cmh_pub_10-9 ordanance dept - planning muntions for war.pdf

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS

FOR WAR

by

Conslance McLaughlin Green

Harry C. Thomson

and

Peler C. Roots

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990

Foreword

The U.S. Army fought World War II with matériel much of which wasdeveloped in the decade prior to our entry, particularly in the period followingthe German blitz in Poland.

Our efforts to develop munitions to the point where our armies could copeon equal terms with those of potential enemies are covered here in this, the firstof three projected volumes on the history of the Ordnance Department in WorldWar II. How well the Ordnance Department succeeded in matching the Ger-mans in quality continues to be a matter of debate both within the OrdnanceDepartment itself, and between the using arms and the Department. That thebattle of quantity was won—with the help of a superb industrial machine—can hardly be denied.

This volume, the result of diligent research by Dr. Constance McL. Greenand her associates, should interest not only military men but also scientists,industrialists, and laymen in general. Among other things, it shows the urgentnecessity of a directed, continuous, and intensive research program and thedanger in failing to recognize and profit by developments abroad. Also shownis the inherent time interval between the drawing board and the production ofthe end item in quantity.

Washington, D.C.15 January 1953

ORLANDO WARDMaj. Gen., U.S.A.Chief of Military History

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Note on the Authors

Constance McLaughlin Green, the principal author of this volume, holdsa Ph.D. degree in history from Yale University. Before entering governmentservice, first as Historian, Springfield Armory, and later as Chief Historian,Ordnance Historical Branch, she taught at the University of Chicago, SmithCollege, and Mount Holyoke College. Her extensive writings and lectures inAmerican local, social, and economic history have won her widespread recogni-tion as an authority in these fields both in this country and abroad. She is atpresent the historian of the Research and Development Board, Department ofDefense.

Harry C. Thomson received his doctorate in government from HarvardUniversity. During World War II he was a historian with the Army Air Forces,serving both as an enlisted man and a commissioned officer. Since 1948 he hasbeen a member of the Ordnance Historical Branch, which he now heads.

Peter C. Roots has a B. S. degree in Foreign Service and a law degree fromGeorgetown University. Before joining the Army, in which he served withOrdnance units between 1942 and 1945, he was the production manager of amachine tool plant in Cincinnati, Ohio. In 1948 he accepted employment in theTranslation Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, and later trans-ferred to the Ordnance Historical Branch. He is now practicing law.

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Preface

This volume treats of the problems of a great Army agency and its prewarand wartime research and development programs. It is directed primarily to themen and women whose responsibility it is to make the U.S. Army the most ef-fective possible tool of national defense. Technical history rarely makes lightreading and this book is not intended to supply diversion for the casual reader.Yet inasmuch as many more Americans than ever before are today concernedwith military affairs, others than Army staff planners may find this analysis ofthe Ordnance Corps' past of interest and use.

The scheme of treatment of the three projected volumes of Ordnance historyis basically chronological. This first volume undertakes to discuss the steps thatprecede manufacture of munitions. The second volume will cover the problemsof computing quantities to be ordered, the processes of production and procure-ment by purchase, and the tasks of distribution and maintenance of equipmentin the zone of the interior. A third volume will be dedicated to the operations ofOrdnance overseas.

To provide essential background this book includes a rather lengthy analy-sis of pre-1940 difficulties and a rapid sketch of the confused interim when theUnited States hovered between peace and war. Discussion of the vital prelimi-naries to efficient wartime functioning follows in chapters describing the evolu-tion of a workable organization and the recruiting and training of soldiers andcivilians to carry out the Ordnance mission. The last section of the book dealswith research and development of weapons, the process that in a scientific agenecessarily also precedes production of matériel.

Special recognition must be accorded Lida Mayo who, though a latecomerto the staff and hence not listed as an author on the title page, assembled thedata and wrote the sections on self-propelled artillery, mines and mine ex-ploders, terminal ballistics, and bombs. Dr. Albert E. Van Dusen, now AssistantProfessor of American History at the University of Connecticut, made a valu-able contribution in collecting and sifting the materials upon which much ofChapters II and VII are based. Several chapters are the work of more than oneindividual. Peter C. Roots wrote the story of German rearming contained inChapter IX, the first half of Chapters X and XI, and the section on armor platein Chapter XIII. Dr. Harry C. Thomson, the sole author of the chapters onover-all organization, military training, civilian personnel, and conservation ofmaterials, also wrote most of the second part of Chapters X and XI. Mrs. Mayo,as noted, prepared the section on self-propelled artillery in Chapter X, the

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second half of Chapter XII, the bulk of Chapter XIII, and the entire chapteron bombs. The rest of the volume is the work of the Chief Ordnance Historian,upon whom rests also responsibility for the plan of the whole.

Throughout this book the authors have been obliged to omit discussion ofnumerous interesting, frequently significant, elements of the whole story of plan-ning weapons. Selection has been chiefly dictated by consideration of contro-versial data, where the Ordnance Corps believes misapprehensions prevail.Thus the tank has received first attention, at the cost of nearly total exclusion ofmotor transport and of merely sketchy description of the evolution of self-pro-pelled artillery. Even much of the tank story is untold, partly because space for-bade, and partly because treatment of some features would have had to be sohighly technical as to make it meaningless to anyone save the automotive en-gineering expert. The development of cross-drive tank transmissions, for exam-ple, has been dismissed with a word, not because this innovation was unimpor-tant, but because explanation of its distinctive features would require manypages of complex engineering data.

Some readers, observing the nature of the documentation, may be disturbedby the degree of reliance the authors have placed upon Ordnance records.Could this volume be regarded as an attempt to produce a definitive history,the failure to exhaust the sources revealing the reverse of the coin would consti-tute a serious charge against the Ordnance historians. At no point have we as-pired to so big an undertaking. Justifications for deliberately narrowing the taskare several. First is the obvious impossibility of exhaustive research when staffwas small and time relatively short. Ordnance records of World War II locatedin the Federal Records Center in Alexandria and in the Pentagon run to some22,000 linear feet. Extracting the most pertinent data from that mass generallyprecluded more than sampling the voluminous records of other branches of theArmy. Only where historians of other services and arms have screened these col-lateral materials have the Ordnance historians been able to examine thoroughlythe counterarguments on controversial issues. Furthermore, the OrdnanceCorps has expected its historians to present its side of the story as fully as possi-ble. And, finally, the events under review are too recent to permit of any finalappraisal, any fully rounded, wholly objective narrative. We can but hope thatthis first historical draft will have distilled a concentrate of some value fromwhich the historian in time to come, by refining and by adding distillates fromother studies, can prepare the authoritative history of a complicated but stirringera.

The authors are heavily indebted to Mrs. Irene House, research assistant inthe Ordnance Historical Branch, whose ingenuity in locating elusive sourcesand whose patience in assembling a multiplicity of irksome detail have insuredthe volume an accuracy it would otherwise have lacked. The index is whollythe work of Mrs. House. Miss Feril M. Cowden of the Historical Branch has inturn contributed greatly to the format of the manuscript. Acknowledgmentsfor assistance are also due to a host of men and women in the Office of the Chiefof Ordnance, to the custodians of the records in Alexandria, to the staff of theNational Archives where the materials of pre-1941 years are housed, and to the

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authors of preliminary studies of particular Ordnance items or particular tasks.And the work of historians of other segments of the Army has been a constantboon, correcting, at least in part, an otherwise one-sided view of Ordnance prob-lems. Finally, thanks go to the editor, Miss Mary Ann Bacon of the Office ofMilitary History, whose sound sense of literary style improved much of the text,and to Mrs. Loretto Stevens, who did the copy editing.

In writing this narrative the authors have sedulously endeavored to inter-pret the evidence by criteria of sound scholarship. Testimony to some measureof success may well lie in the mutually contradictory opinions of reviewers of themanuscript. Ordnance officers found many passages overcritical of Ordnanceperformance; officers of other branches thought that presentation frequentlysmacks of the Ordnance "party line." In the Ordnance view, the inadequaciesof matériel on the battlefields of World War II were the result of the "deadhand" of the using arms, which blocked development of weapons badly neededbefore the war was over. Combat officers, on the other hand, point to the failureof the Ordnance Department to produce many items for some of which require-ments date back to 1919. If the proponents of neither extreme be satisfied, wedare believe we have struck a judicious golden mean.

CONSTANCE McL. GREENChief Ordnance Historian

15 November 1951Washington, D.C.

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ContentsChapter Page

INTRODUCTION: THE ORDNANCE TASK IN WORLDW A R I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I . ORIGINS A N D GROWTH T O 1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4Early History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4World W a r I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0

I I . T H E ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: 1919-40 . . . . . . . . . 3 0Organization, 1919-39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2T h e Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0

Industrial Mobilization Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0Field Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9

III. FINANCES AND THE EFFECTS OF LEND-LEASE . . . . . 65T h e Period o f Limited Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5T h e Period o f Unlimited Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7Shipment of Ordnance "Surplus" After Dunkerque and Its Consequences . 72

IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:1940-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3

The Early Months o f 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Organizational Developments, June 1940 to June 1942 . . . . . . . 88Relations with Army Service Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90T h e Latter Half o f 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5Decentralization o f the Ordnance Department . . . . . . . . . . . 106Developments, 1943-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 4

V . MILITARY PERSONNEL A N D TRAINING . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1Ordnance Schools, 1920-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 21940 Plans f o r Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3The Ordnance School at Aberdeen, 1940-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 124Replacement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1Unit Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 9Bomb Disposal Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 7

V I . CIVILIAN PERSONNEL A N D TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . 1 5 1Growth of the Working Force, 1938-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152Recruiting Ordnance Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 3The Struggle for Delegated Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156The Influence of ASF Personnel Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

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Chapter Page

VI. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND TRAINING—ContinuedTraining Ordnance Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 1Employee Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 4

VII. RESEARCH A N D DEVELOPMENT: 1919-40 . . . . . . . . 1 6 9T h e Westervelt Board Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 9Developments i n Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 2Development o f Combat Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9Influence o f Budgetary Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 4T h e Role o f Technical Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 8

VIII. WARTIME ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES IN RE-SEARCH A N D DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 6

Factors Immediately Conditioning Research and Development . . . . . 216Evolution o f Organized Research and Development . . . . . . . . . 220Relations with Civilian Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 6Relations with Other Military Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232Relations with Theatres o f Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 9Problems of Standardization and Limited Procurement . . . . . . . 239

IX. COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION WITH FOREIGNDESIGNERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6

Ordnance Research and Development in the German Army . . . . . . 246Limitations Upon American Ordnance Research and Development ... 256Technical Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 9Collaboration with Allied Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 7

X. THE SEARCH FOR GREATER MOBILITY IN GROUNDWARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 5

Factors Determining Vehicular Development . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 5Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 7Flotation f o r Tracked Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 1Flotation f o r Wheeled Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 0Self-Propelled Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 4Airborne Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 7Paracrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 1Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2

XI. THE SEARCH FOR INCREASED FIRE POWER IN GROUNDWARFARE: LAUNCHERS A N D FIRE CONTROL . . . . . 3 2 4

T h e Scope o f t h e Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 4Increasing Muzzle Velocities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 6Rocket Launchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 8Recoilless Rifles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 0Very Heavy Artillery: ''Little David" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331Fire Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 3

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Chapter Page

XII. THE SEARCH FOR INCREASED FIRE POWER: AMMUNI-TION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6

Barrel Rifling and Design of Projectiles for Conventional Weapons . . . 346Special Projectiles To Give Hypervelocity . . . . . . . . . . . . 348Propellants f o r Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350Design of Projectiles for New Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Rocket Propellants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 3T h e Bazooka Rocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5Fuzes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 1High Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 6Special Purpose Projectiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 0

XIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER PROTECTION . . . . . 374Armor Plate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 4Body Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 9Land Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 0Mine Exploders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 7Controlled Underwater Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 4

XIV. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE: GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPONS . 401Volume of Fire for Defense Against Low-Flying Aircraft . . . . . . 403Artillery Fire for Defense Against Close-in Attack . . . . . . . . . 407Defense Against Fast-Flying Aircraft at High Altitudes . . . . . . . 411The Search for High Velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414Fire Control and Tracking Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416Proximity Fuzes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 0

XV. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT: WEAPONS FOR AIR-TO-AIRCOMBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 2

T h e Problem o f Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 2The Problem of Effective Striking Power . . . . . . . . . . . . 430The Problem of Functioning at High Altitude . . . . . . . . . . . 438

XVI. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT: GUNS AND ROCKETS FOR AIR-TO-GROUND ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 0

A i r Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 0Rockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 3

XVII. BOMBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 1Developments t o 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 1Blast Versus Fragmentation, 1940-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453Chemical Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 5Fuzes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 7The New Role of Fragmentation Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459U s e o f N e w Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 2U s e o f A i r Bursts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 4

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Chapter Page

XVII. BOMBS—ContinuedThe Search for More Powerful Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466T h e Role o f Pyrotechnics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 8Problems o f High-Altitude Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 0T h e Development Program, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 0Testimony of the World War II Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472

XVIII. CONSERVATION O F MATERIALS . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 5Early Neglect o f Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 5Principles o f t he Conservation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477Steel a n d I t s Alloys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 0Copper a n d I t s Alloys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 6Aluminum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 5Rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 8Preservative Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 5

XIX. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH AND DEVEL-OPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 1

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 9

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 1

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 7

Tables

1. Total Appropriations for the Ordnance Department Compared with TotalAppropriations for the Military Activities of the War Department . . 41

2. Employees and Payroll a t Springfield Armory . . . . . . . . . . . . 433. Ordnance Department Military and Civilian Strength: 1919-41 ... 444 . Proposed Ten-Year Ordnance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 55. Requests and Appropriations: September 1939-May 1940 . . . . . . 676. Appropriations for Ordnance Service and Supplies Army, by Type of

Funds and by Project: Fiscal Year 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687. Appropriations for Ordnance Service and Supplies Army, by Type of

Funds and by Project: Fiscal Year 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708. Appropriations for Ordnance Service and Supplies: Fiscal Year 1943 . . 729. Civilian Accident Frequency Rates at ASF Installations . . . . . . . 161

10. Partial Summary of Caliber Board Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17111. Ordnance Department Total Appropriations and Appropriations for Re-

search and Development: Fiscal Years 1921-40 . . . . . . . . . 20612. Comparison of 5-inch and 4.5-inch Rockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44913. Steel Cartridge Cases in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49114. Summary of Conversions to Synthetic Rubber by V-J Day . . . . . . . 505

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ChartsNo. Page

1. Organization of the Ordnance Department: 31 July 1939 . . . . . . . 842 . Organization o f t he Industrial Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863. Organization of the Ordnance Department: 1 February 1942 . . . . . 894. Ordnance in the Organization of the Army: 1942-45 . . . . . . . . . 925. Organization of the Ordnance Department: 1 September 1942 . . . . . 976 . Organization o f t he Tank-Automotive Center . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097. Organization of the Ordnance Department: 6 July 1944 . . . . . . . . 1158. Organization of the Research and Development Service: 1 July 1945 . . . 2249 . Power f o r Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 9

10. Percent Distribution of Steel Used, by Army Agency: 3d Quarter 1942 and1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 1

11. Steel Alloys Required per Medium Tank (M4), with and without Conser-vation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 5

12. Percent Distribution of Copper Used, by Army Agency: 4th Quarter,1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 7

13. Percent Distribution of Copper Used by Ordnance Department, by Typeo f Matériel: 4 t h Quarter, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 8

14. Copper Requirements for Ordnance Matériel: 1943 . . . . . . . . . 49415. Percent Distribution of Aluminum Used, by Army Agency: 4th Quarter,

1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 516. Percent Distribution of Aluminum Used by the Ordnance Department, by

Type of Matériel: 4 th Quarter, 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49617 . Aluminum Requirements fo r Ordnance Matériel: 1943 . . . . . . . . 49918. Monthly Average Use of Synthetic Rubber by the Ordnance Department:

4 t h Quarter 1942-3d Quarter 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 3

Illustrations

Springfield Armory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5Maj. Gen. William B . Crozier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6Maj. Gen. Clarence C . Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7Maj. Gen. William H . Tschappat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9Maj. Gen. Samuel H o f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0Maj. Gen. Charles M . Wesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5Maj, Gen. Levin H . Campbell, J r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6Factory Training Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6Street-Fighting Training Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 7Ceremonial Dance at Dedication of the Indian Village . . . . . . . . 153Women Inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 5John C . Garand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 6T h e 75-mm. G u n M1923E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 9T h e 75-mm. Pack Howitzer M1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 1T h e 37-mm. G u n M1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 3

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Page

Medium Tank T 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 1Maj. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220Panzer I I , t h e "Lynx" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 48 R a d Panzerspahwagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 4T h e "Panther" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 5Panzer V I , t h e "Tiger" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 5Heavy Tank M6 and Medium Tank M3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279Medium Tank M4, the Sherman, and Heavy Tank M26, the Pershing . . . 285Track Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 3Multiple Rocket Launcher T34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33075-mm. Recoilless Rifle M20, and the "Little David" 914-mm. Mortar T1 . . 332German 28/20-mm. Antitank G u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 9T h e Bazooka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 8V T Fuze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 5Rifle Grenades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 9Body Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 0Land Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 3Mine Exploders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 1Controlled Mine System and the M3A1 Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395Antiaircraft Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 990-mm. Antiaircraft G u n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 2German 88-mm. a t Porte Ferraio, Elba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415Fire Control Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 8Metallic Link Belt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 620-mm. Aircraft Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 4Aircraft Rocket Installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 6T h e Parafrag Bomb i n Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 0

All illustrations are from Department of Defense Files.

xviii

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:

PLANNING MUNITIONS

FOR WAR

INTRODUCTION

The Ordnance Task InWorld War II

Ordnance is fighting equipment. It isthe weapons, the ammunition, the armoredand transport vehicles that give an armedforce its striking power in battle. The Ord-nance Department, in 1950 renamed Ord-nance Corps, is that segment of the U.S.Army responsible for design, procurement,distribution, and maintenance of ordnancefor the Army Ground Forces. DuringWorld War II it also supplied the AirForces and, in some categories, the Navyas well.

Unlike England, France, and Germany,the United States has never sponsored pri-vate manufacturing establishments thatspecialized in the design and production ofheavy munitions. Instead of relying upona Vickers-Armstrong, a Schneider-Creusot,or a Krupp, this country from its begin-ning followed the policy of assigning re-sponsibility for Army munitions supply toa special government agency, the Ord-nance Department of the Army. A fewcommercial concerns, to be sure, acquiredover the years technical skills in makingsmall arms and ammunition, explosivesand propellants, skills that in wartime sim-plified the problems of conversion fromcivilian to war production. But the Ord-nance Department itself undertook devel-opment and manufacture of ordnance or

directly supervised the work placed withprivate contractors.

Design to meet the weapon specifica-tions of the infantry, the artillery, the ar-mored forces, and the air forces; manufac-ture or purchase of items produced exactlyto those design specifications; storage, in-spection, and issue of all this matériel;maintenance by replacement of parts andby complete overhaul and reconditioning;and, finally, salvage—these constituted themission of the Ordnance Department inWorld War II.1

Small arms included rifles, pistols, car-bines, submachine guns, machine guns upto and including .50-caliber, recoillessrifles, grenade launchers, and bazookas.Artillery ranged from 20-mm. aircraftcannon and 76-mm. tank guns through theexperimental 914-mm. mortar. Supplyingammunition for these weapons was com-plicated by the development of specialpurpose ammunition, such as incendiary,illuminating, armor-piercing, and smoke.Besides aircraft bombs, there were newguided missiles, special fuzes, demolitioncharges, land mines, submarine coastal de-fense mines, and flares and other pyro-technics. Assigned responsibility for com-

1 WD SOS Organization Manual, 1942, Sec.304.03.

4 PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR

bat vehicles from World War I onwardand, after mid-1942, for transport vehiclesalso, the Ordnance Department had tosupply tanks, gun motor carriages, ar-mored cars, ¼-ton "jeeps," trucks, heavytractors for tank salvage, amphibious troopand cargo carriers, and all the many vari-ations of these. Nor did the list end there.In the course of World War II the Depart-ment issued some 1,860 different models ofmajor pieces of fighting equipment; ofthese about 1,200 were models of new orimproved design. And into these went over350,000 parts.2

The chain of command under which theDepartment performed these variousduties was altered somewhat when the re-organization of the War Department tookeffect in March 1942. During the preced-ing twenty-odd years the Under Secretaryof War, by authority delegated from thePresident of the United States through theSecretary of War, was charged with super-vising procurement of Army supplies. Heserved as the civilian chief for Ordnance,as for all other supply services.3 After thereorganization of the War Department inMarch 1942, which divided the Army inthe continental United States into theArmy Ground Forces, the Army AirForces, and the Services of Supply, theUnder Secretary of War acted as civiliansupervisor to the Commanding General,Services of Supply, or, as it was relabeledin 1943, the Army Service Forces. Thatgeneral now represented all of the supplyservices in their relations with the UnderSecretary. The latter maintained contactwith the heads of the civilian economy andchiefs of other war agencies, thereby guid-ing production for the Army in order tokeep a balance among the groups compet-ing for supplies.

Before March 1942 the traditional line

of military command of the Ordnance De-partment had been from the Chief of Staffthrough the General Staff Supply Division,usually known as G-4. Creation of theArmy Service Forces interjected anotheradministrative unit between all the operat-ing or technical services and the AssistantChief of Staff, G-4. Thus, after March1942 and throughout the war, the Ord-nance Department performed its missionunder the immediate direction of theCommanding General, Army ServiceForces, and no longer enjoyed direct accessto the Chief of Staff or to the Under Secre-tary of War. The "higher authority" towhich the Chief of Ordnance was subordi-nate consisted of his immediate superior,Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, command-ing the Army Service Forces, and his as-sistant chiefs of staff; the Supply Division,G-4, of the General Staff; the Chief ofStaff himself; the Under Secretary of War;the Secretary of War; and the President inhis capacity of Commander in Chief of theArmy.4

Military equipment for many years pasthas differed markedly from articles for or-dinary nonmilitary use. Even where itemsare of the same general category, differ-ences exist between what is necessary forthe Army and what suffices for the civilian.The military requirements of ruggednessand power far exceed what the civilianusually demands. Army rifles and Armytrucks must first and foremost be capableof operating under the most adverse cir-cumstances, regardless of the dollar cost ofachieving that dependability. The .22rifles, produced in the United States by

2 Min, Joint Army-Navy (A&N) mtg on Army OrdR&D, 1 Oct 45, p. 1, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

3 PL 891, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. See also Chart 1. p.84.

4 (1) WD SOS Organization Manual, 1942, Secs.102.04 and 200.01. (2) Chart 2, p. 86.

THE ORDNANCE TASK IN WORLD WAR II 5

thousands for farm boys who hunt rabbitsand woodchucks, and the trucks manufac-tured for commercial use can be of rela-tively cheap construction, both becausedurability is rarely a matter of life anddeath to the purchasers and because initialprice tends to be a big consideration in de-termining the purchase. Furthermore,many items of military equipment have nocivilian counterpart at all. Large-caliberguns, artillery ammunition and fuzes, ma-chine guns and their ammunition, tanksand other armored vehicles are producedsolely for use by the armed forces. Forthese the toughest steels, the most power-ful explosives, the most highly poweredengines are needed. Hence, the first taskin ordnance design is to test all materialsmeeting these requirements in order tospecify the best. Establishment of exactingspecifications for steels, oils, chemicalagents, and other materials must be fol-lowed by detailed instructions for process-ing and gaging. As research and experienceindicated feasible improvements, the Ord-nance Department revised its designs andspecifications.

Design of ordnance was not arrived atby theory alone. The basic idea for a newweapon might stem from any one of vari-ous sources, from a private citizen, from acommercial company, from combat troops,or, of course, from the Ordnance Depart-ment itself. The value of any proposal hadto be thoroughly explored. Information as-sembled in the course of wars past was thefirst obvious check; forecast of future needswas a second. The using arms, the Infan-try, the Coast and Field Artillery, the AirForces, and the Cavalry, later called theArmored Force, collaborated closely withOrdnance Department designers in deter-mining the characteristics needed in anygiven weapon or accessory to fulfill a defi-

nite military purpose. After March 1942the Army Ground Forces and the ArmyAir Forces spoke for the combat arms. Butthe user had the final say about whatwould be acceptable to him. Sometimesone desired feature ruled out another;maneuverability and high road speed in atank might preclude use of heavy armorplate or powerful guns. What was essentialfor the Infantry might be unimportant forthe Cavalry and vice versa. Hence deci-sions as to what was of primary impor-tance, what of secondary, were often hardto reach.5 These questions were resolvedby the Ordnance Committee, composed ofmembers of the Ordnance Departmentand the using services. When the principal"military characteristics" were agreedupon in the Ordnance Committee, theOrdnance Department worked out a de-sign, built a pilot model, and subjected itto tests. The using arms studied its per-formance, suggested, if need be, modifica-tions, and later scrutinized the resultingmodified weapon. If that appeared to beacceptable, the Ordnance Departmentmade a limited number for test underservice conditions. The using arm con-ducted the final service test. Only whenboth using arm and Ordnance designersconcurred that the item was satisfactory inall essentials did the General Staff author-ize the Ordnance Department to officiallyaccept, or "standardize" it, and issue or-ders for quantity fabrication. In peacetime

5 Particular testimony to the difficulties of deter-mining military characteristics is contained in AHandbook of Ordnance Automotive Engineering,Aberdeen Proving Ground. 1945, II. 2: "A most nota-ble example . . . was the development of combatlights. Due to lack of previous experience, neither thetechnical service nor the using arms were in a positionto more than suggest approximately what was desiredin light intensity, angle of cutoff, colors, and otherdefinite requirements without extensive field tests in-volving actual samples."


this procedure of design, test, refinement,service test, acceptance, and, then, orderfor production might stretch over years. Inwartime the process was necessarily has-tened. But perfection of design cannot begreatly speeded. The U.S. Army foughtmost of World War II, like earlier wars,largely with the types of equipment stand-ardized or ready for standardization whenthe conflict began. During World War IIthe Ordnance Department completed fewsignificant innovations in weapons thatreached the front lines in sufficient quan-tity and in time materially to affect theoutcome on the battlefield.

Large-scale procurement of matériel de-clared satisfactory in design was the nextfunction of the Ordnance Department.Procurement might be by manufacture ingovernment arsenals or other governmentplants, or by purchase from commercialsources. Quantities and dates of deliveryhad to be worked out with utmost care.The General Staff of the Army determinedthe size of the Army, within statutory andbudgetary limitations, and provided theimplementing directives so that the tech-nical services might then calculate thequantities of initial items of equipmentneeded and the volume of replacements.Under the aegis of the Army Service Forcesin World War II, the Ordnance Depart-ment evolved its procurement schedules tomeet the requirements calculated as theresult of General Staff directives. Compu-tation of requirements in order to haveavailable the proper quantities at the ex-act time and place they were needed wasan enormously difficult job. Controversywith the War Production Board and otheragencies directing the civilian economywas occasionally inevitable. "Too muchand too late" was the criticism tenderedby men usually not themselves faced with

responsibility for making the critical deci-sions of how much, when.

Desired requirements schedules mappedout, the Industrial Service of the Ord-nance Department took over the job ofmeeting them. Since the six permanentgovernment arsenals could produce only asmall fraction of the volume needed, con-tracts with private industry had to be themainstay. Government-owned govern-ment-operated plants were far outnum-bered by government-owned contractor-operated plants and privately owned es-tablishments. The Ordnance districts, thegeographically decentralized offices firstcreated in World War I, were in charge ofmaking formal contracts, placing orders,and supervising production in plantsother than the government arsenals. Thestaff of each of the thirteen district officescontrolled the allocations of machine toolsand raw materials and was accountablefor government property within its dis-trict. The staffs trained inspectors, directedthe inspection preliminary to acceptanceof the contractors' output, supervisedpackaging and shipment of the finishedproduct, made payments for satisfactorilycompleted orders, renegotiated and termi-nated contracts. These operations variedin particulars but in general were every-where the same. The district offices fur-nished the administrative machinery forordnance procurement.6

The six permanent Ordnance arsenalsin peacetime sufficed to supply the Army.Each one specialized in particular types ofordnance: Springfield Armory in smallarms; Watervliet Arsenal in cannon;Watertown in gun carriages and forgings;Rock Island in artillery recoil mechanisms,

6 The Ordnance District System, Its Growth andDevelopment, 1918-1945, prepared under the direc-tion of Brig. Gen. A. B. Quinton, Jr.. OHF.


gun carriages, and combat vehicles; Frank-ford in small arms ammunition, artilleryprojectiles, cartridge cases, optical andfire control instruments, gages, and pyro-technics; and Picatinny in artillery am-munition, explosives, and propellants. Inthese establishments year after year re-search and development work went for-ward along with manufacturing and main-tenance of equipment. While their peakproductive capacity was never enough tomeet the needs of a wartime army, the ar-senals provided the technical assistancethat enabled privately owned companiesto manufacture specialized ordnance whenexpansion was necessary. Here the art ofmunitions manufacture was preserved.Not only blueprints of components ofweapons, ammunition, and vehicles, butcarefully planned shop layouts and detailsof processing were available for distributionto new contractors. The long-term civilianemployees of the arsenals, men whose ex-perience often could be counted in decadesrather than years, constituted the school-masters of firms unfamiliar with the pecu-liar problems of ordnance manufacture.Consultations over particular difficultieshelped the commercial contractor produceexactly to specification; occasionally dur-ing the war, arsenal employees were lentto contractors to assist in solving someprocessing problem. Interchangeabilitytests to guarantee that parts of one pro-ducer's output were interchangeable withthose of another were also conducted atthe arsenals. "Technical responsibility" forall Army Ordnance items was dividedamong the six arsenals, so that nothingfrom a cleaning rod to a "blockbuster" wasfabricated without having experts fromone or another of the government estab-lishments qualified to accept or rejectevery piece. In fact, training men in in-

spection procedures was one of the arse-nals' important functions during the war.

While the arsenals made a very smallpart of the matériel required and privatelyowned establishments produced most ofsome types of ordnance, neither possessedcapacity to manufacture all items in suffi-cient quantity. Existing plants could bereadily converted to turn out small arms,artillery shell and other metal components,fuzes, and transport vehicles. In these fieldseither prewar procurement planning hadbeen thorough, or the military item wasclosely enough allied to a civilian articleto eliminate novel production problems.In other fields the reverse was true. No ex-isting facility, for example, was adapted tomass production of tanks; the original planof fabricating all combat vehicles in shopsmaking heavy railway equipment provedimpractical. For procuring a great deal ofordnance, consequently, the best answerwas found to be newly built govern-ment-owned contractor-operated plants—GOCO facilities.7 Thus the vast, rapid ex-pansion was achieved, and government es-tablishments, private facilities, and combi-nations of the two met demand. By the endof 1942 the Ordnance Department wasconducting the financially largest manu-facturing program in the world.8 Expendi-tures between 1940 and V-J Day totaledabout $46,000,000,000.

Another duty of the Ordnance Depart-ment was to manage the distribution andupkeep of matériel. Field Service of the

7 See: (1) Project Supporting Paper 8, Developmentof Production Capacity, OHF (hereafter Project Sup-porting Papers are cited as PSP); (2) Ord War Ad-ministration History, Series II, No. 11, Facilities,OHF.

8 Col. C. Wingate Reed, "The Ordnance Depart-ment, What It Is, What It Does," NADA Bulletin(published by National Automobile Dealers Associ-

ation), XV, 4 (1943), 11.


Ordnance Department was responsible forstoring and issuing both initial equipmentand spare parts and replacement parts.Some twenty-six storage depots in 1940housed ordnance supplies, while the depotunits had the task of keeping accurate rec-ords of stocks, receipt, and issue. As out-put of manufacturing plants mounted, thenumber of depots and warehouses had alsoto be multiplied. Storage space by 1942was ten times that of 1940. In addition toammunition depots, largely built inlandout of range of carrier-based enemy planes,and storage space for weapons and acces-sories both for the U.S. Army and for lend-lease, the Ordnance Department afterSeptember 1942 acquired depots from theQuartermaster Corps for storage of trans-port vehicles and parts.

When U. S. troops began to move over-seas, problems of distribution and record-keeping became more complex. Confusionmight easily have become chaos, for ma-tériel in transit was at all times difficult tokeep track of and supply lines were long.In time, the Army Service Forces evolveda supply control system under which Ord-nance and all other technical services oper-ated, but a foolproof scheme of accountingand method of maintaining a balancedsupply of the thousands of components,component assemblies, and complete itemswas never wholly achieved. Experience, asthe war progressed, dictated establishmentof four types of depot—bulk storage depots,master depots to handle selected types ofordnance, distribution depots to serve asretail distributors, and filler depots for portsof embarkation.

Packaging ordnance matériel had neverbeen recognized as a major problem beforeWorld War II. Neither private industrynor government agencies had anticipatedits importance. But when arms and ammu-

nition, sensitive electronic devices, and ex-pensive engine parts were found to beunusable on the combat fronts because ofimproper packing for shipment or outdoorstorage, Field Service and Industrial Serv-ice jointly undertook a careful study ofpackaging. Design of sturdy, compact con-tainers, use of desiccants and protectivesurface coatings, exact labeling of boxes,and application of engineering principlesto loading freight cars and trucks had to beworked out in detailed procedures forshipping.

A still more exacting assignment for FieldService was maintenance of ordnance ma-tériel. In peacetime, periodic inspection ofitems in storage, cleaning, overhaul, andreconditioning at depot or arsenal weremore or less routine tasks. In wartime,maintenance of equipment being used byan army was a job of major proportions.For cleaning and minor repairs, the com-bat soldier was usually responsible. Butspare parts had to be available so that hecould replace a broken firing pin in his rifleor put new spark plugs in his tank engine.Having the right number of replacementparts at the spots where they were neededand at the time when they were neededwas a constant logistical problem. Mobileordnance supply and maintenance units,serving immediately in the rear of com-bat operations, repaired equipment thatcould be restored to serviceable conditionpromptly. Jobs more time consuming, orbeyond the capabilities of mobile shops,were sent to Ordnance units in the com-munications zone. Ordnance troops sal-vaged matériel both to rebuild and to shipback as scrap to the zone of interior. Main-tenance, a trying job in this country, wasan even more difficult task overseas.

To make proper maintenance possible,Field Service, in the office of the Chief of


Ordnance, prepared a long series of tech-nical manuals and bulletins for use intraining both Ordnance units and usingtroops in the care of equipment. On specialmaintenance problems technical assistancewas also furnished to commands responsi-ble for matériel used by their troops. Ofutmost importance were the Ordnance cat-alogs, popularly called SNL's, which pro-vided complete information on spare partsstockage and identification data—name,number, and photograph of each part orassembly.9 In all, Ordnance requiredabout 1,700 different technical publica-tions and 2,000 different supply catalogues.Preparing and distributing these and thenkeeping this huge publication system up todate, in order to cover improvements andnew information, was a never-ending job.

Ordnance Department responsibility forsupply did not end with the issue of maté-riel to troops or with consignment at de-pots to the Transportation Corps for over-seas shipment; it endured until itemsreceived the "death certificate" and sal-vage began. Yet the Chief of Ordnancehad no command responsibility outsidethis country. Overseas commanders hadfull authority over men and equipment intheatres of operations. Thus Ordnanceunits assigned to divisions outside the zoneof interior were not under the control ofthe Chief of Ordnance, and Ordnance offi-cers attached to the staffs of commandersin the field could not officially communi-cate directly with the Ordnance Depart-ment in Washington save on strictlytechnical matters. Technical missions toobserve functioning of American muni-tions, to further the development and useof new items, and to note particular prob-lems to be met served to keep some con-tact, while publications and confidentialreports abetted translation of field experi-

ence into action in this country. Moreover,personal letters from Ordnance officers inthe theatres to the Chief of Ordnance inWashington kept the headquarters in-formed of ordnance problems overseas.

Ordnance equipment is specialized. Itsconstruction and maintenance requiretechnical skills. Training Ordnance per-sonnel, therefore, is a final, or perhapsmore logically a first, duty of the Depart-ment. Civil Service employees to man thearsenals and depots, to administer theOrdnance districts, to inspect contractors'output, and to carry on much of the paperwork in the Office, Chief of Ordnance, fallinto one category, and Army officers andenlisted men into another. War Depart-ment ceilings on officers forced the Ord-nance Department in World War II to usecivilians on some jobs that officers mightotherwise have filled, though, like otherservices, the Department commissioned anumber of men straight from civilian lifein order to avoid losing them to the draft.At the peak, in February 1943, 262,772civilian employees, 6,500 officers, and13,750 enlisted men were employed by theDepartment's operating missions in thecontinental United States. Over 14,000Ordnance officers were assigned by theend of March 1945 to overseas com-mands.10

During World War II most of the keymen in the arsenals, depots, and admin-istrative offices brought to their war jobstheir skills from civilian life. The OrdnanceDepartment carried on a large trainingprogram for inspectors and also trained a

9 SNL stands for "Standard Nomenclature List,"the name used years ago.

10 (1) ASF Monthly Progress Report, Personnel,Sec. 5. (2) Strength of the Army, prepared for WDGSby Machine Records Br, AGO, under direction ofStat Br, GS, STM-30, 1 Apr 45 (hereafter cited asStrength of the Army, STM-30), DRB AGO.


good many men for depot work. But thebulk of operators on production lines inwar plants were schooled not by the Ord-nance Department itself but by Ordnancecontractors and by the War ManpowerCommission's Training Within IndustryService.

Ordnance training for officers and en-listed men, though necessarily brief, wasfairly intensive. To a degree never beforeconsidered necessary, the Ordnance De-partment had to teach raw recruits to besoldiers as well as technicians, for in WorldWar II Ordnance troops had to functionclose to the front lines and be prepared tofight in case of an enemy break-through.Technical training itself embraced manyspecialties. Instruction in maintenance andrepair of automotive and fire control equip-ment, of small arms, and of artillery con-stituted one kind of training. To preparemen to handle distribution of ordnancethere were courses in ammunition supply,vehicle assembly, spare parts handling, andgeneral depot work with its infinite detailof receipt, issue, and record-keeping. Unitswere trained in such diverse tasks asmethods of disposing of unexploded enemybombs and waterproofing vehicles for am-phibious operations. All told, between 1942and V-J Day some forty basic types ofOrdnance military units, ranging fromsquads to battalions, were activated andtrained—units for ammunition supply,for light, medium, and heavy mainte-nance, for automotive repair, and for ar-mament and automotive repair in baseshops. Because enlistment of men alreadypossessed of experience in maintainingheavy machinery and automotive trans-port promised to ease the problems oftraining specialists, the Ordnance Depart-ment early in 1942 persuaded the NationalAutomobile Dealers Association to organ-

ize a large-scale recruiting drive for Ord-nance "Affiliated Units." The association,later assisted by other business organiza-tions, supplied some 1,200 officers and30,000 enlisted men in a few months' time.These men needed relatively little techni-cal schooling and rather brief indoctrina-tion in Ordnance procedures. As newtrainees poured into the training centers,courses were repeated again and again.Several additional training centers had tobe opened in 1942 as well as "continu-ation" schools at some of the depots. The334 Ordnance officers and 3,950 enlistedmen of mid-1940 grew by D Day in June1944 to nearly 24,000 officers and nearly325,000 men.11

The task of the Ordnance Department,difficult in any war, was far harder inWorld War II than ever before. Since thefighting of the U.S. Army in World War Iwas concentrated on the battlefields ofnorthern France and Flanders, in 1917and 1918 supplies had to be sent only tothe Continent and distributed within a rel-atively small area. In World War II Amer-ican forces were scattered almost literally"from Greenland's icy mountains to In-dia's coral strand," and Allied nations, inpart equipped by the United States, werefighting in every quarter of the globe. Sup-ply lines had to extend in all directions.Weapons, ammunition, and vehicles hadto be designed with the factors of weightand bulk constantly in mind so that equip-ment could be transported easily. The dis-tance from factory to depot in the UnitedStates, to overseas ammunition dump, orto repair shop spelled a costly lapse of timefor delivery of any replacement item not

11 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the Presi-dent, 1940 (Washington, 1940) (hereafter cited as AnnRpt SW), pp. 28-29. (2) Strength of the Army,STM-30, 1 Jun 44, DRB AGO.


shipped with the troops in the first place.And time might determine the success orfailure of any tactical operation. Globalwarfare created a nearly overwhelminglogistical problem for Ordnance, as for allthe supply services.

The sheer quantity of ordnance matérielrequired constituted another problem. Inthe Civil War the Ordnance Departmenthad furnished arms for somewhat over1,500,000 Union soldiers, and in WorldWar I for perhaps 4,000,000 men.12 InApril 1945 the United States Army totaledover 8,290,000 men.13 Add to the individ-ual equipment for these men the machineguns, mortars, artillery, ammunition of alltypes, mines, tanks, transport and combatvehicles, and the magnitude of the Ord-nance task begins to emerge. Some itemswere also made for the Navy and the Ma-rine Corps. Furthermore, the UnitedStates as the "Arsenal of Democracy" hadto supply much matériel to the British,Russians, Free French, Chinese, and otherallies. Plans to meet these demands werenursed by Assistant Secretary of War LouisJohnson before 1940 and by his successor,Robert Patterson, but most of the respon-sibility for carrying out this gargantuanundertaking fell upon the Ordnance De-partment. "From Pearl Harbor to V-J Daythe Industry-Ordnance team furnished tothe Army and 43 foreign nations 47 billionrounds of small arms ammunition, approx-imately 11 million tons of artillery ammu-nition, more than 12 million rifles andcarbines, approximately 750,000 artillerypieces, and 3½ million military vehicles."14

The job would have been enormouseven had American industry been pre-pared in 1940 to produce munitions on alarge scale. Many Americans, and particu-larly isolationists, were opposed. A consid-erable public still branded munitions

makers as merchants of death. Neither thewill to participate in an armament pro-gram nor the machine tools and shops withwhich to carry it out existed. The "Indus-try-Ordnance Team" had to be built upfrom a skeleton organization. Enlisting theinterest of American manufacturers inmaking munitions was easy in 1942, butin 1940 and 1941 was difficult. Only re-cently out from the shadow of a businessdepression, industrialists before Pearl Har-bor were reluctant to forego opportunitiesto enlarge their civilian markets. More-over, even if and when companies werewilling to accept Ordnance orders, theyfaced a technological problem. To manu-

12 The official figure for the total number of CivilWar enlistments, Army and Navy, is 2,400,000,though what proportion was Navy is not certain. Thediscrepancy may be accounted for by short-term en-listments, which permitted the Ordnance Departmentin some cases to reissue used arms. Thomas L. Liver-more considered these figures high and computed thetotal number of men who served for three years as1,500,000. See (1) John D. Hicks, The Federal Union(Boston, 1937), p. 657, citing Thomas L. Livermore,Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-1865(Boston, 1901); and (2) Col. Leonard P. Ayres, TheWar With Germany, A Statistical Summary (Washington,1919),p. 13.

The exact number of men actually equipped by theOrdnance Department in World War I is nowherestated. The British and French supplied a great dealof the artillery the U.S. Army used in combat, but, onthe other hand, America furnished the British withsome small arms. Some 2,086,000 American soldiersserved in the AEF. Troops in training in this countryare estimated as bringing the total number to the4,000,000 cited here. (1) Ayres, op. cit., p. 11; (2)Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions, 1917-1918(Washington, 1919), p. 16.

13 Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and BellI. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops(Washington, 1947), p. 210.

14 Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., The Industry-Ordnance Team (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,New York, 1946), p. 33. The official Army figuresdiffer somewhat from those given by General Camp-bell. See Theodore E. Whiting et al., Statistics, avolume in preparation for the series UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL


facture intricate weapons and ammuni-tion, tanks and cargo carriers markedlydifferent from vehicles for civilian use, re-quires time—time to assemble machines,tools, and gages, time to teach workmenhow to turn out parts made to exacting tol-erances. Precision work as it was known inmany American factories of 1940 was in-exact when measured by the ten-thou-sandth-inch limits permitted for gun mech-anisms and delicate fuze assemblies. It wasthe mission of the Ordnance Departmentto help industry learn how to produce ord-nance and produce it quickly enough toturn out quantities in time to serve. Theso-called technological time lag in manu-facturing matériel was a problem sharedin some measure by all the technical serv-ices of the armed forces, but was particu-larly acute for the Ordnance Department.

World War II was as different fromWorld War I as a future war will be fromWorld War II if the predictions of the Cas-sandras of the atomic age be fulfilled. Thetrench warfare of 1915-18 had few coun-terparts in the 1940's. Planes, combat ve-hicles, and cargo carriers made a war ofmovement. Mobility and maneuverabilitywere prime requisites for an efficient army.Equipment that could not readily beshifted about even in the thick of combatwas of limited use. The batteries of fieldartillery, in World War I solidly emplacedbehind the front lines, had either to bemounted on self-propelled gun carriagesor supplied with motorized tractors to towthem. Towed artillery, though extensivelyused, tended to slow the advance. Enemyplanes and fast-moving tanks in turn ne-cessitated more rapid and accurate sight-ing and fire. Motorization, while militatingagainst the miseries of trench warfare, cre-ated its own supply problems, and main-tenance of vehicles became a never-ending

job. Furthermore, use of tanks called forCountermeasures—fields of land mines. Tomet this hazard Army Ordnance had todevelop mine exploders, as well as minesto sow against an enemy advance.

Still more far reaching were the changesbrought about by aerial warfare. Planesflying at unheard of altitudes and at speedsunobtainable in the 1930's created newpuzzles for Ordnance. Fire control instru-ments, new types of ammunition, highervelocity guns for both aircraft and anti-aircraft became essential to survival. Em-ployment of airborne troops was anotherinnovation calling for redesign of equip-ment. Men must be supplied with weaponslight in weight, sturdy enough to with-stand parachuting, and powerful and reli-able enough to protect the parachutists inencounters with the enemy behind his ownlines. Later in the war German guided mis-siles, particularly the celebrated V-2rocket, challenged American and Britishbrains to find Countermeasures. Duringthe war no effective answer to the power-ful German V-2 was found.

Indeed the complexities of munitionsincreased steadily. Trained soldiers and ex-perts in ballistics no longer alone sufficedfor the jobs of designing weapons to antici-pate enemy developments. Scientists in adozen fields were needed to evolve intri-cate devices which a generation beforewould have seemed fantastically remotefrom any application to arms for fightingmen. Not all physicists were engaged onthe MANHATTAN Project. Men trained inresearch laboratories, authorities in elec-tronics, chemistry, metallurgy, meteorol-ogy, mathematics, and physics were calledupon to contribute to ordnance. Whenworkable applications of involved scientificformulae were completed, men of the Ord-nance Department had still to locate facili-


ties to produce the items and had still totrain men properly in handling and main-taining them. Though the fruits of scien-tific research undoubtedly shortened thewar by many months, the problems im-posed by scientific developments in fight-ing equipment added to the immediatetask of Army Ordnance.

Finally, supplying weapons and themeans of keeping them in usable condi-tion was complicated by unforeseen cir-cumstances of combat. Extremes of cli-mate, unexpected difficulties of terrain,and the demands of amphibious warfarepresented new problems. From 1941 on,the Ordnance Department tested equip-ment under the arctic conditions of Alaska,the tropical of the Canal Zone, in theCalifornia desert, the swamps of Louisiana,and the mountains of Colorado. Yet nei-ther these experiments nor imaginationserved to anticipate many situations thatAmerican soldiers later met. Fungus andcorrosion from even short exposure to thehumidity of jungle islands in the Pacific,wear on piston rings resulting from drivingcombat vehicles over 800 miles of Austral-ian desert from ports in the south to campson the northern coast, brittleness of steelarmor plate and congealing of lubricantsin the subzero temperatures of winter inAlaska might theoretically have been fore-seen. But the most farsighted still couldnot realize how greatly these factors on thescale on which they were encountered

around the globe would complicate theOrdnance task.

Despite the late start, American ord-nance had overtaken and outdistancedenemy ordnance by 1945. Unflatteringcomparisons of some American weaponswith those of the enemy, Ordnance officerswere convinced, grew out of Americansoldiers' tendency to regard only thedeadly effectiveness of an enemy arm with-out taking into consideration its weak-nesses. Unquestionably, particular items ofGerman design and make were superior inat least some particulars to the correspond-ing American pieces—simpler to operate,easier to repair, lighter to carry, cheaper tomanufacture, or better killers. The dreadedGerman "Panthers" were more heavilyarmored and had more fire power thanany American tanks that saw action. Wenow know that ever since 1933 Nazi Ger-many had been applying most of herscience and productive capacity to prepar-ing for war. Her head start put the UnitedStates at a nearly insuperable disadvan-tage. Nevertheless, by the last year of thewar American fighting equipment in gen-eral was sturdier and better functioningthan that of the enemy. And the U.S.Army had far more of it. The British, theCanadians, and the Russians held the lineswhile the United States got its vast arma-ment production under way. But it isabundantly clear that in any future crisisbetter preparedness would be essential.

CHAPTER I

Origins and Growth to 1919Early History

The immediate antecedents of the Ord-nance Department of the United StatesArmy date back to the first days of theAmerican Revolution. The Ordnance De-partment is first mentioned by name in aresolution of the Continental Congress in1778 that assigned to certain artillery offi-cers responsibility for issue of ordnancesupplies to troops in the field. Through-out the Revolutionary War the Congresskept final control of munitions procure-ment in its own hands but gradually dele-gated considerable authority to particularofficers: to a Board of War and Ordnance,which in turn appointed a Surveyor ofOrdnance to inspect matériel; to a Com-missary General of Military Stores to keeprecord of purchases and of stocks on hand;and to the commanding artillery officer ofthe Army as the officer in charge of ord-nance field activities.1

Little provision could be made for designof weapons since a large part of the armswith which the Continental Army foughtthe war was imported from France and theWest Indies, confiscated on the high seasby American privateers, or captured fromBritish stores in America. British-mademuskets owned by colonial militiamenand rifles and muskets produced by localgunsmiths supplemented supply. Car-tridges, ball, and powder were made insmall shops scattered through the country-side. Yet while the urgency of getting

usable field pieces, muskets, and ammu-nition was too great to permit of elabo-rate plans for improving ordnance, thecommanding artillery officer was empow-ered to recommend alterations; if theseproposed changes were approved by theBoard of War and Ordnance, the boardpassed on instructions to the "artificers andlaboratory men." 2 Thus the functions ofthe Ordnance Department of World WarII were also those of the "Ordnance De-partment" of the Continental Army.

For nearly thirty years following the endof hostilities in 1782, the Ordnance De-partment as a distinct unit of the UnitedStates Army ceased to exist. In that interimordnance supplies were first entrusted tothe Keeper of Military Stores, and then in1792 the Congress created the office of Pur-veyor of Public Supplies whose duties ex-tended to purchase of arms and ammuni-tion for the Army. To release the newrepublic from dependence upon foreignarmsmakers, the Congress, moreover, in1794 empowered the President to establishtwo national armories. Thus the Spring-field Armory, the first federal arms factory,was erected and by 1795 had completed itsfirst 245 muskets. Harpers Ferry, the south-

1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Li-brary of Congress edition, Washington, 1904-1937),Feb 11, 1778, X, 144; Feb 18, 1779, XIII, 201-06.

2 See (1) James E. Hicks, Notes on United States Ord-nance: II, Ordnance Correspondence (Mount Vernon,New York, 1940), 11-13; and (2) Felicia J. Deyrup,Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley (Smith CollegeStudies in History, XXXIII, 1948), pp. 33-36.

ORIGINS AND GROWTH TO 1919 15

SPRINGFIELD ARMORY. The main arsenal as it appeared in 1852.

ern armory, began operations in 1796. Ad-ditional arms for the State Militia and theUnited States Army were supplied by pri-vate contractors, most notable of whomwas Eli Whitney.3 It was Whitney's dem-onstration to officials of the War Depart-ment that first convinced doubting Thom-ases of the feasibility of making firearms onan interchangeable basis. Whitney's per-formance was as dramatic as its effects wererevolutionizing. At the invitation of Capt.Decius Wadsworth, later the first Chief ofOrdnance, Whitney in 1801 brought toWashington ten sets of the components ofmusket locks. These he dumped in pilesupon a table and then selecting parts atrandom he assembled ten complete firing

mechanisms. Initial disbelief of his audi-ence gave way before this proof that use ofjigs and machine tools could make compo-nents so identical that filing and specialfitting in assembly were needless. Officialobjections to Whitney's delay in deliverieson his contract for muskets were thusstilled.4 Shortly thereafter, the governmentarmories adopted the new system of manu-

3 Deyrup, op. cit., p. 233. The correspondence ofTench Coxe, Purveyor of Public Supplies from 1803to 1812, gives an illuminating picture of the difficul-ties of organizing supply of arms from domesticsources.

4 See Joseph Roe, English and American Tool Builders(New Haven, 1916), p. 133. For full explanation of theconsequences of acceptance of the principle of inter-changeability, see also Deyrup, op. cit., pp. 87-99.


facturing and, by improvement in machinetools, gradually extended and perfected it.

The approach of war with Great Britainin 1812 stresssed the wisdom of placing re-sponsibility for munitions upon the Army.Accordingly, the Congress on 14 May 1812formally created an Ordnance Departmentand appropriated $20,000 for its expenses.The Commissary-General of Ordnancewas charged with inspection, storage andissue, and supervision of the government"laboratories" or workshops; where guncarriages, muskets and other arms weremade.5 Elaboration of the duties of theOrdnance Department followed in 1815.The Chief of Ordnance thereafter was re-sponsible for contracting for arms and am-munition, for supervision of the govern-ment armories and storage depots, and forrecruitment and training of "artificers" tobe attached to regiments, corps, and garri-sons.6 By 1816 the federal arsenals num-bered five: Springfield and Harpers Ferrymaking small arms; Watervliet, "the arse-nal near Troy," artillery equipment andammunition; Watertown, in Massachu-setts, small arms ammunition and guncarriages; and Frankford, near Philadel-phia, ammunition. Only two more, RockIsland and Picatinny, were added aftermid-century, while Harpers Ferry wasdestroyed early in the Civil War.

The importance of the role of the Ord-nance Department was recognized from itsbeginning. Thus, the Secretary of Warurged the Congress in carrying out pro-posed reductions in the size of the Army toexclude the Engineer Corps and OrdnanceDepartment. "Their duties," he wrote in1818, "are connected with the permanentpreparation and defense of the country,and have so little reference to the existingmilitary establishment, that if the armywere reduced to a single regiment, no re-

duction could safely be made in either ofthem."7 Nevertheless, the reduction ef-fected in 1821 officially merged the Ord-nance Department with the Artillery. Thearrangement endured for eleven years, but,inasmuch as the officers who were trans-ferred to the Artillery continued to performthe duties assigned to Ordnance by the Actof 1815, the change was more apparentthan real. At the end of the 1820's the Ord-nance Department was spending aboutS 1,000,000 a year for equipment.8 In 1830the colonel on Ordnance service reported:

. . . extensive operations are conducted at

. . . two national armories, nine private ar-mories, four cannon foundries, fourteen na-tional arsenals, four ordnance depots, and anextensive region of public lead mines.

These establishments are situated in differ-ent parts of the Union, and they employ morethan one thousand men, consisting chiefly ofartificers and mechanics. They are all con-ducted under the general supervision, and,with the exception of the private armories,under the immediate and special direction ofthe Ordnance Department.9

Officers trained as artillerymen soonproved less qualified to handle this busi-ness than ordnance specialists. The upshotwas the re-establishment of the OrdnanceDepartment as a separate unit in 1832 with14 officers and 250 enlisted men assignedto it.10 Occasionally in the course of thenext century efforts were repeated to re-

5 Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, MilitaryLaws and Rules and Regulations for the Armies of the UnitedStates (Washington, May 1, 1813), pp. 104-09.

6 U.S. Statutes at Large, III, Ch. 38, Feb 8, 1815.7 American State Papers, Military Affairs, I. 780.8 A Collection of Annual Reports and other Important

Papers, Relating to the Ordnance Department, preparedunder the direction of Brig. Gen. Stephen V. Benet(Washington, 1889), I, 209. (Hereafter cited as Ord-nance Reports.)

9 Ordnance Reports, I, 219.1 0 ( 1 ) Ibid., 138-45, 147-49. (2) U.S. Statutes at

Large, IV, Ch. 504, 1832.


assign the control of Ordnance. Wider ci-vilian superintendence, renewed mergingof the Department with the artillery, su-pervision by officers of the line, consolida-tion of all Army supply under one WarDepartment supply service — all wereurged, all discarded.11 After 1832 the struc-ture of the Ordnance Department re-mained unshaken; its functions continuetoday as they were established then.

Design of weapons had not originallybeen included specifically in the duties ofthe Ordnance Department, though Col.Decius Wadsworth, the first Chief of Ord-nance, and his successor, Col. GeorgeBomford, each played an active part indetermining American ordnance designsand specifications. Colonel Bomford hadin fact himself designed a "bomb-cannon,"the "Columbiad," the first heavy shell-firing gun the United States Army everemployed.12 The Regulations of 1834 firstofficially placed responsibility for designupon the Ordnance Department. This didnot mean either then or later that Ord-nance officers or arsenal employees orig-inated designs. Usually new models weretendered for trial by independent inventorsor commercial companies sponsoringthem. The Ordnance Department selected,adapted when necessary, and then stand-ardized, that is, officially accepted modelsfor government use. To ensure havingmodern types of equipment, in 1840 andagain in 1848 the Department sent officersto Europe to study foreign design and pro-duction methods. Utilization of ideasacquired abroad, together with develop-ment of techniques originating in Amer-ica, placed United States artillery in mid-century more nearly on a par with that ofother nations than had been possible in theRepublic's infancy.13 But American aver-sion to preoccupation with military affairs

obstructed ordnance developments after,as before, the Civil War.

Design of small arms was a somewhatdifferent story. The westward movementacross the continent, with its accompani-ment of Indian warfare and frontierviolence, kept Americans immediatelyconcerned with the adequacy of shoulderarms. In the forties the Ordnance Depart-ment replaced the old smooth bore,muzzle-loading flintlock with the percus-sion musket and the cumbersome pistolwith the revolver invented by Samuel Colt.Notable improvements in rifles, pistols,and particularly ammunition, as well as inmethods of production, occurred in the1850's as the beginning of an independentmachine-tool industry and of precisiongage making nourished the growth of aseries of private companies engaged insmall arms manufacture. In this work thegovernment arsenals collaborated.14 Yetthe conservatism of the Army was clearly

11 Civilian superintendents, in charge of the na-tional armories up to 1841, were supplanted for some-what over a decade by Ordnance officers, and werethen again put in charge until the outbreak of theCivil War. Since 1861 officers have always been incharge. Attempts to reorganize the whole OrdnanceDepartment occurred in 1851, 1859, 1872, and 1919.New proposals for a centralized Army supply servicewere tendered as late as 1948.

12 (1) Col. C. Wingate Reed, "Decius Wadsworth,First Chief of Ordnance, U.S. Army, 1812-1821,"Army Ordnance, XXV, 139 (1943), 114-16. (2) Cullum'sBiographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of theUnited States Military Academy (Boston, 1891), p. 59.

13 (1) Regulations for the Government of the OrdnanceDepartment (Washington, 1834). (2) Ordnance Reports, I,381; II, 290-336; III, 229. (3) W. E. Birkhimer, His-torical Sketch of the Artillery, U. S. Army (Washington,1884), pp. 255ff.

14 Government policy at this period permitted in-ventors to have the pilot models of their inventionsbui l t by government armorers in arsenal shops forOrdnance Department test. Thus in 1858, shortly be-fore his Harpers Ferry raid, John Brown was havingthe Springfield Armory make a pistol of his design.See (1) Deyrup, op. cit., p. 128, and (2) Hist of Spring-field Armory, I, 1777-1865, 97-99, OHF.


manifested in the decision at the outbreakof the Civil War to drop the plans tomanufacture breech-loading rifles usingmetallic rim cartridges. Governmentarmorers, considering the models still ex-perimental, feared the delays that alwaysretard mass production of any newweapon. Thus, while American manufac-turers were outstripping European in thespeed and accuracy of their productiontechniques, the Ordnance Departmentwas supplying the U.S. Army with rifles ofa type that European manufacturers wouldhave dubbed antiquated. Not until 1866did the Ordnance Department succeed inconverting its muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders, and not until 1892 did the Armyget bolt action rifles, modern by the stand-ards of that day.15 Widespread interest insmall arms design largely subsided about1890, partly because the possible improve-ments in rifles had by then been prettymuch achieved and partly because the set-tlement of the West and disappearance ofthe frontier turned public attention toother problems.

In the eighties the Congress authorizedcreation of a permanent Ordnance Boardto serve as final judge of the utility of pro-posed new models of weapons. Before theend of the century the Gatling gun andheavy machine guns had been adopted;research upon semiautomatic rifles, whichwould fire eight shots without reloading,and upon more powerful machine gunswas inaugurated in 1901, and the newSpringfield rifle, elaborated from theKrag-Jorgensen and the German Mauser,appeared in 1903. Meanwhile, artillerydesign was a subject of much debate.Adoption of the Crozier-Buffington recoilmechanism for heavy gun carriages washeralded as a great advance and perhapsserved to strengthen Americans' belief in

American technological superiority.16

Though the volunteer regiments of theU.S. Army, supplied with black powder,fought the Spanish-American War againsttroops equipped with the newer smokelesspowder, the speedy American victoryquieted criticism. Confidence in Americanordnance mounted steadily in spite of thediscernible evidence that American equip-ment was consistently some years behindthat of the European powers. On occasionthe sharply revealed need of new modelsbrought action. Just as Civil War combatproved the inferiority of the government-manufactured muzzle-loaders to thebreechloaders of private manufacture thatwere purchased and issued in small num-bers, so experience in the Philippine in-surrection following the war with Spainimpelled the Ordnance Department toseek a larger caliber side arm. Testimonyof soldiers that their revolver shots failed tostop fanatical Moros from rushing to attackwith their bolos led to adoption of .45-caliber instead of .38-caliber for the newautomatic pistol M1911.17

Unlike design, responsibility for whichwas somewhat belatedly assigned to theDepartment, procurement was a majorpart of the Ordnance mission almost fromthe Department's beginning. Purchase ofmatériel or manufacture in governmentarsenals became one of its stated functionsin 1815. Attempt to curtail governmentmanufacture of arms in the interest of

15 (1) Deyrup, op. cit., pp. 23-32. (2) Hist of Spring-field Armory, I, 1777-1865, pp. 101-02, OHF.

