 1710th and 1712thEngineer Map Depot Detachments.

The 66th Topographic Companymoved twelve times between 5 October1943 and the fall of Rome in June 1944.Between those dates the company pro-cessed an average of a half millionimpressions a month. In addition to 866different maps, the 66th printed fieldorders, overlays showing engineer re-sponsibilities, road network overlays,defense overprints, German plans forCassino defense, a monthly history ofII Corps' operations, the disposition ofGerman troops in the II Corps area,special maps for the commanding gen-eral of II Corps, special terrain studies,photomaps, and various posters andbooklets. It produced a major portionof all the 1:100,000, 1:50,000, and1:25,000 maps Fifth Army units used.In April 1945, for the Po operation,the 66th produced 4,900,000 opera-tional maps, working around the clockand using cub planes to speed distribu-tion to units.56

After the fall of Rome the 66th Topo-graphic Company, then the only suchunit with Fifth Army, could not pro-

duce the required amount of work withits authorized personnel and equip-ment. The company procured addi-tional equipment and employed Italiantechnicians and guards, virtually becom-ing a topographic battalion. Using theItalian technicians, the company wasable to work two shifts reproducingmaps but could not get enough peoplefor two shifts on other jobs. The com-pany trained its men for several differ-ent specialties, but the multiple responsi-bilities overtaxed them.

The 1712th Detachment issued1,331,000 maps for the drive againstthe Gustav Line in May 1944. For theentire Italian campaign Fifth Armyhandled and distributed over 29,606,000maps. Ordinarily the corps maintaineda stock of 500 each of all 1:25,000 and1:50,000 sheets of an area and fewer1:100,000 and smaller scale sheets.When new units arrived or large orderscame in, the maps were drawn fromthe army map depot; such orders couldnormally be filled within a day. Periodsof relatively static warfare in the Italiancampaign called for large-scale maps.Unfortunately, not enough 1:25,000-scale maps were available to meet theneed, and some of those in stock wereof dubious quality. The 1:50,000-scalemaps provided complete coverage, butmany panels were considerably out-of-date and in some cases illegible.

The combined sections of mappingand intelligence collected data on weath-er, crossing sites, defense works, obser-vation points, and fields of fire. WhenLt. Col. William L. Jones joined Bow-man's staff in January 1944, intelligencebecame divorced from mapping, andJones became chief of the Plans, Intelli-gence, and Training Section. This ar-rangement continued until September

56 Hist 66th Engr Topo Co, 1944-45; AGF Bd Rpt179, NATOUSA, Notes on Mapping an Army, 16Aug 44. Unless otherwise cited, this section is basedon these two sources.


1944 when Colonel Jones left to takecommand of the 235th Engineer Com-bat Battalion; then mapping and intelli-gence reconsolidated under Lt. Col.John G. Ladd.57

Information came to the section frommany sources, including the Army MapService and other agencies in the UnitedStates and Britain. The IntelligenceBranch, OCE, WD, supplied a ten-volume work on Italy's beaches andports covering such subjects as meteo-rological conditions and water supply.Many studies dealing with Italy's high-way bridges, railroad bridges, and tun-nels originated in the Research Office,a subdivision of the Intelligence Branch.A valuable source from which the engi-neers derived information was a sixteen-volume Rockefeller Foundation workon malaria in Italy with specific infor-mation concerning the regions wheremalaria prevailed. Lessons, hints, andtips came from two series of publica-tions issued frequently during the cam-paign: Fifth Army Engineer Notes andAFHQ Intelligence Summaries.58

Although the Fifth Army G-2 wastechnically the agency for collecting anddisseminating topographic information,the Fifth Army staff relied on the engi-neer to evaluate all topographic intelli-gence required for planning. This sys-tem worked well, for by the nature ofhis work and training the engineer wasbest equipped to provide advice con-cerning terrain and communicationroutes. Corps and division staffs gener-ally expected less terrain informationfrom their engineers because no ade-

quate photo-interpretation organiza-tion existed below the army level. Engi-neer intelligence data seldom coveredterrain more than one hundred milesin advance of the front lines. On thewhole intelligence was adequate, for therate of advance in Italy was not rapidenough to require greater coverage.The timing of engineer intelligence wasimportant; information conveyed to thelower units too far in advance might befiled away and forgotten.59

Skilled interpretation of aerial photo-graphs was an important phase of engi-neer intelligence. Use of such photo-graphs, begun in the stalemate beforeCassino, proved so valuable that by Feb-ruary 1944 a squadron of USAAF P-38s made four to ten sorties (about 350pictures) daily. Two engineers at thephoto center sent all photographs with-in ten miles of the front forward andkept the rest for their own study. Peri-odically they also sent forward reportson roads, bridges, streams, and otherfeatures.60

The engineers used long-range ter-rain reports of the AFHQ EngineerIntelligence Section to plan the forwardmovement of engineer bridge suppliesand the deployment of engineer units.The reports were rich sources of infor-mation on roads and rivers. Road infor-mation included width, nature of sur-face, embankments, demolitions, andsuitability for mules, jeeps, or othertransportation. River information in-cluded bed width, wet gap, width mea-sured from the tops of banks, natureand height of banks, levees, potentialcrossing places, approaches, needed

57 Comments, Jones, 1 Jun 59.58 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:

Troops and Equipment, pp. 457-58; II Corps Hist, an.A, G-2 Rpt 612.

59 Comments, Jones, 1 Jun 59, and Paxson, May 59.60 Bowman comments; Hist 313th Engr C Bn,

1944-45; II Corps Rapido Crossing, Jan-Feb 44.


bridging equipment, fords, and practi-cability of bypasses. The error was sel-dom more than ten feet for estimatedbridge lengths or 20 percent for bridgeheights. Sometimes the terrain reportswere useful in selecting bombing tar-gets such as a dam in the Liri valley.They could be used not only to esti-mate long-range bridging requirementsbut also to anticipate floods, pinpointtank obstacles and minefields, and lo-cate potential main supply routes, air-field sites, strategic points for demoli-tion, and possible traffic blocks. Gen-eral Bowman was so impressed by thevalue of the reports that he tried repeat-edly to have the AFHQ Engineer PhotoInterpretation Section made part of hisoffice, but AFHQ retained control ofthe section.61

Camouflage

At no time during the entire Italiancampaign were there more than twocompanies of the 84th Engineer Cam-ouflage Battalion available, and after themiddle of 1944 only one company re-mained with Fifth Army. Moreover,since in the United States camouflagetroops had been considered noncom-batant, the unit, responsible for camou-flage supervision and inspection, con-sisted of limited service and older-than-average personnel. This policy impairedefficiency in view of the fact that front-line units had the greatest need fordeception and disguise. In addition, thecamouflage companies had neitherenough training in tactical camouflagenor enough transportation to move the

large amount of materials and equip-ment required.62

In spite of these handicaps engineersdid some excellent work with dummies,paint, nets, and other materials. Some-times road screens and dummies con-fused and diverted enemy artillery post-ed in the hills. For example, early inthe campaign, troops of the 337th Engi-neer General Service Regiment erecteda series of structures made from nine30-by-30-foot nets, along a 220-footstretch of road near the Volturno. Thissection had been subject to observationand shelling, but after the erection ofthe road screen the shelling stopped.63

Road screens were the main devicein camouflage operations. As a rule theengineers used a double thickness ofgarnished net, but the best type of netfor all purposes remained an unsettledquestion. Engineers of the 84th Battal-ion preferred shrimp nets to garnishedtwine, yet the 15th Army Group engi-neer concluded at the close of hostili-ties that the shrimp nets had not beendense enough to obscure properly.Pregarnished fish nets had the samedefect. None of the nets was sufficientlydurable or fire resistant. And as snowfell in December 1944, no white camou-flage materials were available.64

The most ambitious operational cam-ouflage programs of the Italian cam-paign took place during preparationsto attack the Gothic Line. Engineers

61 Comments, Bowman, Jones, and Armogida.

62 Hists, 84th Engr Camouflage Bn, 14 Apr 43-Jul44, and Co A, 84th Engr Camouflage Bn, 1944; Coll,Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troopsand Equipment, p. 222; Comments, Elliott, 18 Mar 60.

63 Engr Tech Bull 19, Rpt on Volturno River Bridgeat Cancello, 17 May 44; and 29, Camouflage, 5 Apr45; IV Corps Opns Rpt, Aug 44.

64 AGF Bd Rpt 279, MTO, 24 Jan 45; Killian com-ments.


made every effort to conceal the IICorps buildup in the Empoli-Florencearea and to simulate strength on theleft flank in IV Corps' Pontedera sector.Among the devices employed were dum-my bridges over canals and streams andsmoke to make the enemy believe thatheavy traffic was moving over the dum-my bridges. One dummy bridge at acanal southwest of Pisa drew heavy firefor two hours.65 In October 1944 in theIV Corps area, engineers raised a screento enable them to build a 120-foot float-ing treadway across the Serchio duringthe daytime. During the same monthCompany D of the 84th CamouflageBattalion erected a screen 300 feet longto conceal all movement across a pon-ton bridge that lay under direct enemyobservation. The engineers put up aforty-foot tripod on each bank of theriver, used holdfasts to secure cables,and raised the screen with a 3/4-tonweapons carrier winch and block andtackle. In November a bridge over theReno River at Silla, also exposed toenemy observation, was screened in asimilar fashion. Here the engineersused houses on the two riverbanks asholdfasts.66

Engineers set up dummy targets atbridge sites, river crossings, airstrips,and at various other locations, buildingthem in such shapes as artillery pieces,tanks, bridges, and aircraft. They wereused to draw enemy fire to evaluate itsvolume and origin. They also served toconceal weakness at certain points, topermit the withdrawal of strong ele-

ments, and to conceal buildups. Whena shortage of dummy material devel-oped in January 1945, planners lookedupon it as a serious handicap to tacticaloperations.67

Dummies and disguises took manyforms. Large oil storage tanks becamehouses. Company D used spun glass toblend corps and division artillery withsurrounding snow. The engineers usedpainted shelter halfs and nets withbleached garlands to disguise gun posi-tions, ammunition pits, parapets, andother emplacements. Camouflage provedvaluable enough in many instances toindicate that its wider application couldhave resulted in lower casualties andeasier troop movements.68

Behind Fifth Army in Italy, a mas-sive work of reconstruction continuedas divisions moved forward against aslowly retreating enemy. In the zonesaround the major ports on the westernside of the peninsula and on the routesof supply to the army's rear area, thebase section made its own contributionto the war. Suffering many of the samestrictures and shortages as Fifth Armyengineers, the Peninsular Base SectionEngineer Service carried its own respon-sibilities, guaranteeing the smooth trans-fer of men and material from docksideto fighting front. A host of supportingfunctions also fell to the engineer inthe base section, often taxing strengthand ingenuity to the same degree asamong the combat elements.

65 IV Corps Opns Rpt, Aug 44; Killian comments.66 IV Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44; Engineer History, Medi-

terranean, p. 211.

67 Hist Co A, 84th Engr Camouflage Bn; Comments,Bowman and Elliott, 18 Mar 60.

68 IV Corps Opns Rpt, Feb 45; Engineer History, Medi-terranean, pp. 211-12.

CHAPTER XI

Engineers in the PeninsularBase Section

The support organization behindFifth Army grew from an embryonicplanning group before the invasion ofItaly to an entity of corporate size. Itsfunctions were more varied than thosein the combat zones and as important;it had management responsibility underBrig. Gen. Arthur W. Pence, an engi-neer officer, for combat supply and forrequisitioning or foraging materiel forits own wide-ranging projects. Specialtyunits abounded in the base sectionenclaves. Through the end of the war,engineers were the largest single seg-ment in the Peninsular Base Section(PBS) command.1

The main task of the PBS engineersin late 1943 remained the rehabilita-tion of the port of Naples. Their workat the docks helped Naples to becomeone of the busiest ports in the world.

They provided depots for receivingsupplies and road, railroad, and pipe-line facilities for moving supplies. Theyimproved highways serving PBS depotsand Fifth Army supply dumps to han-dle heavy traffic, built pipelines to carrythousands of gallons of gasoline fromNaples to pipeheads within range ofenemy artillery, and established rail-heads in Fifth Army territory by recon-structing some of the worst damagedlines of the war. Behind the army boun-dary PBS engineers also built hospitals,rest camps, repair shops, and otherfacilities.

On 7 November 1943, five weeksafter Naples fell, one-third of the 31,629American troops assigned or attachedto PBS were engineers. The PBS Engi-neer Service had at its disposal 19 engi-neer units: 2 combat regiments, 2 gen-eral service regiments, 2 separate bat-talions, and 13 units of company sizeor less, including the headquarters of aport construction and repair group, apetroleum distribution company, a spe-cial utilities company, a water supplycompany, 2 fire-fighting platoons, 2mobile searchlight maintenance units,a 3-man engineer mobile petroleumlaboratory, and a map depot detach-ment. By early January 1944 the PBS

1 Except where otherwise noted, this chapter is basedon the following: PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec.I, Chronological Summary; Meyer, Strategy andLogistical History: MTO, ch. XIX, pp. 1-44. See also:Ltr, Pence to Truesdell, 26 Nov 43, sub: Organiza-tion of PBS; Periodic Rpt, SOS NATOUSA, G-4, 31Dec 43; Brig. C.J.C. Molony, "The Campaign in Sicily1943 and The Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943to 31st March 1944," vol. V, The Mediterranean andMiddle East, in the series "History of the Second WorldWar" (London: HMSO, 1973), pp. 398-413.

ENGINEERS IN THE PENINSULAR BASE SECTION 233

Engineer Service alone had twenty-eight units totaling 10,464 men.2

When preparations for the invasionof southern France (ANVIL) got un-der way in early 1944, there were notenough engineer troops to support theoperation. The accompanying Frenchinvasion forces would need Americanhelp. A Fifth Army breakout, expectedin the spring, meant that ANVIL wouldtake place when the demand for engi-neer troops in Italy was at a peak. Ofeighteen engineer combat battalionsrequired for ANVIL, the French couldfurnish two and the U.S. Army eighttrained in shore operations. The inva-sion would also need eight engineergeneral service regiments; PBS andFifth Army, each with five, would bothhave to give up two. Shortages in engi-neer map depot detachments also ex-isted. The only port construction andrepair group in the theater, the 1051st,would be needed at Marseille and wasallocated to ANVIL; this meant PBSwould have to reopen Leghorn with-out experienced port specialists. ANVILwould need three pipeline companies,two of which were to come from out-side the theater.3

The loss of engineers to ANVIL forcedthe PBS engineer, Col. Donald S. Burns,to use more Italian troops and civilians.By early October 1944 he was employ-ing 10,000 men from Italian militaryengineer units and about 5,177 civil-

ians; but these numbers dropped wherenew base section installations in Leg-horn took shape. About 9,700 Ameri-can engineers were in PBS after ANVIL,and by the end of the campaign in ItalyPBS engineer strength had increasedto some 10,200.4

When Fifth Army stalled before Ger-man defenses along the Garigliano andRapido Rivers during the winter of1943-44, PBS engineers were able toprovide close support no longer feasi-ble when the army broke loose in May1944. In two months Fifth Army droveto the Arno, a distance of 250 miles,and PBS support deteriorated steadily.The Germans blew many railroad brid-ges and culverts as they retreated, andPBS engineers could not repair themat the pace the troops were moving.Nor were petroleum engineers able tobuild gasoline pipelines at the fifteen-mile-a-day pace the army sometimesachieved. Thus the main burden of sup-plying Fifth Army fell to motor trans-port, which soon began to falter underincreasingly longer hauls, bottlenecksin hastily repaired roads, and break-downs.

As Fifth Army drew up to the Arnoat the end of July 1944, it was in nocondition to assail the Gothic Line. Menwere tired and equipment worn afterthe long sweep from the Rapido. Thearmy's strength was depleted by thewithdrawal of units for ANVIL, and itssupply lines were stretched thin. Beforeit could drive for the Po valley, FifthArmy needed time to rest, to repair and2 Station List, HQ, PBS, 7 Nov 43; Rpt, HQ, PBS, to

CG, SOS NATOUSA, 15 Jan 44, sub: Rpt on Disposi-tion of Engr Units, app. VIII B to Rpt of the EngrPBS.

3 Estimate of Engr Troop Situation, Engr Sect (U.S.)AFHQ, 14 Feb 44; Ltr, Chf Engr, PBS, to G-4,AFHQ, 3 Jun 44, sub: Engr Troop Requirements,NATOUSA; PBS Periodic G-3 Rpt 8, Jun 44; 10,Aug 44; and 11, Sep 44, 319.1 PBS files.

4 PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. II, app. II,showing engineer units in PBS on various dates, andtheir strengths. PBS Periodic G-3 Rpt 11, Sep 44;Memo, Engr Service, PBS (Col D. S. Burns), for ColOxx, 3 Oct 44, Procurement Action Rpts, PBS files.


replenish equipment, and to establish afirm supply base in northern Italy.

The logical place was Leghorn, 300miles north of Naples, a port with aman-made harbor that could accommo-date ships drawing up to twenty-eightfeet of water. The Germans (with con-siderable assistance from Allied bomb-ers) had so wrecked the port that amonth's work would be required beforedeep draft vessels could enter, but assoon as the harbor was open to ship-ping it became the main supply basefor Fifth Army. To oversee the workthere and at the same time look afterAmerican installations in the Naplesarea, Headquarters, PBS, divided intotwo groups. The one in Leghorn cameto be known as PBS (Main); the otherin Naples was designated Pensouth andoperated as a district under the largerheadquarters at Leghorn.

Port Rehabilitation

Restoring Italian ports after Novem-ber 1943 was a battle of supply anddemand complicated by the fact thatsupply tonnages for combat units hadhigher priority than those for rebuild-ing the ports. As Naples began func-tioning again it imported an average of10,700 tons per day, well above its pre-war capacity, but the engineers still hadto forage locally for materiel to expandfacilities. At Bagnoli they located sub-stantial stocks of steel sections, with-out which they could never have builtramps for the Liberty ships. Railroadtrack and torpedo netting also camefrom local sources, and combat engi-neers supplemented the American for-estry units in cutting and milling tim-ber at Cosenza for the quays in Naplesharbor. For piling the engineers welded

together locally procured ten-inch di-ameter pipes and filled them with con-crete. Wood and prefabricated steelstructural members were always in shortsupply.5

Even with the shortages of materiel,AFHQ steadily revised upward theplanned port capacity goals for the city.In the beginning of January 1944 the1051st Port Construction and RepairGroup had orders to build twenty-sixtemporary LST berths, but the demandincreased piecemeal and by month'send the unit had constructed thirty-fiveberths with still more to come. At thattime, when accumulated unloading atNaples and the satellite ports to thenorth had passed the million-ton level,the revised program called for over 35Liberty berths, 3 troopship spaces, and4 smaller berths for coasters. Port ca-pacity increased through the spring,and in one record day in April 33,750tons of cargo came ashore. With theMay offensive, Fifth Army was draw-ing on the massed stocks that had piledup in beach dumps at Anzio, particu-larly during the breakout offensive of1944. (Map 11)6

With Fifth Army's advance, Peninsu-lar Base Section acquired additionalports, but they were usually damagedseverely. Rome fell on 4 June, Civita-vecchia three days later, Piombino on25 June, and Leghorn on 19 July. AtCivitavecchia, the first seaport north ofAnzio potentially useful to the Allies,

5 NATOUSA Statistical Summary 8, 319.1 (MTO)OCE files; Wakeman et al., Rpt on Rehabilitation ofNaples and Other Captured Ports, 28 Nov 43; ColEwart G. Plant et al., Rpt on Peninsular Base Section,10 Feb 44, in OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 2, OperationalPlanning.

6 PBS, Public Relations Sect, Tools of War, pp. 13-23;Plant, Rpt on PBS, 10 Feb 44.


BLASTING OBSTACLES AT CIVITAVECCHIA, JUNE 1944

the 540th Engineer Combat Regimentforged through the heavy wreckage toopen DUKW and landing craft hard-stands. On 11 June the first cargo craft,an LCT, unloaded; next day an LSTnosed into a berth, and ferry craftbegan to unload Liberty ships. Cargowas soon coming ashore at the rate of3,000 tons a day. Later the 1051st PortConstruction and Repair Group pro-vided Liberty berths by building rampsacross sunken ships as at Naples.7

Even while improvements were un-der way at Civitavecchia, a new entry

for Fifth Army supplies opened 100miles farther north at Piombino, a smallport on a peninsula opposite the islandof Elba. Elements of both the 39th and540th Engineer Combat Regiments re-opened the port, which, like Civita-vecchia, had suffered heavy bomb dam-age. The main pier lay under a mass oftwisted steel from demolished gantrycranes and other wreckage, while de-stroyed buildings and railroad equip-ment cluttered the area. But the engi-neers did not find the profusion ofmines and booby traps the retreatingGermans usually left behind, and theywere able to remove 5,000 tons of scrapsteel and pig iron from the main piersduring the first two days. Pier ribbing

7 PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, sec. II, app. IV; Fifth ArmyEngr Hist, vol. I, pp. 130, 142; War Diary, AFHQEngr Sect, Entry 9 Aug 44; Fifth Army History, vol. VI,pp. 7, 9, 22, 115.


and flooring repair required consider-able underwater work. After three daysfacilities for LCTs to dock head on wereavailable and one alongside berth wasready to receive a coaster; within thenext few days hardstands for LCTs,LSTs, and DUKWs were available; andat the end of the third week the engi-neers built a pier over a sunken ship toprovide berths for two Liberty ships.Piombino joined Civitavecchia as a mainartery of supply for Fifth Army duringJuly and August 1944.8

After the summer offensive, FifthArmy needed Leghorn to support anattack against prepared defenses in therugged northern Apennines. Early inJuly, when Fifth Army was still about18 miles south of Leghorn, PBS selectedthe 338th Engineer General ServiceRegiment to rehabilitate the port. The338th, which had been working on hos-pitals in Rome, had no experience inport repair but received planning aidfrom several specialists of the 1051stGroup, representatives of the BritishNavy charged with clearing the watersof Leghorn harbor, and shipownersand contractors who knew the port.The reinforced engineer regiment wasnot only to repair ship berths but alsoto be PBS's engineer task force in thecity. The 1528th Engineer Dump TruckCompany and an Italian engineer con-struction battalion were attached to thetask force, and PBS made preparationsto provide the force with a large amountof angledozers, cranes, a derrick, andother, heavy construction equipment.Much of this equipment was to move toLeghorn aboard an LST, an LCT, and

several barges, but general cargo wasto be discharged directly from Libertyships.9

Early on the morning of 19 July, Leg-horn fell to elements of the 34th Infan-try Division. Twelve men from the338th Engineers arrived in the city afew hours later to clear mines from pre-determined routes into the port area.Leghorn was heavily mined, and forthe first few days little other than mineclearing could be accomplished. As themine-clearing teams made room, moreelements of the 338th Engineers ar-rived, set up quarters, and began pre-paring a berth for the LST and theLCT carrying construction equipment.By 26 July both craft had unloaded. Inthe meantime, engineers repaired elec-trical lines and started to restore themunicipal water system.

Not until 28 July were engineer andnaval officers able to complete a surveyof conditions in Leghorn harbor. Theywere soon convinced that reopeningLeghorn would be a much more formi-dable job than Naples had been. AtNaples the Germans had not blockedthe harbor entrances, but in Leghornsunken ships completely blocked en-trances to all but shallow-draft craft. Ineach channel the hulks were so inter-locked that no single ship could befloated and swung aside to make apassage. Ultimately the engineers hadto spend nearly a month blasting a pas-sage through the blockships.

The stone quays were pocked bycraters, some forty feet in diameter, andnot one of the eighty-two berthingspaces was untouched. Elsewhere in the

8 Fifth Army History, vol. VI, pp. 53, 115-16; Hists,540th Engr C Rgt, 1942-45, and 39th Engr C Rgt,Jun-Dec 44.

9 This account of the rehabilitation of Leghorn isbased on Hist 338th Engr GS Rgt, Sep 42-Nov 44, aswell as PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, ChronologicalSummary.


port area the enemy's work was almostas devastating. Port equipment andbuildings were demolished; roads, rail-roads, and open spaces between roadswere cratered; and every importantbridge leading out of the port wasdestroyed.

The threat of sea mines in the har-bor delayed the unloading of engineerequipment and construction materials.A floating pile driver and three bargesloaded with piling, timber, and deck-ing arrived at Leghorn on 30 July butcould not enter the harbor until late on2 August. The next day engineers be-gan rigging the floating pile driver anda 1 1/2-yard crane, also to be used as apile driver. Port and depot traffic pat-terns were also developing. The Ital-ians had handled freight directly fromwharf side to rail, so few of their pierswere hard surfaced. But Allied militarycargo had to be moved by truck, and toprovide the large quantities of rockneeded for surfacing the engineers setup a rock crusher to pulverize rubblefrom shell-torn buildings and openeda quarry nearby. By November the338th Engineers had eight quarries inoperation.

While the 2d Battalion, 338th Engi-neers, worked on roads in the area, the1st Battalion began to build berths forLiberty ships and the 696th EngineerPetroleum Distribution Company re-stored pipelines from a tanker berth tolocal tank farms. Pile-driving for thefirst Liberty berths started on 5 August,and four were ready by the seventeenth.Three days later, after British navaldemolition teams had forced a passageinto the harbor, the Liberty ship Sedge-wick came into the port with piling thatenabled the engineers to complete twoadditional berths. The six Liberty

berths then available gave the port adaily capacity of about 5,000 tons.

The goal for Leghorn was to reach acapacity of 12,000 tons a day by theend of September. The port achievedthat goal on the twenty-fifth after aramp the engineers built from a sunkentanker to the shore provided additionalLiberty ship berths and after landingcraft returned from the ANVIL opera-tion. By that time Leghorn was the mainsupply port for Fifth Army, and Civita-vecchia and Piombino had closed.

Petroleum: From Tanker to Truck

At ports along the Italian coast, PBSengineers had to devote considerableattention to unloading and distributingpetroleum products, which accountedfor nearly half the tonnage the Alliesshipped into the Mediterranean the-ater. The engineers were responsiblefor building, and in most cases operat-ing, not only tanker discharge facilitiesand port terminal storage but also pipe-lines that carried the POL to dispens-ing and refueling stations in the FifthArmy area. At the dispensing pointsquartermaster units operated canninginstallations, and they usually took overtruck refueling points. In early planningfor the discharge of oil tankers the PBSengineers had counted on using Civi-tavecchia, the first port north of Naplescapable of receiving tankers. Theseplans were revised after the capture ofSan Stefano, forty miles north of Civi-tavecchia, where, on a spit of land con-nected to the mainland by a causeway,were located a tanker berth and largeunderground storage facilities.10 San

10 Ltr, Capt R. H. Wood, Supply and ConstructionSect, to AFHQ Engr Sect, 9 Aug 44, sub: Rpt on Tripto Fifth Army Hqs; PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, pp. 49-50.


Stefano, along with Naples and Leg-horn, became a major terminal for POLsupplies. Three of the six pipeline sys-tems built in Italy emanated from Na-ples, two from San Stefano, and onefrom Leghorn.11

By 18 November 1943, engineers ofthe 696th Petroleum Distribution Com-pany had 574,000 barrels of storagespace at Naples ready for motor andaviation gasoline and nearly 55,000 bar-rels for diesel oil. Another quarter of amillion barrels of underground storage,found relatively undamaged at Pozzuoli,was cleaned and used to store Navy fueloil.12 While part of the 696th—alongwith as many as 550 civilian workers—was rehabilitating the Naples terminal,the rest of the unit built a four-inchgasoline pipeline into the Fifth Armyarea. The pipeline originated on theoutskirts of Naples at a Socony refin-ery arid followed Highway 6 northward.The twelve-mile section to Fertilia be-came operational on 12 November, butthereafter fall rains and gusty windsslowed construction. Since it was appar-ent from the beginning that one four-inch pipeline would be inadequate forFifth Army's needs, petroleum engi-neers had to prepare to construct a sec-ond pipeline by putting double cross-ings under roads and over streams andcanals. The most difficult crossing wasover the Volturno River, a 400-footgap. Petroleum engineers prepared a

suspension crossing over the Volturno,using two existing high tension electricline towers for supports, but floodwaters knocked the line out soon afterit was finished. Engineers repaired thebreak and also prepared another emer-gency line on an old railroad bridge 21/2 miles upstream.13

Early in December 1943 the 705thEngineer Petroleum Distribution Com-pany joined the 696th on pipeline workin the Naples area, taking over opera-tion of the port terminal and of pipe-lines as far as the Volturno. By 22December two four-inch pipelines witha daily capacity of 260,000 gallons werein operation to Calvi Risorta, twenty-eight miles north of Naples. In Janu-ary engineers extended these lines toSan Felice, nearly forty-one miles fromNaples, then on to San Vittore where adispensing point was set up only 2 1/2miles from embattled Cassino. A thirdfour-inch pipeline followed as far asCalvi Risorta, then turned east alongHighway 7 for over twelve miles. On27 March 1944, the 696th, with the helpof a French POL unit, opened a for-ward fueling point on this line at Sessa.Both forward fueling points were with-in range of enemy artillery, but engi-neers of the 396th Engineer Camou-flage Company concealed them andthey were never shelled.14

Before the spring offensive began inlate May 1944, petroleum engineersassembled more than one hundredmiles of six-inch pipe (which could

11 Unless otherwise noted this section is based onOperational Rpt, Receipt, Storage and Distribution ofBulk Petroleum in West Italy, 3 Oct 43-15 Oct 45,prepared for PBS by 407th Engr Service, 15 Oct 45,670.11, Pipeline History 1944-45, NATOUSA files.See also Pipeline Rpt, Petroleum Branch, Engr Service,PBS, 1 Mar 44, 670.11, Pipeline History 1944-45,NATOUSA files.

12 See ch. VIII.

13 PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. IV, West ItalyPipelines; Hist 705th Engr Pet Dist Co, Apr 45.

14 Hist 705th Engr Pet Dist Co, Apr 45; Fifth ArmyHistory, vol. III, pp. 69-70; Distances used are thosegiven in Pipeline Operations Rpts, PBS, 21 Jul 44-20Aug 44, and 21 Apr 44-20 May 44; and OperationalRpt, Pipeline Dispensing, 1944-45.


deliver as much gasoline as two four-inch pipelines) at forward points onHighways 6 and 7, to be used betweenCalvi Risorta and Rome. A third engi-neer petroleum distribution company,the 785th, arrived from the UnitedStates during April and went to workon a four-inch pipeline along Highway7 while the 696th was laying a six-inchline along Highway 6. The 705th wasto operate the pipeline system.15

As Fifth Army pressed forward dur-ing June and July, sometimes as muchas fifteen miles a day, it left the pipe-heads ever farther behind. By the timethe pipeline reached Rome on 7 July,Fifth Army was nearing Leghorn andSan Stefano had fallen. The 785th Engi-neer Petroleum Distribution Companyreached San Stefano on 24 June, andfive days later a tanker was discharging80,000 barrels of motor gas at the newterminal. By 2 July the 785th had builtten miles of six-inch pipeline inland,for only fifty miles away tanks andtrucks were running dry. The 785thexpanded the San Stefano system tocover 143 miles, and for some time tocome it was the main source of motorfuel for Fifth Army.16

At Leghorn, captured on 19 July, theport was so heavily damaged and Ger-man shell fire so persistent that notanker could enter until 18 September.The 696th Engineer Petroleum Distri-bution Company, which set up bivouacat a Leghorn refinery, soon found thatonly 25 percent of the tankage in thearea was repairable. At the port all

tanker discharge lines were wrecked,but a tanker berth about 1 1/2 milesfrom the refinery was still in goodcondition. The 696th, recruiting aboutone hundred civilian workers, set aboutrepairing storage tanks at the refinerywhile a French petroleum unit workedon storage facilities at a nearby tankfarm. By 10 August the 696th hadrestored a large amount of storage andhad completed a discharge line fromthe tanker berth. When the first tankerentered the port, storage was ready fornearly 275,000 barrels of gasoline. Even-tually, the Leghorn POL terminal hadfacilities for 62,000 barrels of 100-octane gasoline, 307,000 barrels of 80-octane, 43,500 barrels of lower octanefor civilian use, 76,100 barrels of dieseloil, and 34,500 barrels of kerosene. Inall, the engineers rehabilitated thirty-two storage tanks.

Early in September Fifth Army strucknorth across the Arno, coordinatingits attack with an Eighth Army offen-sive along the Adriatic coast, and bythe end of the month Fifth Army troopswere only fourteen miles from Bologna.October found forward units only ninemiles from the Po valley, but for thenext few months the army had to usenearly all its resources just to survivethe northern Apennine winter. Gaso-line issues to Fifth Army troops contin-ued heavy through the winter, averag-ing 357,000 gallons a day between No-vember 1944 and April 1945. Much ofit went to warm troops at gasoline stovesin the mountains some ninety milesfrom Leghorn.

In late September the 696th left forsouthern France, and the 703d Engi-neer Petroleum Distribution Company,relieved from a Highway 2 project, tookover both the operation of the Leghorn

15 Hist 696th Engr Pet Dist Co, May-Sep 44; WarDiary, AFHQ Engr Sect, Jun 44; Hist 705th Engr PetDist Co, Apr 45.

16 Ltr, Wood to AFHQ Engr Sect, 9 Aug 44, sub:Rpt on Trip to Fifth Army Hqs; PBS Engr Hist, pt. I,1943-45, sec. I, Chronological Summary, pp. 49-50.


terminal and the construction of pipe-lines in the wake of Fifth Army. As soonas Fifth Army began to move, the 703dpushed pipeline construction and bythe end of October had a double four-inch line in operation to Sesto, thirty-six miles farther. By mid-December the703d had carried the line to Loiano,over eighty-one miles beyond Leghorn.For the last ten miles snow, mud, andwater got into the line and froze solidin low spots before the line could betested.

In mid-December 1944 engineer pe-troleum companies were spread over450 miles. The Petroleum Section ofthe Engineer Service, PBS, exerciseddirect control over the units but wasfinding this more and more difficult.On 25 December 1944, the section acti-vated the 407th Engineer Service Bat-talion according to TOE 5-500, draw-ing most of the personnel from anengineer utilities detachment. The bat-talion was a skeleton headquarters thatcould supervise a number of indepen-dently operating units and coordinateoperation and construction activities.All troops on POL work in western Italy(three American and one Italian engi-neer petroleum distribution companyand two battalions of other Italian troopsfor security and labor work) came underthe 407th. This move not only relievedthe Petroleum Section but also madefor better supply, planning, and main-tenance support for engineer pipelineunits. The battalion set up a majormaintenance shop in Leghorn and, inFebruary 1945, a smaller one in Naplesfor third echelon and higher mainte-nance and repair of POL equipment.17

When the spring offensive began in1945, the 785th Petroleum DistributionCompany, along with a hundred Ital-ian troops, stood ready to lay a doubleline up Highway 65 from Loiano toBologna, twenty-two miles away. Thework got under way on 24 April 1945,but, plagued with traffic congestion onthe highway and the multitude of minesin the area, was not finished until 7May.

The greatest handicap to efficientpipeline operations was the telephonesystem. Standard issue telephones weretotally inadequate; the wire was of suchlow conductivity that messages travel-ing farther than twelve miles had to berelayed, a process that caused suchdelays and confusion that the PBS engi-neer asked the PBS Signal Section toprovide a communication system solelyfor pipelines. The system helped, butdid not solve the problems. Conversa-tion between Leghorn and Bologna wasimpossible, and only clear weather andshouting permitted Sesto to conversewith either Leghorn or Bologna.

Deliberate sabotage of pipelines wasnegligible, but civilian theft of petro-leum products was a constant problem.In one thirty-day period, pipeline lossesnear Rome averaged three hundredbarrels a day. Usually thieves loosenedcouplings, though in some cases theyknocked holes into pipe. Breaks on longdownhill stretches, where leaks couldnot be detected by a drop in pressure,were especially costly. One such breakoccurred a few miles south of Bologna,at the bottom of a 32-mile grade. Some-one carelessly lighted a cigarette nearthe spilled gas. Eight civilians died in

17 AMO (Lt Col Beddow) 1945, Work Sheets of EngrAMO Survey Team, 10 May 45; Ltr, Lt Col E. P.Streck, Actg Engr Ofcr, PBS, to all Branch Chfs, Engr

Service, Pensouth, 10 Mar 45, sub: Deputy TheaterCommanders' Conf (6 Mar 45), NATOUSA file, Conf,Deputy Theater Commander.


the ensuing holocaust, which also broketwo other lines. An estimated 12,000gallons of gasoline were lost. Leakscaused by tension failures on couplingsthat thieves had loosened kept repaircrews busy. Patrolling Italian soldiersand even horse-mounted GIs did notstop the tampering. Italian courts treat-ed the few thieves who were caughtquite leniently, and American authori-ties sometimes had to pressure the Ital-ians to prosecute such cases.18

Tasks of Base Section Engineers

Base section engineers drew a multi-tude of assignments. (Map 12) Many ofthem were calls for a few men to sweepmines, clear away debris, or repairplumbing. Others' tasks were larger.The ninety-five work orders the 345thEngineer General Service Regimenthandled in August 1944 ranged fromrepairing a water faucet at Villa Maria(the General Officers Rest Camp inNaples) to installing 225 pieces of equip-ment for a huge quartermaster laun-dry and dry cleaning plant at Bagnoli.This unit was the first base section engi-neer construction organization in Na-ples. Its early assignments included set-ting up an engineer and a quartermas-ter depot, repairing railroads, buildingPOW camps, and working on the Serinoaqueduct. The 345th was also responsi-ble for all street and sewer repair inNaples, although civilians did the actualwork.19

Railway repair was an unexpected task.In AVALANCHE planning the Transpor-tation Corps' Military Railway Service(MRS), with help from the Italians, wasexpected to handle railroad rehabilita-tion and engineers were to be responsi-ble only for new rail construction—mainly spurs into dumps and depots.20

But the rail net was so badly damagedand the Italian railroad agencies so dis-organized that MRS had to ask the engi-neers for help. Most of the work fell tothe 94th Engineer General Service Reg-iment, which arrived in Naples the sec-ond week of October 1943 and startedrehabilitating lines to the Aversa rail-head even before their vehicles andequipment were ashore.21

Supplies for track reconstruction hadto be cannibalized. For example, torepair one lane of double-track linesthe engineers used rails, ties, and fishplates from the other track. They alsogathered material, as well as frogs andswitches, from railway yards and unes-sential spur lines. Sometimes engineerscould stockpile items, but because theGermans had destroyed many of thefrogs and switches they were scarce.Luckily, a large stock of unused railsturned up in Naples. For bridging theengineers used steel salvaged from de-stroyed spans and from a steel mill atBagnoli. However, they also neededtimber. Railroad bridging supplies re-mained short, and in many instances

18 Ltrs, HQ, 705th Engr Pet Dist Co, to Engr, EngrService, Pensouth, various dates, sub: Loss of Gaso-line on the Naples-Rome, Italy, Pipeline, PBS file,Loss of Gas on Naples-Rome PPL 1944-45; NATO-USA Statistical Summary 10, 1 Jan 44, 319.1 (MTO),OCE file.

19 Unless otherwise cited this section is based on EngrService, PBS, Work Accomplished, and the historiesof the units mentioned.

20 Wakeman et al., Rpt on Rehabilitation of Naplesand other Captured Ports, 28 Nov 43; Extracts fromRpt on Peninsular Base Section, NATOUSA, 10 Feb44, sec. VIII, Engr Service.

21 Hist of PBS, Phases II and III, 28 Aug 43-3 Jan44; Rpt, Functions of the Base Engr, prepared byPBS Engr, 25 Oct 43, 381 NATOUSA file; Extractsfrom Rpt on PBS, NATOUSA, 10 Feb 44, sec. VIII,Engr Service.


the engineers had to resort to culvertstopped by huge earth fills.22

By the end of November 1943 therail reached Capua and before the springoffensive stretched to Mignano, lessthan ten miles south of Cassino. Theclosest yet built to combat lines, the rail-head was within range of German 270-mm. artillery. Early in June 1944 the94th Engineers began the largest sin-gle railroad repair assignment in Italy,reopening a 32-mile stretch from MonteSan Biagio station to Cisterna stationon the main coastal line to Rome. Themain block was the 4 1/2-mile MonteOrso tunnel, blown in three places, afew miles out of San Biagio. The southportal was blocked partially and thenorth portal completely, but the mainobstruction was deep inside the moun-tain. These engineers worked with airhammers and explosives, cutting a pas-sage by breaking up large rocks andcarting off the debris on a small indus-trial railway installed for the purpose.The work was slow at best, but towardthe end of June a front-end loadermounted on a D-4 tractor more thandoubled the removal capacity.

The engineers relied on a naturaldraft to carry off fumes from genera-tor engines that supplied power forlighting and for air compressors, butwhen the draft occasionally reversed,dangerous fumes soon fouled the air.Large exhaust fans did not solve theproblem, and ultimately the generatorshad to be moved outside the tunnel.The engineers then installed a four-

inch pipeline to carry compressed airto a pressure tank near the main block,whence two smaller lines carried thecompressed air to the work forces.

The main problem was to cut a pas-sage through the mass of debris with-out bringing down more rock and dirt.The engineers first built a broad-basemasonry wall atop the debris on eachside of the passage to support the roof.Then they removed the material be-tween the two walls, tamped crevicesand cracks exposed in the debris sup-porting the walls with mortar, and filledundermined sections with stone mason-ry. The engineers had another majordifficulty at track level, where the debriswas composed of fine material that hadfiltered down through the larger rocks.This material tended to run out fromunder the new walls, and, once started,was hard to stop. In one instance thefine material undermined a forty-footsection of new wall and delayed workfor four days. Only by making under-mined sections shorter could the engi-neers alleviate the problem. This pro-cess slowed all work on the tunnel, andthe rail line to Cisterna did not openuntil 20 July.

North of the Monte Orso tunnel theGermans had blown overpasses andbridges, removed whole sections of railto help build defensive works, and pre-pared culverts for demolition but hadactually blown few. The main job northof Monte Orso was bridging the Musso-lini Canal, where two of three concrete-arch spans were down. The 94th Engi-neers restored this crossing by using a68-foot steel girder to span the centersection of the bridge and an earth fillto replace the northern span.

On this and other jobs along the sec-tion of railroad north of Monte Orso a

22 Ltr, HQ, AGF, to CG, Second Army et al., sub:Observer's Notes on the Italian Campaign, 4 Oct43-29 Mar 44, 319.1, AGF file, Binder 1, Jan-Jun 44;PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. I, ChronologicalSummary, p. 31; Engr Service, PBS, Work Accom-plished, 2 Oct 43-1 Sep 44, pp. 142-46.


major problem was getting supplies.Engineer equipment and constructionmaterial had to be trucked 80 to 115miles from the Naples area; cement andbridge steel came 40 to 70 miles fromthe Minturno railhead; some lumbercame 50 miles from Anzio (but most ofit by truck from Naples); and sand camefrom beaches 5 to 15 miles from therailroad. Until it closed, the Fifth Armyfuel point at Fondi supplied gasoline.Later, gas and oil had to be hauled sixtyto ninety miles from Sparanise.

Once Fifth Army reached Leghornon 20 July, almost all rehabilitation wascentered on lines well north of Rome. InPBS (Main), rehabilitation includedforty-eight miles of mainline track, ninemajor bridges, and six railheads. Muchof this work was in the immediate vicin-ity of Leghorn, but the largest singleassignment was a twelve-mile stretch oftrack between Pisa and Florence, wherefive demolished bridges had to be re-built. By V-E Day 3,000 miles of raillines were in use in western Italy.

Work on roads accounted for nearlyone-third of base section constructionman-hours from July 1944 to mid-March 1945. In northern Italy, Italiansoldiers and contractors working underengineer supervision accounted forover 75 percent of the man-hours thatwent into road maintenance and repair.But many assignments—particularlybuilding and maintaining roads in basesection depots—were either too diffi-cult or too urgent for local authoritiesto handle, and these fell to Americanengineer units.

One of the main occupations of basesection engineers was general hospitalconstruction, which consisted mostly ofexpanding existing buildings and facili-ties. In the Naples area, the unfinished

exhibition buildings at Bagnoli fair-grounds housed six hospitals, a medi-cal laboratory, and a medical supplydepot. The Army took over moderncivilian hospitals in the city and usedschools and other public buildings tohouse nine more hospitals. A generalhospital operated in an apartment build-ing near Pomigliano Airfield, and anunfinished apartment building at Fuori-grotta, near the Bagnoli fairgrounds,was home to the 37th General Hospital.Much of the engineer work went intoincreasing the water, electric, and sani-tary systems. At most hospitals engi-neers had to black out windows, clearaway debris, put up or take out parti-tions, install equipment, and erect pre-fabricated barracks where more spacewas needed.

Using existing buildings had greatadvantages over putting up standardbuildings, but from the engineer stand-point it also had certain disadvantages.Since the scale of allowances NATOUSAestablished was barely applicable, eachpotential site had different constructionand alteration requirements. As eachsite was selected, the Engineer Serviceand the surgeon's office determinedwhat work would be required. In mostcases engineers were able to move hos-pital personnel in within a few days andthen continue their work.

By mid-March 1944, twenty-threegeneral and station hospitals were openin the vicinity of Naples. Five more werestarted before the end of May, but find-ing large buildings to convert was be-coming increasingly difficult. After thespring offensive began only one morewas built south of Anzio, and it con-sisted mainly of 20-by-48-foot prefabri-cated barracks. The offensive openedup a new supply of barracks, schools,


and other public buildings adaptableto hospitals. In June hospitals startedoperating in Rome and in smaller townsto the north. During the latter monthsof the campaign, hospital constructioncentered in the Leghorn-Florence area;of the twenty-three hospitals built northof Anzio by mid-March 1945, five werein Rome, six in Leghorn, and four inFlorence.

For a long time the largest generalconstruction assignment was hospitals,but toward the close of 1944, with theend of the war in sight, another pro-gram loomed for PBS engineers: pre-paring training and staging areas forredeploying troops and building enclo-sures for prisoners of war. By mid-February 1945 tentative redeploymentplans called for eight 25,000-man train-ing areas, two 5,000-man training areas,and two 20,000-man staging areas. Alsoin prospect was a major constructionprogram to accommodate liberated Rus-sians and another for Nazi prisoners ofwar. The two 20,000-man staging areaswere then well toward completion, butMTOUSA and the War Departmentdelayed the POW enclosures. Repeatedchanges in instructions for the Florenceredeployment training area also madeit difficult for the Engineer Service toallocate construction equipment, per-sonnel, and material. By mid-April con-struction had started on four POWcamps: one at Aversa for 10,000 men,another at Florence for 13,000, and twoat Leghorn for 60,000. Construction forredeployment and for POWs continuedbeyond V-E Day. When Germany sur-rendered, 20,000-man redeploymenttraining areas at Francolise, Monteca-tini, and Florence, as well as three30,000-man POW camps, were stillunder construction.

On nearly every PBS engineer job,mine clearing had first priority—evenin areas once held by Fifth Army troops.To remove mines in areas into whichAllied troops moved, PBS relied on basesection engineers, British as well asAmerican, who got some help fromattached Italian engineer troops and atthe end of the war from volunteer Ital-ian prisoners of war. Mine clearing tookconsiderable time; for example, in June1944 at Scauri the 345th Engineersspent 22,405 man-hours during an eigh-teen-day period searching a buildingto be used by the 49th QuartermasterGroup. At a hospital site north of Naplesthe same unit found 230 Teller minesand 47 other mines and booby traps.At Leghorn, one of the most heavilymined areas in Italy, base section en-gineers, with the help of two Britishbomb disposal units, removed 25,000mines. Other mine removal was a re-sponsibility of the Allied Military Gov-ernment Labor Office, which recruitedand trained civilian volunteers for thework. By mid-April these volunteershad found 69,000 mines, bombs, andprojectiles in and around Florencealone.

In addition to the large body of PBSengineers working on construction—the general service regiments, combatbattalions and regiments, port construc-tion companies, separate battalions,construction battalions, and petroleumdistribution companies, which builtports, roads, bridges, railroads, camps,hospitals, stockades, depots, and otherinstallations—were a number of thesmall special units such as water supplyand mapping. In August 1943 the WarDepartment abolished water supply bat-talions in favor of separate companiesand left reorganizing the battalions to


the theaters' discretion. Fifth Armychose not to reorganize its 405th Engi-neer Water Supply Battalion until afterV-E Day. PBS had to reorganize the401st Engineer Water Supply Battal-ion in August 1944 to furnish units forANVIL and redesignated Companies Aand B the 1513th and the 1514th Engi-neer Supply Companies, respectively.The former took over water supplywork in PBS, and the 1514th went tosouthern France.

The 405th Water Supply Battalionprovided 74 percent of the 454,765,000gallons of water the army drew throughthe campaign.23 When the rear sectionof Company C entered Naples from theland side on 1 October, the city hadbeen without fresh water for more thana week, for the retreating Germans haddestroyed the 53-mile-long aqueductbringing spring water from Serino.Sewer lines were clogged and over-flowing, and the danger of a typhoidor typhus epidemic threatened a halfmillion people. At first the rear sectioncould accomplish little, for all purifica-tion equipment was out in the harboraboard ship with the main section; butthe following morning the rear sectiondiscovered within a hundred yards ofthe headquarters they had establishedin the Poggioreale area, the undamagedBolla aqueduct, which brought indus-trial water to the city. With meagerequipment the section pumped thiswater into tankers, purified it, and setup four water points in the city. Crowds

of civilians with containers gathered,the press so great that armed guardshad to keep order. By curfew the sameday, 60,000 gallons of water had beendistributed. After the arrival of themain section of the company and elevendays and nights of work, fresh waterreached Naples by 13 October.

Company C of the 405th remainedin the Naples area until the 401st WaterSupply Battalion arrived in mid-Nov-ember 1943 to handle water supply inthe PBS area. Thereafter the 405themployed a company for supplyingarmy installations, particularly hospitals.During the winter of 1943-44 not allof the 401st was needed in the PBSarea, and at least one company was gen-erally available for well drilling, waterhauling, and general construction.

In the north at Leghorn the mainsource of water was a series of wells atFilettole pump station, some fifteenmiles north of Pisa. When Leghorn fellthese wells were still in German hands,but engineers were able to furnish waterfrom other sources. When the Filettolestation was captured, engineers foundthat the Germans had destroyed all thepumps, and restoring the facility ap-peared hopeless. Closer inspection, how-ever, showed that new pumps couldmake the station operational. This jobwas undertaken by Company F of the338th Engineer General Service Regi-ment, aided by civilian workers. Alsorequired to reopen the line to Leghornwere repairs to a twenty-mile-long,sixteen-inch cast-iron pipeline that hadbeen broken in many places, the worstat the 550-foot Arno River crossing, the300-foot Serchio River crossing, and a100-foot canal crossing.

The most difficult repair job was atthe Arno River crossing. In September

23 Capt. William J. Diamond, "Water Supply inItaly," The Military Engineer, XXXIX (August 1947),332; Rpt, Functions of the Base Engr, prepared byPBS Engr, 25 Oct 43; Extracts from Rpt on Peninsu-lar Base Section, NATOUSA, 10 Feb 44, sec. VIII,Engr Service; PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. I,Chronological Summary, pp. 27-30; Engineer History,Mediterranean, app. K.


Company F tried to put a pipe acrossthe Arno on bents built on the trussesof a demolished bridge, but flood waterswashed it out before it was finished.Company F then tried to put a weldedpipe across the river bottom, but thepipe broke on 23 October. In the mean-time a new Serchio River crossing hadto be raised six feet to get it above floodstage. In November a third attempt toget a line across the Arno succeeded,and water began to flow through toLeghorn. Many leaks showed up in thepipeline, and repairs and improve-ments continued well into 1945. Over96,000 man-hours, divided about equallybetween several engineer units and Ital-ian civilians, ultimately went into therestoration.

At both Naples and Leghorn, as wellas in other cities, the municipal watersystems were badly damaged, but notdestroyed. The Germans had neededto use municipal water supplies untilthe last minute, and civilians had frus-trated some destruction.24 Engineerswere able not only to restore water forpublic use in a remarkably short timebut also to provide railroad engineerswith water for locomotives and to sendtank trucks to engineer fire-fightingplatoons.25

The War Department first author-ized fire-fighting units for the Corps ofEngineers in August 1942, and by theend of 1943 six platoons of thirty-eightmen each were in Peninsular Base Sec-tion. Several more were formed in June1944 from the 6487th Engineer Con-struction Battalion, and five Italian fire-fighting units were organized and equip-

ped; just before ANVIL, PBS had nine-teen fire-fighting platoons. The newplatoons trained at a fire-fighting schoolin Aversa, each equipped and organ-ized to operate in four sections. Themain job was not to fight fires but toprevent them by inspecting for fire haz-ards and by keeping fire extinguishersfilled and in good working order. De-spite such precautions a number of firesbroke out. One fire-fighting platoonassigned to Fifth Army averaged threefire calls a week for several months, andat the Anzio ammunition depot fiftyfires broke out during April 1944 alone.Tankdozers and armored bulldozers,used to scatter burning ammunitionboxes and then smother them with dirt,were effective against dangerous ammu-nition dump fires.26

A less familiar task in Italy was realestate operations. In the AVALANCHEplans the responsibility for procuringproperties for American agencies wentto the engineers. The Real Estate Branchof the PBS Engineer Service processedall requests by American units for prop-erty in the base section area. It also tookcontrol of real estate records for prop-erty that Fifth Army released to Penin-sular Base Section. In the combat areawhen Fifth Army troops damaged prop-erty they occupied (and their occupancywas a matter of record) the owner wasentitled to compensation. Damage thatoccurred before occupancy was chargedto "fortunes-of-war," for which no com-pensation was paid. Careful recordshad to be kept to separate the twocategories. For these purposes photo-graphic records showing the condition

24 Chf Engr, 15th Army Gp, Notes on Engr Opns inItaly, no. 8, 1 Feb 44.

25 Diamond, "Water Supply in Italy," p. 332.

26 Fred K. Shirk, "Engineer Fire Fighters in theMarch on Rome," The Military Engineer, XXXVII(April 1945), 147-48.


of properties, particularly when removalof damaged portions was necessary,proved valuable, as did detailed inven-tories of small, movable furnishings andfixtures. When the war ended, the RealEstate Branch held active files on morethan 3,900 properties ranging fromopen fields to beautiful villas. Hundredsmore had been requisitioned, used, andreturned to private owners.

Before the invasion of Italy the engi-neers had made few preparations tohandle real estate work. The field wasfairly new, and few officers were ex-perienced. For the most part, forms andprocedures had to be worked out bytrial and error in Italy. Under the termsof the armistice the Italian governmentundertook to make all required facil-ities, installations, equipment, and sup-plies available to the Allies and to makeall payments in connection with them.Allied military agencies made only emer-gency payments required to keep finan-cially alive individual workers and con-tractors employed by the Allies.27

Procuring real estate for military useand keeping the necessary records werenevertheless considerable tasks. One ofthe biggest stumbling blocks for theReal Estate Branch was the lack of acentral agency in Fifth Army to handlereal estate; thus, records the army turnedover to PBS were often confused. Theestablishment of a real estate section inthe Fifth Army engineer command,after nearly a year in Italy, helped mat-ters considerably. Thereafter this sec-tion, together with G-4, Fifth Army,was able to plan in advance for realestate needed for dumps, bivouac areas,and other installations.28

Engineers in PBS were to handle,store, and issue maps. Under the Sup-ply Branch of the PBS Engineer Service,two thirteen-man engineer depot de-tachments operated a map depot andmade bulk issues to both Fifth andEighth Armies. Peninsular Base Sectionhad no topographic units for survey,drafting, or reproduction. The mapdepot detachments had reproductionsections but limited their operations tocopying construction drawings and pre-paring administrative directives andreports for the PBS engineer and engi-neer units.

Soon after Naples fell the 2634thEngineer Map Depot Detachment setup a map library at the Engineer Ser-vice headquarters and a base map depotat Miano. The map library filled smallorders while the Miano depot madebulk issues to Fifth and Eighth Armies.A second map depot detachment arrivedin the base section in November 1943and a third in April 1944. NATOUSAactivated other map depot detachmentsfor ANVIL, and, of the final total of six,three went to southern France.

In preparation for the 1944 offen-sives to and past Rome, PBS engineerstook over some twenty tons of mapsfrom Fifth Army depots at Paestum,but these sheets covered only the areasouth of the Volturno. Additional mapscovering the area north to Leghornarrived later, and before the end of1943 some 700 tons of maps hadreached the Miano depot. The PBSmap depots stocked ground maps ofItaly in four scales (1:25,000, 1:50,000,1:100,000, and 1:250,000) as well as airmaps, small-scale coverages of Europe,

27 Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy,pp. 559-64.

28 Extracts from Rpt on Peninsular Base Section,

NATOUSA, 10 Feb 44, sec. VIII, Engr Service; PBSEngr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. I, ChronologicalSummary.


town plans, and road maps. The num-ber of map sheets ran into the millions.29

For the first time in the Europeanwar, engineer lumber operations inItaly assumed importance. Engineertraining was based largely on the use oflocally procured lumber for all aspectsof construction, but in the United King-dom, North Africa, and Sicily the sup-ply had been so short that the engi-neers had come to rely on substitutes.

Italy offered the first real opportu-nity overseas to obtain large quantitiesof lumber from local sources. In twoyears, PBS forestry operations in Italyproduced lumber amounting to 370,885ship tons, more than the total tonnageof engineer supplies recovered throughItalian ports during the first year ofthe campaign. The lumbering opera-tions also saved money; Italian lumbercost an estimated $25.00 per 1,000board feet delivered to the using unit;the price in the United States at thetime was $40.00 per 1,000 board feetat the mill.30

At about the time of the Salernolanding, engineers crossed the Strait ofMessina to investigate timber reservesand lumbering facilities in CosenzaProvince and found approximately ninemillion board feet of milled lumber, alarge stockpile of unsawed logs, exten-sive timber tracts, and scores of exist-ing sawmills. With the capture of Naples,lumber quickly became a critical item.The engineers needed piles for portrehabilitation, bridging, and power linepoles; timbers and heavy planking forbuilding and decking; ties for railroads;

and lumber for boxing, building, anddunnage. The only American forestryunit in the theater, the 800th EngineerForestry Company, was then operatinga sawmill in Tunisia, but this unit had arelatively low shipping priority andcould not be moved promptly to Italy.Therefore, during the latter part ofNovember PBS sent a detachment ofabout fifty men from the 40th Engi-neer Combat Regiment to the Cosenzaarea to ship stockpiled lumber.31

Soon after the 800th Engineer For-estry Company reached Naples in mid-December 1943, it split into three de-tachments. Twenty men went to Cosenzato give the 40th Engineers experiencedmill men and lumber checkers, while asmaller group remained in Naples tosearch out lumber stocks. The rest ofthe company moved into a timber standat Montesano, about 120 miles south-east of Naples, and on Christmas Daybegan milling operations. With its por-table sawmill the company producedover 75,000 board feet of lumber atMontesano and then, on 21 January1944, moved to Cosenza. There it tookover lumber production from the 40thEngineers and by June 1944 had forty-three civilian sawmills operating in thearea, producing about a quarter of amillion board feet per day.

The 800th, operating over a widearea 250 miles from Headquarters,PBS, virtually took over operation ofthe Cosenza-Camigliatello narrow-gaugerailroad relay track after washouts andlandslides and cleared away deep snowdrifts during the winter. The companyalso performed its own road construc-tion and maintenance, including build-

29 AGF Bd Rpt 179, NATOUSA, Notes on Map-ping an Army, 16 Aug 44; PBS Engr Hist, pt. I,1943-45, sec. 1, Chronological Summary.

30 PBS Engr Hist, pt. I, 1943-45, sec. II, app. Vand app. VI; Hist 800th Engr Forestry Co, 13 Dec43-30 Jun 44.

31 Interv with Col Smullen; Engr Service, PBS, WorkAccomplished, p. 275.


ing culverts and bridges. The unit oper-ated a motor pool that expanded froman original fifteen vehicles to a fleet ofseventy-seven trucks and performed itsown maintenance. It operated a depotwhere civilian laborers loaded an aver-age of thirty-five cars of lumber piling aday; it employed 400 civilians directlyand supervised nearly 3,000 othersemployed at civilian sawmills.

During its first year at Cosenza the8OOth's sawmill, working two shifts aday seven days a week, produced ap-proximately 7,956,290 board feet oflumber. Peak production came duringOctober 1944, when the mill producedan average of 37,245 board feet a day.Total lumber shipments from the Co-senza area during the twelve monthsending January 1945 amounted to63,987,350 board feet.32

Producing the lumber was one thing;delivering it was another. At times breaksin the rail lines, heavy snowfalls in themountains, and shortages of railroadcars cut sharply into shipments fromCosenza. At such times the engineershad to pile the lumber in the Cosenzarailroad yards, and on one occasionthese stockpiles contained approximately1,750,000 board feet of lumber. Forseven weeks, from February to April1944, and again the following January,blizzards in the mountains curtailedshipments by 300,000 to 400,000 boardfeet a week. Mt. Vesuvius erupted on18 March 1944, burying several milesof railroad track under six to eightinches of cinders and tying up nearlyseven hundred railroad cars for sev-eral days.33

In September 1944 four members ofthe 800th went to Leghorn to teachmen of the 338th Engineer GeneralService Regiment and Italian troopshow to operate sawmills. This reducedthe amount of lumber that had to beshipped to Leghorn from Cosenza, 650miles away. By February 1945 two millsin northern Italy were producing 40,000board feet a day. Though many logsand trees in timber stands in northernItaly were worthless for military opera-tions because of imbedded shrapnel,lumber production in the area never-theless increased. On one day early inMay 1945 four mills there achieved apeak production of 108,639 board feet.34

PBS Supply and Maintenance

The Peninsular Base Section supplyand maintenance units came under aprovisional base depot group headquar-ters command in Naples as soon as PBSbecame operational. Depot companiesdirected operations and supervised Ital-ian laborers in the supply outlets; main-tenance companies handled construc-tion equipment pools and third, fourth,and fifth echelon maintenance of heavyequipment; and a heavy shop companymade tools and spare parts for themaintenance units and did some re-pairs.35

Engineer depot companies operatedtwo main depots in western Italy. One,near Naples, was located at an ItalianArmy barracks, and the other at an Ital-ian movie studio at Tirrenia, a few miles

32 Hist 800th Engr Forestry Co, Monthly Rpts, 13Dec 43-May 45, Personal files, M/Sgt Robert Kauf-man.

33 Hist 727th Engr Railway Operating Bn, Trans-portation Corps, p. 60.

34 Hist 800th Engr Forestry Co, Mthly Rpts, 13 Dec43—May 45, with annexes.

35 Engr Service, PBS, Work Accomplished, pp.273-74. Unless otherwise indicated this section isbased on this source and the histories of the unitsmentioned.


north of Leghorn. In the Naples areaspecial engineer depots were also setup for POL construction supplies,stream-crossing equipment, and maps.PBS engineers also took over FifthArmy engineer depots at Anzio, Civita-vecchia, Piombino, and other points asthe army moved forward. These armydepots either operated where they wereuntil their stocks were exhausted, orthey closed forthwith to move stocks tomore central locations.

Initially the 458th Engineer DepotCompany handled all administrativeduties at all PBS engineer depots, whilethe 386th Engineer Battalion (Separate),aided by several hundred civilianworkers, received, stored, and issuedsupplies. The 386th also kept severalmen on duty day and night in the portof Naples to identify engineer suppliesand to see that they went to the properdepots. The 473d Engineer Mainte-nance Company received and issuedheavy equipment at the depots andmaintained equipment in the depotsand in engineer units. A second engi-neer depot company, the 462d, arrivedin Naples toward the end of November1943 and ultimately took over the engi-neer depots Fifth Army left behind inits drive north during June and July1944.

With the opening of the engineerdepot near Leghorn, those at Civitavec-chia and Piombino were closed as rap-idly as transportation permitted, andelements of the 462d moved up to oper-ate the Leghorn depot. There, two Ital-ian engineer companies joined the Am-erican unit as a labor force, and civil-ians from as far off as Pisa and Lariwere hired to help. As many as a thou-sand civilians a day—a number limitedonly by the amount of transportation

available—worked at the Leghorn de-pot. During December 1944 a total of23,959 tons of engineer supplies reachedthe depot, which issued 20,907 tons.With Leghorn the focal point for engi-neer supply in the PBS forward area, theSupply Section of the PBS (Main) Engi-neer Service took up quarters there andkept stock records of all engineer depotsin the PBS forward area.

Two types of engineer units, lightequipment and base equipment com-panies, could service, issue, and whennecessary, operate Class IV equipment—extra and special equipment such asbulldozers issued temporarily or forspecific jobs. In July 1944 the 688thEngineer Base Equipment Companyreached Naples to assemble equipmentcoming into engineer depots, service it,transport it to requisitioning units, andprovide instructors for receiving units.But in mid-September the 688th passedto Seventh Army control, and thereaf-ter PBS engineer maintenance compa-nies had to do the 688th's work as wellas their own.

In August 1944 Brig. Gen. DabneyO. Elliott, NATOUSA engineer, puttheater requirements for maintenancecompanies at eleven and estimated thatthe theater also needed at least oneheavy shop and three maintenance com-panies to support Army Air Forcesunits properly. At the time only threeengineer maintenance companies andtwo engineer heavy shop companieswere available in the theater.36

The 469th Engineer MaintenanceCompany went to Italy with Fifth Army,and the 473d, a PBS unit, reached

36 Elliott comments, 18 Mar 60; G-3 Section, HQ,15th Army Group, A Military Encyclopedia, pp. 322—23.


Naples on 10 October 1943. The 473dtook in equipment for second, third,fourth, and even fifth echelon repairsand also functioned as a base equip-ment company, hauling heavy engineerequipment from the port and uncrating,assembling, and servicing it for bothPBS and Fifth Army units. Roads inthe shop area deteriorated badly dur-ing the fall, and in January the unithad to move to a new hard-surfacedarea near the port, ten miles from theengineer depot. In mid-April, with thecoming of dry weather, the companyreturned to Naples. Both moves costthe unit heavily, for it took eleven daysand help from other units to move the5,200 tons of heavy engineer equip-ment back to the depot.

Engineer maintenance forces in PBShad been strengthened in February1944 by the arrival of the 496th Engi-neer Heavy Shop Company, but a monthpassed before all of the 496th's equip-ment reached Italy. In the meantimethe unit established itself at a civiliansteel jobbing concern in Naples. Thereit set up and operated a series of sepa-rate shops for engine rebuilding, carbu-retor and injection repair, electricalrepair, salvage and reclamation work,forging, welding, and patternmaking.

An important function was manufac-turing spare parts that could not beobtained through normal supply chan-nels: piston rings and cylinder sleevesfor internal combustion engines, aircompressors, and reciprocating pumps.The 496th also salvaged and recondi-tioned usable parts from scrapped equip-ment, did fourth and fifth echelon engi-neer maintenance, and took on thirdechelon maintenance until a third engi-neer maintenance company, the 470th,arrived in Italy during May 1944.

ANVIL laid a heavy hand on engi-neer maintenance resources in Italy.Fifth Army gave up its 469th EngineerMaintenance Company; PBS lost the470th Engineer Maintenance Companyand the 688th Engineer Base Equip-,ment Company. Italy was left with onemaintenance company (split among theArmy Air Forces, Fifth Army, and PBS),one heavy shop company, and one baseshop company. PBS had to turn moreand more to Italian sources. The 1stEngineer Maintenance Company (Ital-ian) was activated in July 1944 andattached to the 473d Engineer Mainte-nance Company at the Naples engineerdepot; the 2d Engineer MaintenanceCompany (Italian) came into being inmid-August and worked with the 496thEngineer Heavy Shop Company untilready to function independently. Al-though handicapped in personnel andequipment, both units were soon doinggood work. Machinists, blacksmiths,welders, and carpenters were easyenough to find among Italian soldiersand civilians, but skilled mechanics,patternmakers, and foundry workerswere not. Moreover, securing adequatemaintenance equipment for the Italianunits was difficult. U.S. Army tables ofbasic allowances did not provide forequipping either unauthorized or ex-panded units, so the two Italian compa-nies never had more than half theequipment allotted their Americancounterparts.

During the summer of 1944 the main-tenance of engineer equipment becamecritical; in June, when daily advanceswere great, the 19th Engineer CombatRegiment had to haul its dozers longdistances for minor repairs. During thenext month and into September asmuch as 50 percent of the unit's heavy


equipment was under repair, and overthe last half of 1944 the 19th Engineershad an average of fifty pieces of equip-ment in its "waiting line." The shortageof engineer maintenance units was themain reason, but there were others:poor preventive maintenance, particu-larly during the rapid advances of Julyand August; equipment that had wornout after two or more years of use;replacement of some trained mechan-ics with untrained limited-service men;and a shortage of certain critical spareparts. Another important factor wasextra wear and tear that equipment suf-fered at the hands of unskilled operators.Multiple shifts and heavy use of ClassIV equipment required several timesthe number of operators provided byunit TOEs.

Toward the end of 1944, MTOUSAwas able to achieve a better balance ofengineer forces, largely with men fromdeactivated antiaircraft units. The engi-neers used some of these men to acti-vate two new engineer maintenancecompanies. In Pensouth the 5th Engi-neer Maintenance Company was acti-vated on 10 November with a cadre ofa few men from both the 473d and496th Engineer Companies. In FifthArmy the 40th Engineer MaintenanceCompany came into being on 1 Decem-ber with a cadre from the 473d Engi-neer Company. Neither of the newengineer maintenance companies cameup to full strength until the end ofDecember 1944, and many of the menhad had no experience in maintenance.Already a heavy backlog of deadlinedequipment had built up, while hardwinter usage and age kept broken ma-chines flowing to repair shops. Grad-ually, greater attention to first and sec-ond echelon maintenance reduced

breakdowns, and in March five inspec-tion teams, made up of men from themaintenance and heavy shop companies,began to make frequent trips amongunits. In April Fifth Army reported thefewest equipment breakdowns in sixmonths.

Probably the most challenging sup-ply job the engineers had was handlingspare parts—between eighty and ninetythousand different items. By early 1944fast-moving parts were noticeably lack-ing throughout the engineer shops inthe theater, whereas slow-moving itemswere overstocked. In August 1944,inspection teams from the United Statesfound that about one-fourth of the10,000 tons of spare parts in MTOUSAwas excess that had accumulated as aresult of the automatic supply policy.Some of the heavy parts in third eche-lon maintenance sets had been stocked,unused, for two years, while allowancesfor certain other parts needed to bedoubled, tripled, or increased eventenfold.

Efficient handling of available partsrequired men thoroughly familiar withengineer equipment, with nomencla-ture and cataloging, with interchange-able parts, and with the repair historyof parts and equipment. The 754thEngineer Parts Supply Company, theonly such unit in MTOUSA, furnishedcadres for spare parts platoons in engi-neer depot companies and, during thelatter part of 1944, also lost men forretraining as infantry. By early 1945,60 percent of the company was new-comers, few of whom had any qualifica-tions for their assignments.

Italian theater shortages came fromsacrifices for the more decisive theaterin northern Europe. Beginning in early1944, Fifth Army gave up support and


combat units of all types to the ETOUSAcommand and to the invasion of south-ern France. In losing some of the bestof its engineer units, the theater, insmall measure, replenished some of

what was borrowed in 1942 for commit-ment to Operation TORCH. The focusof the war shifted again to the Conti-nent opposite England.

CHAPTER XII

Reviving BOLERO in theUnited Kingdom

The decisions at the TRIDENT Con-ference in May 1943—to undertake astrategic bombing campaign leading upto a cross-Channel invasion with a tar-get date of 1 May 1944 while continu-ing operations in the Mediterranean—rescued BOLERO from the doldrumsinto which it had fallen as a result ofthe diversions to North Africa. To besure, the drain of the continuing cam-paigns in the Mediterranean and theBritish seeming reluctance to sacrificethose campaigns to a cross-Channeloperation left some doubt in Americanminds that the operations would be exe-cuted in a timely manner. Accordingly,for some months after TRIDENT thebuildup proceeded haltingly and underrelatively low priority. The appearancein July of an outline plan for the opera-tion, now designated OVERLORD, andthe acceptance of that plan at the Que-bec Conference (QUADRANT) in Augustproduced new momentum in the fallof 1943. But only the final resolutionof all doubts at the meetings at Cairo-Tehran (SEXTANT) at the very end ofthe year gave BOLERO the top prior-ity that would reawaken the buildup inthe United Kingdom.1

ETOUSA engineers were essential tothe buildup. They had to constructdepots and camps to house the flood ofincoming men and supplies, build theairfields from which preinvasion airstrikes would be launched, and prepareplans and stockpile supplies for theengineer role in the invasion itself.2

The bases for planning the construc-tion program during 1943 remained theBOLERO Key Plans, and they changedas the OVERLORD concept developed.Engineer planning late in 1942 wasbased on the third BOLERO Key Plan,which held preparations for a full-scaleinvasion in abeyance although it pre-scribed a vague goal of 1,049,000 menin England with no firm target date. Asearly as January 1943 Col. Cecil R.Moore, the ETOUSA chief engineer,directed base section engineers to re-turn to the second BOLERO Key Plan asa guide and to use its troop basis of1,118,000 men with a completion dateof 31 December 1943.3 The TRIDENTdecisions produced firmer data to work

1 See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 114-71, 231-68 for a detailed account.

Except where otherwise indicated the account thatfollows is based on this volume.

2 On this aspect of the engineer effort in the UnitedKingdom and for other engineer support to the AAFsee Craven and Cate, Europe: TORCH to POINT-BLANK, pp. 599-664.

3 Colonel Moore was promoted to brigadier generalon 26 April 1943 and to major general on 1 March

REVIVING BOLERO IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 257

with, and on 12 July 1943, a fourthBOLERO Key Plan set the troop basis at1,340,000 men to be in Britain by 1May 1944. On the basis of decisions atthe Quebec Conference in August theBritish War Office (with the advice ofthe American staff) on 30 October 1943issued an amended version of the fourthplan, setting the goal at 1,446,000 U.S.officers and enlisted men to be in theUnited Kingdom by 30 April 1944.This was the last of the key plans withinwhich the engineer supply and construc-tion programs proceeded.

The Continuing Problem of Organization

The organizational framework withinwhich the engineers operated—specifi-cally the division of function betweenthe theater headquarters and the SOS—continued to cause problems during1943. As Commanding General, SOS,Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee continuedthe drive he had begun in 1942 to bringall supply and administration in the the-ater under his control. He continuedto meet determined resistance fromthose who insisted that the theater staffmust remain responsible for theater-wide policy and planning for futureoperations and that the chiefs of ser-vices in particular must serve the the-ater commander directly in these areaseven if their services were part of theSOS. Until the very end of the yearcompromise arrangements prevailed,but none of them were entirely satisfac-tory for the performance of engineerfunctions.

The duplication of functions createdby moving SOS headquarters to Chel-tenham in May 1942 persisted after Lt.

Gen. Frank M. Andrews replaced Gen-eral Eisenhower as theater commanderon 6 February 1943, and to a lesser de-gree after Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Deversreplaced Andrews, who died in a planecrash on 3 May 1943.4 In early Marchof that year Lee proposed to Andrewsthat he, Lee, be designated deputytheater commander for supply and ad-ministration as well as commandinggeneral, SOS, with the theater G-4 andall the chiefs of the technical and ad-ministrative services serving under himin his dual capacity. The solution wasnot unlike that adopted eventually, butat the time Andrews rejected thescheme. He insisted that planning forfuture operations, a function of thetheater headquarters, should remainseparate from administration and sup-ply of troops in the British Isles, afunction of the SOS. Although hegranted Lee more control over thechiefs of services, he also specified thatthey be ready to serve the theater com-mander immediately if needed. At thesame time, he moved the whole SOSheadquarters back to London close toETOUSA.5 While SOS planning cameto be centered in London, an SOS dep-uty commander handled operations atCheltenham. The operating echelons ofthe technical services remained atCheltenham, and chiefs still had to spendsome time there.

General Devers lent a more willingear to Lee's arguments and vested thecommanding general, SOS, with theoffice of the G-4 on the theater staff.An ETOUSA order of 27 May 1943gave Lee in this dual role jurisdictionover all supply concerns of the theaterand divided his SOS command between

1944. See ch. II; Memo, Moore for Lee, 11 Jan 43,325.21 Policies and Plans, EUCOM Engr files.

4 See ch. II.5 ETOUSA GO 16, 21 Mar 43.


two equal chiefs of theater service func-tions, one for administration and onefor services. The seven technical ser-vices, including the engineers, lumpedtogether with a purchasing service anda new theater area petroleum service,then had a chain of access to the the-ater commander running through Col.Royal B. Lord as chief of services, SOS,and General Lee himself as surrogatetheater G-4.6 Except for the limitedconsolidation involved in the G-4 posi-tion, ETOUSA and SOS staffs contin-ued as separate entities, and the chiefsof services continued in dual roles inthe two headquarters. Even this lim-ited consolidation suffered a setbackwhen the G-4 position on the ETOUSAstaff was removed from the SOS com-mander and given to Maj. Gen. RobertW. Crawford between 8 October and 1December 1943.7

On 1 December General Crawfordmoved to the Chief of Staff to the Su-preme Allied Commander (COSSAC),a provisional Allied staff planning theinvasion pending the establishment ofa command for that purpose. GeneralLee then assumed the position of G-4,ETOUSA, again. Another monthbrought the realization of his propos-als of early 1943. The expansion of theCOSSAC role in England and the estab-lishment of active field, army, and armygroup commands in England reducedthe ETOUSA administrative and long-range planning function to little morethan that of the SOS, ETOUSA, com-mand. In effect, the two separate head-quarters existed for the same reasonand shared the same special staff, whichincluded the engineers. When General

Eisenhower resumed command of theAmerican theater and of the new Su-preme Headquarters, Allied Expedi-tionary Force (SHAEF), which suc-ceeded COSSAC on 15 January 1944,the ETOUSA and SOS staffs were con-solidated. At the same time, GeneralLee assumed the formal title of deputytheater commander, in which capacityhe was to act for General Eisenhowerin all theater administrative and ser-vice matters.8

The consolidation reduced the dupli-cation and inconsistencies and relievedthe confusion that had characterizedsupply and administrative channels in1943. It provided the basis for organiz-ing an American Communications Zonecommand for operations on the Con-tinent. But the organizational picturewas still complicated and commandrelationships confusing. TheoreticallyGeneral Lee's ETOUSA-COMZ staffserved General Eisenhower in his roleas American theater commander whilehis Allied staff served him in his role assupreme commander, Allied Expedi-tionary Force. Senior American fieldcommanders tended to regard Lee'sheadquarters as strictly an SOS or Com-munications Zone headquarters, equalto but not above their own headquar-ters and equally subject to Eisenhower'sdirections as supreme Allied command-er. They never accepted Lee's role asdeputy theater commander and suc-ceeded in having it abolished in August1944.

In a sense the ETOUSA-SOS rela-tionship with the Allied SHAEF com-mand created some of the same prob-lems that had characterized the relation-ship of SOS and ETOUSA because

6 ETOUSA GO 33, 27 May 43.7 SOS ETOUSA GO 79, 19 Aug 43; ETOUSA GO

71, 8 Oct 43; ETOUSA GO 90, 1 Dec 43. 8 ETOUSA GO 5, 17 Jan 44.


GENERAL MOORE (Photograph taken in 1945.)

Eisenhower sometimes used the Ameri-can component of the SHAEF staff asan American theater staff. GeneralMoore's misgivings about the commandon the eve of the invasion were com-mon among his fellow technical servicechiefs. The continued assignment of theEngineer Service under the SOS madethe other elements in the theater regardthe chief engineer as part of a "co-ordi-nate command and not one that hadauthority or supervision over their com-mands."9

The command arrangements in thetheater thus remained unsatisfactory to

the Engineer Service throughout thebuildup and preparation for the inva-sion. In manpower problems alone,Moore's headaches in bidding againstother services for skilled men and inallocating work forces increased sincehe could not always exercise the weightand the rank of a theater commander'sname in his own behalf. Equally diffi-cult was engineer supply in the theater.

New Supply Procedures

When the buildup in England wasexpressed in terms of troop ceilings inthe high-level international conferencesof spring and summer 1943, the fig-ures automatically implied demands forincreased shipments of engineer sup-ply and equipment. General Moore'sSOS Engineer Service would have toplan not only for accommodations forthe incoming men but also for protec-tion and depot warehousing for bothcurrent operating supply and invasionmateriel. The early part of 1943 sawthe influx of comparatively small num-bers of troops, primarily Air Corpsreinforcements for the stepped-up aer-ial offensive. Later arrivals would re-quire coordination of construction andsupply functions, but the OCE Con-struction and Quartering Division hadmoved back to London in General An-drews' separation of planning and oper-ating staffs in March 1943, leaving theSupply Division at SOS headquarters,ninety miles away. The division never-theless contributed to some attempts atimproving the supply flow to the UnitedKingdom, among them a program ofpreshipping unit equipment and newmethods of marking shipments for desti-nations in England.

Until the summer of 1943, engineer

9 Interv, Lt Col Shelby A. McMillion, Chf, LiaisonSect, OCE, with Maj Gen Moore, 10 May 44, sub:Overall Theater Problems in the United Kingdom,app. 17 to OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization,Administration, and Personnel. (Hereafter cited asMoore Interv.)


units arriving from the United Statesbrought their organic equipment withthem. After 1 July they turned in alltheir equipment except necessary house-keeping supplies at their port of embar-kation and upon reaching the UnitedKingdom drew new equipment, includ-ing supplemental maintenance supplies,from stocks previously shipped fromthe United States. The preshipmentprogram took into account the prob-ability that larger numbers of troopswould arrive in England in late 1943and early 1944 and sought to avoidovertaxing British port capacity andinland transportation nets with bothtroops and cargo by shipping the cargobeforehand. It also would permit Brit-ish and American dock crews to takeadvantage of the long summer days forunloading.

But the limitations of the preship-ment program immediately made them-selves felt. Interpretations of the sup-ply flow differed from the start. TheEuropean theater command perceivedthe system as a guarantee that bulkstocks would arrive before using troopsdocked in Great Britain, where theywould immediately pick up TBA mate-rial and draw other needed supply, butnot necessarily the same items they sur-rendered before leaving the UnitedStates. War Department interpretationsrelied at first on force-marking, underwhich units were to recover the sameequipment they had turned in at home.Begun under constraints arising fromlittle excess supply in American inven-tories and training schedules that pre-vented units from giving up equipmentuntil just before they sailed, preship-ment from May to August 1943 wasprimarily a vain struggle to fill avail-able shipping space.

The priority system established forsupplying Army Ground Forces in En-gland also hobbled the program, withETO supply occupying eighth place inthe order of shipping importance in theUnited States. Until after SEXTANT theWar Department was reluctant to changethe priority for a theater that had noclear-cut and overriding strategic pre-cedence. By the time Army ServiceForces arguments produced a higherpriority in November 1943, troop sail-ings rivaled those of preshipped cargoand shipping space went to troops andtheir personal gear.

The advance flow of heavier equip-ment for engineer work suffered fromthe uncertain supply policy in effectthroughout 1943. During July andAugust of that year General Moorecomplained that bulk-shipped TBAitems arrived in the United Kingdomlong after engineer units. In that period75,000 engineer troops reached the the-ater to find that only 5 percent of theirorganizational equipment was waitingfor them. As a result, most of the unitscould not contribute to the general con-struction program or even train effec-tively.11 Receipt of bulk TBA equip-ment improved enough in September1943 to take care of the units arrivingthat month but was not sufficient toreplenish reserve stocks depleted dur-ing the two previous months. Eventu-ally, engineer troops received standardequipment within seven to ten daysafter they arrived instead of the sixtyto ninety days common under the oldsystem.12

10 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 133—39; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logis-tics and Strategy, 1943-45, pp. 51-52.

11 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 4, Troops.12 Interv, Maj. J. H. Thetford, OCE Supply Div, 22

Sep 44, OCE.


Many engineer items shipped fromthe United States were poorly marked;some even lacked service identificationmarks. Of 3,920 items of prefabricatedhutting more than 300 could not beused, largely because so many parts hadbeen mixed together.13 Supply pro-cesses improved for the engineers—andfor other troops in the ETO—whenSOS changed the UGLY marking systemevolved in 1942. Under that system thefirst element in cargo identification, thecode word UGLY, indicated the ETO;the second element indicated the supplyservice making the shipment; and thethird indicated the class of supplies.Thus, engineer Class II supplied goingto the ETO were marked UGLY-ENGRSII.

Early in 1943, SOS and the Britishrefined this system with the aim ofeliminating long rail hauls from theports. They divided the United King-dom into three zones: Zone I, North-ern England, identified by the codeword SOXO; Zone II, Bristol and Lon-don, called GLUE; and Zone III, North-ern Ireland, called BANG. Thereafter,most cargo bore the shipping destina-tion SOXO, GLUE, or BANG; UGLY indi-cated cargo not intended for any partic-ular port in the United Kingdom. Thissystem cut down reshipment from portto port, brought supplies to the correctdepot sooner, relieved pressure on thealready overloaded British rail system,and enabled supplies to be moved outof ports sooner—a necessity with Ger-man air raids an ever present danger.Manifests also improved, and the newISS (Identification of Separate Ship-ments to Overseas Destinations) formscompletely identified, in the third ele-

ment of the UGLY address, separateshipments made against particular req-uisitions.

No amount of new markings couldrevise the shortages in large items ofengineer equipment throughout 1943.One of the most important items wasthe dump truck; at late as Septemberthe engineers had 1,000 fewer than thestandard tables of allocations called for.Heavy construction equipment, general-purpose vehicles, and cranes were incritically short supply well into 1944.Augers, semi-trailers, graders, shopequipment, tractors with angledozers,generators, various hand tools, asphaltpaving equipment, and spare parts ofall types fell into this category. On 30April 1943, the backlog of engineersupply alone due in from the UnitedStates stood at 79,832 ship tons; bythe end of August, it had increased to124,224 tons.14

Construction

At the beginning of 1943 Americanengineers in the United Kingdom couldnot look back on an impressive con-struction record. They had built nohospitals, and although they had under-taken fourteen camp projects they hadnot completed any. They had workedon twelve airfields but none was morethan 25 percent complete, and they hadbegun ten depots but none was finished.In one respect, however, the engineershad made considerable progress—theyhad learned, of necessity, how to workclosely with the British.

13 Shipment of Supplies, 400.22, EUCOM Engr files;OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 8, Nov 43.

14 Moore interv; OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpts, Apr43—Jun 44; Notes on Command and Staff Conf, 3,10 Jan 44, Adm 457, ETOUSA Hist Sect; Rpt, Lt ColJohn H. Hassinger, Chf, Tractor and Crane Sect, OCEWD, to Moore, Nov 43,319.1 Rpts (General), EUCOM


Because all facilities would ultimatelygo back to the British, many plans andspecifications the engineers used wereBritish, and the British had to approvedeviations. British materials also had tobe used. Influencing construction stan-dards and specifications were the smallarea available for military use; a short-age of lumber and a consequent reli-ance on steel, cement, and brick; andwet weather that produced continuousmud. Plans and procedures were af-fected by differences in diction, custom,and nomenclature; slow delivery ofsupplies; red tape and British centrali-zation; and heavy reliance on civilians.15

Every project the engineers workedon had to be approved in the WarOffice by the Directorate of Quartering,the Directorate of Fortifications andWorks, and by Works Finance whichwas made up entirely of civilians. TheConstruction Division, OCE, ETOUSA,had a liaison officer from the Director-ate of Fortifications and Works; an-other, for a time, from the Directorateof Quartering; and a third from theAir Ministry Works Directorate. Inturn, the division kept a liaison officeron duty with the Directorate of Fortifi-cations and Works in the War Office.16

Getting standards for quarters andairfields approved was a problem, forin many cases American standards werehigher than British. The increased costper capita for U.S. forces was incom-prehensible to the British Works Fi-nance. Many projects were delayed fif-teen to forty-five days while the Britishinvestigated the need for the work.

Engr files; Ltr, Moore to Col Joseph S. Gorlinski, 3May 43, 321 Gen, Apr-Dec 43, EUCOM Engr files.

Moore interv; see chs. II and III.16 Interv, McMillion with Col Paul D. Berrigan, 8

May 44.

Another cause for delay was failure toreceive British supplies promptly. Thattardiness and shortages, the engineersestimated, cut the effectiveness ofAmerican troop labor by 30 percent.Fortunately, matters improved in thelater stages of the buildup.17

When General Moore directed thebase section engineers to go back to thesecond Key Plan in February 1943, theBOLERO construction program was 29percent complete. Priorities were airprojects and depots, shops, and specialprojects, to be finished by 1 August1943; accommodations previouslyplanned, to be finished by 15 October1943; and the hospital program, to befinished by 1 November 1943. Anyadditional accommodations were to becompleted by the end of the year.18

The more rapid buildup under thefourth BOLERO Key Plan in July 1943and its amendment in October steppedup all types of construction in theUnited Kingdom. New troop ceilingsset at the international conferencesraised the demand for construction farabove that established for the 1,118,000-man limit in the second Key Plan with-out changing the basic construction pri-orities favoring airfields. The QUAD-RANT decisions, in anticipating OVER-LORD, moved the staging areas for muchof the invasion force from southern tosouthwestern England. Compared withthe earlier construction demands, thework described in the fourth Key Planexpanded upon all previous work loads.

17 Interv, Col C. J. Barker, Chf, Ground Proj Sect,C&Q Div, OCE, 12 May 44; Intervs, Moore andBerrigan.

18 Ltr, OCE ETOUSA to Base Sect Engrs, 10 Feb43, sub: BOLERO Construction Program, 600.1,EUCOM Engr files; For the earlier BOLERO KeyPlans, see ch. I.


The July version of the plan specified970,000 accommodations for incomingground troops; the revised plan ofOctober considered 1,060,000. Closedor covered storage and workshop spaceexpanded from 15 million square feetin the third Key Plan to 18 million inthe fourth plan and then to over 18million in the amended fourth plan.Open storage, set at 26 million squarefeet in the third plan, rose to 34 millionin the fourth but declined to 29,736,000in the amended version. Petroleumproducts requirements rose from130,000 tons in July to 234,000 tons inOctober; ammunition from 244,000tons to 432,000 tons and then to452,000 tons in the amended fourthplan, all requiring special handling andstorage.19

To meet deadlines under the newprograms, the engineers had to limitconstruction to the bare necessities.Safety factors were at the minimum forthe importance of the structure, whiledurability, cost, and appearance becameminor considerations.20 The new con-struction largely ignored camouflage.Camps frequently went up in paradeground style, in open spaces and straightlines, adjacent to prominent landmarks.Bulldozer tracks and construction ma-terials, supplies, and equipment left inopen fields attracted Germanbombers.21

The English winter created its ownset of construction problems. There

were only eight hours of light each day,and using searchlights at night riskeddrawing German aircraft. Many menwere stricken with colds, respiratorydiseases, and other ailments in thedamp weather. Every site had to bewell drained, or the engineers andtheir equipment soon bogged down inmud.22

Determining when a constructionproject was finished became perplex-ing. Two interpretations were possible—when the contract was fulfilled or whenthe using service declared the job com-plete. The first criterion was compli-cated by extras that might or might notaffect the usefulness of the particularfacility. Some items such as work ramps,added after an original contract, upsetcompletion schedules yet did not mate-rially delay when a facility could beused. At the insistence of the chiefengineer, progress reports reflectedphysical completion, including extrawork authorized during construction,rather than availability of facilities.23

By the end of May 1944 the construc-tion program was 97.5 percent com-plete except for hospitals and continu-ous maintenance (especially at airfields).Depots were 99.6 percent complete;accommodations, 98 percent; and hos-pitals, 93.9 percent. The estimatedvalue of installations provided byAmerican forces in the United King-dom as of 31 May was $991,441,000.New British construction cost an esti-mated $668,000,000. Of this total

19 The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. Ill,"Troop and Supply Buildup in the UK Prior toD-Day," pp. 57-73.

20 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 5, 14 Sep 43, p. 10.21 Ltr, WBS Engr to CO, 368th GS Rgt, 11 Jan 44,

sub: Camouflage Instructions, and Ltr, OCE, SOSETOUSA, to SOS, WBS, EBS, and NIBS, 30 Nov 43,sub: Camouflage of. . . Installations, 384.6, EUCOMEngr files.

22 Ltr, OCE, EBS, to SOS ETOUSA, 5 Feb 44, sub:Project Study, OCE; Ltr, SOS ETOUSA to CG, ASF,14 Jan 45, sub: Rpt on Overseas Construction, AG600.1, ASF files.

23 Ltr, OCE, SBS, to Chf Engr, 13 Aug 43, and Ltr,P. D. Berrigan to Engr, SBS, 20 Aug 43, sub: Con-struction Progress Rpts, both in 600 Rpts, EUCOMEngr files.


PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS DEPOT, LANCASHIRE

$502,000,000 ($262,000,000 acquired,$240,000,000 constructed) involved airforces installations; $166,800,000 in-volved hospitals ($151,200,000 for newconstruction and $15,600,000 for ac-quired). Some $41,174,000 went todepots, all but $4,374,000 to new con-struction. The entire construction pro-gram encompassed 150,000 buildingsand 50,000 tents.24

Depots

In November and December 1942and January 1943 the chief engineer

had cut back the depot program inETOUSA and deferred work on somedepots and shops. In February 1943,after the Casablanca Conference, Gen-eral Moore called upon the base sec-tion engineers to produce firm build-ing plans. The fourth Key Plan calledfor the completion of the depot pro-gram by 31 March 1944, and its 18 mil-lion square feet of covered storagespace was 20 percent more than in thesecond Key Plan.25 By the time thefourth plan was announced in July

24 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 14, May 44; OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service Force Con-struction, p. 115; Berrigan interv, 8 May 44.

25 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, pp. 128, 135, 190; Ltr, OCE ETOUSAto Base Section Engrs, 13 Jan 43, sub: Modifying Planfor BOLERO Construction Program, 600.1, EUCOMEngr files.


1943, 13,398,000 square feet wereready. Open storage, which was to total34 million square feet, then amountedto 27 million. In addition, space was tobe provided for 432,000 long tons ofammunition and 215,000 long tons ofPOL.

Until well into 1943, the various ser-vices requiring depot space changedtheir requests from day to day. TheBritish might move out of a selecteddepot site only to have the asking ser-vice turn down the site after all. In somesuch instances British civilian concernshad been put out of business in orderto make facilities available.26 But muchof the work and storage space the Brit-ish provided was hard to adapt to mod-ern American methods. Many of thedepots were too low and doors toonarrow; many multistoried buildingshad either very small elevators or noneat all. Some of the depots were farinland and had only tenuous access tothe ports from which the OVERLORDoperation was to be mounted. To makerequisitions coming from other techni-cal services more orderly and consistent,Colonel Lord required them to desig-nate liaison officers to the engineersmanaging the depot construction andacquisition program, but requirementscontinued to change and some difficul-ties with site selection persisted.27

As one answer to the time, labor, andconstruction materials problems, thechief engineer planned to use openfields for storage space whenever prac-ticable. In most cases roads and rail lineshad to be brought to the site and the

ground conditioned to provide rapiddrainage. The damp English climatewas hard on the poorly packed sup-plies coming from the United States.These factors and difficulties in usingBritish facilities made it necessary toraise estimates for covered storage.

The depot program was not finishedby the end of 1943. However, by 1 May1944, only 29,673 square feet of cov-ered storage in Southern Base Section(SBS) and 1,200,000 square feet ofopen storage in Western Base Section(WBS) were lacking. At the end of thatmonth all but 7 percent of the workhad been completed.28

Within the depots the Americanforces used several types of buildings.One of the first they tried was the Iris,a 35-foot-wide Nissen hut. The Nissen,a British development, was an igloo-like half cylinder made of steel. Moresuccessful was the Romney hut, similarto the Nissen but with a heavier frame.With special bolting the Romney provedto be an exceptionally tight structure.The Romney huts often had set-in win-dows, twelve on each side. The endwalls were of brick, concrete, or, prefer-ably, sheeting, which permitted the useof sliding doors as well as a small accessdoor. The foundation was continuousplain concrete footing, with an eight-inch brick foundation extending a mini-mum of four inches aboveground. Thefloor was five inches of concrete on fourinches of gravel fill. The concrete apronthat joined the building to a railroadsiding was customarily six inches thick.

The largest warehouses were of Mar-ston shedding which could provide rec-tangular buildings as large as 45-by-26 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service Force

Construction, apps. 8 and 9.27 Memo, Col Lord for Liaison Officers of Quarter-

master Ordnance et al., 10 Feb 43, 600.1, EUCOMEngr files.

28 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, p. 128.


250 feet. These consisted of structuralsteel frames, corrugated iron roofs, cor-rugated asbestos siding, and six-inchconcrete floors. Large sliding doorswere at each end. The higher ceiling inthe Marstons made it possible to installtwo ten-ton overhead cranes. A railroadspur ran into one end of the buildings.Sometimes made of wood from pack-ing boxes and composite board panels,the Marston structures were ordinarily60 feet long with an 18 1/2-foot span.The wooden buildings were cheap andeasy to knock down and transport butwere so light that they had to be re-paired frequently. To save steel andwood, structures of curved asbestos andcorrugated cement sheets with endwalls of brick were also built. Someattempts were made to use precastconcrete.29

About twenty-nine depots (each withan average of one hundred buildings)constituted the U.S. Army depot pro-gram in the United Kingdom. The con-struction of new covered storage andthe expansion of existing facilities ac-counted for about one-fourth of thetotal space, while about one-half of theopen storage and hardstandings wasderived from new facilities and expan-sion. The estimated value of acquireddepots was $4,374,000; that of newdepots $36,800,000. Of covered stor-age and shop space the British turnedover 67 percent and constructed 20percent; American engineers built 13percent. Of open storage and hard-standings the British turned over 51percent and built 13 percent while U.S.Army engineers provided 36 percent.For storing ammunition the British

turned over facilities to handle 33 per-cent of the job and constructed 27percent; American engineers con-structed 40 percent. Providing depotspace for POL was largely an engineerjob, with the British contributing only5 percent (3 percent in space turnedover and 2 percent in new construc-tion).30

Accommodations

The first Key Plan did not providefor camp construction, for the Britishwere to make available the necessary845,200 winterized accommodations.The second Key Plan did not breakdown the number of hut and tentcamps that would have to be erectedbut mentioned a total of 845,000. InJanuary 1943 ETOUSA announcedthat all small camp expansions that were50 percent or more complete could befinished; work on all others was to stop,at least temporarily.31 At the end of Jan-uary some 65,000 spaces of the 137,000to be provided by camp expansions andnew hutted camps were ready for use.More than 543,000 spaces already wereavailable, for a total of slightly morethan 600,000. The following monthETOUSA directed that accommoda-tions be completed by 15 October 1943,and any needed thereafter by 1 Decem-ber 1943.32

In January 1943 the British andAmericans designated G-3, ETOUSA,to supervise the preparation of amonthly priority list showing the units

29 Waldo G. Bowman, "Engineers Overseas," Engi-neering News-Record, 26-27.

30 Adm 119, Engr Construction, ETOUSA Hist Sect.31 EUCOM Engr file 600.1.32 Unless otherwise cited this section on camp con-

struction is based on OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 8,Quartering; Staff Conf Notes 1943, Adm 454 and455, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


to arrive in the ETO within the nextmonth or within a longer period if suchdata were available. Called long-termforecast, the lists were derived frominformation the War Department pro-vided and from a convoy program theBritish quartermaster general pre-pared. At the same time the Alliesagreed that each British military com-mand would provide holding areas forAmerican units whose final locationshad not been determined and for unitsthat arrived unexpectedly. The AirForces did not have to determine desti-nations for units in these long-termforecasts but coordinated its needs withthe Air Ministry, not with the Ameri-can base sections or the War Office.

Early in February 1943 the Construc-tion and Quartering Division of the the-ater engineer's office drew up plans forquartering U.S. troops expected in theUnited Kingdom by the end of the year.These forces would be located with aview to their future operational rolesand available facilities and trainingareas. They would be quartered in tentsbetween 15 March and 15 October.

The quartering program did notmake great strides in early 1943.Though the engineers were using over-all estimates of 1,118,000 arrivals listedin the second Key Plan, they were stillworking against the total of 427,000men established in the third Key Planof November 1942 as a basis for calcu-lating accommodations. Even this fig-ure caused no sense of urgency; troopsother than Air Forces were not arriv-ing in any great numbers. Of the 5,244men for whom quarters were found inApril 1943, 4,873 were air personnel.Southern Base Section had at that time380,000 covered accommodations.Army engineers constructed space for60,000 and expanded existing struc-

tures to take 60,000 more. In July 1943they widened the program to provide82,000 spaces: 52,000 for air forcespersonnel, 27,000 for SOS troops, and2,435 for ground forces increments. Asof March 1943, no troops were housedunder canvas.

The first of a series of joint monthlyforecasts concerning the arrival ofAmerican troops in the United King-dom appeared on 14 July 1943. Fromthese engineers received word on unitsalerted in the United States for ship-ment to Europe but not always on sizesof convoys or timing of movements.News of a unit's scheduled arrival some-times reached England while the unitwas at sea. As late as September Gen-eral Moore could not get accurate infor-mation on unit destinations. In mid-October, when the amended fourthKey Plan had raised estimates foraccommodations to 1,060,000, Moorefinally could announce that he had aconstruction program for the phasedarrival of the growing swell of groundforce units.

By April 1944 the camp constructionprogram had provided 1,296,890 ac-commodations in huts, tents, or billets.Of this figure, the British had turnedover 40 percent and constructed forAmerican use another 30 percent, leav-ing the remainder for American mili-tary construction crews. At the end ofMay 1944 the camps were 99.5 percentfinished. A heavy concentration of tentcities, all in Southern Base Section,included 123,664 permanent tent ac-commodations and 49,302 temporary.33

Essential to providing quarters wasdetermining living standards, whichdictated space requirements. At first,

33 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and ForceConstruction, pp. 115, 159, 193.


the U.S. Army accepted for its groundand air forces the respective Britishstandards. This practice made for twoscales, with the USAAF's the higher.34

The accommodations provided officersunder both standards were about thesame, but the British provided thirtysquare feet per enlisted man andseventy-five per sergeant while theAmericans provided thirty-five squarefeet per enlisted man regardless ofgrade. Taking over facilities from theBritish and making them meet U.S.Army standards usually involved reno-vations and minor alterations. In July1943 Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, ETO-USA commander, concluded that thescale of accommodations for U.S.forces could be reduced to the Britishscale or its equivalent. The chief engi-neer and chief surgeon agreed that thebest scheme was sixteen men per hut,or thirty-five square feet per noncomor enlisted man, and seventy-two squarefeet per officer. This "austerity scale"lay between the British and Americanstandards.

The Construction and QuarteringDivision, OCE, ETOUSA, had a num-ber of problems in carrying out itsassignment. Frequently, units were un-willing to accept facilities the Britishoffered, preferring newly constructedaccommodations. Occasionally the ser-vices failed to turn in complete plansfor quartering requirements, tendinginstead to submit their needs bit by bit.In addition, each time the staff of theusing service changed, revised require-ments arose, for each new section chiefhad his own ideas on the subject.35

American officers added to the confu-sion by not following prescribed chan-nels in requesting facilities.

Two varieties of billets were commonoutside the camps: furnished lodgings,which included the use of toilet facili-ties, water, and lighting; and furnishedlodgings in which the U.S. Army pro-vided beds and the British water andlights. Although a British law requiredcivilian householders to provide shel-ter for troops at a fixed rate, privatebilleting was on an entirely voluntarybasis until the end of 1943. With thefourth Key Plan billeting became sys-tematized, and some forced billetingoccurred.

Hospitals

In early 1942 the American forcesused British and Canadian hospital ser-vices and operated a few British hospi-tals themselves. Members of the BritishDirectorate of Fortifications and Works,the Ministry of Works and Planning,the U.S. Medical Department, and theEngineer Service drew up plans for newconstruction as well as for alterationsto existing buildings. To speed mattersthe engineers, the Medical Department,and the British agreed on certain stan-dard designs for new hospitals and forconverting existing facilities, subject tochanges on advice of the chief surgeon.He frequently made adjustments be-cause of location, terrain, and specialneeds.36

Hospital floors gave the engineerstrouble. Because concrete floors createdconsiderable dust, they were coveredwith pitch mastic, but the black cover-

34 Moore interv.35 Interv, Col C. J. Barker, Chf, Ground Projects,

C&Q Div, 12 May 44, Adm 122, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

36 EUCOM Engr file 600 H Gen, 1 Jul-31 Dec 43;OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, p. 192.


ing showed dust and always lookeddirty. A covering of oil and wax solvedthe problem in the wards but not in thepsychiatric and operating wings, wherestatic electricity could cause anestheticgases to explode. Finally, a cement fin-ish treated with sodium silicate was sub-stituted for pitch mastic in operatingrooms.37

All through 1943 and early 1944,hospital construction lagged consider-ably. Because arable land was at a pre-mium, the British Ministry of Agricul-ture refused to approve many sug-gested sites, and locations became lim-ited mostly to parks and estates of the"landed gentry." Inadequate transpor-tation to haul materials to the sites alsoslowed work. Since labor and materialscame through different agencies, oneor the other often was not availablewhen needed. Labor shortages held upall construction, especially for the hos-pital program.38 The lag in hospital con-struction was not too serious, for thefull capacity of hospitals would not beneeded until casualties started comingback from the Continent. On 31 May1944, just one week before the invasion,the hospital program was 94 percentcomplete.

The Manpower Shortage

Personnel became General Moore'smost abiding concern in 1943. As theyear began, only 21,601 U.S. Armyengineers were in the United Kingdom,with just 9,727 allotted to the Servicesof Supply. Many SOS engineer troops

were still in the labor pool that manneddepots supporting the North Africaninvasion. General Moore explored allavenues to solve manpower problems.Some aid came from tactical units, in-cluding USAAF organizations, and, onthe hospital program, from MedicalDepartment personnel and even conva-lescent patients. Considerable reliancealso had to be placed on British civilianlabor.39

British Labor

Civilian labor was an important as-pect of Reverse Lend-Lease. In Decem-ber 1942 British and U.S. Army offi-cials established procedures for employ-ing British civilians. Pooling theirlimited civilian labor force, the Britishallocated civilians according to priori-ties the War Cabinet set, while contractsand contractual changes were made tofit existing priorities. For ground pro-jects the order of priority was depots,camps, and hospitals.40

In April 1943 approximately half ofthe 120,000 British civilians assignedto the BOLERO program were workingon American engineer projects—30,000on air force and 28,000 on groundforce projects. Complaining that theshortage of British labor was delayingcompletion of BOLERO, engineers atSOS, ETOUSA, constantly demandedmore civilian help. The British govern-ment did what it could, but the supplywas limited; indeed, the British had tocut the civilian work force in the springand summer of 1943 to meet domesticdemands for agriculture and industry.

37 Rpt of Inspection Trip of CG, SOS, and Party toDep Chf Engr, ETOUSA, 18 Nov 43; Adm 119, EngrConstruction, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

38 Interv, Col C. J. Barker, Chf, Ground Projects,C&Q Div, 12 May 44, Adm 122.

39 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt, Sep 43 dated 15Oct 43, p. 16; Moore, Final Report, p. 247.

40 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 6, Air Force Construction,p. 21; Moore, Final Report, p." 247.


By 1 September 1943, more Americanengineers than British civilians wereworking on U.S. Army projects, andthe differential grew larger as moreAmerican engineer troops arrived inthe United Kingdom.41

The British civilian labor force wasthe product of a nation already drainedby three years of war. Consisting ofolder men and boys below draft age,the work crews were neither well trainednor effective without close supervision.They worked an average of seven hoursa day, less than troop labor. Britishhabit dictated a 28-day work month,with alternate Sundays off; frequentholidays cut into the work schedules.British workers also had many absencesdue to colds and influenza.

British insistence on semipermanentrather than temporary structures slowedthe construction program. The Minis-try of Works continued to justify moresturdy buildings since they were to beused after the war. There was an eight-month difference in the time neededto complete contracted airfield construc-tion jobs. U.S. Army engineers took13 1/2 months to construct a heavybomber base while British civilian con-tractors needed two years to finish thesame type of project with their limitedwork force and lighter equipment.42 Onthe other hand, not all American engi-

neer units coming into England livedup to expectations.

Field Force Units on Construction Jobs

Engineer combat battalions wereavailable for construction work fromlate July until 11 December 1943, whenthey were to be released for invasiontraining. By the end of July the num-ber of field force engineers on construc-tion tasks had risen to 11,233—morethan twice the number available inJune.43

Although SOS, ETOUSA, which formonths had been calling for the high-est shipping priority for its units, hadsucceeded in obtaining a very high pri-ority for engineer construction units inNovember 1943, the buildup of SOSengineer units was slow, complicatedby uncertainty over the ultimate size ofthe invasion forces and changes in thetroop basis. The shipment of serviceunits began to improve in September1943, but not enough to meet the dead-line for the release of field force engi-neers. In October engineer combat bat-talions were extended on constructionjobs until 31 January 1944. Combatgroup headquarters as well as lightequipment, maintenance, and dumptruck companies were also pressed intoservice. At the end of the year the dead-line date was extended again; someunits were assigned to constructionindefinitely. In the spring of 1944 sev-eral engineer camouflage battalionswere added to the construction force.44

41 Ltr, OCE to G-4, 27 Apr 43, 381, BOLERO,USFET Key Plan H 1942-43; Ltr, Moore to G-4, 24Apr 43, sub: Labor Requirements for U.S. Construc-tion Program, 231.4, Labor, 30 Oct 42-31 Oct 44,EUCOM Engr files.

42 Interv, Col C. J. Barker, Chf, Ground Projects,C&Q Div, 12 May 44, Adm 122; OCE ETOUSA HistRpt 6, Air Force Construction, p. 21; Ltr, OCE, EBS,to SOS ETOUSA, 5 Feb 44, sub: Project Study, 601P&Q Gen, Apr-Aug 43, EUCOM Engr files; OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service Force Con-struction, p. 87; Hist 359th Engr GS Rgt.

43 Ltr, OCE ETOUSA to the Engrs, SBS, EBS, WBS,etc., 25 Jul 43, sub: Proposed Allocation of GroundConstruction Units, 600 Gen; EUCOM Engr files;OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, p. 85.

44 Staff Conf Notes, 11 Oct 43, Adm 454, ETOUSAHist Sect; AGF Bd Rpt 162, NATOUSA.


In December 1943 five of eight non-divisional engineer combat battalions,one combat regiment, and one lightequipment company—all from the fieldforces—were still attached to SOS forconstruction. Two months later ninecombat battalions, a maintenance com-pany, and a light equipment companywere still assigned to construction tasks.In late March the numbers droppedsharply. Only a few field force engi-neers remained on construction jobs,and most ground force engineer unitsturned to training for the invasion.45

U.S. Army engineers on constructionjobs numbered 40,436 on 1 September1943; 49,000 at the end of October(28,000 on ground projects, 21,000 onair force projects); 55,027 at the end ofthe following month; and 56,000 at theclose of the year. Peak strength camein March 1944 with 61,000 engineersworking on construction projects(35,500 men on ground and 25,500 onair force jobs). At the end of May, aweek before the invasion, 13,794 engi-neers were still engaged in construc-tion.46

The effectiveness of field force, SOS,and aviation engineers on constructionjobs decreased—and motor mainte-nance increased—because units weresplit to work on widely scattered jobs.The 1323d Engineer General ServiceRegiment at one time was scattered overan area 200 miles long and 80 mileswide. Elements of the 346th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment were sepa-rated for nineteen months, assemblingas a complete unit only in April 1944.The 342d Engineer General Service

Regiment had no unit larger than a bat-talion in the same area between 12 July1942 and 31 December 1943.47

The quality of engineer units work-ing at construction jobs ranged fromvery good to marginally effective. Theabsence of planning by officers andnoncoms caused inefficiency. Someengineer units on construction jobslacked specialists in steel, brick, andelectrical work, and men had to betrained in these skills. Many officerslacked either administrative ability ortechnical knowledge.48

The shortage of officers with con-struction and engineering experiencepersisted throughout the war in almostevery type of unit. In the summer of1943 a civilian consultant from theUnited States found a greater need fortraining among officers than enlistedmen. "Civilian experience of the offi-cers," he remarked, "in many cases doesnot exist."49 General Moore felt that,considering the large number of peo-ple who had engineering education, "avery poor job was done" in getting theproper personnel into the engineers.50

Engineers at the Depots

In January 1943 ETOUSA had onlyone engineer depot company splitamong three depots to process engi-neer supplies for units in the UnitedKingdom and for TORCH organiza-

45 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 11, Feb 44, dated 15Mar 44.

46 Ibid.; 12, Mar 44; and 14, May 44.

47 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 7, Field and Service ForceConstruction, pp. 86-87; Hist 1323d Engr GS Rgt,Mar 44; Hist 342d Engr GS Rgt.

48 Operation of GS Rgts, Dec 43, Incl to Ltr, EngrSchool to Chf Engr, 28 Dec 43, OCE; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 1, Organization, Administration, and Per-sonnel, p. 46.

49 Rpt, Paul M. King, Engr Training Mission inEngland, 26 May-24 Aug 43, OCE 413.8 (ETO).

Moore interv.


tions. Three companies of an engineeraviation battalion, the 347th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment, and severalseparate engineer battalions providedtemporary help at the depots.51 As thenumber and size of depots grew, decen-tralization became necessary. In Febru-ary 1943 operational control of thedepots passed from the Supply Division,OCE, ETOUSA, to the base sections.

Depot operations improved mark-edly as the base sections assumed morecontrol over supply. By August 1943the base sections were exercising inter-nal management of all previously ex-empted depot activities and were freeof the limitations of Class II and IVsupply levels imposed on their counter-parts in the United States. The newauthority made the engineer represen-tatives in the United Kingdom base sec-tions responsible to their base sectioncommanders rather than to GeneralMoore, though he still retained limitedtechnical supervision.52

The engineers stocked their suppliesin three types of depots. (Map 13) Re-serve depots stocked an assortment ofitems, in large enough quantities foroverseas use, that were issued to unitsin the United Kingdom only when theBritish could not provide them. Keydepots stored and issued selected itemsfor specific purposes. Distributiondepots stored and issued all types ofsupplies and equipment. By 1944 twelveengineer depots, both solely engineerand engineer subdepots at generaldepots, had been set up—one in North-

ern Ireland Base Section, three in East-ern Base Section, and four each inSouthern Base Section and WesternBase Section. By 31 March 1944, thesetwelve had provided a total of17,143,914 square feet of storage space,of which 1,161,452 was covered stor-age space, 15,909,694 square feet wasopen, and 72,768 square feet was shopspace.53

The number and type of units per-forming engineer supply operationsvaried from depot to depot. The larg-est engineer section was at Newbury inSouthern Base Section. With little cov-ered storage, the section handled mainlyheavy and bulky stores. The engineersection at Ashchurch handled a varietyof heavy and bulky supplies, small parts,tools, and spare parts. Another depotheld Class IV supply, most of it re-served for Continental operations, inopen storage. This practice involvedconsiderable risk, especially in winter,since iron and steel items with ma-chined or unpainted surfaces left in theopen rusted.54

The troops at engineer depots fellinto two categories, engineer depotoperating units—companies and groupheadquarters—and quartermaster labor,referred to as "touch labor." In July1943, with only two depot companiesand two base depot companies on hand,

51 Memo, Col R. B. Lord for G-1, 22 Jan 43, 600-A-Gen (1 Jan-28 Feb 43), EUCOM Engr files; Draft,Talk on C&Q Div based on second and third KeyBOLERO Plans, 325.51, Policies & Plans, EUCOM Engrfiles.

52 Status Rpts, 30 Nov 42-3 Jul 43, 319.1, EUCOMEngr files; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 3, Supply.

53 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 5, Aug 43, and 10,Jan 44; MS, T/4 Russell M. Viets, Construction in theUnited Kingdom, Oct 44, p. 29.

54 Corresp between Quartermaster Gen and ChfEngr, ETOUSA, 8 Aug 43, 320.3, Jun 42-Jan 44,EUCOM Engr files; Ltr, Lt Col J. H. Pengilly, Chf,Engr Service, NYPOE, to Overseas Supply Officer,NYPOE, 23 Apr 44, sub: Rpt of Liaison Mission toETO, 519.1 (ETO), OCE (hereafter cited as PengillyRpt); Progress Rpt XCIX, 12 Jun 44, Statistics Sect,Sec Gen Staff, HQ, ETOUSA; Cir 18, 7 Nov 43, sub:Rust Prevention at Engr Depots, Adm 124, ETOUSAHist Sect.


the shortage of depot personnel wascritical. By mid-September the U.S.engineers were running seven depots(soon to be eight) with five depot andbase depot companies. Three of theseunits had been in the theater less thaneighty days and were of limited value—a depot company needed ninety daysof experience in the United Kingdombefore it could be expected to carry itsfull share of work. Neither officers norenlisted men had had much practicalexperience before going overseas be-cause civilians ran U.S. depots. Formany of the engineers, training in theUnited States consisted of only sixweeks in the field or on maneuvers,during which time the depot units hadonly one or two transactions to handle.Approximately 30 percent of the engi-neer supplies handled in the UnitedKingdom were of British manufacture,and their nomenclature could belearned only in the United Kingdom.55

Since only a small portion of engi-neer supplies could be manhandled, alarge number of crane operators andriggers was needed. Men with suchskills were not often available in thesmall quartermaster labor force or inthe engineer depot companies. The445th Engineer Base Depot Company,as an example, arrived in August 1943and immediately began operating theengineer section of a major depot atSudbury. The men often spent eigh-

teen to twenty hours at a stretch tryingto learn their tasks. The unit was con-stantly short of labor and equipment,especially of material-handling equip-ment, which had to be overworked andultimately broke down completely.56

The engineers employed various ex-pedients to overcome the personnelshortage. The few well-trained depotcompanies (such as the 397th) weresplit, usually three ways, and dispersedso that all engineer depots would haveat least some trained personnel. Depotsused men from dump truck, heavyequipment, and general service organi-zations, a last-ditch expedient since iden-tification of various items of engineerequipment and supplies was a difficultjob requiring alertness and training.

