cmh_pub_10-16-1 signal corps - the emergency.pdf

8/14/2019 CMH_Pub_10-16-1 Signal Corps - The Emergency.pdf

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UNITED STATES RMr IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

TH SIGNAL CORPSTH EMERGENCY

To December 194 1)

yDulany Terre tt

CENTER O MlUT RY HISTORYUNITED STATES RMY

WASHINGTON D.C. / 994


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ForewordThe more mobile an armed force becomes, the more rugged the terrain it

encounters, or themore widelytheforce isdeployed,the greater becomesthedifficultyofsecuringandmaintaining rapid, completely linked communications.In the U.S. Army the Signal Corps is the agency charged with developing,procuring,and furnishingsignal equipment toovercome thedifficulties men-

tioned above. In an age ofswift and startling progress in electronics, this phaseofitsmission demands thatitkeepabreastofscientificadvancesathomeandabroad and maintain close ties with civilian laboratories and industry in orderto take advantage of their capabilities.

Thisvolume tracesthecourse whichtheSignal Corps followed betweenthefirst and second world wars, a period of planning and preparation. Others tofollow willrecountthe testingof the Corps' organizationand equipment,andthe results achieved at home and overseas. The author has dealt with the sub-ject on a chronological basis, instead offollowing the topical treatment used inother technical service volumes.Thisbroad-front approach hasenabledhim toweave into one pattern the many activities in which the Signal Corps was simul-taneously engaged. The reader can here follow from birth the history of Armyradar and mobile radio, the first steps taken in the conversion of the civiliancommunications industryto warproduction,theexpansionoftrainingfacilities,and the beginningsof the far-f lung communications network that eventuallyencircledtheglobe.He willsee theuncertaintiesofplanningand thedifficultiesoforganization incidenttorapidly changing conditions, meager appropriations,and the clash of interest within the military household. These and many othermatters showing human beings and institutions under pressure are replete withsignificanceto us whomust livein aturbulent world where revolution tendstohavetheupper hand over evolution.

ORLANDO WARDMaj.Gen.,U.S.A.Chief ofMilitaryHistoryWashington,D. C.30 January 1953

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TheAuthorDr.DulanyTerrett was born andrearedinMontanaand atpresent livesin

Washington, D. C. He holds aPh.B.inEnglish fromthe University ofChicagoand aPh.D.inEnglishfrom NorthwesternUniversity,whereheservedon thefaculty from 1936to 1942.During WorldWar II he was an AirCorpsofficer withthe FlyingTrainingCommandand the AirTransportCommand. In thelatter capacity,hewrotethe history of the AirTransport CommandinBrazilandAscensionIsland.Uponhisdischarge in 1946,hebecamethe SignalCorpschief historian,firstin the Office of theChief SignalOfficer and thenin the Officeof theChiefofMilitary History. In 1952he resigned inordertobecomea consultant.

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PrefaceThe prefacingof hisbook long after he has written it does not ordinarily

comeawriter'sway. If thepresent volumebe a case in point,historyis oneform which permits it. At least to the extentthat it hashappened,history isunchangeable;and to theextentthatit isunchangeableitwillstandand waitfor theattentionofthosewhosoonerorlatercometo it, or ofthosewho,likethepresentauthor,return to itafterhaving drawnapart from itsdetails.

Thisview seemsjustified inretrospectaswell,itappearsto me. The historyof the realizations, disappointments, mistakes, and successes of the UnitedStatesArmySignalCorps beforeand duringthe war whichendedin 1945 wasitselfundertakenentirely after that periodhad passed intohistory, and wasplanned andwritten withan eye tochronologicalandpanoramicstructure.Itwas in an effort tocaptureperspectiveandproportion,those qualitiesofneces-sary removal fromthe subject whicheverywritercloselyattachedto hissubjectwilldespairofalong with me, that I decided todevotethe firstvolume of ahistoryof theSignalCorps inWorldWar II to a periodbeginninga number ofyearsearlier.The massivegiftwhichtheInfantrymakes to thenationalinterestismademostlyin the battle itself, whereforeinfantryhistoryiscombathistoryabove allelse.Technical arms andservices liketheSignalCorps,which mustenter a war with technicalgear readyto go, exert alargeshare of theirproduc-tive effort before it begins. For this reason, thisvolumesurveys TheEmergencyand the years, half lassitude and half desperation,just before the EmperorHirohito'sbombers came inoverKahukuPoint.Openingwith thepanorama ofSignal Corps interests and distinguishingeachof thecharacteristic landmarksof thescene,itdevelopsby movingcloserfo r repeated and prolonged views at most ofthesedominant features and byreturning to the whole view often enough to keep it in mind.As the SignalCorpsis anagentofcommunications,themain themeis thesnaillike,lightning-likerace toward radar, frequencymodulation, and a multitude of electronicdevices.Otherpartsof thenarrativeillustratethelessonof theextravagantandenervatingresultsofinterservicestrife.One candrawitprimarilyfrom the longstory ofunequalrivalry between the AirCorpsand the SignalCorps.Yet thealarums and excursions of this melodrama never drowned out the quieteractions.Of these, the quietest was the development ofradar,second onlytonuclearfissionas thegreatest scientificadvanceof thewar.TheEmergency makesmodest but firmclaims for the SignalCorps' part in this development, at thesametimeproducing evidence against a common notion that radarwas the

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inventionof a single scientist or of asinglecountry;as wastrueof the atomicbomb,itsoriginsweresowideas to benearly universal.Nexttoradarandpos-siblyof evengreatersignificanceto theaverageman was theemergenceof FM,thefrequencymodulationsystem ofradio,which all but revolutionized the useoftanksin thewar,not tospeakof itsrecordafterward. The advanceofcrystalcontrol,alongwith theticklishtriumphover thepresumed insufficiencyof thecrystal supply, makes anepisodeinterlinked withthe FMstory.The influenceofthe communications industry in theSignalCorps is an importantelement,showingthe closerelationshipbetween the two in theselectionand manufac-turingofequipmentand in theselectionand trainingofofficers and signalmen.A wider but verymuchweaker relationshipdescribedisthatbetweenourselvesand our allies,especiallytheBritish.One of the sections in thisfield recallsthemutuallyfruitful missionof SirHenry Tizardandother electronicscientistsandphysicists to the United States in 1940. Finally, I trust that TheEmergencydemonstrates a discrepancy which later years closed: the gap between thepygmy Armyand the jumbo. I hope, insum,that the Signal Corpshistoryaddsitspartto the definingand emphasizing of the twobroadcharacteristicswhichhavecome to be sodominantinmodernwarthat theywillincreasinglymakeup thebulkofmilitaryhistories: first, thelongpreparationsincidentto a waror to any single day of it; and second, the technological aspect which has sotransformed conflict that either wars or the men who fight them mayconsequentlydisappear.

The writing of this book produced many pleasures, of which the mostfrequentand most happily remembered were theactsofinterestand assistanceverygratefully acknowledged here.My colleagues in thewritingofthis series,all ofwhomhave sharedwith me therepeatedprofitofthese acts,havefortheirownpartbulwarkedmewiththem to apointI cannotbegintoacknowledgeinfull. Sufficeit to saythatupon MissPaulineM.Oakes,Mrs.DixieR.Harris,and Dr.George Raynor ThompsonI urge my devoted thanks for all theirintel-ligent appraisals, unflagging perseverance, and liberal contributions. MissHelen Kasenchak'sexperttypingdeservesfull recognition, asdoestheresearchandwriting,at an earlier stage, ofMissRuthE.McKee.Ishould liketo thankindividually the hundreds of persons who have found files for me betweenWashington and Alaska, smoothed my way tointerviews,notifiedme ofoppor-tunities I had overlooked, and ingeneral shown an abundanceofcares andcourtesieswhichone has norightto expect butwelcomes.Since Imustcontentmyselfwithamassacknowledgment, Iwantit to beknownthatin mygratefulmind the mass is made up of individuals. Miss Ruth Stout, Mr.Joseph R.Friedman,and Mr. Arthur Hennehave shepherdedthebookeditorially.Mayitsappearanceinprintbe at least atokentributeto them.Washington,D. C. DULANYTERRETTMay 1954


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ContentsPART ONE

BeforeWorld War IIChapter Page

I . MIL IT A R Y COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3T h e Place of theSignal Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6T h e Early Signal C o r p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Th e Signal Corps in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

I I . THE ARMY I N LIMBO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Postwar Curtailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2The Continuing Technical Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6Defense-Strategy S i g n a l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5Administrative Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8Peacetime Procurement Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8

III. THE SCOPE OF THE SIGNAL CORPS . . . . . . . . . . . 70T h e Chief i n Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0PictorialCommunication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8Communications Contradictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2Communications Spheres o fInterest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8

IV. THE ARMY IN ABEYANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95V . EQUIPMENT SEARCH A N D RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0

Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 6Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1

PART TWOThe Limited and Unlimited Emergencies

V I . T H E PACE O F EMER G EN C Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 3Testing Tactical Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 6F M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 4 1Moves During the Winter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 7T h e Weight o f Field Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 2

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Chapter PageVII. T H E PROPULSION FROM LIMBO . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 66

Accumulating Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 6T h e Mirrors o f Defense Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 4F M Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 8First Answers i n A i r Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 5T h e Tizard Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 1

VIII. SELECTIVE SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 3Signal Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 4Signal Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 9

IX.. WORKING F O R T H E GROUND FORCES. . . . . . . . . . 2 21T h e Pigeon Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 1T h e Photographic Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 3Tactical a n d Administrative Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0Supply Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 0

X . WORKING F O R T H E A I R FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 51X I . SIGNALING T H E HEMISPHERE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 75

T o t h eNorthwest a n d t h e Northeast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 75T o t h eSoutheast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 81From N e w Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 6From the Office of th e Chief Signal Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . 291T o t h e West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 99

APPENDIX: SIGNAL CORPS EQUIPMENT, WORLD WAR II ... 307BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 3LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 47INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5

Charts1 . Radiation Spectrum, World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72. Contrast Between Typical Signal Corps Organizations in Wartime and

Peacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2

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IllustrationsPage

One EarlyMeanso fSignaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12CivilW a r SignalTower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3T h e WrightBrothers' Airplane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Early ExperimentsWithRadio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5Signal Corps Installations in France in 1 9 1 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17T h e SCR-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9A FlyingRadioLaboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1Experimental Antennas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2Early Sound Detection Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7The War Department MessageCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1Transmittersa t StationW A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4ROTCStudents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5Motion Picture Camera Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1MobilePigeon L o f t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5An AircraftWarning Service Filter Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87A TrainingFilm Field Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 02Laying Field Wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2A Battery-Powered Telephone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3ATwelve-DropSwitchboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 4T h e SCR-131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 8Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6T h e SCR-177 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 0D r . EdwinH . Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 43LocatorEquipment at the Louisiana Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 53T h e SCR-195, Walkie-Talkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 57Trainingi nTeletypewriter Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 3Enlisted Men Learning OpenWire Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 216Enlisted Men Learning PoleClimbing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 17Pigeon Lofts a t Fort Monmouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 22Training Film Under Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 6Portable RadiosDeveloped by the SignalCorps . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Camouflaged I F F Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 65Maj. Gen.Joseph O. Mauborgne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Remote Receiver Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 6T h e CableShip Restorer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 8SCR-271RadarStation i n Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 5

All illustrations are from Department of Defense Files.