16 (1) James E. Hicks, Notes on United States Ord-nance: I, Small Arms, 1776 to 1940 (Mount Vernon, NewYork, 1940), passim. (2) Springfield Armory Tests andDevelopments of Semi-Automatic Shoulder Arms,1900 to 1914, OHF. (3) Ordnance Reports, III, 281. (4)Seventh Report of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifi-cation, 1897, p. 11.

17 Record of Army Ord R&D, Vol. II, Small Armsand Small Arms Ammunition, Book 1, p. 79, OHF.


turning the business over to private indus-try was defeated in the fifties by the vigor-ous opposition of the Ordnance Depart-ment and the Secretary of War, JeffersonDavis, and was never seriously urgedagain. Davis argued that governmentmanufacture as well as government designguaranteed constant improvement inmodels and enabled the Ordnance Depart-ment to check not only on the quality ofcontractors' output but also on theirprices.18 Thus the Congress, backed bypublic opinion, quashed the developmentin this country of a private munitions in-dustry comparable to those in Europe. Theenduring consequences for the OrdnanceDepartment have been of signal im-portance.

Government inspection of arms beforeacceptance imposed the necessity of sup-plying gages to both government inspec-tors and, after 1840, to governmentcontractors. Before that date a contractorcould check his work only by comparingit with a model weapon lent as a patternby the government. Not until after theCivil War did the Ordnance Departmentevolve any reasonably satisfactory systemof furnishing gages and not until WorldWar I was it applied on any scale. Fromthe 1880's to 1916 the Master Armorer ateach government arsenal was responsiblefor all gages needed in manufacture of thearms for which his arsenal had "technicalresponsibility." Under his eye, skilledworkmen, rather than gage-checkerstrained in mathematics, verified the accu-racy of each gage. The artisan's experiencelargely offset the paucity of the precisionmeasurement devices then available.19 Aseparate gage unit within the OrdnanceInspection Division was a creation of WorldWar I.

Contracting with commercial producers

fell off somewhat toward the end of thenineteenth century. During the Civil Warthe impossibility of equipping the Unionarmies from stores on hand or by runningthe government arsenals at capacity hadforced reliance upon private firms, butdependence upon inexperienced manufac-turers whose output had to be reworked orassembled in government shops was expen-sive. All powder had to be purchased until1907 when a plant was built at PicatinnyArsenal. After the standardization of thefamous Springfield rifle M1903, govern-ment manufacture of small arms as well asmost artillery became the general rule, andup to 1915 the art of ordnance-making inAmerica was chiefly contained within thegovernment establishments.20

While manufacture of arms on an inter-changeable basis was achieved after a fash-ion long before the Civil War. in the nine-teenth century it was still too little devel-oped to enable the Ordnance Departmentto supply spare parts to maintenance com-panies in the field. Maintenance of hisequipment was the user's job; repair workwent back to the government arsenals.

18 Ordnance Reports, II, 523-26. From time to timeright down to the present, commercial producers ortheir congressmen have protested government manu-facture of munitions, but since 1854 the matter hasalways been dismissed without prolonged debate. See,for example, Memorial of the Association of Manufac-turers of Arms, Ammunition, and Equipments pre-sented to the Congressional Joint Committee on theReorganization of the Army in 1878, 45th Cong, 3dSess, S Exec Doc 16, pp. 65-72.

19 Interv with Theodore Fletcher, Supt Milling Div,Springfield Armory, and John Callahan, Chief ofGage Sec, Springfield Armory, Feb 45. Mr. Fletcherbegan his services at the armory in 1896, Mr. Calla-han in 1903.

2 0 ( 1 ) Hist of Springfield Armory, I, 1777-1865,OHF. (2) War Department Annual Reports, Reportof the Chief of Ordnance, 1902, pp. 43, 48, 56, 63-66;1907, pp. 46-71; 1912, p. 916; 1918-19, pp. 926-27.(Hereafter, regardless of variations of title, these re-ports are cited as Ann Rpt CofOrd.)


Hence, one of the knottiest recent problemsof Ordnance Field Service was unknownin earlier years. During the Mexican WarOrdnance rocket and mountain howitzercompanies commanded by Ordnance offi-cers served as combat troops, but thereafterOrdnance units in the field were assignedonly to supply.21 Ordnance officers com-manding depots or arsenals were responsi-ble for storing and issuing arms andammunition and, after troop demobiliza-tion for collecting repairable weapons forarsenal overhaul and reconditioning. Peri-odic inspection of matériel stored in depotsor at the arsenals obtained all through theyears. But Field Service, as such, was notestablished until after World War I.

The Ordnance Department enjoyedwide public confidence during its first hun-dred years. Occasional criticisms of Ameri-can military equipment were usually for-gotten as soon as the Ordnance Depart-ment had remedied a particular weakness.As American industrial genius began toemerge just before mid-century, America'sfaith in its own capacities, military andother, began to grow. Belief that Americanordnance was equal to any demands thatmight be made upon it encouraged anunconcern over European munitions devel-opments. What matter that foreign powersadopted machine guns a decade before theUnited States? If this country lagged be-hind a little in one field or another, whenneed arose American ingenuity could becounted on to overcome the handicapquickly. Entrenched on the North Ameri-can continent with a friendly neighbor tothe north and relatively feeble, even iftroublesome, neighbors to the south, theUnited States felt no call to devote thoughtand money to making instruments of war.National energies were directed towardexploiting the natural resources of the con-

tinent and building up industrial might forpeaceful ends. The Army had alwaysfought through to victory in the past, soAmericans reasoned, and, were ill chanceto plunge the country into another war,again American arms would triumph. Noone was troubled about deficiencies inAmerican ordnance.

World War I

When war broke out on the continent ofEurope in 1914, the American public re-fused to consider the possibility of UnitedStates involvement. The Ordnance De-partment in the preceding decades haddeveloped orderly routines for supply ofthe small standing Army and as late as thefall of 1916 gave few signs of alarm at hav-ing the Congress make only moderateincreases in appropriations.22 In fact, notthe Congress, but the Chief of Ordnancehimself in the prewar years recommendedreduction of proposed appropriations forsome items of equipment.2 3 The Chief ofOrdnance, Brig. Gen. William B. Crozier,

21 Apparently the violent protest of artillery officersafter the Mexican War put an end to using "artisans"as soldiers. The rivalry between the artillery and theOrdnance Department in the 1840's and 1850'sachieved an acrimony beside which the present-daydifferences among the branches of the armed servicesseem amicable. See Ordnance Reports, II, 462-67.

Probably during the Civil War, as again eightyyears later, Ordnance units occasionally fought in theline when a battle became desperate, but such actionwas not according to the rules.

22 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1916. (2) Army Appropria-tions Bill, 1918. Hearings Before the Committee on Mili-tary Affairs, House of Representatives, pp. 860-917.(Hereafter Congressional Hearings on Army appro-priation bills will be cited as WDAB, S or HR.)

23 The total appropriations for Ordnance increased,but the readiness of the Chief of Ordnance to curtailsome expenditures below those of former years andthe failure of the Department to spend all moniesgranted combined to create the impression that Con-


included in his annual reports for 1915 and1916 recommendations based upon obser-vation of the form the war in Europe wastaking, particularly urging the need ofmore powerful artillery and armored motorcars. He protested the continued insistenceof Congress that government arsenalsmanufacture practically all ordnancematerial unless private concerns couldcompete on price, a condition rarely realiz-able; he pointed out that pursuit of thispolicy would delay expansion of manufac-turing capacity badly needed in any futureemergency.24 But he found reassurance inthe number of American manufacturersthat had undertaken large orders for muni-tions for European governments, althoughhe recognized that plants set up to makeforeign models could not immediately pro-duce American arms and ammunition."The time required for an unpreparedadaptation of this kind is sometimes sur-prising, and in case of emergency would beserious." 25 Still, planning was unhurried.New designs for field and seacoast gun car-riages were begun in 1916 and that sum-mer, in order to equip and train militia inthe use of machine guns, the War Depart-ment bought a few Lewis guns to supple-ment the meagre supply in the hands oftroops on the Mexican border. Yet littlemore than six months before the UnitedStates was to declare war upon a majormilitary power, the Department was justreaching a decision about how to spendthe newly appropriated $12,000,000 ear-marked for procurement of machine guns.26

Before 1918 determination of design andtypes of weapons for the United States

Army lay chiefly with Ordnance officers.Although an Engineer officer, a SignalCorps officer, and usually both a CoastArtillery and a Field Artillery officer servedon the Board of Ordnance and Fortifica-tion and so outnumbered the one Ord-nance member, the Ordnance Departmentitself dominated this body whose recom-mendation was virtually fiat. Indeed, theauthority exercised by the Chief of Ord-nance over decisions as to what weaponsthe U.S. Army should have seems to havegrown during General Crozier's regime. Inthe summer of 1901 the board had pro-tested to the Secretary of War the Ord-nance Department's arrogation unto itselfof the authority and functions vested bylaw in the board. The Secretary of Warapparently ignored the complaint. In De-cember General Crozier, newly appointedChief of Ordnance, won a skirmish overthe question of Ordnance Departmentpower to direct field gun tests. The rest ofthe board had to back down when Crozierpresented a message from the Secretary ofWar declaring that it was his intention "tohave the test of field guns conducted bythe Ordnance Department, through theinstrumentality of Ordnance officers bythe methods of the Ordnance Department,and at the Ordnance Department'splace."27 Thereafter General Crozier,triply fortified by his position as Chief of

gress had been liberal, that the Ordnance Departmenthad usually got what it asked for, and that Ordnanceweaknesses later revealed were not traceable to Con-gressional parsimony. See, for example, WDAB 1916.HR, pp. 666-67, 676-77, 688-90.

24 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1915, pp. 23-26, 29-30; 1916,pp. 20-21, 26-28. The National Defense Act of 1916had recognized the wisdom of placing educational or-ders by permitting public funds to be spent for pro-curing special tooling for private manufacturers will-ing to accept orders. But this provision and the liftingof the requirement of competitive bidding were sohedged about with other restrictions that the so-calledmobilization of industry was theoretical only.

25 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1915, p. 25.26 Ibid., 1916, p. 25.27 Proceedings of the Board of Ordnance and Forti-

fication, 6 Dec 01, p. 103, OHF.


Ordnance, by his recognized stature as anengineer, and by his contributions in thefield of artillery design, went through themotions of deferring to the board and ofheeding reports of special Artillery com-mittees or of Infantry Board members. ButOrdnance Department influence was para-mount. Crozier believed that the techni-cian knew best what combat troopsrequired.28 While occasionally the Secre-tary of War appointed special boards topass upon the respective merits of modelsoffered by rival inventors, ordinarily theservices had little say about what equip-ment they would fight with. The Infantrycould request a more effective service re-volver, the Artillery longer range guns, theCavalry improved saddles and holsters.29

But not until the 1920's were the usingarms to play a primary part in determin-ing military characteristics desired or injudging which model best met require-ments.

The fact of the military unpreparednessof the United States in the spring of 1917is familiar to all the generation that livedthrough that era and to all students of itshistory. The steps belatedly taken to over-come the shortages of trained men andequipment are less well known. Decision toadopt French artillery design in order tospeed procurement for the U.S. Army wasmade before the Ordnance Departmentdiscovered the inescapable problems ofadapting French drawings to Americanmanufacturing processes. Locating facil-ities to produce more familiar items suchas propellants, rifles, and pistols, was ac-complished more successfully. The firstand continuing difficulty was findingenough men competent to cope with thetask.

The Chief of Ordnance had long in-sisted that at least two years were needed

to prepare an officer for Ordnance duty.Ordnance before 1917, as after, was atechnician's job. In April 1917, the De-partment numbered 97 officers; 11,000Ordnance officers were needed for the pro-jected 5,000,000-man army; in actuality5,800 were commissioned from civilian lifebefore the Armistice.30 While two Ord-nance schools for training officers had beenorganized early in the century, both wereclosed in the summer of 1917, presumablybecause they could not accommodateenough students to warrant assignments ofteachers. Officer training then becamesheer improvisation.31 Candidates recruit-ed by combing the training camps for menwith some industrial engineering experi-ence were hurried through special courses,commissioned, and assigned to work whereit was hoped their civilian experiencewould count. So gas engine designers andmanufacturers after a few weeks' instruc-

28 (1) Ibid., 1902-10, 1 9 1 1 - l 7 , passim. (2) Memo,Col James H. Burns, sub: Procurement of Munitions,14 Jan 19. OO 023/424, NA. Testimony to the undis-puted character of General Crozier's authority comesalso from two men attached to the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, for over forty years, Ar thur Adelman,from 1905 to 1916 gun designer, and L. M. Church,personal messenger for General Crozier from 1907 to1909. Intervs with Arthur Adelman and L. M.Church, 27 Jan 49.

29 See, for example: (1) WD SO 227, 1916; (2)WDAB 1918, HR, pp. 915-16; and (3) Ann RptCofOrd, 1916, pp. 17-18. See also below, Ch. VII.

30 Sevellon Brown, The Story of Ordnance in the WorldWar (Washington, 1920), pp. 35, 153-84.

All together the Ordnance Department on Armis-tice Day had 5.954 officers, 62,043 enlisted men, and80,181 civilians. See Rpt D-1 (153), U.S. GeneralStaff, Stat Br, cited in Harvey A. DeWeerd, Produc-tion Lag in the American Ordnance Program, 1917-

1918, pp. 20-21. This is an unpublished doctoral dis-sertation, based upon thorough examination of most ofthe available material, both manuscript and published.Copy in OHF.

31 Capt. William M. Spinrad, "Early History of theOrdnance School," The Ordnance Sergeant, III, 1(1942), 1.


tion became the Ordnance Department'smachine gun "experts,"32 while menfamiliar with materials or products some-what analogous to those of Ordnance wereconverted into "specialists" on other weap-ons and equipment. Nor were all the mencommissioned as Ordnance officers pos-sessed of engineering knowledge. Manycame from fields as remote from Ordnanceas bookselling, law, and the teaching of thehumanities. The resulting difficulties af-fected all aspects of the Ordnance missionfrom design to inspection. In productionand procurement, for example, the differ-ence between the tools and productionmethods of the arsenals and those of com-mercial industry had to be harmonized,but the first step had to be the education orre-education alike of Regular Army Ord-nance officers and officers brought in fromcivilian jobs. That the hasty and inevitablysuperficial training turned out a corps ofofficers even moderately effective is themiracle.33

Whereas provision for officer trainingwas insufficient, no plans for enlisted men'straining existed at all. In years past, troopsin the line had themselves been expectedto keep their equipment in serviceablecondition; since equipment needing moreextensive repairs had been sent to thegovernment arsenals where workers ascivilians were not subject to any Armytraining, the Ordnance Department hadmade no effort to develop courses of in-struction for men in the ranks. Yet in amodern army the high degree of mecha-nization made special schooling for enlistedmen essential, especially in techniques ofmaintenance. In September 1917 theSecretary of War authorized establishmentof the first schools for "enlisted specialists,"where in manufacturing centers in Amer-ica and later in France nearly 11,000 men

were trained.34 Many times that numberwere needed.

But field maintenance depended uponmore than trained officers and men backof the front lines; it depended upon an or-derly flow of spare parts. Want of parts forautomotive vehicles, in the judgment ofone observer, came close to disruptingcompletely the AEF supply and transportsystem: ". . . it is generally conceded bythose who were in authority and by thosewho were in a position to understand thesituation that the Armistice came just intime to prevent this major catastrophe." 35

Exaggerated though this statement maybe, the fact remains that a serious futureproblem was here foreshadowed. Lack ofexperience prevented sound guesses ofwhat parts would be needed in what quan-tity, while improper numbering, a bafflingmultiplicity of parts, and, finally, faultyorganization of handling contributed tothe chaos. From the disastrous confusionover maintenance and supply, the Armylearned that planned procedures must beevolved. Creation of the Division of Pur-chase, Storage, and Traffic in August 1918eased matters for the last months of thewar, and in 1919 the Ordnance Depart-ment was to organize its Field ServiceDivision.

Even more alarming than the threat-ened breakdown in overseas maintenancewas the initial lag in production of major

32 "Before the war, a single Ordnance officer . . .had served as the expert 'staff' on automatic weapons.. . . Certainly not more than four other officers of theOrdnance Department in the field could have quali-fied as machine-gun Experts." Brown, The Story ofOrdnance in the World War, p. 34.

33 Ibid., pp. 32-36.34 (1) Ibid., pp. 153-84. (2) Spinrad, op. cit., pp.

2-4.35 W. G. Burgan, The Spare Parts Problem and a

Plan, incl to ltr, Department of the Army (AGAM-PM 451.9 (30 Mar 48) CSGSP/D7), 6 Apr 48, OHF.


items—artillery, artillery ammunition,and, to a lesser extent, trench warfare ma-tériel. The number of field guns manufac-tured in this country after 1 April 1917and shipped to France before 11 Novem-ber 1918 was only 815, and the AEF wasalmost entirely dependent upon the Frenchand the British through 1917 and 1918 foreverything except rifles and small armsammunition.36 The large orders for Amer-ican artillery in 1917 indicate not onlyfears lest foreign supply not suffice but alsonational pride in having the U.S. Armyequipped with American guns. The rea-sons for the production lag deservescrutiny.

First, time was necessary for tooling upfor any big production job. The Chief ofOrdnance had repeatedly pointed out thateighteen months must be allowed from theplacing of orders to the beginning of large-scale production, a warning that had fallenon deaf ears. The Council of National De-fense, created in August 1916, and its sub-sidiary Advisory Commission formed inDecember, had evolved some sound gen-eral ideas of procurement procedures but,before the declaration of war, had barelybegun to act upon them. Next was theslowness with which the War Departmentarrived at decisions about what weaponsit wanted.37 It was two full months afterthe declaration of war before higher au-thority decided to adopt French artillerycalibers and put in motion the plan to ob-tain drawings from the French Govern-ment for 75-mm. guns and 105-mm. and155-mm. howitzers and ammunition. Sixmonths after that the French drawings ar-rived, only to prove not immediatelyadaptable to American production proc-esses. Indeed, the drawings for Frenchshells were found to contain so many errorsthat the standard joke among the engineers

of the Ordnance Department describedthese drawings as the ones the French hadintended the German Government to ob-tain through secret sources. For manufac-ture of machine guns large orders were notplaced until 20 June 1917; the specialboard had first to submit its recommenda-tions and then wait for War Departmentred tape to unwind. Congressional adher-ence to peacetime restrictions on govern-ment spending further hampered negotia-tion of contracts; insistence on competitivebidding and allocation of funds for speci-fied purposes were the chief sources ofcomplications.38

The most frequently cited reason for thedelays in producing complete ordnanceitems was the Department's handicap inthe race for facilities. War Department ac-quiescence in allowing the Navy firstchance to contract with established indus-trial firms and the decision to permit com-panies with foreign orders to completethem left the Ordnance Department with

36 Crowell. America's Munitions 1917-1918, p. 90.Unless otherwise noted, the data in the paragraphs

that follow are derived from the careful study of De-Weerd, Production Lag in the American OrdnanceProgram, 1917-1918. Copy in OHF.

37 Sharp criticism was hurled at the War Depart-ment in general and the Ordnance Department inparticular for not having profited from reports of ob-servers sent overseas. The accusations were that Ord-nance Department failure to make use of descriptionsof foreign matériel had needlessly delayed design andprocurement of weapons proved in modern combat.Ltrs, Col Spencer Colby to Army War College, 26 Feb15, OO 321.12/193 and 29 Dec 15, OO 231.12/121,cited in Edmund Littell, Procurement Problems ofWorld War I, p. 9, OHF.

38 See discussion by F. A. Scott, in 1917 chairmanof the General Munitions Board and later of the WarIndustries Board, "Plans for an Unplanned Conflict,"Army Ordnance, XVI, 91 (1935), 8.

Explicit permission to procure gages without com-petitive bidding was an exception introduced by theNational Defense Act of 1916. But as late as January1917 the Ordnance Department had placed few or-ders for gages. WDAB 1918, HR, pp. 865-66.


little choice but to build new facilitiesfrom the ground up.39 Competition withinthe Army accentuated the problem, as theCoast Artillery, Signal Corps, Corps of En-gineers, and Medical Department also hadhuge procurement programs to meet, and,whenever possible, pre-empted factories,materials, and labor that the OrdnanceDepartment needed desperately.40 Everyservice fended for itself as best it could. Be-fore March 1918 when the President be-stowed large powers on the War IndustriesBoard, no clear scheme of priorities ob-tained and vital Ordnance orders got side-tracked. While it is a moot questionwhether or not the Department's inabilityto commandeer plants for ordnance manu-facture was the primary cause of the pro-duction lag, it was unquestionably onemajor contributing factor.

In addition to difficulties imposed fromabove, Ordnance suffered from some cir-cumstances beyond the control of any gov-ernment agency in 1917. Labor shortagesin many areas impeded contractors. Facili-ties found, materials delivered, labor re-cruited, producers were still seriouslyhandicapped by a dearth of men with in-dustrial managerial experience. Less obvi-ous than many elements in the procure-ment situation, this lack of experiencedmen at key points created much confusionotherwise avoidable.

On the other hand, the procurementprogram had some weaknesses that greaterforesight within the Ordnance Depart-ment might have minimized, if not whollyeliminated. Most important was the lack ofinformation on where bottlenecks weremost likely to crop up and of planned pro-cedures to anticipate them. Obviously, thenumber of weapons completed must hingeon the number of components shortest insupply, usually those most difficult to

make. Thousands of rifle barrels could beof no use without thousands of receivers.Yet the Ordnance Department operatedfor over a year without any system forchecking o n balanced production o f m a t é r i e l .In late May 1918 a Progress Section

in the Estimates and Requirements Divi-sion was set up. Thereafter, repetition ofearlier mistakes whereby there were moreguns than gun carriages, more gun carri-ages than recuperators, more machinedshell bodies than booster assemblies washalted. But it was too late to have effectupon deliveries of completed weapons.41

Hence, some of the errors derived frompolicy made at higher levels and somewere the fault of the Ordnance Depart-ment itself. False confidence in the ade-quacy of American production capacity atfirst encouraged the Department in a com-placency later paralleled only by that ofthe American public in prophesying quickvictory over Japan immediately after PearlHarbor. The exaggerated assurance ofApril 1917 that everything was ready wasin turn succeeded by belief that productionwas hopelessly behind requirements evenin November 1918. General John J.Pershing had doubled General Crozier's

39 The Council of National Defense in April 1917decreed "that as between the Army and the Navypriority should be given to such needs of the Navy asare intended to be completed within the period of oneyear." Minutes of the Council of National Defense, I,163, cited in DeWeerd, op. cit., p. 69.

40 For fuller discussion of this situation, see Grosve-nor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War(New York, 1923), pp. 111-12, and B. Crowell andR. F. Wilson, How America Went to War, The Armies ofIndustry (New Haven, 1921), I, 2-9.

41 On 75-mm. shells, in fact, the imbalance of com-pleted components lasted till after the Armistice. On 1December 1918 the totals of completed componentswere 30,600,000 primers, 26,800,000 cartridge cases,12,000,000 fuzes, 13,900,000 shell bodies, 10,900,000boosters. See Rpt 5, The Production of 75-mm H. E.Shell, p. 24, U.S. General Staff, Stat Br, cited in De-Weerd, op. cit., p. 197.


MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM B. CROZIER,Chief of Ordnance, 1901-18.

original estimates of quantities needed,and scheduling that increase had furtherdelayed the first deliveries. Out of the con-fusion came one clear fact: regardless ofany mistakes the General Staffer Secre-tary of War might make, the OrdnanceDepartment itself must have a more effi-cient scheme of action. It must reappraiseits organization, plan industrial mobiliza-tion of the future, and train more men andofficers more fully.

Experiments in departmental reorgani-zation had begun early in 1918, immedi-ately after General Crozier's transfer to theWar Council. But the new arrangement,based on a functional division of responsi-bility, heightened rather than lessenedconfusion because operating under sepa-rate divisions for procurement, manufac-turing, inspection, and supply prevented

anyone from knowing the exact status ofany order or any equipment at any exactmoment. A Control Bureau at the top, in-tended to co-ordinate activities, was un-able to assemble necessary informationquickly enough to apply it. Consequentlyupon Brig. Gen. Clarence C. Williams'appointment as Acting Chief of Ordnancein May 1918, he substituted an Estimatesand Requirements Division for the ControlBureau and introduced weekly conferencesbetween division heads, which cut throughmuch of the administrative tangle. Moresweeping changes had to wait till after thewar.42

Meanwhile, one significant change tookplace: the decentralization of procure-ment. The delays and complexities of hav-ing every Ordnance contract go throughthe office of the Chief of Ordnance led tothe decision to delegate authority to dis-trict offices in eleven sections of the coun-try. This innovation, later heralded asrevolutionizing, lay less in the creation ofgeographically scattered offices with con-siderable independence of action than inthe fact that civilians were put in charge.For the former, the federal system of localand national government offered prece-dent, while the regional Federal Reservebanks set a more explicit pattern. But theeffectiveness of the new arrangement de-rived from turning over to local industrialleaders responsibility for mobilizing localcivilian industry for war production. "Thepurpose of this unusual arrangement," theChief of Ordnance wrote after the war,"was to secure a measure of elasticity anda degree of discretion for the district chiefswhich they could not obtain if they were

42 Ordnance Department Office Orders 8, 31 May17; 104, 4 Jan 18; 222, 25 May 18; 297, 10 Aug 18. Allin OHF. (Hereafter Office Orders will be cited asODO.) For further discussion, see below, Ch. IV.


MAJ. GEN. CLARENCE C. WIL-LIAMS, Chief of Ordnance, 1918-30.

under military discipline; to inspire amongmanufacturers the sense of cooperationand reciprocal understanding the presenceof a civilian chief was calculated toarouse. . . . These objects were at-tained." 43

Responsibility placed upon districtchiefs was coupled with authority. BecauseCol. Guy E. Tripp, who organized the dis-tricts, succeeded in finding unusually ablemen to head the districts, the delays inplacing contracts and getting ordnanceproduction started began to diminish im-mediately. Colonel Tripp, in civilian lifechairman of the board of directors of theWestinghouse Electrical and Manufactur-ing Company, encouraged short cuts. Busi-ness procedures, direct and informal, su-perseded military. Although actual nego-tiation and execution of formal contractsremained in Washington, the preliminariesto the legal work, the later supervision offulfilling the contracts, and finally the all-important inspections for acceptance ofmatériel fell to the district staffs. The pro-nounced rise in the production curve afterthe districts began to function cannot, ofcourse, be attributed solely to their work.44

Yet Ordnance officers were so impressedwith the value of the system that as the warwent on the scope of district operations waswidened and two more districts wereadded. Decentralization in Ordnance pro-curement was thus proceeding at the verytime that centralization of controls athigher levels was being contrived by vest-ing power more largely in the War Indus-tries Board. Though the Ordnance districtoffices disappeared after winding up theiraffairs in 1919, they were re-established in1922 because they were believed to be themost effective agencies for industrial mo-bilization.

Published versions of what happened in

1917-18 have taken one or the other of twolines: violent criticism of the OrdnanceDepartment for its slowness in meeting theArmy's needs, or extravagant eulogies ofthe efficiency that converted a cabbagepatch into a munitions factory in eightmonths. Both are partly justified. HadFrance and Great Britain not supplied the

41 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1919, p. 28.44 Figures giving exactly comparable data before

and after the creation of the districts are not obtain-able. Statistics showing the rise in volume of con-tracts placed, though not of orders completed, offeronly partial evidence. Thus, of contracts totaling$1,073,305,731 entered into by the Ordnance Depart-ment before mid-December 1917, only $28,715,779worth had been delivered—less than 3 percent. By 1November 1918, the value of contracts let was $3,185,-559,623. No computation of the percentage filled ispossible, for manufacturers of many items apparentlywere paid for deliveries made in 1919. See Clark B.Firestone, The Ordnance Districts, 1918-19 (Washington,1920).


U.S. Army with arms and ammunition al-most to the end of the fighting, the achieve-ment of United States readiness for full-scale production nineteen months afterdeclaration of war would not have mat-tered. Defeat or victory would have beenalready determined. Yet, given time, theOrdnance Department proved it could or-ganize a colossal production program.During the next twenty years, the Armywas to apply many of the lessons of WorldWar I. The assumption that the UnitedStates always could meet any emergencywas never again to induce such far-flung,fateful complacency within the OrdnanceDepartment.

In one realm, unhappily, the OrdnanceDepartment failed to profit fully from ex-perience. It failed to follow the work offoreign munitions makers closely enoughto keep American ordnance abreast of sig-nificant new developments. Little use wasmade of information brought back by of-ficers sent abroad. After the appearance ofthe important report submitted in 1919 bya carefully chosen group of Army officers,usually called the Westervelt Board, nosimilar bodies were created empowered toexplore the whole field of ordnance design,foreign as well as American. Money tobuild American weapons incorporatingEuropean improvements would, to be sure,not have been forthcoming from the Con-gresses of the 1920's and 1930's—the nationwas intent on forgetting about war—butthe Army would at least have compre-hended more clearly what it had to com-pete against. Military observers in Londonand Berlin in the 1930's were to tendernumerous reports on changes in Britishand German equipment, but if officers inWashington gave weight to the informa-tion, they took no steps to establish an effi-cient routine that would permit Ordnance

designers to adopt useful European inno-vations.45 Yet American ignorance of anydetails of German and French munitionsdevelopments preceding 1917 had admit-tedly had grave consequences. Realizationthat in twentieth century Europe a full-blown industry was giving constant atten-tion to devising new weapons and refiningold did not sink in sufficiently upon theWar Department. Inattention to whatcompetitors had available was eventuallyto prove extremely costly. Whether itstemmed from overconfidence in Ameri-can technological genius or from apathyderiving from conviction that the Congresswould not grant money for military re-search, this disregard of foreign develop-ments after the early twenties must consti-tute a serious charge against the OrdnanceDepartment.

In other fields Ordnance officers were toput their hard-won experience to effectiveuse. Out of World War I came several im-portant changes, changes in methods andplanning and, still more basic, changes inthinking. The Ordnance Department hadlearned that it could not operate efficientlywithout a considerable body of trainedmen. Enlisted men as well as officers mustbe taught Ordnance techniques of supplyand maintenance and be familiarized withsome of the problems of design and pro-duction. The upshot was the launching, inthe summer of 1919, of a school for en-listed men which in one form or anotherhas carried on without break to the pres-ent. The Ordnance Department, like allother units of the Army and Navy, had

45 See Ch. VII, below. Some officers had long ap-preciated the importance of having U.S. Army Ord-nance experts in Europe. In 1901 the Secretary of Warauthorized the Department to send two officers tostudy special problems. Ann Rpt CofOrd. 1901, p. 10.


also discovered that careful plans for war-time use of private industry must be socomplete that loss of time and waste effortin mass production would be reduced to aminimum. Much of the twenty years thatfollowed the 1918 Armistice was to be ded-icated, consequently, to producing blue-prints for industrial mobilization. Estab-lishment of the Army Industrial College in1924 grew out of recognition that militaryprocurement planning must have special-ists trained for just that. A third lesson ofWorld War I was the need for a staff with-in the Ordnance Department assigned tothe sole task of organizing storage and is-sue of matériel and qualified to supervisemaintenance of equipment. The creationof Field Service was the answer.

The final change in the workings of theOrdnance Department was the least im-mediately apparent but, in long-term ef-fects, the most fundamental. The Chief ofOrdnance ceased to be the Czar whose dic-tates on military characteristics and designof weapons the using arms accepted with-out demur. No General Crozier was everagain to issue to the Infantry or the FieldArtillery or the Cavalry equipment thatthe Ordnance Department had decidedwas suitable. Partly because GeneralCrozier's prestige had been badly shakenby the Senate Investigating Committee inDecember 1917,46 and partly because Gen-

eral Williams, Chief of Ordnance fromMay 1918 to 1930, had himself seen over-seas service, the combat arms thereafterwere to have a constantly growing sharein deciding what type and what model ofweapons they would employ. General Wil-liams is reported to have declared upon hisreturn from Europe in the spring of 1918:"If the fighting men want elephants, weget them elephants." 47 Ordnance officersin Washington would no longer exercisetheir technicians' prerogative to insist thatmice or mules would suffice. How far Gen-eral Williams' influence counted in inau-gurating the change whereby the InfantryBoard and other service boards stipulatedtheir requirements and passed judgmentupon what the Ordnance Department pro-duced to meet them may be a question.Certainly his attitude, born of personal ob-servation of combat, made infinitely easierthe transition to the new order. The Ord-nance Department became to an evergreater degree the skilled servant, not themaster, of the using arms.

46 See Hearings Before the Committee on Military Af-fairs, Pt. I, S, 65th Cong, 2d Sess.

47 Quoted by Arthur Adelman, Chief of ArtilleryAmmunition Branch, Industrial Division, OCO, inan interview with the author, 27 Jan 49. For a similarpronouncement made by General Williams in thesummer of 1917 in France, see History of the Servicesof Supply, The Ordnance Department, A.E.F., OO023/423, NA.

CHAPTER II

The Ordnance Department:1919-40

The nearly twenty years between theArmistice of November 1918 and the Ger-man Anschluss with Austria in March 1938saw the American public gradually shiftfrom hope in the possibility of enduringpeace to uneasy perception that aggressiveforce was again taking command of the in-ternational scene. For the Army, and forthe Ordnance Department in particular,changes in public opinion, expressedthrough Congressional appropriations, setthe pattern of activity; the amount ofmoney available for maintenance, devel-opment, and manufacture of fightingequipment always imposed the limits with-in which the Ordnance Department couldwork. Had judgment invariably beenfaultless in interpreting the importance offoreign arms developments, had the Armyevolved the most comprehensive, sounddoctrine of what weapons were needed formechanized warfare and how an army inthe field should use them, and had theOrdnance Department devised an idealscheme of procurement and maintenanceof munitions, all this must still have beenuseless without money enough to turnideas into matériel. Hence, funds voted bythe Congress, generally adhering to thedictates of American public opinion, deter-mined the scope of Ordnance work.

At the end of World War I the United

States, shocked by recent discovery of itsmilitary weakness, appeared to be ready tosupport an army large enough and suffi-ciently well armed to prevent a repetitionof the unpreparedness of 1917. The Ord-nance Department was instructed toassemble, store, and maintain the equip-ment that had belatedly been manufac-tured in the United States or had beencaptured from the enemy. These storesalone might serve, so the Congress couldbelieve, to guarantee American militarystrength for some years. Belief in the needof a sizable military establishment enduredonly long enough to put on the statutebooks the National Defense Act of June1920 before a reaction swept away all ideaof American participation in internationalaffairs and, at the same time, interest inthe Army. The slogan "Back to Nor-malcy," which carried Warren G. Hardinginto the White House, spelled not onlyrepudiation of the League of Nations butrejection of plans to build a strong peace-time Army. Budget cuts for the WarDepartment soon made unattainable theArmy of 280,000 men and 18,000 officersauthorized by the National Defense Actand reduced the Ordnance Departmentprogram to a shadow of the substancehoped for.

Meanwhile, despite American refusal to

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: 1919-40 31

join the League of Nations, a steadilymounting pressure to work for permanentpeace began to make itself felt. This pres-sure somewhat altered the temper of theCongress, encouraging small appropria-tions for national defense. The navalbuilding truce of 1922, followed by theLocarno Pact in 1925, and the high pointof faith in world peace reached with thesigning of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in1928, made reasonable the hope that theArmy need be only a police force. If warcould be outlawed, Ordnance equipmentcould be kept at a minimum.

The depression of the thirties called asudden halt to America's efforts to play aleading role in establishing permanentworld peace. The general attitude now be-came: "Attend to problems at home andlet other nations take care of themselves."Appropriations for the Ordnance Depart-ment in the early thirties were reduced tosave money, apparently without regard toachieving any purely moral goal. Tem-porarily, additional funds from PWA andWPA bolstered the Ordnance Department.The public could view the later, largerallocations of money for Ordnance as partof a make-work program, primarily ameans of shoring up the whole economy.Absorbed in domestic troubles, the UnitedStates turned its back upon Europe andAsia. The Italo-Ethiopian war, the Ger-man occupation of the Rhineland, the"dress rehearsal" of the Spanish Civil War,and the Japanese "incident" in Manchuriafailed to rouse profound apprehensions inthe United States. Conscientious militaryobservers could report upon Germanrearmament and append data on newweapons, but the Ordnance Department,even if it digested the information, couldnot act upon it.

A partial awakening to the new aggres-

sive spirit abroad that might involve theUnited States, rigid isolation notwithstand-ing, came with the German march intoAustria in March 1938. It is reasonable tobelieve that this move helped the passageof the first act permitting the War Depart-ment to place "educational orders" withprivate industry. Antedating by over twoyears President Franklin D. Roosevelt'sproclamation of a national emergency, thepermission to spend money to give com-mercial concerns experience in manufac-turing munitions marked the beginning ofa new era. The next eighteen months,while public opinion veered steadily to-ward acceptance of national rearmament,saw greatly increased activity in the Ord-nance Department. Yet by 1940 the taskwas just begun.

Because ordnance matériel takes yearsto design, test, and manufacture, and be-cause it takes years to teach troops to usethe finished product, full understanding ofthe Ordnance situation in 1940 calls forexamination of the problems, achieve-ments, and shortcomings of the OrdnanceDepartment in the preceding twenty years.From 1920 to 1940 plans had always to beshaved down, operations were always re-stricted, projects were frequently stoppedshort of completion, all for lack of money.This fact must be borne in mind, but itcannot in itself explain 1940. Hence it isnecessary to explore the evolution of care-ful industrial mobilization plans; the per-formance of the newly created FieldService Division; the mapping and partialexecution of a comprehensive artillerydevelopment program; the experimenta-tion with tank design; the difficultiesbesetting Ordnance designers in develop-ing weapons that would satisfy the usingarms, yet, if possible, anticipate the emer-gence of Army doctrine adapted to


modern mechanized warfare; and finally,the consequences of faulty use of technicalintelligence about new foreign equipment.Inasmuch as ordnance cannot be hastilyimprovised, the ideas that took shape dur-ing the peace years demand attention.Activities long established and conductedalong accepted lines warrant no discussionhere, for they represent no new facet ofOrdnance Department problems. The or-ganization of the Department must bedescribed briefly in order to supply theframework within which operations werecarried on. Some analysis of the budgetand yearly appropriations must, of course,be included. But though ever-presentfinancial considerations, be it repeated,and the earmarking of sums for particularprojects limited Ordnance activities be-tween wars, the pattern was not deter-mined by money alone.

Organization, 1919-39

World War I proved to the War Depart-ment and all its branches that its admin-istrative machinery must be revamped;what had sufficed for the tiny standingArmy of the early years of the century couldnot bear the load that emergency put uponit.1 The National Defense Act of 1920,which established the new over-all organi-zation of the War Department, affected theOrdnance Department immediately in tworespects. The first was the increase in thenumber of officers and enlisted men as-signed to Ordnance. Before 1917 the Ord-nance Department had been limited to 97officers; after 1920 it was allotted a majorgeneral, two brigadier generals, 350 otherofficers, and 4,500 enlisted men. Notablethough this increase would appear, it wasonly 1.9 and 1.6 percent, respectively, ofthe maximum officer and enlisted strengthallowed the whole Army, and in actuality

for twenty years it was never achieved.The second and greater consequence ofthe act for the Ordnance Department layin the provision of Section 5a, which gavethe Assistant Secretary of War "supervi-sion of the procurement of all military sup-plies and other business of the WarDepartment pertaining thereto and theassurance of adequate provision for themobilization of matériel and industrial or-ganizations essential to wartime needs." 2

Co-ordination of purchasing activitiesthrough the Assistant Secretary was in-tended to prevent a repetition of the WorldWar I competition for facilities among sep-arate supply bureaus within the Army. Itmeant that all the services of supply hence-forward were to operate both throughmilitary channels by way of the GeneralStaff and through civilian via the AssistantSecretary of War.

The Chief of Ordnance did not wait forCongressional action before reorganizinghis own Department. Because he believedthat the 1918 experience proved the inher-ent weaknesses of any purely functionalplan of organization, General Williamsearly in 1919 realigned responsibilities,setting up a simple, logical scheme which,with minor changes, served as the basicpattern within the Ordnance Departmentall through the peace years. In describinghis plan and the slight revisions he put intoeffect in the fall of 1920, he told a group atthe General Staff College: "There is noquestion in the minds of all of us who havehad experience in the Ordnance Depart-ment but that the subjective system of

1 See. for example: (1) memo, Brig Gen J. H. Rice,Chief Ord Off AEF, for CofOrd, 21 Jun 19, sub: Fun-damental Relations Between the General Staff andOther Branches of the Military Service, OO 320/100,NA; and (2) memo, Brig Gen W. S. Peirce, ActgCofOrd, for CofS, 18 Apr 19, sub: Organization of theArmy on a Peace Footing, OO 320/83, NA.

2 U.S. Statutes at Large, XLI, 764-65.


organization is far superior to the func-tional." 3 "Subjective" meant categories ofweapons, artillery for example, and artil-lery ammunition, small arms, and combatvehicles. The board of officers he had ap-pointed in 1920 to study alternativesworked out the details of the organizationcharts only after careful consideration ofthe relative merits of other systems. Theresult was a division of responsibility byfunction only at the top level. This madethree main units. Design and manufacturewere assigned to one division, maintenanceand distribution to another, while the gen-eral administrative work that imple-mented the other two fell to the third.Within the two operating divisions, lines ofresponsibility were drawn "vertically" ac-cording to type of commodity, a subjectiveor product system.4

Administration was assigned to a Gen-eral Office, and for a time to an Adminis-tration Division as well, which handledfiscal and legal matters for the whole De-partment, hired and trained civilian em-ployees, supervised military training andpersonnel, and maintained records. In-dicative of the new postwar awareness ofproblems of industrial mobilization, a WarPlanning unit was always included as onesubdivision of the General Office. Thoughthe Ordnance district offices, re-estab-lished in 1922, undertook some local plan-ning, most administrative business of theDepartment between 1920 and 1940 wasconcentrated in Washington under theimmediate eye of the Chief of Ordnanceand his staff.

To the three main divisions of the De-partment, the Chief of Ordnance added astaff group to serve as general liaison ontechnical questions. The Technical Staffwas composed of officers and civilians,each a specialist in a particular field ofordnance design or manufacture—field

artillery, coast artillery, ammunition,small arms, tank and automotive equip-ment, or air ordnance. Primarily advisory,the Technical Staff was charged with theresponsibility "to keep informed of thetrend and progress of ordnance develop-ment at home and abroad," and, in keep-ing with this assignment, to act as aclearing house for information on technicalengineering problems and to build up atechnical library in the Ordnance Office.5

Members of the Technical Staff did notthemselves do the creative design work atthe drawing boards and in the shops wherepilot models were built. This was the func-tion of the engineers of ManufacturingService. But the Technical Staff wasauthorized to recommend research proj-ects and to pass upon designs of theManufacturing Service engineers.

Advisory to the chief of the TechnicalStaff was an Ordnance Committee. Cre-ation of this committee marked a true in-novation, for it included representatives ofthe using arms and services. It was the suc-cessor to the Ordnance Board of prewardays but was expressly aimed at giving"the line of the army a greater influenceover the design and development of Ord-nance than it ever possessed in the past.. . ." 6 The chief of the Technical Staff ex-plained: "The line members of the Ord-nance Committee will, therefore, be inti-

3 Maj. Gen. C. C. Williams, Organization andDuties of the Ordnance Department, lecture, GeneralStaff College, 21 Feb 21, OHF.

4 ODO 13, 12 Jan 20; 164, 20 Nov 20, OHF. The

first postwar scheme included a Nitrates Division tomanage the nitrates plants acquired during the war.Later this unit was absorbed into the ManufacturingDivision.

5 ODO 164, 20 Nov 20, p. 4, OHF.6 Memo, Col Golden L'H. Ruggles, Chief of Tech

Staff, OD, for Maj Gen William L. Kenly, Dir MilAeronautics, 21 Jan 19, sub: Assignment of QualifiedOfficers of Line to Tech Staff, OD T-210.3 13/2, Au-thority and Organization, Ordnance CommitteeMinutes, Ord Tech Committee Secretariat files.


mately concerned in establishing the typeto be developed, in passing upon and ap-proving the preliminary studies and thefinal drawings thereof and, lastly, in mak-ing and witnessing the actual test of thematerial and passing final judgment uponits satisfactoriness for use by the service." 7

Not until General George C. Marshall be-came Chief of Staff in 1939 did higher au-thority insist upon reviewing proposedmilitary characteristics. Thus, for twentyyears it was the Ordnance Committee thatput the formal seal of approval upon spec-ifications and designs after satisfactorytrials of pilot models were completed, andwho, after service tests, issued the minutesthat in effect standardized or rendered ob-solete each item of ordnance. As final ap-proval of the General Staff and Secretaryof War on matters of standardization soonbecame practically automatic, OrdnanceCommittee minutes in time constitutedthe orthodox "Bible of Ordnance." Fromthe committee stemmed the Book of Stand-ards, Ordnance Department—the listing ofequipment, type by type and model bymodel, accepted for issue to troops.8

On the operating level, responsibilitywas divided between the ManufacturingService and the Field Service. The Manu-facturing Service designed, developed,produced or procured, and inspected allmatériel and ran the manufacturing arse-nals and acceptance proving grounds. Thetests of experimental models, usually heldat Aberdeen Proving Ground, were con-ducted by Manufacturing Service engi-neers, although the Technical Staff was incharge and prepared the formal reports oftests. When the district offices were recon-stituted in 1922, Manufacturing Servicedirected their activities also. Within theManufacturing Service, the breakdown ofduties of lower echelons was by commod-

ity—ammunition, artillery, aircraft arma-ment, and small arms. Field Service hadcharge of all storage depots, maintenanceand issue of equipment to troops, and allsalvage operations. With the appearanceof the more detailed organization orders of1931, Field Service was assigned prepara-tion of standard nomenclature lists, tech-nical regulations, firing tables, and thetables of organization and basic allow-ances whereby distribution of Ordnancesupplies was to be made. Field Service,like Manufacturing Service, set up sepa-rate operating units, during most of theperiod before 1940 consisting of four divi-sions, Executive, General Supply, Ammu-nition, and Maintenance. Although therewas some shifting of particular duties fromone major division of the Ordnance De-partment to another and some redistribu-tion of tasks and titles within a division,this general pattern remained intact fortwenty years. It was endorsed by the Gen-eral Staff after a thorough survey of theDepartment in 1929.9

7 MD Ibid. (2) Memo, Gen Williams for CofS, 5 Feb19. sub: Assignment of Qualified Officers of the Lineto the Technical Staff, OO 023/428, NA. (3) ODO815, 23 Jul 19, OHF.

8 (1) AR 830-25, 15 Dec 24; 15Jun 27; 15 Jul 31;23 Jul 36. (2) Tech Staff General Instructions 7, 27Sep 24, sub: Book of Standards, Ordnance Department,Authority and Organization, Ordnance CommitteeMinutes, Ord Tech Committee Secretariat files.

See also discussion in Mark Skinner Watson, Chiefof Staff, Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington,1950), pp. 54-55.

9 (1) ODO 412, 22 Jun 22; ODO 425, 28 Aug 22;ODO 573, 1 Dec 24; ODO 10, 20 Jan 31; ODO 27,4 Jun 32; ODO 37, 20 Jun 33; ODO 43, 14 Oct 33;and ODO 1 1 2 , 3 Jun 38, OHF. (2) Survey of OrdDept, 20 Sep 29, OO 320/377, NA.

A good example of a reshuffling of labels withoutfundamental change in assignment of duties was theorder of 1938 placing both the Technical Staff andthe Field Service under a "Chief of Military Service."Both groups carried on their independent activitiesas before. See ODO 1 1 2 , 3 Jun 38, and ODO 122 ,31Jul 39, OHF.


The orders of 1931 made more explicitallocation of duties in the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, than had earlier organizationorders. Issued shortly before the announce-ment of the first War Department Indus-trial Mobilization Plan, the new organiza-tion was "intended basically for eitherpeace or war," a scheme that would enablechanges in time of emergency to be con-fined to expansion by elevating branchesto sections and sections to divisions.10 Theonly significant change was the assign-ment to Field Service of responsibility fordepots attached to arsenals and for Ord-nance sections of Army general depots.

Revision in the summer of 1939 in turnreflected the reviving importance of theOrdnance Department, as the Congress,viewing the troubled world situation, ap-propriated money for educational ordersand over-all Army expansion. While the1939 organization plan of the Departmentwas in essentials identical with the earlier,the order clearly specified new lines of ac-tivity. For example, the Technical Staffwas charged with arranging to furnishqualified men to represent Ordnance onthe technical committees of other branchesof the War Department and was to reviewtechnical and training regulations, super-vise training of Reserve officers assignedto Technical Staff work, and pass upon re-quests for loans and sales under theAmerican Designers Act and upon appli-cations for patents to determine theirstatus regarding military secrecy. In theIndustrial Service, as the ManufacturingService was relabeled in 1938, a new Pro-curement Planning Division was createdto expedite execution of educational or-ders placed with commercial producersand to prepare the path for greater co-op-eration with private industry. Training ofReserve officers here was also specifically

directed. Field Service similarly added aunit, a War Plans and Training Division,and was instructed to so organize its Gen-eral Supply Division that it could handlesales to foreign governments and other au-thorized purchasers.11 In almost everyparticular the new enumeration of dutiesbespoke a comprehension of emergencyneeds, though war in Europe had not yetbroken out. As far as paper organizationwent, the Office of the Chief of Ordnancehad girded its loins in advance.

The arsenals, manufacturing installa-tions long antedating World War I, werenot profoundly affected by reassignmentsof responsibility in Washington. At thehead of each arsenal was an officer of theDepartment who combined the roles ofcommanding officer of the installation as amilitary post and manager of a large in-dustrial plant. His dual position was asmall-scale replica of that of the Chief ofOrdnance in relation to the Army as awhole. The commanding officers of thearsenals were allowed small staffs of lowerranking officers, in the lean days of themid-twenties about four each, later sevenor eight. One officer was usually assignedto the arsenal experimental unit, one asWorks Manager or Production Manager,and one to head the Field Service depotafter the Field Service installation at thearsenal was set up separately. Most of theadministrative personnel and all the pro-duction workers in the shops were civilian.Many of them were Civil Service careermen with long years of arsenal service; itwas not unusual to find foremen who hadbeen employees at one arsenal for thirty orforty years. These men supplied the con-tinuity in operations that the officers,transferred after, at most, a four-year tour

10 ODO 10, 20 Jan 31, p. 1, OHF.11 ODO 122, 31 Jul 39, OHF.


of duty at any one station, could not give.The old-timers, possessed of the know-howof ordnance manufacture, were the menwho perpetuated the art. Though thissuperimposition of a perpetual successionof relatively inexperienced officers uponcivilian administrators and workmen longexpert in their own fields might appear topresage conflict, relations between the mil-itary and civilians in the peace years wereas a rule easy to the point of cordiality.

Design or redesign of any piece ofequipment might be undertaken by engi-neers in the Office, Chief of Ordnance, inWashington or might be assigned to menat one of the arsenals. Before 1940, regard-less of the birthplace of a design, the firstpilot was always built at an arsenal. Thearsenal chosen depended on the article,since the postwar reorganization allottedeach establishment particular items forwhich it alone had "technical responsibil-ity." Thus, one or another of the six man-ufacturing arsenals filed and kept up todate the drawings and specifications forevery article made or purchased by theDepartment. Rock Island, for example,assembled and kept all data on the manu-facture of tanks; Frankford the drawingsand specifications on optical and fire con-trol instruments; and Springfield Armorythe data on rifles and aircraft armament.12

No two arsenals necessarily had the sameinternal organization at any given mo-ment. The commanding officer couldalign his staff as he saw fit as long as thearsenal mission was achieved.13 Basic re-search laboratories were maintained atevery arsenal save Springfield and Water-vliet; every one had an experimental unit,whether within or outside an engineeringdepartment, and each had its shops and itsadministrative division. When arsenal em-ployees numbered only a few hundred, ar-

senal organization was simple; it waselaborated somewhat when, toward theend of the thirties, activity increased. Warplanning sections were established in 1935and charged with maintaining liaison withdistrict offices and with commercial pro-ducers who had to be furnished blueprintsand descriptions of processes of manufac-ture of the weapons or parts they mightcontract to make.14 Training inspectors foraccepting the products of contractingfirms was always an arsenal duty.

After the Armistice the district officeswere closed one after the other, as con-tracts were terminated and salvage opera-tions neared completion, until only Chi-cago and Philadelphia survived.15 Whensurplus matériel, raw materials, and ma-chine tools still undisposed of had beenturned over to the arsenals or field depots,no function appeared to remain for pro-curement districts. But by 1922 War De-partment stress on planning industrialmobilization pointed to the wisdom of re-creating a skeleton organization of districtoffices. Establishing these offices in peace-time to prepare for wartime procurementwas a totally new departure. It showedhow fully the War Department hadlearned that ordnance manufacture de-mands a skill not to be acquired overnight.Thirteen districts were formed covering thesame areas as in the war, except that a SanFrancisco office was split off from the St.Louis District. Like the arsenals, the dis-tricts were a responsibility of the Manu-

12 Aircraft armament immediately after World WarI had constituted a separate division of Manufactur-ing Service with an office at Wright Field in Dayton,Ohio, but the reduction of staff in the summer of 1921led to the transfer of this activity to Springfield Ar-mory. (1) ODO 847, 15 Aug 19, OHF. (2) Hist ofSpringfield Armory, 1918-41, OHF.

13 ODO 854, 14 Aug 19, OHF.14 See arsenal histories, MSs in OHF.15 ODO 207, 29 Jan 21, OHF.


facturing Service. The civilian districtchiefs were leading businessmen familiarwith the industrial facilities of their re-gions. Each was assigned a Regular Armyofficer as an assistant and each had aclerk. Before 1939 this was the wholestaff. The chiefs assembled records of com-panies' war performance, made surveys ofpotential ordnance manufacturing capac-ity, and kept alive in their districts someunderstanding of Ordnance procurementproblems. The value of the districts layless in what they accomplished during thepeace years than in their maintaining instandby condition the administrative ma-chinery for procurement.16 Meanwhile,probably the best public relations deviceof these years in nourishing the interest ofAmerican industry in Ordnance manufac-ture was the Army Ordnance Association,founded in 1920, together with its maga-zine, Army Ordnance.

Apart from the proving grounds, manu-facturing arsenals, loading plants, and dis-trict offices, all field installations were theresponsibility of Field Service. This newpostwar service found itself obliged to or-ganize and expand simultaneously. Mani-festly, the handful of depots and repair ar-senals that had existed before 1917 weretotally insufficient to handle the storageand maintenance of the vast quantities ofmatériel accumulated at the end of thewar. Nor did earlier experience offer anypattern of permanent organization andprocedure. In September 1919 the Provi-sional Manual for Ordnance Field Serviceappeared, embodying the principles thathad proved sound in overseas operations;upon this basis Field Service proceeded toorganize the details of its work in thiscountry.17 Meanwhile, though makeshiftarrangements were necessary to providetemporary storage for the tons of matériel

that had accumulated in the United Statesimmediately after the Armistice and thatwere soon augmented by shipments ofsupplies returned from overseas, commonsense dictated formulation of some settledpolicy on what stocks of munitions as wellas what manufacturing facilities were tobe maintained for the future. The reportsof the so-called Munitions Board, ap-pointed by the Chief of Ordnance in thesummer of 1919 to wrestle with this prob-lem, formed the basis upon which plans forstorage and maintenance were built. Yetit is worth noting that the failure of theGeneral Staff and the Secretary of War toact upon some of the board's recommen-dations imposed upon the Ordnance De-partment obligation to store and maintainfar larger quantities of munitions than theboard believed could reasonably bemarked as primary reserve. This reserveaffected scheduling for the manufactureof new ammunition.18

The decision approved by the Secretaryof War was to create a network of depots,some reserved for ammunition, the rest forother ordnance supplies. The five depotsbuilt during World War I along the Atlan-tic seaboard to serve as forwarding centersfor overseas shipments were designated as

16 (1) Ann Rpt SW, 1921, p. 172; 1922, pp. 249-50.(2) ODO 404, 17 May 22, OHF. (3) Wayne W. Cow-an, "Ordnance District Operation in War," Army Ord-nance, XIV, 80 (1933). 96-99.

17 (1) Provisional Manual for Ordnance Field Serv-ice, September 1919 (Washington, 1920), NA. (2)Field Service, . . . General Duties and Functions, 1May 1921 (Washington, 1921), pp. 8-9, NA.

18 (1) Memo, CofOrd for CofS, 29 Jan 21, sub: De-velopment of a Munitions Policy, and incl, memo,Board of Officers, appointed by Ord Office Order798, for CofOrd, 14 Jan 21, sub: Final Rpt of Bd,OKD 470/135.1, Ord Tech Intel files. (2) Memo, Statand Ind War Planning Sec for ASW, 30 Nov 22, sub:Introduction to 1922 Ord War Plan, OO 381, NA. (3)Statement of Maj Gen C. M. Wesson before the Tru-man Committee, U.S. Senate, April 1941, p. 3, OHF.(4) See below, "Field Service," pp. 59ff.


ammunition depots where 25 percent ofthe permanent reserve was to be stored. Anew depot near Ogden, Utah, was to take15 percent and one at Savanna, Illinois,the rest.19 Four establishments combinedsupply functions with repair work: Au-gusta Arsenal in Georgia, Benicia Arsenalin California, San Antonio Arsenal inTexas, and Raritan Arsenal built at Me-tuchen, New Jersey, during the war. Thefirst three dated from before the Civil Warand had long operated machine shops foroverhaul, repair, and modification work.But differentiation between ammunitionand general storage or repair depots wasnever complete. Raritan, after 1919 by farthe largest of the Field Service depots, be-came not only an ammunition depot anda repair arsenal but also the seat of theOrdnance Enlisted Specialist School and,in 1921, the office responsible for publica-tion of the standard nomenclature lists.

By 1923 the twenty-two storage depotsthat existed in 1920 had shrunk to six-teen—seven ammunition, two reserve, andseven general supply depots. These wereRaritan Arsenal; Delaware General Ord-nance Depot, located near Wilmington;Curtis Bay near Baltimore; Nansemondnear Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston inSouth Carolina; Ogden; Savanna in Illi-nois; Augusta; Benicia; San Antonio;Rock Island; Wingate in New Mexico;Erie Proving Ground and Columbus Gen-eral Supply Depot in Ohio; New Cumber-land General Depot in Pennsylvania; andthe Schenectady General Depot in NewYork State. General depots were thosewhere more than one Army supply servicemaintained sections. Overseas, technicallyoutside the command of the Chief of Ord-nance, Field Service had three depots, inHawaii, Panama, and the Philippines;and after 1923 the depots at the manufac-

turing arsenals were turned over to FieldService.20

Command of each of these installationswas usually assigned to an Ordnance offi-cer who reported to the Chief of FieldService in the Office, Chief of Ordnance,in Washington. As at the manufacturingarsenals, subordinate officers, enlistedmen, and civilians made up the rosters,numbers depending on the size and com-plexity of operations at the depot. Idealexecution of the multiple functions of Ord-nance depots—reception, classification,storage, inspection, maintenance, and is-sue—would have required more personnelthan the Ordnance Department couldmuster through the peace years. But toField Service was assigned the largestnumber of the Department's military per-sonnel. The value of the property to be ac-counted for was about $1,311,949,000 inthe spring of 1921.21 Although in time thisvaluation dropped as ammunition storesdeteriorated and weapons, even whenserviceable, approached obsolescence, theproperty accountability of Field Servicecontinued to be heavy. This routine ac-counting, the necessarily complicated per-petual check on inventories through theOrdnance Provision System, and the spe-cialized nature of the matériel repair andmaintenance work conducted at depotsdemanded trained men. Hence, FieldService was at first charged with trainingall Ordnance troops except provingground companies. While later the special

19 Charles Baxter, 'Ogden Arsenal," Army Ordnance,I, 1 (1920), 23-24.

20 Field Service, . . . General Duties and Func-tions, 1 May 21. NA. In the case of the depots at themanufacturing arsenals, the arsenal commanding offi-cer often acted as chief of the depot, in order to saveofficers for other assignment.

21 Computed from data in Directory of OrdnanceEstablishments. 26 Apr 21, Ord Library, U294XOM.


MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM H. TSCHAP-PAT, Chief of Ordnance, 1934-38.

service schools became the responsibility ofthe General Office of the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, enlisted men gained practicalexperience in such essential operations asstock-record-keeping chiefly at Field Serv-ice depots.22

Storage depots were classified as re-serve, intermediate, embarkation, area,and station storage. The first were whatthe name implied, depots for war reservematériel; the second were for supplies tobe issued in bulk to territorial commandsand theatres of operations; embarkationstorage depots were bases for overseasshipments; area storage for storage andissue within particular territorial com-mands; and station storage for items to beissued locally to troops at Army posts andcamps. Ammunition depots, recognized asconstituting a special problem, were or-ganized differently. Classification of am-munition for storage was sixfold: finishedammunition and loaded components;smokeless powder; fuzes and primers; highexplosives; sodium nitrate; and inert com-ponents such as empty shell, metallic com-ponents of fuses, and also small arms am-munition. To safeguard against deteriora-tion, careful provision was made for "sur-veillance" with a "Surveillance Inspector"responsible for periodic testing of explo-sives at each large ammunition depot.23

Maintenance of other matériel was a re-sponsibility divided between repair arse-nals servicing designated Army corpsareas and the Ordnance officers assignedto the staff of each of the nine corps areacommanders and commanders of foreigndepartments. The position and duties ofofficers responsible for maintenance ofequipment in the hands of troops wereanalogous to those of Ordnance officers ofarmies operating in the field.24

The organization of the Ordnance De-

partment during the "twenty-year Armis-tice" was thus orderly and well suited tothe scale of operations the Departmentwas allowed. Restriction to fewer than 270officers before 1939 automatically limitedwhat the Department could accomplish.That all gaps and overlappings of dutieswere not provided for was fully admitted.The Chief of Ordnance stated flatly inJanuary 1931: "Whereas this order is in-tended to indicate division of responsibil-ity and lines of authority within the Office,Chief of Ordnance, it is obvious that hardand fast lines cannot be drawn. Lapsesand overlaps are bound to occur. With

22 ODO 425, 28 Aug 22; 573, 5 Dec 24, OHF. Seebelow, "Field Service," pp. 59ff.

23 Field Service, . . . General Duties and Func-tions, 1 May 21, pp. 18-23, 29-38, NA.

24 (1) Ibid., pp. 51-52. (2) WD GO 80, 1919, andWD GO 21, 1920.