The number of engineers at depotsincreased slowly to 5,400 at the end ofJanuary 1944, 6,200 by the end ofFebruary, 6,500 the next month, and7,500 by the end of April. Then non-divisional engineer field units had tobe called in to help.57 The shortage ofdepot personnel, especially crane oper-ators, riggers, and trained clerical help,hindered engineer depot work allthrough 1943 and well into 1944.Trained crane operators were as scarceas cranes, and the fumbling efforts ofuntrained operators added to sparepart and repair problems.58

Equipment Maintenance

Engineers in the United Kingdom55 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 7, Oct 43; and 8,Nov 43; Ltr, Ofc CW to Dep Engr, 17 Sep 43, sub:Depot Personnel, 322, Depots, EUCOM Engr files;Rpt, 1st Lt Eugene N. Nelson, sub: Spare Parts forEngr Equip in ETO, 475, Engr Equipment, Dec42-Dec 43, EUCOM Engr files (hereafter cited asNelson Rpt); Rpt, Lt Col John H. Hassinger for theChf, Tractor and Crane Sect, OCE WD, to Gen Moore,Chf Engr, ETOUSA, sub: A Rpt of Trip to ETO, 10Oct-10 Nov 43, 319.1, Rpts (Gen), EUCOM Engrfiles.

56 Hist 445th Engr Base Depot Co.57 Nelson Rpt; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 3, Supply;

OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpts 10-14, Jan-Jun 44.58 IRS, Capt Dunbar to SD, 30 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on

G-4 Inspection, 29 Dec 43, 681, Depots General,EUCOM Engr files; OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 4,Jul 43; 7, Oct 43; and 8, Nov 43; Mins Depot Mtg, 25Oct 43, 319.1, Materiel Rpts, EUCOM Engr files.


sorely needed more third echelon main-tenance companies equipped with mo-bile shop trailers to make field repairsand replace major unit assemblies atconstruction sites, depots, or whereverthe engineers needed more extensiveequipment maintenance than they couldaccomplish with their own second eche-lon tools and parts. In his first monthlyreport to the United States in April1943 General Moore emphasized thisshortage. In May 10 percent of all engi-neer equipment was deadlined for thirdechelon maintenance repairs with anadditional 5 percent deadlined forfourth echelon repairs. Fourth and fifthechelon maintenance repair was theresponsibility of heavy shop companieswhich provided base shop facilities and,when necessary, manufactured equip-ment either at mobile heavy duty shopsor at large, centrally located fixed shops.Mobile shops provided emergency andgeneral-purpose repair and weldingservice.59

The absence of heavy shop compa-nies at some base sections placed anadditional burden on third echeloncompanies, and their efforts to under-take major repairs for which they werenot equipped often resulted in delay orunsatisfactory work. To improve mat-ters General Moore assigned specialmaintenance officers to each base sec-tion to coordinate the work of the main-tenance and heavy shop companies andthe spare parts depots. But the short-age of maintenance companies per-sisted, and at the end of November1943 there were only seven such units

in the European Theater of Operations.At that time the Supply Division, OCE,WD, felt that maintenance in the UnitedKingdom was not more than 75 per-cent adequate.60

When preventive maintenance suchas lubrication and cleaning by equip-ment operators was inadequate, themaintenance companies' work load in-creased. Often the equipment opera-tor received neither proper tools norsupervision, nor were sufficient peri-odic inspections made. Careless han-dling of equipment by inexperiencedoperators added to the problem. Fre-quently, equipment was turned into theengineer maintenance companies forthird and higher echelon repair in a"partially dismantled condition," shortmany parts.61

Spare Parts

Obtaining first echelon spare partssuch as spark plugs, fan belts, bolts,nuts, cotter pins, and lock washers andsecond echelon carburetors, fuel oil andwater pumps, distributors, gaskets, andvarious clutch, brake, and chassis partswas a constant problem, partly becauseof poor procurement procedures—toofew short-lived parts and too manylong-lived ones. The engineers' prob-lem was aggravated by the large num-ber of nonstandard pieces of equip-

59 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt, Apr 43; MS, Eche-lon System of Engr Maintenance; Plan for SOSETOUSA, vol. II, Supply, Installations, Transporta-tion, Maintenance, 1 Jan 44, Adm 375, ETOUSA HistSect.

60 Ltr, Moore to Chf of Adm, 30 Nov 43, app. 15 toOCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 1, Organization, Administra-tion, and Personnel; Ltr, OCE ETOUSA to SBS, WBS,and EBS Engrs, 15 May 43, sub: Maintenance of EngrEquipment, 475, Engr Equipment, Dec 42—Dec 43,EUCOM Engr files; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, TheCorps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, p. 571.

61 Ltr, Chf Engr, SOS ETOUSA, to CG, CBS et al., 2Feb 44, sub: Maintenance of Engr Equipment, EngrMaint Co, 1942-43, EUCOM Engr files; Staff ConfNotes, 12 Apr 43, Adm 455, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


ment—British-made or U.S. items madeto British specifications—for whichparts were often unavailable.62

The first engineer spare parts depotbegan operating at Ashchurch in thespring of 1943. In June the first of thespecialized spare parts companies toarrive in the theater, the 752d Engi-neer Parts Supply Company, took overthe depot. Several similar companiesarrived from the United States duringthe summer and fall, enabling the the-ater engineer to set up spare parts sub-depots at Conington, Sudbury, andHiston and to establish an effective dailycourier system between the subdepotsand the general depot at Ashchurch.63

The spare parts companies did excel-lent work, constructing most of theirown bins and, despite the handicap

imposed by a lack of training and prop-er equipment, reducing substantiallythe large backlog. In conjunction withthe engineer heavy shop companies, theparts supply units salvaged or reclaimedmany parts that might otherwise havebeen lost. In early 1944, as the daysgrew longer, the companies worked twoand even three shifts. Despite theseefforts the shortage of spare parts, par-ticularly such vital items as cranes, con-tinued to be a serious concern to engi-neer planners as preparations acceler-ated for the invasion of Europe.64

The Continent assumed an ever-larger share of the attention of theAllied and theater planning staffs inEngland in the latter part of 1943.Across the Channel lay a host of engi-neering problems associated with theprojected invasion of German-occupiedterritory and the maintenance of armiesthere for the final phases of the war.

62 MS, Echelon System of Engr Maintenance; Ltr,Moore to CG, NYPOE, 24 Apr 44, sub: ExpeditiousShipment of Spare Parts for Engr Equipment, ETO400, OCE; Hist 482d Engr Maint Co.

63 Hists, 491 st Engr Equip Co and 752d, 751 st, 756thEngr Parts Supply Cos; Memo for Capt Austen, 16Nov 43, file J.A.T. S-Miscel.

64 Hist 756th Engr Parts Supply Co; Wkly Rpts, Sup-ply Div, OCE ETOUSA, 12 May 43 and 24 Aug 43;Pengilly Rpt.

CHAPTER XIII

Looking Ahead to the Continent

Detailed engineer planning for aContinental invasion continued in 1943with the addition of a forecasting tech-nique imposed upon theater plannersby ASF headquarters in Washington.To involve theater staffs around theworld in procurement planning formajor operations Army Service Forceshad devised a system of so-called opera-tional or keyed projects. Theater plan-ners were to compile lists of Class IVand Class II items (in excess of regularTOE and TBA allotments) and to keythe requested items to specific and fore-seeable tasks such as the reconstructionof an individual port.

On 4 June 1943, the War Depart-ment directed ETOUSA to begin study-ing what equipment would be neededfor an invasion of the Continent. Thesestudies were known in England as Pro-jects for Continental Operations, orPROCO. Their objective was to allowASF ample time to procure from Ameri-can industry major items of machineryand specialized equipment and havethem on hand in the New York Port ofEmbarkation for shipping as theaterusers requested them. The forecastingsystem required detailed informationon numbers of items needed, intendeduse, tonnage estimates, and operationaljustification. Not intended as requisi-tions in themselves, the project require-ment statements went directly to the

War Department for action. ThePROCO system produced some suc-cesses but in many ways ran afoul ofrealities and practices in the theater.1

Engineer PROCO Projects

Engineer PROCO studies began withsome confusion. When the technicalservices involved in PROCO planningbegan their work, formal Allied agree-ment to the OVERLORD concept was stillthree months away. Upon receivingword of the War Department's require-ments, General Moore protested thathe needed basic data on eight separateaspects of the forthcoming operationin order to proceed with operational orkeyed planning. Specifically, his engi-neer staff needed to know the maxi-mum size of the assault force, the ap-proximate size of forces expected tobe employed on the Continent on Dplus 90, maximum forces to be employedin active operations, the number of linesof communications, the number of portsto be built or rebuilt, the number ofairfields required in each calendar quar-ter through the end of 1944, the state

1 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, VolumeI, pp. 260-68; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logisticsand Strategy, 1943-45, pp. 129-30, 166-68; AnnualReport of the Army Service Forces for the Fiscal Year 1944(Washington, 1944), pp. 11-12.


of repair of facilities in France, and anevaluation of areas to be occupied onthe Continent as of the end of 1944.While American engineer members ofCOSSAC gathered some of the data,General Lee provided the basis of engi-neer supply planning for the majorityof PROCO projects on 24 June.2

In a letter of instruction to his subor-dinate SOS elements Lee listed theobjectives for what he described as aROUNDUP-type operation. Americanforces ashore in France by D plus 30would number 480,000; 985,000 wereexpected by D plus 90. To support thisstrength, two one hundred-mile-longlines of communications were to beoperating by D plus 90, and by D plus240, or the end of 1944, the lines wereexpected to be two hundred miles long.On D plus 90 two additional lines ofcommunications were to open to receivesupplies shipped directly from the Unit-ed States to the European mainland.The overall plan called for four majorand eight minor ports to be fully opera-tional by D plus 240. On these assump-tions the engineers worked all summer,with each division of the theater en-gineer's office responsible for its as-signed portion of the thirty categoriesof engineer functions represented inthe PROCO statements. They divideddelivery schedules according to theplanning timetable General Lee haddescribed, earmarking materiel for ship-ment in the first ninety days after theinvasion or for D plus 91 to D plus 240.With D-day later set tentatively for 1May 1944, the engineers wanted to have75 percent of the equipment and sup-ply for the first ninety-day phase onhand in the United Kingdom by 1 Janu-

ary 1944. Materiel for the second peri-od was to be in the theater ninety daysbefore it was needed. By late September,they had sent to Washington twenty-eight studies with tonnage estimatestotaling 1,136,713 long tons.3

Differing views on the purpose ofPROCO and on the proper content ofPROCO studies also fueled lively corre-spondence between the theater and theWar Department through the summer.In late June 1943 General Lee assertedthat requisitions for the material listedin the theater PROCO studies wouldbe appended to those studies. Thoughthis was not the original scheme for thekeyed projects, the War Departmentacquiesced in the procedure on 25 July.In September the War Departmentcomplained about the content of someof the submitted studies, citing espe-cially quartermaster PROCO submis-sions for medals and decorations, bread-sacks, and standard two-inch plugs forgasoline cans. The engineers' submis-sions conformed to the letter and thespirit of the ASF program, but engi-neer planners often neglected to iden-tify those items that could be procuredin England through reverse lend-lease.Though these items were to be in-cluded in the studies, the PROCO pro-cedures called for flagging them withasterisks in the material lists. Oncethe British had supplied the items, thetheater would notify the War Depart-ment to cancel them in the PROCOstudies.4

In Washington, engineer PROCOprojects followed a tortuous path. From

OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 3, Supply, p. 29.

3 Ltr, CG, SOS, 24 Jun 43, sub: Projects for a Conti-nental Operation, as cited in Ibid., p. 31.

4 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 3, Supply, app. 21, PROCOProcedures; ETO Gen Bd Rpt 128, Logistical Build-upin the British Isles, p. 20.

LOOKING AHEAD TO THE CONTINENT 279

the War Department adjutant generalthey went to the director of plans andoperations, ASF, who was responsiblefor control until the projects were ap-proved. The director of plans, ASF,sent the studies to the Logistics Group,Operations Division, War DepartmentGeneral Staff, which determined wheth-er the projects were necessary. Thedirector of plans, ASF, next forwardedthe studies to OCE, WD. OCE decidedwhether each project was necessary andadequate, from both technical and tacti-cal standpoints. OCE then edited thebill of materials based on availabilityand corrected all nomenclature and cat-alogue numbers. The director of plans,ASF, then sent the projects to the direc-tor of the Requirements Division, ASF,who determined whether the require-ments fitted into worldwide plans foreach item or whether the Army SupplyProgram would have to be changed.The projects again went through thedirector of plans, ASF, to the LogisticsBranch, OPD, for approval and finallyto G-4, War Department General Staff,for concurrence. The approved pro-jects then became the basis upon whichthe engineers in the United Kingdomrequisitioned Class IV items from theUnited States.5

Confusion existed for a time at theNew York Port of Embarkation becauseETOUSA included in PROCO tonnagefigures all of the Class IV operationalneeds estimated before PROCO began.NYPOE, on the other hand, had ac-counted only for tonnages submittedas PROCO projects. Wide discrepan-cies in the records of shipments ASF,

NYPOE, and ETOUSA maintained ad-ded to the confusion. For example, ASFfigures included items released for ship-ment to the United Kingdom. ASF con-sidered them delivered, but these fig-ures were meaningless to the engineersin the United Kingdom because sometime elapsed between the date itemswere released in the United States andtheir arrival in theater. As late as March1944 the OCE Supply Division esti-mated that 120 days were required fordelivery of supplies from the UnitedStates after requisitions had been placed,assuming the supplies were actuallyavailable in U.S. Army depots. There-fore the division felt it was necessary toprovide the United States with estimatesof Class IV supplies required for thenext fifteen months.6

By the end of April 1944, shipmentsof engineer supplies from the UnitedStates, particularly materials requestedunder PROCO, were seriously behindschedule—a backlog of 320,278 longtons existed. The situation improvedonly somewhat during May, with246,521 long tons still overdue. Mean-while, engineer projects had been placedin a common pool with all others. Sup-plies and equipment were issued basedon established priorities to organiza-tions having approved projects whetheror not the specific supplies had arrived.Along with other services and com-mands the engineers were given a creditand a priority on the central pool basedon their project submissions or theirproject supply allocation. This system

5 Rpt, Maj John A. Thetford to CE, 20 Dec 43, sub:Rpt on Trip to United States, 333, Inspections, EUCOMEngr files; Ltr, Francis H. Oxx to Engr, Third Army,28 Mar 44, sub: Engr Supply, file 381 PROCO.

6 Ltr, Lt Col J. H. Pengilly, Chf, Engr Service,NYPOE, to Overseas Supply Ofc, NYPOE, 23 Apr44, sub: Rpt of Liaison Mission to ETO, file 519.1(ETO), OCE; Ltr, Oxx to Engr, First Army et al., 12Mar 44, sub: Time Factor in Engr Supply, 381 Supply,EUCOM Engr files.


BULLDOZERS AT THE ENGINEER DEPOT AT THATCHAM BEFORE THE INVASION

enabled using units to check equipmentissued in the United Kingdom for com-pleteness and workability before theydeparted for the Continent.7

Planning for Construction on the Continent

When PROCO projects began theETOUSA engineers were already wellaware of the problems involved in esti-mating materials and troop labor thatwould be needed for heavy construc-tion on the Continent. Such activitiesnormally fell into seven broad cate-gories: ports, railways, roads, pipelines,inland waterways, utility systems, and

general construction such as hospitals,shops, depots, and troop housing.8

Lacking firm plans for specific opera-tions, engineer planners at COSSACdrew up a comprehensive list of all theengineer Class IV supplies that wouldbe needed for a large overseas operation.The planners considered every activitythat would need engineer Class IVitems and set up units of supply corre-sponding to each activity. The set of stafftables they developed could be used tocompute supplies for regular engineeroperations and for the PROCO studies.The tables also proved useful to plan-

8 Lt. Col. S. A. Potter, "Engineer Construction Plan-ning for Operation OVERLORD," Military Review, XXX(December 1950), 3. Unless otherwise noted, this sec-tion on construction is based on this source.

7 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 13, Apr 44, and 14,May 44; Pengilly Rpt.


ENGINEER CRANE STACKS LUMBER AT THATCHAM, APRIL 1944

ners of other services who wanted quickestimates of engineer work. The esti-mates varied greatly in kind—fromrequirements for a mile of railroadtrack to complete details for buildingand equipping a 1,000-bed hospital.

Even after more definite informationon OVERLORD became available in July1943, engineer planners were ham-pered—more than the other services—because the demand for the utmostsecrecy deprived them of informationon specific terrain. At the insistence ofthe chief engineer security was relaxed,and the details of OVERLORD wererevealed in the late summer of 1943.Theoretically, planners could then studythe specific ports, rail lines, and high-ways involved, but the need for long-

range procurement action and for timeto activate and train engineer unitsmade only changing estimates possible.

Ports that could serve the Allied in-vaders came under close scrutiny in aseries of PROCO studies. Prompted bythe belief, later confirmed at Naples,that the Germans would destroy anysuitable harbors to thwart Allied effortsto seize them, the engineers tried toforecast the reconstruction job expectedin each port covered in PROCO plan-ning. They continued the work of aport committee established early in1943 under a British officer to chartthe capacities of ports from the Nether-lands to the Spanish border. Eventu-ally planners included for considerationonly eighteen ports in the Brittany and


Normandy peninsulas. On 12 August1943, the ASF received an exhaustivePROCO study covering Class II andClass IV construction material and spe-cial equipment deemed necessary toreopen Cherbourg, an important objec-tive in the final OVERLORD plan.9

When planning for specific portsproved virtually impossible withoutknowledge of port conditions and facili-ties, the engineers turned to more gen-eralized methods of construction plan-ning. They first correlated the planningdemands to a fixed length of quay.Then, taking the OVERLORD phasedtonnage requirements for the invasion,they tied the phased capacity to the fig-ures they had derived for the fixed pierlength. One ton of cargo per linear footof pier per day became the standardengineer planning yardstick for portreconstruction. These data were com-bined with others to produce masterlists and general requirements requisi-tions for the Continent.

French harbors had silted up duringthe enforced inactivity under Germanoccupation, and it would take exten-sive dredging to clear them for the sortof supply operations envisioned in theinvasion plan. The Germans were alsolikely to sink blockships and other obsta-cles in the harbor channels and along-side berthing areas. The engineers tookinto account the amounts of explosivesor specialized equipment needed toremove the blockages. They also re-quested specially designed shallow-draftport repair ships, to remain underArmy control, that would provide float-ing machine shops to maintain construc-tion equipment in use or to make re-

placement parts for damaged lock gatesand power plants.

The engineers attempted to developstandard repair methods and bills ofmaterials for the lines of communica-tions and supply leading out of the portareas. They tabulated the labor andmaterial needed to repair a mile of rail-road track or of oil or gasoline pipelineand to provide 1,000 square feet ofgeneral-purpose shop or depot space.There were some forty-one contingencyplans for dealing with unpredictableChannel tides and weather, which couldmake repairs necessary under otherthan normal water levels.

Realizing that ports would not beavailable for at least ninety days afterthe invasion, COSSAC allocated author-ity for beach operations among theNavy, the Army's Transportation Corps,and the Corps of Engineers, which car-ried the heaviest load. At this stage themain problem in planning beach sup-ply operations was selection. Beacheshad to be wide and sheltered from highwinds and heavy surf. Terrain andbeach outlets were of prime importancein the early days of the invasion, andthe engineers tried to locate supplybeaches near ports that would serve assupply arteries once beach operationsclosed down. Plans also included opti-mum sites for beach air strip construc-tion, for inland movement and com-munication, for protection by Allied airpower, and for limited enemy opposi-tion.

Annual Report of the ASF, 1944, p. 12.

Lines of Communications

Influenced by the widespread railand road demolition they had met inItaly, ETOUSA engineer planners atfirst estimated that destruction of traf-


fic nets on the Continent would reach75 percent. Since such an estimate calledfor staggering tonnages of railroadequipment, it was cut to 25 percent formain line tracks and to 35 to 50 per-cent for yards and sidings. U.S. Armyengineer and British planners providedthe following revised estimates of ex-pected damage: railroads in the portarea, 75 percent; railroads up to thirtymiles inland, 50 percent; those beyondthat distance, 25 percent. Railway brid-ges in ports and up to thirty miles awaywould be damaged 100 percent; thosebeyond, 50 percent. In fact, the engi-neers overestimated the amount of newrail and wooden ties that would beneeded in northern France. Thoughthe destruction in major centers wassevere, the trackage in open country-side escaped extensive damage, oftenmore affected by Allied air attacks thanenemy action, and cancellation ordersstopped much of the continued move-ment of rails to Europe later in the year.

Thousands of aerial photographshelped engineer planners estimate theamount of railroad bridging that wouldbe required on the Continent. Theengineers studied track maintenance,railroad grades, the number and lengthof sidetracks needed, the carrying capac-ity of various lines, bridge capacities,water and commercial facilities, andavailable materials.10

The engineers' chief concern in road

planning lay with maintenance ratherthan new construction. They generallyconfined estimates to maintenance ofone mile of various types of roads forone month. By studying typical roadnetsin other theaters, planners could obtainan average road density per square mileof territory occupied, and by comput-ing the total area under occupationfrom the phase lines marked out forOVERLORD, they could calculate totalroad mileage during successive periods.The engineers doubted that the Ger-mans would systematically destroy roadsurfaces. In the Mediterranean the Ger-mans had limited deliberate destructionto roads in difficult terrain where repairswould constitute a major problem, andlittle such terrain existed in northernFrance.11

Tactical and highway bridging occu-pied much of the planners' attention.A tactical bridge policy developed inETOUSA in April 1943 remained thebasis for planning, though it changedwith tactical planning. The engineerscomputed their requirements for high-way bridges by using aerial photographs,expecting to use standard 35-ton capac-ity steel treadway to bridge the thirty-to sixty-foot gaps anticipated on theContinent. In the theater, the engineersused Bailey bridging for everythingfrom tactical floating spans to lines ofcommunications bridges for army anddivision use. But ongoing theater plan-ning coincided with a search for newmodels of tactical bridging in the UnitedStates necessitated by new, wider replace-ments for the M-4 Sherman tank andby Army Ground Forces demands on

10 Engr Planning Data for Operations in NorthwestEurope, Railway Reconstruction, Mar 44, OCE; Rptof Communications Sect. "Railroad and POL Projects—Channel Base," Estimates for Railroad Reconstruction,C&Q Div, OCE, Mar 44: Daily Jnl, ETOUSA G-4Opns, 3 Apr 44, Adm 475, ETOUSA Hist Sect; OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 12, Railroad Reconstruction andBridging (United Kingdom), 1946, Liaison Sect, IntelDiv, ETOUSA Adm file 547.

11 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 14, Road Maintenanceand Highway Bridging (United Kingdom), 1946, p.17, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547.


the Engineer Board for a complete revi-sion in floating bridge equipage. Test-ing of new prototypes and of new Bai-ley bridging applications continued intoearly 1944. Thus, as late as January1944, many engineers in the UnitedStates were still considering the Baileystrictly as a line of communicationsbridge while engineers in the ETO,remembering the Italian campaign,favored its use in any tactical situationto which it could be adapted.12

Initial estimates on the consumptionof gasoline in the ETO were indefinite;only late in the planning stage wereengineer planners able to make fairlyaccurate calculations. Except for bulkstorage installations, which were usu-ally in the vicinity of ports, existing POLfacilities generally lay underground andwere not well suited to military needs.Pipelines had to be laid along existingroads to minimize the problems of trans-porting and distributing constructionmaterials. The terrain along selectedroutes was an important factor, for ithad a direct bearing on the numberand spacing of pumping stations. Thetactical plan and the location of largesupply depots generally would deter-mine both the location and capacity ofbulk storage installations. Thus, withevery major change in the tactical plan(or with any other material change inplans) a new pipeline distribution sys-tem had to be designed.

Ship-to-shore pipelines also posed adifficult problem. Assurance was neededthat pipeline distribution of liquid fuelscould be undertaken before a port was

available. A method had to be devisedto permit tankers anchored one-half toone mile off the beaches to dischargetheir contents directly into a shore-based distribution system. After experi-menting, American and British forcesadopted a simple British solution. Asmall vessel with powerful winches suchas a submarine-net tender could pullsuccessive lengths of rigid pipe seawardfrom a beach. A flexible buoyed hoseattached to the seaward end of the pipewould permit direct discharge of tank-ers into the system.13

The engineers could not estimate inadvance requirements for the recon-struction of the inland waterways ofnortheast France and Belgium, whichthe Germans were using extensively, forthere was no standardization in theirdimensions or in their equipment. Manywere the product of centuries of devel-opment of internal communications.Except for lock structures, reconstruc-tion would be largely an earthmovingjob requiring the type of equipmentorganic to engineer construction units.The repair of locks and lockgates, theengineers believed, could be accom-plished by improvisation using localmaterials.14

The major problem the engineersfaced with utilities systems on the Con-tinent was determining civilian needs—military requirements were to be metby self-contained utilities provided forall new camps and hospitals. Plannersgathered population statistics and percapita figures on water consumptionand electric power. They established

12 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 490-97; Dossier of TacticalBridging, 18 Jan 44, Supply G-4 Directives; Rpt onObservations Made During Visit to the ETO, 16Jun-17 Sep 43.

13 "Railroad and POL Projects—Channel Base," inbooklet, Estimates for Railroad Reconstruction, C&Q Div,OCE, Mar 44.

14 OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 12, Mar 44, and 13,Apr 44.


minimum standards for civilian use andstudied existing utilities systems andanticipated damage.

In the end the engineers regardedthe PROCO system as problematic,either as a means for estimating neces-sary theater stocks accurately or as asupply system. Though PROCO stud-ies were an obvious method of drawingup broad estimates and planning re-quirements for construction on theContinent, there was no possibility ofpinpointing engineer requirementsunder PROCO or any other system.While their objectives were still in enemyhands the engineers could only guessat the type and amount of materialsthey would need. They also had a prob-lem in estimating the requirements ofmajor field commands that had not yetarrived in England. First Army head-quarters came only in October 1943,and the engineer planners had to calcu-late the field army's necessities anew.Nor did PROCO reduce the time it tookfor material to move through the sup-ply pipeline to the theater. In the opin-ion of the theater engineer, the pro-jects "proved to be a poor device forobtaining supply action."15

Responsibility for Civilian Labor

By early 1944 theater planners hadtentative outlines for tapping the wealthof civilian labor on the Continent.SHAEF established a Combined Mili-tary Procurement Control as an execu-

tive agent for General Eisenhower inmatters of local supply procurementand civilian hiring for both British andAmerican forces. Overall Americantheater-level planning for employingcivilians abroad was the job of the the-ater general purchasing agent, whodelegated his authority among variouslevels of the projected CommunicationsZone command that General Lee wouldhead on the Continent. On 19 April1944, Lee formally gave responsibilityfor managing the procurement of civil-ian labor in the field to the engineerssince they would be the first to needworkers for beach dumps, ports, stor-age areas, and roadnets. Maj. Gen. CecilR. Moore's staff had no plans for thiseventuality, few qualified officers orenlisted men to run a personnel clearing-house, and no understanding of theproblems of pay levels, housing, andwelfare of civilian workers. Despiterepeated effort to get engineer officerswho could handle the job, the civilianlabor responsibility fell to the theaterengineer's administrative division. Ac-tually, the engineer-spawned CivilianLabor Procurement Service had as-signed members of other technical ser-vices who could screen prospective em-ployees for specialized work. The gen-eral purchasing agent, privy to thehighest counsels of the Allied commandon the subject of civilian workers in theCombined Military Procurement Con-trol, coordinated activities from the the-ater command level. SHAEF retainedthe final say in matters of pay and setwage tables keyed to prewar salary lev-els in given geographic areas.1615 Ltr, Col J. S. Seybold, Chf, Supply Div, OCE

ETOUSA, to Overseas Supply Div, NYPOE, 5 Jul 44,sub: Req PROCO Projects, file 381 PROCO; Memo,J.R.H. [Col John R. Hardin] for Chf, Opns, OCE, 20Sep 43, sub: Questions of Policy Affecting EngrPlanning, Key BOLERO Plans folder; Moore, FinalReport, p. 49.

16 Henry G. Elliott, The Administrative and LogisticalHistory of the European Theater of Operations, vol.X, "Local Procurement of Labor and Supplies, UnitedKingdom and Continental," pp. 74-80, in CMH.


The engineers set broad classifica-tions to delineate conditions of employ-ment and skill levels for workers. Twogeneral categories aligned prospectiveemployees by their willingness to workin mobile or static detachments. Staticlaborers usually worked in a singlelocation, lived nearby, and were respon-sible for their own quarters and food.Mobile workers, who received their sus-tenance and housing from the Alliedcommand employing them, usually per-formed as part of a transient labor com-pany organized on military lines. Bothstatic and mobile workers served undercontract and were considered unskilleduntil they proved otherwise. Their wageswould then change accordingly.

The foundation for regional andlocal management of labor offices alsocame into being before the invasion.Each base section was to have a pro-curement office, and in each Frenchregion there would be a representativein a centrally located major city. Thefirst organization was scheduled for theimmediate invasion area, and planscalled for offices in Ste. Mere-Eglise,Longueville, Carentan, Bricquebec,Cherbourg, Isigny, and UTAH Beach.17

Refinements in Overlord's Operation

Tactical command for the invasionconsisted of a three-phased allotmentof responsibilities to the higher head-quarters arriving in Normandy to con-trol the incoming combat and supportunits. In the assault phase, the U.S. FirstArmy and the British Second Armyoperated separately to consolidate thebeaches under the remote command ofthe British 21 Army Group. Phase II

would begin when 21 Army Groupcame ashore and assumed tactical con-trol of both field armies. Until the sec-ond stage was concluded First Armyand all the incoming service troopsattached to it were under 21 ArmyGroup control. The last invasion phaseforesaw the introduction of anotherAmerican field army, the Third, andof the American 1st Army Group head-quarters. General Sir Bernard L. Mont-gomery, commanding the 21 ArmyGroup, was responsible for SHAEFtactical planning, but he relied heavilyon American contributions to the NEP-TUNE plan which referred to actualoperations under the OVERLORD inva-sion plan. Though the 1st Army Groupheadquarters was involved in this pro-cess, Montgomery also delegated theplanning for the actual assaults to theFirst Army staff.18

Detailed planning for supply and forrehabilitation of Continental ports andrail and roadnets fell to two new organi-zational echelons established to smooththe transfer of supply and administra-tive functions across the English Chan-nel. Fifth Army in Italy had briefly butsuccessfully experimented with an ad-vance supply section at Naples to elimi-nate the long and uncontrollable sup-ply lines that had become necessary inNorth Africa. In December 1943COSSAC established a similar sectionto relieve First Army of supply respon-sibilities immediately behind its area ofoperations in the first days of the in-vasion. Formally in existence after 7February 1944, Headquarters, AdvanceSection, or ADSEC, was under the com-

17 Ibid., p. 87.

18 First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October1943-1 August 1944, p. 25; 12th Army Group, Reportof Operations, vol. XII, p. 51.


mand of Col. Ewart G. Plank, an engi-neer officer who had commanded East-ern Base Section. The ADSEC engineerwas Col. Emerson C. Itschner. The sec-tion was to remain attached to FirstArmy in the American chain of com-mand and be responsible for supplyinstallations behind it until the arrivalon the Continent of a second, highercommand, Forward Echelon, Commu-nications Zone. Forward Echelon, alsoin existence under ETOUSA since 7February, was formally established bySHAEF directive two days later. De-signed as an extension of General Lee'sSOS organization and equipped to runthe communications zone in Franceuntil the entire SOS moved across theChannel, the command, known asFECOMZ, would become ADSEC's par-ent as soon as General Bradley drew arear boundary for First Army. Planningproceeded under Col. Frank M. Al-brecht, General Moore's former plansofficer, as chief of staff. On 14 March1944, Brig. Gen. Harry B. Vaughan,former commander of Western BaseSection, took over FECOMZ.19

First Army was to estimate the ton-nage and supply needs from D-day toD plus 15 (Phase I) for all U.S. forces,including air and naval forces in theassault, and have ETOUSA fill therequisitions. In Phase II, D plus 16 toD plus 40, 1st U.S. Army Group was tocompile the required tonnage figuresbut would have ETOUSA fill the re-quirements through ADSEC. FECOMZwas to arrange for the buildup to COMZand to introduce base sections at the

same time that 1st Army Group wasstrengthening the combat zone withadditional armies. Between D plus 41and D plus 90 (Phase III), 1st ArmyGroup would continue to assemble theoverall tonnage requirements, but theywould be implemented throughFECOMZ, which would assume activecontrol when a second base sectionarrived on the Continent and ADSECmoved forward with the armies. Notuntil D plus 90 was COMZ to reach theContinent and take over from FECOMZ.

Whereas First Army issued its plansin February 1944, the FECOMZ planwas not complete until 30 April 1944.The detail involved in some aspects ofthe planning was enormous, and theADSEC engineer plan literally out-weighed that of all the other technicalservices combined. Two thick volumesof data on the Normandy ports includedan analysis of each port's facilities, aschedule of reconstruction, and a cata-logue of equipment and materials re-quired.

Planning for post-OVERLORD opera-tions (D plus 90 to D plus 120) forcedMoore, along with other technical ser-vice chiefs, to furnish an estimate—bymonth and class—of the tonnages hewould need for the entire period fromD plus 90 to D plus 360. Planning forthis period continued under the PROCOsystem according to ETOUSA SOSSeries H directives. Two directives be-fore D-day established progressive phaselines and troop counts to D plus 360and required engineer statements onwhich material was to be stored in theUnited Kingdom and which would godirectly to the Continent.

A British officer, Maj. Gen. H. B. W.Hughes, headed the SHAEF engineerdivision, but he had an American dep-

19 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 204-13; ETO Gen Bd Rpt 127, Organiza-tion and Functions of the Communications Zone, ch.4, pp. 32-38.


uty, Brig. Gen. Beverly C. Dunn, andthe four branches under Hughes werealso headed by Americans. The divi-sion's chief task was to coordinate thework of the army group engineers andto provide terrain and engineer intelli-gence studies; recommendations onnew techniques, equipment, and tactics;and engineer estimates of the situation.Perhaps the most important feature ofthis high-level assistance was anticipat-ing what engineer supplies the armygroups would need and helping toobtain them from Allied supply or-ganizations.20

Joint Stockpiling With the British

Because OVERLORD was an Alliedundertaking, a system of combined sup-ply or joint stockage was desirable toprevent overprocurement of inter-changeable items; to ensure sufficientsupply where procurement was diffi-cult and it was unclear which forcewould employ the item; and to provideitems that would, in fact, serve Britishand American forces simultaneously.Joint stockpile items included Baileybridges and railroad and port construc-tion equipment. Some parts of suchitems were manufactured in the UnitedKingdom, others in the United States.The British were responsible for pro-curement of some items, turning overto American forces their share; othersthe Americans procured and dividedwith the British.

Planning for the joint stockpiling ofrailroad items began in the summer of1942 when the Transportation, Plant,and Personnel (TPP) Section of SOS,ETOUSA, was formed with both U.S.and British members under a centralplanning staff. This group included arepresentative from the Corps of En-gineers. At the time railway planningstarted no standard U.S. military rail-road bridge had been developed, andit became necessary to adopt those theBritish had. Since the British were un-able to produce enough bridges forboth armies, the TPP Section arrangedfor production of the same types in theUnited States and ensured that theywere interchangable with those manu-factured in Britain. Later agreementsprovided that stockpiles would be di-vided equally between American andBritish forces and that any reallocationwould be the responsibility of an Alliedheadquarters.22

During the summer of 1943 the Brit-ish repeatedly tried to broaden the basefor joint stock items, which had beenlimited to items for joint use or for pro-vision of a joint service. U.S. engineersobjected strenuously to these effortsand, after long discussion, won theirpoint. The British had argued that mostengineer requirements should be calcu-lated jointly and the supplies handledin joint stockpile. Some British agen-cies even proposed that they handleprocurement of all such items, whetherthey came from the United States orthe United Kingdom. These proposalswere hardly advantageous to the U.S.

20 Rpts, Feb-Jun 44 in file Weekly Rpts, CE, SHAEF,Dec 43-Dec 45.

21 History of the Office of the General PurchasingAgent, May 42-Oct 45, pp. 57-59, Adm 556,ETOUSA Hist Sect; Ltr, Oxx to the Engr, ETOUSA,10 Dec 43, sub: Procedure for Supply and Allocationof Joint U.S.-British Requirements for Operation in

Western Europe, 381, Planning Northwest Europe1944-45, EUCOM Engr files.

22 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 12, Railroad Reconstruc-tion and Bridging.


Army, for if pooling American andBritish resources meant absorbing Am-erican personnel into British operations,American engineers would be deprivedof much-needed experience in doingtheir job independently according totheir own procedures.23

With the establishment of COSSAC,joint policies and procedures were de-fined. A COSSAC circular issued on 25June 1943 required written provisionsfor joint stockpiles and COSSAC ap-proval for talks between American andBritish counterparts. SOS, ETOUSA,further clarified the issues in August,September, and November 1943. Alliedcommands could jointly stockpile itemsonly if definite economies would resultduring the period when forces on theContinent would be supplied princi-pally from the United Kingdom. Later,American policy required that, exceptfor agreements already made, jointstockpiling with the British would bediscontinued; no further agreementswere to be made after 21 November1943. This decision came almost simulta-neously with a PROCO pronouncementcalling for firm plans for PROCO sup-plies for the first 240 days after theinvasion. Since the PROCO items werein addition to the U.S. share of jointrequirements, the Americans had toorder them independently.24

Training

Most engineer units arriving in the

theater in 1943 and early 1944 neededconsiderable training. Camouflage unitsarriving in the United Kingdom wereunfamiliar with the most importantequipment they were to use on theContinent. General service regimentsneeded to learn about mines and boobytraps and the uses of Bailey bridges.Engineer combat battalions lacked train-ing in recording minefields and repair-ing roads. Drivers and mechanics ofdump truck companies had trainedwith non-TOE vehicles. Port construc-tion and repair units had trained in theUnited States with different types ofequipment than those they received inthe United Kingdom. The one notableexception was the topographic organi-zations, which arrived well trained fortheir work on the Continent.25

Training SOS engineers in the UnitedKingdom was the responsibility ofTroops Division, OCE, ETOUSA, whichhad a London branch planning forfuture operations and a Cheltenhambranch providing training aids to SOStroops and supervising SOS engineerschools. The base section supervisedtraining. Theoretically one hour a dayor one day a week was given over totraining for future operations, but con-struction priorities often made it impos-sible to follow any training schedule.Troops might be working on day andnight shifts, or bad weather would inter-vene and training would have to becanceled. In any case, the alloted onehour a day was of little use, for it oftentook that long to reach a training area.

23 Ltr, CE, ETO, to CofEngrs, Washington, D.C., 2Jul 43, sub: Engr Supply in ETO, 400, GeneralSupplies, EUCOM Engr files.

24 History of the Office of GPA, p. 57; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 12, Railroad Reconstruction and Bridging,p. 8; Memo, OCE for Chf, Opns, 17 Sep 43, 400, ColHardin—Supplies and Equipment Procurement of1943-44, EUCOM Engr files.

25 1st Ind to Ltr, Brig Gen L. D. Wersham, 26 May44, Construction Div files, OCE; Moore interv; AGFBd Rpt 599, Training, 1 Feb 45. For training prob-lems in the United States, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal,The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, pp.241-59.


MODELS OF BELGIAN GATES, patterned after German obstacles on Normandy beaches.

Limiting the training time to an houralso meant that a subject had to treatedcompletely in that time, for it oftenproved impossible to continue a sub-ject during the next training period.When longer lapses occurred betweensessions, men forgot subject matter andcontinuity was destroyed. (Map 14)26

In March 1944 when extensive train-ing opportunities became possible,Troops Division, OCE, ETOUSA, sug-

gested one to two months for manyunits. Full-time training was frequentlymore arduous than construction work.Often the day's schedule was extendedfrom 10 hours to 12—15 hours so thatthe troops could practice techniquesused in night operations. Considerabletime also had to be devoted to basicsubjects that had been forgotten or onlyinfrequently put to use.27

Virtually every type of military sub-ject was available. The American sec-tion of the British School of MilitaryEngineering included courses in mines,booby traps, demolitions, Bailey

26 Albrecht interv, Adm 122, ETOUSA Hist Sect;HQ, USFET Engr Sect, 353 Training Gen (Current)1944; History of Western Base Section, Jul 43; Hist833d Engr Avn Bn, 10 Jul 42-25 Sep 45, MaxwellAFB; Incl to Ltr, Engr School to CofEngrs, 28 Dec43, sub: Opn of GS Rgts, OCE; OCE ETOUSA HistRpt 6, Air Force Construction.

27 Hists, 341st, 346th, 355th, and 95th Engr GS Rgts.


WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AND DRAGON'S TEETH at the Assault Training Center,Woolacombe.

bridging, camouflage, waterproofing,and airfield engineering and reconnais-sance. A port construction and repairtraining center in Wales specialized inconstruction of V-type trestles, Baileys,wooden trestle bridges, Sommerfeldmats, and tubular scaffolding. On theIsle of Wight the engineers conductedmarine pipeline training. A five- toseven-week course at the Transporta-tion Training Center trained generalservice regiments for railroad work,especially railroad bridging.28

ETOUSA conducted courses in messmanagement, fire fighting, cooking,motor transport, enemy personnel andequipment identification, basic radiooperation, gas warfare, and water-proofing. At the engineer section of theAmerican School Center, run by G-3,ETOUSA, the primary objective wasdeveloping physical stamina and endur-ance necessary for combat while pro-viding three months of basic technicaland tactical training. Officers and en-listed men attended a two-week coursein logistical planning at the British AirMinistry's Joint British and AmericanSchool. Engineers could attend schoolsoffering instruction in quartermastertransport, bomb reconnaissance, field

28 USFET Engr files, 353 Training (General), 1943;Specialist Course Theater Engr Trng Ctr, Ofc of The-ater Chf Engr, ETOUSA, Aug 46; OCE ETOUSAMonthly Rpt, Apr—May 44.


artillery (for antiaircraft fire), landingcraft loading, bituminous paving androad construction, troop leadership,enemy document evaluation, and orderof battle.29

Engineers took a leading part in thewell-known Assault Training Center.Col. Paul W. Thompson, an engineerofficer, commanded the school from 2April 1943 until early March 1944.Thompson and his staff spent April andMay 1943 studying the French coastline.They calculated that at no place alongthe coast of northwest France could theGermans use more than one platoonper 2,000-2,500 yards to protect beachfortifications. They deduced that Ger-mans would have extremely strong fielddefenses with concrete pillboxes, em-placements, and shelters, and thinlyspread defenders providing consider-able automatic fire. The Assault Train-ing Center prepared units to deal withsuch a defensive strategy. Set up on thenorthwest coast of Devonshire at Ilfra-combe, the center was completed inMarch 1944, allowing over two monthsbefore the invasion for unit trainingand a series of full-scale exercises. Engi-neer units constructed and placed beachand underwater obstacles (modeledafter those on the beaches of northernFrance) and gave lectures on a numberof subjects connected with an assaultlanding.30

The British contributed in many waysto training, opening their schools toAmerican engineers and offering ideasand equipment. British and Americanunits exchanged parties, usually com-posed of one officer and ten enlistedmen, for fifteen days. Each group learn-ed the characteristics, methods, weap-ons, tools, nomenclature, problems, andtactics of the other. The practice alsoincreased understanding and comrade-ship between Allies.31

First Army's training emphasizedbridge building, road maintenance- andconstruction, mine placement, andenemy mine detection and removal.First Army also recommended that allcompany grade engineer officers re-ceive instruction in adjusting artilleryfire by using forward observation meth-ods. Engineer units used schools, lec-tures, and demonstrations to train theirown men and sent enlisted men andofficers to schools in higher British orAmerican echelons.32

American corps and divisions trainedunits for special missions in the assault.Engineers practiced the rapid construc-tion of plywood treadway bridgesmounted on pneumatic floats for cross-ing flooded areas and absorbed what-ever they could on terrain problems tobe expected on the Continent.33

Maps for the Invasion

U.S. and British military forces could29 Hist Trng Div, OCE ETOUSA, 1 Apr 43-1 Apr

45; Ltr; Maj H. E. Webster to Chf, Troop Div, OCE,SOS ETOUSA, 7 Apr 43, sub: Rpt on Visit to Ameri-can School Center, 319.1, EUCOM Engr files; Hist51st Engr Bn.

30 Specialist Course Theater Engr Trng Ctr, OCEETOUSA, Aug 46; First U.S. Army, Report of Opera-tions, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, vol. I, p. 19; 1st. Lt. G. W.Favalion, 1st. Lt. Alex M. Marsh, and Maj. E. R. Kline,eds., Potholes and Bullets (Highland Park, Illinois: SingerPrinting and Pub. Co, 1946), a pictorial account of the

5th Engineer Combat Battalion in World War II. Hists,112th and 204th Engr C Bns.

31 USFET Engr files, 353 Training (General) 1943;First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug44, vol. I, p. 22.

32 First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43-1Aug 44, vol. I, p. 18, and vol. V, p. 209.

33 Ibid.; HQ, ETOUSA, WD Observer Bd, 22 Apr44, sub: Quarterly Rpt Engr Section, 451.3, OCE.


ENGINEER MAPMAKER USES A MULTIPLEX to establish accurate contours on invasion maps.

be proud of the maps they preparedjointly for operations on the Continent.In 1939 the British had had to startalmost literally from scratch. Only foreastern France were World War I mapsavailable on a scale as large as 1:25,000;few of them had been revised to showroads, bridges, or railroads built sincethat time or changes in fields and woods.For western France the only militarymaps were based on those Napoleonhad used. They had been edited andenlarged to a scale of 1:50,000 but hadnot been made more accurate. Fewmaps had had any terrain correctionssince 1900.

Shortly after the evacuation of Dun-kirk in 1940 the British Army inaugu-rated the Benson project, named for an

airfield in Oxfordshire. From this air-field Royal Air Force (RAF) planes tookoff to map the French coast from Cher-bourg to Calais and an area extendinginland approximately sixty miles; theBritish succeeded in producing 1:25,000scale maps.34 Early in 1942, in accor-dance with the terms of the Loper-Hotine Agreement, the British assumedgeneral mapping responsibility for mostof western Europe. Americans helpedin taking aerial photographs for map-making and reproducing maps for useby U.S. forces.35

34 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Top-ography, pp. 6—7.

35 See ch. III.


General mapping (as distinguishedfrom "intelligence" mapping of individ-ual spots) began with aerial photo-graphs showing roads, streams, rail-roads, bridges, buildings, fields, woods,and flood areas. Using the aerial photo-graph, mapmakers drew with instru-ments a topographic contour, or "topomap," divided into small military gridsquares that enabled the user to locateareas exactly. When manpower or timedid not permit making topo maps, theoriginal photograph could be made toserve as a map by the application ofgrid lines, contours, place names, andindications of scale and direction. Thepoor quality of many photomaps preju-diced the users against them, but thechief engineer saw their value in allevi-ating the burden on mapmakers andaerial photographers and planned to usephotomaps in the preinvasion period.36

Topo maps of 1:25,000 scale wereproduced from aerial photographs takenwith a six-inch metrogen lens withhigh-speed multiplex equipment whichregistered both horizontal and verticaldimensions of terrain features. Produc-tion of these maps was the primary mis-sion of the base topographic battalion,the most important element in the ETOtopographic service. Each base topo-graphic battalion contained a photo-mapping company that had a completeset of multiplex equipment includingapproximately one hundred projectors,enough to put fifty operators to workafter the aerial triangulation and con-trol extensions were finished. A photo-mapping company, working with goodquality aerial photography, could map

approximately one hundred squaremiles a day.37

Until the summer of 1943 the great-est hindrance to mapmaking in theEuropean theater was the difficultyof obtaining good aerial photographsto work with—a responsibility of theArmy Air Forces. After four specialB—17E photographic aircraft sent tothe ETO in the fall of 1942 were di-verted to North Africa, the British gavean RAF reconnaissance squadron thejob of filling U.S. photographic map-ping needs. By May 1943 this squad-ron had photographed some 22,000square miles of the first-priority area.But because the RAF used a type ofcamera not suited to American equip-ment, fewer than 10,000 square milesof large-scale topo maps had been pro-duced. The U.S. Army Air Forces hadnot helped, mainly because the AAF'sDirector of Photography, Lt. Col. Min-ton W. Kaye, then in the ETO, felt thatthe hazards and costs of securing wide-angle vertical photography over heav-ily defended areas were too great. Headvocated a system of aerial photogra-phy known as trimetrogen photography.Developed for small-scale aeronauticalcharts, the system used wide-angle cam-eras that tilted in divergent directionsto produce one vertical and two highoblique photographs which made acomposite picture of an area from hori-zon to horizon. The engineers objectedto trimetrogen pictures because obliquephotography multiplied the difficultiesof making enlargements and produced

36 Engrs file 121, General, Adm 212, ETOUSA HistSect.

37 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Top-ography, p. 83; Speech (no signature), 27 Jan 45, sub:Aerial Photographic Mapping, H—4 061 General,EUCOM Engr files.


distortions that no known instrumentcould correct.38

In June 1943, General Moore, Col.Herbert Milwit, head of Moore's intelli-gence division, and Maj. Gen. Ira C.Eaker, commanding officer of theEighth Air Force, discussed the prob-lem. General Eaker said he would helpthe engineers get more accurate photos.Beginning on 22 June 1943, the 13thPhoto Squadron, using K17 cameras inF-4 and F-5 aircraft—reconnaissanceversions of the P-38 Lightning—tookwide-angle photographs covering morethan 10,000 square miles without anyloss from enemy action. The success ofthis project promoted greater AirForce—engineer cooperation, and therewas no serious shortage of aerial pho-tography during the invasion and forseveral months thereafter.

U.S. support of the Benson projectbegan early in 1944. Using aerial pho-tography sent from England, the U.S.Geological Survey and the TennesseeValley Authority, on assignment fromOCE, prepared 200 sheets at the1:25,000 scale covering 16,000 squaremiles of northern France. To enablethe mapmakers to meet deadlines forthe Normandy landings, the OCE Intel-ligence Division permitted the omissionof much fine detail such as hedgerowsbut backed up each battle map with aphotomap of the same area.39

In assuming responsibility for pro-viding engineer intelligence as well astopographic service, General Moore was

treading on new ground. No back-ground of intelligence experience ex-isted in the Corps of Engineers equiva-lent to that acquired in constructionengineering on rivers and harbors duty.Few officers were competent to handlethe expanded duties in engineer intelli-gence and topography, nor was anyprecedent available upon which to basean effective organization or plan. Byagreement with a succession of theaterG—2s, General Moore gave the Intelli-gence Division, OCE, ETOUSA, respon-sibility for all problems pertaining tothe topographical service, includingmap policy, theater map library opera-tion, and planning for map production,reproduction, supply, and distribution.

In planning map production the In-telligence Division had to consider whatmap series should be completed, whichmaps the forces involved would need,how much time was available, and whichcartographic and reproduction facilitiescould be used in the field. Plannerssoon realized that the required mapscould not be produced with the avail-able facilities in the time remaining.They decided to put first priority on1:25,000 maps and photomaps of Francenorth of the Loire and west of the lon-gitude of Paris, with all new maps ofthe same design; second priority on1:50,000 maps of the coastal regions inthe invasion area; third priority on1:100,000 series covering the entireoperational area; and fourth priorityon a 1:200,000 road map. A more satis-factory 1:250,000 map suitable for bothground and air use was also required;the 1:1,000,000 series needed consider-able revision; and many town plans—several thousand sheets—had to beproduced.

The expectation that the British War

38 Maps and Mapping, May 42-Apr 45, L-6 060,EUCOM Engr files. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, TheCorps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, pp. 446—54.

39 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 457-58; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Topography, pp. 28-30,49.


Office's Directorate of Military Surveycould provide most of the maps thatU.S. forces in Europe would need soonhad to be abandoned. Computations in1943 indicated that the four U.S. armiesplanned for European operations wouldneed 7 million maps a month, morethan base and field topographic unitsand local civilian facilities could provide.To produce that many maps, 35 mil-lion impressions would have to be made,one for each of the five colors neededfor the average map. As this was beyondBritish capability, in mid-December1943 Col. Herbert B. Loper of OCE,WD, arranged for the United States toassume a large share of supplying Amer-ican forces. For security reasons Brit-ish and American facilities located inEngland would provide maps neededfrom D-day to D plus 90. After D plus90 all maps for U.S. forces would beproduced in the United States exceptthose required for special, unanticipated,or highly classified projects. Army MapService (AMS) received the first monthlyrequisition in April 1944 and was readywith the first shipment in July. Even-tually, out of every ten maps used inthe theater Army Map Service and pri-vate contractors in the United Statesprinted four; the British, the overseastopographic units, and the French Na-tional Geographic Institute, six.40

November 1943 plans for map ser-vice in support of the tactical forces pro-vided one topographic battalion foreach army group and each army andone company for each corps and airforce. Realizing the need to strengthenstaff control of these units, GeneralMoore recommended adding topo-

graphic sections to the engineer head-quarters of army groups and armies.His proposal could not be put intoeffect because of the time it took toobtain theater approval; therefore, heprovided each of the four armiesplanned for European operations withan engineer survey liaison detachmentof five officers and ten enlisted men tohandle the topographic service. Thisimprovisation worked well and in hisopinion "probably meant the differencebetween outstanding success . . . and arather dismal failure." He later cameto feel that a topographic officer shouldalso be added to the corps engineerstaff.41

The topographic battalions and com-panies were well organized and wellequipped, except for map distribution,a problem that the War Departmentand ETOUSA had neglected. Experi-ence showed that maps could not behandled in the same way as other ClassIV items, for they were too closelyrelated to tactical operations. Distribu-tion had to respond immediately tochanges in tactical plans, and a constantflow had to be maintained. Maps wereso bulky that stocks to cover any contin-gency for a ten-day period would weighat least sixty pounds—too much for anofficer to carry on his person. Moreover,the transportation of stocks betweendepots and from depots to troops wasto cause more trouble than any otheraspect of map distribution on the Con-tinent.42

Security of maps was all important inthe OVERLORD planning stage. Themaps were sealed in coded bundlesfrom which individual maps could be


41 Moore, Final Report, pp. 107-08.42 AGF Bd Rpt 552, Map Distribution, 7 Jan 45.


drawn without revealing much aboutthe general plan for any given area.On 1 September 1943, the British Direc-torate of Military Survey and GeneralMoore's Intelligence Division agreed toestablish four special simnel depots,named for the code system applied tothe map bundles. The depots, locatedat Aldershot, Oxford, Reading, andTowchester, had identical stocks, thecode keys for the maps being kept by aminimum number of officers. In late1943, only the Oxford simnel depot hadAmerican personnel, but as the Ameri-can invasion forces outnumbered theBritish in May 1944 the U.S. Army tookover a second facility at Lockerley.

The United States also had a depotat Witney, set up in March 1944 withbulk stocks for the Continent; one atReading, opened in January 1944 withreserves for the Air Force; another atCheltenham, organized in September1942 to store maps for use in the UnitedKingdom; and a fourth at Swindon,established in January 1943 with bulkstocks of United Kingdom and AirForce maps. From Cheltenham andOxford the maps went to the marshal-ing area mapping depots, then to camp

commanders who undertook detaileddistribution. Maps for troops in themarshaling areas were under guard atall times before they were issued to indi-vidual troop units and during move-ment from depots to camps had a guarddetail of an officer and several armedenlisted men. When any coded rolls(packages of twenty and fifty maps)were opened in a depot, all personshandling the maps were locked into thestorage buildings under strict securitycontrol.43

In mid-1943 as forces massed in theUnited Kingdom to prepare for theinvasion of France, attention also turnedto specific landing places for the assaultforce. The engineering problems asso-ciated with getting the troops across themined and defended beaches were inthemselves immense; organized andrapid supply movement across the sameterrain was essential to the success ofthe operation. It was clear that engi-neers would be in plentiful evidenceon the D-day beaches.

43 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 5, Intelligence and Top-ography, pp. 41, 49, 60, 65, and app. 26.

CHAPTER XIV

Preparing for D-day Landings

By early spring 1944 tactical plan-ning for the most ambitious amphibi-ous operation ever attempted was wellunder way. OVERLORD represented thefruits of two years of strategic thought,argument, experiment, and improvisa-tion and included compromises reflect-ing American and British aims. Thebeaches at Normandy offered the bestcombination of advantages as a foot-hold from which the Allies could directa blow at the Third Reich from theWest.

After 1 February 1944, the generalconcept of an invasion of the Conti-nent in 1944 went by the name OVER-LORD. (The increasingly detailed Ameri-can field army planning—proceedingunder tight security at First U.S. Armyheadquarters—was code named NEP-TUNE.) In its final form OVERLORDcalled for landing two field armiesabreast in the Bay of the Seine west ofthe Orne River, a water barrier thatwas a suitable anchor for the left flankof the operation. While the British Sec-ond Army occupied the easternmost ofthe chosen landing areas on the left andtook the key town of Caen, two corpsof the American First Army under Lt.Gen. Omar N. Bradley were simulta-neously to assault two beaches west ofthe town of Port-en-Bessin. Once ashorethe American forces were to swing westand north to clear the Cotentin penin-

sula by D plus 15, gaining the prize ofCherbourg with its harbor for invasionsupply.1

The American Beaches

Invasion planners studied carefullythe size, location, gradients, and ter-rain features of the American OMAHAand UTAH beaches. Within easy reachof the tactical fighter airfields in Eng-land, they lay separated from eachother by the mouths of the Vire andthe Douve rivers. The current in theriver delta area where the two streamsemptied into the sea deposited silt toform reefs offshore, making landingsin the immediate neighborhood infeasi-ble. Protected from westerly Channelswells by the Cotentin peninsula, thewaters off OMAHA and UTAH normallyhad waves up to three feet in the latespring. The six-fathom line ran closeenough to shore to allow deep-draftattack transports to unload reasonablynear the beaches and naval vessels tobring their guns closer to their targets.Both beaches had a very shallow gradi-ent and tides that receded so rapidly

1 Unless otherwise noted, detail for this chapter isderived from Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, and fromSamuel E. Morison, "History of United States NavalOperations in World War II," vol. XI, The Invasion ofFrance and Germany (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1957).


that a boat beached for even a fewmoments at ebb stuck fast until the nextincoming water. The tidal range ofeighteen feet uncovered a 300-yard flatat low tide. An invasion attempt at lowtide would thus force the infantry towalk 300 yards under enemy fire acrossthe undulating tidal flat, crisscrossedwith runnels and ponds two to four feetdeep. (Map 15)

The assault objective of V Corps' 1stand 29th Infantry Divisions was thesmaller OMAHA Beach, a gentle, 7,000-yard curve of sand. An eight-foot bankof coarse shingle marked the seawardedge of the western part of the beach.The shingle offered some meager coverto an infantryman but barred passageto wheeled vehicles. Back of the beach,and some two hundred yards from theshingle line at the center, a line of grass-covered bluffs rose dramatically 100 to170 feet. At either end the bluffs randown to merge with the rocky head-lands that enclosed OMAHA and madethe flanking coastline impractical foramphibious landings of any conse-quence. A bathing resort before thewar, the area was not thickly populated,but four farming settlements were nes-tled 500 to 1,000 yards inland on thebluffs above the beaches. A single mainroad, part of a predominantly east-westnetwork, roughly paralleled the coastfrom Vierville-sur-Mer at the westernreaches of OMAHA through St. Laurent-sur-Mer, Colleville-sur-Mer, and finallySte. Honorine-des-Pertes before pass-ing into the British Second Army sec-tor behind the beaches to the east.Access to the beaches from the farm-ing communities was through four largeand several smaller gullies or draws.Through one of these, dropping fromVierville to the water, a gravel second-

ary road ran to the beach and turnedto the east. It continued beside a six- totwelve-foot timber and masonry seawallto Les Moulins, a small village directlyon the sea in the draw in front of St.Laurent. From there back to St. Laurentand in the draw from Colleville to thewater, roads were no more than carttracks or sandy paths. A line of bathingcabanas and summer cottages had nes-tled beneath the bluffs west of Les Mou-lins in an area known as Hamel-au-Pretre, but the Germans had razed mostof them as they erected their beachdefenses and cleared fields of fire. Therewere few signs of habitation east of LesMoulins, and the foot paths at that endof the beach ran out altogether in themarsh grass sand.2

The NEPTUNE planners divided OMA-HA Beach into eight contiguous land-ing zones. From its far western end tothe draw before Vierville, Charlie Beachwas the target of a provisional Rangerforce. Next were the main assault areas,Dog and Easy beaches. Dog Green, 970yards long, Dog White, 700 yards, andDog Red, 480 yards, stretched from theVierville draw to the one at Les Moulins.Easy Green began there, running 830yards east. Easy Red, 1,850 yards, strad-dled the draw going up to Colleville,and Fox Red, 3,015 yards at the far leftof the beach, had a smaller draw on itsright-hand boundary. The five draws,vital beach exits, were simply named:the Vierville exit became D-1, the oneat Les Moulins leading to St. Laurent,D-3; E-1 lay in the middle of EasyRed leading up between St. Laurentand Colleville; the Colleville draw off

2 War Department, Historical Div, Omaha Beach-head, 6 June-13 June 1944, American Forces in ActionSeries (Washington, 1945) pp. 8-16.

PREPARING FOR D-DAY LANDINGS 301

MAP 15

Fox Green became E-3, and the smallerone leading off Fox Red, F-1. .

After a 45-minute air and naval bom-bardment on D-day, the reinforced116th Regimental Combat Team, as-signed to the 29th Infantry Division(but attached to the 1st Division for theassault), was to land on Dog Green, DogWhite, Dog Red, and Easy Green, pre-ceded moments earlier by four compa-nies of the 741st Tank Battalion serv-ing as assault artillery. The 16th Regi-mental Combat Team, 1st InfantryDivision, was to touch down on EasyRed and Fox Green, with a battalionlanding team on each beach. The as-sault units were to push through theGerman defense along the beaches,especially in the draws leading inland,by the time the landing was three hours

old. Reinforced with additional forcescoming ashore, V Corps would thenconsolidate an area of hedgerow coun-try bounded on the south by the line ofthe Aure River by the end of D-day.

German defenses in the area fromCaen west, taking in the Cotentin andBrittany peninsulas, fell under the Ger-man Seventh Army. In the OMAHA areathe counterinvasion force on the coastconsisted of two divisions, the 716th, astatic or defense division having noequivalent in the American Army, andthe 352d, a conventional infantry divi-sion capable of counterattack and rapidmovement. In general the Germansconcentrated on emplacing a coastalshield, following Field Marshal ErwinRommel's strategy of defeating an inva-sion at the water's edge. The demands


of the war in the east denied the vauntedGerman Atlantic Wall the concrete, themines, and the trained men Rommelwanted, but the beach defenses, thoughincomplete, were formidable enoughfor any assault force.3

Since the Germans considered a low-tide landing impossible because of theexposed area in front of their guns,they littered the tidal flat with obstaclesto catch landing craft coming ashore athigh tide. About 250 yards from theshingle line stood a row of complicatedstructures called Element C, nicknamedBelgian gates because they resembledthe ornamental ironwork of a Europeanchateau. Festooned with waterproofedmines, they covered either end of thebeach but not its center. Behind themwere irregular rows of single uprightor slightly canted steel stakes, V-shapedchanneled rails that could tear out thebottom of a landing craft; roughly everythird one had a Teller mine fixed atopit. The Germans had emplaced andmined logs and built shallow, minedramps with one upright wooden polesupported by two longer trailing legs.Closest to the high-water mark was arow of hedgehogs, constructed by bolt-ing or welding together three or morechanneled rails at their centers so as toproject impaling spokes in three direc-tions. The tidal flat contained no bur-ied mines, since the sea water rapidlymade them ineffective.4

On shore, twelve fixed gun emplace-ments of the German coastal defensenet between the Vire River and Port-en-Bessin could fire directly on thebeach. The defenders concentrated

their pillboxes at the all-importantbeach exits and supplemented the artil-lery pieces with automatic-weapons andsmall-arms firing pits. They dug anti-tank ditches ten feet deep and thirtyfeet wide across the mouths of thedraws. One pillbox, set in the embank-ment of the Vierville draw, D— 1, couldenfilade the beach eastward as far asLes Moulins. On the landward side ofthe shingle bank and along the seawallthey erected concertina barbed wireand laced the sand with their standardSchu and Teller mines. From the trenchsystem on the bluffs above they couldalso activate an assortment of explosivedevices, using old French naval shellsand stone fougasses (TNT charges thatblew out rock fragments) against anyattackers scaling the heights.

In January 1944 the COSSAC staffdecided to strengthen the Americanattempt to seize Cherbourg by revisingOVERLORD to bring another corpsashore closer to that port. Because ofthe river lines and the marshy terrainto the west of OMAHA, V Corps ran therisk of being stopped around the townof Carentan before wheeling into theCotentin peninsula. The revised planassigned the VII Corps, with the 4thInfantry Division in the assault, to thesecond American D-day beach.

A straight 9,000-yard stretch of rath-er characterless coastline, UTAH lay ona north-south axis west of the mouth ofthe Douve and to the east of the townof Ste. Mere-Eglise. A masonry seawalleight feet high ran the length of thebeach, protecting the dunes behind itfrom storms. At intermittent pointsalong this barrier sand had piled up tomake ramps as high as the wall itself;only a wire fence atop the wall markedits presence. German defenders had

3 Ibid., pp. 20-28.4 Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, OMAHA Beach, 26 Febru-

ary-26 June 1944, 30 Sep 44, pp. 62-66.


flooded the low-lying pastureland be-tween the beach and Ste. Mere-Egliseto a depth of four feet. A series of east-west causeways carried small roadsacross the flood; each ended at a breakin the seawall which normally gave ac-cess to the beach, but which theGermans had also blocked to containan assault force from the sea.

The beach assault area lay betweentwo hamlets, La Madeleine on the southand Les Dunes de Varreville on thenorth. The southerly Uncle Red Beach,1,000 yards long, straddled a causewayroad named Exit No. 3; it led directlyto the village of Audouville-la-Hubert,due east of Ste. Mere-Eglise and threemiles behind the beach. Tare GreenBeach, occupying the 1,000 yards to theright of Uncle Red, had few distinguish-ing natural features. At UTAH, the 8thInfantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Divi-sion, was to go ashore two battalionlanding teams abreast, closely followedby the 70th Tank Battalion as artillerysupport.5

NEPTUNE also called for a parachuteand glider assault into the area behindUTAH. To cut the Cotentin peninsulaat its base, COSSAC planners originallyscheduled airdrops south and east ofSte. Mere-Eglise and farther west in thevicinity of St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte. Butwhen the 91st Infantry Division rein-forced the peninsula in May, the FirstArmy staff had to consider a less ambi-tious airborne undertaking. The 82dAirborne Division would be droppedastride the Merderet River, a tributaryof the Douve running two miles west ofSte. Mere-Eglise, and the 101st Air-borne Division in the area south of the

town early on D-day before the 4thInfantry Division landed at UTAH. Glid-er trains would bring in reinforcementsand heavier weapons to consolidate aperimeter enclosing a section of theCarentan-Cherbourg highway and atleast the inland portions of the cause-ways that would serve as beach exits.6

A lack of high ground made the Ger-man defenses at UTAH somewhat lessimposing than at OMAHA. The defend-ers relied heavily on the inundated low-lands behind the beach to channel anattack and on a series of small infantrystrongpoints to pin down a larger forcetrying to leave the beach over the cause-ways. Consistent with their strategicconception, the German works werewell forward. Two German divisions,the 709th Infantry, manned with east-ern Europeans, mainly Georgians, andthe 243d Infantry, had constructed nu-merous resistance points along the high-water mark. On the tidal flat they hadplaced the obstacles encountered atOMAHA and another antitank devicecalled a tetrahedron, a small pyramidof steel or concrete. Barbed-wire entan-glements and minefields, covered byrifle, automatic, and mortar fire fromthe infantry trenches, began at thewater's edge. Concrete pillboxes, somewith tank turrets set into them, sweptthe beaches with arcs of fire. The vil-lages at the edges of UTAH were con-verted into fortified areas command-ing both the beach and sectors of theinundated land to the rear. Just rightof center on Tare Green, the Germansdug a deep antitank ditch to hindervehicles and tanks coming in from thesea. At UTAH the enemy also intro-duced the Goliath, a miniature, radio-controlled tank loaded with explosives5 Dept of the Army, Historical Div, Utah Beach to

Cherbourg, 6 June—27 June 1944, American Forces inAction Series (Washington, 1947), pp. 4-7. 6 Ibid., p. 9.


and designed to engage incoming land-ing craft and armor. The arrival in lateMay of the 91st Division, with a battal-ion of tanks, gave considerable depthto the defense between Carentan andValognes, but the defenders of thebeaches themselves could hardly ma-neuver, since their own flooding con-fined them to positions in the narrowcoastal strip where there was little roomfor regrouping and counterattack.

Despite the serious German aggrega-tion of flrepower along the coastline,NEPTUNE planners in the months be-fore the invasion worried most aboutobstacles. In early 1944 as aerial photo-graphs of the German-held coastal areasshowed a proliferation of obstacles onthe invasion beaches, the Allies grewmore and more alarmed. A monthbefore D-day, General Eisenhowerlisted the devices as among the "worstproblems of these days."7

Beach Obstacle Teams

In deriving plans and strategems toovercome the obstacle problem theAllies drew on their experience, thoughthe new situation exceeded in size andcomplexity anything they had previous-ly encountered. In the ill-fated Diepperaid of August 1942, British and Cana-dian forces had met concrete walls andblocks set with steel spikes designed toimpale landing craft. The British hadthen established an Underwater Obsta-cle Training Center, but its elaboratetraining courses were chiefly geared forMediterranean beach landings. TheBritish experience prompted the chiefof engineers to propose a similar Armycenter in the United States, but in the

spring of 1943 the Navy took over allamphibious training. The engineersthen selected a site for a beach obstaclecourse close to the Navy's AmphibiousTraining Base at Fort Pierce, Florida.

The course began in July 1943, andthroughout the fall a company of com-bat engineers conducted experimentsin coordination with the Navy. The testsindicated that the obstacles that re-mained after a thorough bombing ofthe beaches could probably be blown tobits by such devices as the "Apex," aremote-controlled drone boat, and the"Reddy Fox," an explosive-laden pipethat could be towed into the area andsunk. The engineers could also destroyobstacles with rocket fire, preferablyfrom rocket launchers mounted on atank; at low tide heavy mechanizedequipment such as the tankdozer couldpush most obstacles out of the way.8

Although the engineers were testingthese methods, ETOUSA plannershoped that such removal work wouldprove unnecessary, for during 1943reconnaissance had uncovered no ob-stacles along the Normandy coast. In-deed, an early engineer plan assumedthat there would be no obstacles or that,if the Germans attempted to install anyat the last minute, naval gunfire andaerial bombardment would take careof them. As a last resort, alternativebeaches might be chosen.9

This optimism waned in late January1944, when aerial reconnaissance dis-closed hedgehogs on the beach at Quine-ville, just north of the UTAH section of

7 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 May 44, Eisenhowerpersonal files.

8 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 472—76; Ltr, Senior Member,Joint Army-Navy Experiment and Testing Board, toCinC, U.S. Fleet, 18 Dec 43.

9 Col E. G. Paules, Notes on Breaching Under-Waterand Shore Obstacles and Land Mine Fields, Mar-Apr44, Incl 1.


the Cotentin coast. Disturbed at thisturn of events, General Eisenhower sentLt. Col. Arthur H. Davidson, Jr., of Gen-eral Moore's staff and Lt. Col. John T.O'Neill, commander of V Corps' 112thEngineer Combat Battalion, to attendan obstacle demonstration at Fort Piercein Florida between 9 and 11 February.10

Returning to the theater about twoweeks later, Davidson and O'Neillfound D-day planners studying aerialphotographs that showed the Germanswere planting obstacles on the tidal flatsbelow the high-water mark—a greathazard to landing craft. Subsequentphotographs revealed that obstacles,usually planted in three rows, were mul-tiplying rapidly not only in the UTAHarea but also, beginning late in March,at OMAHA. Planners assumed that theywere all strengthened with barbed wireand mines. That assumption provedcorrect on 23 April when an Alliedbomb intended for a coastal battery fellon the beach, producing fourteen sec-ondary explosions. Aerial photographsshowed the obstacles proliferating onall beaches right up to D-day.11

Detailed planning for breaching theobstacles on D-day began in the UnitedKingdom in mid-March 1944 whenGeneral Bradley directed V and VIICorps to submit clearing plans forOMAHA and UTAH beaches by 1 April.Because time was short, Bradley toldplanners to depend on only the troops,

materials, equipment, and techniquesthen available in the theater.

Available troops included the corps'combat engineers, engineer special bri-gades, and sixteen naval combat demo-lition units (NCDUs). Each NCDU con-sisted of five enlisted men and an of-ficer—the capacity of the black rubberboats NCDUs used in their work. Theyhad been trained to paddle to shallowwater and then go overboard, wadingto shore and dragging the explosive-filled boat behind them. The first unit,members of the earliest Fort Piercegraduating class, arrived in the theaterat the end of October 1943. By March1944 all sixteen units had arrived andhad been assigned to naval beach battal-ions training at Salcombe, Swansea, andFowey. The demolition units had littleidea of precisely what their role onD-day would be. They had no trainingaids other than those they could impro-vise, nor were they told until mid-April(because of strict security regulations)the type of obstacles being discoveredalong the Normandy beaches.12

On 1 April 1944, V Corps submittedto First Army a plan for breachingobstacles, prepared jointly with the XIAmphibious Force, U.S. Navy. Theplan recommended that an engineergroup consisting of two engineer com-bat battalions and twenty NCDUs beorganized and specially trained for theOMAHA assault; VII Corps submitted asimilar smaller scale plan for UTAH.13

10 Engineer Operations by the VII Corps in theEuropean Theater, vol. II, "Normandy," p. 2; Rpt, LtCol J. T. O'Neill, Summary of Activities of the Provi-sional Engr Gp, 8 Jul 44 (hereafter cited as O'NeillRpt), in AGF Bd Rpt 253, ETO, Engr Rpt on Land-ings in Normandy, 5 Oct 44.

11 O'Neill Rpt; AAR, OMAHA Beach Provisional EngrSpec Bde Gp, Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, pp. 62-66;Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. II, "Normandy," p. 3.

12 Cdr. Francis Douglas Fane, USNR, and DonMoore, The Naked Warriors (New York: Appleton,Century, and Crofts, 1956), p. 21; Rpt on the Work ofU.S. Naval Combat Demolitions Units, Naval and AirSupport folder, Adm 493, ETOUSA Hist Sect. Unlessotherwise cited the section on underwater obstacles isbased on these two sources and on O'Neill Rpt andEngr Opns VII Corps, vol. II, "Normandy."

13 HQ, V Corps, Prefacing Plan, Underwater andBeach Obstacles, OMAHA Beach, in Engineer Special


The V Corps commander, Maj. Gen.Leonard T. Gerow, was disturbed tolearn on 9 April that First Army stillhad adopted no definite obstacle planand that training had barely started.That same day First Army asked VCorps to send two engineer companiesand a tank company with tankdozers tothe Assault Training Center at Woola-combe. The 299th Engineer CombatBattalion, with personnel speciallytrained at Fort Pierce, was to arrive inthe United Kingdom on 16 April, butonly about one-third of the battalionhad been trained in the removal ofunderwater obstacles. Another causefor worry was a scarcity of tankdozerblades. To speed the adoption of a spe-cific plan and undertake vital training,Gerow enlisted the support of Brig.Gen. William B. Kean, First Army chiefof staff. Kean had to admit that "thiswhole subject had been worked out fartoo late." Gerow sent two engineer com-panies with four tankdozers and sixNCDUs to begin training at Woola-combe on 12 April.14

Army and Navy representatives for-mulated detailed plans beginning 15April, when for the first time demoli-tion men obtained precise informationon the tidal-flat obstacles they couldexpect to encounter. Because of thenumber and density of the obstacles,the conferees decided to attack them"dry shod," ahead of the incoming tide.

This decision helped fix the invasiondate—only on 5, 6, or 7 June would theengineers have enough daylight afterH-hour to destroy the obstacles beforethe onrushing Channel tide coveredthem. The decision to attack dry shodalso obviated the need for Apex boats—luckily, for the freighters bringing themfrom the United States did not arrivein England until mid-May, too late toprepare the boats for use. The firstReddy Foxes, which might have helped,came in the same shipment and had tobe put in storage along with the Apexesbecause there was no time to train menin their use. Under such circumstances,the most practicable method of breach-ing the obstacles seemed that of plac-ing explosive charges by hand, althoughNCDU officers continued to warn thatthis course would be possible only ifenemy fire could be neutralized.15

On OMAHA, gaps fifty yards widewere to be blown through the obstacles,two in each beach subsector. Thebroader Easy Red would be breachedin six places. Combined Army-Navyboat teams of thirty-five to forty mencarried in LCMs were to undertake thetask. The sailors were to destroy theseaward obstacles, the soldiers to han-dle those landward and to clear minesfrom the tidal flat. First on the scenewould be the assault gapping team (oneto each gap), composed of twenty-sevenmen from an Army engineer combatbattalion (including one officer and onemedic) and an NCDU augmented tothirteen men by the attachment of fiveArmy engineers to help with demoli-tions and two seamen to handle theexplosives and tend the rubber boats.

The assault teams were to be followedby eight support teams, one to every

Brigades on OMAHA Beach, Notes and Data Used inConnection with Operation NEPTUNE, OMAHA Beach,Prov Engr Spec Bde Gp (hereafter cited as Notes andData NEPTUNE).

14 Ltrs, Gerow to Kean, 10 Apr 44, and Kean toGerow, 13 Apr 44, copies in Notes and Data NEPTUNE;O'Neill participated in the planning for OMAHA alongwith Colonel McDonough, commanding officer of the112th Engineer Combat Group, and Lt. Col. Patillo, VCorps representative at the Obstacle Training Centerto study British methods and techniques. O'Neill Rpt. 15 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 260-61.


two assault teams, of about the samecomposition. Two command boats com-pleted the flotilla. Command was to bean Army responsibility because theobstacles would presumably be dry atthe time of clearing operations. Eachassault team was to be supported by atankdozer to clear obstacles. All boatswere to carry some 1,000 pounds ofexplosives, demolition accessories, minedetectors, and mine gap markers. Thecommand boats were to carry a ton ofextra explosive.16

At UTAH Beach eight fifty-yard gapswere planned, four in each of the twolanding sectors. Boat teams were to beemployed in a somewhat different man-ner. Twelve NCDUs, each consisting ofan officer and fifteen men (includingfive Army engineers) carried in twelveLCVPs, were to attack the seawardband of obstacles. Simultaneously, eightArmy demolition teams, each consist-ing of an officer and twenty-five en-listed men carried in eight LCMs, wereto attack the landward obstacles. FourArmy reserve teams of the same size,also in LCMs, were to follow the eightleading Army teams shoreward. As atOMAHA, the attackers would rely heav-ily on standard engineer explosives andtankdozers, and the Army would havecommand responsibility for obstacle-clearing operations.

On 30 April, V Corps organized theV Corps Provisional Engineer Groupfor the OMAHA assault. Under ColonelO'Neill, formerly commander of the112th Engineer Combat Battalion, theprovisional group consisted of the 146thEngineer Combat Battalion, the 299thEngineer Combat Battalion (less onecompany), and twenty-one NCDUs.

Ultimately, 150 demolition-trained menof the 2d Infantry Division joined theprovisional group to bring its strengthto 1,050. Upon its attachment to the1st Infantry Division for the assault, theprovisional group was redesignated theSpecial Engineer Task Force.

For UTAH obstacle-clearing opera-tions VII Corps organized the BeachObstacle Demolition Party under Maj.Herschel E. Linn, commander of the237th Engineer Combat Battalion.Smaller than the OMAHA organization,the UTAH group consisted mainly ofone company of the 237th EngineerCombat Battalion, another from the299th Engineer Combat Battalion, andtwelve NCDUs. To supply the remain-ing naval support to the UTAH andOMAHA forces, additional NCDUsarrived from the United States on 6May.17

On 27 April, when direction of train-ing for OMAHA passed from First Armyto V Corps control, two engineer com-bat battalions (less one company) andtwenty-one NCDUs went to Woola-combe for training, but not until 1 Maywere aerial photographs of OMAHAavailable for study. Obstacles of thekind shown in detail in low-level photo-graphs were then erected at Woola-combe, and though training aids werelacking the troops practiced debarkingfrom landing craft with explosives andequipment and experimented withwaterproofing methods, tankdozer em-ployment, barbed-wire breaching, andother techniques.18

An NCDU officer, Lt. (jg.) Carl P.Hagensen, developed a method for flat-tening the big Belgian gate obstacles

16 Hist 146th Engr C Bn, Jun-Dec 44; FO 1,299thEngr C Bn, 28 May 44, in Notes and Data NEPTUNE.

17 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44.18 Rpt, T/5 Royce L. Thompson, Sep 44, in folder,

U.S. Training Center, Adm 533, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


with the least danger to troops andlanding craft from steel fragments andshards. Tests indicated that sixteen"Hagensen packs"—small sausage-likewaterproof canvas bags filled with twopounds of a new plastic explosive, Com-position C-2, and fitted with a hook atone end and a cord at the other—couldbe quickly attached to the gates' steelgirders. When a connecting "ring main"of primacord exploded the packs simul-taneously, the gate fell over.

Ten thousand Hagensen packs—withcanvas bags sewn by sailmakers in loftsthroughout England—were producedduring an eleventh-hour roundup ofgear and equipment that began whenthe brief training period ended in mid-May. Some improvisation of suppliesproved possible. For example, mortarammunition bags could hold water-proof fuses and the twenty Hagensenpacks each demolition man would carry.Nevertheless, procurement problemswere considerable. The OMAHA obsta-cle teams alone required twenty-eighttons of explosives and seventy-five milesof primacord. Tankdozers, D-8 ar-mored dozers, special minefield gapmarkers, special towing cables, and amultitude of miscellaneous engineeritems also had to be procured. Themateriel was found and assembled in aremarkably short ten days.

There was also little time for train-ing the demolition teams. Joint train-ing for most of the Army-Navy teamsstarted late and for many units lastedno more than two weeks. On 15 Maythe NCDUs moved to Salcombe, a Navyamphibious training center, and spenttheir time preparing Hagensen packsand obtaining final items of gear. Notuntil the end of May did they rejointhe Army demolition teams, which since

mid-May had been waiting for D-dayin their marshaling areas farther east.19In addition to the obstacle problem

there remained a second engineer re-sponsibility, equally central to the successof the operation: the organization ofthe supply moving on an unprecedentedscale across a complex of invasionbeaches. First Army planners turnedto the proven engineer special brigades,but then devised new command arrange-ments to accommodate the sheer massof the invasion traffic.

The Engineer Special BrigadesAt this stage of the war, the engineer

special brigades in the European the-ater were exclusively shore units sincethe Navy had taken their watercraft.The brigades now had additional ser-vice units to accomplish the enormouscargo transfers necessary for assaultoperations. Basic units included threeengineer combat battalions, a medicalbattalion, a joint assault signal company,a military police (MP) company, aDUKW battalion, an ordnance battal-ion, and various quartermaster troops.Extra equipment included power cranes,angledozers, motorized road graders,tractors, and six-ton Athey trailers.20

19 For criticism by officers of the 299th EngineerCombat Battalion demolition teams on the inadequacyof the Navy briefings, as well as the length of timespent in marshaling areas with "nothing to do," seeinterviews with Capt. William J. Bunting and Maj.Milton Jewett, in Notes and Data NEPTUNE.

20 Lt Clifford L. Jones, The Administrative andLogistical History of the European Theater of Opera-tions, vol. VI, "Neptune: Training for Mounting theOperation, and Artificial Ports," March 1946, in CMH.Unless otherwise noted, the rest of this chapter is basedon this source and on Heavey, Down Ramp! The Story ofthe Army Amphibian Engineers. For the assumption bythe Navy early in 1943 of landing craft operation andamphibious training, see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal,The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, pp.385-90.


The 1st Engineer Special Brigade,which had reached a strength of some20,000 men in Sicily, moved to Englandin December 1943 with only a nucleusof its old organization—3,346 men,including a medical battalion, a quar-termaster DUKW battalion, a signalcompany, and some ordnance troops.Unlike the other two engineer brigadesto be employed in NEPTUNE, the 1stEngineer Special Brigade had an expe-rienced unit in the 531st Engineer ShoreRegiment, which had served in theNorthwest Africa, Sicily, and Salernolandings. The 1st Engineer Special Bri-gade expanded in England to some15,000 troops by D-day.21

The 5th Engineer Special Brigadewas organized in the United Kingdomon 12 November 1943 from the 1119thEngineer Combat Group with threeattached engineer combat battalions(the 37th, 336th, and 348th). The 6thEngineer Special Brigade was formedin January 1944 from the 1116th Engi-neer Combat Group (147th, 149th, and203d Engineer Combat Battalions). Thestaff of the 111 6th brought with it aplan, conceived during training in theUnited States, to employ battalion beachgroups, each composed of an engineercombat battalion with attached troops.This concept was similar to that the 1stEngineer Special Brigade had devel-oped in the Mediterranean.

The 6th Engineer Special Brigadeplanned to deploy two battalion beachgroups on the beach, with another engi-neer combat battalion assuming respon-sibility for most of the work inland. Thebeach groups were to unload cargofrom ships and move it to dumps. Theywere also responsible for roads, mine

clearance, and similar engineer work;reinforced quartermaster and ordnancebattalions would operate the dumps. Inthe assault phase all operations of the6th Engineer Special Brigade were tobe controlled by the reinforced 149thEngineer Combat Battalion BeachGroup. As operations progressed intothe beach maintenance phase, the vari-ous battalions were to regain control oftheir elements initially attached to the149th and to assume responsibility fortheir operations.22

The 5th Engineer Special Brigadedivided itself into three battalion beachgroups. Each consisted of an engineercombat battalion, a naval beach com-pany, a quartermaster service company,a DUKW company, a medical collec-tion company, a quartermaster railheadcompany, a platoon of a quartermastergasoline supply company, a platoon ofan ordnance ammunition company, aplatoon of an ordnance medium auto-motive maintenance company, militarypolice, chemical decontamination andjoint assault signal platoons, and twoauxiliary surgical teams.23

Headquarters, First Army, the Ameri-can tactical planning agency, outlinedthe responsibilities of the engineer spe-cial brigades in an operations memo-randum on 13 February 1944. Eachengineer battalion beach group wouldsupport the assault of a regimental com-bat team and each engineer companygroupment the assault landing of aninfantry battalion landing team. FirstArmy also authorized the grouping of

21 Hist 1st ESB, Jun 42-Sep 45.

22 Rpt, HQ, 6th ESB, to TAG, thru CO, OMAHABeach Cmd, 20 Jul 44, sub: Operation Rpt NEPTUNE(hereafter cited 6th ESB NEPTUNE Rpt).

23 Col Doswell Gullatt, Operation Rpt NEPTUNE,6-26 Jun 44, inclusive, HQ, 5th Engr Spec Bde, 20Jul 44 (hereafter cited as 5th ESB Gullatt Rpt NEPTUNE).


the 5th and 6th Engineer Special Bri-gades under a headquarters known asthe Provisional Engineer Special Bri-gade Group. It soon became evidentthat the two brigades would not be suf-ficient to handle the OMAHA operation,which, besides the beaches, included anartificial port and the minor ports ofGrandcamp-les-Bains and Isigny. The11th Port (TC), which had been operat-ing the Bristol Channel ports, then aug-mented the engineer group with fourport battalions, five DUKW companies,three quartermaster service companies,three quartermaster truck companies,an ordnance medium automotive main-tenance company, and a utility detach-ment—more than 8,000 men in all. Ear-marked to operate the pierheads andminor ports, the 11th Port required notraining in beach operations.

Assault Training and Rehearsals

The combat battalions of both the 5thand 6th Engineer Special Brigades hadhad amphibious training on the Atlan-tic coast at Fort Pierce, Florida, the U.S.Navy's Amphibious Training Base. Butsome units, notably quartermaster units,had had no amphibious training beforejoining the brigades, and the trainingthe 5th Engineer Special Brigade's com-bat battalions received in the UnitedStates proved "elementary" in the lightof the heavy demands soon to be placedupon the units. Brigade units receivedfurther training in mine work, Baileybridge construction, road maintenance,and demolitions upon arrival at Swanseaon the south coast of Wales early inNovember; by early January 1944 theywere receiving training in landing oper-ations at nearby Oxwich Beach. The6th Engineer Special Brigade, stationed

at Paignton in Devon, conducted sim-ilar exercises at neighboring Goodring-ton Sands during February.24

The first of a series of major exer-cises involving assault troops and shoreengineers began in early January 1944at Slapton Sands on the southern coastof England, an area from which some6,000 persons had been evacuated fromeight villages and eighty farms. Theexercise, called DUCK I, involved 10,000troops. The assault forces consisted ofthe inexperienced 29th Infantry Divi-sion of V Corps. To give the divisionsome training with shore engineers, theV Corps commander called on Col.Eugene M. Caffey, commanding offi-cer of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade(stationed at Truro in Cornwall), forsupport. The brigade had arrived inEngland from the Mediterranean under-strength and with no equipment, but,by scouring England for equipment andborrowing officers and units, ColonelCaffey was able to furnish elements ofhis brigade for the exercise.

Succeeding exercises, DUCK II andIII, were held in February to train ele-ments of the 29th Division and the 1stEngineer Special Brigade that had notparticipated in DUCK I. The beach atSlapton Sands was ideal for training,since it approximated conditions laterfound at UTAH. But one purpose ofthe combined exercise—accustomingassault forces to the beach organizationtasks that would face them on D-day—could not be realized because OVER-LORD tactical plans were not firm untillate in February. After the 1st Engi-neer Special Brigade learned it wouldnot be with the 29th Division but with

24 6th ESB NEPTUNE Rpt; 5th ESB Gullatt RptNEPTUNE; De Arman, Hist 5th ESB; Hist 6th ESB,1944.


INFANTRY TROOPS LEAVE LST DURING EXERCISE FABIUS at Slapton Sands,April 1944.

the 4th, the brigade participated in aseries of seven exercises with elementsof the 4th Division during the last twoweeks of March. The first four practicesessions involved engineer detachmentssupporting battalion landing teams; thenext two involved regimental combatteams. VII Corps conducted the lastexercise on a scale approaching DUCKI. Two regimental combat teams trainedwith a large beach party from the 1stEngineer Special Brigade and extraengineers, parachute troops, and airforces elements.25

Exercise FOX, involving 17,000 troops

scheduled to land at OMAHA, took placeat Slapton Sands 9—10 March. The37th Engineer Combat Battalion BeachGroup of the 5th Engineer Special Bri-gade supported the 16th RegimentalCombat Team, and the 149th EngineerBattalion Beach Group of the 6th Engi-neer Special Brigade supported the116th Regimental Combat Team. Thisexercise had been delayed so that itcould parallel final tactical planning forOVERLORD, and it suffered to someextent from late and hurried prepara-tions as well as the inexperience of theunits participating. Neither the mount-ing nor the beach operations went aswell as hoped, but both the engineersand the assault troops learned better

25 T/4 Cliffford L.Jones, Notes on UTAH Beach and1st ESB, Feb 45.


use of DUKWs and more efficient water-proofing of vehicles.26

The major exercises led to the twogreat rehearsals for the invasion: TIGERand FABIUS. TIGER, the rehearsal forthe UTAH landings, came first. Some25,000 men including the 4th InfantryDivision, airborne troops, and the 1stEngineer Special Brigade participatedunder the direction of VII Corps. TIGERlasted nine days (22-30 April) with thefirst six given over to marshaling. Land-ings in the Slapton Sands area were tobegin at 0630 on 28 April.

At 0130 eight LSTs, proceeding west-ward toward the assault area with the1st Engineer Special Brigade, troops ofthe 4th Division, and VII Corps head-quarters aboard, were attacked off Port-land by enemy craft, presumably Ger-man E-boats. Torpedoes sank two LSTsand damaged a third so badly that ithad to be towed back to Dartmouth.The German craft machine-gunned thedecks of the LSTs and men in thewater. LST-531, with 1,026 soldiersand sailors aboard, had only 290 sur-vivors; total U.S. Army casualties were749 killed and more than 300 wounded.The 1st Engineer Special Brigade, with413 dead and 16 wounded, sufferedheavily in the action. Its 3206th Quar-termaster Service Company was virtu-ally wiped out, and the 557th Quarter-master Railhead Company also sustainedheavy losses. Both had to be replacedfor the invasion.27

Shattered by the disaster, which re-duced it to little more than its assault-phase elements, the 1st Engineer Spe-cial Brigade made a poor showing in

TIGER. Observing the landings from anLCI offshore, General Bradley wasdisturbed. For some "unexplained rea-son" a full report on the loss of theLSTs, which he came later to consider"one of the major tragedies of the Euro-pean war," did not reach him, and fromthe sketchy report he received he con-cluded that the damage had been slight.Attributing the poor performance ofthe brigade to a breakdown in com-mand, he suggested to Maj. Gen. J.Lawton Collins, commanding VIICorps, that a new commander be as-signed. Collins gave the job to Brig.Gen. James E. Wharton. Thus by acombination of misfortune and misun-derstanding, Col. Eugene M. Caffey,who had led the 1st Engineer SpecialBrigade in the Sicily landings, was notto lead it on D-day in Normandy.28

FABIUS consisted of six exercises car-ried out under the direction of 21 ArmyGroup. FABIUS I was the rehearsal forForce O, the 1st Division units that wereto assault OMAHA Beach. Approxi-mately 25,000 troops participated inFABIUS I, including three regimentalcombat teams and various attached ser-vice troops. FABIUS II, III, IV, and Vwere British rehearsals carried out atthe same time. FABIUS VI was a mar-shaling exercise for follow-up Force B(the 29th Division) and the British forcesin the buildup. It ran from 3 April to 7May, with a simulated D-day on 3 May.

Every effort was made to deploy regi-mental combat teams from the 1st and29th Divisions plus two Ranger and twotank battalions supported by three engi-neer combat battalions on the secondtide on D-day and 300 tons of supply

26 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 348-49.

27 Hist 1st ESB, 6 Dec 43-1 Nov 44; 1st ESB (UTAH),pp. 22-24. 28 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 247-49.


COLONEL CAFFEY (Photograph taken in 1952.)

on D plus 1—including treadway bridg-ing, Sommerfeld track, coir matting,and other material for building andimproving beach roads. A number offaults showed up in beach operations,but since D-day was only a month awayno drastic revisions could be undertaken.The most important result of the exer-cise was a change in the landing sched-ules; elements of the military policecompany, the brigade headquarters,and the signal company were to landconsiderably earlier than originally plan-ned. After FABIUS was over, most ofthe units that had participated wentdirectly to their marshaling areas.

Marshaling the Invasion Force

The primary responsibilities for mar-shaling engineer personnel, vehicles,and supplies for shipment to Normandyfell to the engineers of Western BaseSection (WBS) and especially SouthernBase Section (SBS), which had a largernumber of marshaling areas. U.S. forcesin the initial assault were to embarkfrom points in England west of Poole,and early reinforcements were to loadat ports in the Bristol Channel in ad-vance of the operation. Later reinforce-ments were to move through Southamp-ton, Portland, and Plymouth.

Of the nine major marshaling andembarkation areas in SBS, the Britishoperated one. The British and Ameri-cans jointly ran two areas around South-ampton; the Americans operated theother six areas. Each marshaling areawas to be used to 75 percent of itscapacity, with the remaining 25 percentkept in reserve to accommodate troopsand vehicles that might not be able tomove out because of enemy action,adverse weather, or other circumstance.

SBS made available many engineertroops, including general service regi-ments, camouflage companies, watersupply companies, fire-fighting pla-toons, and various smaller detachmentsto help operate the marshaling areas.29

In the marshaling areas the first stepwas to construct necessary additionalinstallations. Because the ports did nothave the capacity to load the huge inva-sion fleet at one time, base section engi-neers had to build, either within theports or along riverbanks, concrete

29 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 9, Marshalling for OVER-LORD (United Kingdom), 1946, pp. 10-18, and fig. 1,Marshalling Areas for OVERLORD, Liaison Sect, IntelDiv, ETOUSA Adm file 547.


aprons from existing roads to the water'sedge. Known as "hards" (for hard-standings), the aprons had to extendout into the water. They consisted ofprecast concrete units, called "chocolatebars" because of their scored checker-board surfaces. Averaging ten inchesin thickness, each section measuredabout 2-by-3-feet, which, laid end toend, formed a rough road. Both sidesof the slabs were scored—the top sur-face to prevent vehicles from slipping,the bottom surface to bite into thebeach. The landing craft or landingships anchored at the foot of the hardor apron, let down their ramps, andtook on vehicles and personnel dryshod; no piers or docks were necessary.Because landing craft were of shallowdraft, flat-bottomed, and most unsta-ble in rough seas and because the southcoast of England was generally unpro-tected, windswept, and subject to tidesthat greatly changed water depths, care-ful reconnaissance and British advicewere necessary to locate loading sitesor embarkation points in sheltered sec-tions, generally in a port or a rivermouth.

Next came the selection of tempo-rary camp sites near embarkation points.The capacity for out-loading from acertain group of hards determined thesize and number of camps located near-by. Each marshaling area had railheadsfor storing all classes of supplies, andevery camp was supposed to maintaina stock of food, along with fast-movingitems.

The marshaling areas were of twopatterns, large camps that might accom-modate as many as 9,000 men and

sausage-style camps—fourteen smallcamps, each with a capacity of 230 men,ranged along five to ten miles of road-way. These small camps provided bet-ter dispersal and the possibility of goodcamouflage, for tentage followed hedge-rows. But they required more person-nel for efficient operation because somedegree of control was lost. Good cam-ouflage practices were not always fol-lowed.31

Most of the camps consisted of quar-ters for 200 enlisted men (often inpyramidal tents), officers' quarters,orderly rooms, supply rooms, cooks'quarters, kitchen, mess halls, and la-trines. Special briefing tents with sandtables were also available. Where neces-sary, engineers erected flattops overopen areas used for mess lines.32 Inboth the Southern and Western BaseSections they also constructed securityenclosures and special facilities. Engi-neers had to maintain and waterproofengineer task force vehicles. Each mar-shaling camp had either a concrete tankor a dammed stream for testing water-proofing. Roads, railroads, bridges, anddock and port facilities were primarilyBritish responsibilities, and Americanengineers performed maintenance inthese areas only on request or in caseof emergency.33

The Western Base Section's task waseasier than Southern Base Section's forlittle new construction was required.Existing troop camps were big enoughand close enough to the ports. Campcapacities were increased by billetingeighteen instead of sixteen men in each

30 Southern Base Section History, Aug 43—Aug 44p. 4, Adm 601, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

31 Hist 604th Engr Camouflage Bn.32 Hist 1306th Engr GS Rgt.33 Col Fenton S. Jacobs, Western Base Section, vol.

II, p. 349, Adm 603D, ETOUSA Hist Sect. Theaccount of WBS activities is based on this source.


16-by-36-foot hut and by adding anextra man to each seven-man 16-by-16-foot pyramidal tent. Additional tentswere also erected with constructionmaterials the Royal Engineers contrib-uted.

Providing the needed accommoda-tions in both Western and SouthernBase Sections entailed much more thanacquiring buildings and erecting tents.An acute shortage of base section engi-neer operating personnel which arosein the spring of 1944 promised to be-come worse once the invasion-mounting machinery went into fullswing. SOS, ETOUSA, officials recog-nized the problem as early as February1944 and saw the need to use fieldforces to help out. General Lee esti-mated that at least 15,000 field forcetroops would be required, along with46,000 SOS troops who would have tobe taken off other work. As a result,ETOUSA permitted an entire armoreddivision to be cannibalized to providesome of the troops needed for house-keeping in the marshaling areas. Of thetotal, 4,500 were assigned as cooks, butmany of these men were not qualified.General Moore thought the shortagein mess personnel was frequently theweakest part of the engineer phase ofmarshaling.34

Briefings began in the marshalingareas on 22 May 1944. The ProvisionalEngineer Special Brigade Group's com-mander, Brig. Gen. William M. Hoge,issued a simple but effective order: "Itis my desire that every individual sol-dier in this command, destined for thefar shore, be thoroughly instructed asto the general mission and plan of his

unit, and what he is to do" The menreceived instruction in briefing tentscontaining models of the Normandybeaches, maps, overprints, charts, aerialphotographs, and mosaics.35

Battalion beach groups formed fromthe 5th and 6th Engineer BrigadeGroups, the latter initially under the5th Engineer Special Brigade, were tosupport the V Corps landings on the7,000-yard stretch of beach fronting theVierville-Colleville area. The 5th Engi-neer Special Brigade was to operate allshore installations in sectors Easy, Fox,and George to the left of the commonbrigade boundary. The 6th EngineerSpecial Brigade was to operate those insectors Charlie, Dog, and Easy to theright of the brigade boundary. Head-quarters, Provisional Engineer SpecialBrigade Group, was to assume controlof the two brigades as soon as its com-mand post was established ashore. The1st Division (less the 26th RegimentalCombat Team), with the 29th Division's116th Regimental Combat Team andother troops attached, made up ForceO, the initial assault force. The 29thDivision, less the 116th RegimentalCombat Team but with the 26th Regi-mental Combat Team and other troopsattached, constituted the immediatefollow-up force, Force B.36

Upon landing, engineer special bri-gade engineers were to relieve divi-sional engineers on the beaches. Thenthey were to develop and expand theroadway system and open additionalexits and roads within the establishedbeach maintenance area, with the goal

34 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 247; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 9, Marshalling for OVERLORD, p. 58.

35 Hist 5th ESB, p. 60, Adm 120, ETOUSA HistSect.

36 De Arman, Hist 5th ESB. Unless otherwise noted,this account of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade plansis taken from this source.


of having that area fully developed byD plus 3. Initially beach dumps were tobe set up about a thousand yards inland;later the brigade group was to consoli-date these dumps up to five miles inland.Separate areas were to be set aside forUSAAF dumps, troop transit areas, andvehicle transit areas.

The 5th Engineer Special Brigadeundertook a number of tasks, some insupport of or in coordination with theNavy. The men marked naval hazardsnear the beach, determined the bestlanding areas, and then marked thebeach limits and debarkation points.They helped remove beach obstaclesand developed and operated assaultlanding beaches. They controlled boattraffic near the beach and directed thelanding, retraction, and salvage of craftas well as unloading all craft beachingwithin their sector. Brigade membersalso developed beach exits to permitthe flow of 120 vehicles an hour by Hplus 3, organized and operated initialbeach dumps, directed traffic, and main-tained a naval ponton causeway. Theyoperated personnel and vehicle transitareas, set up and operated a POWstockade, kept track of organizationsand supplies that landed, and estab-lished initial ship-to-shore communi-cations. Finally, they gave first aid tobeach casualties before evacuating themto ships.

The general plan called for progres-sive development of the OMAHA beach-head in three phases. The assault phasewould be under company control, theinitial dump phase under battalionbeach group control, and the beachmaintenance dump phase under bri-gade control. During the first two phasesat OMAHA Beach, groups of the 5thand 6th Engineer Special Brigades were

to support the landings of the 1st Divi-sion.

The 37th Engineer Battalion BeachGroup (of the 5th Engineer SpecialBrigade) was to support the 16th Regi-mental Combat Team; the 149th BeachGroup, with the 147th Beach Groupattached (both from the 6th EngineerSpecial Brigade), was to support the116th Regimental Combat Team; andthe 348th Beach Group (of the 5thEngineer Special Brigade) was to sup-port the 18th Regimental Combat Team.The 29th Division's lead regimentalcombat team, the 26th, was to be sup-ported by the 336th Engineer CombatBattalion Beach Group of the 5th Engi-neer Special Brigade.

The duties of the 1st Engineer Spe-cial Brigade, supporting the assaultlandings of the 4th Infantry Divisionof VII Corps on UTAH Beach, weresimilar to those of the 5th EngineerSpecial Brigade on OMAHA. Uncle RedBeach on the left and Tare Green Beachon the right were each to be operatedby a battalion beach group of the bri-gade's 531st Engineer Shore Regiment;as soon as a third beach group couldland, a third beach, Sugar Red, was tobe opened at the right of Tare Green.37

In the briefings before D-day, theengineer special brigades received intel-ligence information concerning enemyforces, the progressive development ofenemy defenses, detailed geographicand hydrographic studies, reports onlocal resources, and a model of thebeach and adjacent areas. Defense over-prints provided detailed informationabout gun positions, minefields, beachobstacles, roadblocks, and antitank

37 FO 1, HQ, 1st ESB, 10 May 44, Adm 493, ETOUSAHist Sect.


ditches. An Admiralty Tide Chart pre-pared at scale 1:7,920 was valuable, aswas a 1:5,000 chart-map that the Infor-mation Section, Intelligence Division,OCE, published. However, the over-prints of land defenses and underwa-ter obstacles provided with these chartsarrived too late to be of maximum ben-efit to the troops: the land defense over-print for the Admiralty Tide Chart wasdistributed after D-day. In addition,enemy defense information was not asrecent as it might have been.38

Embarkation

After the briefings and final water-proofing of their vehicles to withstand4½-foot depths, the troops split into ves-sel loads and moved to their embarka-tion points or hards. The 5th EngineerSpecial Brigade embarked at Portland,Weymouth, and Falmouth between 31May and 3 June. Elements of the bri-gade scheduled for the first two tideswith Force O loaded aboard troop trans-ports (APs and LSIs), landing ships andcraft (LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs), cargofreighters, and motor transport ships.

Like other components of the assaultforce, the engineers were to go ashorein varied craft to reduce the risk of los-ing an entire unit in the sinking of asingle vessel. Each unit of the brigadehad an assigned number of personneland vehicle spaces, and the total wasconsiderable—4,188 men and 327 ve-hicles, including attached nonengineerunits. Force B, scheduled to land onthe third tide with 1,376 men and 277vehicles, loaded on a single wave forbetter control on the assumption thatthe risk of losing vessels would be much

less by the time of its landing.39 The 1stEngineer Special Brigade units in ForceU loaded at Plymouth, Dartmouth,Torquay, and Brixham beginning on30 May. The assembly of Force U wassomewhat more difficult than that ofForce O because its loading points weremore widely scattered.40

Most assault demolition teams werejammed aboard 100-foot LCTs, eachalready carrying two tanks, a tankdozer,gear, and packs of explosives in addi-tion to its own crew. When they arrivedat the transport area, the teams were totransfer to fifty-foot LCMs to make therun to the beach. Because insufficientlift was available to carry the LCMs inthe customary manner, such as on davits,LCTs towed them to the transport area.41

Before midnight of 3 June the engi-neers were aboard their ships and ontheir way to their rendezvous pointsbeyond the harbors. D-day was to be 5June. The slow landing ships and craftof Force U got under way during theafternoon of 3 June because they hadthe greatest distance to go; those ofForce O sortied later in the evening.The night was clear but the wind wasrising and the water was becomingchoppy. At dawn, after a rough nightat sea, the vessels were ordered to turnback. D-day had been postponed. Sun-day, 4 June, was a miserable day forthe men jammed aboard the landingships and craft under a lashing rain.

At dawn next morning the orderwent out from the supreme com-mander that D-day would be Tuesday,

38 5th ESB Gullatt Rpt NEPTUNE; Jones, Notes onUTAH Beach.

39 De Arman, Hist 5th ESB.40 1st ESB, Boat Assignment Table, an. 2 to FO 1,

Adm 493, ETOUSA Hist Sect; Ruppenthal, LogisticalSupport of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 372-73.

41 Fane and Moore, The Naked Warriors, p. 51; O'NeillRpt; Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. II, "Normandy," p. 9.


6 June. The word came to many of theengineers as it did to those of the 147thEngineer Combat Battalion aboardLCI-92:

Suddenly a hush spread above the din andclamor of the men. . . . And then, as if coin-ciding with silence, a clear, strong voiceextending from bow to stern, and reachingevery far corner of the ship, announcedthe Order of the Day issued by the Supreme

Commander. The men strained to catchevery word, "you are about to embark onthe Great Crusade. . . . Good Luck! And letus all beseech the blessing of Almighty Godupon this great and noble undertaking."For the next few moments, heads werebowed as if in silent prayer. This was theword. Tomorrow was D-day.42

42 Hist 147th Engr C Bn, 29 Jan 43-4 Mar 46.

CHAPTER XV

The Landings on OMAHA and UTAH

Darkness over the English Channelon the night of 5 June 1944 concealedfive thousand ships, spread over twentymiles of sea, plowing the choppy waterstoward Normandy. Two American andthree British task forces traveled theirseparate mine-swept lanes to the mid-point of the Channel. Each lane dividedthere into two sublanes, one for thenaval fire support vessels and the fastertransports, the other for slower craftjammed with tanks, field pieces, andwheeled vehicles.

Force O, destined for OMAHA, andForce U, headed for UTAH, arrived indesignated transport areas ten miles offthe French coast after midnight, andthe larger ships began disgorging menand equipment into the assault LCVPsswinging down from the transports'davits and hovering alongside. Smallerlanding craft churned around the largerships with their own loads of infantry,equipment, and armor for the assault.LCTs carried the duplex-drive amphibi-ous Sherman tanks that would play avital part in the first moments of theinvasion. The spearhead of the assaulton OMAHA, the tanks were to enter thewater 6,000 yards offshore, swim to thewaterline at Dog White and Dog Green,and engage the heavier German em-placements on the beaches five minutesahead of the first wave of infantry.

At H-hour, 0630, with the tide juststarting to rise from its low point,another wave of Shermans and tank-dozers was to land on Easy Green andDog Red, followed a minute later bythe assault infantry in LCVPs and Brit-ish-designed armored landing craftcalled LCAs. At 0633 the sixteen assaultgapping teams were due on OMAHA,and their support craft were to followthem during the next five minutes. Thedemolition teams, with the help of thetankdozers, had just under half an hourto open gaps in the exposed obstaclebelts before the main body of the infan-try hit the beaches. The later waves alsohad combat engineers to blow addi-tional gaps, clear beach exits, aid assaulttroops in moving inland, and help orga-nize the beaches. Off UTAH a similarscene unfolded, with the duplex-drivetanks scheduled to go in on the heels ofthe first wave of the 8th Infantry assault,followed in five minutes by the Army-Navy assault gapping teams and detach-ments from two combat engineer battal-ions. 1

Engineers on Omaha

The eight demolition support teams1 War Dept, Hist Div, Omaha Beachhead, pp. 38-42;

Dept of the Army, Hist Div, Utah Beach to Cherbourg,pp. 43-44; Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, p. 80.


for OMAHA and the three commandteams aboard a British transport hadhad a chance to get some sleep duringthe night. But the gapping teams,crowded aboard LCTs and towed LCMs,were miserable. One of the LCTs hadbroken down early in the voyage, andseveral swamped in the Channel swell.Their drenched and seasick passengerstransferred to the bucking LCMs in theblackness, no small feat considering theamount of equipment involved. (Map16)

The engineers were overburdenedfor their trip to shore. Each man car-ried a forty-pound bag of Hagensenpacks, wire cutters, a gas mask, car-tridges, an inflatable life belt, a canteen,rations, and a first aid packet. They hadeither carbines or Garand rifles andbangalore torpedoes to tear apart thebarbed wire on the beach. Some hadmine detectors, others heavy wire reelswound with 800 feet of primacord, andsome carried bags of fuse assemblies.Over their uniforms all wore coverallsimpregnated against gas, and over thema fur-lined jacket. Each LCM held tworubber boats, each containing about 500pounds of explosives, extra bangalores,mine detectors, gap markers, buoys,and from 75 to 100 cans of gasoline.2

Almost from the beginning, thingsbegan to go wrong for the sixteen gap-ping teams. They managed to transferfrom the LCTs to the LCMs on schedule,around 0300. At 0450, twenty minutesafter the amphibious tanks and the firstinfantry assault wave started for shore,the demolition teams were on their wayto the line of departure, some two miles

offshore. Behind them, their supportteams were delayed when their LCMsfailed to arrive on time, and they en-countered difficulties getting into smal-ler craft from the attack transports.Unable to load completely until 0500,the support, elements finally got underway at 0600, far too late to reach thetidal flat in time to help the gappingteams. The precisely timed schedules,conceived for fair weather and calmseas, were breaking down even beforethe engineers reached the shore.3

The assault gapping teams headedlandward heartened by the rain of metaldescending on enemy positions. Theeight assault teams assigned to the east-ern sector of OMAHA with the 16thRegimental Combat Team reached theline of departure at first light; Navycontrol boats herded them into theircorrect lanes for Easy Red and FoxGreen beaches. As they headed forshore, heavy shells of the naval bom-bardment whistled over their heads,and at 0600 bombers arrived with thefirst of some 1,300 tons of bombs drop-ped on the invasion area on D-day. Thesight made the drenched, shiveringmen in the boats momentarily forgettheir misery. They were cheered intheir certainty that the Air Forces wouldsaturate the beaches, and when a Brit-ish rocket ship loosed the first of a bar-rage of 9,000 missiles at the Germanpositions, hope mounted that the Ger-man artillery and machine-gun nestswould be silent when the LCMs camein. Optimists recalled a statement froma briefing aboard one of the transports:"There will be nothing alive on the

2 Fane and Moore, The Naked Warriors, pp. 51 —52;Interv, Capt William J. Bunting, Jnl, and FO 1, 299thEngr C Bn, in Notes and Data, NEPTUNE.

3 Interv, Maj Milton Jewett, CO, 299th Engr C Bn,in Notes and Data, NEPTUNE; Hist 146th Engr C Bn;O'Neill Rpt.

THE LANDINGS ON OMAHA AND UTAH 321

MAP 16

beach when you land."4

The illusion did not sustain themlong, for the bombers had flown throughcloud cover that forced their crews torely on imperfect blind bombing tech-niques. Only two sticks of bombs fellwithin four miles of the shore defenses,though the area behind the beachestook a thorough pounding. The Brit-ish rockets made a fine display, but dis-appeared over the cliffs to dig up thelandscape behind the German coastalworks. The naval barrage beginning atH minus 45 minutes was also moreeffective inland, contributing to the dis-ruption of German communications.The combined power of the air andnaval bombardment did much to iso-late the battle area. But the Germanshore batteries on OMAHA, located inbunkers and enfilading the beach so

that they could fire no more than a fewhundred yards out to sea, remainedmute during the opening moments ofthe action. Offering no muzzle flashesto give away their positions to the Navygunners and invite their own destruc-tion, they were largely intact when thefirst wave of engineers, tanks, and infan-try hit the tidal flat.5

For the first troops in, OMAHA was"an epic human tragedy which in theearly hours bordered on total disaster."6

The morning mists and the smoke raisedin the bombardment concealed land-marks in some sectors, and a strongtidal crosscurrent carried the boats as

4 Fane and Moore, The Naked Warriors, p. 50; Intervs,Bunting and Jewett, Notes and Data, NEPTUNE.

5 The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. VI,"Neptune: Training for Mounting the Operation, andArtificial Ports," pp. 14-15; Operation Rpt NEPTUNE,p. 82; Col. Paul W. Thompson, "D-day on OmahaBeach," Infantry Journal, LVI (June 1945), 40.

6 S. L. A. Marshall, "First Wave at Omaha Beach,"in Battle at Best (New York: William Morrow and Co.,1963), p. 52.


TANKS AND VEHICLES STALLED AT THE SHINGLE LINE ON OMAHA BEACH

much as two thousand yards east oftheir intended landfalls. The 741stTank Battalion launched twenty-nineof its thirty-two duplex-drive tanks off-shore and immediately lost twenty-seven when they foundered or plungeddirectly to the bottom of the Channelupon leaving their LCTs. Two swamashore, and the remaining three landedfrom beached LCTs, only to fall preyat the waterline to German gunners.Machine-gun fire whipped among theengineer and infantry landing craft,intermingled now, and followed themto the beach. As the ramps dropped, astorm of artillery and mortar roundsjoined the automatic and small-armsfire, ripping apart the first wave. Deadmen dotted the flat; the wounded lay

in the path of the onrushing tide, andmany drowned as the surf engulfedthem. An infantry line formed at theshingle bank and, swelled by fearful,dispirited, and often leaderless men,kept up a weak volume of fire as yetinadequate to protect the engineers. Inthe carnage, the gapping teams, suffer-ing their own losses, fought to blow theobstacles.