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PARTONEBEFOREWORLDWAR II


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CHAPTERI

Military CommunicationsShortlybeforeWorld War II wasover,

theGeneralAssemblyof theUnitedNa-tions met in an auditorium which pro-videdthedelegateswithfivealmostsimul-taneous versions of an address. With aselecting device, they might choose thelanguage they wished to listen to. Thisgear was welcomed with a casualnesswhich only emphasized the distance animportant utilitarian science had comeduring thehalf-dozen yearswhenits ad-vanceshad beenobscured bywar.In thefirstpostwaryears,also,citiescommencedtoequiptheir airportswithradarsystemswhich regulated an incoming airplanefrom theground.Telephonesbeganto beinstalled inautomobiles, and hometele-vision sets and frequency-modulatedradios to be promised to the generalcom-mercial marketoftheUnitedStates,GreatBritain, and a few oftheirallies.Inmanytreason and war-crimestrialsof theera,wire and tape recordings formed an im-portantpartof theevidence. Internationalallotment of radio frequencies meant asmuch,in arenewed contestforspheresofinfluence, as control of mountain passeshad in earlier history. Telephotographyand a special lens for long-range detailappearedin thenewsand pictureindus-tries.The coaxialcable,radiorelay,pageteletype, facsimile processes, and a hun-dred other contrivances stood ready toforwardtherevivalofgeneralcommuni-cation. Whether these developments

would have occurred sooner or later ornot at all,iftherehad beennowar,is apointapartfrom history.Theydid takeplace and,with many others in otherfields,dispassionately demonstratedthatpracticaladvances had beenmadein re-sponse to the destructive demands ofbattle.In theadvancesofthisparticular realm,the realm of mechanical aids to humancommunicat ion, the Signal Corps of theU.S.Armyhad takensomepart;for themilitary services werethegreatestusers ofsuchdevicesduringthatperiod, and theSignal Corps was the communicationscorpsof theArmy.If the Army were oneofits own soldiers, theSignal Corpswouldbe his hand in the act of writing, hislarynx,palate, and tongue in the act ofspeaking, the ears hearing, and the sur-face of the skin registering impressionsfrom external invisibleenergy. It wouldsignalthathe wasabouttocommunicate,itwouldprovidethemechanicsfor him todo so, and itwouldenablehim to receivethemessagesof others.Thusin communi-cations the Signal Corps had a notablysingle mission.Yetalmostinfinitepossibil-ity forvarietymadeitalsoascomplexasthe processes ofhearingand speakingare.Moreover, like those processes, it wasvital. To be able to communicatetosignal isto bealive.Applied throughaperiodwhenearlierscientific development had seemed to


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THE SIGNALCORPSmakeitquaint,thenameSignal CorpshadreattainedexactnessasWorldWar II ap-proached.At one time associatedwiththetorch and the square flags, a signal hadcometodesignateawholescaleofwaysinwhichtheelectromagneticspectrum couldgive noticethatit wascarryinga message.Signals were generated by the humanhand and voice, and by electronic im-pulsesaswell.Onceas rudimentary as ashakingofspearsin the sunlight, militarysignaling now suggested a multitude of de-vices. Even the basic information whichthe savagerequired"Iam afriend"or"I am a foe"could appear in a dozenforms. Over the wire paths of the tele-graph,thecable,and thetelephone,overthe wireless ones of radio, signal com-munication filledtheground,water, andair. Photographsconveyedmessagesin awayeveryonewaslikelytograsp;crypto-graphic appliancesobscured them in thehope that almost nobody could graspthem.Radarwas opening a newavenueofcommunications, the quiveringpatternsofthe oscilloscopebeingaformas special-ized as wigwag had brieflybeen.

Message sending, which had alteredscarcely at all between Pheidippides atMarathon and the Emperor's courier atRatisbon,had acquired a myriadof de-vices between the mid-nineteenth andmid-twentieth centuries, and war hadaltered them in being altered by them.Most of this change had come about inlessthanahundredyears of supplement-ing communication, a message, with com-munications,apparatusforcarryinga mes-sage. It had reached such an extent thatevery margin of efficiency had becomeavitalprizeamongarmies. Not onlydidthe message have to be spoken, heard,written, orread,butalsoit had to be re-ceived withoutinterference from others;ithad to be sent andreceivedover longdis-

tances; it had to arrive on time; it had tobe so precisely transmitted that it left noroomfordoubt,or sodeliberately garbledand obscuredthatonlythoseintended tounderstand it could do so. Army com-munications were often less than theidealeven the most fabulous aid toaerialnavigation,artilleryspotting,tankcommand,or long-rangedetection arousedthe abuseofharried operators from timeto time; butideallytheyweresupposedtobe swift, rugged,adaptable, simple, andsecure beyond anyaverage standard.

The militarymeansofcommunicationused inWorld War II were often not dif-ferent fromthenonmilitarymeans:a com-mandteletypeparalleledanewsorstockexchangeticker;amessengeron amotor-cyclewas the"hand-carrying"equivalentofa bicycling Western Unionboy. Theirusewas distinctive, however, and attainedan importancehardto overstate.Warfareintensifiedthe use of the office telephone,the newspaper teletype,radio broadcast-ing, control towers, railway semaphores,and the other apparatus ofcommunica-tion in the nonbelligerentpursuits.Military communications had devel-oped in three main aspects. These weregeneralsensorysignaling,likelyto be non-electrical,electrical signaling overwires,and electrical signaling without wires.Althoughin thegrowthofmodernmeansof communication these aspects formedearly, middle, and recentstages, theydidnot formalineofsuccession.SamuelF. B.Morse'stelegraphwasalreadyinconsid-erable use when Albert J. Myer intro-ducedsystematic wigwag, but flagsignal-ing quickly reached its limits, whereasMorse'sinventionstartedadevelopmentwhichstillhad noboundariesahundredyearslater.Rather,the threeaspectsrep-resented degreesin the extension of signal-ing techniques. Within the Signal Corps


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MILITARYCOMMUNICATIONS 5ofWorld War II they existed concurrently.

First,therewere theprimary meansofsignaling, which are usually visual: thetorch and flags, aselemental as pillarsoffire by night, cloud by day; the sema-phore,which Napoleondevelopedinto asystemof1,200stationsbetweenParisandMoscow; wigwag; the heliograph,mirrorsflashing in the sunlight; Very pistols andother pyrotechnics; panels (signaling toairplanes with arrangements of coloredcloth upon the ground); and blinker.Pigeons were also primary means ofsig-naling, and so were sirens, gongs, andwhistles.As aclass,theprimary meansofsignalingwerehistoricallyearliest,and,bycontrastwithWorldWarII'scomplicatedreachesof invisiblecommunication,theyseemedprimitive;yettheywerenotout-dated.Wigwagcouldstill beusefulin thebusiness ofsortingoutsupplieson abeach-head,andblinkerwas as much a stand-byfortheNavyas theautomatic semaphorewas forrailtransportation.The chiefdif-ference was a matter not of date but oflimitation.Thebest meansof communica-tionwasthatwhichcould carry themostmessagesfastest withthe fewest mistakes.In thissense, thesimpledevicesfor signal-ing directly to the eye and ear lackedcapacity,speed, andprecision.

When the art of communications hadbecome electrified, it had suddenly ad-vanced in all ofthese qualities, and thetechnicalaspectsofmilitarycommunica-tionscommandedthe fieldto such an ex-tent that virtually the whole history ofWorld War II communications is theirs.The second form of signaling involvedelectrical communication over wires:cable, telegraph, telephone, teletype.Throughout World War II, this was theprincipalformofSignal Corpscommuni-cations. Thethird advancedelectricalsig-naling towirelessdevices:radio,radiotele-

graph,radiotelephone, radioteletype,tele-vision, radar; in this field, the mostthorough and significant change becameevident. The accomplishments ofradioinattainingteletypewritertransmissionat ahundredwordsaminute,inreportingtheweather locally by radiosonde, in radiocontrol of airways, or in the handie-talkie which pleased Winston Churchillduring a visit to Fort Jackson, SouthCarolina,1and withwhichhe pleased thenewsreelaudienceallofthese werepartof a story ofstartling change. Televisionhad not yetcome intoits ownsufficientlyto contend for wide interest. Radar wasthecrownofcommunicationsefforts dur-ing thewar. Radar learned toguideanairplane at adistance,to return it safelyand tolandit;radarmappedlandfallsorstorms;matchingitselfto searchlights andantiaircraft artillery, it gave them un-heard-of precision; it twice enabled theBritish Islestoward offanearly supremeGerman aerial assault, once from theLuftwaffe, once from the V-1; and itlooked toward postwar successes whichwere asgentleas leading theblindand asungentle asmarshalinglong-rangemis-siles. GCI, GCA, loran, shoran, racon,IFF,MEW, ASV, BTO,rawinbecamethenew black magic.2 Resulting from inter-service,international, interactingachieve-mentofmanymindsfully asmuchas the

1WinstonS. Churchill,TheSecond World War: TheHingeof Fate(Boston:Houghton Mifflin Co.,1950), p.386.2GCI ground-controlledinterceptionGCA ground-controlledapproachloran long-rangenavigationshoran short-rangenavigationracon radarbeacons

IFF identification, friend or foeMEW microwave earlywarningequipmentASV air-to-surface-vessel radardetectionBTO bombingthroughovercastrawin radio or radar determination of wind

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6 THE SIGNALCORPSatomic bomb,3 in no sense was radarthought of as U.S . Army equipmentstrictly. Nor did itdiminishfor the SignalCorpstheimportanceof theroutinejob ofsignal communications which was onhandat the beginning of the war andstillonhandat theclose;but as aninstrumenttoopentheimaginationit tookfirst place.