MAJ. GEN. SAMUEL HOF, Chief ofOrdnance, 1930-34.

this order as a guide, all are enjoined toco-operate in the effort to best perform thefunctions as a whole." 25 In the field instal-lations, as in the Washington office, on thewhole the machinery worked.

Four chiefs of Ordnance served the De-partment during the years between worldwars: General Williams, 1918-30; Maj.Gen. Samuel Hof, 1930-34; Maj. Gen.William H. Tschappat, 1934-38; and Maj.Gen. Charles M. Wesson, 1938-42. Gen-eral Williams, an officer whose conceptionof the Ordnance mission had been pro-foundly affected by his overseas service in1917-18, combined openmindedness withunusual administrative ability. His vig-orous pursuit of the Westervelt Board rec-ommendations on new equipment, his en-couragement of industrial mobilizationplanning, and his judicious selection of of-ficers to carry out these basic policiesearned him universal respect. Departmentmorale during his term of office was excep-tionally high. His successor, General Hof,was handicapped by the curtailment ofOrdnance funds, a result of the country-wide depression of the early thirties. Hof'sgreatest contribution to the Departmentlay in preserving the gains it had alreadymade. General Tschappat, known to hisassociates as the greatest ballistician of alltime, was pre-eminently concerned withthe scientific aspects of ordnance and, byhis insistence upon the importance of thisfield, laid the groundwork for much of thelater research and development program.General Wesson began his tour as chiefshortly before the Congress and the Amer-ican public discovered the necessity of ex-tensive re-equipping of the Army. To thisproblem General Wesson dedicated hisconsiderable experience. As a former as-sistant military attache in London, forfour years the chief of the Technical Staffin the office of the Chief of Ordnance, and

for the next four years the commandingofficer at Aberdeen Proving Ground, hehad a wide knowledge of Ordnance maté-riel and Army needs. Methodically, andwith unfaltering confidence in the abilityof the Ordnance Department to meet thenew demands, General Wesson laid andexecuted his plans for the war ahead.

The Budget

Ordnance Appropriations, 1919-37

In 1919 the Ordnance Department ex-pected the Congress to cut its appropria-tions sharply, but it failed to envisage theextreme economy wave of the mid-twen-ties that reduced Ordnance funds far be-low even those of prewar years. No one

25 ODO 10,20 Jan 31, OHF.


TABLE 1—TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT COMPARED WITHTOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

a For the years 1937-40 the figures are those of the Ordnance Budget and Fiscal Branch.

Source: Ord Fiscal Bull 2, p. 30, NA.

could think the United States a militaristiccountry in 1910, yet the ten million dollarsallotted for that year was nearly twice thefigure for 1924. Ordnance appropriationsfor 1924 were set at $5,812,180. In the en-tire 1920-40 period this figure was thenadir not only absolutely but also rela-tively, as it constituted only 2.26 percentof the entire War Department appropria-tions, whereas the average from 1910through 1915 had been 8.58 percent. Notuntil 1939 did the ratio again equal that

of pre-World War I years.26 (See Table 1.)The cuts in appropriations precipitated astruggle to keep activities going at all. Thereduction in funds was not paralleled byan appreciable sloughing off of Ordnanceresponsibilities at arsenals, depots, labora-tories, and testing grounds, yet necessi-tated reduction of force, both military andcivilian.

Heavy maintenance expenses obtained

26 WDAB 1922, HR, p. 1020.


through all these years. Col. David M.King, Ordnance Department, early ex-plained the situation to a Congressionalcommittee: "whether the Army is to have175,000, 200,000 or 225,000 men has littleto do with the size of the appropriation'Ordnance Service.' The Ordnance De-partment has the enormous quantities ofproperty to be guarded, protected, andcared for, regardless of any other consid-eration." 27 In 1920, 1,580 guards andfiremen were required to protect the vastlyincreased postwar establishment and ma-tériel, whereas 100 or less had sufficed be-fore the war. Not only were labor and sup-plies more expensive, but plants and depotswere more widely scattered, and oftenlarger. In 1916, with only fourteen smallplants, the Department had received$290,000 for repairs. In 1929 with twenty-four plants and ten times the capital in-vestment, it got less than $800,000. The1929 War Department survey recom-mended an immediate increase of over 50percent "to preserve the Governmentproperty from serious deterioration." Andin a later paragraph the survey stated: "Tocarry out the mission of the Ordnance De-partment in accordance with programsapproved by the War Department wouldrequire annual appropriations of $54,000,-000." 28

In spite of the collapse of the stockmarket and the beginning of the country-wide depression, in the late twenties andearly thirties appropriations picked upsomewhat and in 1931 were over$12,000,000. Then, as the Congress real-ized the severity of the depression, it againcut Ordnance funds, for 1934 appropriat-ing only $7,048,455. At this point onlyNavy orders placed with the Army Ord-nance Department saved Watertown andWatervliet Arsenals from being closed

down altogether. Had this occurred, it isdoubtful whether they could have beenresuscitated later. By 1936 at WatervlietArsenal 85 percent of the year's work wasfor the Navy and at Watertown more thanhalf.29

Fortunately, the financial picture after1932 was less somber than the officialfigures of Ordnance appropriations wouldsuggest. The extensive emergency reliefprogram that the Roosevelt administrationlaunched in 1933 benefited the Depart-ment greatly. During the Hoover adminis-tration the Congress had set the precedentin the First Deficiency Act of 6 February1931 by which Ordnance obtained a grantof $471,005 for repairs to arsenals. In1934-35 relief funds for Ordnance pur-poses were sizable:30

Procurement and preservation ofammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 6,000,000

Procurement of motor vehicles. . . . . . 1,163,200Procurement of machine guns . . . . . . . . 349,204Seacoast defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,007,660Procurement of machinery for modern-

ization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,309,491Repair and preservation of Ordnance

matériel, storehouses, water mains,and roads at Rock Island . . . . . . . . . . 370,000

Repairs to buildings at WatertownA r s e n a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89,000

TOTAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $11,288,555

27 WDAB 1921, HR, p. 536.28 Survey of WD. 1929, pp. 6-7, 18, NA.29 (1) Intervs with Col George Outland, and with

August Dabrasky, 7 Dec 49. Dabrasky was an OD de-,signer who had formerly been with Navy Ordnance.Dabrasky, Maj. Thomas K. Vincent, and Col. EdwinD. Bricker, of Watervliet, through personal friendshipwith Navy Ordnance men, contrived this deal, whichsaved the arsenals. (2) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4,7 Jan 37, sub: Steps Taken by OD to Effect Econo-mies. . . ,OO 111.3/6310, NA.

30 Ord Fisc Bull 1, p. 6, and Bull 5, p. 4, NA. Ex-cept for $370,000 from PWA funds, this money ca.mefrom funds appropriated in the National RecoveryAct.


The total amount, spread over two years,roughly equaled normal appropriationsfor one year. The Roosevelt administrationstressed projects that employed large num-bers of men rather than expensive equip-ment, and much of the repair work atOrdnance installations fitted admirablyinto that category. From the Civil WorksAdministration, Ordnance received about$1,390,000, mostly for the pay of laborersto spray and paint buildings and to cleanand reslush machinery. Though this laborforce taken from the rolls of the unem-ployed was usually unaccustomed to Ord-nance assignments and suffered manyphysical handicaps, it accomplished valu-able work that must otherwise have beendelayed or left undone.31

Every Ordnance establishment inevi-tably felt the pinch of economy, especiallyin the years from 1923 to 1936. At Spring-field Armory, for example, the civilian staffof the Ordnance Laboratory in 1923 wascut from sixteen to four persons,32 andover-all cuts in personnel were propor-tionate. (See Table 2.) The story at Spring-field was typical. At Watervliet when Lt.Col. William I. Westervelt assumed com-mand on 31 May 1921 he supervised 550employees; on 1 September 1923, the dateof his transfer, only 220 employees. Underhis successor, Col. Edwin D. Bricker,Watervliet touched a low of 198 employ-ees.33 Secretary of War John W. Weeks inthe fall of 1922 noted that on 1 January1923 there would be a smaller force em-ployed in the government arsenals than atany time in the previous twenty years.34

The close correlation between Ordnanceappropriations and Ordnance payrollsmeant that as funds in the mid-twentiesdipped below the levels of the 1910-15period, so also did total personnel.35

From 1919 on, the Chief of Ordnance,

TABLE 2—EMPLOYEES AND PAYROLL ATSPRINGFIELD ARMORY

Source: Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, OHF.

General Williams, protested vigorouslyagainst the small quota of officers allottedto the Department. He submitted in 1919a figure of 494 officers as "a bona fideminimum estimate . . . not subject todiscount." Instead, the Ordnance Depart-ment was allotted 258 officers, a number

31 WDAB 1935, HR, pp. 265-66.32 The Ord Lab at Springfield, p. 1, OHF.33 Hist of Watervliet Arsenal, 1813-1946, pp. 101-

02, OHF. This was the General Westervelt who hadheaded the Westervelt Board and was now reduced topermanent grade.

34 John W. Weeks, "Industrial Mobilization," ArmyOrdnance I I I , 15 (1922) , 134.

35 (1) Ord Civ Pers Br notebook containing State-ment of Ord Pers in Field, 1910 to 1933, NA. (2) OrdFisc Bull 2, p. 30, NA.


TABLE 3—ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTH: 1919-41

a Represents military personnel in all Army commands whose duty branch was reported as Ordnance Department; does not includepersonnel assigned to the Chief of Ordnance whose duty branch was reported as an arm or service other than Ordnance Department.

b Data not available.

Source: Stat Div, Office of Army Comptroller, 1949. Military: Ann Rpts SW. Civilian: 1921 from Special Rpt 158, 12 Nov 21, StatBr, WDGS; 1922 from Regular Rpt 195, 10 Aug 22, Stat Br, WDGS; 1923 and 1924 from Special Rpt 182, 9 Oct 24, Stat Br, WDGS;1925-38 from records of Civ Pers Div, Office Secy Army; 1939 from Special Rpt 264, 1 Dec 39, Stat Br, WDGS; 1940 and 1941 from tabu-lations in Stat Div, Office of Army Comptroller.

which General Williams considered en-tirely out of line with totals assigned toother departments. The average propertyresponsibility per Ordnance officer, hepointed out, was some $7,000,000, farabove that of officers in any other branchof the Army.36 Despite this plea, Ordnanceofficers on active duty as of 30 June 1921numbered only 281, and even in 1939, amere 287.37 (See Table3.) What the figures

do not reveal is the excessive reductions inrank and the stagnation in promotion thatstemmed largely from the paring down ofofficer strength. In 1923 reductions fornoncommissioned officers ran from 2.44percent in one grade to 100 percent in

36 Memo. CofOrd for Dir of Opns and Pers, 2 Oct19, sub: Allotment of Personnel, OO 023/735, NA.

37 Strength of Army tables in Ann Rpt SW, 1921, p.157; 1939, facing p. 56.


TABLE 4—PROPOSED TEN-YEAR ORDNANCE PROGRAM

a Unknown.

Source Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 8 May 25, sub: Extended Service Test and Limited Rearmament wi th Improved Types ofOrdnance Weapons in the Next Ten-Year Period, OO400.11/51, NA.

another, action that seriously hurtmorale.38 At no time did military person-nel approach the figure of 350 officers and4,500 enlisted men, set in the NationalDefense Act of 1920 as a reasonable peace-time level, or the recommendation of 373officers in the War Department survey of

1929. Since of the small staff about 87 per-cent was assigned to the Field Service, theChief of Ordnance had only some 35 offi-

38 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1923, p. 2. Annual reports forlater years frequently comment on the same problem.Promotions stagnated also because of the "hump" leftby World War I.


cers for all other duties, except in so far asofficers from other branches of the servicewere detailed to special Ordnance duty.This circumstance goes far to explain theDepartment's inability to assign a numberof officers as military observers abroad.39

Lack of money similarly limited plan-ning and execution of plans. With theexperience of World War I to give perspec-tive, the Ordnance Department in 1922prepared a comprehensive munitions pol-icy aimed at procuring for and supplyingto the Army at all times munitions thatwould "at the minimum be equal in qualityand quantity to those available to ourenemy." Achievement of this aim calledfor a development program, a reserve stockprogram, and a manufacturing, replace-ment, and rearmament program.40 Threedays after its submission, the Ordnancestatement of basic policy, with a few modi-fications, obtained the approval of Generalof the Armies John J. Pershing and theSecretary of War. The story of the rearma-ment plan will suffice to illustrate theeffects of the budget cuts.

To implement the rearmament portionof the munitions policy, the OrdnanceDepartment on 8 May 1925 submitted tothe Secretary of War a detailed ten-yearprogram of "Extended Service Test andLimited Rearmament." (See Table 4.)Theprogram was critically studied by the Chiefof Staff and the General Staff, and by theCavalry, Coast Artillery, Air Service, FieldArtillery, and Infantry. It received enthu-siastic approval as a whole, though modifi-cations and reductions were recommended.General Williams explained that unit costfor many of these items was high because,as they were new, the expense of dies, jigs,tools, and gages had to be added tothe necessarily high cost of small-scaleproduction.

The Ordnance limited rearmament pro-gram of 1925 thus proposed merely amodest scale of re-equipment for a part ofthe Regular Army. The Adjutant Generalinformed the Chief of Ordnance that theprogram would be subject to annual revi-sion, and, after lengthy study, the Secre-tary of War in April 1926 approved theplan with the proviso: "the extent to whichit is carried out to be dependent upon fundsappropriated for the purpose." 41 But themoderate character of the program failedto protect it from large reductions. Cutswere made in nearly all items so that the$35,729,500 program of 1925 was scaleddown to the $21,798,500 program of1928.42 Unfortunately, and ironically, themaximum production was scheduled for1932-36, with the peak in 1935. From thestart, funds available remained below theamounts scheduled even in the reducedprogram. At the Congressional hearings inDecember 1928 for the fiscal year 1930, forexample, General Williams stated thatfinancial limitations had forced reductionsof $500,000 in the 75-mm. and 105-mm.howitzer and 3-inch antiaircraft phases ofthe rearmament program.43

By June 1933, more than seven yearsafter the ten-year program had beenapproved, Ordnance production of majorartillery items stood as follows:44

39 Survey of WD. 1929, p. 5, NA. Interv, 20 Sep 49,with Col John C. Raaen, exec off to CofOrd, Jun 42-Feb 46.

40 Memo. CofOrd for Gen Pershing, 6 Jun 22, sub:Recommendations as to a Munitions Policy, OO023/1553, NA.

41 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd. 12 Apr 25; 3d Ind, 28 Oct25; and 5th Ind, 12 Apr 26, all in OO 400.11 /51, NA.

42 Memo. TAG for CofOrd, 24 Feb 28, sub: Altera-tion of the Ten Year Ord Program . . . , OO400.11/111, NA.

43 WDAB 1929, HR, p. 517; 1930, p. 699.44 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1933, par. 15.


In no category had progress been rapid,and in the larger caliber matériel, army,corps, and seacoast artillery, not a singleweapon had been completed. Nor diditems completed in the next few yearsbrighten the picture. Only a few guns andmortars came off the production line at thearsenals and, apart from three 155-mm.guns, there was still no heavy artillery.45

Yet The Inspector General's reports con-sistently commended the efficiency of thearsenals. By and large the program wastoo small to keep the arsenals busy, muchless to give selected private firms produc-tion experience.46

Meanwhile, in line with a War Depart-ment attempt to integrate the numerous,and often overlapping, programs that hadbeen started since the end of the war, theOrdnance Department submitted a rear-mament and re-equipment program forthe six-year period, 1935 through 1940.The objective was to equip the unitsinvolved in initial mobilization under the1933 mobilization plan.47 The originalOrdnance six-year re-equipment programas submitted in 1932, although consider-ably revised later, offered an excellent pic-ture of the most pressing needs of theDepartment in supplying the Army. Theprogram called for only $1,400,000 yearly.For the six years the chief items, in orderof cost, ranked: (1) antiaircraft guns,

$ 1,240,800; (2) tanks, $ 1,000,000; (3) com-bat cars $837,000; (4) semiautomatic rifles,$900,000; (5) railway artillery, $610,000;and (6) antitank guns, $442,400. Yetbudget cuts prevented full execution ofthese plans. For example, in estimates forthe fiscal year 1938 under its re-equipmentprogram the Ordnance Department askedfor $7,849,536. G-4 reduced this to$5,395,363, and the Bureau of the Budgetforced it down to about $5,000,000.48 TheOrdnance Department did well when inany one year it could proceed at more thanhalf the pace envisioned in the six-yearprogram.

If the entire rearmament program hadbeen carried out, by 30 June 1940 theresults would have comprised: mechaniz-ing one cavalry regiment, equipping the1st Cavalry Division with standardarmored cars, supplying active units of theField Artillery with high-speed artillery,new or modernized, supplying antiaircraftunits with standard matériel including fire

45 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934, pars. 15-16; 1935, pars.16-18; 1936, pars. 14-15; 1937, pars. 17-18; 1938,pars. 21-22. By 1938 one 8-inch howitzer T3 was un-der manufacture.

46 For example, see: (1) rpt to TIG, Ann InspectionSpringfield Armory, 19 Nov 34, OO 333.1/4102; (2)rpt to TIG, Ann Inspection Rock Island Arsenal, 4Dec 35, OO 333.1/4366 RIA; (3) rpt to TIG, Ann In-spection Frankford Arsenal, 25 Mar 36, OO333.1/4484; (4) rpt to TIG, Ann Inspection PicatinnyArsenal, 18 Jun 36, OO 333.1/4541. All in NA IGfiles.

47 Memo, ACofS for DCofS, 7 Sep 34, sub: Rear-mament and Reequipment Program, G-4/29552,P&E file, Sec 1, NA. For background see in same file,(1) memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 16 Sep 32; and (2)ltr, TAG to Chiefs of WD Arms and Services, 24 Mar34, sub: Revision of Six-Year WD Programs, OO400.11/165, NA. The letter repeats that the objectiveof the programs was the re-equipment of all units tobe included in the initial mobilization under the 1933mobilization plan.

48 (1) See OO 111.3/6101-6750 and OO 111.3 filesfor this period for data illustrative of the constant dif-ficulties. (2) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 25 Nov36, OO 111.3/6285 and Incl 1. All in NA.


control, and the beginning of supply to theInfantry of new tanks, rifles, mortars, andguns. That would have been all.49

The consequences of the meagre appro-priations year after year, limiting opera-tions and narrowing down planning to theconceivably attainable, are so clear inretrospect that the layman must wonderwhether the Ordnance Department couldnot have staged a successful fight for moremoney. Could the Chief of Ordnance nothave persuaded the General Staff to allotto him a larger share of the War Depart-ment budget? Or, failing that, could he notenter a special plea for urgent projectswhen he appeared at hearings of theHouse Appropriations Committee? To thesecond question the answer is an emphaticno. The budget law of 1924 expressly pro-hibited any government official fromappealing to the Congress for more moneythan the President's budget had allottedhis department, and Army officers werefurther bound by military discipline toaccept the decision of the Commander inChief, once it had been formulated.50 Themost a service chief dared hope to accom-plish before the Congress was to presenthis needs so convincingly that the Appro-priations Committee would not slice hispart of the budget. The answer to the firstquestion, on the other hand, might theo-retically be yes. It was always possible forthe Chief of Ordnance to protest to theGeneral Staff any proposed budget cutsbefore G-4 approved them. But each serv-ice had to compete with every other for itsshare. The War Department had to con-sider the Army as a whole, and the supplybranches were not likely to get specialfavors. Still, protocol permitted each chiefto convince the General Staff, if he could,that the needs of his service exceeded thoseof any other, and Ordnance representa-

tives frequently tried their powers of per-suasion. But skillful salesmanship, Ord-nance officers agree, was not a strong pointin the Department during the twenties andthirties. Furthermore, military traditionprecluded protracted argument with one'ssuperior officers. There was simply neverenough money to go round. Each Chief ofOrdnance in turn was obliged to accept hisallowance and then stretch it as far as hecould.

The Upturn, 1938-40

Fortunately, after 1935 Ordnanceappropriations increased steadily. Upthrough fiscal year 1938 the gains were inline with those for the War Department asa whole. For the fiscal year 1939 the Ord-nance Department's share showed a pro-nounced proportional gain, from 6 percentof the War Department total of 1938 to 24percent. The Ordnance appropriation for1939 was 4.5 times that for 1938 and 16times that for 1934. (See Table J.) As thesituation abroad darkened, PresidentRoosevelt's interest in the deficiencies ofthe armed forces grew. A special messageto the Congress on 28 January 1938 askedfor $16,880,000 for antiaircraft matériel,manufacture of gages, dies, and the like,and a start on making up the ammunitiondeficiency. The Congress promptly author-ized this expenditure. The $112,226,412

49 Memo, CofOrd for TAG, 2 May 34, sub: Revi-sion of Six Year WD Program, OO 400.1 1/165, NA.The using arms submitted suggestions. Typical were(1) memo, CofCA for CofOrd, 9 Nov 32, sub: Rearma-ment Program, 1935-1940, OO400.11/158; (2) ltr,CofInf to CofOrd, 7 Nov 32, sub: Suggested Six-YearRearmament Program, OO 400.11/156 and ind. Ingeneral, folders OO 400.11/101-150 and OO400.11/28-257 contain much of interest on the re-equipment programs. All in NA.

50 See Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Prepa-rations, pp. 21-22.


available for Ordnance in that summer of1938 permitted planning and operationson so enlarged a scale that an AssistantChief of Ordnance later declared that forthe Ordnance Department the war beganin 1938.51

By October descriptions of conditions inEurope, particularly information broughtback by William C. Bullitt, U.S. Ambas-sador to France, so alarmed the Presidentthat he called for immediate reports onwhat was most needed to strengthen theArmy.52 The Chief of Ordnance on 20October 1938 presented an itemized billfor $125,000,000 as the minimum price formeeting Ordnance deficiencies and, oneday later, an estimate of $349,000,000 asthe cost of matériel to equip a 4,000,000-man Army to be called up under the Pro-tective Mobilization Plan.53 On 12 January1939 President Roosevelt, armed withdetailed figures, forcefully urged upon theCongress the appropriation of some$477,000,000, of which the Air Corpswould get the largest amount, and theground forces $110,000,000 for new equip-ment. In April the Congress passed theregular appropriation act granting theOrdnance Department $62,000,000. Butthe President's plea for full rearmamentasked for much more: the proposed billgave Ordnance $55,366,362 in cash forexpenditures for "Ordnance Service andSupplies, Army," plus authorization toplace contracts with commercial com-

panies up to $44,000,000.54 The SecondDeficiency Appropriation Act, whenpassed, carried the exact amounts re-quested. The general breakdown for Ord-nance read:

Project Item Amount4 Renovation of ammunition. . $10,000,000

11 Maintenance and overhaul ofmatériel in storage. . . . . . . 4,891,052

11 Augmentation of stocks of am-munition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37,506,505

11 Augmentation of critical itemsof antiaircraft equipment. . 7,581,500

11 Augmentation of other criticalordnance items. . . . . . . . . . 39,387,305

$99,366,362

"Other critical ordnance items" signifiedchiefly semiautomatic rifles, antitankguns, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars,ground machine guns, trucks, tanks, 8-inch railway artillery guns, 155-mm. how-itzers, and modernization of 75-mm.guns.55 "Critical" items were defined asthose essential to effective combat but forwhich the maximum procurement rate fellshort of war requirements.56 These appro-priations, Ordnance officers declared,would enable industry to get ready for pro-duction and be somewhat prepared in caseof real emergency. On 1 July 1939 another$11,500,000 was appropriated for Ord-nance. Thus, all together the OrdnanceDepartment got $176,546,788 for the yearahead, $62,000,000 additional in May,and approximately $11,500,000 on 1July.57 The total constituted a 58 percentincrease over the appropriations for 1939.The lean years were over, but their legacy

51 Interv with Brig Gen Earl McFarland, 28 Feb 50.52 See Mark S. Watson, "First Vigorous Steps," Mil-

itary Affairs, XII, 2 (1948), 70.53 (1) Memo, CofOrd for DCofS G-4, 20 Oct 38,

sub: Deficiencies in Ordnance Equipment. (2) Memo,CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 21 Oct 38, sub: Deficienciesin Ordnance Equipment for the Protective Mobiliza-tion Plan. Both in Ord Study Folder 69, War Plansand Requirements files, DRB AGO. See also below,"The Protective Mobilization Plan," pp. 53-54.

54 Cash for settlement of contracts authorized in onefiscal year was usually appropriated in the next fiscalyear.

55 Hearings, Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill,1939, HR, pp. 454-72.

56 AR 700-10, 24 Oct 42.57 PL 44, PL 61, and PL 164, 76th Cong, 1st Sess.


was an accumulated deficiency of desper-ately needed matériel.

Industrial Mobilization Plans

One immediate consequence of the sup-ply tangle of World War I was the WarDepartment's decision thenceforward toplan in advance. From 1920 on, industrialmobilization planning was a task to whichthe Ordnance Department gave constantthought. The planning involved twostages: preparation of cost estimates andschedules of items and quantities neededto fit the over-all Army mobilizationplans; and plans for allocating manufac-ture of the matériel to commercial com-panies and government arsenals. The WarPlans Staff in the Office, Chief of Ord-nance, was in charge of the first, but theManufacturing Division, because it super-vised the district offices and the arsenals,had a large part in the second, the actualprocurement planning. The considerablelabor expended on both phases of plan-ning was a clear reflection of the OrdnanceDepartment's conviction that carefulpreparation for industrial mobilizationwas essential if the disasters of supply in1917-18 were not to be repeated.

Three steps taken in the first years afterthe war indicated the constructive think-ing of Ordnance officers on this whole sub-ject. The Ordnance Munitions Boardreports, submitted in twenty-four separatepapers between 1919 and 1921, mappedout an intelligent, comprehensive policyfor keeping the United States Armyequipped and industry prepared to meetmilitary emergency demands. That higherauthority disregarded many of these rec-ommendations in no way invalidates theirsoundness, as later events proved.58 Thesecond measure was the drafting of Section

5a of the National Defense Act of 1920.While this was the work of a number ofmen besides Ordnance officers, severalhigh-ranking men in the Departmentplayed a considerable part in bringingabout the creation of a War Departmentoffice specifically charged with responsibil-ity for procurement and industrial mobi-lization planning.59 The third move wasthe founding of the Army Industrial Col-lege to which officers were assigned tostudy problems of industrial mobilization.This project, like the National DefenseAct, was the fruit of many men's efforts,but Ordnance officers conceived the ideaand by skillful persuasion contributed toits realization.60 Through the years of dis-couragement that lay ahead, the Ord-nance Department constantly worked atthe problem of preparing the nation's in-dustry for the moment when the nationmust rearm. Though, as World War II ap-proached, Navy and Air Force prioritiesobliged the Department to recast some ofits plans, Ordnance officers believed thattheir work had been sound and the sur-veys and production studies valuable.61

To understand the character of this work,review of Army mobilization planning and

58 Interv with Maj Gen Charles T. Harris, 1 Dec49. The Munitions Board report was largely the workof Maj. James H. Burns. See memo, CofOrd for CofS,29 Jan 21, sub: Development of a Munition Policy,OKD470/135.1.

59 For full discussion of the origins, content, and im-plications of Section 5a, see Troyer Anderson's manu-script history of the Office of the Under Secretary ofWar, Ch. III, pp. 2-5, in OCMH files.

60 The idea was again more Major Burns' than thatof any other one person. He was also chiefly responsi-ble for converting the Under Secretary, Dwight F.Davis, and the Secretary of War, John W. Weeks, tofaith in the proposal. See (1) Anderson MS, Ch. III,pp. 30-31, OCMH; and (2) pamphlet, The IndustrialCollege of the Armed Forces, 1924-1949, Twenty-fifth Anniversary, 25 Feb 49, OHF.

61 Interv with Gen Harris, 2 Dec 49.


brief examination of district procurementplanning is necessary.

Early Mobilization Plans

Preparation of over-all Army mobiliza-tion plans was a nearly continuous processthroughout the peace years. The blueprintfor American rearmament—the elaborateProtective Mobilization Plan of the late1930's—had its beginnings in the simplerplans of the early 1920's. When the Na-tional Defense Act of 1920 made theAssistant Secretary of War responsible forindustrial mobilization planning and pro-curement, he organized his office to in-clude a Planning Branch. This staff,together with the Army and Navy Muni-tions Board, was charged with co-ordinat-ing Army and Navy procurement pro-grams and exerted strong influence uponthe Ordnance Department's planning be-tween world wars. For two decades thesetwo groups, in the face of public indiffer-ence, struggled to devise comprehensiveprograms of industrial mobilization.

The 1920's saw the completion of sev-eral editions of mobilization plans. As soonas one version was finished, modificationbegan, and usually within four years a newone appeared. The earlier plans, especiallythose of 1921 and 1922, tended to bechiefly munitions plans for the Army in-stead of all-around industrial mobilizationplans.62 Ordnance experts who drafted theextensive Ordnance annex of the 1922plan noted that the 1921 plans were ab-surd in that they set impossible require-ments for Ordnance. The 1922 over-allOrdnance plan ran to about fifty mimeo-graphed pages. In addition, the Ordnanceunit in each corps area had branch plans,while Field Service and other divisions, aswell as all field establishments, each had a

unit plan prepared by the individual in-stallation and submitted to the Chief ofOrdnance for approval.63 In 1924 a newmobilization plan superseded the less de-tailed scheme of 1922. The OrdnanceDepartment took its part in the planningwith such seriousness that it ran an elabo-rate test on a mythical M Day to ascertainthe quality of its plans. Analysis of this testrevealed manifold complications and nu-merous deficiencies.64 By decision of theGeneral Staff, the Army's still more ex-haustively detailed plan of 1928 was basedentirely upon manpower potential, ratherthan upon reasonable procurement capac-ity. The result was a schedule of procure-ment objectives that the supply servicesconsidered impossible of attainment.65

The special survey of the Army made in1929 called attention to several basic de-fects. One serious weakness was the failureto apply one of the fundamental lessons ofWorld War I—that it takes at least a yearlonger to arm men for fighting than tomobilize and train them for actual com-bat. The survey stated: ". . . it will benoted that in all munition phases there isa wide gap between the exhaustion of thepresent reserve and the receipt of muni-tion [s] from new production." 66 The Ord-nance Department could not meet the re-quirements of the plan under its budgetary

62 Anderson MS, Ch. III, p. 38, OCMH. The 1921-22 plans assumed that the peacetime economic life ofthe nation could carry the load without seriousderangement. A true industrial mobilization planinvolves far-reaching controls over national economicinstitutions.

63 Introduction to the 1922 Ordnance War Plan, pp.6-8, filed in DRB AGO with OO 381 material.Unclassified unit plans are in the National ArchivesOO381 files.

64 Memo, CofOrd for CofS, 9 Sep 24, sub: Test ofOrd War Plans, OO 370.01/520, NA.

65 Anderson MS, Ch. III, pp. 40, 45-48, OCMH.66 Survey of Ord Dept, 20 Sep 29, pp. 28-29, OO

320/365, NA.


limitations, and indeed as late as 1930execution of the 1924 procurement pro-gram was still far behind schedule.Nevertheless, the 1928 plan for a four-field-army, 4,000,000-man mobilizationformed the basis of all Ordnance compu-tations of requirements right down to 1940.It constituted what Maj. Gen. Charles T.Harris, one of the key men of the Ord-nance Manufacturing Service, called the"Position of Readiness Plan." If goals setseemed in the thirties too unrealizable toachieve with funds that the Departmentdared hope for, at least Ordnance officerswere ready with detailed estimates ofquantities of each type of munitions neededand a planned procedure for gettingthem.67

The over-all Army and Ordnance mo-bilization planning of the twenties, defectsnotwithstanding, marked a great forwardstep simply because it was the first exten-sive peacetime planning the United Stateshad ever undertaken. It was experimentaland flexible. The plans, although not con-sidered secret in broad outlines, wereshielded from public view because the WarDepartment feared an unfavorable publicreaction. Probably the chief drawback ofthe top-level planning effort was its super-ficial, generalized nature. It failed to en-vision the extreme complexity and theenormous scale of operations another warwould entail.68

The 1930's saw a pronounced broaden-ing of perspective in mobilization plan-ning. In part this was brought about bythe work of the War Policies Commission,a body created by the Congress to considerhow best "to promote peace and to equal-ize the burdens and to minimize the profitsof war." 69 The commission, composed ofsix cabinet officers and eight congressmen,made a painstaking survey and submitted

reports in December 1931 and March1932. It pronounced the Army procure-ment program excellent and recommendedCongressional review of the plans everytwo years. The Congress took no action.70

While earlier plans had been confinedto a narrowly interpreted scheme for pro-ducing munitions, a plan worked out in1930-31 dealt with the problem of over-allmobilization of national industry. Thistook a new approach based on the premisethat Army procurement plans could notbe made workable unless the entire econ-omy of the nation was subject to govern-mental controls.71 A revision in 1933 mademore explicit provision for these controlsand for administrative organization.72

But in the Ordnance Department the 1933plan was not popular because it called forequipping a large force faster than Ord-nance could possibly effect it, particularlyin view of the fact that most of the WorldWar I stocks of matériel by then were ob-solete and approaching uselessness. Iftroops were supplied at the rate at whichthey were called up, the heaviest procure-ment load would come in the first fewmonths and then taper off—obviously animpossible arrangement. A revision of1936, primarily important because issuedjointly by the Army and Navy, took asomewhat wider view of the problems of

67 (1) Inspection of OCO, 1930, par. 13(c), NA.(2) Interv with Gen Harris, 2 Dec 49. The 1928 plan,like the versions of the early thirties, followed out Maj.Gen. Douglas MacArthur's views. See Hearings, WarPolicies Commission, 13-14 May, 1931, Pt. II, pp.354-78.

68 QMC Historical Study 4, Harold W. Thatcher,Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1940 (August,1943, reprinted 1948), pp. 82, 133-34.

69 'PubRes98, 71st Cong.70 John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the

Army Service Forces (Washington, 1954).71 (1) Thatcher, op. cit., pp. 82-83. (2) Anderson

MS, Ch. III, pp. 52, 54, OCMH.72 Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1933, p. xi, NA.


mobilization.73 In the next two years studyof British industrial mobilization proce-dures produced a series of informing ar-ticles in Army Ordnance,74 but public inter-est in preparedness remained almost nil.The Neutrality Act had become law in1935, the Nye Committee investigationswere pillorying Army officers advocat-ing any planning for war, and a seriesof magazine articles and books, undersuggestive titles such as The Merchants ofDeath, were fanning public hostility to suchmeasures. The Congress before 1938made no move to legislate for industrialmobilization.

The Protective Mobilization Plan

In spite of public opposition to anypreparations for war, in 1937 the Protec-tive Mobilization Plan was born. The1938 annual report of the Secretary ofWar, Harry H. Woodring, describes itsgenesis:

During my tenure of office as AssistantSecretary of War from 1933 to 1936 I becameconvinced that the then current War Depart-ment plan for mobilization in the event ofmajor emergency contained discrepanciesbetween the programs for procurement ofpersonnel and procurement of supplies whichwere so incompatible that the plan wouldprove ineffective in war time. ... It becameevident to me that the War Departmentmobilization plan then current was gravelydefective in that supplies required during thefirst months of a major war could not be pro-cured from industry in sufficient quantitiesto meet the requirements of the mobilizationprogram. . . . My conviction of the inade-quacy of the initial plan from the supplyprocurement standpoint was so strong thatone of the first directives issued by me as Sec-retary of War was that the General Staffrestudy the whole intricate problem of emer-gency mobilization with a view to completereplacement of the then current War Depart-

ment mobilization plan. . . . The result ofthat study is now found in what we term theprotective mobilization plan of 1937. The1937 plan has not been perfected; details re-main to be worked out and are being workedout thoroughly and diligently. But we haveevery reason to believe that the protectivemobilization plan is feasible and will meetour national defense requirements.75

The name Protective Mobilization Plan,usually abbreviated to PMP, was designedto reassure the average American. Theplan underwent steady amplification andrefinement for the next two years.76 Unlikeits forerunners, it set only attainable goalsfor the Ordnance Department. It calledfor an Initial Protective Force of 400,000men within three months after mobiliza-tion, far fewer than demanded in earlierplans; eight months after M Day, 800,000men were to be ready for combat, and inone year, 1,000,000 men. The maximum-size Army envisioned was 3,750,000 men.Ordnance leaders felt reasonably confi-dent that the Department could equip thenew quotas on time.77

From mid-1937 on, Ordnance plans inlarge part revolved around the PMP. End-less computations and recomputationswere requested by the Secretary of War,

73 (1) Millett, op. cit., pp. 17, 77. (2) Thatcher, op.at., p. 231.

74 Maj. L. A. Godd. "Preparedness in England,"Army Ordnance, XVIII, 105 (1937), 143-46; 106 (1938),210-13; 107 (1938), 285-88; 108 (1938), 347-50.

In 1936 the Assistant Secretary of War called for asurvey of mobilization plans of several of the GreatPowers. (1) Ltr to ACofS G-2, 29 Aug 38, OO321.12/4279, NA. (2) Ltr, CofOrd thru ACofS G-2,29 May [?] 36, directed that the same questions askedthe French be given to the British. The directive forthe survey is in letter from ASW in 1936. OO381/17061 Misc, NA.

75 Ann Rpt SW, 1938, p. 1.

7 6 Lt r , TAG to CofOrd, 17 Jul 39, sub: Chief ofOrdnance PMP, 1939, OO 381/25782, NA.

77 Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, The Operationsof the Ordnance Department, lecture, Army WarCollege, 16 Nov 39, p. 18.


the Assistant Secretary of War, and theGeneral Staff.78 Calculation of war re-serves, for example, in August 1937 re-sulted in scheduling expenditures of fundsby priorities up to $50,000,000.79 Whenthe worsening international situation ledPresident Roosevelt in October 1938 toconfer with his top military advisers onstepping up defense expenditures, theDeputy Chief of Staff asked the Chief ofOrdnance to prepare a program to plugthe biggest holes in Ordnance supply.Twenty-four hours later General Wessonturned in an estimate of $125,000,000, anamount that would "supply the deficien-cies in essential equipment required forthe Initial Protective Force." Only the ex-istence of plans already well worked outunder the PMP enabled the Departmentto complete a tabulation so speedily. Oneday later, 21 October, following a tele-phone conversation with G-4, GeneralWesson submitted a supplemental plancalling for $349,000,000 to meet the addi-tional requirements for the PMP as awhole, in contrast to coverage of the Ini-tial Protective Force only.80 A convictionthat the White House mood favored abold program, plus the readiness of theDepartment's plans, help explain thismove. Actually the translation of such aprogram into action had to wait manymonths till more decisive events abroadcrystallized American public opinion infavor of large expenditures for arms.

Just before the outbreak of war in Eu-rope, the Office of the Assistant Secretaryof War requested the Chief of Ordnance toprovide in forty-eight hours a detailed out-line of Ordnance action in case of war inEurope. The reply listed funds neededunder three headings: those to equip com-pletely the forces under PMP, those forPMP requirements with augmentation forone year, and those for PMP requirements

with augmentation for two years.81 Soonafter, the Ordnance Department esti-mated the cost of the munitions procure-ment program under PMP augmented fortwo years to be $6,076,750,000 and de-clared that its computations were up todate for all items under PMP.82

The Ordnance sections of PMP werethus subjected to careful revision over aperiod of more than two years. The 132-page document, which became effective30 November 1939, was entitled "Ord-nance Protective Mobilization Plan,1939." 83 Ordnance corps areas and fieldinstallations prepared their individualplans. All these were the bases upon whichthe Department built its program of prep-aration for war.

Procurement Planning

Procurement planning, the step that fol-lowed over-all industrial mobilizationplanning, was mapped out in the Office,Chief of Ordnance, but the arsenals and

78 Typical examples are: (1) ltr, ACofS G-4 to allchiefs. 14 May 37, and (2) follow-up ltr, 18 Aug, bothin AG 381.4 (5-14-37)-G-4 13765-103, DRB AGO.

79 Ibid.80 (1) Memo, CofOrd for CofS, 20 Oct 38, sub: Defi-

ciencies in Ord Equipment, and incl, OO 111.3/6877.(2) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 21 Oct 38, sub:Deficiencies in Ord Equipment for PMP. and incl,OO 111.3/6878. (3) By December 1938 GeneralWesson was talking in terms of a $420,000,000 pro-gram. Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 19 Dec 38, sub:Breakdown of PMP Requirements into Increments,OO 111.3/6916. All in NA.

81 Min, Wesson Conferences, 19 and 21 Aug 39,OHF. The report went to President Roosevelt forstudy.

82 Memo, CofOrd for Dir of Planning Br, OASW,8 Sep 39, sub: Measures to be Taken by War Depart-ment in the Event of War in Europe, OO 381/27496Misc, NA.

83 The PMP as printed for public sale at ten cents acopy under the title Protective Mobilization Plan, Revisionof 1939 was a slim document of only eighteen pages.The appendices were omitted, both because of theirconfidential nature and because of the need for con-stant revision.


the Ordnance districts supplied the data.The districts were re-established in 1922for the express purpose of keeping contactsthe country over with industrial concernsthat might one day serve as sources of sup-ply. A group of Ordnance officers hadalready evolved a careful scheme of proce-dures upon which district operations there-after were based.84 While orders for maté-riel down into the late 1930's were scarcelyenough to keep the government arsenals inoperation, and contracts with commercialproducers were rarely negotiated, everydistrict office had the job of determining itsarea's industrial potential for manufactureof each type of ordnance item. Analysis ofthis information from all the districts per-mitted the Manufacturing Division inWashington to allocate particular items toparticular districts. Thereupon the districtstaffs made plant surveys. A complete sur-vey called for a large amount of detailedinformation:

. . . the location, construction, and equip-ment of the plant; the availability of power,materials, and labor; the examination of themanufacturing processes involved to deter-mine the readiness with which the facilitycan adapt itself to the proposed task of man-ufacture, and the extent to which variationsfrom the Ordnance prescribed routine maybe permitted; the new equipment and newconstruction which will be needed for con-version, the sources from which this equip-ment and the construction material mustcome, and the time within which they canbe secured.85

With staffs of only three or four peoplethrough most of the peace years, districtoffices could not undertake any suchthorough job. The partial surveys firstcompleted merely produced lists of com-panies arranged according to the type ofordnance they were capable of manufac-turing. The early industrial mobilizationrecords in one district consisted of a few

reference cards filed in shoe boxes. Duringthe depression, economy necessitatedabandoning even the yearly meetings ofdistrict chiefs. These were resumed in1935. Over the years some districts suc-ceeded better than others in keeping in-terest in planning alive, for some wereable to enlist the co-operation of a greaternumber of Reserve officers. In this theNew York District was particularly suc-cessful; every winter from 1923 on a groupof Reserve officers met once a week withthe district officials to discuss district prob-lems, to hear lectures on Ordnance devel-opments, and occasionally to rehearse thesteps in negotiating contracts. Where dis-trict officers had less help of this sort,keeping in readiness the machinery forlarge-scale procurement was more diffi-cult, but all districts maintained someactivity.86

In spite of meagre budgets and limitedpersonnel, the districts succeeded fromtime to time in obtaining from manufac-turers gentlemen's agreements, known asAccepted Schedules of Production, whichspecified quantities and rates of future warproduction. Upon request, the AssistantSecretary of War then allocated theirplants to Ordnance. This arrangementwas designed to eliminate competitionamong the Army and Navy supply servicesfor particular facilities. By 1937 the dis-tricts had in hand some 2,500 acceptedschedules representing 645 different com-mercial facilities. When any company hadthus pledged itself to ordnance manufac-

84 The three men primarily responsible for this firstplanning were Major Harris, Maj. Richard H. Somers,and Capt. Edward E. MacMorland.

85 Hist of Pittsburgh Ord Dist 66, OHF.86 (1) The Ordnance District System, Its Growth

and Development, January 1918-June 1945, preparedunder the direction of Brig. Gen. A. B. Quinton, Jr.,p. 6, OHF. (2) Chester Mueller, The New York OrdnanceDistrict in World War II (New York, 1947), pp. 8-10.


ture in case of emergency, the districtexecutive assistant worked out with themanagement fairly detailed productionplans—plant layouts, machine tool re-quirements, gages, raw materials, powerand manpower needs to convert rapidly tomanufacture of the unfamiliar Ordnanceitem. The government arsenals' blueprintsand data on production methods werealways available for this purpose. Ord-nance officers regarded these as manu-facturing aids, not mandatory instruc-tions.87 In view of public apathy andindustrialists' reluctance to be involved ingovernment munitions making, it is hardto see what more the Ordnance Depart-ment could have done in these yearstoward planning procurement from privatecompanies.

Special mention must be made of themachine tool surveys. Though neither theOrdnance districts nor the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, conducted these alone, theirparticipation was of importance. Theover-all studies were the responsibility ofthe Assistant Secretary of War; the Armyand Navy Munitions Board also played apart. The urgency of having an adequatesupply of machine tools suitable for muni-tions manufacture was well understood,but the problems involved were as com-plex as they were vital. The industry wasalways relatively small and except inboom periods operated below capacity.From the mid-thirties on, through a spe-cial committee of the National MachineTool Builders Association, the industry co-operated with the government in an effortto forestall the shortages a national emer-gency might bring. The questions were:What did the armed forces require? andthen, Could the industry meet the re-quirements? 88 In a computation of Armymachine-tool requirements prepared in1937, the needs of the Ordnance Depart-

ment comprised a big percentage of thetotal. Out of 20,613 lathes needed for thewhole Army, Ordnance required 16,220.89

In spite of efforts to anticipate these needs,1939 and 1940 found machine-tool supplythe principal bottleneck in the rearma-ment program. Indeed, to stretch the sup-ply early in 1940 it became necessary toresurrect obsolete or incomplete machinetools from arsenal storehouses.90

In 1938 conditions in Europe broughtan upward turn in district activities. Inevery district Army inspectors were ap-pointed to inspect items under currentcommercial procurement, a scheme thatwas later of great help because it provideda nucleus of trained inspectors qualified totrain others when war came. Col. A. B.Quinton,Jr., Chief of the District ControlDivision, was directed to conduct more ex-tensive industrial surveys and, as soon asfunds were available, to enlarge the dis-trict organizations.91 Louis Johnson, As-sistant Secretary of War, in December1938 at a conference of district chiefs,urged them to bring their surveys up to

87 (1) Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 20. (2)Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1937, par. 10. Post-World War IIcomments of some industrialists have implied that theOrdnance Department expected to show industry howto manufacture what private industry unguided couldproduce most efficiently without military interference.The Ordnance Department, on the other hand, con-tends that it offered help only where help was needed.

88 Progress Report on Machine Tool Plan. 20 Jun39, pp. 2-4. Exhibits, C, D, E, F, G, OO 381/26423ASW, NA. Early in 1938 the Tool Builder's Associa-tion sent a questionnaire to all machine-tool buildersto be returned directly to the ANMB.

89 (1) Rpt cited n. 88. Exhibits C and D. (2) Ltr,OASW to all Supply Arms and Services, 1 Oct 36,sub: Planning for Procurement of Machine Tools, OO381/26423 ASW, NA.

90 (1) Ltr, B. A. Franklin, Hartford Dist Chief, toCofOrd, 19 Jun 39, OO 381/26757 Hartford, NA.(2) Ltr, CofOrd to Hartford Ord Dist, 7 Mar 40, and1st Ind, 3 Apr 40. OO 381/33149 Hartford, DRBAGO. (3) Ord Digest, Mar 40, Minton file, OHF.

91 (1) Hist of Boston Ord Dist. p. 40, OHF. (2) AnnRpt CofOrd, 1938, par. 10.


date so that "you are familiar with everypotential war-producing facility in yourDistrict." 92 The money was appropriatedearly in 1939. Accordingly, as soon as pro-curement planning engineers, more in-spectors, and more clerks could be hired,district office personnel increased. ThePittsburgh District, which in 1930 hadhad only two full-time workers, by mid-1939 had twenty-three; Philadelphia

jumped to fifty-one. Even teletype systemswere installed that summer. To preparefor the "accelerated Procurement Plan-ning Program" every district submittedlists of machine-tool shortages.93

That this work was effective is provenby the report made by the Chief of Indus-trial Service a few days before war brokeout in Europe. On 29 August 1939 Gen-eral Harris stated that out of 133 ordersplaced under the $50,000,000 procure-ment program for 1939, 50 were com-pleted, 70 were on schedule, and only 13were delayed because of hold ups on de-liveries of forgings. Whereas on 1 January,119 orders had been waiting for drawings,only 44 were now wanting detailed blue-prints, and of a January backlog of 319orders deficient in specifications, only 90remained. By May 1940, on the 1940 pro-gram 870 contracts for matériel totalingover $66,000,000 had been placed withcommercial firms, and procurement ofraw materials and parts at the governmentarsenals amounted to $29,000,000.94

Educational Orders: 7he First Stepin Industrial Mobilization

Meanwhile, on 16 June 1938, nearlyeighteen months before the appearance ofthe "Ordnance Protective MobilizationPlan, 1939," the Educational Orders Actbecame law. This enabled the OrdnanceDepartment to make its first definite move

toward industrial mobilization. The fundsvoted were not large, but Congressionalappropriation of any money at all for thispurpose three and a half years before PearlHarbor was a minor triumph, and by1941 proved to be of significance.

The Ordnance Department's campaignfor permission to place orders with privateindustrial firms to give them experience inmunitions manufacture had stretched overmore than twenty years.95 An abortive ef-fort before World War I preceded a seriesof attempts in the 1920's to obtain suchlegislation. In 1922 Secretary of WarWeeks had advocated it, as did his succes-sor, Dwight Davis. General Williams in1925 had suggested to the Assistant Secre-tary of War that educational orders be em-ployed as an instrument to speed upprogress on each item of the new ten-yearOrdnance program and, to back up thisidea, attached the text of a proposed law.96

One of the main purposes of the ten-yearprogram was to set up facilities for manu-facture of the new matériel so that in eventof war long delays would be avoided.Without authorization to place educa-tional orders with suitable firms—and notnecessarily with those submitting the low-est bids—only the government arsenalswith their limited capacity would be readyin emergency. In 1926 Guy E. Tripp,Chairman of the Westinghouse Company,as head of a national committee on indus-trial preparedness, brought in a compre-

92 Campbell, op. cit., p. 21.93 (1) Hist of Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, 17, OHF. (2)

Hist of Philadelphia Ord Dist, Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 2, OHF.(3) Ord Digest, Jul 34, Aug 39, Folder EducationalOrders, OHF.

94 (1) Min, Wesson Conference, 29 Aug 39, OHF.(2) Memo, CofOrd for Stat Br, OASW, 15 May 40,sub: Weekly Report of Ordnance Procurement andProduction as of May 11,1940, OO 400.12/5904, NA.

95 Seen. 24, p. 21, above.96 Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 11 Nov 25, sub: Ten-

Year Program, OO 400.11 /35, NA.


hensive report vigorously recommendinglegislation for educational orders, but abill introduced in Congress the next yearand reintroduced in 1929 failed to pass.97

A new bill in 1933, proposing expenditureof $2,000,000 yearly for five years, waspigeonholed without debate, although ad-vocates in the worst period of the depres-sion pointed out that educational orderswould help "prime the industrial pump."Yet the second recovery appropriation actspecifically banned "munitions." Further-more, the opprobrium attached to theterm munitions maker before 1937 ledmost industrialists to avoid any risk of es-tranging public good will, especially sinceprobable profits looked slim.98 Henceenactment of legislation for educationalorders in June 1938 marked a consider-able victory.

The act of June 1938 authorized theSecretary of War to place educational or-ders with commercial firms to familiarizethem with the techniques of manufactur-ing "munitions of war of special or techni-cal design . . . non-commercial in char-acter." He was to solicit bids only fromfirms that from their records appearedcompetent to handle large wartime con-tracts for the items bid on. This meantelimination of the usual competitive bid-ding. As a check upon the Secretary'sjudgment, every contract had to have theapproval of the President. No concerncould receive more than one order withinany three consecutive years. To carry outthe provisions the Congress appropriated$2,000,000." Seven months later, in thefamous defense message of 12 January1939, President Roosevelt called for $32,-500,000 more in educational orders, and$1,762,000 for both procurement plan-ning and production orders. An act of 3April 1939 authorized $32,500,000 to beavailable until 30 June 1941, and $2,000,-

000 in each of the four ensuing years. Italso authorized funds for purchase of pro-duction studies and provided for storageof the special aids to manufacture—gages,jigs, dies, and the like—which becamegovernment property.100 At the last min-ute the Congress appropriated an addi-tional $14,250,000 for 1940. Thus in real-ity a seven-year program was mapped out.

A special board of officers met in thesummer of 1938 to define specific objec-tives and work out procedures. They drewup a list of fifty-five critical items, and se-lected six for orders in 1939: recoil mecha-nisms for the 3-inch antiaircraft gun, semi-automatic rifles, forging 75-mm, shells,machining 75-mm, shells, searchlights, andgas masks. Four of these six were Ord-nance items; aircraft matériel was ex-cluded because a growing number of mili-tary orders from foreign countries obvi-ated the need of American orders. Ord-nance's allotment for 1939 amounted to$1,600,000; for 1940, $8,800,000. In thefirst year four educational orders wereplaced:101

Company Item Amount

Winchester Repeating Rifle M1, $1,382,000Arms Co. (New Haven) Gal. .30

R. Hoe & Co. 3" AA recoil 110,000(New York) mechanism

S. A. Woods Co. Machining 75- 83,000(Boston) mm. shell

American Forge Co. Forging 75- 20,000(Chicago) mm. shell

In retrospect, question might arise as towhy, in view of Springfield Armory's ac-

97 The Secretary of War in urging Congressionalaction cited the new types of guns and gun carriagesand rifle ammunition as categories for which educa-tional orders would be most valuable. Ltr, SW toChairman of House Military Affairs Committee, 24Sep 27, OO400.11/104, NA.

98 Wesson lecture cited n. 77, above, pp. 11-12.99 PL 639, Ch. 458, 75th Cong, 3d Sess, HR 6246.100 See memo, ASW for CofOrd, 25 Oct 39, sub:

Procurement Planning, OO 381.28767 Misc, NA.101 Wesson lecture cited n. 77, p. 12.


tual and large future potential produc-tion, the M1 rifle was chosen for an edu-cational order when the shortage of me-dium and heavy artillery was so great.102

The justification was that Winchester'sadded capacity was essential to speedachievement of the PMP requirement of149,000 M1 rifles for the Initial ProtectiveForce. The Infantry listed the semiauto-matic rifle as priority "1" in the rearma-ment program.103

The program started off auspiciously.To ensure careful check on progress, LouisJohnson on 15 July 1939 appointed a com-mittee on Review of the Program of Edu-cational Orders, headed by Brig. Gen.Benedict Crowell. Ten other eminent in-dustrialists, including William S. Knud-sen, President of General Motors Corpora-tion, and J. L. Perry, President of Car-negie Illinois Steel Company, also served.Their report, submitted early in August,commended the previous handling of edu-cational orders and made recommenda-tions for future procedures.104 In thecourse of the next ten months seventy-sixadditional educational orders were placed,most of them for ammunition items. Whilethe question arose as to whether and whenthese should be converted to production or-ders, the decision in September was to con-tinue the program as it was "on the prem-ise of educating more firms and in someinstances providing complete rather thanpartial tooling." 105 After February 1940a number of contracts for productionstudies were inaugurated. These studies,though not so useful ultimately as educa-tional orders, had the advantage of requir-ing less time to complete and thereforeenabled a larger number of manufac-turers in diverse fields to study the prob-lems of making Ordnance matériel thanwere willing at this time to accept educa-tional orders.106

Field Service

However much budgetary limitationscut the operations of the ManufacturingService before 1939 and curtailed plan-ning and research, economy itself de-manded that the matériel accumulatedduring World War I be preserved in usa-ble condition. Consequently, money forstorage and maintenance depots wasalways forthcoming, although Field Serv-ice, the unit responsible, like the other di-visions of the Ordnance Department,never had enough.

After the signing of the Armistice in No-vember 1918, the newly created FieldService faced peculiarly urgent problems.The sudden collapse of the enemy putupon Field Service the obligation of takingimmediate measures to deal with the im-mense stores of arms, ammunition, andother ordnance matériel piled high inAmerican factories and depots, on trains,docks, and ships, and in supply depots inFrance. Of the persistent and significantproblems Field Service encountered in the

102 Springfield Armory produced 3,519,471 M1rifles by the end of the war, Winchester only 513,880.See Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, Book 2, Ch.VI, p. 10, OHF.

103 (1) See Pt. I, Annex 7, PMP, 1 Jan 38, and OO472.41/1749, NA, for 1936 requirements of 148,832rifles. (2) Ltr, CofInf to CofOrd, 9 Mar 39, sub:Rearmament and Reequipment Program, FY 1941,OO 111.3/7023, NA.

104 See text of report in Army Ordnance, XX, 117(1939), 167-68. Working in close co-operation was theArmy board on educational orders which, under thechairmanship of General Harris, had the chief voicein selection of items for orders. Memo, TAG thruCofOrd for Gen Harris, 15 Mar 39, OO 381/24300,NA.

105 (1) Memo, Gen Harris for Dist Planning Bd,OASW, 8 Sep 39, sub: Measures to be Taken by theWD in the Event of War in Europe, OO 381/27496Misc, NA. (2) Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 20 Sep 39,sub: Readiness of the OD to Meet the Requirementsof a Major Emergency, OO 381/278000 ASW, NA.

106 Ord Digest; Mar-May 40, Folder, EducationalOrders, OHF.


years between world wars, none hadgreater importance for the future thanprovision of storage facilities for both am-munition and general supplies. Solutionof the problem involved immediate tem-porary disposition of the large, scatteredstocks, determination of a long-rangepeacetime policy, and finally, plans andfacilities for storing the greatly increasedstocks needed in a future emergency.

The first step was of necessity accom-plished quickly. From mid-1919 to mid-1920 the Supply Division of Field Serviceincreased its storage space from about3,500,000 to 8,700,000 square feet, a totalthat did not include space in generalArmy storage depots, posts, cantonments,and camps. In these twelve months the Di-vision received and stored some 1,000,000rifles, 58,000 automatic rifles, 118,000 ma-chine guns, 1,500 37-mm, guns, 11,000guns and howitzers, and 12,000 automo-tive vehicles, trailers, and accessories.Most of this matériel went into storage atRock Island, the rest at Aberdeen, Erie,Savanna, Middletown, San Antonio, FortBliss in Texas, and Augusta. Before storageevery item needed overhaul, cleaning, andreconditioning. A small sampling of thetask of the Maintenance Division shows bymidsummer of 1920 overhaul of 3,099 75-mm, guns, 2,567 155-mm, howitzers,1,849 10-ton tractors, 826 6-ton tanks,2,216,448 .30-caliber rifles, 25,604 Brown-ing machine guns, and 140,814 automaticpistols. And these items were only a frac-tion of 119 types of artillery and smallarms handled.107

Some ammunition was left for a brieftime in manufacturing plants, but factoryowners soon demanded the space for theirreconversion operations. A less temporaryexpedient lay in using the ammunition de-pots built as forwarding points during the

war. On the problem of long-range stra-tegic storage, the Department made aspecial study which the Secretary of Warapproved 29 August 1919. The plan pro-vided that about one fourth of the ammu-nition be stored at five permanent depotsalready built in the East, and the remain-der at new facilities near Ogden in Utah,Sparta in Wisconsin, and Savanna. Thesecond deficiency bill of 6 March 1920 al-lotted $5,000,000 for part of this construc-tion program. Like general supplies, am-munition required thorough inspectionand repacking before storing. This job oc-cupied depot personnel all through 1919and 1920.108

Another important storage problem wasthe preservation of jigs, gages, and dies.The munitions plants shipped these itemsto Springfield Armory for verification andstorage. Since about 125,000 gages wereprocessed, the task ran well into 1921.109

Meanwhile an Ordnance SalvageBoard, created on 19 November 1918, wasengaged in disposing of all government-owned surplus manufacturing equipment,materials, and buildings. Wherever possi-ble the work was decentralized throughthe salvage boards of Ordnance districts.By 30 June 1920 the board had disposed ofmaterials valued at $174,000,000 andproperty at $84,000,000. The disposalwork underwent careful scrutiny by Houseof Representatives committees, inasmuchas the project was costly, with some 3,500civilian workers on the staff at one time.The Congress permitted continuation ofthe organization for several years, but on asteadily contracting scale. Sales in the fis-

107 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1920, pp. 40-42, 45-46.108 (1) Ibid., pp. 42-44. (2) Ann Rpt SW, 1921,

p. 171.109 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1920, p. 37.


cal year 1922 netted only about $15,000,-000 and the next year slightly less.110

By June 1922 a comprehensive Ord-nance munitions policy was established.It decreed the rapid sale of surplus ammu-nition; abandonment of temporary stor-age places and removal of reserve ammu-nition to permanent depots; halting of allexpenditures at temporary installationsand the least possible investment at per-manent ones; reduction of nitrates re-serves; and retention of only a limitednumber of experts at each arsenal.111 Toreduce overhead the Department had dis-posed of two wartime depots in 1919,Sandy Hook and Tobyhanna, and in 1922dispensed with Mays Landing and ninetemporary depots: Amatol, Middletown,Morgan, Penniman, Seven Pines, Sparta,Toledo, Tullytown, and Woodbury. Thematériel stored in these went to other de-pots or to salvage.112

After the readjustments of the immedi-ate postwar years, depot activities sub-sided for more than a decade. Ogden Ar-senal, for instance, reverted to an inactive,caretaker status. From 1926 to 1935 a ser-geant commanded the post, and usuallyonly one other sergeant was on duty. Partof the magazine and the lower area wereleased for grazing.113 Other depots carriedon the routine duties of maintenance andrenovation of matériel, surveillance, pro-tection, supply of troops for occasionalmaneuvers, and keeping stock records ofissue and shipment. Administration of thedepots was competent. Inspectors fromThe Inspector General's Department inthe peacetime years usually directed criti-cism only at the run-down physical condi-tion of facilities. At Wingate Depot, forexample, the old wooden magazines of-fered a serious fire hazard in a regionnoted for electrical storms, and personnel

was too limited to guard the magazines.At Curtis Bay Depot, on the other hand,physical facilities were in excellent shape.At Raritan Arsenal, while administrationof both the Field Service School and main-tenance and storage activities was pro-nounced efficient, the inspector noted thatfifty-four temporary buildings unfit forhabitation were still in use and that manyof the tools and equipment used in WorldWar I were obsolete.114

Curtailed appropriations during the de-pression limited operations both at depotsand at arsenals, but the threatened reduc-tion to stand-by status was obviated by useof federal relief funds.115 The relief fundsfor individual depots assumed sizable pro-portions. In the fiscal year 1938 AugustaArsenal received $106,354; DelawareOrdnance Depot, $133,011; Savanna,$20,959; and Ogden $321,477. The moneywas spent on such work as improvingroads, railroad tracks, barracks, and offi-cers' quarters, and for constructing load-ing plants and magazines.116

110 (1) Ibid., 1920, pp. 56-60; 1922, p. 18; 1923,p. 21. (2) WDAB 1921. HR, pp. 533-34, 540. Largeamounts of surplus property were transferred to othergovernment departments, for example, $41,650,656.32in 1922-23.