On the left of Easy Red, one teamled the entire invasion by at least fiveminutes. The commander of Team 14,2d Lt. Phill C. Wood, Jr., was underthe impression that H-hour was 0620instead of 0630. Under his entreaties,the Navy coxswain brought the LCMin at 0625, the boat's gun crew unsuc-cessfully trying to destroy Teller mines


on the upright stakes. Wood and histeam dragged their explosive-ladenrubber boat into waist-deep water undera hail of machine-gun fire. No one wason the beach. The lieutenant chargedtoward a row of obstacles, glancingbackward as he ran. In that moment hesaw an artillery shell land squarely inthe center of the craft he had just left,detonating the contents of the secondrubber boat and killing most of theNavy contingent of his team. The LCMburned fiercely. Wood's crew droppedbangalore torpedoes and mine detec-tors and abandoned their load of ex-plosives. Dodging among the rows, theymanaged to wire a line of obstacles toproduce a gap, but here the infantrylanding behind them frustrated theirattempt to complete the job. Troops,wounded or hale, huddled among theobstacles, using them for cover, andWood finally gave up trying to chasethem out of range of his charges. Leav-ing the obstacles as they were, he andhis team, now only about half of itsoriginal strength, rushed forward andtook up firing positions with the infan-try concentrated at the shingle.7

Other teams had little more success.Team 13's naval detachment also fellwhen an artillery shell struck its boat-load of explosives just after it landedon Easy Red. The Army contingent lostonly one man but found the infantrydischarging from the landing craft seek-ing cover among the obstacles, thus pre-venting the team from setting offcharges. Team 12 left its two rubberboats aboard the LCM, yet managed toclear a thirty-yard gap on Easy Red,

but at a fearful cost. A German mortarshell struck a line of primacord, prema-turely setting off the charges strungabout one series of obstacles, killing sixArmy and four Navy demolitions menand wounding nine other members ofthe team and a number of infantrymenin the vicinity. Team 11, arriving onthe far left flank of Easy Red ahead ofthe infantry, lost over half its men. Afaulty fuse prevented the remainderfrom blowing a passage through thebeach impediments.

Only two teams, 9 and 10, accom-plished their missions on the easternsector of OMAHA. Team 9, landing inthe middle of Easy Red well ahead ofthe infantry waves, managed to open afifty-yard path for the main assault.Team 10's performance was encourag-ing in comparison with that of theothers. Clearing the infantry aside with-in twenty minutes of hitting the beach,the men demolished enough obstaclesin spite of heavy casualties to create twogaps, one fifty yards wide and a seconda hundred yards across. They were theonly gaps blown on the eastern half ofthe assault beaches.

The remaining teams assigned to thatarea had much the same dismal experi-ence as Lieutenant Wood's team, andthe failure of the assault gapping effortbecame evident. At Fox Green, Teams15 and 16 came in later than those onEasy Red but met the same heavy artil-lery and automatic fire. At 0633 Team16 plunged off its LCM, leaving its rub-ber boats adrift when it became appar-ent that they drew German attention.Here too the men gave up trying toblow gaps when the infantry would notleave the protection of the Germandevices. Team 15 touched down at0640, just as the tide began rising rap-

7 Interv, Lt Wood, in Notes and Data, NEPTUNE;Hist 146th Engr C Bn; Fane and Moore, The NakedWarriors, p. 53—64.


idly, and lost several men to machine-gun fire before they left the LCM. In anow common occurrence, they sustainedmore casualties when a shell found therubber boat with its volatile load. Thesurvivors nevertheless attacked the Bel-gian gates farthest from shore and fixedcharges to several. The fusillade fromshore cut away fuses as rapidly as theengineers could rig them. One burst offragments carried away a fuseman'scarefully set mechanism—and all of hisfingers. With no choice but to make forshore, they ran, only four of their origi-nal forty uninjured, to the low shinglebank on Fox Green, where they col-lapsed, "soaking wet, unable to move,and suffering from cramps. It was coldand there was no sun."8

Seven teams bound for the 116thInfantry's beaches on the western halfof OMAHA—Dog Green, Dog White,Dog Red, and Easy Green—were onschedule, most of them, in fact, comingin ahead of the infantry companies inthe first waves. The eighth team landedmore than an hour later; its LCT hadfoundered and sunk shortly after leav-ing England, and the team transferredto other craft. When it finally landed at0745, the team found the obstacles cov-ered with water. The duplex-drive tankcrews on the western half of the beachcame in all the way on their landingcraft rather than attempting the swimashore, but their presence was onlybriefly felt. German fire disabled manytanks at the shingle line where they hadhalted, unable to move farther, andthose remaining could not silence theheavier enemy guns. The men of Team

8, landing a little to the left of DogGreen, saw no Americans on the beachbut confronted a German party work-ing on the obstacles. The Germans fled,and the team was able to blow one fifty-yard gap before the American infantryarrived. Teams 3 and 4, badly shot up,achieved little, and Teams 5 and 7 coulddo no blasting after the incoming infan-try took cover among the beach obstruc-tions. The only positive results camewhen Teams 1 and 6 each opened afifty-yard gap, one on Dog White andone on Dog Red. Command Boat 1, onthe beach flat at 0645, unloaded a crewthat made an equally wide hole in theobstacles on Easy Green. Where theengineers successfully blew lanes open,they had first to cajole, threaten, andeven kick the infantry out of the way.Gapping team members later recalledthat the teams had more success if theycame in without firing the machineguns on the LCMs, since their distinc-tive muzzle flashes gave their range tothe enemy.

The tardy support teams appearedoff the eastern beaches, all carried offcourse and landing between 0640 and0745 on or around Fox Red. The Ger-man artillerymen at the eastern reachesof OMAHA met them with fearsomelyaccurate fire. One 88-mm. piece puttwo rounds into Team F's LCM, killingand wounding fifteen men; only fourmen of the original team got to shore.Team D got a partial gap opened, mak-ing a narrow, thirty-yard lane, but theother teams could do little. The menarriving later found the German firejust as heavy, and the incoming tideforced them to shore before they coulddeploy among the obstacles. They joinedthe earlier elements that had found

8 Interv, S/Sgt James M. Redmond, Team 15, Notesand Data, NEPTUNE.


shelter under the cliffs at the easternend of the beach.9

Their strength reduced to a singlemachine, engineer tankdozers couldoffer little help. Only six of the sixteenM—4s equipped with bulldozer bladesgot ashore, and the enemy picked offfive of them. The remaining one pro-vided the engineers an alternative toblowing up the obstacles, an increas-ingly hazardous undertaking as moretroops and vehicles crowded onto thebeaches. Instead of using demolitions,which sent shards of metal from theobstacles careening around the area,the teams set about removing the minesfrom stakes, ramps, hedgehogs, andBelgian gates, and let the tankdozers,joined later in the day by several ar-mored bulldozers, shove the obstaclesout of the way as long as the tide per-mitted. Pushed ashore after 0800 bythe inrushing water, the gapping teamshelped move wounded men off thetidal flat and consolidated equipmentand the supply of explosives to awaitthe next ebb.

In the meantime the Navy had dis-covered that the obstacles did not posethe expected problem once they werestripped of their mines. Shortly after1000, several destroyers moved to with-in a thousand yards of the beach. Engag-ing the German emplacements withdevastating 5-inch gunfire, they beganto accomplish what the tanks in the firstassault could not. Using the coveringfire, two landing craft, LCT—30 andLCI-554, simply rammed through theobstacles off Fox Green, battering apath to shore with all automatic weap-

ons blazing. Though LCT—30 was lostto fire from the bluffs, the other vesselretracted from the beach without loss,and dozens of other craft hovering off-shore repeated the maneuver with thesame result.10

When the first morning tide inter-rupted the work of the gapping teams,they had opened just five holes, andonly one of these, Team 10's 100-yard-wide lane on Easy Red, was usable.Their ranks virtually decimated in theirfirst half-hour ashore, the teams' mem-bers were often bitter when they dis-cussed their experience later. Most ofthe equipment the LCMs carried hadbeen useless or worse; the rubber boatswith their explosives had drawn heavyfire, and the engineers had abandonedthem as quickly as possible. The minedetectors were useless since the enemyhad buried no mines in the flat, andGerman snipers made special targetsof men carrying them. With no barbedwire strung among the obstacles, thebangalore torpedoes the engineersbrought in were only an extra burden.Overloaded and dressed in impreg-nated coveralls, the engineers foundtheir movement impeded, and woundedand uninjured men alike drowned un-der the weight of their packs as theyleft the landing craft. The survivors alsocriticized the close timing of the inva-sion waves that left them only a halfhour to clear lanes. The confusion pro-duced when the engineers landed si-multaneously with or even ahead of theinfantry led to the opinion that therealso should have been at least a halfhour between the first infantry assault

9 Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day, June 6, 1944 (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 190-91; Oper-ation Rpt NEPTUNE, p. 85; O'Neill Rpt.

10 Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, p.141.


and the arrival of the gapping teams.In future actions, support teams shouldgo in with the groups they were back-ing up rather than behind them in theinvasion sequence. Lastly, as a tacticalmeasure, the gapping team veteransrecommended that the first concernshould be to strip the mines from anyobstacles encountered so as to renderthem safe for tankdozers or landingcraft to ram.11

The human cost of the engineers'heroism on OMAHA was enormous.When the Army elements of the gap-ping teams reverted on D plus 5 to con-trol of the 146th and 299th EngineerCombat Battalions, then attached to VCorps, they had each lost between 34and 41 percent of their original strength.The units had not yet accounted for alltheir members, and the Navy set lossesamong the naval contingents of theteams at 52 percent. Fifteen Distin-guished Service Crosses went to Armymembers of the team; Navy demolitionsmen received seven Navy Crosses. Eachof the companies of the 146th and299th Engineer Combat Battalions in-volved and the naval demolition unitreceived unit citations for the action onD-day.12

The end of the first half hour onD-day saw approximately 3,000 Ameri-can assault troops on OMAHA, scatteredin small clumps along the sand. Iso-lated from each other and firing spo-radically at the enemy, they sought toadvance up the small defiles leading to

the flanks and rear of German positions,but no forward motion was yet evident.On the right, or western, flank of thebeach in front of Vierville in the 116thInfantry's zone, the Germans had takenthe heaviest toll among the incomingmen, and the assault of Company A,116th Infantry, crumbled under thewithering fire. Reinforcements wereslow, often carried off course to the eastin the tidal current. A thousand yardseast, straddling Dog Red and EasyGreen, lay elements of two more com-panies from the 116th, confused bytheir surroundings but less punishedby German fire since the defensive posi-tions above were wrapped in a heavysmoke from grass fires that obscuredvision seaward. Sections of four differ-ent companies from both assault regi-ments landed on the Fox beaches and,huddled with engineers from the gap-ping teams, fired at opportune targetsor contemplated their next moves. Onlyin the stretch between the Colleville andSt. Laurent draws, Exits E-1 and E-3,was there relative safety. The Germanposts in the bluffs here seemed un-manned through the whole invasion,which also permitted the more success-ful performance of the gapping teamson Easy Red. But the success of theinvasion on OMAHA now dependedupon getting the troops and vehicles offthe beaches and through the Germancoastal defensive shell.13

Opening the Exits

While the ordeal of the gapping teamswas still in progress, a second phase of11 Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, p. 92; Cdr. Kenneth

Edwards, RN, Operation Neptune (London: Collins,1946), p. 149; Intervs, Bunting and Jewett, Notes andData, NEPTUNE.

12 O'Neill Rpt; War Dept, Hist Div, Omaha Beach-head, pp. 43, 165—66; Fane and Moore, The NakedWarriors, pp. 65—66.

13 Col . Paul W. Thompson, "D-day on Omaha Beach,"Infantry Journal, LXI, no. 6 (June 1945), 34-48;Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 315; War Dept, HistDiv, Omaha Beachhead, pp. 45—47.


engineer operations on OMAHA beganwith the arrival of the first elements ofthe 5th Engineer Special Brigade. Theseunits were charged with bringing someorder out of the chaos of the invasionbeaches. For the purpose some engi-neer combat battalions became the coreunits for beach groups, which includeda DUKW company, quartermaster unitsfor gasoline and other supply, a medi-cal detachment, ordnance ammunition,maintenance, and bomb disposal units,and an assortment of signal, chemical,and military police companies. A com-pany from a naval beach battalion com-pleted the organization to assist in struc-turing the beaches for supply opera-tions. Four groups had assignments onOMAHA for D-day. The 37th EngineerBattalion Beach Group supported the16th Regimental Combat Team, 1stDivision, and the 149th was behind the116th Infantry. The 348th was to facili-tate the landing of the 18th Infantry,following the 16th on the eastern endof the beach. The 336th Engineer Bat-talion Beach Group was scheduled toarrive in the afternoon to organize FoxRed. All the groups were under 5thEngineer Special Brigade control untilthe assault phase was over; the 149thEngineer Battalion Beach Group wouldthen revert to the 6th Brigade.14

The earliest elements stepped intothe same fire that cut up the gappingteams. First in was a reconnaissanceparty from Company A, 37th EngineerCombat Battalion, led by the companycommander; it landed at 0700, ten min-utes ahead of schedule, opposite theE-3 draw on Fox Green. Sections ofthe remainder of Company A and a

platoon of Company C, accompanyinga headquarters group, arrived over thenext several minutes, but the entirecomplement of the battalion's menwound up hugging the shingle bank andhelping to build up the fire line. Anotherengineer section, this one from Com-pany C, 149th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, scheduled for landing on DogRed, landed on Easy Green. They setto work there, and a small detachmentbegan digging a path through the duneline to the road paralleling the shore.A second detail wormed its way throughgaps cut in the barbed wire and ap-proached the base of the cliffs, only tobe halted by an antitank ditch. Enemyfire forced the group back to the shin-gle line. Two companies from the 147thEngineer Combat Battalion sufferedforty-five men lost to artillery fire evenbefore their LCT set them down offDog White at 0710. In the five-foot surfthey lost or jettisoned their equipmentand found shelter after a harrowingrun for the shingle.15 An LCI put Com-pany B, 37th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, ashore safely at 0730 at ExitE-1, leading to St. Laurent, which thebattalion was supposed to open for the2d Battalion of the 16th Infantry. Com-pany A was to open Exit E-3 for the3d Battalion but did not arrive until0930. Landing near E-1, Company Ahad to make its way through the wreck-age on the beach to E-3, where theunit ran into such withering artillery,mortar, and small-arms fire that it couldaccomplish little all day. Unluckiest ofall was Company C, which was to pushinland and set up transit areas. A directhit to its LCI on landing at Exit E-1killed many men. In the same area one

14 Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, p. 37. 15 Ibid., p. 87.


of two LCIs carrying the battalion staffbroached on a stake; the men had todrop off into neck-deep water and wadeashore under machine-gun fire.16 Com-ing in with the fifth wave, they hadexpected to find OMAHA free of small-arms fire. Instead, the beach wascrowded with the men of the first wavescrouching behind the shingle. Deadlyaccurate artillery fire was still hittingthe landing craft, tanks, and half-trackslining the water's edge; one mortar shellkilled the commander of the 37th Engi-neer Combat Battalion, Lt. Col. LionelF. Smith, and two members of his staff,Capts. Paul F. Harkleroad and AlienH. Cox, Jr., as soon as they landed.Badly shaken, the engineers joined theinfantrymen behind the shingle bank.

By 0930, infantry penetrations of theGerman positions above the beach werebeginning to have some effect, thoughonly a few men were scaling the heights.Rangers and elements of the 116thInfantry got astride the high groundbetween Exits D-1 and D-3 around0800 and slowly eliminated some of theautomatic weapons trained on Ameri-can troops below. Between St. Laurentand Colleville, companies from bothregiments got men on the heights. Onecompany raked the German trenchesin the E-1 draw, capturing twenty-oneGermans before moving farther inland.In the F-1 draw back of Fox Red, mostcoordinated resistance ended by 0900,but isolated nests of Germans remained.The movement continued all morning,and the engineers either joined attemptsto scale the bluffs or made it possiblefor others to climb.

Beyond the shingle on Easy Green

and Easy Red were a double-apronbarbed-wire fence and minefields cov-ering the sands to the bluffs. As theinfantry advances began to take a tollof the German defenders on the bluffs,Sgt. Zolton Simon, a squad leader inCompany C, 37th Engineer CombatBattalion, gathered his five-man mine-detector crew, cut a gap in the wire,and led his men into the minefield. Dis-regarding the fire, they methodicallyopened and marked a narrow pathacross the mined area, into a smalldefile, and up the hill. Simon waswounded once while helping to sweepmines and again when he reached thehilltop, this time so seriously that hewas out of action. By now, infantry wason the trail behind him, urged into thegap by 1st Lt. Charles Peckham of Com-pany B, who stood exposed to enemyfire directing men across the mine-swept corridor.17

The task remained of getting thetanks inland. A platoon of the 20thEngineer Combat Battalion, landing insupport of the 1st Battalion, 16th In-fantry, began blowing a larger gapthrough the minefield with bangaloretorpedoes. Mine-detector crews of Com-pany C of the 37th Engineer Battalionfollowed to widen the lanes to accom-modate vehicles. But the tanks couldnot get past the shingle, where theycould get no traction. Behind the shin-gle lay a deep antitank ditch. Pvt. VintonDove, a bulldozer operator of CompanyC, made the first efforts to overcomethese obstacles, assisted by his reliefoperator, Pvt. William J. Shoemaker,who alternated with him in driving andguiding the bulldozer. Dove cleared a

16 Hist 37th Engr C Bn, Mar 43-Aug 44.

17 Ibid. Simon received the Silver Star, Peckham theBronze Star.


ENGINEERS ANCHOR REINFORCED TRACK for vehicles coming ashore at Omaha.

road through the shingle, pulled outroadblocks at Exit E-1, and beganworking on the antitank ditch, whichwas soon filled with the help of dozeroperators from Company B and a com-pany of the 149th Engineer CombatBattalion that had landed near E— 1 bymistake. The pioneer efforts of Doveand Shoemaker in the face of severeenemy fire, which singled out the bull-dozer as a prime target, won for bothmen the Distinguished Service Cross.18

Company C's 1st Lt. Robert P. Rosswon the third of the three DistinguishedService Crosses awarded to men of the

37th on D-day for his contribution tosilencing the heavy fire coming from ahill overlooking Exit E-1. Assumingcommand of a leaderless infantry com-pany, Ross took the infantrymen, alongwith his own engineer platoon, up theslopes to the crest, where the troopsengaged the enemy, killed forty Ger-mans, and forced the surrender of twomachine-gun emplacements.19 Clearedfairly early, the E-1 exit became theprincipal egress from OMAHA Beachon D-day, largely due to the exertionsof the 37th Engineer Combat Battalion.The unit suffered the heaviest casual-ties among the components of the 5th

18 Hist 20th Engr C Bn, Jun 44; Operation RptNEPTUNE, pp. 87, 92; Recommendations for Awards,5th ESB, Aug-Oct 44. 19 Hist 37th Engr C Bn.


Engineer Special Brigade—twenty-four men killed, including the battal-ion commander.

Exit E-3 yielded only slowly to thepersistence of the engineer troops inthe area, including Company A, 37thEngineer Combat Battalion. Still underaccurate if intermittent artillery firearound 1630, the beach remained un-marked for incoming boat traffic, asthe shelling tore down the signposts assoon as they were erected. By 1700 the348th Engineer Combat Battalion hadcleared the lateral road along the beachof mines, and the members of both bat-talions moved to the base of the uplandsto begin work in the draw, alreadychoked with wrecked American tanksand half-tracks. Night drew on as themen opened the road leading up fromthe beach. A particularly troublesome88-mm. gun interfered with their workuntil dark, and Capt. Louis J. Drnovich,commanding Company A, 37th Engi-neers, determined that he "would getthat gun or else." Taking only his car-bine and a few grenades, he set off upthe hill. His body was found three dayslater a short distance from where hehad started. The exit carried its firsttank traffic over the hill to Colleville at0100 on D plus 1, but trucks could notnegotiate the road until morning.20

By that time, tanks were moving toColleville through Exit F-1, eastern-most in the 16th Infantry's sector andclose to bluffs dominating Fox Red.This was the sector where many troopsof the first assault waves, includingsome of the 116th Regimental CombatTeam, had landed as a result of theeasterly tidal current. The task of open-

ing Exit F-1 belonged to the 336thEngineer Battalion Beach Group, whichwas scheduled to land after 1200 onD-day at Easy Red near E-3 and thenmarch east to Fox Red. Some of theadvance elements went ashore on E-3at 1315 and made their way towardtheir objective through wreckage on thebeach, falling flat when enemy firecame in and running during the lulls.21

Heavy enemy fire drove away twoLCTs carrying three platoons of Com-pany C, and the platoons landed at theend of OMAHA farthest from the Foxbeaches. An artillery shell hit one LCT;the other struck a sandbar. Both finallygrounded off the Dog beaches betweenLes Moulins and Vierville—the moststrongly fortified part of OMAHA, wherestone-walled summer villas affordedprotection to German machine gunnersand snipers and the cliffs at the west-ward end at Pointe de la Percee pro-vided excellent observation points forartillery positions behind the two re-sorts. This was the area of the 116thRegimental Combat Team, whose engi-neer combat battalions—the 112th,121st, and 147th—suffered severelyduring the landings.

Survivors of the first sections of the147th Engineer Combat Battalion tocome in on Dog White at 0710 joinedinfantrymen in the fight for Viervilleor climbed the cliffs with the Rangers.At midmorning the battalion comman-der, concerned about a growing con-gestion of tanks and vehicles on DogGreen, ordered all his units to concen-trate on blowing open Exit D-1, blockedby a concrete revetment. They set towork, collecting explosives from deadbodies and wrecked vessels, and with

20 Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, p. 101; De Arman, Hist5th ESB. Drnovich was awarded the Silver Star post-humously.

21 Hist 336th Engr C Bn, 25 Jul 42-31 Aug 44.


the help of men of the 121st EngineerCombat Battalion, who had mislandedon Easy Green and had made their wayto Dog Green, were able to open theexit, but it was not fully usable until2100. At Exit D-3, the Les Moulinsdraw between Dog Red and Easy Green,the 112th Engineer Combat Battalioncommander was killed early on D-day,and the men were pinned down byenemy fire behind a seawall. Even withthe assistance of a platoon of the 147th,which came in with most of its equip-ment during the day, the 112th Battal-ion was not able to open Exit D-3 until2000.22

Wading ashore at Dog Green about1500, troops of the 336th EngineerCombat Battalion assembled at the shin-gle bank and began a hazardous marchtoward Fox Red, more than two milesaway. The unit moved in a long irregu-lar column, followed by a D-7 tractorthat towed an Athey trailer loaded withexplosives. As the battalion made its wayaround bodies and wreckage throughsmoke and gunfire, it witnessed theawful panorama of D-day on OMAHA.Artillery fire had decreased at Exit D-1after destroyers knocked out a strong-point on Pointe de la Percee aboutnoon. It grew heavier as engineersapproached Exit D-3, several timesnarrowly missing the explosive-ladentrailer. At E— 1 the fire let up, but con-gestion on the beach increased. Bull-dozers were clearing a road throughthe shingle embankment, and the beachflat was jammed with vehicles waitingto join a line moving up the hill towardSt. Laurent. DUKWs with 105-mm.howitzers were beginning to come in;

the first (and only) artillery mission ofthe day from the beach was fired at1615 against a machine-gun nest nearColleville.

The worst spot they encountered onthe beach was at Exit E-3, still underfire as they passed. There the 336thBattalion's column ran into such heavymachine-gun fire and artillery shellingthat the unit had to halt. The com-mander sent the men forward two at atime; when about half had gone throughthe area, a shell hit a bulldozer workingat the shingle bank. The dozer beganto burn, sending up clouds of smokethat covered the gap and enabled therest of the men to dash across. As thetroops proceeded down the beach, theysaw a tank nose over the dune line andfire about twenty-five rounds at a Ger-man machine-gun emplacement, knock-ing it out; but artillery barrages contin-ued hitting the beach in front of E-3every fifteen or twenty minutes.

At the end of its "memorable andterrible" march across OMAHA, duringwhich two men were killed by shell frag-ments and twenty-seven were injured,the engineer column reached the com-parative safety of the F— 1 area at 1700.The surrounding hills had been clearedof machine-gun nests, and althoughenemy artillery was able to reach thetidal flat, it could not hit the beach. Thefirst job was mine clearance: the areawas still so heavily mined that severaltanks, one of them equipped with adozer blade, could not get off the beach.The men had only one mine detectorbut were able to assemble several morefrom damaged detectors the infantryhad left on the beach. More were sal-vaged when the last elements of the bat-talion came in from Dog Green around1730. After they had cleared the fields

22 Hists, 147th Engr C Bn, 29 Jan 43-4 Mar 46;121st, 1 Jun-31 Aug 44; and 112th, 1944.


near the beach of mines and a tank-dozer had filled in an antitank ditch,the teams began to work up a hill witha tractor following, opening the F-1exit. Tanks began climbing the hill at2000; two struck mines, halting themovement for about an hour, but by2230 fifteen tanks had passed throughthe exit to the Colleville area to helpthe infantry clear the town.23

Brig. Gen. William M. Hoge, com-manding general of the ProvisionalEngineer Special Brigade Group, hadlanded at Exit E-1 shortly after 1500and had set up a command post in aconcrete pillbox just west of the exit;from there he assumed engineer com-mand responsibility from the 5th Engi-neer Special Brigade commander, Col.Doswell Gullatt. As units of the 6thEngineer Special Brigade reverted tothat unit, additional infantry units werelanding to support the 116th and the16th Infantry. The 115th, ahead ofschedule and also carried eastward,landed in the middle of the 18th In-fantry, east of the St. Laurent draw.This produced some confusion, but thenew strength swelled the advance mov-ing slowly off the beaches by evening.In the morning of D plus 1 vehiculartraffic, infantry, and engineers alikewere moving through the exits, off thebeaches, and over the hills. By that timethe 4th Infantry Division of Force Uhad penetrated the German defensessome ten miles to the west at UTAHBeach.24

Utah

As the first assault elements transfer-

red into landing craft a dozen miles offUTAH, alarmed German local com-manders were trying to fathom theintentions and to gauge the strength ofthe paratroopers that had dropped intotheir midst around 0130. Separated inthe cloud cover over the Cotentin pen-insula while evading German antiair-craft fire, the transport aircraft headedfor partially marked drop zones astridethe Merderet River and the area be-tween Ste. Mere-Eglise and UTAH itself.Scattered widely in the drop, the troop-ers of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divi-sions struggled to concentrate theirstrength and find their objectives. The82d had one regiment fairly consoli-dated from the start east of the Mer-deret. The division took the town ofSte. Mere-Eglise with mixed contin-gents, some troops from the 101st work-ing with the 82d even as glider-bornereinforcements came in shortly beforedawn. The 101st Airborne Division,equally dispersed, managed to massenough of its own men and troopers ofthe 82d who fell into its area of respon-sibility to secure the western edges ofthe inundated land behind UTAH andthe all-important causeway entranceson that side of the German beach de-fenses. With German strength threat-ening the landing zone from across theDouve River to the south, the para-troopers could not muster enough mento control or destroy all the bridgesacross the river. Engineers of CompanyC, 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion,rigged some for destruction, and smallgroups held out nearly all of D-day inthe face of German units south of thestream, awaiting relief by other air-borne units or by the main body of theinvasion. Their losses and their disorga-nization notwithstanding, the para-troops had thoroughly confused the

23 Hist 336th Engr C Bn, 25 Jul 42-31 Aug 44;Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, pp. 98- 100; War Dept, HistDiv, Omaha, Beachhead, pp. 101-06.

24 Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, pp. 96, 102-03.


German defenders and engaged theirreserves, especially the veterans of the91st Division, far from the beaches.25

Compared with OMAHA, UTAH waspractically a walkover. Owing to thesmoke of the prelanding bombardmentand the loss of two small Navy controlvessels marking the line of departureoff the beach, the entire first wave ofthe 8th Infantry's assault grounded2,000 yards south of its intended land-fall. The operation of UTAH shifted tothe left of the original beaches, fortu-itously striking a shoreline far less heav-ily defended and with much sparserobstacle belts than expected. (Map 17)

Engineer demolitions were to beginat 0635, five minutes after the infantrylanding. The teams involved were un-der an ad hoc Beach Obstacle Demoli-tion Party commanded by Maj. Her-schel E. Linn, also the commandingofficer of the 237th Engineer CombatBattalion. Underwater obstacles abovethe low tide line were the targets of thefirst demolition units, eight sixteen-mannaval teams, each including five Armyengineers. Eight of the twelve available26-man Army demolition teams wereto land ten minutes later, directly be-hind eight LCTs carrying the dozertanks to be used on the beach. Navyand Army teams were to clear eightfifty-yard gaps through the beach ob-structions for the subsequent waves,and the fourth and fifth waves of theassault would bring in the remainderof the engineers to help clear the areaas necessary. Linn and his executiveofficer, Capt. Robert P. Tabb, Jr., plan-ned to supervise the beach operationsfrom their M-29 Weasels, small tracked

cargo vehicles capable of negotiatingsand and surf.26

The plan came apart immediately.Army and Navy teams landed almostsimultaneously between 0635 and 0645.On the run to the beach, Major Linn'scraft was sunk off Uncle Red; he didnot arrive ashore until the followingday. Captain Tabb, now in command,drove his Weasel off the LCT on TareGreen and felt it sink beneath him. Hesalvaged the radio after getting the crewout and made for the beach, where heencountered Brig. Gen. Theodore Roo-sevelt, Jr., assistant commander of the4th Infantry Division, walking up anddown the seawall back of UTAH anddirecting operations. At the time enemyfire was so much lighter than expectedthat the landing seemed to Tabb almostan anticlimax. Except for six Armyengineers, who were killed when a shellhit their LCM just as the ramp dropped,all the demolition men got ashore safelyand immediately began to blast gaps inthe obstacles. About half were steel andconcrete stakes, some with mines at-tached to the top; the rest were mostlyhedgehogs and steel tetrahedrons,with only a few Belgian gates.27

The four Army gapping supportteams landed on the northern part ofTare Green Beach at 0645 after a har-rowing trip from the transport area.They had been aboard an attack trans-port with the commanding officer ofthe 1106th Engineer Combat Group,Col. Thomas DeF. Rogers. Rogers dis-covered at the last minute that no provi-

25 Dept of the Army, Hist Div, Utah Reach to Cher-bourg, pp. 14—42; Chester Wilmot, The Struggle forEurope (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 245.

26 Dept of the Army, Hist Div, Utah Beach to Cher-bourg, p. 47; Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. II, "Nor-mandy," pp. 9- 10; Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec44; Jnl, 237th Engr C Bn, Jun 44; Interv, Capt RolandG. Ruppenthal with Maj Robert P. Tabb, Jr., 6 Sep44, ML 1032, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

27 Interv, Tabb, 6 Sep 44.


sion had been made for getting thereserve teams ashore, and he arrangedwith the ship's commander to load thewhole party of ninety-three men, withexplosives, into a single LCM. Rogerswent along in the dangerously over-loaded craft, proceeding shoreward atfull speed. Landing in an area whereno gap had been blown, he got the mento work and then walked southwarddown the beach to inspect the work theleading teams were doing. The Armyand Navy teams had partly blown fifty-yard gaps, which Rogers instructedthem to widen to accommodate thelanding craft bunching up offshore. Hesaw two tankdozers in use but observedthat gaps were cleared mainly by hand-placed charges connected with prima-cord.

The work went on under artillery firethat increased at both the southern andnorthern gaps after H-hour. Rogersand others were deeply impressed bythe heroism of the men, but casualtieswere light compared to those on OMA-HA. The Army teams had 6 men killed,39 wounded; the Navy teams, 4 killedand 11 wounded. The initial gaps werecleared by 0715. Then the demolition-ists worked northward, widening clearedareas and helping demolish a seawall.By 0930 UTAH Beach was free of allobstacles. The Navy teams went out onthe flat with the second ebb tide andworked until nightfall on the flanks ofthe beaches, while by. noon the Armyteams were ready to assist the assaultengineers in opening exit roads.28

While the demolitionists were blow-ing the obstacles, Companies A and Cof the 237th Engineer Combat Battal-ion, which had landed with the 8thInfantry at H-hour, were blowing gapsin the seawall, removing wire, and clear-ing paths through sand dunes beyond.For these tasks the two companies hadbangalore torpedoes, mine detectors,explosives, pioneer tools, and markers.Later in the morning they receivedequipment to bulldoze roads across thedunes.29

Beyond the dunes was the water bar-rier, running a mile or so inland fromQuineville on the north to Pouppevilleon the south, which the Germans hadcreated by reversing the action of thelocks that the French had constructedto convert salt marshes into pasture-land. Seven causeways crossed the wetarea in the region of the UTAH landingsto connect the beach with a north-southinland road. Not all the causeways wereusable on D-day. Most were under water;the northernmost, although dry, wastoo close to German artillery. The bestexits were at or near the area wherethe troops had landed—another strokeof good fortune. Exit T—5, just northof Tare Green Beach, was flooded buthad a hard surface and was used dur-ing the night of D-day. Exit U —5 atUncle Red was above water for its entirelength and became the first route in-land, leading to the village of Ste.Marie-du-Mont. South of U —5, somedistance down the coast near Pouppe-ville and the Douve River, lay the thirdroad used on D-day, Exit V—1. Al-though in poor condition, the road wasalmost completely dry.3028 Ltr, Col Thomas DeF. Rogers to Engr, VII Corps,

23 Jun 44, sub: Report on Demolition of UTAH BeachObstacles, 237th Engr C Bn Jnl, 1944; Commo. JamesE. Arnold, "NOIC UTAH," United States Naval InstituteProceedings, LXXIII (June 1947), 675; Hist 1st ESB(UTAH), sec. VII, p. 67; Interv, Tabb, 6 Sep 44.

29 Interv, Tabb, 6 Sep 44.30 Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. II, "Normandy," p. 12;

1st ESB (UTAH), p. 52.


TELLER MINE ATOP A STAKE emplaced toimpale landing craft on Utah Beach.

At the entrance to Exit U—5 the Ger-mans had emplaced two Belgian gates.Company A, 237th Engineer CombatBattalion, blew them and also pickedup several prisoners from pillboxesalong the seawall. Then the engineersaccompanied the 3d Battalion, 8th In-fantry, inland along Exit U—5. Half-way across the causeway they found thatthe Germans had blown a concrete cul-vert over a small stream. The columnforded the stream and proceeded, leav-ing Captain Tabb to deal with theculvert. He brought up a bridge truckand a platoon of Company B to beginconstructing a thirty-foot treadwaybridge—the first bridge built in the

UTAH bridgehead. Men of the 238thEngineer Combat Battalion, who hadlanded around 1000 with the mainbody of the 1106th Engineer CombatGroup, helped. By 1435, Exit U—5 wasopen to traffic.31

Two companies of the 49th EngineerCombat Battalion, also landing with the1106th in midmorning, accompaniedthe 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, on itsmarch south to Pouppeville. The engi-neers were to work on Exit V—1 lead-ing from the beach through Pouppe-ville to the north-south inland road,while infantry was to make contact withthe 101st Airborne Division, protect-ing the southern flank of VII Corps.Company G of the 8th Infantry alsohad the mission of capturing the sluicegates or locks southeast of Pouppe-ville that the Germans had manipulatedto flood the pastureland behind TareGreen and Uncle Red beaches. An en-emy strongpoint still farther south atLe Grand Vey protected the locks.32

While Company E of the 8th Infan-try moved down the road along theeastern edge of the inundations, Com-pany G hugged the seawall. All the waydown the coast the two companies en-countered continuous small-arms fire,and Company G met artillery fire froma strongpoint on the seaward side abouthalfway down. At a road junction north-east of Pouppeville, the infantry battal-ion assembled and advanced to thevillage, where shortly after noon occur-red the first meeting of seaborne andairborne troops on D-day.

31 Interv, Tabb, 6 Sep 44; Hists, 238th and 237th EngrC Bns and 1106th Engr C Gp.

32 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44; 1st ESB(UTAH), p. 65; Dept of the Army, Hist Div, Utah Beachto Cherbourg, map 8.


During the probe to Pouppeville theinfantrymen bypassed the sluice gates.But Company A of the 49th EngineerCombat Battalion moved south, securedthe locks, took twenty-eight prisoners,and dug in to protect the locks fromrecapture. Next day the company over-came the German strongpoint at LeGrand Vey, capturing fifty-nine pris-oners, seventeen tons of ammunition,large quantities of small arms, and threeartillery pieces, which the engineersused to reinforce their defenses. Dur-ing the next few days, with the aid of aplatoon of Company B, Company Acontinued to hold its position, protect-ing the south flank of the beachheadand operating the locks to drain thewater barrier.33

Except for the 49th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, which bivouacked nearPouppeville, all elements of the 1106thEngineer Combat Group including thebeach obstacle demolitionists went intobivouac on the night of D-day at Pont-Hebert, a village on the north-southinland road about halfway betweencauseways U—5 and V— 1. Total D-daycasualties for the group had been sevenmen killed and fifty-four wounded. Fora few days work on the exits continued,but the next major task for the groupwas to help the 101st Airborne Divi-sion cross the Douve River. Improv-ing the causeways, clearing and devel-oping Tare Green and Uncle Red, andopening new beaches then became theresponsibility of the 1st Engineer Spe-cial Brigade.34

When Brig. Gen. James E. Wharton,commanding the 1st Engineer Special

Brigade, landed on UTAH at 0730 onD-day he found his deputy, Col. Eu-gene M. Caffey, already on the beach.Not scheduled to land until 0900, Caf-fey had smuggled himself, with noequipment except an empty rifle, aboardan 8th Infantry landing craft. En routehe managed to load his rifle by takingup a collection of one bullet each fromeight infantrymen. He arrived ashorevery early in the assault and found Gen-eral Roosevelt in a huddle with infan-try battalion commanders, debatingwhether to bring later waves in on theactual place of landing or to divert themto the beaches originally planned. Menof the 8th Infantry were already mov-ing inland on Exit U—5. The decisionwas made. "I'm going ahead with thetroops," Roosevelt told Caffey. "You getword to the Navy to bring them in.We're going to start the war fromhere."35

The first elements of the 1st Engi-neer Special Brigade to land were menof the 1st and 2d Battalions, 531st Engi-neer Shore Regiment, who came inabout the same time as Wharton. Theyset to work widening gaps the combatengineers had blown in the seawall,searching out mines, improving exits,and undertaking reconnaissance. Be-cause one of the main tasks of the engi-neer regiment was to open Sugar Red,a new beach to the north of Tare Green,the officers reconnoitered the area, andelements of the 2d Battalion partiallycleared it in preparation for its com-plete clearance and operation by the3d Battalion, scheduled to arrive on thesecond tide. The brigade headquarters

33 Hists, 49th Engr C Bn, Jun, Jul, Dec 44, and1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44; Dept of the Army,Hist Div, Utah Beach to Cherbourg, p. 53.

34 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44.

35 1st ESB (UTAH), p. 63; Ryan, The Longest Day, pp.205, 233. Ryan based his account on an interview withCaffey.


ROADS LEADING OFF THE BEACHES opened by engineers, 8 June 1944.

was ashore by noon, and at 1400 Whar-ton established his command post in aGerman pillbox at La Grande Dune, asmall settlement just beyond the duneline and near the entrance to Exit U—5.

Less than half of the road-buildingequipment the engineers counted onreached shore on D-day. Twelve LCTswere expected, but only five landedsafely, all on the second tide. Germanshells hit three of the remainder, andthe other four were delayed until D plus1. Many engineer vehicles drowned outwhen they dropped into water too deep;hauling out such vehicles of all serviceswas one of the heaviest engineer taskson D-day, and a good deal of the workhad to be done under artillery fire.

Artillery accounted for most of theD-day casualties in the brigade—twenty-one killed and ninety-six wounded;strafing by enemy planes, which cameover in the evening, caused most of therest.

By nightfall of D-day the brigadeengineers had opened Sugar Red, andhad made the road leading inland fromit (Exit T—5) passable for vehicles.They had cleared beaches of wreckedvehicles and mines, had improved theexisting lateral beach road with ches-paling (wood and wire matting), andhad set up markers. The brigade's mili-tary police were helping traffic moveinland. The engineers had also established dumps for ammunition and medi


cal supplies and had found sites forother dumps behind the beaches.36

Despite the doubts and fears of theearly hours on OMAHA, the invasionwas successful. To be sure, the troopswere nearly everywhere behind sched-ule and nowhere near their objectivesbehind OMAHA, but at UTAH the entire4th Division got ashore within fifteenhours after H-hour with 20,000 menand 1,700 vehicles. In the UTAH area,the fighting remained largely concen-trated in battalion-size actions and scat-tered across the segments of French ter-rain tenuously held by American air-borne units. Nevertheless, the Alliedforces had a strong grip on a beach-head on the Continent, and German

counterattacks were feeble at best. Thejob of the next few days was to con-solidate the flow of supply across thebeaches and through the artificial portcomplex that the invasion force hadbrought with it across the Channel.Despite the tragic losses among the gap-ping teams and the collapse of theirefforts on D-day, the Provisional Engi-neer Special Brigade Group by D plus1 had provided the early basis for thesupply organization on the beaches thatwould operate until the end of the year.Backlogs of invasion shipping fed byfactors beyond the engineers' control de-veloped immediately off both beaches,and the limited numbers of trucks andDUKWs available affected supply move-ment just behind the shore. But onbalance, the engineers' contribution iningenuity and blood in the Normandyassault was immeasurable.

36 1st ESB (UTAH), pp. 63-69; Hist 531st EngrShore Rgt, 6-17 Jun 44.

CHAPTER XVI

Developing Beaches andReconstructing Ports

Once the invasion force was ashorethe engineers of the Provisional Engi-neer Special Brigade Group enteredupon a three-phased schedule for or-ganizing beach supply operations. Thefirst two phases were tied directly tothe tactical situation since they involvedsetting up dumps on the beaches andlater moving the dumps to protectedsites as much as four miles inland. Thelast phase would begin with the comple-tion of the MULBERRY, an artificial har-bor to be made of sunken blockshipsand concrete caissons offshore, provid-ing more efficient discharge of cargoesand men directly from pierhead struc-tures to the beaches at OMAHA via float-ing roadways. UTAH, with more lim-ited constructed facilities serving it,would continue to receive heavy trafficin men and materiel from lighters, thevarious landing craft, makeshift Rhinoferries, and barges plying between largervessels and the beach. Gradually, as cap-tured ports came into service, the logis-tic load would shift there, and the MUL-BERRY complex would close down beforethe autumnal storms interfered with theoperation.1 No clear-cut dividing line

separated these activities, and, in fact,they tended to overlap each other asshore engineers developed the supplysystem. While the engineers organizedthe beaches into administrative subdi-visions, providing roads to the water'sedge and laying out supply areas justinland, Transportation Corps troopswould help unload cargo, move sup-plies to depots or using units, and con-trol traffic on and behind the beaches.The Transportation Corps would alsooperate smaller captured ports in thearea once the engineers had clearedobstacles and mines and restored dock-side equipment and storage space.

The initial dump phase demanded aclear marking scheme for all the beachesin both landing areas. The ProvisionalEngineer Special Brigade Group fol-lowed the so-called British World WideSystem, extending the military alpha-bet and color codes already in use onthe invasion beaches. By 1600 on 8 Junethe engineers had subdivided the origi-nal Easy Red and Fox Red beaches onOMAHA into two more beaches, EasyWhite and Fox White. Each sector wasmarked with large, color-coded woodenpanels. For night identification theOMAHA beaches first had lights blink-ing the Morse code for Dog, Easy, orFox. When this system caused confusion,

1 Unless otherwise noted the following is basedchiefly on Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,Volume I, pp. 389-426; Operation Rpt NEPTUNE; andMorison, The Invasion of France and Germany, p. 162.

DEVELOPING BEACHES AND RECONSTRUCTING PORTS 341

TETRAHEDRONS AT OMAHA BEACH

the brigades erected signboards withnine-foot-high lettering outlined in col-ored lights matching the beach names.On UTAH, the 1st Brigade resorted tohanging barrage balloons directly overthe beaches, painting them to corre-spond to the coding of Uncle Red andTare Green. They added a second redballoon above Sugar Red, opened tothe right of Tare Green by the 531stEngineer Shore Regiment.2

During the week after D-day theengineers also cleared the OMAHAbeaches and improved the roads run-ning the length of the beach and up

through the draws. The men could onlycut paths through the debris in somespots. The gapping team survivors fromthe 149th and the 299th Engineer Com-bat Battalions joined the group engi-neers in clearing junk and salvagingvehicles. Bulldozer crews either assistedin this work or leveled the shingle bank,using the stones and wreckage to fill inantitank ditches. At UTAH other Ger-man forces withdrawing up the Cotentinpeninsula toward Cherbourg kept thebeaches under artillery fire for a weekafter the landings, but the main diffi-culty in managing supply was the lackof dump space in the low fields behindthe beach. Though drainage operationsbegan on D-day in the Pouppeville areawhen 1106th Engineer Combat Group

2 The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. VI,"Neptune: Training for Mounting the Operation, andArtificial Ports," pp. 68-71.


units reset the locks there to draw offthe flood behind the southern end ofthe beach, the terrain was still too marshyto support the weight of large amountsof supplies and the vehicles necessaryto move them.

Confusion offshore and unbendingadherence to the NEPTUNE plan addedto the delay in unloading. Until D plus4 First Army plans called for the dis-charge of items according to a rigid pri-ority system. But shipping manifestsidentifying priority cargoes and vesselsdid not reach the proper hands amongTransportation Corps crews or the Navyofficer in charge of beach operations.Engineer brigade officers at first joinednaval officers and transportation troopsin small launches in time-consumingsearches for specific ships but later sim-ply took the nearest vessels ready fordischarge. The Navy refused to beachLSTs for fear of German artillery fireat UTAH and in the belief that theywould break their keels as they settledonto the uneven tidal flats. Once thelatter worry proved unfounded, LSTsafter D plus 2 "dried out" regularly—the vessels would ground just after hightide, discharge their cargo onto the dryflat after the water receded, and pulloff again with the next tide. This methodslowed the shipping shuttle between thebeaches and the mounting out ports insouthern England because it took twelvehours to refloat the craft. Nevertheless,it did more than any other single expe-dient to reduce the shipping backlogoff Normandy and to boost the laggingdischarge rates of troops, supply, andvehicles before segments of the MUL-BERRY harbor came into full service.

The arrival at UTAH on 10 June ofthe 38th Engineer General Service Regi-ment, an Advance Section (ADSEC)

unit attached to the 1st Engineer Spe-cial Brigade, heralded the beginning ofthe beach maintenance phase of engi-neer operations. The regiment was towork behind the beaches, removingmines, improving roads and bridges,and draining flooded areas. One battal-ion had the task of opening a fourthbeach, Roger White, to the north ofSugar Red. Blasting holes in the sea-wall and clearing beach obstacles fromthe tidal flat, the battalion had the newsector ready for operation two dayslater on 12 June, but shellfire from Ger-man batteries to the north postponedthe opening of Roger White. The enemyopposition there also stopped work onthe northernmost sluice gates behindUTAH until mid-June, though the south-ernmost gates, in the area where mostof the landings were made, were alreadyfunctioning when the 38th arrived. On13 June the regiment could report thatall roads in its area were open andpassable.3

Beach maintenance dumps of the 5thand 6th Engineer Special Brigades,located along the Isigny-Bayeux road,were ready for operation on 13 and 14June. By then the fields were clear ofmines and, after the capture of Treviereson 10 June, of enemy resistance exceptfor scattered sniper fire. The dumpswere located in a series of relativelysmall fields divided by hedgerows, smalltrees, and drainage ditches. The engi-neers filled the trenches and cut gapsthrough the hedgerows to allow trucksto move from field to field and torelieve congestion on narrow roads.

As combat troops inland eliminatedthe last direct German fire on OMAHAon D plus 4, the buildup on shore took

8 Hist 38th Engr GS Rgt, 1944.


TWISTED SECTIONS OF LOBNITZ PIERS AT OMAHA BEACH

impetus from the gradual completionof artificial harbor installations andtheir protective breakwaters—a line ofsunken ships known as a GOOSEBERRY.Naval construction elements openedtwo 2,450-foot causeways on each ofthe major invasion beaches by 10 June,the spans at OMAHA coming in at ExitsE-1 and F-1. Two days later, whenGeneral Bradley stood on OMAHA, thesight of the massive construction off thebeaches convinced him that the inva-sion area had become the major portof Europe.

On 12 June the influx of men andsupply still lagged behind the plannedfigures: just over 17,000 troops landedwith 22,869 called for; only 9,896 longtons of supply arrived ashore compared

to the 12,700 tons planned; and 2,645of the more than 4,000 vehicles sched-uled for the day arrived. With VIICorps ready to begin cutting off theCotentin peninsula and isolating Cher-bourg, an ammunition shortage, espe-cially in artillery shells, was alreadydeveloping. Cumulative totals amongthe various categories of discharge were88 percent of the planned troops, 73percent of the supply tonnage, and 66percent of the vehicles. But on 16 Junehopes rose for meeting unloading sched-ules as the first LST nosed up to theLobnitz pierhead off OMAHA and dis-charged its load of vehicles directly toshore via a 3,000-foot "whale," or float-ing roadway, in just under two hours.Not the least elated was Col. Richard


Whitcomb, whose 11th Port organiza-tion was manning the pierheads whileattached to the Provisional EngineerSpecial Brigade Group. But the opti-mism died on the eighteenth, as naturebegan reducing the American MUL-BERRY to ruins.4

Unloading slowed to a crawl from 19to 22 June while a howling Channelstorm tore the harbor apart, drivingsmaller vessels into causeways, pier-heads, and whale structures and cast-ing the wreckage ashore in tangledheaps of caissons, coasters, and land-ing craft. The engineers managed toget a total of 2,557 long tons of cargoout of beached craft during the fourdays. In several cases, as with the coasterHighware, the men resorted to cuttingholes in ships' sides to get at the holds.The more fortunate British MULBERRY,farther east, rode out the storm with-out extensive damage. The debris atUTAH was not heavy, but the engineerbrigades at OMAHA faced the samebeach clearance problem on 22 Junethat they had on the seventh.

Clearance and salvage now vied withthe rush to unload necessary men andsupply in the days after the storm. AllLSTs dried out on the Fox beaches atOMAHA, where there was less wreckage.By using every available LCT, LCM,and DUKW to ferry material from shipto shore, the brigades began to realizea potential for moving supply and troopsacross an open beach that the plannersapparently had not recognized. DUKWs,which had all escaped the storm's effectby hastening ashore to wait out theweather, were invaluable at both beach-es. Tonnage figures exceeded the

planned daily tables consistently be-tween 24 and 30 June although the dis-charge rate never caught up with cumu-lative figures expected. By the end of themonth the troop buildup had reached452,460, roughly 78 percent of the esti-mated 579,000 that should have beenashore on that date. Supplies amountedto 80 percent of the 360,000 long tonsscheduled, and the 70,910 vehicles un-loaded were only 65 percent of the111 ,000 First Army expected by D plus24. Despite the lag, the engineers hadrecovered remarkably well from thedevastation of the storm and had sus-tained operations on the beaches as thefighting moved toward Cherbourg and,south of the beaches, into the hedge-row country of Normandy. In the mean-time some measure of help in supple-menting the over-the-beach supply op-erations came with the rehabilitation ofseveral minor ports in the area.

Small Ports Near the Beaches

OVERLORD planning had taken intoconsideration six minor ports: Grand-camp-les-Bains and Isigny just west ofOMAHA; St. Vaast-la-Hougue and Bar-fleur north of UTAH; Granville on thewest coast of the Cotentin peninsula;and St. Malo in Brittany. All these portswere tidal, drying out at low water; evenat high tide they could accommodateonly small vessels. Therefore, theircapacity was not expected to be great,and they were to be developed only asa stop-gap measure to provide someadditional discharge facilities until thefull potential of larger ports could berealized. All minor ports were to beopen by 6 July. (Map 18)

According to the plan of the ADSECengineer, Colonel Itschner, who was

4 Bradley, A Soldiers Story, p. 289; Operation RptNEPTUNE, pp. 12, 144; Alfred Stanford, Force Mulberry(New York: William Morrow, 1951), pp. 139, 171.


responsible for opening the ports, theheadquarters of the 1055th Port Con-struction and Repair Group and ad-vance elements of the group's 342dEngineer General Service Regimentwere to tackle the repair of the ports inturn, beginning with Grandcamp andIsigny. After rehabilitation, operationof these two small ports near OMAHAwould be the responsibility of the 11thPort (TC), attached to the ProvisionalEngineer Special Brigade Group. The11th Port was also to furnish a detach-ment to the 1st Engineer Special Bri-gade to operate St. Vaast, while the 4thPort (TC) was to supervise operationsat Barfleur, Granville, and St. Malo.5

Access to Grandcamp, a small fish-ing port and summer resort about fivemiles west of OMAHA, was through afifty-foot-wide channel between twojetties. The jetties extended from thebeach for about 350 feet to the portproper, a rectangular artificial basinwith a concrete wharf and one quay.From the information available, plan-ners had estimated the minimum high-tide depth of channel and basin at eightfeet, making it possible to bring in LCTsand small coasters. Because the littleport was so vulnerable to enemy demo-litions the engineers were not sure thatit could be used at all, but they hoped itcould be opened by 20 June, with agoal of 500 tons of cargo daily there-after. A TC port company, a quarter-master truck platoon, and an adminis-tration detachment from Headquarters,11th Port, were to operate Grandcampport.

Grandcamp fell on 9 June. Nextmorning, while the port was still undersniper fire, Capt. Andrew F. Klase of11 th Port headquarters arrived to sur-vey conditions and was agreeably sur-prised to find that the Germans haddone no damage beyond sinking twohulks across the channel. Five wreckslay in the basin, probably victims ofAllied aircraft. Less agreeable was thediscovery that the water in the basinand channel was only 4 1/2 feet deep.The estimate of eight feet, based onold charts, proved wrong because theport had not been dredged in six years.Nevertheless, Captain Klase began thetask of rehabilitation, calling in units ofthe 358th Engineer General ServiceRegiment, which floated and beachedtwo of the wrecks and blasted apart andhauled away the pieces of the other five.With help from men of the 342d Engi-neer General Service Regiment, whocleared the port of mines, underwaterobstructions, and barbed-wire entangle-ments, Grandcamp was ready to oper-ate on 17 June. At the time the onlymen available to operate the port con-sisted of an administrative staff of fourofficers and thirty-seven enlisted menfrom 11th Port.6

On 23 June the small Dutch coasterJune entered the basin—the first Alliedship to berth in a French port in theAmerican sector. Ordered to Isigny, shehad entered Grandcamp harbor bymistake, somehow managing without apilot to navigate the shallow water andtreacherous channel and tie up at thequay. As no labor troops had yet re-ported at Grandcamp, the 11th Port

5 Unless otherwise cited, this section on the smallports is based on: Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of theArmies, Volume I, pp. 62, 288-90, 310, 463-65, andVolume II, pp. 61-62; Operation Rpt NEPTUNE, pp.159-62, 166-69.

6 Interv, Capt Andrew-F. Klase, 1 Jul 44, Adm 493B, Minor Ports, ETOUSA Hist Sect; Hists, 342d EngrGS Rgt, 15 Apr 42-31 Dec 45 and 358th Engr GSRgt, 6 Jan 43-30 Jun 45.


men left their typewriters and pitchedin to unload her, aided by civilians. Bythe end of the day the ad hoc laborforce had put 158 tons of cargo aboardtrucks for movement to inland dumps.Despite the successful berthing of theJune, coasters could not be handled effi-ciently at Grandcamp, and only land-ing craft could be used. Because thebasin was too small to permit LCTs toturn around, the best choice was theLBV, a fifty-ton, self-propelled bargeable to carry vehicles and supplies. Thefirst came in on 24 June, bringing cargofrom vessels anchored off OMAHA.That day the 4145th QuartermasterService Company arrived to take overunloading, with some continued civil-ian help. In its eighty-eight days ofoperations, from 23 June to 19 Septem-ber (it was the first of the small ports toclose), Grandcamp took in 58,382 tonsof cargo for an average daily dischargerate of 675 tons, considerably morethan the 500 tons expected.7

Isigny, a somewhat more prepossess-ing port, was a small dairying town onthe Aure River near where the riverflowed into the Vire about ten mileswest-southwest of OMAHA. To reachthe port from the sea, ships enteredthe mouth of the Vire and after aboutthree miles turned left into the narrowAure, which for three-quarters of a mileformed the port channel. Lined on theright almost continuously with stonequays terminating in a small turningbasin, the channel contained two orthree feet of water at mean low tideand about thirteen feet at high tide, adepth adequate for coaster operations.

American forces took Isigny on 10June, and the next day four officers

from the 11th Port and ADSEC exam-ined the port. They found that the Ger-mans had done no damage but thatAllied bombs had sunk a German flakship and a barge in the channel, blownpart of a quay wall, and put the quay-side railroad out of commission. The358th and 342d Engineer General Ser-vice Regiments quickly made necessaryrepairs, and the first coaster arrived on24 June with 486 tons of cargo, mostlygasoline unloaded by two quartermas-ter service companies. In its 114 daysof operation, until 15 October, Isigny'saverage daily discharge was 740 tons.8

On the east shoulder of the Cotentinpeninsula the ports of St. Vaast andBarfleur, left undefended as Germanforces withdrew toward Cherbourg,were in American hands by 21 June.The more productive was St. Vaast,which had an inner and an outer har-bor. While the inner harbor dried outat mean low tide, the outer one couldbe used at all tides and boasted a break-water that provided an excellent berth-ing area for coasters and lighters. TheGermans had placed mines across theharbor entrance and had sunk fifteenships in the harbor. ADSEC engineersremoved the major obstacles, and theport began operations on 9 July. Be-tween that date and the closing of theport on 16 October St. Vaast averaged1,172 tons a day—by far the best recordacheived by any minor port. Barfleurwas found virtually undamaged, withthe only major job that of removingmines across the harbor entrance. Inthree days the engineers had Barfleur

7 Klase interv.

8 Interv. Capt Howard E. Bierkan, HQ, 11th Port, 1Jul 44, Adm 493 B, Minor Ports, ETOUSA Hist Sect;Hists, 342d Engr GS Rgt, 15 Apr 42-31 Dec 45, and358th Engr GS Rgt, 6 Jan 43-30 Jun 45.


COASTER WITH A CARGO OF GASOLINE UNLOADS AT ISIGNY

ready for operation; the port openedon 26 July.9

In late July delays in the rehabilita-tion of Cherbourg, which was not ableto receive cargo until 16 July, broughtabout renewed interest in all the minorports. At the time, two of the six portsincluded in the OVERLORD planning—Granville and St. Malo—were still inenemy hands. ADSEC, therefore, con-centrated on improving Grandcamp,Isigny, and St. Vaast and on openingnot only Barfleur but also Carentan,which had not been included in OVER-LORD planning. ADSEC planners ex-

pected to obtain from the five ports atotal discharge of at least 12,000 tonsof cargo a day and hoped for 17,000tons after the ports expanded to theirfull capacity.10

At each port troops of the 2d Battal-ion, 358th Engineer General ServiceRegiment, went to work dredging, re-surfacing, and improving quays andrepairing roads and railroad facilitiesin the port area. Of these efforts themost important was dredging, and forit the engineers used a French bucket

9 History of the ADSEG Engineer Section, 7 Sep44—30 Jun 45, pp. 46— 47; Bykofsky and Larson, TheTransportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 238.

10 Ltr, HQ, ASCZ, to CG, ASGZ, 17 Jul 44, sub:Recommendations for Minor Ports; Ltr, IRS, ADSG,to ADSEC, 26 Jul 44; Condition Rpts, Project P-4 St.Vaast, 27 Sep 44, and 2d Project P-3 Barfleur; all inADSEC Engr Sect, file Port Hist St. Vaast.


dredge discovered in the British-con-trolled port of Courseulles. After re-pairs, the dredge was put to work atIsigny, Grandcamp, and St. Vaast. AtBarfleur, a rocky bottom forestalleddredging and restricted the harbor tocraft drawing no more than ten feet.Nevertheless, Barfleur did well in itseighty-four days of operation, averag-ing 803 tons a day. Carentan was disap-pointing. A small-craft harbor on theTaute River with a passageway to thesea about three times longer than thatat Isigny, Carentan opened on 25 July.But after a series of mishaps, includingthe sinking or grounding of three ves-sels in the channel, Carentan closed on31 July having averaged not more than300 tons a day.11

At no time did the small ports, com-bined, approach the 12,000 tons ofcargo per day the logisticians had hopedfor. Such a total might have beenachieved had the ports been developedmore fully, but this step was not neces-sary. OMAHA and UTAH beaches provedsurprisingly successful in deliveringcargo, and by early October, when au-tumn storms showed the need for phas-ing out beach operations, the engineerport reconstruction effort had concen-trated at Cherbourg. There, duringmost of the autumn of 1944, was to bedischarged the bulk of the suppliesrequired to support American forces.By 16 October 1944, Grandcamp, Isig-ny, St. Vaast, and Barfleur had closeddown; on 9 November they reverted toFrench control. By this time a rear areasystem of base sections was in placeunder the COMZ command of Gen-

eral Lee, who took over active controlof the rehabilitation efforts at the the-ater level.

COMZ on the Continent

No sooner had operations on theContinent begun than the prospect ofa breakout from the Allied lodgmentand an ensuing war of maneuver raisedthe issue of control of the communica-tions zone behind First Army. Theeventual command structure governingthat area would also affect the ETOUSAchief engineer. Invasion plans providedfor the introduction of two interim com-mands prior to the transfer to Franceof General Lee's SOS, ETOUSA, re-named COMZ as of D-day. On 16 Junethe first of these, Brig. Gen. Ewart G.Plank's ADSEC organization, went intooperation as planned, running supplyaffairs for First Army under GeneralBradley's direct control. At the sametime ADSEC's parent command, For-ward Echelon, Communications Zone,or FECOMZ, began phasing its advanceparties into two chateaus near Valognes,twenty miles southwest of Cherbourg.Here Col. Frank M. Albrecht formallyannounced the existence of the com-mand on 15 July and awaited Bradley'sdelineation of First Army's rear bound-ary, the event that would fully activateFECOMZ.12

Bradley's announcement was not forth-coming. Under NEPTUNE, he was toestablish the army rear boundary around

11 Hist 358th Engr GS Rgt, 6 Jan 43-30 Jun 45;Completion Rpt, Engr Sect, ASCZ, Project P-3 Bar-fleur, ADSEC Engr Sect, file Port Hist St. Vaast; His-tory of the ADSEC Engineer Section, p. 47.

12 See ch. XII I ; Robert W. Coakley, The Adminis-trative and Logistical History of the European The-ater of Operations, vol. II, "Organization and Com-mand in the European Theater of Operations," p.139, in CMH. General Vaughan, the former com-mander of FECOMZ, had been reassigned com-mander of the United Kingdom Base Section on 26June 1944.


D plus 20, 26 June. The introductionof the Third U.S. Army, scheduled forD plus 41, or 17 July, would necessitatethe activation of the U.S. 1st ArmyGroup headquarters on the Continent.On the same day FECOMZ would takeover the communications zone fromADSEC, allowing it to advance behind1st Army Group as the service com-mand immediately to its rear. Dissatis-fied over aspects of army supply onD-day and the tactical situation—FirstArmy was entangled in the hedgerowsand wetlands of Normandy—Bradleyresolved to retain direct control ofADSEC as long as possible. On 20 June,under pressure from the COMZ head-quarters still in London, he resorted toa legalism in which he drew a forwardboundary for ADSEC instead of a rearboundary for the army. When COMZtook its case to General Eisenhower forresolution, SHAEF decreed the separa-tion of ADSEC from First Army con-trol on 14 July but did nothing aboutthe rear army boundary, leaving thefinal say in troop and supply matters toGeneral Bradley.13

FECOMZ in the event died aborning.It never fulfilled its role of advanceheadquarters for Lee's COMZ. It causedconsiderable confusion during its exis-tence and actually interfered with effi-cient supply planning although its staffleft extensive drafts on the continentalsystem of base sections for future use.Its demise came with the arrival of theentire COMZ at Valognes on 7 August,exactly a month ahead of schedule; Col-onel Albrecht's short-lived commandsimply melded into General Lee's head-

quarters even as the Allied breakoutfrom the invasion lodgment reachedfull stride. General Lee rapidly tookover 560,000 square feet of engineer-built office space and tent quarters for11,000 individuals in the temporaryheadquarters at Valognes. But GeneralBradley surrendered his control of sup-ply and the allocation of service troopsamong the field armies, ADSEC, andLee's burgeoning Communications Zonecommand only when SHAEF arrivedon the Continent on 1 September. Brad-ley, now the commander of the 12thArmy Group with the First and ThirdArmies attached, thereupon became thecoequal of General Lee in the theaterorganization under General Eisenhow-er. Though Lee dropped his earlierdesignation of deputy theater command-er, the same command problems thathad prevailed for the theater chief engi-neer in England during BOLERO ob-tained on the Continent. GeneralMoore's access to the theater com-mander still ran through General Lee,and commanders of the fighting armiestended to regard Moore as less than akey member of the theater special staffthough all engineer work proceededunder his technical supervision.14

The theater engineer's office con-sisted for the duration of the war ofseven divisions under the chief engi-neer and his deputy. The Administra-tion and Control Divisions performedinternal housekeeping functions, coor-dinating planning, data collection, andpersonnel affairs. Intelligence Divisioncompiled necessary engineer intelli-gence on all lines of communications,

13 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 305; The Adm andLog Hist of the ETO, vol. II, "Organization and Com-mand in the European Theater of Operations," pp.4-46.

14 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 434-36; ETO Gen Bd Rpt 127, Organiza-tion and Functions of the Communications Zone, ch4, pp. 32-38; Moore, Final Report, p. 326.


ports, and inland waterways and han-dled all mapping problems, includingliaison on maps with Allied forces. Thedivision also kept current on enemyengineering methods, mine warfare,and field works that combat engineerswere likely to encounter. The RealEstate and Labor Division dealt withthe acquisition of property for militaryuse and hired civilian labor. Theaterpolicies on engineer troop strengths,the distribution of engineers within thetheater, and revisions to standard tablesof organization fell within the jurisdic-tion of the Troops Division. It also han-dled training and the general technicalsupervision of bridge building, demoli-tions, camouflage, water supply, andfire fighting. The Supply Division sawto the engineer logistical line of com-munications on the Continent and themanagement of the entire theater depotsystem and the inventory and stock lev-els in it. The Construction Division setengineer construction standards andsupervised the rehabilitation or build-ing of roads, installations of all kinds,pipelines, power systems, and water-ways.15 The chief engineer's technicalcontrol extended, therefore, to the basesections on the Continent and in theUnited Kingdom, where all of the for-mer base sections were consolidated intoa single United Kingdom Base with sub-ordinate districts.

The base sections that composed theCOMZ empire in France began takingshape in July, and new headquartersopened as the need arose in the liber-ated territory. As ADSEC began therehabilitation of Cherbourg, on 21 JulyGeneral Plank established in the citythe Cherbourg Command with all the

prerogatives of a base section. On 16August it became the Normandy BaseSection, encompassing the Cotentinpeninsula. Though the command's exis-tence disrupted the OVERLORD plan tophase into the city one of the existingbase section commands held in readi-ness in England, those staffs were laterassigned to other section commands.Brittany Base opened on 16 August tooversee the smaller ports of that penin-sula, and a short-lived Loire Base existedfrom 5 September until Brittany Baseabsorbed it on 1 December. The cap-ture of Paris triggered the installationof the Seine Base Section in the city,where Headquarters, COMZ, also movedin early September amid considerablecontroversy since it occupied some ofthe best hotel accommodations in thecity. After some administrative confu-sion over their missions, the last twosections evolved as Oise Base Sectionon 3 September and Channel Base Sec-tion a week later. Oise Base was respon-sible for territory east of Paris and upto the rear boundary of ADSEC as itmoved forward with the field armies.Channel Base concerned itself with theChannel ports from the D-day beacheseastward but centered its attention onAntwerp once that city was wrestedfrom German control.16

Essentially complete by the end ofOctober, the base section organizationnevertheless underwent boundary andorganizational modifications and majorshifts in emphasis through the end ofthe war. Another base section arrivedin southern France with OperationDRAGOON to handle the Rhone valleymain supply route.17 As the war drew

15 Moore, Final Report, app. I — K — I .

16 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume II, pp. 26-38.

17 See ch. XX.


to a close, Normandy Base Section hadprogressively absorbed Brittany Baseand taken over the Channel coast fromBrest to the 21 Army Group boundary.Channel Base remained responsible forAmerican supply and administration inwhat was a British rear area, where Brit-ish forces retained a small enclave inNormandy Base Section incorporatingtheir original D-day beaches. The portof Cherbourg in the meantime haddeveloped into one of the principalpoints of entry for American forces andsupply.

Cherbourg

Combat troops fought their way intoCherbourg on 26 June. Next day, Col.James B. Cress of ADSEC and com-manding officer of the 1056th Engi-neer Port Construction and RepairGroup set off with Navy and Transpor-tation Corps officers to inspect the city'screscent-shaped harbor. It was dividedby a breakwater into an outer harbor,or Grande Rade, and an inner harbor,or Petite Rade. At the center of theinner harbor lay the Quai de France,jutting out into the roadstead besidethe Darse Transatlantique, the famousdeepwater basin the Germans had builtbetween 1923 and 1935 as a World WarI reparation. Here, in peacetime, thelargest ocean liners docked. On theQuai de France was a huge railway sta-tion with a great vaulted roof, the GareMaritime, which provided transatlanticpassengers with speedy rail service toParis. (Few travelers lingered in Cher-bourg, for it was primarily a naval baseof little interest to tourists.)

A naval installation occupied most ofthe western side of the inner harbor.Between the naval base and the Quai

de France the ADSEC officers saw asmall seaplane base, a bathing beach(the Nouvelle Plage), and a narrowchannel leading inland to two basins inthe center of the city, the Avant Portde Commerce and the Bassin a Flot,where in peacetime most of the cargohandled at Cherbourg came ashore.The eastern side of the harbor, beyondthe Darse Transatlantique, was the leastdeveloped. It consisted merely of openareas known as the Reclamation andthe Terre Plein, bounded by a longsloping seawall where the water wasquite shallow at low tide.

Although the advance party foundno demolition in the Terre Plein andReclamation areas, the great transatlan-tic dock area was a shambles—the mostspectacular evidence of the "exemplarydestruction of the harbor of Cherbourg"for which the German commander re-ceived the Knight's Cross of the IronCross from Adolf Hitler. The GareMaritime was badly damaged, the twoquays lay in ruins, and two sunken shipsblocked the entrance to the Darse. Thereconnaissance party also found wide-spread destruction at the naval base,some of it from Allied air attacks. Sun-ken ships and barges blocked the en-trances to the three basins, which werefilled with sunken barges, tugs, trawlers,and coasters. In the base area two tre-mendous craters severed the westernbreakwater of the Petite Rade, the Diguedu Homet, a 3,300-foot-long, 70-foot-wide mole quayed on the south sideand carrying three railroad tracks andseveral oil pipelines. The Quai du Hom-et, a berth for coal coasters at rightangles to the Digue on its south side,was damaged in nine places.18

18 Port of Cherbourg, Rpt, 1056th Engr Port Con-struction and Repair Gp; Rpt, Cherbourg Port Recon-struction, OCE ETOUSA, 1944, p. 13; Maj. Gen.


The destruction of Cherbourg, whileacknowledged to be "a masterful job,"was no greater than the ADSEC engi-neer had expected.19 The engineerswere to work first on those areas wherethe quickest results could be expected,so that construction machinery andequipment waiting off UTAH Beachcould land as soon as possible. Theseareas were designated in a four-pointprogram established by naval, engineer,and transportation officers on 28 June:first, the Nouvelle Plage bathing beachfor DUKWs; second, the Bassin a Flotin the commercial port for barges;third, the Reclamation and Terre Pleinarea for LSTs; and, fourth, the Diguedu Homet for Liberty ships and vesselscarrying locomotives and boxcars.

The 332d and 342d Engineer Gen-eral Service and the 333d Engineer Spe-cial Service Regiments were assignedto the 1056th Port Construction andRepair Group to begin the reconstruc-tion of Cherbourg. Details entered theport with the advance parties to cleardebris, remove mines, and scour theterritory for construction materials, andby the first week in July all three regi-ments had numbers of men on thescene. They found huge stores of Ger-man construction materials and equip-ment, some at a buzz-bomb launchingplatform west of Cherbourg. Frenchcivilian mechanics helped get the equip-

ment in working order. By 8 July AD-SEC engineers were making optimisticestimates of the daily tonnage that Cher-bourg could receive—a port that inpeacetime averaged less than 900 tonsa day. Exclusive of POL, vehicles, andrailroad rolling stock, the engineers esti-mated that after rehabilitation Cher-bourg would have a capacity of 17,900tons daily.20

At Nouvelle Plage the engineers blewgaps in the seawall, swept away barbed-wire entanglements, graded the beach,and built three concrete exit roads forDUKWs. Work started early on rampsand hards for vehicle-carrying LCTsand LSTs at the seaplane base and thenorth side of the Reclamation area. Theengineers quickly constructed timberwharves for unloading barges and coast-ers along the Terre Plein and at theBassin a Flot, which had seventeen feetof water controlled by locks at the innerend of the Avant Port de Commerce. Aswing bridge over these locks, whichcarried traffic from one side of the cityto the other, was down; the engineersreplaced it with an ingenious retract-able drawbridge—a movable Bailey rest-ing on dollies that ran on old streetcarrails.

Nouvelle Plage was ready to receiveDUKWs on 6 July, but none could comein for ten days because of Germanunderwater mines. Minesweepers en-tered the Petite Rade on 8 July, andnot until the fourteenth were the west-ern ends of the Grande and PetiteRades free of mines. Ships waiting offthe Normandy beaches now came for-ward. The first four Liberties steamingup the Cotentin coast arrived around

James B. Cress, "Reconstruction of Cherbourg," TheMilitary Engineer, XLIV, no. 300 (July-August 1952),248. Unless otherwise noted, this section is based onthese three sources, and on MS, Cherbourg—Gatewayto France: Rehabilitation and Operation of the FirstMajor Port, Hist Sect, ETOUSA, 1945. See also:Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II,pp. 62—89, and the histories of the units mentioned.

19 Ltr, Col E. C. Itschner, Engr, ASCZ, to CE,ETOUSA, 5 Jul 44, sub: Port and Port Area Rehabili-tation Plan: CHERBOURG, Notes on Port of Cher-bourg.

20 Ibid., Incl 6, sub: Cherbourg, Estimated PortCapacity Based on Reconstruction Plan, 8 Jul 44.


noon on 16 July and anchored safely inthe Grande Rade. By 1738 a load ofsignal corps wire had been placed intoa waiting DUKW; forty-five minuteslater, it was on its way by truck to asignal corps dump five miles south ofCherbourg. Port operations had begun.

The first cargo was not typical, forDUKWs normally handled only smallpackages and in later operations wereused almost exclusively for subsistence.Sixty-three percent of all supplies andequipment that came into the port be-fore the end of July bore the castlemarking of the Corps of Engineers, andmuch of that cargo consisted of con-struction materials for rebuilding theport. Barges had to bring in heavy engi-neer equipment such as girders, raillengths, and bulldozers. Thirty 18-by-16-foot wooden barges arrived shortlyafter the first Liberties, loaded at once,and the next day, 17 July, dischargedin the Bassin a Flot, the wet dock at thecommercial port.

Meanwhile, work on the high-priorityDigue du Homet, begun the week afterCherbourg's capture, was well along.The 332d Engineer General ServiceRegiment and other engineers filled acrater isolating the Digue from thenaval base, repaired road and railroadtracks on the Digue, and constructedfive pile-and-timber finger piers forLiberty ships because the quay wall hadan underwater shelf. At the shore endof the Digue the engineers providedtwo berths for Twickenham ferries,British vessels specially built to carrylocomotives and rolling stock. On 29July a Twickenham made its firstdelivery—several 65-ton diesel electriclocomotives and other rolling stock.The first Liberty ship docked at one ofthe Digue's finger piers on 9 August.

After 13 August, when the 332dEngineer General Service Regimentmoved to Mayenne to undertake rail-road repair in support of First Army'sFalaise Gap operations, the 342d and398th Engineer General Service Regi-ments took over the work at the Quaidu Homet and Digue du Homet. Effortsto provide more deepwater berths in-creased when it became obvious thatthe lighterage operations—dischargedinto DUKWs or barges from shipsanchored out in the roadstead—weretoo costly in labor, equipment, andtime. DUKWs had a limited capacity;barges could be towed into basins onlyduring a few hours at high tide andotherwise had to be moored to stakeboats in the harbor. Moreover, all light-ers were at the mercy of the weather,and storms frequently prevented themfrom venturing out into the harbor.

The first area to benefit from theefforts to speed ship-to-shore opera-tions was the naval base, which couldaccommodate Liberty ships. The 342dEngineer General Service Regiment,aided by men from the 398th, beganconstruction in mid-August, replacingdemolished bridges and building tim-ber wharves to provide a continuoussurface along the top of the quays,which boat slips and entrance channelsto dry docks indented at frequent in-tervals. A bridge the 342d Engineersbuilt across a passage at the north endof Bassin Charles X illustrates the inge-nious use of local and captured mate-rials. For girders the engineers used themain beams of an old German sub-marine-lifting craft (turned over to theFrench with other reparations after1918), which the Navy had found block-ing the entrance to the Avant Port. Thefloor channels for the bridge came from


captured special railroad cars. Eventu-ally the naval base provided berths foreleven Liberty ships and five coasters.

The last area to benefit from the pro-gram to provide more deepwater berthswas potentially the most valuable andtherefore the most thoroughly sub-jected to German demolitions—thegreat Darse Transatlantique. Early inJuly the 333d Engineer Special ServiceRegiment began clearing debris fromthe shattered docks. In the wreckageof the Gare Maritime the engineers dis-covered twenty-four freight cars loadedwith unexploded sea mines, renderedextremely sensitive by tons of debristhat had fallen on them. The ticklishtask of removing the debris and thendeactivating the mines fell to the mineand booby-trap team of the 333d Engi-neer Special Service Regiment, whichundertook most of the mine deactiva-tion on the land side of the harbor. Theteam found unexploded charges, whichthe Germans had apparently not hadtime to detonate, in underground pass-ages, sewers, bridges, and buildingsthroughout the port area.21

After the debris and mines were re-moved from the quays at the DarseTransatlantique, the 333d EngineerSpecial Service Regiment began con-struction. Operating two ten-hour shiftsand employing hundreds of Frenchcivilians and POWs, the regiment firstbuilt finger piers at intervals to matchthe hatches of Liberty ships; later theyfilled the spaces between the piers,using timber wharfing to provide con-tinuous berthing along the Quai deFrance. But construction in the Darse

was a long-term project. Not until 21August, when the Navy declared thewaters free of mines, could a survey ofunderwater debris be made. An accesschannel was not open until 18 Septem-ber, and the first Liberty did not berthin the Darse until 8 October.

On 10 August the engineers work-ing on the Cherbourg quays saw a newkind of ship steaming into the harbor.She was the Junior N. Van Noy, the firstengineer port repair ship sent overseas.A converted Great Lakes steamer dis-placing only 3,000 tons, the ship hadmachine shops, storage bins, and heavysalvage equipment aboard. Her decksbristled with derricks and booms forlifting sunken ships and other debris.Manning the ship was the sixty-member1071st Engineer Port Repair ShipCrew.22

The day after her arrival at Cher-bourg the ship went under the controlof the 1056th Engineer Port Construc-tion and Repair Group but in a fewdays passed to the control of the 1055thEngineer Port Construction and RepairGroup, which had come up from Gran-ville to work on the vital Liberty berthsalong the Digue du Hornet. The repairship could not enter the wrecked innerbasins because she drew twenty feet,but out in the harbor the vessel accom-plished valuable work. Her divers,welders, and mechanics patched andraised several hulks. Divers with elec-tric torches broke up a dry dock thatwas beyond repair. Another important

21 1st Lt S. T. Holden, Asst S-3, Pertinent Informa-tion on the 333d Mine & Booby Trap Team, 20 Sep44, in booklet, Port of Cherbourg, Rpt of Demolitionand Reconstruction, 333d Engr SS Rgt.

22 For the conversion and equipping of such shipssent to the ETO, and crew recruitment and training,see Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 339-411. The ship wasnamed in honor of an enlisted man whose heroicaction at Finschhafen, Southwest Pacific Area, hadearned him posthumously, the first Medal of Honorawarded an Army engineer during World War II.


task was repair of a large rock crusherfound in a quarry just outside Cher-bourg, equipment badly needed forroad building. On 3 October 1944, theJunior N. Van Noy left Cherbourg,bound for Le Havre with the 1055thPort Construction and Repair Group.23

In the OVERLORD plan Cherbourgoriginally had a scheduled daily dis-charge capacity of 8,000 to 9,000 tons—Brest and Quiberon Bay were to be-come the major ports of entry for Alliedforces and supplies entering the Conti-nent. But as the bitter German defenseof some Brittany ports increased Cher-bourg's importance, G-4 plannersraised the port's projected intake capac-ity to 15,000 tons daily in July. Brig.Gen. Royal B. Lord, ETOUSA G-4,expected a 20,000-ton capacity in thecity by September, but in the middle ofthat month only 12,000 tons per daywere moving through the port, thenabout 75 percent rehabilitated. Thevital berths that could handle Libertyships still lay in the inoperable 25 per-cent of the harbor, and their repair con-tinued even as the utility of Cherbourgdeclined later in the year.

Railway Rehabilitation

By mid-August, Liberties at deepwa-ter quays in Cherbourg were unload-ing onto barges because a shortage oftrucks and rail cars had crowded thequays and the marginal wharves atTerre Plein with supplies and equip-ment awaiting transportation inland.Only about 3,000 tons of cargo a day

were moving out by rail at the end ofAugust, and a backlog of nearly 72,000tons awaited clearance in the port

24area.24

Efforts to expedite rail service hadstarted before the fall of Cherbourg,when the 1056th Engineer Port Con-struction and Repair Group began torepair demolished railway bridges overthe Vire, Taute, Madeleine, and Jour-dan Rivers. By 7 July the two main linetracks from Paris to Cherbourg wereopen. One company of the 347th Engi-neer General Service Regiment hadcleared a demolished tunnel just southof Cherbourg, and three other compa-nies had repaired blown frogs andswitches on the tracks into the city's rail-way station, the Gare de l'Etat. Fortu-nately damage was light on a mile-longspur from the Gare de l'Etat to theDigue du Hornet, and less than five ofthe fifteen miles of track within the cityneeded extensive repairs. Most of thedamage had resulted from Allied bombsand artillery fire.

Railway rehabilitation, carried onunder the supervision of the Transpor-tation Corps' 2d Military Railway Ser-vice, accelerated considerably after thelate July decision to increase Cher-bourg's tonnage target to 20,000 tonsby mid-September, with the railroadscarrying the main burden of transpor-tation inland. New spurs were neededas well as new storage and marshalingyards to ensure that a constant supplyof railway cars could be fed to thedocks. Primarily a passenger port,Cherbourg had storage yards for only

23 Cherbourg Port Reconstruction, p. 42. A similarengineer port repair ship came into Cherbourg on 20August and remained there under the 1056th PortConstruction and Repair Group.

24 OCE ETOUSA Monthy Rpt 17, Aug 44, dated 15Sep 44; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11, Port Reconstruc-tion and Repair (United Kingdom), 1946, Liaison Sect,Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547.


350 cars and marshaling yards for only400. The plan to move 20,000 tons dailythrough Cherbourg required 2,000 rail-way cars a day, and since a two-day sup-ply of empty cars had to be on hand atall times, storage for 4,000 cars as wellas marshaling yard capacity for thedaily 2,000 was mandatory.

The first major railway reconstruc-tion took place in the Terre Plein area,where an existing yard consisted ofthree tracks with a capacity of only 165cars and a spur running into the AmiotAircraft Plant. The 347th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment repaired thetracks, which Allied bombing and shell-fire had badly damaged, cleared awaydragon's teeth and pillboxes from thearea behind the Terre Plein, and laid61/2 miles of new track to provide amarshaling yard for 714 cars. Unfortu-nately, the unit was inexperienced inrailroad work and laid the track with-out ballast on filled-in land. As the tracksank into the soft ground the railsspread, causing a number of derail-ments before the engineers stabilizedthe area by placing crushed rock bal-last under the tracks.25

The same problem occurred in theconstruction of new yards at Couvilleand Sottevast, which together consti-tuted one of the most ambitious con-struction projects undertaken on theCotentin. Work at Couville began on 2August, but heavy rains turned the areainto a sea of mud. The engineers hadto open a rock quarry and haul hun-dreds of carloads of rock to ballast thetracks. The first yard at Couville openedon 18 September, and expansion con-tinued until 3 November, when the

yard had sixteen miles of track with acapacity of 1,740 cars. Construction ofthe Sottevast yard, begun on 15 August,also was plagued by heavy rains that atone time had portions of the area undereighteen inches of water. Nevertheless,some of the facilities were ready by mid-October, and when constructionstopped in mid-December the yard hadeighteen miles of track with a capacityof 2,280 cars.

POL Storage

On 24 July the tanker Empire Travel-ler discharged the first gasoline atCherbourg, unloading at the long break-water in the outer harbor—the Diguede Querqueville. The French and laterthe Germans had discharged gasolineand other POL supplies through a nine-inch pipeline running along the Digueto two nearby tank farms at the largeDepot Cotier du Petrole and the some-what smaller one at Sunk. In the sameneighborhood was a tank farm atHainneville, which the French Navyhad used to store diesel fuel. The fourthfarm the Americans discovered wasunderground, so cleverly concealedthat even few Frenchmen knew of itsexistence. The French had built theinstallation, Les Couplets, in 1938 atthe time of the Maginot Line construc-tion. Double garage doors of aninnocent-looking two story house fac-ing the Rue de la Paix, which skirtedthe harbor between Cherbourg andQuerqueville, opened on a 600-yardtunnel leading to four huge storagetanks located in a hollow carved out ofa small mountain; thirty-eight feet ofsolid granite overhead made the tanksimpervious to air attacks.

The engineers' major construction25 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 123, Military Railway Service,

p. 27.


GASOLINE BEING PUMPED ASHOREat Cherbourg.

effort was at the tank farm at the DepotCoder du Petrole, where the Germanshad demolished four huge tanks, leav-ing one small tank more or less intact.The engineers built three new tanksamong the ruins left from the Germandemolitions and welded patches overholes in the one tank that had escapeddemolition. The nine-inch pipelinefrom the Digue de Querqueville provedto be corroded beyond repair. Decid-ing to scrap it, the engineers installedseven six-inch lines that carried diesel,motor transport, and aviation fuel si-multaneously. Aviation gasoline went tothe Sunk tank farm, diesel fuel to LesCouplets.26

On 4 November 1944, Cherbourgdischarged a peak 19,955 tons of cargo;the daily average for that month was14,300 tons. Thereafter, the port's dis-charge rate declined rapidly as person-nel, equipment, and railroad cars trans-ferred to Antwerp. A few days aftersupply ships entered Antwerp on 26November, Cherbourg's tonnage targetdropped to 12,000 tons a day; twoweeks later it went down to 7,000 tons.Cherbourg's role as the mainstay of theAmerican port system in France wasover.

Granville and the Minor Brittany Ports

OVERLORD planners concentratedtheir attentions on the Brittany portsbecause they expected the peninsula toserve as the entryway for Allied forcesand materiel before any other develop-ment on the Continent. The scheduledthrust from Normandy into Brittanyafter D-day was to be the prelude tothe construction of a sturdy logisticalbase to support attacks to the Seine thatwould come after 1 November. Brest,Lorient, Quiberon Bay, and St. Maloin Brittany were expected to provide16,240 tons of daily port capacity by Dplus 90; with the opening of Nantes,the Brittany ports were to receive morethan 27,000 tons a day by that date.After the breakout at St. Lo in late July,G-4, COMZ, was planning to increasethe Brittany capacity to provide morethan half of the port discharge require-ments as of D plus 90. But the majorBrittany ports held out stubbornly, andby late August only St. Malo was inAmerican hands. On 25 August G-4,COMZ, called for the speedy develop-ment of St. Malo and three small Brit-tany ports that had not figured in OVER-

26 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants (United Kingdom), 1946, pp. 67—80 andfig. 2, Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547.


LORD planning—Morlaix, St. Brieuc,and Cancale—as well as the small fish-ing port of Granville on the west coastof Normandy. At the time COMZ madethis decision supplies were coming inon the Brittany coast only across a beachat St. Michel-en-Greve, where LSTswere bringing in ammunition for thesiege of Brest. Morlaix, St. Brieuc, andCancale were to be ready to handle atotal of 9,500 tons a day by 5 Septem-ber, St. Malo, 2,400 tons by 1 October.27

The goals set for the Brittany portswere never realized and at most of themthe engineer effort was considered "ut-terly wasted."28 Despite the heavy em-phasis on those ports in July, the break-out from the bridgehead and the head-long drive across northern Francemoved the action far from Brittany bySeptember. This development causedlogistical planners at SHAEF to regardAntwerp as the major prize; engineersnevertheless expended considerableeffort in Brittany before the tactical sit-uation changed so drastically. The 1053dPort Construction and Repair Groupand the 360th Engineer General Ser-vice Regiment worked on St. Malo,Cancale, and St. Brieuc before movinginto captured Brest. The St. Malo proj-ect halted just as it neared completion,primarily because the task of reopen-

ing waterways south and inland fromSt. Malo did not appear worth the effortrequired. Some port-operating person-nel went to Cancale, but tidal condi-tions there proved so difficult that theport was never used. St. Brieuc openedin mid-September but operated for onlya month, averaging 317 tons a day,mostly coal for local generating plantsand railroads. St. Michel-en-Greve didsomewhat better, averaging 745 tons aday; but it closed down on 1 September,never contributing more than a smallamount of port capacity and revertingto French control in mid-December.The only ports in Brittany that deliv-ered more than token tonnages wereGranville and Morlaix.29

Granville, captured on 3 July, was thefirst port taken after the breakout. The1055th Engineer Port Construction andRepair Group, which ADSEC immedi-ately dispatched there, found that theGermans had undertaken extensivedemolition work similar to that at Cher-bourg—quays cratered, cranes tippedinto the water, and blockships sunk.Worst of all, they had destroyed lockgates between the outer and inner ba-sins so that, at each change of the tide,water raced into the inner, main basin.By minesweeping, clearing debris, andremoving sunken craft, the engineersopened the outer basin to coasters ableto dry out alongside the jetties. Whenthe tonnage target rose on 25 August,the 1058th Engineer Port Constructionand Repair Group, originally destinedfor Lorient, went to Granville to pre-pare additional coaster berths. Oper-ated entirely as a coaling port, Gran-ville averaged 1,244 tons a day between

27 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume II, pp. 89—93; T/5 Robert L. Davis, The Adminis-trative and Logistical History of the European The-ater of Operations, vol. VII, "Opening and OperatingContinental Ports," pp. 66—67, in CMH; Maj CharlesK. McDerot and 1st Lt Adolph P. Gratiot, BringingSupplies into the Theater, vol. I, p. 40, Hist G-4,COMZ, ETOUSA, in CMH. Histories of the unitsmentioned. Unless otherwise cited, this section istaken from these sources.

28 Ltr, Col John R. Hardin to Maj Gen R. W. Craw-ford, 10 Oct 47, Incl to Ltr, Maj Gen R. W. Crawfordto Maj R. G. Ruppenthal, 31 Oct 47, sub: Questionson the Logistics of the War in the European Theater.

29 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11, Port Reconstructionand Repair; OCE ETOUSA Monthly Rpt 19, Sep 44,and 21, Dec 44.


its opening on 15 September 1944 andits closing on 21 April 1945. Its prosaicactivities were violently interruptedshortly after midnight on 9 March 1945,when a German task force of about 150men from their isolated garrison on theChannel Islands raided the little port,causing about eighty casualties anddamaging coasters and port facilities.

Morlaix (situated about twelve milesup the Dossen River estuary) and thesmall neighboring port of Roscoff werethe westernmost of the Brittany ports.Consistently linked in all plans, theywere operated by one headquarters andwere referred to as one port, Morlaix-Roscoff. Though Roscoff was tidal,Morlaix, like Granville, had outer andinner basins. Neither port was badlydamaged, and the 1057th EngineerPort Construction and Repair Groupquickly restored them. The two pro-vided anchorage for six Liberty shipsthat discharged into lighters. Betweenthe opening day, 5 September, and theclosing date of 14 December 1944,Morlaix-Roscoff turned in the best per-formance of any of the Brittany groupof ports—2,105 tons a day.

The Seine Ports: Le Havre and Rouen

Although Rouen, lying seventy-fivemiles up the Seine River, fell on 30August 1944, it was unusable until LeHavre, at the mouth of the Seine, wasin Allied hands. The Germans held outat Le Havre until 12 September, caus-ing the big port—the second largest inFrance—to be subjected to intensiveAllied sea, air, and land bombardmentthat destroyed almost two-thirds of thecity. The Germans had also damagedport facilities as at Cherbourg and Gran-ville. All lock gates were out, an espe-

cially serious matter because most ofthe port's activities had centered aroundnumerous wet basins and every deep-water berth had been destroyed. Tre-mendous engineer resources would beneeded to restore deepwater berths.Moreover, port clearance problemswould increase at Le Havre because allAmerican traffic inland would have tocross British lines of communications.For these reasons, and bolstered by theexpectation that Antwerp (captured on4 September) would provide plenty ofport capacity closer to the front, COMZdecided against undertaking a majorreconstruction effort at Le Havre.30

An engineer task force under Col.Frank F. Bell, commanding officer ofthe 373d Engineer General ServiceRegiment, undertook limited rehabilita-tion of both Le Havre and Rouen. Inaddition to his own regiment, ColonelBell ultimately had control of the 1055thand 1061st Engineer Port Constructionand Repair Groups, the 392d EngineerGeneral Service Regiment, the 1071stEngineer Port Repair Ship Crew, the1044th Engineer Gas Generating Unit,the 971st Engineer Maintenance Com-pany, and the 577th Engineer DumpTruck Company. He also had underhis operational control two Royal Navyparties, each equivalent to a U.S. Armyengineer port construction and repairgroup.

The 373d Engineers, moving by mo-tor convoy from the outskirts of Brest,

30 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume II, pp. 96- 103, 167; The Adm and Log Hist ofthe ETO, vol. VII , "Opening and Operating Conti-nental Ports," pp. 34-36, 88-97; History of the Chan-nel Base Section, Aug 44-Jun 45, vol. I, Adm 588,ETOUSA Hist Sect; Hist Rpt, Transportation Corpsin the European Theater of Operations, Oct—Dec44, vol. V, pt. 1, Adm 582, ETOUSA Hist Sect. Histo-ries of units mentioned.


BLAST REMOVES BLOCKAGE FROM THE MOUTH OF THE LOCKS AT ST. MALO

arrived in Le Havre on 19 September.Road and mine clearance work startedthe next day while, offshore, naval sal-vage crews began clearing an entranceinto the harbor. As at other ports theengineers first worked to provide theearliest possible discharge of cargo,making space on the beaches for land-ing craft, clearing storage areas, andpreparing exits through rubble-filledstreets.

The engineers built no timber pilewharves but instead installed a numberof artificial piers to provide berths fordeep-draft ships. One was a floatingponton pier the Navy built; the Armyengineers provided the connection withthe shore—Bailey bridges 130 feet long

that moved up and down with the tide.31

Two of the artificial piers used fourPhoenixes originally designed for theMULBERRY project. Another ingenioususe of existing materials was the employ-ment of Phion ferries, left over fromoperations on the D-day beaches, toconstruct floating piers in the port's wetbasins.

Damage to tidal lock gates seriouslyaffected the wet basins at Le Havre. Asthe tides rushed in and out, changes inhydrostatic pressure soon began to dam-

31 Ltr, Maj Gen C. R. Moore to Brig Gen L. D.Worsham, 18 Apr 45, Incl 2, Project Description ofBailey Bridge Connection Floating Wharf to Shore,Le Havre, Nov 44, 312 Gen Moore, EUCOM Engrfiles.


age quay walls. To stop this deteriora-tion and to make the basins usable atall stages of the tide, the 1055th Engi-neer Port Construction and RepairGroup repaired the Rochemont lockgates, one of the outstanding engineer-ing achievements at Le Havre. Failingin several attempts to repair the hugegates where they hung, the engineersremoved them and repaired them indry dock. The rehanging was com-pleted on 30 November 1944, and there-after the tidal range within the wetbasins fell by nearly twenty feet. Laterrepairs along the Tancarville Canal,which connected with the Seme, in-creased the stabilization.

The first vessels entered Le Havreon 2 October, but mines in the harborlimited the arrivals to LCTs and coast-ers until 13 October, when the first Lib-erties came forward. The port neverdeveloped the number of alongside Lib-erty berths that logisticians had plan-ned; consequently, lighters and DUKWshad to bring ashore a large percentageof the tonnage. Nevertheless, Le Hav-re's cargo capacity continued to risegratifyingly. By the end of Decembermore than 9,500 tons were being dis-charged per day, considerably exceed-ing expectations. By that time, the portwas also making another important con-tribution to the American effort inEurope. Beginning in November 1944,when COMZ shifted personnel stagingfrom the Cotentin peninsula to theSeine, Le Havre developed into theprincipal troop debarkation point inthe European theater.32

Rouen, the third major port Ameri-can forces reconstructed in Europe, wasnot as badly damaged as Le Havre.

Although the Germans had demolishedcargo-handling facilities and blockedthe river channel by sinking a numberof ships, the quays were in good con-dition—some 14,000 feet were usable.On the land side, the marshaling yardsadjacent to the port had suffered heavybomb damage. This presented no par-ticular problem because other marshal-ing yards twelve miles away were eas-ily accessible over a four-lane highway.

In peacetime, two-thirds of the traf-fic between Rouen and Paris moved byinland waterways along an eight-foot-deep channel in the Seine that couldhandle barges up to twenty-one feetwide.33 The largest task of rehabilita-tion at Rouen—the removal of mines,sunken cranes, ships, barges, and tugsfrom this river channel—fell mainly tothe U.S. Navy, aided by French author-ities. The engineers removed debrisand filled in bomb craters. Elements ofthe engineer task force in Le Havre,consisting of the 1061st Engineer PortConstruction and Repair Group, a Roy-al Navy party, and a platoon of the 37thEngineer Combat Battalion, undertookthese tasks.

On 15 October the first ships, coast-ers with POL from England, berthedat Rouen. Because the channel betweenLe Havre and Rouen was shallow, coast-ers were the mainstay of supply opera-tions at Rouen. They were so successful,discharging an average of more than4,000 tons daily the first week in No-vember, that COMZ ordered all coast-ers except those carrying coal to dis-charge at Rouen. Barge operationsinland, undertaken to meet civilianneeds, began on 22 November.34

32 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps:Operations Overseas, p. 318.

33 Moore, Final Report, p. 275.34 Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps:

Operations Overseas, p. 318.


Liberty ships could come into Rouenonly after they had been partially un-loaded at Le Havre. Before neap tidethey had to be trimmed to as little as 161/2 feet of draft, for otherwise the shipswould block the channel for ten daysuntil a spring tide came in. The engi-neers dredged channels to facilitate thepassage of deep-draft ships through theshoal water. In England the U.S. Armyengineers held four seagoing, light hop-per dredges, originally dispatched tothe ETO to support canceled logisticaloperations along the Loire River. Onlyone, which the 1077th Engineer DredgeCrew operated, had a draft shallowenough to be employable along theSeine. Although not ideally suited forthe purpose, the 1077th's dredge helpedfacilitate Liberty ship passage to Rouen.By the spring of 1945 the port had fif-teen Liberty berths as compared totwenty-six for coasters.35

Antwerp and Ghent

A visit to captured Antwerp, accord-ing to a British engineer who had viewedthe battered ruins of other harbors, was"a startling experience."36 The greatport, ranking with New York, Ham-burg, and Rotterdam, was in miracu-lously good condition, thanks to thespeed of the British advance and Bel-gian success in forestalling Germanattempts at demolition.

Situated on the Schelde River estu-ary fifty-five miles from the sea, Ant-werp provided fine deepwater quayage,75 percent of it along a complex ofeighteen wet basins, ample for the dis-

charge of supplies for both the Britishand American forces. During Octoberrepresentatives of the two forces work-ed out an agreement, known as the"Treaty of Antwerp," by which theAmericans were to use the basins northof a line drawn through the BassinAlbert, the British those to the south.River berths were to be allocated basedon need. The expected tonnage capac-ity was 40,000 tons a day excludingPOL—22,500 for the Americans and17,500 for the British. Command of theport was the responsibility of the Brit-ish 21 Army Group; American opera-tions were under Col. Doswell Gullatt,who had commanded the 5th EngineerSpecial Brigade at OMAHA. At AntwerpGullatt commanded the 13th Port (TC),which had reached the Continent fromEngland in October. The largest singleengineer element of the 13th Port wasthe 358th Engineer General ServiceRegiment; other engineer support in-cluded two depot and two petroleumdistribution companies and two of thefive engineer port repair ships in theETO. By early December Gullatt alsohad under his control the 5th Port (TC),sent forward to Antwerp from Morlaix-Roscoff in Brittany.37

Rehabilitation of the port was underBritish control, with as much Ameri-can assistance as necessary to meet thetarget opening date of 15 November.The first major task was repair of a

35 Ltr, Moore to Worsham, 4 May 45; Moore, FinalReport, pp. 272, 404-05.

36 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11, Port Reconstructionand Repair, app. 22.

37 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume II, pp. 105-10; The Adm and Log Hist of theETO, vol. VII, "Opening and Operating ContinentalPorts," p. 169; Hist Rpt, Transportation Corps in theEuropean Theater of Operations, vols. V and VI, Adm582, ETOUSA Hist Sect; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11,Port Reconstruction and Repair, pp. 48-49, 83-90,and apps. 24, 28. Histories of the units mentioned.Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on these


lock controlling the Kruisschans sluice,the longest of four sluices connectingthe wet basins with the river and theonly one leading into the Americanarea. A German mine had damagedone of the gates. The 358th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment began workon the vital sluice on 6 November incooperation with the British. The factthat the sluice had both flood and ebbgates made repair possible in plenty oftime for the first American Liberty shipto enter on 28 November.38 Americanengineers also removed sand, rubble,and damaged cranes from the quays,improved quays and roads, constructedhardstandings and trackage, and rebuiltdockside warehouses.

The V-1 and V-2 rockets that theGermans sent over Antwerp beginningin mid-October 1944 inflicted surpris-ingly little damage at first, but in mid-December, at the start of the Battle ofthe Ardennes, rocket attacks on the cityintensified. Between 11 and 29 Decem-ber thirty men of the 358th Engi-neer General Service Regiment werewounded by V-bomb attacks, twenty-nine seriously; one died of wounds. OnSaturday afternoon, 16 December, aV—2 bomb scored a direct hit on theRex movie theater, killing 567 soldiersand civilians and seriously injuring 291.The 358th Engineers took over rescueand demolition operations and perse-vered until the last body was recoveredon 22 December. For this extraordinaryeffort, the men of the 358th, theircommander, Col. Chester L. Landaker,and the commander of the regiment's2d Battalion, Maj. Roy S. Kelley, were

warmly thanked by the British briga-dier in charge of the area, who ex-pressed his "highest admiration for themanner in which they worked undersuch distressing circumstances."39

Antwerp provided three means ofport clearance—rail, truck, and inlandwaterway. Damage to tracks was minor;the limiting factor for railroad supplymovements was a shortage of rollingstock. Truck transport began very early,and a network of roads to the principalAmerican depots at Liege-Namur wasoperational before the end of October.The major British-American engineereffort was devoted to helping Belgianagencies open the Albert Canal, whichran eighty miles from Antwerp to Liege.The British were responsible for clear-ing the western portion of the canal—the thirty miles from Antwerp to Kwa-admechelen, and the Americans theremaining fifty miles to Liege. Thework primarily involved repairing locksand removing demolished bridges andsunken barges. The headquarters ele-ment of the 1056th Engineer Port Con-struction and Repair Group supervisedclearing operations in the Americansector, with the 332d and 355th Engi-neer General Service Regiments andBelgian civilian contractors undertak-ing most of the actual work. Althoughtwenty-one blown bridges, includingfive railroad bridges, blocked the Amer-ican sector, the engineers cleared thatstretch for 600-ton barges by the targetdate of 15 December and for 2,000-tonbarges by 9 March 1945. During the win-ter ice and flooding hampered opera-tions, and the German counteroffen-sive for a time forced an embargo onbarge traffic. Eventually 50 percent of38 Ltr, Lt Col Floyd E. Gidinsky to CG, COMZ,

ETOUSA, 11 Nov 44, sub: Status Report—Port ofAntwerp, and 1st Ind. 800 Antwerp, EUCOM Engrfiles. 39 Hist 358th Engr GS Rgt, 1944.


all U.S. military tonnage discharged atAntwerp moved inland along the AlbertCanal.40

After buzz-bomb and rocket attacksand German successes in the Ardennesraised the possibility that Antwerp mightbe wholly or partially denied to theAllies, British and American plannersdecided in mid-January to open theport of Ghent as a standby, makingmuch the same sort of agreement onjoint use as at Antwerp. The Americanallocation was 7,500 tons a day, to becleared primarily over inland waterwaysand railroads; the British quota was setat 5,000 tons.

Accessible from the sea via a canalrunning twenty miles south of Terneu-zen on the Schelde estuary west ofAntwerp, Ghent was in peacetime thesecond port of Belgium, although itstraffic was restricted to barges, coasters,and small freighters. The war had de-stroyed locks at Terneuzen and brid-ges across the canal, and many smallcraft were sunk in the canal. The Ger-mans had used Ghent only for barges,mainly bringing in material used in theconstruction of the Atlantic Wall, andhad dismantled, removed, or neglectedcranes on quays along Ghent's basin.The quays were piled high with sand,gravel, scrap iron, and rubbish; someof the loading berths, undredged forfive years, had become silted.41

On 18 December 1944, the Britishbegan repair of the Terneuzen locksand removal of bridges and sunken ves-sels from the canal. American assistancein rehabilitation did not begin until

after the arrival of the main body ofthe 17th Port (TC) in mid-January;their immediate task was the removalof approximately 450,000 tons of sandand other aggregate from the quays.Most of this material the 17th Portloaded as ballast into outgoing deep-sea vessels; the rest went to Antwerp tobe used on roads and other facilities.The American forces also built roads,repaired cranes, lifted wrecks, anddredged loading berths at the GrandBassin, the principal dock. The U.S.Army hopper dredge W. L. Marshall,with the 1080th Engineer Dredge Crewaboard, undertook the dredging earlyin April. Arriving at Antwerp in lateJanuary to replace a disabled Armydredge, the W. L. Marshall had spentmore than two months dredging alongthe Schelde despite near misses by V-1and V—2 bombs, which blew off sev-eral doors and caused "some conster-nation" among the crew.42

The first U.S. vessel to pass the Ter-neuzen locks and enter the port ofGhent was the Hannis Taylor, a Libertyship that berthed on 23 January 1945.She was the first ship of her size to enterGhent, and her passage through thelocks, which Belgian and Dutch navalauthorities considered impassable forships of such beam, was a triumph.After the Hannis Taylor's entry, Liber-ties went through regularly, with aclearance of only one foot on eitherside. In line with the chief of trans-portation's policy to keep Ghent freeof cargo so that the port would be avail-able in case the Allies had to abandonAntwerp, unloadings were limited to2,500 tons a day during the first month40 Moore, Final Report, p. 278.

41 Ltr, Lt Col Carl H. Irwin to CO, Channel BaseSect, COMZ, 3 Dec 44, sub: Report of Reconnaissance,Port of Ghent; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11, PortReconstruction and Repair, app. 28.

42 Hist 1080th Engr Dredge Crew, 22 Nov 43-25Nov 45.


of operations. This rate more than dou-bled in March, and in the final monthbefore V-E Day an average of 9,500tons a day was discharging at Ghent.

For all their accomplishments in portreconstruction in Europe following D-day, the engineers were never reallyable to keep up with the demands ofharbor improvement until well into thespring of 1945. Statistics on dischargesof ships showed continual increase, butthe shortages of berthing capacity forvessels on the Continent and the inade-quate depot system for bulk supply inthe theater contributed heavily to thesupply crises during the latter part ofthe year. Basing estimates on combat

requirements instead of on port capac-ities, General Lee's COMZ headquar-ters consistently overstated the numberof ships the logistical structure in theports could handle in a single month.The excess shipments created a bottle-neck at that point in the supply chain.Without unloading capacity, the shipspiled up offshore, remaining idle asfloating warehouses instead of return-ing to more efficient use in the ship-ping pool on the high seas. Only withthe capture and the eventual develop-ment of Antwerp and Ghent did thebacklog clear up and the port capacitygrow to a size large enough to supportthe last drive into Germany.

CHAPTER XVII

Combat Engineers in the Breakoutand Pursuit

While engineers at Cherbourg werebeginning the task of port reconstruc-tion late in June, others on the plainsouth of Carentan were preparing tohelp First Army combat troops advanceto a point from which they could breakthrough German defenses and sweepsouth toward Brittany and east towardthe Seine. The advance was to followthree main roads, one leading throughLa Haye-du-Puits down the west coastof the Cotentin to Coutances, anotherfrom Carentan southwest to Periers,and the third south from Carentan toSt. Lo. The VIII Corps, which hadbecome operational on the Continenton 15 June, was to advance on Cou-tances; VII Corps, which had swiftlyturned around after the capture ofCherbourg, was to head for Periers;and part of XIX Corps was to drivetoward St. Lo. The VIII Corps, on thewest or right flank, was to lead off on 3July.1

At the neck of the Cotentin penin-sula the Germans had a powerful allyin the terrain. About half of the Caren-tan plain was so marshy that passage byfoot was difficult, by vehicle impossible.The other half consisted of small fieldsseparated by hedgerows—thick para-pets of dirt from three to twelve feethigh topped by hedges of trees andvines that grew as tall as fifteen feet insome places. Because of the height ofthe hedgerows, the wagon trails thatwound among them seemed to be sun-ken roads. The advantage of such ter-rain to the defender was obvious. Pro-viding concealment for riflemen, ma-chine gunners, and artillery, hedgerowswere, in effect, miniature fortified lines.Combat forces required close engineersupport to open gaps through whichtanks could advance, delivering ma-chine-gun and point-blank artillery fire.Ordnance units developed a hedgerowcutter by welding prongs to the frontof a tank, enabling it to slice throughhedgerows without exposing its vulner-able underbelly and thus to cut anopening through which other tankscould follow. Where hedgerows wereso thick that cutter tanks could notbreak through, the engineers had firstto blow a breach with a heavy satchelcharge.

1 Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, UnitedStates Army in World War II (Washington, 1961), p.40. Unless otherwise cited, tactical information in thischapter is based on this source. Information on engi-neering activities is based on OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt10, Combat Engineering (United Kingdom), 1946,Liaison Sect, Intel Div, ETOUSA Adm file 547, andhistories of the engineer units mentioned.


The Road to Coutances

In the VIII Corps sector the Germanshad another terrain advantage, a horse-shoe-shaped ring of hills around LaHaye-du-Puits. So commanding werethese hills that from their crests the Ger-mans could watch the shipping off theAllied beaches. Enemy artillery deniedto VIII Corps the main roads leadingto the town, forcing the corps' units touse lateral one-way roads and heavilymined lanes. Engineers supporting thethree divisions moving out abreast in adrenching rain early on 3 July had toclear the narrow roads of mines andthen to widen them for two-way traffic.2

Each division, the 82d Airborne inthe center, the 79th on the west (right),and the 90th on the east (left), had itsorganic engineer combat battalion. Inaddition, on 17 June First Army attachedto VIII Corps the 1110th EngineerCombat Group, which had supportedVII Corps during the advance to Cher-bourg. The group commander placedthe 300th Engineer Combat Battalionbehind the 79th Division, the 148thbehind the 82d Airborne Division, andthe 207th behind the 90th Division. Thegroup also had a light ponton companyand a treadway bridge company, which,split into platoons, could provide sup-port to the divisions as needed.

The VIII Corps advanced to La Haye-du-Puits in a flying wedge formationwith the 82d Airborne Division at theapex. Squads of the division's 307thAirborne Engineer Battalion accom-panied battalions of parachute infantry,clearing roads of mines to enable sup-porting tanks to advance. The minedetectors and tanks drew enemy small-arms and artillery fire that caused heavy

losses among mine detector crews. Never-theless, the crack airborne engineerswho had dropped with the 82d Air-borne Division in the early hours ofD-day boasted that "the enemy pioneerobstacles had no effect on the tacticalsituation. The whole thing resolveditself into a sort of game between thepioneers and the engineers."3

The 82d Airborne Division met theweakest resistance during the VIII Corps'advance, encountering mainly Polesand Georgians whose morale was poorand who seemed happy to surrender.From these prisoners the engineersgained considerable information aboutthe Germans' use of land mines. Theyemployed the flat, antitank Teller minewith considerable ingenuity—some-times burying them three deep in sucha way that the two bottom mines werenot visible even when the top one wasremoved; sometimes equipping themines with a second fuse at the bottom,timed to go off after the demolitionistshad unscrewed the top fuse; sometimesburying mines upside down with a pushigniter that converted the Teller intoan antipersonnel mine. The familiarantipersonnel S-mine was now equip-ped with a wire that would set off ablock of TNT when the mine was lifted.The engineers also discovered a newtype of antipersonnel mine called a"Mustard Pot," which consisted of a 50-mm. mortar shell equipped with a chem-ical igniter.4

2 Hist 315th Engr C Bn, 7 Mar 44-May 45.

3 Hist 307th Abn Engr Bn, Normandy Campaign,6 Jun-15 Jul 44.

4 Hist 148th Engr C Bn, Jun 44, Oct 44, and Dec44; Hist 207th Engr C Bn, Nov 43-Dec 44. At theend of June the paratroopers had discovered a Ger-man artillery shell that contained, instead of explosives,notes in Polish encouraging the Allies. William G. LordIII, History of the 508th Parachute Infantry (Washington:Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 32; 315th Engr C

COMBAT ENGINEERS IN THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 369

By daybreak on 7 July the 82d Air-borne Division had gained its objective,and its troops, longest in combat on theContinent, were "lying in rain-filled slittrenches" beginning "to sweat out themuch-rumored trip to England."5 Onthe right the 79th held the heights westof La Haye-du-Puits but had been un-able to take the town. This division,which had participated in the conquestof Cherbourg, had encountered enemytroops of better caliber, including a bat-talion of Waffen SS troops. Ingeniousmines and booby traps also slowed the79th. When an infantry battalion at-tempted a reconnaissance-in-force ofLa Haye-du-Puits during the afternoonof 7 July, the troops ran into "mine-studded fields strung with checker-board patterns of piano wire about afoot off the ground and the booby trapsset to blow off a leg any time you trippedthe strands."6

On the east, or left, flank of theV-shaped advance, the inexperienced90th Division had hard going from themoment it jumped off on 3 July. By 7July the division's foothold on a ridgeeast of La Haye-du-Puits known asMont Castre was so precarious that ithad to call on its organic engineer com-bat battalion, the 315th, for combat sup-port at the highest point of the ridgeline, Hill 122. Companies A, B, and C,which had been doing mine sweeping,road clearing, and other engineer tasksin support of the 357th, 358th, and359th Regimental Combat Teams, werealerted shortly before midnight on the

seventh to move out as infantry, at-tached to the 358th Regimental Com-bat Team. Late in June the battalionhad trained in firing bazookas andheavy machine guns, and on 3 July ithad contributed a bazooka team to helprescue men trapped under Germanself-propelled artillery fire. Moreover,the battalion had a mortar section madeup of one squad from each line com-pany, each squad being armed with twocaptured German 80-mm. trench mor-tars.

The mortar section occupied a posi-tion near the base of Hill 122, protect-ing the right flank of the 90th Division.The lettered companies went into actionon the hill at dawn on 8 July. Battalionheadquarters and the battalion aid sta-tion set up in a gravel quarry behindthe lines. Between 8 and 11 July thebattalion sustained ten casualties fromenemy artillery, which reached evenheadquarters company's position, nor-mally out of range, destroying the kit-chen truck.

After 11 July the situation on VIIICorps' front began to improve. Thatday the 358th Infantry was able todescend the south slope of Hill 122,and the division commander returnedthe engineers to their normal tasks. Bynoon on 9 July, the 79th Division hadtaken La Haye-du-Puits and turned itover to the 8th Division, which hadcome foward to replace the 82d Air-borne Division, soon to return to En-gland. Five days later the 8th and 79thDivisions were occupying the northbank of the Ay River and reconnoiter-ing for crossing sites to Lessay, still inGerman hands. The 90th Division wasat the Seves River near Periers.

Between the 3 July jump-off and 14July, VIII Corps had advanced only

Bn, Mine and Booby Trap Bull 3, Mine Helpers, 20Jul 44, in Opns Rpt, 315th Engr C Bn, 90th Inf Div,Jul 44.

5 Lord, Hist of the 508th Parachute Infantry, p. 37.6 Warren A. Robinson, Through Combat: 314th Infan-

try Regiment (Salt Lake City: Lorraine Press, 1948), pp.21-22.


some seven miles through the hedge-rows—about one-third of the distanceto Coutances—but had suffered morethan 10,000 casualties. Lt. Gen. OmarN. Bradley, commanding First Army,changed tactics, planning the breakoutnot across the Coutances—St. Lo road,Route 172, but across Route 800 fromLessay through Periers to St. Lo. Theoperation, called COBRA, was to beginon 21 July. In the interim, the VIIICorps' divisional combat engineer teamsprovided demonstrations to infantrytroops on clearing mines and blowinghedgerows and benefited from a gen-eral program of reequipping and re-habilitation. The 1110th Engineer Com-bat Group provided hot showers forthe badly crippled 90th Division.