The span from visual signals toradarwas enormous; yet they shared a basicfunction: passage of information. In thecourse of the SignalCorps'emergenceintothe formitpossessedin the 1940's, two de-parturesfrom thisessentialfunctionmadethemselves felt. One of these was pic-turesstillpictures,training films,com-bat newsreelsundeniably aformof com-munication but a form at least once re-moved from the commonly acceptedmeaning of it. The other stood not forcommunication,but forcountercommuni-cation. It was aninterruption,obscuring,orobstructionofcommunication. "Chaff,""cigar," "carpet," and such devices forjammingenemyradar;speech scramblingand otherendeavorsto hinder intercep-tionoftelephoneconversations; monitor-ing and interceptionofbothfriendly andenemy radio; and all modes of cryptog-raphy came underthis classification.With these two exceptions,however,allofthedevices withinthe field ofresponsi-bilityof military signaling,whethertheyusedsimpleorcomplex, natura lorartifi-cial means,had thesinglefunction of pass-inginformation.In executing it, theSig-nal Corps had become, at one time oranother, either permanently or tempo-rarily, the Army's center of activity forcaptive balloons, weather observation,codes and ciphers, ocean cables, carrierpigeons,aviation,goniometrics,field tele-phoning, thermal detection, and manyotherefforts.By thetimeof the laboratory

and field experiments of the 1930's, theSignal Corps was long established as apartner in the development of the com-munications science. Even in the daysofequipping Union armies with telegraphwagons, military communications hadpenetrated,althoughunknowinglyand ina matter-of-fact way, the splendid scalewhich joins sound, light, and energy.(Chart 1) When electronics emergedeighty years later at the forefront of thisscientific research, Signal Corps experi-mentation contributed to the generaladvance.

The Place of the Signal CorpsThe major mission, however,was pur-

sued notthroughscience but throughprac-tical mechanics. For the most part, dur-ingWorld War II, the Signal Corps wasdescribed as one of seven technical serv-ices.The adjectivewassignificant,becauseseveral of these services were essentiallyappliedsciences.Beforethe war theSignalCorps had been classified as an arm,butduring the war it wasbracketedwiththesixothertechnicalservices as an agencyofthe Services of Supply, or Army ServiceForces.4 As a part of the Army ServiceForces,itthustook itsplacein one ofthreemajor groupingsofresourcesof men andmatriel, the other two being the ArmyGround Forces and theArmyAirForces.5

3The fact ofradar's internationalparentage"willsurpriseonlythose who cling to a Hero Theoryofscientific progressand demand foreach discovery asingleputative inventor. . . ."HenryGuerlac,"TheRadioBackgroundofRadar,"Journal ofthe FranklinInstitute,CCL,No. 4(October, 1950), 285.

4WD Cirs59, 2 Mar 42, and 138,14 May 46,sub:WDReorganization.The Corpsof Engineersalsooc-cupied a prewar category as an arm.5 Th eArmy Ground Forces drewin the Infantry,Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps,Armored Force, Antiaircraft Command, and TankDestroyerCommand.


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C

1RAOS

MWDWAI


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8 THE SIGNALCORPSArmy Air,Ground, and Service Forceswere designed to be interdependent;although administratively the SignalCorpsserved as acomponentof the ArmyService Forces, Signal Corps equipment,functions, and trained men appearedthroughout the Ground and Air Forcesand in theaters and defenseand basecom-mands as well. The same relationshipscharacterizedtheothertechnicalservicesand the administrative services7 which,with the service commands (erstwhilecorps areas, zone of interior administra-tivedivisions),madeup theArmyServiceForces.

The way to see the Signal Corps ofWorld War II,therefore,is toplotit on aworld-wide chart. Such a chart beginswith thePresident,theSecretaryofWar,and the Chief ofStaff,continueswiththeGeneraland SpecialStaffs,withtheaters,task forces, defense and base commands,and with the Army Ground, Air,andServiceForces,andsubdividesagainintothe big ground and air arms andservices.Mostof itsspacemust still be devoted toan extraordinary complexity of armygroups,armies,corps,divisions,regiments,battalions,companies,and platoons, of airforces and commands, wings, groups,squadrons, and flights, of administrativedivisions,branches,sections,subsections,and units.Withinthis vast wartimeframe-work,theSignal Corpswas to be thoughtof chiefly as a technical service, as theprincipalcommunicationsagencyfor thewholeorganization.

It was to bethoughtofalsoas anarm.Signalingwas indisputably operational,and thesignalmen were attendant uponthe air force and the infantry closelyenough toqualifyascombat-zonesoldiers.The dualityisclearly markedin thecom-mon Signal Corps distinction betweentacticalnetworksandadministrativenet-

works.Tactically,allforwardcommunica-tion was theprovinceof theusingarm:forexample,of theInfantry,theCavalry,theArmoredForce. The crewof aB-17-Eor-F,during the firstyearof the war,usedan interphone set,RC-36; a tank orarmoredcar would employ a frequency-modulated radio, SCR-508: this is theway in which the using armsrequired afundamental Signal Corpscontribution.Eachdivisionhad asignalcompany, eacharmy corps a signal battalion, and eachfieldarmy asignalconstruction and asig-nal operationsbattalion,aswellasdepot,repair, radiointelligence, photographic,headquarters signal service, and othercompanies, depending upon the fieldarmytableof organization and thetacti-calsituation whichwasapplicable.In theArmy Air Forces, a similar pattern wasdrawn, signal units being assigned atwing, division, command, and air forcelevels.8The conception of the Signal Corpsfunction both as arm and as servicechanged,however.Duringthewar,all ofthe armsandservicesunderwenta meta-

6The Chemical, Engineer, Quartermaster, andTransportationCorpsand the Medical andOrdnanceDepartments.For thepurposesofthishistorythis is astandardlist,although Departmentof theArmyCir-cular64, 10March1948,addedto it theFinanceDe-partment, and although Circular59, 2March 1942,alsosubordinatedto ArmyService Forcesthesupplyand procurement functions of the Coast ArtilleryCorps.

7The Adju tan t General's, Judge Advocate Gen-eral's, and Provost Marshal General's Departmentsand the Officesof the Chiefs ofChaplains, SpecialServices,andFinance.

8FM 1-45,ArmyAir Forces Field Manual:SignalCommunication, 4 Dec 42, par 2b. See also thebasicmanual on signal communication, FM 24-5,19 Oct42, and all of the pertinent manuals in the FM-11,orSignalCorps, series.Sometimesofficial usagelinks thetermssignalsand communication,as itdoesin the titlestothese fieldmanuals;sometimesitseparatesthem,asin referring toarmy,corps, and divisionalsignal offi-cers, but to regimental, and lower, communicationofficers.


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MILITARYCOMMUNICATIONS 9morphosis, the Cavalry most of all,theSignal Corps not least.Quietandsmallinpeacetime, characterizedby suchfamiliarobjects as the telephone, it became aworld-wide, strategic service, wieldingprodigieslikeradar.Even sometimeafterthe war had begun, the Signal Corpscould stillbe thought of as an organiza-tion which devoted itself primarily tomessage-center work and which, in itstactical duties, rated visual communica-tions high alongside telephone and tele-graph.10 But at the end of the war,theSignalCorpsdescribedits mission as"notonly [the provision of] communicationfacilities for the War Department in thezone of theinteriorand all overseasthea-ters, but [also] the design, procurement,construction,installationandmajor main-tenance for radar, radio, telephone andtelegraphcommunicationsfor theopera-tions of the U.S.Army throughout theworld."1

TheEarly Signal CorpsAmong thetechnicalservices,theSignalCorpswas neither the biggest nor theold-est.12 Its work wasconcentrated, and its

history covered onlyeightyyears.Histori-cal hindsight,in fact, would suggest thatmodern military signaling was a condi-tioned responseto Morse'simprovementin messagesending;that in former daysthe Army had had no need for a SignalCorps becausequickmeansof communi-cationwere unknown,but that arevolu-tionaryinventionhad had to be metwithan armcapableof exercising it.Hindsightfaltersa little, forunderthis sort ofcauseand effectthe Army wouldhave producedaTransportationCorpssoonafter FultonandcertainlyafterStephenson. Moreover,the Signal Corps had its recognizablebeginningsin aregionfarfromthe electrictelegraph,along the RioGrandein Texas,

whereDr.AlbertJ. Myer,recently com-missioned an assistant surgeon and de-tailedtoFortDuncan,Texas,wascarefullyaltering a system ofhandsignals which hehaddevelopedfor deaf mutes into asystemof flag signals for use at distances out ofearshotaltogether.13Fromthisstart,Myerwas tobecomethe first ChiefSignalOffi-cer of theArmy.He had realizedthatthesame sort of alternation and spacing bywhich a telegrapher controlled his key

9 "Theprincipal weaponof theSignal Corpsmanisthe telephone with itsassociated materialjus t as theri f le with itsammunition is the principal weaponofthe infantryman." Memo, Lt Col Alvin C. Voris forMaj GenCharlesMcK.Saltzman,CSigO,9 Oct 24.SigC475.7Equip.

10 WD, IntroductiontoEmployment in the WarDepart-mentAReference Manualfor Employees, Aug 42, p. 21.

The Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer, 1942,'listedthefollowing agenciesof comm unication em-ployed in signal systems within Army divisions:1.Messagecenters2.Messengercommunication

a. Airplane messengerb. Motormessengerc. Motorcycle messengerd.Mounted(horse)messengere. Dismounted messenger(runner)3.Pigeon communication

4.Radiocommunicationa.Telegraphb.Telephone

5.Visualcommunicationa.Lampsb.Flagsc.Panelsd. Pyrotechnicse. Airplanes

6.Soundcommunication7.Wirecommunicationa. Telephoneb.Telegraphc.Teletypewriter

11 InfoBrOCSigO,The Signal Corps, U.S.Army,16 Dec 46.SigC HistSec File. (SeeBibliographicalNote.)Formalstatement ofSignalCorpsfunctions ap-pearsinArmy regulations.The versions which werein force atvariousstagesfrom the end ofWorld War Ithrough World War II were: AR 105-5, 14 Jan 22,15 Dec 26, 15 Mar 33, 10 May 39, and 1 Dec 42; AR105-15, 12 Nov 21, 1 Aug 25, 1 7 Apr 40, 1 Aug 42.12The quartermaster, medical, and engineerfunc-tions, whichwerepartof the Arm y durin g the Revo-lution,werethe oldest, and by mostmeasurementsthelargest.The OrdnanceDepartment,whichdatesfromthe War of 1812,remained smallbut always had largeappropriations. For thesourceson the historicalori-gins of the services, aswellas those on thebeginningsand developmentof the Signal Corps, see the Biblio-graphical Note.

13 (1) Hq of the Arm y, New York City,SO's128and 129,4 and 6 Oct 1854. NationalArchives. (2) Al-bert J. Myer, A NewSignLanguage forDeaf Mutes,Being aThesisfor theDegreeofDoctorofMedicine,1851, Universityof Buffalo.