111 (1) Memo, CofOrd for all Ord Offs, 14 Jun 22,sub: Ordnance Department Policies, OO 023/1549,NA. (2) Memo, CofOrd for General Pershing, 6 Jan22, sub: Recommendations as to a Munitions Policy,00023/1553, NA.

112 (1) Hist of FS Exec Div, 1919 to 30 June 39, I, 8,OHF. (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1923, pp. 17-18.

113 Hist of Ogden Arsenal, Vol. I, Pt. 1,p. 12, OHF.114 (1) Rpt to CG 8th Corps Area, 9 May 35, sub:

Inspection of Wingate Ord Depot, OO 333.1/4237IG. (2) Rpt to TIG, 15 Aug 35, sub: Ann GeneralInspection of Curtis Bay Ord Depot, OO 333.1/4336IG. (3) Rpt to TIG, sub: Ann Inspection of RaritanArsenal and Ord Field Service School, 8 May 36, OO333.1/4522 IG. All in NA.

115 (1) WDAB 1935, HR, pp. 262-63. Watervliet,for example, operated on a skeleton basis during theperiod 1932-34. (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934. par. 7Iff .See also Hist of Watervliet Arsenal, p. 106, OHF.

116 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1938, par. 102.


Ammunition storage and maintenancecaused the most trouble during these years.More money than for any other one pur-pose was earmarked for maintenance ofthe War Reserve; and of the total sum, an-nually about three fifths was for preserva-tion of ammunition. To maintain a usableWar Reserve, periodic surveillance ofstocks was necessary, a careful testing ofrepresentative lots to detect incipient de-terioration; lots that were no longer goodmust be renovated or replaced. In 1926Public Law 318 authorized exchange ofdeteriorated ammunition for new, butadequate funds for renovation continuedto be hard to get from congressmen who,despite the yearly attempts of OrdnanceDepartment spokesmen to explain thechemistry of ammunition deterioration,found the argument unconvincing.117 Aspecial program of surveillance and reno-vation was started in 1928, when the De-partment not only exchanged some 4,000,-000 pounds of unserviceable powder for360,000 pounds of new flashless, nonhy-groscopic powder, but also opened its firstspecial renovation plants. By 1931 theCharleston, Nansemond, Delaware, Rari-tan, and Hawaiian depots were operatingrenovating plants on 75-mm, shell, CurtisBay on 75-mm, shrapnel, and Savanna on155-mm, shell.118 While the 1929 Armysurvey and the 1930 inspections of Ord-nance depots showed that storage depotscontained seriously deteriorated stock "farin excess of quantities which [could] beproperly maintained with available main-tenance funds," 119 by 1933 the Depart-ment was able to draw upon public worksfunds for some of its renovation work.120

Surveillance inspectors, trained in the useof new as well as old techniques of testing,functioned at various depots and the ab-sence of any great conflagrations and ex-

plosions at Ordnance depots in these yearsindicates the success of their work. Theonly heavy loss was caused by a greatwind, hail, and rainstorm at Ogden in June1929 where thirty of the thirty-five maga-zines were destroyed at an estimated lossof more than $781,000.121

Yet up to the outbreak of World War II,the question was ever recurring whether itwas better to renovate old stocks than tobuy all new ammunition. The Ammuni-tion Supply Division of Field Service esti-mated in October 1938 that it would cost$19,373,734 to renovate the ammunitionitems required to meet the war reserve forthe Initial Protective Force.122 But whencareful study showed that renovationwould cost only one fourth as much as newammunition, the Chief of Ordnance andhis aides concluded that renovated artil-lery ammunition would provide "the bestmeans of having immediately available areasonable supply of ammunition."1 2 3

Large sums were earmarked for renovationwork at depots; by the summer of 1939some $10,000,000 was available for a two-year program.124

Issue of ammunition for troop training

117 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1925, pp. 5-6, 33-34; 1930,par. 61. (2) Hist of FS Exec Div, 1919-30 June 1939,I, pp. 4-5. OHF. (3) WDAB 1927, HR, pp. 272-78;1928, HR, pp. 406-408; 1936, HR, pp. 326-27; 1938,HR, pp. 341-45; 1938, S, pp. 94-95; 1939, HR, pp.363, 370.

118 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1928, pars. 155, 156; 1931,par. 17.

119 (1) Inspection of OD, 1930, p. 20, OO333.1/2870, NA. (2) Survey of WD, 1929, p. 20, NA.

120 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934, Sec. 4, War Reserves,par. 12 (2)b.

121 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1928, par. 159; 1931, par.17c; 1935, par. 13c. (2) For further details, see corre-spondence in OO 600.913/2611-2638 Ogden, NA.

122 Intraoffice memo, Chief of Ammo Supply Div,FS, for Chief of Ord War Plans Div, General Office,20 Oct 38, Folder 69, WPD General Office files, NA.

123 Min, Wesson Conference, 13 Dec 38, OHF.124 Ibid., 29 Aug 39.


was guided by the War Department's pay-as-you-go policy. Under this plan allow-ances were fitted to the available appropri-ations so that the War Reserve would notbe depleted by use of ammunition for train-ing purposes. The Ordnance Departmentmade one exception. Because of the rapiddeterioration of the .30-caliber ballammunition of World War I vintage, greatquantities of this type were issued "free" toget some value out of it before the stockbecame useless. In 1932 alone, $2,339,000worth was issued. But in spite of all pre-cautions, 1931 found approximately 20percent of the World War I ammunitionunusable because of visible defects, andsome additional spoilage because of pow-der decomposition. The replacement pol-icy was to order items low in stock inquantity, rather than to replace round-for-round the types actually fired in training.This lowered unit cost.125

With the rapid expansion of the AirCorps in the 1930's, Field Service facedproblems of handling, storing, and main-taining quantities of specialized matérielat regular Ordnance depots and at airbases as well. A large Ordnance detach-ment was stationed at Langley Field,attached to General Headquarters AirForce. Its duties were to provide and main-tain all ordnance items used by the GHQAir Force, operate GHQ Air Force Ord-nance depots and distributing points, dis-pose of "duds" on ranges, and compile anddistribute technical information on the useand defects of matériel issued to personnelof the air arm. The growing shortage ofOrdnance storage facilities at air bases, thespecialized demands of the air ammuni-tion supply system, and the field assemblyof demolition bombs made special diffi-culties. Thus, for example, developmentand subsequent maintenance of tractors

and trucks with cranes and trailers forloading heavy bombs became an arduoustask.126 In 1938 Ogden, Savanna, andDelaware Ordnance Depots were namedthe ammunition storage bases for AirCorps storage. This meant that funds forconstructing the necessary igloos could besought under the Wilcox Act.127 Early in1938 Ordnance proposed a $5,000,000program for construction of additionaligloos for air ammunition storage at thethree depots, a plan that received supportfrom the General Staff.128 Subsequentlythe Congress voted money for this purpose.

Meanwhile the whole question of loca-tion of munitions plants and storage depotshad been subject to some study. Increas-ingly aware of the dangers of air attack,several groups in the War Department hadurged adoption of a definite policy thatwould determine the choice of sites for newmanufacturing facilities and additionalstorage depots. When a War Departmentpolicy statement appeared in February1936, it was confined to recommendationson sites for storage depots only.129 Never-theless, at the request of the Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-4, the Chief of Ordnanceappointed a board of officers "to prepare asecret plan embodying an ideal setup for

125 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1931, par. 17.126 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1938. par. 89J. (2) OCM

13180, 22 Oct 36.127 PL 263, 74th Cong.128 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to WD Budget Off, 21 Jan 38,

sub: Authorizing Legislation for Additional Ammuni-tion Storage Facilities, and incl, OO 111.3/6623 NA.(2) Ltr, CofOrd to TQMG, 21 May 38, sub: Construc-tion of Additional Ammunition Storage Facilities, OO111.3/6812, NA.

Public Law 164. approved 3 April 1939, carried anitem for additional Ordnance storage facilities underthe aviation expansion program. Acts and Res relatingto WD, XLVI, 462.

129 Office, Chief of Ordnance, t i t le: WD Policy Con-cerning Sites for New Ordnance Depots, ApprovedSite Board Reports, 1 Dec 44 (hereafter cited asApproved Site Bd Rpts), Rpts 1, 3, 5, and 15, OHF.


Ordnance manufacturing and storagefacilities in the United States." The studyprojected was to consider five points inorder of importance: strategic location,proximity to strategic raw materials, trans-portation facilities to probable theatres ofwar, economy of operation, and climate.The report submitted in April 1937 in-cluded a map marked "Reasonably SafeArea for Arsenals and Depots," uponwhich the western line of safety ran alongthe crest of the Cascades and SierraNevadas, the eastern line along the Appa-lachian ridge. To a number of the board'sfindings, the Chief of Ordnance took ex-ception. Regarding storage, he questionedthe wisdom of abandoning three depots onthe Atlantic seaboard in spite of the pro-posal to erect a new depot in eastern Penn-sylvania.130 No action was taken.

As Ordnance appropriations mountedin 1938 and 1939, the Department gavenew attention to storage facilities, but lesswith an eye to safe strategic location thanto total available cubic footage. As late as15 December 1938 an Ordnance Depart-ment study confidently reported that therewas enough unoccupied storage space—over 700,000 square feet—to care for allneeds under the Initial Protective Forcemobilization; by eliminating obsolete ma-tériel, much additional space could bereleased. Beyond construction of a fewwarehouses at Ogden Arsenal, the studyenvisaged little need for more space, evenunder complete PMP mobilization. AtOgden 115 igloos and 8 smokeless powdermagazines had been built between 1935and 1939.131 But soon after, when the Gen-eral Staff, evincing new anxiety over theexposed location of some Ordnance supplydepots, requested the Department to pre-pare an "integrated plan of Ordnance

depots," the Chief of Ordnance admittedthat eventually new construction would benecessary.132 Though exploration of a stop-gap measure of more complete utilizationof existing facilities revealed considerableunused space at several depots such as Erieand Curtis Bay, in the Great Salt Lakearea alone the Department listed as pri-mary needs under PMP eight warehousesfor general supplies, twenty-eight standardammunition magazines, thirty standardunderground magazines, and four stand-ard primer and fuze magazines.133 Still,neither the higher echelons of the WarDepartment nor the Ordnance Depart-ment in 1939 had a clear conception of thedimensions that the storage problemwould assume in the next two years. TheOrdnance annex to PMP of November1939 merely stated: "Details as to theamount of expansion required cannot bedefinitely stated until the stock levels to bemaintained at the several levels have beendetermined." The plan proposed construc-tion at Ogden for both ammunition andgeneral supplies, and at Savanna for am-munition only.134 Later events were todwarf the PMP calculations.

130 Rpt of Bd of Offs to Prepare a Secret PlanEmbodying an Ideal Setup for Ord Manufacturingand Storage Facilities in U.S.. 13 Apr 37, and 2d Ind,2 May 37, OO 682/1499, NA.

131 (1) Memo, Col William E. Lamed for GenMcFarland. 15 Dec 38. sub: Storage Requirements forIPF and the PMP Plan, Folder 69, WPD GeneralOffice files. NA. (2) Hist of Ogden Arsenal, Vol. I, Pt.2, p. 51, OHF.

132- (1) Approved Site Bd Rpts. Rpt 27. OHF. (2)CofOrd for ACofS, G-4, 20 Jan 39, sub: New Con-struction Facilities. FY 1940, OO 600.1/13865/2, NA.

133 (1) Min, Wesson Conferences, 22 and 23 Jun 39,OHF. (2) Ltr. OCO to TAG, 26 Aug 39, sub: SupplyFacilities under PMP and 1st Ind. OO 381/25469.NA.

134 CofOrd, PMP, 1939, No. 42, NA. This edition ofPMP was dated 30 Nov 39.

CHAPTER III

Finances and the Effects ofLend-Lease

Upon the outbreak of war in Europe theproblems of the War Department becamemore acute. General apprehension solidi-fied into clear realization that Americanrearmament was not merely desirable butwas now necessary. A summary of thedevelopments of the twenty-seven monthswhen America was not wholly at peacebut was not acknowledgedly at war shouldserve to illuminate the over-all problemsthat later chapters will explore in somedetail. The financial story and the begin-nings of the foreign aid program can here-after be dismissed, since the OrdnanceDepartment's work under the Lend-LeaseAct became part and parcel of its activitiesin behalf of the United States Army, andsince after Pearl Harbor money ceased tobe a controlling factor.

The Period of Limited Emergency

On 8 September 1939, a week after theGerman armies swept across the borderinto Poland and five days after GreatBritain and France declared war, Presi-dent Roosevelt proclaimed a state of lim-ited national emergency and authorizedthe Army to take steps to bring itself up tofull statutory strength. The greatly en-larged War Department appropriationsvoted earlier in the year had already set

machinery in motion to hasten Americanrearmament. In August, at the President'srequest, the Assistant Secretaries of Warand Navy had appointed the members tothe War Resources Board to assist in plan-ning industrial mobilization. Early in Sep-tember the Ordnance Department hadready a $6,300,000,000 over-all plan forcarrying out its responsibilities under theProtective Mobilization Plan augmentedfor two years. The Ordnance Departmentcompleted an annex to PMP in Novem-ber, showing schedules for increased pro-duction and tentative plans for additionalstorage space; district officers with con-stantly augmented staffs were expandingtheir procurement activities, contractingfor production studies and new educa-tional orders, while the government arse-nals hurried through detailed blueprintsof essential matériel and trained the inspec-tors for work in private manufacturingplants that were to undertake orders.

Time for industrial mobilization was ofparticular importance to the OrdnanceDepartment because of the peculiar natureof ordnance matériel. Much of it washeavy, complex, and hard to manufacture.Since American industry produced nocommercial counterparts of the big guns,the tanks, the high-explosive shells, andthe bombs, special tooling up was neces-


sary. The six government arsenals, Ord-nance officers estimated, could turn outabout 5 percent of what the Army wouldneed; hence, private industrial plants mustbe converted to munitions manufacture,and new facilities built. Under the mostfavorable circumstances that would taketime.

The initial expansion of munitions pro-duction had come from orders placed withAmerican industrial firms not by theUnited States Government but by Franceand Great Britain. Beginning in 1938, andincreasing sharply after the outbreak ofwar in Europe, foreign orders had beenplaced with American companies for guns,rifles, ammunition, airplanes, and othermilitary equipment, with the result thatduring 1939 and 1940 more munitionswere produced in this country for the Brit-ish and French Armies than for the UnitedStates Army.1 In December 1939 the Pres-ident appointed an interdepartmentalcommittee to co-ordinate foreign anddomestic military purchases, and soonafterward the Anglo-French PurchasingBoard was formed. Multiplying foreignorders by no means committed Americanindustry as a whole to "all-out" war pro-duction. On the contrary, for many monthsafter fighting began in Europe, the beliefwas widely held in America that theUnited States could and should avoid en-tanglement in the European war. InNovember 1939 the Congress amended theneutrality legislation to permit the sale ofmunitions to warring nations, but onlyon a cash-and-carry basis designed to keepAmerica free from financial involvementin the conflict. During the winter of1939-40, inaction on the Western Frontwas interpreted as a stalemate, and theconviction took hold in the minds of manyAmericans that this was a "phony war."

Many businessmen were reluctant to enterinto agreements with the United StatesGovernment for the manufacture of mili-tary equipment because of the uncertaintyof the outlook and because of the vigorouscriticism the public had leveled at muni-tions makers during the 1930's. These andother factors deterred rapid mobilizationof American industry for war productionand directly affected Ordnance Depart-ment operations.

While, difficulties notwithstanding, thetempo of preparation had quickened dur-ing 1939 and the early months of 1940, itwas laggardly in the light of the events oflate spring 1940. In February GeneralMarshall had presented to the Congressthe War Department's budgetary requestsin figures that the House subcommitteepromptly cut by about 10 percent. Earlyin April the House passed a bill for thereduced amount. Before the Senate couldact came the German conquest of Den-mark and Norway. During May, whilediscussion of large increases in War De-partment appropriations proceeded fever-ishly on Capitol Hill, the Nazi armiesmoved into the Low Countries and theninto France. The changes in War Depart-ment concepts of need and in Congres-sional sentiment between September 1939and mid-May 1940 plainly show in thetabulation of requests and sums voted. (SeeTable 5.) After February 1940 these figuresinclude money authorized for contract ob-ligations, the payment of which would notfall within the fiscal year. Sen. HenryCabot Lodge of Massachusetts expressedthe new attitude of the Congress: ". . . itis the general feeling of Congress, and asfar as I can gather, among public opinionthroughout the country, to provide all the

1 Civilian Production Administration, IndustrialMobilization for War (Washington, 1947), I, 51.

FINANCES AND THE EFFECTS OF LEND-EEASE 67

TABLE 5—REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS: SEPTEMBER 1939-MAY 1940

Date

September-October 1939._..February 1940 - . __4 April 1940__. . . „ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .29 April 1940 and early May__

16 May 1940.... ...........22 May 1 9 4 0 _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ .

Title

Additions recommended by Secretary of Warand partial restoration of cuts made byHouse.

War DepartmentTotal

$317,000,000941, 137, 254828, 999, 094103, 878, 630

733,000,0001,823,554,624

Ordnance Total

3139,200,000119,641,358118,067,99311,199,700

306, 897, 576436, 296, 991

money necessary for the National Defense,and so all you have to do is ask for it."2

The limited emergency was over. Recogni-tion of full emergency was written into theappropriations act of June.

The Period of Unlimited Emergency

Peacetime procedures for obtainingOrdnance appropriations had always beentime consuming; a lapse of eighteenmonths to two years was usual betweenpreparation of fiscal estimates and receiptof funds voted by the Congress. The fall ofFrance on 17 June 1940 necessitated afaster system. The annual appropriationfor the War Department voted four daysearlier would obviously not be enough.The process therefore adopted, and kept inoperation for the next two years, was topass supplemental acts. To form a basis foreach request for supplemental funds, theGeneral Staff prepared documents knownas Expenditure Programs, giving detailedsummaries of the specific quantities ofitems to be procured with the money to bevoted in each act. It was a piecemeal sys-tem, a series of procurement demands andadditions to appropriations. Not until thespring of 1942 was longer-range planningeffected in the Army Supply Program stat-

ing requirements in terms of two or threecalendar years.3

The Military Appropriation Act, ap-proved 13 June 1940, and the supplemen-tal acts that followed at brief intervalsthrough the summer and fall, plus thesupplemental act of 5 April 1941, broughtthe 1941 fiscal year figure for the Ord-nance Department up to $2,977,913,998.Another $46,000,000 for liquidating 1939contracts raised the total to $3,023,913,998.Table 1 shows the apportionment of moneyfor various purposes. For the mechanizedunits alone, an Ordnance estimate in Junecalled for $89,719,000 to purchase 1,690medium tanks, 200 scout cars, 744 person-nel carriers, 527 75-mm, howitzers, and 72105-mm, howitzers.4 But, for all its readi-ness to provide necessary funds, the Con-gress did not accept Ordnance estimateswithout questioning how the money wasto be spent. The regular appropriation andfirst supplemental funds were to equip the

2 WDAB 1941, S, p. 126.3 See Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, Procure-

ment and Supply of Munitions, the second volume ofthis subseries, now in preparation for the seriesUNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.MS, OHF (copy in OCMH).

4 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 26 Jun 40, sub: AdditionalExpenditure Authorization, OO 1 12.5/1600, DRBAGO.

TAB

LE

6—A

PPR

OPR

IATI

ON

S FO

R O

RDN

AN

CE

SERV

ICE

AN

D SU

PPLI

ES

ARM

Y,

BY T

YPE

O

F FU

ND

S A

ND

BY

PRO

JEC

T:FI

SCA

L Y

EAR

1941

FINANCES AND THE EFFECTS OF LEND-LEASE 69

full-strength Regular Army and the first750,000 men enlisted through PMP.Money had to be spent in building powderplants, an ammunition loading plant, newstorage facilities, a new Garand rifle plant,and in repairing arsenals. The OrdnanceDepartment's allotment under the SecondSupplemental National Defense Appro-priation Act was designed to provide forthe entire PMP force plus critical items ofreserve for a force of 2,000,000 men, andto supply armament for the aircraft pro-gram. Most of the Third SupplementalAct fund was assigned to ammunition pro-curement. Of the $913,197,851 of the FifthSupplemental Act, about $800,000,000represented critical items deferred fromthe Second Supplemental Act. Moneyfor ammunition plants was the chief itemof cash expenditure, but antiaircraft guns,fire control equipment, mortars, tankguns, tanks, tractors, and personnel car-riers also were covered.5

From July 1941 to Pearl Harbor, theCongress continued to vote large Ord-nance appropriations at fairly close inter-vals to cover increases in equipment,acquisition of facilities to produce thatequipment, and additional manpower. Inpreparing the regular appropriation billfor the War Department for the fiscal year1942, neither the Bureau of the Budgetnor the Congress attempted to cut back theOrdnance Department's requests. GeneralWesson found not a single item chal-lenged.6 The largest part of the $1,339,-390,595 allotted for Ordnance was cashfor liquidating the preceding year's con-tract authorizations, that is, paying forcritical items contracted for in the 30 June1940 program.7

When the German forces invaded theSoviet Union on 22 June 1941 and ad-vanced rapidly, the considered judgment

of competent observers was that Germanywould conquer the USSR in six weeks ortwo months. Consequently, American po-litical and military leaders were eager tospeed industrial and military mobilization.On 11 July 1941 officers of the War De-partment again appeared before the Housesubcommittee, this time to explain the firstsupplemental requests for the fiscal year1942. The $4,770,065,588 asked for theArmy would procure critical equipmentand ammunition for a 3,000,000-man forceas well as large amounts of essential items.Some $84,000,000 was allotted to newstorage facilities, including six ammunitionstorage depots.8

The First Supplemental National De-fense Appropriation Act for 1942, passedon 25 August 1941, allowed the OrdnanceDepartment $2,888,980,486—nearly asmuch as the total of all appropriations forOrdnance for the fiscal year 1941. (SeeTables 2 and3.) Yet a month later PresidentRoosevelt wrote the Secretary of War thatit was "perfectly clear that there should bea very substantial increase in ordnanceitems other than tanks," and requestedprompt submission of "proposals of theArmy relative to increasing these ordnanceitems." 9 After five days of intensive workat all levels, the War Department on 2October sent a list to the White House.The program proposed an expenditure of$320,000,000 for antiaircraft weapons,$222,000,000 for antitank weapons andartillery, and $1,408,000,000 for tanks and

5 WDAB 1941, S, p. 406; WDAB, Second Supp1941, S, pp. 96-97; WDAB, Fifth Supp 1941, HR, pp.247-48, S, p. 158; WDAB 1942, S, p. 30.

6 WDAB 1942, HR, pp. 524-40.7 WDAB, First Supp 1942, HR, p. 2.8 WDAB, First Supp 1942, HR, pp. 1-7, 56-60.9 Ltr, President to SW, 27 Sep 41, sub: Procure-

ment of Additional Ord Items, AG 111 (8-9-39) Sec2, NA.

TAB

LE 7

—A

PPR

OPR

IATI

ON

S FO

R O

RDN

AN

CE S

ERV

ICE

AN

D SU

PPLI

ES A

RMY

, BY

TY

PE O

F FU

ND

S A

ND

BY P

RO

JEC

T:FI

SCA

L Y

EAR

1942


TABLE 8—APPROPRIATIONS FOR ORDNANCE SERVICE AND SUPPLIES: FISCAL YEAR 1943

• Excludes £3,250,000 transferred to General Depots, SOS.

tank guns.10 This high-speed planningtypified the preparation of the 1942 finan-cial and rearmament programs under waywhen the attack on Pearl Harbor came.

From June 1940 to 7 December 1941Ordnance appropriations were: 1J

Over-all, fiscal year 1941 . . . . ."Regular" 1942 appropriation.First Supplemental, 1942 . . . . .

$2,977,913,9981,339,390,5952,888,980,486

T O T A L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7,206,285,079

After America's entrance into the war,seven billion dollars for munitions ceasedto be a staggering figure. Once the nationwas actually at war, money was no majorconsideration. The Ordnance Departmentcould count on having as much as itneeded. But before Pearl Harbor theUnited States was formally at peace. Inthe seventeen months of the unlimited

emergency, the Congress voted the Ord-nance Department fourteen times the totalgiven the Department in the precedingtwenty years.

Shipment of Ordnance "Surplus" AfterDunkerque and Its Consequences 12

Preliminaries of Lend-Lease

While the Congress was preparing tovote the first huge defense budgets in late

10 Incl to memo, SW for President, 2 Oct 41, sub:Procurement of Additional Ord Items of Equipment,AG 111 (9-27-41), DRB AGO.

11 Ord Budget and Fiscal Br.12 For fuller discussion of many aspects of this topic

and lend-lease operations, see Richard M. Leightonand Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,1940-1943, a volume in preparation for the seriesUNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,MS, OCMH.


May 1940, American leaders took one ofthe greatest peacetime gambles in Amer-ican history. As Belgian and French re-sistance gave way before the German at-tack and the British Expeditionary Forcesuffered staggering losses, the War Depart-ment faced the question of whether theUnited States should send large quantitiesof American reserve stocks to bolster theEnglish and French. Several weeks beforethe fall of France the President, after care-ful study of the complex problem andupon advice of military and civilian ad-visers, decided to gamble upon the survivalof Great Britain and France and to sendthem American equipment.13 It requireda ruling of The Attorney General to clearthe way for this transfer of matériel. Bylegislation enacted in 1919 and 1926, mili-tary supplies declared to be surplus toneeds of the War Department could besold, and unserviceable or deterioratedammunition could be exchanged for new.These laws The Attorney General de-clared applicable to the transfer, but the"surplus" stocks must be sold to privatecitizens, who in turn could sell to foreigngovernments. The United States SteelCorporation agreed to have one of its sub-sidiary companies be the agent in the deal.This roundabout procedure thus acquiredsome color of legality.

Determining exactly what military sup-plies could best be spared fell mainly to theOrdnance Department. The GermanArmy reached Abbeville on the Channelon 21 May. Early on the morning of 22May General Marshall called GeneralWesson to his office, outlined the problemsof determining "surplus," and asked for alist of ordnance items and quantities thatcould be shipped to England. The Chief ofOrdnance straightway called his top aides

into conference to draw up the list ofequipment that "could be released with-out prejudice to the United States Na-tional Defense." Tentative agreement camequickly, and General Wesson later thesame day carried the resulting memoran-dum to General Marshall's office.14

During the next two weeks the Nazitroops rolled on to other spots along theChannel. The British, mustering 600 ships,yachts, and small river craft, succeeded inevacuating about 335,000 men from Dun-kerque, but left behind most of their armsand all their heavy ordnance. In Washing-ton frequent conferences were held to ironout the details of transfer of American"surplus." To complicate matters an Alliedcommission kept raising its demands. Forexample, early in June it requested 250,-000,000 additional rounds of .30-caliberrifle ammunition; General Wesson con-sidered 100,000,000 the limit. As a com-promise, 130,000,000 rounds was finallysettled upon. Decisions involving a widerange of ordnance matériel were neces-sary, but by 4 June the program for ship-ment was virtually complete and hadGeneral Marshall's approval. That daythe Equipment Division of the OrdnanceDepartment Field Service sent its firstbatch of telegrams to field installationsordering immediate shipment of the listeditems to Raritan for overseas transit.15

The capitulation of France later in Junemeant that all ordnance "surplus" mate-

13 This decision was made over the violent protestsof many of the top presidential advisers and legisla-tive leaders of the government. They believed thatGreat Britain was finished and that the matérielwould simply fall into Nazi hands to be used againstAmerica. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,An Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 149.

14 Min, Wesson Conference, 22 May 40, OHF.15 Min, Wesson Conferences, 3-6 Jun 40, OHF.


riel would go to England. Within the nexttwo months the British received 615,000Enfield rifles, 25,000 Browning automaticrifles, BAR's, with 1,000,000 20-roundBAR magazines, 86,000 machine guns,895 75-mm, guns, 138,000,000 rounds of.30-caliber ammunition, 1,075,000 roundsfor the 75's, and lesser amounts of smoke-less powder and TNT. This matériel com-prised a very important accretion toBritish defensive powers at a most criticalperiod.16

However wise the transfer of this maté-riel proved to be ultimately, the immediateconsequences were a loss of equipmentavailable to the United States Army. Thevalue of the munitions first shipped wasset at $37,100,000, of which nearly $22,-000,000 was in ammunition. Later, asadditional matériel was sent, the totalreached $41,289,130. Though the pur-chase money would go into replacements,production could not be contrived over-night. The tanks that were shipped wereobsolete; it is true the Enfield rifles couldhave been used in the United States onlyfor training; and some of the 75-mm, gunsand 76,000 of the machine guns, an assort-ment of British Marlin, Vickers, and Lewismodels stored away and practically for-gotten after World War I, would not havebeen issued to the U.S. Army in any case.But the Browning automatic rifles werebadly needed. Shipping 25,000 BAR'sreduced the supply of the U.S. Army bynearly 30 percent, and the 895 75-mm,guns came from a total of 5,131. Theammunition sent was officially labeleddeteriorated but was still usable.17

After subtracting the "surplus," ord-nance matériel on hand at the end of June1940 looked meagre. Exclusive of a few bigguns mounted for seacoast defense, com-putation showed twelve types of artillery

available in the following quantities:

Artillery 18

Antiaircraft guns:37-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83-inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 0 7105-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

Howitzers:75-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1105-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4155-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a 2,9718-inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 5240-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 0

Tank and antitank guns:37-mm. antitank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 837-mm. tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4

Field guns:75-mm. (all models) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,236155-mm. (all models) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973

Mortars81-mm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 03-inch trench . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,226

a Includes 599 HiSpeeded

Small arms were in better supply: about67,000 .30-caliber Browning machine gunsof all types, 4,421 .50-caliber of all types,62,430 Browning automatic rifles, 895,738Springfield rifles, 44,170 semiautomaticrifles, and 371 submachine guns. Therewere 468 tanks, 511 scout cars, and justover 1,200 tractors and auxiliary vehicles.

16 ANMB Clearance Committee, Summary ofBritish Orders as of 28 Dec 40 in Clearance Commit-tee file, Rpts to ASW, 1941, DRB AGO. For fullerdiscussion, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logisticsand Strategy, 1940-1943, Ch. I, MS, OCMH.

17 Interv, 13 Mar 50, with Col Burnett R. Olmsted,officer in charge of figuring requirements, 1940-46.

18 Computations are based on: Consolidated SupplyReport, Status of Principal Items of Ordnance Gen-eral Supply as of 1 November 1939, and figures as of29 June 1940 requested by the Chief of Staff inWeekly Materiel Report. Both in General Supply Div,ODFS files. Sources of figures for artillery differsharply from tabulations in G-4 files. For example,the 155-mm, field guns according to the General Staffrecord numbered only 641. The 973 listed aboveinclude pieces apparently not available for modern-ization. See Production Rates which must be Attainedto get Initial Equipment for PMP, G-4/3 1773 ,6 Sep40, DRB AGO.


The ammunition situation was particu-larly acute. On 5 June 1940 there were588,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber ball am-munition in existence; the shipment of130,000,000 rounds to Great Britain cutthat figure by 22 percent. By Septemberadditional shipments and Army consump-tion reduced the rounds on hand to 370,-000,000. No .50-caliber ammunition wassent. The 1,075,000 75-mm, shells shippedleft the United States Army with 3,625,000rounds, though there were also about oneand a half million unloaded cases. Therewere 124,108 loaded bombs of all types,27,972,979 pounds of smokeless powderfor guns smaller than 10-inch, and bulkexplosives in greater quantity. But the17,716,000 pounds of TNT released toGreat Britain came out of a manufactur-ing surplus of only about 20,000,000pounds.19

In the fall of 1940, 329 obsolete tankswere turned over to Canada and 212 toBritain to be used for training, and somemonths later an additional 50,000,000rounds of .30-caliber ammunition andmost of the remaining stock of Enfieldrifles went to the United Kingdom. Someequipment was released to other countriesin the course of these months, but thequantities were comparatively small. Be-tween June 1940 and February 1941about 1,135,000 Enfields and 188,000,000rounds of .30-caliber ammunition weresent Great Britain. Except for the rifles,the transfer cost the United States muchmatériel that could be called "surplus"only by a long stretch of the imagination.

Nevertheless, apart from the long-termadvantage of strengthening British de-fense, the Ordnance Department didbenefit somewhat from the transfer. Ofsome importance was the effect of theagreement to have British .30-caliber am-

munition production released to the Ord-nance Department till the 50,000,000rounds shipped in February was replaced.

This arrangement gave the U.S. Armynew Remington ammunition at an earlierdate than would otherwise have been pos-sible. Furthermore, the revelation of thepaucity of all ammunition reserves has-tened action to expand manufacturingcapacity. And finally, the Field Servicelearned in this first small-scale dress re-hearsal that it must strengthen its systemof distribution and maintenance. Whilepackaging and shipping the equipment toBritain was officially handled by the

-United States Steel Export Company, thisagent employed Field Service depot work-men. The experience thus gained wasuseful.20

Subsequent Foreign Aid: Procurement

By the end of 1940 munitions ordersplaced with American companies by theBritish Purchasing Commission amountedto some 3.2 billion dollars, of which thelargest sums were for machine tools, air-craft, and ordnance.21 Though these orderswere invaluable in creating new plantcapacity and initiating American firmsinto ordnance manufacture, they posedfresh problems to officers responsible forre-equipping the United States Army.Companies that had contracted with for-

l 9 (1) Computed from Consolidated AmmunitionRpt, Status of Principal Items of Ammunition, 31 Dec39, ODFS files, supplemented by data in memo,ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 6 Jun 40, sub: Exchange ofDeteriorated Ammo, G-4/16110-6, DRB AGO. (2)Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Pro-duction of S.A. Ammo, G-4/31773, DRB AGO.

20 Interv, 2 Sep 42, Capt Paul Olejar with E. H.Meyers, Chief Clerk FS Div, 1940-41.

21 ANMB Clearance Committee, Summary ofBritish Orders as of 28 Dec 40, in CG file, Rpts toASW, 1941, DRB AGO.


eign governments usually could not acceptlarge Ordnance Department contracts.The plant allocation system worked outduring the peace years therefore threat-ened to fall apart before industrial mobi-lization was well started.22 Unfilled Britishorders, amounting to some 90 million dol-lars, at the end of June 1940 pre-emptedvery considerable capacity of the pro-ducers of forgings and tank transmissions,machine guns, ammunition, and explo-sives. Still more difficult was the problemof equipping new facilities because of largeforeign machine-tool orders. British policybefore mid-1940 deliberately aimed at ob-taining tools to use in plants in the UnitedKingdom rather than at purchasing ma-tériel manufactured in the United States.23

When the Ordnance Department at lasthad money to launch a big procurementprogram, the 114 unfilled machine-toolorders placed earlier by the British Pur-chasing Commission constituted a stum-bling block. The creation of the NationalDefense Advisory Committee with powerto veto all production contracts of morethan $150,000 somewhat eased this prob-lem for the Ordnance Department aftermidsummer 1940, although the Army andNavy Munitions Board Clearance Com-mittee had for months scrutinized foreignorders in an attempt to prevent interfer-ence with the American military procure-ment program.24 "The creation of addi-tional production capacity to meet thedesired program," wrote Maj. Gen. JamesH. Burns in September, "is controlled pri-marily by the available production of ma-chine tools. The output of machine toolsanalysis shows demand of the UnitedStates and Great Britain about twice thepresent yearly supply." 25 A priorities sys-tem eventually worked reasonably well,but not until the Chief of Ordnance vigor-

ously protested the allocations to Ord-nance.26 In the last analysis the most seri-ous problems of equipping the U.S. Armystemmed from the delays in developingnew production facilities. For small armsammunition these delays were particularlycostly.27

As long as foreign orders were for maté-riel differing in design from standardizedAmerican equipment, the Ordnance De-partment could consider the experienceAmerican producers were gaining onlypartially helpful. But when late in the fallof 1940 the "battle of the types" was wonand the British agreed to accept Ameri-can-type equipment, American firms tool-ing up for munitions work were preparingfor production that could be immediatelyswitched to the United States Army. In avery few cases the United States was per-suaded to adopt British weapons, but ex-asperating delays grew out of the failure

22 Memo, OASW for Chiefs of Supply Armies andServices, 3 1 Dec 40, sub: Earmarking Industrial Facil-ities for Specialized Production, OO 381 Key Indus-trial Facilities, DRB AGO.

23 (1) Memo, Secy ANMB for CofOrd, 23 Jul 40,sub: Status of British Orders in U.S. as of 29 Jun 40,OO 400.3295/136, Eng, DRB AGO. (2) W. K.Hancock and M. M. Gowing, British War Economy(London, 1949), pp. 106, 229-30.

24 See, for example, memo, 1st Ind, CofOrd forANMB Clearance Committee, 2 Aug 40, sub: Use ofGovernment Owned Machinery in Production of75mm. Ammunit ion for British Orders, OO400.3295/177, Eng, DRB AGO.

25 Ltr, Gen Burns to ASW, 16 Sep 40, cited inmemo. Brig Gen George V. Strong for CofS, 25 Sep40, WPD 4321-9, DRB AGO.

26 (1) Memo. CofOrd for USW, 12 Mar 41, sub:Probable Failure of Ord Program, OO 400.12/2085,DRB AGO. (2) Memo, CofOrd for USW, 2 Jun 41,sub: Necessary Measures to Prevent Failure of OrdProd Program, OO 400.12/3480, DRB AGO. Theconflict lay between the Ordnance Department andthe Air Forces and Navy to whose orders machinetools were diverted.

27 Memo, Brig Gen Richard C. Moore, DCofS, forCofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Production of Small ArmsAmmunition, G-4/31773.


of the British to send complete drawingsand specifications.28 Only a few "noncom-mon" items were to be made to Britishspecifications.29 In fact, the Anglophile in1940 might have contended that this ar-rangement left the British to pay the billfor tooling up for American military pro-duction. Meanwhile, by agreement of of-ficials in higher echelons than the Ord-nance Department Industrial Service,foreign orders placed before the passageof the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 were ordi-narily not to be set aside for Ordnance De-partment work. Formal provisos guaran-teeing priority to PMP critical items werenot invoked.30

Passage of the Lend-Lease Act inMarch 1941 brought a new administrativesystem.31 Foreign procurement programswere henceforward to be financed by theUnited States Government and carried onby its departments and agencies. After theUnited States entered the war, lend-leasemoney was included in Army appropria-tions, and consequently the Ordnance De-partment contracted for, inspected, andshipped matériel for foreign aid by thesame procedures that it employed in sup-plying the United States armed forces. Butbefore Pearl Harbor the Congress madespecial appropriations for lend-lease andthe Ordnance Department found itself inthe awkward position of having to runtwo production programs. Inasmuch asArmy matériel was mostly for use in train-ing the American forces now expandingunder Selective Service whereas lend-leaseequipment had to be shipped overseas, thetwofold distribution was complicated.Keeping two simultaneous productionschedules separate soon proved so waste-ful of time in getting items completed thatthe Ordnance Department resorted to jug-gling United States Army and lend-lease

contracts on items common to both and tomaking the allocation of money a matterof accounting. For a time the Defense AidRequirements Committee, established todeal with ordnance matériel, reviewedforeign requests and attempted to co-ordi-nate them with American requirements,but after October 1941 a special unitunder Maj. Paul M. Seleen was added tothe Executive Branch of the Office, Chiefof Ordnance, to handle these.32 Becausethe Ordnance Department was more con-cerned than any other service with pro-curement of machine tools, throughout thewar all foreign requests for machine toolswent through the Ordnance DepartmentWar Aid Section.33 While planning lend-lease production programs so they woulddovetail with the United States PMP wasthe responsibility of the General Staff and

28 For example, inability to obtain a single drawingfor the Kerrison director and power control for theBritish Bofors 40-mm, gun obliged Frankford Arsenalto disassemble the model completely, measure eachgear, and then make some 600 drawings before pro-duction could be started. (General Barnes Diary, 14Jan 41, OHF.) Besides the Bofors the principal Britishweapon adopted by the U.S. Army was the 6-pounder(57-mm.), though the American 4.7-inch gun was re-chambered to take British 4.5-inch ammunition. Seebelow, Ch. IX.

29 (1) Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy,p. 231. (2) Memo, Arthur E. Palmer, Jr., Special Asstto SW, for Secy GS, 6 Nov 40, AG 400.3295, DRBAGO.

30 (1) International Aid, Ordnance Lend-LeaseActivities (hereafter cited as Intn' t l Aid, Ord I), Vol.I, Ch. 1, p. 9, OHF. (2) Memo, CofS for ACofS WPD,2 Dec 40, sub: Material Assistance to Gt Brit underthe Brit "B" Program, OO 400.3295/1460 Eng, DRBAGO.

In 1939 the Chief of Ordnance had announced apolicy of noninterference with French Governmentorders unless the United States itself became involvedin war. Min, Wesson Conference, 1 1 Apr 39.

:u For fuller discussion, see Leighton and Coakley,Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, Ch. I, MS,OCMH.

32 See Ch. IV, below.33 This was variously entitled Defense Aid, War

Aid, and finally International Aid Section.


Under Secretary of War, detailed informa-tion and advice on proposed ordnanceschedules had to come from the OrdnanceDepartment. Ordnance recommendationsmight be overruled for political or otherreasons, but they carried great weight.

The expansion of munitions productionand rapid increase in facilities to achieveit were the most urgent parts of the taskthe Ordnance Department faced in 1940and 1941. Industrial mobilization plan-ning in the preceding twenty years hadlaid the ground carefully so that Ordnanceofficers and civilian chiefs were ready tostart the machinery of large-scale procure-ment as soon as the money for it was ap-propriated. But peacetime planning hadnot included any program of foreign aid,and lend-lease commitments in the monthsbefore the United States became a bellig-erent consequently imposed particularprocurement problems. The four most im-portant were establishing balanced pro-duction, contriving manufacture of itemsnot used by the U.S. Army, handling "bitsand pieces" requisitions, and administer-ing the program of shipments sanctionedin the Lend-Lease Act.

Keeping production in balance so thatall component parts are ready for assem-bly at the same moment is difficult underany circumstances. The complications ofthis procedure that arose after the passageof the Lend-Lease Act are well illustratedby the situation in tank production. Earlyin 1941 the Baldwin Locomotive Com-pany and the American Locomotive Com-pany each had contracts from the Ord-nance Department for 685 medium tanksand from the British Tank Commission fora like number. The American LocomotiveCompany, moreover, had agreed to buildin Canada an additional number for theBritish, and the Pullman-Standard Com-

pany and the Pressed Steel Car Companyhad each accepted British orders for 500.The Ordnance Department's policy wasto buy complete tanks and supply as "freeissue" only government-made radio equip-ment, guns, and engines. The British, onthe other hand, negotiated separate con-tracts for armor plate, suspension wheels,and other major components. Unhappily,the British Tank Commission had failed toplace a contract for engine transmissions.34

Without transmissions no tanks could beassembled.

As noted above, when the confusionsand delays became inescapable, the Ord-nance Department abandoned the attemptto keep foreign orders and Army ordersseparate. With all the prime contractorsusing subcontractors for parts, manufac-ture of components was under way inmany different plants and localities. Out-put of complete tanks could only bespeeded if assembly could proceed as soonas parts were ready, irrespective ofwhether they were made for lend-lease orOrdnance Department orders. Presiden-tial approval of this procedure was an-nounced in September 1941.35

The second problem confronting theOrdnance Department on lend-lease or-ders concerned manufacture of noncom-mon items. The volume of these was notlarge because of British acceptance ofAmerican types of most equipment, butthe exceptions to the general rule createddifficulties of procurement out of all pro-portion to either volume or money value.

34 Rpt, Lt Col W. W. Knight, Jr., for Brig Gen JohnK. Christmas. 16 May 45, sub: Informal Rpt on EarlyPhases of Tank Program, OHF.

35 Ltr. President Roosevelt to SW, 18 Aug 41,quoted in memo. Lt Col John B. Franks, QMC,Defense Aid Div, for Chiefs of all Supply Arms andServices. 4 Sep 41, sub: Defense Aid. . . . Intn'tl Aid,Ord, I, OHF.


Furthermore, upon the recognition ofChina and later the USSR as lend-leasecountries, their wishes for munitions meet-ing their own special specifications had tobe considered. The Ordnance Depart-ment Defense Aid Branch assembled forthe War Department Defense Aid officethe information bearing upon the requestsfor noncommon items. If procuring theseseverely threatened schedules for commonitems, the Ordnance Department recom-mended refusal of the requests. Higher au-thority made the decision. When requisi-tions for noncommon items were accepted,the Ordnance Department undertook tofind contractors for the jobs. Foreign blue-prints of design and specifications had tobe obtained, and sometimes special gages.The Ordnance Department had to seethat light tanks for the British were builtwith special British-designed turrets, thattanks for Russia had diesel instead of gaso-line engines; the Chinese wanted 7.92-mm, ammunition, the Russians a specialnitroglycerine powder. All this at best wastime consuming, and time was short.When the nonstandard items requestedconstituted an order, placing the orderwhere it would not interfere with the exe-cution of larger orders was particularlydifficult.

"Bits and pieces" requisitions forstandard matériel also created problemsin 1941. Tiny orders made wholesale pur-chase impossible. An extreme examplewas a foreign government's request for tenyards of cheesecloth. On that occasionCol. A. B. Quinton, Jr., reached into hispocket, pulled out a dollar bill and offeredit to anyone who would go to a local de-partment store to make the purchase di-rect.36 Unfortunately, more specializedmatériel was a different matter. Repre-sentatives of foreign governments, on

learning from depot officers that certainitems were on hand, were prone to submiturgent requests for all or part of the sup-ply. Refusal of such requests was often notpossible for political reasons, but piece-meal replacement of the supplies releasedwas uneconomical. The solution finallyreached was twofold: first, to reduce thefrequency of these requests by forbiddingAmerican officers to divulge to foreignagents any information about the stocksavailable, and, second, when "bits andpieces" requisitions were authorized, to di-vert from existing Army stores or currentproduction the quantities requested but towait till total "diversions" mounted to asizable lot before placing a production or-der for replacement.37

The fourth complication arose out ofthe continued shipment of "surplus"equipment to lend-lease nations. TheLend-Lease Act expressly sanctionedtransfers of supplies produced on appro-priations antedating 11 March 1941, pro-vided the Chief of Staff declared them sur-plus to the defense needs of the UnitedStates and provided the total value did notexceed 1.3 billion dollars. The "BillionThree" shipments, as they came to becalled, covered almost all the first lots ofmatériel sent to the Soviet Union. TheFirst (Moscow) Protocol putting the termsof the agreement on paper was endorsedby President Roosevelt on 1 October 1941.The United Kingdom not only receivedsupplies direct from United States stocks

36 Interv with Maj Gen A. B. Quinton, Jr., 1Jun 49.

37 (1) Memo, 1st Lt John G. Detwiler for Maj PaulM. Seleen, 17 Oct 41, sub: Possible Elimination ofSmall Requisitions. (2) Memo, Brig Gen James K.Crain for Chief of Equipment Div and Chief of AmmoSupply Div, 21 Oct 41. (3) Memo, Col Hugh C.Minton for WD DA Administrator, 27 Oct 41, sub:DA Requisitions for Small Quantities. All in Intn'tlAid, Ord, I, OHF.


immediately after enactment of lend-leasebut also, following the British withdrawalfrom Greece in May, a second large con-signment of "surplus," sent to augmentBritish matériel in the Mediterranean andMiddle East.38 No one who knew the factsof the strategic situation doubted the wis-dom of the new transfers, but the Ord-nance Department was obliged to recasthastily its procurement schedules when-ever fresh disasters on the battlefronts orsinkings of vessels carrying machine tools,machinery, and munitions occurred. Thisvirtual commandeering of American ma-tériel for foreign aid was, of course, to en-dure through much of the war,39 but re-placement was less difficult after theUnited States' entry into the war enlistedthe whole-hearted co-operation of allAmerican industry in the fight to keepsupply lines full. The release of "surplus"military supplies just after Dunkerque wasmore dramatic than the subsequent trans-fers; on the first occasion the need arosemore unexpectedly, and the response ofthe United States was then unprece-dented. Still, the effect of later transferswas similar. Indeed, difficulties for theOrdnance Department in the later pre-Pearl Harbor transactions were greater, asmanufacturing facilities ready to acceptmunitions orders became glutted withwork and many peacetime procedures ofprocurement still obtained. Consideringthat over nine billion dollars in ordnancematériel was shipped to lend-lease nationsbefore 1945, the miracle is not that trou-bles developed but that military procure-ment for the United States could proceedat all.

Field Service and Foreign Aid

While vigorous endeavors to expandproduction went forward, research anddevelopment work and the storage prob-

lem received relatively little attention. Be-cause development of new weapons wasless important than having adequate sup-plies of matériel already standardizedready at the earliest possible moment, allthrough 1940 and 1941 effort was delib-erately concentrated upon expediting out-put of standard items. Work upon new ex-perimental models was not canceled, butits priority was not high.4 0 Field Serviceresponsibilities, on the other hand, ex-panded at once. As the training campsopened after the inauguration of the Se-lective Service Act, depot operations be-came active and the mounting tasks ofpreparing shipments to foreign govern-ments both before and after the passage ofthe Lend-Lease Act required many morepeople to handle them. The correspondingneed for a series of new depots to store thematériel that the enlarged procurementprogram must accumulate was not imme-diately understood. General Staff strategicplanning through 1940 was based solelyupon defense of the American continent,not upon overseas offensives. Depot op-erations accordingly were mapped outwithout regard to supplying armies over-seas.41 When the foreign aid program wassuperimposed upon this scheme, a numberof changes became imperative.

38 International Div, Hq ASF, A Guide to Interna-tional Supply, 31 Dec 45, pp. 5, 7, 21, 31, DRB AGO.Later legislation removed most of the limitations ondate of appropriation and amounts transferable. SeeBudgetary Methods and Financing of Lend-LeaseActivities, 17 Oct 44, in Intn ' t l Aid, Ord I, OHF.

39 See, for example, memo, OD Fiscal Br for BrigGen Harry R. Kutz, Contracting Off, 27 Sep 43, sub:Audit Rpt on York Safe & Lock Co, Exchange Con-tract W-ORD-489.00160/13032 York Safe & LockCo. Intn'tl Aid, Ord I, OHF.

40 The Assistant Secretary of War in fact warnedemphatically of the dangerous delays in productionthat must result from failure to freeze designs. ASWfor CofOrd, 26 Aug 40, sub: Freezing of Designs. OO400.114/752 Misc, DRB AGO.

41 Approved Site Bd Rpts, Rpt 42, OHF.


In the fall of 1939 plans for increasingOrdnance storage facilities had called fornew buildings at Ogden, Utah, for bothammunition and general supplies, and atSavanna, Illinois, for ammunition. Sixmonths later additional storage and re-pairs for Field Service installations stillstood sixteenth on the list of undertakingsdeemed essential to prepare the OrdnanceDepartment for emergency, and evenafter the June 1940 Munitions Programwas launched, the General Staff was pro-posing to rent commercial warehousesrather than construct new government de-pots.42 That this procedure was unwise wasby then clear to Ordnance Field Service.Strong representations made by the Ord-nance Department persuaded G-4 of theGeneral Staff that new depots were a ne-cessity. War Department policy, decreedin 1937, limited location of depots andnew munitions plants to sites within areasconsidered strategically safe from bomb-ing, though the Chief of Ordnance suc-ceeded in getting approval for placingsome depots nearer the seaboard than theGeneral Staff was originally willing tosanction. The result was selection of eightsites in the fall of 1940 for the OrdnanceDepartment's "A" Program, creating aring of permanent depots, none placednearer than 200 miles to the country'sborders.43

Construction began in February 1941on the Umatilla, Oregon, depot, and onthe other seven depots that summer. Firstto be activated were Umatilla, in thenorthwest corner of the "safe" zone; Win-gate, New Mexico, in the southwest; Port-age, Ohio, in the northeast; and Anniston,Alabama, in the southeast. While not com-pleted, these four were ready for use bythe time of the attack on Pearl Harbor,thereby providing some 8,000,000 addi-tional square feet of space, over 5,000,000

of it for ammunition. Furthermore, theconstruction and layout of the new depots,modern in every respect, permitted con-centration of large quantities of matérieland far more efficient operations than whenstocks were scattered among twenty orthirty depots. These facilities doubled am-munition storage capacity, but adequatestorage for general supplies had not as yetbeen provided. For these the General Staffin the summer of 1941 was still expectingto use commercial facilities. Again theOrdnance Department protested. Duringthe second half of 1941 Field Serviceworked out its "B" plan for eight more de-pots. G-4 approved, and construction be-gan early in 1942.44

The first plans for expanding storagecapacity had thus been conceived beforeforeign aid shipments were a considera-tion. Yet before the building program ac-tually got started, assembling matériel tobe sent to the British was beginning tocomplicate operations at Ordnance depots.After lend-lease was enacted these compli-cations multiplied. Question arose in thelate spring of 1941 of the legality of storingin U.S. Army depots packaged suppliesbought by the British from commercialconcerns. Temporarily, the Ordnance De-partment arranged to lease to the Britishsome depot space, but this was no perma-

42 (1) 2d Ind to memo, Col Minton for OASW, 22May 40, OO 381/29669. DRB AGO. (2) Min, Wes-son Conference, 15 Jul 40, OHF.

43 (1) Min. Wesson Conference, 16 Jul 40, OHF.(2) Pers ltr, Gen Crain to CofOrd, 25 Jul 50, OHF.(3) 1st ind to ltr, OCO to TAG, 17 Jul 40, OO 633/34Misc, DRB AGO. (4) Approved Site Bd Rpts, Rpts33-41, OHF. These contain background informationabout the bases of selection of depot sites.

44 (1) Pers ltr, Gen Crain to CofOrd, 25 Jul 50. (2)Min. Wesson Conference, 2 Jul 41, OHF. (3) OCO,FS Storage Div, Hist of Depot System, Jul 39 to 7 Dec41, Exhibits 1-3, OHF. For fuller discussion of FieldService problems, see Thomson and Mayo, Procure-ment and Supply of Munitions, MS, OHF.


nent solution of the problem.45 Submarinewarfare made shipping schedules so irreg-ular that transport of completed items di-rect from factory to the docks would havecreated intolerable congestion at the ports.Furthermore, some equipment requiredassembly of complementary items. Conse-quently, "intransit" storage was unavoid-able, either in regular Army depots or oc-casionally at commercial warehouses thatthe British had acquired. In May 1941 theChief of Ordnance described the situation:

Theoretically at least a shipload of tanksshould, as far as practicable, be by organiza-tion. The shipment should include not onlytanks but all accessories, essential extra partsand all allied equipment. It has been neces-sary for the Ordnance Department to utilizein a manner . . . far from ideal availablestorage space. At Raritan Arsenal, for exam-ple, nowhere is there available a coveredfloor space essential to the gradually increas-ing task of receiving, sorting and checkingequipment to see that ships can be loadedfrom the standpoint of organization equip-ment so that as promptly as possible afterreaching the other side the equipment can beput to use.46

The congestion at British ports on the westcoast of Great Britain during this periodnecessitated taking every possible measurein the United States to expedite unloadingin the United Kingdom.47 The result wasa decision ordinarily to exclude lend-leasematériel from regular Army depots in or-der to prevent clogging of operationsthere, and to establish intransit storage de-pots for lend-lease. The first intransitstorage depot opened in midsummer of1941. Here lend-lease as well as someUnited States Army matériel waiting forshipping space was stored, and Ordnancepersonnel assisted a British contingent inassembling equipment. Eventually theTreasury Department allotted lend-leasemoney to building eleven depots for lend-

lease supplies. Five of these were in timeturned over to the Ordnance Departmentto run without special differentiation be-tween Army and lend-lease matériel.48

That the depot programs of 1939 and1940 were inadequate by 1941 was due farless to the scheduling of large-scale foreignaid than to the General Staff concept ofcontinental defense.49 As realization grewthat the United States would almost surelybe drawn into the war, earlier plans wererevised, but not before Ordnance FieldService was beginning to suffer from lackof depot facilities. Storage was only one ofmany Ordnance responsibilities for main-tenance and distribution of fighting equip-ment, but within the zone of the interiorduring the defense period and, indeed,long after, storage constituted a peculiarlyacute problem. Foreign aid added to, butdid not create, these difficulties. In fact, theprewar experience gained in handling for-eign aid matériel was invaluable later.

45 (1) Memo, Lt Col Henry S. Aurand for GenEugene Reybold, 3 Jun 41, sub: Storage for DefenseAid, Exhibit 48, Approved Site Rpts, Rpt 48, OHF.(2) Memo, Brig Gen George R. Spaulding for G-4,29 Jun 41, Folder Correspondence Lend-Lease 4,DRB AGO

46 Memo, CofOrd for TAG, 14 May 41, sub: Stor-age Space under LL Act, AG 400.242 (5-14-41) (1 ) ,DRB AGO.

47 Bombings and sinkings along the east coast wherethe bulk of British imports was ordinarily handled hadmounted to a pitch that had led the British Govern-ment to route all cargos to west coast ports. Thesewere insufficiently equipped with dock storage orrail transport facilities. See discussion in Hancock andGowing, British War Economy, pp. 250-65.

48 (1) OCT. Hist Br, Monograph 6, pp. 338-39. (2)Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Arms and Services and Chiefof AAF, 20 Aug 41, sub: DA Storage and Transporta-tion. AG 68 1 (8-14-41), DRB AGO. For fuller dis-cussion, see Chester Wardlow, The TransportationCorps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations(Washington, 1951).

49 See Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, TheFramework of Hemisphere Defense, a volume in prep-aration for the series UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II. MS, OCMH.

CHAPTER IV

Organization of the OrdnanceDepartment: 1940-45

The Early Months of 1940

In the early months of 1940 the Office,Chief of Ordnance, in Washington was stillhoused in the Munitions Building, whichhad been its home since World War I. Gen-eral Wesson's staff at the end of May num-bered 400—56 Regular Army officers, 3Reserve officers, and 341 civilians.1 Allthe other supply services also had theirheadquarters in the Munitions Building,and overcrowding was becoming a seriousproblem. By the end of the summer theOrdnance Department had outgrown itspeacetime quarters and in Decembermoved to larger, more modern offices inthe Social Security Building on Independ-ence Avenue.

No essential change in the Ordnancemission or organizational pattern had beenmade for nearly twenty years, but the com-plexity and variety of the Army's weaponshad increased and by 1940 plans were wellunder way for their production in enor-mous quantities. With $176,000,000allotted to the Department for the fiscalyear 1940, and many times that amountfor the following year, the procurementand distribution of munitions was becom-ing "big business." General Wesson's staffin 1940 was divided, as it had been since1920, into four main groups—the GeneralOffice, the Technical Staff, the Industrial

Service, and the Field Service.2 (Chart 1)The General Office performed adminis-trative duties under direction of the execu-tive officer, Brig. Gen. Hugh C. Minton.The Technical Staff supervised tests ofexperimental equipment and collaborated,through the Ordnance Committee, withthe using arms. The two main operatingunits of the Ordnance office were theIndustrial Service, with broad responsibil-ity for production and procurement, andthe Field Service, which handled supply.

To aid in administering the Department,the Chief of Ordnance was authorized bylaw to have two assistants with the rank ofbrigadier general.3 During GeneralWesson's term of office the assistants wereBrig. Gen. Earl McFarland and GeneralHarris. In 1940 General McFarland waschief of the Military Service, with jurisdic-tion over both the Field Service and the

1 On 30 January 1940 the chief of the Military Per-sonnel and Training Branch reported that the totalmilitary strength of the Ordnance Department was376 officers and 3,280 enlisted men. Min, WessonConference, 30 Jan 40, OHF.

2 ODO 122, 31 Jul 39, OHF. These four units wereofficially called "groups" and were subdivided intodivisions, sections, and branches. The term "head-quarters" was seldom used to refer to the Office, Chiefof Ordnance. General Wesson felt that "headquar-ters" was properly applied only to a military organi-zation, and he looked upon his staff as primarily abusiness office.

3 National Defense Act, 4 June 1920, PL 242, 66thCong.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: 1940-45 85

MAJ. GEN. CHARLES M. WESSON,Chief of Ordnance, 1938-42.

Technical Staff, while General Harris waschief of the Industrial Service. Thisarrangement gave emphasis to the distinc-tion between the military duties of theChief of Ordnance, for which he was re-sponsible to the Chief of Staff of the Army,and his industrial duties, for which he wasresponsible to the Assistant Secretary ofWar.

By far the largest of the four groups wasthe Industrial Service which, in additionto its procurement and production func-tions, had responsibility for designing anddeveloping new and improved weapons,since Ordnance at the time had no Re-search and Development Division.4 Dur-ing the spring of 1940, when interest in therearmament program was growing, Col.Gladeon M. Barnes, chief of the TechnicalStaff, urged General Wesson to separatethe research function from production andprocurement by establishing a researchdivision independent of the IndustrialService. Colonel Barnes argued that thiswould give the research experts freedomto carry on their investigations and experi-ments without being constantly hamperedby production problems.5 But GeneralWesson decided that the most pressingneed at the moment was not for moretime-consuming research and experimen-tation with new weapons but for the prep-aration of blueprints and specifications forequipment already approved. He chose tokeep design and development within theIndustrial Service and, at the same time,to strengthen that service by adding threeexperienced officers as assistants to Gen-eral Harris. He named Col. Burton O.Lewis as assistant chief for production andprocurement; transferred Colonel Barnesfrom the Technical Staff to the IndustrialService as assistant chief for engineering;and a short time later ordered Lt. Col.