The Road to Periers

There was little room to maneuver.For the attack south from Carentan toPeriers, VII Corps had the 4th and 9thInfantry Divisions, which had partici-pated in the capture of Cherbourg, andthe 83d Division, which had arrived inNormandy late in June to relieve the101st Airborne Division. To reach itsobjective the corps had to pass down acorridor resembling an isthmus two tothree miles wide, with marshes on eitherside. This restricted the advance at theoutset to two divisions; the 83d was tolead off on 4 July, followed by the 4th.The 9th was not to be committed untilthe leading divisions had taken objec-tives on the Periers-St. Lo road.

In addition to their organic engineercombat battalions, the divisions had thesupport of two engineer combat groups:the 1106th, with engineer combat bat-talions behind the 83d and 9th Divi-sions, and the 1120th, supporting the

4th Division and corps troops. Thecommander of the 1106th EngineerCombat Group, Col. Thomas DeF. Rog-ers, first had to undo previous engi-neer efforts—drain the Douve marshesthat had been flooded to protect VIICorps' rear on its march to Cherbourgand clear a huge minefield that Ameri-can forces had planted below Carentanto protect the 101st Airborne Divisionfrom a frontal attack. Two companiesof the 238th Engineer Combat Battal-ion had the task of lifting the mines.Although enemy artillery and small-arms fire slowed the work, they re-moved 12,000 mines in two days. Mean-while, battalions from both engineercombat groups drained marshes andmaintained and guarded bridges overthe Douve River.

When the 83d Division jumped offon the Fourth of July behind a ten-minute artillery preparation—"plentyof fireworks, but of a deadlier kind thanthose back home"—its 308th EngineerCombat Battalion, backed by the 238thEngineer Combat Battalion, built hastybridges, maintained defensive positionsat night, and blew hedgerows so thattanks could advance.7 The Germans,protected behind the hedgerows, re-acted strongly with artillery and ma-chine-gun fire. The advance down thenarrow isthmus went so slowly that aftertwo days the VII Corps commanderturned the 83d Division east toward theTaute River to make room to committhe 4th Division. That division, withengineer support from its organic 4thEngineer Combat Battalion and the1102d Combat Group's 298th Engineer

7 Thunderbolt Across Europe: A History of the 83d Infan-try Division 1942 — 1945 (Munich: F. Bruckmann,1945), p. 29.


Combat Battalion, also had hard going.Six miles northeast of Periers the nar-row neck of high land descended into arain-swollen bog. Leading elementsreached this point on 8 July. A weeklater, still four miles south of Periers,the 4th Division halted and went intoreserve. In ten days of fighting it hadsustained 2,500 casualties.

Thus, by mid-July the advance toPeriers along the narrow isthmus fromCarentan had come to a standstill. FirstArmy reorganized the whole front. The83d Division (less its 330th Infantry),badly crippled by 5,000 casualties intwelve days of combat and stalled atthe western bank of the Taute River,began to relieve the 4th Division andpassed to the control of VIII Corps.The main VII Corps effort then focusedon high ground near St. Lo.

The Road to St. Lo

Two infantry divisions were to spear-head the XIX Corps' advance towardSt. Lo, the 30th down the west bank ofthe Vire and the 29th down the eastbank. The 30th Division deployed inan arc extending from the north bankof the Vire and Taute Canal (which ransoutheast from a point near Carentanon the Taute to a point just north ofAirel on the Vire) to the east bank ofthe Vire near Airel. The division hadto put its 120th Infantry across thecanal and its 117th and 119th over theriver. After the troops assembled nearSt. Jean-de-Daye, a crossroads villageabout three miles from the canal andfrom the river, they had to push throughhedgerow country for nine miles toreach their objective on the highwayleading west from St. Lo to Coutances.The 29th Division would presumably

have easier going down the high groundeast of the Vire to its objective, St. Lo.Therefore, the 30th Division was to leadoff on 7 July, with the 29th not commit-ted until the 30th was about halfway toits objective. A third XIX Corps infan-try division, the 35th, was then arrivingin France and was to be committedeither east or west of the Vire as cir-cumstances dictated. The XIX Corpsalso might receive an armored divisionfor use west of the Vire, but this wasnot certain when the 30th Divisionjumped off on 7 July.

The 30th Division had the supportof its organic 105th Engineer CombatBattalion, backed by the 1104th Engi-neer Combat Group, which suppliedthe 247th Engineer Combat Battalionat the Vire River crossing and the 246thBattalion at the canal. Both were tohave the aid of platoons of the group's992d Engineer Treadway Bridge Com-pany and 503d Engineer Light PontonCompany. Since mid-June the 105thBattalion's companies had been recon-noitering for crossing sites, readyingequipment, and making practice cross-ings near the mouth of the Vire River.

The Vire Crossings at Airel

Before dawn on 7 July, in drizzlingrain and fog, Company A of the 105thEngineer Combat Battalion met the117th Infantry at the site selected forthe first Vire River crossing, just northof Airel. There the river was about sixtyfeet wide and from nine to fourteenfeet deep. Because the river had steepbanks, at least six feet high, the engi-neers and infantrymen carried scalingladders with grappling hooks in addi-tion to twelve-man rubber assault boats.To the comforting sound of a heavy


artillery preparation that began at 0330,the first wave of thirty-two boats gotunder way at 0420, the men of theweapons platoons dumping their mor-tars and machine guns into the boatsand swimming alongside to avoid swamp-ing the frail craft. The 117th Infantrywas experienced, having demonstratedriver crossing at the Infantry School,Fort Benning, Georgia. In ten minutesthe men were scrambling up the scal-ing ladders on the far shore.

Enemy artillery opened up just as theengineer boats were returning to thenear shore, and the second and thirdboat waves crossed under heavy shel-ling. The worst victim of German firewas a platoon of Company B, 105thEngineer Combat Battalion, which wasattempting to build a footbridge. Theplatoon had six bays in the water whendirect artillery hits destroyed them.Another concentration killed four menand wounded four more. Still underfire, the engineers had scarcely finisheda second bridge when enemy artillerytore the span loose from its mooringsand wounded several men. Some of theengineers swam into the river and se-cured the bridge, and by 0530 thetroops had a footbridge. The engineerplatoon, which had lost half its men,was awarded a Distinguished Unit Cita-tion for its heroic action.8

While the infantry was streamingover the footbridge, combat engineersbegan getting the division's vehicles andtanks across the Vire. A seven-archstone bridge spanned the river at Airel,but it was badly cratered. The 247thEngineer Combat Battalion began work

on the bridge at 0700, finding on it atruck that a German shell had hit a fewdays before. At the steering wheel wasthe body of the driver and behind thetruck two other bodies. Removing thecorpses and winching away the truck,the engineers first cleared mines fromthe bridge and then set to work, underconcentrated artillery fire, to coverholes and gaps. With the aid of a pla-toon of the 992d Bridge Company, the247th brought up a 108-foot floatingtreadway bridge on Brockway trucks,which had hydraulic booms to lift theheavy steel treadways and emplace themover the craters. In the process bothengineer units suffered heavy casual-ties, mostly burns from white phospho-rus shells, but the stone bridge wasusable by 0900. After a bulldozer hadpassed over the treadway and clearedAirel of rubble, and after a battalion ofthe 119th Infantry had crossed to pro-tect the bridgehead, tanks and tankdestroyers began rolling over the bridgearound noon.9

By this time the engineers had con-structed additional vehicular bridgesnear Airel. One was an 84-foot infan-try support bridge, which the 503dEngineer Light Ponton Company beganat 0730 and finished in less than anhour. The other was a floating tread-way just south of the stone bridge, builtunder heavy artillery and machine-gunfire that cost Company A of the 247thEngineer Combat Battalion four menkilled and seven wounded. The bridgewas in by 1130. Thus, at noon on 7July, the 30th Division had the threebridges initially planned, the stonebridge and the treadway for one-way

8 Robert L. Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front:The Story of the 30th Infantry Division (Washington:Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 25-27.

9 Jnl, Engr Sect, XIX Corps, 1-31 Jul 44, in XIXCorps G-4 AAR, ans. A-G.


traffic east and the infantry supportbridge for casualties and traffic mov-ing west.

Before the day was over events placedadditional burdens on the group engi-neers. Early in the afternoon the infan-try support bridge, weakened from shel-ling, was put out of action when a half-track and trailer crashed through it,fouling the ponton structure. The bridgehad not yet been repaired when Com-bat Command B of the 3d ArmoredDivision, ordered to cross the Vire atAirel on the evening of 7 July, arrived.This formidable convoy created a traf-fic jam at the stone bridge. On 8 and 9July group engineers repaired the infan-try support bridge, widened the stonebridge to take two-way traffic includ-ing armor, and built a ninety-foot triple-single Bailey to supplement it.10

The Crossing of the Vire and Taute Canal

The 120th Infantry was to cross thetwenty-foot-wide Vire and Taute Canalat the point where Route 174, the high-way from Carentan to St. Lo, crossedthe canal, but the bridge there wasdown. Because the canal was quite shal-low, the plan was for most of the infan-trymen to wade over. For troops of theheavy weapons companies and for thelitter bearers evacuating casualties,Company C of the 105th EngineerCombat Battalion fabricated duck-boards in ten-foot sections.

The crossing was to begin at 1330 on7 July. At midmorning the XIX Corpsengineer received a message from thecorps G-3 that the water in the canalwas deeper than expected, presumably

because the Germans had opened locksthat controlled the tidal stream. Thecorps engineer ordered the 1104thEngineer Combat Group to close thelocks, but the unit could not do so intime to ease the crossing. Finding thecanal deeper and wider than they hadexpected, the infantrymen hesitated tostart wading, and the engineers foundtheir duckboards inadequate. Aftersome confusion and a fifteen-minutedelay, the lead troops of the 120thInfantry finally plunged into the canal,and the men of the 105th EngineerCombat Battalion erected a footbridgein thirty-five minutes. Heavy enemyartillery, mortar, and small-arms firecost the engineers five men killed andtwenty-six wounded.11

Continuous German artillery fire atthe site of the destroyed Route 174bridge delayed for several hours theemplacement of a bridge that couldaccommodate the tanks of the 113thCavalry Group, Mechanized. In a reararea, Company A of the 1104th Engi-neer Combat Group's 246th EngineerCombat Battalion had constructed thirty-six feet of treadway bridge, loaded iton Brockway trucks, and was waitingonly for some halt in the artillery fireto emplace the treadway. On an orderat 1615 from the commanding generalof the 30th Division to disregard enemyfire and erect the bridge, the engineersarranged with divisional artillery to laydown a smoke barrage. The emplace-ment required split-second timing. Asthe first smoke shells landed, men ofthe 246th Engineer Combat Battalion,

10 Ibid.; Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 6, ML 2220,ETOUSA Hist Sect.

11 Jnl, Engr Sect. XIX Corps, 1-31 Jul 44: WarDepartment, Historical Div, St. Lo, (7 July-19 July1944), American Forces in Action Series (Washington,1944), p. 15.


aided by the 992d Treadway BridgeCompany, brought the Brockways upto the site; they had the treadways inplace in less than twenty minutes, justas the smoke screen lifted. Traffic start-ed flowing across immediately. The120th Infantry commended CompanyA of the 246th Engineer Combat Bat-talion for a "fine job."12

The VII Corps in the Vire-Taute Area

To protect XIX Corps' right flankand to help VII Corps outflank Ger-man resistance on the Carentan-Perierscorridor, General Bradley decided tocommit VII Corps' 9th Division in thearea between the Taute and Vire Rivers.The division crossed the Vire and TauteCanal on 9 July and next day attackedwest toward the Taute River. In addi-tion to its own 15th Engineer CombatBattalion, the 9th Division had thedirect support of the 237th EngineerCombat Battalion, 1106th EngineerCombat Group, a battalion that had dis-tinguished itself in the D-day landingsat UTAH Beach. The group commanderexplained the meaning of "direct sup-port" to the engineer battalion andcompany commanders at a conferenceon the evening before the canal cross-ing. He defined it as doing "anythingwithin reason to assist the attackingdivisions."13

This the engineers did. While the15th Engineer Combat Battalion con-centrated on furnishing hedgerow-blast-ing teams and performing road workand mine clearance, the 237th made a

major contribution in bridging, build-ing bypasses, widening and patchingroads, and clearing mines. During mine-field clearance northwest of St. Jean-de-Daye, the engineers discovered anew type of German mine—the "bottlemine"—made from a quart wine bottle,the lower half filled with earth, theupper half with a yellow crystallineexplosive mixed with copper wire, nails,and tin, and corked with an igniter. Theengineers worked often under artilleryfire and in the face of several strongGerman counterattacks.

Vire Crossings from Airel to St. Lo

While the 30th Division battered itsway down the high ridge west of theVire, XIX Corps' 35th and 29th Divi-sions advanced down the east bank. The35th, nearer the river, had the supportof the 234th Engineer Combat Battal-ion, attached to the 1115th EngineerCombat Group.

The next bridge was to be erectednear Cavigny, about halfway betweenAirel and Pont-Hebert, about four milesto the south. In planning, the com-manding officer of the 1115th Groupused aerial photographs and maps, butaccording to group policy the final deci-sion on the type of bridge to be used,treadway or Bailey (both types wereavailable), depended on reconnaissanceat the site. To get exact measurementsthe site selection party sometimes hadto wade and swim the river under heavyenemy artillery, mortar, and small-armsfire. Although the Germans had goodobservation of the bridge site at Cavig-ny, the 247th Engineer Combat Battal-ion was able to install a 110-foot triple-single Bailey bridge there on 12 July.

Next day the group received orders

12 Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 6, ML 2220, ETOUSAHist Sect; History of the 120th Infantry Regiment (Wash-ington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 18.

13 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44.


to build a bridge over the Vire a mileor so farther south, at La Meauffe.Moving on the heels of the infantry,the 234th Engineer Combat Battalionreached the work site on 16 July almostbefore the last German had left. Bymidnight the men had erected a Baileysimilar to that at Cavigny, a treadwaybridge, and a bypass to route heavy traf-fic away from the railroad overpass,which artillery fire had seriously weak-ened. The 503d Engineer Light Pon-ton Company, attached to the 1115thGroup on 15 July, brought up the Bai-ley bridging. Following a pattern estab-lished at the Vire and other rivers inNormandy, the engineers replaced Bai-ley bridges as soon as possible with tim-ber bridges and took the Baileys for-ward for use in later crossings. Likewise,whenever possible—as at the stone bridgeat Airel—they removed treadway soas to make it available for subsequenttemporary bridging.

Information the 1115th EngineerCombat Group obtained from a Frenchcitizen who had been the governmentengineer for roads and bridges in theSt. Lo area considerably eased planningfor an important bridge at Pont-Hebert,where Route 174 from Carentan to St.Lo crossed the Vire. Of particular valuewas the civilian engineer's advice onmanipulating the locks on the tidal VireRiver at Airel and La Meauffe. Thisinformation enabled American engi-neers to lower the water level when acrossing was desired and to raise it, asnecessary, to protect the 35th Division'sflanks. After reconnaissance discoveredan underwater bridge the Germans hadbuilt at Rampan, a town at a bend ofthe river about halfway between Pont-Hebert and St. Lo, the engineers sud-denly closed the lock at La Meauffe one

night, raising the level of the water atRampan more than seven feet. This tac-tic denied the bridge to the enemy anddrowned some Germans leading horse-drawn artillery across.14

One question the French engineercould not answer was whether a rail-road overpass immediately east of Pont-Hebert was intact. Here, help camefrom artillery observation plane crewswho bivouacked in the same hedgerowfields as the group engineers. The pilotsreported several times daily not onlyon the condition of the overpass (whichthe Germans never demolished) butalso on the bridge itself. The task ofconstructing the two bridges, a tread-way and a Bailey, went to the 234thEngineer Combat Battalion, largely asa result of its excellent work at Cavignyand La Meauffe. The unit began worklate on 18 July, and with the help oftwo officers from the 992d TreadwayBridge Company had a 156-foot float-ing treadway bridge in place by 0630.At 1100 the 503d Ponton Companybrought up a 130-foot double-doubleBailey bridge, which was ready for traf-fic by 1800.

Several hours before the engineersbegan bridge operations at Pont-Heberton 18 July, a 29th Division task forcecaptured the battered, bombed-out cityof St. Lo. With the task force came aplatoon of Company C of the 29th'sorganic 121st Engineer Combat Battal-ion to clear the streets of rubble. A ser-geant of the engineer platoon claimedto be the first American to enter St.Lo.15

14 Hist XIX Corps Engrs, pp. 9-10, and MS, TheXIX Corps History, p. 8. Both in ML 2220, ETOUSAHist Sect.

15 Joseph H. Ewing, 29 Let's Go!: A History of the 29thInfantry Division in World War II (Washington:


VII Corps Engineers inthe Cobra Breakthrough

While XIX Corps was assuming engi-neer responsibility for the constructionand maintenance of bridges and roads,it was also preparing its part in Opera-tion COBRA. The operation called fortroops to break out of the bocage andthrough the German lines to the south,then to liberate more ports in Brittany.To open the offensive, air forces wereto deluge a well-defined area south ofthe St. Lo-Periers road with light anti-personnel bombs designed to destroyenemy troop concentrations withouttearing up the terrain to the detrimentof attacking American armor and in-fantry. The corps' mission was to seizeand hold a line from Coutances toMarigny, about eight miles to the north-east, in order to cut off and destroy theenemy facing VIII Corps in the Lessay-Periers area and to prevent Germanreinforcements' approach from thesouth and east. Armor to support thethrust was to pass through gaps the 9thand 30th Infantry Divisions opened.The VII Corps engineers devoted theirefforts to opening and maintainingmain supply routes (MSRs) to supportthe advance.16

The 1106th Engineer Combat Groupwas to support the 30th Infantry Divi-sion, advancing along high ground onthe Vire's west bank with the 2d Ar-mored Division following. The area hadtwo main supply routes. One MSR (D—77), a two-way road for Class 40 traffic,was the responsibility of the group's

49th Engineer Combat Battalion; theother (D-446), a one-way Class 40road, the 237th Engineer Combat Bat-talion was to open and maintain. Athird engineer combat battalion, the238th, would support the 2d ArmoredDivision. On VII Corps' right flank the1120th Engineer Combat Group wasto support the 1st and 9th InfantryDivisions and the 3d Armored Division.The 1120th's 294th and 297th Engi-neer Combat Battalions were respon-sible for maintaining the two main sup-ply routes—from Tribehou to Marigny—on the right flank, while the 298thEngineer Combat Battalion was to sup-port the 3d Armored Division. Armyengineer support in the VII Corps areawas the responsibility of the 1111thEngineer Combat Group. About a weekbefore COBRA, Maj. Gen. Manton S.Eddy, commanding the 9th Division,complained that the front assigned hisdivision was too wide. General Bradleythen gave VII Corps the 4th InfantryDivision to attack down the center ofthe breakthrough area. The 1106th and1120th Groups divided the engineersupport mission for the 4th Division.17

According to the VII Corps plan, the9th, 4th, and 30th Divisions were to benear the St. Lo-Periers road on 20July, ready to break through as soon aspossible after a massive air bombard-ment. But pouring rain and cloudyskies forced postponement of the bom-bardment until the morning of 25 July.By 17 July the engineers were at workon the main supply routes down whichthe tanks were to roll, sweeping theroads from shoulder to shoulder formines, repairing craters and potholes,and clearing away rubble. For the diffi-Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 102; Hists, 121st

Engr C Bn, 1 Jun-31 Aug 44, and 1115th Engr CGp, 29 Mar 43-Dec 44.

16 VII Corps Engr FO 3, 19 Jul 44. 17 Ibid.; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 332.


cult problem of removing abandonedheavy German tanks, the 1106th Engi-neer Combat Group supplied heavyblock and tackle of about fifty-ton ca-pacity, threaded with 7/8-inch cable andoperated by a four-ton wrecker. The49th Engineer Combat Battalion testedthe equipment successfully on a Tigertank. Later the battalion used a simplermethod for one more or less intacttank—the battalion's S-3 removedbooby traps from the tank and drove itoff the road under its own power. For"rush crossings" of bomb craters the1106th Engineer Combat Group sup-plied the 2d Armored Division with sec-tions of treadway bridging.18

"It's raining very hard," noted the1106th Group's journal on 21 July;next day it was "still pouring." Mudmade the construction of bypasses forinfantry troops difficult, and gravel hadto be brought up and stockpiled at stra-tegic points to keep the four main sup-ply routes firm enough for tanks. Thework went on under increasingly heavyenemy artilley fire. For example, on theevening of 21 July at an engineer biv-ouac near Tribehou, German shellsexploded a demolition dump, killingtwo men of the 298th Engineer Com-bat Battalion and wounding fourteen.On 23 July the weather began to clear,and on the morning of the twenty-fifththe engineers maintaining the roads inthe VII Corps area saw the sky black-ened with Allied planes. The COBRAbreakthrough had begun. As the infan-try divisions broke across the Cou-tances-St. Lo highway between Marignyand St. Gilles, the engineers, working

night and day, had roads ready for thetanks.19

VIII Corps Engineers Aidthe War of Movement

For VIII Corps, the "direct pressureforce" in the breakthrough, H-hour was0530 on 26 July. The commander, Maj.Gen. Troy H. Middleton, had four divi-sions that he planned to move abreastin a fifteen-mile zone between the westcoast of the Cotentin peninsula and theTaute River: the 79th Division facingthe Ay River near Lessay on the ex-treme west, the 8th Division facinghedgerow country, the 90th Divisionalong the Seves River, and the 83d Divi-sion on the extreme left along the Taute.(Map 19} Two armored divisions, the4th and the 6th, were to roll throughgaps on the Lessay-Periers road. Be-cause both the 79th and the 90th Divi-sions faced flooded regions that offeredthe Germans excellent fields of fire, the8th was chosen to spearhead the attack,opening a gap. The 79th was to followthrough the gap, turn west, outflankthe enemy south of the Ay, and seizeLessay. Engineer support of the ad-vance was the responsibility of the1110th Engineer Combat Group, withits 207th Engineer Combat Battaliondirectly behind the 8th Division and its148th Battalion behind the 79th Divi-sion.

In preparing for the advance thegroup engineers repaired roads andcleared minefields. By midafternoon,26 July, the 28th Infantry had reached

18 Map, Operation COBRA VII Corps Plan, in Blu-menson, Breakout and Pursuit, map 10, p. 216.

19 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44; EngineerOperations by the VII Corps in the European The-ater of Operations, vol. III, "Northern France andBelgium," pp. 1—2.


ENGINEERS ASSEMBLE AN EXPLOSIVE-LADEN "SNAKE" to clear a path in aminefield.

the Lessay-Periers road and had madeuntenable the entire enemy positionalong the VIII Corps front; by the eve-ning of 28 July, the Germans were inretreat, leaving behind some of themost extensive minefields encounteredon the Continent. The same eveningthe VIII Corps engineer, Col. WilliamR. Winslow, ordered the engineer tech-nical intelligence team (ETIT) attachedto VIII Corps, bolstered by hastily or-ganized teams from engineer combatbattalions, to instruct the tankers of the4th and 6th Armored Divisions in mineremoval. The teams worked through-out the night giving demonstrations tothe armored troops with actual mus-tard pot, Schu, and Bouncing Bettymines. Next morning, when the armor

rolled across a treadway bridge over theAy River near Lessay (completed on themorning of 28 July by the 4th ArmoredDivision's 24th Armored Engineer Bat-talion), the commander of the ETIT,1st Lt. James Ball, could report that hesaw "men from 4th Armored taking outmines they had never heard of beforelike veterans." The villages were alsobooby-trapped. In Lessay, a village ofonly 2,000, VIII Corps engineer unitsremoved more than 300 booby trapsduring the afternoon of 29 July.20

Engineers of the 24th and the 25thArmored Engineer Battalions, organicto the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions,

20 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering,p. 35.


respectively, also removed roadblocksand constructed bridges as they passedthrough Avranches and advanced intoBrittany. Their experience illustratesoperating differences between thearmored engineer battalions and thosein support of infantry. The armoredengineer battalion was broken up intoplatoons, each assigned to an armoredtask force and operating under thecommand of the task force comman-der; the engineer battalion commanderand the division engineer could thusexercise only the remotest degree ofcontrol. This situation became ap-parent during the speedy armored ad-vance in the last days of July and ledthe 24th Armored Engineer Battalion'scommanding officer to recommendplacing the "utmost emphasis" on thetraining of platoon and company com-manders.21

Speed in reducing obstacles—wheth-er roadblock, minefield, blown bridge,or crater—was the essence of armoredengineer operations. The engineersusually employed demolitions to reduceroadblocks and tankdozers to pushaway rubble. Mines Were lifted by hand.While corps engineers generally bridg-ed larger streams, the armored engi-neer platoon or battalion (to which abridge company was attached) per-formed bridging whenever possible.Engineers of the 24th Armored Engi-neer Battalion considered the short,unsupported span treadway their mostimportant bridge because it was thequickest to emplace when crossing anti-tank obstacles. On the night of 28 July,a platoon of Company B used a 24-footfixed-span treadway to move 4th Ar-mored Division tanks over a road crater;the engineers completed the operation,

including mine clearance, in twenty-fiveminutes.

On 1 August 1944, when Third Armybecame operational on the Continent,VIII Corps passed to its control. Thearmy headquarters placed the 1102dand 1107th Engineer Combat Groupsin support of the corps; the 1110thEngineer Combat Group reverted toFirst Army. The VIII Corps also hadthe support of the 1117th EngineerCombat Group until 7 August, whenXV Corps became operational and tookover the 1117th. Because trained engi-neer combat battalions were in shortsupply, Third Army obtained two engi-neer general service regiments. One ofthem, the 1303d, the army attached toVIII Corps.22

Siege Operations in Brittany

In the dash toward Brest—the firstpriority in early August because of theneed for a large port—the 6th ArmoredDivision bypassed St, Malo on the northshore of Brittany. Maj. Gen. Troy H.Middleton, the VIII Corps commander,gave the task of taking St. Malo to the83d Division, reinforced by the 121stInfantry of the 8th Division, a mediumtank company, and corps artillery. Themission included the reduction of Di-nard, directly across the mile-wide RaneeRiver estuary from St. Malo, At Dinard(in peacetime a popular bathing resortfor the British), the Germans had em-placed artillery targeted on St. Malo.

The first task for the 83d Division'sorganic 308th Engineer Combat Battal-ion was to move the 121st RegimentalCombat Team across the Ranee River

21 Hist 24th Armd Engr Bn, Jul-Dec 44.

22 AAR of Third U.S. Army, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45(hereafter cited as TUSA Rpt), vol. II, p. Eng-3.


for the advance on Dinard. Uprivernear Dinan, about twelve miles southof Dinard, was a stone-arch bridge thatthe Germans had destroyed. There,Company A of the 308th began build-ing two bridges on the afternoon of 5August. The first completed was a Class9 expedient floating bridge designedto move reconnaissance elements acrossthe river. Company A had some diffi-culty with the second bridge, a 140-footClass 40 double-double Bailey builtacross two spans of the stone bridge.Most of the work had to be done atnight and because the roadway wasabout two hundred feet above the water,placing the intermediate and far-shorerocking rollers was extremely hazard-ous. Nevertheless, the bridge was readyfor traffic by 0645 on 6 August. Beforemidnight, Company C had constructeda sixty-foot double-single Bailey bridgeand three footbridges under such in-tense small-arms and mortar fire thatonly small parties could work at onetime. Next day Company B made anassault river crossing for two infantrycompanies near La Vicomte-sur-Rance,four miles northeast of Dinan, againstsmall-arms fire from Germans who heldcommanding ground on the far shore.

Thereafter, at Dinard and St. Malo,the engineers supporting the 121stRegimental Combat Team and the 83dDivision played an important part inpreliminary siege operations—destroy-ing barricades, demolishing pillboxes toprevent the enemy from returning tothem, gapping minefields, and remov-ing booby traps. On several occasionsengineers joined the infantry in flame-throwing teams. By 9 August the troopsof the 83d Division had fought theirway through the suburbs of St. Maloand, after bitter street fighting, reached

the old part of the city near the harbor.The Citadel de St. Servan, a concreteand natural rock fortress with walls upto fifty-five feet thick, dominated theharbor. German shells were still crash-ing down from Dinard as well as fromthe tiny offshore island of Cezembre.Sending a combat team across the Raneeto assist the 121st Regimental CombatTeam in reducing Dinard, the mainbody of the 83d Division turned to bat-tering down the last defenses of St.Malo.

Colonel Winslow, the VIII Corpsengineer, maintained close personalliaison with the division engineers dur-ing the efforts between 9 and 12 Augustto breach the Citadel. On the afternoonof the tenth he led a party to exploreSt. Malo's sewerage system, hoping tolocate a conduit under the Citadel wherea major demolition charge might beplaced; he found none. Nor did the308th Engineer Combat Battalion haveany luck aboveground. After dark oneach night between the ninth and thetwelfth the engineers climbed over thefortifications, dropping pole chargesthrough the Citadel's vents and ports.Neither these nor demolitions placedunder the battlements had any effect.As soon as the engineers' explosivesbegan going off, German artillery fromCezembre Island would come in soheavily that the engineers would haveto withdraw. The siege of the Citadelcontinued until 17 August, when theAmericans forced surrender with direct8-inch fire, using white phosphorusshells on vents and ports.

The VIII Corps then concentratedall its efforts on taking Brest. By mid-August a swift-moving task force, com-posed principally of cavalry and tank-destroyer units with the 159th Engineer


Combat Battalion in support, opened asupply line to the vicinity of Brest, anessential preliminary to capturing thecity. The main mission was to securevital bridges on a double-track railwayrunning from Rennes to Brest beforethe Germans could demolish them.During the operation the engineersplayed a vital role, often taking theplace of the infantry that the task forcehad fruitlessly requested.

The first railway bridges seized lay atSt. Brieuc, on the coast about thirty-three miles west of Dinard. The taskforce captured the spans intact on 7August; Company B of the 159th Engi-neer Battalion remained behind to guardthem and set up a cage for prisoners ofwar. The most important bridge on theline was at the port of Morlaix, nearlyfifty miles west of St. Brieuc. A stone-arch structure about a thousand feetlong and two hundred feet high, theMorlaix bridge was the largest railwayviaduct in France. Minefields and anti-tank obstacles temporarily slowed partof the task force, but Company B ofthe 159th Engineer Battalion kept goingwith the leading tanks and helped takeMorlaix, which later became the princi-pal port of entry for supplies used atBrest. The task force captured thebridge intact, and Company B stayedbehind to guard it.

The rest of the battalion then re-ceived a new mission—to remove minesand obstacles from the beaches at St.Michel-en-Greve, some twenty-five milesnortheast of Morlaix on the north coastof Brittany. Supplies for Brest cameashore there from LSTs; the first beach-ing was on 12 August.23

At 0300 on 25 August the attack onBrest began, with three infantry divi-sions side by side: the 8th in the center,the 29th on the right (west), and the 2don the left. The city, France's secondport and a great naval base, was forti-fied in depth. Ten miles out into thecountryside the Germans had set uproadblocks, dug antitank ditches, plantedhuge minefields protected by machine-gun nests, and built concrete pillboxes.These provided a defensive position asstrong as any American troops encoun-tered on the Continent.

On the morning the siege began thecommander of the 8th Division's 12thEngineer Combat Battalion, Lt. Col.E. M. Fry, Jr., was captured when heleft his jeep to reconnoiter a bridge;three men of his party were killed. Thebattalion, aided by a company of the202d Engineer Combat Battalion ofVIII Corps' 1107th Engineer CombatGroup, kept busy on road work, whichenemy fire slowed, until 1 September.Then the 8th Division, having justreached the city limits, stopped in frontof ramparts up to seventy feet thick andthirty feet high, on which the Germanshad emplaced 88-mm. artillery andmachine guns. Because of this formida-ble obstacle the task of taking Brest wasturned over to the flank divisions, the29th and the 2d; the 8th Division turnedaside to clear the Crozon peninsula,west of the port. A few days after itsarrival in the new sector, Colonel Fryrejoined his battalion. He had escapedfrom Brest in a rowboat.

About the time the 8th Division turnedaside, the 29th Division on the west flankwas approaching two ancient Frenchforts, Fort Keranroux and Fort Mont-barrey. The division captured Fort Ke-ranroux on the afternoon of 13 Sep-tember, mainly with the aid of heavy

23 Capt. William W. Baltz et al., The 159th EngineerCombat Battalion (Antwerp: De Vos Van Kleef, Ltd.,1945), pp. 11-15. For the events at Morlaix-Roscoff,see ch. XVI.


bombardment from planes and artil-lery. The reduction of Fort Mont-barrey, a casemated fort with wallsabout twenty-five feet thick and sur-rounded by a fifty-foot moat, requiredintensive effort by the 29th Division's121st Engineer Combat Battalion. Theengineers first had to get close enoughto the fort, in the face of withering firefrom its ports, to place charges underthe wall. Colonel Winslow, the VIIICorps engineer, planned to cover theports with flame from flame-throwingtanks. He was able to obtain twelve suchtanks—known as "Crocodiles"—fromthe British, but to get them close enoughfor their fire to be effective the engi-neers had to go out on the night beforethe attack and clear a path through aheavily mined and shell-pitted ap-proach to the fort. This task, whichCompany B of the 121st Engineer Com-bat Battalion accomplished, was the firststep of what turned out to be a classicsiege operation.

The first attempt to get the tanksthrough failed. Of four Crocodiles thatstarted out on 14 September, two wan-dered from the safe path through themines; enemy fire destroyed another.The engineers again widened the pathat night, and at 1500 on 16 Septemberthree Crocodiles, concealed by a smokescreen, were able to cover the entirewest side of the fort with flames. Thusprotected, engineers rushed to the outerwall and placed under it 2,500 poundsof TNT, creating a breach large enoughfor men to pass through. Then theyplaced 1,200-pound charge of TNT ina tunnel leading into the fort, causingthe fort's reduction. Another party ofengineers preceded the infantry, carry-ing scaling ladders that they set upagainst the fort. Scaling the roof, the

assault party then used the ladders toget down into the courtyard. Within tenminutes the garrison surrendered.

Engineers of the 2d Engineer Com-bat Battalion, supporting the 2d Divi-sion approaching Brest from the east,also supplied scaling ladders as well asgrappling hooks projected by rifle gre-nades for the infantry. But when thedivision came up against the ancientwall of the inner city, the engineerswere unable to get close enough to blasta gap because the Germans had em-placed on the wall machine guns and anumber of 88-mm. guns. The combatcomnmanders called up the 8-inch gunsthat had been so successful at St. Malo.Firing from ranges as close as 5,000yards, the big guns blasted a breachlarge enough for men to pass through;the engineers then widened it withexplosives so that the hole would ac-commodate vehicles.

During the bitter house-to-housestreet fighting that followed, the 2dEngineer Combat Battalion made itsmost valuable contribution. The engi-neers became adept at blowing holes inthe walls of houses at points where theentering infantrymen would not haveto expose themselves to enemy fire inthe streets. On the eastern side, awayfrom the enemy, the engineers blewholes through inner walls to enable thetroops to pass safely from building tobuilding and in ceilings to allow theinfantry to pass from floor to floorwhen the Germans defended stairways.The engineers also developed severalmethods of quickly overcoming obsta-cles in the way of the advancing troops.The engineers used TNT to cut steel-rail roadblocks and learned to fill cra-ters and ditches quickly by blowingdebris into them from the walls of adja-


cent buildings. In clearing debris fromstreets where sniper fire was prevalent,the engineers developed a new appre-ciation for the armored cab on D—4angledozers.24

By the time Brest fell on 18 Sep-tember, the Allies had the port of Ant-werp. Brest was no longer required,and no effort was made to undertakeextensive repair of the port facilities.

The Seine Crossings

At the beginning of the third weekin August, even before the siege ofBrest had begun, U.S. Army engineerswere helping American divisions tocross the Seine. Bridging operationsbegan on 20 August when the 151stEngineer Combat Battalion put a tread-way over the Seine at Mantes-Gassi-court, about thirty miles northwest (asthe crow flies) of Paris. By the time theyreached the Seine the engineers of bothFirst and Third Armies had becomeadept at getting the combat troopsacross rivers. After First Army's break-through at Marigny-St. Gilles andThird Army's advance east from Fou-geres (south of Avranches), bridge con-struction became the principal engineermission. Roads across northern Francewere damaged in few places, and thesecould be quickly repaired or bypassed.The very speed of the advance pre-vented the Germans from either pre-paring extensive road demolitions orplanting large minefields. Most bridges,however, were down—demolishedeither by the Germans or by Alliedbombers.25

In supporting the advance of FirstArmy's VII Corps, for example, corpsand division engineers built twenty-ninebridges across the Seine between 31July and 26 August. At several impor-tant crossing sites, such as those on theSeine immediately after the breakoutand others on the Mayenne and Va-renne Rivers during the closing of theFalaise Gap, the ground forces requiredfour bridges at each crossing to pro-vide adequate roadnets. Fortunately, inmost cases not all the spans of existingstone bridges were down and mostabutments were intact, permitting therapid emplacement of treadway andBailey bridging.26

Of particular interest to the engineerswas a dual roadway Bailey built overthe Varenne on 7 and 8 August atAmbrieres-le-Grand (about twenty milessoutheast of Mortain), where only onearch of a 120-foot-long stone bridgeremained in place. On the remainingpier, Company B of the 297th Engi-neer Combat Battalion began construct-ing a Class 40 Bailey at 0800 and bynightfall had completed it. That after-noon the 23d Armored Engineer Bat-talion quickly emplaced a treadwayalongside, crossed the tanks of the 3dArmored Division, and then departedwith the treadway. Two-lane traffic wasstill desired, but the abutments werenot wide enough to carry two Baileybridges side by side. The 297th Battal-ion converted the Bailey into a dualroad structure by adding a second storyto the central girder, building andlaunching a third girder, and then plac-ing transoms and flooring for the sec-ond roadway. The two-lane bridge was24 Daily Opns Log, 2d Engr C Bn, Sep 44, in AAR,

2d Engr Bn, Jun-Dec 44.25 FUSA Rpt I, bk. V, pp. 224-25; TUSA Rpt, vol.

II, p. Eng-3; Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. III, "North-ern France and Belgium," p. 2.

26 Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. III, "Northern Franceand Belgium," p. 2, and app. 3, Tabulation of StreamCrossing Data.


ready by 2000 on 8 August and provedsturdy enough to support not only a1st Infantry Division regimental com-bat team crossing but also a week's con-tinuous supply of traffic.27

Engineers with the convoys rollingeastward found northern France "some-thing different from Normandy: thestreets black with people, who seemedto do nothing twenty-four hours a daybut stand there and cheer us and wave,and weep, some of them, and throw usflowers and fruits and vegetables, andstare wide-eyed at the trucks and jeepsand tanks. What always got them mostwere the tank retrievers that filled thewhole road, with red lights blinking,and all armored up like something fromMars, and the Long Toms and 8 inchhows. They loved them!"28

While moving up to the XIX Corps'Seine River crossing at Meulan, a fewmiles northwest of Paris, the 1115thEngineer Combat Group's long, un-gainly Brockway bridge trucks, carry-ing sections of steel treadways and lift-ing equipment, made a strong impres-sion on the Germans. During the nightof 26 August a convoy that includedthe 295th Engineer Combat Battalionran into a company of German soliders.Uncertain of the enemy strength, theconvoy held its fire. So did the Ger-mans—a circumstance that mystifiedthe Americans until two American pris-oners of war, breaking away from theircaptors and jumping aboard the Ameri-

can convoy, supplied the reason. TheGermans had been afraid to fire be-cause they thought the Brockway truckwas a new secret weapon—perhaps arocket launcher.29

In the race across France the SeineRiver, not Paris, became the main ob-jective. By mid-August enemy forceswere fleeing the Argentan-Falaise pock-et and concentrating along the lowerSeine northwest of Paris. In the fore-front of the pursuit, Third Army's XVCorps was to send its 5th Armored Divi-sion down the west bank of the Seineand put its 79th Infantry Division acrossthe river to establish a bridgehead onthe east bank near Mantes-Gassicourt.

A few hours before midnight on 19August, receiving the order to cross,the commander of the 79th sent oneregiment on foot across a dam nearMantes. A torrential rain was falling.In the blackness and rain the menwalked single file, each man touchingthe one ahead. Another regiment, pluslight equipment, crossed in engineerassault boats and rafts. The crossingseemed interminable—the river wasfrom 500 to 800 feet wide. For the firstbridge the 79th Division commanderborrowed 700 feet of treadway fromthe 5th Armored Division. By the after-noon of 20 August the treadway wasinstalled on rubber pontons, and anotherinfantry regiment was crossing in trucks;by nightfall the bulk of the 79th, includ-ing tanks, artillery, and tank destroyers,was across the river. During the dayenemy aircraft came over and attackedthe treadway; its rubber pontons madethe bridge vulnerable to bullets andbomb splinters. Next morning the divi-sion engineers began to construct a less

27 Ibid., p. 3 and apps. 3 and 5; AAR, 297th Engr CBn, Jun-Dec 44, Incl 3, Bridge Construction Rpt, 11Aug 44. As insurance against the destruction of theBailey (two enemy shells fell near the bridge on 7August, though they did no damage), the 297th builta Class 40 floating treadway on pontons to the east ofAmbrieres-le-Grand.

28 MS, The XIX Corps History, p. 21, XIX CorpsEngr, ML 2220, ETOUSA Hist Sect. 29 Hist 1115th Engr C Gp, 29 Mar 43-Dec 44.


3D ARMORED DIVISION VEHICLES CROSS THE SEINE RIVER

vulnerable floating Bailey, supportingit on timber laid across four river bar-ges. Finished at 0130 on 23 August,the improvised Bailey had to be usedcarefully because loads of more thanforty tons caused the sides of the bargesto spread apart. Nevertheless, the bridgeserved the division well.30

While elements of XV Corps, whichtemporarily passed to First Army con-trol on 24 August, were using the Bai-ley over the lower Seine at Mantes-Gassicourt, engineers of Third Army'sXII and XX Corps were preparingcrossings south of Paris on the upperSeine. Typical was the effort by XXCorps engineers to cross the 7th Ar-

mored Division at Melun, twenty-fivemiles southeast of Paris. Hopes that thebridge at Melun could be capturedintact were dashed on the morning of23 August, when the Germans destroyedthe span just as Combat CommandReserve (CCR) of the 7th ArmoredDivision was about to attack. BecauseCombat Command Reserve had noassault boats and was receiving heavyfire from the opposite bank, the divi-sion commander brought up CombatCommand A to cross downriver fromMelun and attack the city from thenorth. Arriving the same morning atPonthierry, a village about five milesdownstream from Melun, Combat Com-mand A, with the 179th Engineer Com-bat Battalion of the 1139th Engineer30 TUSA Rpt, vol. II, p. Eng-4.


FRENCH BARGES SUPPORT BAILEY BRIDGING OVER THE SEINE AT MANTES

Combat Group in support, found thebridge at Ponthierry demolished. Recon-naissance revealed two suitable assaultcrossing sites near Tilly, a hamlet a mileto the north. After a heavy artillerypreparation at 1615, two companies ofthe 179th Engineer Combat Battalion,using seventy-six assault boats the 509thEngineer Light Ponton Company sup-plied, began crossing the armored troopsat both sites. Initial waves went acrosswithout casualties, but succeeding wavesmet rifle fire that killed two of theengineers. The engineer battalion suf-fered even more heavily later in theevening when a German artillery shellhit one of its trucks, killing five men.

Meantime, elements of the 179thEngineer Combat Battalion had started

construction of a treadway bridge at thenorthernmost site, aided by elementsof the 7th Armored Division's organic33d Armored Engineer Battalion. (Dur-ing the fast pursuit the troops of the33d had been riding on the outside oftanks acting as riflemen and had under-taken little engineer work.) By midnightthe bridge was ready. Bulldozer opera-tors, who prepared the approaches tothe bridge as well as landing slips for aferry operated at the south site, accom-plished a particularly hazardous taskunder mortar, artillery, and rifle fire.

Engineers of V Corps had the envi-able mission of assisting in the libera-tion of Paris. On 24 August reconnais-sance parties of the 4th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, organic to the 4th Infan-


try Division, which with the 2d FrenchArmored Division formed the bulk ofV Corps, went forward to contact theFrench Forces of the Interior (FFI) andobtain data on Seine crossings. On thetwenty-sixth, the combat engineers builta treadway bridge south of Paris andon that day and the next worked onthe streets of Paris, clearing roadblocksand removing mines and booby traps.But the engineers had only two days toenjoy the riotous welcome given the lib-erators before the 4th Battalion movedeast of Paris with its division. For thevictory parade of the 28th InfantryDivision down the Champs-Elysees on29 August, engineers of V Corps' 1171stEngineer Combat Group improvised areviewing stand for senior Americanand French officers, using a Baileybridge turned upside down. 31

Beyond the Seine

After crossing the Seine, First Army'sXIX, V, and VII Corps turned northand northeast in rapid pursuit of thefleeing and disorganized enemy. Fast-est of all—"pursuit With a capital'P' "—was the headlong 100-mile dash ofXIX Corps to the Belgian border atTournai on 1 and 2 September.32 Cross-ing the Somme on bridges the Britishhad captured intact with FFI help, thecorps encountered no major water ob-stacles until it reached the Albert Canaland the Meuse River during the sec-ond week in September. In the "ratherstrange war" that developed, large pock-ets of the enemy were bypassed andGermans wandered into American biv-

ouac areas. Two engineer task forcesorganized from elements of the 1104thEngineer Combat Group had the mis-sion of rapidly clearing and maintain-ing roads and constructing the few brid-ges required.33

In the center of the First Army ad-vance, the engineers of V Corps, sup-porting the 4th and 28th Infantry Divi-sions and the U.S. 5th Armored and2d French Armored Divisions, con-structed a series of floating and fixedbridges over the Aisne and the Oiseand various small canals to the north ofthose rivers. Near Cambrai, south ofthe Belgian border, the corps (less the2d French Armored Division) on 4 Sep-tember turned to the right toward Lux-embourg. During its march east, thecorps encountered its first formidablewater obstacle—the Meuse. The retreat-ing Germans had destroyed all bridgesalong the line of advance-from Charle-ville to Sedan. At Charleville on 6 Sep-tember the 1171st Engineer CombatGroup erected V Corps' first heavyponton bridge, followed two days laterby a second at Sedan. Because of thelimited availability of floating equip-ment and of the need to keep treadwayequipment with the forward elements,corps engineers rebuilt damagedbridges, including railway bridges,whenever possible. During these opera-tions French civilians and members ofthe French Forces of the Interior pro-vided helpful information concerningthe status of bridges and the locationof minefields.34

In the course of VII Corps' rapid

31 Hist V Corps Engr Sect, Jun, Aug—Dec 44, Jan—9May 45; V Corps Operations in the ETO, 6 Jan 1942-9May 1945, p. 211, in CMH.

32 Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, p. 85.

33 Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 11, ML 2220, ETOUSAHist Sect.

34 V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 214-36, inCMH; AAR, V Corps Engr Sect, Jun, Aug-Dec 44,Jan-9 May 45; Hist 112th Engr C Bn, 1944.


march northeast from the Seine thefirst important water barrier was theMarne, but it presented few problemsto the corps engineers. The 3d Armor-ed Division captured intact bridges atLa Ferte and Chateau-Thierry, and oneat Meaux, only partially destroyed, wasquickly repaired. Elements of the 1120thand 1106th Engineer Combat Groupswere over the border into Belgiumbefore the end of the first week in Sep-tember and made their most notewor-thy contribution in bridging the Meusein Belgium at Namur, Liege, and Di-nant.

On the night of 6 September, the1106th Group's 238th Engineer Com-bat Battalion constructed a record 564-foot treadway at Namur in five hours.35

The next day the battalion spanned theMeuse with a 150-foot triple-doubleBailey. Several shorter Baileys and tread-ways also had to be erected in the sameneighborhood. The work went on un-der the protection of a corps antiair-craft battery; nevertheless, the battal-ion suffered two casualties. Beginningon 9 September the group's 237th Engi-neer Combat Battalion constructed a550-foot treadway downriver at Liegeand repaired a partially demolishedbridge with Bailey equipment. Enemybombing at the sites cost the battalioncasualties consisting of three men killedand a number wounded. The mostimportant effort of the 1120th Grouptook place upriver at Dinant, where the297th Engineer Combat Battalion spentmore than twelve hours on 9 and 10September constructing a 287-foot,Class 40 floating Bailey, working mostof the time in heavy fog.36

During Third Army's rapid dash tothe Moselle from the Seine, where Gen-eral Patton relinquished the Melunbridgehead to First Army, the princi-pal water barriers were the Marne andthe Meuse. On 28 August tanks of the4th Armored Division, spearheadingthe advance of XII Corps, found themain bridge at Chalons-sur-Marneblown. The debris blocking the riverformed a temporary dam, enabling theengineers of the 24th Armored Engi-neer Battalion to construct a hasty fordby which the entire task force crossedin 1 1/2 hours. As the water rose, theengineers constructed a treadway tres-tle bridge, and on the following daythe 248th Engineer Combat Battalionof the 111 7th Engineer Combat Groupcamped a few miles upstream at Vitry-le-Francois. By 31 August the 4th Ar-mored Division was crossing the Meuseat Commercy over bridges seized intact.To the north the 1139th Engineer Com-bat Group, supporting the advance ofXX Corps, found, on 29 August, twoundamaged, permanent wooden brid-ges of unlimited capacity at Chateau-Thierry on the Marne. Treadways atother points were all completed thesame day. At Verdun, where the mainhighway bridge crossed the Meuse, theGermans had installed mines, but theFFI was able to prevent demolition. On31 August, XX Corps was over theMeuse in strength.37

Toward the end of August ominousentries had begun to appear in the jour-nals of the engineer combat groups ofFirst and Third Armies. Gasoline wasrunning short, as were certain items ofbridge-building equipment. The armieshad outrun their supply depots, which

35 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44.36 Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. III, "Northern France

and Belgium," p. 4. See also histories of the unitsmentioned. 37 TUSA Rpt, vol. II, p. Eng-6.


FRENCH CHILDREN WATCH THE 982D ENGINEER MAINTENANCE COMPANY WELDSIX-INCH PIPELINE

were far to the rear, most of them atthe original invasion beaches. The prob-lem was mainly one of transportation.The damage to railway lines and brid-ges had been extensive, principally as aresult of Allied bombing. The installa-tion of pipelines for petroleum, oil, andlubricants, an engineer responsibility,could not keep pace with the headlongadvance of the combat forces, and trucksbecame the only means of getting sup-plies forward.38 A particularly trouble-some problem for the combat engineerswas map supply—either because maps

could not be sent forward in time to beof use or because the combat forceswere moving into areas for which nomaps were available. Leading elementsof the 4th Armored Division, whichduring August traveled more than athousand miles in less than thirty days,normally operated with road maps ob-tained from the FFI or captured Ger-man stocks. One of the first tasks of theengineers entering Verdun was to scourthe city for German maps.39

For both U.S. armies, the pursuitended the second week in September

38 Hist 1139th Engr C Gp, Aug 44; MS, The XIXCorps History, p. 13, XIX Corps Engrs, ML 2220,ETOUSA Hist Sect; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support ofthe Armies, Volume I, pp. 500—16, 544—47.

39 Hist 1139th Engr C Gp, Aug 44; Hist V CorpsEngr Sect, Jun, Aug—Dec 44, Jan—9 May 45; Hist24th Armd Engr Bn, Jul-Dec 44; TUSA Rpt, vol. II,p. Eng-5.


when Third Army met stiffening Ger-man resistance at the Moselle and FirstArmy slowed down at the SiegfriedLine in Belgium. By that time troopswere exhausted, equipment was badlyworn, and disturbing shortages in criti-cal supplies had begun to appear. Newoffensives by both armies were author-

ized in mid-September, but it soonbecame apparent that stronger Com-munications Zone support was impera-tive.40

40 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, p. 583.

CHAPTER XVIII

Supporting a War of Movement inNorthern France

Progress by American units afterD-day depended on the maintenance ofexisting lines of communications. For-tunately, the French road and rail netswere highly developed and for the mostpart immediately usable by combat ele-ments. ADSEC engineers were the firstto tackle the damage from Germandemolitions and Allied bombing, turn-ing over their responsibilities to theirbrethren in the COMZ area of opera-tions as the front lines moved acrossFrance. Engineers constructed gasolineand oil pipelines simultaneously in aconstant struggle to keep pace with theracing tactical units through the end ofSeptember.

Highways

Immediately following the D-day land-ings in northern France, corps and FirstArmy engineer combat battalions were toassume responsibility for road construc-tion—corps engineers making emer-gency repairs only, and army engineersrestoring bituminous surfaces. Bridg-ing was to be of the military type, Bai-ley or treadway, to be replaced by tim-ber bridges as rapidly as possible.1 Assoon as an army rear boundary became

established, road construction and main-tenance were to be turned over to AD-SEC. From D-day to D plus 90 theADSEC engineer, Col. Emerson C. It-schner, planned to use four general ser-vice regiments, adding special equip-ment such as asphalt mixers and con-tainers to their tables of equipment.

Road maps provided encouraginginformation about French roads to theengineers planning support of combatforces in northern France. The RoutesNationales were the French equivalentof numbered U.S. highways. Some ofthem dated from the Napoleonic era;all had a solid base of granite block sur-faced with tarmac. The Chemins Depart-mentaux, comparable to numbered stateroads in the United States were also ofgood quality, although the engineersknew little about their substructure.Both types seemed suitable for militarytraffic but were narrow by U.S. stan-dards. The width of the national high-ways varied from twenty to twenty-sixfeet, that of the departmental roadsfrom ten to twenty feet.2 Route N—13,

1 FUSA Rpt I, an. 9, p. 201 and an. 10, p. 208.

2 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 14, Road Maintenanceand Highway Bridging, pp. 13-14; OCE ETOUSAHist Rpt 12, Railroad Reconstruction and Bridging;OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, Rpt of Activities, Engr Sect, ADSEC,COMZ, ETO, 7 Feb-30 Jun 44.


COLONEL ITSCHNER

which ran from Cherbourg southeastto Carentan and thence east behind theinvasion beaches to Bayeux and beyond,received special attention in the plan-ning. Another key route, N—800, ledsouth from Cherbourg to Periers, whereit turned southeast to St. Lo.3

The ADSEC general service regi-ments began landing on the Continentat the end of June, but because of theslow advance to St. Lo during the hedge-row fighting before the breakout on 26July, combat engineers undertook mosthighway repairs inland of the beaches.(Charts 4 and 5) The two ADSEC engi-neer general service regiments landingat OMAHA (the 355th and 365th) spenttheir first month repairing roads lead-ing to beach dumps. Those landing atUTAH (the 95th and 341st) undertook

the first ADSEC highway repairs per-formed on the Continent, beginningtheir work south of Cherbourg on 7July. The 341st General Service Regi-ment was most experienced in road build-ing and maintenance, having workedon the Alcan highway. To it went thedifficult task of reconstructing N—13,running southeast from Cherbourgabout fifteen miles to Valognes, andN—800, running south about the samedistance to Bricquebec. These roadswere sorely needed to move men, equip-ment, and supplies to the new battle-front after the fall of Cherbourg. Usingcrushed rock and asphalt, the menfilled craters made by Allied bombs andshells and shored up the edges of pave-ment broken down under the pound-ing of heavy traffic. The work went onwhile the routes were carrying nearly3,000 vehicles in a 24-hour period. Tomake up for the late arrival of some ofits equipment the 341st Engineers im-provised, using captured German equip-ment to assemble asphalt batching plantsand a German cook wagon to heat tar.

Following the breakout at St. Lo andthe formation of Third Army on 1August, the 341st stayed close behindThird Army, repairing roads aroundPeriers and maintaining those in thevital, narrow bottlenecks in the Cou-tances-Avranches area. In one ten-milestretch of the main supply route run-ning south from Periers to Avranches,the engineers laid more than 5,000 tonsof stone in six days, working in shiftsthrough daylight hours so intently thatthey "hardly saw armored division afterdivision, the supply columns and a largepart of the First Army move throughthe gap in the dust or mud."4

3 Planned Road Net, Incl 25 to History of theADSEC Engineer Section. 4 Hist 341st Engr GS Rgt, 1944.

SUPPORTING A WAR OF MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN FRANCE 397

Except on the Cotentin peninsulasouth of Cherbourg to Avranches, high-way reconstruction proved less difficultthan ADSEC planners had expected.The primary roads stood up well underthe pounding they received, and theGermans had not damaged highwaysor highway bridges to the extent feared.After the breakout, the armies movingacross northern France encounteredgood roads that needed little work.Highway repair became mainly drain-age and pothole filling on the Red Ballsupply routes. Because of lesseningrequirements and the increased avail-ability of prisoner of war and civilianlabor, the four general service regi-ments earmarked for road buildingcould be diverted to other work. The365th transferred to hospital construc-tion during most of the summer, andin mid-August the mission of the 341st,355th, and 95th Engineer General Ser-vice Regiments changed from highwayto railroad repair, which had by thenbecome ADSEC's highest priority.5

Railways

A 19 January 1944 agreement be-tween the chief engineer, ETOUSA,and the chief of transportation maderailroad reconstruction in northernFrance the responsibility of ColonelItschner, the ADSEC engineer, to beperformed at Transportation Corpsrequest. Railroad reconstruction meantnot only re-laying track but also recon-structing road culverts, bridges, andwatering and coaling facilities. In south-ern France, responsibility for the con-struction and rehabilitation of railroadsbelonged not to the engineers, but tothe 1st Military Railway Service (TC),

to which engineer units were attachedor assigned.6

After the Normandy landings, prior-ity went first to the tracks within Cher-bourg and second to lines leading fromCherbourg to Lison junction near Isig-ny, about forty miles southeast. A linewas then to be reconstructed leadingsouthwest from Lison junction via Cou-tances, Folligny, Avranches, and Dol (inBrittany) to Rennes, the first majordepot area. The British were responsi-ble for the rail line running east fromLison junction.7

Planners estimated that 75 percentof the track and all the bridges wouldhave been destroyed and that neces-sary reconstruction would require 55percent new ties and 90 percent newbridging material. All this material wasto be of British origin, not only fortracks (standard British 75-pound flat-bottom rail) but also for bridges, becausethe U.S. Army had developed no mili-tary railway bridges. British designswent into production both in the UnitedStates and in the United Kingdom. Thetypes included in American planningwere rolled steel joist (RSJ) spans, whichcame in lengths of 17, 21, 27, 31, and35 feet; a 40-foot sectional girder bridge;a unit construction railway bridge(UCRB), in lengths from about 50 to80 feet; and light steel trestling.8

The units earmarked for railroadconstruction included five engineergeneral service regiments, three engi-neer dump truck companies, and oneengineer heavy ponton battalion forhauling materials and equipment. First

5 Hists, 365th and 341st Engr GS Rgts.

6 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 123, Military Railway Service,p 2.

7 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, VolumeI, pp. 316-17, map 9.

8 Moore, Final Report, p. 282.


Army was to lend the ponton battalionto ADSEC. The training and equip-ment of the five general service regi-ments left something to be desired.Only the 332d and 347th had attendedthe U.S.-British Railway Bridging Schoolat King's Newton. The remaining threehad to rely on a thirty-day intensivetraining program which was providedto several types of specialized units dur-ing April 1944. The training was notvery effective, for railway tools and spe-cial track fixtures were scarce and muchof the available material had alreadybeen packed for the cross-Channel at-tack.9

The chief of Colonel Itschner's Rail-road Section, Lt. Col. A. D. Harvey,landed in Normandy on 11 June andimmediately began reconnoitering rail-way lines near Isigny and Carentan,walking tracks when it was safe to doso. On 15 June he flew in a Piper Cubas low as 150 feet over the main linefrom Lison junction at Montebourg, alittle more than halfway up the penin-sula, to Cherbourg. He found that dam-age to tracks and yards, usually inflictedby Allied bombing, was much less thanexpected and that, except for a bridgeover the Vire River near the Lisonjunction, the railway bridges would notbe difficult to repair.10 This and laterreconnaissance trips showed that ear-lier estimates on the amount of mate-rial required could be revised down-ward. Two events after the landing alsoforced Itschner to alter the engineers'railroad reconstruction plan—the latecapture of Cherbourg, which deferredrailroad work there from mid-June tothe end of the month, and the late

arrival of the engineer general serviceregiments earmarked for railroad re-pair.

Railroad rehabilitation on the Conti-nent began at the Carentan yards on17 June, with the 1055th Engineer PortConstruction and Repair Group incharge. During the following week thatgroup also furnished a detachment todirect a crew of civilians at the Lisonjunction yards, and the 342d EngineerGeneral Service Regiment went to workon the line north from Carentan. Thegroup also began repairing the VireRiver railroad bridge. On 26 June the1055th moved three locomotives fromLison to Isigny—the first U.S. railroadoperation on the Continent.

The 332d Engineer General ServiceRegiment, scheduled to arrive on 14June, did not land at UTAH Beach untilthe twenty-eighth. The regiment workedat Cherbourg on port reconstruction,while railroad work in that city becamethe responsibility of the 347th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment, which ar-rived on the Continent about the sametime. Other general service regimentsearmarked for railroad work arrivedsoon thereafter, but not all were em-ployed as planned. The 390th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment performedtrack work between Cherbourg andLison junction, but the 392d largelyundertook engineer supply operations.The 354th worked on construction ofthe Couville railroad yards near Cher-bourg, an assignment that original planshad not envisioned. The engineer heavyponton battalion, hauling material andequipment, did not arrive until muchlater than planned, and when the unitreached France First Army assigned itanother mission.119 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

10 Diary, Lt Col A. D. Harvey, D plus 5-D plus 49,app. 6, OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 12. 11 For the railroad work at Cherbourg, see ch. XVII.


After the Breakout

Until the breakout at St. Lo on 26July, railroad reconstruction receivedrelatively low priority, for distanceswere short and trucks could do thehauling from beaches to dumps andfrom dumps to forward areas. Afterthe breakout the tempo accelerated.Within a few days the general serviceregiment most experienced in railroadwork, the 347th, came down from Cher-bourg and took on the task of openinglines to St. Lo and beyond to Coutances.After the capture of Coutances on 29July, urgent priority went to rebuild-ing the line south to Third Army's rail-head at Folligny. In the fifty days fol-lowing the St. Lo breakout, railroadreconstruction became the ADSEC en-gineer's primary mission.

First and most important was recon-struction of the yards at St. Lo, whichAllied bombing had almost entirelydestroyed. So complete was the destruc-tion in one section that engineers hadto obtain plans from the Societe Nationaledes Chemins de Fer before they could startre-laying track. On 4 August two com-panies of the 347th began work at St.Lo, using rail, fittings, and ballast eithersalvaged from unused lines or hauledfrom beach dumps in trucks. On thesame day, a third company of the 347thbegan rebuilding the double-track, three-span, masonry-arch railway bridge overthe Vire River on the Lison—St. Lo line.Bombing had demolished the centerspan and damaged another. The en-gineers, who had not yet received anymilitary bridging, replaced the centerspan with a timber trestle bridge—thefirst timber trestle the 347th Engineersbuilt—and repaired the damaged span

by fitting face stone and keystones andfilling in with concrete.12

Simultaneously with the jobs in theSt. Lo area, the engineers began reha-bilitating two single-track lines, onesouth of St. Lo and the other west. Thetrack running to Vire, about twentymiles southeast of St. Lo, was to pro-vide an alternate route behind the ar-mies. The track on the west, from LaHaye-du-Puits to Coutances, would bringforward supplies from Cherbourg. Butthe ADSEC engineer completed neitherof these efforts. The Vire line, which acompany of the 347th Engineers startedto repair, was turned over to the British.The 2d Battalion, 390th Engineers,began work on the line to Coutanceswith engineers from the Transporta-tion Corps' Military Railway Service(MRS), but before the line was com-plete MRS assumed full responsibility—ADSEC units were needed elsewhere,and ADSEC had to commit all its scarcerailway troops to supplying ammuni-tion and gasoline to Third Army.

The Third Army was already swing-ing east toward Paris when the 347thEngineer General Service Regimentbegan reconstruction of the Coutances-Folligny rail line. At Coutances, whereAllied bombers had done considerabledamage, Company D of the 347th en-countered a damaged high viaduct rail-road bridge—the first of many foundin France. A six-span, single-track, ma-sonry-arch structure with one spanmissing eighty feet over the Soulle River,the bridge provided the first opportu-nity to employ the British unit construc-

12 Waldo G. Bowman, "Railroad Bridging in theE.T.O.," Engineering News-Record (July 12, 1945),36-37.


tion railway bridge. Using the speciallaunching nose, the engineers launcheda fifty-foot unit to span the arch open-ing. Then they installed a timber strutjust below the unit to resist thrusts fromadjacent arches carrying the weight ofheavy locomotives. In the meantime,the 347th Engineers had begun to re-pair a demolished concrete-arch rail-way bridge over a highway just southof Coutances, completing the work on12 August.13 On the same day GeneralPatton put the engineers to a gruelingtest.

Supporting Patton's Thrust Toward Paris

What was later described as "perhapsthe most dramatic achievement of Engi-neers in railroad construction" beganafter sunset on 12 August when Colo-nel Itschner received surprising instruc-tions from Third Army: "Gen Pattonhas broken through and is striking rap-idly for Paris. He says his men can getalong without food, but his tanks andtrucks won't run without gas. There-fore the railroad must be constructedinto Le Mans by Tuesday midnight.Today is Saturday. Use one man perfoot to make the repairs if necessary."14

The message meant that a railroad 135miles long, with seven bridges down,three railroad yards badly bombed,track damaged in many places, and few,if any, watering and coaling facilitiesavailable, had to be reconstructed inseventy-five hours. Normally the jobwould have taken months.

Colonel Itschner had on hand only2,000 men working on the line run-ning from Coutances to Folligny—the347th Engineer General Service Regi-ment and the 2d Battalion of the 390th.The latter had just begun restoring theyards at Formigny, a few miles south ofOMAHA Beach, where the air forceshad completely destroyed a large Ger-man troop train shortly after D-day. Anadditional 8,500 men were available toItschner for his formidable task, butthey were scattered widely, some as faraway as Cherbourg. Moreover, the onlymeans of communication with the wide-ly separated units was by a messengerin a jeep.15

The first step was to fly over the rail-road net from Folligny to Le Mans toselect the lines that could be repairedin the shortest time. The most directroute led south from Folligny via Av-ranches, Pontaubault, and Fougeres toVitre, where it turned east via Laval toLe Mans. Itschner had to rule out thisroute, for two bridges along it had beenso badly bombed, piers as well as spans,that they could never be reconstructedin time. One was a forty-foot-high bridgeover the Selune River at Pontaubault,the other a ninety-foot-high bridge overthe Mayenne at Laval. To bypass both,the engineers planned to open a single-track line turning east just north ofPontaubault to St. Hilaire-du-Harcouetand then south to a point beyond Fou-geres, from there east to Mayenne, andon south to La Chapelle-Anthenaise(beyond Laval). Here the line was toconnect with the double-track railroad

13 Ibid., pp. 37-38.14 Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore, "Engineer Operations

in the European Theater, Informal Remarks ... toSHAEF Correspondents, Friday, 6 October 1944," TheMilitary Engineer, XXXVI (December 1944), 408; Col.Emerson C. Itschner, "Reconstruction of WesternEuropean Railroads," [July 1945], Bortz files.

15 Itschner, "Reconstruction of W European Rail-roads"; Moore, "Engr Opns in the European Theater,"p. 408.


to Le Mans. Five bridges were downalong the planned route.16

Elements of eleven different engi-neer general service regiments workedsimultaneously on the line. The experi-ence of the 332d Engineer General Ser-vice Regiment illustrates the urgencywith which the engineers moved to thescene. The 332d, then at Cherbourg,received orders at 0300 on 13 Augustto proceed to Mayenne. Two compa-nies took the 0700 train to Carentan,then moved to Mayenne by truck. Uponarrival, the unit set up a pup tent biv-ouac in a hayfleld nearby and quicklybegan work on the railroad. Some ofthe 9,000 engineer troops required toopen the line did not arrive on the proj-ect until twenty-four hours before thedeadline, and equipment moved slowlyon the congested roads. Yet the workproceeded so swiftly that as the dead-line approached Colonel Itschner hadonly one serious cause for concern—aneighty-foot single-track bridge at St.Hilaire-du-Harcouet.17

With a well-placed charge the Ger-mans had blown the south end of thebridge from its abutment, dropping itinto the Selune River. The 347th Engi-neer General Service Regiment cut offthe damaged end, jacked up the bridgeand placed it onto a pier built of ties inthe form of a crib. This the unit accom-plished in three days, during whichmany of the men had no sleep at all.When General Moore and Colonel Its-chner flew over the St. Hilaire bridgesite on an inspection trip six hours

before the deadline of midnight 15August, they saw spelled out on theground in white cement, "Will finish at2000." The first gasoline-loaded trainleft the Folligny area at 1900 on 15August, passed over the St. Hilairebridge shortly before midnight, andafter many delays was at Le Mans on17 August. Thirty trains followed atthirty-minute intervals.18

Even while the emergency single-track line was being opened, engineerswere working on the bridges at Pontau-bault and Laval to provide a more per-manent and serviceable line to Le Mans.These major bridges, which units of the332d Engineer General Service Regi-ment reconstructed, were the most am-bitious bridging projects yet undertak-en. Each bridge had one badly dam-aged concrete pier that had to be re-placed by a light steel trestling pier, andeach bridge required two UCRB spans.The Pontaubault bridge was ready on22 August, rebuilt in twelve days; thatat Laval, where work continued at nightunder floodlights, was ready in four-teen days, and the first train crossed on31 August.19

The ADSEC Engineer Groups

About the time the rush job for Gen-eral Patton was completed, the size ofthe ADSEC area and the increased vol-ume of railroad reconstruction made itnecessary for the ADSEC engineer'sRailroad Division, which up to that timehad handled all reconnaissance, plans,

16 History of the ADSEC Engineer Section, figs. 23and 24; OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 12, Railroad Recon-struction and Bridging, fig. 8; Ruppenthal, LogisticalSupport of the Armies, Volume I, p. 316, map 9.

17 Itschner, "Reconstruction of W European Rail-roads."

18 Interv, Col A. H. Davidson, Jr., in Memorandumto Files, 7 Mar 50, Bortz notes; Itschner, "Reconstruc-tion of W European Railroads"; History of the ADSECEngineer Section, fig. 21.

19 History of the ADSEC Engineer Section, pp.66-67 and figs. 23 and 24.


procurement, project assignments, andinspections, to delegate many of theseresponsibilities to subordinate units.Therefore, on 23 August ADSEC cre-ated three provisional engineer groups,ADSEC Engineer Groups A, B, and C.Each had an experienced general ser-vice regiment as a nucleus, with one ormore additional regiments attached,and each was commanded by the seniorregimental commander. Although eachunit retained its identity for administra-tive functions, the group commander,aided by the staff of the nucleus regi-ment, handled all operational matters,including work assignments, supply,and reconnaissance.

The nucleus of Group A was the332d Engineer General Service Regi-ment, whose commanding officer, Col.Helmer Swenholt, became group com-mander. Attached were the 392d, 375th,and 389th Engineer General ServiceRegiments. Group B, commanded byCol. Harry Hulen, had the 347th Engi-neer General Service Regiment as thenucleus, with the 377th Engineer Gen-eral Service Regiment attached. Col.Edward H. Coe commanded Group C,whose nucleus was the 341st GeneralService Regiment, with the 355th and95th attached. Of the nine general ser-vice regiments in the three groups, fivehad engineer dump truck companiesattached, and one had an attached engi-neer welding detachment (provisional).

During the last week of August, ele-ments of the three groups were work-ing on almost all rail lines betweenPontaubault and the Seine. Groups Aand B set to repairing the main double-track Vire-Argentan-Dreux-Versailles-Juvisy line and a bridge crossing theSeine at Juvisy. Group C worked far-ther south in support of Third Army

to open the Chartres-Orleans-Montar-gis line. On 27 August the group re-ceived an urgent mission to open imme-diately a single-track line between Ram-bouillet and Versailles, the first line intoParis. Two companies of the 341st Engi-neer General Service Regiment, work-ing twenty hours straight, completedthe job the following day. Lt. Col. E.Warren Heilig of the 341st Engineersand his driver, Pvt. Harry Smith, werehailed by great crowds as the first Ameri-cans to enter Versailles on the heels ofthe retreating Germans.20

During the period of fast pursuit,Allied bombing and artillery fire causedmost of the track damage. Until theengineers reached the area east of Metz,where German track destruction wassevere—some of it occasioned by the"track ripper," a huge hook pulled bylocomotives—the main problem wasbridges.21 The worst destruction GroupA encountered was at a bridge over theEure River near Dreux, about thirtymiles west of Paris. All that remainedof a five-span, 300-foot masonry-archstructure was a pile of splintered wreck-age and two damaged abutments wellover 200 feet apart. This bridge had astrange history. According to a storythe engineers heard, the French haddestroyed the bridge in 1939. Later, theGermans repaired it, replacing the ma-sonry arches with steel beams andwooden piers. During the rush to theSeine, Allied bombers attacked thebridge repeatedly. Bombs falling wideof the mark became so dangerous tothe local population that the FrenchForces of the Interior put demolitioncharges on the bridge and blew it up.

20 Hist 341st Engr GS Rgt. 1944.21 Itschner, "Reconstruction of W European Rail-

roads," p. 2.


Company F, 332d Engineer GeneralService Regiment, aided by elements ofCompanies C and D, rebuilt the bridgebetween 25 August and 9 September.The engineers placed five steel deck-type spans on four light steel trestlepiers—seventy-foot-long unit construc-tion railway bridge spans at each endand three I-beams in the center. Thesteel trestle piers in the center restedon existing concrete footings; those atthe end of the bridge sat on footingsthe engineers made with compactedrubble. At first the bridge carried onlya single track, but the engineers latercompleted a double-track bridge byincreasing the width of the piers andbuilding a duplicate superstructure onthe widened section. The engineersassembled the additional spans on theground and lifted them into place be-cause the usual nose-launching methodwould have required halting trafficalong the single-track line.22

For the first crossing of the SeineRiver south of Paris at Juvisy, the engi-neers faced the widest body of waterthey had yet encountered. (Map 20) Nounit construction launching equipmentwas available for the four sixty-footUCRB spans required to cover gaps inthe existing bridge, gaps created whenthe Germans dropped two 120-foot lat-tice girder spans into the river. GroupB's 347th Engineer General ServiceRegiment solved the problem by assem-bling the UCRB spans and towers forlight steel trestling piers on shore. Thisprocedure saved time in the long run,because it permitted superstructureassembly to proceed simultaneouslywith wreckage clearance and pier foun-

dation work. When the piers were ready,the engineers put the spans and towersaboard a French derrick barge, pushedit out to the site with tugs, and set theequipment in place in a matter of min-utes. Speed was essential because untilthe bridge was in, Third Army opera-tions east of Metz could not be supplied.The engineers completed the bridge on6 September, forty-eight hours aheadof schedule.23

Bridge reconstruction east of Parisposed different problems. Bridges wereusually longer and lower, so timber-piletrestles frequently could be erected onthe debris of the old bridge, a distinctadvantage. On the other hand, supplybecame more difficult because the longdistance from the beaches made it im-practicable to haul forward such mate-rial as UCRB spans. The engineers hadto depend on materials obtained locallyor captured from the Germans. Thenew conditions were exemplified in thereconstruction of the bridge over theMarne River Canal at Vitry. Two com-panies of Group C's 341st EngineerGeneral Service Regiment repaired itin six days beginning 5 September,working around the clock and usingfloodlights at night. Two ninety-footspans of the three-span masonry-archbridge had received direct hits fromAllied bombers as two German freighttrains were crossing it on adjacent tracks.Cars, track, and stone were piled in thewater. Instead of attempting to removeor build through the rubble, the engi-neers used the debris to carry wood sillsupon which bents were set to support astringer-type bridge. For spans, theengineers employed captured German

22 Bowman, "Railroad Bridging in the E.T.O.," pp.40-41 and figs. 11, 12a, and 12b. 23 Ibid., pp. 39-40 and figs. 9 and 10.


I-beams and a prefabricated deck gir-der span found in a railroad yard.24

Fifty days after the breakthrough atSt. Lo the rail net in the Third Armysector extended to Verdun on the Metzline and to Toul on the line to Nancy.In the First Army sector, the line wasopen from Paris northeast throughSoissons, Laon, Hirson, Marienbourg,Charleroi, Gembloux, and Landen toLiege. (Map 21}

The first train to cross the borderinto Belgium was the regimental head-quarters train of the 332d EngineerGeneral Service Regiment. On 25 Aug-ust Colonel Swenholt, the regimentalcommander (also commander of GroupA), decided to move his headquartersand the administration section of Head-quarters and Service Company to theLa Hutte-Coulombiers area near LeMans by train to save precious gasolineand tires. He used a German hospitaltrain augmented with a few French carsand drawn by Transportation Corpslocomotives. Pulling out of the villagein some style after the townspeople haddecked it with flowers, the train rolledover the Eure River bridge near Dreuxon 9 September and continued to Parisvia Versailles. Beyond Paris the engi-neers had to depend upon French loco-motives and crews. Problems with thelocomotives soon developed, and whenthe train reached the Belgian bordermore trouble arose, for the Frenchcrews objected to going into Belgium.Acquiring a German freight locomo-tive and recruiting crews from his ownunits, Colonel Swenholt got the twentysteel cars and five boxcars under wayfrom Hirson shortly after midnight on12 September and reached Charleroi,

Belgium, at 2000 the same day. After astay of four days in Charleroi, duringwhich the engineers were so mobbedby welcoming Belgians that the gen-darmes had to be called out, the head-quarters train arrived at Liege in theearly morning of 17 September 1944.25

Pipelines

By 12 August 1944, the day GeneralPatton demanded railroad reconstruc-tion from Folligny to Le Mans to carrygasoline in the dash toward Paris, thepipeline designed to bring bulk POL for-ward from the ports ran only as far asSt. Lo. ADSEC engineer units, whosemission was to construct pipelines, stor-age tanks, and pumping stations andthen to operate them, began landingon OMAHA Beach shortly after D-day. 26

The largest unit in the POL organiza-tion was the 359th Engineer GeneralService Regiment, with Company A ofthe 358th Engineer General ServiceRegiment attached. Other componentswere seven engineer petroleum distri-bution companies—the 698th, 786th,787th, 788th, 790th, 1374th, and1375th; two engineer fire-fighting pla-toons; and a squad from an engineercamouflage battalion. The 358th and359th General Service Regiments werenot assigned to bulk POL supply onthe Continent until well after theirarrival in England in late 1943. Theregiments were generally inexperiencedin pipeline operations and had insuffi-cient time and equipment for adequatetraining. On the other hand, the petro-leum distribution companies had been

24 Ibid., pp. 42-43 and fig. 13.

25 Hist 332d Engr GS Rgt, 1 Jan-31 Dec 44.26 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-

ume I, p. 510. For early POL planning in the ETO, seeIbid., pp. 319-27.


MAP 21

recruited largely from oilfield workersand had received specialized trainingin the United States. In late spring of1944 the 787th Engineer PetroleumDistribution Company instructed thetwo general service regiments in pipe-line construction and operation.

Most engineer POL units had themission of installing and operating theMajor POL System at Cherbourg, con-structing or rehabilitating facilities forreceiving, storing, and dispensing fuel.Most POL was to be delivered docksideby tankers, but some was to come inthrough British lines laid on the floorof the Channel from the Isle of Wightto the Continent, a system called PLUTO(Pipeline Under the Ocean). From Cher-bourg south the engineers were to laythree six-inch pipelines, two for motorgasoline (MT 80) and one for aviationgasoline (avgas), with pump stations,tank farms, and dispensing facilities atLa Haye-du-Puits, Coutances, Avran-ches, Fougeres, and Laval. Lines formotor fuel were to extend from Fou-geres to Rennes and from Laval to Cha-teaubriant. But because constructionfor the major system could not beginuntil Cherbourg was captured, the engi-neers were to put the Minor POL Sys-tem into operation shortly after D-dayat two points east of OMAHA—Ste.Honorine-des-Pertes, the easternmosttown in the American sector, and Port-en-Bessin, at the edge of the Britishbeach area.27

The Minor POL System

The first POL engineers ashore at

OMAHA were two companies of the359th General Service Regiment andtwo petroleum distribution companies,the 698th and 786th. An advance partyof officers landed early in the eveningof 9 June and proceeded east to theassigned bivouac area—an apple orch-ard near the village of Huppain, some-what inland and about halfway betweenSte. Honorine-des-Pertes and Port-en-Bessin. In the next two days a convoywith the rest of the first elements camein over the narrow cliffside road toHuppain. As the last men of the 786th

27 Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers:Troops and Equipment, pp. 417-37. See also Hists,359th Engr GS Rgt, 1943-45, and 787th Engr PetDist Co, 22 Feb 44-Dec 45.


Engineer Petroleum Distribution Com-pany landed at OMAHA on 11 June,they saw that the "wet, flat strip of sandwas littered up and down the coast asfar as the men could see. Machinery,guns, tools, clothes, and the innumera-ble odds and ends that came ashorewith the assault were scattered andstrewn as tho by some incredible wind.Broken landing boats [were] flung be-side burnt-out tanks whose tracks werealready bright with rust. [DUKWs,] bentlike metal toys, spotted the foot of thesheer cliffs descending from the forti-fied hills." That night after the petro-

leum engineers had settled down in thebivouac at Huppain, German fighter-bombers roared low over them butdropped no bombs.28

At that time, the engineers had ascant ten days to get the first POL sys-tem in operation. Bulk deliveries ofPOL, which had been handled in cansduring and immediately after the inva-sion, were scheduled to begin on D plus15.29

At Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes the engi-28 Hist 786th Engr Pet Dist Co, Feb-Dec 44.29 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-

ume I, p. 322.


neers were to install two six-inch ship-to-shore submarine pipelines known asTOMBOLAs to receive gasoline and die-sel fuel from tankers at a deepwateranchorage and carry it to five boltedsteel tanks onshore. One tank, holding10,000 barrels of gasoline, was for Armyuse; four 5,000-barrel tanks, one forgasoline and three for diesel fuel, werefor the Navy. Pump stations and four-inch lines would carry the Army gaso-line to an inland tank farm at Mt. Cau-vin, a hill about two miles south ofHuppain and equidistant from Ste.Honorine-des-Pertes and Port-en-Bes-sin. The Navy fuel was to go to theMULBERRY at OMAHA.

Port-en-Bessin had two moles whereshallow-draft tankers could tie up. Whilethe British used the easternmost, theengineers were to install two six-inchdischarge lines at the other—one formotor gasoline and one for aviationgasoline—and to erect two 1,000-barreltanks, one for each type. Two pumpstations were required, as well as twosix-inch delivery lines running to thetank farm at Mt. Cauvin.

Mt. Cauvin needed considerable work,including tankage for 30,000 barrels ofmotor gasoline, a six-inch gravity lineand six tank truck filling risers, pumpstations, and two four-inch lines con-necting with British lines. In addition,one four-inch pipeline was to be con-structed south to Balleroy, with a boost-er station on the way at Crouay. Balle-roy, an important filling station, wouldhave two terminal storage tanks (oneholding 1,000 barrels and the other5,000 barrels), dispensing lines and con-nections to permit loading six tanktrucks simultaneously, and decantingconnections where quartermastertroops could fill five-gallon cans.

Plans for expansion of the MinorPOL System were partly shaped by thefuel needs of U.S. aircraft on the Conti-nent. For aviation fuel, a four-inch linewas to extend from Mt. Cauvin abouttwenty-eight miles west to Carentan,with booster stations on the way. AtCarentan French fuel tanks with a capac-ity of 4,200 barrels were to be rehabili-tated and dispensing facilities con-structed. A similar line for motor vehi-cle gasoline was to run from Mt. Cauvinto St. Lo and Coutances, where the Mi-nor and Major POL Systems would con-nect. At both St. Lo and Coutances,storage tanks and facilities to serve aquartermaster decanting station were tobe constructed.30

Lack of supplies seriously handi-capped the POL engineers who landedon OMAHA beginning 9 June. Construc-tion materials expected to come inaboard a commodity-loaded coaster on10 June did not arrive. By scouringOMAHA and UTAH beaches the engi-neers found enough scattered materialto make a small start on 13 June. Twodays later the first of eight LCTs, load-ed with construction materials and sentforward when it became evident thatthe capture of Cherbourg would bedelayed, arrived at Port-en-Bessin. Un-fortunately, a storm that raged alongthe coast for three days wrecked two ofthe LCTs.

Mines the Germans had sown in thearea also handicapped early operations.They had not been cleared because thecombat engineers charged with this workhad landed elsewhere. From one field

30 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, app. 1Oc, POL Plan, OVERLORD, pp. 12-13; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume/, pp. 316-17, map 9.


behind Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes thePOL engineers removed more than athousand mines, suffering six casualties,one fatal. Casualties would undoubtedlyhave been higher except for a "kindly,sharp-sighted little Frenchman," Eu-gene Le Garre, who had a summerhome near the beach at Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes. From his front porch he hadwatched the Germans plant their minesand had noted their locations. On fish-ing trips he had discovered underwa-ter mines near the beaches and fur-nished information for which Alliedengineers were grateful.31 The engi-neers also faced German snipers, whosebullets sometimes punctured pipelines.They often found that the elevationsmarked on their contour maps wereincorrect, forcing drastic changes to theplans for tank sites. Nevertheless, by23 June, the day the first tanker arrivedat Port-en-Bessin, the POL engineershad their transmission, storage, and dis-pensing facilities ready. When the firstTOMBOLA was launched at Ste. Hon-orine-des-Pertes three days later theengineers had extended a pipeline tothe Balleroy storage area, where thePOL troops had erected one tank andwere installing dispensing facilities.32

After the capture of Cherbourg mostPOL engineers left work on the MinorPOL System and proceeded towardCherbourg via Bricquebec, where ele-ments of the POL organization werealready located. Company A of the358th General Service Regiment andthe 787th Engineer Petroleum Distri-bution Company, for example, did not

reach Huppain until 22 June and stayedonly three days before moving west.After 1 July responsibility for the MinorPOL System passed entirely to the 786thEngineer Petroleum Distribution Com-pany, the only engineer POL unit re-maining in the area.

As the transfer to Cherbourg began,the 786th was pushing pipelines west-ward, following a railroad bed that ranfrom Bayeux to Carentan via St. Jean-de-Daye. Although trucks and trailersnegotiated the rough railroad bed withdifficulty, it was the most direct andlevel route west. By 9 July constructionhad advanced to Govin, within fivemiles of St. Jean-de-Daye, but thereenemy small-arms fire halted the work.St. Jean-de-Daye had not yet been cap-tured, and the line that was to runthrough the town had to be abandoned.After a temporary suspension of allconstruction, the 786th Engineer Petro-leum Distribution Company pushed aline for aviation fuel north from Govinto Carentan, arriving there on 24 July.South from Govin engineers con-structed two pipelines, one for aviationfuel and another for motor gasoline, totie in with the Major POL System at St.Lo. Early in August elements of the1374th Engineer Petroleum Distribu-tion Company, which had reached Hup-pain in mid-July, worked at Carentanrepairing civilian gasoline tanks and atSt. Lo building a 10,000-barrel tank.

The Major POL System

Gasoline from the Cherbourg areabegan to flow into St. Lo on 11 August.While elements of the 359th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment, with the787th, 698th, and 1375th Engineer Pe-troleum Distribution Companies, recon-

31 Hist 359th GS Rgt, pp. 145-46.32 Col A. G. Viney, Dep ADSEC Engr, Rpt to Engr

Fwd Echelon, HQ, COMZ, 26 Jun 44, quoted in OCEETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants,pp. 65—66.


strutted POL facilities at Cherbourg,troops of the 359th General ServiceRegiment surveyed the pipeline routesouth.

Work on the pipelines to the front,beginning at the Hainneville tank farmin Cherbourg and undertaken mainlyby the 2d Battalion of the 359th, pro-ceeded expeditiously, thanks to an in-crease in supplies and manpower. Closebehind the combat troops, the engi-neers extended the lines to La Haye-du-Puits and Lessay by the beginningof August. The route of the pipelineschanged with the breakthrough. In-stead of swinging south via Coutancesand Avranches to Laval, the pipelineswere to run southeast to St. Lo, Vire,and Domfront, and then east to Alen-con, Chartres, and Dourdan, to crossthe Seine near Corbeil and go to Cou-bert near Paris.

The major system consisted of threepipelines, two for 80-octane and onefor 100-octane aviation fuel. Construc-tion of the 80-octane lines got prioritybecause of the greater demand formotor fuel. Except at highway and rail-road crossings, where welded lines wentunderground, engineers laid the pipe-lines on the ground and connected eachsection with victaulic couplings. When-ever possible, the route followed a hard-surfaced road along which POL con-struction material could be transported.In the early days in Normandy the pipe-lines followed road shoulders becausethe engineers did not have time tobreak through the hedgerows and re-move mines from the fields. But herethe lines fell victim to errant drivers,and traffic accidents nearly always in-volved a section of the pipe. The engi-neers soon learned to lay the pipelineson the other side of the hedgerows,

where they escaped damage and stillfollowed the line of communications.33

Construction from St. Lo went onsimultaneously along three segments ofthe route: St. Lo to Vire, Vire to Dom-front, and Domfront to Alencon. Bythe end of August the engineers hadpushed one 80-octane line, the "Pio-neer" six-inch line, as far as Alencon,eighty-one miles from St. Lo; a second80-octane line had reached Domfront,and the aviation gas line was approach-ing Domfront. The need for speed andthe inexperience of some of the POLengineers resulted, at times, in poorconstruction. Breaks occurred when theengineers were careless with couplingsor left openings through which smallanimals entered the line or into whichother troops threw such objects asC-ration cans. Breaks in the linenorth of Domfront on 29 August madeit necessary for combat forces to drawall gasoline at St. Lo until repairs couldbe made. Interruptions to the workwere inevitable when the engineers raninto minefields and suffered casualtiesor encountered pockets of enemy resis-tance. Fuel losses from holes punchedin the line by black market operatorsand saboteurs became frequent as thelines moved east, while breaks result-ing from ramming by trucks and tanksincreased as the traffic built up.34

When the advance party of the 359thGeneral Service Regiment reached thebombed-out city of Alencon on 20 Aug-ust, it ran into clouds of dust from hun-dreds of vehicles rolling over the rub-ble in the streets. A tremendous acceler-ation of traffic came a week later with

33 Moore, Final Report, pp. 312-13.34 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-

umel, pp. 510—11 and map 16; History of the ADSECEngineer Section, Incl 13.


MAP 22

the inauguration of the Red Ball Ex-press, an around-the-clock operation tocarry supplies (except bulk POL) to thefront. The engineers soon felt the effectof Red Ball on pipeline construction.Faced with the urgent needs of theadvancing armies, COMZ chose to di-vert to Red Ball many truck units neededto carry pipeline construction materi-als to the POL engineers. At the end ofAugust COMZ gave high priority to therail movement of POL engineer materi-als, and within ten days the engineersreceived enough material in the Alen-con-Chartres area to permit construc-tion to continue. But by then the slow-down of pipeline construction had al-ready contributed to the critical gaso-line shortages that developed early inSeptember. 35

New POL Organization

By the third week in August the engi-neer force working on the major andminor pipeline systems included threegeneral service regiments, the 358th,359th, and 368th; a battalion of a fourth,the 364th; and nine petroleum distribu-tion companies, the 698th, 786th, 787th,788th, 790th, 1374th, 1375th, 1376th,and 1377th. With attached truck com-panies, welding detachments, and fire-fighting platoons, the force numberedmore than 7,000 men. On 23 AugustADSEC organized this engineer forceinto the Military Pipeline Group (Pro-visional) under the command of Col.John L. Person of the 359th. (Map 22)

Enough troops were available to oper-ate the systems, but by mid-September,after a brief spurt of moving construc-tion materials by rail had ended, trans-portation to move the pipe forward was

35 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, p. 513; Moore, Final Report, p. 313.


DECANTING AREA ON THE OIL PIPELINE IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM

lacking. The Major POL System hadadvanced to Chartres, but the ADSECengineer estimated that available trucksand trailers could deliver no more thanseven to eight miles of pipe per day.36

The lack of transportation to movePOL construction supplies made it in-creasingly difficult for the pipelines tokeep up when ADSEC headquartersmoved forward. This posed a problemof control. For a time, base sectionsoperated parts of the system in theirrespective areas, but the division ofresponsibility was unworkable becausethe POL system was essentially an entityunto itself. When ADSEC moved to

Reims early in September, the entirePOL system fell outside the ADSECarea and was likely to remain so forsome time. Therefore, on 23 Septem-ber 1944, the Military Pipeline Group(Provisional) passed to the control ofHeadquarters, Communications Zone,and was renamed the Military PipelineService (MPLS). Colonel Person contin-ued as commander.37

COMZ instituted a number of help-ful changes, dividing the pipeline areainto districts, with commanding officersof the experienced engineer petroleumdistribution companies in charge. COMZalso set up schools in each district for

36 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, p. 88 and fig. 5; Hist 359th GS Rgt, p. 195. 37 History of the ADSEC Engineer Section, p. 56.


the less experienced engineers of thegeneral service regiments, took steps toreduce pilferage, and, most important,provided first a courier service and latera telephone service for better commu-nications among the POL engineerswho had hitherto been operating, asone expressed it, "by smoke signals."In addition, an airlift from the UnitedStates brought in a number of sorelyneeded spare parts.38

The problem of moving the construc-tion materials forward remained vexing.By 6 October 1944, the Major POL Sys-tem was in operation to Coubert, acrossthe Seine about twenty miles southeastof Paris. The period of rapid pursuitwas over, and other supplies, notably

ammunition, had priority over POL.Planners then decided to terminate themajor system at Coubert, at least forsome time, and to concentrate on shorterpipelines based at Le Havre and Ant-werp. Coubert remained the end of theline until January 1945.39

Farther east of Paris, Allied armieswere approaching the German borderby mid-September. The engineers ex-pected formidable obstacles in the forti-fied belts of the Siegfried Line and inthe Rhine River to say nothing of theterrain between them, heavily criss-crossed with watercourses large andsmall.

38 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, app. 15, Military Pipeline Service: Individ-ual and Unit History.

39 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-ume I, pp. 514-15. For construction of pipelines andsupply of POL after January 1945, see Ibid., VolumeII, pp. 193-209, 434-40, and map 11.

CHAPTER XIX

Breaching Germany's Barriers

Rolling into Eupen behind tanks onthe afternoon of 11 September 1944,the engineers saw that "the 'fun' theboys had had in liberating all thosetowns and cities in France and Belgiumwas over."1 They were greeted not withwild cheers but with hostile stares. Eupenwas in Belgium, but it was only somefive miles from the German border. Allthe signs were in German. From somewindows hung Belgian flags, but fromothers were suspended white bedsheetssignifying surrender. The engineersbelonged to Company B of the 23dArmored Engineer Battalion and weresupporting Combat Command B of VIICorps' 3d Armored Division, the spear-head tankers who, on 12 September,would be the first Americans to cap-ture a German town.

General Eisenhower had long plan-ned that as soon as enemy forces inFrance were destroyed the Americanarmies would advance rapidly to theRhine, First Army through the AachenGap on the north to Cologne and ThirdArmy through the Metz Gap south ofKoblenz.2 On the northern battlefrontin France artificial and natural barriersblocked the routes to the Rhine. The

attackers would have to clear a paththrough the concrete fortifications thatformed the Siegfried Line. They wouldalso have to penetrate dense woods andforests, overcome fortifications protect-ing Aachen and Metz, and cross manyrivers, some of them in flood. In the twomonths between the first breaching ofthe Siegfried Line and the start of theGerman counteroffensive in mid-De-cember the deepest advance into Ger-many was only twenty-two miles.3

The Siegfried Line

Begun in 1938, the Siegfried Linewas a system of mutually supportingpillboxes, about ten per mile, extend-ing along the German border from apoint above Aachen south and south-east to the Rhine and thence along theGerman bank of the Rhine to the Swissborder. North of Aachen the line con-sisted of a single belt of fortifications,while south of that city it split into twobelts, about five miles apart, known asthe Scharnhorst Line and the SchillLine. Farther southeast, in the ruggedterrain of the Eifel, the line was againone belt until it reached the region of

1 Hist 23d Armd Engr Bn, 1944, p. 8.2 Msg, Eisenhower to Commanders, 4 Sep 44, quoted

in Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, United StatesArmy in World War II (Washington, 1950), p. 53.

3 Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign,United States Army in World War II (Washington,1963), p. 616. Unless otherwise cited, tactical detailsof the First Army penetration are from this source.

BREACHING GERMANY'S BARRIERS 415

the Saar, where it split once more. (Map23)

The pillboxes were set at least half-way into the earth. Walls and roofs wereof reinforced concrete three to eightfeet thick, sometimes covered with earth,grass, and trees and sometimes dis-guised as farmhouses or barns. Con-cealed steel doors led to rooms for quar-tering troops and storing arms andammunition. The firing ports couldusually accommodate only light machineguns and the 37-mm. antitank gunsstandard in 1938. Most heavier fire hadto come from mobile artillery and tanksstationed near the fixed fortifications.

For protection against tanks the pill-boxes often depended on natural barri-ers such as watercourses, forests, anddefiles. In more open country the pill-boxes had a shield of 45-foot-wide bandsof "dragon's teeth"—small concretepyramids, usually painted green to blendin with the fields. The pyramids hadbeen cast in one piece on a concretebase, with steel reinforcing rods tiedinto the base's reinforcing rods. Theteeth in the first two rows were about 21/2 feet high, those in the followingrows successively higher until the laststood almost 5 feet tall. Between therows were iron pickets imbedded in thebases, designed to take barbed wire.Wherever a road ran through the bank,the Germans blocked access with obsta-cles such as steel gates.4

In late August 1944 Hitler rushed ina "people's" labor force to strengthenthe line. This effort bore fruit in theSaar, where the Third Army did notarrive at the Siegfried Line until early

December; but in the First Army'sAachen and Eifel sectors, where VIICorps and V Corps reached the linealmost simultaneously on 12 and 13September, the Germans did not havetime to accomplish much.5 They hadbegun to dig antitank ditches in frontof the dragon's teeth but had to aban-don them, leaving picks and shovelsbehind; nor had they had time to stringbarbed wire on the iron pickets. Ingeneral, second-rate troops manned thepillboxes and other defensive works.

VII Corps South of Aachen

By nightfall on 11 September twotask forces of CCB—Task Force 1 com-manded by Lt. Col. Wiliam B. Loveladyand Task Force 2 commanded by Lt.Col. Roswell H. King—and 3d ArmoredDivision had passed through Eupenand encamped for the night east andnortheast of the town. At 0800 nextmorning a reconnaissance force of in-fantry, tanks, and engineers of TaskForce Lovelady began to move towardthe German border, but the tanks bog-ged down on a forest trail. A secondgroup set out along the main highwayshortly before noon. Capturing someGerman machine gunners who surren-dered without firing, the reconnais-sance elements crossed the bordershortly before 1500; the main body ofTask Force Lovelady joined them aboutan hour later. The task force passedthrough the German town of Roetgenwithout opposition.

Beyond Roetgen, on a highway lead-ing north, Task Force Lovelady ran into

4 Engineer Operations by the VII Corps in the Euro-pean Theater, vol. IV, "Pursuit Into Germany," app.1, Initial Breaching of the Siegfried Line.

5 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 548—51. Unlessotherwise cited, Third Army tactical details are fromthis source.


MEN OF THE 23D ARMORED ENGINEER BATTALION RIG CHARGES to demolishdragon's teeth in the Siegfried Line.

the first defenses of the Siegfried Line.Ahead was a crater the Germans hadcreated by blowing a bridge over a drystream bed, and behind the crater wasa gate made of steel pipes. Left of thegate lay a band of dragon's teeth, ex-tending for about a hundred yards andending at a hill on which stood a pillbox.On the right rose a steep, almost per-pendicular hill. Embedded in slots inthis hill, just behind the gate, were steelI-beams that protruded across the road.This hill also boasted a pillbox.

Heavy fire from the two pillboxesstopped the advance about 1800. Dark-ness was falling, and the task force,whose vehicles stretched back beyondRoetgen, camped for the night. Dur-

ing the night the infantry began work-ing its way behind the pillboxes, andafter a fire fight early on 13 Septemberboth pillboxes surrendered. Then theengineers went to work. They filled inthe road crater using a tankdozer, blewthe gate with ten pounds of TNT, andremoved the I-beams from the hill byhand. The attack columns began mov-ing forward. After about three hundredyards they ran into another steel gate,which the engineers blew out about1000. Task Force Lovelady was throughthe Scharnhorst Line.6

6 Engineers in the Siegfried Line Penetration, CCB,3d Armd Div, 12-22 Sep 44, pp. 3-6, in folder,Penetration of the Siegfried Line, 12-25 Sep 44, 3dArmd Div files.


During the afternoon of 12 Septem-ber Task Force King bypassed Roetgenand headed toward the village ofSchmidthof, about four miles to thenorth. King's unit encountered the sametypes of obstacles as Task Force Loveladyhad faced. A crater, steel gates andI-beams, and dominating pillboxes inhilly, wooded terrain barred Task ForceKing's way. On the morning of 13 Sep-tember tanks nosed out the first steelgate. A second gate was more formi-dable. In front of it lay a huge water-filled crater; behind it were I-beamsembedded in concrete blocks. More-over, the roadblock was under fire from88-mm. artillery and the guns of tanksat Schmidthof. The shelling delayedthe attack for hours. Unable to workon the roadblock under such fire, theengineers constructed bypasses wideenough to accommodate tanks. Tanksand artillery ultimately knocked out theguns at Schmidthof, and by the after-noon of 14 September Combat Com-mand B's Task Force King had pene-trated the line.7

Combat Command A of the 3d Ar-mored Division, advancing on the northnearer Aachen where the countrysidewas open and rolling, ran into a belt ofdragon's teeth extending from the edgeof a forest on the Belgian border to theGerman town of Oberforstbach, a dis-tance of about a thousand yards. TaskForce X, commanded by Col. LeanderLaC. Doan, began the advance about1000 on 13 September. Doan sent infan-try through the dragon's teeth; engi-neers of Company C, 23d ArmoredEngineer Battalion, followed with tripwires and demolition materials. Initiallyholding at the line of departure, the

tanks were to move out as soon as theengineers had cleared a path for them.But the infantry and engineers ran intofire from a pillbox as well as heavymachine-gun and mortar fire fromopen emplacements that forced the for-ward troops to take shelter behind thedragon's teeth. Some way had to befound to get the tanks forward. At mid-afternoon reconnaissance discovered apassageway over the dragon's teeth—apparently, local farmers had filled inthe spaces between the teeth with stonesand earth. About a foot of each toothwas exposed, but engineers cut off theseobstacles with explosives, and the tankswent through, neutralizing pillboxes atpoint-blank range.8

Having broken through the Scharn-horst Line, the 3d Armored Divisionpressed north toward Eschweiler, north-east of Aachen, and by 15 Septembercame up against the dragon's teeth andpillboxes of the Schill Line. In this morethickly settled area pillboxes were oftendisguised as houses, ice plants, or powerstations.

By the time VII Corps reached theSchill Line, the corps' units had learnedthat the best way to take out the pillboxeswas to bring up tanks, tank destroyers,and self-propelled 155-mm. guns forpoint-blank fire. Even with a concrete-piercing fuse, high-explosive (HE) pro-jectiles could seldom penetrate the thickwalls; however, penetration was usuallynot necessary. The occupants of thepillboxes, suffering from concussion

7 Ibid., pp. 8-12.

8 Cracking the Siegfried Line, TF Doan, CCB, 3dArmd Div, 13—19 Sep 44, pp. 1 —3, in folder, Penetra-tion of the Siegfried Line, 12-25 Sep 44, 3d ArmdDiv files; Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. IV, "Pursuit IntoGermany," app. 1, Initial Breaching of the SiegfriedLine. The remainder of this section is taken from thislatter source.


BULLDOZER SEALS BUNKERS IN THE FORTIFIED LINE OUTSIDE AACHEN

shock and choking on powdered con-crete, would in most cases readily sur-render.

Then the engineers' task began. Inthe VII Corps sector and farther southin the Schnee Eifel, where the V Corpshad broken through the Siegfried Linein several places by mid-September, theAmericans had learned that if a pillboxwas not rendered unusable enemy pa-trols were likely to infiltrate the lines atnight and reoccupy it. Although thesimplest method was to blow up pill-boxes, in many cases it was expensive—destruction of the larger pillboxes inVII Corps area required up to 1,000pounds of TNT. In forward areas thenoise and smoke of the explosions alsoattracted enemy fire. The VII Corps

engineers preferred to seal the pill-boxes. Using a bulldozer, they wouldcover all openings with eight to ten feetof earth. In places where a bulldozercould not be employed, the engineerswelded steel doors and embrasuresshut. Between 11 September and 16October in the VII Corps area only 36pillboxes were completely destroyedwith explosives as compared to 239 cov-ered with earth and 12 closed bywelding.

Most of this work was completedbefore the end of September. By Octo-ber First Army had outrun supply lines,gas and ammunition were running low,the troops were exhausted, and theirequipment was depleted. Bad weatherprevented close air support. In addition,


German tanks and antitank guns, wellpositioned along the second band ofthe Siegfried Line, were inflicting heavylosses on American armor. At the endof September the advances of V andVII Corps halted, and both corps wenton the defensive.

XIX Corps North of Aachen

North of Aachen the Wurm Riverprotected Siegfried Line pillboxes. Theriver rendered dragon's teeth superflu-ous except at a few points, and XIXCorps encountered none when attack-ing across a mile-wide front about ninemiles north of Aachen. There the Wurmwas about thirty feet wide and onlythree feet deep. The infantry couldcross the stream easily, using duckboardfootbridges or even logs thrown intothe stream. But the Wurm was a realobstacle to tanks, for its banks weresteep and marshy.9

The 30th Infantry Division was tospearhead the attack, followed by the2d Armored Division. The infantry wasin position on 19 September. The origi-nal plan was to push through the Sieg-fried Line next day and move south torelieve pressure on VII Corps nearAachen. But the weather did not per-mit an air strike deemed essential beforethe jump-off. To allow time for thebombing and for the arrival of suppliesand reinforcements, the attack was post-poned until 2 October.

During the fortnight's delay, the 105thEngineer Combat Battalion, organic tothe 30th Division, reconnoitered the

Wurm River for the best crossing sites,and one of its companies constructedbridges for infantry and tanks. Thetank bridges, which the engineers calledculverts, were ingenious contraptionsmade of thirty-inch steel pipe, rein-forced on the inside with smaller pipeand on the outside with a layer of six-inch logs bound with cable. The engi-neers constructed ten, to be dividedequally between the two assault regi-ments. The method of emplacing thebridges, designed to protect the troopsfrom small-arms fire, was also inventive.The culverts, laid lengthwise on impro-vised wood and steel sleds, were to bepulled to the crossing site by a tankmoving parallel to the stream with atankdozer following. At the site thetankdozer was to push the culverts intoplace and then cover them with dirt.

Two companies of the 105th Engi-neer Battalion were in direct supportof the division's two assault regiments,with an engineer platoon attached toeach infantry assault battalion and athree-man engineer demolition team,armed with bangalore torpedoes andsatchel charges, moving out with eachinfantry platoon. The engineers super-vised training of the infantry in the useof flame throwers, demolition charges,bazookas, and other weapons to be usedagainst pillboxes.

D-day for the XIX Corps' attack onthe Siegfried Line was 2 October. Anair strike preceded the jump-off at 1100but did little good. Nor did prepara-tory artillery and mortar barrages ac-complish much beyond driving Ger-mans holding outlying emplacementsinto pillboxes. Tank and tank-destroyersupport was lacking, and wet weatherproved too much for the culvert bridges.One of them became stuck in mud;

9 XIX Corps Special Rpt, Breaching the SiegfriedLine; Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, pp.107-17. Unless otherwise cited, this section is basedon these sources and the histories of the units men-tioned.


another could not be emplaced becauseits bulldozer became mired. The engi-neers abandoned the culverts and beganconstructing treadway bridges with thehelp of the 1104th Engineer CombatGroup's 247th Engineer Combat Bat-talion. This work went forward underheavy enemy artillery fire, and after atreadway was ready at one regimentalcrossing half the tanks, as well as theirrecovery vehicles, bogged down in mud.In the other regimental sector the tread-way was not in place until 1830—toolate to permit a crossing.

Thus, the first day's assault on thepillboxes became entirely an infantryand engineer undertaking. The infan-try had considerable success firing smallarms and bazooka shells into apertures.Little use was made of flame throwers,pole charges, or satchel charges. Whenthe pillboxes were small, located on flator gently sloping ground, and lightlydefended, the engineers preferred toseal them, bringing up a jeep-towed arcwelder to weld shut the entrances andthen bulldozing earth over the em-brasures. When observed enemy firewas present, or when terrain or the tac-tical situation prevented the use ofdozers, the engineers destroyed thepillboxes, placing TNT on the weakerportion of the walls and firing thecharge electrically. The engineers foundthat a 400-pound TNT charge coulddestroy the average pillbox at this pointin the line. Learning that a single explo-sion in the forward areas would bringdown an accurate German artilleryconcentration, the engineers blew sev-eral pillboxes simultaneously.

When tanks arrived at the fortifica-tions they assisted the infantry and engi-neers with covering fire. By blastingpillbox apertures and entrances with

armor-piercing ammunition, the tankssometimes could induce the occupantsto surrender, but tank fire was effec-tive only in knocking camouflage fromthe thick concrete. This was also trueof most artillery fire. The only weaponthat could achieve any significant pene-tration was the self-propelled 155-mm.gun.

The Siege of Aachen

By 7 October XIX Corps hadbreached the West Wall in its sector andwas ready to join VII Corps in attack-ing Aachen. As the two corps moved toencircle the city, engineers served asinfantry on the flanks, and when theassault commenced on 8 October bothengineer groups sent battalions to thefront lines. The XIX Corps wanted tofree one regiment of the 29th Divisionto help the 30th Division in a drivesouth on 13 October to close the AachenGap. Thus, three days before the attackthe 1104th Engineer Combat Groupentered the line to contain the pillboxesnear Kerkrade, west of the Wurm River.Corps headquarters attached to thegroup a company of tank destroyersand two batteries of self-propelled auto-matic weapons, actually half-tracksmounting .50-caliber machine guns. Lt.Col. Hugh W. Colton, commanding thegroup, combed his light ponton, lightequipment, and treadway bridge com-panies to form an infantry reserve forthe operation.10

Stiffening German resistance slowedthe XIX Corps' advance south downboth banks of the Wurm River. Not

10 Hist 1104th Engr C Gp, Jun-Dec 44. Unless oth-erwise cited, this section is taken from this source andthe histories of the units mentioned.


until late in the afternoon of 16 Octo-ber was the corps able to link up withVII Corps elements north of Aachen.During the advance the 1104th Engi-neer Group patrolled its flanks and dis-patched aggressive reconnaissance pa-trols in front of its position. On 17October, after an artillery and mortarconcentration, Colonel Colton sent the172d and 247th Engineer Combat Bat-talions forward toward Aachen. Destroy-ing pillboxes that blocked the way, theengineers, reinforced by a platoon oftanks, fought their way to the outskirtsof the city but stopped as the town fell.11

Under VII Corps the 1106th Engi-neer Group during the last week of Sep-tember moved to relieve the 18th In-fantry, 1st Infantry Division, in posi-tions on the heights south of Aachen sothat the infantry could move north tolink with XIX Corps. The group com-mander, Col. Thomas DeF. Rogers,began training his two combat battalions,the 237th and the 238th, in the use of81-mm. mortars and organized a reserveof 150 men drawn from his light pon-ton and treadway bridge companies. Assoon as the attachment to the 18thInfantry became effective on 29 Sep-tember, Colonel Rogers sent his twocombat battalions to occupy positionswith the infantry battalions; the actionproved so valuable in familiarizing theengineers with the operation that hestrongly recommended an overlapperiod during any similar mission inthe future.12

After the infantry began withdraw-ing on 2 October, the 1106th EngineerGroup "became a real 'doughboy' out-fit standing on its own feet in a frontline fight." Supported by an armed fieldartillery battalion, the engineers laidbooby traps and antipersonnel minesalong the barbed wire protecting theirfront and sent out combat patrols tomaintain contact with the enemy. Colo-nel Rogers learned that his group's tac-tical operations would act as a diver-sion for the 18th Infantry's assault onthe city from the north.

The group's 238th Engineer Com-bat Battalion made an ingenious contri-bution to this mission on 8 October.Discovering several streetcars standingon tracks leading down a grade intoAachen, they loaded one of the carswith captured German shells and am-munition, a case of American explo-sives, and several time fuses. On its sidethey painted "V—13," inspired by aGerman V-bomb that had recentlypassed over the area. Then they senttheir missile careening downhill towardAachen. About 200 yards beyond a bat-talion outpost the car struck some debrison the track and exploded with a finedisplay of tracer shells. Next day theengineers tried again, loading a secondstreetcar with enemy shells and send-ing it down the track, but it hit thewreckage of the first and exploded.Clearing the wreckage from the track,the engineers sent a third car downhillon 16 October. It reached the city, butit could not be determined whether itdid any damage. In any case, "SecretWeapon V—13" attracted swarms ofnewspaper correspondents. ColonelRogers concluded that the greatest valueof the V—13 was "in giving GI Joe

11 Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 15, ML 2220, ETOUSAHist Sect.

12 1106th Engr C Gp Opns Memo 9, Lessons Learnedby the 1106th Engineer Combat Group during theAachen Operation, 1 Nov 44, app. 9 to Engr OpnsVII Corps, vol. IV, "Pursuit into Germany."


something amusing and bizarre to talkabout."13

An all-out attack on Aachen began11 October after the Germans refusedto surrender. By that time, the 26thInfantry of the 1st Division was in posi-tion to attack from the east, its left wingtied in with the position of the 1106thEngineer Combat Group. The infantrybegan moving into the city in smallassault teams that attacked block byblock, building by building, even roomby room; the engineers also sent patrolsinto the city.

Two men of the 238th Engineer Com-bat Battalion patrol, S/Sgt. Ewart M.Padgett and Pfc. James B. Haswell,were to play an important role in thesurrender of Aachen. The Germanscaptured the two on 17 October in aclearing outside the city. After passingthrough several command posts the twoAmericans arrived on the third day atthe garrison command post, a pillboxwhere the Germans held about thirtyAmerican prisoners. There, on themorning of 21 October, the Germanintelligence officer informed the Ameri-can prisoners that the fort had tried tosurrender but that two Germans carry-ing a white flag outside had been killed.He asked for a volunteer among theAmericans to carry the flag. Haswellvolunteered and Padgett insisted ongoing along.

Padgett took the flag, and the twomen, followed by two German officers,ran out into the middle of the streetand began waving it. Braving small-arms and mortar fire, they managed toreach an American officer who toldthem to bring out the entire German

garrison. The two led out the Germans,including the commander of Aachen,Col. Gerhard Wilck. Before leaving thepillbox, the engineers asked Wilck forhis pistol. He laid it on a table, smiled,and left the room. Thus they secured aprize souvenir of the occasion. Later,after surrender formalities were com-pleted, Wilck shook hands with the twoengineers, saluted, and thanked themfor their "gallant bravery" in carryingout the surrender flag.14

From the Moselle to the Saar

On 22 September General Bradleyhad stopped the Third Army advanceto give priority to First Army's drive tothe Ruhr in support of the 21 ArmyGroup effort to capture Antwerp. Atthat time General Patton had been pre-paring to push through the Metz Gapto the Rhine. When Aachen fell on 21October, Bradley lifted the restrictionson Third Army.

In the army's path lay some of themost formidable fortifications inEurope. West of Metz lay a chain of oldforts, some dating from 1870, situatedon ridgetops that gave every advantageto defenders. Next was the MoselleRiver, on whose east bank most of thecity of Metz was located. The river hada swift current and steep gradients andwas subject to autumnal flooding. Be-yond the Moselle on the Lorraine plain,a region extending thirty miles to theSaar River, was the Maginot Line. Atthe Saar around Saarbruecken the mainLorraine gateway opened to the Rhine.There, on the east side of the Saar, was

13 Ibid.; Combat Interv 4, 1106th Engr C Gp, Southof Aachen, Battle of Aachen, 8-22 Oct 44, 1st InfDiv files.

14 Interv, 238th Engr C Bn S-2 with Padgett,Experiences of Two American Prisoners of War Heldin Aachen, Germany, Incl to Oct 44 Jnl, AAR, 238thEngr C Bn, Jun-Dec 44.


the strongest portion of the SiegfriedLine.15

The plan was for XII Corps, in thearea of Nancy thirty miles south ofMetz, to start pushing north on 8 No-vember. The XX Corps would followthe next day, advancing eastward northand south of Metz. About ten miles tothe south, XX Corps' 5th InfantryDivision already had a bridgehead overthe Moselle at Arnaville. While that divi-sion turned north for a close envelop-ment of Metz, the 90th Infantry and10th Armored Divisions were to makea wider encirclement, bypassing theforts around Metz by crossing theMoselle six miles northeast of the vil-lage of Thionville, about twenty milesnorth of Metz. At the same time, the95th Infantry Division was to make alimited-objective crossing as a feint at apoint about three miles south of Thion-ville.