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10 THE SIGNALCORPScould be applied to flags or torches forvisualsignaling. He patented hissystem,got the Army to adopt it, experimentedwith itjustbeforethe CivilWar,and thenin frustration saw itworkfor the Confed-erateforcesat theFirstBattle ofBullRun,while hehimselfwas toolatefor thebattle.Afterward, it proved itself for the UnionArmy atGettysburg,for theUnion Navyat Mobile Bay,and in a hundred otherengagements. Sometimes the armies putupchainsofelevatedplatformsinordertofacilitatethe flagsignaling.14Myeralso wasattemptingtoconstructthe newSignalServiceuponlong-distance,mechanicalsignaling aswellas upon short-distance, manual methods; but theregulartelegraph, which ordinarily followed thetracksof therailroad,was in thehandsoftheU.S.Military Telegraph. Ostensiblymilitary,butactuallya privateconcession,it controlled the Morse equipment andthe teen-aged boys who were skilled atusing it. Civilian aeronauts organized aballooncorpsforobservationand signal-ing. Myer wanted no part of that, andultimately deflated it in 1863when herejected an opportunity to take it over.Instead,he assembled wagon trains andequipped them with alphabet dials andmagnetized pointerswhich,responding tothe electric impulses being transmittedfromanother partof the train,indicatedamessage letter by letter. Without effec-tively challenging the civilian telegraphmonopoly, hedevelopedthirtysuchtrainsfo rtheUnion troops,each extendingthetactical situation by wire for six or eightmiles. On 3 March 1863 Myer had thesatisfaction ofseeing Congresscreate thesignalsarm,15but his continued attempt todraw administrative as well as tacticalwirecommunication intohis neworgani-zation brought him into conflict with

Secretary of War Edwin M.Stanton,senthim intoeclipse, and helped toallowtheSignal Service to expire unredeemed atthe end of thewar.Within a year and ahalf, hispointof view was sufficiently vin-dicated torestorethe organization,withhimselfat itshead.Fromthenon, althoughwith vicissitudes, it survived. In 1875theSignal Servicewas givenbureaustatusinthe WarDepartment,and on 24 February1880 it became the Signal Corps, withMyer itsgeneral and hisManual ofSignalsitsguide.16

For a timewithin its first quarter cen-tury, part of the emphasis of its missionshifted f rom signalingtometeorology.In1870 ittookon responsibilityforscientificweather observation, especially in theshippingareasof theGreatLakesand theAtlantic coast.Untilthisworkwas trans-ferred in 1891 to the Weather Bureauofthe Departmentof Agriculture,17 SignalCorpsmen pursuedmeteorology,especiallyin two notableexpeditions to the north.Famousat the time,these arctic projectsmade magnetic,pendular,and tidalobser-vationsandcollected weatherandnatural

14At thebeginningof theCivilWar the Union hadfewsecretsf rom the Confederacy. J. E. B. Stuar t hadbeen asignal officer; andJefferson DavisandJohnB.Floyd,bothformer SecretariesofWar,as well asRob-ert E.Lee,hadbeen acquainted with Myer'swork.Lt. E. P. Alexander, whoknewabout this method ofsignalingbecausehe had been assigned toworkon itwithMyer,waspresentat theFirstBattleofBullRunand warned Beauregard of the approach of Mc-Dowell'scolumn. In turn, poeticjustice thwarted himat Gettysburg,when signal flagsonLittleRoundTopled him tobelieveit wasbetterdefended than itwas.

15 PL 58, Secs 17-20, 37thCong.The official birthdateof theSignalCorps is 21Ju ne 1860,thedateofMyer's appointment as Army Signal Officer. Com-ment3,OCMHtoOCSigO, 11 Feb 54,sub: BirthdayofSigC. SigC HistSecFile314.7 General 1954.

16 Thisworkwas published invariouseditionsfromtheCivilWar to the close of the nineteenthcentury.17Except for gathering marine meteorologicaldata,

whichtheHydrographic Office took over in 1904.


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MILITARYCOMMUNICATIONS 11history information atpointsthenthefar-thest north reached by white men. ThePoint Barrow party, led by 1st Lt. P.HenryRay,left San Franciscoin midsum-mer, 1881,andcamesafelybacktwoyearslater.The Ellesmere Island party,leavingfrom St.John's, Newfoundland, at thesame time, was not seen in the UnitedStates againuntil 1884, whenthe sixsur-vivors told bitter tales of hardship anddeath, includingtheexecutionof one manfor rifling foodsupplies.Thecommanderofthis group, AdolphusW.Greely,becameChief SignalOfficer in1887 and remainedsointothe era ofradioand the airplane, twenty years afterward.18The famehe won asheadofthis meteor-ologicalexpeditionled to hisappointmentas Chief Signal Officer, yet he reflectedalmostevery interestof theSignal Corps,and hiscareerspannedthematurityof theearlier forms of communication and theorigins of the later ones. Before hisarcticassignment,he had been putting in tele-graph lines in the territorial west. Morethantwothousandmiles ofsuchconstruc-tion took place between 1876and 1879,and commercial communications and theSignal Corps thenbeganthe closerelationwhich continued thereaf te r . As the rail-roads consolidated the west and as thenumberofArmyoutpostsdiminished,pri-vateinterests took over the telegraphlines.OutsideWashington, D. C., FortWhipple,then a Signal Corpspostand later namedFort Myer in honor of the general, hadinstalled a practice telephone line in1878.19 Also in that year, the Corps hadbegunitsfirstexperimentswithpigeons.20The lastyears ofIndian fightingadvancedtheheliographas ameansofmilitarysig-naling. In 1888the Corps brought out anew type of heliograph which weighedonly fourteenpounds packed and which

had arangeof asmuch as sixty milesinclearatmosphere.21Onlyvisualsignalingcountedformuchin the field.Telegraph trains, increasedinsizeto nine wagons, were stillrear-echeloncommunications,and the telephone gavenopromiseofsturdymilitaryusefulness.ASignal Corps sergeant combined it in afieldkit with aMorsekey and batteryin1889,but thedevicewas tooexpensivetobepractical. Military ballooning cameinagainin1892,and experiments in air-to-ground telephoninga fewyears later re-

18For an excellent sketchof Greely'slife and works,see W. ElmerEkblaw'saccount in the DictionaryofAmerican Biography, XXI (Supplement One), 352-55.

After GeneralMyer,whodied in 1880, the succes-sionof ChiefSignal Off ice r s through World War IIwas as follows:

Brig.Gen.William B .Hazen. . . . . . . . . 1880-1887Maj. Gen.AdolphusW.Greely.. . . . . . 1887-1906Brig.Gen.JamesAllen . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1906-1913Brig.Gen. GeorgeP.Scriven . . . . . . . . 1913-1917Maj. Gen.GeorgeO.Squier . . . . . . . . 1917-1923Maj. Gen. Charles McK. Sa lt zm an .. .. 1924-1928Maj. Gen. GeorgeS.Gibbs . . . . . . . . . 1928-1931Maj. Gen. Irving J. Carr . . . . . . . . . . . 1931-1934Maj. Gen.JamesB.Allison . . . . . . . . . 1935-1937Maj. Gen.JosephO. Mauborgne. . . . . 1937-1941Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead. . . . . . . . . 1941-1943Maj. Gen. HarryC. I n g l e s . . . . . . . . . . . 1943-1947

The listof Chief Signal Off icers mightalso containthe namesof two officers who held theplacebrieflyduring theperiodwhen Myer was indisfavor.ThesewereLt.Col. WilliamJ. L.Nicodemus,who occupiedit from 10November 1863to 26December 1864,andCol. Benjamin F. Fisher, whosetenure, beginningwith Nicodemus' departure,ended indeterminatelybetween 28July 1866,when Myer's administrationretroactively recommenced, and 15Novemberof thesameyear,whenFisher wasformally relieved.

19 1st Lt.GeorgeI.Back, TheTelephone;Com-mercialv. Military History andDevelopment," SignalCorps Bulletin,No. 42 (March, 1928) , p. 10.20 Unsuccessfully,because thehawksof the region

preyed upon them.Th e experiments took placeinDakotaTerritorywith Col. NelsonA.Miles's5th In-fantry. Capt.EvanD.Cameron, TheDevelopmentand Use ofHomingPigeonsfor MilitaryPurposes,"Signal Corps Bulletin,No. 24(February, 1924),p. 26.

21 Possiblythegreatestrange achieved bythisde-vice (in 1890)was 125miles.Historical Sketch of theSig-na l Corps(1860-1941), EasternSigCSchoolsPamphlet32 (Ft. Monmouth, N.J., 1942) ,p. 30.


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12 THE SIGNALCORPS

ONE EARLYMEANSOF SIGNAL-ING employedflags hoisted byballoon.calledtheair-to-groundtelegraphdemon-strations of the Civil War.Most Armypostshad a few telephones,someownedby the SignalCorps,somerented from theBellCompany. Evensoshortaconflictasthe Spanish-AmericanWar,however,in-creasedtheadvanceof newsciences.TheArmygaveitsfirstcontractfor apoweredairplane in the year of that w ar , 1898,allottingthe money to Samuel R Langley.The laying of submarine cable in thewaters ofCuba and the Philippines ex-tended the scope of signal communica-tions, and in the expansive aftermath ofthe war the Signal Corps undertook theWashington-Alaska Military Cable andTelegraphSystem.Thisbecame themostimportant continuous field operation.22The knowledgeof the northobtained in

the Ray-Greely expeditions, the experi-encegainedinbuildingfrontier commu-nications systems, the scientific back-groundderivedfrommeteorological duties,and theexerciseprovidedin establishingrelatively long lines during the war withSpainall contributed to theformationof achainwhichemployed telegraph,cable,telephone, and even the newest wonder,wirelesscommunication.

In 1899theSignalCorps had radioedexperimentallybetween Fire Island andthe lightshiptwelvemilesaway and ayearlater installed two stationsfor New YorkHarbortraffic .2 3 In 1903apairofstationsprovided spacetelegraphin thosedaysan excellent description of radioacrossNorton Sound, to and from Nome. By1908 therewere eight stations in Alaska,six in the United States, five upon Armytransports, threein thePhilippines,andone inCuba.Theirspark-gapsetsrangedin power from 750watts to 10kilowatts.Field tests improving upon Boer Warmodels meanwhiledevelopedtheArmy'sfirstvehicularsets,loadedintowagonsoron pack mules.24 Cumbersome as thesewere,they illustrated thefact thatthe re-searches of Maxwell and Hertz25 weregiving birth to the era of Marconi and

22FirstDraft,Alaska Communication SystemHis-tory, 1944.SigC Hist SecFile. Whenthepredominantuseofradio madetheearly title inappropriate, theWashington-Alaska MilitaryCableand TelegraphSystembecamethe AlaskaCommunicationSystem.