Levin H. Campbell, Jr., from FrankfordArsenal to Washington to become assistantchief for facilities.6

These three "vice presidents," as theywere familiarly known in the Department,assumed their duties while Ordnance wasbeing tooled up for the big job ahead. Inthe summer of 1940 the Industrial Servicewas suddenly called upon to negotiate con-tracts amounting to hundreds of millionsof dollars for a great variety of complex

4 ODO 122, 31 Jul 39, OHF.5 Memo, Col Barnes for Gen Wesson, 13 May 40,

sub: Expansion of Research and Development Activi-ties, OHF. For further discussion of the problem oforganizing research and development activities, seeCh. VIII, below.

6 (1) Intervs with Gen Harris and Brig Gen BurtonO. Lewis, Jun 49. (2) General Instructions 1, 2, 3, 4,Ind Serv, Jun-Jul 40, OHF. See also Brig. Gen. LevinH. Campbell, Jr., "Ordnance Facilities," Army Ord-nance, XXI, 124 (1941), 369.

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weapons. The district offices were expand-ing their small peacetime organizations asquickly as possible and were preparing tohandle procurement assignments on agrand scale. The three assistant chiefsaided General Harris in exercising effec-tive supervision over the operating divi-sions of the Industrial Service during thisperiod of rapid growth.

Management of supply activities was theresponsibility of Field Service. It storedand issued matériel; inspected, repaired,and maintained ordnance equipment,whether in storage or in the hands oftroops; and administered storage depots,renovation plants, and other field estab-lishments. The growing importance ofsupply operations early in 1940 led to theassignment of the executive officer forField Service, Col. James K. Crain, aschief of the Field Service, under the super-vision of General McFarland, chief of theMilitary Service.7 The Field Service atthat time was organized into an ExecutiveDivision, a War Plans and Training Divi-sion (later renamed Military Organizationand Publications Division), and threeoperating divisions—Ammunition Supply,General Supply, and Maintenance. InApril the Maintenance and General Sup-ply Divisions were placed under the direc-tion of Col. Everett S. Hughes, then desig-nated chief of the Equipment Division, tobring about closer co-ordination of theiractivities, particularly as they concernedspare parts.8 Under Colonel Grain's super-vision, specially trained Ordnance com-panies and battalions were organized toadminister Field Service depots and main-tain Ordnance equipment in the hands oftroops. Construction of new storage facili-ties was begun during 1940, and in mid-summer the Field Service handled its firstbig prewar assignment—the transfer of

over 50,000 tons of Ordnance supplies tothe British Army.

From the Office, Chief of Ordnance,control was exercised over an increasingnumber of field establishments. These weredivided into four main groups, with theGeneral Office administering the schools,the Technical Staff the laboratories andproving grounds, the Industrial Service thearsenals and district offices, and the FieldService the storage depots and renovationplants. General Wesson delegated fullauthority to the commanding officers tocarry on day-to-day operations, subjectonly to broad policies determined by theWashington headquarters. This practicewas based on the traditional Ordnancepolicy of "centralized control from theWashington office with operations decen-tralized to field agencies." 9

At General Wesson's 11 o'clock confer-ences, held virtually every day, membersof the staff reported on progress and diffi-culties and threshed out common prob-lems. Sometimes only two or three officersattended and at other times the heads ofall the groups and staff branches werepresent. On several occasions the Chief ofStaff and other representatives of the WarDepartment high command attended.Under General Wesson's leadership, the"11 o'clocks" served as the central policy-making agency for the Ordnance Depart-ment.10

7 (1) Ord SO 76, par. 5, 30 Mar 40, OHF. (2) In-tervs with Gen McFarland and Maj Gen James K.Crain, 30 Jun 49.

8 (1) Change 2, ODO 122, 1 Apr 40, OHF. (2) In-terv with Gen Crain, 30 Jun 49.

9 Ordnance Department Reply to QuestionnaireNo. 2, House Committee on Military Affairs, 14 Jul41, OO 400.12/4454, DRB AGO.

10 (1) Interv with Gen McFarland, 28 Feb 50. (2)Min, Wesson Conferences, 21 Dec 38-18 May 42,OHF.

PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR

Organisational Developments, June 1940 toJune 1942

Most of the changes in the organizationof the Department between June 1940 andJune 1942 resulted from the swift expan-sion of Ordnance operations, beginningwith the Munitions Program of 30 June1940 and culminating in the multibillion-dollar arms appropriations of early 1942.The extent of this expansion is indicatedby the rise in the number of people in theWashington office—from 400 in May 1940to 5,000 in June 1942. Between these twodates nearly 100,000 civilian workersthroughout the nation were added to theOrdnance Department payroll, not count-ing hundreds of thousands employed bycontractors holding Ordnance contracts.

In spite of this rapid growth, fewchanges were made in the organization ofthe Department until June 1942 whenMaj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell,Jr., becameChief of Ordnance. General Wesson's hope,expressed in early 1940, that "the machineis so designed and planned that it canmeet the load imposed on it without break-ing down," was largely realized.11 Thechanges in the headquarters organizationwere mostly additions to the staff, such asthe establishment of a Lend-Lease Sectionin the Fiscal Division after the passage ofthe Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. Simi-larly, because of the pressure for increasedtank production in the spring of 1941, aseparate Tank and Combat Vehicle Divi-sion was split off from the Artillery Divi-sion of the Industrial Service.12

In July 1941 General Wesson made onemajor organizational change when heabolished the Technical Staff and trans-ferred its functions and personnel to vari-ous branches of the Industrial Service.13

He assigned most of the former Technical

Staff functions to Brig. Gen. Gladeon M.Barnes, who then became the assistantchief for research and engineering in theIndustrial Service. General Wesson's pur-pose was to eliminate duplication of effortbetween the Technical Staffand the Indus-trial Service. This change, coupled withthe increasing independence of the FieldService under the leadership of Brig. Gen.James K. Crain, led to dropping the posi-tion of chief of the Military Service in thesummer of 1941. General McFarland, whohad filled this position since 1938, wasassigned to continue as chairman of theOrdnance Committee and to supervise andinvestigate various activities pertainingdirectly to the Office, Chief of Ordnance.14

A fourth "vice president" was added tothe Industrial Service in July 1941, whenBrig. Gen. Richard H. Somers, formerchief of the Technical Staff, was appointedassistant chief for inspection.15 GeneralSomers was responsible for testing newmatériel at Ordnance proving grounds andfor co-ordinating all inspection activitieswithin the Industrial Service. As the muni-tions production curve began to rise, andas plans for a tremendous procurementprogram matured, inspection assumedhuge proportions.

In December 1941, a few days after theattack on Pearl Harbor, Brig. Gen. BurtonO. Lewis, assistant chief for productionand procurement, was named deputy chiefto General Harris. General Lewis' respon-

11 Gen. G. M. Wesson, "Ordnance DepartmentProcurement," lecture, Army Industrial College, 15Jan 40.

12 Change 4, ODO 156, 18 Jul 41, OHF.13 (1) Changes 1-5, ODO 156, 22 Jul 41. (2) ODO

183, 29 Jul 41, OHF. For a discussion of the Techni-cal Staffand its position in the Ordnance organiza-tion, see Ch. VIII, below.

14 Interv with Gen McFarland, 28 Feb 50.15 (1) General Instructions 22, Ind Serv, 24 Jul 41,

OHF. (2) ODO 183, 29 Jul 41, OHF.

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sibility for supervising production wasthen taken over by General Campbell,who had virtually completed his earlierassignment by getting the construction ofnew facilities well under way.16 At thesame time, the Department's procurementprogram was turned over to ColonelQuinton, former chief of the District Con-trol Division, who became assistant chieffor purchasing. In this capacity ColonelQuinton supervised the purchasing activi-ties of the arsenals and Ordnance districtsand maintained liaison with the Office ofthe Under Secretary of War and the Officeof Production Management.17

In the Field Service several organiza-tional changes occurred during 1941 andearly 1942. The first was the establish-ment in July 1941 of the Utilities Division,which was to plan the construction of newstorage depots and provide for mainte-nance and new construction at all existingOrdnance depots.18 By the spring of 1942,Field Service exercised control over forty-two field installations as compared withtwenty-seven two years earlier. Fifteennew depots for the storage of ammunitionand other ordnance supplies had beenbuilt, and the Wingate Depot in NewMexico had been so extensively rebuiltthat it was practically a new installation.19

In February 1942 a whole new level ofadministration was added to the FieldService when six positions of assistantchief, roughly comparable to those of theassistant chiefs of the Industrial Service,were created. By then the volume of busi-ness in the Field Service had become sogreat that General Crain felt it essentialto have the assistance of experienced offi-cers capable of assuming a large measureof responsibility.20 Each assistant chief wasmade responsible for a phase of Field Serv-ice activities in which he was specially

qualified, and was required to report di-rectly to the chief of the Field Service. Col.Charles M. Steese was assigned plans andstatistics, and ammunition and bombs;Colonel Hughes, artillery; Col. Morris K.Barroll, automotive equipment and arma-ment; Col. Stephen MacGregor, smallarms; and Col. James L. Hatcher, aircraftarmament. The new appointees also main-tained close contact with the appropriateassistant chiefs of the Industrial Service inorder to expedite deliveries of ordnancefrom factory to training center or fightingfront.21

Relations with Army Service Forces

The 9 March 1942 reorganization of theArmy brought about a fundamentalchange in the relationship between theOrdnance Department and higher head-quarters.22 With the establishment of theServices of Supply, the Army GroundForces, and the Army Air Forces, a newlevel of command was placed between theOrdnance Department and the Chief ofStaff and Under Secretary of War. The

16 Interv with Gen Lewis, summer 1949. (2)General Instructions 29, Ind Serv, 16 Dec 41, OHF.(3) Change 8, ODO 183, 15 Dec 41, OHF.

17 (1) Interv with Gen Quinton, 1 Jun 49. (2) Gen-eral Instructions 29, Ind Serv, 16 Dec 41, OHF. (3)Change 8. ODO 183, 15 Dec 41, OHF. GeneralQuinton was on duty in the Office of the Under Sec-retary of War during February and March 1942.

18 ODO 183. 29 Jul 41, OHF. For a general de-scription of the Field Service, see Brig. Gen. James K.Crain, "Ordnance Service in Our New Army," ArmyOrdnance, XXI, 125 (1941), 464.

19 See ODO 250, 31 Mar 42, OHF, for list of fieldinstallations.

20 (1) Change 1, ODO 215, 4 Feb 42, OHF. (2) In-terv with Gen Crain, 30 Jun 49.

21 FS Office Memo 32, 5 Feb 42, OHF. Detailedstatements of the duties of each assistant chief ap-peared in various FS office memos and in ODO 250,31 Mar 42, OHF.

22 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, sub: War Department Re-organization.


commanding general of the Services ofSupply, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,was given broad powers over all the sup-ply services.23 He and his staff not onlytook a large part of the administrativeburden off the shoulders of General Mar-shall and Under Secretary Patterson, butalso worked out the Army Supply Pro-gram to guide procurement activities ofthe supply services.

The new headquarters combined in oneorganization all elements of supervisionformerly divided between G-4 of the Gen-eral Staff and the Office of the UnderSecretary of War. The March 1942 reor-ganization did not abolish the Office,Chief of Ordnance, or the offices of any ofthe other supply chiefs as it abolished theoffices of the Chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry,Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery whenthose arms were united to form the ArmyGround Forces. As a result each supplyservice continued to have some measure ofindependence. The Ordnance Depart-ment, for one, vigorously resisted furthermoves to limit its prerogatives and to inter-fere with its methods of operation.

In the relations between Ordnance andASF friction gradually developed andeventually increased to such a degree thatit had a marked effect upon the function-ing of the two organizations.24 The Ord-nance Department, with its century-oldtradition of independence and technicalcompetence, looked upon the new head-quarters with suspicion and resentment,while a few of the officers in ASF con-sidered the Ordnance Department ratherstiff-necked and imbued with an unco-operative spirit bordering at times oninsubordination. Some ASF officers re-garded Ordnance not only as being tooconservative and unimaginative but alsoas being so intent upon protecting its own

interests that it sometimes placed themabove the interests of the Army as awhole.25 Col. Clinton F. Robinson, directorof the ASF Control Division, commentedin April 1942:

There appears to be a decided fraternityor clique feeling among the majority of Ord-nance officers. . . . There is apparently abelief that there is something "mysterious"about the design and production of Ord-nance munitions; Ordnance officers are spe-cialists in this—no one else knows anythingabout it, and no one should interfere. Ap-parently there is the feeling that the way theorganization should operate is to give theOrdnance Department the job, and com-plete authority for production of Ordnancemunitions, and then for any higher head-quarters to forget about it and assume thatthe job is being done. . . 26

Ordnance officers believed that therewas a great deal about the production andmaintenance of munitions that the unini-tiated could not readily comprehend, andmany who had specialized in their chosenfields for years resented supervision by of-ficers on General Somervell's staff who

2 3 In April 1942 the term "supply services" wasadopted by the Services of Supply, in place of theolder term "supply arms and services." to describeOrdnance, Quartermaster Corps, Corps of Engineers,Signal Corps. Chemical Warfare Service, Transporta-tion Corps, and Medical Corps. A year later the term"technical services" was officially introduced as moreaccurately descriptive. SOS GO 4, 9 Apr 42; ASF Cir30, 15 May 43. DRB AGO. The Services of Supply-was redesignated Army Service Forces by WD GO14, 12 May 43. To avoid confusion, the latter title isused throughout the rest of this chapter.

24 The following paragraphs are based on numer-ous interviews with officers who served in ASF andin Ordnance during the war period, and upon manyscattered fragments found in the correspondence filesof both agencies. For a statement of the situation fromthe ASF point of view, see Millett, Organization andRole of the Army Service Forces.

25 Interv, 10 Aug 49, with Col Kilbourne Johnston,ASF Control Div.

26 Memo, Col Robinson for Gen Somervell, 12 Apr42, ASF Control Div File 321 (Ord), DRB AGO.

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were not familiar with the nature of Ord-nance problems. They complained thatthey were forced again and again to wastevaluable time explaining to a succession ofASF officers why existing Ordnance pro-cedures were necessary, why munitionsproduction "could not be turned on andoff like a water spigot," and why proposalsfor achieving greater efficiency would notwork. One top-ranking Ordnance officersummarized the Department's point ofview :

The Ordnance Department had been aprocuring service over a period of some 130years. During that time it had developed acertain know-how concerning procurementand manufacture. Very few of the membersof the ASF headquarters had any experiencein the procurement or manufacture of ord-nance items. . . . There was a group ofsome two or three thousand in the ASF head-quarters with little or no experience alongour specialized line who were continuallytelling us just how to do our job in the mi-nutest details. We resented this, and I thinkrightly so.27

The Ordnance Department fully recog-nized the need for control of the Army'sprocurement program by an agency suchas the General Staff, the Office of theUnder Secretary of War, or the ASF, butit strongly objected to attempts by anysuch agency to take on direct operatingfunctions or to supervise its activities tooclosely. As General Harris once expressedit, "The higher headquarters should chartthe course, but not keep a hand on thewheel." In accord with this policy, theOrdnance Department, during 1941 andearly 1942 when it was directly responsi-ble to the Under Secretary of War, had ar-ranged frequent production conferencesto which Mr. Patterson, members of theGeneral Staff, and representatives of thecivilian production control agencies were

invited. "At these meetings," said GeneralLewis, "the Ordnance Department tookthe initiative in laying its cards on thetable. We said to Judge Patterson and toall the others present, 'Here is what we aredoing, and here is what we plan to do.Look over our production schedules andour program for the future and tell us ifwe are on the right track.' " These confer-ences, carried on in a spirit of co-operationand mutual confidence, promoted under-standing, but were discontinued soon afterthe creation of the ASF.28

The new headquarters introduced im-personal supervision and reporting. In itsefforts to harness the supply services andto keep them all pulling in the same direc-tion at the same speed, it standardizedprocedures wherever possible and mini-mized the differences among the services.At the same time, the ASF staff exercisedmuch closer supervision over the servicesthan had the Under Secretary of War.Inspections of various activities and re-quests for statistical reports on manyphases of the supply program became theorder of the day and, as time went on,Ordnance officers felt that ASF interferedmore and more in the details of Ordnanceoperations.

General Somervell recognized in thesummer of 1942 that some members of hisstaff had gone too far. At a conference ofthe commanding generals of the ServiceCommands in August, he declared: "Iknow that you have been plagued with alot of parachute jumpers from Washing-ton. They drop in on you every day, ingreat numbers, and inspect you from hellto breakfast. We want to cut that out to avery considerable extent. I notice that here

27 Ltr, Col Raaen, exec off to Gen Campbell, 1942-45, to author, 15 Aug 49, OHF.

28 Intervs with Gen Lewis, during summer of 1949.


in Chicago alone, for example, in the Ord-nance District office, one month they had151 inspectors come here . . . 151. Well,how in the world they ever had a chanceto do anything, I don't know." 29 Thesecomments suggest that many of the diffi-culties that arose in Ordnance-ASF rela-tions could have been avoided if super-vision by ASF had been more effectivelyco-ordinated and controlled. Particularlyduring 1942, while ASF was building upits organization and working out its in-ternal plans of operation, friction fre-quently occurred as a result of inexpertimplementation of ASF policies.

Other difficulties in Ordnance-ASF re-lations stemmed from the fact that in 1942and 1943 only one high-ranking Ordnanceofficer, General Minton, held an impor-tant position in the ASF. The lack of Ord-nance representation within ASF was duein large part to General Campbell's re-luctance to release badly needed Ord-nance officers, but it nevertheless aggra-vated the Ordnance Department's irrita-tion over close staff supervision, and madedifficult the development of mutual con-fidence. Many Ordnance officers agreedwith General Somervell's objectives, butthey felt that ASF staff officers were de-feating their own ends and delaying theOrdnance program by issuing directivesthat took little account of the Depart-ment's problems. The presence of eventwo or three Ordnance officers in thecouncils of the ASF in 1942 might haveserved the dual purpose of allaying the re-sentment aroused by the very existence ofthe new headquarters and of adjustingASF policies to fit Ordnance needs.30

Underlying the structure of Ordnance-ASF relations was the fear, shared in vary-ing degrees by all the technical services,that the ultimate objective of ASF was to

abolish the technical services. They fearedthey might some day meet the fate of thecombat arms, which lost their identities atthe creation of the AGF. General Somer-vell never reassured them on this point,and throughout the war the services sawthe ASF as a constant threat to their inde-pendent existence. This feeling becameparticularly strong after a detailed ASFplan for abolishing the services was actu-ally made public in the summer of 1943.31

Upon the Department's internal organ-ization also, ASF had important effects.Though ASF policy was to leave the com-manding general of each technical servicefree to organize his own command as hesaw fit, ASF in the course of the war di-rected a number of specific changes in theorganization of the Ordnance Depart-ment. Moreover, the mere existence ofASF exerted an indirect effect on Ord-nance organization. After General Somer-vell's headquarters achieved a relativelystable organization, it urged the technicalservices to copy its pattern so that eachASF staff division would have a counter-part in each technical service. At the sametime, the chiefs of the technical serviceswere required to conform to certain broadprinciples set forth in the ASF Control

29 Rpt of Conference of CG's Service Commands,5th Session. 1 Aug 42, p. 250, OHF.

30 This view has been expressed by many Ordnanceofficers in conversations with the author. When askedto comment on it in June 1952, General Somervellstated that there were many Ordnance colonels inASF and that, because of the urgent need for capableofficers to manage the Ordnance program, he ac-ceded to General Campbell's request not to take moreofficers out of the Department. Ltr, Gen Somervell toauthor, 17 Jun 52, OHF.

31 For a description of this plan see Millett, op. cit.The attitude of the Secretary of War toward the planis expressed in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorgeBundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York,1948), p. 452. See copy of a similar plan, dated 15 Jul44, ASF Control Div file 020, DRB AGO.


Manual and the ASF Organization Man-ual, and to submit all proposals for majororganizational changes to the ASF Con-trol Division for approval.32

The Latter Half of 1942

On 1 April 1942 President Rooseveltsent the name of Maj. Gen. James H.Burns to the Senate for confirmation asChief of Ordnance to succeed GeneralWesson, whose term of office was to expirein June.33 General Burns, at that time ex-ecutive officer to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,chairman of the Munitions AssignmentsBoard, was an outstanding Ordnance offi-cer with a distinguished record. His nom-ination was promptly confirmed.34 But on20 May the President nominated GeneralCampbell to be Chief of Ordnance, ex-plaining that General Burns had declinedto accept the nomination.35 On the sameday the War Department announced thatGeneral Burns had acted at the request ofMr. Hopkins who felt that an "urgentnecessity" existed for General Burns tocontinue his work with the Munitions As-signments Board.36 In the summer of 1949General Burns stated that he requestedwithdrawal of his nomination primarilybecause it had become apparent to himthat the differences between his and Gen-eral Somervell's views on the managementof the Ordnance Department were toosharp to be reconciled.37 On the morningof 1 June General Campbell took the oathof office in the new Pentagon Building,into which the Department—the first waragency to occupy quarters in the still un-finished structure—had moved a fewweeks earlier.38

General Campbell had graduated fromthe United States Naval Academy in June1909, and shortly thereafter resigned to

enter industry. He was commissioned inthe Army as a second lieutenant, CoastArtillery Corps, in December 1911. Dur-ing World War I, while assigned to the Of-fice, Chief of Ordnance, he worked on theengineering development of railway gunmounts. He served at various Ordnanceinstallations during the 1920's and 1930's,devoting his attention primarily to theproduction of artillery, tanks, and ammu-nition. In 1939 and 1940 he won widerecognition for his success in introducingnew automatic machinery for the assem-bly-line production of artillery ammuni-tion at Frankford Arsenal. After being or-dered to Washington in June 1940 to be-come assistant chief of the Industrial Serv-ice for facilities, he planned and super-vised the construction of new plantsneeded by the Industrial Service and thensucceeded General Lewis as assistant chiefof the Industrial Service for production.

32 The Ordnance Department had close relationswith the various civilian agencies created to promoteeffective co-ordination of the national war produc-tion program. The activities of all these agencies areconsidered in detail in the account of Ordnance pro-duction and procurement in Thomson and Mayo,Procurement and Supply of Munitions, MS, OHF.For discussion of Ordnance relations with civilianresearch agencies, see Ch. VIII, below.

33 Congressional Record, Vol. 88, Pt. 3, 77th Cong,2d Sess, pp. 3282-83. Announcement of the nomina-tion was made by the White House and by the WarDepartment on 1 April 1942, and appeared in the TheNew York Times, April 2. 1942, p. 15, and in ArmyOrdnance, XXII, 132 (1942) , 965, 970.

34 Congressional Record, Vol. 88, Pt. 3, p. 3328.35 (1) Ibid., p. 4410. (2) Executive Proceedings of

the Senate, 77th Cong, 2d Sess, Vol. 84, p. 276.36 (1) WD press release, 20 May 42. (2) The New

York Times, May 21, 1942, p. 1 1. (3) Army Ordnance,XXIII, 133 (1942) 106.

37 Interv with Gen Burns, 12 Sep 49. When ques-tioned about the incident by the author in 1952,General Somervell disclaimed any recollection of it.Ltr, Somervell to author, 1 7 Jun 52, OHF.

38 For an account of the ceremony attending Gen-eral Campbell's induction into office, see Army andNavy Journal, 6 June 1942, p. 1 1 14.


LT. GEN. LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Jr.,Chief of Ordnance, 1942-46.

Immediately after General Campbellbecame Chief of Ordnance, the Depart-ment experienced more changes in organ-ization and personnel than it had knownduring the preceding two and a half years.In the summer of 1942 there was not onlythe reshuffling of key men that normallyaccompanies a change in command, butalso a series of changes in the structure ofthe Department. General Campbell, anenergetic administrator, became Chief ofOrdnance just as the full influence of thenewly formed ASF was being felt and theDepartment was reaching the peak of itsexpansion.

The two most important organizationalchanges were the formation of new divi-sions in the Washington office and the fur-ther decentralization of the Department'soperations to field offices. General Camp-bell immediately created three new divi-sions—Military Training, Technical, andParts Control—and placed them on thesame administrative level as the IndustrialService and the Field Service.39 Hechanged the internal organization of thetwo latter divisions by abolishing the posi-tions of assistant chiefs and decentralizedthe Department's operations by establish-ing the Office of Field Director of Ammu-nition Plants at St. Louis, seven FieldService zone headquarters, the Tank-Automotive Center in Detroit, and othersuboffices in the field.

General Campbell also appointed aspecial advisory staff of four prominentbusinessmen to consult with him on prob-lems of industrial production. The mem-bers of this staff were Bernard Baruch,chairman of the War Industries Boardduring the first World War; K. T. Keller,president of the Chrysler Corporation;Benjamin F. Fairless, president of U.S.Steel Corporation; and Lewis H. Brown,

president of the Johns-Manville Corpora-tion. The creation of this staff, GeneralCampbell wrote at the end of the war,"was intended to underscore again and toreaffirm in the most emphatic way the tre-mendous importance of Industry's role inthe great, bewildering, onrushing arma-ment program." 40 Contrary to Campbell'swishes, however, the two statutory posi-tions of assistant chief of Ordnance werevirtually abolished for the duration of thewar by ASF headquarters in May 1942.

39 By direction of ASF headquarters, the term "di-vision" was now applied to the major units formerlyknown as "services" to avoid confusion with the useof the word "'services" to describe all the elementswithin Army Service Forces, the "supply services" orthe "technical services."

40 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 10. For acontemporary account of the creation of the specialadvisory staff, see Army Ordnance, XXIII, 134 (1942),266-67.

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When their terms expired at the end ofthat month, Generals Harris and McFar-land were transferred to other duties.41

In addition to these organizationalchanges, General Campbell ordered thereassignment of nearly all the top-rankingofficers within the Department headquar-ters. To an increasing degree, authoritywas delegated directly from the Chief ofOrdnance to the heads of the operating di-visions, and control of all these divisionswas placed in new hands. Maj. Gen.Thomas J. Hayes, an officer of outstand-ing production ability and experience whohad served in the Office of the Under Sec-retary of War during 1941 and then brieflyas chief of the Production Branch of ASFheadquarters, succeeded General Harrisas chief of the Industrial Division. Col.Harry R. Kutz, who had served as chief ofthe Fiscal Division since 1938, was pro-moted to the rank of brigadier generaland appointed chief of the Field ServiceDivision, succeeding General .Crain. Gen-eral Barnes, who had served for two yearsas assistant chief for research and engineer-ing in the Industrial Service, became chiefof the newly formed Technical Division.Of the other two new divisions, the Mili-tary Training Division was headed byBrig. Gen. Julian S. Hatcher, former com-manding general of the Ordnance Train-ing Center at Aberdeen, and the PartsControl Division by Brig. Gen. Rolland W.Case, former commanding general ofAberdeen Proving Ground.

This brief summary suggests that thechanges made during the first few weeksof General Campbell's term were so nu-merous and far reaching as to be almostrevolutionary. The changes in personnelwere indeed almost revolutionary, but thestructural changes were less radical thanthey at first appeared. Most were the end

products of a long evolutionary develop-ment. To persons intimately acquaintedwith the gradual unfolding of the Ord-nance program for war production, theycame as no surprise. General Campbelleven felt that "reorganization" was toostrong a word to use in describing thesteps taken during his first few weeks in of-fice, and preferred to say that it was sim-ply a matter of "making additions to theorganization." 42

Abolition of Assistant Chiefsof Industrial Service

The evolutionary character of theevents of June 1942 is well illustrated bythe abolition of the positions of assistantchief that had been created in the Indus-trial Service in 1940. This apparentlysudden and drastic step was actually theculmination of a gradual development. Inthe fall of 1941, when General Campbellwas serving as assistant chief for facilities,he had seen the need for his services de-cline as the job of constructing new manu-facturing and loading plants got well un-der way. In December this position wasabolished, on Campbell's own recom-mendation, when he was appointed assist-ant chief for production. A short time laterGeneral Campbell concluded that theneed for this position had also lessened be-cause the operating divisions of the Indus-trial Service had succeeded in building upcompetent staffs and were able to managetheir jobs without the supervision of an as-sistant chief. Substantially the same wastrue of Colonel Quinton's duties as assist-

41 General Harris became commanding general ofAberdeen Proving Ground. General McFarland re-verted to his permanent rank of colonel and becamecommanding officer of the Springfield Armory.

42 Ltr, Campbell to author, 29 Apr 49, OHF.


ant chief for purchasing and GeneralSomers' duties as assistant chief for in-spection.43

The decisive factor that brought the"Assistant Chiefs Era" to an end was Gen-eral Campbell's conviction—shared byGeneral Hayes, the new chief of the Indus-trial Division—that the positions of assist-ant chief violated fundamental principlesof sound organization. "I did not want inthe organization any 'Vice Presidents'—men who were without real authority andresponsibility," General Campbell wrote,"I wanted the organization to be one ofdirect responsibility. If performance waslacking, then I could accurately andquickly assess responsibility for non-per-formance." 44

After the elimination of the assistantchiefs, a Production Service Branch wasformed to absorb the remaining functionsof the assistant chief for production and,later on, to assume responsibility for ad-ministration of the Controlled MaterialsPlan for the Department.45 The remainingfunctions of the assistant chief for purchas-ing were taken over by the various staffbranches, particularly by the LegalBranch. Supervision of inspection activi-ties was assigned to inspection sectionswithin the operating branches of the In-dustrial Division, and these branches wereplaced on the same organizational level asthe production and engineering sectionsto guard against the danger that qualitywould be sacrificed to achieve quantityproduction.

Field Service Division

The Field Service Division also experi-enced an organizational overhauling dur-ing June and July of 1942. General Camp-bell ended the six-months-old experiment

with the assistant chiefs of the Field Serv-ice and eliminated two of the divisionsthat had been created during the preced-ing two years—the Military Organizationand Publications Division, which becamea part of the Executive Branch, and theBomb Disposal Division, which was com-bined with the Ammunition SupplyBranch. The number of main divisions ofthe service was thus reduced to five—anExecutive Branch, a newly created Plansand Operations Branch, and the three op-erating branches, Ammunition Supply,General Supply, and Maintenance.46

This reshuffling of responsibility oc-curred to a large extent because the newPlans and Operations Branch took overdepot administration and other overheadduties affecting more than one branch. Itabsorbed the responsibilities and person-nel formerly assigned to the Transporta-tion and Facilities Divisions and consoli-dated them with duties that had beenperformed by the assistant chief for plansand statistics, Colonel Steese, who becamechief of the new branch. In this way, allphases of depot administration includingthe construction and maintenance ofbuildings, the supervision of personnel, thecontrol of shipments to and from the de-pots, and the gathering of statistics onavailable stocks were co-ordinated througha single staff branch.47

43 The statements in this paragraph are based oninterviews with Generals Hayes, Lewis, and Quin-ton, and correspondence with Generals Campbelland Somers. For discussion of the elimination ofGeneral Barnes' position as assistant chief for re-search and engineering, see Ch. VIII, below.

44 (1) Ltr, Campbell to author, 7 Sep 49, OHF.(2) Intervs with Gen Hayes, summer of 1949.

45 Campbell, op. cit., p. 177.4 6 (1) ODO 291, 8 Jul 42, OHF. (2) FS Office

Memo 55, 25 Jun 42, OHF.47 Hist of FS, Plans and Opns Br, Vol. I, Pt. 1,

OHF.


Military Training Division

Because of the rapid expansion of theOrdnance training mission, GeneralCampbell established a separate MilitaryTraining Division in June 1942. Sinceenactment of the Selective Service Act inSeptember 1940, the Department hadbeen called upon to train an ever increas-ing number of officers and enlisted menat the Ordnance school at Aberdeen Prov-ing Ground. Two additional training or-ganizations were established at Aberdeento carry on a well-rounded program—theOrdnance Replacement Training Centerand the Ordnance Unit Training Center.To administer the three training units, andto supervise the training of military per-sonnel at various civilian institutions, theOrdnance Training Center had beenformed on New Year's Day, 1941, withheadquarters at Aberdeen.48 In establish-ing the Military Training Division, Gen-eral Campbell converted the OrdnanceTraining Center into a full-fledged divi-sion on a par with the Industrial, FieldService, and other divisions of the head-quarters.49 To avoid any break in the con-tinuity of command, the Military TrainingDivision was placed under the directionof the former chief of the Ordnance Train-ing Center, General Hatcher. The organ-ization of the new division was patternedclosely after that of the training directo-rate at ASF headquarters.

Unlike the other divisions in the Office,Chief of Ordnance, all of which had theirheadquarters in the Pentagon, the Mili-tary Training Division at first had its head-quarters at Aberdeen Proving Ground,where most of the training was carried on.To maintain contact with the other divi-sions of the Department and with ASFheadquarters, a Liaison Branch was estab-

lished in Washington. Placing the Mili-tary Training Division headquarters atAberdeen was the first major attempt todecentralize the Ordnance Department,but it proved unsuccessful and it wasabandoned within a few weeks. It soonbecame apparent, for example, that thelarge volume of directives and requests forinformation from ASF could never behandled fast enough through the LiaisonBranch to satisfy ASF headquarters. Theannouncement in July that the Quarter-master Motor Transport Service was soonto be transferred to the Ordnance Depart-ment, along with a large-scale trainingprogram for automotive mechanics, fur-ther complicated the situation. The train-ing section of the Motor Transport Servicewas in Washington—as, in fact, were thetraining sections of all the other supplyservices—and its schools were widely scat-tered. In mid-August General Campbelltherefore ordered the Military TrainingDivision to move its headquarters to thePentagon. From that vantage point itdirected the training of thousands of offi-cers and enlisted men at training centersin all parts of the country.50

Parts Control Division

The importance of administrative ma-chinery for handling matters relating tospare parts had been recognized early inthe defense period by the OrdnanceDepartment. In November 1940 GeneralWesson had appointed a permanent boardof officers to determine the types and quan-

48 (1) ODO 151. 26 Dec 40, OHF. (2) Interv withGen Hatcher, 11 Jul 49. See also Gen J. S. Hatcher,"The Ordnance Training Center," Army Ordnance,XXI, 126 (1941), 625.

49 ODO 285. 26 Jun 42, OHF.

50 Intervs with Gen Hatcher and Col Herman U.Wagner, summer 1949.


titles of spare parts to be ordered whenlarge-scale production contracts were let.51

The board consisted of the chiefs of theField Service, the Fiscal Division, the WarPlans Division, and the assistant chief ofIndustrial Service for engineering. Withinthe various subdivisions of Field Serviceand Industrial Service spare parts sectionswere created to maintain lists of essentialspare parts, arrange for the distribution ofparts among the depots, and generallysupervise spare-parts production and pro-curement.

Toward the end of 1941 it becameapparent that this arrangement had notyielded altogether satisfactory results. Bythe very nature of their activities, theIndustrial and Field Services were con-stantly at loggerheads on the subject ofspare parts. The primary concern of theIndustrial Service was to produce com-pleted items of equipment, and it wasunder constant pressure from higher head-quarters to get maximum production. Theprimary concern of the Field Service, onthe other hand, was to build up stocks ofreplacement parts for maintenance workin the field. Any reconciliation of these twomissions involved compromise, and therewas no recognized objective standard ofspare-parts requirements on which to basesuch a compromise.52 The problem finallybecame so serious that the Control Divi-sion of ASF headquarters made a specialstudy of it, and the Ordnance Departmenton its own initiative called in experts fromthe General Motors Overseas Operationsto investigate the matter and make recom-mendations.53 The reports of both groupsemphasized the inadequacy of the co-ordi-nation effected by the Spare Parts Boardand the various spare parts sections. "Themajor problem," the ASF Control Divisionreported, "is that ten separate offices deal

with various aspects of Spare Parts, and noone is effectively coordinating the entireoperation."54 To remedy this situation, theGeneral Motors group recommended thatthe Spare Parts Board be abolished andthat a "Spare Parts Service" be establishedin the Ordnance Department on the samelevel as the Industrial Service and FieldService. This recommendation was inaccord with the spare parts organizationsthat prevailed in industry. The proposedservice was to formulate spare parts poli-cies and, when they were approved by theChief of Ordnance, to be responsible fortheir execution. Acting on this recommen-dation, General Campbell on 26 Juneordered the formation of a Parts ControlDivision as one of the six main units of theOrdnance Department.55 General Case,formerly commanding general of Aber-deen Proving Ground, was brought in to

51 Ord SO 263. 7 Nov 40, DRB AGO. The organ-ization and functions of the board were described indetail in Ordnance Office Memo 510, 21 Jan 41,which remained in effect, with minor changes, untilrescinded by Ordnance Office Memo 618, 30 Apr42, DRB AGO.

52 Intervs with Gen Harris, Gen Crain, and otherofficers, summer 1950.

53 (1) ASF Control Div Rpt 26, Notes on Organi-zation and Operation of the Tank and Combat Ve-hicle Division of the Ordnance Department, ASFControl Div files, DRB AGO. (2) General MotorsOverseas Operations, May 1942, General Survey ofthe Organization, Functions and Operations of theOrdnance Department (3 vols.), OHF.

See also Lawrence S. Barroll. Study of U. S. Army-Ordnance Department Spare Parts Procedure, 8 Oct40, PSP 63, Exhibit 1; and Lawrence S. Barroll, Sur-vey of Ordnance Spare Parts Supply, 26 Dec 42,PSP 63, Exhibit 2. Both in OHF.

54 ASF Control Div Rpt 26, cited n. 53(1) .The report of the General Motors survey included

an organization chart that illustrated this dispersionof spare-part functions throughout the Department.General Survey of the Organization . . . , Vol. I I ,p. 31, OHF.

55 ODO 285, 26 Jun 42, OHF. The new divisionwas established in June on verbal orders from Gen-eral Campbell.


be chief of the new division. Some of hisstaff came from the spare parts sectionsthat were to be taken over by the PartsControl Division, while others came fromamong the General Motors experts whohad made the survey.

Neither the order creating the new divi-sion nor the General Motors report wentinto any detail as to how the new divisionwas to function. General Case and his staffwere therefore at once faced with the taskof determining their operating procedures.A difference of opinion soon emergedamong the personnel of the new divisionas to whether it should take over all opera-tions bearing on spare parts or shouldmerely set up controls to see that thoseresponsible for such operations actuallyproduced the desired results. Further, theGeneral Motors people, who were experi-enced in peacetime supply problems of theautomobile industry, did not see eye to eyewith Ordnance officers who were familiarwith the much different problems of war-time military supply.56 In the many con-ferences on these subjects held during themonth of July, the wisdom of creating aParts Control Division was seriously ques-tioned.

General Case finally came to the con-clusion toward the end of the month thatthe establishment of the division had beena mistake. Feeling that he had been put inthe position of having responsibility with-out full authority, he recommended thatthe division be abolished, and that thespare parts problem be given to the FieldService.57 General Campbell reluctantlyaccepted General Case's recommendationand abolished the Parts Control Divisionon 28 July—just four weeks after its cre-ation. Responsibility for parts control wasthen turned over to the Field Service Divi-sion. The Spare Parts Board was re-estab-

lished with essentially the same responsi-bilities it had had before the creation of theParts Control Division, but its membershipwas now limited to two officers—the chiefsof the Industrial and the Field ServiceDivisions.58

With the elimination of Parts Control,the number of divisions was reduced tofour—Industrial Service, Field Service,Technical, and Military Training. In termsof personnel and funds, every one of thesedivisions was many times larger than theentire Ordnance Department had beenbefore the war. They had budgets runninginto the hundreds of millions of dollars anddirected the activities of many thousandsof officers, enlisted men, and civilianworkers. Of their relationship to eachother and to the Chief of Ordnance, Gen-eral Campbell wrote:

These divisions were largely autonomous.They were tied together as to the commonpolicy and as to inter-division relations by meand my immediate personal staff. The headsof each of the divisions reported directly tome, as did also the heads of the Personnel,Fiscal, and Legal Branches. I tried to giveeach of them full authority, and I also triedto be completely frank with them at all timesso that they, acting in a given situation, couldhave the maximum background on which tobase an action. I tried to impress upon themthat the more decisions they gave, withingeneral broad policy limitations, the morevalue to me they were. They were at all timesto keep me advised of matters which theircommon sense indicated I should know;equally, their common sense was exercised to

56 (1) Intervs, Aug-Nov 49, with Gen Case, andCol W. F. Sadtler, Production Control Off Parts Con-trol Div. (2) Key Pers Rpt, 1945, Col L. J. Meyns,Exec Off Parts Control Div, OHF.

57 Interv with Gen Case, 22 Nov 49.58 Change 1, Ord Office Memo 618, 12 Aug 42.

The Parts Control Div was abolished by Change 1,ODO 285, 28 Jul 42, OHF. For further discussion ofthe spare parts problem see Thomson and Mayo,Procurement and Supply of Munitions, MS, OHF.


keep unimportant things away from me. . . . My job as I saw it was to be the Chiefof Ordnance and to be as free as time wouldpermit, to think and to spend time in theselection of men. In practically every case Iwas able to fill the principal positions withmen who could do the job far better than Icould.59

The "Front Office Team"

In the new administration, GeneralCampbell's right-hand man was ColonelRaaen, his executive officer, but there werealso several assistants who handled specialassignments. Lt. Col. Paul M. Seleen, whohad served with General Wesson as assist-ant for matters pertaining to Field Serviceand research and development, continuedin this position on General Campbell'sstaff, with the important additional dutyof heading the War Aid Branch. Lt. Col.Everett P. Russell, a consulting engineer incivilian life, handled matters concerningthe Industrial Service, and Col. HerbertR. White, a former General Motors execu-tive, served as a "trouble shooter" onindustrial production matters. Lt. Col. LeoA. Codd, the executive vice president ofthe Army Ordnance Association and editorof the magazine Army Ordnance, handledthe public relations activities of the Depart-ment. These four officers, with ColonelRaaen and Lt. Col. Thomas Moore, aideto General Campbell, made up the "frontoffice team" during nearly all of GeneralCampbell's term.60

Staff Branches

In addition to the changes on the oper-ating division level, several were madeduring June among the staff branches of

the former General Office. A ControlBranch, an Explosives Safety Branch, anda War Aid Branch were established, andthe Fiscal and Legal Division was splitinto the Fiscal Branch and the LegalBranch. At the same time an OrdnanceDepartment Board was created to studyField Service operations. Most of thesechanges were results of developmentswithin the Department that had beengradually unfolding during the precedingmonths, but the establishment of the Con-trol Branch and the War Aid Branch werespecifically directed by ASF headquarters.

The Control Branch was a new andunfamiliar piece of administrative machin-ery that was virtually forced upon Ord-nance by ASF, and was not welcomed byofficers in the Department.61 With theformation of ASF in March, a ControlDivision had been set up as a part of Gen-eral Somervell's staff, and the proposalwas advanced that corresponding controlunits be formed in all of the supply services.Because of the reluctance to accept thisinnovation, no final action was taken onthe matter for over three months.

When the Ordnance Control Branchwas finally established at the end of June,it was placed under the direction of Col.Clarence E. Davies, former executive offi-cer to General Lewis in the Industrial

59 Ltr, Campbell to author, 29 Apr 49, OHF.60 (1) Intervs with Cols Raaen, Seleen, and Codd,

and other officers. (2) Correspondence with Camp-bell, 1949-50, OHF.

61 See, for example, comments on the OrdnanceControl Branch by O. A. Gottschalk, special assistantto the chief of the ASF Control Division, in November1942: "The mission of the Control Branch is not fullyunderstood and appreciated by heads of operatingdivisions. This is indicated by resistance to studiesbeing made by the Control Branch." Rpt 54, ASFControl Div files, DRB AGO. The same view hasalso been expressed to the author by many officers ofthe Ordnance Department during interviews.


Service.62 Steps were then taken to recruita competent staff of officers and civilians,but progress was slow.63 The new branchwas charged with broad responsibilities forobtaining information regarding the effi-ciency of operation of all elements of theDepartment, recommending changes inorganization, procedures, and policies, andmanaging statistical and reporting activi-ties. Actually, the Control Branch seldomwent beyond more or less routine functionsand never achieved the position of influ-ence that ASF wished it to have. In termsof initiative, rate of progress, and ability toget its recommendations put into effect,the Ordnance Control Branch wasrepeatedly given a low rating, as com-pared with similar branches in other serv-ices, by the ASF Control Division.64

Much of the difficulty ASF experiencedwith the Control Branch sprang from amisunderstanding within Ordnance of thefunctions of such a branch. The name itselfwas not accurately descriptive. GeneralSomervell did not intend that the ASFControl Division should actually exercisecontrol over day-to-day operations, butonly that it should be an investigative andfact-finding agency to study organiza-tional matters and help him keep informedabout rates of progress, or lack of progress,in the many diverse activities of his com-mand.65 General Wesson, taking a literalinterpretation of the name, had assumedthat the Control Division was to be anagency that would actually exercise con-trol over operating personnel. When firstapproached by ASF representatives on thismatter in 1942, he is reported to havedeclared that Ordnance did not need anysuch unit because he himself exercised fullcontrol of the Department. Much of thefriction that subsequently developed be-tween ASF and Ordnance stemmed from

this brusque refusal by General Wesson toconsider the need for an Ordnance Con-trol Branch. General Campbell, thoughless hostile toward the proposal, never hadmuch enthusiasm for it except in terms ofmaking organizational charts and prepar-ing statistical studies.66

In September 1942, following a surveyof the existing administrative machineryfor handling lend-lease transactions, ASFdirected that a war aid branch or divisionbe established within each of the supplyservices.67 A Defense Aid Section, headedby Colonel Seleen, was already in existencein Ordnance, as part of the ExecutiveBranch. To comply with the ASF directive,this section was simply renamed the WarAid Branch and given status equal to thatof the other staff branches. The War AidBranch (later redesignated InternationalAid Division) always remained a staff unitand never grew to large proportionsbecause the basic policy of the OrdnanceDepartment was to handle war aid trans-actions through the existing organization—procurement through the Industrial Serv-

62 (1) ODO 285, 26 Jun 42, OHF. (2) Hist of Con-trol Div, OHF. (3) Correspondence and interv withCol Davies, OHF. In civilian life, Colonel Davies hadbeen secretary of the American Society of MechanicalEngineers.

63 A critical review of the Ordnance ControlBranch, including the slowness of recruiting, appearsin the ASF Control Division report cited in n. 61,above.

64 Summary of Comparative Evaluations of ControlOffices . . . , 15 Mar 43, Cabinet 12, ASF ControlDiv File 321 (Ord), DRB AGO.

65 Memo, CG SOS to Staff Divisions, 27 Mar 42,sub: Control, OO 020/29, DRB AGO. See also Histof ASF Control Div, ASF Control Div files, DRBAGO.

66 Intervs with Gen Harris, Col Davies, and ColJohnston, summer of 1949.

67 Memo, CG SOS for Chiefs of Supply Services, 8Sep 42, sub: Responsibility of Supply Services forAccomplishing Aid to United Nations, SPX 400.3295(9-6-42), DRB AGO.


ice and distribution and shipping throughthe Field Service.68

Before the summer of 1942 the legalfunctions of the Department had been per-formed in three separate sections createdto serve special needs. General responsi-bility for advising the Chief of Ordnanceon legal matters had traditionally beenassigned to the Fiscal Division. Legal prob-lems relating to patent applications hadbeen handled separately by a section of theTechnical Staff. A third legal section,formed by General Campbell in 1940when he was assistant chief of the Indus-trial Service for facilities, had handled thework connected with the construction andoperation of scores of government-owned,contractor-operated plants.69 With thearmament program in full swing by thesummer of 1942, the volume and complex-ity of the legal work relating to contracts,patents, taxes, price ceilings, and renego-tiation of contracts mounted steadily. Gen-eral Campbell therefore named Lt. Col.Irving A. Duffy, former assistant chief ofthe Fiscal and Legal Division, chief of aseparate Legal Branch and gave him fullauthority to handle all the legal work ofthe Department.

District Offices

Another phase of the June 1942 reorgan-ization was the change in the administra-tion of the district offices. The volume ofbusiness handled in the districts rose totremendous proportions during the springof 1942, and it became apparent that thecivilian chiefs, most of whom were promi-nent industrialists serving on a volunteerbasis, could not devote their full time andenergy to district affairs. General Campbelltherefore assigned experienced Ordnanceofficers to be chiefs of the districts and the

former civilian heads, now relieved of theday-to-day operating responsibilities, be-came top-level policy advisers. Of theappointments to the larger districts, Gen-eral Lewis was assigned to Boston, GeneralMinton to Pittsburgh, Brig. Gen. WalterP. Boatwright to New York, ColonelQuinton to Detroit, Col. Guy H. Drewryto Springfield, Col. David N. Hausemanto Philadelphia, and Col. Merle H. Davisto St. Louis.70 Later, as demands for Regu-lar officers had to be met for service in thefield and elsewhere, many of these menwere replaced by Reserve officers or byleading local industrialists.

At the same time, a uniform organiza-tion for all districts was prescribed, a planthat had been under study for severalmonths by a board of officers headed byCol. Fred A. McMahon. Before this timethe districts had been developing ratherdiverse structures. In 1935, when most dis-trict offices were staffed by only a volun-teer civilian chief, one Ordnance officer,and a secretary, Ordnance had publisheda model for district wartime organization,but it had not been made mandatory as itsauthors felt that each district chief shouldhave broad discretionary powers in devel-oping his organization. The prescribedpattern of June 1942 paralleled that of theIndustrial Division and thus facilitatedcommunication between the districts andthe Washington headquarters.71

After he had been in office for eightmonths, General Campbell wrote to ASF

6 8 ( 1 ) Interv with Col Seleen, 13 Sep 49. (2)Intern'tl Aid, Ord, I, Ch. 3, OHF.

69 Leon Malman, Origin and Early History of theLegal Division, OHF. See also ODO 1 2 2 , 3 1 Jul 39,and ODO 215, 10 Jan 42, OHF.

70 Directory of Ordnance Establishments, 10 Aug42, OHF.

71 (1) Cir Ltr 496, Dist Control Div, 30 Jun 42, OO381/81236, DRB AGO. (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1943,p. 22.


describing the progress the Departmenthad made since the start of the defenseperiod, and the nature of the organiza-tional problems that had been faced.72 Hepointed out that by December 1942 thedollar value of Ordnance production hadrisen to something over one billion dollarsa month, and contrasted that figure withthe meagre appropriations available to theDepartment during the 1920's and 1930's.He conceded that there had been mistakes,false starts, inefficiency, and some duplica-tion of effort. No organization could haveexpanded as fast as Ordnance did in thehectic atmosphere of wartime Washingtonwith anything like normal peacetime effi-ciency. But, wrote Campbell, the faultswere not all within Ordnance—the top-heavy administrative structure of the WarDepartment itself was a serious handicapto the operating agencies. He referred tothe "multiplicity of layers above the Serv-ices" and cited, as one example, the largenumber of boards, offices, and commis-sions in the War Department that dealtwith the single problem of personnel. "Theresult of this," he declared, "is confusion,uncertainty, and delay in putting our ownorganization on the efficient basis that theimportance of our work demands. We wel-come the opportunity to demonstrate howwe can do a better job with less people. Wehave much yet to do. Much is being done.Our work will be materially aided if themultiplicity of reviewing and inspectingagencies can be reduced."73

Decentralization of the OrdnanceDepartment

Throughout World War II the Ord-nance Department followed its traditionalpolicy of decentralization to reduce thevolume of administrative work that had to

flow through the office of the Chief of Ord-nance. Long before Pearl Harbor GeneralWesson had delegated a large measure ofresponsibility to existing Ordnance fieldagencies, and had transferred variousheadquarters sections from Washington toother parts of the country. When GeneralCampbell became Chief of Ordnance inJune he entered enthusiastically into thetask of further decentralizing the Depart-ment and soon made Ordnance the leaderamong the supply services in delegatingresponsibility to field headquarters and inmoving units out of Washington.74 Inexplaining his policy of decentralization tohis staff, General Campbell frequentlyquoted the old adage, "If you want to eatan elephant, first cut him up into smallpieces." It was his firm conviction that themultibillion-dollar Ordnance program wasfar too big and too complicated to be suc-cessfully administered from a single head-quarters in Washington and that it had tobe "cut up into small pieces."75

Field Director of Ammunition Plants

In applying this principle during thesummer of 1942, General Campbell estab-lished the office of Field Director ofAmmunition Plants (FDAP) in St. Louisto administer a group of about 60government-owned, contractor-operated(GOCO) plants producing artillery ammu-nition under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.

72 Pers ltr, Gen Campbell to Maj Gen Wilhelm D.Styer, 10 Feb 43. OO 230/7603, DRB AGO.

73 Ibid.74 Memo, CofOrd for Gen Hayes, 7 Oct 42. This

memo reports General Somervell's statement at a staffconference praising the Ordnance Department'sdecentralization. See also memo, Col Robinson forCG SOS, 28 Nov 42, sub: GOCO Ord Plants, ASFControl Div files, DRB AGO.

75 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 56.


St. Louis was chosen as the location for theFDAP office because it had excellent rail-road and airplane connections with theammunition plants and was "the naturalhub of this three-billion-dollar wheel."76

Office space was leased in the basement ofthe Scottish Rite Cathedral on LindellBoulevard, a convenient location nextdoor to the office of the St. Louis OrdnanceDistrict.

To staff the new headquarters twenty-five officers and thirty civilians, who hadserved as contract negotiators and admin-istrators in the Ammunition Division ofthe Industrial Service, were transferred toSt. Louis. Col. Theodore C. Gerber, anOrdnance officer with extensive experiencein commanding GOCO plants, wasappointed field director and was maderesponsible to the chief of the AmmunitionBranch of the Industrial Division.77 Thetask of the FDAP was to analyze andco-ordinate the operations of the variousammunition plants under its jurisdiction,regulate the flow of raw material and partsto the plants, and help each contractor tobenefit from the experience of the others.The type of cost-plus-fixed-fee contractunder which the plants were operating wascomparatively new and required closeFDAP supervision to get all the contractorsto adopt standard procedures for reportingcosts, preparing statistical data, and usingmanpower efficiently. As the functions ofthe FDAP were gradually extended toinclude supervision of ammunition loadingplants, the staff increased in size until itnumbered more than 500 officers, includ-ing officers assigned to plants as well asthose in the field director's office. InDecember 1943 Colonel Gerber was giventhe additional duty of serving as chief ofthe Safety and Security Branch, which hadits headquarters in Chicago. This step

brought about a closer co-ordination of theefforts of those who were responsible forproduction and those who were concernedwith matters of safety and security.

The Industrial Division established fourother suboffices during the latter half of1942. The first of these was the SmallArms Ammunition Suboffice, formed bytransferring the Ammunition unit of theSmall Arms Branch to Philadelphia andassigning to it responsibility for adminis-tering the contracts at twelve GOCOplants manufacturing small arms ammu-nition.78 A second suboffice was establishedin Philadelphia at the same time by trans-ferring to that city the Inspection GageSection of the Production Service Branchto handle all matters pertaining to the pro-curement of inspection gages and theexpansion of gage facilities.79 A third sub-office of the Industrial Division, establishedat Rock Island Arsenal late in August, wasassigned engineering and inspection func-tions for all types of field carriages, and inDecember a suboffice for mobile artillerywas also established at Rock Island.

76 History of Field Director of Ammunition Plants(hereafter cited as Hist of FDAP), OHF. See alsoODO 305. 16 Jul 42, OHF, and Campbell, op. cit., pp.58-69.

77 Col. T. C. Gerber, "Ammunition Production,"Army Ordnance, XXIV, 137 (1943), 305. This article,written by the field director, describes the origin andfunction of the FDAP and contains a chart showingthe principal divisions of the office. A later article byColonel Gerber on the FDAP appeared in Army Ord-nance, XXVIII, 149 (1945), 237.

78 (1) ODO 303, 14 Jul 42, OHF. (2) Memo, ColRobinson for CG SOS, 28 Nov 42, sub: GOCO Ord-nance Plants, ASF Control Div files, DRB AGO. TheSmall Arms Ammunition Suboffice was located atFrankford Arsenal for a short time before being trans-ferred to Philadelphia. See Hist of Small Arms Div,Ind Serv, Vol. I, OHF.

79 ODO 303, 14 Jul 42, OHF. Both of the Philadel-phia suboffices were attached to Frankford Arsenalfor purposes of administration.


The Tank-Automotive Center

On 17 July 1942, the day the FDAP wasestablished in St. Louis, General Somervellissued an order transferring to the Ord-nance Department within six weeks all theautomotive activities of the QuartermasterCorps except operating units.80 This actionwas taken in order to centralize in theOrdnance Department control over thedevelopment, production, distribution, andmaintenance of vehicles, which had manycommon elements—engines, transmissions,and axles—and was intended to eliminateduplication of effort by the two supplyservices in dealing with the automotiveindustry. To the Department's traditionalresponsibility for combat vehicles such astanks and armored cars, was now addedthe responsibility for trucks, passenger cars,ambulances, jeeps, and other types oftransport vehicles.

In terms of organization, the order of 17July meant that the civilian and militarypersonnel of the Motor Transport Service(MTS), and all Quartermaster motorbases, motor supply depots, and schoolsfor automobile mechanics were to be trans-ferred to the Ordnance Department. Theadministration of more than 4,000 con-tracts with a total value of nearly threebillion dollars was taken over by Ord-nance. It was by far the largest single addi-tion to the Department made during thewar and, because of its magnitude, was agradual process of absorption.81

To manage this enormous automotiveproduction and distribution program, theDepartment made a move that one ob-server called "the boldest stroke of decen-tralization the country has yet seen in thiswar."82 The Tank-Automotive Center inDetroit was established in the heart of theautomobile manufacturing industry, and

to it was delegated a large degree ofauthority and responsibility. The newheadquarters was formed during Septem-ber and October by moving the MotorTransport Service and the Tank and Com-bat Vehicle Division from their Washing-ton offices to the Union Guardian Build-ing in Detroit, along with other branchesof the Ordnance Department concernedwith tank and automotive matters.

The main reasons for this action wereGeneral Campbell's concern lest there betoo great a concentration of Ordnancefunctions in Washington and his desire toestablish the closest possible relations withthe automobile industry in the Detroitarea. Office space in Washington was at apremium in 1942, as was housing for bothmilitary and civilian personnel. Agenciesof the federal government had been urgedto decentralize their operations whereverpossible. General Somervell was keenly in-terested in decentralization within thetechnical services, and the Control Divi-sion of his headquarters had recommendedtransfer of the Tank and Combat VehicleDivision to Detroit or some other city. Allof these factors had a bearing on the de-cision finally reached in August to estab-lish the T-AC in Detroit.83

Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong took the

80 Ltr, CG SOS to CofOrd, 17 Jul 42, sub: Transferof ... Motor Transportation . . . , OO 020/47,DRB AGO. See also WD Cir 245, par. 10, 25 Jul 42,as amended by WD Cir 267, 8 Aug 42.

81 ODO 315, 28 Jul 42, OHF. For a list of installa-tions transferred, see ltr, CofOrd to CG SOS, 7 Aug42, sub: Redesignation of Certain Installations, OO029/69, DRB AGO.

82 Brig. Gen. A. R. Glancy, "Integration for Pro-duction, Industrial Committees as an Aid to Manu-facture." Army Ordnance, XXIV, 136 (1943), 72.

83 (1) ASF Control Div Rpt 26, Notes on Organiza-tion and Operations of the Tank and Combat VehicleDivision of the Ordnance Department, ASF ControlDiv files, DRB AGO. (2) Intervs with Gens Christmas,Glancy, Armstrong, and Hayes, summer 1949.

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first steps to establish the T-AC in August,and was joined a short time later by Brig.Gen. John K. Christmas.84 In September,Mr. A. R. Glancy accepted a reserve com-mission as brigadier general and becamedeputy chief of Ordnance in charge of thetank-automotive activities of the Depart-ment in Detroit.85 General Campbell se-lected these three officers for the Detroitheadquarters because each had specialqualifications for the job, which was partlyindustrial and partly military in nature.General Glancy, the chief of the T-AC,was an industrialist with experience inmilitary procurement and productionproblems. General Armstrong, deputychief of the center, was a Regular Armyofficer with experience in procurement,distribution, and supply. General Christ-mas, who had devoted most of his militarycareer to tank design and engineering, be-came the chief engineer of the T-AC. Butthis arrangement proved to be unsoundand was soon abandoned. As one officercommented, it provided "too many chiefsand not enough Indians." The situationwas further complicated by the fact thatGenerals Glancy and Armstrong were notsuited by temperament and background topull together in the same harness. Withina few months, General Armstrong wasnamed chief of the Ordnance TrainingCenter at Aberdeen Proving Ground andGeneral Glancy was left in full commandof the center, with General Christmas ashis deputy.86

Under these circumstances, the T-ACwas naturally beset with many adminis-trative difficulties during the first fewmonths of its existence. It was impossibleto establish such a large headquarters, andat the same time integrate the MotorTransport Service with Ordnance, withoutgoing through a shakedown period. Dur-

ing these trying months, many criticisms ofthe organization and functioning of theT-AC came to General Campbell fromASF, particularly of the organizationalstructure and lines of authority. But by thefirst anniversary of Pearl Harbor—justthree months after the creation of theT-AC—General Glancy was able to re-port: "Now that all our organizationcharts, manning charts, flow charts, andjob sheets have been written, I doubt ifthere is another organization in the wholeArmy whose lines of authority and scopeof activities are as clearly defined." 87

One feature of the T-AC organizationadopted by General Glancy was the staffof five directors who stood between thechiefs of the operating branches and thecommanding general. Each director wasassigned to a product specialty—tanks andcombat vehicles, transport vehicles, partsand supplies, tools and equipment, andrubber products. Each was an expert inhis own field, and each was given broadresponsibility for supervising and co-ordi-nating the work of the appropriate sec-tions of the operating branches. TheDirector of Transport Vehicles, for ex-ample, who was a Motor Transport Serv-ice officer of long experience, workedclosely with the transport vehicle sectionsof the Development, Engineering, Manu-facturing, Supply, and Maintenance

84 (1) Intervs with Gen Armstrong and GenChristmas, Oct-Nov 49. (2) Pers ltr, Gen Campbell toGen Armstrong, 20 Aug 42, OO 020/84, DRB AGO.