The Moselle Crossings atMailing and Cattenom

The bulk of the effort to get ThirdArmy troops over the Moselle duringthe November attack fell to the engi-neers supporting the 90th Division. Inrubber assault boats of the 1139th Engi-neer Combat Group, troops of the 359thInfantry were to cross near the villageof Mailing on the left (north) flank, sup-ported by the 206th Engineer CombatBattalion. On the right, battalions ofthe 358th Infantry were to cross simul-taneously near Cattenom, with the 179thEngineer Combat Battalion in support.At both crossings, where the water gapswere estimated to be 360 and 300 feet

wide, respectively, the engineers alsowere to construct an infantry supportbridge, a treadway bridge, and a float-ing Bailey bridge, while the 90th Divi-sion's organic 315th Engineer CombatBattalion was to build a footbridge,operate ferries, and undertake far-shore work. As soon as the expandingbridgehead had cleared the far shoreof Germans, the 160th Engineer Com-bat Battalion was to construct a double-triple fixed Bailey bridge at Rettel,northeast of Mailing.16

By the night of 8 November the engi-neers had trained with the infantry inpreparation for the crossing, demon-strating the proper way to carry andload an assault boat. For each boat thecrew consisted of three engineers, onea guide. That night the river began torise, and by the time the boats of theattack wave shoved off in drizzling rainat 0330 on 9 November, the infantryhad to load in waist-deep water. In spiteof a strong current the two leadinginfantry battalions were on the eastbank of the Moselle by 0500. As theyreached their destination the troopsfound that the high water had actuallyhelped the crossings: extensive mine-fields the Germans had prepared onthe far shore were flooded, and theboats passed over without danger. Also,the enemy had abandoned water-filledfoxholes and rifle pits dug into the eastbank.17

After daybreak, as succeeding infan-try battalions crossed the racing yellowMoselle, enemy artillery fire fell soheavily on the east bank that many

15 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 28, 124-29.Tactical details in this section are from Cole.

16 Combat Interv 364, Opns of 1139th Engr C Gp(8-17 Nov), Crossing of the Moselle River, XX Corpsfiles.

17 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineeringpp. 116-17.


crews abandoned their boats after de-barking the troops, allowing the craftto swirl downstream to be lost. But theinfantrymen made swift progress. AtMailing, where they achieved completesurprise, troops of the 359th Infantrycaptured the town by noon. The 358thInfantry, after crossing from Cattenom,faced a more formidable objective—FortKoenigsmacker, which had to be re-duced before further progress could bemade. There too the 90th Divisionachieved surprise. Assault teams ofinfantry and engineers (from the 315thEngineer Combat Battalion) rippedthrough bands of barbed wire andreached the trenches around the fortbefore an alarm was sounded. Bravingmortar and machine-gun fire from thefort's superstructure, the teams reducedthe fort, blowing steel doors open withsatchel charges and blasting ventilatingports with thermite grenades or TNT.

By the end of November the 90thDivision had eight battalions, includingreserves from the 357th Infantry, acrossthe Moselle. The division had advancedtwo miles beyond the river, overrunseven towns, and penetrated Fort Koe-nigsmacker.18 Next day, as German re-sistance stiffened, little progress wasmade, but by midnight, 11 November,the 90th Division's leading units helda defensible position on a ridge toppedwith the Maginot Line fortifications.The division had knocked out or by-passed many of the line's weakly heldpillboxes and had forced the surrenderof Fort Koenigsmacker with hand-car-ried weapons and explosives, a few 57-mm. antitank guns ferried across theMoselle, and artillery fire from the west

bank. No tanks or trucks had yet beenable to cross the river, and supply par-ties had to use rickety farm wagons andeven abandoned baby buggies.

Attempts to bridge the flooding river,beginning early on 9 November, cameto naught for two days. Before FortKoenigsmacker surrendered, shellflrefrom the bastion had made the bridgesite at Cattenom untenable and de-stroyed the bridging equipment. AtMailing, harassing enemy machine-gunand mortar fire forced the 206th Engi-neer Combat Battalion to abandon itsfirst attempt to build a footbridge. At0600 on 9 November the engineersbegan constructing another and simul-taneously put two ferries into operation.One, using boats lashed together andpowered by outboard motors, carriedammunition and rations and evacuatedthe wounded around the clock. Theother, using infantry support rafts tocarry 57-mm. antitank guns, jeeps, andweapons carriers, was short-lived. A fewantitank guns got across, but at 1100 araft carrying a jeep ran into the infan-try footbridge, broke its cable, and putthe bridge out of action. The infantrysupport bridge, then about three-quarters finished, was carried down-stream and lost.

Recovering some of the equipment,the engineers decided to build a tread-way bridge at the site, and the 991stEngineer Treadway Bridge Companymanaged to complete the new span bydusk on 10 November. But the river'scontinued rise had now put the roadleading to the bridge under nearly fivefeet of water. No vehicles could getthrough until the following afternoonwhen the flood waters, having crestedat noon on 11 November, began torecede. At 1500 the crossings began

18 The XX Corps: Its History and Service in World WarII (Osaka, Japan), p. 159.


TROOPS FLOAT FOOTBRIDGE SECTIONS INTO PLACE on the flooded Moselle Riverin the 90th Division area.

again. Ten supply-laden Brockwaytrucks, some jeeps, and a few light tanksand tank destroyers reached the farshore. Shortly after dawn next morn-ing German artillery fire repeatedly hitthe treadway, so weakening it that itcould no longer bear the weight of atank destroyer. It broke loose and wentoff downstream.

While waiting for more equipmentto come up so they could rebuild thebridge, the men of the 991st EngineerTreadway Bridge Company used bridgefragments to construct a tank ferry.Employing a heavy raft made of pon-tons and treads and tying powerboatsto the raft, the engineers manned theferry, crossing a company each of

medium tanks and tank destroyers bydark. This work earned the 991st Engi-neer Treadway Bridge Company theDistinguished Unit Citation.19

Late on 12 November, the engineerswere repairing the Mailing bridge andbuilding a bridge at the Cattenom site.But by now the XX Corps commander,Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker, had de-cided on another site for heavy bridg-ing to move his armored division acrossthe Moselle.

The Bridge at Thionville

The place was Thionville, where high19 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering,

pp. 117-21; Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 400.


retaining walls constricted the floodwaters of the Moselle and where theGermans had built a timber bridge,long since down. On the near side twospans of the German bridge were usable,while on the far side part of an oldstone-arch bridge, which the Frenchhad blown in 1940, was still standing.Third Army held the part of Thionvillewest of the river, but the Germans wereon the other side; there, a canal paral-leling the riverbank formed a second-ary obstacle. Beyond the canal lay FortYutz, an old star-shaped stone fortifi-cation. On the west bank the 1306thEngineer General Service Regiment,which had been acting as an engineercombat group because no group head-quarters was available, was preparingon 9 November to build a Bailey bridgeas soon as the east bank was clear ofenemy. Meanwhile, they could do noth-ing, for any movement near the riverdrew rifle and machine-gun fire fromGermans on the far bank. In his press-ing need to get his armor across theMoselle, General Walker gave the com-manding officer of the 1306th Engi-neers, Col. William C. Hall, a hardassignment, changing "the routine jobof constructing a support bridge into aweird operation of major importanceto the advance of an entire corps."20

The first tactical task, to clear the eastbank, General Walker gave to the 95thDivision, which on 8 and 9 Novemberhad established a very small bridgeheadacross the Moselle at Uckange, a fewmiles south of Thionville. The com-mander of the 95th Division sent toThionville two companies of the 378th

Infantry, supported by two companiesof the 135th Engineer Combat Battal-ion. On the morning of 11 Novemberthe troops began to cross the Moselle atThionville in powerboats. Enemy small-arms and mortar fire poured down onthem. The engineer captain in chargeof the boats was killed, as were a num-ber of the crewmen, and all but one ofthe boats were lost. Nevertheless, by themorning of 12 November two platoonshad crossed and cleared the south endof the island and had begun pushingnorth.

At 1030 that morning General Walkerordered the construction of the bridge,emphasizing that the success of thewhole Third Army attack dependedupon it. The 1306th General ServiceRegiment had already begun planningand from aerial photographs had deter-mined that the gap to be bridged wasabout 165 feet long. The regimentdecided upon a double-triple Baileybridge, which could carry tanks. The1306th had never built such a bridge,but one of its companies, Company Cof the 1st Battalion, which had built a100-foot double-single Bailey, took onthe job. On the night of 10-11 Novem-ber the regiment brought materials andequipment up to the bridge site andunloaded under blackout.

When the word came on 12 Novem-ber to build the bridge, the engineerswent into action. A party crossed theriver in a powerboat, cleared the farspan of mines, and prepared the farshore abutment. Then they discovered"a shocking fact"—the span to be bridgedwas 206 feet long instead of 165. Thelongest double-triple Bailey was 180feet, and any lighter structure could notcarry tanks. Engineers solved the prob-lem by extending the near abutment

20 William C. Hall, "Bridging at Thionville," MilitaryEngineer, XL (April 1948), 169. Unless otherwisenoted, this account of the bridge at Thionville is takenfrom this source.


HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE AT UCKANGE, MOSELLE RIVER

about ten feet, moving the far bridgeseat almost to the edge of the stonearch, and building a double-triple Bai-ley 190 feet long. It was a calculatedrisk that had to be taken.

Cranes began lifting the panels intoplace, and the launching nose movedout over the water. Then, at 1700, thebridge came under concentrated mor-tar fire. A direct hit killed one engi-neer and wounded six; within two min-utes the Germans inflicted more thantwenty casualties, and the entire com-pany had to take cover. After dark workresumed, continuing all night with asecond company relieving Company C.At dawn on 13 November a smoke gen-erating company gave the men the pro-tection of a smoke screen. Mortar fire

soon ceased as the infantry cleared thestrip between the riverbank and thecanal and advanced into Fort Yutz.Although 150-mm. guns began firing,the bridge escaped a direct hit, and nocasualties occurred among the engineersclimbing the superstructure clad inflak suits. Late that afternoon the en-gineers seated the far end of thebridge without difficulty.

About that time the near end ran intotrouble, for one of six jacks failed tofunction. The bridge swayed and fell in-to the cribbing, and jacking up the nearend took all night. A fresh company ofengineers came up to the site. Despiteheavy 150-mm. shelling which hit oneman and ignited the remains of theGerman timber bridge, creating a glare


that drew further artillery fire, theycompleted the bridge at 0930 on 14November. The engineers believed itto be the longest single-span bridge everlaunched as a unit.

On the afternoon of 14 Novemberthe tanks of Combat Command B, 10thArmored Division, began to roll overthe Bailey bridge at Thionville, and bydaylight next day all had crossed. Com-bat Command A used the treadwaybridge at Mailing and by dark on 15November had two companies across.General Patton, who visited both sites,inspecting the Bailey bridge while it wasstill under enemy fire and crossing thetreadway under a protecting smokescreen, later pronounced the 90th Divi-sion passage of the Moselle "an epicriver crossing done under terrific diffi-culties."21

Advance to the Saar

After envelopment to the north andsouth, coupled with a containing actionwest of the Moselle, Metz fell to XXCorps on 22 November. The lesser Ger-man forts in the area were left to "witheron the vine" (the last surrendering on13 December) because scarce U.S. artil-lery ammunition had to be conservedto support the corps' advance to theSaar River.

The XX Corps was to make the mainthrust, heading toward a crossing atSaarlautern, about thirty miles north-east of Metz at the strongest section ofthe Siegfried Line.22 The XII Corps,

coming up from the south, was to drivewith the bulk of its forces to Sarregue-mines, about forty miles due east ofMetz, where the Saar swung south outof the Siegfried Line and into theMaginot Line. One of the corps' twoarmored divisions, the 4th, was to crosssouth of Sarreguemines near Sarre-Union. The XX Corps' 95th Divisionwas to cross the Saar at Saarlautern,followed by the 90th. Flank protectionon the north would be provided byCombat Command B of the 10th Ar-mored Division, which was to movetoward Merzig, about ten miles northof Saarlautern. Ten miles north ofMerzig, Combat Command A of the10th Armored Division was to seize abridgehead over the Saar at Sarre-bourg, an important move because itpointed toward the ultimate axis of theThird Army effort—a Rhine crossingbetween Worms and Mainz. The 1139thEngineer Combat Group was to sup-port the 10th Armored and 90th Infan-try Divisions; the 95th Division was tohave the support of the 1103d Engi-neer Combat Group.

In the path of XX Corps the Ger-mans had demolished almost all thebridges over streams and culverts. Abut-ments, however, were seldom de-stroyed, making the use of fixed Baileybridges or short fixed treadway sectionsboth feasible and relatively easy.23 Mud,rain, fog, and mines slowed the infan-try more than did the Maginot Line,which was not very formidable. Cross-ing it, General Patton was "impressedby its lack of impressiveness."24 Only inthe path of the armor moving north

21 George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 172.

22 Patton believed attacking the line where it wasstrongest not as foolhardy as it seemed, because"people are inclined not to occupy strong positionswith as many men as they should." Ibid., p. 176.

23 Combat Interv 44, Engineer Participation in theMetz Operation, p. 11, XX Corps files; Hist 315thEngr C Bn, 7 Mar 44-May 45.

24 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 181.


did effective field fortifications blockthe way.

On the night of 21 November Com-bat Command A of the 10th ArmoredDivision came up against a strong lineof fieldworks—a bank of antitankditches, dragon's teeth, concrete pill-boxes, and bunkers. American intelli-gence had provided little or no informa-tion about this formidable barrier. It wasthe Orscholz Switch Line (known to theAmericans as the "Siegfried Switch"),constructed at right angles to the Sieg-fried Line and located at the base ofthe triangle formed by the confluenceof the Saar and Moselle Rivers. Thenineteen-mile-long triangle, ten mileswide at its base, was of vital concern tothe Germans because at its apex lay thecity of Trier, guarding the Mosellecorridor, an important pathway toKoblenz on the Rhine.25

The Orscholz Line provided a bul-wark for enemy forces withdrawingunder pressure from XX Corps. TheGermans manning its defenses pouredartillery and mortar fire on the tankersand on engineers attempting to bridgethe line's antitank ditches and deepcraters. The 10th Armored Division wasunable to drive through the fortifica-tions, and an infantry regiment of the90th Division had to reinforce the at-tack.

In three days of fighting the infan-try suffered very heavy casualties, notonly from enemy fire but also fromexposure to cold, mud, and rain. More-over, the bad weather forestalled Ameri-can bomber support. At the end ofNovember General Walker abandoned

the attempt to penetrate the OrscholzSwitch Line and to attack toward Sarre-bourg. He sent the infantry regimentto the rear and directed Combat Com-mand A of the 10th Armored Divisionto join Combat Command B near Mer-zig to protect the north flank of the XXCorps' drive on Saarlautern. By 2 De-cember the armor had overcome allresistance in the Merzig sector.

On 1 December the weather hadbegun to clear—a good omen for the95th Division's attack on Saarlautern—and on the morning of 2 Decemberbombers blasted in and around the city.Shortly before noon the bombing lifted.The 2d Battalion of the 379th Infantry,the 95th Division regiment chosen toseize a bridgehead across the Saar,advanced into the city. By 1500 thetroops had captured an enemy barrackson the western edge of Saarlautern, butas they converged on the center of thecity they met heavy resistance. The Ger-mans were fighting viciously, house byhouse and block by block.26 To breakthrough the strongly defended city andforce a river crossing too seemed im-possible, but fortune favored the at-tackers.

The Capture of the Saarlautern Bridge

That evening Col. Robert L. Bacon,commanding the 379th Infantry, washanded a photograph taken from anartillery observation plane late in theafternoon. The picture showed a bridge,intact, spanning the Saar between thecenter of the city and a northern sub-urb. Colonel Bacon decided on a dar-ing maneuver to capture the bridge

25 For the Orscholz Switch Line, see Cole, The Lor-raine Campaign, pp. 487-88 and map 43; The XX Corps:Its History and Service in WW II, p. 238. 26 AAR, 95th Inf Div, 2 Dec 44.


before the Germans could blow it. Heplanned to send his 1st Battalion inboats across the Saar northwest of thecity, where the river makes a loop, toseize the far end of the bridge whilethe 2d Battalion attacked toward thenear (south) side.

Under cover of darkness, rain, andfog and with all sounds drowned outby the roar of American artillery, as-sault boats moved up to the crossingsite, where the river was only 125 feetwide; the first wave of the commando-type operation was across at 0545. Ledby an infantry battalion commander,Lt. Col. Tobias R. Philbin, the assaultwave included a platoon from the 320thEngineer Combat Battalion under 2dLt. Edward Herbert. On the far bankthe column hurried down the road tothe bridge, encountering only one Ger-man, an unarmed telephone operator.At the bridge was an armored car witha radio operator in it and a Germansoldier alongside. A company com-mander bayonetted the radio operator,and Colonel Philbin shot the otherwhen he made a dash for the bridge totrip the switch that would blow it.27

Philbin's troops first cut all the wiresthey could find. Following closely be-hind the infantrymen, the engineerschecked the bridge for mines and explo-sives. About halfway across they foundfour 500-pound American bombs, with-out fuses, laid end to end across thebridge. Without stopping, Herbert ledhis men to check the south end of thebridge. There they encountered a Ger-man officer and four enlisted men whorefused an order to halt. All were shot.

A few minutes later the engineers sawa second party of several Germans com-ing toward the bridge dragging a rub-ber boat. They also refused to surren-der and were shot. This gunfire broughton such a heavy concentration of Ger-man machine-gun fire that the engi-neers had to retreat to the north end ofthe bridge, where machine-gun andartillery fire pinned them down forhours. Not until 1600 were they able toreturn to the bridge and hoist the Amer-ican bombs over the side and into theriver. The engineers also managed torestore enough flooring to enable sometank destroyers and supply trucks topass over the north side. After darkthe Germans dispatched to the bridgesome tanks loaded with explosives, butafter the lead tank was hit they aban-doned the attempt.

Next day the enemy resumed shell-ing and made determined efforts toretake or destroy the bridge. A partyof German engineers came forward toblow it by hand because the 95th Divi-sion's artillery had knocked out the gen-erators needed to blow the bridge elec-trically. The Germans were captured,and under questioning one of themrevealed that the bridge was virtually apowder keg—channels bored in thepiers were filled with dynamite andTNT. Herbert's platoon eventually re-moved three tons of the explosives.28

Assaulting Pillboxes on the Far Bank

While the engineers were still tryingto clear the bridge, fighting was alreadyunder way across the river in the sub-urbs of Saarlautern: Saarlautern-Rodenand Fraulautern to the north and Ens-

27 Details of the bridge capture are from interviewswith 2d Lt. Edward Herbert et al., Combat Interv 205,XX Corps files, and AAR, 95th Inf Div, 2 Dec 44. 28 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 518.


dorf to the east. Each regiment of the95th Division had the support of a com-pany of the 320th Engineer CombatBattalion. These suburbs boasted oneof the strongest sectors of the entireSiegfried Line. Pillboxes of reinforcedconcrete were built into the streets andbetween houses, many extending twoor three levels below ground, some withroofs and walls ten feet thick or steelturrets housing 88-mm. guns. The Ger-mans had cleverly camouflaged thepillboxes. Some resembled manure pilesor mounds of earth, others ordinarystructures. One had been constructedinside a barn, and another was dis-guised as a suburban railroad station,complete with ticket windows. Ordinarybuildings had been fortified with sand-bags, wire, and concrete. "Every housewas a fort," reported an officer fromSaarlautern-Roden.29

The engineers who had the job ofassaulting the pillboxes came under firenot only from the pillboxes themselvesbut from heavy German artillery em-placed on heights behind the threesuburbs, outranging American artilleryon the near bank of the river. Rain andovercast prevented air support. Ger-man tanks roamed the streets, and pro-tection against them was available onlyin the two northern suburbs, where theSaarlautern bridge brought acrossAmerican tanks and tank destroyers.The U.S. position in the southern sub-urb, Ensdorf, had to depend on brid-ges the engineers constructed, and Ger-man artillery knocked them out almostas soon as they were built. On 8 Decem-ber artillery fire cost the 320th Engi-neer Combat Battalion more than$300,000 worth of bridging equipment.

To add to the hardships, the Saar Riverwas rising rapidly. By 9 December,when assault boats were still support-ing the Ensdorf attack, the river hadswollen to a width of between 400 and500 feet.

It became evident very early that theadvance through the suburbs would beslow. Five German pillboxes, mutuallysupporting on each flank, held up aninfantry battalion for two days at Saar-lautern-Roden. Tank destroyers cameup to fire directly at the pillboxes butwithout effect. On the afternoon of thethird day, 7 December, T/5 Henry E.Barth of the 320th Engineer CombatBattalion's C Company volunteered toattack the first pillbox. Carrying a heavybeehive charge, he was unarmed buthad the covering fire of eighteen infan-trymen. Fifty yards from the target theinfantrymen, who had suffered severalcasualties during the approach, tookcover in a small building from whichthey kept up fire on the pillbox's ma-chine-gun ports until Barth was closeenough to rush forward, place hischarge on a gun port, and detonate it.The Germans surrendered imme-diately. Another engineer, Pfc. WilliamE. Farthing, captured a second pillboxsinglehanded. Slipping out alone, Far-thing crawled toward the pillbox andshoved an explosive charge into its gunport until it touched the gun muzzle,then detonated it.

Engineers advancing under infantrycovering fire became the general pat-tern for taking out the pillboxes in theSaarlautern suburbs. Sometimes aftera pillbox had fallen and the engineersand infantrymen inside were waitingfor darkness to resume their advance,the Germans would counterattack andhave to be driven off. The advance was29 AAR, 95th Inf Div, 2 Dec 44.


costly to the engineers. During Decem-ber the 320th Engineer Combat Battal-ion had ten men killed in action andfifty-nine wounded, two so severely thatthey died in the hospital.30 The pillbox-by-pillbox, street-by-street, house-by-house fighting in early December wasso costly to the already depleted 95thDivision that by mid-December XXCorps began withdrawing the unit tothe west bank of the Saar, replacing itwith the relatively fresh 5th InfantryDivision.

The plan was for the 5th Division todrive north and ultimately advancealongside XX Corps' 90th InfantryDivision. The latter had not been ableto follow the 95th Division over theriver but had had to cross some miles tothe north. Its main objective was Dil-lingen, on the east bank of the Saar andcovering the right flank of the Saar-lautern defenses. Two battalions of the1139th Engineer Combat Group wereto ferry the 90th Division across theSaar. Since no bridge existed, the divi-sion selected two sites for assault boatcrossings. The 179th Engineer CombatBattalion was to ferry the 357thInfantry over the river on the left(north) flank; the 206th EngineerCombat Battalion was to cross the 358thInfantry on the right. The engineerswere to operate the assault boats forthe infantry and, after the landings, tobring over supplies and evacuate thewounded. The 179th Battalion also hadto construct an infantry support bridge,an M2 treadway for tanks, other vehicles,or both, depending on the outcome of

the assault. Late on 5 December theengineers brought the boats down tothe riverbank as a ninety-minute artillerybarrage drowned the noise of the de-ployment.

The first boats shoved off at 0415.Darkness protected them from enemyfire, but they had to buck a strong cur-rent in the river, which had begun ris-ing the day before. Almost half of theboats the 179th Engineer Combat Bat-talion operated swamped on the wayover or back and went off downstream,smashing into the debris of a blown rail-road bridge. Most of the first infantrywave got across without mishap, but forsucceeding waves the crossings wereprogressively more difficult. At day-break the enemy spotted the boats, andsmoke seemed only to attract heavierfire. When the engineers attempted toput down footbridges that first day, theGermans knocked out the spans almostas soon as work started.31

On the far bank of the Saar a strongband of pillboxes barred the way east-ward. The 357th Infantry made someprogress on the north, but to the souththe 358th was unable to cross railroadtracks separating the riverside villageof Pachten from Dillingen. At Pachtenone of the engineers of the 315th Engi-neer Combat Battalion, Sgt. Joseph E.Williams, won the Distinguished Ser-vice Cross for gallantry in action. Vol-unteering to breach a pillbox, he waswounded before he could reach it butcrawled on and fired his charge. Herefused to be evacuated, advanced onanother pillbox, and although woundedfor the second time succeeded in tak-ing sixteen prisoners.32 However, this30 Hist 320th Engr C Bn, 1942-11 Aug 45. Barth,

Farthing, and seven other members of the 320th Engi-neer Combat Battalion were awarded the Silver Starfor action in reducing pillboxes at Saarlautern-Rodenfrom 4 to 7 December.

31 Hists, 1139th Engr C Gp, Dec 44; 179th Engr C Bn,Aug, Nov, Dec 44; and 206th Engr C Bn, Jun-Dec 44.

32 AAR, 358th Inf Div, 6 Dec 44.


and other acts of heroism by engineersand infantry were not enough to over-come the pillboxes. The only field gunthe 90th Division had east of the riverwas a captured German 75-mm. piece.Frantic calls went back to the near bankfor tanks and antitank guns.

To get the tanks and guns across theriver the engineers tried to build M2treadway bridges, but German artilleryknocked them out. So intense was theenemy fire that the powerboats used toferry supplies and evacuate thewounded could be employed only atnight; at times ferry operations had tobe suspended entirely. Not until 9 De-cember were the engineers able to getheavy rafts into operation. That day the179th Engineer Combat Battalioncrossed tanks and antitank guns on anM2 steel treadway raft, and the 206thBattalion got some jeeps, antitank guns,and tank destroyers across. Later, the206th had sole charge of the crossingoperation.33

During the following week, despitechilling rain and snow, the engineerskept the vehicular ferry running, re-peatedly repairing damage from heavyGerman artillery fire. As the river be-gan to recede the engineers also built acorduroy road of logs on the far shoreto keep the tanks from miring downwhen they rolled off the rafts.34 By 15December, after the tanks as well as the359th Infantry had crossed the Saar,the 90th Division was penetrating forti-fications protecting Dillingen. Then theattack halted for several days to givethe 5th Division time to relieve the 95thin the Saarlautern bridgehead and comeabreast of the 90th. The advance re-

sumed on 18 December. Resistanceproved surprisingly light, and in threehours most of Dillingen was captured.

The Withdrawal

Next afternoon, on 19 December,General Patton ordered the 90th Divi-sion to give up its hard-won Dillingenbridgehead and withdraw west of theSaar. By that time German attacks inthe Ardennes, beginning on 16 Decem-ber, had been recognized as a full-scaleoffensive. After a conference with Eisen-hower and Bradley at Verdun on themorning of 19 December, Patton com-mitted to the American defenses thebulk of Third Army, including the 90thand 5th Infantry Divisions, leaving the95th Division to hold the Saarlauternbridgehead—the only foothold left eastof the Saar.

For the withdrawal the engineers hadto depend on assault boats and the M2treadway ferries because a heavy pon-ton bridge they had planned to erectwas not yet in place. The first tanksand trucks went back west on the nightof 19 December After artillery fireknocked out one of the ferries duringdaylight operations, the crossings con-tinued only at night. The 206th Engi-neer Combat Battalion was in chargeof the withdrawal. By noon of 22 De-cember the 90th Division had recrossedthe Saar and was headed north to takeits place in the hasty defense againstthe last great German counteroffensivein the west.35

South of Third Army's withdrawingelements, American and French forcesalso steeled themselves for the German

33 Hists, 179th and 206th Engr C Bns.34 Hist 1139th Engr C Gp. 35 Hists, 1139th Engr C Gp and 206th Engr C Bn.


blow. From mid-September on, Pattonhad been fighting with a new Alliedarmy group on his flank in the south.Another seaborne thrust into German-occupied France on 15 August had rap-idly cleared the southern tier of thecountry and linked with the 12th Army

Group to form a continuous line fromthe Mediterranean to the English Chan-nel. Mounted from the MediterraneanTheater of Operations, the assault andthe subsequent advance north reliedheavily on engineer elements for suc-cess.

CHAPTER XX

Southern France

As the Allied plans for the cross-Channel attack matured in January1944, another staff headquarters in theMediterranean began preparing for thelast major seaborne thrust onto theEuropean continent in World War ILUnder the U.S. Seventh Army engineer,Brig. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, thenewly formed Force 163 moved intoan unused French girls' school outsideAlgiers. Having briefly commanded theSeventh Army, then a headquartersorganization with few troops assigned,General Davidson retained an interestin the planning of the invasion, Opera-tion ANVIL, after Maj. Gen. AlexanderM. Patch took over the army commandon 2 March 1944. The predominantlyengineer staff developed several alter-nate plans for the undertaking in south-ern France but at General Davidson'sinsistence and at the Navy IntelligenceBoard's recommendation, the plannersconcentrated on the forty-five milecoastline between Toulon and Cannes.There, the beaches offered a good gra-dient for amphibious operations andrapid access to the major port of Mar-seille and the naval base at Toulon. Twogood roads into the French interior rannorth from the area. One led up theRhone River valley to Lyon, and theother through the Durance River val-ley to Grenoble. Having served as Na-poleon's escape route from Elba in

1815, the latter was known as the RouteNapoleon.1

ANVIL lived a precarious existencefrom the outset. It remained subordi-nate to the material demands of theprojected Normandy invasion and theItalian campaign and subject to thevoluble objections of Winston Churchill.Nevertheless, active planning continuedat Seventh Army headquarters with theexplicit endorsement of Lt. Gen. JacobL. Devers, who had taken command ofthe North African theater at the turnof the year. Devers went so far as tofreeze theater stocks necessary for AN-VIL to preserve it as a viable operation.Not until 2 July did the CombinedChiefs of Staff finally direct the execu-tion of ANVIL with a target date of 15August. Churchill made a last-minuteattempt to divert ANVIL forces to thewest coast of France, but, because ofGeneral Devers' commitment to theproject, planning for ANVIL at SeventhArmy was uninterrupted.2

Planning sessions had hardly begunwhen the impetus for closer coopera-tion between Army and Navy planners

1 Seventh U.S. Army, Report of Operations, France andGermany, 1944-1945, vol. I (Heidelberg: Aloys Graef,1946), pp. 1 — 10. This chapter relies on this sourcefor planning and tactical details pertaining to the Sev-enth Army, except where otherwise noted. It is citedhereafter as Seventh Army Report.

2 Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy,1943-45, pp. 365, 381-82.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 437

made organizational innovation neces-sary. The experiences of the Sicilianand Italian landings showed the needfor interservice coordination of theoperation, while the near-debacle atAnzio provoked a reassessment of am-phibious warfare practice. In March1944 General Davidson recommendedthat General Patch establish two jointagencies, a Beach Obstacle Board and aBeach Control Board, to revise proce-dures for the combined operations phaseof the forthcoming invasion.

To form the Beach Obstacle BoardSeventh Army engineers joined Navyengineers and planners working underVice Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, commanderof the Western Naval Task Force, whichwould transport Seventh Army to theinvasion area. Working through thesummer of 1944 at the Invasion Train-ing Center in and around Salerno, theboard tested several devices that hadarrived too late for use at Normandy.The Apex drone boats, the Reddy Foxexplosive pipe, and the Navy"Woofus"—a rocket-firing LCM—engendered no great hopes among theboard members, and they chose to relyprimarily on demolition teams, eachconsisting of a naval officer and a bal-anced contingent of sailors and Armyengineers.3

The Beach Control Board produceda similar new organizational element inthe Beach Control Group, combiningan Army engineer combat regiment, anaval beach battalion, and several small-er service units. Trained under thesupervision of the Seventh Army G-4,Col. Oliver C. Harvey, one beach groupwas assigned to each of the three invad-

ing divisions with the job of movingsupplies ashore in the assault, clearingany shore obstacles impeding deliver-ies to the troops moving off the beaches,and acting as an embryonic base sec-tion until the consolidation of the beach-head and the arrival of regular servicesof supply on shore.4

Tank-gapping teams were anothersuccessful innovation for ANVIL. Anarmored unit equipped with M4A4tanks mounting bulldozer blades orscarifiers, the team was to breach theenemy beach minefields and sea wallsserving as tank obstacles so that thearmor in the first assault wave couldmove quickly off the open beaches insupport of the advancing infantry. Theengineers split the 6617th Mine Clear-ance Company to provide three teams,one attached to each of the engineerbeach groups for the assault. Driversfrom the regular armored forces weretrained to manipulate the dozer bladesto unearth buried mines as rapidly aspossible.

By 19 June the major engineer com-bat unit assignments for the invasionwere completed. Supporting the 3dInfantry Division as the nucleus for the36th Engineer Beach Control Group,the 36th Engineer Combat Regimentoperated with the 1st Naval Beach Bat-talion and various chemical, ordnance,signal, and military police units. Assignedto the 45th Infantry Division, the 40thEngineer Beach Control Group em-ployed its core engineer regiment, the4th Naval Beach Battalion, two quarter-master battalions, two port battalions, amedical battalion, and several smaller

3 See ch. XIV; Morison, The Invasion of France andGermany, p. 241.

4 Seventh Army, Engineer Section Reports, Engi-neer Historical Report, 1 Jan—30 Sep 44, pp. 1—2(hereafter cited as Seventh Army, Engr Hist Rpt).


GENERAL DAVIDSON

service units. With the 36th InfantryDivision was the 540th Engineer BeachControl Group, comprised of the 48thEngineer Battalion, the 8th Naval BeachBattalion, two quartermaster battalions,two port battalions, a medical battalion,several detachments of service troops,and the three battalions of the 540thEngineer Combat Regiment.5 Thoughthe same mix of support units wasemployed as in OVERLORD, there wasno provisional brigade headquarterssuch as the one that controlled activi-ties during the cross-Channel attack.

Attached to Maj. Gen. Lucian K.Truscott's VI Corps, these units wereaccomplished veterans. The infantrydivisions and engineers chosen for thefirst waves had all seen extensive actionin the invasions of North Africa andSicily and in the Italian campaign. The36th Engineer Combat Regiment waspreparing its fifth amphibious opera-tion, and the 540th had had a distin-guished career in two earlier landings.At the Invasion Training Center andaround the Bay of Gaeta after the Sev-enth Army headquarters moved to Na-ples in early July, the engineer beachgroups demonstrated demolitions, minewarfare, and small boat handling toinfantry units. Since the engineers werewell versed in tactics, their training cen-tered on equipment—variations of thetank bulldozer and scarifiers, a newbridge-carrying tank, and other innova-tions.6

Enemy forces in the target area forOperation ANVIL looked formidable onpaper but had major weaknesses intheir organization and shortages inmanpower and equipment. The local

command, Nineteenth Army, three corpsstrong under Lt. Gen. Friedrich Wiese,had had to exchange several units withGerman commands in northern Francefollowing the Normandy invasion andemerged the loser in these transfers.Wiese's relationship with his seniorcommand, Army Group G, was uncertain.The divisional commanders available tohim were competent, but at least twowere exhausted from their experienceson the Russian front. German strengthin southern France, counting reserveaggregations, amounted to over 285,000men, including weak naval and air sup-port. Wiese had somewhere between85,000 and 100,000 men in the imme-diate assault area to thwart an invasionthat he knew was coming. German aerialreconnaissance over the Mediterraneanhad detected the Allied buildup ofshipping; some agent reports even men-

5 Seventh Army Report, vol. I, p. 81.6 Seventh Army, Engr Hist Rpt, p. 5.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 439

tioned 15 August as the date set for theassault. The 242d Infantry Division, de-fending nearly the exact area describedin the Seventh Army assault plan, wasone of the two best Wiese had. But likethe other divisions along the coast fromthe Italian to the Spanish borders, itwas understrength and lacked someequipment. Though relatively better offthan other units for trained soldiery,the 242d had unreliable ethnic Germantroops from eastern Europe reinforc-ing it, and its least effective regimentincluded a battalion of Azerbaijanis. Toadd to Wiese's difficulties, Hitler hadpersonally decreed that the 242d wasto defend Toulon as a fortress and hadgiven its sister division, the 244th, thesame assignment in Marseille. Underthese conditions, the army commandercould not use his two most effectivedivisions as a maneuver force.7

Obstacles to landing craft in south-ern France were not nearly as numer-ous as those sown on the Normandybeaches, but the Germans had not to-tally neglected their defenses. Beachsands and all the beach exits were heav-ily mined and covered with barbed wire.Heavy artillery pieces, some from scut-tled French warships in Toulon harbor,commanded all the likely approachesto shore. Concrete geometric shapes ofall kinds barred movement on majorroads and intersections along the coast.But, lacking manpower and necessarysupplies, the German defenders couldnot construct positions in great depth,though their orders called for networksextending eight miles inland. At Ger-man Navy insistence they left intact the

larger ports of Toulon and Marseillebut completely wrecked some twentysmaller harbors in the invasion areas,including Ste. Maxime and St. Raphael.After 12 August, German forces alongthe coast were on constant alert.8

The main assault force assembled tostrike this defensive shell loaded intoattack craft with its contingents of engi-neers at Naples harbor between 8 and12 August. Some of the slower vesselsleft the crowded anchorage early tocoordinate their arrival off the beaches.By midnight 14 August, in calm weatherand a light sea, over 950 vessels hadgathered in assembly areas facing theBays of Cavalaire, Pampelonne, andBougnon and the shore east of St.Raphael. Before daybreak on 15 Augustcommando raiders hit the suspectedGerman gun emplacements on the Ilesd'Hyeres off Cape Benat, and the Allied1st Airborne Task Force began its dropinto zones around the towns of Le Muyand Le Luc, some ten miles inland fromthe amphibious landing zones. As thesun rose at 0638 a furious naval bom-bardment was directed at the largerGerman guns on the mainland, nowobscured in the light haze hanging overmuch of the shoreline in the early dawn.

The Landings

Facing the 3d Infantry Division onthe left were the Alpha beaches. AlphaRed, the westernmost, was an arc ofsmooth yellow sand on the Bay of Cava-laire, bordered by a thin, intermittentstand of pines thirty yards from thewater. Six miles due east across thesouthern tier of the St. Tropez pen-insula, Alpha Yellow stretched along7 MS R-103, Charles V. P. von Luttichau, German

Operations in Southern France and Alsace, 1944:Army Group G Prepares to Meet the Invasion, 1957,p. 11, in CMH. 8 Ibid.; Seventh Army Report, vol. I, pp. 37-40.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 441

the Bay of Pampelonne, with restrictedexits behind it leading to the resorttown of St. Tropez to the north andover rolling farmland and rougher ter-rain to the west. (Map 24)

After 0710 minesweepers moved inunder the cover of naval fire, clearingboat lanes to within 100 yards of thebeaches. In the shallow water stood rowsof concrete pyramids and tetrahedrons,most equipped with Teller mines. At0730 eighteen Apex drones rumbledshoreward to blast clear the last 100yards for the landing craft. Fifteendrones destroyed as many obstacles, buttwo circled aimlessly, and one roaredback into the fleet area, damaging asub-chaser when it blew up among theships.9

By 0758, naval fire support shiftedto the flanks of the beaches, and thefirst waves started shoreward. Threeminutes later, the 7th Regimental Com-bat Team, 3d Infantry Division, struckAlpha Red, and the 15th Infantry droveonto Alpha Yellow. The tank-gappingteam at Alpha Red immediately fell intofive-foot surf off the beach, nearlydrowning out the tank engines. Unde-terred, their crews gunned the twoengineer tanks up the sand, bulldozinga passage through the railroad embank-ment behind the beach and clearing aroad through a mined, wooded area,all in less than ten minutes.10 Elements

of the 1st Battalion, 36th EngineerCombat Regiment, came in with thefirst wave on Red, and immediatelysquads began probing for mines withbayonets and detectors.

The gapping team at Yellow landedsome 1,500 yards to the left of its as-signed point and had to wade the sin-gle tank through water five feet deep.But once ashore, the vehicle took onlya quarter-hour to clear a 1,500-yardpath through antitank and antiperson-nel mines to a highway, silencing a Ger-man antitank gun in the process. Thetank's dozer arm, partially severed byan exploding mine, finally buckled com-pletely as the tank forded a stream tobegin preparing a crossing site.

The 3d Battalion, 36th Engineer Com-bat Regiment, hit Yellow and, clearingpaths through the mines, pushed vehi-cle tracks of reinforced matting throughthe serviceable beach exits. By 0920 the36th Engineer Beach Group's com-mand post was set up in the HotelPardigon in Cavalaire, off the left flankof Alpha Red. As the day progressedthe 1st Battalion, leaving beach opera-tions to the 3d Battalion, advancedinland with the infantry to clear road-blocks and minefields. The unit laid outdumps behind the troops moving to thebeachhead line, leveled an airstrip forreconnaissance aircraft, and erectedbarbed-wire barricades for a prisonerenclosure.11

Alpha Yellow Beach closed down on16 August; poor exits and a sandbarjust off shore limited its supply flow.The 3d Battalion moved southwestacross the St. Tropez peninsula on 18August to relieve the crush of opera-

9 Adm. H. Kent Hewitt, "Executing OperationANVIL-DRAGOON," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,LXXX (August 1954), 903; Morison, The Invasion ofFrance and Germany, p. 256; Seventh Army Report, vol. I,p. 199.

10 Summary of Accomplishments, Tank-GappingTeams, app. to Memo, Maj Thomas W. Wood forJoint Army-Navy Experimental and Testing Board,Ft. Pierce, Fla., 10 Sep 44, sub: Operation DRAGOON.All details on the operations of the tank-gapping teamsare taken from this source.

11 Hist Rpt, 36th Engr C Rgt, 1944, Report forAugust 1944.


tions on Alpha Red by opening AlphaGreen opposite Red on the Bay ofCavalaire. Engineers quickly discoveredthat the exits off Green were heavilymined, and clearing them occupiedmuch of the labor force until the endof the month. With these hindrances,service troops on the Alpha beaches hadcontinual difficulty responding to thesupply demands of the combat troops.Though the Alpha complex was theleast efficient of the ANVIL beach oper-ations, it continued to receive cargountil Marseille harbor came into fulluse.

Seven miles across the mouth of theBay of St. Tropez from Alpha Yellow,beginning just east of rocky Cape Sar-dineau, the Delta beaches curved fromsouth to northeast along the shores ofthe Bay of Bougnon. Delta Red andDelta Green lay contiguous, giving wayto flat hinterlands. Delta Blue was sep-arate, broken on its far right by a smallriver mouth and marked to its rear byrising slopes of the Maures. An eight-foot-high, three-foot-thick concrete wallstood along the back edge of Red andGreen; behind it ran a paved road anda narrow-gauge coastal railroad atop amasonry embankment that also paral-leled the shore behind Yellow and Blue.

No underwater obstacles hinderedthe Delta force, and at 0802 the 40thEngineer Beach Control Group, underLt. Col. Oscar B. Beasley, toucheddown. Finding no mines on the beach,the 1st Battalion of the engineer regi-ment reduced concertina-wire defensesof Red and Green and set to workunloading over ponton causeways andlanding craft that grounded severalyards out on the steep gradient.

The gapping team at Delta Greenhad approached the beach 500 yards

to the right of its intended landfall andimmediately lost all three of its engi-neer tanks when they plunged almostout of sight into the water on leavingthe landing craft. The crews dove toretrieve the wall-breaching charges inthe forward racks on the tank hulls andblew out a sea-wall section large enoughfor troops, tanks, and supplies to movethrough. By nightfall the 1st Battalionhad supply dumps laid out 500 yardsinland.

At Delta Yellow and Blue, the 3d Bat-talion of the engineer regiment beganlimited operations. Landing craft nosedright into the beach here, but the exitsat Blue were so constricted that it alsoclosed on D plus 1. The 2d Battalion,40th Engineer Combat Regiment, alater arrival, went to the aid of the 36thEngineer Beach Group on short-livedAlpha Yellow late in the afternoon ofD-day. It then moved through St. Tro-pez in the face of stiff German resis-tance to clear mines and open overtwenty new boat ramps on beacheschristened Delta Red 2, at the head ofthe Gulf of St. Tropez and west of thetown.12

Farther east the road and the rail-road tracks that skirted the Deltabeaches ran through the ancient Romanport of Frejus, still a major populatedpoint although centuries-long siltinghad placed it a mile from the sea. Atthe head of the gulf that once led to itsharbor was Camel Red, the best beachin the VI Corps assault area for itsgradient, size, and access to the valleyof the sluggish Argens River to the left.Its advantages as a lodgment had oc-curred to the Germans too, and theyerected here the strongest and best-

12 Seventh Army Report, vol. I, pp. 133-34.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 443

organized defenses encountered inOperation ANVIL. The Navy and theAir Forces pounded the emplacementsall morning, softening the defenses fora thrust ashore planned at 1400 onD-day, but minesweepers sent in at1100 drew such heavy fire that theyretreated. An air attack at noon rained187 tons of explosives on the Germanpositions.

The main assault in the Camel areacame at 0803 on Green, a narrow 500-yard-long stretch of rocky shinglebacked by rising cliffs scarred withquarries 11/2 miles east of the resorttown of St. Raphael. Camel Yellow, tobe taken indirectly rather than by imme-diate seaborne frontal attack, lay at thehead of the Rade d'Agay across the baseof the Drammont promontory fromGreen and was defended and blockedby obstacles and a net boom across theroadstead. At Antheor Cove, 2,000yards east of Yellow, Camel Blue, a thineighty-yard stretch, was the landingpoint of the troops of the 141st Infan-try, 36th Division, who were to securethe easternmost flank of the beachheadline. The embankment of the coastalmotor road ran thirty feet from thewater's edge at Blue, and the narrow-gauge railroad crossed the back of thediminutive inlet on an eight-spanmasonry bridge a hundred feet abovethe water.

The 1st Battalion of Col. George W.Marvin's 540th Engineer Combat Regi-ment, leading the beach group, chargedashore on Green with two battalions ofthe 141st Infantry. Two engineer com-panies quickly organized the beaches,cleared mines, and set up dumps forthe following assault waves. CompanyB crossed the Agay River with the 2dBattalion, 141st Infantry, and met infan-

try units coming from Camel Blue totake Yellow from behind in order tostart supply operations there.13

The first wave on Camel Green wentin without a tank-gapping team. Equip-ped with a rocket rack atop its turret,the tank intended for the first wave wasaboard an LCT that broke down onthe way to the invasion area. The tankarrived on another craft in a later infan-try assault wave and moved to the beachwall to blast a hole. The rockets accom-plished their purpose, but the backblastspewed a scorching sandstorm into theranks of the unwary onlookers to therear. After breaching the obstacle theengineer crew of the tank had no ordersfor other employment, though it oc-curred to them that they could haveused their machine to help the regularengineer squads remove mines. FourD-7 bulldozers were damaged and sev-eral men wounded on Camel Greendigging out mines by traditionalmethods.14

The Apex drones had their worsthour before the scheduled landing onCamel Red. Launched under a furiousnaval barrage about 1300, ten of theboats churned through the Gulf ofFrejus. Three wrecked some minedtetrahedrons, one exploded on the farleft flank of the beach, two ran up onthe sand, and one made tight circlesoffshore. A destroyer blew another outof the water when it veered seaward,and sailors gingerly boarded the lasttwo wayward robots to put them out ofaction. Navy intelligence later specu-lated that the Germans had stolen radio

13 Ibid., p. 137; Hist 540th Engr C Rgt, p. 14.14 Summary of Accomplishments, Tank-Gapping

Teams. The engineer tank crews on other beacheshad complaints similar to those expressed in the afore-mentioned work about their inactivity after the assault.


control of the boats, a logical explana-tion of their dismal performance.

The volume of German fire duringthe foray of the drones forced a changein the plan to land the 142d Infantry,36th Division, on Camel Red; the Navyplaced the assault wave ashore on al-ready secured Camel Green at 1515.Diverting the assault force doubtlesssaved needless casualties, but now the540th Engineer Combat Regiment'soverworked 1st Battalion, having movedthe 141st and 143d Infantry regimentsashore at Green, received the men andequipment of the 142d as well. Workon the beach continued throughout thenight, interrupted briefly at 2225, whenseveral engineers joined rescuers swim-ming to the aid of the wounded on thestriken LST-282 after a German gliderbomb hit the craft. The vessel groundedin the shoals near Cape Drammont andlay smoldering with forty casualtiesaboard and half her cargo reduced tojunk.15

The 540th's 2d Battalion, landingwith the 142d Infantry, swept the rightflank of Camel Green and then struckoverland to organize Camel Yellow,at the same time relieving Company B.Yellow Beach became the principal sup-ply beach in the Camel net, while troopand vehicular traffic moved over Green.

The 36th Division troops movingfrom these beaches carried the town ofSt. Raphael, lying between Red andGreen, by evening of D-day and movedto reduce the formidable defenses ofRed from the rear. After its relief on

Yellow, Company B led the engineerelements following the 36th Divisioninto St. Raphael shortly after daybreakon 16 August. Scattered German sniperfire greeted the company's arrival onthe outskirts of the town, but a shortseries of skirmishes eliminated the de-fenders, and the 540th Beach Groupcommand post was set up in the townby noon. Joined later by Company A,Company B began the clearance ofCamel Red, sweeping the western endof the beach, blasting out sections ofseawall, and demolishing the seven-foot-high, three-foot-thick reinforced-concrete antitank blocks the Germanshad strewn about the beach. The 1stBattalion less Company C, left behindto operate Camel Green, had Red opento traffic late in the afternoon of 17August. Supply dumps behind thebeaches had been operating for fourhours, receiving laden trucks from theother Camel beaches.

Company F left Yellow on the eigh-teenth to begin clearing the docksidearea and the quays of the town. Bull-dozers had started to open the streetswhen one of the company machinesengaged a row of blocks, concrete obsta-cles with hidden Teller mines. Theengineer components of the 540thBeach Group, having sustained onlyone fatality since D-day, lost nearly aplatoon when the detonation of onebooby-trapped block killed four andwounded twenty-seven men. On the fol-lowing day the remainder of the 2d Bat-talion abandoned Yellow Beach andcame to St. Raphael to continue the har-bor reconstruction that Company F hadbegun, and the little port began receiv-ing incoming cargo on the twentieth.

While VI Corps consolidated theinvasion beaches, the Seventh Army

15 Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, p.270; Hist Div, WDSS, Invasion of Southern France,pp. 60—61, typescript copy in CMH. This source isbased largely on the Seventh Army Report but is supple-mented with additional material from after-actioninterviews.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 445

MINE REMOVAL AT CAMEL RED. Mines were used to blast a hole in the seawall at rear.

Engineer Section, operating out of theHotel Latitude Quarante-trois in St.Tropez, kept a close eye on the devel-oping beach supply operations. Theunexpectedly rapid advance off theANVIL beaches soon forced the engi-neers to accelerate work schedules intwo areas intimately connected with theforward movement of Seventh Armysupply: rehabilitation of ports and re-pair of railroad lines and bridges. By27 August General Davidson had com-pleted personal reconnaissance of Mar-seille and Toulon as well as petroleumfacilities at Port-de-Bouc. He was al-ready revising engineer plans to speedup the influx of engineer units and sup-plies of all kinds.

The choice of ports for major cargodischarge became a bone of Army-Navycontention even before German resis-tance in Marseille and Toulon col-lapsed. From 25 August, General David-son opposed the original Navy plan torefurbish both ports simultaneously.Spurred by the desperate need to getahead of a mounting shipping crisis inthe European theater, where two majoramphibious invasions had taken placewithin two months, the Navy sought allmeans possible to turn ships aroundand keep a constant supply of emptyvessels available. The Army's immedi-ate concern was the movement of sup-plies; Toulon, a naval base with narrowwharves, constricted access, and only


single-track rails to serve it, was unsuit-able for bulk cargo movement exceptas a supplementary port. The railroadnet in and out of Marseille was highlydeveloped—capable of moving morethan 350 boxcars a day—and followedthe natural commercial route along theaxis of advance of the Seventh Army.General Davidson recommended direct-ing all salvage and clearance efforts atpreparing Marseille for the twenty-fiveships of the D plus 25 convoy. A confer-ence on 1 September, chaired by Maj.Gen. Arthur A. White, Seventh Armychief of staff, resolved the impasse infavor of the Army's view but gave theNavy permission to assign Seabees todevelop Toulon as a secondary port.After 1 September the French Navyalso devoted most of its engineeringefforts to the reconstruction of its for-mer base.16

A successful French assault on thetwo cities, concluded on 28 August aftera week-long fight, brought the head-quarters and 2d Battalion, 36th Engi-neer Combat Regiment, and the 335thEngineer General Service Regimentinto Marseille to prepare it for large-scale cargo operations. Assigned for themoment to Coastal Base Section estab-lished at Marseille, the troops under-took preliminary damage estimates,started mine and booby-trap clearance,and removed rubble in the docksideareas, with the 335th at first doing themine clearance around the deepwaterharbor and the 36th handling the VieuxPort area.

Many of the German mines were

improvised, though the standard Schuantipersonnel and heavier Teller mineswere plentiful. Larger charges meantto demolish entire docks and storagefacilities were made locally of explosive-packed wooden barrels and 300-pounddrums, casks of picric acid, and detona-tors. Equipped with timing mechanismsand set into the docks or warehousewalls, they blasted twelve-foot craters,making whole wharves temporarily im-passable. The charges had flattened allwarehousing in the dock area. The335th dug out over thirty tons of explo-sives and removed 2,000 Teller mines,but had to detonate many of the bigcharges in place when the engineers dis-covered that the fuses had so decom-posed that their safe deactivation wasimpossible.

Engineer regiments supervised by theheadquarters organization known after1 September as the 1051st EngineerPort Construction and Repair Groupset about restoring enough of the portto serve the needs of the Seventh Armyand the projected requirements of the6th Army Group headquarters of Lt.Gen. Jacob L. Devers. The army groupwas scheduled to become operationalon 15 September. On the landward sidethe engineers removed debris and re-paired quay walls. Where Germancharges had blown holes in the tops andsides of masonry wharves, the engineersfirst reconstructed the dock walls. Ger-man prisoners, augmented by Italianlabor gangs, did all of the heavy, dis-agreeable manual labor to clear thebreaks and then to fill the craters, andthey repaired wall sections with therubble they carried from other parts ofthe city and the harbor.17

16 Mins of Mtg, 6th Army Group Conference file 7,25 Aug-1 Sep; Coakley and Leighton, Global Logisticsand Strategy, 1943-45, p. 385; Official Diary for Com-manding General Seventh Army, vol. II, 15 August1944 to 31 January 1945, pp. 222-23, typescript copyin CMH.

17 CONAD History, vol. I (Heidelberg: Aloys Graef,1945), p. 40.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 447

In the harbor channels the Germanshad sunk over sixty-five ships in pat-terns that vitiated the methods the engi-neers had used at Naples harbor. AtMarseille the enemy piled ships atopone another on the harbor floor at suchodd angles to and distances from thequays that bridging over them was notfeasible. Nearly all the 121 individualberthing spaces in the old and new sec-tions of the 550-acre port were blocked;cranes serving the cargo wharves weretoppled into the water to form addi-tional blocks or were otherwise sabo-taged. The Germans also had scuttledseven ocean-going vessels in a heap toclose the mouth of the deepwater sec-tion of the port.

While Navy salvage teams attackedthis key obstruction, French engineersand the 1051st tried to bypass it byblowing a passage in the breakwaterprotecting the harbor. The engineersmoved in a well-drilling crew to boreholes in the jetty for charges. But thenNavy divers managed to topple one ofthe seven hulks off the pile, allowingthe passage of laden Liberty ships abovethe remainder of the wreckage. Oncethis blockage was eliminated, the Mar-seille port slowly came to life again. By8 September, when the Coastal BaseSection took control of the port, eightLiberty berths were operating aroundthe clock; by month's end the port hadreceived 188 ships carrying 147,460men, 113,500 long tons of cargo, 32,768vehicles, and 10,000 barrels of petro-leum products of all kinds.18

In the area of Port-de-Bouc, a satel-lite port some twenty-five miles by seanorthwest of Marseille, the engineers

encountered similar, though much lessextensive, destruction and harbor block-age. The center of the southern Frenchpetroleum traffic in peacetime, this portalso had a daily capacity of 7,000 shorttons of dry cargo; it was the hub of acanal system that funneled barge traf-fic between Aries, twenty-five miles upthe Rhone River, and Marseille's Barge-line Harbor. Port-de-Bouc's dock sys-tem on the Mediterranean was con-structed as an extension of a continu-ous commercial net winding along anarrow, 3 1/2-mile tidal strait passingthrough the town of Martigues, whichsat astride the opening into a wide salt-water lake, the Etang de Berre. Itsshore was lined with smaller wharves,canal entrances, and petroleumrefineries.

Here the Germans had had little timefor methodical destruction of facilities.They blasted loose large stones fromthe masonry docks to ruin them and tofoul the berthing areas alongside. Com-pany A, 335th Engineer General Ser-vice Regiment, arriving in the area on27 August, replaced these stones easilyand filled craters along the quays withthe debris of the scattered Germandemolition charges. When the Navy fin-ished sweeping mines from the ap-proaches later in August and removedthe single blockship in the harbor, threeberths along the T-shaped jetty and onthe quays became available for Liber-ties. The end of September saw the dis-charge of 36,837 long tons of regularcargo at Port-de-Bouc, little when com-pared to the tonnages of Marseille, butconsistent with the port's real impor-tance as the chief Allied POL entrypoint in southern France.19

18 Ibid., p. 41; The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO,vol. VII, "Opening and Operating the ContinentalPorts," p. 127.

19 The Adm and Log Hist of the ETO, vol. VII,"Opening and Operating the Continental Ports," p.


ENGINEER OFFICER PROBES FOR EXPLOSIVE CHARGE AT MARSEILLE

The main rail service through thearea was a double-track system that par-alleled the coast west of Marseille,crossed the narrow ship channel be-tween Port-de-Bouc and Martigues atits center, swung east through Port-de-Bouc, and then veered north afterbridging the Aries Canal. The Germansblocked both ship movement on thewaterways and rail traffic by dumpingthe turn span that crossed the tidal straitinto the ship channel and dropping thesecond rail bridge into the canal. The

1051st finally cleared the channel ob-struction in October, blasting away thewreckage to allow heavy tanker trafficaccess to the Etang de Berre. Recon-struction of the rail overpass over theAries Canal restored traffic on the lineout of Port-de-Bouc in early Decem-her.20

Base Sections and SOLOC

In the two weeks following the inva-sion, General Davidson made everyeffort to free engineer combat regi-ments on the beaches for work behind

134; Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, p.286; Unit Hist, 335th Engr GS Rgt, Hist Rpts forAug—Sep 44. Company A was active around Port-de-Bouc until 27 September, when the 335th movednorth. See also "POL Operations" below.

20 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 11, Port Reconstructionand Repair, app. 50, Port-de-Bouc.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 449

the advancing armies. The Coastal BaseSection, with an advance party ashoreon 16 August, began assuming controlof operations in Marseille and was infull control in the city by 8 September,a week ahead of schedule. The CoastalBase Section engineer, Lt. Col.Chauncey K. Smullen, agreed to releaseall engineers but one battalion of the40th Engineer Combat Regiment fromthe beaches. Renamed Continental BaseSection on 10 September, Coastal Baseleft Marseille to become the mobile sec-tion moving behind the 6th ArmyGroup. On 26 September, when it wasrechristened Continental Advance Sec-tion, the logistical command was atDijon. (Map 25)

The Advance Section left behind atthe port city a new support command,Delta Base Section (DBS), which ranthe southern French ports until afterV-J Day. The DBS Engineer Section,established 3 October under Lt. Col.William B. Harmon and among thelargest components of the new basesection, took over the 1051st EngineerPort Construction and Repair Groupand the activities of over thirty otherunits providing fire protection, con-struction, water supply, and services inthe port areas. By war's end in Europethe engineers had restored nearly 35percent of Marseille's prewar harborfacilities, leaving the remainder forpostwar reconstruction by the Frenchgovernment.21

With the relief of the engineers onthe beaches, the over-shore operationsbegan closing down. Supply-chokedAlpha Beach closed 9 September, fol-lowed by the Deltas on the sixteenth

and the busy Camel Red on 25 Septem-ber. By the end of the month the flowof supply had shifted to Marseille whereDelta Base Section formed the south-ern end of 6th Army Group's line ofcommunications in France.

Once 6th Army Group had met 12thArmy Group in east-central France toform a continuous battle line facing theReich, an adjustment in the administra-tion of supply functions became neces-sary. SHAEF assumed tactical controlof the 6th Army Group on 15 Septem-ber, the day it began operations as aheadquarters in France, but resolutionof the question of command over thesupply establishment in southernFrance was more gradual and compli-cated.

The complexities arose from the factthat two separate communications zonecommands were now active in theETOUSA area, an advance element ofSOS, NATOUSA, that opened at Lyonon 11 September, and General Lee'sCOMZ, ETOUSA. Though the 6thArmy Group's operational area waswithin Lee's preserve, it still drew itssupply from massive reserves in theNorth African theater, which lay out-side Lee's purview. COMZ was momen-tarily unprepared to handle requisitionsand establish procedures for the Rhonevalley supply net, but any accommoda-tion would have to recognize the legalsupremacy of COMZ on the Europeanmainland. Conferences between the twoparties proceeded throughout Septem-ber. SHAEF was willing to allow Gen-eral Devers as commander of 6th ArmyGroup a fair degree of autonomy in hissupply. In the compromise eventuallyworked out, ETOUSA would assumeultimate control of the Rhone supplyroute on 20 November while an inter-

21 Seventh Army, Engr Hist Rpt, pp. 8-9; History,Delta Base Section, pp. 155-60, in CMH.


MAP 25

mediate command, the Southern Lineof Communications (SOLOC), openedon the same day to handle supply inthe south. Although a subsidiary ofCOMZ, ETOUSA, SOLOC was stillauthorized direct communication withNATOUSA on the matters of supplyand personnel coming from Italy orNorth Africa. On 3 November, aCOMZ general order named Maj. Gen.Thomas B. Larkin, former NATOUSASOS commander, commander ofSOLOC and deputy commander ofCOMZ, ETOUSA. This uneasy unionof the two supply commands func-tioned acceptably, but SOLOC lastedonly through the winter; on 6 Febru-ary 1945, the command passed out ofexistence, six weeks before 6th ArmyGroup crossed the Rhine.22

Engineer operations on the supplyroutes in southern France were underthe SOLOC engineer, Col. Clark Kit-trell, a career soldier with years of expe-rience in civil works in the United States.Kittrell's Engineer Section was alwaysunderstaffed and constantly workingunder two separate sets of proceduresand policies, depending upon whichtheater's jurisdiction applied to matterstouching on engineer operations. Hecontinued to wrestle with shortages ofspare parts and inadequate inventorymethods that became worse as the de-mands of the sudden advance accumu-lated. Chief among the engineer con-cerns for SOLOC, however, were thefunctions affecting the supply of thepursuing army, railroad supply routes,and petroleum pipeline supply sys-tems.23

22 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol-um II, pp. 41-45; History of SOLOC-ETOUSA, vol.I, Adm 600A, ETOUSA Adm files.

23 Hist of SOLOC-ETOUSA, vol. II, Adm 600B,ETOUSA Adm files.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 451

Railroads

Allied rail supply operations in south-ern France began on 23 August withshort-haul bulk service lines out ofFrejus to points less than thirty milesinland. The 40th Engineer BeachGroup had begun collecting empty railcars at St. Tropez on D plus 2 andadded this equipment to the twelvelocomotives and eighty cars found intactat Carnoules, within the beachheadarea. As Coastal Base Section took overMarseille, the Army engineers retainedresponsibility for roads and rail mainte-nance out of the city. Damage to roadswas slight, and the rails were usuallyonly blocked by fallen debris. WhereGermans had torn up trackage, Frenchrailroad employees replaced rails andties with no difficulty.

From a point above Aix-en-Provence,twenty-five miles north of Marseille, theFrench rail net divided into two routestraveling north: a multiple track linkrunning up the Rhone valley on bothsides of the river and a single trackbranching east and then north toGrenoble. More steeply graded, negoti-ating mountain terrain, and subject todeep snows and frequent flooding inthe upland passes, the Grenoble routenevertheless had priority because thereseemed to be far less damage along itthan along the heavier duty Rhonealternate. The major breaks encoun-tered in the southern end of the netwere just southwest of Aix; at Meyrar-gues, ten miles north of Aix; and northof Sisteron at the confluence of theBuech and Durance Rivers.

The original plan for railroad repairleft the entire job of major rehabilita-tion behind the armies to the engineersof the 1st Military Railway Service,scheduled for phasing into southern

France on D plus 30. When the advanceup the Rhone valley got much ahead ofschedule, bridge repair fell to the Sev-enth Army engineers, now forced torely on their ingenuity and extensivestocks of locally procured materials.With heavy bridging steel sections stillon convoys sailing from the UnitedStates or heading for Marseille fromstockpiles within the Mediterranean,the engineers were working with a sup-ply allotment adequate for D plus 14operations when the combat elementshad already taken D plus 60 objectives.General Davidson's construction regi-ments picked up what they could toimprovise structures to span Germandemolitions in the rail supply line.

L-5 Cub planes gave the engineersa head start on surveying the damage.Engineer officers with Speed Graphiccameras flew low-level passes overblown bridges, some behind enemylines, shooting oblique-angle photo-graphs to give construction troops ameans of computing their material re-quirements.24

The 343d Engineer General ServiceRegiment restored service to Aix in tendays by a strategem that saved days inrepairing a 104-foot gap in the railbridge. In the area the unit found aGerman 270-mm. railway gun. Haul-ing it to the site, the engineers strippedthe gun and the rail trucks from thetraverse base of the piece and, attach-ing a ten-foot steel extension, launchedthe platform as the stringers for thenew span across the void, Bailey fash-ion. The Aix bridge work was completeon 29 August. At the same time engi-neers were restoring the bridge at

24 A Report on 7th Army Railroad Bridges during theContinental Operations 15 August 1944 to 9 June 1945,pp. 5-8.


Meyrargues, a task made doubly trou-blesome by a rise in flood waters. Afterclosing a 107-foot gap with the first Bai-ley railroad bridge in southern France,a quadruple-single span with a deckthirty-eight feet above the water's sur-face, they opened the bridge to trafficon 18 September.

The 40th Engineer Combat Regi-ment forged the last link in the railchain on the eastern route. A Class 60span covering two breaks over theBuech River north of Sisteron, thebridge used stocks of local lumber andsteel sections. The engineers replaceda destroyed 91-foot-high centralmasonry pier with a vertically emplacedtriple-single Bailey panel. Supply traf-fic, moving 1,500 tons per day over thispoint after 22 September, could travelto railheads in the Poligny-Mouchardarea, 130 miles north of Grenoble,relieving some transport problems asthe 6th Army Group crossed the MoselleRiver.25

When the director general of theMilitary Railway Service, Brig. Gen.Carl R. Gray, Jr., brought his headquar-ters from Rome to Lyon on 14 Septem-ber, he immediately began a more com-plete reconnaissance of rail damage. Hethen revised original priorities, concen-trating on the double-track system upthe Rhone valley to Lyon. General Graytold General Devers four days later thatthe main breaks in this stretch were atLivron, Avignon, and Valence; twosmaller rail bridges outside Lyon, oneover the Rhone and one over the SaoneRiver, would have to be reconvertedfrom use as vehicular bridges. Save for

material shortages, the breaks atValence and Avignon posed no prob-lems.26

The 343d Engineer General ServiceRegiment, assigned the job of openingthe Marseille-to-Lyon route, beganwork on the Livron bridge on 7 Sep-tember. Where before the war amasonry-arch bridge had carried a sin-gle track across the shallow, muddyDrome, there was now a 310-foot breakwith all the masonry piles blown. Thelow height of the original structure andthe river's slow current lessened engi-neering problems; the troops emplacedscarce steel I-beam stringers atop ninetimber bents to open the line to rail-borne supply on 20 September, fivedays ahead of General Gray's estimates.This performance, together with the343d's operation in the southern Rhonevalley, earned the regiment Lt. Gen.Alexander M. Patch's commendation.

On 2 October, the 344th EngineerGeneral Service Regiment repaired a410-foot single-track structure over theDoubs River at Dole, using thirty-foot-high timber bents, with standard Bai-ley forming the span. Opening the Doleroute brought the railheads north toVesoul and Besancon.27

At that point in the restoration, withrailheads moving into the rear of the6th Army Group area, German demoli-tions at the bridges had become thesmaller supply problem. By mid-September General Devers found thatwhere railroads were concerned, the"bottleneck now is cars rather thanbridges."28

25 Ibid., pp. 16-17; 40th Engr C Rgt, Opns Rptfor Eastern France, sec. V, Reconstruction of Rail-road Bridge, Sisteron, France, 6th Army Gp, G-3,Final Report, WWII, 1 Jul 45, p. 14.

26 Memo, DG, MRS, for CG, 6th Army Gp, 18 Sep44, sub: Resume of MRS Activities and Conditions ofRailroads in Southern France.

27 A Report on 7th Army Railroad Bridges, pp. 18-21;Hists, 343d Engr GS Rgt and 344th Engr GS Rgt.

28 Lt Gen Jacob L. Devers, Diary entry 14 Sep 44.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 453

THE AIX BRIDGE, WHICH USED THE CARRIAGE OF A GERMAN RAILWAY GUN

When the Allied drive slowed againststiffening German resistance at theVosges Mountains and the defensesbefore the Rhine River, supply linesstopped growing. But the demand forammunition rose alarmingly, and short-ages persisted until the winter months.Trucks remained the principal meansof transport until well into October,when new railroad rolling stock arrivedat Marseille; in September trucks car-ried forward 222,000 tons of supplycompared to 63,000 tons moving byrail. Engineer units had built eighty-eight highway bridges on the supplyroutes, mostly from local timber andsteel stock.

After 30 October Seventh Army engi-neers divided responsibility for rail

rehabilitation with the increasingly capa-ble 1st Military Railway Service, whoseunits and equipment were now arriv-ing more regularly. Army engineersreopened a northern loop in the railservice running from Epinal to Stras-bourg through Blainville, Luneville,and Sarrebourg, while the 1st MilitaryRailway Service worked on a southernleg running from Epinal through St.Die to Strasbourg. The Military Rail-way Service refurbished the military railline behind the First French Army onan axis running from Vesoul throughLure and Belfort to Mulhouse. In sup-porting the drive up the Rhone, the 1stMilitary Railway Service supervised theconstruction of forty-two rail bridgesand the repair of nine between Mar-


seille and Dijon by early 1945. At vari-ous times, the work continued to in-volve the 40th, 94th, 343d, 344th, and540th Engineer Regiments and the1051st Engineer Port Construction andRepair Group.

With the winter lull in the advance,the engineers began to take up scarceBailey panels laid down in the press ofthe rapid assault, replacing them withsemipermanent timber bent, steel, andwood deck bridging along vital roadsand rail lines. During the last half ofOctober the engineers consolidated thehoarded reserves for the thrust throughthe Siegfried Line, over the Rhine Riverand into Germany itself.29

Map Supply

The rapidity of the advance carriedthe assaulting American and Frenchdivisions into areas for which militarymaps were still in Italy. The two engi-neer units sent in with the invasion, the1st Mobile Map Depot with VI Corpsand the 2d Mobile Map Depot with theFrench, were merely clearinghouses fordistribution. Their early stocks of1:100,000, 1:50,000, and 1:25,000 mapsreflected an invasion plan that did notproject an Allied advance out ofProvence until much later in the year.Small-scale maps for areas far up theRhone valley were especially scarce;French units were even relying on thestandard Michelin road maps and oninformation from local natives. By 1

September the demand for maps hadinundated the two units, and the 1709thEngineer Map Depot Detachment flewin from Naples to help. In little morethan a month these three units shippedover eight million maps to combattroops.

Map production in southern Francebegan on 14 September with the arrivalof the 661st Engineer TopographicCompany and the 649th Engineer Topo-graphic Battalion and reached a peakcapacity within about two weeks. Thedemand for l:25,000-scale maps alsorose rapidly as the Allied offensiveencountered the prepared German de-fenses at the Vosges Mountains andslowed down in late October and earlyNovember.30

Engineer Supply for the First French Army

The establishment of 6th Army Groupheadquarters at Lyon on 15 Septembermarked also the redesignation of theFrench Armee B as First French Army.Although now a formally organizedfield army operating on home soil, Lt.Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's com-mand continued to labor under a nota-ble lack of service forces, includingengineers. French supply of all typesfunneled in part through Base 901,hastily transferred from Naples twoweeks before the invasion to supportArmee B. The organization had neverfunctioned in its intended capacity inItaly, and it fared only slightly better inFrance. Attached to Coastal Base Sec-tion for the assault period, the com-mand, under Brig. Gen. Jean Gross,was so lacking in basic equipment, trucks,

29 Robert R. Smith, "Riviera to the Rhine," draft MSin the United States Army in World War II series,ch. XVI, passim; Msg, CG, 6th Army Gp, to CG,Seventh Army, CG, FFA, and DGMRS, 30 Oct 44,sub: Railway Plan, 6th Army Gp Transport Sect, DailyRail Sitreps file, 15 Sep-30 Nov 44; Seventh ArmyReport, vol. II, p. 396. 30 Seventh Army, Engr Hist Rpt, p. 16.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 455

and trained staff personnel that it couldnot meet the demands made upon it.Divided in half in mid-October, Base901 acquired a new commanding offi-cer in Brig. Gen. Georges Granier as itsheadquarters moved to Dijon to workside by side with the Continental Ad-vance Section in the city.

The establishment of the First FrenchArmy also occasioned the division ofSeventh Army engineer stocks, nearlyhalf of which were to go to the French.Brig. Gen. Henry C. Wolfe, 6th ArmyGroup engineer, met with GeneralDavidson on 20 September to appor-tion the materials, and Brig. Gen. Rob-ert Dromard, First French Army engi-neer, received his allotment the follow-ing day. American sources supplied theFrench with sparing amounts of criti-cal bridging parts and stream-crossingequipment and rationed what was foundon the battlefields thereafter. TheFrench also received maps from Ameri-can topographic units until 1 November,when they organized their own print-ing operations.31

POL Operations

The Seventh Army engineer POLplan for DRAGOON, formulated in earlysummer 1944 at Naples under Lt. Col.Charles L. Lockett, drew on the success-ful experience with pipelines gained inthe North African and Italian cam-paigns. The engineers envisioned apipeline system up the Rhone Rivervalley, making use of the already exist-

ing refinery installations in Toulon,Marseille, and smaller ports at the rivermouth.32 Depending on the damagedone by the retreating Germans, theengineers could easily support the troopsbattling in the beachhead area with agallon of gasoline per man per day, theconsumption rate established in earliercampaigns. But the rapid success of theinvasion altered the sequence and tim-ing of fuel depot construction and accel-erated the schedule for laying of thepipeline north. Demands for gasolineskyrocketed; every truck moving for-ward off the beaches took with it asmany jerry cans as it could hold, butadvance units were still sending con-voys on 300-mile round trips back tothe beach dumps for resupply as theSeventh Army pursued the fleeing Ger-man Nineteenth Army to the north. (Map26)

The 697th Engineer Petroleum Dis-tribution Company was the first of itskind ashore, landing at Camel Greenon D-day. Capt. Carl W. Bills, com-manding the unit, was among the fore-most POL experts in the theater, a manof wide prewar experience in the Okla-homa oil fields; despite his relativelylow rank, he became the technical super-visor of the whole fuel pipeline systemup the Rhone valley. The companyentered St. Raphael as soon as the townwas cleared, surveying for a pipeline inthat area. Various detachments col-lected enough petroleum pumpingequipment to begin construction andoperations, but spent several days re-trieving materiel coming to the inva-sion beaches in scattered lots on small

31 Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, UnitedStates Army in World War II (Washington, 1957), pp.186-90; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,Volume II, p. 379. 32 CONAD History, vol. I, p. 234.


MAP 26

landing craft. The company took fourdays to construct three 10,000-barreltanks in the town. By the end of themonth, St. Raphael was receiving bulktanker discharge through one four-inchand one six-inch line connecting thefacilities to the docks. Another four-inch aviation gas line covered the sixmiles from the larger tanks to a 1,000-barrel storage container at the airfieldat Frejus. After the field was aban-doned, the airfield tank served as amotor fuel storage point.33

Bypassing the embattled petroleumfacilities at Marseille and Toulon forthe moment, Captain Bills left a 79-mandetachment in St. Raphael to run affairsand took the 697th to the next logicalpoint for pipeline operations, the portarea around Port-de-Bouc, 120 milesby road from St. Raphael. Arriving 25August in Martigues, held only by FFItroops, the company rested for a daywhile the French overcame the last Ger-man sniper resistance. Rapid surveyswith General Davidson at the scenerevealed that, apart from a few bulletholes punched into the tanks by theU.S. XII Tactical Air Force, the pre-war storage capacity of 250,000 barrelsin the area was undiminished.

On 26 August the 697th began theconstruction of a nineteen-mile, four-inch-diameter victaulic pipe for 80-oc-tane fuel to connect the refineries ofL'Avera at Port-de-Bouc; La Provenceat La Mede, three miles east of Martigueson the southern edge of the lake; andthe large Bruni oil refining complexon the north shore of the Etang deBerre. A second four-inch line for 100-octane gasoline paralleled the first be-

33 Ibid., p. 233n; Hist 697th Engr Pet Dist Co, Sep44, p. 2-5.

SOUTHERN FRANCE 457

tween Port-de-Bouc and La Mede,where the company built a 1,000-barrel storage tank.

In their four-year occupation theGermans had depleted the supply ofcoupling joints to match the French fit-tings within the refineries; the engi-neers were able to maintain an adequatesupply only after the establishment ofthe engineer dump at Le Pas-des-Lanciers. The occupiers did leave be-hind a valuable source of expertise inthe French former employees of the oilplants and the Vichy government fuel-rationing authorities. After the elimina-tion of collaborators among them, theseFrenchmen provided a ready and exper-ienced supplement for Allied man-power and facilitated military and es-sential civilian fuel distribution.34

With the discharge areas intact andthe first interterminal line wholly oper-ational by 12 September, the companyhad already begun the pipeline cover-ing the thirty-five miles between Berreand the Durance River. The line reachedSalon, eight miles north of Berre andthe site of a large convoy refueling andjerry can refill point, in the first weekof construction and by 25 Septemberwas at the south bank of the Durance,five miles southeast of Avignon. Here,pushing the pipe across on a 1,480-foottimber trestle, the 697th passed the lineto the 784th Engineer Petroleum Distri-bution Company, which linked it totheir completed section. It covered thenext thirty-two miles north to the Frenchrailroad tank car installation at LePontet, the second large decanting sta-tion for refueling of truck convoys.Accompanying the engineer pipelinealong its whole length was a Signal

Corps telephone net that permittedprompt reporting of pipeline leaks.

By early September, the press ofoperations forced the establishment ofa provisional battalion-level supervisoryheadquarters to coordinate and controlthe pipelaying and operating activitiesof eight distribution companies, severalattached companies from engineer com-bat regiments, and one dump truckcompany. First commanded by Maj.Charles B. Gholson, the unit finally wasdesignated 408th Engineer Service Bat-talion (Pipeline) on 6 January 1945. Itallowed the rapid transfer of supervi-sory talent among the operating battal-ion headquarters, the distribution com-panies, the Delta Base Section, andContinental Advance Section (CONAD)or SOLOC commands as the construc-tion effort demanded. The headquar-ters also relieved the individual compa-nies of the need to obtain their ownsupply of pipes, couplings, and pumpgear from the harbors in southernFrance. The battalion tied its wholesalesupply to the French rail net, placingstocks of pipe in rail sidings close to theline of construction at roughly twenty-mile intervals.35

After connecting the pipe on thenorth bank of the Durance, the 784thtook responsibility for testing and oper-ating the whole line from Berre to LePontet. Meanwhile, the 697th leap-frogged ahead to install the next sec-tion of pipe into the rehabilitated Frenchstorage tanks at Lyon, with dispensingpoints at St. Marcel, Vienne, and Lyonitself. By 9 November the pipe was mov-ing nearly 13,000 barrels of fuel daily,

34 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 241.

35 History of the 408th Engineer Service Battalionin the Southern Military Pipeline System (Aug 44—Aug45), typescript [1947], p. 3; Adm Hist, 408th EngrServBn, 10 Feb 45, p. 1.


a rate maintained until the end of thewar on the Rhone River valley pipeline.36

Meanwhile, other petroleum engi-neer units arrived at Marseille and Port-de-Bouc to continue refurbishing andoperating the bulk ports there. The1379th Engineer Petroleum Distribu-tion Company entered Marseille on 29August after landing six days earlier atSt. Raphael. The fierce battle for Mar-seille had done little damage to thepetroleum facilities, and the companyhad pipelines running from the quaysto the largest refinery at the Rue deLyon within a week. One group leftbehind on Corsica to train French petro-leum units rejoined the company on 17September, With detachments in Port-de-Bouc, Marseille, La Mede, and Berre,the 1379th took over the whole tankerdischarge operation in southern Franceand began the construction of a six-inch line around the Etang de Berre asthe beginning of a new system to paral-lel the earlier four-inch pipe. The 696thEngineer Petroleum Distribution Com-pany arrived at Berre on the twenty-first to carry the six-inch pipe to justabove Avignon.37 The 701st EngineerPetroleum Distribution Company,another highly experienced unit fromthe Italian campaign, arrived at Mar-seille on 9 October and moved the workahead from Avignon to Piolenc; there,the 696th took over again to a pointabove Valence.

In late October the Rhone overflowedits banks after heavy rains. The twocompanies constructing the line up theriverbank south of Lyon had to floatpipe into position by plugging one endof it and moving it into the heavy flood

waters. A detachment of the 701st down-stream repaired the severed four-inchline at Livron. In November, progresson both lines came to a temporary haltwhen an early Freeze blocked the pipesand burst couplings on a stretch be-tween Lyon and Macon—water used totest the pipe before pumping fuelthrough it had been left in the pipeduring a sudden temperature drop.The 697th and the 701st backtracked,hastily thawed the line, and replacedbroken sections, allowing operation toresume by 23 November.

The combined work of the 696th andthe 697th Engineer Petroleum Distri-bution Companies and Companies Eand F of the 335th Engineer GeneralService Regiment brought the opera-tional four-inch pipe to the rear of theSeventh Army area at La Forge, nearSarrebourg, on 12 February 1945,although construction was slowed byheavy snow. The six-inch pipe laggedbehind north of Vesoul, plagued by aninadequate supply of parts and faultyconstruction that had to be rechecked.The six-inch pipe became operationalto the La Forge terminal on 3 April,while the 697th was overseeing thelast leg of four-inch pipe constructionin three parallel lines from La Forgethrough Sarreguemines and Franken-thal, Germany, and across the Rhinenear Mannheim into the terminal atSandhofen, a Mannheim suburb. An-other seven miles of six-inch pipe,erected by the 1385th Engineer Petro-leum Distribution Company under thesupervision of the 697th experts andthe 408th Engineer Service Battalion,connected the Frankenthal and Mann-heim terminals.38

36 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, app. 16.

37 Unit Hist, 1379th Engr Pet Dist Co, Dec 43-Nov45, pp. 3-4.

38 Adm Hist, 697th Engr Pet Dist Co, Jan-May 45.Other constructing units on the lines betweenSarreguemines and Sandhofen were the 1385th

SOUTHERN FRANCE 459

On 26 February 1945, in the generalconsolidation of supply operationsunder ETOUSA, Lt. Gen. John C. H.Lee, commanding the CommunicationsZone (COMZ), ETOUSA, took underhis ultimate authority the petroleumdistribution net in southern Francealong with the pipelines constructedacross the northern tier of the Continent.Operations records were turned overto the ETOUSA Military Pipeline Ser-vice after 26 February, and the 408thEngineer Service Battalion and its at-tached units came under the opera-tional control of the ETOUSA staff,though still attached to CONAD forsupply and administration. The con-struction companies remained relativelyautonomous through all of the central-izing and remained in place to continuethe operation of the 875 miles of four-inch and 532 miles of six-inch pipelinethey had emplaced behind the 6th ArmyGroup in the advance from southernFrance.39

Preparing To Cross the Rhine

As the Germans fell back speedilyupon their defenses before the Rhinein September and October 1944, 6thArmy Group planners began to enter-tain the idea of crossing the river beforethe year was out. This possibility ledthe engineers to establish Rhine Rivercrossing schools in late September. Sev-enth Army engineers, who would carrythe brunt of the assault burden, treated

the crossing as an amphibious opera-tion complicated by the rapid currentof the river—eight to ten miles per hourin the winter months. Once again Gen-eral Davidson turned to his experiencedengineer regiments, the 40th, the 540th,and the 36th, to form the central ele-ments of combat groups capable oftransporting assault troops and of or-ganizing beachheads on the far bank asthey had on the Riviera beaches.

On 26 September one battalion fromeach of the engineer regiments and twoFrench engineer battalions began train-ing in two crossing schools. The basiccourse was held near Dole on the DoubsRiver, usually slow and narrow in theautumn. Under the supervision of the1553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Bat-talion, the combat engineers practicedwith swift fourteen-foot storm boatsand larger assault craft, both types pow-ered with outboard motors. After fourdays of practice, the engineer traineesmoved to the advanced-course site atCamp de Valbonne near Lyon on theRhone River to gain experience withthe same equipment in faster rivercurrents.40

At Camp de Valbonne, under thedirection of the 85th Engineer HeavyPonton Battalion, the engineers alsopracticed bridge building over the rapidstream and experimented with heaviercable anchors for ponton treadwaybridging and antimine nets to ward offexplosives set adrift by the enemy toeliminate crossing structures. Newmeans of launching and affixing cross-river cables were tested in efforts to pro-vide guy wires for laden DUKWs nego-tiating the current with barely enough

Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company, the 2814th,Companies E and F of the 335th Engineer GeneralService Regiment, and a platoon of the 701st. Histof the 408th Engr Serv Bn in the Southern MPS,P2.

39 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oil, andLubricants, app. 11, p. 3; Hist of the 408th Engr ServBn in the Southern MPS, p. 5.

40 A Negro unit, the 1553d Engineer Heavy PontonBattalion arrived in France 13 September 1944.


power to make headway against theriver's flow.

As winter drew on and chances forcrossing the last major water obstaclebefore the German heartland dwindled,the engineers concentrated on main-taining their equipment for the post-poned operation. The equipmentamassed for each crossing groupcounted 96 storm boats, 188 assaultcraft, 6 rafts, over 400 outboard motors,1 heavy ponton bridge, and 150 DUKWsassigned to transport artillery pieces.All of this material was now mountedon wheels to take immediate advantageof any sudden breakthrough to theRhine's edge. By early December, Gen-eral Davidson decided to store the entire

collection for the winter, and Armyengineers moved their equipment tocovered areas, factories, and the for-ests around Luneville.41

As the year ended, the engineersturned to face a different ordeal. In afinal desperate attempt to stem theAllied advance to the Rhine, Germanforces along the western front launcheda massive counteroffensive out of theArdennes Forest. In the middle of De-cember, the surprise blow put the entireAllied command in the west on thedefensive for over a month and stretchedengineer elements to their utmost.

41 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering,pp. 235-39; Seventh Army, Engr Hist Rpt, p. 8.

CHAPTER XXI

The Ardennes: Engineersas Infantry

A cold rain was turning to snow onthe afternoon of 8 December 1944,when the lead trucks of the 81st Engi-neer Combat Battalion pulled into theSchnee Eifel, a wooded ridge just insidethe German border east of the Ardennesand southeast of Liege. The 81st Battal-ion had landed in France only a fewdays before with VIII Corps' 106thInfantry Division. The division, thenewest on the Western Front and theyoungest (the first containing a largenumber of eighteen-year-old draftees),had moved forward immediately afterlanding to take over a sector from the2d Division, which was redeployingnorthward to reinforce a First Armyattack on the Roer River dam.1

The Schnee Eifel landscape lookedlike a Christmas card, with snow-tippedfir trees dark against white hills. In thefolds of the hills lay small villages set inhollows for protection against blizzards.Here the engineers found billets. The81st Engineer Combat Battalion settledin at Heuem, on the road leading easttoward the German border from St.-

Vith, Belgium, an important road cen-ter and site of division headquarters.The battalion's Company B, support-ing the 423d Infantry, bivouacked about11/2 miles east at Schoenberg. Cross-ing the border into Germany, CompanyA found billets at Auw, only three milesas the crow flies behind the most for-ward position on the VIII Corps front,a six-mile stretch of the Schnee Eifelcontaining Siegfried Line pillboxes.

The first 20 miles of the 85-mile-longArdennes front, beginning at Monschau,were held by V Corps' 99th InfantryDivision. Also new to the theater, thedivision had arrived on the Continentduring November 1944. The southerntwo miles of its portion of the front layalong a narrow, seven-mile-long valleyknown as the Losheim Gap. There theV Corps sector ended and that of theVIII Corps began. The next five milesof the Losheim Gap were held by the14th Cavalry Group, a light reconnais-sance unit that the 106th Division hadinherited when the 2d Division movednorth.

The 106th Division sector ended aboutfive miles below the Schnee Eifel salient,at the village of Luetzkampen, andthere the 28th Infantry Division areabegan. Near this point, where the nar-

1 Hist 81st Engr C Bn, Dec 44; Hugh M. Cole, TheArdennes: The Battle of the Bulge, United States Army inWorld War II (Washington, 1968), p. 139 and map 1.Unless otherwise noted tactical information in thischapter derives from Cole.


row, swift Our River began to definethe border between Belgium and Ger-many, the American positions swungsouthwest to the Belgian side of theriver along a high bluff carrying a road(Route 16) known as the "Skyline Drive,"which continued south through Luxem-bourg. Responsible for about twenty-three miles of the front in Belgium andLuxembourg, the veteran 28th Divisionwas resting and training replacementsfor the more than 6,000 casualties ithad suffered during the battle of theHuertgen Forest, more casualties thanany other division in that action.2

Beginning on 10 December, elementsof the 9th Armored Division, anothernewcomer to ETOUSA, took over thenext six miles south along the front.The bulk of the armored division, how-ever, was in reserve fifty miles north.Near the point where the Schwarz ErntzRiver flowed into the Sauer River the4th Infantry Division portion of thefront began. This division had also beenbadly battered in the Huertgen Forest,having suffered more than 4,000 casual-ties, second in losses only to the 28th.3

The 4th Division held the VIII Corpsfront along the Sauer and the Moselleto the border between Luxembourgand France, where the First Army sec-tor ended and that of Third Armybegan.

The long front, manned by troopsweary from combat or not yet tested inbattle, was very lightly held in someplaces. Along two miles of the LosheimGap, through which German armieshad poured westward in 1870, 1914,and 1940, the Americans patrolled solightly that Germans on leave often

walked across to visit friends and rela-tives behind the American lines. Fortwo months the front had been quietexcept for sporadic mortar and artil-lery fire. Across the narrow rivers orfrom Siegfried Line positions Ameri-can and German outposts watched eachother.4

The Storm Breaks in the Schnee Eifel

It was snowing on the evening of 11December when the 81st Engineer Com-bat Battalion relieved the 2d EngineerCombat Battalion in the Schnee Eifel.The 81st Battalion's foremost task wasroad maintenance—removing snow andfilling shell holes. Behind the front roadmaintenance was the responsibility ofthe 168th Engineer Combat Battalion,attached to VIII Corps. Operating quar-ries to provide crushed rock was partof the road repair job, but engineersalso manned sawmills to provide lum-ber for a First Army winterization pro-gram, which called for wooden huts andshelters.5

The crossroads village of Auw markedthe line dividing the 14th Cavalry Groupsector from that of the 422d Infantry,106th Division. There Company A ofthe 81st Engineer Combat Battalionhad comfortable billets, with headquar-ters men in one house and the threeplatoons in three others. Before dawnon 16 December heavy artillery fireawakened the men. They found to theirsurprise that the villagers were up,

2 MacDonald, Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 374, 493.3 Ibid., pp. 374, 474.

4 John Toland, Battle: The Story of the Bulge (NewYork: Random House, 1959), p. 4; Col. R. ErnestDupuy, St. Vith: Lion in the Way (Washington: InfantryJournal Press, 1949), pp. 17-18.

5 Hist 81st Engr C Bn, Dec 44; First Army Report ofOperations, 1 August 1944-22 February 1945, ans. 4-8,p. 128.

THE ARDENNES: ENGINEERS AS INFANTRY 463

dressed, and huddled in their cellars.Then they remembered that the eve-ning before a young woman had beenobserved going from house to house,evidently carrying a warning. But therewas no reason to suppose that this wasmore than a local attack, and when theartillery fire died away the companycommander, Capt. Harold M. Harmon,sent out his platoons on road work asusual at 0800. The 1st Platoon underLt. William J. Coughlin went to the422d Infantry headquarters at Schlau-senbach, about a mile away, the 3d Pla-toon under Lt. David M. Woerner tothe 422d's 3d Battalion in the pillboxarea, and the 2d Platoon under Lt. Wil-liam E. Purteil to work in and nearAuw. Captain Harmon then left forHeuem for the usual morning confer-ence of company commanders.6

The engineers at Auw—the onlytroops in the town—heard rifle andmachine-gun fire about 0930. It seemedclose, but because the day was cloudywith drizzle and patches of heavy fog,nobody could find out what was hap-pening. As soon as the engineers recog-nized the white-clad enemy, the 2d Pla-toon and the headquarters men tookup positions in two buildings and beganfiring. At that point, the 1st Platoon,having heard the sound of battle fromthe direction of Auw, returned underheavy fire, dashed into the house whereit was billeted, and began returningenemy fire coming from a barn acrossthe road, using tracer ammunition toset the barn afire. Ten German infantry-

men ran out and were cut down byCompany A cooks.

About 1000 Captain Harmon re-turned from Heuem, where he hadlearned that Lt. Col. Thomas J. Riggs,Jr., the battalion commander, had ordersto employ the 81st Engineer CombatBattalion as infantry. The plan finallyadopted was to commit the engineerswith their respective regimental com-bat teams. Unable to find his men inAuw, Harmon started for the 422dInfantry area to locate his 1st Platoon.On the way he learned that the enemyhad broken through the cavalry groupdefenses in the Losheim Gap and wasattacking in great force. Returning toAuw, he was fired on by an enemy col-umn but made a dash for it; althoughhis jeep was riddled he managed toreach his 2d Platoon, which Germantanks were about to encircle. He gotthe men on trucks and on the road backto Heuem.

Four German Tiger tanks came up themain street of Auw. Infantry was ridingon the tanks, and most of the turretswere open; the tankers evidently ex-pected little opposition. The engineersin their strongpoints opened up withrifles and machine guns, claiming "con-siderable" casualties before the Ger-mans realized what was happening. TheGerman infantry dropped to theground, the tank turrets clattered shut,and the tanks opened fire with 88-mm.guns on the two houses that the engi-neers occupied. The headquarters menmanaged to escape, but then the fulltank attack fell on Lieutenant Coughlinand his 1st Platoon. Eight rounds ofpoint-blank 88-mm. fire burst in thebuilding but miraculously caused nocasualties, though small-arms firewounded several men. Desperate,

6 This account of the 81st Engineer Combat Battal-ion is taken from their unit citation, 25 May 1945, andthe narrative, Baptism of Fire, both in Hist 81st EngrC Bn, 15 Mar 43-31 May 45; and Dupuy, St. Vith:Lion in the Way, pp. 32-34.


Coughlin decided to risk a dash acrossan open field behind the house. At 1500he gave the order to withdraw. T/5Edward S. Withee insisted on remain-ing behind to cover the withdrawal withhis submachine gun. Captured after hisheroic stand, Withee later was awardedthe Distinguished Service Cross.

That afternoon in a sudden snow-storm Captain Harmon became involvedin a 422d Infantry attempt to retakeAuw. He moved thirty engineers to apoint about a mile west of the town,but by that time American artillery wasfalling on Auw. Before the 422d couldhalt the American fire German artil-lery fire became so heavy that Harmon'sparty, having suffered ten casualties,had to withdraw to Heuem.

By the evening of 16 December ithad become plain that the Germanattack, which the 106th Division had atfirst considered only an attempt toretake Siegfried Line pillboxes, was infact an offensive on a grand scale allalong the Ardennes front from Mon-schau to the Luxembourg border. Inthe Schnee Eifel the Germans commit-ted the entire LXVI Corps of General derPanzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel'sFifth Panzer Army. One of its divisionswas to encircle and cut off the 422dand 423d Infantry regiments in the pill-box area and take St.-Vith. The otherwas to attack the 424th Infantry southof the pillbox positions, blocking thewestern and southern exits from St.-Vith.

The German pincer movementaround the pillbox positions, success-fully begun on the north with the cap-ture of Auw, continued during the earlymorning hours of 17 December withthe taking of Bleialf in the 423d Infan-try's area to the south. The two Ger-

man divisions rejoined at Schoenberglater that morning. At Heuem, only 11/2 miles to the west, the engineers onorders from the 106th Division with-drew at 0930 to a point about five mileswest of St.-Vith. There they were fedand issued cigarettes, socks, galoshes,and ammunition. But they were to havelittle rest. At noon Colonel Riggs re-ceived orders to round up all the avail-able men of the 81st and 168th Engi-neer Combat Battalions to halt a Ger-man attack on St.-Vith.

On a wooded ridge about a mile eastof the town, astride the road fromSchoenberg, Colonel Riggs assembledhis little force, which had only a fewbazookas and machine guns. In his 81stEngineer Combat Battalion, CompanyA, after losses on 16 December, had onlysixty-five men; Headquarters and Ser-vice Company had only fifty, some ofthem clerks and cooks. The 168th Engi-neer Combat Battalion had the rem-nants of two companies and the bulk ofa third. The men, with few tools, hadhardly finished digging their foxholeswhen at 1600 three German self-pro-pelled 88-mm. assault guns, supportedby infantry, came down the road fromSchoenberg. The Germans knocked outa divisional antitank gun in their path,forced a tank destroyer to withdraw,then turned their 88-mm. guns on engi-neers of the 168th Battalion in the mostforward position, inflicting heavy casu-alties. Meantime, a forward divisionalobserver directed a P—47 fighter-bomber to the spot. After a number ofpasses the plane set one of the Germangun carriages afire.

The defenders succeeded in delay-ing the enemy until dusk, when tanksof the U.S. 7th Armored Division begancoming through the snow and mist


ENGINEERS DROP BARBED-WIRE ROLLS To PREPARE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

down the road from St.-Vith. By thattime one of the German assault gunshad broken through the 168th Battal-ion defenses and reached the 81st Engi-neer Combat Battalion's position. Jump-ing out of their foxholes, the engineersstopped the gun by pulling a chain ofmines across the road. One of the 7thArmored Division tanks finally knockedthe gun out.

Next morning, Company A, 81st En-gineer Combat Battalion, and the tank-ers continued to hold against strong Ger-man attacks. In the afternoon a groupunder Colonel Riggs counterattacked,driving some German infantrymen outof hillside positions. The defenderscould then consolidate their lines, butshortly after dark a message came from

division headquarters that signaled thebeginning of the end. Threatened byGerman tanks that were outflanking thedefenders on the Schoenberg road tothe east, the 106th Division headquar-ters was withdrawing from St.-Vith tenmiles west to Vielsalm.

The next two days, 19 and 20 De-cember, were fairly quiet on the Schoen-berg road, with German activity lim-ited to patrol actions and intermittentshelling. During the night of the nine-teenth the engineers laid hasty mine-fields along possible avenues of tankapproach and covered foxholes withlogs for protection from tree bursts.Patrols went into St.-Vith to salvage any-thing useful—food, blankets, clothing.From their foxholes on the Schoenberg


road that night the engineers could seeflashes in the distant sky—to the northwhere V Corps was trying to hold theSixth Panzer Army; to the east beyondSchoenberg where the 422d and 423dInfantry regiments, hopelessly cut off,were making their last stand; to thesouth where the 424th Infantry, bol-stered by a combat command of the9th Armored Division, was successfullycovering its withdrawal to Vielsalm. Farto the southwest flashes showed wherethe battle for Bastogne was raging.

By the morning of 20 December Ger-man successes in the Bastogne area hadisolated the St.-Vith forces from the restof VIII Corps. During the afternoonthe 7th Armored Division commanderreceived word that the 82d AirborneDivision was on its way to help, but itwas already too late. The Germans wereimpressed by the intensity of Americanartillery fire east of St.-Vith and by thenumber of American tanks—"tankswere everywhere," reported the 18thVolksgrenadier Division on 20 December—and they assumed that the force block-ing the Schoenberg road was strongerthan it actually was. Nevertheless, theGermans were determined to breakthrough the defenses as soon as theycould extract their own artillery andtanks from a traffic jam that had builtup around Schoenberg.

This the Germans accomplished bymidafternoon on 21 December. Com-mencing at 1500 and continuing untilwell after dark, the enemy directed onthe tankers and engineers a concen-trated barrage of artillery, rocket, andmortar fire, inflicting heavy casualties.Company A, 81st Engineer CombatBattalion, for example, lost forty of itssixty-five men.

The engineers had not mined the

road because of a promised 7th Ar-mored Division counterattack. Withoutwarning—the German barrage hadknocked out all communications—shortly before midnight four Mark VI(Tiger) and two Mark IV tanks, withsupporting infantry, came over a risein the road, close to where some Sher-man tanks were positioned at the Ameri-can foxhole line. Firing a volley of illu-minating flares that silhouetted theShermans and blinded their crews, theGerman tanks picked off three of theShermans and overran the foxholes.Colonel Riggs attempted to organize adefense at a ridge farther back, but itwas hopeless. The Americans broke upinto small parties. Wandering about inthe heavy snow and darkness, most ofthe men, including Colonel Riggs, werecaptured. Only eight officers and en-listed men from Company A, 81st Engi-neer Combat Battalion, and thirty-threeofficers and men from the Headquar-ters and Service Company were able toreach Vielsalm.

Company C, with the 424th Infantrysouth of St.-Vith, protected the ap-proaches to the town by guarding andblowing bridges; when 9th ArmoredDivision tanks arrived on 20 Decemberthe company acted as infantry in sup-port of the tanks. The bulk of Com-pany B of the engineer battalion waslost when the enemy captured most ofthe 422d and 423d Infantry regiments.

For its first engagement the 81stEngineer Combat Battalion won theDistinguished Unit Citation. At St.-Vithfrom 16 to 23 December 1944, the bat-talion "distinguished itself in battle withsuch extraordinary heroism, gallantry,determination, and esprit de corps inovercoming unusually difficult and haz-ardous conditions in the face of a nu-


merically superior enemy, as to set thisbattalion apart and above units partici-pating in the same engagements."7

Blocking Sixth Panzer Army'sDrive to the Meuse

On the night of 16 December a heavyconcentration of enemy artillery firepounded and shook the eastern andsouthern flanks of V Corps' 99th Divi-sion. (Map 27) Under cover of thisbarrage, tanks of the German Sixth Pan-zer Army were advancing west towardthe Meuse, creating the major threat inthe northern sector of the Ardennes.At the extreme north, infantry of LXVIICorps attacked the Siegfried Line townsof Monschau and Hoefen on the morn-ing of 16 December. These attacksfailed, but in the Losheim Gap region(the central and southern portions ofthe northern sector) the Germans threwin considerable armor, and the tank col-umns broke through.8

Around midnight on 16 December amessage came to V Corps' 254th Engi-neer Combat Battalion, which was re-pairing roads in support of the 2d and99th Divisions. The unit was bivou-acked in the woods near Buellingen atthe southern end of the corridor alongwhich the 2d Division was attackingthrough the 99th toward the Roer River.The engineers were on a two-hour alertto act as infantry. But in the darknessthe roads around the bivouac becameso jammed with American tanks andother traffic that the battalion's com-manding officer was not able to reach

99th Division headquarters and returnwith orders until 0230. Engineer Com-panies A, B, and C were to form adefensive line south and east of Buellin-gen to protect American tanks and tankdestroyers withdrawing under pressurefrom German forces coming up theroad from Honsfeld, three miles to thesoutheast.

At 0600 the engineers of CompanyB, stationed on the road to Honsfeld,saw white and red flares about eighthundred yards away and heard trackedvehicles approaching. When they heardshouts in German, the engineers openedfire with rifles, rifle grenades, andmachine guns. The German infantryriding on the lead tank and in six half-tracks jumped down and attacked, butthey were driven back. The vehicleswithdrew. Twenty minutes later theGerman infantry reappeared, followedby tanks. The tank fire was ineffectiveagainst the dug-in engineers, and theattackers were again repulsed. Tenminutes later, as the sky was gettinglight, a third force came up the road.This time tanks were in the lead, andthey overran Company B's position,crushing two machine guns. They alsopassed over foxholes where engineerswere crouching, but injured only threeAmericans.

The engineers continued to fire onthe German infantry, but the 254thEngineer Combat Battalion's positionwas now hopeless. The men were or-dered to fall back on Butgenbach whilefighting a delaying action through Buel-lingen.9 Many of the men were cut off,and the situation at Buellingen was soconfusing because communicationswere out that when the commanding

7 Citation in Hist 81st Engr C Bn, 15 Mar 43-31May 45.

8 Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer, Battle Babies: The Storyof the 99th Infantry Division in World War II (BatonRouge: Military Press of Louisiana, 1951), pp. 16—28. 9 Hist 254th Engr C Bn, Jul-Oct-Dec 44.


officer of the 254th arrived at Butgen-bach he reported to Maj. Gen. WalterE. Lauer, commanding the 99th Divi-sion, that his battalion had been de-stroyed. According to Lauer, "It was adramatic moment at my C. P. at aboutnoon that day when the details of theaction were reported. I awarded thebattalion commander then and therethe Bronze Star Medal, and gave himmy lunch to eat."10 Later the engineerofficer discovered that he had not losthis entire battalion. Although manymen had been killed or captured, others,in groups of two or three, made theirway back to Butgenbach or Wirtzfeld.11

The tanks that came up on the Hons-feld road early on 17 December be-longed to ObersturmbannfuehrerJoachim Peiper's Kampfgruppe Peiper,the armored spearhead of I SS PanzerCorps, the strongest fighting unit of SixthPanzer Army, which had broken throughat the Losheim Gap. By 1030 on 17December Peiper's tanks were rollinginto Buellingen, but instead of continu-ing northwest to Butgenbach as theAmericans expected, most turnedsouthwest out of the town. AlthoughBuellingen was a target of the 12th SSPanzer Division, Peiper had detouredthrough the town to avoid a stretch ofmuddy road between Honsfeld andSchoppen, his next objective to the west.He had also learned that there weregasoline dumps in Buellingen, and hefilled his tanks from American dumps,using American prisoners as labor.12

Buellingen was an important supplyarea, with dumps and service troops.

Headquarters Company and CompanyB of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion,part of the 2d Infantry Division, werebilleted there. Ordered to hold the townat all costs, Company B put up a deter-mined defense, but once in the townGerman tanks took up positions at inter-sections and cut all traffic. The engi-neer company split into platoons, foughtuntil its ammunition was gone, and thenhad to withdraw. Four officers andfifty-seven enlisted men of Headquar-ters Company were surrounded. Fromthe basement of their billet they firedat all the enemy infantry that came inview, but they had no bazookas to useagainst tanks. Nevertheless they werestill reported to be holding out on thenight of 18 December, when advanceelements of the 12th SS Panzer Divisionbegan arriving in the town to direct acoming fight at Butgenbach. After that,nothing more was heard from Head-quarters Company, and the men wereassumed to be either killed or cap-tured.13

The arrival of Peiper's tanks at Buel-lingen on the morning of 17 Decemberbrought the first realization of the scaleof the German offensive, because com-munications had gone out when theGermans hit the 99th Division regi-ments stationed along the West Wallon 16 December. On the morning ofthe seventeenth Maj. Gen. Leonard T.Gerow, commanding V Corps, decidedto pull his corps back to a defensiveposition on the Elsenborn ridge north-west of Buellingen. Two infantry regi-ments of his 2d Division were attackingWest Wall positions about five miles tothe northeast near Wahlerscheid, sup-

10 Lauer, Battle Babies, p. 34n.11 Hist 254th Engr C Bn, Jul-Oct-Dec 44.12 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, pp.

91-92, 260-61. 13 Hist 2d Engr C Bn, 2d Inf Div, Jun-Dec 44.


ported by a regimental combat teamcomposed mainly of the 99th Division's395th Infantry. The withdrawal routeof these forces ran south from Wahler-scheid to the twin villages of Krinkeltand Rocherath, then northwest of Elsen-born through Wirtzfeld. Infantry of thecollapsing 99th Division was also pass-ing through the twin villages on the wayto Elsenborn. The Germans had madedeep penetrations along the roads lead-ing west and could be expected to attackKrinkelt and Rocherath.

During the dangerous withdrawal theengineers supporting both divisionsplayed an important part. The 99thDivision's 324th Engineer Combat Bat-talion was with the 395th RegimentalCombat Team in woods east of Wahler-scheid. When the combat team receivedthe task of covering the 2d Division'smove south, the engineers assumeddefensive positions as infantry. At onetime on 17 December the battalion wascut off and surrounded by the enemy,but managed to escape and join theforces at Elsenborn.14

At dusk on 17 December CompanyC of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion,organic to the 2d Infantry Division, was-working behind the infantry to blockthe road to the east. The infantry felledtrees and created abatis, which the engi-neers mined and booby-trapped. By thetime the company reached the twin vil-lages enemy riflemen were close be-hind, but thick fog that lay close to thesnow-covered ground concealed theunit. When Company C reachedRocherath the village was burning, andtraffic on the road was completelyblocked. The company turned off themain road and moved west along for-

est trails to Elsenborn, on the way clear-ing from the trails abandoned trucksand guns and putting down matting,brush, and even abandoned bed rollsto get the unit's vehicles through toElsenborn. Next day, 18 December, theengineers worked on the Elsenborndefenses, placing mines and wire, butthat night part of the company had toreturn to Krinkelt. Under heavy pres-sure the last U.S. unit in the town, the38th Infantry, was getting ready to pullout, and engineers were needed to setup roadblocks behind the regiment toprotect its withdrawal.

The road to Krinkelt was under heavyartillery fire. More than once the engi-neers had to jump from their trucksand run; several trucks were damaged.They arrived at Krinkelt in the black-ness, discovering next day, 19 Decem-ber, that the enemy was edging closer,obviously preparing for a final nightattack. At 1730, in darkness and fog,the 38th Infantry began to pull out.The engineers, who could not set uptheir roadblocks until all the tanks ofthe covering force had withdrawn, werethe last Americans left in the town."Under the very noses of the pressingSS troopers," they went to work install-ing roadblocks at all important corners.Enemy tank, artillery, and small-armsfire killed a number of men, but thesurvivors managed to finish the job andwithdraw to Elsenborn.15

By 20 December a regiment of the1st Infantry Division had reinforced the2d and 99th Divisions at Elsenborn. Onthe north, the 9th Division took overthe Monschau-Hoefen sector. Thesetwo positions held. At the Elsenbornridge, which the Germans called the

14 Hist 324th Engr C Bn, 9 Nov-31 Dec 44. 15 Hist 2d Engr C Bn, 2d Inf Div, Jun-Dec 44.


"door posts," the 12th SS Panzer Divi-sion gave up the fight on 23 Decemberwhen the unit ran into a fresh 1st Divi-sion regiment.16 Thereafter the Ger-mans would not risk at Elsenborn any-thing better than second-line troopscapable only of defensive action.

About the time the 12th SS PanzerDivision was moving against Krinkeltand Rocherath, Peiper's Kampfgruppeswung west toward its objective, a Meusecrossing at Huy, about fifteen milesupriver from Liege. At dusk on 17December Peiper's lead tanks were ap-proaching Stavelot, on the northernbank of the Ambleve River forty-twomiles short of Huy. Peiper was alreadydeep into the area where First Army'sservice troops were working behind thecombat zone. A few miles west of Stavelotat Trois Fonts on N—23, Peiper's routeto the Meuse, was the headquarters ofthe 1111th Engineer Combat Group,whose battalions were supporting FirstArmy's winterization program. The291st Engineer Combat Battalion wasoperating a sawmill just west of TroisPonts and a company of the 202d Engi-neer Combat Battalion another at Stave-lot.

The first news of the enemy break-through came to the 1111th Groupcommander, Col. H. W. Anderson, at1005 on 17 December, when he learnedthat the Germans were near Butgen-bach. This posed a serious threat toMalmedy, five miles northeast of Stave-lot. At Malmedy Anderson had abouttwo hundred men of the 291st Engi-neer Combat Battalion, aided by the962d Engineer Maintenance Company,building a landing strip for liaison planes

near First Army headquarters at Spa.He sent the commanding officer of the291st, Lt. Col. David E. Pergrin, toMalmedy to take charge of the group'sunits there. Later in that day they wereaugmented by the 629th Engineer LightEquipment Company, which had beendoing road work near Butgenbach buthad managed to extricate itself aheadof the German advance.17

Anderson ordered his engineers atMalmedy to prepare to defend thetown. Prospects for defense lookedbright soon after Pergrin's arrival, espe-cially when elements of the 7th Ar-mored Division rumbled into the town.But the armor was only passing throughon its way to St.-Vith, and as the vehi-cles disappeared down the road mostof the First Army rear units, accordingto an engineer account, fled in panic,leaving behind food, liquor, documents,footlockers, clothing, and all sorts ofequipment. The engineers, armed onlywith mines and a few bazookas, stayed. 18

When Colonel Pergrin was asked laterwhy his men did not leave with theother units, he said the reason was"psychology." Combat units moving upto the front had taunted the road build-ers they passed, "You engineer so-and-sos! Why don't you come on up thereand fight?"19

By noon of 17 December the engi-neers had set up roadblocks on the edgeof town. An hour later, patrols reportedseeing sixty-eight enemy armored vehi-cles including thirty tanks on a road afew miles to the southeast. About 1430Colonel Pergrin was standing on a hill

16 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 578.

17 Hist 1111th Engr C Gp, Jun, Nov, Dec 44.18 Hist 291st Engr C Bn, Dec 44.19 Helena Huntington Smith, "A Few Men in Sol-

dier Suits," American Heritage (August 1957), 30 (ac-count from interview with Pergrin).


near town when he heard "an awful lotof noise" in the valley below; then fourAmerican soldiers ran toward him,screaming.20 They were survivors of the"Malmedy massacre" in which Peiper'smen shot up a convoy of field artilleryobservers that crossed their path, thenrounded up about eighty-five prisoners,marched them into a field, and at asignal shot them down with machine-gun and machine-pistol fire. Pergrinbrought the four survivors back toMalmedy in his jeep. Their story didnot shake the determination of his engi-neers to defend Malmedy "to the lastman."21

On the chance that Peiper wouldbypass Malmedy (as he did) and headfor Stavelot, Pergrin sent a squad of hisengineers equipped with twenty minesand one bazooka south to set up a road-block at Stavelot. They emplaced ahasty minefield at the approach to astone bridge leading into the town andwaited. At 1900 three Mark IV tankscame toward the bridge. The first strucka mine that blew off its treads; the oth-ers withdrew. Two of the engineers,Pfc. Lorenzo A. Liparulo and Pvt. Ber-nard Goldstein, tried to follow the tanksin a jeep. They were wounded by Ger-man fire, Liparulo fatally, but the Ger-mans did not attack again until earlynext morning. By that time a companyof the 526th Armored Infantry Battal-ion, towing 3-inch antitank guns, hadreinforced the engineer roadblock. Thearmored infantry managed to repulsea German infantry attack but was nomatch for the 88-mm. guns on Ger-man tanks that began rumbling over thebridge into the town about 0800.22

While the fighting was still going oninside Stavelot, Peiper turned some ofhis tanks west toward Trois Fonts, thenext town on his route to the Meuse.In his own words, "We proceeded attop speed towards Trois Ponts in aneffort to seize the bridge there. ... Ifwe had captured the bridge at TroisPonts intact and had had enough fuel,it would have been a simple matter todrive through to the Meuse River earlythat day."23

Trois Ponts, as its name suggests,boasted three bridges—one over theAmbleve that provided entry to thetown; another over the Salm within thetown, carrying the main highway west;and a third over the Salm southeast oftown. By the time Peiper turned hislead tanks toward Trois Ponts the 1111thEngineer Combat Group had preparedall three bridges for demolition. Com-pany C of the group's 51st EngineerCombat Battalion, ordered the nightbefore to defend the town, had placedcharges on two of the bridges, and adetachment of the 291st Engineer Com-bat Battalion had prepared the third.The engineers were armed only withbazookas and machine guns, but dur-ing the morning a 57-mm. antitank gunwith its crew, somehow separated fromthe 526th Armored Infantry Battalion,turned up in the town and was used toblock the road from Stavelot.

At 1115 on 18 December, when thefirst enemy tank came into sight, theengineers blew the bridge over theAmbleve. Half an hour later the leadtank ran into the roadblock. The 57-mm.gun immobilized it, but fire from othertanks knocked out the gun and killedfour of the crew. Finding the bridge

20 Ibid., p. 29.21 Hist 291st Engr C Bn, Dec 44.22 Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, p. 174.

23 Cole. The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 267.


blown, Peiper's men hesitated for aboutforty-five minutes. Though the tankscould not cross, the narrow, shallowAmbleve offered no obstacle to infan-try. The defenders expected an infan-try attack, and Company C spread outfor 500 yards along the steep far bank.The Germans apparently decided notto risk an infantry crossing at that point,but they did attempt to cross at thebridge southeast of town, which the291st Engineer Combat Battalion blewwhile two German soldiers were on thespan.

Peiper's lead tanks then turned north,seemingly probing for a way to outflankthe town. Colonel Anderson had thebridge over the Salm within Trois Pontsdestroyed. In midafternoon he de-parted for First Army headquarters,leaving the defense of Trois Ponts inthe hands of a new arrival on the scene,Maj. Robert B. Yates, the 51st Engi-neer Combat Battalion's executive of-ficer.