23Capt.EdwinR. Petzing, "Development of Radioin the UnitedStates,"Signal CorpsBulletin,No. 42(March, 1928) ,p. 34. Mentionofthis work shouldnot slightCapt.Leonard H. Wildman,whocontrib-uted to the installation ofwirelessatbothLongIslandSound andNortonSound.

24S. I.Neiman,"VehicularRadio,"Signals,I, No.6(July-August, 1947),20-25.

25JamesClerkMaxwell (1831-1879), Britishphysi-cist, and Heinrich R. Hertz (1857-1894), Germanphysicist.The principlesofelectromagnetic radiationwhichMaxwellforecast in 1866wereconfirmed in theexperiments ofHertzin the '90's.


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MILITARYCOMMUNICATIONS 13

CIVIL WAR SIGNAL TOWER onCobb'sHill,Appomattox, Virginia.

De Forest. Military communication wasassuming its twentieth-centurycharacter.The emergence of a science of elec-tronicswas paralleled by theappearance,after long waiting and frustration, of ascience of heavier-than-air flight. On1 August 1907 the current Chief SignalOfficer, Brig. Gen. James Allen, estab-lishedan AeronauticalDivision,to"havechargeof allmatters pertainingto militaryballooning,air machines, and allkindredsubjects."26A captain, acorporal,and aprivatestaffed the division.Specificationsfo r theArmy'sfirstairplane requiredthatit be abletocarry the pilot, a passenger,and enough fuel for 125 miles, that itsspeedaveragefortymilesan hour in aten-mile test,thatitstayaloftfor anhour,andthatit becapableof beingdismountedandloaded intoArmywagons.27The Wrightbrothers produced such a plane in 1908and testeditsuccessfully(despite the fatalaccidentto 1st Lt.ThomasE.Selfridge),with aseriesofpassengersincludingMaj.GeorgeO. Squier,latertheWorldWar IChiefSignalOfficer.

For a period, there was a possibilitythat airplanes and radio, the twoinven-tions whichhadsuddenlyopenedtheele-ment of air as a space for the hithertogrounded army to move within, woulddevelop inside the same organization.Squier, the man who had drawn up thespecifications for the military airplane,representsthe transitionwhichwas thenaltering theSignalCorps. In 1911he de-scribed experiments covering the use ofwires to guide high-frequency oscilla-tions,28 a process fundamental to themultiplextelegraphy and telephonywhichmadeup thelargestpartofWorldWar IImilitary communications.JosephO.Mau-borgne, a lieutenant who was to beChiefSignal Officer twenty years after Squier,

wasbeginning to achieverecognition as acontributorbothto airbornetransmitting,in 1912 and 1913, at Fort Riley,Kansas,and toairbornereceiving,overCorregidorin December 1914.29 These demonstra-tions, however crude, had opened aerial

26 OCSigOOffice Memo6, 1 Aug 07. AAF 321.91-A SigCOrg.27 WDSS,Information and EducationDiv, TheArmy AirForcesOrganization,"Army Talk, No.159, 25January 1947.28 George O. Squier, "Multiplex Telephony and

TelegraphybyMeansof ElectricWavesGuidedbyWires,"Proceedingsof theAmericanInstitute ofElectricalEngineers,1911. Originallycalledwirewireless,wiredwireless,or lineradio,the processcameto becalledwireradio(possiblythemostdescriptive term),carrierfrequency, or the carrier-frequency, carrier-current,or guided-wave method.

29 (1) The Signal Corps, UnitedStates Army: APopularHistory,M S, p. 75; (2) Maj GenJosephO.Mauborgne,My Early Work in AirplaneRadioDe-velopment. SigC342Gen.


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14 THE SIGNALCORPS

TH E WRIGHTBROTHERS'AIRPLANEduring testsatFort Myer, Virginia.communicationsas amajor fieldofSignalCorpswork.Congress recognizedmilitaryaviationby converting a small office divi-sion into an Aviation Section of a topstrength of 320.30 The range of air-to-groundMorseincreasedto 140miles,andSignal Corps pilots experimented withair-to-airMorseexchange.The mostper-plexingproblemwasnoise.Airplanedesignhadsubstitutedtractorfor pusher engines,with theresultthatall thedisturbancelaydirectly in front of the pilot. By 1916 theAviationSectionfeltthata different gen-erator and headset had solved theprob-lem; and Michael Pupin and Edwin H.Armstrong, whom Brig.Gen.George O.Squier asked to convert the radio signalintoavisual signal whichwouldshowupontheinstrumentpanel, agreed that radioreceptionwaspreferableand possibleeven

in spite of theroarand static.It issignifi-cantthatSignalCorpsactivityof thisera,at a timewhile it wasstillattached to arudimentary tactical mission, producednamesassociatedwithbothof the worldwars, when scientific research tended tobecome as important in the mission asutilitarianskill.An olderSignalCorps andanewerone,soonto be olditself,coexisted.

30 PL 143,63d Cong, 18 Jul 14. The testimonyofSignalCorps officersat the preliminaryhearingsonthis billa yearbeforehad madeclearthefact thatinearly military aviation the mostimportant functionwas reconnaissance and communication, not bom-bardment.Capt.William Mitchell,1st Lt.BenjaminD. Foulois, and 1st Lt.HenryH. Arnold,future AirCorpsgenerals,agreed with Brig.Gen. GeorgeP.Scriven, the Chief SignalOfficer, that the timewasnot then ripeforseparationfrom the SignalCorps,"whereallaeronauticwork hasbeendonefor the last20 years." Hearings before the Committee on MilitaryAffairs, HR, 63dCong, 1st Sess, On HR 5304,16 May13,p. 51andpassim.


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EARLY EXPERIMENTS WITH RADIO included installation of sets in aircraft(above) and automobiles (below).


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16 THE SIGNALCORPSTheSignal Corps in World War I

Theolderwasdominant.The UnitedStatesbeganand completed itsrolein the1917-1918warwithoutreaching adevel-opmentineithercombatcommunicationsorcombataviationcomparabletothatofFranceorGreatBritain.Inbothfieldsthenation's war experience was shorter, itsappropriationssmaller,and to aconsider-abledegreeits industry slow to start andits research too late to be felt. The onlybattletestingof theAviationSectionhadconsisted of mail and reconnaissanceflightsduringthePunitive ExpeditionintoMexicoin 1916.Noneof its fifty-five air-planes carried any kind of weapon; norhad the experiments with aerial wirelesscommunication introducedradiointo anycockpit.When,inMarch1918,theSignalCorpswasfaced for the firsttimewith theneed to install radio apparatus aboardSpadswhich the Air Service wasflyinginFrance, the French supplied it, havingsupplied the airplanes also.31 Americanair-to-ground radiotelephone,shownthesummer before to the Secretary ofWar,NewtonD.Baker,was not ready.

Correspondingly, ingroundsignaling,the old methods had sufficed before thewar for an Army engaged in small-scalemaneuvers or patrolling the borders ofMexico.Quenched-sparksetscarried bypackor wagon had introducedradiointoboth the Punitive Expedition and maneu-vers,but,ingeneral,buzzers,messengers,andvisual signalingansweredtheneedforcommandcommunicationswithininfantrybrigades;andalthoughthe fieldartilleryhad telephonesfor fire control, providedby theSignalCorpssince1905,italsousedflags.Tactically,therewaslittle needfor,oropportunity to employ, electricalcom-munications. Thus, much of the equip-

mentwhichthe SignalCorpsbroughtovertoEuropein1917waswhollyunsuitableforthecharacterofwarfarethenexisting.32In the earlystages,the American Expedi-tionary Forces wasobliged to rely solelyupon French telephone and telegraphfacilities;largepurchases,as of poles andcrossarms, dry batteries, buzzerphones,switchboards,andradioand earthtelegra-phy sets, were necessary before the com-munications mission for the AmericanExpeditionary Forces could be fulfilled.Titlesin the procurementlistweregroupedinto butfourteencategories.33

In France, wire quickly became thealmostexclusiveinstrumentofarmycom-munications. It was the best meanswhether within the regiment or from thedivision back to corps and army head-quarters. Heliographsappeared only farback of the lines, if at all;panels werereservedtosignalingtoaircraft;thepigeonservice,attemptedatGeneralPershing'sorder, had a limited success, although abirdnamed Cher Ami proved to be ahelpto the "Lost Battalion." But wire wasparamount;theMeuse-Argonneoffensiveused it at therateof 2,500milesa week.34

31 "Reportof theChief Signal Officer," War De-partment Annual Reports, 1919, p. 1190. Alsoseparatelypublished, the AnnualReport of theChief Signal Officer1919,is by far themostcomprehensivesourceof infor-mationon theWorldWar I Signal Corps.32 (1) Petzing articlecitedn. 23, p. 36. (2) Col C. F.Martin, HistSec Army War College, SignalCom-

municationsinWorldWar I, Aug 42, p. 8. SigCHistSecFile.33 Telephones,telegraphs,radios,lineconstructionmaterials, batteries, wire and cable, field glasses,chests, kitsand tools,mechanical and electricalsig-nals,wirecarts,pigeonsupplies,meteorologicalequip-ment, and watches.JamesV. Clarke, Contract Ad-justment in the SignalCorps, 1July 1939-15 August1945,Nov 45, p. 3.SigC HistSec File.34 By the close of World War I,U.S.production offield wirehad reached 8,000 milesa month. Afterasimilar t imeinterval inWorldWar II, theproductionrateofW-110-Bwire was 150,000 miles a month.


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SIGNALCORPSINSTALLATIONS IN FRANCE IN 1918 included atelephoneandtelegraphstationat Chteau-Thierry (above) and a goniometricstationatRoyaumeix (below).


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18 THE SIGNALCORPSMultiplexprintingtelegraph equipmentconnected Tours, Chaumont, Paris, andLondon. Transatlantic cable was calledintouse, at reduced rates,forEFM's (ex-peditionary force messages) from thetroopstotheirfriendsand relatives in theUnited States.35 Both forward and rearzones depended upon the telephone net-work,afterconstructioncrewshadfannedit out from Chaumont and Tours.36Thiswasanachievementfor theperiod, admi-rable for trench warfare. In the mobilesituation ofWorld War II it would havebeen,firstofall, nearlyimpossible tobuildand, second,notrelativelyworth building.