85 Intervs with Gen Glancy, Oct-Nov 49. For adetailed report on General Glancy's appointment, see"The Tank-Automotive Center," Army Ordnance,XXIII. 135 (1942). 501.

86 (1) Ltr, Campbell to author, 15 Jul 49, OHF. (2)Intervs with Gens Glancy, Armstrong, and Christmas,summer 1949.

87 2d Ind, Glancy to Campbell, 7 Dec 42, on memo,Somervell for Campbell, 24 Nov 42, OO 023/144,DRB AGO.


Branches, while the Director of Tanks andCombat Vehicles supervised the combatvehicle sections of the branches.88 Ap-pointment of these directors was anattempt on General Glancy's part tocreate an executive committee for theT-AC. He felt that any organization aslarge as the Detroit center, or as large asthe Office, Chief of Ordnance, in Wash-ington, needed the kind of executive com-mittee found in industry—a small groupof mature, highly qualified men whowould spend their full time watching thewhole operation, advising on major policydecisions, and handling major problems asthey came up. But, finding this conceptforeign to traditional Army organization,he never put it into full operation inDetroit.89

By the end of June 1943 ill health forcedGeneral Glancy to relinquish his duties atthe center, and General Boatwright, chiefof the New York Ordnance District, wasappointed to succeed him.90 Within thefollowing three months the new com-manding general made a number oforganizational changes, most important ofwhich were the elimination of the directorsand the establishment of an OperationsPlanning Branch headed by Col. GraemeK. Howard, a former General Motorsexecutive. The new branch was given re-sponsibility for co-ordinating projectscommon to two or more of the operatingbranches and thus assumed a large part ofthe job formerly handled by the direc-tors.91

General Boatwright's tenure as chief ofthe center was marked by several impor-tant steps taken to strengthen the supplyorganization, for the year 1943 brought tothe T-AC, as to the Ordnance Departmentand all the other supply services, the needfor closer attention to stock control, stor-

age, and distribution functions. Brig. Gen.Stewart E. Reimel was appointed assistantchief for supply and maintenance and wasgiven a position in the organization on apar with that of General Christmas, whoremained as assistant chief for develop-ment, engineering, and manufacturing. Ashort time later two new branches—Stor-age and Redistribution—were added tocope with the task of maintaining a con-stant flow of vehicles and spare parts toand from distant theaters of operations.92

The T-AC was not only the largest of allthe decentralized offices established by theOrdnance Department during the warbut, unlike the other suboffices which wereagencies of particular divisions or branchesof the Department, the T-AC representedall of the major divisions. It was, as its latertitle of Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit(OCO-D) indicated, a replica of theOffice, Chief of Ordnance, in Washing-ton.93 The size and importance of the or-ganization are indicated by the fact thatduring the course of the war it spentnearly 50 percent of all the funds allocatedto the entire Ordnance Department. Itdirected the production of more than threemillion vehicles, ranging from bicycles to

88 Interv with Col Edwin S. Van Deusen, 12 Aug49.

89 Intervs with Gen Glancy, Oct-Nov 49.90

T-AC GO 7, 12 Jul 43, OHF.91 T-AC Bull 96, 27 Sep 43, OHF.92 History, Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit (here-

after cited as Hist OCO-D), OHF.93 The change in name was made by ODO 113, 31

Dec 43, OHF. "The Ordnance automotive activity inDetroit was originally called the Tank-AutomotiveCenter," General Campbell explained, "in order toidentify to Industry the nature of its activities. LaterI changed this name to Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit, as I found it desirable to give this decentral-ized part of my office the fullest recognition as anintegral part of the Office, Chief of Ordnance, ratherthan as a subordinate agency." Lt. Gen. Levin H.Campbell, Jr., The Industry-Ordnance Team (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1946), p. 226.


70-ton tanks. Its personnel strength grewfrom 40 officers and 593 civilians in Sep-tember 1942 to 500 officers and 3,800civilians by February 1943.94 These figuressupport the conclusion reached by ColonelRaaen, Ordnance executive officer, that"the establishment of the Tank-Automo-tive Center . . . was the greatest steptaken toward decentralization since theOrdnance district offices were establishedduring the last war." 95

In the opinion of officers who served inthe OCO-D, one of the major lessonslearned from the experience was the needfor clear-cut delegation of authority by theheadquarters in Washington. Many of thedifficulties experienced by the Detroit of-fice during the war were due to the factthat not all of the division chiefs in Wash-ington delegated full authority to theirrepresentatives in the OCO-D. It wasGeneral Campbell's intention that theWashington office should exercise onlystaff functions and that the Detroit officeshould be the operating level. But therewere many different interpretations as towhat was a staff and what was an operat-ing function. "On the one hand," a Con-trol Division report stated in 1944, "officesin Detroit believe that Washington exceedsthe bounds of staff supervision and in-dulges in operations to the point of inter-ference, while on the other hand, someofficers in Washington feel that staff super-vision properly may be carried to anypoint that the staff officers feel is necessaryin order to achieve effective results andthat, where Washington has gone into op-erating details, it has been justified byfailure on the part of Detroit to takeprompt and effective measures, or byother sufficient reasons." 96

These difficulties were greater in supplyand maintenance than in production and

procurement. In general, there was morecomplete delegation of authority to theOCO-D by the Industrial Division inWashington than by the Field ServiceDivision. Commenting after the war onthis phase of Ordnance operations, Gen-eral Boatwright stated that securing fullco-operation between the various subor-dinate groups in Washington and Detroitwas one of his most difficult problems in1943. OCO-D was organized on a productbasis well understood by the IndustrialService but not so well understood by theField Service, which had an essentiallyfunctional organization.97

Other elements were also in the picture.The tank-automotive section of the Indus-trial Division, which became the manu-facturing-engineering branch of theOCO-D, had been physically transferredto Detroit in the fall of 1942 as a goingconcern under General Christmas andhad been given relatively free rein at theoutset, but General Reimel only graduallybuilt up the maintenance-supply organ-ization after the Detroit headquarters wasestablished. As a result, the IndustrialDivision in Washington tended to givegreater freedom of action to the manu-facturing branch in Detroit than the FieldService Division gave to the maintenanceand supply branches. In addition, therewas within the maintenance and supplybranches a large proportion of formerQuartermaster officers who had just re-cently been transferred to the OrdnanceDepartment and who did not have close

94 Statistical Summary of Accomplishments, T-AC,Dec 45, p. 51, OHF.

95 "The Ordnance Reorganization," Army Ordnance,XXIV, 136 (1943), 66.

96 Relationships Between the OCO-Washingtonand the OCO-D, 24 Aug 44, prepared by Control Div,OCO-Washington, OHF.

97 Ltr, Gen Boatwright to author, 16 Nov 49, OHF.


personal ties, based on long years of asso-ciation, with their opposite numbers inWashington. Finally, there was the feel-ing among some officers, both in Washing-ton and Detroit, that the supply-mainte-nance functions should never have beenassigned to the OCO-D at all but shouldhave been kept within the Field ServiceDivision or delegated to some other subor-dinate command.

When asked, after the war, to evaluatethe Detroit experiment in decentralizationon the basis of his experience, GeneralChristmas summed up the matter in thesewords:

Decentralization by General Campbell in1942 of substantially half of his office (andsubstantially half of the money value of hisprogram) to Detroit, was a bold and far-see-ing move. I consider that it was highly suc-cessful and contributed greatly to the out-standing success of the Ordnance Depart-ment.

But it is no secret that the operation of theOCO-D, employing some 500 officers andnearly 5,000 civilians, was not accomplishedwithout some wear and tear on the people incharge (both in Detroit and Washington) norwithout some inefficiency and error. These Ilay to two factors: (a) The functional organ-ization of the higher echelon of the OrdnanceDepartment, which cut across the essentiallycommodity organization of the OCO-D,which had been given complete responsibil-ity for all automotive vehicles under theChief of Ordnance and his staff. (b) The factthat it takes a long time to get such a newidea across to most people. Hence, there werepeople in the Office, Chief of Ordnance-Washington, who either misunderstood theobject of decentralization, were out of sym-pathy with it, or in some few cases, as so oftenhappens, had personal reasons for opposingit.98

Field Service Zones

At the same time that the FDAP wasbeing established in St. Louis, and the

T-AC in Detroit, seven zone offices wereestablished by the Field Service Divisionto decentralize the administration of itsdepots." This step was taken largely be-cause the Ordnance Department, follow-ing the transfer of transport vehicles fromthe Quartermaster Corps, had assumedresponsibility for approximately 55,000,-000 additional square feet of storage space,including eight motor bases, four motorsupply depots, eleven motor supply sec-tions, one motor reception park, and twotraining centers. This had brought to morethan sixty the total number of depots andother field establishments under the juris-diction of the Field Service, and hadadded to the mounting volume of admin-istrative work in the Washington head-quarters of the Field Service Division. Toprovide for decentralized administrationand management of these widely scatteredestablishments, seven zones were markedout on the map, with headquarters atAlbany, New York, Baltimore, Maryland,Indianapolis, Indiana, Augusta, Georgia(moved within a few weeks to Atlanta,Georgia), Shreveport, Louisiana, Pueblo,Colorado, and Salt Lake City, Utah.100

Each zone office had from seven to twelvedepots under its supervision, and served asan intermediate headquarters betweenthese installations and the Office, Chief ofOrdnance.

After six months the zones were abol-ished and the depots again came directlyunder the Field Service Division in Wash-

98 Statement by Gen Christmas, 11 Oct 49, OHF.99 As early as May 1942 General Crain, then chief

of the Field Service, had recommended that this bedone, but no action had been taken before GeneralCrain's departure from the office. Ltr, CofOrd to CGSOS, 29 May 42, sub: Plan to Place Experienced Ord-nance Officers at Various Points . . . , Exhibit 35,Hist of FS Plans and Opns Br, OHF.

100 (1) ODO 338, 25 Sep 42, and Rev 1, 29 Jan 43,and (2) FS Bull 1-15, 10 Dec 42, both in OHF.


ington. The zone offices were closed earlyin April 1943 because experience hadshown that, instead of eliminating unnec-essary administrative work, the zones hadsimply become "yet another channelthrough which reports and directives f u n -neled."101 General Campbell and thechief of the Field Service Division, Gen-eral Hatcher, were in agreement that thezone offices had become bottlenecks thatslowed up operations and that their dis-continuance would result in a great savingof manpower.102

Developments, 1943-45

The organization of the Department re-mained relatively stable during the 1943-45 period. (See charts dated 6 July 1944and 14 August 1945.) Changes occurredin the names of various units, and occa-sionally functions were reassigned, butthere was no modification of the broadoutlines of the organizational structure. InJune 1944 the word "service" came backinto use to replace "division" as the desig-nation of the major units of the Depart-ment, and at the same time all the staffbranches were renamed divisions.103 Thefour main operating units—Industrial,Field Service, Technical, and Training—continued as the major elements of theDepartment, and, except in name, theeleven staff branches existing at the end of1942 continued throughout the war. Earlyin 1943 the Department reached the peakof its wartime expansion, and after thattime more and more attention was givento tightening up the existing organization,economizing in the use of manpower andessential raw materials, and carefullyscrutinizing all production schedules andstock inventories.

Of all the major divisions of the Depart-

ment, the Field Service experienced thegreatest number of organizational changesduring the 1943-45 period. This waschiefly because of a significant shift of em-phasis in the operation of the Departmentthat took place during the latter half of1942. Throughout the preceding twoyears, first priority had necessarily beengiven to production, and the IndustrialService had occupied the center of thestage. At the end of 1942 the Field Servicecame to the front as munitions of all kindscame off the assembly lines in mountain-ous quantities and created serious prob-lems in storage, distribution, maintenance,and stock control. As war productionmoved into high gear, and as large over-seas movements of men and matériel gotunder way, the scale and complexity ofsupply operations reached unprecedentedproportions and placed a severe strain onthe Field Service Division.104 The recom-mendations of a special advisory staff,combined with pressure from ASF head-quarters to make the division correspondmore closely to the pattern of ASF organ-ization, accounted for the revisions madein the Field Service organization at thistime.

In January 1943 General Hatcher re-placed General Kutz as chief of the divi-sion. A short time later a Military Plansand Organizations Branch was formed toobtain information from higher headquar-ters on projected troop movements over-seas and use it as a basis for scheduling

101 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1943, p. 28. The zone officeswere officially abolished by ODO 37, 6 Apr 43, OHF.

102 (1) Intervs with Gen Hatcher and Col Ray M.Hare, summer 1949. (2) Memo, Campbell forHatcher, 8 Mar 43. Exhibit 37, Hist of FS Plans andOpns, Vol. I. Pt. 2, OHF.

103 ODO 88-44, 27 Jun 44, OHF.104 (1) Interv with Gen Hatcher, summer 1949. (2)

Key Pers Rpt, 1945, Gen Hatcher, OHF.

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operations within the Division.105 A FieldService Control Branch was created inApril to comply with orders from ASFheadquarters that the Ordnance Depart-ment set up control branches in each of itsmain operating divisions.106

The most important change in the or-ganization of the Field Service Divisionduring 1943 was the creation of the Stor-age Branch and Stock Control Branch inAugust. This move came as a result ofdirect orders from ASF headquarters andwas reluctantly accepted by the OrdnanceDepartment. In organizing his staff at ASFheadquarters, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes,assistant chief of staff for operations, hadestablished two separate divisions, one todeal with storage and the other with stockcontrol. In April 1943 he directed theOrdnance Department to adopt the sametype of functional organization in its FieldService Division.107 Neither GeneralCampbell nor General Hatcher favoredtaking such a step. Both believed that thetraditional Ordnance practice of assigningsupply responsibility on a product basisshould be continued, with the Ammuni-tion Supply Branch handling all phases ofammunition supply, including storage andstock control, and the General SupplyBranch handling all other types of Ord-nance supplies.108 In the middle of MayGeneral Hatcher created a SupplyBranch, made up of a Storage Section anda Stock Control Section. The SupplyBranch, headed by Brig. Gen. R. S.Chavin, was a compromise between theASF and Ordnance points of view, anddid not last long. In August GeneralHatcher was forced to abolish the SupplyBranch and to raise its two sections to thelevel of branches, on the same organiza-tional plane as the existing Executive,Control, Maintenance, and Military

Plans and Organizations Branches.109

During 1944 ASF ordered anotherchange in the Field Service organization.To comply with the provisions of ASF Cir-cular 67, General Hatcher appointedColonel McMahon to serve as executiveassistant for matériel control. ColonelMcMahon was charged with responsibilityfor co-ordinating the activities of the FieldService Division, the Industrial Division,and the War Plans and RequirementsBranch of the General Office on all mat-ters relating to stock levels and distributionof supplies, and to maintain liaison for theOrdnance Department with ASF head-quarters.110 After V-E Day ColonelMcMahon's title was changed to executiveassistant for surplus military property, asincreasing attention was given to the dis-posal of surplus matériel, particularlytrucks and automotive parts for whichthere was a big demand in the civilianeconomy. A year later, when its functionswere relatively routine, Colonel Mc-Mahon's office was transferred to theStock Control Division where it becamethe Surplus Property Branch.

The Military Training Service gainednew responsibilities in 1944 when both theMilitary Plans and Organizations Branchof the Field Service and the Ordnance De-

105 (1) Change 2, Rev 2, ODO 291, 29 Mar 43,OHF. (2) Hist of FS Exec Div, Vol. III, Ch. 3, OHF.(3) Interv, summer 1949, with Col Harold J. Conway,Chief of FS Exec Br, 1943.

106 (1) Memo, CofOrd for Chiefs of Divs, 8 Apr 43,sub: Establishment of Additional Control Offices, OO023/489, DRB AGO. (2) FS Office Memo 116, 30Apr 43, DRB AGO.

107 Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 30 Apr 43, sub:Depot Operations, OO 400.24/3556, DRB AGO.

108 Intervs with Gen Hatcher, summer 1950.109 FS Office Memo 142, 24 Aug 43, DRB AGO.

110 ODO 45-44, 25 Mar 44, OHF. See also KeyPers Rpt, 1945, Col McMahon, and Hist of Exec Asstfor Materiel Control, OHF.


partment Board were assigned to it.111 Be-fore this time the service had been exclu-sively a training organization. Thefollow-up on Ordnance troops after com-pletion of their training had been aresponsibility of the Field Service MilitaryPlans and Organizations Branch. Simi-larly, studies of troop equipment and or-ganization had been carried on by theOrdnance Department Board, which hadbeen administratively independent al-though reporting through the MilitaryTraining Service. This separation ofrelated staff functions was ended in Octo-ber 1944 when General Campbell trans-ferred both the Ordnance DepartmentBoard and the Military Plans and Organ-izations Branch of Field Service to theMilitary Training Service, and at the sametime renamed it the Military Plans andTraining Service, thus placing under onecommand the threefold responsibility fortraining, troop movement, and the studyof equipment and organization of Ord-nance units.

In the Technical Division the only or-ganizational change of any importanceduring 1943 came in September when aRocket Development Branch was addedto the five existing development branches(Ammunition, Artillery, Tank, SmallArms, and Aircraft Armament) because ofthe growing importance of these newweapons.112 Before this time rocket devel-opment work had been carried on withinthe Ammunition, Artillery, and SmallArms Branches. The new branch tookover all rocket development work exceptthat on the shoulder-type launcher, the"bazooka," which remained with theSmall Arms Development Branch. InApril 1944 a small Control Section wasadded to the Executive Branch in order todecentralize the control function within

the Department, and in June 1944 thename of the Technical Division waschanged to Research and DevelopmentService.113

Among the staff branches the only note-worthy change was the creation of theoffice of director of personnel in March1944 to co-ordinate the activities of theCivilian Personnel Branch and the Mili-tary Personnel Branch. Such a link be-tween the two branches was necessary be-cause ASF headquarters had adopted asystem of bulk allotments of personnel,lumping together civilian and militarymanpower, and had itself established asingle personnel branch. To bring theOrdnance organization into line with thatof ASF headquarters and thus facilitatethe transaction of business, GeneralCampbell appointed the chief of the Mili-tary Personnel Branch, Col. C. WingateReed, as director of personnel and madehim responsible for all Ordnance person-nel matters.114

Throughout the war the leaders of theOrdnance Department were influenced byseveral more or less clearly defined prin-ciples of administration. The officers whoheld controlling positions in Ordnancewere, for the most part, not men who haddevoted much time to studying the theoryof public administration, but were menwith strong convictions on the subject,convictions that were the outgrowth ofmany years of experience with various

111 (1) Change 1, Rev 1, ODO 6-44, 10 Oct 44. (2)Rev 2, ODO 6-44, 21 Oct 44. See also Hist of OrdDept Bd, Vol. III, Ch. 13. All in OHF.

112 Tech Div Memo 22, 23 Sep 43, OHF.113 (1) Rpt of Tech Div, 1943-44, OO 319.1/4303,

DRB AGO. (2) ODO 88-44, 27 Jun 44, OHF.114 (1) Rev 1, ODO 4-44, 13 Mar 44, and ODO

5-44, 18 Mar 44, OHF. (2) ASF Ann Rpt, 1943, pp.248-49, DRB AGO.


types of military and industrial organiza-tion. The fundamental concepts that thesemen had formulated during the twentyyears between the two world wars werecarried over into the period after 1941 anddid much to determine the structure of theDepartment during World War II.

Perhaps the most important of these wasthe principle of decentralization. Since thecreation of the Ordnance districts inWorld War I, decentralization of procure-ment functions had been a traditionalOrdnance policy, while decentralizationof manufacturing and related functions tothe arsenals had been an establishedpolicy for over a century. During WorldWar II the decentralization principle wasapplied on a much wider basis than everbefore and was generally credited withmaking an important contribution to thesuccess of the Ordnance program. Amongall the technical services in the War De-partment, Ordnance took the lead indecentralizing its activities to subordinateheadquarters in various parts of the coun-try, both General Wesson and GeneralCampbell strongly supporting the prin-ciple. Decentralization created certainproblems, but the soundness of the prin-ciple was recognized by the ASF ControlDivision and by virtually all the leadingofficers in the Ordnance Department.

There was a sharp contrast between thetype of decentralization represented bythe districts and arsenals and that intro-duced when the Tank-Automotive Centerwas established. Each district covered aspecific geographical area and was respon-sible for procurement and inspection of alltypes of products, although each districttended to specialize in certain types mostcommonly produced by the industrieswithin its boundaries. The arsenals wereprimarily government-owned manufac-

turing establishments that served to keepalive the art of munitions making in timeof peace, to develop new weapons andmanufacturing techniques, and to serve asproduction centers and training groundsin time of war. The establishment of theTank-Automotive Center in Detroit addeda third type of geographical decentraliza-tion along product lines. The T-AC wasnot limited to procurement, inspection,and manufacture, but was created tomanage all aspects of the tank-automotiveprogram—development, test, procure-ment (through the districts), distribution,and maintenance. Its activities were chieflyconcentrated within the Detroit area, butthe center had no fixed geographicalboundaries. The functions of the T-ACwere so broad that it was considered to bea replica of the Office, Chief of Ordnance.

The existence of the Detroit office ledmany Ordnance officers to propose thatthe Department be organized after thewar on the basis of similar decentralized"product centers," each of which would beresponsible for one group of items fromstart to finish. This was perhaps the mostsignificant new concept of organizationdeveloped within the Department duringthe war, and the one that resulted in thewidest differences of opinion. Reorganiza-tion along these lines was the chief recom-mendation made by the Harris Board, ap-pointed by General Campbell in 1944 tostudy the postwar organization of the De-partment.115 This suggestion was not putinto effect by Campbell's successor, Maj.Gen. Everett S. Hughes, during the yearsimmediately following the war and re-mained one of the major questions on

115 As it was concerned principally with productionand storage, this proposal will be discussed in detailin Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supply ofMunitions, MS, OHF.


which opinion within the Department wasdivided.

Another organizational issue thataroused a great deal of discussion and ledto sharp differences of opinion was that offunctional as opposed to product organi-zation. Confusion often entered the pic-ture when this issue was under discussionbecause the Ordnance Department, likemost large organizations, combined thetwo types, with alternate levels of author-ity being organized on functional andproduct bases. The top-level division fol-lowed functional lines—the productionand procurement functions to IndustrialService, the supply and distribution func-tions to Field Service, the research and de-velopment functions to the Technical Di-vision, and so on. But, with the exceptionof the Field Service, the first level of au-thority below these top divisions was basedon products rather than functions. Withinthe Industrial Division there were sepa-rate branches devoted to the major prod-uct groups such as artillery, small arms,and ammunition, rather than branchesdealing with functions such as design,manufacture, procurement, and inspec-tion. Within each of the product branches,in turn, there were sections organized on afunctional basis.

Early in the war the Field Service wasorganized in similar fashion, dividing itsactivities between two product branches—ammunition supply and general supply.As time went on, the Field Service Divi-sion adopted an essentially functional or-ganization with separate branches de-voted to storage, stock control, and main-tenance, but with ammunition remainingas a separate product-type branch.

General Campbell regretted that it wasnecessary for the Department to continueduring the war on a partly functional-type

and partly product-type of organization.Had he considered it feasible to makesuch a drastic change while the war wasin progress, he would have rooted out"every last malingering vestige of func-tionalism." 116 He favored establishing aplan of definite product responsibility,with the chief of each product divisiongiven full responsibility for that productfrom design to obsolescence. And he gavehis approval to the recommendation of theHarris Board on the postwar organizationof the Department that decentralizationbe combined with product responsibilityto form six "product centers."

In the minds of many Ordnance offi-cers, functional organization was lookedupon as the first step on the road to themerger of all technical services within asingle Army supply agency, along the linesof General Somervell's proposals in thesummer of 1943 and at the end of the war.This was in part due to the fact that theSomervell plans contemplated a func-tional organization for the proposed Armysupply agency, with Ordnance handlingonly the procurement function, and othersupply services handling research and de-velopment, storage and issue, and so on.There was virtually universal agreementamong high-ranking Ordnance officersthat such a plan of organization wouldhave resulted in a dispersal of responsibil-ity and would have made effective inte-gration of the entire program of produc-tion and distribution impossible. Theofficers contended that a functional organ-ization would have allowed too much op-portunity for the production program toget out of balance—with too many guns ofone caliber and not enough of another, in-sufficient ammunition for the guns on

116 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 443.


hand, or more trucks than there were tiresto equip them—because no one individualwould have been responsible for any oneproduct group.

Of all the organizational issues thatarose during the war, the most importantfor the Ordnance Department was that ofthe position the Department was to oc-cupy within the framework of the War De-partment. Ordnance leaders were con-vinced that the Department could functionmost effectively, and make its greatest con-tribution to the war effort, if it enjoyed alarge measure of freedom in carrying outthe production programs adopted byhigher authority. Far from ever question-ing the need for over-all direction of thewar program, these officers, particularlyin 1940 and 1941, consistently argued thatthe failure of the War Department to pro-vide sufficient guidance by determiningwell in advance how large the Army waseventually to be and what equipment itwas to have, was one of the gravest handi-caps for the Ordnance Department in get-ting large-scale production of munitionsunder way. But they vigorously opposedany efforts by higher authority to go be-yond the establishment of requirementsand broad policies, feeling that top-levelstaff agencies should concern themselvesonly with questions of policy and shouldnot interfere with operating details.

Many Ordnance officers felt that Gen-eral Campbell's greatest service to theOrdnance Department—and to the cause

of national security—was his successful re-sistance to proposals of the Army ServiceForces to merge all the technical servicesinto one Army-wide supply agency. Withits century-old tradition of independentstatus and its high standards of technicalcompetence, the Department felt that itwas fully capable of completing its as-signed mission without the constant super-vision of any higher headquarters. It wasalso convinced that any proposal to assignOrdnance research and development, am-munition supply, or any other technicalphase of Ordnance operations to a WarDepartment agency such as the Quarter-master Corps or the Chemical WarfareService, which had had no experience inthat particular specialty, would havebeen foolhardy.

Although the Ordnance Departmentsuccessfully opposed many of the ASF pro-posals advanced during World War II, theissue was not dead at the end of the war.The officers who had championed the De-partment's point of view gained somesatisfaction in witnessing the abolition ofthe Army Service Forces in 1946 and therestoration of the technical services to sub-stantially the same positions—as relatedto higher authority—they had held before1942. But these officers remained on thealert to challenge any revival of proposalsto abolish the separate product responsi-bilities of the technical services in favor ofa consolidated supply agency based on afunctional organization.

CHAPTER V

Military Personnel and TrainingDuring the years between the two world

wars the number of officers and enlistedmen in the Ordnance Department wasnever large. The Department was limitedby law to 350 Regular Army officers, andlack of funds kept its actual officer strengthduring those years to an average of only275. By June 1940, in spite of the increasedtempo of national defense activities, thetotal number of Regular Army officers inthe Department had risen only to 375.There were, in addition, 3,000 OrdnanceReserve officers on the rolls, but nearlytwo thirds of these were earmarked forduty with troops or with other arms andservices and were not under the jurisdic-tion of the Chief of Ordnance. The aver-age number of enlisted men in the Depart-ment during the years between the warswas only about 2,200, and by June 1940had not risen to much more than 3,500.1

During the latter half of 1940, with largerappropriations available, the militarystrength of the Department rose rapidlyand continued to rise throughout 1941.The ranks of the officer corps were filled atfirst by calling Reserve officers to activeduty and by granting Reserve commis-sions to qualified civilians, and later bycommissioning graduates of the OfficerCandidate School.2 At the time of the at-tack on Pearl Harbor the Department had410 Regular Army officers and 3,338 Re-serve officers on active duty, and approxi-mately 30,000 enlisted men. A year later

the number of officers and men hadjumped to 235,000, a 700 percent increasewithin one year.3

During the prewar years the "regulars"who carried on the work of the Depart-ment were professional soldiers welltrained in both military and technicalsubjects. The rapid expansion of the warperiod, however, brought in so manythousands of untrained or only partiallytrained officers and men that an intensive,large-scale training program became nec-essary. New schools and training centerswere established to produce automotivemechanics, ammunition handlers, and ex-perts in repairing small arms and artil-lery—the "fighting technicians" who wereto supply and maintain the complicatedweapons and vehicles used by the U.S.Army in World War II. Although manyofficers and some enlisted men were as-signed to procurement, storage, and in-spection functions at depots and districtoffices, the majority of Ordnance troops

1 (1) Ann Rpts SW, 1920-40. (2) Ltr, CofOrd toTAG, 15 Jul 40, sub: Allotment of Officers . . . , AG320.2 (7-19-40) (1) Sec 1, DRB AGO. (3) ASF Con-trol Div, The Period of Military Preparedness, 1940-1941, MS hist, OCMH.

2 By August 1940, Ordnance had called 800 Re-serve officers to active duty on a voluntary basis. Bythe following summer, when the Officer CandidateSchool opened, there were nearly 1,500 Reserve offi-cers on duty with the Department. Ordnance Admin-istration, Ch. 14, Table I, MS hist, OHF.

3 (1) Period of Military Preparedness, OCMH. (2)Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of,Ground Combat Troops, p. 203.


were assigned to duty with maintenanceunits in the field, and the Ordnancetraining program had to provide theskilled manpower needed. The number ofofficers engaged in training activities in1943 far exceeded the total number of of-ficers in the Department during the pre-war years, and the number of Ordnancemen trained during World War II wasgreater than the total of the peacetimeArmy.

Ordnance Schools, 1920-40

From 1920 to 1940 the Ordnance De-partment maintained two schools at whichsmall groups of officers and enlisted menwere given formal training. The OrdnanceSchool at Watertown Arsenal offered acomprehensive two-year ordnance engi-neering course in which twenty officerswere normally enrolled.4 The OrdnanceSpecialist School at Raritan Arsenal of-fered a number of nine-month courses inthe repair, maintenance, and storage ofOrdnance matériel for groups of care-fully selected enlisted men.

Enlisted students at Raritan were givenno military training because they were allveterans of two or more years of activeArmy service. Each student enrolled for aperiod of from nine to twelve months inone of the specialized courses for armorers,artillery mechanics, automotive mechan-ics, carpenters, welders, or other special-ists. In addition, each year a group ofabout twenty-five enlisted men took thenoncommissioned officers course, whichgave them a broad survey of all aspects ofthe Ordnance sergeant's duties. The Ord-nance Field Service School, as it was re-named in 1931, was essentially a tradeschool for enlisted men with about 150students normally enrolled, but in 1932

the curriculum was extended to include athree months' course for officers.5

The facilities at Raritan were neveradequate. The buildings were of tempo-rary World War I construction, and by themiddle 1930's were in urgent need of re-pair.6 There was no outdoor range onwhich students could fire weapons, nocross-country course for maneuvering ve-hicles, and only limited amounts of equip-ment for teaching repair of optical instru-ments. Further, since Raritan was princi-pally an ammunition depot, it had onhand very little Ordnance equipment forthe students to observe and study. Whenofficers of both schools surveyed the situa-tion during the summer of 1936, theyreached the conclusion that AberdeenProving Ground, the center for Ordnanceresearch and learning, was the most suit-able location for all the educational activi-ties of the Department. This conclusionwas approved by the Secretary of Warearly in December, but funds were notmade available for the needed construc-tion at Aberdeen until nearly eighteenmonths later.

The final impetus for moving the en-listed men's school to Aberdeen came fromthe swift victories of the German armies inthe early summer of 1940. In May of thatyear, while Lt. Col. Julian S. Hatcher,commandant of the officers' school, was en

4 (1) Interv with Gen Lewis, Jan 50. (2) Capt.W. H. Spinrad, "Early History of The OrdnanceSchool," The Ordnance Sergeant, III, 1 (1942), 1-4. (3)Hist of Ord School and appended docs, OHF.

5 (1) Spinrad, loc. cit. (2) Interv, Oct 49, with ColGeorge W. Outland, former commandant of FSSchool.

6 (1) Memo, Gen Tschappat for ACofS G-3, 14Nov 36, sub: Consolidation of the Ordnance FieldService School and the Ordnance School, OO352/146, NA. (2) Memo, Lt Col Julian S. Hatcher forCapt Norris W. Osborn, Engr Sec, 11 Aug 37, sub:New Construction, OHF. (3) Hist of Ord School,App., pp. 2-7, OHF.

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 123

route to the Army maneuvers in Louisi-ana, he read in newspapers of the Germaninvasion of the Low Countries. "Beforeproceeding further to the maneuvers,"Major General Hatcher wrote later, "Idispatched an informal letter to Maj. Gen.C. M. Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, makingthe urgent personal recommendation that,without delay, the schools at Aberdeenand Raritan should be consolidated andsuitable emergency facilities found atAberdeen for a greatly expanded trainingprogram."7 Although the new buildingswere still incomplete, General Wessonapproved the proposal to combine the twoschools as soon as possible. Early in Julythe 40th Training Company, which hadbeen stationed at Raritan Arsenal sinceWorld War I, moved to Aberdeen.8 Thisstep marked the end of relatively leisurelytraining of small groups at separate Ord-nance schools and ushered in the periodwhen tens of thousands of men arrived atAberdeen every year for intensive, high-speed instruction.

1940 Plans for Training

As the possibility of American involve-ment in the war daily came closer duringthe summer of 1940, War Departmentplans for training troops were hastilyrevised and brought up to date, but theyhad to remain in the blueprint stage untilthe Congress enacted legislation toincrease the size of the Army. During thatsummer legislation to draft men for mili-tary service was under protracted consid-eration by the House and Senate. Hugesums of money were voted in June for theprocurement of military supplies, but itwas not until 16 September that the Selec-tive Service and Training Act was passed.

Anticipating enactment of this legisla-

tion, the G-3 Division of the General Staffin August completed a tentative plan formobilization training and forwardedcopies to all interested agencies.9 This plancalled for the establishment of a score ofReplacement Centers to receive "enlistees"who volunteered for military service and"selectees" inducted under the SelectiveService Act and give them thirteen weeksof training in basic military and basic tech-nical subjects. The Replacement Centerat Aberdeen Proving Ground was to beused to train Ordnance troops and was tohave a capacity of 5,800. At the same timethe G-3 Division approved an increase inthe capacity of the Ordnance School to2,200 and the establishment of three Ord-nance Unit Training Centers (UTC's) witha combined capacity of 3,700.

Although these plans existed only onpaper, they outlined a well-rounded pro-gram of Ordnance training. The Ord-nance School, with its long experience andits competent staff, was designed to pro-vide technical training for both officers andenlisted specialists. It was also to serve asthe source of cadres for the new trainingcenters. The Replacement Center, laterrenamed Replacement Training Center,was to teach newly inducted men theirmilitary ABC's and give them an elemen-tary course in some phase of Ordnanceservice. The Unit Training Centers were toreceive graduates, both officers andenlisted men, from the ReplacementCenter and Ordnance School, organizethem as companies, and, with the aid of an

7 Key Pers Rpt, 1945, Hatcher, OHF.8 Hist of Ord School, pp. 39-40, OHF. A detach-

ment was left at Raritan to train a group of enlistedmen who were to be transferred to Aberdeen later forspecialized training as instructors.

9 See ltr , CofOrd to QMG, 6 Sep 40, sub: Addi-tional QMC Personnel . . . , OO 353/76, DRBAGO.


experienced cadre assigned to each unit,give them a thirteen-week course on work-ing together as members of a team. Thewhole program of Army training in 1940was geared to crowding as much instruc-tion as possible into one year since theSelective Service Act provided that menwould return to civilian life after twelvemonths of military training.

Actual establishment of the proposedtraining centers was not authorized by theWar Department until several weeks afterthe enactment of Selective Service in mid-September.10 Then began the long processof erecting barracks, shops, and buildingsfor classrooms, acquiring training equip-ment, and organizing staffs of instructors.Because the Ordnance School, Replace-ment Center, and Unit Training Centerwere all to be located at Aberdeen, anOrdnance Training Center was formedthere to provide unified control of alltraining activities. The Ordnance TrainingCenter was officially activated on NewYear's Day 1941 with Colonel Hatcher incommand.11

The Ordnance School at Aberdeen1940-45

Within a few days of the transfer of the40th Training Company to Aberdeen inJuly 1940, the Ordnance School was con-ducting classes for both officers and enlistedmen at its new location. Instruction beganwhile partitions, plumbing, heating, andlighting were still being installed. Theunfinished barracks offered only coldshowers, screenless windows, and bedswithout sheets or pillows. An old museumbuilding provided makeshift classroomsand shops while new buildings were beingerected. At the same time, preparationswere being made for the future, although

no definite long-range training objectiveshad yet been set by the War Department.

Streamlining the Curriculum

The pace of Ordnance training before1940 had been slow, and the instructionhad been thorough. Classes had normallybeen small and students had been spe-cially selected, above-average, career sol-diers.12 The enlisted students who came tothe Ordnance School after 1940 were notexperienced Regular Army veterans, butyoung men who had been drafted for ayear of military training under the Selec-tive Service Act. There was not time togive them nine-month courses in variousphases of ordnance. They had to be trainedquickly—and in large numbers—and thenbe transferred to the field forces for addi-tional training in large-unit operations. Tomeet this situation the Ordnance Schoolstreamlined its courses by eliminating allbut the most essential material and reduc-ing the time allotted for each subject.13

The first course given at Aberdeen wasa shortened version of the former NCOcourse, lasting only twelve weeks instead

10 Ltr, TAG to CG's major commands, 25 Oct 40,sub: Replacement Centers, AG 680.1 (7-1 1-40) (1)Sec 1, DRB AGO.

11 (1) ODO 151, 26 Dec 40, OHF. (2) Col. J. S.Hatcher. "The Ordnance Training Center," ArmyOrdnance, XXI, 1 2 6 ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 625. (3) For comment onthe difficulties encountered at Aberdeen, see memo,Col Outland for author, 3 1 Oct 50, OHF.

12 Brig. Gen. Harry R. Kutz, "Military Education,"Army Ordnance, XXVI, 144 (1944), 531-32. GeneralKutz was chief of the Military Training Division from1943 to 1945. See also Capt. J. G. Smithwick, "Train-ing Enlisted Specialists," Army Ordnance, XXIX, 152(1945), 260-61.

13 Col. G. W. Outland, "The Ordnance School,"The Ordnance Sergeant, V, 1 (1943), 36-37. The samestep was taken by the German Army in training itsordnance technicians. See manuscript study, MS D-175, Die Techmsche Ausbildung des Waffenmeister—Per-sonals. GMDS DRB AGO.


of nine months. During July, a few daysafter the 40th Training Company hadmoved to Aberdeen, a group of two hun-dred enlisted men—eight times the num-ber usually enrolled at Raritan—arrivedat the school to take the NCO course.14

Later in the year, as construction of moreclassrooms and shop buildings was com-pleted, the specialist courses in artillery,small arms, automotive vehicles, fire con-trol instruments, carpentry, and welding,formerly conducted at Raritan, wereincluded in the curriculum at Aberdeen.Each course was given in three monthsinstead of nine and, as time went on, othershort courses were added for machinists,clerks, munitions workers, and antiaircraftfire control specialists. In addition to thecourses for enlisted men, the OrdnanceSchool also developed a streamlined pro-gram of officer training. In June 1940 thetwo-year course for officers was discon-tinued and several short, specializedcourses, designed chiefly for the large num-ber of Reserve officers who were beingcalled to active duty, were substituted.15

In the summer of 1941 the demand forenlisted specialists became so great thatthe Ordnance School had to speed up itstraining process. The school authoritiesadopted the methods of industrial massproduction, setting up many different pro-duction lines to turn out specialists just asfactory production lines turned out inter-changeable parts for a machine. In theautomotive section, for example, theattempt to produce in thirteen weeks ver-satile automotive mechanics capable ofrepairing all types of vehicles was aban-doned. Instead, students were divided intothree groups—tank mechanics, tractormechanics, and wheeled-vehicle and half-track mechanics—each group being givena short but intensive course in its special

field. Meanwhile, the general-purposeNCO course was dropped because itproved to be less valuable than the special-ized courses, particularly since it could nolonger be restricted to highly qualified,experienced veterans. As General Kutz,who became chief of the Military TrainingDivision in 1943, described this move: "Wediscarded the time-consuming endeavor oftrying to train a Jack-of-all-trades andconcentrated, instead, upon turning outhighly skilled technicians in specializedfields."16

A new form of specialized training wasadded to the curriculum early in 1942when the Base Shop School was opened.In 1940 it had generally been assumedthat, in time of war, ordnance in need ofmajor overhaul would be returned to thearsenals in the United States, as had beenthe procedure in World War I. Althoughseveral officers on the Ordnance Schoolstaff had dissented, and recommendedthat troop units be trained to operate Ord-nance base maintenance shops overseas,no provision for such training was madeduring the first year of the school's opera-tion at Aberdeen. In the fall of 1941, how-ever, it became apparent that suchinstruction was needed, and a few weeksbefore Pearl Harbor General Wessondirected the Ordnance School to establishan organization to train personnel foroverseas base shop units.17

14 Hist of Ord School, p. 208, OHF.15 Ibid., p. 137.16 Gen. H. R. Kutz, "Military Education," Army

Ordnance, XXVI, 144 (1944) , 532. See also the re-marks of Dr. Robert E. Doherty in the same issue, p.538.

17 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to CG Ord Training Center, 22Nov 41, sub: Base Shop Facilities at APG, copy inHist of Ord School. App., OHF. (2) Intervs with ColOutland and Lt Col Keith T. O'Keefe, Apr 50. (3)Hist of MPTS, XI, 37-44, OHF.


FACTORY TRAINING CLASS at the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio.

Decentralization of Technical Training

The Ordnance School steadily increasedin size during 1941, reaching a capacity of1,500 by the end of the year.18 After theoutbreak of war in December the schoolarea was extended until it eventuallycovered 275 acres, with more than 300buildings, and, at the peak of the trainingload, the curriculum included more than70 different technical courses. But evenwith this rapid growth, the school was notable to train all the Ordnance techniciansrequired by the Army, and an elaborateprogram of decentralization was adopted.To supplement the facilities at Aberdeen,the Ordnance Department turned first tovarious civilian trade schools, then to spe-cialized branches of the Ordnance School,and finally to factory schools.

As early as November 1940 the Ord-

nance School had adopted the practice offarming out a few of its students to civiliantrade schools. At that time, a group of 50student machinists had been enrolled atthe Springfield Trade School in Massachu-setts, and in July 1941 another group ofstudents had been sent to a civilian tradeschool in Baltimore for training in electri-cal maintenance. Contracts for trainingOrdnance troops were made with severalother civilian trade schools in 1942.19 Atthe same time the Ordnance School estab-lished branches at Ordnance depots. In

18 Ltr, CofOrd to ACofS G-3, 8 Jan 42, sub: TheOrdnance Training Problem, OO 353.4/61, DRBAGO. The average number of graduates per monthduring fiscal year 1941 was 200; during 1942 it roseto 400, and during 1943 to over 1,000. See Hist of OrdSchool, Vol. I, App., pp. 2-55, OHF.

19 Hist of MPTS, I, 56-60, OHF.


January 1942 after the UTC at Savannahad been closed, the clerical and ammu-nition courses at Aberdeen were trans-ferred to Savanna to release facilitiesurgently needed for the expanding OfficerCandidate School which had been openedat Aberdeen in July 1941. As the problemsof distributing and keeping records ofspare parts for all kinds of Ordnanceequipment became critical during 1942, aschool for training parts clerks was organ-ized at the Rossford Ordnance Depot,Toledo, Ohio.

In 1942, as it became apparent that theDepartment would not be able to train allthe technical specialists needed, the Mili-tary Training Division asked manufactur-ing concerns holding war contracts to trainOrdnance personnel in their own shopsand classrooms. In many instances theseconcerns were ideally prepared to trainmaintenance mechanics as they had staffsof expert instructors and ample supplies oftools, equipment, and technical litera-ture. The manufacturers entered whole-heartedly into the task of producing"factory-trained soldiers" to maintain theweapons of war coming off the productionlines.

The largest single addition to Ordnancetraining operations during World War IIcame in August 1942 when responsibilityfor Army trucks and other vehicles wastransferred from The Quartermaster Gen-eral to the Chief of Ordnance. Included inthe transfer were a score of Quartermasterautomotive schools, both military andcivilian, with a combined capacity fornearly 15,000 students. Most of theseschools were comparatively small, how-ever, and were closed during the springand summer of 1943 in an effort to consoli-date automotive training in a few largecenters.20 By December 1943, when the

automotive school at Holabird OrdnanceDepot in Baltimore, Maryland, was closed,only four Ordnance automotive schoolswere still in operation—Atlanta, Georgia;Normoyle in San Antonio, Texas; FortCrook, Nebraska; and Mt. Rainier inTacoma, Washington. Normoyle wasclosed in March 1944 and Fort Crook inApril 1945, leaving only Atlanta and Mt.Rainier in operation at the end of the war.For some months after the transfer ofmotor vehicles to Ordnance, the Quarter-master Corps trained men for the Ord-nance Department at its two largereplacement centers.

Ordnance school training expanded sorapidly during 1941 and 1942 that it wasimpossible to keep an accurate anddetailed record of the number of studentstrained. "We were adding new schools sorapidly in 1942," Col. George W. Outlandlater remarked, "that I would have beenhard pressed to tell you on any one dayexactly how many we had."21 New courseswere added to the curriculum and oldcourses were revised and redesignated.Not all students assigned to the OrdnanceSchool followed the simple pattern of com-pleting a single course and then moving onto a new assignment. Some took severalshort courses in related fields before leav-ing the school while others, for one reasonor another, were transferred before com-pleting a single course. The courses variedso in length that statistical tabulations ofcourses completed are virtually meaning-less. The following table of the number ofmen graduated from these courses is basedon the best available estimates for the

20 ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, 30 Apr 43, Sec. 9,p. 5. OHF. For discussion of Ordnance automotiveUTC's, see below, p. 144.

21 Interv with Col Outland, Jan 50.


period between January 1941 and Sep-tember 1945:22

a Total for 1941 and 1942.

Teaching Methods and Training Aids

The veteran instructors on the faculty ofthe Ordnance School in 1940 had learnedeffective teaching methods through manyyears of experience, but most of the newmembers who joined the staff in 1941needed instruction in the techniques ofteaching. In September 1941, therefore,Colonel Outland created a TrainingMethods Branch and assigned as its heada senior instructor from the automotivesection who had extensive civilian experi-ence as a teacher of engineering subjects.23

Beginning in September the new branchgave a thirty-hour course in teachingmethods to all officer instructors. Thecourse included discussion of lesson plans,the proper use of various techniques ofteaching, the employment of visual aids,and a showing of the War Departmentfilm, "Military Training" (TF 7-295).Approximately half the course time wasdevoted to practice teaching, with eachpractice period followed by a critique ofthe student teacher's methods. "A Manualfor Ordnance Instructors," prepared bythe Training Methods Branch, was pub-lished in February 1942 and was used asthe basic text until publication of TM21-250 by the War Department a year

later. The training methods course waslater given to enlisted instructors of theOrdnance School, to bomb disposal offi-cers, and in abbreviated form to studentsin the Officer Candidate School.

In accordance with War Departmentpolicy, Ordnance instructors were encour-aged to use training aids of all types, rang-ing from books and blackboards to motionpictures and cut-away models. In the earlydays of the war period up-to-date publica-tions were virtually nonexistent, and theonly usable drawings were those made onthe blackboard by the instructor.24 Mostof the printed manuals on hand had beenprepared by the Field Service School inearlier years for Army extension courses. Tobring these manuals up to date and to pro-duce others as rapidly as possible, a smallpublications section was formed, and dur-ing the winter of 1940-41 a growing staffof writers, editors, and illustrators preparedtexts, charts, scenarios for training films,and other instructional material. Animpressive list of Ordnance School textssoon appeared, including separate man-uals on telescopes, range finders, ammuni-tion, and other subjects.25 Thousands ofcharts, maps, and photographs were pre-pared and reproduced for classroom use,

22 Computed from various tabulations in Hist ofOrd School, OHF.

The Ordnance School at Santa Anita, California,closed in May 1944 after graduating 8,488 students.Hist of MPTS, XI, 97, OHF.

23 Hist of Ord School, p. 85, OHF.24 "Ordnance training literature, thus far, is woe-

fully insufficient," the Chief of Ordnance wrote inMay 1941. "We have only one War Department ap-proved Field Manual, which incidentally, is alreadyout of date. Likewise, we have only one instructionaltype of Technical Manual which has been approvedby the War Department." Ltr, CofOrd to CO OTC,20 May 41, sub: Ordnance Training Literature, OO353/395, DRB AGO.

25 Hist of MPTS, XI, 16, OHF.


and models of many types of equipmentwere used in all sections of the school. Car-buretors, for example, were made of trans-parent plastic to give the students a chanceto see exactly how a carburetor functioned,and models of small items of equipmentwere made ten or twenty times their actualsize for demonstration to large classes.26

One of the most important training aidsoriginated within the Ordnance Schoolwas a monthly magazine, The Ordnance Ser-geant. In the fall of 1940, Sgt. Hugh E.Martin, a graduate of the first NCO courseat Aberdeen and chief of the publicationssection of the school, observed that, how-ever effective the Ordnance School coursesmight be, something would be lacking inthe instruction program if nothing weredone to keep the enlisted specialists abreastof developments in ordnance after theirgraduation.27 Sergeant Martin recom-mended that an "alumni magazine," con-taining descriptions of revised proceduresand new matériel and answers to questionsreceived from troops in the field, be pre-pared and distributed by the OrdnanceSchool. This recommendation waspromptly approved, and the first issue ofThe Ordnance Sergeant appeared in mimeo-graphed form in January 1941, with Ser-geant Martin as editor.28 The first fewissues had such a favorable reception thatan improved reproduction process wasadopted and the size of the magazine wasincreased to 100 pages. It was distributedfree of charge to all Ordnance organiza-tions, and its circulation eventually passedthe 25,000 mark. Many officers reportedthat wherever copies of The Ordnance Ser-geant were found in the dayrooms andlibraries of Ordnance units, their smudgedand dog-eared pages gave evidence of hav-ing been read and reread.

The Officer Candidate School

In the summer of 1940 Colonel Hatcher,foreseeing the need for hundreds of addi-tional officers to carry out OrdnanceDepartment responsibilities, urged thatauthority be granted to institute an officercandidate training program, erect schoolbuildings, and organize a corps of instruc-tors.29 The War Department, however, wasreluctant to approve the training of addi-tional officers at that time because so manyReservists had not yet been called to activeduty, and it was not until the spring of1941 that the War Department authorizedthe various arms and services to establishOfficer Candidate Schools (OCS). On 26April 1941 Ordnance was directed to openits OCS at Aberdeen Proving Ground inJuly, but with an initial quota of only fiftystudents.30

The first class at Aberdeen was made upof candidates selected chiefly from theRegular Army and National Guard by

26 Lt. E. D. Roberts, "Seeing Is Believing," ArmyOrdnance, XXIX, 153 (1945), 418-19. See also illus-trated article in Life, XIX, 4 (1945), 42. Inspectingofficers in January 1944 rated the training aids in useat the school "exceptionally good." Inspection Rpt onOrd School, 29 Jan 44, OO 353/6468, DRB AGO.

27 Col. G. W. Outland, "The Birth of the OrdnanceSergeant." The Ordnance Sergeant, III, 1 (1942), 5-7.

28 Sergeant Martin was awarded the Legion ofMerit for his work as editor of The Ordnance Sergeant.WD GO 44, 30 May 44.

29 Interview, January 1950, with Colonel Outland,first commandant of the Ordnance Officer CandidateSchool. Establishment of Officer Candidate Schoolshad been envisaged in the National Defense Act of1920 and in Mobilization Regulations published bythe War Department during the 1930's.

30 Ltr, TAG to CG's all armies and others, 26 Apr41, sub: Officer Candidate Schools, AG 352 (4-10-41), DRB AGO. For a discussion of War Departmentpolicy on officer candidate training in 1940 see Rob-ert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast,The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops(Washington, 1948), pp. 325-28.


OCS boards appointed by corps area ordepartment commanders.31 The groupwas housed on the second floor of theauxiliary barracks of the 40th OrdnanceCompany, and, for lack of better accom-modations, classes were held in the base-ment of the barracks. The officercandidates were instructed by the facultyof the Ordnance School, the OCS actuallybeing a section within the school. The firstcourse of study, adopted in July 1941, pro-vided a quick survey of both military andtechnical subjects, and allotted thirty-twohours to each of four technical specialties—small arms, artillery, ammunition, andautomotive equipment.32 Experience soonshowed that this program needed elabora-tion and refinement. It made no provisionfor instruction in such essential subjects ascamouflage, defense against aerial attack,and the use of weapons. It offered littleopportunity for the candidates to becomefamiliar with field operations, and the timeallotted for the study of each category ofOrdnance items was sufficient only for asketchy orientation.

Beginning with the third class, whichentered in January 1942, the course wasrevised to include more specialized instruc-tion in technical subjects.33 At the end ofthe eighth week of training each candidatechose one technical subject as his field ofstudy for the remaining four weeks of thecourse. Toward the end of this period ofspecialization, the student went on anovernight bivouac and worked out a fieldproblem that required him to apply hisnewly acquired knowledge. Throughout1942, because of the necessity for crowdingboth military and technical training intosuch a short period, the Ordnance OCSwas unable to train its officer candidateswith the desired degree of thoroughness. Asingle overnight bivouac did little to pre-

pare them for the realities of combat oper-ations, and four weeks of technicalinstruction was not adequate preparationfor dealing with practical problems offield maintenance.

After the landings in North Africa inNovember 1942, reports from overseascommanders indicated that many servicetroops, in addition to their technical profi-ciency, needed more thorough training inadapting themselves to field conditions.34

Beginning in May 1943, therefore, a radi-cal change was made in the OrdnanceOCS course. The entire period was givenover to basic military subjects includingrifle marksmanship, first aid, convoy oper-ations, sanitation, and field expedients.After completing this intensive course ofmilitary training and receiving their com-missions, the students entered upon thesecond phase of their training—twelveweeks of technical instruction duringwhich they spent four weeks on "basicordnance" and eight weeks on the study ofa specialty such as small arms, ammuni-tion, or artillery.

In addition to basic military trainingand physical conditioning, the OrdnanceOCS constantly emphasized the selectionand training of men for leadership.35 TheWar Department directive authorizingofficer candidate schools had stated thatdemonstrated leadership ability was to be"the basic and predominant considerationgoverning selection to officer candidate

31 WD Cir 245, 26 Nov 41, and AR 625-5 pre-scribed the procedures for selecting officer candidates.

32 The Ordnance OCS, Hist of MPTS, Vol. 100.p. 2, OHF.

33 Ibid., p. 5.34 Ltr, CofOrd to CG ASF, 13 Apr 43, sub: Revi-

sion Ordnance OC Training, OO 352.11/16447,DRB AGO.

35 For a description of leadership training of officercandidates in the Army Ground Forces, see Palmer,Wiley, and Keast, op. cit., pp. 334-35.


schools,"36 but experience soon showedthat the various OCS boards were sendingmany poorly qualified candidates to theOrdnance OCS.37 Thus, the school notonly had to teach the principles of leader-ship but also to devise means of evaluatingthe leadership qualities of the students sothat those who were not up to standardcould be eliminated. The methods em-ployed at Aberdeen to select and trainstudents for military leadership were simi-lar to those used throughout the Army.They included close-order drill, the "floorrating" system, and subjection of studentsto constant pressure. The day-by-day judg-ments of instructors—many of whom werethemselves recent graduates of the coursethey were teaching—played an importantpart, as did the impressions made by thecandidates on their classmates. Some can-didates felt that in judging leadershipability, the emphasis placed on close-orderdrill was excessive and that too littleweight was given to the individual's tech-nical knowledge and experience. Othersfelt that "lack of leadership qualities" wassimply a convenient catch-all used byinstructors in lieu of more specific criti-cism. Rightly or wrongly, more candidateswere eliminated from the Ordnance OCSfor leadership deficiencies than for anyother reason.38

One of the most pressing problems facingthe school throughout its first two yearswas the need for more barracks, moreclassrooms, more instructors, and hugequantities of teaching materials. The firstclasses in 1941 were small and entered atintervals of several weeks, but soon thequotas were doubled and tripled, and anew class was formed every week. Duringthe first six months of 1943 the peakenrollment was reached when over 1,000students entered the school every month.

Classes were then reduced to 200 each,beginning at intervals of two weeks, andlate in the year the classes were limited to50 candidates each, entering at intervalsof eight weeks. This schedule continued ineffect with only minor changes throughout1944 and the first eight months of 1945. Atotal of 713 candidates received their com-missions during 1945, bringing the numberof graduates for the 1941-45 period toapproximately 13,000.39

Replacement Training

The Ordnance Replacement TrainingCenter (ORTC) was activated at Aber-deen Proving Ground on 1 January 1941to train the Ordnance quota of menbrought into the Army under the SelectiveService Act. Its mission was to receivenewly inducted men from reception cen-ters, give them basic military and technicaltraining, and then transfer them as indi-vidual replacements for existing units, ascadre for new units, or as specialist stu-dents for the Ordnance School.40 After thepeacetime "defense" training turned into

36 See also WD Cir 126, 28 Apr 42, for further de-tails on the selection of candidates.

37 "The boards sent to the school," the OCS his-torians wrote, "a student body which ranged in qual-ifications from the brilliant to the dull-witted andfrom the born leaders to the uninspired followers."Hist of MPTS, Vol. 100, p. 9, OHF. This problemwas not peculiar to the Ordnance OCS, but wasArmy wide.

38 For a more detailed description of the leadershipdeficiencies of officer candidates, see Palmer, Wiley,and Keast, op. cit., pp. 345-50.

39 Hist of MPTS, XVI, Supplement 1 ,16 , OHF.40 The terminology applied to training activities in

1941 was sometimes confusing. "Replacements" weremen assigned to organizations either to replace actuallosses (loss replacements) or to bring the organizationinitially up to strength (filler replacements). A cadrewas a small group of trained officers and men whoformed the nucleus around which a new unit was or-ganized.


actual war training in December 1941, theORTC continued as the focal point forOrdnance replacement training through-out World War II.

Training Under MTP 9-1, 1941-42

The basic military and technical train-ing given at the ORTC during the firsthalf of 1941 was guided by MobilizationTraining Program 9-1, dated 1 October1940, which prescribed a course of instruc-tion for all Ordnance enlisted replace-ments during their first four weeks in theArmy.41 Two weeks were devoted exclu-sively to basic military subjects and twoweeks to a combination of basic militaryand basic technical instruction. In contrastto the more elaborate training programsdeveloped in later years, this early 1941schedule was sketchy. It allotted a dispro-portionate amount of time to close-orderdrill and made no provision for teachingsubjects such as map reading and nightoperations. Nevertheless, it was consideredadequate because the four weeks of basictraining were intended to serve only as thefirst phase of a recruit's military education.

The original version of MTP 9-1 madeno provision for keeping trainees in theORTC itself for specialized technicaltraining, but as the volume of recruitsmounted in 1941 it became impractical totransfer all of them elsewhere for suchtraining, and technical sections had to behastily organized. The technical courses,ranging in length from six to eight weeks,were not designed to produce highlyskilled specialists but to turn out men whocould fit into Ordnance units as basic re-placements and then gain greater pro-ficiency through experience on the job.For this reason, the courses covered onlythe most essential data. Emphasis was

placed on the nomenclature and functionof each item, its assembly and disassembly,and the repairs normally made by an Ord-nance maintenance company in the field.All the courses devoted as much time aspossible to practical work, and all includedat least one brief field exercise.

The technical sections faced a greatmany difficulties in getting started duringthe summer of 1941. There was a shortageof virtually everything except students.Barracks had to be used as classroomsuntil new shop buildings were completed,and many classes had to be held outdoorsduring the summer. There were practi-cally no visual aids, and even items ofequipment for observation and study werescarce. The automotive section, for exam-ple, opened in July with only one M3 tank,one scout car, and ten condemned trucksin its stock room.

Recognizing that instructors are thevitally important "machine tools" of atraining center, the ORTC staff imme-diately took steps to train a corps of com-petent instructors for both technical andmilitary subjects. Two hundred of the mostpromising men were withdrawn from thefirst contingents to arrive at Aberdeen,given an intensive course of instruction inbasic military subjects, and then assignedto training battalions, where they filled allcadre positions from first sergeant to cor-poral. As time went on, more and moremen were given "cadre training" and theinstruction was broadened to cover tech-nical as well as military subjects.42 A re-lated program of instructor training waslaunched early in 1942 to improve the

41 Copy in AG 300.8 MTP (8 Feb 40) (1 ) , DRBAGO.

42 (1) Hist of MPTS, XIV, 216, OHF. (2) PSP 60,Ordnance Military Training, 1939-1944, Sec. V,OHF.


technique of teaching. All enlisted instruc-tors in the technical sections were requiredto attend an evening class each week forsix weeks to study the principles set forthin FM 21-5, "Military Training," to dis-cuss examinations and visual aids, and topractice public speaking. This combinedprogram of training in military subjectsand teacher training eventually became apermanent feature of the ORTC curricu-lum and was made a requirement in allcadre training.43

Although Ordnance troops were givenmore military training during 1941 thanhad ever before been considered neces-sary, inspecting officers of G-3 found thatthe military training given at the ORTCin the summer of 1941 was not sufficientlythorough and was inferior to the technicaltraining. The inspecting officers attributedthis condition largely to the fact that mostof the instructors were Reserve officerswho had been schooled primarily in tech-nical subjects rather than in the commandof troops.44 The Chief of Ordnanceacknowledged the soundness of this criti-cism and replied that it was an unavoid-able consequence since sufficient funds fortraining Ordnance Reserve officers hadnot been available during the prewaryears. General Wesson immediately di-rected the ORTC officers to give constantattention to raising the level of militarytraining. Steady progress resulted duringthe following months, and by the summerof 1942 an inspecting officer reported thatthe ORTC military training program was"exceptionally well conducted." 45

A number of factors contributed to thisimprovement. One was the Congressionalaction in August 1941 extending the Se-lective Service Act for another year andlengthening the period of training fromtwelve to eighteen months. Another was

the approval by the G-3 Division of a newOrdnance training program that morethan doubled the number of hours allottedto basic military training — 254 hours incontrast to 102 hours in the 1940 MTP.The new program also provided that somemilitary training be given during theweeks of technical instruction so that thebenefits of the initial training would notbe lost. Most of the additional time formilitary training was devoted to close-order drill, physical training, marches andbivouacs, inspections, and running theobstacle course.46

The most important stimulus to im-provement of training in 1941 was the out-break of war in December. The attack onPearl Harbor put a stop to all argumentover the need for military training. In-structors and trainees were no longer pre-paring for a war that might or might notcome, but were now definitely committedto fight to the finish against powerfulenemies.