As darkness fell at 1700, Major Yatesdrew his men back to the center ofTrois Ponts where they could hear thesound of enemy armor and vehicles allnight. Yates employed several ruses tohide his weakness in men and weaponsfrom the enemy. He moved small groupsof riflemen, firing, from point to point;he had a heavy truck driven noisilyaround the streets to mimic the soundof arriving artillery; and to create theimpression that reinforcements werecoming in from the west, all night heran his five trucks out of town withlights out and back in town with lightson. Also, he received an unexpectedassist from a tank destroyer that hismen had set afire to keep it out ofenemy hands—the 105-mm. shells with-in the burning vehicle continued explod-

ing for some time. These deceptionsapparently worked, for the Germansdid not attack. Just before midnighttheir tanks moved north up the roadtoward Stoumont.24

That day, 18 December, infantry ofthe 30th Division arrived to man thedefenses at Malmedy and Stavelot. Oneof the division's regimental combatteams went into position to interruptPeiper's tanks at Stoumont, but theengineers were the sole defenders ofTrois Ponts all that day and the next.25

Late on 19 December a small advanceparty of paratroopers arrived from thewest. They were from the 82d AirborneDivision, elements of which Maj. Gen.Matthew B. Ridgway, commanding gen-eral of the XVIII Airborne Corps, hadrushed forward to help stop Peiper.The newcomers did not know that thecritical bridgehead of Trois Ponts wasin friendly hands, much less that it washeld by a single engineer company.Greeting the paratroopers, Major Yatesjoked, "I'll bet you guys are glad we'rehere."26

Next afternoon, following an enemyartillery barrage that killed one engi-neer and wounded another, a companyof the 505th Parachute Infantry Regi-ment arrived at Trois Ponts with a pla-toon of airborne engineers. But whenthe infantrymen took up a position ona hill east of town they were sur-rounded, and troops of the 51st Engi-neer Combat Battalion had to providecovering fire to extricate the airborne

24 Hist 51st Engr C Bn, Jun-Dec 44, and Jnl entry,18 Dec 44; Hists, 291st Engr C Bn and 1111th Engr CGp, Dec 44.

25 Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, pp.174-77.

26 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 351.


force. Not until dusk on 21 Decemberwere Yates' men able to withdraw fromthe defensive positions they had heldfor five days and journey to their battal-ion headquarters at Marche, far to thewest. Exhausted and numb from thebitter cold (the temperature haddropped to 20° F.), they had been"spurred to almost superhuman effort"by the "heroic example and leadershipof Major Yates."27

Combined elements of the 82d Air-borne, 30th Infantry, and 3d ArmoredDivisions stopped Peiper on the Am-bleve near Stoumont. The deepest pene-tration in the Battle of the Bulge was tobe made not by the Sixth Panzer Armybut by the Fifth Panzer Army to thesouth.

Delaying Fifth Panzer Armyfrom the Our to the Meuse

On the Skyline Drive in Luxembourgit had been snowing or raining off andon throughout the first two weeks inDecember. Clearing away accumula-tions of snow and icy slush was the prin-cipal task of Company B of the 103dEngineer Combat Battalion, quarteredat Hosingen. The company was sup-porting the 28th Division's 110th Infan-try, located in the center of the divi-sion's frontline positions. Other compa-nies of the same engineer battalion weresupporting the 112th Infantry on thenorth and the 109th Infantry on thesouth.

Because the 28th Division could nothope to defend every mile of its 23-mile-long front, the division commander hadset up a series of strongpoints; Hosin-

gen was one. Garrisoned by CompanyK of the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry,Hosingen overlooked two roads fromGermany that crossed the Our River,wound over the Skyline Drive, de-scended to the Clerf River, and thencontinued west for fourteen miles tothe important road center of Bastogne.One road, crossing the Skyline Driveabout two miles north of Hosingen, wasa paved highway, the best east-westroute in the sector. About two mileswest of the drive the road ran throughthe castle town of Clerf on the ClerfRiver, where the 110th Infantry had itsheadquarters. The other road, muddyand winding, crossed the Skyline Drivejust south of the outskirts of Hosingen.The engineers knew this secondaryroad well. They had accompanied in-fantry over it on several small raids intoGermany, using rubber boats to crossthe Our, and on it they had emplacedan abatis and planted a minefield.

At 0530 on 16 December, a Germanbarrage of massed guns and rocketsreverberated over the Skyline Drive forabout half an hour. As dawn broke,cloudy and cold with patches of groundfog, infantry of the 26th VolksgrenadierDivision came up the muddy road. Sometroops bypassed Hosingen, but one bat-talion entered the town. Company K,110th Infantry, and Company B, 103dEngineer Combat Battalion, put up astrong defense. House-to-house fight-ing continued all day, but no Germantanks appeared until the morning ofthe seventeenth—German engineershad failed to erect heavy bridging atthe nearest Our River crossing. Whenthe tanks reached Hosingen they setthe town afire, but the defenders heldout until the evening of the seven-teenth, after Clerf had surrendered.

27 Hist 51st Engr C Bn, Oct, Nov, Dec 44, and Jnlentry, 20 Dec 44.


PLACING CHARGES To DROP TREESacross roadways.

Communications had been out since theheavy opening barrage on the sixteenth,so the headquarters of the 103d Engi-neer Combat Battalion at Eschdorf,twelve miles to the southwest, had noword from this last bastion until 0050on 18 December. Then an officer gotthrough to report that the eveningbefore, the troops at Hosingen had stillbeen fighting. Out of ammunition andbeyond the range of American artillery,they were withdrawing from house tohouse, using hand grenades. After thatnothing more was heard.28

During the night of 17 December theGermans, having secured two bridgesover the Clerf River at Clerf and far-ther south at Drauffelt, moved swiftlywest in several columns. One turnedsouth toward the 28th Division com-mand post at Wiltz, twelve miles east ofBastogne.

The defenders of Wiltz included 600men of the 44th Engineer Combat Bat-talion. This unit, along with the 168th,the 159th, and the 35th Engineer Com-bat Battalions and Combat CommandReserve of the 9th Armored Division,made up General Middleton's VIIICorps reserve. Until noon of 17 Decem-ber the 44th Battalion had been work-ing in the corps area as part of the1107th Engineer Combat Group, main-taining roads and operating two saw-mills, a rock quarry, and a water point.Then General Middleton sent the bat-talion to Wiltz and attached it to the29th Infantry Division, whose com-mander, Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota,gave the engineers the mission of de-fending the town. Cota's plan called forsecuring Wiltz and covering all ap-proaches to the town. Supporting the

engineers were remnants of the 707thTank Battalion with six crippled tanksand five assault guns; four towed 3-inchguns from a tank destroyer battalion; adepleted battalion of 105-mm. divi-sional artillery; and a provisional battal-ion of infantry organized from head-quarters troops. The 105-mm. howit-zers went into battery along a road lead-ing southeast from Wiltz, while the restof the defense force manned a perime-ter north and northeast of town, northof the Wiltz River.

About noon on 18 December tanksand assault guns of the Panzer LehrDivision's Reconnaissance Battalion struckthe forward outposts, overrunning a sec-tion of tank destroyers. The engineersheld their fire until the German infan-try arrived behind the tanks and thencut it down. But the weight of armor28 Hist 103d Engr C Bn, Dec 44.


proved too strong, and the engineershad to withdraw to a second line ofdefense.

During the night activity on bothsides was limited to intense patrollingand harassing fire. Next morning thedefenders were able to dig in and gen-erally improve their positions, but inthe middle of the afternoon the Ger-mans attacked strongly from the north,northeast, and east with tanks accompa-nied by infantry armed with machinepistols. The three-hour attack cut theengineers' Company B to pieces. Atdusk the 44th Engineer Combat Battal-ion was forced to withdraw into Wiltz,having suffered heavy casualties.

The engineers still felt confident,believing that the attack had cost theGermans dearly and gained them littleground. They also felt safer after theyblew the bridge over the Wiltz. Butabout 1800 a new German column wasreported approaching from the south-east, on the same side of the river asthe town. A few hours later the enemyhad cut all roads to Wiltz, and ammuni-tion was running low. At 2130 thedefense force received orders to pullback toward American lines to the rear.It was a grueling and bloody withdrawalthrough German roadblocks and agauntlet of fire. The 44th EngineerCombat Battalion suffered heavily dur-ing the evacuation, losing 18 officersand 160 enlisted men.29

While the 44th Engineer CombatBattalion was defending Wiltz, two ofthe VIII Corps' reserve engineer battal-ions were engaged elsewhere. On thenorth the 168th, supporting the 106thDivision, was astride the road from

Schoenberg to St.-Vith; on the souththe 159th, attached to the 4th Division,was preparing to bar the way to Luxem-bourg City. Thus, by 1600 on 17 De-cember, General Middleton had onlyone reserve engineer battalion, the35th. Relieving the battalion of attach-ment to the 1102d Engineer CombatGroup, he assigned it to the defense ofBastogne.30

By then Bastogne was in great dan-ger. In midafternoon the commanderof Combat Command Reserve of the9th Armored Division (spread out alongthe paved road leading into the cityfrom Clerf) reported that the Germanswere overrunning his most advancedroadblock. The enemy was then lessthan nine miles from Bastogne. Gen-eral Middleton was expecting reinforce-ments—the 101st Airborne Divisionfrom SHAEF reserve and Combat Com-mand B of the 10th Armored Divisionfrom Third Army—but these unitscould not arrive until 18 December. Inthe meantime, the engineers wouldhave to guard the approaches to Bas-togne. At the suggestion of the VIIICorps engineer, a second engineer com-bat battalion was committed. It was the158th, not a part of Middleton's formalreserve but part of First Army's 1128thEngineer Combat Group, which wasworking in his area and could be calledupon "in dire circumstances."31

The 158th Engineer Combat Battal-ion received orders at 1730 on 17 De-cember to take over the 35th EngineerCombat Battalion's 3,900-yard left flankextending from Foy, a town on themain paved road (N—15) leading intoBastogne from the north to Neffe, a

29 Hist 44th Engr C Bn, Oct. Nov, Dec 44.30 Hist 35th Engr C Bn, Oct 44-Apr 45.31 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 310.


ROAD MAINTENANCE OUTSIDE WILTZ, BELGIUM

town just south of the main paved road(N-28) from the east—the most likelydirection of the German advance. TheVIII Corps engineer advised that atakeover in the blackness of the winternight would be too difficult, and thecommander of the 158th, Lt. Col. SamTabet, postponed the arrival of his bat-talion at the perimeter until daybreakat 18 December. Company A began todig in on the left near Foy, Company Bnear Neffe, and Company C nearLuzery, just north of Bastogne. To helphold his line of defense astride theroads along which the Germans wereadvancing, Tabet obtained 4 tank de-stroyers mounting 105-mm. howitzers,8 light tanks, and 2 Shermans, all takenfrom ordnance shops and manned by

ordnance mechanics. The battalion alsomanaged to round up 950 antitankmines.32

During the daylight hours of 18 De-cember the engineers sent out recon-naissance parties and set up roadblocks,using chains of mines, bazookas, .50-caliber machine guns, and rifle grenades.Late that evening they were attachedto the 10th Armored Division, whoseCombat Command B was expected toarrive momentarily. Around midnightthey heard rifle and automatic weap-ons fire to the east, and Germans over-ran one of the engineer roadblocks a

32 Hist 158th Engr C Bn, 17 Dec-20 Dec 44. Unlessotherwise cited, this account of the 158th is takenfrom this source.


few miles down the road from the com-mand post.

At 0600 next morning tanks of thePanzer Lehr Division hit the engineerroadblock at Neffe, manned by Com-pany B's 2d Platoon under a younglieutenant, William C. Cochran. Coch-ran could not tell in the darkness andfog whether the approaching tankswere German or American, so he wentforward to get a better look. He wasquite close to the first tank when hecalled back to his men, "These areGermans." From the tank someonereplied in English, "Yes, we are super-men" and fired. Cochran fired back,killing two men riding on the tank.33

Pvt. Bernard Michin, waiting at theroadblock with a bazooka, peered at theadvancing tank. Never having fired theweapon before, he let the vehicle comewithin ten yards of him to be sure ofhis target. At that range the explosionseared Michin's face and totally blindedhim. He rolled into a ditch, stung withpain. A German machine gun stutterednearby, and he tossed a hand grenadein the direction of the firing, whichstopped abruptly. Still blind, he rantoward American lines where willinghands among the platoon guided himto the rear. His sight returned only afteranother eight hours, but his heroismhad earned him the Distinguished Ser-vice Cross.34

By the evening of 19 December, in-fantry of the 101st Airborne Divisionhad relieved the 158th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, and the battalion was backin a bivouac area well to the west. Butthe engineers were to be allowed onlythe briefest respite. Beginning at 2200

the 158th was alerted to defend a Bai-ley bridge at Ortheuville, about tenmiles west of Bastogne. This bridge,which carried the VIII Corps' mainsupply route (N-4, from Namur viaMarche) over the western branch of theOurthe River, was threatened by recon-naissance tanks of the 2d Panzer Division.Advancing southwest along Route N —26, which intersected N—4 about sevenmiles west of Bastogne, they were prob-ing for a route west to bypass that city.35

The 299th Engineer Combat Battal-ion had prepared the Bailey bridge atOrtheuville for demolition and withdetachments of the 1278th EngineerCombat Battalion had been setting uproadblocks and mining bridges in awide arc behind Bastogne to bar theway to Germans bypassing the city tothe north or south. Because the Ortheu-ville bridge was vital to the supply routethe engineers had not yet demolishedit. As the Germans began to attacktoward the bridge during the earlyhours of 20 December, defenses con-sisted of not more than a platoon ofthe 299th Engineer Combat Battalion,reinforced by eight tank destroyers the705th Tank Destroyer Battalion hadleft behind on its way to Bastogne.36

Arriving in Ortheuville at daybreakon 20 December, the 2d Platoon of the158th's Company B found that Germanmachine-gun and rifle fire had driventhe 299th Battalion's platoon off theBailey bridge and that the Germans hadseized it. The 158th's platoon separatedinto squads, crossed the Ourthe on a

33 Smith, "A Few Men in Soldier Suits," p. 31.34 Ibid.; see also Hist 158th Engr C Bn.

35 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, pp.319-20 and map VI.

36 Hists, 299th Engr C Bn, 16-22 Dec 44, and 5thEngr C Bn (formerly 1278th Engr C Bn), 16-24 Dec44.


small wooden bridge, and attacked theGermans' right and left flanks. Theengineers pushed the plunger to blowup the bridge, but nothing happened;presumably German fire had cut thewiring. Tank destroyers stopped anenemy tank column attempting to crossthe bridge, and at noon the Germanswithdrew.37 With the arrival of the 1stand 3d Platoons, Company B, 158thEngineer Combat Battalion, advanceddown Route N—4 to the intersectionwith N—26, clearing the road and set-ting up roadblocks. Elements of Com-panies A and C joined later in theafternoon, bringing forward four 105-mm. tank destroyers. By the end of theday the 158th had made Route N—4safe for convoys of gasoline and ammu-nition to roll into Bastogne from depotsat Marche.

At 1800, Company B, which haddone most of the battalion's fightingfor the past two days, withdrew to abivouac area, but an hour later it wasalerted again. The Bailey bridge atOrtheuville was under heavy artilleryfire, and at 2000 German armor over-ran the roadblock at the intersection ofRoutes N—4 and N—26, continuing upN—4. As soon as the 2d Platoon ofCompany B arrived on the scene someof the men crossed to the enemy sideof the bridge and planted antitank minesacross the road, but they failed to stopthe Germans and had to withdraw acrossthe wooden bridge.

In three attacks, one involving a partyof four Germans dressed as civilians orU.S. soldiers, the enemy tried to seizethe wooden bridge but was repulsed.Then; after a second attempt to blow

the bridge failed, a fourth Germanattack was successful. The enemy infan-try forded the river and picked off thedefenders silhouetted against the glareof the burning houses beyond. At mid-night German armor began clankingacross the Bailey bridge. After a part-ing shot from one of their four tankdestroyers caused a gratifying (but in-conclusive) explosion, the engineerswithdrew about eight miles southwestto St. Hubert, where in the early after-noon they were ordered to take overthe defense of Libramont, another eightmiles to the south.

The German armored column cross-ing the Bailey bridge at Ortheuville raninto roadblocks established by the 51stEngineer Combat Battalion, sent downfrom Marche. This was the battalion thathad contributed its Company C to thedefense of Trois Ponts. On 21 Decem-ber the other two companies were guard-ing a barrier line along the easternbranch of the Ourthe River from Hot-ton, about six miles northeast of Marche,to La Roche, nine miles southeast ofHotton, and were manning roadblockssouth of Marche on Route N—4 andsouthwest of Marche as far as Roche-fort.38

The defense of Hotton, at the west-ern end of an important Class 70 bridgeover the Ourthe, was in the hands of asquad from Company B and half asquad from Company A. The 116thPanzer Division, attacking from the north-east in an attempt to get to the Meusenorth of Bastogne, shelled Hotton atdaybreak on 21 December and thenstruck with about five tanks and somearmored infantry—the spearhead of an

37 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering,pp. 24-25.

38 AAR, 51st Engr C Bn, Jun-Dec 44, and Hist 51stEngr C Bn, Oct, Nov, Dec 44. Unless otherwise cited,this account is taken from these two sources.


armored brigade. In the ensuing fire-fight the American defenders includedhalf a squad of Company A, the squadof Company B, ten men of the bat-talion's Headquarters and Service Com-pany, and two 40-mm. gun sectionsfrom the battalion's attached antiair-craft battery. They were joined by sev-eral bazooka teams, a few 3d ArmoredDivision engineers with a 37-mm. gun,and a Sherman tank with a 76-mm. gunthat the engineers discovered in an ord-nance shop on the edge of the townand had commandeered along with itscrew. This scratch force, under thecommand of Capt. Preston C. Hodgesof Company B, managed to hold thetown until shortly after noon, when aplatoon of tanks of the 84th InfantryDivision arrived from Marche and atask force of the 3d Armored Divisioncame in from the east.39

Stopping the German Seventh Army

At the southernmost portion of theVIII Corps front the Our flowed intothe Sauer and the Sauer formed theboundary between Luxembourg andGermany. There General der Panzer-truppen Erich Brandenberger's SeventhArmy, composed of two infantry corps,attacked on 16 December. This armywas the "stepchild of the Ardennesoffensive," lacking the heavy supportaccorded the two powerful panzer ar-mies on the north.40 Its mission was toguard the flank of the Fifth Panzer Army.Its northernmost corps (the LXXXV),with the 352d Volksgrenadier Division,

was to cross the Our north of its junc-ture with the Sauer and advance on awestward axis parallel to the Fifth Pan-zer Army. The southernmost corps, theLXXX, with the 276th and 212th Volks-grenadier Divisions, was to establish abridgehead at the town of Echternachon the Sauer and make a limited ad-vance to the southwest in the directionof Luxembourg City.

Guarding the line of the Our on thenorth was the 28th Division's 109thInfantry. It was attacked by the 352dVolksgrenadier Division and the Fifth Pan-zer Army 5th Parachute Division, whichwas driving a wedge between the 109thand the 110th Infantry regiments tothe north. Most of the 28th Division'smeager reserves had gone to the hard-pressed 110th Infantry, in the path ofthe powerful Fifth Panzer Army. Amongthe few reserves allotted to the 109thInfantry was Company A of the 103dEngineer Combat Battalion, which wasattached to the 109th on the evening of16 December.41

By the end of the sixteenth elementsof the German parachute division onthe extreme north had crossed the Ourat Vianden (about thirteen miles south-east of Wiltz) on a prefabricated bridgeemplaced in about an hour, brokenthrough to the Skyline Drive, and cutoff several 109th Infantry outposts.The rapidity of this advance, threaten-ing Wiltz, caused the 28th Division com-mander to request some of the 109thInfantry's reserves. A platoon of tankswith an infantry platoon aboard and afew engineers started north, but couldneither stop nor penetrate the north-ern wing of the 352d Volksgrenadier39 Theodore Draper, The 84th Infantry Division in the

Battle of Germany (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p.90; Spearhead in the West: The Third Armored Division, p.111.

40 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 258.41 Hist 103d Engr C Bn, Dec 44, S-2 and S-3 Jnls.


Division; they joined the withdrawalwestward toward Wiltz. The southernwing of the 352d, on the other hand, en-countered Americans dug in on heightsin a triangle formed by the confluenceof the Our and the Sauer. On the nightof 17 December the Volksgrenadier Divi-sion received some bridging equipmentand, with its increasing strength inheavy weapons including Tiger tanks,was able to break through the defenders'roadblocks and take Diekirch, six milessouthwest of the Our crossing, on 20December. That night the division ad-vanced nearly three miles farther totake Ettelbruck, a German objective for16 December. By delaying the Germandivision four days, the outnumbereddefenders had disrupted enemy plans.The engineers who established road-blocks and manned outposts had madea considerable contribution. One pla-toon patrolling roads in the forwardarea captured twelve Germans beforeit was forced to withdraw.42

Just to the south, where the LXXXCorps was attacking, the 60th ArmoredInfantry Battalion of the 9th ArmoredDivision, an untried unit sent to thisquiet sector for combat indoctrination,held about six miles of front. When the276th Volksgrenadier Division attackedthe armored battalion, the 9th ArmoredDivision commander sent forward rein-forcements of tanks, tank destroyers,and artillery; the infantry reinforce-ments consisted of a company of divi-sional engineers. The new strength ena-bled the armored infantry battalion tofight as a combat command and to putup strong resistance to the 276th. Leasteffective of the three Seventh Army divi-sions committed to the battle, the 276th

had no tanks, and American shellingeffectively interfered with its attemptsto get heavy weapons over the Sauer.The division had to pay heavily for thethree or four miles it was able to ad-vance from the Sauer—a more limitedpenetration than that of any otherSeventh Army division.

General Brandenberger sent his bestdivision, the 212th Volksgrenadier, acrossthe Sauer about twelve miles southeastof Vianden into a hilly area around thetown of Echternach known as "LittleSwitzerland." This was the northernportion of the 35-mile-long front, bor-dered by the Sauer and the Moselle,and held by Maj. Gen. Raymond O.Barton's depleted 4th Infantry Division.

Crossing the narrow, swift Sauer atseveral points in rubber boats, the Ger-man troops quickly overcame forwardelements of the 12th Infantry, the onlytroops in the Echternach area. Here, asin other sectors, the preliminary Ger-man artillery barrage cut wire communi-cations; in this sector, held by a regi-ment battered in Huertgen Forest, ra-dios were scarce and had very limitedrange in the broken terrain. Thus, itwas around noon before General Bar-ton, at division headquarters near Lux-embourg City about twenty miles south-west of Echternach, had a clear pictureof what was happening. From the mea-ger stocks of his 70th Tank Battalionhe allotted the 12th Infantry eight me-dium and ten light tanks, making possi-ble the formation of tank-infantry teamsto aid the hard-pressed infantry compa-nies at the front. With one of theseteams, Task Force Luckett, the 4thEngineer Combat Battalion went for-ward to hold high ground near Breid-weiler, about five miles southwest ofEchternach, but when no enemy ap-42 Hist 103d Engr C Bn, Dec 44.


peared part of the battalion returnedto engineer work.43

On the afternoon of 16 DecemberGeneral Barton telephoned GeneralMiddleton, the VIII Corps commander,to ask for reinforcements. All Middle-ton could offer was the 159th EngineerCombat Battalion, which was workingon roads throughout the corps area asfar north as Wiltz and Clerf. Middle-ton told Barton that "if he could findthe engineers he could use them."44

Barton found the headquarters ofthe 159th in Luxembourg City. Theengineers were ready for orders tomove to the front, for two of theirtrucks on a routine run to pick up rockat Diekirch in the 28th Division areahad returned with the news that therock quarry was under German fire.On 17 December the battalion was at-tached to Task Force Riley from Com-bat Command A of the 10th ArmoredDivision, whose objective was the vil-lage of Scheidgen, some four milessouth of the Sauer on the Echternach—Luxembourg City road. The Germanshad already overrun Scheidgen, bypass-ing roadbound U.S. tanks by goingthrough the woods.45

On the morning of 18 December, wetand cold with heavy, low-hanging clouds,the engineer battalion drew ammuni-tion and grenades and moved forwardfrom Luxembourg City. Company Bremained in reserve several miles to therear. Accompanied by light tanks andtank destroyers, Companies A and Cadvanced toward Scheidgen, the engi-

neers through woods south of the townand the tanks on a road from the west.They took the town without much op-position, though part of Company Creceived heavy small-arms fire fromHill 313, about a mile north. After anight in Scheidgen under heavy Ger-man shelling the two engineer compa-nies secured Hill 313, which overlookedthe Echternach—Luxembourg City road.They dug foxholes and waited. Theycould see Germans moving around atthe foot of the hill, and next morning,20 December, they received a barrageof enemy artillery, mortar, and rocketfire. Then two parties of Germans triedto come up the hill, but were repulsed.That day, Company B (minus one pla-toon) came up, assuming positions onhigh ground about 800 yards west ofHill 313, while Companies A and Ctook turns going into Scheidgen for hotfood and a little rest. The engineerskept hearing reports that infantry wascoming up to relieve them, but nonearrived.

On the morning of 21 December theGermans attacked again. Some chargedup Hill 313 screaming and firing auto-matic weapons, but the main force hitCompany B on the left, drove a wedgebetween two platoons, killed the com-pany commander, and occupied thecompany's positions. The tactical valueof Hill 313 was lost, and Scheidgen hadbecome a shambles from heavy pound-ing by German artillery. Companies Aand C withdrew to positions slightlysoutheast of Scheidgen toward Michel-shof, while the remnants of CompanyB went to the rear.

Michelshof, a crossroads town on theroad to Luxembourg City, formed partof the main line of resistance. The twoengineer companies, accompanied by

43 Hist 4th Engr C Bn, May-Dec 44.44 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 243.45 The 159th Engineer Combat Battalion (Antwerp: De

Vos van Kleef, Ltd., 1945), pp. 17-19. The accountof the action around Scheidgen is taken from thissource.


two medium tanks and a tank destroyerand commanded by Capt. Arthur T.Surkamp, the battalion S-3, dug inthere on 22 December. Nothing laybetween them and the enemy on thenorth but a badly mauled companyfrom the 12th Infantry, a patch ofwoods, and some open fields. Duringthe day they came under rocket andartillery fire, but supporting artilleryof the 10th Armored Division put a stopto most of it.

About 1700, as dusk was falling, en-emy troops moved out of the woods inV formation and advanced across thefields toward the engineers. CaptainSurkamp, alerting the artillery to "dropthem in close" when signaled, orderedthe engineers to hold their fire. Whenthe leading soldiers were 150 yardsaway, the engineers, the tankers, andthe artillery opened fire. Most of theenemy in the formation were killed orwounded.

On the morning of 23 December theengineers woke to find that the heavyclouds were gone. Soon they heard thedrone of motors, and American fighterand bomber planes passed over. "Thiswas the thing we had sweated out fordays and there they were, you thenknew that the jig for Herr Hitler wasup."46

The next morning, Christmas Eve,Third Army infantry relieved the menof the 159th Engineer Combat Battal-ion. General Patton was swinging thebulk of his troops north to pound theGerman southern flank, relieve Bas-togne, and help end the Battle of theArdennes.

General Middleton credited the engi-neers with doing a "magnificent job" as

infantry in repulsing the Germans inthe Ardennes. On the other hand, theVIII Corps engineer and various engi-neer group commanders believed thatthe engineer combat battalions couldhave done more to impede the Ger-man advance had they been employednot in the front line but in a tacticallyunified second line of defense in therear. Going a step further, the officialArmy historian of the Battle of theArdennes states that "the use of engi-neers in their capacity as trained techni-cians often paid greater dividends thantheir use as infantry" and points outthat Field Marshal Walter Model issuedan order on 18 December forbiddingthe use of the German pioneer troopsas infantry.47

Yet on the defensive in the ArdennesGeneral Middleton had to depend onthe engineers. At crucial points on thefront, such as Auw, divisional engineerswere the only troops on the scene whenthe Germans struck. Because there wasthought to be little danger of an attackin this quiet sector, aside from a singlearmored combat command GeneralMiddleton's only reserves consisted offour engineer combat battalions—the44th, 35th, 168th, and 150th. Theyfought in defense of Wiltz, Bastogne,St.-Vith, and Michelshof. Several FirstArmy engineer combat battalions whichwere operating sawmills in the area—the 291st, 51st, and 158th—distin-guished themselves at Malmedy, at TroisFonts and Hotton, and at Bastogne andOrtheuville. The engineers were ableto upset the German timetable, delay-ing the onrushing columns long enoughfor American reinforcements to bebrought to the five main pillars of

46 The 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, p. 20. 47 Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 329.


resistance—Elsenborn ridge, the forti-fied "goose egg" area around St.-Vith,Bastogne, Echternach, and Marche.48

Engineers in NORDWIND

When the German Ardennes offen-sive fell on 12th Army Group in fullfury in mid-December 1944, GeneralDevers estimated that it was only a mat-ter of time before German forces wouldstrike 6th Army Group to prevent itsadvancing to aid the 12th Army Groupto its immediate north. At the end ofthe month the Seventh Army held abroad salient, eighty-four miles of frontthat wound into the northeastern cor-ner of Alsace from Saarbruecken to theRhine River, with limited bridgeheadsacross the German border. The rightflank of the Seventh Army line ransouth along the Rhine to a point belowStrasbourg. There, the First FrenchArmy zone began, running farthersouth and including a vise closed onthe pocket of German divisions pinnedin their positions around Colmar. AGerman plan, Operation NORDWIND,developed by Christmas Day, called fora massive double envelopment to catchthe entire Seventh Army. ConvergingGerman attacks, one to the north outof the Colmar Pocket, would join an-other arm driving south near the Magi-not Line town of Bitche. They wouldmeet around Sarrebourg, twenty tothirty miles behind the Seventh Armylines. The offensive was set for 31December 1944.

By 28 December, General Devers hadordered a phased withdrawal throughthree defensive lines, the first along the

Maginot Line and the others markinga progressive pullout to strong positionsin the Low Vosges Mountains. Theseorders changed repeatedly as the Ger-man thrusts failed and as French pro-tests about the surrender of Alsatianterritory reached SHAEF headquarters,but regardless of the changes, the con-struction of the defenses fell to theengineers.

In the last two weeks of Decemberthe three veteran engineer combatregiments, the 540th, the 40th, and the36th, began extensive work in the VICorps area, the most exposed north-eastern corner of Alsace, which the Ger-mans now proposed to isolate. Basingmuch of the fortification on the Magi-not structures assigned as the first de-fense line, the engineers supplementedtheir construction with roadblocks, usu-ally employing concealed 57-mm. anti-tank gun positions. Across the rear ofthe corps and the army area they pre-pared all bridges for demolition.

The 1st Battalion, 540th EngineerCombat Regiment, extracted itself froma precarious position at the start of theGerman drive. Assigned to VI Corps,the regiment was alerted as early as 18December against German attacks ex-pected over the Rhine, but no seriousthreats had developed by ChristmasDay on the regimental front, and theengineers spent a peaceful holiday. Theunit was busy through the end of 1944extending Maginot Line positions, lay-ing mines, and constructing bridgesaround Baerenthal, fifteen miles southof Bitche.

In the early morning hours of NewYear's Day 1945, the 1st Battalion ofthe 540th Engineer Combat Regimentassembled at Baerenthal, organizing asinfantry to help meet the enemy ad-

48 John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (NewYork: Putnam, 1969), pp. 462-63.


vance into the unit's general area. Smallunits joined counterattacks or rescueattempts through the morning. Com-pany B stood with the 117th CavalryReconnaissance Squadron in the line.Before sunup, two platoons of Com-pany A assaulted German positions toopen a path for isolated elements ofthe 125th Armored Engineer Battalion.Two platoons of Company C went intothe main line, flanking elements of the62d Armored Infantry Battalion.

By midmorning the rescued 125thArmored Engineer Battalion took posi-tions in the main line with Company C,540th Engineer Regiment, in the faceof the rapidly developing German on-slaught. The hastily collected defensesof widely disparate units sagged underthe weight of the German drive andfinally broke at noon, sending Com-pany C retreating upon the 1st Battal-ion headquarters. Just as the headquar-ters detachment finished burning itsunit records, the Germans overran thearea, and the engineers joined the gen-eral withdrawal.

By mid-January, the 1st and 2d Bat-talions, 540th Engineer Combat Regi-ment, were again in the line as infantryin 45th Division positions aroundWimmenau and Wingen, twenty-fivemiles south of Bitche and twenty milessoutheast of 1st Battalion's formerpositions around Baerenthal. Theregiment's major concern other thancombat was the construction of worksnear the towns of Haguenau andVosges, a defensive line intended tocontain other German thrusts across theRhine.49

On VI Corps' left the 36th Engineer

Combat Regiment relieved the 179thInfantry, 45th Division, on 1 January1945 and continued to operate as infan-try until 7 February. The regimentbegan withdrawing from positionsnorth of Wissembourg on the Franco-German border to the main line ofresistance in the Maginot bunkers andtrenches and sent aggressive patrolsthrough inhabited points well forwardof this line to prevent a solid enemyfront from taking shape.50

When the German drives on thewhole Seventh Army front had spentthemselves by mid-January, the 36thEngineer Combat Regiment moved torelieve the 275th Infantry. The engi-neers occupied the right flank positionof the 157th Infantry in the 45th Divi-sion line while the infantry regimentled the division's counterattack on theenemy salient from Bitche toward thesouth on 14 January. In this case the36th Engineer Combat Regiment wit-nessed a disaster.

As part of a double envelopment toclear the enemy from the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal valley, the 157th Infantryhad advanced one battalion against thepositions of the 6th SS Mountain Divi-sion in the valley and the woods aroundit, but the unit was pinned down andthen surrounded. In eight days of heavyfighting, the regiment attacked with itsremaining battalions to extricate thesurrounded unit. On the fifteenth twomore companies drove their way intothe encirclement, only to find them-selves trapped with the surroundedbattalion. After five concerted assaultson the German lines, the 157th had toabandon the effort, and the regiment

49 Hist 540th Engineer Regiment [11 Sep 42-14Feb 45], pp. 21-24. 50 Hist Rpt, 36th Engr C Rgt, Jan 45.


SEVENTH ARMY ENGINEERS INSTALL A BRIDGE ON THE ILL RIVER

left the line on 21 January; breakoutattempts from within the pocket gainedthe freedom of only 2 men of the origi-nal 750 engulfed in the German net.Engineer attacks to relieve the pressureon the 157th's right were of no avail.The five companies were annihilated.51

The beginning of January found the40th Engineer Combat Regiment spreadout on VI Corps' right flank, support-ing the three infantry divisions facing aGerman thrust across the Rhine Riverin the vicinity of Gambsheim, fifteenmiles north of Strasbourg. The bulk ofthe regiment was with the 79th Infan-try Division, with one battalion support-ing the 3d Division. By early February

the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment,reinforced with the 111th EngineerCombat Battalion, fell in behind the36th Infantry Division, involved in clear-ing the west bank of the Rhine.52

While this clearing operation wasbeing completed, Seventh Army wasalready moving to reverse the tide ofOperation NORDWIND and to straight-en its front in preparation for its ownassault on the Siegfried Line and forcrossing the Rhine. The first of theseoperations was the elimination of theColmar Pocket, which had held out allwinter despite determined French as-saults. General Devers gave the XXICorps, under Maj. Gen. Frank W.

51 Seventh Army Report, vol. II, pp. 588-90; Hist Rpt,36th Engr C Rgt, Jan 45.

52 Hist Rpt, 40th Engr C Rgt, Jan 45.


Millburn, to the operational control ofthe First French Army for the mop-up.The 3d, the 28th, and the 75th Infan-try Divisions, the 12th Armored, andthe 2d French Armored Divisions hadtheir own organic engineers, supple-mented by numerous attached specialunits whose services were needed tokeep open main supply routes for thetroops cleaning out the remnants ofGerman resistance around Colmar. The1145th Engineer Combat Group, at-tached to XXI Corps, was the parentorganization for these units. The lackof treadway bridge units in the 6thArmy Group area was partially allevi-ated by the attachment of the 998thTreadway Bridge Company from 12thArmy Group and a detachment of the196th Engineer Dump Truck Company,converted into a bridge unit.

American engineers repeatedly wentinto the line as infantry during theColmar action. The 290th EngineerCombat Battalion spent the wholeperiod of its assignment to XXI Corpsin direct contact with the enemy andaggressively pursued retreating Ger-man units in maneuvers with the 112thInfantry, 28th Infantry Division".53

The elimination of the Colmar Pocketin mid-February released the XXI Corpsfor action on the left flank and centerof the Seventh Army line. The attached

engineer units reverted to SeventhArmy control for use in a series of lim-ited objective assaults which eventuallybrought French and American divisionsto the Siegfried Line. After crossing theSaar and the Blies Rivers, Allied forceswere on German soil and in front ofthe city of Saarbruecken. The 6th ArmyGroup troops did not reach the Sieg-fried Line until mid-March, long afterthe Allies to the north had overcomethat obstacle in the late fall of 1944.

Seventh Army Through the Siegfried Line

The 6th Army Group engineer, Gen-eral Wolfe, had the benefit of engineerintelligence gathered on the famousSiegfried Line defenses farther northin the 12th Army Group zones. By earlyDecember, Seventh Army engineershad detailed studies of the nature ofthe defenses and the best means ofbreaching them. Farther to the north,along the traditional east-west invasioncorridors, the West Wall defenses ranin thicker bands, presenting layers offortifications sometimes twelve milesdeep. In the 6th Army Group sectorthe line was formidable but generallyless deep than in the 12th Army Group'szone. The 6th Army Group plannersin fact developed designs to breakthrough it and to jump the Rhine River,using the troops that had trained forthat eventuality through the previousautumn.54

General Patch's Seventh Army openedan assault on the line on 15 March. Cen-tral in the drive was the XV Corpswhich, because of the planned ap-proach to the Rhine behind the Ger-

53 Unit Hists, 1145th Engr C Gp, 196th Engr DumpTruck Co, 998th Engr Treadway Bridge Co, and290th Engr C Bn. The 6th Army Group attachedseven other units to the French Army's operationalcontrol in January and February 1945. Among themwere the 677th Light Maintenance Company, 1271stEngineer Combat Battalion, Company B of the 1553dEngineer Heavy Ponton Battalion, the 25th and the286th Engineer Combat Battalions, and the 3d Battal-ion of the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment. The 3dArmored Engineer Battalion was attached to the 2dFrench Armored Division. 6th Army Gp Sitreps,Jan—May 45.

54 AAR, Seventh Army Engr, Dec 44, sub: Breach-ing the Siegfried Line; Seventh Army Report, vol. III, p.695.


man defenses, had the 540th and the40th Engineer Combat Regiments at-tached. Both units now had a 35-miletrain of vehicles and trailers with river-crossing equipment retrieved from theforests and factories of Luneville. Tokeep the main arteries clear for combatelements, the long lines of laden engi-neer vehicles moved mainly on second-ary roads, a feat for the accompanyingpile-driving equipment and cranes.

Engineer troops set the pace of theattack in many places. Each regimentof the 63d Division, whose men werethe first to reach the far side of theSiegfried defenses in the XXI Corpsarea, had one company of the 263dEngineer Combat Battalion attached. Ina performance repeated all along theassaulting line, these engineers usedprimacord explosive rope and the heav-ier tank-launched "Snake" to clear pathsthrough minefields. Hastily erectedtreadway bridges carried assaultingShermans over the antitank trenches,while engineer satchel charges ex-tracted dragon's teeth to make pathsfor vehicles. Engineers moved withinfantry teams to demolish concretecasemates, forestalling the enemy's at-tempts to return and use pillboxesagain. Many of the bunker entranceswere simply sealed with bulldozed earth.The 263d Engineer Combat Battalionalone used fifty tons of explosive onthe German fortifications. The SeventhArmy had four full divisions throughthe vaunted line on 23 March.

After the Ardennes

During the Allied offensive that be-gan 3 January, following the Germanrepulse in the Ardennes, engineer unitswere generally released from their in-fantry role and reverted to the task of

helping the combat troops to moveforward. The weather turned bittercold, and snow or ice covered the roads.Working sometimes in blinding snow-storms, the engineers scattered cindersand gravel on the roads, aided in someareas by German civilian laborers. Fro-zen ground and deep snow made mineremoval all but impossible. At one timein the XIX Corps sector, for example,thirteen bulldozers were lost to minesburied deep in snow. Since normallyfordable streams were too icy for wad-ing, the engineers had to build foot-bridges or use assault boats. At the lit-tle Sure River, during XII Corps' ad-vance in late January, the engineersturned the frozen riverbank to advan-tage by loading men into assault boatsat the top of the bank and shoving theboats downhill like toboggans.55

A thaw during the first week of Feb-ruary, far more extensive than usual,presented worse problems than thecold. Roads disintegrated into deepmud. The engineers laid down crushedstone, sometimes on a bed of dry hay,and when this did not work they cordu-royed the roads with logs, using pris-oner of war labor. The engineers hadto build highway bridges strong enoughto withstand the rushing streamsflooded by melting ice and snow.56

By mid-February engineer units wereagain being drawn from their normalduties to train for the major engineereffort on the European continent—thecrossing of the Rhine.

55 Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 16, ML 2220, ETOUSAHist Sect; Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive,United States Army in World War II (Washington,1973), p. 49.

56 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 14, Road Maintenanceand Highway Bridging, pp. 39-40; Engr Opns VIICorps, vol. VI, "The Roer River Crossings and Ad-vance to the Rhine," pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER XXII

The Roer Crossing and theRemagen Bridgehead

The ETOUSA chief engineer, Maj.Gen. Cecil R. Moore, considered theRhine crossing nearly as important asthe D-day Channel crossing. Beginningearly in October 1944 he met often withSHAEF engineers from all British andAmerican army group and army com-mand levels and with members of theBritish and American navies. The plan-ners decided that after the first wavesof infantry had crossed in assault boats,larger LCVPs and LCM landing craftunder Navy control would ferry tanks,trucks, and supplies and enough troopsto build up the bridgehead rapidly. Theengineers would then string stout cablefrom one bank to the other to guideDUKWs, smaller landing craft, andamphibious tanks. Once established onthe far bank, engineers would constructthe first heavy ponton and steel tread-way bridges.1 But in January 1945 noAllied army yet stood on the Rhine, andthe force most likely to reach it still hadto cover difficult terrain and cross an-other river that provided unexpecteddelays.

Sitting tight through December 1944and January 1945, Lt. Gen. William H.Simpson's Ninth Army was alreadyperched on the west bank of the RoerRiver behind Aachen, holding a salienton the German northern flank. Gen-eral Simpson was searching for theopportunity to act on plans developedthe previous October to sweep from theRoer to the Rhine and past it, if possi-ble. Ninth Army had three corps ar-rayed on a thirty-mile front on theRoer's west bank from Dueren in thesouth to Roermond at the confluenceof the Roer and the Meuse. There theGermans still held a bridgehead westof the Roer in the first week of Febru-ary 1945. On Ninth Army's right wasthe XIX Corps with the 30th and 29thInfantry Divisions in the assault and the83d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisionsin reserve; in the center was XIII Corpswith the 102d and 84th Infantry Divi-sions on the line and the 5th Armoredin reserve. On the left, occupying agood half of the Army front, was XVICorps, operational only since 7 Febru-ary. The corps consisted of the 35thand 79th Infantry Divisions and the 8thArmored Division.

In Operation GRENADE, originallyconceived as a thrust due east to envel-

1 Moore, Final Report, p. 170; OCE ETOUSA HistRpt 20, Forced Crossing of the Rhine, pp. 5-6, andapps. 1-6.


op Cologne on the Rhine, Americanforces were to advance northeast to-ward Wesel, converging there with aFirst Canadian Army attack, OperationVERITABLE, to smash the weakened ele-ments of German Army Group H. Setfor 10 February 1945, the Ninth Armyoffensive was to seal the northern bor-der of the Ruhr industrial complex,while the British Second Army, onNinth Army's northern flank, struckout northeast across the northern Ger-man plain. On the very eve of theattack, the Germans hastily played onelast defensive card to forestall the NinthArmy's expected assault.2

Already the subject of a Ninth Armyengineer study in January 1945 was acomplex of seven dams on the RoerRiver and its tributaries. Impoundinga flood of 111 million cubic meters ofwater, the two largest dams, the Urfttal-sperre and the Schwammenauel, repre-sented a constant threat to future opera-tions. Air attacks on the Schwam-menauel had failed to rupture it, andthe German Ardennes offensive hadinterrupted First Army's ground attacksthrough November and December1944. On 4 February 1945, First Armytroops captured the Urft Dam with nodifficulty, but as the 309th Infantry,attached to the 9th Infantry Division,First Army, moved in late on the ninthto take the Schwammenauel Dam, theGermans, leaving the face intact, blewout all the dam's discharge valves. Nowall of water sped down the Roer val-ley; rather, the cumulative flow caused

a slow, steady rise in the Roer, and thestream overflowed its banks in the low-lying areas north of Dueren. Usuallyaveraging ninety feet in width, the riverformed lakes twelve hundred feet acrossin places and achieved velocities thatmade military bridging impossible.Based on the observations of engineersposted on the banks and aerial photo-graphs that recorded the slow with-drawal of the waters, Col. Richard U.Nicholas, Ninth Army engineer, finallypredicted that operations could pro-ceed on 24 February. The inundationforced the impatient Simpson to delaythe assault for the better part of twoweeks, time spent making additionalpreparations and revising plans.

On the supposition that the Germanswould not expect a Roer crossing untilafter 24 February, the day when thedams would probably empty and theriver return to normal, General Simp-son had decided to achieve surprise byordering the crossing before daylighton 23 February. Colonel Nicholas ad-vised Simpson that the river by thattime would have receded enough tomake a crossing possible and that theRoer's swift current would have sub-sided somewhat. Preceded by a tremen-dous 45-minute artillery preparation,the Roer crossings of XIX Corps' 30thand 29th Divisions and XIII Corps'102d and 84th Divisions (supportedrespectively by the 1115th, 1104th,1141st, and 1149th Engineer CombatGroups) began at 0330 on 23 Februaryfrom Linnich on the north to a pointbelow Juelich on the south.

The Roer Crossings

General Simpson later called the Roercrossings a "rehearsal for the Rhine,"

2 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 135-45; Col.Theodore W. Parker and Col. William J. Thompson,Conquer, The Story of the Ninth Army, 1944-1945(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp.114-60. Tactical detail on the GRENADE operation istaken from these two sources.

THE ROER CROSSING AND THE REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD 491

ENGINEERS EMPLACE MATS To STABILIZE THE BANKS OF THE FLOODED ROER

but actually little of the experiencegained at the Roer would prove appli-cable to the Rhine.3 The rivers werequite different; even in flood, for exam-ple, the Roer was narrow. For such ariver, engineer doctrine dictated thatafter the assault boat crossings prefabri-cated footbridges would be used tomove troops to the far bank and infan-try support, heavy ponton, treadway,and Bailey bridges quickly thrownacross. In the Roer crossings no navallanding craft of the type so importantin plans for the Rhine crossings wererequired.4 LVTs were available from

the hundred earmarked for the Rhinecrossings, but they were not to be usedexcept in special circumstances, wheremuddy banks or unexpectedly heavyenemy fire on the far shore were en-countered.5

The artillery barrage that began at0245 on 23 February was the heaviestyet laid down in Europe. The engineerswaiting with their assault boats and foot-bridge material in the fields along thewest bank of the Roer or in cellars sawin the pink sky to the rear lightning-

3 Lt. Gen. W. H. Simpson, "Rehearsal for the Rhine,"Military Review, XXV, no. 7 (October 1945), 20.

4 Interv, Maj Edward L. Waller, S-2, 1141st EngrC Gp, 12 Feb 45; Folder, Bridging the Roer: The

Contribution of the Engineer Combat Groups in NinthU.S. Army, 23 Feb-10 Mar 45, CI 371, ETOUSAHist Sect. Subsequent references to contents of thisETOUSA Historical Section folder will be cited as:Bridging the Roer.



like flashes from the big guns. In thedark sky above they observed long redribbons of tracer rounds from machineguns, and on the east bank ahead ex-ploding shells illuminated ruined housesor bare tree branches and sodden fields.(Map 28)

On the right, about three miles up-stream from Juelich, engineers sup-porting the 30th Division crossed somecombat troops before the barrage lifted.They soon found that they were to suf-fer more from the swift current thanfrom enemy fire. The rushing waterscarried assault boats downstream, cap-sizing them and breaking cables whenthe engineers tried to anchor foot-bridges. At the site where the 82d Engi-neer Combat Battalion was trying to getthe 120th Infantry across, friendly artil-lery fire falling on the far bank until0330 cut a footbridge. Thereafter thecurrent, as strong as seven miles anhour in this sector, aborted six effortsto replace the bridge. Only by transfer-ring the work downstream where thecurrent was slower were the engineersable to build a footbridge at all, and itwas not ready for use until 1730. In themeantime, the 234th Engineer CombatBattalion, assigned to the 1115th Group,carried men and supplies over the Roerin ten LVTs that made a total of fifty-four trips beginning at 0330. Otherinfantrymen of the 120th Infantrycrossed via a footbridge the 295th Engi-neer Combat Battalion put in down-stream for the 119th Infantry. The cur-rent caused trouble for treadway bridgesat both sites. Delays occurred with atreadway the 295th was erecting whenboats carrying the cable to the far bankoverturned or swamped; the cable wasnot anchored until 1400. In the 120thInfantry sector upstream, the 82d Engi-

neer Combat Battalion anchored itsfirst treadway to the piles of a demol-ished German bridge.

Elsewhere, heavy German fire addedto the hazards of the current. On theeast bank at Juelich, an old Prussiangarrison town where XIX Corps' 29thInfantry Division was to cross, the enemyheld commanding positions in the ruinsof the town and at an ancient, thick-walled fortress, the Citadel. Near Lin-nich on the west bank, two XIII Corpsinfantry divisions, the 102d and 84th,had to cross on a narrow two-mile frontbecause the area to the north and southwas flooded. Crossing at Juelich andLinnich, which the Germans wouldundoubtedly expect, had obvious dis-advantages. But considering the prob-lems the swampy flats elsewhere posed,General Simpson decided that the ad-vantage of paved roads leading into andaway from the towns justified the risk.6

The paved roads leading into Juelichfrom the west determined the locationof the first bridges the engineers built.On the right, where the road fromAldenhoven came in, the narrownessof the river and the height of the farbank—offering protection againstsmall-arms fire—dictated a reversal ofthe usual assault procedure. Ratherthan crossing in boats, most assaulttroops of the 175th Infantry were tocross on footbridges built by the 1104thEngineer Combat Group's 246th Engi-neer Combat Battalion. At 0430 on 23February at this site the group's 247thEngineer Combat Battalion was to startconstruction of two tactical bridges—one heavy ponton and one treadway.About the same time the 246th, havingcompleted three footbridges, was to

6 SimpSon, "Rehearsal for the Rhine," p. 24.


move downstream to build an infantrysupport bridge at a point where a pavedroad from Boslar entered the city. Thiswas expected to be the first vehicularbridge into Juelich, although the sitelay under the guns of the Citadel. Northof Juelich, where the river was wider,no bridges were to be built until thefloodwaters subsided. There, where apaved road ran from Boslar to the riv-erbank and on the other side to thevillage of Broich, troops of the 115thInfantry were to ferry to the far bankin assault boats and LVTs.7

Half an hour before the opening bar-rage lifted on 23 February three assaultboats filled with divisional engineers ofthe 121st Engineer Combat Battalionand covering troops of the 175th Infan-try got across at the Aldenhoven roadsite against scattered German machine-gun fire. These troops spread out alongthe far bank, and at 0330 the 246thEngineer Combat Battalion began workon a footbridge under a smoke screen.Although making it difficult for theengineers to see what they were doing,the smoke protected them from rifle,machine-pistol, and machine-gun firefrom the far bank. Again, the greatestproblem was the racing current. Aftersome difficulty in anchoring the cable,the engineers completed the first foot-bridge on schedule at 0424. But a fewminutes later an assault boat, sweptdownstream by the current, rammedinto the bridge and buckled it. As daybroke, cloudy, damp, and chilly, repairsto this bridge went on simultaneouslywith the construction of two additionalfootbridges. The engineers completedone footbridge by 0600; the first troopsto use it were two Germans who ran

out of a bunker on the far side andsurrendered to the engineers. By 0700all three footbridges were in place, andthe infantrymen were dashing acrossto clean out German strongpoints inhouses on the far bank.

Around 0900, small-arms fire ceasedto harass the 247th Engineer CombatBattalion which, since 0430, had beenconstructing the heavy ponton andtreadway bridges at the Aldenhovensite. But now German mortar and artil-lery fire began to fall, with tragic resultsat the treadway, where seven rounds ofheavy artillery fire killed six engineersand wounded eighteen. The fire alsodestroyed the bridge. Work began on anew bridge twenty-five yards upstreamat 1400, but observed artillery fire andthe swift current delayed completionuntil late the following morning. Theengineers working on the heavy pon-ton bridge were luckier and had thespan in operation by 1600 on D-day.Before darkness fell on 23 Februarytanks and bulldozers were clankingacross.8

At the Boslar-Juelich site downstreamthe beach party started out at 0300 intwo assault boats. One capsized and theother was caught by the current andthrown on the east bank near a mine-field, where several men were injured.These two incidents cost the party morethan half its strength. The 246th Engi-neer Combat Battalion suffered a seriesof misfortunes when it tried to build aninfantry support bridge at the down-stream site. The engineers had sweptthe approach for mines, but their metalmine detectors were ineffective on theplastic Topf mines in the road and onthe shoulders. After the Topf mines

7 Section on 1104th Engineer Combat Group, Bridg-ing the Roer; Ewing, 29 Let's Go!, pp. 225-27.

8 Bridging the Roer; Ewing, 29 Let's Go!, pp.228-31.


2D ARMORED DIVISION TANKS CROSS THE ROER INTO JUELICH

destroyed a wrecker, two tractors, andtwo dump trucks, the engineers spentsix hours checking the road by probing.When construction finally began, heavymortar fire from the Citadel drove offthe working crews. Some crew mem-bers infiltrated to the bridge from astadium on the near bank; others wereguided by an artillery observation planethat flew overhead, signaling to the mento take cover when the observer sawthe muzzle flash of enemy mortars. Themortar fire stopped when the Citadelfell in midafternoon, but when the engi-neers at last reached the site the swiftcurrent made it impossible to stretchanchor cables across the river. Not until1000 on 24 February were the engi-neers successful, and it was midafter-

noon before the bridge was open totraffic.9

By that time the current downstreamhad subsided enough to enable theengineers to build bridges for the 115thInfantry. In spite of trouble with plas-tic mines on the near bank and thehampering effect of heavy smoke, whichblinded and sickened the engineers, bydaylight they had most of two infantrybattalions across the river in assaultboats and LVTs. On the east bankminefields held up the infantry for atime, and although one infantry battal-ion had little trouble in taking and clear-ing Broich, heavy fire from houses andbunkers on high ground north of Juelich

9 Bridging the Roer.


held the second from its objective untillate in the evening. The third infantrybattalion, routing its companies throughBroich, reached its first-day objective,a hill northeast of the town. There itmade contact with the 102d InfantryDivision on the left.10

Troops of the 102d Division, whichthe 1141st Engineer Combat Groupsupported, crossed the Roer down-stream at two sites where there hadonce been bridges (hence paved roads)—one at Roerdorf (nearest Juelich) andanother at Linnich. At Roerdorf twocompanies of the group's 1276th Engi-neer Combat Battalion were to crossthe leading waves of the 405th Infan-try in assault boats, then emplace anantimine boom and build a treadwayfor vehicles. Simultaneously with theassault boat crossings a third engineercompany was to build two footbridgesupstream from the treadway site. Stand-ing by in case the bridges could not bebuilt or were knocked out were someLVTs manned by members of a tankbattalion. As the American artillery bar-rage began, the engineers carried theassault boats and footbridges to theriverbank, a hazardous operation be-cause German artillery had all roadsleading to the river well targeted.

The first wave of assault boats, mov-ing off at H-hour on 23 February,received direct hits from enemy fire onthe way over; several boats were rid-dled by shell fragments and sank. Theswift current carried many empty boatsdownstream during the return trip.

The engineers dragged some back, butother boats were swept over a dam andcapsized. By the time the second wavehad reached the far bank, so many ofthe original twenty assault boats hadbeen lost—most hit by enemy fire-—thattwenty more were called for. Germanmortar fire knocked out the secondtwenty along the road to the launchingsites, and these, too, had to be replaced.Of the total of sixty boats ultimatelycommitted only two were still usablewhen ferrying ended about 0700. Bythen the engineers had managed toferry across most of two infantry battal-ions. An hour later several LVTs ar-rived on the scene, but they were insuch poor shape mechanically that theycould not be employed.

The engineers had bad luck with thefootbridges from the start. The mencarrying them down to the river cameunder heavy artillery and mortar fireand had to scatter. When the engineerswere able to begin working they had tobattle the current. One footbridge over-turned and could not be rebuilt; theother parted in the middle when itscable lines snapped. The engineersrepaired the bridge, only to see it col-lapse again when a tree fell across it; itwas not in operation until 1300. In themeantime, divisional engineers hadbeen able to get an infantry supportbridge across, and the troops used thisspan instead of the footbridges. Workon a treadway began at 0930 at a siteimmediately upstream from the demol-ished bridge where the river was nar-rowest. That site was relatively freefrom artillery fire because the enemyhad not expected a crossing there. Nev-ertheless, the swift current made an-choring and guying difficult, whilemarshiness on the far bank caused fur-

10 Ewing, 29 Let's Go!, pp. 223-31; Joseph Binkoskiand Arthur Plaut, The 115th Infantry Regiment in WorldWar II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948),pp. 282-83, 292-93.


ther delay. The bridge was not openfor traffic until 2200.11

At the Linnich site and just to thesouth the 1141st Engineer CombatGroup's 279th Engineer Combat Bat-talion was to cross the 102d Division's407th Infantry. There the same haz-ards prevailed as at the Roerdorf site—rapid current and enemy fire. Onetreadway was in place at 1800, but low-flying German aircraft bombed it,wrecking all but one of the floats. Alltraffic during the night of 23-24 Feb-ruary had to be rerouted over the Roer-dorf treadway, which for a time wasthe only vehicular bridge in the XIIICorps area. This bombing raid demon-strated the importance of placing highpriority on getting antiaircraft weap-ons across the river.12

German bombs also fell on the Lin-nich bridges less than a mile north,where troops of the 84th Infantry Divi-sion were crossing the Roer with thesupport of the 1149th Engineer Com-bat Group's 171st Engineer CombatBattalion. In this narrowly restrictedarea plans differed from those the 30thand 102d Divisions followed—insteadof two engineer battalions crossing twoinfantry regiments abreast, one engi-neer battalion was to cross the infantryregiments in succession.13 After gettingthe first wave—a battalion of the 334thInfantry—over in assault boats, the171st Engineer Combat Battalion wasto build at Linnich three footbridges,

an infantry support bridge, and twotreadways. Meantime another of the1149th Group's battalions, the 292d,was to build a Class 70 Bailey bridge atan autobahn crossing about four milesnorth of Linnich near the town of Koer-renzig.14

The 334th Infantry characterized thecrossing of its lead battalion as smooth,marred only by a burst of enemy ma-chine-gun fire that killed five men, butattempts to build footbridges for thesucceeding battalions were more frus-trating here than anywhere else in theentire XIII Corps area. The currentimmediately tore out the first foot-bridge, empty assault boats racing down-river from the 102d Division crossingsdestroyed the second, and enemy mor-tar fire broke the cables of the third.Not until 1100 did the infantrymenhave a footbridge they could use. Inthe meantime the 171st Engineer Com-bat Battalion had suffered a number ofcasualties from enemy fire.

All 84th Division bridging was de-layed. The engineers could not com-plete an infantry support bridge until1630, and the treadway bridge was notin until much later. At daylight a pocketof enemy troops that the 334th Infan-try had bypassed fired on anyone whowent down to the river at the treadwaysite; work could not even begin untilthe pocket was cleared around noonon 23 February. The engineers thenwent ahead without interference andhad the bridge almost ready to taketraffic at 2000 when enemy aircraft flewover, causing casualties and damagingthe far side of the bridge. This was, inthe words of the 84th Infantry Division

11 Section on 1141st Engineer Combat Group, andInterv with its CO, Col William L. Rogers, 26 Feb. 45,both in Bridging the Roer; Hist 1276th Engr C Bn,Jan—May 45.

12 Section on 1141 st Engineer Combat Group, Bridg-ing the Roer; Simpson, "Rehearsal for the Rhine," p.26.

13 Draper, The 84th Infantry Division in the Battle ofGermany, p. 141; Hist 171st Engr C Bn, Jan-May 45.

14 Section on 1149th Engineer Combat Group,Bridging the Roer.


FOOTBRIDGE ON THE ROER

historian, "perhaps the most criticalmoment of the first day," because itmeant that no tanks or tank destroyerscould get across the river to help theinfantry on D-day. Using material in-tended for the second treadway, theengineers were able to replace the bridgeby noon on 24 February. At dusk thesame day work started on a heavy pon-ton bridge at the site originally selectedfor the second treadway, and the pon-ton span was operational before dawnof 25 February. Over the heavy pontonand treadway crossed the entire 84thInfantry Division, elements of the 5thArmored and 35th Infantry Divisions,and corps units, including artillery.15

The most ambitious effort in the XIIICorps sector was the construction of aClass 70 Bailey bridge across the Roerat the former autobahn crossing northof Linnich near Koerrenzig. Havingrepaired and strengthened an existing120-foot trestle bridge over a creek westof the river to accommodate Class 70loads, the 292d Engineer Combat Bat-talion began work on 25 February tobridge the 220-foot gap over the Roer.This involved placing a pier seventy feetfrom the near shore and then closing a150-foot gap with a triple-triple Baileyand the last 70-foot gap with a triple-single. Open to traffic at 0830 on 26

15 Cpl. Perry S. Wolff, A History of the 334th Infantry(Germany, 1945), p. 81; Hist 171st Engr C Bn, Jan-

May 45; Draper, The 84th Infantry Division in the Battleof Germany, pp. 151—52; Section on 1149th EngineerCombat Group, Bridging the Roer.


February, this bridge became the maincrossing for XIII Corps.16

Once on the far bank, XIII Corps'troops made such good progress thatGeneral Simpson decided not to holdthem back to provide a bridgehead forXVI Corps. Instead, he directed XVICorps to seize its own bridgehead atHilfarth, about five miles downstreamfrom Koerrenzig. Spearheading thiscrossing, the 35th Infantry Divisionmoved out in the evening of 25 Feb-ruary. Next morning some elements ofthe 134th Infantry were crossing theRoer on two footbridges and an infan-try support bridge a short distancedownstream from Hilfarth, while oth-ers were attacking the town. Many in-fantrymen were wounded in enemyminefields that the Germans coveredwith small-arms and machine-gun fire.Clearing the town, the troops foundthat although the highway bridge therewas somewhat damaged, it was stillusable; by early afternoon the bridgewas carrying XVI Corps tanks acrossthe Roer. During the afternoon corpsengineers built two treadway bridgesto ease traffic problems.17

The Roer crossings had consumedlarge amounts of bridging equipmentand numerous assault boats. This wasthe price General Simpson had expectedto pay for the surprise he achieved byattacking while the river was still swollen,and he considered "one of the essentialfactors in our success" the quick replace-ment of boats and bridging materialsfrom engineer parks close to the river.

Initial waves of combat troops had goneacross the Roer with small loss of life;the first day's casualties throughoutNinth Army amounted to 92 killed and913 wounded. In proportion to thenumber of men involved the casualtiesamong the engineers, who had beenforced to go on working at the bridgesites after the Germans recovered fromtheir surprise, were high. The fourengineer groups supporting XIX andXIII Corps during the Roer crossingslost 31 men killed and 226 wounded. 18

The Ludendorff Bridge

Though Ninth Army planners hadproceeded on the assumption that theGermans would destroy all eight of theRhine bridges in their area, they alsomade determined efforts to capture atleast one usable span intact. On 2 MarchGerman-speaking American troops incaptured German tanks failed in anattempt; by the fifth no bridge was leftstanding. Field Marshal Montgomeryvetoed a Ninth Army proposal for aquick assault crossing near Wesel whilethe Germans were still regrouping acrossthe Rhine. On 6 March he set the datefor the 21 Army Group crossing at 24March. Montgomery could not foreseethe good fortune that would befall FirstArmy troops moving south of the Ruhron Ninth Army's right.

First Army made good progress on 6March, with VII Corps entering Cologneand III Corps, farther south, approach-ing Bonn near the Ahr River, whichflows into the Rhine just upstream of

16 Section on 1149th Engineer Combat GroupBridging the Roer.

17 Parker and Thompson, Conquer, The Story of theNinth Army, pp. 174, 176; History of the XVI Corps(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp.24-26.

18 Simpson, "Rehearsal for the Rhine," p. 26; Par-ker and Thompson, Conquer, The Story of the NinthArmy, p. 171. Figures on engineer casualties are inBridging the Roer and Hist XIX Corps Engrs, p. 18,ML 2220, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


that city. This crossing would block theAhr River valley, the main escape routeof the enemy. Cologne had severalbridges, but by the time the city wascleared on the afternoon of 7 March,the Germans had destroyed them all.19

In the III Corps zone was an impor-tant highway bridge over the Rhine atBonn. About twelve miles upstreamfrom Bonn lay a railway bridge atRemagen, built during World War Iand named for one of the Germanheroes of that war, General ErichLudendorff. On the evening of 6 March,Maj. Gen. John Millikin, the III Corpscommander, asked the First Army airofficer to forbid bombing of the Bonnand Remagen bridges on the very slimchance that both might be capturedintact. Neither had figured seriously inIII Corps planning, and the Bonn high-way bridge had to be eliminated entirelyfrom the corps' plans early on 7 March,when First Army transferred responsi-bility for Bonn to VII Corps. The IIICorps all but discounted the LudendorffBridge—it had been under Allied airattack since September 1944, and in lateDecember the air forces claimed fourdirect hits. During January and earlyFebruary the bridge strikes had in-tensified, but the Germans had provedadept in making repairs. In mid-Feb-ruary American air reconnaissance re-ported that the bridge was back inservice. Thereafter a cloud cover hadprotected the span from attack. Itseemed inconceivable that the Germanswould not destroy the bridge before itcould be captured.20

When III Corps' spearhead, the 9thArmored Division, moved east on 7March, its main effort was directedtoward the Ahr River crossings, Com-bat Command A to cross at BadNeuenahr and one column of CombatCommand B at the point where the Ahrflows into the Rhine, a little more thana mile upstream from Remagen.Another column of Combat CommandB, organized as a task force under Lt.Col. Leonard Engeman, commandingthe 14th Tank Battalion, was to turnaside and take the towns of Remagenand Kripp, the latter near the Ahr-Rhine confluence. Orders said nothingabout capturing a bridge.21

Led by a platoon from Company Aof the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion,riding on half-tracks, and a platoon offour new T-26 90-mm. tanks from the14th Tank Battalion, Task Force Enge-man left Meckenheim at 0820 on 7March for Remagen, ten miles away.With it was the 2d platoon of CompanyB, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion,under 1st Lt. Hugh Mott.

The column moved out in a colddrizzle. The men, having pushed fromthe Roer toward the Rhine with littlerest since 28 February, were groggyfrom lack of sleep. The engineers wereparticularly weary. On the march theyhad built treadway bridges over threerivers, one under heavy German artil-lery fire. The bridging work was moredifficult because the T-26 tanks hadwider treads than the M-4 Shermans.The new M2 treadway bridge couldaccommodate the T—26s but was notsatisfactory for other vehicles, notablytrucks. The engineers had found anumber of bridges standing, but had

19 Engineer Operations by VII Corps in the Euro-pean Theater, vol. VII, "Crossings of the Rhine Riverand the Advance to the Elbe," p. 1, and app. II.

20 Ken Hechler, The Bridge at Remagen (New York:Ballantine Books, 1957), pp. 69-75. Unless other-wise cited, this section is based on this source.

21 Combat Interv 300, 9th Armd Div, 7-8 Mar 45.


THE LUDENDORFF RAIL BRIDGE AT REMAGEN

to search carefully for explosives andto remove mines and roadblocks alongthe roads.22

After leaving Meckenheim the col-umn made good time, meeting littleresistance. At 1300 the leading infan-try platoon commander was standingon a bluff at Apollinarisberg, overlook-ing Remagen and the 700-foot-wideRhine rushing through a gorge. Abouta mile upstream the Ludendorff Bridgewas still standing and the infantry offi-

cers could see it plainly through fieldglasses. It was a steel-arch bridge a lit-tle more than a thousand feet long andwide enough to carry two railroad tracks.Two castle-like stone towers with win-dows guarded each end. Beyond thetowers on the far side the two railroadtracks entered a tunnel cut into a rockcliff. By the morning of 7 March thelast train had gone over. One of thetracks on the bridge the Germans hadcovered with planking; over it streameda procession of soldiers, trucks, horse-drawn wagons and guns, civilians, andcattle.

Colonel Engeman sent infantrymendown the hill to take Remagen andordered the leader of the 90-mm. tankplatoon "to barrel down the hill and go

22 Hist 9th Armd Engr Bn, 1944-45 and AAR forMar 45; Memo, for 6th and 12th Army Gps, 15 Mar45, sub: Widened Bridges for the T-26 Tank, OCEETOUSA, 823-Bridges, 1944-45. For the develop-ment of the widened treadway, see Coll, Keith, andRosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equip-ment, pp. 490-95.


through and cover the bridge with tankfire, and if anybody attempted to repairor demolish the bridge to liquidatethem."23 The Combat Command Bcommander, Brig. Gen. William M.Hoge, came forward. Although Hogehad no specific orders to take the bridge,he had an informal understanding withthe commanding general of the 9thArmored Division that if the bridge wasintact it should be seized. When hearrived on the scene, Hoge had toweigh the chance that the Germanswould blow the bridge while Americanswere on it or trap part of his forces byletting some units get across beforeblowing the bridge.

At 1515 a courier arrived from Com-bat Command B's other column, southof Remagen at Sinzig, with informa-tion from a German civilian that theLudendorff Bridge was to be blown at1600. The story later proved fictitious,but the prospect of forty-five minutes'grace made up General Hoge's mind.He immediately ordered ColonelEngeman to emplace tanks and machineguns on the Remagen approach to thebridge, to fire smoke and white phos-phorus, to bring up engineers to pullfiring wires and fuses, and to make adash across the span.24

Engeman's tankers were already atthe bridge. His messenger found theyoung engineer platoon leader, Lieu-tenant Mott, at a hotel near the riverand passed on Hoge's orders to rip outdemolitions and to find out whetherthe bridge would support tanks. Mott

took along two of his sergeants, EugeneBorland and John A. Reynolds. As theyneared the bridge the three wereshocked by a tremendous explosion thatblew a thirty-foot crater into the Rema-gen approach. This, for the time beingat least, would deny the bridge to anyvehicles, including tanks.

Mott and his men jumped down intothe crater for protection against a sec-ond blast, but when they saw the com-mander of the 27th Armored InfantryBattalion talking to 1st Lt. Karl Tim-merman, commanding the leading in-fantry company and pointing towardthe bridge, the engineers climbed outand went forward to join the infantry-men. Just as they did so there came asecond explosion, this time about two-thirds of the way across the bridge. Thestructure groaned and seemed to raiseitself ponderously; timbers flew and ahuge cloud of dust and smoke ascended.But when the smoke cleared the mensaw that the bridge was still standing.Obviously the few German defendersmoving about on the far side had setoff only one charge in a vain attempt todrop the span. Mott decided that hismain job would be to locate and cut thewires to other charges before the Ger-mans could detonate them. The threeengineers ran out on the bridge just asTimmerman and his lead scouts werebeginning to cross.

Machine-gun fire came from the fartowers and from a barge on the river,but with the help of covering fire fromthe tanks on the Remagen side theinfantrymen made their way cautiouslyalong a catwalk around the hole in thebridge. The engineers searched fordemolition charges and wires. Findingfour thirty-pound packages of explo-sives tied to I-beams under the decking,

23 Interv, Lt Col Leonard Engeman, 14 Mar 45, inThe Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure and Expansion,6-11 Mar 45, 9th Armd Div, ML 888, ETOUSA HistSect.

24 Interv, Gen Hoge, 14 Mar 45, in The RemagenBridgehead, Seizure and Expansion.


they climbed down and cut the wires,sending the packages splashing into theRhine.25 Climbing back onto the bridge,Sergeant Dorland blasted a heavy cableapart with his carbine. The engineersapparently did not locate the wiringfuse that would have set off all thecharges—the Germans had enclosed itin a thick pipe laid underneath thetracks to protect it from American shells.As soon as the infantry had cleared thetowers on the far side, Dorland foundthe box that housed the master switchand shot out the heavy wires leadingfrom it. A few minutes later the threeengineers came upon a large explosivecharge of from 500 to 600 pounds cor-rectly wired and prepared for detona-tion but with its fuse cap blown.

Fuse damage was one possible solu-tion to the mystery that continued topuzzle historians, American andGerman, for years: why the main chargethat would have dropped the bridgehad failed to explode when, at 1530after Americans were seen approach-ing from Remagen, the German engi-neer at the bridge, Capt. Karl Friesen-hahn, turned the key to set it off. Oneexplanation for the failure was sabotage,either by a German soldier or a foreignworker, but this theory could not besubstantiated and Captain Friesenhahnand the German commandant at thebridge, Capt. Willi Bratge, dismissed itas impossible because the mechanismwas carefully guarded at all times. MostGerman officers and historians believedthat the wires were severed by a luckyhit from an American tank gun. JacobKlebach of Remagen, a sergeant-majorworking with the German engineers onthe bridge that day, offered another

explanation. Interviewed twenty yearslater, Klebach said, "The truth is thatthe concussion damage of all the monthsbefore just made it a toss-up whetherthe fuses would function whenneeded."26

Calling up the rest of his platoon tohelp remove the demolitions, Lieuten-ant Mott reported to Colonel Engemanthat he could have the bridge ready totake tanks in two hours if he couldobtain enough timber to repair thedamaged planking. While Engemanwas trying to find the timber, the armor,at Mott's request, brought up a tank-dozer to fill the crater at the Remagenend of the bridge.27 Fear of a Germancounterattack spurred efforts to gettanks across. Lumber for the plankingwas difficult to locate, but GeneralHoge rounded up enough, instructinghis S—4 and civil affairs officials to "teardown houses in Remagen if necessary."28

By 2000 that evening the news of thecapture of the Ludendorff Bridge hadtraveled from combat command throughdivision, corps, army, and army groupto General Eisenhower at SHAEF. Maj.Gen. Harold R. Bull, Eisenhower's G-3,could not see the value of the bridge.The terrain on the other side was mis-erable and, he told General Bradley,"You're not going anywhere down thereat Remagen"; nor did the effort fit intoplans to cross farther north.29 But Bull'sopinion was the exception. Command-

25 Hechler, The Bridge at Remagen, pp. 66-67.

26 Interv in New York Times, "Rhine Crossing:Twenty Years Later," March 21, 1965. Hechler in TheBridge at Remagen discusses the probability of sabotageor damage from a tank shell; see pp. 212—20.

27 Engeman interv in The Remagen Bridgehead,Seizure and Expansion.

28 Hoge interv in The Remagen Bridgehead, Sei-zure and Expansion.

29 John Toland, The Last 100 Days (New York: Ran-dom House, 1966), pp. 214-15


ers from Eisenhower down were elatedand enthusiastically approved rein-forcements. Lt. Gen. Courtney H.Hodges that same evening relieved IIICorps of its mission to drive southacross the Ahr and approved exploit-ing the Rhine crossing. General Millikinmade plans to motorize the reserve ele-ments of his 9th and 78th Infantry Divi-sions and rush them to Remagen.

Col. F. Russel Lyons, the III Corpsengineer, followed plans First Armyhad already worked out for a Rhinecrossing in its area, based on topographi-cal and terrain studies. Engineers wereto erect a treadway bridge downstreamfrom the Ludendorff Bridge and aponton bridge upstream. While theywere being built, ferries were to carrymen, supplies, and vehicles to the farbank and bring back the wounded. Netsand booms would have to be emplacedupstream to protect the bridges fromunderwater attack by small submarinesand frogmen carrying explosives. (InSeptember the Germans had used spe-cially trained and equipped swimmersin an attempt to blow up the Nijmegenbridge in the British area.)30 Since thesepreparations required resources IIICorps did not have, First Army turnedover to the corps' operational controlthe units and equipment needed. TwoFirst Army engineer combat groupsthat had been supporting the 9th and78th Infantry Divisions were to be em-ployed, the 1111th to build the treadwayand landing sites for three ferries, the1159th to construct the ponton bridgeand operate the ferries, using DUKWsand Navy LCVPs. The 164th Engineer

Combat Battalion was to emplace thenets and booms to protect the Luden-dorff Bridge from underwater attack.31

While these engineers stood alertduring the rainy night of 7 March, 9thArmored Division engineers on thescene were working on the approachesand the planking to get tanks acrossthe bridge. All afternoon infantry hadbeen moving across, walking very fastor running to escape sniper fire, move-ment which slowed the engineers' work.Although the crater at the approachwas filled in by dusk, not until 2200was Mott able to tell Engeman that thebridge was ready to take tanks. Theengineers had laid down white guidetapes to enable the tanks to bypass dan-gerous places. In the blackness shortlyafter midnight nine Shermans startedacross, their passage over the planking"accompanied by an ominous and nerve-wracking creaking." They got acrosssafely, but when a tank destroyer, fol-lowing them at a slightly faster pace,came to the point at which the Ger-mans had blown their charge, its righttread fell into the hole. For the rest ofthe night the engineers worked to jackup the tank destroyer, which was block-ing the passage of all vehicles, but theywere not successful until 0530.32

Among the nearly 8,000 men whocrossed the bridge in the first twenty-four hours after its capture was theremainder of the 9th Armored Engi-neer Battalion's Company B. Duringthe early hours of 8 March Company C

30 Brig. Gen. P. H. Timothy, The Rhine Crossings;Twelfth Army Group Engineer Operations (Fort Belvoir,Va., 1946), pp. 11,24.

31 Intervs, Col F. Russel Lyons, 21 Mar 45, and LtCol H. F. Cameron, CO, 164th Engr C Bn et al., 26Mar 45, in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure andExpansion; III Corps Hist, 314.7, file 1; Hists, 1111thand 1159th Engr C Gps, Mar 45.

32 Intervs, Engeman, 14 Mar 45, and Capt George PSoumas, CO, Co A, 14th Tank Bn, 15 Mar 45, both inThe Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure and Expansion.


relieved Company B on the bridge.After making an intensive search forGerman demolitions, which turned up1,400 pounds in wells of the piers, themen of Company C assumed the job ofrepair and traffic control just as enemybombers and artillery began to hit thebridge. The Luftwaffe was relativelyineffective, but the artillery did consid-erable damage. Company C estimatedthat during the forty-eight hours itworked on the bridge, the Germansscored at least twenty-four direct hits.At times, when panic-stricken driversabandoned their vehicles, the engineersdrove the vehicles off the bridge, andwhen first-aid men refused to set footon the bridge the engineers acted asmedics.

Late on the afternoon of the ninth,shells from heavy artillery tore a fifteen-foot hole in the decking and set fire toan ammunition truck on the far bank,blocking all traffic. Amid explodingammunition, an engineer of CompanyB in an armored bulldozer safely pushedthe blazing truck off the road. But whensquads of Company C tried to repairthe hole in the decking, two officers andnine enlisted men were wounded by ashell exploding in the superstructurenear them. Then the engineers spreadout in two-man teams, repairing thehole by laying steel treadways overplanks. On the morning of the tenththe 276th Engineer Combat Battalion,one of the III Corps units sent toRemagen, relieved Company C. Beforeleaving, Company C put up a sign:"Cross the Rhine With Dry Feet, Cour-tesy of the 9th Armored Division."33

The Ferries

The III Corps' engineer units arrivedlate because of traffic jams on narrowwinding roads, the blackout in whichthey had to feel their way forward, andenemy shellfire near Remagen. Thus,the 86th Engineer Heavy Ponton Bat-talion, which was to operate ferrieswhile tactical bridges were being built,did not arrive until around 0330 on 9March. Under intermittent shelling, theweary men immediately began to con-struct the first raft at the site selectedfor the crossing, downstream from theLudendorff Bridge. The engineers low-ered five boats into the water and laybalk and planking over them. Beforenoon next morning three five-boat raftshad been built, and the approaches atRemagen and at Erpel on the east bankwere ready. At 1100 on 9 March in acold wind and lashing rain, withoutwaiting for a cable to be emplaced, thefirst ferry chugged across the Rhine,propelled by two outboard motors andtwo powerboats—a 22-horsepowermotor fastened to each of the end engi-neer boats and a powerboat lashed tothe second and fourth. Headed up-stream at a 45-degree angle because ofthe swift current, the ferry took lessthan eight minutes to reach the farshore.34The Remagen-Erpel ferry, the only

one in operation on 9 and 10 March,became a vital factor in support of thebridgehead across the river. At noonon the tenth a gasoline truck on theLudendorff Bridge had been hit andset afire; all ammunition and gasoline

33 Hist 9th Armd Engr Bn, 1944-45; Interv, CaptEllis G. Fee, CO, Co C, 9th Armd Engr Bn, 14 Mar45, in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure and Expan-sion.

34 Interv, Lt Col Robert O. Hass, CO, 86th EngrHeavy Ponton Bn, 25 Mar 45, in The RemagenBridgehead, Seizure and Expansion.


convoys were ordered ferried across fortwo days. The second ferry was con-structed upstream of the LudendorffBridge, from Kripp to Linz, but enemyopposition near Linz caused delays andthe ferry did not begin operation untillate on the afternoon of 11 March.Work on the third ferry (downstreamof the treadway), from Unkelbach toUnkel, was so slowed by very accurate(probably observed) artillery fire that itcould not be finished in time to be ofmuch use. By noon on 12 March thetreadway and ponton bridges had beencompleted. Then the need for the raftsdiminished, although that day and thenext the ferries made a further impor-tant contribution to the far shore bridge-head when they crossed four heavy Per-shing tanks to Erpel and thirty-oneShermans to Linz.35From the beginning, plans for a Rhine

crossing had included LCM, LCVP, andDUKW ferry operations (the DUKWsto carry ammunition, gasoline, andrations). Early during the Remagenoperation the Transportation Corps'819th Amphibian Truck Company,which had distinguished itself at OMAHAon D-day, came forward and was at-tached to the 1159th Engineer CombatGroup. The company's DUKWs werelate getting into operation because itwas hard to find a suitable site to launchthe trucks. Then, when they began fer-rying at a site near Kripp, the DUKWshad to travel some twelve miles to therear to pick up their loads because FirstArmy disapproved of setting up dumpsfor them closer to the river. Men onthe scene generally believed that a rivercrossing under conditions like those at

Remagen, involving a long land hauland short water haul, was uneconomi-cal for DUKWs.36

No LCMs came forward because FirstArmy considered that capture of thebridge rendered them unnecessary, butLCVPs were needed to ferry troops andevacuate the wounded. The LCVPsarrived in the Remagen area at mid-night on 10 March, sent forward in flat-bed trailers together with cranes forlaunching them. They proved highlyuseful—each craft could ferry thirty-six soldiers faster and more efficientlythan the troops could march across afootbridge. This speed was demon-strated on 15 March, when four LCVPstransported a regimental combat teamof VII Corps' 1st Division across theRhine at a site not far downstream fromthe Ludendorff Bridge and leading toUnkel on the far shore. A round triprequired not more than seven minutes,enabling the LCVPs to put ashore 2,200infantrymen in three hours. The imme-diate job of the first boats that arrived,however, was to aid in the constructionof the heavy ponton bridge.37

The Treadway and Ponton Bridges

On 9 March under cold, rainy, andovercast skies, two engineer units thathad distinguished themselves during

35 Ibid.; Folder, Crossing the Rhine Operation"Varsity," OCE files.

36 Diary, III Corps Engr, 25 Mar 45, and Interv,Capt John C. Bray, CO, 819th Amphib Truck Co, 25Mar 45, both in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizureand Expansion.

37 On LCMs, see Ltr, Cmdr, TG, 122.5 to CinC, U.S.Fleet, 16 Apr 45, sub: Operations Rpt, copy in OCEfiles; Opns Rpt, LCVP Unit No. 1, 12th Army GpNaval Opns Rpt, copy in OCE files. The Navy's LCVPUnit No. 1, with twenty-four boats, was assigned toFirst Army. Sixteen boats were in the first contingentarriving at Remagen; the remaining eight came uplater.


the Battle of the Ardennes in the Mal-medy—Trois Fonts area began arriv-ing at Remagen, the 291st EngineerCombat Battalion under Lt. Col. DavidE. Pergrin to work on a treadway bridgefrom Remagen to Erpel and the 51stEngineer Combat Battalion under Lt.Col. Harvey R. Eraser to build a heavyponton bridge upstream, from Krippto Linz. Arriving before dawn, the 291sthad to wait until 0830 for the 998thTreadway Bridge Company to bring upbridging equipment. This company, theonly unit available, had been workingwith First French Army. By 1030 Colo-nel Pergrin had a platoon clearing theapproach on the near bank.

The men had just started to cut awaythe bank when an enemy artillery shellhit the site, injuring seven. There wereno more direct hits that day, and bydusk the engineers had extended thetreadway 200 feet, with good prospectsof reaching the far shore next morning.Then, shortly after midnight, Germantanks on high ground at the east end ofthe bridge began to rake the bridgingwith direct fire. They knocked out twocranes and twenty-six rafts assembledwith treadway and caused a five-hourdelay. Work resumed although enemyshelling continued, intensifying justafter noon on 10 March, when thetreadway began receiving a round ofheavy artillery every five minutes. At1230 a direct hit at the west end dam-aged fifteen rafts. The treadway heldthem in place, enabling the engineersto finish the bridge. Reaching the farshore at 1710 the engineers could claimto have built the first tactical bridge overthe Rhine and, at 1,032 feet, the long-est yet constructed in Europe. But re-pairs to the rafts delayed the openingof the bridge to traffic until 0700 on 11

March. That morning the 988th Engi-neer Treadway Bridge Company re-placed the 998th, which had run out ofequipment. The building of the tread-way bridge had been costly, with oneman killed and twenty-four woundedduring construction.

By the time the bridge was finished,German artillery fire was letting up. AGerman artillery observer with a radiohad been captured in Remagen, a heavyconcentration of U.S. artillery had laiddown a smoke screen, and the advanceof the combat forces on the far shorewas pushing the German guns back.During its first two days of operation,the eastbound traffic count for thetreadway was 3,105 vehicles. At noonon 13 March the bridge began carryinga heavy volume of westbound traffic aseastbound traffic transferred to theponton bridge located upstream.38

Building the heavy ponton bridgefrom Kripp to Linz had to be post-poned until the enemy was clearedfrom a high hill across the river. Whenthe order to begin construction cameat 1600 on 10 March, the executive offi-cer of the 51st Engineer Combat Battal-ion, Maj. Robert B. Yates (who had dis-tinguished himself at Trois Ponts dur-ing the Bulge), had everything ready,including six smoke pots on a 3/4-tontruck. Despite the smoke screen, sixrounds of heavy artillery, variouslydescribed as 170-mm. and 88-mm.,immediately hit the near shore andbridge site, but did no damage. Theequipment for the bridge, which the

38 Interv, Lt Col David E. Pergrin, 22 Mar 45, andCol F. Russel Lyons, 21 Mar 45, and Diary, III CorpsEngr, all in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure andExpansion; Hists, 291st Engr C Bn, Jan—Apr 45, May45, and 1111th Engr C Gp, Mar 45.


HEAVY AND PNEUMATIC PONTONS LOADED FOR TRANSPORT TO REMAGEN

181st and 552d Heavy Ponton Battal-ions provided, consisted of fourteenfour-boat rafts and seventy-five feet oftrestle, reinforced by pneumatic rub-ber floats between each raft. The 51stused a total of sixty boats and fifty-sevenrubber floats. Next day, 11 March, withthe current at the site swift and the riverrising, the engineers had such troublemaneuvering the parts into positionwith powerboats that they called forLCVPs. Slipping crossways in the cur-rent, one of the LCVPs on the upstreamside rammed into a section of the bridgeand might have swept it into the tread-way if three LCVPs downstream hadnot held the section in place until theengineers could safely anchor it to abarge on the far shore.

While this work was going on, Ger-man planes came over, bombing andstrafing in pairs. At the far shore abut-ment three men were killed, two wereseriously wounded, and several suf-fered light wounds from bomb frag-ments. An hour before midnight on 11March the bridge was open for trafficand next day was reinforced to carry24-ton loads, but possibly because it waseasy to spot from the air, the pontonbridge continued to come under attackfrom German bombers and strafers. On13 March five waves flew over; one inmidafternoon killed Maj. William F.Tompkins, Jr., commanding officer ofthe 552d Heavy Ponton Battalion, forwhom the bridge was named. When theweather cleared on 14 March the Ger-


mans stepped up air attacks. A riverbarge on the far shore near the anchorbarge received a direct hit from a 500-pound bomb that killed two of its engi-neer guards; on the bridge itself fivemen were wounded by shell and bombfragments. This marked the end of thelow-level, daylight attempts to destroythe Remagen bridges from the air. Withclearing weather American fighterscould rise to meet the enemy, and by14 March a heavy concentration ofAmerican antiaircraft guns on bothbanks of the river rendered daylightattacks too costly to the dwindling Luft-waffe?39

Collapse of the Ludendorff Bridge

On 12 March, after the treadway andponton bridges were in operation, theengineers closed the Ludendorff Bridgefor repairs. The fixed span was consid-ered worth repairing because artillerycould not knock it out as readily as thetactical bridges—an ordinary shellwould not damage its structure but onlyrip the flooring. Moreover, the tacticalbridges could not as easily carry heavyloads such as the new Pershing tanks.40The Germans had certainly tried to

knock out the Ludendorff. On thenight of 10 March, just as the 276thEngineer Combat Battalion had begunconstruction of a 140-foot double-double Bailey at the near shore to makepossible two-way traffic, a direct enemy

artillery hit killed Maj. James E. Foley,the battalion executive officer, andwounded nineteen men. On the daysfollowing, enemy shells continued to fallas the 276th worked on the approaches,completing them under cover of dark-ness on 12 March. A team from the1058th Port Construction and RepairGroup undertook the heavy steel workon the bridge.41

In the meantime, preparations wereunder way to protect the bridge fromwaterborne or underwater attack. Fivehundred yards upstream the engineerswere to string a net across the river tocatch floating mines, boats loaded withexplosives, torpedoes launched fromone-man submarines, and frogmen.The next barrier to be emplaced wasan impact boom 600 yards from thebridge, the third a log boom at 900yards. Responsibility for installing thesedevices went to the 164th EngineerCombat Battalion, a First Army unitthat reported directly to the corps engi-neer. The 164th arrived on the eve-ning of 8 March and started work nextmorning, but it soon became evidentthat the construction site, on the farshore at the river's edge, was in thedirect line of enemy artillery fire. Thatafternoon enemy shells killed threemen and wounded two, and on theafternoon of 10 March four men werekilled when German artillery hit a truck;three others were wounded. The inten-sity of enemy artillery fire as well as thelack of powerboats delayed the place-ment of floats. Nevertheless, at 2200

39 Intervs, Lt Col Harvey R. Fraser and Maj RobertYates, 20 Mar 45, Col F. Russel Lyons, 21 Mar 45, andDiary, III Corps Engr, all in The Remagen Bridge-head, Seizure and Expansion; Hists, 51st Engr C Bn,Jan-Jun 45; 1159th Engr C Gp, Mar 45 and 26 Jun44-20 Aug 45; Opns Rpt, LCVP Unit No. 1.

40 Interv, Gen Hoge, 14 Mar 45, in The RemagenBridgehead, Seizure and Expansion.

41 Hist 1159th Engr C Bn, Mar 45 and 26 Jun 44-20Aug 45; Intervs, Lt Col Kenneth E. Fields, CO, andMaj Francis E. Goodwin, S-4, 1159th Engr C Gp, 21Mar 45, in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizure andExpansion; Jnl, 276th Engr C Bn, Feb, Mar, Apr,May 45.


on 11 March the impact boom's anchor-age of angle iron and railroad bump-ers was in place, as were four sectionsof the boom.

Then orders came to protect theheavy ponton bridge newly installed atKripp. Work at the new site began nextday, 12 March, but was hampered bynightly air raids, which two days laterkilled three and wounded two engi-neers. The difficulty of towing overwater the heavy material required toerect and anchor the protective boomsalso slowed progress, for powerboatsand LCVPs—both of which had beenadequate in constructing floatingbridges—had insufficient power. Themost satisfactory work boats were 38-foot Army tugboats known as Sea Mules.With a detachment of the 329th Har-bor Craft Company (TC) to operatethem, the tugs came forward on flat-bed trailers on the evening of 14March.42

For further protection against water-borne attacks, guards with rifles stoodon the Ludendorff Bridge with ordersto shoot at suspicious objects. Tanks ofthe 738th Tank Battalion with brilliantsearchlights called canal defense lightstook positions on the banks to illumi-nate the river, the first use of such tanksduring the war. Three LCVPs werelaunched upstream of the antimineboom at noon on 14 March. They pa-trolled the river every night, droppingfifty-pound depth charges at five-minute intervals, with good effect. TwoGerman swimmers found lying ex-hausted on the far bank a few days latersaid they had been stunned by the

depth charges, as well as numbed bythe cold water.43

On 16 March the Germans begantheir strongest effort yet to bring downthe Ludendorff Bridge. That morningshells larger than 88-mm. came over,and on 17 March several rounds ofgiant projectiles from a tank-mountedpiece called the Karl howitzer landedin Remagen. On the same morning aGerman rocket unit in the Netherlandsfired eleven V-2s at the bridge—theonly tactical use of V-weapons duringthe war. About 1220 one rocket hit abuilding in Remagen serving as com-mand post for Company B of the 284thEngineer Combat Battalion (a unit the1159th Engineer Combat Group hadbrought up for road work west of theRhine), killing three men and seriouslyinjuring thirty-one, among them thecompany commander.44 Another rockethit a house east of the bridge, killingthree American soldiers and woundingfifteen. The rest of the rockets landedharmlessly in the river or open coun-try.45

Soon the rocket barrage and the shell-ing ended. All was quiet on the clear,windless spring day. Capt. Francis E.Goodwin, S-4 of the 1159th EngineerCombat Group, walked out onto thebridge from the Remagen side around1400 and found the engineers of the276th Engineer Combat Battalion and

42 First U.S. Army Report of Rhine River Crossing,pp. 28, 31-32, 44; Diary, III Corps Engr, in TheRemagen Bridgehead, Seizure and Expansion.

43 Hist 164th Engr C Bn, 5 May 43-2 Sep 45; OpnsRpt, LCVP Unit No. 1, p. 5; Diary, III Corps Engr,and Interv, Lt Col H. F. Cameron, CO, 164th Engr CBn et al., p. 5, in The Remagen Bridgehead, Seizureand Expansion.

44 Hists, 284th Engr C Bn, Feb, Mar-May 45, and1159th Engr C Gp, 26 Jun-20 Aug 45 and Mar 45.

45 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 228, quotingSHAEF Air Defense Div, Summary of Casualties andDamage from V-Weapon Attack, Rpt for the WeekEnding 19 Mar 45.


the 1058th Engineer Port Constructionand Repair Group making good prog-ress.46 The 276th was finishing the deckrepair. The Germans had placed deck-ing only on the upstream half of thebridge; the engineers were decking thedownstream half, as well as repairingdamage from the enemy shells that hadfallen almost every day.47 The newflooring was complete except for a gapat the Remagen approach and anotherwhere the Germans had attempted toblow the bridge. Goodwin passed asquad loading pieces of lumber on atruck. At the point where the Germanshad tried to blow the bridge he foundMaj. William S. Carr and the 1058thPort Construction and Repair Groupwith a crane and steel cable. They werepreparing to repair the most criticalspot, the bottom chord on the upstreamarch truss, which the German demoli-tion charge of 7 March had broken.Carr said he expected to have the re-pairs completed next day. CaptainGoodwin crossed to the east bank ofthe Rhine. It was then about 1445.

A few minutes before 1500 Lt. Col.Clayton A. Rust, commanding the 276thEngineer Combat Battalion, was walk-ing over the bridge on his way to inspectthe new approach on the far side, ac-companied by his executive officer.When he was about halfway across, he

heard a sharp crack like the report of arifle. It was a rivethead shearing. Hesaw a vertical hanger ahead of him break-ing loose and then heard another sharpreport behind him. The whole decktrembled, dust rose, and he knew thebridge was collapsing. Turning around,he ran toward Remagen as fast as hecould, but found himself running uphillbecause the far side of the bridge wasfalling. The next moment he was in thewater.

At 1500 Captain Goodwin was ridinga motorcycle around the east abutmentof the bridge on his way to cross backover the treadway, when a sound hecould not identify made him look up.To his horror he saw that the arch ofthe Ludendorff Bridge had crumbled.The east abutment was falling. Theassistant S-3 of the 1058th Port Con-struction Repair Group, 1st Lt. F. E.Csendes, was in the tunnel on the farside, where he had gone with a ser-geant to pick up some clamps, when heheard someone yell. He looked out andsaw the center span of the bridge twist-ing counterclockwise and buckling;then it fell into the river and the adja-cent spans with it.

Captain Goodwin raced his motorcy-cle over the treadway and told the menon the west bank to pick up the survi-vors and protect the treadway fromheavy bridge iron and timbers thatmight float downstream. From Rema-gen he sent ambulances to the scene,then continued to the forward com-mand post of the 1159th EngineerCombat Group at Kripp, arriving thereat 1512. After instructing the sergeantin charge to round up all the medicalaid available, he rode back across theponton bridge to the east bank and sent

46 Goodwin statement in Summary of Statements ofWitnesses, Incl 2 to Lt Col K. E. Fields, CO, 1159thEngr C Gp, Report on the Collapse of the Ludendorf[sic] Bridge, 19 Mar 45, in Hist 1159th Engr C Gp,Mar 45.

47 Waldo G. Bowman, American Military Engineeringin Europe from Normandy to the Rhine (New York:MacGraw-Hill, 1945), p. 83. Bowman, editor of Engi-neering News-Record, inspected the bridge on 16 March1945. Also see Jnl, 276th Engr C Bn, Mar 45, entriesfor 151755 and 161830.


WRECKAGE OF THE LUDENDORFF BRIDGE AFTER ITS COLLAPSE

powerboats downstream for rescuework.48

Colonel Rust and his companion werepulled out of the river at the treadwaybridge, both shaken but not badly hurt.Few of the men working on the bridgeat the time were as lucky. Six membersof the 276th Engineer Battalion werekilled in the collapse of the bridge, 11were missing (presumably drowned),and 60 were injured, 3 so severely thatthey died. The commander of the1058th Port Construction and RepairGroup, Major Carr, was killed; seven

of his men were missing and six m-jured. 49

The main reason for the collapse ofthe Ludendorff Bridge, most engineersbelieved, was the break in the bottomchord of the upstream truss from theGerman demolition charge of 7 March.This forced the downstream truss tocarry the whole load and subjected theentire bridge to a twisting action. Thestrain on the truss was increased by theweight of the timber decking Ameri-can engineers had added to the flooring,by continuous bridge traffic between 7and 12 March, and by engineer repairsbetween 12 and 17 March—ham-48 Statements of Goodwill, Rust, and others, in Sum-

mary of Statements of Witnesses, Incl 2 to Fields'Report on the Collapse of the Ludendorf [sic] Bridge;Operations and Reconnaissance Journal, Forward GPVie Kripp; both in Hist 1159th Engr C Gp, Mar 45.

49 Fields Rpt and Rust statement in Hist 1159th EngrC Gp, Mar 45.


mering, welding, and moving heavycranes and trucks.

The immediate cause of the collapsewas thought to be vibration from artil-lery fire. The enemy fired very heavyartillery shells beginning on 15 Marchand culminating on 17 March with theKarl howitzer and the V—2 rockets.Some of the shells actually hit the bridge.Perhaps even more damaging vibrationcame from American artillery fire. Only2,000 yards from the bridge an 8-inchhowitzer battalion had fired more thana thousand rounds in the previous fivedays, and just before the bridge fell abattalion of giant 8-inch guns and an-other of 240-mm. howitzers were fir-ing constantly.50

The III Corps Bailey Bridge

At 1800 on 17 March, only threehours after the collapse of the Luden-dorff Bridge, the commanding officerof the 148th Engineer Combat Battal-ion, Lt. Col. William J. Irby, receivedorders from First Army to build a Class40 floating Bailey bridge at Remagen.The floating Bailey was regarded as a"semitactical" bridge, normally used toreplace treadway bridges and requir-ing considerably more time to constructthan either treadways or pontons. Thebattalion was one of three operating aBailey bridge park at Weilerswist aboutten miles west of Bonn, under the1110th Engineer Combat Group, FirstArmy's Bailey bridge and mine boomexperts.

Colonel Irby lost no time. Orderinghis men to begin loading the bridgingequipment on about one hundredtrucks, most of them borrowed fromquartermaster units, he sent two of hisofficers to reconnoiter for a site andinstructed his company commanders tomove their men to the Remagen areaand to meet him at this advance com-mand post at Remagen at 0200 on 18March. Then he hurried to group head-quarters, where he was told that hewould have the help of Company C,291st Engineer Combat Battalion, andsixty men of the 501st Light PontonCompany.

Irby had not expected orders to builda Bailey bridge over the Rhine so soon,and his planning had focused on a 25March target date. Nevertheless hismen were ready, having practiced onthe Meuse near Liege for months. Mostimportant, the equipment was ready,neatly laid out along the roadnet atWeilerswist in the order in which itwould be used, landing bay equipmentin one stack, floating Baileys in another.

Work began at 0730 on 18 March atthe site where the heavy ponton ferryhad operated from Remagen to Erpel(downstream from the treadway bridge).While the company from the 291stEngineer Combat Battalion preparedapproach roads to connect with theexisting roadnet, the 148th Battalionbuilt the bridge. Here, as with thetreadway and ponton bridges, the swiftriver current made it difficult to towcomponents into position. Repairedcivilian Rhine tugboats were too slowand clumsy, but three U.S. Navy LCVPsproved excellent. The rushing watersof the Rhine also complicated anchor-age, but the engineers solved this prob-lem by dropping five 1,500-pound an-

50 Ibid.; Interv, Col V. F. Burger, XO, III Corps,FDC et al., 10 Mar 45, in The Remagen Bridgehead,Seizure and Expansion; Bowman, American MilitaryEngineering in Europe from Normandy to the Rhine (quot-ing Capt. James B. Cooke, structural expert in theOCE ETOUSA), pp. 84-87.


chors upstream and sinking two rock-filled barges to which cables were at-tached.

Artillery fire occasionally landed nearthe bridge but did no damage. Menworked around the clock; the coxswainof one of the LCVPs, for example,remained at the wheel for twenty-ninehours without a halt. By 0715 on 20March the 1,258-foot floating Baileywas ready to take traffic—twenty-fourhours earlier than First Army had ex-pected.51

VII Corps, First Army, and V Corps Crossings

By 16 March VII Corps' 1st and 78thInfantry Divisions (the latter transfer-red from III Corps on 16 March) hadcrossed the Rhine on the III Corps'bridges and ferries at Remagen andwere driving north and northeast toseize the line of the Sieg River, whichentered the Rhine from the east nearBonn. The time had come to build tacti-cal bridges in the VII Corps area, andequipment was available for two steeltreadways and one heavy ponton.

During site selection the roadnet onthe opposite bank was an importantconsideration but not the only one. Thebest of four good roads leading to theCologne-Frankfurt autobahn lay oppo-site Bonn, but sites there had to awaitthe clearing of the area by the 78thDivision, headed north along the Rhine.Therefore, the first tactical bridgeswere to be constructed in the southernpart of VII Corps' zone. Not far down-stream from the site of III Corps' float-

ing Bailey, the 1120th Engineer Com-bat Group was to build an M2 steeltreadway at Rolandseck, and about fivemiles farther downstream at Koenigs-winter the same group Was to build aheavy ponton bridge. At the southernfringe of Bonn the 1106th EngineerCombat Group was to construct an M2treadway. Corps engineer units wereto build bridges and operate ferries,using heavy ponton rafts and all LCVPsnot required as powerboats or guardboats.52

Special security precautions weretaken as a result of the enemy harass-ment that bridge builders in the Rema-gen area had suffered. To cover bothbanks at each site the 80th ChemicalSmoke Generating Company providedsmoke, thickened as necessary by boat-mounted smoke generators. First Armyengineers built protective booms, andtwo Navy LCVPs patrolled the riverduring darkness. At each site, corpsartillery furnished a battery of 155-mm.howitzers, two forward observers, andan artillery liaison plane. Corps antiair-craft artillery, in addition to providing90-mm. antiaircraft protection, turnedsearchlights on clouds to provide artifi-cial moonlight at night.

In building the bridge at Rolandseck,the 297th Engineer Combat Battalionhad the help of a company from the294th Engineer Combat Battalion andtwo treadway bridge companies, the988th and 990th. Work on the westbank began at 1930 on 16 March at aspot where a civilian ferry had operated.During the night the battalion S-3,

51 Interv, Lt Col William J. Irby, 23 Mar 45, in TheRemagen Bridgehead, Seizure and Expansion; Rpt ofRhine River Crossings, First U.S. Army, pp. 14—16;Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 10; Hist 148th Engr CBn, Jan-Apr 45; Opns Rpt, LCVP Unit No. 1, p. 7.

52 Rpt of Rhine River Crossings, First U.S. Army,pp. 16-20; Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. VII, "Crossingsof the Rhine River and the Advance to the Elbe," pp.1 -6, and app. 8, Engr FO 6, 16 Mar 45. Unless other-wise cited this section is based on these two sources.


Maj. Matthew J. Sweeney, was woundedby artillery fire and had to be evacuated.On the east bank heavy traffic and theslow pace of blackout driving delayedthe arrival of bridge equipment, andconstruction did not start until 0745 on17 March. That afternoon floating de-bris from the Ludendorff Bridge haltedwork at Rolandseck for more than anhour. All these factors slowed construc-tion time to 23 1/2 hours.53

Work on the ponton bridge atKoenigswinter, which the 294th Engi-neer Combat Battalion built with thehelp of the 181st, 86th, and 552d Engi-neer Heavy Ponton Battalions, beganat 2210 on 18 March and was com-pleted in less than seventeen hours. Thetreadway at Bonn, which the 237thEngineer Combat Battalion built withthe help of a company each from the238th Engineer Combat Battalion, the23d Armored Engineer Battalion, andthe 990th Engineer Treadway BridgeCompany, went even more rapidly. At1,340 feet the longest bridge yet builtacross the Rhine, it was completed inrecord time. For one thing, construc-tion started in daylight. Also, the menof the 237th had a powerful incentive.The VII Corps commander, Maj. Gen.J. Lawton Collins, who urgently neededthe bridge near Bonn, offered to buybeer for every man working on it if thetotal construction time did not exceedten hours. Work began at 0615 on 21March and the first vehicle crossed at1625—ten hours and ten minutes later.That was good enough for GeneralCollins. The following day he hosted aparty in a hall at Bonn to celebrate with

the engineers the completion of the"Beer Bridge."54

The VII Corps operated three heavyponton ferries, one upstream of theRolandseck bridge, another downstreamof the Koenigswinter bridge, and athird at Bonn. These ferries carried notonly vehicles that convoy jams at thebridges had delayed but also Pershingtanks, each ferried on a Navy LCVP-propelled, six-ponton raft. First Armyhad long planned for at least a semi-fixed bridge that could accommodateheavy tanks. Accordingly, on 25 Marchthe engineers began work at Bad Godes-berg, about five miles upstream fromBonn, on a bridge designed for two-way Class 40 or one-way Class 70 traffic.Vehicles began crossing this bridge on5 April.55

At a conference with First and ThirdArmy commanders at Luxembourg on19 March, General Omar N. Bradleytold General Hodges, First Army com-mander, to be prepared by 23 March tobreak out of his bridgehead, drivesoutheast, and link up with Third Armyin the Lahn River valley. The objectivewas a corridor running from Frankfurt(across the Rhine from Mainz, about100 miles upstream from Remagen) toKassel, about 160 miles to the north-east. Patton was told to "take the Rhineon the run."56

Hodges ordered his V Corps, thesouthernmost unit which shared aboundary with Third Army, to crossthe Rhine. Early on 21 March the corpscommander, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.Huebner, sent elements of his 2d and

53 App. 1, Summary of Data on Rhine Bridges, inEngr Opns VII Corps, vol. VII, "Crossings of theRhine River and the Advance to the Elbe."

54 Hist 1106th Engr C Gp, Jan-May 45, and fig. 16,Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. VII, "Crossings of theRhine River and the Advance to the Elbe."

55 Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 33.56 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 519.


69th Infantry Divisions across the riveron III Corps bridges and ferries. Bythe evening of 22 March, V Corps hada bridge of its own. Using the onlybridge equipment available, the corpsengineers constructed a Class 40 M2steel treadway about ten miles upstreamfrom the III Corps bridges. VictorBridge was 1,372 feet long, designated"the longest tactical bridge in the world"by the men of the 254th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, who built it with the helpof the 994th and 998th Engineer Tread-way Bridge Companies and, as the signbeside the bridge proclaimed, "U.S.Navy"—a detachment from the Navy'sLCVP Unit No. 1.

Work began on both banks at 0800on 22 March. The engineers used nosmoke screen, nor was artillery supportdeemed necessary. The principal pro-tective effort was directed against water

attack, to which, farthest upstream, theVictor Bridge was especially vulnerable.Infantry and cavalry patrolled the banks;the engineers emplaced three protec-tive booms, using a locally procuredsteam tug; and at night tanks threw thebeams of their canal defense lights overthe rushing waters to seek out enemyswimmers and floating mines. Thoughthe booms were not ready immediately,the bridge was finished in twelve hoursand was opened to traffic at 2000 on22 March. The V Corps used the bridgeentirely for vehicles and crossed theinfantry in LCVPs.57

In the meantime, far to the northand south of the V Corps crossing site,the Ninth, Third, and Seventh Armieswere in position for their own assaultcrossings of the Rhine.

57 V Corps Operations in ETO, pp. 404,406, in CMH.

CHAPTER XXIII

The Assault Crossings of the Rhine

The Remagen bridgehead had madeheadlines as a spectacular and fortu-itous jump across the last major waterbarrier in the western Reich. Onceformed, though, it received only sparsesustenance from SHAEF. General Eisen-hower still focused upon the largerpreparations of 21 Army Group andNinth Army north of Remagen to crossthe Rhine in an area where terrainfavored mutually supporting offensivesinto the heartland of Germany. Muchto the disgust of Lt. Gen. Courtney H.Hodges, First Army commander, thesupreme commander kept the ninedivisions in the bridgehead on a shortleash, tying down weak German forcesin the area while the Ninth, Third, andSeventh Armies to the north and southcrossed the Rhine.

Ninth Army at Rheinberg

Ninth Army was ready. On 19 Feb-ruary, even before the Roer operation,General Simpson had delegated to Maj.Gen. John B. Anderson, commandingthe XVI Corps, the job of planning aRhine crossing at Rheinberg, some fif-teen miles south of Wesel, under thecode name FLASHPOINT. Though theoperation did not begin as early as Gen-eral Simpson had hoped, the plans gov-erned Ninth Army's move across the ri-ver in late March. Col. John W. Wheeler,

the XVI Corps engineer, had alreadystaged a general planning session on12 February with the commanders andstaffs of the two corps engineer combatgroups, the 1153d and the 1148th. Theengineers discovered that they had onhand only 150 storm boats, plywoodcraft powered by a 55-horsepower motorwith a combat load of seven proneinfantrymen. Most of the assault forcewould thus have to move in slower,fifteen-man single assault boats, eitherpaddled across or propelled by 22-horsepower outboard motors. Of the500 single assault craft rounded up,exactly half had motors. The engineersplanned to ferry tanks on rafts of float-ing Bailey bridge sections. To guaran-tee the rapid transfer of heavier wea-pons, vehicles, and supply, they availedthemselves of the services of NavalLanding Unit No. 3, which furnishedtwenty-four LCVPs and twenty-fourLCMs. Another hundred LVTs wereavailable to handle special missions,especially to transfer entire beach par-ties to the far shore. To exploit theassault, the engineer groups would haveready on the west bank one heavy pon-ton bridge set and three floating tread-ways; twelve Sea Mule tugs would helpemplace the bridge components. Tocounteract German air attacks, the ar-my command attached to the engineers


an automatic antiaircraft weapons bat-talion for the operation.1

Training for the operation continueduntil 10 March at two centers on theMeuse River in the Netherlands, whereconditions approximated those at theRhine crossing site. Col. David C. Wal-lace, commanding the 1153d EngineerCombat Group, established his schoolat Echt, about twenty miles south ofLiege. Col. Ellsworth I. Davis of the1148th Engineer Combat Group set upa second training site at Sittard, farthersouth. The group engineers trainedwith the troops of two relatively freshinfantry divisions they would supportin the assault, the 30th and the 79thDivisions. As part of XIX Corps, the30th had crossed the Roer against onlylight resistance and the 79th againstnone at all. Neither engineer group hadany assault experience, though severalof the engineer officers had seen action.The commanding officer of the 1104thEngineer Combat Group took up a tem-porary assignment under the moreexperienced Col. John W. Wheeler, theXVI Corps engineer. Wheeler also tem-porarily assumed direct control of theintelligence sections of the two engineergroups in the assault. They remainedin positions from which they could con-stantly reconnoiter the river at Lintfort,six miles southwest of Rheinberg,throughout the period before the attack.2

Colonel Wallace assembled the river-crossing equipment and operators in

the training area and organized his1153d Group into eight task forces.Task Force Assault, consisting of the258th Engineer Combat Battalion rein-forced by 200 powerboat operatorsfrom the 1153d and Ninth Army, wasto furnish and operate all storm anddouble assault boats for the initial cros-sings. Task Force Heavy Boats, the202d Engineer Combat Battalion rein-forced by U.S. Navy Task Unit 122.5.3,was in charge of the LCMs, LCVPs, SeaMules, and rafts to be used in ferryingoperations. Task Force Roads, the 280thEngineer Combat Battalion, was to doroad work up to the Rhine. The remain-ing five were Task Forces M2 Tread-way, Heavy Ponton Bridge, Boom (toconstruct debris and antimine booms),M1 Treadway, and LVT.

Colonel Davis of the 1148th EngineerCombat Group organized his engineertroops differently. His 149th EngineerCombat Battalion was to support oneinfantry regiment of the 79th Division,controlling and operating assault andstorm boats and all types of ferryingequipment. The 187th Engineer Com-bat Battalion was to provide the samesupport to the other assault infantryregiment. The 1276th Engineer Com-bat Battalion was to support the twoengineer battalions by launching Bai-ley rafts, Sea Mules, LCMs, and LCVPs,erecting an M2 treadway bridge, andinstalling mine booms.

One of the most difficult problemswas moving the large, cumbersomeboats to be used in the ferrying opera-tion over the roads from Echt to theRhine, especially the LCMs and SeaMules, which had to be carried on tanktransporters. The 202d Engineer Com-bat Battalion, responsible for movingforward all the heavy equipment of

1 Hist 1153d Engr C Gp, Mar-May 45; Hist 1148thEngr C Gp, Mar 45; Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, pp.7-8; Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, p. 235.

2 Conquer, The Story of the Ninth Army, pp. 190—91;Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, pp. 231-33;Combat Engineers' Rhine-Ruhr-Elbe Operation, 24Mar-1 May 45, CI 372, ETOUSA Hist Sect; HistXIX Corps Engrs, p. 19, ML 2220, ETOUSA HistSect; Hists, 1153d Engr C Gp, Mar- May 45, and1148th Engr C Gp, Mar 45.

THE ASSAULT CROSSINGS OF THE RHINE 519

both groups, sent a demolition crew anda bulldozer along the eighty-mile routefrom Echt to Lintfort, the initial assem-bly area, to widen roads and removeobstacles.3 At Lintfort, all XVI Corps'assault craft and bridging materialswere to be stored in the large railroadyard of a coal mine. The engineersmade elaborate preparations to camou-flage the equipment with garnished fishnets, chicken wire, and cotton duckblackened with coal dust. At the sametime, XIII Corps engineers construc-ted a dummy depot near Krefeld aspart of Operation EXPLOIT, an elabo-rate scheme designed to trick the Ger-mans into expecting a crossing at Uer-dingen, some fifteen miles south ofRheinberg.4

By 20 March both engineer combatgroups, having completed a week oftraining along the Maas, were movingthe river-crossing equipment forwardto Lintfort. From there to the crossingsites at Rheinberg the two groups hadexclusive use of one road, over whichthe LCMs, LCVPs, DUKWs, and SeaMules moved at night to conceal themfrom the Germans.5 By nightfall on 23March the engineers had reconnoiteredtheir crossing areas, paying particularattention to unloading sites for theheavy craft. The bridging equipment,loaded on vehicles at Lintfort, was readyto go forward as soon as the engineershad breached a twelve- to fifteen-footwinter dike along the riverbank. Cam-ouflaged assault and storm boats werein place behind the dike, their motorswarmed for the early morning start by

chemical heating pads borrowed fromhospital units.6

The 1153d Engineer Combat Grouphad made thorough arrangements foran orderly crossing of the 30th Division.There were to be three beaches—Red,White, and Blue—one for each of thedivision's infantry regiments, with Redon the left, or north, opposite Buede-rich; White in the center; and Blue onthe right, or south, opposite Rheinberg.The first boats over, guided by machineguns firing tracer ammunition, were tomark the boundaries of their beacheswith red, white, or blue aircraft land-ing lamps. Thereafter the assault ele-ments would show the heavy boats whereto land by emplacing ten-foot stakes onwhich were wired flashlights with a redcovering, no covering (white), or a bluecovering to designate the beach. Lightswere arranged one above the other (twofor LCVPs, three for LCMs, four forduplex-drive tanks) or in a design (threeforming a triangle for Bailey rafts). Thebeachmaster wore a white helmet; thoseof the engineer guides, boat crews, andothers were marked with white paintin identifying patterns.