Although atransatlantic radiostationwasbuiltnearBordeaux, the WarDepart-mentinWashingtonhad noradiocontactwith its commanders in the field, andthese commanders had noverydepend-ablewireless systems amongthemselves.Radiocarriedlittle of the war'scommuni-cationsload.In the first place,thetacticalsituation again and again brought theWesternFrontintosmallareasand miredit there. For another reason, althoughnearly 10,000radiosets,chieflyairborneradiotelegraph, were produced for theSignal Corpsand Air Service, the conflictwasover toosoon for the combat signal-man oraviatorto usethemmuch. Finally,radiowas too new tohave passedtheawk-wardage. Spark-typeequipment did havethe advantage of not requiring a skilledman totuneit or mend it, but was so heavyitcould scarcelybemoved,wasoften un-intelligible, and was f requent ly out ofcommission. Tube equipment generallyreplacedit.Radio'schief use was forintel-ligence work. At goniometric stations ittookwhatwere later called "fixes" uponenemy transmitters and identified theirlocationby the intersection of theangles.It interceptedGermanground telegraph,

telephone,aircraft, and artillery signals;and, in aforeshadowingof thesucceedingwar's signal intelligence and monitoringcompanies,itpolicedcommunications onthe Alliedside.

The most interesting aspect of SignalCorpsradioinWorldWar I was thecon-solidationof thehithertoscattered effortsin scientific research. The Signal CorpsLaboratories had their beginnings in aWorldWar Iradio researchdivision whichfunctioned incompany with the electriccommunicationsindustry and withaspe-cial wartime Signal Corps laboratory inParis.Thisdivisionworkedupon aircraftradiotelegraph and radiotelephone sets,aircraft interphone equipment, aircraftdirection-findingsystems(given first pri-ority),37 three types of continuous-waveradiotelegraphsets,wavemeters, battery-charging radios, four improved T R S .(earth telegraphy)items,radio operatingand repair trucks, and a radiotelegraphset for tanks. The prewar invention ofvacuum tubes enabled Signal Corps re-searchers to try them for electric wavedetection,amplification ofradiofrequencyand audiofrequency, continuous wavetransmission,voicemodulation, regulation

35Col EdgarRussel,CSigO AEF, AEF Memo, 17Jun 17. SigC 676WiredWireless andTreeTel &Tel.

36 Historyof theSignalCorps, American Expedi-tionary Forces.SigCHist SecFile.The SignalCorpswirenetworks for theAmericanExpeditionary Forces, including those leased fromFrance,comprised approximately 50,000milesof ad-ministrative linesand 40,000 oftactical lines.Theexact figuresare difficult to determine,becausethestandards for calculation vary. (1) "Signal CorpsWork in the A.E.F.," Signal Corps Bulletin, No. 1(April, 1920),p. 14. (2)Maj. Alfred E.Larabee, TheSignal Corps and Signal Communication," SignalCorpsBulletin,No. 31(September, 1925),pp. 33-34.(3 ) Lt. Col. Frank H. Fay, "A.E.F.TelephoneandTelegraphSystem," SignalCorps Bulletin,No. 56(September-October, 1930),pp. 25-27.

37 HistoryofCamp Alfred Vail,NewJersey, 1918.SigCHq Ft.MonmouthFile314.7.


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MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 19ofcurrentand voltage in generators, andother specialpurposeswithout whichthemultiple applications of World War IIradiowouldneverhave beenpossible. Butdespite the fact that an American, LeeDe Forest, was the inventor, the UnitedStates was behind in the use of vacuumtubes. Industrial production of themstarted from almost nothing when thenation went into thewar.

For the mostpart,noneof thelaboratoryimprovementsgotintoproduction beforetheArmistice. Had any been developedbefore thewar,radiohistory would havebeenmade,for the criticalinadequacyofequipment necessitated remarkable ad-vancesin thefield.Forexample,atwo-wayradioloop set was contrived becausetheenemyshot awaytheantennasofordinaryradio.The new device laid thereceivingantennaon theground,and for thetrans-mittingantenna substituted a small loopconnected with the spark gap.This sethad a rangeof sixmiles, transmitted ontwo wavelengths,andcouldbe transportedinthreesectionseach weighing less thanthirty pounds. Developments in electriccommunicationsof theAmericanExpedi-tionaryForces wereinpartthecontribu-tions of Edwin H. Armstrong, then aSignal Corps captain and a noted radioscientist since 1910.He applied Lang-muir's master oscillator-power amplifiercircuit to improve tank communication,and he invented theamplifier tofacilitatereception ofhigh-frequency signals.Themaster oscillator-poweramplifierbecamebasic in radio design, although the warwasoverbeforeit could betriedinbattle,and high-frequency amplification madepossiblethe superheterodynereceiverandrevolutionized wirelesscommunications.38Signal Corps and Tank Corps mentogetherdevisedequipment on the master-

oscillator principlewhich the signalmeninstalled after the Armistice to make aradiotelegraph network connecting theParis headquarters with the Army ofOccupation.Of considerableextent andsurely one of the earliest successes of thesort, thenetworkengagedstationsatAnt-werp, Spa, Koblenz, Trier, Toul, andChaumontat various stages between No-vember 1918and September 1919.Thecontrol wastwentymilesoutsideParis,atasitein the British zone farenough awaytoescapetheradiodiffusion from the EifFelTower sparktransmitter.The purpose ofthe net was to take the placeof the tele-phone and telegraph lines in case theywere sabotaged; and on one occasion,when the wire transmission was inter-ruptedforforty-fiveminutes,it didconveyto Paris an addresswhichPresidentWood-row Wilson was making inGermany.Dur-ing thetimeof itsoperation,the networkcarried thousandsofmessages,as onlywirenetworkshad done up tothat point.39

Historically the most interestingof alltheexperimentswas an initialattemptatradar.The onlymeansofbeing warnedoftheapproachof an a irplane was tocatchsight of it, which wasusuallytoolate,or tohearit,which, evenwith the aid ofsound

38 Armstrong's contributions to radio science, al-though generally acknowledged, were persistentlychallenged in court, and the decisions often wentagainst him. "Revolution in Radio," Fortune, XX(October, 1939),86 ff. De Forestwas the principalfigure to press counterclaims. So far as the super-heterodyne discoveryisconcerned,1943adjudicationassigned the credit to Lucien Levy, wholikeArm-strongwas aWorldWar I officer. Henry W.Roberts,AviationRadio,introductionby Lee DeForest(NewYork: W.Morrow&Company, 1945),p. 90.Never-theless,and taking account of the fact thatthe deci-sionswereessentiallycommercialrather than tech-nical, Armstrong'splacein the development ofradioissecure.

39 Ltr,EdwinH.Armstrongtoauthor,21 May 52,withincls.SigC HistSecFile.


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20 THE SIGNALCORPSlocators, gaveadvancenoticeonlyasfastassoundtravels. Duringthe workwhichledto his contribution to the superhetero-dynereceivingcircuit,Armstrong consid-ered thepossibilityof a receiversensitiveenoughtopickup theelectromagneticdis-turbancesgivenoffby anairplane'signi-tion system.40 Another attempt made inthe same period was thermal detection.This, too,was an effort to intercept theelectromagnetic radiations from an air-planeengine,but to measure itsheatas itdrewnear orreceded from range.Ther-mal detection was a tantalizing field ofresearch. Even with the later successfuldevelopmentofpulse detection,scientists,includingthose in the Signal Corps Labo-ratories, never wholly gave it up; but itseemed always to promise better resultsthan itproduced, and until theoutsetofWorldWar II,auraldetectors(soundloca-tors), in association with searchlights,markedAmericanaircraft warningsites.

In order to meet itsWorld War Imis-sion, the Signal Corps had to multiplyitselfbythirty-five.At thetimeof the1916National Defense Act,the Corps wassmaller eventhanwhen it had takenpartin the Spanish-American War.It com-prised42officers and 1,212enlistedmen,scatteredoverhalf theworld.TheAviationSection alone had grownas large. At thedeclaration of war Signal strength wasonly371more.Halfwere in the Washing-ton-AlaskaMilitaryCableand TelegraphSystem, half wereorganized intoa patternof fieldandtelegraph companies.41Tosup-plement them,therewere 6,000 licensedamateurradiooperators. Morethan4,000ofthese responded to a spiritedrecruitingcampaign which even promised "assign-mentin abattle planeflyingover thefrontlines,"42 and,under aWorld War Ipre-cursor ofWorld War II'sA ffiliated Plan,

thousands of men came in from thecommercialcommunicationscompanies.Amongthe regular SignalCorpstroopsatthe outset of the war,there had beenorganized two telegraph and two fieldbattalions. The NationalGuardhad tenfield signalbattalions,notelegraphcom-panies, butsixteenseparatecompaniesall together 163 officers, 3,510enlistedmen.Thestrength deficiency,then,was intelegraphunits,and it was to make upthisdifference thatthe SignalCorpshadper-suaded American Telephone and Tele-graph,Postal Telegraph, WesternUnion,and Western Electrictoorganizebattal-ionsofskilled technicians and to permitmanyof their engineers tobecomeSignalCorps Reserveofficers in 1916.43TrainingstartedatFortLeavenworth,

40E. H.Armstrong,"Vagariesand ElusivenessofInvention,"ElectricalEngineering,LXII,No. 4 (April,1943), 149.41 The field signalcompany authorized in 1907consisted of 4 off icers and 100enlisted men.From1910,regulationsprovidedfor onefield signalbattal-ion to each infantry and cavalrydivision.The fieldbattalion comprised an outpost, a wire and a radiocompany. (Memo,CSigOforCofS [1 Jan 36],sub:Study of the reorganizationof sigcomsof div andhigherunits.SigC OT 322Gen.)The telegraphcom-pany,unlikea fieldcompany, did not serve at thefront;it hadbeen createdby War DepartmentGen-eralOrder55 in 1913.Two of them madeup abat-talion from 1916on. Until just before the United

Statesenteredthewar,the signalfield and telegraphbattalionsexistedonlyonpaper.The first referencetothem in theArmyListandDirectoryappeared on 20December 1916.The issueforthatdatelistsfour bat-talionsofeachtype.42 Kenneth B. Warner,"RadioAmateursin Warand Peace,"Signals,I, No. 2(November-December,1946),38.43 Fornarrativesofthisexpedient, see: (1)RuthF.Sadler,History of theSignal Corps Affiliated Plan,

Aug44, pp. 1-14. SigC Hist SecFile.(2)PeterL.Schauble,The FirstBattalion,theStory of the406th Tele-graphBattalion,Signal Corps, U.S. Army(Philadelphia,1921). (3) 313th Field Signal Battalion History (DesMoines,Iowa, 1939).(4) A.Lincoln Lavine, Circuitsof Victory (NewYork:DoubledayPage&Company,1921).