At the same time, the need for morerapid mobilization of troops made it neces-sary to shorten the time for replacementtraining. On 19 December 1941 the WarDepartment ordered all ReplacementTraining Centers (except those of the In-

43 Interv, 18 Jul 50, with Col Paul C. Kelly, formerdirector of ORTC training.

44 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 9 Aug 41, sub: Rpt ofTraining Inspection, ORTC, OO 353/519, DRBAGO.

45 Memo, Lt Col William C. Bennett, Jr., for Dirof Training, ASF, 3 Jul 42, sub: Training Inspectionof ORTC, Aberdeen . . . , OO 353/986, DRBAGO.

46 MTP 9-1, Ordnance MTP for . . . Replace-ments . . . . 21 Aug 41, AG 381 (9-12-39), DRBAGO.

The obstacle course was opened in August 1941. Itextended over approximately 500 yards of woodedterritory and consisted of hurdles, log mazes, ropeclimbs, a rope traverse across a water-filled ditch,and a gas chamber. Hist of MPTS, XIV, 29-30,OHF.


fantry, Armored Force, and Signal Corps)to reduce the training cycle to eightweeks.47 The ORTC did not return to thelonger training schedule until June 1942,but it adopted a forty-eight hour week aspartial compensation for the time lostunder the shortened program, and gavemore instruction at night. During the earlymonths of 1942 the average trainee wasgiven four weeks of basic military trainingand four weeks of technical training, butthe demand for replacements was so greatthat many individuals were transferredbefore completing even this shortenedschedule.

ASF Influence on ReplacementTraining in 1942

When the War Department was reor-ganized in March 1942, the training divi-sion of Army Service Forces replaced theG-3 Division of the General Staff as super-visor of training in the technical services.The new office, headed by Brig. Gen.Clarence R. Huebner, soon began to exer-cise much closer control over militarytraining within the technical services thanG-3 had ever attempted. The need formore intensive and realistic instructionwas emphasized, and the chiefs of serviceswere bluntly ordered to "give constant at-tention to the urgent problem of training"and not to shunt it aside as a matter ofsecondary importance.48

Within the Ordnance Department needfor the increased emphasis on training wasrecognized by General Campbell in June1942 when he formed a Military TrainingDivision, headed by General Hatcher, andplaced it on the same administrative levelas the other divisions in the Department.49

At the same time, a Civilian AdvisoryCouncil, composed of noted educators and

industrialists, was appointed to advise theMilitary Training Division.50 The mem-bers of the council conferred at intervalswith Ordnance training officers and onseveral occasions visited Aberdeen andother training centers.

One of the first matters to which theASF training staff turned its attention wasstandardization of the basic military train-ing given at the replacement centers op-erated by the technical services. In August1942 it issued a detailed four-week train-ing schedule to be followed by all replace-ment centers and unit training centersunder its jurisdiction.51 The new programrequired a complete revision of the Ord-nance schedule of basic military training.By June 1942 the ORTC had returned toits longer training schedule and was devot-ing more than five weeks to basic militarytraining under the 254-hour programadopted the year before. The new ASFschedule reduced this to less than 4 weeks,or 163 hours, and sharply reduced the time

47 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 19 Dec 41, sub: Reductionin Length of Training Program at RTC's, AG 320.2(12-17-41), DRB AGO. Return to the longer cyclewas directed by the War Department on 28 Febru-ary 1942. See AG 320.2 (2-3-42), DRB AGO.

48 Ltr, CG SOS to Chiefs of Services, 2 May 42,sub: Training of Troops in SOS, OO 353/858, DRBAGO.

49 In January 1943 General Kutz replaced Gen-eral Hatcher, who became chief of the Field ServiceDivision.

50 The members of the Civilian Advisory Councilwere Dr. Kaufman T. Compton of Massachusetts In-stitute of Technology, Dr. Robert E. Doherty of Car-negie Inst i tute of Technology, Dr. J. E. Johnson ofGeneral Motors, Dr. Harry P. Hammond of Pennsyl-vania State College. Dr. Alexander R. Stevenson ofGeneral Electric, Dr. Ivan C. Crawford of the Uni-versity of Michigan, and Dr. Arthur C. Willard of theUniversity of Illinois.

5 1 Basic Training Program for all RTC's ... ofSOS, Aug 42. incl to ltr, CG SOS to CofOrd, 28 Aug42, sub: Basic Training Program, OO 353/1060,DRB AGO. See also draft history of ASF training ofreplacements and units, SPTR 314.7 (1 Jan 45), DRBAGO.


allotted to each of the four main subjects—close-order drill, physical training,marches and bivouacs, and inspections. Intwo respects the new program was a majorforward step: it marked the end of theperiod when close-order drill was allottedmore time than any other training topic,and it more than doubled the number ofhours for rifle marksmanship. Events weresoon to prove that the decision to limitbasic training to 163 hours was unsoundand that the virtual elimination of marchesand bivouacs from the program was aserious mistake.

Although Ordnance training centershad introduced rifle marksmanship train-ing in the fall of 194152 and had given itmore and more attention during the firstsix months of 1942, marksmanship train-ing remained one of the chief weaknessesof Ordnance training until late in 1942.There was no rifle range at the ORTC onwhich trainees could fire for record, andthe supply of both ammunition and riflesfor training purposes was strictly rationed.In its survey of replacement training in thespring of 1942 the ASF training divisionhad discovered that the same conditionsprevailed at many other replacementtraining centers, and in July it thereforehad directed all of them to intensify theirinstruction in rifle marksmanship. 53

In November 1942, when a second Ord-nance Training Center was opened atCamp Santa Anita in California, Brig.Gen. Bethel W. Simpson was transferredfrom Aberdeen, along with a large part ofthe ORTC staff, and placed in commandof the new center.54 Colonel Outland,commandant of the Ordnance School, wasthen assigned to head the ORTC, withCol. Paul C. Kelly, a retired infantryofficer back on active duty, as his directorof training. To these two officers fell the

responsibility for administering the newASF training program after a large pro-portion of the experienced ORTC officersand enlisted men had been transferred toSanta Anita.

"One of the first things I did after reach-ing Aberdeen," Colonel Kelly reported,"was to eliminate the parades held everySaturday morning. Parades have theirplace in military life, we all agree, but itshocked me to see so many thousands ofman-hours desperately needed for trainingbeing wasted on formal parades—andColonel Outland agreed with me." 55 Thecompany officers were required to conducttraining personally instead of delegatingresponsibility to NCO's. Company officerswere directed to turn over the administra-tive paper work to their first sergeants andthen go out to the training areas and per-sonally take over the task of training theirmen.

Under the leadership of Colonels Out-land and Kelly, close attention was givento what may be called "human relations"in dealing with the new recruits who ar-rived at Aberdeen. A friendly, under-standing attitude was found to be mosteffective in converting the civilian to a sol-dier capable of accepting the hardshipsand responsibilities of modern warfare.Trucks were kept on hand at the railwaystation to meet every train bringing mento the ORTC, and a mess hall stayed openall night to give new arrivals a hot meal."We even had their bunks made up for

52 Memo, G-3 for CofOrd, 9 Oct 41, sub: RifleMarksmanship, and 8 inds, OO 353.14/8, DRBAGO. Before the summer of 1941, Ordnance troopswere given training on the pistol rather than therifle.

53 Memo, CG SOS for CofOrd, 8 Jul 42, sub: SmallArms Record Firing, OO 353/4302. DRB AGO.

54 For further details on the Santa Anita trainingcenter, see OTC Hist Santa Anita. OHF.

55 Interv with Col Kelly, 18 Jul 50.


for them the first night," Colonel Kelly re-ported. "Not that we coddled anybody orneglected discipline—we just treated themlike human beings. And our system paiddividends in the form of better training." 56

The staff psychiatrist at the station hospi-tal supplemented this policy by giving newrecruits a series of informal talks on adjust-ment to Army life. When experiments inthe fall of 1942 showed that these "mentalhygiene talks" helped trainees to overcomehomesickness and resentment toward mili-tary regimentation, the talks were made aregular feature of ORTC training.57 Acleverly illustrated booklet called "TheStory of Mack and Mike" was given to alltrainees, showing them how Mike adjustednormally to the Army routine while Mackmade himself unhappy by resenting everyregulation and feeling sorry for himself.

More Combat Realism in Training

In spite of the efforts made during 1942to improve replacement training in allbranches of the Army, results were notentirely satisfactory. The earliest reportsreceived from overseas observers in late1942 and early 1943 praised the technicalskill of Ordnance and other service troopsbut complained that some were deficientin military training and physical condi-tioning. One observer, for example, spokeof the "backbreaking work" that had beenrequired to get supplies ashore in NorthAfrica and urged that service troops bephysically hardened before being sentoverseas. "They cannot be conditioned"he added, "by games, calisthenics, ormarching; they must actually manhandlecargo for long hours, during darkness, in-clement weather, and rough seas." 58 As aresult of such reports, the keynote of Ord-nance replacement training during 1943

became combat realism. Although Ord-nance troops were not officially classifiedas fighting soldiers, strenuous efforts weremade to toughen them, physically andmentally, to withstand the rigors of fieldoperations and to teach them to work andfight alongside combat troops. Less timewas spent in close-order drill and inspec-tions, and more attention was given to liv-ing and working under simulated combatconditions.

The most important single step takenduring 1943 to improve the training of re-placements was the addition of four weeksto the training period.59 In addition tolengthening the training time, the newprogram overcame one of the major diffi-culties of the past by allowing an addi-tional four weeks for processing men inand out of the training centers, travel, andfurloughs at completion of training.

While the basic training program wasextended and intensified during 1943, im-proved methods of teaching were alsoadopted. Instructors became more pro-ficient as they gained experience, and anever-increasing supply of training aidscontributed to the effectiveness of theirteaching. Because of the long hours of in-

56 Ibid.57 (1) Maj. Robert R. Cohen, "Mental Hygiene for

the Trainees," The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol.100, No. 1 (1943). (2) Maj. Robert R. Cohen, "Fac-tors in Adjustment to Army Life," War Medicine, V,2 (1944), 83-91.

58 Lessons Learned from Recent Amphibious Op-erations in North Africa, incl to memo, CG SOS forCofOrd, 12 Feb 43. OO 350.05/2444, DRB AGO.See also Training in the Ground Army, AGF HistStudy 11, p. 39, DRB AGO.

59 Memo, G-3 for CG ASF, 13 Jun 43, sub: LossReplacements, ASF 320.2 General (12 Jun 43), DRBAGO. The Civilian Advisory Council of the Ord-nance Military Training Division recommended inJune 1943 that the training period for Ordnanceunits and replacements be extended to six months.Ltr, Dr. Doherty to Military Training Div, 8 Jul 43,OO 353/4281-4282, DRB AGO.


STREET-FIGHTING TRAINING EXERCISE under simulated combat conditions atAberdeen ORTC.

struction and the vigorous outdoor activ-ity to which most of them were notaccustomed, the trainees tended to becomedrowsy in classes and drop off to sleepwhen the instruction was dull and unin-teresting. Every effort was therefore madeto present each subject in an interestingand forceful manner and to use the mosteffective teaching techniques. In teachingmilitary courtesy, for example, the lecturemethod was almost entirely discarded infavor of dramatic presentations. With theaid of several assistants, the instructor ar-ranged a series of brief skits, often sparkedwith humor, to demonstrate the variousprinciples of military courtesy and thusenliven an otherwise dull subject.

Instruction in booby traps, for whicheight hours was allotted in the summer of

1943, lent itself admirably to the use ofvarious tricks and surprises to hold the in-terest of the trainees. The subject was in-troduced to each class by a training film,followed by a lecture during which large-scale working models were used as trainingaids. The instructor supplemented hispresentation of the theory by actually wir-ing several booby traps in the classroom.When the men went outside for a ten-minute break they found that the groundshad been wired with countless booby trapscontaining small firecrackers. The openingof the latrine door, for example, set off aloud blast, and the unsuspecting studentswho picked up helmets or bottles of Coca-Cola lying on the ground were startled byother explosions. The rest periods were asinstructive as the lectures.


Perhaps the best known and most effec-tive training aid developed at the ORTCwas a loose-leaf notebook on basic trainingcalled "The Ordnance Soldier's Guide."Every trainee was given a copy of thisnotebook to carry to his classes. First issuedas a sheaf of mimeographed sheets clippedto a board, it was later revised andprinted. The "Guide" covered all the sub-jects included in the basic training pro-gram, from "ammunition" and "mapreading" to "World War IL" The brieftext was clear and easily understood, andwas supplemented by scores of illustra-tions, most of which were miniature repro-ductions of large charts used in theclassrooms. A distinctive feature of the"Guide" was its provision of blank spacesunder many topics for the trainees to writein the data supplied during classroom lec-tures and demonstrations. When properlyfilled out, the "Guide" became the sol-dier's own notebook to take with himwhen he left the ORTC and keep for fu-ture reference.

It was, of course, necessary to adoptteaching methods suitable to the mentalability and previous experience of thetrainees. There were wide variationsamong the men assigned to Ordnance but,generally speaking, they were well abovethe Army average in mental ability andmechanical aptitude. A comprehensivesurvey by the ORTC classification sectionduring 1943 showed that the averageArmy General Classification Test (AGCT)score for the 25,000 white recruits assignedto the training center during the year was107.8, and the average Mechanical Apti-ture Test (MAT) score was 106.5. The cor-responding scores for Negro trainees weremuch lower—79.8 for the AGCT and 77.9for the MAT—but during 1943 only 8 per-cent of the arrivals at the ORTC were

Negroes. Half the white trainees fell intoClasses I and II on the basis of AGCTscores, as compared to 36 percent for theArmy as a whole, and only 18 percentwere in Classes IV and V as compared to30 percent for the entire Army. More thanhalf the white trainees and nearly onethird of the Negro trainees were highschool or college graduates.60

The 1944-45 Period

The 1943 pattern of replacement train-ing carried over into 1944 with relativelyfew changes. The new program (MPT21-3) issued by ASF in May 1944 reducedthe number of hours of close-order drillfrom twenty to twelve and thus continuedthe trend started by the first ASF basictraining program in 1942. Close-orderdrill was now allotted less than 5 percentof the total basic training time in contrastto more than 20 percent in the 1940 and1941 Ordnance programs. Two basic sub-jects were given increased time—physicaltraining 20 hours instead of 14, and riflemarksmanship 75 hours instead of 68.Marksmanship thus continued to get farmore attention than any other subject inthe basic training curriculum and was nowsupplemented by eight hours of familiar-ization with the carbine and six hours ofbayonet drill. Because of the heavy tolltaken by malaria among American troopsoverseas, the new program specifically pro-vided that four hours be devoted tomalaria control measures.61

60 Annual Report of Basic Trainees Received atORTC, 1943, Classification and Assignment Sec,ORTC, OHF. For corresponding figures on otherbranches of the Army, see Palmer, Wiley, and Keast,op. cit., pp. 17-18.

61 In September 1943, WD Cir 223 stated that inone active theatre malaria had sent ten times as manysoldiers to hospitals as had battle injuries. See alsoWD Cir 48, 3 Feb 44.


There were occasional minor changesand shifts of emphasis in the program oftechnical instruction at the ORTC during1944 and 1945, but the broad outline re-mained the same as in 1943. The trend to-ward offering more and more practicalwork continued in the shop and classroomphases and during the field exercises. Allthe technical sections changed their train-ing programs at intervals as new equip-ment came into use by the Army and asreports from overseas recommended re-vised procedures. But the number of suchreports from overseas observers was small.No Ordnance officers visited any of theactive theatres to evaluate the training ofOrdnance troops until July 1944 whenColonel Slaughter, commandant of theOrdnance School, toured the ETO forseveral weeks.

During 1944, as during 1943, more menwere trained at the ORTC for automotivemaintenance work than for any othertechnical specialty. During 1943, 26 per-cent of all white trainees had been assignedfor training as tank or truck mechanics,and in 1944 the percentage rose for a timeto 35. Clerk-typists, supply clerks, andtruck drivers formed the next largestgroups. Each of the traditional Ordnancespecialties—artillery mechanic, smallarms mechanic, and instrument repair-man—accounted on the average for onlyabout 5 or 10 percent of the total trainingload.62

The number of men in training during1944 gradually declined from the peak butrose again in the summer of 1945 as theArmy-wide redeployment program gotwell under way. In August 1945, over5,000 men were received for training at theAberdeen ORTC—more than twice theaverage monthly arrival rate of 1943. Thenumber of arrivals quickly declined dur-

ing the months after the Japanese sur-render.63

Unit Training

There were three more or less distinctphases of Ordnance unit training duringWorld War II. The first opened in Febru-ary 1941 and was virtually completed bythe time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.The second began in March 1942 whenthe first "affiliated units" were organized.It overlapped the third phase which beganin May 1942 with the opening of a largeUTC at Camp Perry near Toledo, Ohio,and ended in the fall of 1943 when most ofthe UTC's were closed. Some unit trainingcontinued during 1944 and 1945, chieflyat Red River in Texas, and Flora in Mis-sissippi, but on a much reduced scale.

The 1941 Program

In the late summer of 1940, in responseto a War Department directive, the Ord-nance Department drew up three mobi-lization training programs for Ordnanceunits. By early October these programswere approved by the G-3 Division andpublished as MTP 9-2, for maintenancecompanies; MTP 9-3, for ammunition

62 Tabulation in ORTC Hist, Vol. VI, Pt. 2, p. 23,OHF. Very few Negro recruits were trained as me-chanics because they lacked the education and ex-perience for such training. Most were assigned asmunitions workers, carpenter-painters, truck drivers,or clerks.

63 The number of arrivals, in round figures, atORTC between 1941 and 1945 were: 15,000 in 1941,30,000 in 1942, 33,000 in 1943, 24,000 in 1944, and20,000 through 31 August 1945, a total of 122,000.

These figures are based on charts prepared by theMorning Reports Section, ORTC, included in Histof MPTC. Vol. XIV, and supplements, OHF. Thefigures for each year have been rounded off to thenearest thousand. See also Rpts DRB AGO.


companies; and MTP 9-4, for depot com-panies. All three programs had the samegeneral objectives: (1) "to train a basicordnance soldier," (2) "to train the in-dividual in the particular duties he will berequired to perform in a company," and(3) "to produce a thoroughly trained . . .company which will function as a team." 64

While these MTP's were being prepared,a schedule for training Ordnance units atthree Unit Training Centers was drawn upin accordance with the existing War De-partment troop basis. This schedule calledfor training 26 maintenance companies atthe Aberdeen UTC, 10 ammunition com-panies at the Savanna UTC, and 6 ammu-nition companies at the Raritan UTC.

The companies were scheduled to re-main in training for thirteen weeks, butWar Department mobilization plans pro-vided that units should be ready for fieldduty, in case of emergency, at any timeafter one month. Col. Herman U. Wagner,commanding officer of the AberdeenUTC, therefore decided to devote the firstfour weeks exclusively to military trainingin order to prepare the companies to op-erate under field conditions as soon as pos-sible. Attention was then turned to tech-nical subjects. Here a difficult problemarose because there were only a few mem-bers of the UTC staff who were technicalexperts, and equipment for technicaltraining was scarce. The only tank avail-able to the Aberdeen UTC, for example,was of World War I vintage. As none of thecompanies had enough competent instruc-tors or enough matériel to provide tech-nical training on all classes of equipment,Colonel Wagner centralized technical in-struction along the lines followed at theOrdnance School. All equipment waspooled and placed at the disposal of a staffof instructors who taught regular classes in

small arms, artillery, automotive vehicles,and fire control instruments.65

When the first thirteen companies de-parted on 25 June, taking with them mostof the experienced cadre, they were re-placed by men for thirteen other com-panies. In most respects, the conditionsunder which these units started their train-ing were even less satisfactory than thosefor the first companies. The enlisted mencame directly from reception centers, in-stead of from the ORTC, and arrivedwith no previous military training. Withthe exception of one officer and four en-listed men retained from each of the firstcompanies, the cadremen for the secondgroup came directly from the ORTCwhere they had been given only eightweeks of training. The Aberdeen UTCwas thus faced with the task of startingfrom scratch to give thirteen companiesbasic military training, technical training,and unit training all within a period ofthirteen weeks, and with only a skeletonstaff of experienced personnel.66

Under the direction of Col. W. I. Wil-son, who became chief of the AberdeenUTC in June, and later under Maj. A. R.Del Campo, the procedures followed intraining the first thirteen companies wereused to train the second group. Basic mili-tary training was given within the com-panies by company officers and enlistedcadre, and technical training was cen-tralized under the direction of competentinstructors. An increased allotment of toolsand matériel was available for these units,however, and mobile shops arrived duringthe summer. One of the highlights of the

64 MTP 9-2, 1 Oct 40, AG 300.8 MTP (8 Feb 40)(1), DRB AGO.

65 For a detailed training schedule, see Hist ofMPTS, XV, 12-15, OHF.

66 Interv with Lt Col A. R. Del Campo, Feb 50.


training period was the arrival of thirtynew tanks, just off the assembly line at thenew Chrysler Tank Arsenal, for emergencymodification before shipment to the Britishforces in North Africa. In September, atthe end of their thirteen weeks of training,the companies were sent to their fieldassignments, and, by order of the WarDepartment, the Aberdeen UTC was in-activated. It had completed the trainingof twenty-six maintenance companies andhad met the requirements for Ordnancemaintenance units under the existingtroop basis.67

In the meantime, the other two Ord-nance UTC's, at Raritan Arsenal andSavanna Ordnance Depot, were trainingammunition companies. The RaritanUTC, activated in January 1941, trainedsix ammunition companies during the yearand was then placed on stand-by status.68

The UTC at Savanna Ordnance Depotwas activated early in February by a cadrefrom Raritan Arsenal.69 Five ammunitioncompanies were trained during the nextthree months, according to MTP 9-3, andin June the training of five more ammuni-tion companies began. The large percent-age of illiterates among the men in thissecond group posed a serious problem forthe UTC staff since the men could notqualify as members of ammunition com-panies until they had learned to read thelabels on boxes. At the conclusion of thetraining period, there were no assignmentsfor these companies, and they remained atthe depot until the end of the year, work-ing part of the time as ammunition han-dlers during a period of labor shortage.The Savanna UTC was then inactivatedin January 1942.70

During the winter of 1941-42, while thequestion of the responsibility for unittraining was being threshed out at the

General Staff level, the training of unitsby the Ordnance Department came virtu-ally to a standstill. Three ammunitioncompanies were trained at Raritan earlyin 1942 but, generally speaking, serviceunits of all kinds were trained during thisperiod by the combat arms rather than bythe technical services. Ordnance unitsthat were organic to infantry divisions, forexample, were trained by the divisionsrather than by the Ordnance Depart-ment. This policy continued in effect afterthe reorganization of the War Depart-ment in March 1942, largely because theArmy Service Forces had practically nofacilities for training units, while the ArmyGround and Army Air Forces had exten-sive unit training programs in operation.The directive establishing the new Armyorganization provided that the using com-mand would train the units, but the ASF,in addition to the responsibility for train-ing all units required for its own installa-tions, was also directed to train certainunits for the AGF and AAF.71 This direc-tive authorized the ASF to proceed with alarge-scale program of unit training during1942 as soon as training centers could beestablished.

Recruitment and Training ofAffiliated Units, 1942

The resumption of unit training in theOrdnance Department began when theso-called affiliated units were formed inthe spring of 1942. At the end of February,

67 (1) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 18 Sep 41, sub: Addi-tional ORTC Capacity, AG 320.2 (9-13-41), DRBAGO. (2) WD GO 9, OTC, 30 Sep 41.

68 Hist of Raritan Arsenal, Vol. I, Ch. 5, OHF.69 Hist of Savanna Ord Depot, Vol. I, Pt. 2, pp.

109-28, OHF.70 Ibid.71 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42.


a short time before the reorganization ofthe War Department was announced,Ordnance was assigned the responsibilityfor training two base regiments that wereurgently required for overseas shipmentwithin three months. Since the time wasso short and Ordnance had no unit train-ing center at which to train base regi-ments, Col. C. Wingate Reed, chief of theMilitary Personnel and Training Branch,proposed that the Department enlist theaid of commercial organizations in recruit-ing for these units mechanics who werealready skilled in heavy maintenancework. He believed that these mechanics,with a minimum of military training andsome familiarization with Ordnance pro-cedures, would be able to function asmaintenance troops in a very short time.He based his belief on the proposition thatit is easier to train a mechanic to be a sol-dier than to train a soldier to be a me-chanic.72

General Wesson approved ColonelReed's proposal, and on 14 March 1942the War Department authorized Ord-nance to recruit two affiliated base regi-ments, a maintenance battalion, and amaintenance company, with a combinedstrength of 300 officers and 5,000 enlistedmen.73 Since no single commercial organ-ization was capable of providing such alarge number of skilled mechanics, theOrdnance Department turned for assist-ance to the NADA. With a total member-ship of over 40,000 automobile dealers,most of whom employed mechanics intheir repair shops, the NADA was admi-rably suited to serve as a connecting linkbetween the needs of the Ordnance De-partment and the skilled manpower incommercial garages across the country.74

Unlike other technical services, the Ord-nance Department had had no previous

experience in recruiting and training af-filiated units.7 5 No plans had been pre-pared during the prewar years for the or-ganization of such units, nor had commer-cial organizations been alerted to the pos-sibility that they would be called upon torecruit personnel. As a result, plans had tobe formulated and put into effect in greathaste.

The two regiments were destined forshipment to North Africa where the Ger-man forces were then pushing eastwardand threatening Alexandria. Strategicplans required that the regiments be readyfor embarkation by the end of June, thusleaving only three months to recruit,equip, and train them. Within the sixweeks from 15 March to the end of April,a whirlwind recruiting campaign was con-ducted and a total of 350 officers and8,500 men were recruited—a number sub-stantially greater than was required.

Early in May the two regiments re-ported for training at Camp Sutton on the

72 Interv, 25 Jan 50, with Capt Champlin F. Buck,Jr., executive officer to Colonel Reed during 1942.

"An affiliated military unit," General Wessonwrote, "is one whose activities so resemble the civil-ian occupation of its members that it is possible to se-lect personnel from civil life for similar assignmentsin the Army, enlist or commission this personnel inthe Reserve, and call the organization out as an entireunit." Ltr, Gen Wesson to Mr. Harry Sommers,President NADA, 17 Mar 42, OO 322.1/225, DRBAGO.

73 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 14 Mar 42, sub: Constitu-tion and Activation of Certain Ordnance Units,SPAG 320.2 (2-18-42), DRB AGO. These were the301st and 302d Ord Regts (Base), the 47th Ord Bn,and the 506th Ord Co (HM).

74 (1) Col. C. W. Reed, "Affiliated Units," NADABulletin, XV, 4 (1943) . (2) Col. C. W. Reed, "TheOrdnance Affiliated Units," Army Ordnance, XXVIII,148 (1945), 75-77. (3) Ltr, CofOrd to Sommers,NADA, 17 Mar 42, OO 322.1/225, DRB AGO.

75 Both the Signal Corps and the Medical Depart-ment had made plans during the 1930's for formingaffiliated units and had actually activated such unitsin 1941.


outskirts of the little town of Monroe,North Carolina. Camp Sutton was a newtemporary divisional camp at which vir-tually no facilities or equipment had beenprovided before the arrival of the troops.76

The men had to pitch tents for shelterand, as no sewage system had been in-stalled, were forced to spend much of theirvaluable time digging latrines. The train-ing program consisted of basic militarytraining and familiarization with Ord-nance matériel. Because of the lack of ade-quate facilities for either kind of instruc-tion, improvisation was the order of theday. The local high school, the StateGuard armory, and various small shopsand warehouses were converted to train-ing purposes, and the officers and men whoserved as instructors studied the hand-books at night to keep a jump ahead oftheir students. The arrival of a cadre ofveteran instructors from the OrdnanceSchool helped, but the lack of heavyorganizational equipment continued tohandicap the training.77

At the end of the scheduled trainingperiod the regiments were not sent over-seas as had been planned. Instead, themen were sent individually and in smallgroups to the Ordnance school at Aber-deen, and to other technical training in-stallations, for intensive training in variousspecialties such as small arms, artillery,fire control instruments, and tanks. Aftertwelve weeks of individual technical train-ing, the men were then re-formed intounits, most of which sailed for North Africaearly in 1943.

In recruiting and training three moreregiments (the 303d, 304th, and 305th)different methods were used in order toavoid some of the difficulties experiencedwith the first two affiliated regiments. Of-ficers were selected and trained in ad-

vance of the enlisted personnel instead ofbeing placed in command of troops beforethey had themselves received any militarytraining. Special recruiting teams were or-ganized to choose properly qualified menfor specific assignments. To remove allground for complaint that favoritism en-tered into the recruiting process, the offi-cers selected to command the units did notparticipate in the recruitment of enlistedpersonnel. As a rule, the enlisted menwere given ratings somewhat lower thantheir qualifications warranted, to allowroom for promotion later on.

When the resources of the NADA wereeventually exhausted, several businessconcerns volunteered to recruit additionalpersonnel for Ordnance affiliated units.Among these were the International Har-vester Company, American RoadbuildersAssociation, John Deere Company, Asso-ciated Equipment Distributors, J. I. CaseCompany, and the Allis-Chalmers Com-pany. By 15 December 1942, when re-cruiting for affiliated units was discon-tinued because of the executive order ban-ning further voluntary enlistments, a totalof approximately 1,100 officers and 30,000enlisted men had been provided for 5 baseregiments, 10 separate battalions, and 109separate companies.78 Ordnance unitswere thereafter organized and trained atregularly established Unit Training Cen-ters.

76 "I regret to advise you," General Campbellwrote, "that unquestionably some mistakes have beenmade by the Ordnance in raising these units; thecamp was not ready for occupation and training facil-ities could not be procured as fast as the men wereraised. Camp Sutton is a new tent camp. . . ." Ltr,CofOrd to Sen D. Worth Clark, 11 Jul 42, OO320.2/2129, DRB AGO.

77 Memo, Gen Hatcher for Gen James Kirk, 22 Sep42, sub: Training of Ordnance Base Regiments, OO322.1/414, DRB AGO.

78 For a complete list of all Ordnance affiliatedunits, see NADA Bulletin, Feb 43, p. 24.


Unit Training 1942-45

During the first six months of 1942, theOrdnance Department's responsibility fortraining—aside from the affiliated units—was not clearly fixed. In addition to theuncertainty as to whether the GroundForces or the Service Forces should trainservice-type units, there were also in early1942 frequent revisions of the War De-partment troop basis. Ordnance officersresponsible for training units were handi-capped in making definite plans becausethey did not know precisely how manyunits they would be called upon to trainduring the months ahead. They estimatedthat a total UTC capacity of from 20,000to 25,000 would probably be required be-fore the end of the year, but in the springof 1942 the small UTC at Raritan was theonly existing Ordnance facility for con-ducting unit training, and it was on astand-by basis. An immediate search wastherefore made for suitable sites at whichto establish several new and largerUTC's.79

The first site to be approved was CampPerry, adjacent to Erie Proving Groundin northern Ohio. It had a capacity of4,500 trainees and was converted into anOrdnance UTC on 18 May 1942 to trainunits for service with the Army GroundForces. The second new UTC was estab-lished at the Mississippi Ordnance Plant,near the town of Flora, Mississippi. Thislarge bag-loading plant was nearing com-pletion in the summer of 1942 under su-pervision of the Industrial Service, but wasnot at that time essential to the ammuni-tion production needs of the Department.The Military Training Division thereforearranged in August to convert the plantinto a unit training center with a capacityof 7,000. In late October a 3,000-man

UTC was established at the Red RiverOrdnance Depot, and when the OrdnanceTraining Center at Santa Anita wasopened in November, most of its capacitywas devoted to the training of units.80 Inaddition to these regularly establishedtraining centers, Ordnance depots such asAugusta; Mt. Rainier; Fort Crook; Nanse-mond at Portsmouth, Virginia; Seneca atRomulus, New York; Letterkenny atChambersburg, Pennsylvania; and Nor-moyle were used for on-the-job continua-tion training.

Before the responsibility for motor trans-port vehicles was transferred from TheQuartermaster General to the Chief ofOrdnance in August 1942, the training ofQuartermaster units for automotive main-tenance had been conducted at variousAGF installations such as Camp Butner,Camp Sutton, and Pine Camp. Ordnancetraining officers took immediate steps inSeptember to centralize control of thetraining of automotive units by establish-ing three automotive UTC's. The first, andlargest, of these centers was opened inOctober 1942 at the Pomona OrdnanceDepot, with a capacity of 3,000. In mid-February 1943 two more were established,one at Holabird Ordnance Depot (capac-ity 800) and the other at Atlanta OrdnanceDepot (capacity 1,800).81 With eight cen-ters in operation by February 1943, thecombined capacity of all Ordnance UTC'srose to more than 24,000. This program of

79 Interv with Col Wagner, Jan 50.80 The OTC at Santa Anita was established on the

race track, which had been closed because of the war-time ban on horse racing. It filled the need for anOrdnance training center on the west coast and spe-cialized during 1943 in the training of men beforetheir assignment to units. Hist of OTC, Camp SantaAnita, OHF.

81 Ltr, TAG to major commands, 5 Feb 43, sub:Establishment of Ord UTC's, AG 353 (2-3-43), DRBAGO.


expansion placed Ordnance far in the leadamong the technical services in establishingunit training centers.82

All of the Ordnance UTC's establishedin 1942 encountered difficulties during theearly months of their operation because ofthe limited facilities and lack of experi-enced personnel. Basic military trainingwas hampered by the lack of rifle ranges,gas chambers, bivouac areas, visual aidssuch as films and charts, and areas fordemonstrating hasty field fortifications,tank obstacles, and field sanitation.83 Tech-nical training of maintenance companieswas handicapped by the lack of shopequipment, sample items of Ordnancematériel, charts, and manuals. Because ofthe need for speed in activating and train-ing new units, none of the UTC's was fullyequipped or manned when it received itsfirst units for training, and, what was evenworse, many units were ordered to over-seas duty by higher headquarters beforethey had completed the prescribed thir-teen weeks of training. At Camp Perry, forexample, of twenty units shipped out dur-ing 1942, only three had completed thescheduled thirteen weeks of training. Nineof the units had only seven weeks of train-ing, and others had less than seven weeks.84

All of these were units that the OrdnanceDepartment was training for the ArmyGround Forces, and they were moved atthe request of AGF with full knowledgethat their training was incomplete.85

This divided control over the training ofOrdnance units was the source of a greatdeal of dissatisfaction during 1942. InOctober, for example, when the UnderSecretary of War wrote to General Camp-bell that he was concerned over the effi-ciency of Ordnance units in the field, theChief of Ordnance replied that he was"fully cognizant of the lack of trained per-

sonnel in Ordnance field uni ts . 8 6 GeneralCampbell went on to state that he did notconcur in the existing War Departmentpolicy of training Ordnance units of theArmy Ground Forces. This policy placedprimary responsibility for the activationand training of such units with the AGFrather than with Ordnance. "All Ord-nance units," General Campbell wrote,"should be activated at least three monthsprior to the activation of the combat unitsthey are to serve. Until released for assign-ment to combat units, the training of allOrdnance units should be under the com-plete control of the Chief of Ordnance."He followed up these recommendationsthree weeks later with a memorandum forGeneral Somervell requesting that respon-sibility for the initial three months of train-ing of all Ordnance units be vested in theChief of Ordnance, that no Ordnance unitsbe released from Ordnance control untilthe three-month training period was com-pleted, and that the necessary UTC capac-ity and equipment be made available tothe Chief of Ordnance.

This request was not favorably consid-ered, but during 1943 the ASF Training

82 See chart of UTC strength in Progress of Ord-nance Program, 30 Jan 43, p. 25, OHF. In June 1943,4,000 men completed training at Ordnance UTC's.

83 For a typical example, see report by the com-manding officer of Red River Ordnance Depotquoted in Red River UTC Hist, II, 4, OHF.

84 Ltr, CG 5th SC to CG SOS, 8 Feb 43, sub: Rec-

ommendations Concerning Ordnance UTC, CampPerry, OO 354.1/70, DRB AGO.

85 2d Ind, CofOrd, 19 Feb 43, to ltr cited n. 84, OO354.1/70 DRB AGO. "Army Ground Forces werecompletely familiar with the situation," the Chief ofOrdnance reported, "and still were desirous of mov-ing these companies from Camp Perry."

86 (1) Memo, USW for CofOrd, 2 Oct 42, OO322.1/552. (2) Memo, CofOrd for USW, 2 Oct 42,USW Misc and Subject files—Ordnance. (3) Ltr,CofOrd to CG SOS, 28 Oct 42, sub: Activation ofOrdnance Field Units, OO 322.1/552. All in DRBAGO.


Division took several important steps tostrengthen the unit training programs ofall the technical services. Requirementswere prescribed in greater detail, inspec-tions were more rigid and more frequent,and at the end of the summer the timeallotted for unit training was lengthenedfrom thirteen to seventeen weeks.87 In Juneall UTC's were required to give militarytraining continued emphasis during thetechnical training phase, to provide morethorough training in first aid, chain ofcommand, and use of weapons for anti-aircraft defense. As reports came in fromoverseas stressing the importance of nightoperations, the UTC's were directed togive more attention to instructing units tocarry out all their operations under black-out conditions. In August ASF headquar-ters established minimum requirements forthe training of all nonmedical ASF unitsand directed that no unit be reported asready to perform its mission until theminimum requirements had been met.88

The quality of Ordnance unit trainingsteadily improved during 1943 and 1944as rifle ranges, obstacle courses, infiltrationcourses, and other facilities for trainingwere constructed at the training centers,and as equipment for shop and field main-tenance work became more plentiful.89

Progress was most clearly reflected in thereports of The Inspector General on Ord-nance units before their movement over-seas. During 1944, fifty-four Ordnanceunits were inspected and only two werefound to be below the minimum standard.No other technical service with a compar-able number of units inspected had such ahigh rate of acceptance.90

After V-E Day there was a brief periodof intense activity in the redeploymenttraining of units. In accordance with WarDepartment policy, entire units were trans-

ferred from the European theatre to train-ing centers in the United States where theywere given special training before movingon to the Pacific. Every effort was made atthe Ordnance training centers—chiefly atAberdeen, Red River, and Atlanta—toadjust the training to the needs of rede-ployed units, to avoid unnecessary repeti-tion of earlier instructions, and to directthe whole program toward the conditionslikely to be encountered in the Pacific area.Most of the technical training consisted ofpractical on-the-job instruction to bringthe men up to date on new procedures.Military training focused special attentionon Japanese tactics, identification of Jap-anese uniforms and weapons, throwing livehand grenades, bayonet practice, camou-flage, and malaria control measures.

Because of the nature of unit training itis impossible to compile an accurate andmeaningful statistical summary of unitstrained during World War II. Units variedin size from the bomb disposal squad tothe base regiment, and the length of theirtraining period varied from one to sixmonths. Many units were ordered to activefield duty before they completed morethan half the scheduled program, whileothers engaged in advanced training forseveral weeks after completing the basictraining requirements. The affiliated units,composed of skilled mechanics, needed

87 MTP 21-2, 1 Aug 43. This training programapplied to RTC's as well as to the UTC's.

88 ASF Memo S 350-43-43, 28 Aug 43, OO353/4011½, DRB AGO.

89 Memo, Maj L. W. Reeves for Dir of Mil TngASF, 13 Aug 43, sub: Inspection of the OUTC, Tex-arkana . . . , OO 353/4081, DRB AGO. "The Ord-nance Unit Training Center at Texarkana is con-sidered superior in the conduct of basic field train-ing," the memo stated. "This training is character-ized by thoroughness and reality."

90 ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, 31 Jul 45, Sec. 9,Military Training, p. 11, DRB AGO.


only basic military training and familiari-zation with Ordnance matériel. Mostother Ordnance units were made up ofselectees assigned to Ordnance by recep-tion centers, and required the full cycle ofbasic military, technical, and unit training.But, without taking into consideration allof these variations in the length and scopeof the training programs, estimates showthat approximately 90,000 men receivedsome degree of training at OrdnanceUTC's during the 1941-45 period.91

Bomb Disposal Training

Training personnel to dispose of unex-ploded bombs (UXB's)—whether of thedefective-fuze or delayed-action variety—was one of the many new problems theOrdnance Department was called upon toface during World War IL During earlierwars, unexploded bombs or shells hadusually been disposed of simply by blowingthem up wherever they were found. Dur-ing World War II, when large-scale bomb-ing raids were launched against centers ofpopulation and industry as well as againstmilitary installations, use of the crudedemolition methods of the past was nolonger feasible. A large high-explosivebomb dropped in the middle of an urbanbusiness district and buried several feetunder the pavement among vital water,gas, and electric lines could not be blownup without incurring tremendous propertydamage, nor could it be left for hours—oreven for days or weeks—to explode at itsown appointed time. Means had to bedevised for gaining access to the bomb,removing the fuze, stopping the time mech-anism, or otherwise rendering the bombharmless and then digging it out and haul-ing it away for destruction or salvage.After the destructive bombing raids

launched by the Germans in 1940, theneed for trained bomb disposal squadsbecame apparent to authorities planningthe defense of the United States. No large-scale attacks on American cities were ex-pected, but it was felt that preparationsshould be made to minimize the destruc-tiveness of any attacks that might occur.92

Progress in getting the bomb disposaltraining program under way during 1941was hindered by delay on the part ofhigher authority in deciding who shouldbe responsible for such training. The earli-est plans had envisaged an Office of Civil-ian Defense that would organize and directcivilians in every community to carry outfire-fighting and bomb-disposal operationsduring bombing raids. But it was not untilfive days after the attack on Pearl Harborthat the War Department specificallyassigned to the Office of Civilian Defense(OCD) the task of disposing of UXB's inthe zone of interior, and to the OrdnanceDepartment the same responsibility withinall military reservations, overseas depart-ments, and theatres of operations.93 TheOrdnance Department was also assignedresponsibility for training bomb disposalpersonnel, both military and civilian, andwas authorized to send an instructor cadreto the bomb disposal school in England tostudy British methods.

In early December the Chief of Ord-nance concurred in this decision to divideresponsibility for bomb disposal betweenthe OCD and the Ordnance Department,but further study of the matter convinced

91 Table, prepared by MPTS, in PSP 60, OrdnanceMilitary Training, 1939-44, p. 160, OHF.

92 For a general view of the bomb disposal prob-lem, see Lt. Col. Thomas J. Kane, "UnexplodedBombs," Army Ordnance, XXIII, 134 (1942), 277-82.

93 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd and others, 12 Dec 41, sub:Disposal of Unexploded Bombs, AG 471.6 (9-9-41)MC-C-M, DRB AGO.


him that the decision had been unsound."Civilian volunteers cannot be properlytrained or disciplined for this hazardouswork," he concluded. "Every detail ofdelayed-action bomb disposal is hazardousin the extreme and requires the utmost inskill, caution, and discipline. Only profes-sionals can develop the skill and experi-ence necessary for such work."94 Evenmore important in the eyes of the Ord-nance experts who had studied the matterwas the need for the strictest secrecy inbomb disposal work so that the enemywould not learn when effective measuresfor disarming his bombs had been devel-oped. They pointed out that, if the enemylearned what methods were used by bombdisposal squads, he would immediatelydevise new bombs that would explodewhen these methods were used. This argu-ment clinched the matter. The Decemberdirective was rescinded and the OrdnanceDepartment was given sole responsibilityfor disposing of all explosive bombs. TheOCD was limited to disposing of incendi-aries and carrying on "bomb reconnais-sance," that is, locating, identifying, andreporting bombs.95

Immediately after issuance of the De-cember directive, the Ordnance Depart-ment formed a tentative bomb disposalorganization at Aberdeen Proving Groundto prepare for the opening of the BombDisposal School. Maj. Thomas J. Kanewas chosen as commandant of the schooland in January 1942 was sent to England,accompanied by eight officers and enlistedmen, for instruction in bomb disposalmethods. At the same time a small groupof British bomb disposal experts—all sea-soned veterans of the Battle of Britain—came to the United States with a completeset of British bomb disposal equipment.96

The most urgent problem facing the

Bomb Disposal School during the springof 1942 was the need for effective instruc-tional materials. As the school was adja-cent to the Proving Ground, it waspossible to obtain samples of Americanfuzes, bombs, and other matériel for studyand demonstration, and a bomb disposalmuseum was started. A large area was setaside as a bomb disposal range where thestudents could work on actual bombsdropped from airplanes, but there were nofilms, film strips, charts, and manuals. Tomeet this need, the official British trainingfilm "UXB" was duplicated by the SignalCorps during March, and several filmstrips, charts, and pamphlets on bombreconnaissance were prepared by theschool staff. By December 1942, well sup-plied with training aids and qualifiedinstructors, the school was offering eightcourses. Three of these were very brief ori-entation courses including only eight orten hours of instruction, and one was a cor-respondence course. The other four, rang-ing from 45 hours to 180 hours of instruc-tion, formed the backbone of the schoolcurriculum. In addition, instructors fromthe school gave a sixteen-hour bomb recon-naissance course to top OCD personnel inall states east of the Mississippi and in thestates bordering on the Gulf of Mexico andthe Pacific Ocean.97

The value of this training was twofold.94 Disposal of Unexploded and Delayed Action

Bombs, incl to ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 7 Jan 41 , samesub, AG 471.6 (1-7-42) MSC, DRB AGO.93 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd and others, 5 Feb 42, sub:

Disposal of . . . Bombs, AG 471.6 (1-7-42) MSC-C-M, DRB AGO.

96 Hist of Bomb Disposal School, p. 3, OHF. TheAmerican mission included Col. Kane, Maj. H. M.Walker. 1st Lt. F. A. Parsons, 1st Lt. W. W. Prichard,2d Lt. W. R. Nass, M/Sgt. A. E. Keller, T/Sgt. R. E.Metress, T/Sgt. J. E. Pilcher, and S/Sgt. R. S. Fel-ton. The British group was headed by Col. GeoffreyYates of the Royal Engineers.

97 (1) The Courses of Instruction Composed by the


On the domestic side, the Bomb DisposalSchool provided a nucleus of trained per-sonnel for all the Service Commands andcivilian defense regions and thus strength-ened the nation's civilian defense organi-zation. The significance of this contribu-tion is sometimes overlooked because noenemy bomber formations appeared overAmerican cities during the war to bringthe bomb disposal forces into action. Inoverseas theatres the value of bomb dis-posal training was clearly demonstrated.In those areas, Ordnance-trained bombdisposal units found plenty of work to do,often working around-the-clock for daysat a time. They performed heroic service inneutralizing and removing UXB's, artil-lery shells, and other explosives from terri-tory occupied by Allied troops. Althoughtheir training had not covered all types ofexplosive items, bomb disposal personneloverseas found that the red bomb on theirsleeves made them the target for questionson all kinds of objects suspected of beingexplosive. The disposal of explosive bombsand shells was not glamorous work, andwas not rewarded with additional com-pensation for all its hazardous nature, butit proved immensely valuable to the fight-ing troops.

The accomplishment of the OrdnanceDepartment in training more than 300,000officers and enlisted men during WorldWar II can be seen in proper perspectiveonly when viewed against the backgroundof the prewar years. Before 1940 trainingwas not an important phase of Ordnanceoperations and accounted for only a small

fraction of the annual Ordnance budget.All efforts during the 1930's to prepare forthe future were hindered by lack of funds,lack of interest in training activities, anduncertainty as to Congressional action inauthorizing a larger Army.

The Selective Service Act of 1940 andthe assignment to Ordnance of large num-bers of selectees early in 1941 gave theDepartment an opportunity to strengthenits training organization and try out itsplans. Much was accomplished during theyear, but Ordnance officers felt that muchmore could have been accomplished if theWar Department had approved their plansfor expansion. Because of the uncertaintyas to the continuance of selective servicebeyond one year, no full-scale expansionof permanent Army training facilities wasauthorized. As a result, the OrdnanceDepartment, along with all other branchesof the Army, was forced to train the re-cruits it received during 1941 under con-ditions far from ideal.

The effect of this failure to expand train-ing facilities more rapidly during 1940 and1941 carried over into the first year of thewar. The attack on Pearl Harbor injecteda new spirit of realism into all Army train-ing, but buildings, equipment, and instruc-tors could not be provided overnight.Moreover, the increased need to train menquickly and in large numbers made itimpossible to train them thoroughly.Throughout 1942, Ordnance basic mili-tary training was too brief to be very effec-tive and continued to place too muchemphasis on traditional garrison subjectssuch as close-order drill and formal inspec-tions, neglecting rifle marksmanship, fieldexercises, map reading, and night opera-tions. Lack of essential equipment andfacilities such as rifles, ammunition, rifleranges, and bivouac areas hindered the

Ordnance Department for the Training of Militaryand Civilian Personnel on Matters Pertaining toBomb Disposal, Exhibit 1, Hist of Bomb DisposalSchool, OHF. (2) Ltr, Maj A. E. Keller, Chief ofBomb Disposal Div, OD Bd, to author, 25 Nov 49,OHF.


basic training program all during 1941and 1942. Technical training, althoughsuperior to military training, was alsogreatly handicapped during the 1941-42period, and to a lesser extent during thelatter half of the war, by the lack of shopbuildings and equipment.

No review of Ordnance training duringWorld War II would be complete withoutreference to its almost infinite variety. TheOrdnance School trained enlisted techni-cians in scores of specialized fields, rangingfrom cooking and baking to the majoroverhaul of tanks and heavy guns. It alsotrained thousands of officer specialists andgraduated more than 13,000 officer candi-dates. Instruction at the Aberdeen Re-placement Training Center and the variousUTC's covered a wide range of subjects,from elementary military courtesy andclose-order drill to the recovery and repairof heavy field equipment at night undersimulated combat conditions. The BombDisposal School at Aberdeen providedboth individual and unit training in theidentification and disposal of unexplodedbombs. Never before in its history had theOrdnance Department been called upon totrain such large numbers of men in somany different specialized fields.

Perhaps the most noteworthy develop-ment in Ordnance training during WorldWar II was the streamlining of all schoolcourses and training programs. The broad,general training of the prewar years wasdiscarded in favor of highly specializedand intensive courses of instruction. In allbranches of technical instruction, courseswere stripped of nonessentials and only the"must-know" information was taught. Atthe same time, more effective teachingmethods were adopted, and great ingenu-ity was displayed in developing a widevariety of training aids. The success withwhich this streamlining process was ap-plied to Ordnance training was attested toby a well-known educator, Dr. Robert E.Doherty, president of the Carnegie Insti-tute of Technology, when he said: "Thecharacteristic which distinguishes Ord-nance training from all other training withwhich I am familiar is its intensive nature. . . . In this program I think GeneralKutz and his associates not only have donea magnificent job for the Army but alsohave made a significant contribution toeducation in general."98

98 Dr. Robert E. Doherty, "Combat Knowledge,"Army Ordnance, XXVI, 144 (1944), 538.

CHAPTER VI

Civilian Personnel and TrainingThe Ordnance Department during

World War II was one of the country'slargest employers of civilian workers. Noother Army technical service had so largea work force, and the payrolls of few pri-vate industries approached in size that ofOrdnance. The overseas operations of theDepartment were carried on by militarypersonnel, but practically all Ordnanceinstallations in the United States—the ar-senals, depots, proving grounds, and dis-trict offices—were manned by civilians,with only a few officers and enlisted menfilling administrative and specialist posi-tions. The only important exceptions tothis rule were the military training centers,which were of necessity staffed almost ex-clusively by officers and enlisted men. Alltold, the Ordnance Department mobilizedmore than a quarter of a million workersduring World War II, roughly one fourthof all the civilians who worked for the WarDepartment.1 It trained them in hundredsof different specialties, assigned them tonew and unfamiliar tasks, and madesteady progress toward developing theirskills and promoting efficient teamwork.

In so doing, Ordnance was following itstraditional practice. To a large extent anindustrial organization, Ordnance hadfrom the earliest days of its history leanedheavily on skilled civilian workmen tostaff its manufacturing arsenals and, par-ticularly after the first World War, hadcome to depend increasingly on civilian

employees to operate its storage depots,carry on research projects, and fill thou-sands of clerical and administrative posi-tions in Washington and the field offices.Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, in fact,civilians on the Ordnance payroll far out-numbered officers and enlisted men, theirnumber rising from a low point of 4,250 in1924 to 27,000 in June 1940, while thetotal military strength of the Departmentremained relatively stable at about 3,000.2

In addition to bringing a manyfold in-crease in the number of Ordnance civilianworkers, World War II raised new prob-lems for the Ordnance personnel division.3

Habits of thought acquired during theyears between the wars when economyand careful deliberation were the order ofthe day had to be discarded, and proce-dures for hiring, training, transferring,and promoting employees had to bestreamlined. Despite having entered the

1 This figure includes only men and women em-ployed directly by Ordnance; it excludes employeesof commercial companies that operated government-owned, contractor-operated plants. The personnelproblems encountered at GOCO plants, in so far asthey had a bearing on Ordnance history, are consid-ered in Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supplyof Munitions, MS, OHF.

2 (1) See Table 3, Ch. II. (2) Hist of Civ Pers Div(hereafter cited as CPD Hist), Vol. I, Ch. A, OHF.(3) Monthly Turnover Rpts, 1920-40, Ord Civ PersDiv files.

3 The word "division" is used throughout this chap-ter for the sake of convenience, although the civilianpersonnel division became a staff branch in June 1942.


war without a well-defined personnelpolicy and with only a small staff for ad-ministering regulations, Ordnance notonly developed an effective personnel or-ganization but also contributed in largemeasure to the formulation of a soundcivilian personnel policy for the entire WarDepartment.

Growth of the Working Force, 1938-45

The World War II expansion of thecivilian working force began in the sum-mer of 1938. From 12,480 in July 1938,the number of Ordnance employeesmounted to over 21,000 in January 1940—an increase of more than 60 percent ineighteen months.4 Virtually all of this in-crease was in the field rather than in theso-called departmental service in Wash-ington, and of all field employees, nearly90 percent worked in the manufacturingarsenals. Most of the remaining 10 percentwere employed in the storage depots, in-cluding 500 civilian workers in depots inPanama, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

The rise in the number of civilian work-ers between 1938 and 1940 was only thebeginning of the Department's World WarII expansion. With over three billion dol-lars allotted to Ordnance for the fiscalyear 1941, the number of civilians on thepayroll jumped from 21,051 in January1940 to 96,263 in December 1941, a 357percent increase in twenty-four months.After Pearl Harbor the expansion pro-ceeded at an even faster pace and con-tinued throughout 1942. By February1943 Ordnance employment had reachedits World War II peak of 262,772. A singlearsenal, Frankford, now employed almostas many civilians as had the entire Depart-ment three years earlier.5 Furthermore, in

January 1942 nearly all War Departmentemployees were put on a forty-eight hourschedule, thus increasing substantially thenumber of man-hours worked each week.

The civilian work force in February1943 was not only larger than before thewar, its distribution was much different.Whereas in January 1940 nine tenths of allOrdnance civilians worked in the manu-facturing arsenals, these installations inFebruary 1943 accounted for only aboutone third of the total work force, or 95,000.The district offices, which had employedonly 239 workers in January 1940, had37,500 employees on their rolls. Thus thearsenals and district offices together ac-counted for roughly half the total civilianwork force in February 1943. The otherhalf worked in the depots and provinggrounds, and in the motor bases recentlytransferred from the Quartermaster Corps.

As the nationwide manpower shortagereached an acute stage early in 1943, theOrdnance Department intensified its man-power conservation efforts, and the num-ber of civilian employees dropped steadilythroughout the year. Not all of the reduc-tions stemmed from the manpower con-servation program; some came from cut-backs in certain phases of the productionschedule and others from increased effi-ciency as individual workers gainedexperience on the job. The net result wasa reduction in the number of Ordnancecivilian employees from 262,772 in Febru-ary 1943 to 176,384 in December 1943, adrop of 34 percent in less than a year.During the next sixteen months Ordnancecivilian employment remained relatively

4 CPD Hist, I, 9, OHF.5 Ibid. Figures for field installations are in Monthly

Turnover Rpts, 1920-46, Ord Civ Pers Div files. TheWorld War I peak of 88,000 was reached in Novem-ber 1918.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 153

CEREMONIAL DANCE at the dedication of the Indian village, Wingate, New Mexico,Ordnance Depot.

stable at the 176,000 level, except for atemporary increase early in 1945. It de-clined slowly after V-E Day and thendropped sharply upon the surrender ofJapan in August. By the end of 1945 thenumber of civilians on the Ordnance pay-roll was 86,667, roughly the same as inNovember 1941.

Recruiting Ordnance Workers

During the early stages of the emer-gency, recruitment was carried on pri-marily by the Civil Service Commission,which was, in theory, prepared to supplyproperly qualified individuals to fill anygovernment job under its jurisdiction. Butas the labor market tightened during 1940

and 1941, the commission was unable tosupply the thousands of workers neededby war agencies. Greater authority to hirenew workers was granted to local com-manders, and after Pearl Harbor more ag-gressive recruiting methods were adopted,including newspaper and radio publicityand the opening of recruiting offices incenters of labor supply. In the Bostonarea, for example, a sound truck toured thecity during a War Manpower Commissionrecruiting drive, and a recruiting officewas set up on the Boston Common. Ord-nance field installations listed their per-sonnel needs with the district offices of theU.S. Employment Service, and recruitingteams composed of Ordnance and CivilService Commission representatives trav-eled from town to town enlisting typists


and stenographers. In all of their efforts,however, Ordnance installations com-plained that they were handicapped byCivil Service laws and regulations in com-peting with private industry for the serv-ices of available workers. Private industrycould offer inducements such as promisesof quick promotions and productionbonuses that could not be matched by anygovernment agency.6

For the Ordnance Department, recruit-ment was most difficult at isolated ammu-nition depots such as Black Hills in SouthDakota, Navajo in Arizona, and Wingatein New Mexico. With no large communi-ties nearby, these depots had virtually nolocal labor supplies to draw upon, norexisting housing and related accommoda-tions for workers brought in from otherareas. All of these depots drew a large pro-portion of their workers from Indian reser-vations. Recruiting officers, assisted byrepresentatives of the Civil Service Com-mission, Indian agents, and tribal chiefs,sent trucks to the reservations, gave exam-inations on the spot, and immediatelytransported the recruits to the depots. In-dian villages built at the depots werededicated with appropriate ceremonies;weaving racks and looms were provided forIndian women; trading posts and schoolswere established; and arrangements weremade so that the Indians would not haveto forfeit their land because they could notfarm it.7

Other installations resorted to differentexpedients. At Watervliet Arsenal, for ex-ample, groups of so-called commandoswere formed by local business and profes-sional men who volunteered to accept em-ployment in the evening or on week endsto help ease the labor shortage. Elsewhere,high school students and teachers weregiven short-term jobs during the summer

months. More than 500 natives of Jamaicaand Barbados were employed at Pica-tinny. Several thousand German andItalian prisoners of war were employed atOrdnance depots and at the Erie ProvingGround, but, by the terms of the GenevaConvention, they could be used only onwork not directly connected with the war,such as maintaining roads, loading andunloading nonmilitary supplies, operatingheating plants, and making boxes andcrates.8 No such restrictions applied to theItalian Service Units, which were com-posed of volunteers who supported the re-constructed Italian Government. Theseunits were used on a wide variety of proj-jects and proved their worth.9

By far the most important departurefrom traditional Ordnance practice wasthe recruiting of large numbers of womenfor work in shops and depots. Even beforethe outbreak of war the proportion ofwomen employees in the Ordnance De-partment had risen from 11.5 percent inthe summer of 1940 to 17 percent in July1941. By the summer of 1942 it had

jumped to 30 percent. This rapid increasetook place before the manpower shortagereached serious proportions and wasaccomplished without much formal direc-tion from the Office, Chief of Ordnance.Late in the summer of 1942 the Ordnancecivilian personnel division launched anaggressive campaign to induce field instal-lations to employ even more women work-ers, and as a result, the proportion of

6 (1) The Story of the Arsenals, p. 97. (2) The Placeof the Ordnance Laboratories in Government Re-search and Development. Both in OHF.

7 Ordnance Administration, Pt. 3, p. 546, MS hist,OHF.

8 Ltr, TAG to CG's Service Commands, 14 Aug 43,sub: Labor of POW's, AG 383.6 (12-8-43), DRBAGO.

9 Ord Admin, Pt. 3, p. 547, OHF.


WOMEN INSPECTORS working at Picatinny Arsenal.

women employed rose to a peak of 47.6percent by the spring of 1945.10

There were, of course, many difficultiesencountered in recruiting women warworkers. Most of the women who appliedfor work in Army installations lacked pre-vious experience in industrial employmentand had, therefore, to be given rather ex-tensive training before being put to work.With some of the more elaborate jobprocesses performed by skilled workmenat the arsenals, "job dilution" was essen-tial before women could be taken on andassigned to the simpler steps in the process,leaving the more difficult tasks for themen. The average woman's lack of phys-ical strength barred her from many jobs,particularly in warehouses where workerswere frequently required to lift heavypackages. State laws restricting the weight

women workers could lift also had to beconsidered, as did laws forbidding the em-ployment of women on night shifts. But, inthe opinion of most Ordnance administra-tors, these problems were insignificant incomparison with the contribution to thewar production program made by womenworkers.11

10 (1) Ord Civ Pers Bull 93, 15 Aug 42, sub: LaborSupply. (2) Memo, SW for CofOrd and others, 14Aug 42, quoted in Ord Procurement Instructions9,051.1 (3) Ord Civ Pers Bull 115, 9 Oct 42, sub:Employment of Women. All in DRB AGO. (4) Tabu-lation in PSP 59, taken from monthly reports inProgress of Ordnance Program, Graphic Analysis.OHF. In Washington and in the district offices,women made up as much as 70 percent of the total.