Over the Rhine

The night was clear and the river-banks almost dry at 0100 on 24 Marchwhen the Ninth Army artillery prepara-tion erupted into the sky. An hour laterthe 30th Division's first wave of stormboats, each carrying two engineers andseven infantrymen, pushed off. Thesecond wave consisted of storm anddouble assault boats constructed by bolt-ing together two single craft, stern tostern; the third of LVTs and double

3 Hist 202d Engr C Bn, 1 Jan-1 Jun 45; History ofthe XVI Corps, p. 39.

4 Engineer Operations in the Rhine Crossing, NinthU.S. Army, pp. 51, 55.

5 Cover Narrative, 79th Div, FLASHPOINT Opera-tion, CI 159, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

6 Conquer, The Story of the Ninth Army, p. 245.


assault boats; and the fourth of LCVPs.Troops of the first wave were able torig the lights on the far shore threeminutes after hitting the beach. (Map29)

German shells killed one man,wounded three others, and knocked outtwo Red Beach storm boats, but else-where the Americans encountered lit-tle or no resistance. The artillery bar-rage had stunned or daunted the fewGermans on the far shore, and the artil-lery had cut enemy telephone wires,making it impossible for the Germansto call up artillery fire immediately. By0243 the engineer of the 30th InfantryDivision could report that all the assaultbattalions were across and that resis-tance had been negligible; by 0600 thebulk of the 30th Division's three infan-try regiments was on the far shore.

Upstream, around a bend in theRhine, the first wave of the 79th Infan-try Division's two assault regimentsstarted off at 0300 in storm and assaultboats. By that time fog and smoke hadsettled on the water and on both banksof the river. Here the width of the steepbanks and swampy areas on the farshore restricted the crossing sites. Someof the assault boats failed to get across.Three swamped because the engineersof the 149th Engineer Combat Battal-ion had not built bow extensions highenough. But the men swam to shore,and none were lost in the assault cros-sings. By 0600 at the upstream or south-ernmost site, the 187th Engineer Com-bat Battalion had crossed its infantryregiment, and by 0730 the 149th Engi-neer Combat Battalion had put ashoreall men of the second regiment at thenorthern site. The remaining infantryregiment of the 79th Division ferriedacross next day, 25 March, the two engi-

neer battalions sharing the work.7

At both the 30th and 79th InfantryDivision sites the LVTs were in actionearly and saw extensive service through-out D-day. The LVTs, victims of thecurrent, tended to drift downstreamand could not manage direct crossingsto a small, defined bridgehead at theoutset of the assault. Later, however,they ferried load after load of tanks,which did not need specially preparedpoints of debarkation on the far bank.The DUKWs also proved excellent bothas ferry craft and as general utility boatsduring bridge construction. The heav-ier ferry craft had trouble getting for-ward over the congested roadnet in thedarkness, the LCVPs on flatbed trailers,the LCMs and Sea Mules on tank trans-porters. At 0130 these cumbersomeloads caused a traffic jam that was notcleared until 0300.

In the 30th Infantry Division zoneenemy fire hampered construction ofhardstandings at the launching sites,and the LCVPs and LCMs could notbegin ferrying operations until day-break. By noon eight LCVPs and nineLCMs were hauling men, weapons,light tanks, and tank destroyers acrossthe Rhine. The landing craft also helpedduring the construction of the threebridges—M2 treadway, heavy ponton,and Ml treadway. By afternoon sev-eral treadway rafts and two Bailey rafts,propelled by powered storm boats, werecarrying Sherman tanks across.

In the 79th Infantry Division's areaferrying assumed increasing impor-

7 Engineer Operations in the Rhine Crossing, NinthU.S. Army, p. 19 and map, Incl 3. Unless otherwisecited, this section is based on this source, pp. 18—31,and also on the histories of the 1153d and 1148thEngineer Combat Groups. Engineer Study of theRhine River Crossing made by the 79th Inf Div,Exhibit D, GI 160, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


89TH DIVISION INFANTRY CROSS THE RHINE AT OBERWESEL

tance after enemy fire slowed work onthe divisional bridge. The 1276th Engi-neer Combat Battalion, with the mis-sion of launching the ferry craft, wasalso responsible for the M2 treadwaybridge and the mine booms. The unitwas not only overburdened with workbut was also unlucky. German phospho-rous shells set the battalion commandpost ablaze at 0230, and a few minuteslater enemy mortar fire added to theconfusion. No one was hurt, but theunit struggled to move its equipmentthrough the congested area. Tractorshad to pull the LCM-laden transport-ers across the last yards of soft river-bank, but once there the transporterscould back into the water and float their

cargoes off with the assistance of craw-ler cranes at the site. By 0700 two LCMswere carrying tanks to the far shore,but German fire hit one and sevenmore craft remained on the west bankuntil 1900. The engineers launchedthe LCVPs more easily, and nine werein operation by noon. The Sea Mulesbogged down on their transports shortof the bank and got into the river onlyafter the men finished a plank road tothe water at noon on 25 March.8

Engineers supporting both the 30thand 79th Infantry Divisions recognizedthat ferry sites should be located down-stream of tactical bridges to avoid the

8 AAR, 1276th Engr C Bn, Jan-May 45.


possibility of ramming, but in severalcases the best ferry sites—those notrequiring extensive preparation—werelocated immediately upstream. So theyequipped the ferries with two anchorseach, to be cast overboard if the powerfailed, to prevent the ferries from float-ing downstream with the current.

Another deviation from planning wasthe timing of bridge construction.Because only a 50 percent reserve ofbridge material was available, plannershad not intended that bridge construc-tion start before bridgeheads on the farshore had been seized. Firm, substan-tial bridgeheads would forestall observedenemy fire against bridging operations.But enemy resistance seemed to be solight and smoke so effective for con-cealment that work on all three 30thDivision bridges began by 0630 on 24March and on the 79th Division bridgeat 0800.

However, after the wind changedand the smoke lifted, enemy fire hitthe treadway bridges in both zones.Moreover, ferries that swept down-stream when anchors failed to hold (orcrews neglected to use them) rammedthe treadways. Intermittent artillery firehit the northernmost bridge, the M2treadway in the White Beach area, sev-eral times. Then shortly after the bridgeopened to traffic at 1600 a Bailey raftloaded with a Sherman tank crashedinto it, causing so much damage thatthe bridge could not be reopened until0200 on 25 March. At the Ml treadwayin the Blue Beach area enemy fireinterrupted work for an hour in themorning and knocked out 144 feet ofthe bridge during the afternoon. Thebridge opened for traffic at 0830 on 25March, but a little more than an hourlater a Sea Mule drifted against the

treadway and buckled it. The M2 tread-way built in the northern part of the79th Division's zone was the southern-most of the three treadways. It was hitfirst by light enemy fire and then at2330 by three LCMs that broke thebridge about 240 feet from shore; itcould not be repaired until noon on Dplus 1. By that time heavier artil-lery fire was falling, which killed thecommander of the engineer treadwaybridge company, wounded several men,and knocked out seven floats. That eve-ning the XVI Corps engineer, ColonelWheeler, turned the bridge work overto the 1153d Engineer Combat Group,whose 208th Engineer Combat Battal-ion completed the repairs late on theafternoon of D plus 2, 26 March. Inthe meantime, the 79th Division wasable to use the 30th Division's Ml tread-way. To protect the bridges againstdebris, floating mines, barges, explo-sive-filled motorboats, submarines, andunderwater swimmers, five booms wereto be installed and covered by tankswith canal defense lights, but groupengineers could not complete the taskprimarily because powerboats neededto emplace the booms were not avail-able.

Far to the south (upstream) of the79th Division's area, near Homberg,75th Infantry Division engineers con-structed an excellent cable boom indarkness on the morning of D-day.Then a direct artillery hit severed thecable, setting the boom adrift, and en-emy strafing eliminated a rebuilt boomnext morning. Lacking booms, XVICorps depended on antitank guns andtank destroyers placed in dikes alongthe riverfront and on patrol boatsequipped with an underwater listeningdevice. The enemy attempted no water-

524

ENGINEERS SLIDE BAILEY BRIDGING INTO PLACE AT WESEL

CORPS OF ENGINEERS: THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY

borne or underwater attacks.The tactical units were satisfied with

the crossing. The 30th Infantry Divi-sion considered the Rhine "much lessof a problem than the swollen, racingRoer had been."9 Though 1,100 feetwide in the 30th Division's zone, theRhine was slow moving and easy towork in. Enemy resistance there and inthe 79th Division's zone was negligiblecompared with that at Remagen, andthe Germans in the XVI Corps' areamay well have been deceived by camou-flage and the diversionary operationsat Krefeld and Uerdingen. In both divi-sion zones assault troops had crossedquickly and with very few casualties. By

0600 the engineers had moved eightinfantry battalions of the 30th Divisionand five of the 79th over the Rhine; bythe end of D-day three tank battalions,two field artillery battalions, and twotank-destroyer battalions were also onthe far bank. One field artillery battal-ion managed to cross the treadway atWhite Beach before the bridge wasrammed; the rest of the heavy weap-ons went across on ferry craft. By night-fall engineers were ferrying one Sher-man tank over the Rhine every tenminutes. The crossing had cost XVICorps 38 men killed, 426 wounded, and3 missing. Ninth Army considered theoperation a complete success.10


10 Ibid., p. 242; History of the XVI Corps, pp. 42-46;Conquer, The Story of the Ninth Army, p. 247.


Farther south, the two other Ameri-can field armies in the line jumped theRhine between 23 and 26 March. Thetechniques employed in the crossingsof Third and Seventh Armies varied.General Patton got six battalions acrosswith a fair degree of surprise by restrict-ing artillery and air bombardment inhis assault zones around Oppenheimand the Rhine gorge. Seventh Army,on Patton's right flank, made compara-tively heavier use of artillery in itsassault near Worms. Common to allthese efforts, however, was extensiveengineer preparation beforehand.

The XII Corps Crossing at Oppenheim

For months the engineers of XIICorps, scheduled to make Patton's firstcrossing, had considered Oppenheim agood site. Because the Third Armyoperation was to be a surprise, a cross-ing at a town was essential to concealthe movement of the assault boats tothe river's edge. The engineers favoredOppenheim because it straddled oneof the main roads to Frankfurt amMain, some twenty miles to the north-east. The bridge carrying the road overthe river could not be counted on, butat that spot the Rhine was not morethan a thousand feet wide and fairlyslow, while its sandy banks were firmenough to support amphibious vehicles.For building rafts and launching LCVPsthe protected Oppenheim boat basinon the near bank was ideal.11

As planning progressed it becameevident that some 560 assault boatswould be available. This made it neces-sary to expand the plans to include aneighboring town, Nierstein, 1,500yards downstream. During the assault

at 2200 on 22 March, engineers of the1135th Engineer Combat Group's 204thEngineer Combat Battalion were tocross two battalions of the 5th Division's11th Infantry in column at Niersteinand the third battalion at Oppenheim.As soon as the 11th Infantry had clearedthe far bank, the group's 7th EngineerCombat Battalion was to put across the5th Division's 10th Infantry at Oppen-heim.12On the morning of 22 March Ger-

man planes bombed and strafed Nier-stein, but nothing indicated that theenemy expected an immediate cross-ing there. The only activity the Ameri-cans could see on the far bank was aparty of soldiers digging mine holes inthe dike about fifty yards from the river'sedge. After dark on the twenty-secondthe 204th Engineer Combat Battalionbrought assault boats down to the ri-ver's edge. No artillery barrage wasfired, nor did the boats use their mo-tors. Three engineers manned eachboat, which carried twelve infantrymen.As silently as possible, the boats pad-dled across in the blackness. The firstboat from Nierstein drew a single burstof machine-gun fire, but the infantryreplied with automatic rifles and beforethe boat unloaded five Germans camedown from the dike and surrendered.The first infantry company was ashorein eight minutes, and by 0130 on 23March all three battalions of the 11thInfantry were over the Rhine with onlytwenty casualties. Strongest resistancehad occurred in the Oppenheim cros-

11 XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Third Army, p. 360.

12 Interviews with officers of the 150th, 204th, and7th Engineer Combat Battalions and 88th EngineerHeavy Ponton Battalion on 25 and 31 March and 5April 1945, CI 44, ETOUSA Hist Sect. Details of thecrossing are from this source.


sing, during which one engineer waskilled.

At 0200 the 7th Engineer CombatBattalion began crossing the 10th In-fantry in a column of battalions. Just atdaylight, as the last wave was paddlingacross, shells from a German self-pro-pelled 105-mm. gun hit the water,splashing and swamping some of thebloats but causing no casualties. The guncould not be driven off or silenced untilthe ferries went into operation to carryacross heavy weapons. Meanwhile, en-emy shelling, bombing, and strafinginterfered with the work at the Oppen-heim boat basin where the 88th Engi-neer Heavy Ponton Battalion was con-structing four Class 40 rafts. The firstraft, pushed downstream to Ferry Site1 near Nierstein, did not begin operat-ing until 0700, when it carried a bull-dozer to the far shore; it was 0830before tank destroyers could raft acrossto attack the self-propelled gun. Dur-ing the night a party of engineers hadmarked beaches for the landing ofDUKWs, LCVPs, and Weasels usingblinking white, red, and green lightsand setting up vertical panels of corres-ponding colors for daytime use. SomeLCVPs were working by dawn on 23March, but DUKWs and Weasels didnot arrive until the next day.

The 2d Infantry of the 5th Divisioncrossed to the east bank on rafts andLCVPs next morning, and by midafter-noon an attached battalion of the 90thInfantry Division had also crossed. Twoof the big rafts could accommodate sixjeeps at a time; they operated continu-ously for two days and nights, onepushed by an LCVP, the other by twopowerboats. The rafts continued sup-ply and evacuation operations evenafter bridges were in, a treadway at

1800 on 23 March and a heavy pontonbridge at 0700 the next morning. Theraft operations permitted the 4th Ar-mored Division to employ the treadwayas a one-way crossing, and the divisionused the bridge continuously for twenty-four hours beginning at 0900 on thetwenty-fourth.13In one respect the engineers of the

1135th Engineer Combat Group showedmore foresight than had their col-leagues in the First and Ninth Armycrossings. When the construction of theheavy ponton bridge began, all ferriesmoved to Ferry Site 2, downstream ofall bridges. There, the U.S. Navy wasoperating LCVPs, and DUKWs beganoperations on the twenty-fourth. Thismovement downstream assured that theferries would not crash into the bridges.

The 150th Engineer Combat Battal-ion began bridge work at 0330, but Ger-man artillery fire at dawn and strafingand bombing during the morning inter-rupted the work. American combattroops on the east bank soon silencedthe artillery piece, and although thebombing and strafing wounded oneman, the air attacks did little damageto the bridge material.14

About the time bridge building be-gan, a detachment of the 1301st Engi-neer General Service Regiment, experi-enced in boom construction, startedemplacing an antimine floating logboom and an antipersonnel boom madeof admiralty netting, both upstream ofthe bridges. The engineer detachmentcompleted the log boom by 1400 on 23March. The more troublesome antiper-sonnel boom was only half completed

13 AAR, 5th Inf Div, GI 43, ETOUSA Hist Sect.14 Hist 150th Engr C Bn, 16 Oct 44-12 May 45;

Annex E, AAR, 1135th Engr C Gp, Jan-Apr 45.


by nightfall, but during the night twoGerman frogmen were caught in itsmeshes. Each carried two disc-shapedmagnetic mines, both set to explode at0600. The Germans said they were twoof a party of five frogmen who droppedinto the river about eleven kilometersupstream with orders to place mineson either a ferry site or a bridge. Theyhad almost immediately lost contactwith the other three, who were neverpicked up. The two captives were sol-diers who had been sentenced to threemonths' service in a naval diving schoolfor offenses committed in Russia andin Greece. On this penal service, theyrevealed, they could not handle explo-sives and received their mines onlywhen they were actually in the waterupstream of Rheinberg. The officershad also told them that they had littlechance of returning from the mission.15

The VIII Corps Crossing at the Rhine Gorge

The area selected for the VIII Corpscrossings, between Koblenz on the northand Bingen on the south, was the fam-ous Rhine gorge, where the river runsswiftly between rock cliffs. There hadlived the river barons, who from theircastles on the heights had exacted trib-ute from passing ships. At a point nearSt. Goar stands the Lorelei, the hugerock formation from which the golden-haired maiden of Heine's poem enticedsailors to their deaths on the shoalbelow. This stretch of the Rhine wasthe worst possible for an assault cros-sing. For that very reason Patton hadselected it in the belief that "the impos-sible place is usually the least well de-fended."16 He was wrong. Boatmen on

the river were at the mercy of those onthe heights above. At the 87th InfantryDivision's crossing site near Rhens, amile or so upstream from Koblenz, firefrom machine guns, mortars, flak guns,and artillery emplaced on the rockycliffs above fell on a 347th Infantrylaunching site six minutes before H-hour, scheduled for 0001 on 25 March.This caused such disruption that anhour passed before a second try couldbe made; this time the men succeeded.At another site a few hundred yardsdownstream, the leading assault boatsmoved out on time but had scarcelytouched down on the east shore whenGerman flares lit up the river. Follow-ing boats drew heavy fire. After day-light the attack battalions tried smokecover, but damp air in the gorge kept itfrom rising much above the surface ofthe river. By early afternoon, with resis-tance continuing, units waiting to crossat Rhens moved upriver four miles toBoppard. The crossing attempts atRhens had been costly: the 347th Infan-try had sustained casualties of 7 killedand 110 wounded. In proportion, itssupporting 35th Engineer Combat Bat-talion had suffered even more, with 9men killed, 6 missing, and 19 wounded.17

The 1102d Engineer Combat Group,supporting the 87th Division crossings,had set up headquarters at Boppard.There the assault wave achieved a mea-sure of surprise, pushing out into the riv-er shortly after midnight on 25 March.The 159th Engineer Combat Battalion,after moving the 345th Infantry acrossthe river, considered the crossing "nottough at all, that is, not like we expectedit to be."18 A smoke screen laid down

15 Merzweiler interv, 25 Mar 45.16 Patton, War as I Knew It, p. 275.

17 Hist 35th Engr C Bn, Oct 44-Apr 45.18 The 159th Engineer Combat Battalion (Antwerp,

1945), p. 30.


for the crossing of succeeding wavesproved effective. Although artillery andmortar fire continued sporadically dur-ing the morning, six LCVPs were inthe water transporting infantry, andrafting soon began, the first tank cross-ing at noon. Enemy fire slowed thework of the 44th Engineer Combat Bat-talion on a treadway bridge until 0930on the overcast, rainy morning of 26March. Shortly before the bridge opened,the men working on it saw evidence ofthe 89th Infantry Division's bloodycrossing upstream at St. Goar duringthe night. An assault boat came hur-tling downstream; only one of its fourpassengers had escaped injury—anoth-er was dead and two were wounded.19

The night before the 89th Division'scrossing, scheduled for 0200 on 26March, the 1107th Engineer CombatGroup set up headquarters in a 13th-century castle on a cliff overlooking St.Goar. Three sites had been selected forthe assault. Five companies of the divi-sion's 354th Infantry were to be dividedbetween St. Goar and a wooded areadownstream, while a battalion of the353d Infantry was to cross at Ober-wesel, upstream of St. Goar. The 168thEngineer Combat Battalion was to sup-port all assault crossings, the 188thEngineer Combat Battalion to constructrafts and take charge of all ferry equip-ment, and the 243d Engineer CombatBattalion to build a treadway bridge atSt. Goar.20

The troops expected trouble at St.Goar because the day before the Ger-mans had announced on their radio

that the Americans had tried to crossthere. The opposition proved evenstronger than anticipated. In fadingmoonlight the first assault boats pulledaway from the shadowy western shoreat 0200. American artillery was quietbecause a surprise operation like thatat Oppenheim had been ordered, butthe Germans were already shelling fromSt. Goarshausen across the Rhine. AGerman 88-mm. gun hit three of thethirty-one boats taken down to the riv-erbank at St. Goar before they could belaunched. One shell killed three motor-boat operators, injured six other menof the 168th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, and killed the 89th Division'schemical officer. The rest of the assaultboats had gone about a third of theway across the river when heavy enemyfire came down, mostly from 20-mm.antiaircraft guns. Then a shell igniteda gasoline barge anchored in midstreamnear St. Goar. By the light of the leap-ing flames the anxious watchers on thenear bank saw boats exploding "in ageyser of flying wood and sprawlingbodies."21

Two hours later, at 0400, none ofthe boats had returned. Group engi-neers considered it unlikely that manyof them had been swept downstreamby the swift current, since they had pro-vided some of the boats with motors totow those that had none. They con-cluded that all the boats had been lostand that the assault engineers who hadbeen able to get across were fightingalongside the infantry. During the nightsmall-arms fire could be heard fromSt. Goarshausen; when dawn came U.S.troops could be seen advancing towardthe center of town, cleaning it out house

19 VIII Corps Intervs, 25-26 Mar 45, GI 44,ETOUSA Hist Sect.

20 Hist 1107th Engr C Gp, Jan-May 45. Unless oth-erwise cited, the details of the crossing are from thissource. 21 Hist 1107th Engr C Gp, Jan-May 45.


MEN CONNECT BRIDGE SECTIONS NEAR ST. GOAR

by house. Daylight also revealed shat-tered assault boats lining the far bank.

The crossing at the wooded areadownstream from St. Goar was alsobloody; there too German 20-mm. anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine gunsplayed a leading role. Most of the 89thDivision's casualties—29 killed, 146missing, and 102 wounded—were menof the 354th Infantry. At Oberwesel,although the Germans used a castle onan island in midriver as a strongpoint,firing from slits in the walls, the cross-ing went well. During the morningDUKWs went into service. In contrastto the forty-five minutes required forassault boats to get to the far bank andreturn, the engineer-manned DUKWs

carried eighteen infantrymen and madethe round trip in five minutes.22 Withreinforcements and help from artilleryand self-propelled guns brought up tothe near bank, by noon enemy fire wasalmost eliminated at Oberwesel, whichthen became the main crossing site. Inthe afternoon six LCVPs and six LCMsferried enough troops and equipmentover to clear St. Goarshausen by earlyevening.23 Raft construction began at St. Goar at

1800. Work on a treadway bridge startedthere at 1930, but the swift current

22 The 89th Infantry Division, 1942-1945 (Wash-ington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 107.

23 AAR, Third U.S. Army, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol.II, Staff Sect Rpts, p. Eng-32.


M2 TREADWAY BRIDGE on the Rhine atBoppard.

washed out anchors. A cable had to bestrung across the river, and the tread-way was not completed until early onthe morning of 28 March. In the mean-time, two 89th Division task forces cros-sed the Rhine on the 87th Division'sbridge at Boppard.24

General Patton could have used thebridges at Boppard and Oppenheim tosend Third Army's XX Corps acrossthe Rhine. Instead he chose to make anassault crossing at Mainz, between Bop-pard and Oppenheim, on 28 March,probably because he considered Mainz,centrally located and with a good roadand rail net, the best place for perma-nent rail and highway bridges.

The XX Corps Crossing at Mainz

At Mainz the Rhine is almost 2,000feet wide—one of its widest points.Directly opposite the city, which lies onthe west bank of the Rhine, the nar-rower and slower Main River emptiesinto the Rhine from the east. Parallelto the Main's north bank an excellentroad ran to Frankfurt am Main andbeyond, into the heart of Germany. Ele-ments of the 4th and 6th ArmoredDivisions, having broken out of theOppenheim bridgehead, tried to crossthe Main near Frankfurt between 25and 27 March. At three places railwaybridges were found still standing, butthe only one that would take tanks wasat Aschaffenburg, fifteen miles up theMain from Frankfurt. Demolitions hadso weakened the other two bridges thatonly foot soldiers could get across;heavy shelling from Frankfurt pre-vented engineers from repairing thebridges.

Although the width of the Rhine atMainz would place a heavy strain onXX Corps' bridging equipment, the cityhad a number of advantages as a cross-ing site: the banks were flat, the enemylacked high ground for observation,and buildings extending to the water'sedge would protect the attackers fromsmall-arms fire and shell splinters asthey embarked in the assault boats. Asat Oppenheim, boat basins with slipswere available to provide concealmentfor launching naval craft.

The XX Corps decided on two assaultcrossings, both of which the 80th Infan-try Division was to undertake. Thedivision's 317th Infantry was to crossthe Rhine at Mainz, where engineerswere to build a treadway bridge; the319th Infantry, using the Oppenheimbridge over the Rhine, was to cross the

24 Hist 1107th Engr C Gp and The 89th Infantry Divi-sion, p. 108.


Main from Bischofsheim to Hochheim,three miles upstream from Mainz. AtHochheim, where the Main was lessthan 700 feet wide—a favorable circum-stance in view of an increasing short-age of bridging material—engineerswere to build a second treadway, allow-ing more tanks to cross to reinforce theXII Corps' armor.

In the early hours of 28 March the1139th Engineer Combat Group's 135thEngineer Combat Battalion paddled thefirst assault wave over the Rhine atMainz. From an island in midriver andfrom the far bank came small-arms andmachine-gun fire and some 20-mm.antiaircraft shells. The second wave,crossing in LCVPs and LCMs, encoun-tered heavier shelling. During the as-sault crossing 10 men were killed, 18wounded, and some 55 reported mis-sing. Small-arms fire falling on thebridge site delayed a start on the tread-way. Because there was no reserve bridg-ing material, the 160th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, which had the treadwayproject, was reluctant to run the risk oflosing what equipment it had. But onorders from the XX Corps commander,Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker, the engi-neers began work at 0900.

At the Main River site there was littleor no opposition to the assault crossings,which the 1139th Group's 179th Engi-neer Combat Battalion supported. By0900 the 206th Engineer CombatBattalion's heavy rafts were ferryingtanks to help clear the far bank, and at1855 the battalion completed a 624-footbridge. Next day around noon, theMainz bridge over the Rhine was readyfor traffic. The XX Corps engineerswere especially proud because they be-lieved the 1,896-foot span to be thelongest tactical bridge built under

combat conditions in the Europeantheater.25

The Seventh Army Crossings

About fifteen miles south of Oppen-heim lay Worms, where the SeventhArmy was to cross the Rhine. The factthat operations there and at the Oppen-heim bridgehead would be mutuallysupporting outweighed the disadvan-tages of the terrain at Worms. On thefar bank, some eight miles east of theRhine, the hills of the Odenwald rosesharply. On those heights the Germanscould make a stand and contain thebridgehead—if they had men and weap-ons to do so. Enemy strength was diffi-cult to estimate, but Seventh Armyintelligence indicated that the Germanshad not more than fifty men per river-front kilometer and no large guns per-manently emplaced east of the Rhine.26

Early Seventh Army plans and prep-arations, begun in September 1944, hadenvisioned a Rhine crossing about twen-ty miles upstream from Worms andsouth of Mannheim. For that reason agood deal of the engineer planning con-cerned the possibility that the Germansmight open power dams upstream fromBasel to create flood waves that couldwash out tactical bridges as far north asMannheim, leaving American assaulttroops stranded on the far shore. Toprovide warning of approaching floodsso that floating bridges could be safe-guarded, the ETOUSA chief engineerestablished a flood protection servicein his office; engineers at the headquar-ters of the various armies set up similar

25 Hist 1139th Engr C Gp, Mar 45; Third ArmyRpt, vol. II, pp. Eng-32-33; The XX Corps: Its Historyand Service in World War II, pp. 331-33.

26 Seventh Army Report, vol. III, pp. 746-47. Unlessotherwise cited, this section is based on that source.


organizations. To collect planning data,6th Army Group engineers experi-mented with hydraulic models of thedams between Basel and Lake Con-stance.27 This effort decreased inimportance when 6th Army Grouplearned that the Swiss were preparedto protect the dams along their borderwith Germany. Moreover, Seventh Armychanged its crossing site to Worms,north of Mannheim.

The 40th and 540th Engineer Com-bat Groups, both amphibious veterans,were available to put Seventh Army'sXV Corps across the Rhine on a nine-mile front extending north and southfrom Worms. Training had begun inSeptember 1944, when Seventh Army'srapid advance inland through south-ern France made a November or De-cember Rhine crossing appear likely.During those months the Rhine cur-rent is swift, usually from eight to tenmiles per hour. Accordingly, the Sev-enth Army engineer, Brig. Gen. Garri-son H. Davidson, felt that hand-paddled assault boats would be out ofthe question. He would need the ser-vices of boat operators who had trainedat sites on the Rhine and Doubs riversto pilot motor-driven boats. To preparefor a swift-current crossing the engi-neers also experimented with stringingcable to help DUKWs take artilleryacross promptly and with anchoringponton bridges.28

In the event, much of the time spentpreparing for a swift-current crossing

was wasted. By the 26 March crossingdate, the current was only three or fourmiles per hour, slow enough to usepaddle-powered assault boats. In thesector north of Worms, where XV Corps'45th Infantry Division supported by the40th Engineer Combat Group crossedthe river, using powered boats actuallyproved detrimental because motor noisealerted the enemy. In addition, theengineers found that DUKWs and du-plex-drive tanks could cross without theaid of cables.29

Around midnight on 25 March afour-man patrol of the 180th Infantry,45th Division, paddled across the Rhinein a rubber boat to reconnoiter the eastbank. The patrol saw some German sol-diers but was not fired upon and, aftersearching fruitlessly for gun emplace-ments and mines, returned safely to thenear bank in time to take part in theassault crossing at 0230.30 The heavystorm and assault boats, brought to theriverbank on carts borrowed from theChemical Warfare Service, werelaunched on schedule from stone-pavedrevetments. Mist rising from the riverhid the moon. To achieve surprise theattackers used neither smoke nor anypreliminary artillery barrage. However,after the Germans heard the roar ofthe motors, small-arms, 20-mm. antiair-craft, and mortar fire hit the boats asthey reached the far bank. This firewas heaviest in the 180th Infantry'ssector, where 60 percent of the boatswere damaged; the 179th Infantry lostonly 10 percent of its boats. All four-teen of the duplex-drive tanks in theassault went across safely. With the helpof the tanks and of artillery ferried over

27 Lt. Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, "Rhine River FloodPrediction Service," The Military Engineer, XXXVII,no. 239 (September 1945), 348-53; and "HydraulicsModel Experiments," in Ibid., XXXVIII (May 1946),189-93.

28 Brig Gen Garrison H. Davidson, The Crossing ofthe Rhine, Incl 3 to Hist Rpt, Mar-Apr 45, Office ofthe Engr, Seventh Army.

29 River Crossing Notes, 29 Mar 45, in Hist 40thEngr C Gp, 16 Feb-31 Mar 45.

30 Hist 180th Inf Rgt, 1-31 Mar 45.


in DUKWs or on infantry support rafts,the infantry overran the Germans andmade good progress on the ground.During the crossing the 2831st Engi-neer Combat Battalion, piloting thestorm and assault boats, suffered eigh-teen casualties; the 2830th Battalion,which operated rafts and ferries, sus-tained none.31

Just south of Worms, the 3d Divisionmade two feints across the Rhine belowMannheim on the evening of 25 Marchwhich alerted the enemy. When the540th Engineer Combat Group's 2832dand 2833d Engineer Combat Battalionsbegan moving toward their assemblyareas at 2000 hours—the former to sup-port the 7th Infantry on the south, thelatter the 30th Infantry—they cameunder German artillery and mortarfire. This fire continued while the engi-neers pulled the storm and assault boatsover the steep, revetted banks and intoplace for the crossing. In the 7th Infan-try zone flames from a barn set on fireby a German incendiary shell lit up thecrossing area, silhouetting the men andboats.32

At 0152 friendly artillery began amassive barrage that continued untilH-hour, 0230. Four minutes before thebarrage lifted, 7th Infantry boats beganmoving across the river, and by 0340both assault infantry battalions wereover. In the 30th Infantry's zone, whereopposition was lighter, the two assaultbattalions were across by 0330. Theartillery barrage, as well as the use ofsmoke, kept the loss rate of storm boatsto only 10 percent. Ten of fourteen du-

plex-drive tanks reached the far shore.About H plus 2 the first DUKW crossedthe river safely without cables. Theengineers also found that cables werenot necessary for the rafts, which by0700 were ferrying tanks and vehiclesacross the Rhine. Nevertheless, sincethe ferrying operations lay upstreamfrom where floating bridges were beingbuilt, the engineers strung cables andused them to keep ferries from beingswept downstream to crash into thebridges.

The engineers who were to build amine barrier and patrol the river to pro-tect the bridges from floating mines,frogmen, and other menaces reachedtheir assembly area, farthest upstreamof all, at 0300. The fire from Germanantiaircraft guns, ranging in caliberfrom 8-mm. to 128-mm. and emplacedon an island in the Rhine, drove theengineers off. Heavy fire from theisland, a fortress that had apparentlyescaped the notice of Seventh Armyplanners, continued throughout muchof D-day, harassing the 7th Infantry'scrossing site and holding up the bar-rier work. It was late afternoon when abattalion of the 15th Infantry assaultedthe island from the east bank of theRhine and silenced the guns. On D plus1 the engineers erected the mine bar-rier, and the river patrol went intooperation with searchlights, artillery,and DUKWs mounting quad-50 ma-chine guns. The patrol sank a numberof barges that might have destroyed thedownstream bridges.

Fire from the German guns on theisland also delayed construction of thenearest floating bridge, a treadwaysouth of Worms. The 163d EngineerCombat Battalion began work at 0600on D-day but did not complete the

31 Hist 40th Engr C Gp, 16 Feb-31 Mar 45.32 Hist 540th Engr C Gp, Mar 45; Taggart, History

of the Third Infantry Division, p. 339. Unless otherwisecited, the story of the 3d Division crossing is fromthese two sources.


HEAVY PONTON BRIDGE IN THE SEVENTH ARMY AREA

treadway until 1850. The first usablebridge was a heavy ponton span atWorms, about two hundred feet down-stream from the site of the Ernst Lud-wig highway bridge, which the Germanshad demolished. In just over nine hoursthe 85th Engineer Heavy Ponton Bat-talion built the 1,047-foot ponton; opento traffic at 1512 on D-day, it was namedthe Alexander Patch Bridge for the Sev-enth Army commander. Although thehandsome stone tower of the ErnstLudwig Bridge, still standing on the farbank, harbored enemy snipers, ruinsof the span provided good anchoragefor the bridge builders. The Alexan-der Patch Bridge carried 3,040 vehi-cles eastward during its first twenty-

four hours of operation.33 Because ofits early completion and excellent loca-tion, Seventh Army preferred the Alex-ander Patch Bridge to a ponton bridgethe 1553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Bat-talion erected downstream near Rhein-duerkheim in the 45th Division's sector.As a result, that bridge operated at onlyhalf its capacity.34

On 29 March, General Davidson, theSeventh Army engineer, instructed the85th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalionto build a bridge to take tanks and vehi-cles over the Rhine to Mannheim. Withthe help of aerial photographs a recon-

33 Seventh Army Report, vol. III, p. 887.34 Hist 40th Engr C Gp, 16 Feb-31 Mar 45.


naissance party found a suitable site atLudwigshafen, on the west bank oppo-site Mannheim. Eight bulldozers workedsix hours clearing rubble from thestreets and preparing the site, and the1553d Engineer Heavy Ponton Battal-ion brought pontons down from theWorms area on its trailers. Construc-tion started at daylight on 30 March.The bridge opened to light traffic at1500, but tanks and heavy vehicles hadto wait until 1900 because of a delay inobtaining two-inch decking. The engi-neers dubbed the span the Gar David-son Bridge to honor the Seventh Armyengineer.35

The Rhine Crossings in Retrospect

No two assault crossings of the Rhineduring March 1945 were exactly alike.Conditions ranged from the haste andimprovisation of First Army's Remagenbridge crossing to the long, carefulplanning involved in Ninth Army'scrossing near Rheinberg, Moreover,Ninth Army's massive artillery prepa-ration, which eliminated surprise andnecessitated fast assault boats and speedyrafting of heavy weapons, contrastedsharply with Third Army's dispensingwith preliminary bombardment andachieving surprise with a night cross-ing in paddle boats.

Engineer planning had allowed fordiversity. Working during the fall of1944 before the Battle of the Ardennes,planners had assumed a winter cross-ing and made provisions for bad weath-er and excessive flooding. Such condi-tions did not arise. Crossings were alsoeasier than expected because the Ger-mans did not seriously try to destroy

bridges with mines, midget submarines,or boats laden with explosives.36

Looking back, corps and army engi-neers saw no reason to revise engineerdoctrine. Rather, a study of the Rhineoperations provided several examplesof the folly of deviating from doctrine.Perhaps the most outstanding instancewas disregard of the rule that all heavyboats and rafts should operate down-stream of bridges, even if launchingand landing sites downstream wereinferior to those upstream. For example,at Wallach the 1153d Engineer Com-bat Group's achievement in installing atreadway bridge by 1600 on D-day wasnullified when a Bailey raft crashed intothe bridge, knocking it out for morethan seven hours.

Almost all of the standard stream-crossing equipment provided for theRhine crossing—assault and storm boats,utility powerboats, outboard motors,rafts, and bridging material—had al-ready been used, most of it successfully.The principal criticisms were that theinfantry support rafts tended to swampin the Rhine's swift current and thatutility boats were not powerful enoughto serve efficiently as general work boatsfor building bridges, emplacing heavyboom material, or towing heavy rafts.

The engineers also obtained mate-rial from sources other than standardengineer stocks. Two of the most im-portant types of equipment, LCVPs andLCMs, the U.S. Navy furnished to First,Ninth, and Third Armies. The engi-neers generally considered the LCVPsinvaluable. They ferried troops at arapid rate, faster than the men couldwalk over footbridges, and returned the

35 Hist 85th Engr Heavy Ponton Bn, Jan-May 45.

36 OCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 20, Forced Crossing ofthe Rhine.


wounded quickly. The LCVPs also performed excellent service as patrol boatsand even acted as work boats and tug-boats, although they did not haveenough power to handle the heavy rein-forced rafts required for ferrying tanks.Opinions on the value of LCMs varied.Ninth Army engineers felt that the craftdid not contribute enough to the cross-ings to warrant the effort involved intransporting and launching it. On theother hand, the Third Army engineerfound LCMs extremely useful, citingan instance during which six LCVPsand six LCMs crossed an entire divi-sion with all its vehicles and equipmentin forty-eight hours.

Other special nonengineer equip-ment employed during the Rhine cross-ings included DUKWs, LVTs, and SeaMules. In all crossings except at Rema-gen (where DUKWs were subjected toan excessively long land haul) they per-formed valuable service, not only in car-rying shore parties and artillery to thefar bank but also in working aroundbridges and dropping bridge anchors.LVTs were well liked, especially LVT4s,which could load jeeps through drop

doors. Although a good work boat, theSea Mule was bulky to transport, hardto handle in a rapid current, and sus-ceptible to damage in shallow waterbecause of exposed propellers and rud-ders. For these reasons, most engineersthought it should be replaced in rivercrossings by a new and more powerfulengineer power utility boat.37

In sustaining surprise during theRhine crossings, dummy bridging ofwood and burlap played an importantpart. So convincing from the air wereNinth Army's decoy preparations nearUerdingen that on the night of D plus2 German planes strafed the area. Dur-ing the Seventh Army crossings engi-neers threw two dummy bridges acrossthe Rhine upstream and downstreamof real bridges. Made of wooden framesresting on steel drums, the spans seemedso real even at ground level that guardshad to be stationed at their approachesto prevent crowds of refugees fromusing the dummies to flee over theRhine.38

37 ibid.38 ibid.

CHAPTER XXIV

Into the Heart of Germany

"No one slept, no one ate, no one didanything but attack and push on, attackand push on." So the tankers of XIIICorps' 5th Armored Division describedtheir dash from the Rhine to the Elbe.

Passing to Ninth Army control on themorning of 31 March, the 5th's tankerscrossed the Rhine that same day over aponton bridge at Wesel, where the Brit-ish Second Army's bridges had justbeen turned over to Ninth Army onorders from Field Marshal Montgomery.By the time the last elements of thearmored division reached the bridgenight had fallen, and as the men crossedthe river they entered a nearly surrealatmosphere. Floodlights split the dark-ness and shone on the water; antiair-craft guns pointed toward the sky. Inthe glare of the lights barge-mountedpile drivers were pounding, whileplumes of smoke from busy tugboatssilhouetted huge cranes.1 Two impor-tant bridges were under construction.Ninth Army engineers were drivingpiles for a fixed highway bridge, andADSEC engineers were building a rail-road bridge. All were working aroundthe clock so that the combat forces, rac-ing across tactical bridges, would notrun out of supplies before they couldreach the heart of Germany.

Months before, Colonel Itschner andhis ADSEC staff had established dumpsof material for the railroad bridge,planned as a single-track span on steelgirders supported by light steel trestlesand timber-pile piers. The planners hadintended to use the site of a destroyedGerman railroad bridge downstreamfrom where the Lippe River enteredthe Rhine. When the engineers recon-noitered the far bank, however, theyfound the damage there too extensivefor quick repair and had to settle on asite upstream near a wrecked highwaybridge to which the Germans had addeda single-track rail line. This substitu-tion meant a very long bridge since itadded to the Rhine section of twenty-three spans (1,753 feet) a section of sixspans (463 feet) over the Lippe. Luckily,the supply of meter-depth I-beamsneeded for girders had been assuredwhen the Hadir Steel Mill in Luxem-bourg became operational in October1944.

On 29 March a large force under Col.James B. Cress began work. The orga-nization consisted of the 1056th PortConstruction and Repair Group; ele-ments of the 341st, 355th, and 1317thEngineer General Service Regiments;and an engineer construction battalion,a dump truck company, an engineermaintenance company, and a weldingdetachment. Several nonengineer units

1 The Victory Division in Europe: History of the FifthArmored Division, pp. 49, 63.


were included—a Signal Corps battal-ion to provide communications, a Trans-portation Corps harbor craft companyto control water traffic, and a U.S. Navydetachment to assemble barges. Thearound-the-clock work was hard anddangerous, and the construction costthe lives of three men of the 355thEngineer General Service Regiment.This first railroad bridge across theRhine opened to traffic at 0100 on 9April, only ten days, four hours, andforty-five minutes after the first pile wasdriven; it was named the Major Robe-rt A. Gouldin Bridge for an officer ofthe 355th Engineer General ServiceRegiment who lost his life during theconstruction.2

Ninth Army's fixed timber-pile high-way bridge was placed about seventy-five yards upstream of the wreckedGerman bridge (the railroad bridge wasabout the same distance downstream)to take advantage of existing roadnets.3

The span was to carry three lanes—two-way Class 40 and one-way Class 70traffic. The builder was the 1146thEngineer Combat Group, using the250th, 252d, and 1256th Engineer Com-bat Battalions, aided by detachmentsfrom ADSEC's 1053d and 1058th PortConstruction and Repair Groups and aU.S. Navy Seabee maintenance unit.

The first step was to construct anembankment on the near side of Weselto carry an approach road. To obtainthe needed fill, the engineers demol-ished old Fort Blucher and carted therubble to the site. Work on the bridge

itself began on 31 March. Like the rail-road bridge, the highway bridge wasvery long, spanning the Rhine (1,813feet) and the Lippe (411 feet). Thewestern and eastern approaches to thetwo rivers totaled more than 2,000 feet.Open to truck traffic during the earlyafternoon of 18 April, the span wascalled the Roosevelt Bridge in memoryof President Franklin D. Roosevelt whohad died less than a week before.4

Ninth Army's Dash to the Elbe

Rolling over the ponton bridge atWesel with the 5th Armored Divisionon 31 March was the division's organic22d Armored Engineer Battalion. Toget the armor over streams on the wayto the Elbe, the engineers carried atruckload of lumber to refloor bridgesand treadway to use at crossing siteswhere bridges were down.

On the route along the northernedge of the Ruhr Pocket, the first waterbarrier in the 5th Armored Division'spath was the Dortmund-Ems Canal.The original plan had been to bridgethe canal at Muenster, from which goodroads led eastward; but south of Muen-ster near Senden, on the right flank ofthe advance, Combat Command Reserveran into fire from German 20-mm. flakguns, bazookas, small arms, and tanks.The armored division commander, Maj.Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, decided tocross the canal at Senden and movesouth, skirting the pocket of resistance.The task of getting the tanks across thecanal fell to CCR's engineers, Company

2 ADSEC History, pp. 71-73, 75-76; Maj Gen C. R.Moore, "Rhine River Railroad Bridges," app. 12 toOCE ETOUSA Hist Rpt 12, Railroad Reconstructionand Bridging; Bridging the Way to Victory with the 355thEngineers [355th Engr GS Rgt, 1945].

3 See photograph, Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p.43, fig. 76.

4 Engineer Operations in the Rhine Crossing, NinthU.S. Army, pp. 44-49; Hist 1146th Engr C Gp,Jan-May 45, and MS, 1146th Engr C Gp, A Reporton the Roosevelt Rhine and Lippe River Bridges . . .April 1945, OCE files.

INTO THE HEART OF GERMANY 539

C of the 22d Armored Engineer Bat-talion.

Orders came at 2100 on 31 Marchfor CCR's armored infantry to estab-lish a bridgehead on the far bank ofthe canal to protect the engineers work-ing on the bridge, but no mention wasmade of how the infantrymen were toget across. After two men making theirway down the bank in the dark foundsome rowboats, the infantry rowed overthe canal to set up a defensive peri-meter. At 0400 on Easter, the engineersbegan installing treadway. Four hourslater in a light rain the tanks started tocross the canal, and by the morning of2 April all Combat Command Reservewas over. The bridge also carried Com-bat Command B and the motorized84th Infantry Division, which was fol-lowing the armor. Later XIII Corpsengineers came up and repaired a Ger-man bridge over the canal; the 5thArmored Division's Combat CommandA used this span after it cleaned outthe German pocket south of Muenster.

Racing northeast in the rain throughthe spring-green countryside on themorning of 2 April, the tank columnsbegan to encounter roadblocks. Somewere merely logs stacked on the road;others consisted of two emplaced cylin-ders, one on either side of the road.These the Germans made by driving acircle of wooden piles in the ground,filling the center with dirt or crushedrock, and blocking the gap between thecylinders with a truck or wagon. Therewas also the "rolling roadblock"—ahuge drum filled with gravel or dirt.None of the roadblocks delayed theadvance for very long; few were mannedand some had not even been completed.When the Germans did man the blocks,the Americans could normally eliminate

the covering fire, and then the engi-neers with the help of tanks could de-stroy all but the most elaborate obsta-cles in fifteen to twenty minutes.

On 3 April the engineers becameinvolved in an attempt to seize bridgesacross the Weser River. Small assaultteams of engineers, tanks, and infantrywere organized to take the bridges bysurprise, but they found all bridgesblown. There followed five days ofeffort to seize bridges, and the tankers,pounding swiftly down the autobahn,at one point got close enough to see abridge intact, only to hear a dull boomand watch the girders falling into theriver. All efforts failed. On 8 AprilCombat Command Reserve was orderedto cross the Weser over a bridge in theXIX Corps zone at Hameln of PiedPiper fame.

Once across the Weser CCR's tanksran into increasing enemy resistance.Although the engineers lost some oftheir trucks to 20-mm. flak fire, theymanaged to keep up with the attack,filling craters in the roads and remov-ing mines and roadblocks from the pathof the fast-moving armored columns.The attack proceeded so swiftly thatsoon bridges were being captured in-tact. The engineers' main tasks thenbecame removing bombs (some of themAmerican 500-pound aerial bombs)buried in bridge abutments and em-placing flooring that would carry tanks.

On 12 April Combat Command Re-serve reached the Elbe. After two daysof searching for bridge sites the engi-neers started to install a bridge at San-dau, but while they were assemblingbridge equipment orders came that nobridge would be built.5

5 The Victory Division in Europe, pp. 50—58; Interv,Capt Frank Perlman, CO, Co C, 22d Armd Engr Bn,


South of XIII Corps in the dash tothe Elbe was the bulk of XIX Corps,which also sent some elements even far-ther south to aid in reducing the RuhrPocket. Its rapid sweep to the Elbe wasspearheaded by the 2d Armored Divi-sion and its 17th Armored EngineerBattalion. By the end of the first weekof April the 2d Armored Division hadcrossed the Weser on treadway bridgesits engineers had built and the LeineRiver on bridges captured intact. On11 April, after taking the great Her-mann Goering Steel Works southwestof Braunschweig, the tankers made a73-mile march in a single day to reachthe Elbe just southeast of Magdeburgat Schoenebeck. There, as the armordrew within a few feet of a still stand-ing bridge, heavy German antiaircraftshelling demolished it.

The tankers then sent for DUKWs.After nightfall on 12 April the DUKWscarried two battalions of armored infan-try across the river just south of Magde-burg and before daylight next morn-ing crossed an infantry battalion of the30th Division. No antitank guns, tanks,or tank destroyers could get acrossbecause the water on the near side wastoo shallow for vehicular ferries.

After dark on 12 April the 17th Ar-mored Engineers began to build a tread-way bridge, but shelling from largeguns at Magdeburg, increasing withdaylight, slowed the work. The engi-neers set out smoke pots and by noon

on 13 April had advanced their bridgeto a point within twenty-five yards ofthe far bank. Two hours later Germanshellfire destroyed it. Enemy fire alsodefeated an effort to construct a ferry.The engineers deposited rubble in theriver to form a loading ramp and man-aged to anchor a guide cable to the eastbank. Then, as the first raft carrying abulldozer approached the far bank,German artillery severed the cable, andthe raft careened downstream.

The XIX Corps was unable to gettanks across to the precarious bridge-head, where the infantry was beingattacked by tanks and assault guns ofthe new Twelfth Army, which the Ger-mans had hastily formed of young menfrom army schools, overaged conscripts,and other remnants. Accordingly, theXIX Corps commander ordered theinfantry to abandon the bridgeheadand withdraw. Tanks and infantry ofthe 2d Armored Division then movedsouth to use a XIX Corps crossing overthe Elbe at Barby, five miles upstreamand out of range of the artillery atMagdeburg. There the 83d Division's295th Engineer Combat Battalion, sup-ported by the 992d Engineer TreadwayBridge Company, had built the firstbridge over the Elbe on 13 April. Theengineers named the span the TrumanBridge in honor of the new commanderin chief. Two days later the 234th Engi-neer Combat Battalion built anothertreadway in the same area. The Ger-mans tried in every way, including theuse of frogmen, to destroy both brid-ges but were unsuccessful.

The engineers called their TrumanBridge "Gateway to Berlin"; but it hadhardly been built when they learnedthat it was, in fact, a gateway to no-where. On 15 April the word came that

3 May 45, GI 43, ETOUSA Hist Sect; Intervs, Lt ColFred E. Ressegieu, CO, and Maj Albert M. Brown,XO, 22d Armd Engr Bn, 4 May 45, CI 278, ETOUSAHist Sect; Intervs, Lt Col John H. Morave, 85th DivEng; Lt Col Marvin L.Jacobs, CO, 309th Engr C Bn;and Capt Seymour S. Deutsch, Asst 85th Div Engr, 9Apr 45, CI 188, ETOUSA Hist Sect.


there was to be no drive to Berlin andno advance beyond the Elbe.6

First Army's Drive to Leipzig and Beyond

On 5 April, after the attack to sealoff the Ruhr ended, First Army's V andVII Corps began a drive east to theLeipzig area, where most of the remain-ing German industrial capacity was con-centrated and where General Eisen-hower believed the German govern-ment was fleeing.7 The 3d ArmoredDivision, leading the VII Corps advance,was delayed two days by resistance atnumerous roadblocks. The V Corps'leading infantry division, the 69th, raninto determined resistance at Hann-Muenden on the Weser and also wasstalled for two days. But V Corps' otherspearhead unit, the 2d Infantry Division,had a comparatively clear route and bynightfall on 6 April was crossing theWeser in assault boats, thus gaining abridgehead only one day after NinthArmy had crossed.

On 7 April V Corps engineers built atreadway over the Weser at Hameln forthe rest of the 2d Infantry Division andnext day helped the 69th Division crossthe narrow Werra River via anothertreadway. On 8 April the engineersbuilt a second treadway over the Weser,this time for the 9th Armored Divisionat Hann-Muenden, an industrial cen-ter where the engineers uncovered aPanzer Pioneer School with a supply ofall types of land mines—including Rus-

sian ones—as well as German buildingequipment and tools.

On 10 April General Bradley removedrestrictions on eastward movement.That day the 9th Armored Division,once over the Weser, passed throughthe 2d and 69th Infantry Divisions andraced ahead. Its leading elements wereaccompanied by V Corps engineers,who undertook reconnaissance anderected signs with the distinctive, pen-tagonal V Corps insignia.8

With little rest during the long driveafter the Rhine crossing at Hoennin-gen, the V and VII Corps engineerswere as weary as the tankers and infan-trymen who, according to correspon-dent Hal Boyle,

threw themselves down in fields for a napwhenever the columns paused. They aremoving across wide rolling farm lands alongroads blanketed with blinding yellow dust.Trucks going back for supplies occasionallydrive with their lights on so that the vehiclesmoving forward won't crash into them inthe yellow fog. Black pillars of smoke fromenemy vehicles can be seen on the horizonas the tanks smash slowly forward againststiffening resistance from German troopswho fight until surrounded or they are outof ammunition and then surrender andsay amiably, "The war will be over in twoweeks." 9Approaching the Saale River on 12

April, the 9th Armored Division raninto an area known to the Allied air-men as "flak alley"—one of the heavi-est concentrations of antiaircraft guns(mainly 88-mm.) in Europe. Emplacedin an arc around Leipzig to protectneighboring synthetic oil refineries andrelated industries, including Germany's6 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, ch. XVII; Hist 17th

Armd Engr Bn, Jul 44-May 45; Thunderbolt AcrossEurope, pp. 89-91; Hist XIX Corps Engrs, pp. 19-20,ML 2220, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

7 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 400.

8 AAR, Engr Sect, V Corps, Jan-9 Mar 45.9 As quoted in V Corps Operations in ETO, p. 426, in

CMH.


largest synthetic rubber plant, wereabout a thousand antiaircraft weapons,depressed for ground fire. The armoreddivision's leading task force on thenorth lost nine tanks when it came upagainst the first German position. (Map30)

Because of the flak guns, the V Corpscommander, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.Huebner, ordered the 9th ArmoredDivision to bypass Leipzig and push onto the Mulde River. Coming up to theSaale River at Weissenfels on 13 April,part of the armor crossed on a bridgecaptured intact, the rest on a 240-foottreadway that corps engineers con-structed the next day. The infantry divi-sions following in the wake of the armorcrossed on the treadway and in assaultboats. The 9th Armored Division droveeast toward the Mulde, crossing theWeisse Elster near Zeitz on bridges theGermans did not have time to destroy.The two infantry divisions turned northto attack Leipzig, the 2d moving againstthe city from the west, the 69th fromthe south. On 15 April leading elementsof the armor reached the Mulde atColditz, twenty miles southeast of Leip-zig. Combat Command Reserve crossedthe river on a railroad bridge and re-leased 1,800 prisoners of war at a campthere, but did not advance much beyondthe Mulde.

The two infantry divisions movedcautiously against Leipzig, hoping atthis late stage of the war to keep casual-ties down. On the west the 2d InfantryDivision launched night attacks to sur-prise the crews of the flak guns. Be-cause these crews were unaccustomedto ground combat the tactic usuallyworked, but in this case the infantrysuffered heavy casualties before break-ing into Leipzig from the west and the

south on 18 April. Prolonged negotia-tions for surrender ended on 20 April,and the 2d and 69th Infantry Divisionsmoved on to the Mulde to relieve the9th Armored Division.

At Leipzig the main concern of VCorps engineers was the water system,damaged by Allied bombing and shel-ling. Although the water supply waslow, it was adequate until German waterworks employees could undertake re-pairs, supervised by American engineers.In addition, V Corps engineers tookon a job that was normally not theirfunction—repairing a railroad. Recon-naissance showed that the 150-mile rail-road line from Muehlhausen to Leip-zig could be opened for traffic if about2,000 feet of bomb-cratered line wererefilled, ballasted, and laid with track.The 1121st Engineer Combat Group's254th Engineer Combat Battalion ac-complished the work, taking greatpride in naming the repaired road the"Snortin' Bull Express." The rail ser-vice carried to Leipzig gasoline for thespearhead units, thereby freeing fornormal engineer duties the companiesthat the 1121st Engineer Group hadfurnished to haul fuel to the front. Onthe return trip to Muehlhausen thetrain carried to the rear German pris-oners of war and Allied soldiers re-leased from German prison camps.10

Following the linkup of U.S. and Rus-sian forces on 25 April, V Corps engi-neers erected a Bailey bridge over theMulde at Eilenburg so that the Ameri-can commanders could cross the riverand meet the Russians at Torgau onthe Elbe River.

10 AAR, Engr Sect, V Corps, Apr 45; Dozer Blade (aweekly newspaper published by the 1121st EngineerCombat Group), 21 Apr 45, copy in Hist 1121st EngrC Gp, Mar-Dec 45.


The men of VII Corps' 3d ArmoredDivision, swinging eastward in earlyApril north of the V Corps drive, cameto feel that "there was always one moreriver."11 Col. Mason J. Young, the VIICorps engineer, had long since learnedthat he could not count on finding Ger-man bridges still intact. Therefore,when VII Corps' combat units ap-proached the Weser River on 7 April,he was prepared for a crossing. Theorganic divisional engineers—the 1stEngineer Combat Battalion supportingthe 1st Infantry Division on the left ofthe 3d Armored Division and the 329thEngineer Combat Battalion supportingthe 104th Infantry Division on theright—had assault boats, storm boats,infantry support rafts, and material forfootbridges so that they could make anassault crossing and establish a bridge-head. Then VII Corps' 1106th Engi-neer Combat Group was to build thebridges the 3d Armored and 1st Infan-try Divisions would require and the1120th Engineer Combat Group thoseneeded at the 104th Infantry Division'scrossing.12

Reaching the Weser at Gieselwerderat midafternoon on 7 April, the lead-ing elements of the 104th Division sawan arched iron bridge still standing. Asthe Americans dashed toward it, theGermans blew the span. A German tankand about fifty infantrymen left in thetown put up a fight, but by dark resis-tance was over. All night trucks carry-ing assault boats rolled into Giesel-werder, and before dawn two battalionswere crossing in the boats and on a foot-

bridge the 329th Engineer Combat Bat-talion had built. By noon on 8 Aprilthe combat engineers were construct-ing treadways and infantry supportbridges at this and other sites. Late thatnight the 3d Armored Division's tanksbegan crossing; before sunset on 9April the combat commands had cross-ed the river and, branching out, hadcaptured twenty-two towns beyond theWeser.

At dusk on 11 April assault elementsof two task forces of Combat CommandB, 3d Armored Division, one com-manded by Col. John C. Welborn, theother by Lt. Col. William B. Lovelady,entered Nordhausen. Here, on the east-ward route nearest to the Harz Moun-tain area, Hitler was attempting tomount a counteroffensive to relieve hisforces in the Ruhr Pocket, using troopsof the newly formed Twelfth Army. Gen-eral Huebner ordered the 3d ArmoredDivision to block exits from the HarzMountains and sent his 1st InfantryDivision and part of his 104th InfantryDivision into the mountain redoubt.

Nordhausen was also a place of utterhorror. In a concentration camp with acapacity of about 30,000, the tankersdiscovered the pathetic remnants of aslave labor force used in huge under-ground factories, one for manufactur-ing V—2 rockets. Many of the living, inthe last stages of starvation and tooweak to move, were lying alongside theemaciated dead. The tankers of the 3d,their historian recorded, "were in a sav-age mood as they went on to the finalbattles."13

The armor fought the last battlesbetween the Saale and the Mulde with-out infantry support, except from their11 Spearhead in the West, p. 145.

12 Engr Opns VII Corps, vol. VII, "Crossings of theRhine River and the Advance to the Elbe," app. 10,Engineer Plan for Weser River Crossing, 6 Apr 45. 13 Spearhead in the West, p. 150.


MEN OF THE 234TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION HAUL A TANK ACROSSTHE SAALE RIVER

organic armored infantry units. The104th Division had orders to stop onthe way and capture Halle, the tenthlargest city of Germany, which held outuntil 19 April. Meantime most of Com-bat Command B, still in the lead, stalledin front of strong enemy panzerfaustpositions and antitank fire. Only TaskForce Welborn, which hit the softestspot in the German defenses, was ableto keep up its momentum. This taskforce soon reached an autobahn lead-ing north, and by the evening of 14April one of Welborn's infantry patrolsarrived at the point where the auto-bahn crossed the Mulde on a steel-girder, two-span bridge two miles southof Dessau. The infantrymen found the

autobahn bridge still standing, but be-fore the rest of the task force couldcome up, the Germans destroyed it.Colonel Welborn thereupon orderedengineers to bring up boats for anassault crossing. The 294th EngineerCombat Battalion sent forward four-teen boats, but by the time the boatsarrived early in the afternoon Welbornhad decided that the infantry couldcross on the destroyed autobahn bridge.The infantry started crossing at 1600,protected by a smoke screen.

Building a new bridge alongside theautobahn bridge did not appear too dif-ficult at first, for the river was narrowand required not more than 150 feetof treadway. But the engineers had


hardly begun to inflate pontons whenenemy artillery fire fell on them, kill-ing one and wounding three. This firewas so accurate that it stopped the workin midafternoon. Next morning, 16April, after a crane had put a power-boat into the water to tow pontons tothe far bank, German artillery fire hitand set afire a truck arriving with pon-tons. Two engineers dragged from theblazing truck were seriously burned. Allthat day and into the moonlit night,enemy shellfire forestalled all bridgingwork.

On 17 April work resumed under asmoke screen. By afternoon about fif-teen pontons were in the water, butthen enemy artillery scored a direct hit,killing one engineer, wounding eight,and knocking many more into the water.Arriving on the scene, the commanderof Combat Command B suspendedoperations, and shortly after dark or-ders came to pull back to the near bankof the Mulde.14

Third Army Reaches Austria

After crossing the Rhine at Oppen-heim, Third Army's spearheading XIICorps crossed the Main on batteredbridges still standing between Aschaf-fenburg and Frankfurt am Main. Thenthe corps left the Rhine-Main plain andheaded through rolling forested hillsand open farmlands, using the Frank-furt-Dresden autobahn toward thecorps' next objective, Chemnitz, southof Leipzig and ten miles beyond theMulde.

Leading the advance, Combat Com-mand A of the 4th Armored Division

struck its first obstacle on 1 April at theWerra River. Bridges were down, andnext morning when the 24th ArmoredEngineer Battalion began to build tread-ways at two towns, German planesswooped low to attack, while direct firecame from the east bank. The armoredinfantry finally managed to cross de-spite small-arms fire; next day the tankscrossed the Werra and were again roll-ing east along the autobahn. 15

At Leina the tankers came to a blownoverpass that forced them off the auto-bahn. In any case the 4th ArmoredDivision received orders to backtrack,swing north, and assist in an attack onGotha. After the town fell, the armormoved south to Ohrdruf, finding asmall but gruesome concentration camp.There Combat Command A remainedsix days. Starting east on 12 April the4th Armored Division tankers—havingby then come under the command ofXX Corps—found that demolitionsmade using the autobahn too danger-ous and took to the fields on eitherside.16

For infantry vehicles the Frankfurt-Dresden autobahn was literally the back-bone of Third Army's push east dur-ing the first half of April. Engineersfound that their largest task was notspanning rivers but building bridgesover or around the autobahn's dam-aged overpasses and underpasses. Atthe rivers the enemy occasionally de-layed construction, not only at the Wer-ra but also at the Elster, where thebridge site was dominated for a time bya battery of 88-mm. guns. Yet the Ful-

14 Interv, Capt G. E. Conley, CO, Co B, 23d ArmdEngr Bn, 2 May 45, GI 270, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

15 Hist 24th Armd Engr Bn, Kyll River to Chemnitz,5 Mar-20 Apr 45, CI 275, ETOUSA Hist Sect.

16 Interv, Capt Roland G. Ruppenthal with Lt ColHal C. Pattison, XO, CCA, 4th Armd Div, 22 Apr 45,sub: CCA from the Crossing of the Kyll to Chemnitz.


da, Werra, Saale, and Elster Rivers pre-sented few engineering problems be-cause they were low, making nearly allfordable.17

Bridges on the autobahn were nor-mally quite large. Fortunately the Ger-mans usually blew only one span, andwhen a Bailey could not bridge the gapthe engineers would construct a tread-way bypass. But so many bridges weredown that the engineers began to runout of material. One very wide gap theysimply filled with earth; at another sitethat required a large amount of Baileybridging, the engineers used bents tomake a Class 40 double-single Bailey.Elsewhere, the Germans had buckledtwo center stringers of a four-stringerbridge and had blown holes in twenty-five feet of the roadbed. Here, build-ing piers to strengthen the buckledstringers was especially difficult becausethe slope beneath was so steep. Unableto use a bulldozer, the engineers had towork with picks and shovels, and thebents had to be constructed on levelground and moved into position withblock and tackle.18

On 13 April the 4th Armored Divi-sion, leading the XX Corps, reachedthe Mulde and by nightfall had seizedfour bridges intact. During the sweepto the Mulde the engineers of the 1154thEngineer Combat Group, supportingthe XX Corps drive, carried out recon-naissance of roads and minor roadclearance and repairs. The Germanswere being pushed back so rapidly thatthey were unable to do enough dam-age to slow the advance.

The XX Corps expected to go on toDresden, but a directive from General

Eisenhower on 15 April brought abouta radical change in plans. 19 Havingdecided not to go to Berlin, Eisenhowerdirected the 12th Army Group to holdalong the Elbe-Mulde line with the Firstand Ninth Armies and sent the ThirdArmy southeast down the Danube val-ley into Austria for eventual linkup withthe Russians.20

New plans required the reshufflingof corps. The VIII Corps went to FirstArmy, to remain along the Mulde; IIICorps' six divisions, having completedoperations in the Ruhr, turned southto take over the right flank in Patton'sdrive; XX Corps was to move forwardin the center and XII Corps on ThirdArmy's left. Third Army was to bestrengthened to fifteen divisions, manyof them newcomers to battle. Becausethe regrouping took time, the drive inforce could not begin until 23 Aprilalthough XII and XX Corps actuallystarted to advance three or four daysearlier.

By 22 April forward troops of XXCorps were southeast of Nuremberg,only forty miles from the Danube. Leav-ing the Berlin-Munich autobahn, thecorps turned southeast toward Regens-burg, where the Danube turns almostat a right angle to flow southeast, paral-leling the Czechoslovakian border. On24 April a task force of the 3d CavalryGroup (Mechanized), leading the XXCorps advance, reached the Danubesouthwest of Regensburg. Supported bya company of the 245th Engineer Com-bat Battalion, the cavalry task forcebegan crossing in assault boats the fol-lowing night.

17 Third Army Report, vol. II, Engr Sect, p. Eng-37;Hist 1154th Engr C Gp, 26 Mar-30 Apr 45.

18 Hist 1107th Engr C Gp, Jan-May 45.

19 Opns Rpt, 1154th Engr C Gp, 26 Mar-30 Apr45.

20 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, ch. XVIII. Tacti-cal details on Third Army's drive are from this source.


The 1139th Engineer Combat Groupbuilt the first bridge over the Danubeto support XX Corps' 71st InfantryDivision, newly arrived at the front. By2215 on 26 April the group's 160thEngineer Combat Battalion had com-pleted an M2 treadway at Sulzbach, justeast of Regensburg. While the bridgewas being built, group engineers alsohelped the 71st Division's organic 271stEngineer Combat Battalion to moveinfantry across in assault boats.21

Three Danube tributaries—the Isar,Inn, and Enns Rivers—impeded thedrive southeast down the broad Dan-ube valley. At the Isar the engineersfound the current too swift for pad-dled assault boats. Instead, some of theinfantry crossed in motor-driven stormboats, while other troops used a dam-aged railway bridge, at one place climb-ing hand over hand.

Arriving on 2 May at the Inn River,which marked the border with Austria,71st Division scouting parties found allbridges down but discovered two largedams that might be used for crossings.In a determined effort to seize the damsbefore the Germans could blow them,infantrymen of the 71st Division foughttheir way across, captured Germandemolition crews just in time, and cutwires that would have set off explosions.By midnight the 71st Division had twobridgeheads across the dams, therebybecoming the first Allied unit to enterAustria from the west.

Late on 3 May XX Corps gave allunits the mission of establishing con-tact with the Russians at the Enns River.Moving over two bridges captured in-tact beyond Lambach, motorized pa-trols of the 71st Division on 7 May

encountered the headquarters of theRussian 5th Guards Airborne Divisionnear St. Peter, Austria. That day theAmerican patrols withdrew behind theEnns after they received the orders thatended hostilities in Europe.22

Advancing to the left of XX Corpsdown a narrow corridor between theChechoslovakian border and the Dan-ube, XII Corps had to cross the Naaband the Regen, both tributaries of theDanube. Engineers of the 1135th Engi-neer Combat Group, supporting XIICorps, found that assault crossings wereunnecessary, for resistance was light,mainly scattered small-arms and pan-zerfaust attacks. The engineers quicklyinstalled tactical bridging and almostimmediately replaced such spans withfixed bridges. On the extreme left ofthe XII Corps advance, in rolling,pine-covered, upland country near theCzechoslovakian border, an armoredtask force found the Naab so shallowthat tanks and other armored vehicleswere able to ford it.

On 30 April, an overcast day withsome snow, the 1135th Group receivedorders to plan for an assault crossingof the Danube at Passau; it was can-celed when orders came to remain northof the Danube. On 4 May the groupcompleted a ponton bridge at Passauand two days later had a treadway overthe Danube at Deggendorf. The XIICorps, arriving just ahead of XX Corps,captured an intact highway bridge overthe Danube at Linz, but had hardly

21 AAR, 1139th Engr C Gp, Apr 45.

22 Fred Clinger, Arthur Johnston, and VincentMasel, The History of the 71st Infantry Division (Munich,1946), pp. 83-98. For engineer support of XX Corps'13th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division inthe drive down the Danube after 28 April, see Hist1154th Engr C Gp.


PONTONS HEADED FOR THE DANUBE

begun to press southeast when wordcame of the German surrender.23

On Patton's right III Corps, with the86th and 99th Infantry Divisions andthe 14th Armored Division, drove souththrough a corridor between the XXCorps zone and the Berlin-Munich auto-bahn. Here as in the other zones, theonly real obstacles were rivers, first theAltmuehl, then the Danube, and be-yond the Danube the Isar and the Inn.All bridges were down.

The 99th Infantry Division, whoseown 324th Engineer Combat Battalion

had the support of the 1159th Engi-neer Combat Group's 291st EngineerCombat Battalion, met heavy enemyopposition at the Altmuehl. The divi-sion undertook several night assaultcrossings and by the evening of 26 Aprilwas on the banks of the Danube—notthe blue Danube the men had imag-ined, but "a muddy, dirty, yellow col-ored, fast flowing, smelly river."24 Thedivision's heavy equipment and suppliesarrived promptly, thanks to a treadwaythe divisional engineers had quicklybuilt over the Altmuehl.

Shortly before noon on 27 April thetroops began to move across the Dan-ube in assault boats from four sites. One

23 AAR, 1135th Engr C Gp, Jan-Apr 45; Lt. Col.George Dyer, X/7 Corps: Spearhead of Patton's ThirdArmy (Baton Rouge: Military Press of Louisiana,[1947]), p. 420; Third Army Report, vol. II, Engr Sect,p. Eng-43.

24 Lauer, Battle Babies, p. 297.


site was hit by heavy small-arms andartillery fire from well dug-in and con-cealed enemy positions. But at the otherthree the troops met little opposition,and the 324th Engineer Combat Bat-talion, with the help of the 291st, beganconstructing a ponton bridge near Kien-heim at an old boat landing. The roadseemed to the division's commandinggeneral "ideal for our purpose."25

So it might have been in good weath-er. But it rained during the afternoon,and when heavy engineer trucks beganto haul bridging equipment down tothe banks of the Danube, the roadbeddisintegrated into a seemingly bottom-less marsh. By putting down gravel andstone and corduroying the road withlogs cut from nearby forests, the engi-neers were able to move pontons downto the river. Working all night and allthe next day, part of the time underGerman artillery fire, the engineerscompleted the bridge before dark on28 April. The division's trucks andtanks began to roll toward the bridge,then bogged down so badly that theengineers had to use tractors to towthem out of the marsh and onto thebridge apron. The work of reinforcingthe road resumed, continuing afterdark by turning on truck headlights.This was the first time in the war theengineers supporting the 99th Infan-try Division had been permitted to uselights at night. No hostile fire fell be-cause infantry had crossed the bridgeon foot and had driven the Germanartillery out of range.

By nightfall of 29 April elements ofthe 99th Division had reached the Isarat two towns, Moosburg on the nearbank and Landshut astride the river.

At Landshut, where the enemy put upa stiff fight, the 99th Division infantryclimbed over the debris of a blownbridge at Moosburg, ran across on adam nearby, and paddled over the Isarin assault boats. To get the 14th Ar-mored Division tanks in position to helpin the fight required strenuous engi-neer effort. Working under artilleryfire the engineers built a short treadwayfrom the near side of the Isar to anisland in the river. From there the tanksfired on Landshut, which fell early on 1May. By dark all elements of the 99thDivision had crossed the Isar.

Advancing toward the Inn River in alight snowfall, the infantry soon outdis-tanced the armor, roadbound becauseof soggy fields and stopped by blownbridges. The 99th Infantry Division wasthe first III Corps element to reach theInn, but it was to go no farther. Justbefore noon on 2 May, corps orderedthe division to halt and await new or-ders. Within sight of the Bavarian Alps,the division received the news that Ger-many had surrendered.26

Seventh Army to the "Alpine Fortress"

Breaking out of its Rhine bridgeheadnear Worms with the mission of pro-tecting 12th Army Group's right dur-ing its drive toward Leipzig, SeventhArmy advanced on a 120-mile-widefront—more than double the width ofthe army sectors within 12th ArmyGroup. The Seventh Army commander,General Patch, gave XV Corps the mainrole on the left, ordered XXI Corps todrive east in the center, and sent VI

25 Ibid., p. 304.

26 Ibid., pp. 297-318; Hist 1159th Engr C Gp, 26Jun 44-20 Aug 45; Hist 291st Engr C Bn, Jan-Apr45, May 45.


Corps to the south on the right. Whenthe drive began early in April the 6thArmy Group commander, Lt. Gen.Jacob L. Devers, restricted the VI Corpsdrive because he did not have strengthfor an all-out advance. The weak linkwas the First French Army, which hadto keep some troops on the west bankof the Rhine facing the Black Forest,others along the French-Italian frontier,and still others at ports along the FrenchAtlantic coast.27

Making the main thrust on the north,XV Corps advanced rapidly. Althoughsome of the towns in the corps' path,notably Aschaffenburg, were resolutelydefended, the combat units met onlysporadic resistance while marching totheir objective, the Hohe Rhoen hillmass, during the first week in April.The Germans derisively called theirown roadblocks 61-minute blocks be-cause, they said, "It will take the Ameri-cans sixty-one minutes to get past them.They will look at them and laugh sixtyminutes and then tear them down inone."28

More troublesome to the engineerswas debris on the roads—German vehi-cles that American tanks, artillery, andplanes had destroyed.29 Debris alsofilled the streets of the fire-scarredtowns, and the engineers went in toclear the streets while fighting was stillgoing on. The 14th Armored Division,leading the XV Corps advance, met itsfirst serious resistance at Lohr. Theengineers entered the town at nightfallto find it "afire from the shelling, theflames leaping through the darkness

and crackling through the madness ofthe firing; the smoke was in your eyesand nose, and the weird shadows ofthe men running, and of the tanks, andof nothing at all (at night, in a burningtown, in war) leapt and jumped alongthe walls."30

Moving along with the combat troopsduring the rapid march, the engineershad some strange encounters. One oc-curred near Lohr. Lt. Melvin O. Robin-son of the 125th Armored EngineerBattalion, reconnoitering in his jeepwith his driver, Pfc. George A. Bartels,saw a Mark VI tank by the road. Thetwo men were approaching it cautiouslyto see whether it was mined, when allat once they were surrounded and firedupon by a party of twenty-one Germansoldiers. Neither American had time tofire, and both were wounded. Then theGermans threw down their weaponsand surrendered. Toward the end ofthe week, two jeeploads of engineersstarting out one night to look for a biv-ouac ran into an ambush at a roadblock.A mortar round killed one man andwounded another. The rest of the menwere taken prisoner, but before thenight was over tankers of the 14thArmored Division found and releasedthem.31

Resistance decreased as the troopsreached the narrow, winding roads ofthe Hohe Rhoen. On 8 April SeventhArmy's armor established contact withThird Army, and the time had comefor XV Corps to turn southeast.

Through the zones of both XV andXXI Corps meandered the Main River,making so many loops and turns that ithad to be crossed not once but several27 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 430. Unless oth-

erwise cited, tactical details are from this source.28 Taggart, History of the Third Infantry Division, p.

346.29 Ibid., p. 350.

30 Capt. Joseph Carter, History of the 14th ArmoredDivision, ch. XII.

31 Ibid.


times—when XV Corps' 3d InfantryDivision turned south on 11 April thedivision crossed the Main for the fourthtime.32 Most of the bridges over theMain were down, but the crossings pre-sented no special engineer problems.The river was fordable in places, andSeventh Army had plenty of DUKWsto help in the crossings.

In the XXI Corps sector a regimentof the 42d Infantry Division and a com-bat command of the 12th ArmoredDivision reached the Main oppositeWuerzburg on the night of 2 April tofind the three bridges across the riverdown. Unwilling to wait for the 142dEngineer Combat Battalion to arrivewith assault boats, a party of Rangerscrossed just before dawn in a rowboatthey had found along the bank. Theyreached the far bank unobserved andsent the boat back for another load. Thetwo boatloads of Rangers had estab-lished a small bridgehead by the timethe engineers came up.

Daylight revealed a surprising scene.Across the river rose the ramparts ofthe huge Marienburg Castle. On oneof the retaining walls the Germans hadpainted in large white letters "HeilHitler!"

As the first engineer assault boat ofeleven infantrymen and three engi-neers reached midstream, the Germansopened fire with rifles and 20-mm. anti-aircraft guns. The guns were not veryaccurate, possibly because the Germanswere unable to depress the barrels suf-ficiently, but throughout the day shellsfell around the boats. In spite of enemyfire and a swift current, the engineersmanaged to get an entire infantry bat-

talion across before the day was over.While the infantry enlarged the bridge-head the engineers built a ferry forjeeps, ambulances, and radio equip-ment and began constructing a Baileyacross a hole the Germans had blownin a substantial stone bridge leading intothe castle area.

Before dawn on 4 April foot troops(but not vehicles) were able to use theBailey bridge. To bring armored aid tothe infantry the engineers erected atreadway bridge. While the fight wasraging in the city early next morning, aparty of about two hundred Germansmade a desperate, last-ditch attempt toreach and destroy the treadway and todemolish the Bailey, which was still notcomplete. The attack stalled a hundredyards short of the Bailey bridge, andby the end of the day the battle forWuerzburg was over.3

On the following day, 6 April, the 42dInfantry Division moved northeast to-ward the corps' next objective, Schwein-furt, the center of the German ball-bearing industry. The main problemwas 88-mm. guns ringing the city. Theseweapons had made Schweinfurt one ofthe costliest of all targets for Alliedbombers and, because the guns couldbe depressed for ground fire, wouldvery likely make it costly for groundtroops as well. The plan was to encirclethe city with the 42d's three regiments.No assault river crossing was required,but to enable a combat command ofthe 12th Armored Division to swingsouth of Schweinfurt and cut the en-emy's escape route to the east, the 142dEngineer Combat Battalion built a tread-way over the Main at Nordheim. The

32 Taggart, History of the Third Infantry Division, p.351.

33 42d "Rainbow" Infantry Division: A Combat Historyof World War II (1947), pp. 58-70.


encirclement was successful, and withthe close support of medium bombersmost of the 88-mm. guns were de-stroyed. By 13 April XXI Corps wasready to turn southeast and help XVCorps capture Nuremberg by attack-ing the suburb Fuerth.

Nuremberg lay in a broad valleyveined by three rivers with confusingnames. The Rednitz, flowing from thesouth, and the Pegnitz, from the east,joined at the northern boundaries ofFuerth to form the Regnitz. The rivercrossings were not difficult. For ex-ample, in the XV Corps' zone, undercover of darkness the 3d Infantry Divi-sion made unopposed crossings of boththe Regnitz and a man-made streamparalleling it, Ludwigs Canal; the 45thInfantry Division crossed the Pegnitzover a bridge captured intact. Withinthe city, through which the Pegnitz andthe canal ran, all bridges were down,but troops could cross on the twistedgirders of blown bridges.

The engineers' hardest task was re-moving roadblocks, which were numer-ous and strong and included streetcarsderailed and placed sideways, barriersof logs, and huge chunks of scrap ironand steel. Another engineering taskthat was to prove increasingly impor-tant went to the 40th Engineer CombatGroup's 2831st Engineer Combat Bat-talion, attached to the 3d Division. Asthe infantry progressed through thecity the engineer battalion assumed theguard of enemy installations, not onlythe usual railroad yards and factoriesbut also important Nazi Party offices inNuremberg. Eighty-six such installa-tions had been discovered by the timeNuremberg fell on 20 April.34

The XV Corps' next objective wasMunich. Then the corps was to plungeinto an area the Germans called theAlpenfestung ("Alpine fortress") and theAmericans called the National Redoubt,presumably located in the mountainsof southern Bavaria, western Austria,and northern Italy. General Eisen-hower believed that the Germans in-tended to withdraw into this mountainfortress. To block such a move, hedirected 6th Army Group to advanceinto a wide area containing the passesinto the Italian Alps, including thefamous Brenner Pass. The Alpine for-tress region extended from Salzburg onthe right, in the XV Corps line of march,to Lake Constance on the left, whereVI Corps was heading.35

While XV and XXI Corps were mak-ing grand sweeps to Nuremburg, VICorps, on the right of the SeventhArmy sector, halted early in April be-fore strong German resistance at theNeckar and Jagst Rivers. About tenmiles north of Heilbronn, an impor-tant communications center, the Neckarforks. Its right fork, the Jagst, flowsnortheast, then southeast through thetown of Crailsheim. Along the arc ofthe Jagst between Heilbronn and Crail-sheim, the enemy unexpectedly delayedVI Corps for about ten days.

Combat commands of the 10th Ar-mored Division, spearheading the 63dand 100th Infantry Divisions, found thebridges over the Neckar and Jagst down.While the bulk of the armor waited for

34 Rpt of Opns, The Seventh United States Army in Franceand Germany 1944-1945, vol. III, pp. 792-96; Tag-

gart, History of the Third Infantry Division, p. 353; 42d"Rainbow" Division, p. 85; Opns Rpt, 40th Engr C Gp,1 Apr-25 Aug 45.

35 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397; Toland,The Last 100 Days, pp. 262-63. For a map of theGerman National Redoubt area, see Seventh ArmyReport, vol. III, opposite p. 807.


bridging at the most important objec-tive, Heilbronn, the 63d Division crossedthe Neckar on a treadway downstreamat Mosbach and began reconnoiteringthe north bank of the Jagst.

Considered the gateway to Bavariaand the Alps, Heilbronn was stronglydefended. On 4 and 5 April three bat-talions of the 100th Division managedto cross the Neckar and establish tenu-ous bridgeheads in a factory area onthe far bank, but German artillery onheights above the city prevented theconstruction of a treadway bridge anddestroyed ferries that might have takentanks across.

The 10th Armored Division had touse the 63d Division's bridge down-stream at Mosbach and so was unableto help in the attack on Heilbronn.Instead, it became involved in a battlefor Crailsheim. The town fell on 6April, but the Germans succeeded incutting its line of communications andcontinued to counterattack strongly.Crailsheim became "another Bastogne."By 11 April Maj. Gen. Edward H.Brooks, commanding VI Corps, de-cided it was not worth the effort to holdthe town; that night the armored divi-sion withdrew. The tankers turnedwest, forded the shallow headwaters ofthe Kocher River, and headed for ameeting with the infantry east of Heil-bronn. 36In the meantime, the infantry of the

100th Division was putting up a desper-ate fight for Heilbronn. By the after-noon of 7 April the 31st Engineer Com-bat Battalion had almost completed atreadway when German artillery scoreda direct hit on it. The following morn-

ing the engineers emplaced a secondtreadway. Some tanks and tank destroy-ers managed to cross before the Ger-mans destroyed the span at noon, buteven with the help of tanks the 100thDivision was unable to push east ofHeilbronn until 14 April.37By 17 April engineers of the 540th

Engineer Combat Group, in close sup-port of VI Corps, were building brid-ges over the Neckar, the Jagst, and theKocher to get men and supplies for-ward for a push across the Danube andinto the Alpine fortress.38 Leaving Stutt-gart to the First French Army, VI Corpsraced toward the Danube. The firstcrossings the corps made came aroundmidnight on 23 April. The 10th Ar-mored Division used three bridges cap-tured near Ehingen, while the 44thDivision employed a treadway south ofthe town. Part of the infantry divisionturned north to assist in the capture ofthe medieval city of Ulm, astride theDanube. In the path of this force laythe Iller River, flowing into the Dan-ube near Ulm. In the swift current theinfantry's assault boats capsized, forc-ing one company to cross on cables,hand over hand, while engineers placedheavy logs across blown bridges for cat-walk crossings.

Two combat commands of the 10thArmored Division, racing more thantwenty miles ahead, reached the Illerduring the night of 24 April, and a com-pany of the division's 55th ArmoredEngineer Battalion built a treadwaybridge near Dietenheim. An incidentat this bridge typified the fluidity ofpursuit warfare. A trapped German col-umn attempted to escape over the tread-

36 Lester M. Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of theTenth Armored Division (1954), pp. 221-70.

37 Seventh Army Report, vol. III, pp. 782-89.38 Jnl, 540th Engr C Gp, Jan-May 45.


way in the darkness, using a capturedAmerican truck to lead it. The Germansalmost succeeded. When the Americansdiscovered that the column was Ger-man, a wild firelight erupted, duringwhich an engineer bulldozer operatorused his blade to bring down a Germanofficer.39

Although disorganized, the enemywas still capable of placing dangerousobstacles in the path of tanks. As the10th Armored Division moved into theBavarian Alps, it found bridges overdeep gorges destroyed, huge cratersblown in the roads, and fields mined.At one point the Germans had rolleddown the hairpin curve of a mountainroad a 200-yard-wide avalanche of boul-ders, gravel, and logs.

On 30 April the armor halted at theresort town of Garmisch-Partenkir-chen; infantrymen of the 44th and103d Divisions took up the advancethrough the Alpine passes to the InnRiver valley, nestling between the pre-cipitous mountain ranges of the Bavar-ian Alps on the north and the TyroleanAlps on the south, along the borderwith Italy. The 44th Division, headingfor Resia Pass on the Austrian-Italianborder, slowed early at a point wherethe enemy had blasted away a cliffsideroad.40 A bypass had to be found. Thenthe troops were hindered by snowbanksblocking the roads and falling rain,mixed with snow. On 5 May, when sur-render negotiations began and all ad-vances in the VI Corps sector halted,the division was still more than twentymiles short of its goal.

The 103d Infantry Division, com-manded by Maj. Gen. Anthony C. Mc-Auliffe and headed for Innsbruck andthe Brenner Pass, had better luck. Bythe evening of 3 May the division wasin Innsbruck, and one of its motorizedregiments was on its way to the Bren-ner Pass, headlights blazing; at 0150, 4May, McAuliffe's men took the pass.Later in the morning advance partiessent over the border into Italy metAmericans from the U.S. Fifth Army,thus fulfilling a prediction made byGeneral Eisenhower when he left theMediterranean for the European the-ater late in 1943 that he would meetthe soldiers of the Mediterranean com-mand "in the heart of the enemy home-land."41

The last Alpine pass to be capturedwas at Salzburg, important because theGermans fleeing from Patton's ThirdArmy might attempt to use it. On 1May XV Corps, in position to moveswiftly down the Munich-Salzburg auto-bahn, was assigned to capture Salzburg.After assault crossings of the Danubeand Lech Rivers on 26 April, XV Corpstook Munich by nightfall of the thir-tieth. Through the city ran the IsarRiver, which might have delayed theadvance, but with the help of Germananti-Nazi resistance forces ten bridgeswithin the city were seized intact. Leav-ing the 45th Infantry Division to garri-son Munich, Maj. Gen. Wade H. Hai-slip, the XV Corps commander, assignedthe capture of Salzburg to the 3d Infan-try Division with the 106th CavalryGroup attached and the 20th ArmoredDivision, a newly arrived unit that had

39 Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth ArmoredDivision, p. 278.

40 See photograph, Seventh Army Report, vol. III, p.842.

41 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 418. For tacticaldetails of the drive for the passes, see Seventh ArmyReport, vol. III, pp. 840-47.


replaced the 14th Armored Division.The 42d Infantry Division was to securecrossings for armor at the Inn River,the last major barrier to the Alpine for-tress area. The advance was to beginon 2 May.42

One task force of the 3d InfantryDivision was already moving on 1 May.In an unseasonable May Day snow-storm, whipped by a cold wind fromthe Alps, the force sped down the auto-bahn to cut off escaping Germans andsecure bridges across the Inn. At Ro-senheim the Americans found threebridges. Two they captured withoutdifficulty, but the third—the most stra-tegically located and the only one capa-ble of carrying tanks—was defendedbriefly by a small party of Germans.The infantry task force took the offen-sive, but stopped at the bridge, whichhad mines strewn along its flooring.Then the task force commander noticeda smoldering fuse beneath the bridgeand cut the primacord just in time to pre-vent the detonation of a huge amountof explosives. This bridge not only tookthe divisional tanks over the Inn butalso enabled the 3d Division to win therace for Salzburg—the advance of the20th Armored Division had slowedwhen the 42d Infantry Division wasunable to find an intact bridge in itsarea. Not until late on 3 May did tanksof the 20th Armored cross the Inn,using a dam near Wasserburg.

By nightfall on 3 May elements ofthe 3d Infantry Division, racing downthe autobahn, had reached the SaalachRiver, only five or six miles southwestof Salzburg.43 In the lead was the 2d

Battalion of the 7th Infantry. The regi-ment was an old one with a great dealof esprit de corps—its crest and colorscarried a cotton bale, symbolizing ser-vice under Andrew Jackson at the Bat-tle of New Orleans, where it had usedsuch bales as breastworks. It had landedin North Africa on 8 November 1942and had been fighting ever since. Find-ing all three bridges over the Saalachdown, the 10th Engineer Combat Bat-talion crossed the 2d Battalion, 7thInfantry, in assault boats. By dawn on4 May the infantry was entering Salz-burg. The city quickly capitulated. Bythen it was plain that German resistancein the Alpine fortress, or National Re-doubt, was no more than a mirage.

Support of Alsos

In the last half of April, with Ger-man armies collapsing, Allied technicalteams moved into Germany in the VICorps area to capture German scien-tists, documents, and equipment inorder to assess their contributions tothe German war effort. Because of theprogress the United States had madein achieving nuclear reactions in theManhattan Project, the most urgent ofthese efforts sought intelligence on howclose the German scientists were tobuilding a fission bomb that, even atthat late hour, might change the courseof the war. An investigation team ofnuclear scientists had already been ac-tive in Alsace, capturing almost 1,000tons of uranium ore and various equip-ment in the 6th Army Group area.Associated with the American nuclearresearch effort in the United States andoperating under the code name ALSOS,the team, commanded by Col. Boris T.Pash, now sought to seize the remain-

42 AAR, XV Corps, 31 Jul 44-31 May 45.43 Taggart, History of Third Infantry Division, pp. 369,

371.


ing uranium supply, the research docu-ments and laboratories, and the brainsbehind German nuclear science.44

To support these scientific teams,SHAEF assigned each army group com-mand a so-called T-Force headquartersto which scientific personnel were as-signed when they arrived in the theater.The technical experts and theoreticalscientists usually were accompanied by acomplement of combat troops to pro-tect them and by combat engineers whocould serve that purpose but whosemain task was to dismantle capturedequipment and laboratories. In Gen-eral Devers' headquarters, the 1269thEngineer Combat Battalion providedcombat engineer support for the 6thArmy Group T-Force.

Intelligence gathered in ALSOS opera-tions before the 6th Army Group crossedthe Rhine pointed to the existence of adispersed research complex centeredon the villages of Hechingen, Bisingen,and Tailflngen nestled at the easternedge of the Black Forest.

Colonel Pash's target area lay in abroad valley laced with the tributariesof the Neckar River, a region of charmand natural beauty. At the western endof the valley lay Freudenstadt, sometwenty-five miles east of the Rhine atthe same latitude as Strasbourg in Al-sace. From Freudenstadt southeast cur-ved a rough arc of small towns thatmarked the scientific mission's line ofadvance across thirty-five miles of Ger-

man countryside. Denied an airborneoperation to secure this area, Pash de-cided instead on an unsupported thrustinto the hills, risky as it was in the faceof small and scattered, but still combatready, groups of German soldiers andSS troops.

Colonel Pash's difficulties were com-pounded by the sudden successes of theFirst French Army. On 16 April the 6thArmy Group had drawn army bound-aries in the area to leave the city ofStuttgart in the Seventh Army zone ofoperations. French forces had clearedthe east bank of the Rhine oppositeStrasbourg by that date and GeneralJean de Lattre de Tassigny, ignoringGeneral Devers' restrictions on his move-ments, exploited his advantage to thrustnorth and seize Stuttgart by 22 April.This forced Colonel Pash to move histeam across a French rear area, a featthat took resolution, considerable bluff,and occasional strong language withFrench soldiery. The French Provi-sional Government never knew thenature of the search missions, but sus-pected that General Devers hoped tocapture the remnants of the VichyFrench regime, which had taken ref-uge in the German city of Sigmaringen,some fifty miles south of Stuttgart.

The 1269th Engineer Combat Battal-ion less its Company B, left behind withthe 6th Army Group T-Force, joinedthe ALSOS team at Freudenstadt on themorning of 21 April; the engineer con-tingent became Task Force White, afterits commander, Lt. Col. Willard White.The entire command of scientists, engi-neers, and British technicians was knownas Task Force A.45

44 The mission was called ALSOS, the Greek word for"grove" (as in olive grove), as a play on the name ofthen Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, the military head ofthe U.S. Manhattan Project. This account of the activi-ties of the investigation team in Germany relies onthe unit records of the 1269th Engineer Combat Bat-talion for April and May 1945 and on Col. Boris T.Pash's The ALSOS Mission (New York: Award Books,1969), pp. 204-41.

45 Unit Records, 1269th Engr C Bn, Jan-May 45.The 1269th replaced its own Company B with


The same morning Task Force A setout on Colonel Pash's Operation BIGfrom Freudenstadt through the quiettown of Horb to Haigerloch, twentymiles east of Freudenstadt. Here theelated scientists made their first bigdiscovery. As the engineer troops con-solidated the group's position in thetown, the ALSOS team shot open a bolt-ed door sealing the entrance to a cavein the side of a cliff. Inside, the teamfound a large chamber and severalsmaller rooms crammed with instru-ments, control boxes, and an array ofcylinders described by a frightenedGerman technician as a uranium ma-chine. Though missing its uraniumelement, the device was an operatingatomic pile, captured undamaged.

While the scientists, with engineerhelp, spent two days dismantling theequipment, Colonel Pash led most ofthe engineers to the Bisingen-Hechin-gen area, the next populated complex.Spurred by statements of Germans cap-tured at Haigerloch, the force went insearch of the missing uranium andother German scientists in the vicinity.Early engineer patrols ran into increas-ing signs of enemy small unit activity.Bisingen itself was quiet when the engi-neer column snaked into the town, butas the scientists left to explore Hech-ingen four miles to the north, a skir-mish between engineers remaining inBisingen and some German stragglersset off a show of resistance to the Ameri-can troops by the hostile inhabitants.Colonel White put the whole battalionon alert, and the incident passed with-out further development, though themen advancing into the last town occu-

pied during Operation BIG were con-siderably more edgy for this experi-ence.

Early on 24 April, Company A, bayo-nets fixed, moved on Tailfingen, tenmiles by road southeast of Bisingen. InBisingen and Hechingen some twenty-five noted German nuclear physicistsand their staffs had surrendered andunder interrogation had revealed thelocation of other German technicalfacilities in the town Task Force A nowapproached. Although expecting resis-tance, the engineer column pulled intoTailfingen after encountering little morethan a roadblock on the way. By noonthe troops had established Task ForceA in Tailfingen and had surveyed thearea for signs of German military activ-ity. The atmosphere here contrastedsharply with that in Bisingen the daybefore. The laboratory staff of nuclearphysicist Dr. Otto Hahn was coopera-tive as was the burgermeister, and thetask force soon had the information itneeded.

The last discoveries of Operation BIGwere at hand. In a cesspool in the townthe team found a large metal containerholding the valuable secret researchpapers of the Hahn laboratory. TheAllied technicians then moved to aplowed field outside the town to super-vise a hastily impressed German exca-vation crew, whose digging uncovereda large wooden platform. Drawing backthis cover, they found a neat stack ofdark ingots—the missing uranium fromthe pile at Haigerloch. A nearby grist-mill yielded up three large drums ofheavy water, used to control the re-action in the pile.

The engineers loaded this treasureaboard the battalion's trucks with somestrain, the scientists hardly concealing

Company B of the 163d Engineer Combat Battalion tofill its ranks. Colonel Pash incorrectly identifiesColonel White as Wilbur White.


their amusement at the surprise of thetroops as they loaded the trucks. Thedeceptively light-looking stack of ingots,about two cubic feet in size, weighedover two tons, uranium being amongthe densest elements.

With the entire supply of Germanuranium in Allied hands, OperationBIG ended, as did the 1269th EngineerCombat Battalion's association with theALSOS team. The battalion returned tothe 6th Army Group T-Force at Mun-ich in the closing days of the war.46

Engineer units were a central elementin the last six weeks of the war againstcrumbling German forces in the heartof the Reich. In the war of pursuit thateventually cut Hitler's dwindling terri-tory in half, the race to the Elbe in thenorth and into Austria and Czechoslo-vakia in the south was a matter of brid-ges and open roads. Along lines of com-munications from French and Dutchports to the most forward fighting front,engineers supported the advance thatcontributed to the final collapse of theNazi regime.

46 Among the later discoveries made by the men ofCompany A of the battalion around Munich was thecache of stolen art treasures hidden in a mine outside

the city. The erstwhile owner of this collection wasReichsmarschal Hermann Goering.

CHAPTER XXV

Conclusion

U.S. Army engineers unquestionablyfulfilled their traditional mission in theMediterranean and European theatersin World War II. In their massive con-struction program in England, theyhoused the Allied armies preparing forthe main thrust against German forcesin the west. In combat zones in boththeaters, engineer work on beaches andin bridging, rail and road construction,and mine clearance permitted the tacti-cal advance of combat elements. Diversespecialty units from water purificationto engineer pipeline companies alsocontributed to the success. In the com-munications zones, constant rehabilita-tion of harbors and of lines of commu-nications guaranteed the movement ofArmy supply in unprecedented volumeand provided facilities for other ser-vice branches. Of course, none of theseaccomplishments was without drawbackor fault. Like the rest of the Armythroughout the war, the engineerslearned and relearned lessons con-stantly, often in the face of enemy fire.

During the interwar period the Corpsof Engineers had acquiesced in thealmost inevitable allocation of limitedfunds to combat arms at the expense ofcombat support elements. In the smallAmerican Army of the 1930s, traininghad consistently favored combat engi-neering and the quick engagement of

the enemy to produce a decision in ashort time, all at the expense of a thor-ough grounding in administrative func-tions and the methods of building andmaintaining a rear area service of sup-ply. When the first engineers wentoverseas, the want of properly schooledsupply personnel and of a comprehen-sive system of supply management com-pounded the material shortages thatplagued them. The engineers in En-gland in 1941 wrestled with their earlylogistical problems without much appli-cation of one of the chief American con-tributions to warfare: a business senseof organization, efficiency, and plan-ning foresight. The lack of traineddepot troops and of an adequate andstandardized inventory procedure con-tinued on the Continent later in thewar and contributed to the shipping cri-sis of the fall of 1944. Improvementwas slow, and at the close of the warthe ETO chief engineer called for arevamping of engineer supply doctrine,policy, and operating procedures.

A problem as basic as the supplyshortages was the alarmingly low levelof engineering and construction expe-rience among new engineer officersand troops arriving in England after1942. Though aviation engineer unitscould learn their jobs by doing them inEngland, combat and construction engi-

CONCLUSION 561

neers had barely enough time duringthe BOLERO buildup to learn the rudi-ments of their trade as they would prac-tice it under fire. Officers in the the-ater perforce absorbed an education inthe technical side of their work and atthe same time in the art of leadership.The training of engineers overseas alsosuffered from the uncertainties of stra-tegic direction through 1942 and 1943;the TORCH operation committed manyof the most accomplished engineers tothe war in North Africa.

The ETOUSA command structurethat first evolved in England with thetheater chief engineer subordinate tothe theater services of supply echelonpersisted to the end of the war in north-ern Europe. Though the peculiaritiesof that arrangement placed GeneralMoore at an organizational level fromwhich he could advise General Eisen-hower on engineer affairs only throughGeneral Lee, he, like the other techni-cal chiefs in the theater, accommodatedhimself to this system, and it never exer-cised an untoward effect on engineeroperations. Similarly, the sometimestangled lines of authority for the engi-neers in North Africa saw resolutiononly in the last year of the war, buthere too other considerations were moreimportant to engineer performancethan the top-level organization.

The evolution and the employmentof major new engineer organizationsand units in the theaters met with mixedsuccess. With the enemy in possessionof ports on the Continent and withNorth African harbors of any conse-quence under Vichy control, gaining afoothold in either area involved am-phibious operations. The amphibianbrigades the engineers developed tomeet the demands of seaborne inva-

sion were original in concept, but onlypartially realized their true potential inEuropean and North African opera-tions. In contrast to the Pacific, whereengineers retained their boat regiments,the truncation of the brigades in Europelimited their performance; when theNavy insisted on running all the land-ing craft to be employed in beach oper-ations, the Army brigades lost theirorganic boat elements. The division oflabor remained, however; all activitieson the seaward side of a landing opera-tion were the responsibility of the Navyand everything on shore remained theprovince of the Army. No single author-ity controlled the entire expanse betweenthe ships offshore and the inland sup-ply dumps. The history of amphibiousoperations after TORCH saw continu-ous efforts to provide this control byplacing on the beach an organizationwhose writ would extend seaward andlandward from the traditional divisionpoint of Army and Navy authority dur-ing an assault landing—the high-watermark on the beach. In subsequent inva-sions, joint Army-Navy organizationswere formed to manage traffic fromoffshore and to move supply across thebeaches quickly. These arrangementsbrought ashore not only naval demoli-tions experts with Army engineers, butalso an entire self-contained organiza-tion, the engineer special brigade, withthe functions of obstacle demolition,fire fighting, ordnance disposal, medi-cal service, quartermaster duties, vehi-cle maintenance, signals, and trafficmanagement. Despite the loss of theboat regiments, the engineers adaptedto an amphibious doctrine and an as-sault function with organizations un-known in the Army before the war.

Through the war in Europe, as in


other theaters, the engineers struggledwith demands of unprecedented com-plexity on their unit structure. The tri-angular division with its assigned engi-neer battalion proved itself in battle inNorth Africa, Italy, and northern Eu-rope. But the introduction in the the-aters of other new and specialized engi-neer functions during the press of com-bat created command and organiza-tional problems that began to see someresolution only toward the conflict'send. The evolution of units along thegroup concept reflected efforts to tai-lor engineer commands to meet the exi-gencies of modern war. The direct bor-rowing of techniques and manpowerfrom the national industrial basebrought the latest industrial methodsand devices into military use rapidly,but the absorbing of these features intoa regular military organization involvedtrial, error, and time.

The engineer group concept forsookthe traditional regimental structure forone based on function and extremeflexibility. As a tactical headquarterswith its engineer battalions attachedrather than assigned to it, the groupwas a loose organization that allowedthe rapid transfer of specialty units inand out of the command for specifictasks. Heavy equipment belonging tothe group's battalions was generallyconcentrated in a separate supply poolthat took the place of the regiment'sheadquarters and service company sothat the individual battalions couldtravel light.

The pronounced advantages in flexi-bility and mobility achieved by the engi-neer battalions in this fashion were notentirely unqualified. The rapid intro-duction of the group concept producedwidely disparate ideas as to the com-

mand arrangements between head-quarters and subordinate attached units;doctrine on group tactics was lacking,and the shifting of units from onegroup to another frequently causedmore administrative confusion andmorale problems than were acceptable.The burden on independent battalioncommanders for planning and carry-ing out work was too great for the staffsthey had available to them. The groupconcept was also so unevenly appliedin the field that widely divergent prac-tices held sway in Italy and in north-western Europe. Though this did notaffect the performance of the units asmuch as other factors such as short-ages of manpower, engineers in theEuropean theater who gathered afterthe war to discuss their experiencesdecided that the concept had been over-used and imperfectly applied; theyvoted to retain the desirable featuresof the engineer group in a more for-mal military unit with a regimentaldesignation.1

Quite aside from the problems ofnew engineer functions to be performed,some lack of technical experience alsosurfaced among officers as the war pro-gressed despite an excellent engineerreserve establishment. The rapid ex-pansion of the officer corps and theoften hasty training of candidates athome produced situations in the fieldin which engineer troops had moretechnical know-how than some of theirofficers. Highly specialized organiza-tions such as port construction andrepair groups and petroleum distribu-tion companies at first benefited from

1 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 71, Engineer Organization, p.12.

CONCLUSION 563

the crash recruiting campaigns amongthe marine technicians and wildcattersof civilian industry. As with the generalservice regiments first sent to England,the result was often a concentration ofscarce talent in a few units. Units formedlater had the pick of the draft and ofqualified officers, but, however wellmotivated, these men had to learn muchof their work after they had reachedthe theaters of operations.

Though the petroleum distributioncompanies also suffered this disadvan-tage, the reasons for their sometimesslow progress lay elsewhere. Pipelineconstruction could never keep up withthe tactical units in their race acrossnorthern France after the breakoutfrom the lodgment area of Normandy.The unexpectedly rapid advance fromsouthern France likewise outran thepipeline that was to carry fuel forwardto the combat elements. Even with moremanpower and a surplus of pipelinematerial, a rapidly changing tactical sit-uation imposed impossible constructiondemands upon the petroleum distribu-tion companies in the field. Gasoline-starved armored divisions were send-ing truck convoys on 250-mile supplyruns to the closest pipehead throughAugust and early September 1944.

The systems nevertheless provedthemselves. Without them, POL sup-ply lines would have relied on truckand road capacity that was equally taxedduring the pursuit warfare of late sum-mer 1944. In the slower moving Italiancampaign, pipeline troops had moresuccess in keeping pace with the fight-ing units they were supplying despitethe rugged terrain. The chief engineerof the Mediterranean theater consid-ered them among the best special engi-

neer troops in the Peninsular BaseSection.2

The engineers in Europe and NorthAfrica quickly learned the value ofmodern heavy equipment in combatsupport and in rear area operations.The versatile engineer bulldozer, whichbecame the symbol of the Americanability to tackle seemingly impossiblejobs, was indispensable in all aspects ofroad and airfield construction. Supple-mented by graders and rollers that lev-eled roads and fields in short order andby huge rock crushers to provide aggre-gate from quarries, the dozer consis-tently enabled the engineers to rehabili-tate older lines of communications orto create new ones at great speed. With-out their large and powerful machinery,in fact, the engineers could not havecoped with their assignments. Constantrevision of the standard TOEs for equip-ment through the war reflected thetrend toward ever heavier machinery.At the war's end, engineer officers rec-ommended that the D-7 Caterpillardozer be standard in all units, replac-ing any lighter machines.

Similar sentiments prevailed on theuse of trucks, which grew larger andheavier in American and British inven-tories as the war went on. The humble2 1/2-ton dump truck was always inshort supply for the engineers. Adapt-able to a number of uses, including theeasy transport of oil pipeline sections,the dump trucks were valuable enoughto prompt demands for their substitu-tion for cargo vehicles of the same size.The Brockway trucks issued to engi-neer heavy ponton units to transportbridge sets and floats also contributed



to the trend toward larger and heaviervehicles.

The tactical bridging with which theAmerican Army experimented in 1940in imitation of German examples proveditself in combat, but one of the mostrewarding measures of the war was theadoption of the British Bailey bridge.Besides providing a common heavybridge for both British and U.S. Ar-mies, the Bailey was far more versatilethan any American design and proveditself even as a floating ponton struc-ture. In another application of moderntechnique to an engineer function, theuse of light aircraft for observation andphotographic surveillance added muchto the process of estimating bridgingand road-building requirements alongprojected lines of advance that still layin enemy territory. In Europe, the engi-neers could also harness a steel produc-tion capacity to their own use. Contractswith French firms supplemented theAmerican supply, especially of I-beamstringers for heavy railway bridging.

In one area, mine warfare, Germanpractice continued to excel until the endof the war. American methods wereinferior by comparison; standard U.S.Army mines were usually smaller andfar less ingenious in design than theGerman variety. The Teller antitankmine had twice the explosive charge ofthe American M-1 antitank mine, whichdid little damage to German tank hulls,though it could wreck tracks that struckit. Smaller American antipersonnelmines were often unstable and danger-ous to the engineers implanting them.Engineer training in mine warfare the-ory was more than adequate, but themen lacked the experience that wouldhave made them experts. Captured orswept ordnance was always too danger-

ous to transport to the United States,and as a result many engineers came tothe battlefield without having seen thedevices they were to unearth and dis-arm. The engineers established coun-termine schools in the theaters andshared their own experience with thetroops of other arms in an attempt tosave lives and to establish standards forAmerican mine warfare. The SCR-625detector and such innovations as theSnake proved of more value than de-vices like the Scorpion flail, but the warended with the engineers still relyingon the one method of mine sweepingused from the start: a sharp-eyed vet-eran probing with a bayonet held at athirty-degree angle. Units emplacingminefields were also notably absent-minded about passing along specificdetail on the location and the dimen-sion of mined areas, leaving enemy andAllied troops to negotiate the field later.The Germans routinely recorded allminefields in minute detail and col-lected this information at the field armylevel with identical records going to acentral land mine office in Germany. Apostwar engineer investigating boardrecommended the American imitationof the German system, at least in estab-lishing a centralized theater-level mineinformation network.3

Several considerations affected map-ping throughout the operations in theMediterranean and European theaters.Map quality was usually sufficient tosatisfy the needs of the using combatelements during the hostilities. Mapsobtained from British sources underwartime agreements and from Frenchor even captured German stocks sup-

3 ETO Gen Bd Rpt 73, Engineer Technical Policies,p. 13; Ottinger, "Landmine and Countermine War-fare," North Africa, 1940-1943, p. 260.

CONCLUSION 565

ported planning and tactical operations;these sources were supplemented bymaps derived from aerial photographsby American air forces. All of thesemethods had drawbacks, but served thepurposes of Allied armies well enough.

Less satisfactory, although never anobstacle to operations, was the prob-lem of map issue to using units. Eachfield army had difficulty in moving mapstocks to the forward battalions, but thecauses of the problem varied. Inevit-ably, pursuit warfare led to situationsin which troops advanced into areas notdepicted on the maps they carried forimmediate operations. Pursuit opera-tions also demanded more small-scalemaps—those above 1:50,000, which wasthe preferred tactical map in Europe.Static or siege operations required largerscale renditions of 1:25,000 or even1:5,000.

Distribution units in the field han-dled more than 210 million maps of allsizes in the European theater alone,with the bulk of this number comingfrom presses in the United States; over28 million maps were from the FrenchInstitut Geographique National. Troopsused commercial road maps wherethey were available, and the theatersought to supply each vehicle with alocal road map. Engineer authoritiesassembled at the end of the war esti-mated, however, that had the demandsfor any category of maps been evenminimally higher, the strained distribu-tion nets would not have met require-ments.

Though highly publicized by bothenemy and Allied sources, fortificationsin Europe proved less formidable thananticipated. In the cases of the AtlanticWall and the Siegfried Line, engineersproceeded with infantry teams to re-

duce bunkers or, sometimes, to sealtheir defenders inside. Assaults on for-tified positions showed that aggressive,well-trained engineer and infantry par-ties supported by flat-trajectory artil-lery fire or close tactical air cover couldreduce the most forbidding Germancasemates. Engineers examining coastaldefenses after assault landings discov-ered that naval fire was effective againstconcrete emplacements, but only directhits or an impact close enough to showerthe bunker interior with fragmentsbrought decisive results.

Engineers performed well when theywent into action as infantry. GeneralMoore remarked after the war that theuse of engineers in combat had beenmore frequent than he had anticipated.Although their celebrated performancein the German Ardennes offensive re-ceived considerable public attention,engineers were committed as infantryduring tactical emergencies everywherein Europe and North Africa. Theircombat doctrine proved sound in theheat of battle. Engineers establishedperimeter defenses around bridgeheadconstruction sites and served in activecombat with infantry and as coveringforces at roadblocks and minefieldsthroughout the war.

Engineer strengths in the Mediterra-nean and in northern Europe varied asthe strategic importance of the north-ern European campaigns grew and thatof the Italian campaign declined. Nev-ertheless, the proportion of engineertroops to combat elements at the endof the war was not widely divergent inthe two theaters. In the European the-ater there were 323,677 engineers—some 10.5 percent of the total theaterstrength of 3,065,505 on 30 April 1945.One man in nine in the ETO was an


engineer. In the Mediterranean theratio was one in eleven. Engineers therenumbered 44,467, or about 9 percentof the theater aggregate of 493,876 inthe last month of the war. These fig-ures can be contrasted with those forthe Southwest Pacific, where one manin seven was an Army engineer. Despitethe usual shortages in their numbers,the engineers were the largest singlecomponent of the divisional slice out-side of regular combat troops.4

Their frequent shortages in men andequipment notwithstanding, the engi-neers met the exacting demands of thecampaigns against German and Italianarms in North Africa and Europe. In awar calling for the closest integrationof all combat and support arms for suc-cess in battle, the engineers were a com-petent and motivated force. They facili-tated the concentration of Allied armiesin England, helped move combat forcesand their supply across hostile beaches,and supported the final decisive drivesinto the very heart of the Reich.

4 Extracts, Staff Officers' Field Manual Planning Data,Draft FM 101-10, 1 Sep 47, pp. 406-07.

Bibliographical NoteDocumentary Sources

Documentary sources for the historyof engineer operations in Europe andNorth Africa during World War II con-sist of records generated in the varioustheater command headquarters, in staffsections, and in active combat, general,or special service engineer units. Nowhoused in the General Archives Divi-sion of the Washington National Rec-ords Center, Suitland, Maryland, theyinclude daily journals, memorandums,correspondence, general and specialorders, and periodic reports for com-mands and units in both theaters. Theauthor has supplemented informationdrawn from these sources by solicitingcomments from engineer participantsin the events described through inter-views, correspondence, and submissionto them of early drafts of the manu-script for elaboration or correction.

Several major collections were of spe-cial value in the preparation of thisaccount. The military series of the cen-tral files of the Office of the Chief ofEngineers, War Department, containsmaterials on the engineer preparationfor war and the later broad supervisionof engineer technical affairs overseas.A wartime Historical Branch in OCEgathered a separate documentary fileduring the war and, as the EngineerHistorical Division, later supplementedthe collection with additional documen-tary and interview files. Ancillary col-lections include the Army Map Servicewartime records. This material has alsobeen retired to the Washington Nation-al Records Center.

The files of the European Theaterof Operations, U.S. Army, contain therecords of the chief engineer and thestated theater policies and proceduresgoverning engineer activities in En-gland and on the Continent. The ETOHistorical Division files also deal exten-sively with the history of engineers inthe war in Europe. The files of the basesections and the advance section like-wise contain material central to theengineer support of combat operations.

North African—Mediterranean the-ater files, also in the Washington Na-tional Records Center, are similarlyorganized by command and cover engi-neer activities in North Africa and Italy.Records of numerically designated unitsare filed individually by unit numberin the records center.

The amount of unpublished mate-rial on engineer units in the two the-aters is also voluminous, though it isuneven in quality. The more importantworks are the following:

1. Twenty Engineer Historical Re-ports were prepared by the Liaison Sec-tion of the Intelligence Division, OCE,ETOUSA, late in 1945. Each reportdeals exhaustively with a single broadaspect of engineer endeavor in Englandand on the Continent and includesextensive appendixes that contain somebasic documents, detailed drawings,technical guidance, and occasional inter-view transcripts. This series is filedunder the heading ETO Administra-tive File in the General Archives Div-ision, Washington National RecordsCenter. There is no comparable collec-


tion for the North African and Medi-terranean theaters, though a short se-ries of histories of base sections existsfor North Africa and Italy, the latteron file at the Center of Military History.Engineer affairs are included as appro-priate in these volumes.

2. A multi-volume history of the Med-iterranean theater's Allied headquarters,History of AFHQ, also has numerousreferences to engineer activities and tocommand problems involving engi-neers.

3. Of the 131 ETO General BoardReports, the results of investigations byspecially appointed teams of ETOUSAveterans, four deal directly with engi-neer organizations, technical and tacti-cal policies, and engineer equipment.Others deal with matters affecting engi-neer operations such as theater organi-zation, supply policy, maintenance, andthe structure of SOS, ETOUSA, andCOMZ, ETOUSA. A complete set ofthe reports is at the Center of MilitaryHistory.