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MILITARYCOMMUNICATIONS 21Kansas,atCampMeade,Maryland,mostparticularly at Camp Alfred Vail, NewJersey, and at several other locations;forty-five universities and colleges organ-izedspecialcoursesofinstructionin tele-phone andradioengineering,meteorology,andphotography;44atVailacampof 129buildings arose equipped with everyknown device used in field signal work,includingadivisional wirenetwithunder-ground stations.In W ashington the Officeof the Chief Signal Officer moved frombuilding to building as it outgrew itself.Well over 50percentof the total force ofthe Signal Corps wentintothe AmericanExpeditionary Forces, there to becomeabout4 percent of a muchgreater total.45Thisis not tocounttheAviation Section.In theAmerican ExpeditionaryForcesatthe time of the Armistice, there were 50fieldsignalbattalions,28telegraphbattal-ions, 11depotbattalions,and 19servicecompanies: a sum of 1,462 officers and33,038enlistedmen.Afterdemobilizationhaddrainedoffthewartimestrength,aftertheyears interven-ingbetweenthe two world warshad dis-pelledthe fullrecollectionof theearlier,aresidueofaccomplishmentwasstillto beobserved.Therewas,for one thing, apic-torial record of conflict compiled by thecamerasofthirty-eightSignalCorpspho-tographicteams.46Therehadbeena prac-ticaldemonstrationof the Affiliated Plan.AtGeneral Pershing'sdemandforweatherservice in France, military meteorologyhad come back to the Signal Corps.47Electronicknowledgehad noticeablywid-ened.And the principal Signal Corpsposthad come into being in northern NewJersey, with its character permanentlyestablished.Notuntil 1925did it becomea permanent installation and change its

name from Camp Alfred Vail to FortMonmouth; but almost from the end ofthe war it was the recognized center fortwoprincipalfunctions,communicationstrainingand communications research; itwasthe site of the Signal School and theSignalCorpsLaboratories.Withthispost,as possibly nowhere else in its range ofinterest, the Signal Corps assumed theaspect which it held at the outset of thenextwartwentyyearslater.

44 (1)Memo,CSigOforCofS,citedn. 41. (2)Court-ney R. Hall,The Developmentof the Off iceof theChief Signal Officer,Pt. I: 1917-1943,Sep 44, pp. 17-18.SigCHistSecFile.

45 ExecOrder 2862,20 May 18.46 At the end of World War I, the Signal Corps had

becometherepositoryforalmost 7,000,000feetofhis-torical motionpicture film and forabout 85,000stillnegatives, most of them purchased from outsidesources.Thismaterial joinedthecollectionofmilitarypicturestakensince thedaysofMathewB.BradyintheCivil War.

Although the photograp hicactivitiesof theSignalCorpsbegan in 1881, theprimary photographicdutywas assignedofficially inJuly 1917.Memo,Brig GenJosephE.Kuhn,Chief War College DivWDGS,f orCofS, 17 Jul 17, sub: Photography ofmilitaryoper-ations. PM-10122-1WCD Record Div NationalArchives. Training f i l ms came to be a part of thisduty; the Army's first one, Close Order Drill, wasphotographedat theMilitaryAcademy in1916. Pic-tures forsurveyingand groundphotom apping werearesponsibility reserved to the Corps of Engineers.Memo,CofSforTAG, 19 Jul 17.PM-10122-1WCDRecordDivNationalArchives.The Air Service,afteritsdivorcefrom the Signal Corpson 20 May 1918,tookoveraerialphotography,alongwith 2,700of the3,000menengagedin themilitarypictorialwork.M.E.Boswell,SignalCorpsPhotography inWorld WarI, Apr 46.SigCHistSec File.WPD, Hist Br, Catalogueof Official A. E. F. Photo-graphs Taken by the Signal Corps, U.S.A., WD Doc 903(Washington, 1919) , is an excellentguide to the stillpicturesofWorldWar I. The motionpicturefilm canbe referred tofrom atitlelistin the Na tional Archives.

47 In 1917.Signal Corps weather stations com-mencedin the UnitedStatesitselfin 1918, and theMeteorological Service wasformalized in AR 105-210, 12 November 1921.At its peak, it comprisedthirty-ninestations.AG file 665.6,passim,especiallyMemo,OCSigOforWP&TDiv, 30 Oct 31.


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CHAPTERII

The ArmyinLimboPostwar Curtailment

The sudden evaporation of a largearmy,the change from crowded trainingcamps and busy offices to a backwaterorganization,put adrainonmilitaryeffi-ciency andsenseofidentity.In the confi-dence bursting forth from a victory andwithanatural reluctancetothinkofwarsin thefuture tense,thenationwas glad torevertto itsnormalcivilian status and toput the Army back in perspective. TheArmy saw its recent strength vanishing,and its brief influence wiped away as itresumed the pleasant life of peacetimeservice. The abrupt ebbing, followed bygradual stagnation and ultimately a re-commencing rise, formed the soil of thenexttwentyyears.Tendaysafter theArmisticetheremain-ingallowancesfor the current fiscal yearwerealmosterased.1Forindustry's sake,Congresscontinuedmostof the 1,244 con-tracts outstanding; theywere fulfilled inspiteof thefact thatthe war wasover,andSignalCorpswar-ordered equipmentpiledup in the sudden peace with nobody touse it.Civilianemployees,drafted soldiers,National Guardsmen,Reservistsallwentout along with most of the money. TheNationalDefenseAct of 1920 providedastrengthof5,000men for theSignal Corps.In 1921 the figurewasdownto 3,000 andin 1922 had fallento 2,184.2The 51st Sig-nalBattalion, stationedatCampVail,was

theonlyoneauthorizedfor thepost-WorldWar IArmy.Inevery way, thedwarfingof the Military Establishment left littleopportunityfor studying and applyingthegigantic lessonsof the war.Planning formobilization of industry in a future warbeganwith a marked lackof encourage-ment.3Manylaboratoryprojectscame toa halt.From time totime,enlisted men,confronting frozen promotion lists andmeagerpay,securedtheir releasebypay-ing to the finance officer a sum propor-tionatetotheirunexpiredterm ofservice.The Signal Corps continued,proudin itsownhouseholdbut feeling,withtherestoftheArmy,thatat the national dinnertableit wassittingbelowthesalt.Raids and forays from other branchesoftheservice filled theplaceof the recentwar. The FieldArtillery,the AirService,and the Tank Corps asked the SignalCorps to concur in achangeinArmy reg-ulations which would let them install,maintain, and operate their own signalcommunications systems. The AdjutantGeneral'sOfficeendeavored,withoutsuc-cess, to take over the War DepartmentMessage Center. The Coast ArtilleryCorps expressed a preference forhavingthe Corps of Engineers install its fire-control systems. The Air Corps wanted

1Memo,SW forChiefsofBureaus,21 Nov 18.2CSigO,AnnualReports, 1920, 1921, 1922.3H. D.Hausmann,SignalCorpsActivityinIndus-

trial Mobilizationand ProcurementPlanning, 1920-1940, Pt. I. SigCHistSec File.


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THE ARMYIN LIMBO 23photography, military meteorology, anddevelopment, procurement, installation,and maintenanceof air navigation equip-ment.4

The hardestblow of allcamefirst.In itscapacityas aprominentarm of theArmy,the Signal Corps had controlled combatcommunications, exceptfor theFieldAr-tillery, well down to all but the smallestechelons,or, to put it inanotherdirection,from the rear all the way to the front.Duringthe warjust past,somesignalunitswithin the infantry brigade had beenmadeup inpartofInfantrymen,inpartofSignal Corpsmen from the outpost com-panies of the field signal battalions; butthe generalfactwasthatthe communica-tions of the great combat organizationshad been in sole charge of the SignalCorps. The 1920 Army reorganizationcarriedthis responsibilitythroughthedivi-sional level,stoppeditthere,andfromthatpoint onassignedcommunicationsto theInfantry, FieldArtillery,or Cavalry.5 Ineffect, giventhepostwarArmy, inwhichunitsgreater than adivision scarcely ex-isted, the order wiped out most of thetactical interest of the Signal Corps andpermanently moved itscenter of gravityaway from classification as an arm andtoward classification as aservice.

Every Chief Signal Officer protested,beginning with Maj. Gen.George O.Squier,whopointedout theconfusion hefeltsurewould resultifseveralindepend-entradioorwiresystemsoperatedin onearea,and who declared that signalcom-munication"MUSTBE onecompleteandcoordinatedsystem from battalionhead-quarters of thecombatunitsto theCom-mander in Chief of the Army."6 Col.GeorgeC. Marshall expressedhimself inmuch the same way,saying that he be-lievedthatcommunication troops should

all be Signal Corps troops. But he hadmade it clearthattheunits shouldbeindi-visiblepartsof thecombat organizationswhichtheyserved,not,as had often beenthe case in the American ExpeditionaryForces, to be broken in upon and deprivedofthisman orthatby thesignalofficer ofahigherlevel.Theymust"trainandservehabituallywiththeorganizationto whichattached."7

Nevertheless,and although thereweredoubts as to the legality of the shift, thechangetookplace. It hadmuchtorecom-mend it for other arms and services. Inmanyways,itmarkedthebeginningof anessential Army-wideinterestincommuni-cations matters.8 The new arrangementspecified thatthecommanderofeachunitwouldestablish theunit'scommunicationssystem, hissignalofficer beingresponsiblefo r its efficiency. For the Infantry and

4 (1)Memo,CSigOforCofS, 22 Jan 20,sub:Sigcom sv.SigC 676Gen,1918-1938. (2)Pauline M.Oakes, The Army Com m and and AdministrativeCommunications System, Pt. I: War DepartmentRadioNet,1920-1940,Oct 45, pp. 16-18.SigCHistSec File. (3)Memo, Lt Col ConsueloA.SeoaneforColCharlesMcK.Saltzman,8 Mar 23. SigC 676 Gen1918-1938. (4) Summary Report on PhotographicActivities of theSignal CorpsSinceAugust4, 1941,intheFieldsofMotionPicturesand VisualAid,26 Feb43,pp. 374-76.SigCAPS DivFile. (5)CourtneyR.Hall, The Development of the Office of the ChiefSignal Off icer , Pt. I: 1917-1943,Sep 44, p. 72.SigCHistSecFile.(6) M. P.Claussen, The DevelopmentofRadioand RadarEquipmentfor Air Operations,1939-1944, p. 11.Photostatcopyin same file. (7)Ltr,TAG toCSigO,18 Jul 34,sub: Radiodirectioncom-pass, and 6thInd,Chief of AC toTAG,11 Mar 35.SigC413.44Compasses 1, 1919-1934.5W D GO 9, 18 May 20.

6 Memo,CSigOforCofS,cited n.4(1).7 Memo,CSigOfor CofS [1 Jan 36], sub: Study ofreorgnof sigcomsof div and higher units. SigC OT32 2Gen.8(1 )Memo,Maj Gen William G.Haan,WPD, for

[TAG?],4 May 20.SigC676Gen,1918-1938.(2) AR105-15, 12 Nov 21 and 1 Aug 25. (3) Brig Gen PaulM. Robinett,Ret.,ChiefSpecialStudiesDivOCMH,commenton MS, 25 Oct 51. Copy in OCMH.


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24 THE SIGNALCORPSCavalry,itsolved the problemofhavingsignalmenarbitrarilytransferred withoutreference to the tacticalproblems of thecommander. Yet other difficulties arose.Men nottrainedincommunicationsworkcontended that the Signal Corps equip-ment was toodelicateor wasimproperlymade. Signal platoons and detachmentsbecameindistinctandundependable.Theusingarmswere authorized to train theircommunications men bywhatevermeth-ods worked best inside the regiment orbattalion or squadron, whereas signalcommunication takesplacemuch oftenerbetweenthanwithin units.

Thus an un-co-ordinated pattern ofseparatetraining proceduresinvitedchaos.Six armsthe Infantry, Cavalry, FieldArtillery,Coast Artillery,Air Corps, andSignal Corpsbeganto use diverse meth-ods. T heSignal Corps is making theutmost endeavor to assist in producingstandardtrainingfor allcomm unicationstroopsof the Army, with a view todoingitspartin making thesystemworkable,"said Maj. Gen. Charles McK. Saltzman,Squier's successor, bu t it is the duty ofthis office to express the view that theprincipleis notsound."9In 1923 the Cav-alry endorsedaresumptionof the old sys-tem, and the War College commandantsuggestedthatfor theInfantry thedivid-ing line could be drawn so that brigadecommunications returned to the SignalCorps;but the parceling-out of responsi-bilitycontinued.10

Periodically, the Chief Signal Officersdenounced it, declaring that it had notbeenthought suitablefor thelastwar andwould not remain long in another one.11The opinion wasuniversal in the SignalCorpsthatcommunicationsmustoperateundersingleratherthandivided control.Thegreatertheircomplexityandmeans

of communication were becoming morecomplex every daythe greater the ap-parent urgency for having one agencyalone develop the signal plans, producethesignalequipment,trainthesignalmen.Maj. Harry C. Ingles, for instance, saidthattheprincipleappliedin the Air Corps,too. Inglesbecamea World War IIChiefSignal Officer, and his words thereforepass intoand mergewithan official posi-tion insisted upon for twenty-five years.The Signal Corps ought to have the re-sponsibility for communications all theway to the front in the Infantry and theCavalry, he asserted, andoughtto have itall the way for the Air Corps as well. Sofar as the Air Corps went, the originalreason for the present arrangement wasthatit wasthought [by theGeneralStaff]that airplanes would be operating fromlandingfieldsand airdromesso far in therear that itwould not bepracticable"toassignair signaltroops anywh ereelsethanat therear,wheretheywouldpresumablyspend theirtime puttinginwirecommuni-cationsfor the bigheadquarters.Airsignalcommunications, Ingles felt, would cer-tainly entail muchmorethanthat,partic-ularly when aviation, having ceased to besubordinate, was no longerattachedto theground arms. In hisopinion,"Thisreasonnever hadverymuchfoundationand now. . . has evenless."12

Maj. Jerry V. Matejka, also a SignalCorpsgeneral of World War II,concededthata tacticalcommandermustbe"solelyresponsible"for his owncommunications

9 Ltr, CSigOto TAG, 2 Apr 24.SigC300.3AR105-15.10SigC676Gen, 1918-1938,passim.11 HistoricalSketch ofthe Signal Corps(1860-1941), p.

95.12 Notation by Maj Ingleson Ltr , Capt Fred G.Borden to Ingles,8 Feb 30.SigC676 Use ofArmyCo m Systems 3, 1929.


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THE ARMYIN LIMBO 25systemand "musthave absolutemilitarycontrol" of all of the men assigned to it,but contended that there was no reasonwhythe menmustbelongto thesamearmasthe commander. Matejka repeatedtheconvictionthatstandardizationoftrainingwasvital,becausegoodcommunications inone regiment must be matched by goodcommunications in another regiment, ifthere is to be good communication be-tweenthe two. Thistraining, heargued,isaspecialized knowledge,and the men whomaster it need to know that they will berewardedfortheirskill,notheldbackbe-cause,being signalmen,theydo not com-mandtroops. He recommended,therefore,that Signal Corps units should be re-established in echelons from which theyhaddisappeared,shouldbe commandedbySignalCorpsofficerson thecommand-ers' staffs, shouldbeattachedto thetacti-cal organizationrather thanassigned,and,the tactical mission being completed,should once again become part of theparentSignal Corpsunitsfromwhichtheyhadbeendetached.13

Maj. Gen. JosephO. Mauborgne, like-wise,becomingChief Signal Officer, metthe lingeringcontroversy. It came up in1937 over the question of who was obli-gatedactuallyto put aradiointoacombatvehicle.Didresponsibilityforsignal com-munications extend to installing signalequipment? The chiefs of the Infantry,Cavalry, and Field Artillery, as well asG-1, G-2, G-4, and Mauborgne, heldopinions atvariancewitheachother. Thecombat arms wanted to have the SignalCorps do the installation of every set inevery one oftheirvehicles. But thelinesofauthority had been drawn at a pointwhich made this impossible, the ChiefSignalOfficer objected.Hisorganization,not being provided with the men or the

funds forgoingthroughout the MilitaryEstablishment in order to install radios,could onlyinstall them at thefactory, aspartof anassembly-lineprocess.Assembly-line installation could occur only if theInfantry, Cavalry, and others synchro-nized theirprocurementof vehicles withthe procurement of accessories,yet so farwasthisfrombeingthe casethatappropri-ationsfor the radio equipment werenoteven sought in the same fiscal year asappropriationsfor thevehiclesthemselves.The combat arms must be prepared totrainspecialistsforhandlingcommunica-tions.Thiswas thepointofmajor impor-tance.Installing aradiowas not difficult;an untrainedinfantrymancoulddo it. TheSignalCorpswouldput thepilotmodel in,and would enclose specific instructionswithevery set, but theInfantry, Cavalry,Artillery,and other arms must usetheirown men for the responsibilities whichtheyclaimed.14Everyyear,meanw hile, put allformsofsignaling severalyearsaheadof the stagesofdevelopment reached before the 1920reorganization. The man who had beenexpertin 1918 wasignorantin 1928 unlesshe had kept himselfinformedof the newdevicesandmethods.Far frombeingableto becommunicationsmentor to thewholeArmy, the Signal Corps could barelymaintainthepaceitself.General Saltzmantooknoteof a growingdemandforappa-ratus ofgreater capacityand variety, butwasunableto domuchtosupply it .15 His

13 Maj J. V. Matejka, "Signal Communication,"Signal CorpsBulletin,No. 89(M arch-April, 1936),pp.20-24.

14 Memo,Actg ACofSG-3 for CofS, 20 Aug 37,sub: Revision of AR 105-15 re responsibility for in-stallation ofradio equipinvehicles.AG 676(3-19-37)(1) Revisionof AR 105-15.

15 Ltr, CSigOto All SigC Officers, 28 Mar 24.SigC676 Gen, 1918-1938.


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6 THE SIGNALCORPSorganization could afford almost no newequipment for its operating functions inWashington, thecorpsareas,Alaskaandthe departments, nor even for its SignalSchool atFortMonmouth,wherethe de-mandsof the future made it particularlyimportant.

Recognizingthe necessity formodern-izing its curriculum, the school tried tokeepits instruction up todateand its en-rollment at a high enough level to war-rant the instruction. But onlya few mencould be allotted to training withoutaffecting the efficiencyof theCorps'dailyresponsibility;andtherewasconsiderabledissatisfaction,moreover, with thecaliberofofficers, whether from theSignalCorpsor from another branch, who were al-lotted.16Manyafieldofficerwas"deplora-blyignorantofsignalcommunications."17In a few cases, men who could not bespared from theirdutiesinorderto go tothe school sought further study at localtechnical schools and universities; andpartlyfortheiradvantage,partlytomain-taininterest amongReserveand NationalGuardofficers,the school gavecorrespond-encecourses.Eveninthese, however, stu-dentsdid not alwaysshowthereasonablefamiliarity with their owncomponent ofthe Armywhich theprinted lessons andmonographstookforgranted.Occupied with routine duties, someSignal Corpsofficers and menvegetated.Routineduties,someessential, someun-essential,told particularly upon enlistedmen. It became increasingly difficult tomaintainmorale;therateofturnoverwasheavy.The Army Pay Act of1922had re-ducedthegrades availabletoradio oper-ators;as aresult,a good operator did notoften re-enlist unless he had one of thehigher noncommissioned officer ratings.From Monmouth,the51stSignalBattal-

ion was supplying qualified enlisted in-structors and qualified enlisted adminis-trativeor technicalspecialists,butagainstasteadydemandthatalwaysexceeded thesupply. Ofninety-four men from thebat-talionwho weregoingto classes in 1928,fifty-one weremadeavailable forassign-ment as a pool oftrained specialists. Sogreatwas theneedforthemthatthe poolwasdrainedwithinsixmonths.18 Officersfound themselvesfaced with the require-ment that theydevelop attainments likeskillinpublic speakingand anelementaryacquaintance with international affairs,withbusinessadministration,or withlan-guages.19Inanotherconnection but on thesame theme,Maj. SpencerB. Akin,laterthe postwar Chief Signal Officer, sug-gestedthat itmightbe a goodthingfor aSignal Corps officer to have at least "ageneralideaof theprobableeffectson hisspecialty of the most recentlydevelopedagencies ofwarfare."20

The Continuing Technical TraditionTakingamuch firmer view, from timetotime membersof theCorpsofferedplansfor rebuildingit as a strongtechnicalor-

16 (1)Ltr, MajGeorgeL. Van Deusen,SigSchool,to Maj DavidMcL. Crawford,OCSigO,27 Mar 29;(2 )Ltr,CSigOtoComdt SigSchool, 28 Mar 29; (3)Ltr, CSigO to CO Ft. Monmouth, 24 Jul 29,sub:Home study courses for officers. SigC 352.11 GenCoursesofInstruction 1.

17Ltr,Maj Ingles, Sig School, to Maj Otis K.Sadtler,OCSigO, 9 Mar 25.SigC352.11 Gen 1.18 S Sgt Leo W. Bundy,HistoryofFort Monmouth,

1936, pp. 1-8.SigC Hq Ft. Monmouth 32251stFM1928.19 AG Ltr , 22 Aug 30,s u b :Honorcourses in svschools.AG 352.01(8-18-30) Misc(0).20 2dWrapperInd , [MajAkin , Asst Comdt] SigSchool Ft. Monmouth to CSigO, 7 Oct 31, on AG

Ltr, AG 352.01 (4-15-31) Misc M, 24 Sep 31.SigC352.11 Gen 2.


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