4. The eleven-volume Administra-tive and Logistical History of the Euro-pean Theater of Operations also con-tains considerable engineer information.Intended as a series of preliminarymonographs for a major history ofETOUSA, the works were completedin the theater early in 1946. Of impor-tance for engineer operations are thefollowing: The Predecessor Com-mands: The Special Observers (SPOBS)and United States Army Forces in theBritish Isles (USAFBI) by Henry G.Elliott; Organization and Command inthe European Theater of Operationsby Robert W. Coakley; OperationsTORCH and the ETO; Neptune: Train-ing for Mounting the Operation, andArtificial Ports by Clifford Jones; Open-

ing and Operating the Continental Portsby Elmer Cutts and Robert L. Davis;Survey of Allied Planning for Conti-nental Operations by Howard L. Oleck,Henry J. Webb, and Vernon W. Hoo-ver; The Local Procurement of Laborand Supplies, United Kingdom andContinental by Henry G. Elliott; andTroop and Supply Buildup in the Uni-ted Kingdom Prior to D-day by Her-bert French.

Published Sources

Important published sources includeMaj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore's comprehen-sive Final Report of the Chief Engineer,European Theater of Operations, 1942 —1945 and the published histories of theFirst, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Armies,and of the 12th Army Group. A gen-eral treatment of logistical—and engi-neer—problems in North Africa andItaly is in the Logistical History of NATO-USA-MTOUSA (Naples, 1946). Of spe-cial value were the following volumesin the official United States Army inWorld War II series: Blanche D. Coll,Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosen-thal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops andEquipment (Washington, 1958); RolandG. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support ofthe Armies, Volume I (Washington,1953) and Logistical Support of the Armies,Volume II (Washington, 1959); RichardM. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943(Washington, 1955) and Robert W.Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Glo-bal Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945(Washington, 1968). The campaign his-tories in the series also provided a com-prehensive background for this accountof engineer operations.

The chief commercially published

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 569

works used in the preparation of thisbook were General of the Army OmarNelson Bradley's A Soldier's Story (NewYork: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), Brig.Gen. William F. Heavey's Down Ramp!The Story of the U.S. Army AmphibianEngineers (Washington: Infantry Jour-nal Press, 1947), General of the ArmyDwight D. Eisenhower's Crusade in Eu-rope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,1948), General George S. Patton, Jr.'sWar as I Knew It (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1947), and Wesley F. Cra-ven and James L. Cate's The U.S. ArmyAir Forces in World War II (Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press, 1948-1958),7 volumes.

Numerous articles on engineer opera-tions appeared during and after the warin service journals. Among the best ofthese were those in Military Review, TheMilitary Engineer, the Engineering News-Record, and the Industry Journal.

GlossaryAAAAAFABC-1

ABSACofSADSECAEFAEFAFHQAFSCAGFALSOS

AMGLOANVIL

APAPApexASFATAUSAVALANCHEAvgas

BACKBONE

BANGBARRACUDABAYTOWN

Belgian gates

BIG

BLACKSTONE

Antiaircraft artilleryArmy Air ForcesAgreements reached at Washington Conference,

January-March 1941Atlantic Base SectionAssistant Chief of StaffAdvance SectionAllied Expeditionary Force (World War II)American Expeditionary Forces (World War I)Allied Force HeadquartersAir Force Service CommandArmy Ground ForcesCode name for an Allied intelligence mission that

sought information on German developments innuclear fission

Allied Military Government Labor OfficeThe planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern

France in the Toulon-Marseille area (laterDRAGOON)

Troop transportAntipersonnel mineA remote-controlled drone boatArmy Service ForcesAntitank mineArmy of the United StatesCode name for the invasion of Italy at SalernoAviation gasoline

An assault plan which called for a foray, intoSpanish Morocco should Spain change its nom-inally neutral position

Shipping code name for Zone III, Northern IrelandAssault plan aimed directly at the harbor of NaplesAssault plan that called for the British to move

across the Strait of Messina to Reggio di CalabriaNickname of Element C, a beach obstacle emplaced

on northern French beachesAssault plan to move nuclear intelligence teams

from Freudenstadt through Horb to Haigerlochin southwest Germany

A subtask force of Western Task Force whosemission was to capture Safi, a small port 150miles south of Casablanca

GLOSSARY 571

Blade Force

BOLERO

Bouncing BettyBRIMSTONEBRUSHWOOD

CCACCBCCRCCSCECENT

CGChocolate bars

Class IClass IIClass IIIClass IVClass VClass 30, 40, 70

COCOBRA

CofEngrsCofSCOMZCONAD

COSSACCOWPUNCHERCTF

D-1D-3DBSDIME

DRAGOON

Belonging to the British 78th Division; resembleda U.S. armored combat command and includedan American armored battalion

Code name for the buildup of U.S. forces andsupplies in United Kingdom for cross-Channelattack

German antipersonnel S-minePlan for the capture of Sardinia, canceledSubtask force of Western Task Force for the attackon Fedala, Morocco

Combat Command ACombat Command BCombat Command ReserveCombined Chiefs of StaffCorps of EngineersTask force in Sicily assault landing (45th Infantry

Division); also the code name for beachesassaulted by this force

Commanding generalPrecast concrete units with scored checkerboard

surfaceRationsOrganizational equipmentFuels and lubricants such as gasoline and coalConstruction suppliesAmmunition and explosivesDesignation indicating weight-bearing capacities

of military bridges and roadsCommanding officerCode name for the operation launched by First

Army on 25 July 1944, designed to break out ofthe Normandy lodgment

Chief of EngineersChief of StaffCommunications ZoneContinental Advance Section, Communications

ZoneChief of Staff to the Supreme Allied CommanderAmphibious exercises before invasion of ItalyCenter Task Force, North African invasion

Vierville exit, OMAHA Beach, NormandyLes Moulins leading to St. Laurent, OMAHA BeachDelta Base SectionTask force for Sicily assault landing (1st Infantry

Division); the beaches assaulted by the task forceFinal code word for the invasion of southern France


DUKW

E-1

E-3EACEAFEBSETFETITETOUSAEUCOMEXPLOIT

F-1FABIUS

FECFECOMZFFAFFIFLASHPOINT

G-1G-2G-3G-4GANGWAY

GHQGLUEGOALPOST

GOOSEBERRY

GPAGPBGRENADE

Hards

A 2½-ton, 6-by-6 amphibian truck

Easy Red, leading up between St. Laurent andColleville, OMAHA Beach

Colleville draw, OMAHA BeachEngineer Amphibian CommandEastern Assault Force, North African invasionEastern Base SectionEastern Task Force, North African invasionEngineer technical intelligence teamEuropean Theater of Operations, U.S. ArmyEuropean CommandAn elaborate deception scheme designed to trick

the Germans into expecting a crossing of theRhine River at Uerdingen, some fifteen milessouth of Rheinberg

Draw leading off Fox Red, OMAHA BeachAmphibious landing exercises of all assault forces

except Force U, early May 1944, southernEngland

French Expeditionary CorpsForward Echelon, Communications ZoneFirst French ArmyFrench Forces of the InteriorA plan to cross the Rhine at Rheinberg, fifteen miles

south of Wesel

Personnel officer of division or higher staffIntelligence sectionPlans and operations sectionLogistics and supply sectionAssault plan aimed at the beaches immediately

north of NaplesGeneral HeadquartersMailing code name for Zone II, Bristol and LondonTask force for assault landing in Mehdia— Port-

Lyautey area, North AfricaPartial breakwater formed off the Normandy

beaches by the sinking of blockshipsGeneral Purchasing AgentGeneral Purchasing BoardCode word for a Ninth U.S. Army assault crossing of

the Roer followed by a northeastward drive tolink with the First Canadian Army along theRhine, February 1945

Short for hardstandings

GLOSSARY 573

HEHHCHUSKY

IBCIBCAFIBSINDIGOISISISS

Joss

KOOL

LBVLCALCILCM(I)LCM(III)LCPLCTLCVPLSILSTLVT

MAGNET

MAMDMBSMPMPLSMRSMSRMT 80MTOMULBERRY

MUSKET

NAAF

High-explosiveHeadquarters and Headquarters CompanyCode name for Allied invasion of Sicily in July

1943

Iceland Base CommandIceland Base Command, Air ForceIsland Base SectionCode name for occupation of IcelandInter-Service Information Series (British)Identification of Separate Shipments to Overseas

Destinations

Task force for Sicily assault landing (3d InfantryDivision); the beaches assaulted by the taskforce

Task force for Sicily assault landing (2d ArmoredDivision less Combat Command A); the beachesassaulted by the task force

A Fifty-ton self-propelled bargeLanding craft, assaultLanding craft, infantryLanding craft, mechanized, Mark ILanding craft, mechanized, Mark IIILanding craft, personnelLanding craft, tankLanding craft, vehicle and personnelLanding ship, infantryLanding ship, tankLanding vehicle, tracked

Plan for shipment of American forces to NorthernIreland

Marshaling area mapping depotsMediterranean Base SectionMilitary policeMilitary Pipeline ServiceMilitary Railway ServiceMain supply routeMotor gasolineMediterranean Theater of OperationsThe artificial harbor constructed off the Normandy

beachesAssault plan that would bring Fifth Army into

Taranto, Italy

Northwest African Air Forces


NAAFI

NAASCNATOUSANCDUNEPTUNE

NIBSNIFNORDWIND

NYPOE

OCEOMAHA BeachOVERLORD

PBSPBS (Main)PensouthPLUTOPOEPOLPROCO

QUADRANT

RAFRAINBOW-5

RCTROUNDUP

RSJ

SBSSCR-625SEXTANT

SHARKSHAEFSHINGLESLEDGEHAMMER

SOLOC

Navy-Army-Air Force Institution (British equiva-lent to post exchange)

North African Air Service CommandNorth African Theater of Operations, U.S. ArmyNaval combat demolition unitActual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. The

code name was used for security reasons afterSeptember 1943 on all OVERLORD planning paperswhich referred to the target area and date.

Northern Ireland Base SectionNorthern Ireland ForcesCode word for a German counteroffensive launched

on New Year's Eve 1944 near the southern endof the Allied line in Alsace

New York Port of Embarkation

Office of the Chief of EngineersLanding beach in NormandyPlan for the invasion of northwest Europe, June

1944

Peninsular Base SectionLeghorn half of Peninsular Base SectionNaples half of Peninsular Base SectionPipeline Under the OceanPort of EmbarkationPetroleum, Oil, and LubricantsProjects for Continental Operations

Quebec Conference, August 1943

Royal Air ForceA U.S. war plan designed to implement that por-

tion of ABC-1 which applied to the UnitedKingdom in the event of U.S. entry into the war

Regimental combat teamPlan for major U.S.-British attack across the Channel

in 1943Rolled steel joist

Southern Base SectionU.S. mine detectorInternational conference at Cairo, November and

December 1943Task force (II Corps), Operation HUSKYSupreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary ForceCode name for the Anzio landing, 22 January 1944Plan for a limited-objective attack across the

Channel in 1942Southern Line of Communications (Rhone

Valley)

GLOSSARY 575

SOSSOXOSPOBS

TAGTBATCTERMINALTIGER

TOETOMBOLA

TORCH

TPP SectionTRIDENT

UCRBUGLYUSAAFUSAFBIUSANIFUSMCUSFETUTAH Beach

VERITABLE

WBSWEBFOOT

WNTFWoofusWTF

XO

ZAZI

Services of SupplyMailing code name for Zone I, northern EnglandSpecial Observer Group

The Adjutant GeneralTable of Basic AllowanceTransportation CorpsA special landing partyCode name for an amphibious rehearsal for

OVERLORDTable of Organization and EquipmentA flexible six-inch underwater pipeline designed

to discharge POL tankers anchored offshore atSte. Honorine-des-Pertes

Code name for the Allied invasion of NorthwestAfrica, 1942

Transportation, Plant, and Personnel SectionWashington Conference, 1943

Unit Construction Railway Bridge (British)Shipping address code name for United KingdomU.S. Army Air ForcesU.S. Army Forces British IslesU.S. Army Northern Ireland ForcesU.S. Marine CorpsU.S. Forces in the European TheaterLanding beach in Normandy

A 21 Army Group plan for a Canadian attackbetween the Maas and the Rhine, January-February 1945

Western Base Section (England)Code name for a practice landing preparatory to

Anzio landingsWestern Naval Task ForceA rocket-firing LCMWestern Task Force (North African invasion)

Executive officer

Zone of the AdvanceZone of the Interior

Basic Military Map Symbols*Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supplypoint.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service.

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wingsymbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, seeFM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.

Size SymbolsThe following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifyingarm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT fol-lowing identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air ForceWing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLESThe letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parentunit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or belowboundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division.

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

WeaponsMachine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941 — 1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943 — 1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of OperationsNorthwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the BulgeThe Last Offensive

The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro TroopsManhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Japan

The U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as requiredby the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historicalproperties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaisonwith public and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and studyin the field of military history. The Center is located at 20 Massachusetts Ave-nue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20314.

Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee

Roger A. Beaumont, Texas A&M UniversityMaj. Gen. Quinn H. Becker, Deputy Surgeon General, U.S. ArmyMaj. Gen. John B. Blount, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine CommandBrig. Gen. Dallas C. Brown, Jr., U.S. Army War CollegeRichard D. Challener, Princeton UniversityCol. Roy K. Flint, U.S. Military AcademyJohn H. Hatcher, The Adjutant General CenterArcher Jones, North Dakota State UniversityJamie W. Moore, The CitadelJames C. Olson, University of MissouriJames O'Neill, National Archives and Records ServiceCharles P. Roland, University of KentuckyJohn Shy, University of MichiganCol. William A. Stofft, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

IndexAachen: 414-15, 418, 420-23, 489ABC-1: 8, 10, 17Adams, Col. Donald B.: 18-20, 56, 113Adige River: 221Advance Section (ADSEC): 286-87, 342, 344,

347-53, 359, 393-94, 397-403, 405, 411-12,537-38

Aerial photography: 109, 145, 192, 227, 294-96,430, 565. See also Maps and mapping; Photointerpreters.

K17 and Speed Graphic cameras: 296, 451multiplex equipment: 5, 295of Normandy beaches: 304-05, 307, 315trimetrogen pictures: 295use in bridge siting: 176, 185-86, 229-30, 283,

374, 427, 451, 490, 534-35, 564Aerial tramway: 216Agay River: 443Agropoli: 154Ahr River: 499-500, 504Ain Beida: 98Ain Fritissa: 105, 157Air Force, Eighth: 36, 52, 56, 90, 296Air Force, Twelfth: 86, 88Air Force Engineer Command, IX: 90Air Force Engineer Command, MTO (Provisional):

90Air Force Service Command, XII: 88Air Service Area Command, III: 172, 203Air Support Command, XII: 84Airborne Division, 82d: 136, 156, 165, 303, 332,

368-69, 466, 473-74Airborne Division, 101st: 303, 332, 336-37, 370, 476,

478Airborne Engineer Aviation Companies

887th: 85, 87888th: 73, 85, 87

Airborne Engineer Battalions307th: 156, 368326th: 332

Airborne Task Force, 1st: 439Airborne troops: 96, 131, 311-12, 473Aircraft

B-17E photographic: 49, 295bomber: 87F-4 and F-5: 296light observation: 228, 375, 430, 451, 564P-38: 229

Airel: 371-75Airfield construction: 6, 9-11, 13-16, 31, 33, 40,

45, 50, 52-55, 58, 61, 85-90, 119, 140, 256,261-64, 270, 277, 282

Aisne River: 389Aix-en-Provence: 451-52

Akureyri: 11, 13Alban Hills: 192, 208-09Albert Canal: 365, 389Albrecht, Col. Frank M.: 50, 56, 287, 349-50Aldenhoven: 492, 494Aldershot: 298Alencon: 410-11Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G.: 113, 115,

137, 179Alexander Patch Bridge: 534Algeria: 85, 87, 89, 91-92, 113, 121Algiers: 59, 77-78, 83, 85, 91, 111, 115, 119-20,

125, 436Alimena: 140Alien, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa: 145-46Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ): 59-61, 83, 88,

108, 110-11, 115, 118-21, 123, 125, 141, 166,192, 198, 200-201, 203, 229-30, 234. See alsoCommand structure problems.

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), EngineerSection: 59, 61, 88, 102, 111, 116, 120, 153,200-201, 206, 215, 229-30

Allied Military Government (Italy): 172, 225-26, 246Alpine fortress: 553-56Alps: 553-55Alsace: 484, 556ALSOS team: 556-59Altavilla: 164Altmuehl River: 549Amalfi: 162, 177Ambleve River: 471-74Ambrieres-le-Grand: 385, 386nAmerican School Center: 40, 291Amorosi: 175Amphibian engineers: 6, 561Amphibian Truck Company (TC), 819th: 506Amphibious operations: 33

Army-Navy assault gapping teams: 305-08, 317,319-20, 322-27, 333-34, 339, 341, 437,441-43

Army-Navy responsibility division: 64-66, 78-79,121-22, 163, 195, 306-08, 436-37, 561

doctrine and SOP: 64-65, 133leapfrogging landings: 148, 162pre-World War II planning: 6rehearsals and exercises: 68, 76, 80, 124, 157, 192,

195, 293, 310-13training: 6, 31, 65-68, 76, 80, 121-24, 157-58,

192, 195, 293, 304-07, 309-13, 437-38Amphibious Training Command, AGF: 65Anderson, Col. H. W.: 471, 473Anderson, Maj. Gen. John B.: 517Anderson, Maj. Gen. Jonathan W.: 65, 69Anderson, Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N.: 59, 66, 77, 86


Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M.: 257, 259Annunziata: 177Antheor Cove: 443Antiaircraft units and weapons: 223, 225, 227, 254,

480, 497, 509, 514, 518Antrim Quartermaster Depot: 21Antwerp: 351, 358-60, 363-66, 385, 413, 423ANVIL operation: 212, 233, 238, 247, 249, 253,

436-38, 442-43, 445. See also Southern Franceoperations.

Anzio: 228landings and breakout: 179, 180, 183, 192-93,

195-97, 208, 223, 434port operations: 197, 211, 234, 245, 248, 252

Anzola: 220Apennines: 180, 237Apex drone boats: 304, 306, 437, 441, 443-44Apollinarisberg: 501Ardennes counteroffensive: 364, 414, 434, 460,

461-84, 488, 507, 565Argens River: 442Argentan: 402Argentan-Falaise pocket: 386Aries: 447Aries Canal: 448Armogida, Lt. Col. Salvatore A.: 216Armored Divisions: 5

1st: 17, 19, 21, 67, 74, 84, 94, 96, 98, 105, 156-57,183, 189, 199, 222, 224

2d: 65, 69, 119, 129, 131, 136, 376-77, 420, 489,540

3d: 373, 376, 385, 390, 414-15, 417-18, 474, 480,541, 544-46

4th: 377, 380-81, 390-91, 429, 526, 530, 546-475th: 386, 389, 489, 498, 537-396th: 377, 380-81, 5307th: 387-88, 464-66, 4718th: 4899th: 462, 466, 475-76, 481, 500, 502, 504-05,

541-4210th: 424, 429-30, 476-77, 482-83, 553-5512th: 487, 55214th: 549-51, 55620th: 555-56

Armored Engineer Battalions: 5, 100, 3813d: 487n9th: 500-50516th: 67-68, 74, 93, 100, 103-05, 156-57, 166,

177-78, 183-85, 190-92, 208, 224-2517th: 69, 125, 144, 157, 54022d: 538-3923d: 385, 414, 418, 51524th: 380-81, 390, 54625th: 380-8133d: 38855th: 554125th: 485, 551

Armored Field Artillery Group, 5th: 136Armored Infantry Battalions

27th: 500, 502

Armored Infantry Battalions—Continued60th: 48162d: 485526th: 472

Armored Infantry Regiment, 6th: 189, 224Army, First

advance to the Rhine: 414-15, 419, 423, 461-62,490

Ardennes counteroffensive: 471, 473, 476, 483, 490cross-Channel preparations: 285-87, 293, 299,

303, 305-09, 342, 344operations in France: 349-50, 354, 366-68,

370-71, 381, 385, 387-92, 393, 398, 405Rhine crossing and Elbe advance: 499-500, 504,

506, 513-15, 517, 526, 535, 541Army, Third

advance to the Rhine: 414-15, 423-24, 427, 429,462

Ardennes counteroffensive: 434, 476, 483operations in France: 286, 350, 381, 385-87,

390-92, 394, 399-400, 402-03, 405Rhine crossing to Austria: 515-16, 517, 525, 530,

535-36, 546-47, 551, 555Army, Fifth: 286

Engineer Command: 205-07Engineer Section: 153-54, 156-57, 163, 165-66,

172, 183-88, 191-92, 203, 205, 215-16,218-19, 221-31, 249

Invasion Training Center: 121, 123, 157, 437-38Italian campaign: 153-54, 165-68, 171, 174, 179,

180-81, 188, 190-91, 208-09, 211-12, 214,216-19, 223, 228-31, 232-34, 555

Mine Warfare School: 105-06, 124-25Peninsular Base Section support: 203, 232-34,

236-40, 245-49, 252-54river crossing school: 224

Army, SeventhRhine crossing and advance: 459, 516, 517, 525,

531-36, 550-52, 557Sicilian operations: 115-16, 119-21, 124-25, 129,

134-35, 136-37, 140-41, 145, 151-52southern France campaign: 222-23, 227, 252,

436-39, 444-46, 451, 453, 455, 458, 484-88Army, Ninth: 489-90, 499, 516, 517-19, 524,

535-36, 537-38, 541, 547Army Air Forces: 6, 7, 252

aerial photography operations: 49, 229, 295-96aviation engineers control: 88-90support of ground operations:, 420, 430, 509support of landing operations: 301, 304, 311,

320-21, 443in the United Kingdom: 8, 16, 36-37, 52, 259,

267-69, 298Army Air Forces Engineer Command, MTO

(Provisional): 90Army Ground Forces: 65, 100, 205, 260, 283Army Groups

1st: 286-87, 3506th: 435, 446, 449-50, 452, 454, 459, 484, 487, 532,

551, 553, 556-57, 559

INDEX 585

Army Groups—Continued12th: 350, 435, 449, 484, 487, 547, 55015th: 115, 118, 125, 138, 197, 203, 216, 23018: 11321: 286, 312, 352, 363, 423, 499, 517

Army Map Service: 60, 63, 229, 297Army reorganizations of 1937 and 1943: 4, 100, 205Army Service Forces: 60, 89, 205, 260, 277-79, 282Army Transport Command: 93Arnaville: 424Arno River: 211-14, 218, 224, 233, 240, 247-48Arzew: 74, 76-77, 79-80, 91, 124, 158Aschaffenburg: 530, 546, 551Ashchurch depot: 45-48, 272, 276Asphalt: 15, 140, 393-94Assault Training Center: 293, 306Atlantic Base Section: 60, 92, 110-13, 171Atlantic Wall: 302, 365, 565Audouville-la-Hubert: 303Aure River: 301, 347Aurunci Mountains: 209Ausonia Mountains: 211Austria: 547-48Auw: 461-64, 483AVALANCHE operation: 154, 158, 242, 248. See also

Salerno.Avellino: 166Aversa: 242, 246, 248Aviation engineers: 37, 85-90, 560Avignon: 452, 457-58Avranches: 381, 385, 394, 397, 400, 406, 410Ay River: 369, 377, 380Ayr: 9

BACKBONE operation: 153Bacon, Col. Robert L.: 430-31Bad Godesberg: 515Bad Neuenahr: 500Baerenthal: 484-85Bagnoli: 184, 234, 242, 245Ball, 1st Lt. James: 380Balleroy: 408-09Ballyclare depot: 19-21Barby: 540Barfleur: 344, 346-47Barnes, Col. Elmer E.: 31-33BARRACUDA operation: 153-54Bartels, Pfc. George A.: 551Barth, T/5 Henry E.: 432, 433nBarton, Maj. Gen. Raymond O.: 481-82Base 901: 454-55Base Area Groups (Provisional)

6625th: 1526665th: 171

Base sections: 26, 29, 31, 38, 46, 51, 56, 60,110-11, 121, 200-201, 262, 264, 272, 275,287, 349-51. See also by name.

Basel: 531-32Bastogne: 466, 474-79, 483-84Bathurst: 64

Bay of Bougnon: 439, 442Bay of Cavalaire: 439, 442Bay of Gaeta: 438Bay of Pampelonne: 439-41Bay of the Seine: 299Bayeux: 394, 409BAYTOWN operation: 154Beach Control Board: 437Beach defenses and operations

Anzio: 193, 195-96Normandy: 282, 300-308, 316-17, 319-20,

322-34, 336-39Salerno: 154-55, 159, 161-63, 167Sicily: 118-35southern France: 437, 439, 441-44

Beach models: 49, 63-64, 293, 315-16Beach Obstacle Board: 437Beall, T/5 Robert L.: 127nBeanish, Sgt. Warren W.: 127nBeasley, Lt. Col. Oscar B.: 442Bedja: 83-84"Beer Bridge": 515Bekkaria: 96, 107Belfast: 19, 66Belfort: 454Belgium: 389-90, 392, 405, 414Bell, Col. Frank F.: 360Bennett, Rear Adm. Andrew C.: 66Benson project: 294, 296Berlin: 541, 547Berlin-Munich autobahn: 547, 549Berre: 457-58Besancon: 452BIG operation: 558-59Bills, Capt. Carl W.: 455-56Bingen: 527Bingham, Lt. Col. Leonard L.: 150Birmingham: 9Biscari Airfield: 119, 132Bischofsheim: 531Bisingen: 557-58Biskra: 87, 89Bitche: 484-85Bivio Salica: 150Bizerte: 84-85, 92, 99, 109, 114, 124-25Black Forest: 551, 557BLACKSTONE Task Force: 69Blainville: 454Bleialf: 464Blida Airfield: 59, 77Blies River: 487Board of Contracts and Adjustments: 41Boatner, Col. Mark M., Jr.: 59, 153Boats. See also Powerboats; Sea Mules.Boats, assault

Italian river crossings: 175-76, 191, 218, 220northern Europe river crossings: 371-72, 388, 424,

433-34, 488, 548, 552, 554Rhine crossings: 460, 489, 517-20, 525, 528-29,

532-33, 535


Boats, assault—ContinuedRoer crossings: 491-92, 494-96, 499

Boats, storm: 218, 220, 459-60, 517-20, 532-33,535, 548

Body armor: 181BOLERO plans: 22-24, 35-37, 42, 45-46, 50, 56, 58,

59, 195, 256-57, 262-64, 266-69, 350, 561Bologna: 212-17, 240-41Bolte, Lt. Col. Charles L.: 8Bone: 83, 85-86, 92, 113Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 12Bonesteel, Lt. Col. Charles H. III: 22, 26, 115Bonn: 499-500, 513-15Booby traps: 68, 101-04, 141, 181, 369, 380Booms and antimine nets: 459, 496, 504, 509-10,

513-14, 516, 518, 523, 526-27, 533, 535Boppard: 527, 530Borgo Grappa: 208Boslar: 494Boston Port of Embarkation: 13Bou Chebka: 84, 96Bou Zadjar: 75Bowman, Brig. Gen. Frank O.: 59, 61, 153-54, 163,

165, 184, 191-92, 203, 205-07, 216, 219, 221,223, 228, 230

Bowman, Waldo G.: 511nBoyle, Hal: 541Bradley, General Omar N.: 137, 287, 299, 305, 312,

343, 349-50, 370, 374, 376, 423, 434, 503, 515,541

Braintree: 47Brandenberger, General der Panzertruppen Erich:

480-81Bratge, Capt. Willi: 503Braunschweig: 540Brazilian Expeditionary Force: 212, 225Breidweiler: 481Brenner Pass: 553, 555Brenta River: 221Brest: 352, 356, 359-60, 381-85Bricquebec: 286, 394, 409"Bridge in the sky": 149, 165Bridges. See also Bridging operations; Railroad

bridges and tunnels; and by name.Bailey: 5, 33, 41-42, 68, 100, 138-40, 147,

165-66, 179, 183-86, 191, 218, 224, 283-84,288-89, 291, 361, 373-75, 382, 385, 390,393, 427-28, 452, 454, 497-98, 513-14,547, 564

British Bailey superior to U.S. design: 5, 184, 564dummy: 186, 231, 536footbridges: 190-91, 212, 372-73, 382, 488,

491-92, 494, 496-97girder H-10 and H-20: 5heavy ponton: 185, 218, 221, 389, 460, 492, 498,

506-10, 514, 517-18, 520, 526, 534-35improvised: 175, 178, 191, 353-54, 382, 387,

420-21infantry support: 185, 190, 372-73, 497new models development: 283-84

Bridges—Continuedpile: 165, 167, 178-79, 218, 538ponton: 76, 185, 231, 515, 550steel girder: 244timber: 166, 184, 214, 224, 375, 393, 399treadway: 5, 68, 75, 166-67, 176-78, 183-85,

218, 220-21, 224, 231, 283, 293, 336, 372-75,381, 386, 390, 393, 459, 488, 492, 497-98,500, 506-07, 509, 514-18, 520-21, 523-24,526, 529-31, 533

trestle bent, fixed: 167Bridging operations: 31, 33

demolition in Ardennes: 472-73, 476, 478-79,484

equipment and bridge trains: 139, 184-85, 218,221, 390, 499, 507, 513, 519, 531-32, 535

Italy: 165-67, 175-79, 183-86, 190-91, 199,209, 211, 216, 218-19, 229, 231, 284

North Africa: 82, 99-100, 138northern Europe: 283-84, 336, 372-75, 381-82,

385-90, 393, 420-21, 424-29, 432-34,538-42, 544-50, 552, 554

Rhine River: 506-11, 513-16, 518, 520, 523, 526,528-31, 533-36, 537-38

Roer River: 491-92, 494-500Sicily: 138-41, 146-47, 149, 152southern France: 453-54training for: 41, 67-68, 218, 224-25, 291, 293,

310, 398BRIMSTONE operation: 153-54Bristol: 45, 261, 310, 313British Air Ministry: 8, 52, 55, 262, 267, 291British Chiefs of Staff: 8British Eighth Army mine school: 124-25, 157British Engineer Stores: 115British Floating Bailey Bridge School: 218, 225British Geographical Section, General Staff: 62, 120,

297, 564British Inter-Service Information Series (ISIS): 64,

154British Joint Planning Staff: 8British Ministry of Agriculture: 269British Ministry of Works and Planning: 268, 270British quartermaster general: 23, 267British School of Military Engineering (Italy): 225British School of Military Engineering (U.K.): 41, 68,

290British Timber Control Board: 55British Underwater Obstacle Training Center: 304,

306nBritish units. See also Army Groups, 18 and 21; Royal

Air Force; Royal Engineers; Royal Navy.First Army: 77, 83-84, 105, 109, 113Second Army: 286, 299-300, 312, 490, 537Eighth Army: 83-84, 105, 113, 115-16, 137, 140,

153, 158, 165, 175, 179, 180-81, 208, 212,216-17, 222-23, 240, 249

5 Corps: 8410 Corps: 154, 156, 159, 162-65, 175, 177, 179,

180, 185, 188-89

INDEX 587

British units—Continued13 Corps: 212, 2161st Division: 19546th Division: 15949th Division: 1156th Division: 159, 19678th Division: 83, 147Force 545: 115, 118-19Blade Force: 83Peter Force: 1933d Beach Group: 193Airdrome Construction Groups: 85-87, 89-90Commandos: 83, 159Survey companies: 227

British-U.S. cooperation and differences: 8, 19, 22,24, 32-33, 49-52, 55-56, 195, 261-62,265-70, 274-75, 278, 284, 288-89, 293-98,314-15, 363-65

British War Office: 8, 10, 23, 49, 51-52, 257, 262,267-68, 296-98

British Works Finance: 262British World Wide System: 340Brittany Base Section: 351-52Brittany peninsula: 301, 367, 381-85Brixham: 317Brockway trucks: 184-85, 221, 372-74, 386, 426,

563Broich: 494-96Brolo: 148Brooks, Maj. Beryl C.: 38Brooks, Maj. Gen. Edward H.: 554Bruni oil refining complex: 456BRUSHWOOD Task Force: 69Budhareyri: 13Buech River: 451-52Buellingen: 467, 469Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R.: 503Bulldozers: 5, 48, 79, 82, 166, 215, 328-29, 331,

341, 388, 437-38, 441-42Allis-Chalmers: 195armored: 209, 248, 325, 385, 505D-7: 98-99, 128, 132-33, 144, 146, 183, 195,

443, 563D-8: 144, 147, 308R-4: 98, 128, 133, 144, 146-47vulnerability: 130, 141, 145, 147, 161, 176, 181-82,

488Burns, Col. Donald S.: 171, 203, 233Butgenbach: 467, 469, 471

Caen: 299, 301Caffey, Col. Eugene M.: 121n, 124, 310, 312, 337Caiazzo: 177-78Cairo: 119Cairo (Italy): 192Calore River: 163-64, 175, 180Caltanissetta: 137, 139Calvi Risorta: 239-40Cambrai: 389Camigliatello: 250

Camouflage: 41, 55, 108-09, 122, 145, 230-31, 239,519, 524

Camp Carrabelle: 65Camp Edwards: 65Camp de Valbonne: 459Canadian Army, First: 490Cancale: 359Cannes: 436Cape Benat: 439Cape Bon peninsula: 125Cape Calava: 149Cape Drammont: 443-44Cape Orlando: 141, 144, 148Cape Passero: 126Capizzi: 146Capri: 193Capua: 177-78, 218, 224-25, 244Cardiff: 46Carentan: 286, 302, 304, 348-49, 367, 370-71, 374,

394, 398, 401, 408-09Carentan-Cherbourg highway: 303Cargo nets: 132Carnoules: 451Carr, Maj. William S.: 511-12Carroceto: 197Carter, Col. William A., Jr.: 98Casablanca: 59, 63, 69, 72-73, 80, 88, 93-94,

111-12, 115Casablanca Conference: 264Caserta: 192, 195Caspoli: 179Cassino: 180-81, 186-87, 189-93, 208, 228, 239,

244Castel San Vincenzo: 179Cattenom: 424-26Causeways. See Piers.Cavalaire: 441Cavalry Groups

3d (Mechanized): 54714th: 461-62106th: 555113th (Mechanized): 373

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 117th: 585Cavigny: 374-75Cecina: 211CENT Force: 119-20, 122, 124-27, 132-35Center Task Force (CTF): 59-62, 66-69, 74-80, 85Cerami: 146Cesaro: 146-47Cezembre Island: 382Chalons-sur-Marne: 390Chancy, Maj. Gen. James E.: 7-12, 17, 24-25, 35,

41Channel Base Section: 351-52Channel Islands: 360Charleroi: 405Charleville: 389Chartres: 402, 410-12Chateau-Thierry: 390Chateaubriant: 406


Cheltenham: 26, 28, 257, 259, 289, 298Chemical Corps: 3Chemical Smoke Generating Company, 80th: 514Chemical Warfare Service units: 187, 532Chemnitz: 546Cherbourg: 282, 286, 299, 302, 341, 343-44, 347,

369-70, 394, 397-401, 406, 408-10. See alsoPort reconstruction.

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander(COSSAC): 258, 278, 280, 282, 286, 289, 302-03

Churchill, Winston: 436Cisterna: 183, 209, 211, 244Citadel (Juelich): 492, 494-95Citadel de St. Servan: 382Civilian labor: 10

on the Continent: 285-86, 347, 351, 353, 355,364, 397, 446, 457, 488

Iceland: 14-15Italy: 172-73, 187, 215, 223-26, 228, 233,

239-40, 242, 245-47, 251-53North Africa: 80-81, 87, 92-93, 112Sicily: 119, 152United Kingdom: 42, 46, 269-70

Civilian Labor Procurement Service, ETOUSA: 285Civitavecchia: 192, 211, 227, 234, 236-38, 252Clark, Lt. Col. Alien F., Jr.: 209, 211Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.: 60, 66, 106, 153-54,

162-63, 165, 177, 179, 205, 212, 216, 223Clerf: 474-75, 482Clerf River: 474-75Coastal Base Section: 446-47, 449, 451, 454COBRA operation: 370, 376-77Cochran, Lt. William C.: 478Coe, Col. Edward H.: 402Colditz: 542Colle Basso: 146Colleville: 300, 315, 326, 328, 330-32Colli: 178Colli al Volturno: 186Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton: 312, 515Colmar Pocket: 484, 486-87Cologne: 414, 490, 499-500Cologne-Frankfurt autobahn: 514Colonna, Col. John O.: 88Colton, Lt. Col. Hugh W.: 421-22Colvocoresses, Capt. A.: 185-86Combined Chiefs of Staff: 59, 115-16, 154, 436Combined Military Procurement Control, SHAEF:

285Comiso Airfield: 119, 132, 138, 140Command structure problems

Army-Navy amphibious operations responsibility:64-66, 78-79, 121-22, 163, 195, 306-08,436-37, 561

control of aviation engineers: 88-90in ETOUSA: 24-26, 28-29, 31-32, 200,

257-59, 349-50, 561in NATOUSA/MTOUSA: 110, 200-201, 203,

561supply authority in southern France: 449-50

Commercy: 390Communications Zone (COMZ), ETOUSA: 258,

285, 287, 349-51, 358-60, 362, 366, 392, 393,411-12, 449-50, 459

Communications Zone, NATOUSA: 80, 110-11,200-201, 203

Concentration camp liberations: 544, 546Congressional Medal of Honor: 190, 355nConington depot: 276Conklin, Col. John F.: 60Constantine: 87-88, 113, 120Construction: 16. See also Airfield; Hospital;

Housing; Supply depots.Continental Advance Section (CONAD): 449, 455,

457, 459Continental Base Section: 449Corbeil: 410Corps

I Armored: 105, 118, 120II: 60, 77, 83-85, 94, 96, 98-99, 107-10,

113-14, 119, 121, 136-37, 139-40, 144,153, 180, 188, 190, 206, 208-09, 211-16,218-21, 227-28, 231

III: 499-500, 504-05, 514, 516, 547, 549-50IV: 212-13, 215-16, 218-21, 231V: 17-19, 21, 300-302, 305-07, 310, 315, 326,

388-89, 415, 419-20, 461, 466-67, 469,515-16, 541-42, 544

VI: 155-56, 159, 162-63, 165-66, 174-75, 177,179, 180, 188, 190, 192, 197-98, 208, 212,227, 438, 442, 444, 454, 484-86, 550-51,553-56

VII: 302, 305, 307, 311-12, 316, 336, 343, 367,370-71, 374, 376-77, 385, 389-90, 414-15,418-22, 499-500, 506, 514-15, 541, 544

VIII: 367-71, 376-77, 380-84, 461-62, 466,475-78, 480, 482-83, 527, 547

XII: 387, 390, 424, 429, 488, 525, 531, 546-48XIII: 489-90, 492, 497-99, 519, 537, 539-40XV: 381, 386-87, 487, 532, 550-53, 555XVI: 489, 499, 517-19, 523-24XVIII Airborne: 473XIX: 367, 371, 373-74, 376, 386, 389, 420-22,

488, 489-90, 492, 499, 539-40XX: 387, 390, 424, 426, 429-30, 433, 530-31,

546-49, 553XXI: 486-88, 550-52Provisional: 136-37

Corps of Engineers: 3-6, 16, 88-89. See also Office,Chief of Engineers, War Department.

Corsica: 458Cosenza: 234, 250-51Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 475Cotentin peninsula: 299, 302-03, 341, 343, 347,

351, 367, 377, 397Coubert: 410, 413Coughlin, Lt. William J.: 463-64Courseulles: 349Coutances: 367, 370, 376, 394, 397, 399-400,

406-08, 410

INDEX 589

Coutances-St. Lo highway: 377Couville: 357, 398COWPUNCHER exercise: 158Cox, Capt. Alien H., Jr.: 328Crailsheim: 553-54Cranes: 5, 40, 44, 82, 128, 171, 184, 195, 238, 261,

274, 276, 308, 488, 521Craw Field: 86Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W.: 258Cress, Col. James B.: 352, 537Crouay: 408Crozon peninsula: 383Csendes, 1st Lt. F. E.: 511Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew B.: 59Cyclone wire: 82, 133Czechoslovakia: 547-48

Dahlquist, Lt. Col. John E.: 7Danube River: 547-50, 554-55Dartmouth: 312, 317Davidson, Lt. Col. Arthur H., Jr.: 305Davidson, Brig. Gen. Garrison H.: 118, 125, 151,

436-37, 445-46, 448, 451, 455-56, 459-60,532, 534-35

Davis, Col. Ellsworth I.: 518Davison, Brig. Gen. Donald A.: 7-11, 17, 22,

24-26, 28-29, 31, 36, 39, 41, 50, 52, 61,87-88, 90, 111

Dawley, Maj. Gen. Ernest J.: 163Deception: 186, 230-31, 473, 519, 524, 536Deggendorf: 548Delta Base Section: 449, 457Depot Cotier du Petrole: 357-58Desertmartin depot: 19-20, 45Dessau: 545Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 201, 257, 268, 436, 446,

449, 452, 484, 486, 551, 557Diekirch:481-82Dieppe raid: 304Dietenheim: 554Dijon: 449, 454-55Dillingen: 433-34DIME Force: 119-20, 122, 124-27, 129-33, 135Dinan: 382Dinant: 390Dinard: 381-83Distinguished Service Cross: 127n, 190, 326, 329,

433, 464, 478Distinguished Unit Citation: 189, 326, 372, 426,

466-67Djebel Abiod: 89Djedeida: 83Doan, Col. Leander LaC.: 418Dol: 397Dole: 452, 459Domfront: 410Doolittle, Brig. Gen. James H.: 86Dorland, Sgt. Eugene: 502-03Dortmund-Ems Canal: 538-39Dossen River: 360

Doubs River: 452, 459, 532Dourdan: 410Douve River: 299, 302-03, 332, 335, 337, 370Dove, Pvt. Vinton: 328-29Dragoni: 184DRAGOON operation: 351, 455. See also ANVIL

operation.Drauffelt: 475Dresden: 547Dreux: 402, 405Drnovich, Capt. Louis J.: 330Dromard, Brig. Gen. Robert: 455Drome River: 452Dryden, Lt. Edwin C.: 96DUCK I, II, III exercises: 310-11Dueren: 489-90DUKWs

Mediterranean operations: 117, 123-24, 128-32,134, 159, 169, 193, 199, 220, 236-37

Normandy operations: 312, 331, 339, 344,353-54, 362

river crossings: 459-60, 489, 504, 506, 519-20,526, 529, 532-33, 536, 540

Dunkirk: 294Dunn, Brig. Gen. Beverly C.: 288Durance River: 436, 451, 457

Eaker, Maj. Gen. Ira C.: 296Earth auger: 48Eastern Assault Force (EAF): 77-79Eastern Base Section (NATOUSA): 113-14Eastern Base Section (U.K.): 28-29, 39, 45, 47-48,

50, 52-53, 272, 287Eastern Task Force (ETF): 59-60, 62, 67-68, 74,

77, 83, 86Echt: 518-19Echternach: 480-82, 484Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 146, 376Egginton subdepot: 48Ehingen: 554Eifel: 414-15Eilenburg: 542Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.

as commander AFHQ and NATOUSA: 59, 88,110, 192, 201, 258

as commander ETOUSA: 25-26, 201, 257-59,350, 561

and operations on the Continent: 304-05,317-18, 414, 434, 503-04, 517, 541, 547,553, 555

and operations in the Mediterranean: 116, 118,153, 159

as Supreme Commander, Allied ExpeditionaryForce: 258-59, 285

El Ala: 94El Guettar: 107Elbe River: 537-42, 547Elliott, Brig. Gen. Dabney O.: 200, 206, 252Elsenborn: 470Elsenborn ridge: 469-71, 484


Elster River: 546-47Empire Emerald: 173-74Empire Traveller: 357Empoli: 231Enfidaville: 84Engeman, Lt. Col. Leonard: 500-504Engineer Air Force Headquarters Company, 904th:

145Engineer Amphibian Brigades: 64-66, 122

1st: 61, 65-66, 74, 80, 111-12, 114, 121, 122nEngineer Amphibian Command: 65, 79, 122Engineer Aviation Battalions: 9, 35-36, 38-40, 50,

52-56, 85-89, 271-72, 560809th: 39, 53, 85-87814th: 39, 85, 87, 89815th: 85-86817th: 44, 85818th: 40824th: 12, 15825th: 39-40, 85830th: 39832d: 39, 85837th: 89838th: 89845th: 89871st: 73

Engineer Aviation Regiments: 621st: 7, 12, 14-15, 85-86, 89

Engineer Base Depot Companies: 272445th: 274

Engineer Base Equipment Company, 688th:252-53

Engineer Battalions (Separate): 232, 272378th: 157383d: 223384th: 157386th: 171, 252387th: 185

Engineer Beach Control Groups36th: 437, 441-4240th: 437, 442, 451540th: 438, 444

Engineer Board: 284Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, 561st: 67Engineer Boat Regiments: 65, 561

591st: 59, 66-67, 74-76, 80, 121, 122nEngineer Camouflage Battalions: 208, 216, 270, 289

84th: 230-31601st: 94, 108, 145

Engineer Camouflage Company, 396th: 239Engineer Combat Battalion Beach Groups: 309

37th: 311, 314, 327147th: 316149th: 309, 311, 316, 327336th: 316, 327, 330348th: 316, 327

Engineer Combat Battalions: 4, 99-100, 207, 223,233, 270-71, 289, 305-06, 381, 483, 562

1st: 74, 94, 129-30, 138, 140, 146-47, 5442d: 384, 462, 469-70

Engineer Combat Battalions—Continued4th: 370, 388-89, 481-827th: 15, 525-2610th: 69, 94, 148-51, 156, 165-66, 175-77,

182-83, 199, 224-25,-55612th: 38315th: 69, 72-73, 77, 94, 146-47, 37420th: 136n, 32825th: 487n31st: 55435th: 475-76, 483, 52737th: 221, 309, 327-30, 36244th: 475-76, 483, 52848th: 183-84, 186, 188-90, 208, 212, 225, 43849th: 336-37, 376-7751st: 472-73, 479, 483, 50781st: 461-6782d: 492103d: 474-75, 480105th: 371-73, 420107th: 20-21109th: 78, 94, 96, 106, 156-57, 186, 192, 197,

199, 223111th: 156, 164, 168, 176, 190, 225, 486112th: 20-21, 305, 307, 330-31120th: 132-33, 140-41, 156, 164-65, 188,

225-26121st: 330-31, 375, 384, 494135th: 427, 531142d: 552146th: 307, 326147th: 309, 318, 327, 330-31148th: 368, 377, 513149th: 309, 327, 329, 341, 518, 520150th: 483, 526151st: 385158th: 476-79, 483159th: 382-83, 475-76, 482-83, 527160th: 424, 531, 548163d: 533, 558n164th: 504, 509168th: 462, 464-65, 475-76, 483, 528169th: 218171st: 497172d: 422179th: 387-88, 424, 433-34, 531187th: 518, 520188th: 528202d: 383, 471, 518-19203d: 309204th: 525206th: 424-25, 433-34, 531207th: 368, 377208th: 523234th: 374-75, 492, 540235th: 187-90, 209, 211, 218, 220, 224, 229237th: 307, 333-34, 336, 374, 376, 390, 422, 515238th: 336, 370, 376, 390, 422-23, 515243d: 528245th: 547

INDEX 591

Engineer Combat Battalions—Continued246th: 371, 373-74, 492, 494-95247th: 371-72, 374, 421-22, 492, 494248th: 390250th: 538252d: 538254th: 467, 469, 516, 542255th: 220258th: 518263d: 488271st: 548276th: 505, 509-12279th: 497280th: 518284th: 510286th: 487n290th: 487291st: 471-73, 483, 507, 513, 549-50292d: 497-98294th: 376, 514-15, 545-46295th: 386, 492, 540297th: 376, 385, 386n, 390, 514298th: 370-71, 376-77299th: 306-07, 308n, 326, 341, 478300th: 368308th: 370, 381-82310th: 209, 211, 220, 224-25313th: 207, 209, 225-26315th: 369, 424-25, 433316th: 225320th: 431-33324th: 470, 549-50329th: 544334th: 157336th: 309, 331348th: 309, 330401st: 139n, 220402d: 139n, 220n404th: 2201256th: 5381269th: 557-591271st: 487n1276th: 496, 518, 5211278th: 4782830th: 5332831st: 533, 5532832d: 5332833d: 533

Engineer Combat Groups: 205-06, 216, 222-23,270, 562

19th: 139n, 22039th: 22040th: 532, 553112th: 306n540th: 532-33, 5541102d: 370, 381, 476, 5271103d: 4291104th: 371, 373, 389, 421-22, 490, 492, 499, 5181106th: 333, 336-37, 341-42, 370, 374, 376-77,

390, 422-23, 514, 544

Engineer Combat Groups—Continued1107th: 381, 383, 475, 5281108th: 192, 206, 218, 2201110th: 368, 370, 377, 381, 5131111th: 376, 471-72, 5041115th: 374-75, 386, 490, 492, 4971116th: 3091117th: 381, 3901119th: 3091120th: 370, 376, 390, 514, 5441121st: 5421128th: 4761135th: 525-26, 5481139th: 387-88, 390, 424, 429, 433, 531, 5481141st: 490, 496-97, 4991145th: 4871146th: 5381148th: 517-191149th: 490, 497, 4991153d: 517-19, 523, 5351154th: 5471159th: 504, 506, 510-11, 5491168th: 216, 2181171st: 3891338th: 218

Engineer Combat Regiments: 5, 122, 205-06, 223,232, 271, 562

5th: 12, 1519th: 67, 94, 96-99, 132, 139-41, 144, 190-91,

209, 215, 220n, 224, 253-5420th: 69, 94, 99, 136, 140-41, 151-5236th: 69, 78, 80, 121-23, 161-67, 177, 184, 186,

188, 193, 196-97, 208, 212, 223-24,437-38, 441, 446, 459, 484-85

39th: 129-31, 140, 144, 157, 176-77, 188,196-98 214, 224, 236

40th: 122, 127n, 250, 437, 449, 452, 454, 459,484, 486, 487n, 488

112th: 20-21540th: 69, 121-23, 129, 131-32, 148, 152,

156-57, 162-63, 168-69, 171, 193,195-96, 198-99, 212, 236, 438, 443-44,454, 459, 484-85, 488

Engineer Construction Battalion, 6487th: 248Engineer Depot Companies: 46, 82, 208, 223, 251,

272, 363383d: 227397th: 20, 39, 274450th: 46, 112, 227451st: 111, 227458th: 252460th: 112462d: 112, 252715th: 112

Engineer Dredge Crews1077th: 3631080th: 365-66

Engineer Dump Truck Companies: 35, 208, 270,274, 289

196th: 487


Engineer Dump Truck Companies—Continued427th: 20434th: 40577th: 3601528th: 237

Engineer fire-fighting units: 172, 248Engineer Forestry Company, 800th: 250-51Engineer Gas Generating Unit, 1044th: 360Engineer General Service Regiments: 5, 9, 35,

39-40, 53, 223, 232-33, 274, 289, 291, 393,398, 563

38th: 34294th: 171, 242, 244, 45495th: 394, 397, 402175th: 73, 94, 99, 185, 224332d: 38, 353-54, 364, 398, 401-03, 405335th: 446-47, 448n, 458, 459n337th: 163, 167, 230338th: 237-38, 247-48, 251341st: 38, 394, 397, 402-03, 537342d: 38, 271, 346-47, 353-54, 398343d: 140-41, 152, 156, 178, 212, 451-52, 454344th: 186, 212, 452, 454345th: 93, 171, 173, 242, 246346th: 271347th: 272, 356-57, 398-403354th: 398355th: 364, 394, 397, 402, 537-38358th: 346-48, 363-64, 405, 409, 411359th: 405, 406, 409-11360th: 359364th: 411365th: 394, 397368th: 411373d: 360-61375th: 402377th: 402389th: 402390th: 398-400392d: 360, 398, 402398th: 3541301st: 5261303d: 3811306th: 427-291317th: 5371323d: 271

Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalions: 397-98, 56385th: 185, 459, 534-3586th: 505, 51588th: 526181st: 508, 515552d: 508, 5151553d: 459, 487n, 534-351554th: 185, 218, 220-21

Engineer Heavy Shop Companies: 47, 251-52,275-76

496th: 253-54Engineer Light Equipment Companies: 223, 252,

270-71629th: 471

Engineer Light Maintenance Company, 677th: 487nEngineer Light Ponton Companies

501st: 513503d: 371-72, 375509th: 388

Engineer Maintenance Companies: 47, 208, 223,251-52, 270-71, 275

5th: 25440th: 254467th: 20, 47469th: 252-53470th: 47, 94, 109, 253471st: 47473d: 252-54962d: 471971st: 360

Engineer Maintenance Companies (Italian), 1st and2d: 253

Engineer Map Depot Detachments: 122, 233, 2491709th: 4541710th: 193, 2281712th: 2282634th: 2492657th: 1202658th: 1202699th: 158

Engineer Mine Clearance Company, 6617th: 437Engineer Mines and Bridge School: 225Engineer Mobile Map Depots, 1st and 2d: 454Engineer Mobile Mapmaking Detachments: 63Engineer Model Making Detachments: 49

1621st: 218Engineer Mountain Battalion, 126th: 216, 220Engineer Parts Supply Companies

752d: 276754th: 254

Engineer Petroleum Distribution Companies: 6, 37,233, 363, 412, 457, 562-63

696th: 138, 173-74, 238-40, 458697th: 455-58698th: 405-06, 409, 411701st: 458, 459n702d: 92703d: 240-41705th: 239-40784th: 457785th: 240-41786th: 405-07, 409, 411787th: 405-06, 409, 411788th: 405, 411790th: 405, 4111374th: 405, 409, 4111375th: 405, 409, 4111376th: 4111377th: 4111379th: 4581385th: 4582004th: 922602d: 91, 1192814th: 459n

INDEX 593

Engineer Port Construction and Repair Groups:116, 289, 562-63

1051st: 152, 169, 233-34, 236-37, 446-49, 4541053d: 359, 5381055th: 346, 355-56, 359-60, 362, 3981056th: 352-53, 355-56, 364, 5371057th: 3601058th: 359-60, 509, 511-12, 5381061st: 360, 362

Engineer Port Repair Ship Crew, 1071st: 355, 360Engineer port repair ships: 282, 363Engineer Regiments (World War I), 17th and 18th:

3Engineer Service Battalions

407th: 241408th: 457-59

Engineer Shore Groups: 12136th: 122-23, 126-2940th: 122-24, 133531st: 122-24540th: 122-24

Engineer Shore Regiments: 65, 68531st: 66, 74, 76-77, 121-23, 129-32, 156,

158-59, 161-64, 167, 309, 316, 337, 341540th: 72-73

Engineer Special Brigades: 65, 122, 305, 308-10,561

1st: 122-24, 134-35, 137-38, 156-57, 309-12,316-17, 337-38, 341-42, 346

5th: 309-11, 315-17, 327, 329-30, 332, 342,363

6th: 309-11, 315-16, 327, 332, 342Engineer Special Service Regiment, 333d: 353, 355Engineer survey liaison detachments: 297Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams (ETIT):

380Engineer Topographic Battalions: 49, 289, 295,

29730th: 48649th: 454

Engineer Topographic Companies: 289, 29762d: 94, 109, 14566th: 63, 120, 218, 227-28661st: 227, 454

Engineer Treadway Bridge Companies988th: 507, 514990th: 514-15991st: 425-26992d: 371-72, 374-75, 540994th: 516998th: 487, 507, 5161755th: 224

Engineer Utilities Company, 1090th: 152Engineer Water Supply Battalions: 246

401st: 247405th: 247

Engineer Water Supply Companies: 37, 246518th: 94, 107-081513th: 2471514th: 247

Engineersarmy organization and tasks: 187, 207, 393corps organization and tasks: 187, 205, 207, 214,

297, 393division organization and tasks: 186-87, 205-07,

214field force engineers in construction: 35, 270-71,

315in infantry role: 72-73, 94-97, 159, 164,

188-90, 196-97, 329, 369, 383, 421-22,462-67, 469-85, 487-88, 565

labor pool system in U.K.: 56-57manpower shortages: 28-29, 222-23, 259,

269-71, 274, 315, 381, 562officers and specialists: 32-33, 37-39, 43,

222-23, 271, 274-75, 560, 562requisitioning procedures: 37-38strength in European Theater: 38, 269, 565-66strength in Mediterranean: 223, 232-33, 566

Enna: 139-40Enns River: 548Ensdorf: 431-32Epinal: 453Ernst Ludwig Bridge: 534Erpel: 505-07, 513Eschdorf: 475Eschweiler: 418Etang de Berre: 447-48, 456, 458Ettelbruck: 481Eupen: 414-15Eure River: 402, 405European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA):

25-26, 44-45, 58, 110, 277, 279, 287. See alsoCommand structure problems; Office, ChiefEngineer, ETOUSA; Services of Supply,ETOUSA.

deputy theater commander: 257-58, 350G-1 38G-3 266, 291G-4 32, 37, 257-58, 356

EXPLOIT operation: 519

FABIUS amphibious exercises: 312-13Faid Pass: 84, 94Falaise Gap: 354, 385Falmouth: 317Farthing, Pfc. William E.: 432, 433nFedala: 69-70, 79, 93Feriana: 84Ferries. See also Rafts and ferries.

Phion: 361Rhino: 340Twickenham: 354

Fertilia: 239Fifth Army Base Section: 169, 171, 203Filettole pump station: 247Finberg, Maj. Irving W.: 157Fisciano: 167Fiumarello Canal: 156, 159, 163FLASHPOINT operation: 517


Florence: 211-14, 219, 231, 245-46Floresta: 147Foggia airfields: 165Foley, Maj. James E.: 509Folligny: 397, 399-400, 405Fondi: 209, 245Fontanelle caves: 226Force 141: 115-16, 118-20, 123Force 163: 436Force 343: 115, 118-20Formia: 182, 209Formigny: 400Fort Belvoir: 63Fort Benning: 372Fort Blucher: 538Fort Keranroux: 383-84Fort Koenigsmacker: 425Fort Montbarrey: 383-84Fort Pierce: 304-05, 310Fort Yutz: 427-28Fortifications and obstacle reduction: 148-50, 166,

186, 357, 367, 381-84, 413-15, 417-21, 424-25, 430, 432-44, 488, 539, 551, 553, 555, 565

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECOMZ):287, 349-50

Fougeres: 385, 400, 406Fowey: 305Fox exercise: 311Foy: 476-77Fracolise: 246Franey, Maj. J. M.: 38Frankenthal: 458Frankfurt: 515, 525, 530, 546Frankfurt-Dresden autobahn: 546Fraser, Lt. Col. Harvey R.: 507Fraulautern: 431Fredendall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.: 59, 97, 113Frejus: 442, 451, 456French forces: 83, 87, 227, 233, 239-40, 434, 447,

459. See also French units.French Forces of the Interior (FFI): 389-91, 402,

456French Morocco: 87, 89, 91, 93, 99, 105, 112, 121,

153, 157French National Geographic Institute: 297, 564-65French Navy: 446French units

Armee B: 454First Army: 453-55, 484, 486-87, 507, 551, 554,

557Expeditionary Corps (FEC): 180, 208-09, 2122d Armored Division: 389, 487

Freudenstadt: 557-58Friesenhahn, Capt. Karl: 503Fry, Lt. Col. E. M., Jr.: 383Fuerth: 553Fulda River: 546-47Fuorigrotta: 245Futa Pass: 212, 215

Gabes: 84

Gaeta: 154, 182, 192Gafsa: 84, 87, 94, 96, 98, 107-08Gale, Maj. Gen. Humfrey: 59Gallagher, Col. Leonard B.: 206Gambsheim: 486GANGWAY operation: 153-54Gar Davidson Bridge: 535Gardes, Lt. Col. George W.: 164Gare Loch: 9Garigliano River: 180-81, 183, 188-90, 208-09,

211, 233Garmisch-Partenkirchen: 555Gela: 119, 121, 126, 129-32, 137-38Gembloux: 405General Hospital, 37th: 245General purchasing agent (U.K.): 41-43, 285General Purchasing Board, USAFBI: 41-42German Army units

Army Group G: 438Army Group H: 490German-Italian Panzer Army: 83, 97Fifth Panzer Army: 464, 474, 480Sixth Panzer Army: 466-67, 469, 474Seventh Army: 301, 480-81Tenth Army: 154, 180Twelfth Army: 540, 544Fourteenth Army: 180Nineteenth Army: 438, 455I SS Panzer Corps: 469XIV Panzer Corps: 154LXVI Corps: 464LXVII Corps: 467LXXX Corps: 480-81LXXXV Corps: 480Hermann Goering Division: 131, 154Panzer Lehr Division: 475, 4782d Panzer Division: 4785th Parachute Division: 4806th SS Mountain Division: 48512th SS Panzer Division: 469, 47115th Panzer Grenadier Division: 15416th Panzer Division: 154, 16418th Volksgrenadier Division: 46626th Volksgrenadier Division: 47429th Panzer Division: 16491st Infantry Division: 303-04, 333116th Panzer Division: 479212th Volksgrenadier Division: 480-81224th Infantry Division: 439242d Infantry Division: 439243d Infantry Division: 303276th Volksgrenadier Division: 480-81352d Infantry Division: 301152d Volksgrenadier Division: 480-81709th Infantry Division: 303716th Division: 301Kampfgruppe Peiper: 469, 471-73Waffen SS troops: 369

German E-boats: 312German frogmen: 504, 509-10, 516, 523, 527, 533,

540

INDEX 595

German nuclear research laboratories: 556-59Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.: 306, 469Ghent: 365-66Gholson, Maj. Charles B.: 457Gieselwerder: 544Glatton Airdrome: 54GOALPOST task force: 69, 73Goering, Reichsmarschal Hermann: 559nGoldstein, Pvt. Bernard: 472Goodrington Sands: 310Goodwin, Capt. Francis E.: 510-11GOOSEBERRY breakwaters: 343Gotha: 546Gothic Line: 230, 233Gouldin, Maj. Robert A.: 538Governola: 221Govin: 409Gozo island: 125Graders and scrapers: 5, 48, 98-99, 132, 308, 563Grandcamp-les-Bains: 310, 344, 346-49Granier, Brig. Gen. Georges: 455Granville: 344, 346, 348, 355, 359-60Grappling hooks: 212, 371, 384Gray, Brig. Gen. Carl R., Jr.: 452GRENADE operation: 489-90Grenoble: 436, 451-52Griner, Lt. Col. George W., Jr.: 7, 11Gross, Brig. Gen. Jean: 454Groves, Maj. Gen. Leslie R.: 557nGuard (installation) operations: 553Gulf of Frejus: 442-43Gulf of Gela: 116Gulf of Naples: 154Gulf of Salerno: 154, 159Gullat, Col. Doswell: 332, 363Gustav Line: 180, 190, 208, 228

Hadir Steel Mill: 537Hagensen, Lt. (jg.) Carl P.: 307-08Hagensen packs: 307-08, 320Haguenau: 485Hahn, Otto: 558Haigerloch: 558Hainneville: 357, 410Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H.: 555Hall, Col. William C.: 427Halle: 545Hamel-au-Pretre: 300Hameln: 539, 541Hampton Roads: 63Hann-Muenden: 541Hannis Taylor: 365Harbor Craft Company (TC), 329th: 510Hardstandings construction: 10, 86, 266, 313-14,

520Harkleroad, Capt. Paul F.: 328Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 69Harmon, Capt. Harold M.: 463-64Harmon, Lt. Col. William B.: 449Harris, T/5 Charles E.: 161Hartle, Maj. Gen. Russell P.: 18

Harvey, Lt. Col. A. D.: 398Harvey, Col. Oliver C.: 437Harz Mountains: 544Haswell, Pfc. James B.: 423Hayden, Maj. Gen. J. C.: 66Heavey, Col. Edward H.: 18Hechingen: 557-58Hedgerow blasting operations: 367, 370, 374Heilbronn: 553-54Heilig, Lt. Col. E. Warren: 402Herbert, 2d Lt. Edward: 431Hermann Goering Steel Works: 540Heuem: 461, 463-64Hewitt, Vice Adm. H. Kent: 65, 124, 195, 437Highware: 344Highway 1 (Italy): 211Highway 2 (Italy): 211, 240Highway 6 (Italy): 187-88, 214, 239-40Highway 7 (Italy): 188, 208-09, 211, 239-40Highway 9 (Italy): 213Highway 18 (Italy): 166Highway 64 (Italy): 215, 219Highway 65 (Italy): 212-15, 217, 219, 241Highway 82 (Italy): 209Highway 85 (Italy): 188Highway 87 (Italy): 177Highway 113 (Sicily): 137, 139-41, 144, 148-50Highway 117 (Sicily): 141, 152Highway 120 (Sicily): 137, 139-41, 145-48, 152Hilfarth: 499Hill 122: 369Hill 313: 482Hirson: 405Histon depot: 276Hitler, Adolf: 352, 415, 439, 544Hitler Line: 208Hochheim: 531Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.: 504, 515, 517Hodges, Capt. Preston C.: 480Hoefen: 467, 470Hoefn field: 11Hoenningen: 541Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M.: 315, 332, 502-03Hohe Rhoen: 551Homberg: 523Honsfeld: 467, 469Hopkins, Harry: 22Hopper dredges: 363, 365Horb: 558Hosingen: 474-75Hospital construction: 9, 51-53, 245-46, 261,

263-64, 268-69, 280-81Hotton: 479-80, 483House-to-house fighting: 384-85, 433, 474-75Housing construction: 7-10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 24,

50-58, 256, 259, 261-64, 266-68, 280Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.: 515, 542, 544Huertgen Forest: 462, 481Hughes, Brig. Gen. Everett S.: 110Hughes, Maj. Gen. H. B. W.: 287-88Hughes-Hallett, Vice Adm. J.: 66


Hulen, Col. Hairy: 402Huntingdon: 45, 48Huntingdonshire: 9Huppain: 406-09HUSKY operation: 115-16, 118, 120-22, 124-25,

152, 163. See also Sicilian operations.Huy: 471

Iceland: 8, 11-16Iceland Base Command: 12, 15-16Idice valley: 215Il Giogo Pass: 212Iles d'Hyeres: 439Ilfracombe: 293Iller River: 554Ilva Steel Works: 184Impregnated clothing: 320, 325INDIGO operation: 11Infantry Divisions

1st: 66, 74, 76-77, 79, 94, 98, 119, 125-26, 129,136-38, 140-41, 145-48, 300-301, 307,312, 315-16, 327, 376, 386, 422-23,470-71, 506, 514, 544

2d: 307, 383-84, 461, 467, 469-70, 515, 541-423d: 65, 69, 94, 118-19, 125-26, 136, 148-50,

156, 165, 174-77, 179, 193, 195, 437, 439,441, 486-87, 533, 552-53, 555-56

4th: 302-03, 311-12, 316, 332-33, 339,370-71, 376, 388-89, 462, 476, 481

5th: 424, 433-34, 525-268th: 369, 377, 381, 3839th: 65, 69, 73, 77-78, 94, 100, 145-48, 370,

374, 376, 470, 490, 50428th: 389, 461-62, 474-75, 480, 482, 48729th: 300-301, 310, 312, 315-16, 371, 374-75,

383-84, 421, 475, 489-90, 49230th: 371-74, 376, 420-21, 473-74, 489-90,

492, 497, 518-21, 523-24, 54032d: 17, 19, 21n34th: 17-19, 21, 77-78, 94, 96, 156, 158,

174-79, 189-92, 199, 211, 23735th: 371, 374-75, 489, 498-9936th: 156, 158-59, 161, 164, 168, 179, 190-91,

224, 438, 443-44, 48637th: 17, 19, 21n42d: 552, 55644th: 554-5545th: 119, 122, 125-26, 132-33, 136-37,

139-41, 147, 150, 156, 158-59, 162-65,175, 179, 188, 226, 437, 485, 532, 534, 553,555

63d: 488, 553-5469th: 516, 541-4271st: 54875th: 487, 52378th: 504, 51479th: 368-69, 377, 386-87, 486, 489, 518,

520-21, 523-2480th: 53083d: 370-71, 377, 381-82, 489, 540

Infantry Divisions—Continued84th: 480, 489-90, 492, 497-98, 53985th: 208-09, 220-22, 22486th: 54987th: 527, 53088th: 207-09, 212, 22189th: 528-3090th: 368-70, 377, 424-25, 429-30, 433-34,

52691st: 212, 22192d: 212, 217, 22595th: 424, 427, 429-3499th: 461, 467, 469-70, 549-50100th: 553-54102d: 489-90, 492, 496-97103d: 555104th: 544-45106th: 461-62, 464-65, 476

Infantry Regiments2d: 5263d: 1007th: 148-49, 175-76, 441, 533, 5568th: 303, 319, 333-34, 336-3710th: 525-2611th: 52512th: 481, 48315th: 128, 148, 176, 441, 53316th: 74, 129-31, 146, 301, 311, 316, 320,

327-28, 330, 33218th: 74, 119, 129, 131, 146-47, 316, 327,

332, 42226th: 74, 76, 96-97, 129-30, 146, 315-16, 42328th: 377, 38030th: 148, 53338th: 47039th: 77-78, 145-4647th: 146-4760th: 146-47109th: 474, 480110th: 474, 480112th: 474, 487115th: 332, 494-96116th: 301, 311, 315-16, 324, 326-28, 330,

332117th: 371-72119th: 371-72, 492120th: 371, 373-74, 492121st: 381-82134th: 499141st: 156, 159, 161, 190-91, 443-44142d: 156, 159, 161, 444143d: 190-91, 444157th: 149-50, 485-86168th: 77-78175th: 492, 494179th: 485, 532180th: 532275th: 485309th: 490317th: 530

INDEX 597

Infantry Regiments—Continued319th: 530-31330th: 371334th: 497345th: 527347th: 527353d: 528354th: 528-29357th: 369, 425, 433358th: 369, 424-25, 433359th: 369, 424-25, 434378th: 427379th: 430-31395th: 470405th: 496407th: 497422d: 462-64, 466423d: 461, 464, 466424th: 464, 466442d RCT: 212

Infantry-engineer assault teams: 130, 415, 417,420-21, 432, 488, 565

Infantry School: 372Inland waterways: 284, 362, 364-65, 447Inn River: 548-50, 555-56Innsbruck: 555Inspector General: 200Intelligence: 48-49, 62-64, 192, 227-30, 296,

316-17, 350-51Inverary: 67Irby, Lt. Col. William J.: 513Iris huts: 52, 55, 265Iry, Lt. Col. Clarence N.: 12Isar River: 548-50, 555Isigny: 286, 310, 344, 346-49, 397-98Isigny-Bayeux road: 342Island Base Section: 152Isle of Wight: 291, 406Italian campaign: 153-59, 161-79, 180-93,

195-99, 200, 203, 208-09, 211-31, 233-34,236-42, 244-55, 282, 286, 437-38, 562

Italian forceswith Allied units: 227, 245, 248, 253Axis defense forces: 83, 126-27, 131, 155engineers: 180, 216, 225, 227, 233, 237, 241,

246, 252-53Itri: 209Itschner, Col. Emerson C.: 287, 344, 393, 397-98,

400-401, 537

Jagst River: 553-54Jemmapes: 119Joint staff planners, U.S.: 31Jones, Lt. Col. William L.: 228-29Jones, Lt. Col. William P., Jr.: 206Joss force: 118-20, 122, 124-30, 132-33, 135Jourdan River: 356Juelich: 490, 492, 494-97June: 246-47Junior N. Van Noy: 355-56

Juvisy: 402-03

Kaldadharnes Airdrome: 11, 15Kasba fort: 73Kassel: 515Kasserine Pass: 83-84, 88, 94, 96-98, 100, 104,

107Kaye, Lt. Col. Minton W.: 295Kean, Brig. Gen. William B.: 306Keflavik field: 11, 15Kelley, Maj. Roy S.: 364Kennedy, Capt. Kenneth W.: 74-76Kerkrade: 421Kienheim: 550Killian, Col. Joseph O.: 221King, Admiral Ernest J.: 65King, Lt. Col. Roswell H.: 415, 418King's Newton: 398Kittrell, Col. Clark: 450Klase, Capt. Andrew F.: 346Klebach, Sergeant-Major Jacob: 503Koblenz: 414, 430, 527Kocher River: 554Koenigswinter: 514-15Koerrenzig: 497-99KOOL force: 119-20, 122-24, 131Krefeld: 519, 524Krinkelt: 470-71Kripp: 500, 506-07, 510-11Kwaadmechelen: 364

La Calle: 113La Chapelle-Anthenaise: 400La Ferte: 391La Forge: 358La Grande Dune: 338La Haye-du-Puits: 367-69, 399, 406, 410La Hutte-Coulombiers: 405La Madeleine: 303La Meauffe: 375La Mede: 456-58La Roche: 479La Senia Airfield: 74, 91La Vicomte-sur-Ranee: 382Ladd, Lt. Col. John G.: 229Lahn River valley: 515Lake Constance: 532, 553Lambach: 548Landaker, Col. Chester L.: 364Landen: 405Landing ships and craft: 31, 64-66, 439, 491.

See also River crossings; and by type designation.Italian campaign: 156, 159, 163, 169, 192-93, 195,

199 236-37Normandy landings: 299, 314, 316-17, 319-25,

327-28, 330-34, 338-39, 340North Africa landings: 67-69, 72, 75-76, 78-79Sicilian landings: 116-18, 123-24, 127-29,

132-33southern France landings: 439, 441-43


Landshut: 550Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B.: 24, 26, 37-39, 60, 88,

110-11, 200-201, 203, 450Lauer, Maj. Gen. Walter E.: 469Laval: 400-401, 406, 410LBVs: 347LCAs: 75, 319LCI-92: 318LCI-554: 325LCIs: 193, 317, 325, 327-28LCMs: 65

Mediterranean operations: 75-76, 118, 131, 133,437

Normandy invasion: 306-07, 317, 320, 322-25,333-34, 344

Rhine crossing: 489, 506, 517-21, 523, 529, 531,535-36

LCP(R)s: 75LCT-30: 325LCTs: 65

Mediterranean operations: 118, 127, 129, 131-32,169, 193, 195, 199, 236-37, 443

Normandy and French port operations: 317,319-20, 322, 324-25, 327, 330, 333, 338,344, 346-47, 353, 362, 408

LCVPs: 65Mediterranean operations: 81, 117, 127, 133,

159, 193Normandy landings: 307, 319Rhine crossing operations: 489, 504, 506, 508, 510,

513-16, 517-21, 525-26, 528-29, 531,535-36

Le Garre, Eugene: 409Le Grand Vey: 336-37Le Havre: 356, 360-63, 413Le Luc: 439Le Mans: 400-401, 405Le Muy: 439Le Pas-des-Lanciers: 457Le Pontet: 457Lech River: 555Lee, Maj. Gen. John C. H.: 28

as COMZ commander: 285, 349-50, 366, 449,459

as G-4 and deputy commander, ETOUSA:257-58, 350

as SOS, ETOUSA, commander: 24-26, 29,31, 200, 287, 561

and U.K. construction and supply buildup: 37,51-52, 56, 278, 315

Leghorn: 211, 219, 221, 233-34, 237-41, 245-48,251-52

Leina: 546Leine River: 540Leipzig: 541-42, 546, 550Les Andalouses: 74Les Couplets tank farm: 357-58Les Dunes de Varreville: 303Les Moulins: 300, 302, 330-31Lessay: 369-70, 376-77, 380, 410

Lessay-Periers road: 377, 380Liberty ships: 136, 167, 169-71, 199, 234, 236-38,

353-56, 360, 362-65, 447Libramont: 479Licata: 116, 119, 121, 126-29, 136-38, 144Liege: 364, 390, 405, 461, 471, 513, 518Limatola: 224Lines of communication: 31, 152, 277-78, 282-83,

350-51, 449, 563Linn, Maj. Herschel E.: 307, 333Linnich: 490, 492, 496-98Lintfort: 518-19Linz: 506-07, 548Liparulo, Pfc. Lorenzo A.: 472Lippe River: 537-38Liri River: 192, 208, 227, 230Lison: 397-99Littlejohn, Brig. Gen. Robert McG.: 45, 56Liverpool: 45Livron: 452, 458Loch Linnhe: 68Loch Ryan: 9Lockerley: 298Lockett, Lt. Col. Charles L.: 455Lohr: 551Loiano: 241Loire Base Section: 351Loire River: 363London: 26, 28, 257, 259, 261, 289Londonderry: 19, 66Longueville: 286Loper, Col. Herbert B.: 297Loper-Hotine Agreement: 49, 120, 294, 564Lord, Brig. Gen. Royal B.: 33, 39, 258, 265, 356Lorelei: 527Lorient: 358-59Lorraine plain: 423Losheim Gap: 461-63, 467, 469Lourmel: 74Lovelady, Lt. Col. William B.: 415, 417-18, 544LSIs: 317LST-282: 444LST-338: 131LST-531: 312LSTs: 68n

Mediterranean operations: 75-76, 117-18, 124,128-29, 131-32, 136, 149, 163, 169, 193,195, 199, 234, 236-37, 444

Normandy and French port operations: 312, 317,342-44, 353, 359, 383

Lucas, Maj. Gen. John P.: 165Lucca: 213-14Ludendorff, General Erich: 500Ludendorff Bridge: 500-506, 509-13, 515Ludwigs Canal: 552Ludwigshafen: 535Luetzkampen: 461Lumber supply: 9, 166, 175, 218, 234, 242, 245,

250-51, 462, 471, 475, 483, 503Luneville: 454, 460, 488

INDEX 599

Lure: 453Luxembourg: 389, 462, 464Luxembourg City: 476, 480-82, 515Luzery: 477LVTs: 491-92, 494-96, 517-18, 520, 536Lyon: 436, 449, 452, 454-55, 457-59Lyons, Col. F. Russel: 504

Maas River: 519McAuliffe, Maj. Gen. Anthony C.: 555McCoach, Maj. Gen. David J., Jr.: 200nMcDonough, Colonel: 306nMacKeachie, Col. Douglas C.: 41-42McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J.: 205-06McNarney, Brig. Gen. Joseph T.: 7Macon: 458Maddaloni: 225Madeleine River: 356Madonie-Nebrodi ranges: 141Magdeburg: 540Maginot Line: 423, 425, 429, 484-85MAGNET force: 17-19, 21Main River: 530-31, 546, 551-52Main supply routes (MSRs): 351, 376-77, 394Maintenance operations: 46-47, 214, 241, 252-54,

274-76Mainz: 429, 515, 530-31Maiori: 162Maison Blanche Airfield: 77, 86-87Major Robert A. Gouldin Bridge: 538Maknassy-Sened area: 84, 107Maktar: 94Mailing: 424-26, 429Malmedy: 471-73, 483, 507"Malmedy massacre": 472Manhattan Project: 556, 557nMannheim: 458, 531-35Mantes-Gassicourt: 385-87Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von:

464Maps and mapping: 5, 48-49, 564. See also Aerial

photography.defense overprints: 120, 145, 156, 158, 185,

227-28, 315-17Italian campaign: 156, 158, 185, 218, 227-29,

249-50, 252North Africa operations: 62-63, 81, 109, 120operations in northern Europe: 293-98, 315-17,

351, 391photomaps: 49, 62-63, 109, 145, 218, 227-28,

295-96, 315, 565security measures: 63, 120, 158, 297-98Sicilian operations: 120, 144-45southern France operations: 454-55supply and distribution problems: 120, 297, 391,

454, 565Maracaibo boats: 68, 75Marche: 474, 478-80Mareth Line: 83-84Marienburg Castle: 552

Marigny: 376-77, 385Maritime Command, ETOUSA: 66Marne River: 390Marne River Canal: 403Marrakech: 93Marseille: 233, 436, 439, 442, 445-49, 451-53,

456, 458Marsh draining: 370Marshall, General George C.: 8, 12, 22-25, 65Marston, Brig. Gen. John: 11Marston warehouses: 265-66Martigues: 447-48, 456Marvin, Col. George W.: 443Matching Airdrome: 54Maures: 442Mayenne: 354, 401Mayenne River: 385, 400-401Meaux: 390Meckenheim: 500-501Medical Battalion, 56th: 123Medical Department: 268-69Mediouna airfield: 93Mediterranean Allied Air Forces: 208Mediterranean Base Section: 60, 77, 88, 92, 110,

112-13Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA):

90, 203, 225, 227, 246, 254, 435, 563Meeks Field: 15Mehdia: 69, 73, 79, 82Melgerdhi field: 11Melun: 387, 390Merderet River: 303, 332Mers-el-Kebir: 158Mersa Bou Zedjar: 74-75Merzig: 429-30Messina: 116, 137, 139, 141, 150Metz: 402-03, 405, 414, 423-24, 429Metz Gap: 414, 423Meulan: 386Meuse River: 389-90, 467, 471-72, 479, 489, 513,

518Meyrargues: 451-52Miano: 249Michelshof: 482-83Michin, Pvt. Bernard: 478Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 377, 381, 475-76,

482-83Mignano: 179, 180, 186, 244Milazzo: 144Military Pipeline Group (Provisional): 411 - 12Military Pipeline Service (MPLS): 412Military Railway Service (MRS), Transportation

Corps: 242, 399, 405, 4521st: 397, 451, 4532d: 356

Millburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.: 486-87Miller, 1st Lt. Keith E.: 127nMillikin, Maj. Gen. John: 500, 504Milwit, Col. Herbert: 48-49, 296Mincio River: 221


Mine clearance methods: 103, 105, 107, 116, 140,144, 158, 182-83, 488, 564. See also Minedetectors.

Mine detectors: 101, 307, 320, 325, 334, 368, 494AN/PRS-1 (Dinah): 183AN/VRS-1: 183British: 144SCR-625: 5, 103-04, 107, 130, 141, 144,

182-83, 564vehicle-mounted: 104, 183

Minefield charting and recording: 101, 106, 182,197-98, 564

Minefields and clearance operationsItaly: 168, 181-83, 190-91, 199, 217, 237, 246Normandy and northern France: 328, 331-32,

369, 380, 383-84, 408-09Sicily: 119, 130, 140-41, 144, 146-48southern France: 437training: 67-68, 100, 103, 105-06, 124-25,

157-58, 182, 212, 225, 370, 380, 564Tunisia: 96, 100-107, 141

Mines, German: 5, 100antipersonnel (AP): 101-02, 368antitank (AT): 101, 141, 368"bottle mine": 374improvised: 144, 446mustard pot: 368, 380nonmetallic: 181plastic: 217n, 494S ("Bouncing Betty"): 102, 147, 181-82, 190, 368,

380Schu: 107, 158, 181-83, 217, 302, 380, 446Stock: 181Teller: 101-02, 107, 130, 147, 181, 190, 2l7n,

302, 322, 368, 446, 564Topf: 217, 494-95wooden box: 107, 141, 144, 190, 217

Mines, Italian: 101, 155, 217nMines and minelaying, U.S.: 96-97, 102, 197-98,

370, 465, 472, 474, 477, 564Minturno: 245Mistretta: 141Model, Field Marshal Walter: 483Moletta River: 196Mondovi: 113-14Moneymore General Depot: 20Monschau: 461, 464, 467, 470Mont Castre ridge: 369Montalbano: 147Montargis: 402Monte Camino: 188Monte Camolato: 146-47Monte Grande: 216Monte Lungo: 186Monte Maggiore: 188Monte Orso railroad tunnel: 244Monte Pelato: 146Monte Porchia: 188-89Monte San Biagio: 244Monte San Fratello: 148

Monte Serrasiccia: 216Monte Soprana: 155Monte Trocchio: 189Montebourg: 398Montecatini: 246Montesano: 250Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L.: 83-84, 97,

115-16, 137, 165, 286, 499, 537Moore, Col. Anderson T. W.: 97Moore, Maj. Gen. Cecil R.: 31, 56, 285, 287, 401,

489, 565and dual command, ETOUSA and SOS: 28, 259,

350, 561and engineer intelligence: 296-98and engineer manpower: 38, 56-57, 260, 271, 315and U.K. buildup: 42-43, 256, 260, 262, 264, 267,

272, 275, 277Moosberg: 550Morlaix: 359-60, 364, 383Mortain: 385Mosbach: 554Moselle River: 390, 392, 423-30, 452, 462, 481Mostaganem: 119Mott, 1st Lt. Hugh: 500-504Mt. Cauvin tank farm: 408Mt. Etna: 140, 146Mt. Vesuvius: 251Mountain Division, 10th: 216, 220-22Mountain Infantry Regiments, 86th and 87th: 220Mouterhouse: 485Muehlhausen: 542Muenster: 538-39MULBERRY artificial harbor: 340, 342-44, 361, 408Mulde River: 542, 544-47Mulhouse: 454Munich: 553, 555, 559Munich-Salzburg autobahn: 555MUSKET operation: 154Mussolini Canal: 244

Naab River: 548Namur: 364, 390, 478Nancy: 405, 424Nantes: 359Naples: 153-54, 158, 162, 165-67, 175, 184, 192,

195, 203, 226, 234, 241-42, 249-53, 286, 438,454. See also Port reconstruction.

Naso ridge: 148National Redoubt (Alpine Fortress): 553-56Native Labor Company, 144th: 92Naval Beach Battalions: 122-23, 133, 305

1st: 193, 4372d: 1294th: 4378th: 438

Naval combat demolition units (NCDUs): 305-08.See also Amphibious operations.

Naval LCVP Units:No. 1: 506n, 516No. 3: 517

INDEX 601

Naval Operations Board: 145Navy, U.S.

Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet: 65Amphibious Force, XI: 305Amphibious Training Base: 304-06, 310bases in the United Kingdom: 9, 67in Iceland: 11-12, 16Italian campaign support: 156, 158, 163, 169, 195Normandy landings support: 282, 299, 301,

304-07, 316, 320-21, 325-26, 333, 337,342-43, 565

North Africa landings support: 68-69, 73, 78-79port reconstruction operations: 136, 237, 352-53,

355, 361-62, 445-47Rhine River crossing support: 489, 516, 526, 535,

538Seabees: 15, 446, 538Sicilian operations support: 123-24, 127, 131-32southern France landings support: 436-37,

439-41, 443Task Unit 122.5.3: 518

Navy Cross: 326Navy Intelligence Board: 436Neckar River: 553-54, 557Neffe: 476-78NEPTUNE plan: 286, 299-300, 303-04, 309, 342, 349Nettuno: 193, 196New York Port of Embarkation: 43, 60, 157, 173,

277, 279Newbury depot: 46, 272Newcastle: 68Newport: 46Niblo, Col. Urban: 205Nicholas, Col. Richard U.: 490Nicosia: 139, 145Nierstein: 525-26Nijmegen bridge: 504Niscemi: 131Nissen huts: 8-9, 12-14, 33, 52, 54-55, 265Noce, Brig. Gen. Daniel: 65-66, 79Nordhausen: 544Nordheim: 552NORDWIND operation: 484, 486Normandy Base Section: 351-52Normandy landings. See OMAHA Beach; UTAH Beach.North Africa invasion: 40, 59-69, 72, 74-82, 114,

121-22, 438. See also TORCH operation.North African Air Service Command (NAASC): 90North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(NATOUSA): 110-11, 113, 152, 156, 200-201,203, 228, 245, 249, 252, 436, 450. See alsoCommand structure problems; Services ofSupply, NATOUSA.

North African Training Command: 93Northern Ireland: 8-9, 17-22, 35, 68, 261Northern Ireland Base Command (Provisional): 21Northern Ireland Base Section: 29, 272Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF): 88-90Nuremberg: 547, 553

Oberforstbach: 418

Oberwesel: 528-29O'Daniel, Brig. Gen. John W.: 157Oddi Airdrome: 11Odenwald: 531Office, Chief Engineer, ETOUSA: 28, 42, 46,

560-61. See also Moore, Maj. Gen. Cecil R.administrative divisions: 36, 262, 267-68, 272,

285, 289-90, 296, 298, 317, 350-51cross-Channel plans and operations: 31-33,

256-57, 280, 282-85, 297, 304, 349, 397,489, 531

and TORCH operation: 38-39, 56Office, Chief of Engineers, War Department: 17, 35,

40, 42-43, 48-49, 51, 60, 63, 229, 279, 288,296-97

Ohrdruf: 546Oise Base Section: 351Oise River: 389Oliver, Maj. Gen. Lunsford E.: 538OMAHA Beach

assault plans: 299-303, 305-07, 310-12, 315-16landing operations: 317, 319-34, 339, 506post D-day operations: 340-44, 346-47, 349, 394,

400, 405-08Ombrone River: 211O'Neill, Lt. Col. John T.: 305, 306n, 307Oppenheim: 525-26, 528, 530-31, 546Oran: 59, 69, 74, 77-78, 83, 86, 88, 91, 111-13,

119, 122, 124-25, 156, 158Ordnance Department: 47Orleans: 402Orleansville: 74, 77Orne River: 299Orscholz Switch Line: 430Ortheuville: 478-79, 483Oujda: 153Ouled Rahmoun: 92, 114Our River: 462, 474, 480-81Ourthe River: 478-79OVERLORD operation: 256, 262, 265, 277, 281-83,

286-88, 297, 299, 302, 310-11, 344, 348, 351,356, 358, 438

Oxford: 298Oxwich Beach: 310Oxx, Col. Francis H.: 60

Pachten: 433Pack animals: 99-100, 148, 188, 209, 211, 213, 225,

229Padgett, S/Sgt. Ewart M.: 423Paestum: 156, 162, 249Paignton: 310Palermo: 118, 132, 136-37, 139, 141, 150, 156, 159.

See also Port reconstruction.Parachute Infantry Regiment, 505th: 473Paris: 351, 356, 362, 385-89, 399-400, 402-03,

405, 410, 413Pash, Col. Boris T.: 556-58Passau: 548Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 436-37, 452, 487,

534, 550


Patillo, Lt. Col.: 306nPatterson Field (Iceland): 15Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.

and North Africa operations: 59, 72, 74, 113Seventh Army commander: 115-16, 131, 135,

136-37Third Army commander: 390, 400-401, 405, 423,

429, 434-35, 483, 515, 525, 527, 530, 547,549, 555

Paxson, Col. Harry O.: 185-86, 192PBS (Main): 234, 245, 252. See also Peninsular Base

Section.Peckham, 1st Lt. Charles: 328Pegnitz River: 553Peiper, Obersturmbannfuehrer Joachim: 469, 471-74Pence, Brig. Gen. Arthur W.: 29, 39, 113, 171, 203,

232Peninsular Base Section: 171-74, 199, 203, 222,

227, 231, 232-34, 236-42, 244-55, 563Pensouth: 234, 254. See also Peninsular Base Section.Pergrin, Lt. Col. David E.: 471-72, 507Periers: 367, 369-71, 374, 376, 394Perregaux: 91Person, Col. John L.: 411-12Petralia: 137, 139Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants. See POL supply.Philbin, Lt. Col. Tobias R.: 431Philippeville: 91-92, 113Photo interpreters: 145, 185-86, 192, 229-30. See

also Aerial photography.Photo Squadron, 13th: 296Pichon-Fondouk el Aouareb Pass: 94Pico: 209Pierced steel plank: 6, 87Piers: 354-55

causeways: 343-44Lobnitz pierheads: 343-44naval ponton: 117-18, 124, 128-29, 131-32,

169-70, 316, 361, 442ramps: 136, 238"whale" floating roadway: 340, 343-44

Pietravairano: 224Pile driving equipment: 167, 238, 488Piolenc: 458Piombino: 234, 236-38, 252Pipeline construction: 6, 563

Mediterranean: 61-62, 91-93, 119, 138, 172-73,232-33, 238-42, 252, 455-59

northern Europe: 280, 282, 284, 291, 358, 391,393, 405, 408-13

ship-to-shore: 91, 284, 291, 408-09training: 406victaulic coupling: 62, 92, 410

Pisa: 211, 214, 218, 231, 245, 247Pistoia: 214-16Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart G.: 287, 349, 351PLUTO (Pipeline Under the Ocean): 406Plymouth: 313, 317Po River: 217-20, 224, 228Po valley: 213, 215, 217-18, 233, 240

Pointe de la Percee: 330-31POL supply: 6, 32-33, 563

Major POL System: 406-13Mediterranean operations: 62, 91-92, 119, 138,

167, 172-73, 174, 232, 238-41, 252, 447Minor POL System: 406-09, 411northern Europe operations: 284, 357, 405-13storage tanks and pumping stations: 62, 91-92,

138, 173-74, 238, 240, 357-58, 405-06,408-09

Polich, Lt. Col. Frank J.: 188Poligny-Mouchard: 452Pomigliano Airfield: 245Pont-du-Fahs: 84Pont-Hebert: 337, 374-75Pontaubault: 400-402Pome Olivo Airfield: 119, 131, 138, 145Pontedera: 231Ponthierry: 387-88Pontine marshes: 209, 211Poole: 313Port-aux-Poules: 121-23, 157-58Port Battalion (TC), 382d: 129Port-de-Bouc: 445, 447-48, 456-58Port-en-Bessin: 299, 302, 406-09Port-Lyautey: 63, 69, 73, 86-87, 93Port reconstruction, Mediterranean: 113, 119, 129

Leghorn: 233-34, 237-40Marseille: 233, 445-47, 456, 458minor ports, Italy: 234, 236-39minor ports, southern France: 439, 444-45, 447,

458Naples: 167-74, 177, 232, 234, 236-39, 245-48,

281, 447Palermo: 115-16, 136, 138, 151-52Toulon: 445-46, 456

Port reconstruction, northern Europe: 31, 33,277-78, 280-83, 286-89, 291

Antwerp: 351, 363-66Cherbourg: 282, 348-49, 351-57, 360, 367,

406Le Havre: 360-63minor ports: 310, 340, 344, 346-49, 351, 356,

358-60, 365-66Portland: 312-13, 317Porto Empedocle: 119, 137-38, 151Ports, artificial: 310, 339, 340, 343Ports (TC)

4th: 3465th: 36311th: 310, 344, 346-4713th: 36317th: 365

Pouppeville: 335-37, 341Power shovel: 99Powerboats: 427, 434, 459, 505, 508-10, 512, 526,

532, 535-36Pozzilli: 188Pozzuoli: 239Prime movers: 80, 144, 195

INDEX 603

Projects for Continental Operations (PROCO):277-82, 285, 287, 289

Provisional Engineer Group, V Corps: 307Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group: 310,

315, 332, 339, 340, 344, 346, 438Public utilities restoration: 61, 151-52, 168, 172,

237, 242, 245, 247-48, 280, 284-85, 542Pursuit Squadron, 33d: 12Purteil, Lt. William E.: 463

QUADRANT Conference (Quebec): 256-57, 259, 262Quarries: 187, 225, 238, 356, 357, 462, 475Quartermaster Corps: 5-6, 45, 278Quartermaster Group, 49th: 246Quartermaster Railhead Company, 557th: 312Quartermaster Service Companies:

3206th: 3124145th: 347

Quartermaster units: 36, 122-23, 238, 272, 274,309-10

Queen Mary: 19Querqueville: 357Quiberon Bay: 356, 359Quineville: 304, 335Quonset barges: 218, 220-21

Rabat: 118-19, 121Rade d'Agay: 443Rafts and ferries: 68, 175-76, 218, 220-21, 425-26,

434, 460, 505-06, 508, 514-15, 517-18, 521,523-24, 526, 528, 531, 533, 535-36

Railroad bridges and tunnelsBritish unit construction railway bridge (UCRB):

288, 397, 399-401, 403northern Europe: 283, 288, 291, 356, 364, 383,

397-403, 405Sicily and Italy: 141, 152, 229, 233, 242, 244-45southern France: 451-53, 537-38, 564training: 398

Railroad reconstruction. See also Railroad bridgesand tunnels.

cross-Channel attack plans: 280-83, 286, 288, 291Italy: 152, 172, 232-33, 242, 244-45North Africa: 61northern Europe: 282, 356-57, 364, 397-99, 403,

405, 542Sicily: 119, 137, 152southern France: 448, 451-53training: 41, 398

RAINBOW-5 plan: 8, 17Rambouillet: 402Rampan: 375Ramps. See Piers.Ranee River: 381-82Randazzo: 139, 141, 144, 146-47Ranger Battalions

1st: 74, 763d: 128, 136

Rangers: 126, 129-31, 159, 162, 177, 195, 300,312, 328, 330, 552. See also Ranger Battalions.

Rapido River: 180-81, 186, 190-92, 208, 224, 233Raviscanina: 186Reading: 298Real estate operations: 119, 173, 203, 248-49, 351Recovery unit, T-2: 128, 184Red Ball Express: 397, 411Reddy Fox explosive pipe: 304, 306, 437Rednitz River: 553Reed, Lt. Col. Howard H.: 39Regen River: 548Regensburg: 547-48Reggio di Calabria: 154Regnitz River: 553Reims: 412Relizane: 119Remagen: 500-503, 505, 507-11, 513-14Remagen bridge. See Ludendorff Bridge.Rennes: 383, 397, 407Reno River: 216, 231Resia Pass: 555Rettel: 424Reykjavik: 11-15Reynolds, Sgt. John A.: 502Rheinberg: 517-19, 527, 535Rheinduerkheim: 534Rhens: 527Rhine gorge: 525, 527Rhine River: 413, 414, 423, 430, 454, 458, 484-86Rhine River crossings

First Army: 500-16, 517, 524, 526, 535-36, 541Third Army: 517, 525-31, 535-36, 546Seventh Army: 517, 525, 531-36, 550-51Ninth Army: 517-21, 523-36, 537-38planning: 429, 459-60, 486-88, 489-91,

499-500, 504, 517-18, 531Rhone River valley: 436, 447, 449, 451-55, 458-59Ricciardi, Roberto: 163Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.: 473Riggs, Lt. Col. Thomas J., Jr.: 463-66Ripon: 41River crossings: 5, 229, 382. See also Boats; Bridging

operations; Rafts and ferries; and rivers by name.artillery support: 371-72, 388, 431, 433, 490-92,

519, 525, 532-33, 535cableways: 459, 489, 492, 495, 532-33, 540, 554doctrine: 535equipment: 455, 488, 518-21landing craft: 459-60, 489, 491-92, 494-96,

504, 506, 508, 510, 513-16, 517-21, 523,525-26, 528-29, 531-33, 535-36, 540

training: 212, 218, 224, 424, 459, 518-19, 532Road construction

Iceland: 15Italy: 165, 186-87, 192, 195-96, 198-99, 209,

211-12, 214-17, 226, 229, 245North Africa: 61, 82, 94, 96-99northern France: 280, 283, 286, 393-94, 397Sicily: 140-41, 146-47

Robinson, Lt. Melvin O.: 551Rochefort: 479


Rocherath: 470-71Rock and gravel supply: 8, 13, 15, 99, 140, 175,

187-88, 196, 215, 225-26, 238, 356-57, 377,394, 488, 563

Roer River crossings: 467, 489-92, 494-500,517-18, 524

Roer River dams: 461, 490Roerdorf: 496-97Roermond: 489Roetgen: 415, 417-18Rogers, Col. Thomas DeF.: 42, 333-34, 370, 422Rolandseck: 514-15Rome: 154, 188, 192, 208-09, 211, 234, 237, 240,

244, 246Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin: 97, 301-02Romney huts: 55, 265Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 22, 538Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore, Jr.: 333, 337Roosevelt Bridge: 538Roscoff: 360, 363Rosenheim: 556Rosneath: 66-67Ross, 1st Lt. Robert P.: 329Rouen: 360-63ROUNDUP operation: 22-23, 31-32, 36, 48, 57, 278Route Napoleon: 436Routes

16: 462172: 370174: 373, 375M-4: 478-79N-13: 393-94N-15: 476N-23: 471N-26: 478-79N-28: 477N-800: 370, 394

Royal Air Force: 49, 90, 294-95Royal Engineers: 12, 15, 18, 21, 92, 315Royal Navy: 74-76, 78, 169, 195, 237-38, 320-21,

360, 363, 489Ruhr: 423, 490, 499Ruhr Pocket: 538, 540-41, 544, 547Russian 5th Guards Airborne Division: 548Russian forces: 542, 547-48Rust, Lt. Col. Clayton A.: 511-12Ryder, Maj. Gen. Charles W.: 59, 77

Saalach River: 556Saale River: 541-42, 544, 547Saar-Moselle triangle: 430Saar River: 423, 429-34, 487Saarbruecken: 423, 484, 487Saarlautern: 429-34Sacco River: 227Safi: 63, 79-80St. Brieuc: 359, 383St.-Charles: 114St. Die: 454St. Gilles: 377, 385

St. Goar: 527-30St. Goarshausen: 528-29St. Hilaire-du-Harcouet: 400-401St. Hubert: 479St. Jean-de-Daye: 371, 374, 409St. Laurent: 300, 326-28, 331-32St. Lo: 367, 370-71, 375, 394, 408-10St. Lo breakout: 359, 399, 405St. Lo-Periers road: 376St. Malo: 344, 346, 348, 358-59, 381-82, 384St. Marcel: 457St. Michel-en-Greve: 359, 383St. Peter: 548St. Raphael: 439, 443-44, 456, 458St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte: 303St. Tropez: 439, 441-42, 445, 451St. Vaast-la-Hougue: 344, 346-49St.-Vith: 461, 464-66, 471, 476, 483-84Ste.-Barbe-du-Tlelat: 157Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes: 300, 407-09Ste. Marie-du-Mont: 335Ste. Maxime: 439Ste. Mere-Eglise: 286, 302-03, 332Salcombe: 305, 308Sale airfield: 93Salerno: 154-56, 158-59, 161-65, 167, 171, 177,

192, 437Salm River: 472-73Salon: 457Salzburg: 553, 555-56San Benedetto: 220San Biagio: 244San Felice: 239San Pietro: 192San Stefano: 238-40San Vittore: 239Sandau: 539Sandhofen: 458Sant' Agata: 148Sant' Angelo: 190-91Santerno valley: 212Santo Stefano: 141, 147-48, 152Saone River: 452Sardinia: 153Sarre-Union: 429Sarrebourg: 429-30, 453, 458, 484Sarreguemines: 429, 458Sauer River: 462, 480-82Sbeitla: 84, 89, 100, 107Sbeitla-Gafsa road: 98Sbeitla-Hadjeb el Aioun road: 94Sbiba: 94, 96-97Scaling ladders: 371-72, 384Scauri: 246Scharnhorst Line: 414, 417-18Scheidgen: 482Schelde estuary: 363, 365Schill Line: 414, 418Schlausenbach: 463Schmidthof: 418

INDEX 605

Schnee Eifel: 419, 461-62, 464Schoenberg: 461, 464-66, 476Schoenebeck: 540Schoppen: 469Schwammenauel dam: 490Schwarz Erntz River: 462Schweinfurt: 552Scoglitti: 126, 132, 134Scorpion flails. See Tanks.Scotland: 8-9, 66-68Scott, Col. Stanley L.: 24Sea Mules (tugboats): 510, 517-21, 523, 536Sebou River: 73Sedan: 389Sedgewick: 238Seine Base Section: 351Seine River: 360, 362-63, 367Seine River crossings: 385-87, 389-90, 402-03,

410, 413Sele River: 154, 156, 159, 161, 163-64, 166-67Selune River: 400-401Senden: 538Serchio River: 213, 231, 247-48Serino aqueducts: 168, 242, 247Services of Supply, ETOUSA: 21, 24-26, 28-29,

31, 33-34, 36-38, 43, 57, 60, 257-58, 261,270, 278, 287-89, 315, 349, 561. See alsoCommand structure problems; CommunicationsZone.

Services of Supply, ETOUSA, Engineer Service: 26,28-29, 31-33, 37-39, 42-43, 47-48, 51-53,55-56, 62, 77, 200, 256, 259, 269-71, 289

Services of Supply, NATOUSA: 26, 100, 110-12,115, 121, 153, 157, 172, 200-201, 203, 449-50

Services of Supply, War Department: 24, 37, 65,88-89. See also Army Service Forces.

Sessa: 239Sesto: 241Seves River: 369, 377SEXTANT Conference (Cairo-Tehran): 256, 260Seydhisfjordhur: 13Sfax: 84, 92SHARK force: 119-20Sherman, Col. Harry B.: 176SHINGLE operation: 180, 192, 195. See also Anzio.Shoemaker, Pvt. William J.: 328-29Shrivenham: 40, 47Sicilian operations: 114, 115-35, 136-41, 144-52,

153, 165, 437Sieg River: 514Siege operations: 382, 384Siegfried Line: 392, 430, 454, 461-62, 464, 467,

486breaching operations: 414, 419, 429, 432, 488, 565fortifications: 413, 414-15, 417, 420, 424, 432,

487Siena: 211Signiaringen: 557Silla: 231Simon, Sgt. Zolton: 328

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.: 489-90, 492, 499,517

Sinzig: 502Sisteron: 451-52Sittard: 518Skyline Drive: 462, 474, 480Slapton Sands: 310-12SLEDGEHAMMER operation: 22Smith, Pvt. Harry: 402Smith, Lt. Col. Lionel F.: 328Smoke screening operations: 127, 175, 177, 187, 231,

373-74, 384, 428-29, 494-95, 507, 514, 527,540, 546

Smullen, Lt. Col. Chauncey K.: 449Smyser, Col. Rudolf E., Jr.: 90Snake devices. See Tanks."Snortin' Bull Express": 542Societe Nationals des Chemins de Per: 399Soissons: 405Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.: 24, 43, 58Somme River: 389Sommerfeld track: 42, 68, 75-76, 82, 87, 134, 175,

196Sonnino: 211Sorrento: 154, 162SOS Task Force A: 60, 72Sottevast railroad yard: 357Souk el Arba: 87, 89-90, 92-93Souk el Khemis: 87, 89-90, 92Soulle River: 399Sousse: 92South African Survey Companies: 227

46th: 218Southampton: 313Southern Base Section: 29, 46-47, 50, 52-53, 265,

267, 272, 313-15Southern France operations: 222-23, 233, 255,

436-60. See also ANVIL operation.Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC): 450,

457Spa: 471Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl W.: 88, 90Spaccasassi Creek: 197Spain: 69, 74, 153Spanish Morocco: 69, 74, 85, 153Sparanise: 245Special Engineer Task Force, OMAHA Beach: 307-08Special Observer Group (SPOBS): 7-11, 16Special Service Force, 1st: 199Specker, Sgt. Joseph C.: 190Spohn, 2d Lt. George S.: 127nStaging and marshaling areas: 246, 262, 313-15Stark, Col. Alexander N., Jr.: 97Station de Sened: 108Stavelot: 471-72Stoumont: 473-74Strait of Messina: 150, 153-54, 158, 250Strasbourg: 454, 484, 486, 557Stuttgart: 554, 557Submarines, German midget: 504, 509, 523, 535


Sudbury depot: 274, 276Sulzbach: 548Sunk tank farm: 357-58Supply. See also POL supply; Supply depots; Supply

shortages,buildup for cross-Channel attack: 32-33, 43-44,

256, 259-61, 263, 265, 272, 278-79,285, 288-89

Class II: 43-44, 60, 272, 277, 282Class IV: 32, 43, 60, 99, 252, 272, 277, 279-80,

282, 297Class V: 60controlled and critical items: 44, 112, 157doctrine: 560heavy equipment need: 5, 20, 44, 48, 52, 55,

86-87, 89-90, 166, 260-61, 354, 562-63to Iceland: 12-14inventory procedures: 46, 157, 450, 560ISS manifest system: 261for Italian campaign: 157, 167, 172-73, 193, 199,

219, 226-27, 233-34, 236-37, 245, 251-52joint U.S.-British stockpiling: 288-89loading and handling problems: 12, 45, 79-80,

85-86, 133, 137-38, 163, 195, 265of Normandy beaches: 308-09, 312-13, 316,

327, 338-39, 340-44, 349in North Africa: 42, 60-61, 72-74, 76-80, 82,

111-14, 286operations on the Continent: 366, 376-77,

390-91, 394, 419PROCO forecasting system: 277-82, 285, 287, 289reverse lend-lease: 41-42, 269, 278shipment marking systems: 19-20, 259-61of Sicilian operations: 115-16, 121, 124, 129,

132-35, 137-39, 148, 151of southern France operations: 351, 441-42, 444,

449-50unit equipment preshipping: 259-60from U.S. to the United Kingdom: 19-20, 41-44,

259-61, 278-79Supply depots

on the Continent: 280, 282, 284, 286-88, 351,364, 366, 390-91

lists and catalog problems: 32-33, 42-43, 46-47,254, 274

simnel (map): 298in the United Kingdom: 19-20, 45-46, 56, 58,

261-66, 269, 271-72, 274-76, 560Supply shortages: 20, 44-45, 47-48, 392, 411, 560

bridging equipment: 166-67, 184-85, 191, 213,218, 390, 454-55, 507, 531-32

heavy equipment: 166, 224, 261railroad rolling stock: 356, 364, 452spare parts: 45, 48, 82, 214, 253-54, 275-76,

413, 450vehicles: 60-61, 79, 99, 112-13, 137, 261, 339,

356, 563Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

(SHAEF): 258-59, 285, 287-88, 350, 359, 449,476, 484, 489, 517, 557

Sure River: 488Surkamp, Capt. Arthur T.: 483Survey Directorate, AFHQ: 120Swansea: 305, 310Sweeney, Maj. Matthew J.: 515Swenholt, Col. Helmer: 402, 405Swindon: 298Syracuse: 116, 126, 136, 138

T-Force headquarters: 557, 559Tabarka: 92, 114Tabb, Capt. Robert P., Jr.: 333, 336Tabet, Lt. Col. Sam: 477Table of Basic Allowances (TBA): 43, 89, 99, 112,

253, 261, 277Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE): 4-6,

38, 43, 100, 141, 223, 241, 254, 277, 351, 393,562-63

Tactical Air Force, XII: 456Tafaraoui: 74, 86, 91Tailfingen: 557-58Tancarville Canal: 362Tank Battalions

14th: 50070th: 303, 481707th: 475738th: 510741st: 301, 322756th: 192

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 705th: 478Tankdozers: 248, 304, 306-08, 317, 319, 325-26,

334, 381, 420Tanks

with canal defense searchlights: 510, 516, 523duplex-drive amphibious: 319-20, 222, 324-25,

489, 532-33flame-throwing "Crocodile": 384hedgerow cutter: 367M-4: 144, 283, 500, 504, 506, 520, 524M4A4 with dozer blade: 437-38, 441-42with Scorpion flail: 105, 116, 158, 564with snake devices: 105, 183, 488, 564T-26 (Pershing): 500, 506, 509, 515tank-gapping teams: 437, 441-43use in bridging: 184, 438

Taranto: 154Task Forces

4 (Iceland): 11-12, 14Alien: 189-90Engeman: 500-504Lovelady: 415, 417-18King: 415, 418Luckett: 481Raff: 96Riley: 482Stark: 97Welborn: 545X (3d Armored Division): 418

Tassigny, Lt. Gen. Jean de Lattre de: 454, 557Taute River: 349, 356, 370-71, 374, 377

INDEX 607

Tebessa: 83-84, 87, 92, 96, 113-14Technical intelligence teams, Allied: 556-59Telephone communications: 241, 413, 457Telergma: 87, 89, 92Tennessee Valley Authority: 296TERMINAL landing party: 77Termini Imerese: 137, 152Terneuzen: 365Terracina: 209, 211Terrain models: 218, 532Thala: 84, 96-97, 107Thatcham-Newbury depot: 45-46Thelepte: 98, 107Thionville: 424, 426-29Thomas, Col. William N., Jr.: 193Thompson, Col. Paul W.: 293TIGER amphibious exercise: 312Tilly: 388Timmerman, 1st Lt. Karl: 502Tirrenia depot: 251Tlemcen: 94Todd, Lt. Col. John G.: 185TOMBOLAS: 408-09Tompkins, Col. William F.: 24Tompkins, Maj. William F., Jr.: 508TORCH operation: 22-23, 26, 32-33, 35, 37-40,

43, 45-46, 53, 55-57, 59-60, 62-63, 67, 82,91, 121, 124, 163, 255, 271, 561

Torgau: 542Torquay: 317Torremuzza: 148Toul: 405Toulon: 436, 439, 445-46, 456Tournai: 389Towchester: 298Tractors: 44, 48, 81, 128, 244, 308, 331, 521Trailers: 144, 185, 218, 308, 331Training. See also Amphibious operations; Bridging

operations; Minefields; River crossings,in NATOUSA/MTOUSA: 120-21, 123-25, 212,

218, 224-25in the United Kingdom: 20-21, 40-41, 55,

66-68, 271, 274, 289-91, 293, 304, 398,560-61

in the United States: 6, 20, 39, 65, 68, 97-98, 122,274, 289, 304, 560

Transportation Corps: 29, 119, 137, 156, 215, 282,340, 342, 352-53, 365, 397, 538

Transportation Training Center: 291"Treaty of Antwerp": 363Trevieres: 342Tribehou: 376-77TRIDENT Conference (Washington): 153, 256, 259Trier: 430Triflisco: 175, 177, 185Tripoli: 125Troina: 139, 145-48Troina River: 147Trois Fonts: 471-73, 479, 483, 507

Troop basis: 23, 32, 35-37, 43, 58, 61, 116, 256-57,262-63, 267

Trucks: 5, 48, 99, 113, 137, 185, 193, 213, 261, 563Truman Bridge: 540Truro: 310Truscott, Lt. Gen. Lucian K., Jr.: 69, 148-50, 166,

175-76, 179, 216, 438Tunis: 77, 83-85, 92, 124Tunisian campaign: 83-94, 96-114, 118, 120-21,

250Tunnels. See Railroad bridges and tunnels.Tyrrhenian Sea: 180

Uckange: 427Uerdingen: 519, 524, 536Ulm: 554United Kingdom (U.K.) Base Section: 349n, 351Unkel: 506Unkelbach: 506Urft dam: 490U.S. Army Forces, British Isles (USAFBI): 16-18,

25, 35, 41-42U.S. Army, Northern Ireland Forces: 18-19U.S.-British Railway Bridging School: 398U.S. Geological Survey: 296U.S. Marine Corps: 11, 64

1st Provisional Brigade: 11 - 12, 15U.S.S. Boise: 131U.S.S. Chase: 80U.S.S. Dallas: 73U.S.S. Jeffers: 131U.S.S. Leedstown: 80U.S.S. Shubrick: 131U.S.S. Wasp: 12UTAH Beach

assault planning: 299, 302-05, 307, 310, 312, 316landing operations: 317, 319, 332-34, 336-39,

374post D-day operations: 286, 340-42, 344, 349,

353, 394, 398, 408

"V-13" streetcar: 422V-weapons: 364-65, 422, 510, 513, 544Valence: 451-52, 458Valognes: 304, 349-50, 394Varenne River: 385Vaughan, Brig. Gen. Harry B.: 287, 349nVecchiano: 213Vehicle recovery and salvage operations: 81-82, 96,

127-28, 133, 195, 213, 338, 341, 377Vehicle waterproofing: 82, 175, 307, 312, 314, 317Velletri: 209Venafro: 178-79, 188Verdun: 390-91, 405, 434VERITABLE operation: 490Verona: 221-22Versailles: 402, 405Vesoul: 452-53, 458Vianden: 480-81


Victaulic Company of America: 62Victor Bridge: 516Victor Hugo Storage Depot: 91Vielsalm: 465-66Vienne: 457Vierville: 300, 302, 315, 326, 330Vire: 402, 410Vire and Taute Canal: 371, 373-74Vire River: 299, 302, 347, 356, 371-76, 398-99Vitre: 400Vitry-le-Francois: 390, 403Volturno River: 165-66, 174-79, 180-81, 184,

186, 224-25, 227, 230, 239Vosges: 485Vosges Mountains: 454-55, 484

W. L. Marshall: 365Wahlerscheid: 469-70Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H.: 426-27, 430, 531Wallace, Col. David C.: 518Wallach: 535Walworth Camp: 19War Department: 8, 10-11, 16, 24, 35-38,

43-44, 205, 222, 277-79, 297. See also Office,Chief of Engineers.

Wasserburg: 556Water supply (in the field): 31, 33, 107-08,

119-20, 124, 147Water supply (municipal). See Public utilities

restoration.Watkins, Maj. Vernon L.: 94Weasels, M-29: 333, 526WEBFOOT exercise: 195Weilerswist: 513Weisse Elster: 542Weissenfels: 542Welborn, Col. John C.: 544-45Werra River: 541, 546-47Wesel: 490, 499, 517, 537-38Weser River: 539-41, 544West Wall: 421, 469, 487. See also Siegfried Line.Western Base Section: 26, 29, 50, 53, 265, 272, 287,

313-15

Western Naval Task Force: 119, 124, 437Western Task Force (WTF): 59-61, 63, 65, 68-69,

72-73, 78-79, 110Weymouth: 317Wharton, Brig. Gen. James E.: 312, 337-38Wheeler, Col. John W.: 517-18, 523Whitcomb, Col. Richard: 343-44White, Maj. Gen. Arthur A.: 446White, Lt. Col. Willard: 557-58Wiese, Lt. Gen. Friedrich: 438-39Wilck, Col. Gerhard: 423Williams, Sgt. Joseph E.: 433Wilmont: 20Wilson, Brig. Gen. Arthur R.: 60Wiltz: 475-76, 480-83Wimmenau: 485Wingen: 485Winslow, Col. William R.: 380, 382, 384Winter Line: 179, 180, 188Winter operations: 215, 240, 462, 471, 488Wirtzfeld: 469-70Wissembourg: 485Withee, T/5 Edward S.: 464Witney: 298Woerner, Lt. David M.: 463Wolfe, Brig. Gen. Henry C.: 66, 74, 121, 455, 487Wood, 2d Lt. Phill C., Jr.: 322-23Woofus rocket-firing LCM: 437Woolacombe: 306-07Wooten, Maj. Gen. Richard M.: 24Worms: 429, 525, 531-35, 550Wright Field: 49Wrotham: 9Wuerzburg: 552Wurm River: 420-21Wyatt, Lt. Col. Aaron A., Jr.: 157-58

X-Ray Force: 193

Yates, Maj. Robert B.: 473-74, 507Young, Col. Mason J.: 544

Zeitz: 542

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1985 O - 432-452 : QL 2

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