11 For an account of the difficulties encountered inemploying women in the Field Service, see memo, Mr.William M. Hines, Sr., for Gen Hatcher, 14 Jul 43,sub: Reduction of FS Pers, Exhibit 1 in Hist of FSExec Div, Vol. II, Pt. 2, OHF.


The Struggle for Delegated Authority

In administering its civilian personnelat the start of the war emergency, the Ord-nance Department had to comply with therules and regulations issued by two agen-cies—the Civil Service Commission andthe War Department Civilian PersonnelDivision. With the former, Ordnance hadlittle complaint and usually managed toadjust promptly the differences of opinionthat arose. With the latter there wasmounting friction during 1940 and 1941,largely due to the decision of the War De-partment division to maintain its tightcontrol over personnel activities and notto delegate to the Chief of Ordnance thediscretionary authority he desired.12

Concentration of authority in the WarDepartment division had gradually de-veloped during the 1920's and 1930'swhen the number of civilians on the Armypayroll had been small enough to permitclose supervision of all hiring and firing bya central office in Washington. During thefall and winter of 1940 General Wessonbecame convinced that the number ofcivilian employees in the War Departmentwas so large that it was administrativefolly to expect that a single office in Wash-ington could, or should, review every per-sonnel action taken by each branch. Heurged the War Department division toconfine itself to top-level staff planningand policy formulation, and to delegate tosubordinate commands full responsibilityfor putting the plans and policies intoeffect. The director of the division, Mr. A.Heath Onthank, did not favor such sweep-ing delegation of responsibility. Herecognized the need for gradually assign-ing authority to lower administrativelevels and eliminating some of the conges-tion in Washington, but felt that hasty

delegation of power to untrained person-nel in the technical services would lead toendless difficulties. In December 1940, asan intermediate step toward decentraliza-tion, he established field personnel officesin each of the corps areas and authorizedthem to deal directly with local Army in-stallations.13

In January 1941 General Wesson wrotea strongly worded memorandum to theSecretary of War requesting that Ord-nance be given authority to deal directlywith the Civil Service Commission and tohire and fire civilians without referringeach case to the War Department for priorapproval. He charged that the delays anddifficulties encountered under existingprocedures had become "a serious imped-iment to the prosecution of the NationalDefense Program," and would becomeeven more serious in the future as Ord-nance operations assumed larger propor-tions.14 The Secretary of War promptlyrejected this request on the ground thatOrdnance had not made use of the WarDepartment field offices and had not itselffully decentralized personnel functions toits own field establishments.15 In his replyto this decision, General Wesson defendedthe Ordnance record on decentralizationand called attention to the fact that thearsenals, plants, and depots had not used

12 This section is based in large measure on: (1)CPD Hist, Vol. I, Ch. F, and appended documents,OHF; (2) intervs, Aug 50. with George W. DeCamp,wartime assistant chief of Ord Civ Pers Div; and (3)intervs, Aug 50, with A. Heath Onthank, Dir WD CivPers Div. 1938-42.

13(1) Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Arms and Services. . . . 10 Dec 40, sub: Functions of Civ Pers FieldOffices, OSW, AG 230.14 (12-10-40) DRB AGO.(2) Interv with A. Heath Onthank, 28 Aug 50.

14 Memo, CofOrd for SW, 9 Jan 41. OO 230/929,DRB AGO See also Key Pers Rpt, Col Reiff H.Hannum, 6 Sep 45, OHF.

15 Memo, Admin ASW for CofOrd, 11 Jan 41, sub:Civ Pers Procedures, OO 230/1050, DRB AGO.


the War Department field offices becausethey were all exempt from corps area con-trol. He bluntly declared that he had nointention of granting to these Ordnanceinstallations, many of which had beenestablished only recently and weremanned by inexperienced personnel, fullauthority to deal with the War Depart-ment field offices, and thus bypass allcontrol by the Ordnance office in Wash-ington.16

On the day that he wrote this reply,General Wesson presented the Ordnancecase to the Crowell Committee, which hadbeen appointed to study the problem.17

He referred to the policy followed duringWorld War I of delegating virtually com-plete authority in civilian personnel mat-ters to the Ordnance Department, and hecontrasted that policy with the cumber-some procedures under which Ordnancewas still operating in January 1941. Butwhen the Crowell Committee made itsreport on 7 February it recommended thepolicy the War Department Civilian Per-sonnel Division had urged all along—thatOrdnance and other War Departmentagencies delegate to field establishmentsfull authority to handle personnel trans-actions through the civilian personnel fieldoffices in the corps areas.18

All of the War Department agenciesconcerned concurred in the Crowell Com-mittee recommendations except the Ord-nance Department. Several conferenceswere held during the following weeks todiscuss the problem, but little progress wasmade. Ordnance neither delegated au-thority to its field establishments, nor usedthe War Department field offices, and theWar Department personnel division con-tinued to hold close control over the ap-pointment, classification, and promotionof Ordnance civilians. The only definite

step taken was to assign to Ordnance, asthe Crowell Committee had recom-mended, a "service unit" composed ofsixteen personnel experts from the WarDepartment to expedite approval of de-partmental personnel actions.

On 16 December, less than two weeksafter Pearl Harbor, General Wesson re-peated the request he had made in Janu-ary 1941. Before an answer was received,War Department Orders "N" came out,giving all the technical services authorityto deal directly with the Civil ServiceCommission on departmental appoint-ments and ordering them to delegate totheir field establishments within six weeksauthority to utilize the War Departmentcivilian personnel field offices.19 Mr.Onthank informed General Wesson thatthese orders constituted an answer to hismemorandum of 16 December and as-sured him that they provided "all neces-sary latitude in the procurement andmanagement of civilian personnel." Wes-son was unable to share Onthank's opti-mistic view of the effect of Orders "N."Instead, he saw disastrous implications inthe new directive. It put into effect, hewrote, "radical and undesirable changesin personnel procedure" that would "in-evitably result in confusion and chaos."He contended that it withdrew control ofpersonnel procedures in the field from the

16 Memo. CofOrd for Admin ASW, 21 Jan 41, sub:Civ Pers Procedures, OO 230/1014, DRB AGO.

17 Memo, CofOrd for USW, attn Committee onCiv Pers Procedures, 2 1 Jan 41, OO 230/991 Misc,DRB AGO. The members of the committee wereGeneral Crowell, consultant to the Secretary ofWar; Arthur S. Flemming of the U.S. Civil ServiceCommission; and A. Heath Onthank, chief of the WarDepartment Civilian Personnel Division.

18 Rpt, Crowell Committee, 7 Feb 41, OO230.2/499 Misc, DRB AGO.

19 WD Orders "N," 23 Dec 41, sub: EmergencyProcedures re Civ Pers, Exhibit 27 in CPD Hist, Vol.I, Ch. F, OHF.


Chief of Ordnance and placed control inthe hands of War Department field agen-cies staffed by inexperienced personnelwith little or no knowledge of OrdnanceDepartment problems and policies.20

The argument over the application ofOrders "N" to Ordnance field personnelcame to an end early in February 1942when the Secretary of War agreed to ex-empt the Ordnance Department from theorder until a classification manual couldbe prepared to guide Ordnance personnelofficers in the field. The manual did notappear until early 1943, and by that timeOrders "N" had been rescinded. In themeantime, the March 1942 reorganizationof the War Department materiallychanged the personnel picture. All thetechnical and administrative services wereplaced under the jurisdiction of the ArmyService Forces, which thereafter assumedthe burden of fighting for delegated au-thority.

The Influence of ASF Personnel Policies

The influence of the Army ServiceForces on Ordnance civilian personnel ac-tivities was direct and far reaching. Thenew headquarters not only carried on thefight for delegated authority, but also for-mulated a broad statement of personnelpolicy to apply throughout the ASF. Itvigorously pushed wage standardization,encouraged the development of improvedtraining programs, and exerted pressureon all the technical services to employworkers more efficiently and reduce thenumber of employees. In so doing theASF, as the employer of more than threefourths of all War Department civilianworkers, to a great extent set the patternof civilian personnel management for theArmy as a whole.

The development of the ASF personnelprogram began in April 1942 with the ap-pointment of a staff of experts to surveythe status of personnel management in thefield installations of the technical servicesand corps areas.21 As a sample, the groupselected for study the ASF installations inthe New York area, including the Ord-nance district office, Picatinny Arsenal,and offices and depots of other technicalservices. After visiting these establishmentsthe investigators reached some rather dis-turbing conclusions. They reported thatthe activity carried on under the name of"personnel work" at the ASF installationswas of a routine clerical nature and wasnot regarded as a major management re-sponsibility; that recruitment, induction,and training of workers did not receive theattention they deserved; and that wage ad-ministration was not governed by any uni-form standard.22

When the ASF personnel divisiontackled the problem of remedying thesedeficiencies it found itself blocked at thestart, as Ordnance had been for the pasttwo years, by the concentration of author-ity in the War Department Civilian Per-sonnel Division. After several months ofdiscussion, however, the policy that theOrdnance Department had fought forsince the beginning of the emergency wasadopted. In August 1942 the Secretary ofWar issued Orders "M" delegating toeach of the three major commands—Army

20 Memo, CofOrd for USW, 2 Jan 42, OO337/1642, DRB AGO. See also 2d Ind, CofOrd, 15Jan 42, to memo, Onthank for USW, sub: WD Orders"N," 3 Jan 42, OO 230/3585, DRB AGO.

21 New York Field Survey, ASF Control Div Rpt 6,May 42, in ASF Control Div files, DRB AGO.

22 For a detailed description of personnel adminis-tration in a district office during the early years, seeHist of Philadelphia Ord Dist, Vol. I, Pt. 4, Ch. 2,OHF. See also Hist of Civ Tng in ASF, Exhibit A,The First Six Months, OCMH.


Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, andArmy Service Forces—authority to takefinal action on nearly all civilian person-nel transactions. ASF immediately passedon this authority to Ordnance and theother services and directed them, in turn,to decentralize personnel operations totheir field establishments. Since there wasnow no question of Ordnance field instal-lations having to deal with War Depart-ment field offices, and since most of thenew depots and plants were now staffedwith more experienced personnel officers,the Ordnance Department promptly com-plied with the ASF directive.23

In August ASF published an officialstatement of policy emphasizing the needfor closer attention to such matters as jobplacement, safety, training, and the estab-lishment of equitable rates of pay.24 Thenew Chief of Ordnance, General Camp-bell, immediately directed his personnelbranch to work toward these objectivesand also persuaded a prominent indus-trialist, Mr. Walter C. Pew of the Sun OilCompany, to accept a commission as alieutenant colonel and come into the Ord-nance Department as head of the civilianpersonnel branch. Mr. Pew accepted thepost with the understanding that he wasto work closely with the veteran assistantchief of the branch, Maj. George W. De-Camp, who had a thorough knowledge ofgovernment procedures. These two men,the one representing private industry andthe other government service, were se-lected by General Campbell to foster inthe field of personnel administration theconcept of the "Industry-Ordnance team."They served throughout the rest of thewar as directors of Ordnance civilian per-sonnel activity.

One of the first problems tackled by theASF civilian personnel branch in the sum-

mer of 1942 was establishment of uniformmethods of wage administration in thesupply services and corps areas. For em-ployees in the so-called Classification Actpositions, rates of pay were fixed by law,but for many in the ungraded positions,such as machinists, munitions handlers,and carpenters, there was no uniformity.25

No standard wage scale was used through-out the Army, and, as a result, wages paidat Ordnance installations were sometimesout of line with wages paid for similarwork elsewhere in government and in pri-vate industry. In many labor areas theArmy technical services found themselvesin competition with each other and withthe Navy, Air Forces, and private indus-try. The situation was obviously one thatdemanded the immediate attention of theASF personnel division, for it was a sourceof endless dissatisfaction among employeesand contributed to high turnover rates.26

For many years the Ordnance Depart-ment had determined the wages of its un-graded employees by surveying the ratesof pay for comparable work in local pri-vate industries, and had prescribed a setof basic principles to be followed by localcommanding officers in making wage sur-veys.27 In 1941 Ordnance was the onlytechnical service using wage surveys to de-

23 CPD Hist, I, 100-105, and appended docs, OHF.24 Principles and Policies of Pers Management SOS

Hq, Aug 42, Exhibit 4 in CPD Hist, Vol. I. Ch. E,OHF.

25 These were commonly called "wage board posi-tions" because the wages they paid were determinedby wage board surveys rather than by the Classifica-tion Act.

26 The situation in the summer of 1942 is brieflydescribed in The Development of a Pattern of Civil-ian Personnel Management Throughout Army Serv-ice Forces, MS, OCMH.

27 For the origin of this practice see (1) ODO 369,24 Jan 22, and (2) Ord Admin, Pt. 3, pp. 603-05,both in OHF.


termine rates of pay. In the spring of 1942it went a step further by experimenting attwo arsenals, Springfield and Picatinny,with the method of job evaluation devel-oped by the National Metal Trades Asso-ciation.28 Because this method of classify-ing jobs according to their level of difficul-ty represented the practice of the mostprogressive metal trades industries, its useby Ordnance was carefully studied by theASF personnel division during the sum-mer of 1942. When the ASF manual onwage administration was issued in Octo-ber, it embodied the essential principles ofthe wage survey system and labor classifi-cation methods used by the Ordnance De-partment. The manual was henceforthused as a guide for wage administration inthe ASF, and, further to assure uniformityamong ASF installations, all wage boardswere thereafter headed by a service com-mand officer and included representativesof all the ASF installations in the localityunder survey.29

Another area of personnel managementthat received close attention throughoutthe ASF, particularly during 1943, wasconservation of manpower. During theearly phase of the emergency, when pro-duction had been the paramount need,conservation had been a secondary con-sideration. In September 1942, as bothwar production and selective service madeheavy demands on the nation's manpowerresources, the Ordnance Department tooksteps to cope with the situation by order-ing all its field establishments to reducetheir staffs.30 In November it published asmall pamphlet, generally known as the"Blue Book," which outlined a program ofconservation, and on the first anniversaryof Pearl Harbor, General Campbell,launching a drive to make substantialcuts in the Ordnance payroll, issued a

freeze order to the effect that no vacancieswere to be filled except with the personalapproval of the local commanding officeror district chief.31 This drive was com-mended by General Somervell who or-dered copies of the Blue Book to be sent,as a model, to all the other technicalservices.

To conserve manpower, Ordnancemade organizational studies to improveoperating efficiency, eliminated all but themost essential activities, reduced the num-ber of guards, firefighters, and chauffeurs,and discharged the least efficient em-ployees and chronic absentees.32 In theOrdnance districts the largest reductionswere made in the ranks of inspectors,mainly because of the increased efficiencyof individual inspectors, improved inspec-tion by manufacturers, and adoption ofsampling techniques. The Pittsburgh Ord-nance District, for example, dropped 800inspectors from its rolls during 1943, andthe total employment in that district at theend of 1943 was 50 percent less than inOctober 1942.33

The Field Service was hit hardest by themanpower conservation drive in 1943. By

2 8 (1) Interv wi th George DeCamp, Nov 50. (2)CPD Hist, Vol. I, App. to Ch. K, OHF.

29 (1) Manual, Wage Administration for UngradedCivilian Jobs in SOS, 26 Oct 42. (2) SOS Civ PersMemo 19, 23 Sep 42. Both in DRB AGO.

30 Ltr, CofOrd to Chief of Pittsburgh Ord Dist, 7Oct 42, quoted in Hist of Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, 348,OHF.

31 ODO 366, 7 Dec 42, OHF. A copy of the BlueBook is in CPD Hist, Vol. 100, Ch. E. Col. Gordon C.Baird and Col. Charles D. Wiman headed a man-power conservation group in the OCO to direct theprogram.

32 Ltr, Chief of FS to all FS establishments, 12 Jul32, sub: Authorized Maximum Civ Pers Strength, inHist of FS Exec Div, Vol. II, OHF. Some of the re-duction shown in the reports stemmed from book-keeping changes, such as the removal from the per-sonnel count of persons on extended leave.

33 Hist of Pittsburgh Ord Dist, II, 39-40, OHF.


TABLE 9—CIVILIAN ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATES AT ASF INSTALLATIONS

Source ASF Hq, Statistical Review World War II, App. K, p. 165. Data for 1942 are not available. Each figure represents the num-ber of injuries per million man-hours.

the winter of 1942-43 the Industrial Serv-ice had passed the peak of its expansion,but the Field Service was just then cominginto its own as the storage and distribu-tion agency of the Ordnance Department.During 1943 the Field Service depots notonly had to cope with the rapidly increas-ing inflow of supplies of all kinds from warproduction plants but also had to handlethe steadily mounting outward flow ofsupplies to troop units overseas. The onlyreductions in the Field Service work loadcame in August 1943 when several depotswere transferred to private companies foroperation under contract. To hold the line,or to reduce its personnel strength, meantfor the Field Service the most rigid econ-omy in the use of manpower, adoptionof the most efficient operating methods,and the use of labor-saving machinerywherever possible.34

One of the major weaknesses in thecivilian personnel programs at ASF instal-lations revealed by the 1942 New Yorksurvey was the lack of attention to em-ployee safety. Of all the technical services,the investigators found that only the Ord-nance Department had an organized ac-cident prevention program. Largely be-cause of the hazardous nature of manyOrdnance operations, safety programswere begun in the arsenals and depots

many years before the outbreak of WorldWar II and were well established by thespring of 1942. When scores of new load-ing plants and ammunition depots cameinto operation in 1942, safety became suchan important phase of Ordnance activitiesthat an Explosives Safety Branch was or-ganized in Chicago under the direction ofCol. Francis H. Miles, Jr.35 A statisticalsummary, compiled by ASF headquartersat the end of the war, shows what a re-markable safety record the Ordnance De-partment achieved during World War II.(See Table 9.)

Training Ordnance Workers

During the twenty years before 1940the Ordnance Department had not foundit necessary to give much attention totraining civilian employees. Throughoutthose years the Department had experi-enced little difficulty in recruiting skilledcraftsmen and professional workers to filloccasional vacancies. Ordnance mobiliza-tion planning, however, did not overlookthe fact that in time of emergency large

54 For a detailed statement of FS personnel prob-lems, see rpt, Hines to Chief of FS, 14 Jul 43, Hist ofFS Exec Div, Vol. II, Pt. 2, OHF.

35 (1) ODO 285, 26 Jun 42, OHF. (2) Hist of Safe-ty and Security Div, OCO, I, 12-15, OHF.


numbers of men trained in the productionand handling of munitions would beneeded. More than six years before warcame, Frankford Arsenal revived the four-year course for apprentice machinists thatit had discontinued in 1921, and in 1937Rock Island Arsenal enrolled thirty-sixapprentice machinists.36 The other arse-nals soon made similar provisions fortraining young men in various Ordnancespecialties, and by the fall of 1940—morethan a year before Pearl Harbor—thetraining activities of the Ordnance De-partment had reached such large propor-tions that a training unit was createdwithin the civilian personnel division.

In the training of many types of Ord-nance specialists there was a fruitful ex-change between the Ordnance Depart-ment and private industry all during thewar period. Ordnance employees weretrained in the maintenance of specializedtypes of equipment at factory schools, andemployees of industrial firms studied atOrdnance installations. As early as thesummer of 1940, for example, six Ord-nance employees were trained at theSperry Gyroscope Company on the main-tenance of antiaircraft fire control instru-ments. A few months later five inspectorsand three chemists, who were to be sta-tioned at the Radford Ordnance Workswhen it was completed, were in trainingat the Carney's Point plant of the DuPontCompany. This process was reversed whenOrdnance undertook to train small num-bers of operating personnel of the com-panies that were to operate the new muni-tions plants under construction in 1940and 1941. As reservoirs of productionknow-how, the arsenals and depots trainedengineers, chemists, and other techniciansselected by the contractors to operateGOCO plants.37

One of the most important phases ofarsenal training began in the summer of1940 when courses were instituted for in-spectors who were to serve in the districts.Each arsenal instructed the trainees as-signed to it on those items it normally pro-duced. Picatinny, for example, trainedmost of the ammunition inspectors;Frankford offered courses on optical in-struments, mechanical time fuzes, andammunition; Rock Island gave instruc-tion in the inspection of mobile artillerycarriages, recoil mechanisms, and ma-chine guns. Later, as the districts made ar-rangements for training their own inspec-tors at local trade schools and colleges, thearsenal courses were discontinued.38

After creation of ASF in March 1942,the many-sided Ordnance program ofcivilian training became even more variedand elaborate. At Rock Island Arsenalcourses were added for administrative spe-cialists, armament maintenance men, fieldservice supervisors, traffic managers,welders, storekeepers, checkers, and fore-men.39 At Frankford training was given tolens grinders, draftsmen, machine opera-tors, engravers, fuze assemblers, and otherspecialists in related fields. New employeeswere trained at many installations to be-come machine operators, and after theywere assigned to production work they

36 Lt. Col. L. H. Campbell, Jr., "Training Appren-tice Machinists," Army Ordnance, XIX, 114 (1939),344-46. See also Brig. Gen. N. F. Ramsey, "ArsenalCraftsmen," Army Ordnance, XXI, 129 (1941) , 367.

17 Memo, Lt Col Reiff H. Hannum for CofOrd, 27Jan 41, sub: Tng Programs. OO 352.11/303, DRBAGO. See also l t r , Col Hannum to Lt Col Frank J.McSherry. 18 Nov 40, OO 352.11/104, DRB AGO.

38 For further details, see Brig. Gen. C. T. Harris,"Civilian Ordnance Training," Army Ordnance, XXI,126 (1941), 600-602.

3 9 Hist of Rock Island Arsenal, Vol. II, Ch. 18,OHF. For a brief description of each course, see Histof Tng Program of FS Div, in Hist of FS Exec Div,Vol. 108, OHF.


were given additional on-the-job trainingto improve their efficiency. Thousands oflaborers and munitions handlers weretrained as explosives operators, and largenumbers of women were trained for cleri-cal work.

The most important additions to Ord-nance training prescribed by ASF during1942 and 1943 were the "J" programs,originated for use in war plants by theTraining Within Industry Service of theWar Manpower Commission.40 ASF in-stallations were directed in August 1942 tointroduce the Job Instructor Training(JIT) course to teach supervisors how togive on-the-job instruction to their subor-dinates. All supervisors were to be giventhe JIT course before the end of the yearand then, beginning in January 1943,they were to be given the second of theWar Manpower Commission courses, JobRelations Training (JRT). JRT dealt withsuch basic elements of personnel manage-ment as stimulating job pride, adjustinggrievances, and maintaining discipline.When this program was completed inJune, the third phase of supervisor train-ing, Job Methods Training (JMT) was be-gun. JMT was a program of work simpli-fication designed to show supervisors howto analyze jobs and devise more efficientwork patterns.41

Of all war production plants, PicatinnyArsenal took the lead in pioneering theJMT course. It conducted the first in-plant JMT Institute in the United States,in October 1942, and thus became the firstplant in the country to hold institutes inall three "J" courses. During the followingyear Picatinny conducted a greater num-ber of ten-hour JMT courses and traineda larger number of supervisors than anyother war plant. "From the standpoint ofthe resulting conservation of manpower,

materials, and machine capacity," wrotethe author of the JMT course to Col. Wil-liam E. Lamed of Picatinny, "your sav-ings are far ahead of any other private orgovernmental installation. From everyangle your program is far and away themost outstanding in America." 42

Much of the training given in late 1943and early 1944 was guided by the replace-ment schedules drawn up at all Ordnanceestablishments to provide for the orderlyreplacement of men inducted into militaryservice. Because the War Department in1941 adopted the policy of asking localdraft boards to grant occupational defer-ments to its civilian employees only in themost unusual circumstances, Ordnanceemployees were drafted at a rapid rateafter Pearl Harbor. At Rock Island Arse-nal, to take one example, 2,500 employeesentered military service during 1942 andan equal number during 1943. And, interms of production line requirements,men were taken into the armed forces in ahaphazard fashion, the selection depend-ing more upon their age, physical qualifi-cations, and family status than upon thenature of their employment. To remedythis situation, Frankford Arsenal early in1943 pioneered the replacement scheduleplan for the War Department and demon-strated the practicability of working outlong in advance a systematic program totrain draft-exempt replacements for menlikely to be called for military service. Theselective service boards were then requested

40 SOS Cir 45, 19 Aug 42, sub: Job Instructor TngProgram, DRB AGO.

41 ASF Civ Pers Memo 77, 3 Aug 43, DRB AGO.For a detailed description of the course as given in oneOrdnance district, see Hist of San Francisco Ord Dist,Vol. IV, OHF. The entire volume is devoted to JMT.

42 Ltr, Clifton Cox, Training Within Industry Re-gional Dir, to CO Picatinny Arsenal, 21 Oct 43, inHist of Picatinny Arsenal, Admin Gp, Oct-Dec 43, p.61, OHF.


to grant temporary occupational defer-ments, on an individual basis, until re-placements for the men could be trained.After replacement schedules were pre-pared throughout the Department in1943, each Ordnance installation couldplan well in advance for the replacementof men to be taken into the armed forces.43

By April 1945, when the Europeanphase of the war was about to end, nearlyevery activity of the Ordnance Depart-ment was covered by a civilian trainingcourse of some kind. There were 355 dis-tinct courses being given to employees,most of them of the on-the-job type, andnearly 17,500 persons completed a courseduring, the month. The course producingthe most graduates in April 1945 was thaton general safety procedures; next in ordercame orientation and induction training,work simplification, and work measure-ment.44

Statistics on training are apt to be mis-leading because they were usually kept interms of the number of persons who com-pleted courses, regardless of the length ofthe courses or the level of their difficulty.Ordnance courses ranged in length fromthe ten-hour "J" courses to the four-yearprograms of apprentice training, andvaried in difficulty from typing and truckdriving to lens grinding and contract ter-mination. The number of course comple-tions was surprisingly high because manyOrdnance employees, probably most ofthem, completed more than one course ofinstruction during the war, and some com-pleted a dozen or more. Although Ord-nance had only 262,772 employees on itspayroll at the peak of its strength, it hasbeen estimated that Ordnance workerschalked up more than 700,000 "comple-tions" between August 1942 (when main-tenance of statistics on training began)

and August 1945.45 Although there wasoccasional criticism during the war thattraining was overemphasized and "over-organized," and that it interfered withproduction when workers were taken fromtheir jobs to spend hours in a classroom,the prevailing opinion was that time spenton training was more than reclaimed in in-creased production, higher morale, andreduced turnover.46

Employee Relations

Employee relations were of greater im-portance to Ordnance during World WarII than during the years of peace chieflybecause wartime conditions of employ-ment were far different from those before1941. As the war years brought a"worker's market" in which jobs wereplentiful and workers were scarce, thethreat of dismissal no longer held any ter-ror for the average employee. He knewthat he could find another job in a fewdays, and he also knew that his employerwas eager to avoid the expense resultingfrom high turnover rates. The problems ofmanagement were further complicated asthe war years brought into Ordnance em-ployment thousands of men and womenwith little or no previous work experience,and with little understanding of the needfor strict observance of rules and regula-tions.

When ASF came into the picture in thespring of 1942, there was ample evidenceof the need for improved employee rela-

43 (1) Hist of Frankford Arsenal, IV, 11. (2) Hist ofRock Island Arsenal, p. 289. Both in OHF.

44 Ord Admin, Pt. 3, pp. 579-80, OHF.45 Ibid., p. 569.46 (1) Intervs with George DeCamp and others in

Civ Pers Div, 1950. (2) Ltr, CO Letterkenny Ord De-pot to CofOrd, 30 Mar 44, sub: Evaluation of Tng,OO 353/7 109, DRB AGO.


tions at many Army installations. Theturnover rate among ASF employees wasdescribed as being "nothing less than as-tronomical. Workers left their jobs whole-sale. Out of every 10 people hired, onlyfour or even fewer would remain . . . foras much as one year." 47 Ordnance was noexception to the rule. At Springfield Ar-mory, for example, 4,700 persons werehired between December 1941 and June1942, but 1,600 resigned during the sameperiod. At Picatinny and Frankford Arse-nals the annual turnover rate during 1942approached 50 percent.48

A relatively high turnover rate duringthe hectic months following the attack onPearl Harbor was to be expected asworkers adjusted themselves to new condi-tions of employment and shopped aroundin the worker's market, but in the summerof 1942 the ASF personnel division de-cided that the rate was excessive and thatthe time had come to do something aboutbringing it down to reasonable propor-tions. One of the first steps taken in thisdirection was the adoption of a standardprocedure for handling employee griev-ances at all ASF installations. This wasthe same procedure that had been in forcein Ordnance for many years. It providedthat an employee, acting by himself orthrough a representative, should normallytake up his complaint first with his imme-diate supervisor, and that all supervisorsshould try to straighten out misunder-standings or difficulties presented tothem.49

In dealing with complaints, personneladministrators in Ordnance and at ASFheadquarters recognized that most griev-ances were of a minor nature but were,like a stone in one's shoe, no less irritatingfor their small size. They recognized, too,that the great majority of such grievances

could be satisfactorily handled at the low-est or next-to-lowest level of supervision ifthe supervisors had sufficient training andaptitude to do the job. Throughout theASF during 1942 and 1943, therefore, in-tensive efforts were made to train super-visors, through the "J" programs, to be-come more adept in dealing with theirsubordinates.

The need for care and intelligence in in-troducing new Ordnance employees totheir jobs was best illustrated in the em-ployment of inexperienced women work-ers. Many women who had never beforedone any work outside their own homesvolunteered for war work and then foundthemselves unceremoniously assigned tojobs in huge shops or warehouses beforethey had an opportunity to get their bear-ings. The most that was done for them wasto put in their hands a small pamphletcontaining the rules and regulations of theinstallation. On far too many occasionsthe women thus hastily put to work foundthe transition from home to factory toodifficult to make and resigned at the endof their first week. The time saved at theexpense of proper induction and preas-signment training was thus lost as thewhole cycle of recruitment and assign-ment had to be repeated with others.50

More attention was also given to theproper placement of new employees. In theearly stages of war mobilization, whenworkers were recruited with all possible

47 ASF Manual M-216, Sec. X.48 (1) Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, Book III,

p. 153. (2) Hist of Frankford Arsenal. Vol. I I I , ExhibitM. (3) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal, Admin Gp, Vol. I,Pt. 2, pp. 110-11. All in OHF.

4 9 ODO 80-44, 16 Jun 44, sub: Employee Griev-ance Procedure, OHF. (2) ASF Cir 149, 20 May 44.(3) ASF Cir 171, 6 June 44. Last two in DRB AGO.

50 Constance McL. Green, The Role of Women as Pro-duction Workers in War Plants in the Connecticut Valley(Northampton, 1946), p. 28.


speed and when thousands of inexperi-enced men and women were put on thepayroll overnight, careful testing andplacement of each individual had beenimpossible. "The tendency was to take allcomers," stated the ASF personnel man-ual. "The employee was placed on theworking force in the hope that in one wayor another he would gravitate toward theright job and stay with it." 51 Placement inthe Ordnance Department was morehighly developed than it was in otherbranches of the Army because of the tech-nical nature of most Ordnance activities,but it still left much to be desired in thespring of 1942. At Springfield Armory, forexample, there was no aptitude testing orpreshop training for men during the 1941-42 period.52 Early in 1943 an Ordnance-wide campaign was launched to give moreconsideration to the placement of workers.Personnel staffs were directed to draw upa job description for every position, keep arecord of each employee's qualifications,and assign each worker to the job forwhich he was best qualified. This cam-paign was in line with the provisions of theASF policy statement of August 1942 andprobably contributed as much towardpromoting good employee relations andreducing turnover as any other single steptaken by the Ordnance Department dur-ing the war.

Experience soon demonstrated that inthe work history of the average employee,in Ordnance and throughout ASF, twodays were of crucial importance—his firstday on the job, and the day he quit work.Ordnance personnel administrators con-centrated a large share of their efforts onthose two days. The first day, or moreoften the first week, was devoted to the in-duction and training of the new employeeso that he would get started on the right

foot. The last day, or the day on which heresigned, the employee was called in foran "exit interview" that had a dual pur-pose: to persuade him not to leave his job,and to discover what factors were causinghim to leave. The employee was encour-aged to speak freely and frankly about hisreasons for leaving. It was sometimes feltthat he chose to conceal his real reasonswith a plausible excuse that would fore-stall further questioning, but the skillfulinterviewer was often able to discover theunderlying causes of dissatisfaction. Amongthe reasons most frequently given for leav-ing Ordnance employment—excludingcalls to military service—were acceptanceof a better job, ill health, and transporta-tion difficulties. Many workers took jobselsewhere that offered higher pay, entailedless dangerous work, or were more con-venient to home. Many Ordnance arsenals,depots, and plants were of necessity situ-ated at remote points, causing workers tomake long trips by bus or automobileevery day. A large number of womenworkers reported that they were quittingbecause of ill health caused by the heavywork to which they were not accustomed,or because they were needed at hometo take care of children. When the exitinterviews revealed that employees wereresigning because of specific conditionswithin the establishment that could beremedied, steps were taken to eliminatethe conditions.

Scientists employed at Ordnance labo-ratories deserve at least brief mention inthis section on employee relations, if onlyfor the fact that a rather comprehensive

51 ASF Pers Officer's Handbook on Employee Rela-tions, ASF Manual M-216, Sec. X. See also ASF AnnRpt 1944, p. 312.

52 Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, Book 3, pp.170-72. OHF.


survey of their job attitudes was made atthe end of the war.53 To some extent, also,the attitudes of the laboratory scientistswere typical of professional workersthroughout the Ordnance Department.When the scientists spoke confidentially,and under the cloak of anonymity, theywere frequently vitriolic in condemningcertain aspects of their employment. Alarge proportion of them, including morethan half the small group of Ph.D's,planned to leave the Ordnance Depart-ment after the war ended. Many of thesemen chose not to remain with Ordnancebecause they felt there was no assurancethat Congress would support an adequatepostwar military research program, but allwere influenced to some extent by the con-ditions of employment in Ordnance asthey had experienced them during thewar. The complaints most frequentlyvoiced were: (1) salaries were too low; (2)there was too much red tape, too many"channels" causing delay and frustration;and (3) professsional men were not treatedwith sufficient dignity and trust. Amongscientists with high professional ratings,one of the grounds for dissatisfaction wasthe Army-wide practice of placing com-missioned officers in top positions—andthen transferring them as soon as theybecame familiar with their jobs.54 Manyscientists resented having to take ordersfrom officers with less experience and lessprofessional education than themselves,and then being denied personal recogni-tion for their own achievements. Com-plaints of a related nature stemmed fromthe practice of placing research labora-tories at the manufacturing arsenals undercontrol of the arsenal commanders. Thearsenals were naturally production mindedand did not always evince full sympathyfor the research problems of the labora-

tory. As one scientist described the situa-tion, "It's like living with your mother-in-law. You are welcome, but you're notfree."55

Many of the complaints made by thescientists were of a petty nature, hardlyworthy of professional men holding respon-sible positions. Many of them centeredaround being required to observe routineregulations, which the scientists consideredas properly applicable only to clericalworkers. Research scientists, for example,objected vehemently to punching a timeclock and being held to a rigid lunchschedule. Their complaints suggest thatsome arsenal and laboratory administra-tors may have shown poor judgment in notallowing more freedom of action to the sci-entists, many of whom were eager to workovertime on their research projects, andthat the scientists themselves might haveshown greater willingness to accept theinevitable restrictions imposed by employ-ment in a large organization. Whateverjudgment of the situation may be offered,the fact remains that for large numbers ofscientific workers Ordnance employmentwas not sufficiently attractive to hold themafter the war.56

53 Where Do We Go from Here: A Survey of Or-ganization and Working Conditions at Six ArsenalLaboratories, OHF.

54 A Survey of Ballistic Research Laboratory, p. 1 1,OHF. "Military officers with little special knowledgeof the work are given responsible positions here." itwas reported. "They aren't interested in the projectsbecause they don't expect to stay long. They are likestudents at school who know they won't have to takethe exams."

55 Where Do We Go From Here, p. 49, OHF.56 Nearly a hundred complaints, ranging from the

need for more Coca-Cola machines to lack of oppor-tunities for professional advancement, are describedin A Survey of Ballistic Research Laboratory, OHF.See also The Place of the Ordnance Arsenal Labora-tories in Government Research and Development,OHF.


At the end of World War II the WarDepartment was in a far stronger position,as far as civilian personnel managementwas concerned, than it had been when theJapanese attacked Pearl Harbor. In few,if any, other areas did the Army makegreater progress during World War II.Starting in 1938 and 1939, when it wasgenerally considered to have the least pro-gressive civilian personnel program in thefederal government, the War Departmentmade steady progress until it eventuallyachieved what one Ordnance officiallabeled "the best personnel program youwill find anywhere—bar none." And tothe development of this enlightened per-sonnel policy the Ordnance Departmentmade a substantial contribution.

Experience during World War II dem-onstrated the need for decentralization ofWar Department personnel administrationin time of war, and amply justified theOrdnance Department's unremitting ef-forts to break down the tight centralizedcontrol maintained until August 1942 bythe War Department Civilian PersonnelDivision. Concurrently, World War IIexperience demonstrated the need for abroad and continuing program to traincivilian personnel officers for field installa-tions. At the end of the war the decentral-ization policy was so firmly established,and was buttressed by such a large force oftrained personnel administrators in thefield, that it was carried over into the post-war years as a permanent feature of WarDepartment policy.

The months of August and September1942 formed a great divide in the historyof War Department and Ordnance per-sonnel management. These were themonths during which the newly formedASF began to take positive steps to correctthe deficiencies in personnel administra-

tion revealed by the New York field sur-vey. In August 1942 War DepartmentOrders "M" appeared, delegating to thethree major commands—ASF, AAF, andAGF—most of the authority formerly con-centrated in the personnel division of theOffice of the Secretary of War. Also inAugust came the publication of a civilianpersonnel policy for the entire ASF andthe launching of an intensive program ofsupervisory training under the "J" pro-grams. In September 1942 the Ordnanceprogram to conserve manpower was givenadded impetus, and the commanders of allfield installations were directed to employa larger proportion of women. At the sametime, plans were made to standardize wageadministration throughout the ASF alongthe lines dictated by Ordnance experience.

To measure the progress made in civil-ian personnel management in the WarDepartment during World War II, oneneed only compare the report of the NewYork field survey of May 1942 with theconditions of civilian employment thatprevailed throughout the Army in thespring of 1945. Although the OrdnanceDepartment at the beginning of the warwas more advanced in personnel mattersthan some other branches of the Army, theNew York survey revealed that many of itspractices were still in an embryonic state.Its training, safety, and wage administra-tion programs were well established beforePearl Harbor, but the induction andplacement procedures at many Ordnanceinstallations left much to be desired. Stim-ulated and encouraged by enlightenedsupervision of the ASF personnel division,and given greater freedom of action by thedecentralization order of August 1942,Ordnance made steady progress and by1945 had a well-rounded personnel pro-gram administered by a well-trained staff.

CHAPTER VII

Research and Development1919-40

The Westervelt Board Report

No lesson of World War I was plainer tothe United States Army than its need ofmodern ordnance. Aviation, signal equip-ment, chemical warfare materials, medi-cal and engineer supplies must also re-ceive study, but the Army's need of moreeffective artillery was the most obviouswant of all. Accordingly, a month afterthe Armistice General Peyton C. March,Chief of Staff, appointed a board of sevenofficers to draw up recommendations forfield artillery for the U.S. Army of thefuture. Special orders directed the boardto convene in France at the earliest prac-ticable time "to make a study of the arma-ment, calibers and types of matériel, kindsand proportion of ammunition, and meth-ods of transport of the artillery to be as-signed to a Field Army." 1 The board wasto map out a comprehensive developmentprogram. Headed by Brig. Gen. WilliamI. Westervelt from whom it derived itsname, the board first met at Chaumont,France, on 12 January 1919. It accumu-lated its data over a period of monthsthrough interviews with French, Italian,and British artillery experts, examinationof both Allied and enemy matériel, inspec-tions of plants, and conferences withAmerican generals who had commanded

line troops in the AEF. Returning to Wash-ington in April, the "Caliber Board" di-gested its findings, consulted with thechiefs of Ordnance, Coast Artillery, FieldArtillery, and Chemical Warfare, and sub-mitted its report on 5 May 1919. The re-port was approved by the Chief of Staff on23 May of that year.2

This broad, penetrating survey showedthat, as General Westervelt expressed it,"every item of the hardware of war neededimprovement"—every type of gun, how-itzer, projectile, gun mount, carriage, andvehicle that the U.S. Army used.3 The re-port outlined clearly the mission of divi-sional, corps, and army artillery, pointedout the distinctive problems of each, and

1 WD SO 289-0, 11 Dec 18. The impetus for thestudy came in part from the Chief of Field Artillerywho, making suggestions as to the leading problemsand how to approach them, submitted a list of sevenqualified officers. (Memo, CofFA for CofS, 5 Dec 18,OO 334.3/W, NA.) The seven were Brig. Gen.William I. Westervelt, Brig. Gen. Robert E. Callan,Brig. Gen. William P. Ennis, Col. James B. Dillard,Col. Ralph McT. Pennell, Lt. Col. Webster A.Capron, and Lt. Col. Walter P. Boatwright. The per-sonnel formed a nice balance between using armsand Ordnance. Field Artillery was represented byGeneral Ennis and Colonels Pennell and Capron;Coast Artillery by General Callan and Colonel Boat-wright; and Ordnance by General Westervelt andColonel Dillard.

2 William I. Westervelt, "A Challenge to AmericanEngineers," Army Ordnance, I, 2 (1920), 59-62, 64.

3 Westervelt, loc. cit., p. 62.


made definite recommendations.4 The lastthree sections analyzed the existing inade-quacies of American ordnance. The sec-tion that dealt with projectiles emphasizedthe need for a great variety of develop-ments in fuzes, powders, and shell. Theboard noted: "There are investigationsunder way by the Ordnance Departmentcovering this entire subject and the Boardrecommends that these be continued. It isto be expected that the subject will requireextended investigation and is one whichcan only be adequately handled by a con-tinuing technical body." 5

The heart of the report was Section IV,"Types of Artillery Recommended: Idealand Practical." For each class of artillerythe board described the characteristics ofan "ideal" weapon, and then advisedwhat should be used as a "practical" one.The "ideal" light field artillery piece wasof about 3-inch caliber, on carriage, usingfixed ammunition and smokeless, flashlesspropellant—one charge for 11,000 yards,a second for 15,000 yards—time fuzes forshrapnel, and superquick and selective-delay fuzes for shell. It should have maxi-mum ballistic efficiency and maximumbursting charge, the same ballistics forshell and shrapnel and for every type ofammunition used, and a maximum rate offire of twenty rounds per minute. Whilework should proceed toward the idealweapon, the board set as a practical meas-ure the use of 50 percent 75-mm. guns,Model 1916, and 50 percent French 75-mm's. The difference between the "ideal"and the "practical" typified the distanceOrdnance designers had to span in nearlyall Westervelt projects. A partial summaryof recommendations is given in Table 10.

For artillery transport, the board advo-cated immediate motorization of all weap-ons larger than 75-mm. guns and 4-inch

howitzers. It proposed immediate adop-tion of the 5-ton and the 10-ton artillerytractors as standard vehicles and the ex-clusive use of four-wheeled-drive cargotrucks for artillery supply and ammunitiontrains. In addition to recommendingample reserves of spare parts and ade-quate repair facilities, the board citedcertain particular needs: supply trucksfurnished with suitable tool chests andcabinets; immediate manufacture of 150standard 3-ton, four-wheeled-drive trucksto motorize one regiment of 155-mm. how-itzers; caterpillar treads of improved de-sign and construction; artillery tractorswith lowered unit ground pressure, im-proved grousers, and noiseless engine ex-hausts; waterproofing to allow engines torun submerged for short periods; and asimple form of coupling for towing guns,tractors, or trucks in tandem. AlthoughAmerican mechanical transport appearedto be far ahead of European, the boardwarned against complacency.6 Admittingthe rapidity of American progress since1914 when the Ordnance Department be-gan practical experiments with the cater-pillar for artillery transport, the reportstated:

Mechanical transport is the prime moverof the future. ... It is urgent that study

4 These findings were not approved in entirety byWestervelt, Callan, and Boatwright, who submitteda minority report. The minority view held thatorganic army artillery was inadvisable and that anartillery reserve was essential not only for the armybut also for the corps and division. Rpt, Bd of Offi-cers, 5 May 19. sub: Study of the Armament, Caliberand Types of Materiel ... to be Assigned to a FieldArmy (hereafter cited as Caliber Bd Rpt), pp. 61 -64,OKD 334.3/1.3. Ord Tech Intel files.

5 Caliber Bd Rpt, pp. 21-23, OKD 334.3/1.3, OrdTech Intel files. The Ordnance Committee, set up inJuly 1919 and working through subcommittees, ful-filled the function of the "continuing technical body."

6 Caliber Bd Rpt pp. 88-114, OKD 334.3/1.3, OrdTech Intel files.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1919-40 171

TABLE 10—PARTIAL SUMMARY OF CALIBER BOARD REPORT

In general a smokeless, flashless powder was specified for each weapon.

Source: Caliber Bd Rpt, pars. 29-76, OKD 334.3/1.3, Ord Tech Intel files.


and development be vigorously carried onalong these lines, as we are on the verge ofchanges fully as radical as the introductionof the long recoil field gun carriage, and thecountry first utilizing the new capabilitiesopened up by mechanical traction and thecaterpillar, will have a great advantage inthe next war.7

These are only the highlights of the re-port. The whole was greeted simultane-ously with interest, surprise, skepticism,and enthusiasm. General Westervelt in1920 wrote: "The ideal set by the Boardis not an easy one to reach, and I fre-quently think of the politely amazed lookupon the faces of many hardened veteransin high places to whom the Board first re-vealed its dream of complete motoriza-tion." 8 Apart from small arms projects,most of the developments at which theOrdnance Department aimed for the nextfifteen years were those outlined in theWestervelt Board report. The postwar in-novation whereby not the Ordnance De-partment but the using arms stated theirneeds and specified the military character-istics new equipment should have some-times delayed initiation of new projects,but down into the mid-thirties users andOrdnance Department alike were stronglyinfluenced by Westervelt Board recom-mendations. Indeed in 1939 and 1940 of-ficers still cited the board as the incontro-vertible authority on armament.

Developments in Ammunition

The most complicated task of develop-ment confronting the Ordnance Depart-ment at the end of World War I lay in thefield of ammunition. Combat experiencehad shown the inadequacies of much ofwhat had been used in 1917-18—inaccu-racies, failures, lack of safety features, anda host of needless complexities. But where-

as Artillery officers could specify ratherexactly what the requirements of guns andvehicles should be, for the development ofexplosives, propellants, projectiles, andfuzes their recommendations had to becouched in general terms. Here were prob-lems of basic research that ammunition ex-perts themselves had to define, often seek-ing immediately only interim solutionsand waiting till greater knowledge couldsupply better answers. Hence the ammuni-tion designers had free rein within budge-tary limits. Over the twenty years of peacethe Ordnance Department dedicated moremoney to the ammunition program thanto any other development work.

Research upon ammunition in the firstpostwar years was inspired not only by theCaliber Board but also by the necessity ofpreserving ammunition stored after theArmistice. The latter task involved a seriesof experiments with methods of determin-ing the stability of smokeless powder, of sostoring it as to lengthen the duration ofstability, and of drying it more efficientlythan by processes formerly used. A gooddeal of valuable information on these sub-jects was assembled at Picatinny Arsenalbefore 1926, notably that on feasibilityof the vapor method of drying, which re-duced drying time from months or weeksto days.9 But a more permanent solutionof some phases of the powder storage prob-lem would be to develop new nonhygro-scopic powders, which because of theirchemical composition would not absorb

7 Ibid., p. 31. Ordnance achievements includeddevelopment of efficient 5-ton and 10-ton artillerytractors, and heavy mobile repair shops. Ibid., p. 98.

8 Westervelt, loc. cit., p. 60.9 (1) History of Army Ordnance Developmental

and Experimental Projects for FY 1920-25 Inclusive(hereafter cited as ODEP), II, 256-91, 479-94, OHF.(2) Interv, 24 Apr 50, with Bruce Anderson, AmmoSec, R&D Serv.


enough moisture to affect their ballisticsor chemical stability even when stored ina damp atmosphere. If at the same timeflashless and smokeless qualities could beincorporated, the advantages would bestill greater. The search for flashless non-hygroscopic powders, FNH, was accord-ingly pushed vigorously. The DuPontCompany by a special agreement withthe Ordnance Department followed oneline of investigation, Picatinny Arsenalanother, each with considerable success.The peacetime development of a completeline of single-based and double-based non-hygroscopic powders, flashless in manyweapons, was one of the most useful ac-complishments of the Ordnance Depart-ment before 1940.

Meanwhile, other highly importantstudies went forward on fuzes, on bombsand artillery projectiles, on high explosivesand pyrotechnics, on artillery ignition sys-tems, and on improved methods of load-ing bombs and shells. Special attentionwas directed toward development ofbombs since the relative ineffectiveness ofthe World War I tear-shaped type and thegrowing role of air warfare made betterbombs imperative. The results of twentyyears' work gave the Air Forces of the1940's a series of cylindrical bombs ofgreatly increased accuracy and deadliness.Still the number of ammunition projects,all important and frequently interrelated,coupled with the meagreness of funds pre-vented rapid progress on any one under-taking.10 In developing artillery ammuni-tion, a particular handicap was the smallnumber of pilot weapons available to testammunition, for ammunition develop-ment could never precede and could onlypartially parallel development of the weap-on for which it was intended. Thus, forexample, the abnormal variations in

range and velocity that occurred in firingin the low zones with the high-explosiveshell M1 designed for the 105-mm. how-itzer were not satisfactorily eliminateduntil rather late in World War II, largelybecause the 105's were not fired frequentlyenough during the peace years to providethe data on which to base corrective meas-ures.11 Nevertheless, while no projectcould be labeled completed, the work ofthe ammunition experts between 1919and 1940 was extremely useful in definingobjectives, blocking off blind alleys of re-search, and carrying forward a number ofimportant investigations.

Perhaps the single most significantachievement was the development of acomplete system of artillery fuzes inter-changeable in practically all artillery pro-jectiles. The Caliber Board's recommen-dations emphasized the need of bore-safefuzes for high-explosive shells and urgedreducing the number of types for any par-ticular weapon but did not expressly stip-ulate combination fuzes or indicate the ex-tent to which the same fuze should beusable in different calibers. The Ord-nance Department's work on these prob-lems was along entirely original lines.Design of bore-safe fuzes, so constructed asto prevent detonation of the main chargebefore the shell had left the gun's muzzle,required a radical departure from WorldWar I safety features and revision ofearlier concepts of the quantity of explo-sive to be used. It was clear that the bestway to limit the number of types was todevelop combination fuzes, such as com-bination superquick delayed-action, or

10 ODEP, II, passim, OHF.11 (1) Design, Development, and Procurement of

Heavy Artillery Ammunition, Nov 44, OHF. (2)Interv, 26 Apr 50, with Robert Marshall, Fuze Sec,Ind Serv.


combination time and superquick, inwhich a change in setting would make onefuze usable for more than one purpose.One major difficulty was finding designsthat would lend themselves to quantityproduction; during the twenties severaltypes functioned satisfactorily when builtin laboratory or experimental shop butproved faulty when produced on a factorybasis.12

By 1932 several new fuzes had beenstandardized, but many gaps in any com-plete system remained. Consequently, thatyear the Ordnance Department initiateda study of requirements for a series ofpoint-detonating fuzes and arrived at theconclusion that tactical needs demandedfour classes of fuzes for high-explosiveshell or shrapnel fire, at ground and aerialtargets, at both long and short ranges. Thestudy showed the tactical advantages ofhaving all fuzes identical in contour andweight, and designed with setting lugs andthreads that would fit all fuze settersand permit both interchangeability in allpoint-fuzed projectiles and use with all firecontrol directors and range tables. If timefuzes could be used interchangeably asdetonating fuzes in HE shell and as ignit-ing fuzes in shrapnel, and if substantiallythe same mechanism could be used in allfuzes employing a superquick element, ora delay, powder-train time, mechanicaltime, or detonator safety element, the sim-plification for the artilleryman in the fieldand for the producer alike would be enor-mous.13 Upon this difficult task effort wasbent from 1934 on. The first satisfactorymember of the new "family" of inter-changeable artillery fuzes to be completedwas a mechanical time fuze (30 seconds),the M43. The second was a combinationsuperquick delayed-action fuze originallyissued for use with the 75-mm. pack how-

itzer, later used with larger calibers. Thispoint-detonating fuze, the M48, adoptedin June 1938, was an achievement; unlikethe earlier designs of a dual-purpose fuze,it was safe, reliable, easily set, acceptablyaccurate. In the course of the next twoyears another superquick delay and a timesuperquick fuze were adopted as well as a75-second mechanical time fuze. Thesefive, mechanically and ballistically inter-changeable, constituted the series most ex-tensively used during World War II.14

Closely allied with fuze developmentwas the redesign of shells. During WorldWar I the U.S. Army had largely de-pended upon the French for its shells; theonly American-designed type was the 3-inch, the shortcomings of which hadbeen apparent. The increased range,greater accuracy, and higher lethality de-sired in artillery ammunition were to beobtained only by the development of acomplete series of shells in which contour,form, and location of the rotating bands,composition of steels calculated to producethe most effective fragmentation, powdercharges, and a number of other designfeatures all had to be considered. Oneearly discovery was that elongating andstreamlining the shape of the projectileincreased the range of a gun without anymodification whatsoever in the weapon it-self. Yet every change tended to start achain of new problems. For example, togive projectiles for heavy, mobile artillerythe best ballistic shape and maintain sta-bility in flight, designers at first resorted to

12 ODEP, II, 42-75, OHF.13 (1) Ordnance Committee Minutes (OCM) 6808,

18 Feb 28: 90927, 30 Jul 31; 10597, 6 Apr 33. AllOCM's are in Ordnance Technical Committee Secre-tariat files. (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934, par. 28.

14 (1) OCM 11364, 29 Mar 34; 11812, 6 Dec 34;14554, 30 Jun 38; 15133, 29 Jun 39. (2) Interv, 9May 50, with Robert Cuthill, Ammo Br, Ind Serv.


use of so-called false ogives, that is, lighthollow tips. Not only did these thin steelogives prove hard to manufacture and dif-ficult to secure to the projectile, they alsowere likely to be dented or injured in ship-ping. Improved shipping containers metthe latter difficulty but the false ogive wasnevertheless abandoned for all shells savethe 8-inch gun as soon as alternate designprogressed further. New testing devices,especially wind tunnels in which the airresistance of variously shaped projectilescould be measured accurately, facilitatedall work on shell design. By 1940 standardHE shell had been developed for all weap-ons from 75-mm. through 240-mm. in aseries of projectiles that had the range, ac-curacy, and killing power sought by theCaliber Board in 1919. Furthermore,small arms ammunition, mortar shells,projectiles for small caliber cannon, andpacking of all types had similarly been ex-tensively improved.15

Small Arms Projects

Notwithstanding the Ordnance De-partment's concern to improve artilleryand to achieve Westervelt's "completemotorization," development of small armsalso absorbed considerable time andmoney. Perhaps, indeed, before 1936 de-sign of a semiautomatic rifle netted moreattention than larger weapons. This con-centration of effort upon a small armsproject is probably partly attributable toits long prewar history. As early as 1900the Chief of Ordnance had proposed de-sign of a semiautomatic rifle, and from1901 to 1916 a great deal of work hadbeen expended on various experimentalmodels, both foreign and American. It wasonly logical to resume this work which,though interrupted by the war, appeared

to be well along in 1919.16 Doubtless atthat time no small arms expert would havebelieved that acceptance of a suitablemodel would take another seventeenyears. The course of events leading up toadoption of the Garand semiautomaticrifle is worth review because it well illus-trates the long-drawn-out process of get-ting matériel standardized.

In October 1919 John C. Garand wentfrom the Bureau of Standards to theSpringfield Armory on express assignmentto design a semiautomatic rifle. The prob-lem occupied other designers too, notablyCapt. Julian S. Hatcher and John D.Pedersen. With Pedersen, the Departmententered into formal contract. The charac-teristics required for an acceptable designincluded weight as close to 8 pounds aspossible and not in excess of 8.5; caliberas close as possible to .30, with .276 themimimum; muzzle velocity of at least2,450 feet per second; and accuracy up to800 yards. As the result of careful tests onseveral competing models in 1920-21, theOrdnance Committee in 1923 recom-mended that twenty-four Garand rifles bemade for test by the Infantry and Cavalry.Informed Ordnance technicians were op-timistic that acceptance would not be longdelayed; in February 1924 General Wil-liams told a House subcommittee that theOrdnance Department had a semiauto-matic rifle that promised to be satisfac-tory.17 The twenty-four rifles were com-pleted in the spring of 1925, tested atAberdeen Proving Ground, and then sentto Fort Benning, Georgia, for further

15 (1) ODEP, II, 3-40, OHF. (2) Interv, 3 May 50,with Granville M. Taliaferro, Ammo Br, R&D Serv.(3) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1939, pars. 30, 37-39, 46.

16 (1) Tests and Development of Semi-AutomaticShoulder Arms, 1900 to 1914, OHF. (2) Ann RptCofOrd, 1927, pp. 38-39.

17 WDAB 1925, HR, p. 1004.


JOHN C. GARAND, designer of the M1 rifle.

tests. On the basis of these tests SpringfieldArmory made some modifications andthen shipped the rifles to Fort Benningand to Fort Riley, Kansas, for new trials.Meanwhile, models of Pedersen's designwere tested and retested.

Expectations for quick completion of theproject were not realized. In the summerof 1929 elaborate formal tests of eighttypes of semiautomatic rifle narrowed thechoice to two, the Garand .276-caliberand the Pedersen .276-caliber. After athorough canvas of the performance andproduction problems involved in eachrifle, the special board of officers chargedwith making a final decision voted in favorof the Garand. In the interim Garand hadbegun work on a .30-caliber rifle and soonfound that the light weight believed at-

tainable only in the smaller caliber waspossible in the larger. The Chief of Staff,General Douglas MacArthur, at this pointinsisted upon abandoning work upon the.276 and concentrating upon the .30-cali-ber. By the next year Garand had com-pleted one experimental .30-caliber model,which successfully passed tests at Aber-deen.18 The Ordnance Department thenordered eighty of this model manufacturedfor final test by the using arms. SpringfieldArmory began manufacture in 1932 andfinished the job in 1934. Exhaustive testsof the seventy-five rifles sent to the Infan-

18 (1) Maj. Gen. Julian S. Hatcher, The Book of theGarand (Washington, 1948), p. 110. (2) Hist of Spring-field Armory, II, 48, 48a, 48b, OHF. Advocates ofPedersen's design long contended that his was supe-rior to the Garand, but careful study of the officialcomparative tests does not bear them out.


try and Cavalry Boards showed so manystoppages that the rifles were returned formodifications. After some redesign, Ord-nance tests indicated a greatly improvedrifle, and 1935 tests by the Infantry andCavalry Boards substantiated this find-ing.19 On 9 January 1936 the weapon wasstandardized as Rifle, Semiautomatic, M1.

Thirty-five years had elapsed since theinitiation of the project, nearly seven sincethe decision to use a .30-caliber gas-oper-ated type. The slowness of progress waspartly caused by lack of any sense ofgreat urgency. Let the new rifle be asnearly perfect as possible before standard-izing. Full approval of the using arms wasclearly desirable before accepting new orradically modified weapons, but the conse-quent delays were a drawback. Productionproblems were still to be solved. By 30June 1936 design of tools, jigs, and fixtureswas 95 percent complete, and, as moneyfor tooling became available, productiongot under way in the latter half of the year.Yet innumerable small alterations weremade during the next two years, andchanges in details of design, tests, andactual manufacture proceeded simultane-ously. By 1938 only some 2,000 rifles hadcome off the assembly line.20 The chiefconsolation over lack of quantity camefrom testimony on quality; comments ofthe troops to whom the first productionrifles were issued in August 1937 wereimmediately enthusiastic—and this despitethe high popularity of the predecessor, theSpringfield rifle M1903. With the new M1the average rifleman could fire forty shotsa minute, and some soldiers as high as ahundred a minute.21

Nevertheless, Congressional criticism ofthe slowness of work on the M1 and ofOrdnance development programs as awhole was sharp. One Congressman ob-

served in 1937, "The war has been overnearly 20 years, and we have 80 semi-automatics in the service; and we are stillexperimenting." 22 As far back as 1926 theSecretary of War had tried to hasten theprocess of standardization of all matériel,but in 1935 the Chief of Staff was still con-cerned with the problem. At its root lay aphilosophy of perfection held by manymembers of the General Staff, the usingarms, and the Ordnance Departmentitself. General Malin Craig, Chief of Stafffrom 1935 to 1939, proposed a system ofyearly standardization and annual revi-sion that resulted in a directive orderinguse in the 1937 program of only standard-ized equipment, and freezing the design ofstandardized items from the moment costestimates were submitted until manufac-ture was concluded.23 But this measurewas at best only an alleviation. Difficultiescontinued. Unequal rates of standardiza-tion of closely related items caused greattrouble. For example, the 37-mm. infantrygun and carriage was standardized in 1937but had no ammunition approved foruse.24 Furthermore, unequal rates of stand-ardization of particular components heldup acceptance of end items. Of the searchfor ideal weapons and the delays that

19 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934, par. 37a; 1935, par.41a. (2) Hatcher, op. cit., p. 113.

20 Hist of Springfield Armory, II, 74-75, OHF.21 Frank J. Jervey, "The New Semiautomatic

Rifle," Army Ordnance, XIX, 113 (1938), 147.22 WDAB 1938, HR, pp. 372-78.23 (1) Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, National Security

and the General Staff (Washington, 1946), p. 302. (2)OCM 7814, 22 Aug 29, p. 27. (3) Memo, CofS forDCofS, 20 Nov 35, sub: Standardization, AG 111(11-20-35), DRB AGO. (4) Memo, DCofS for TAG,25 Nov 35, sub: Standardization, AG 111 (11-25-35),DRB AGO.

24 Memo, CofOrd for Ord Tech Staff, 1 Jul 37, sub:Procurement Planning and Standardization of Mate-riel, OO 381/8055, NA.


search entailed, one observer later wrote:"The best is the enemy of the good." 25

Not all development projects, to be sure,ran an unduly long course. Modificationand redesign of machine guns, begunimmediately after World War I, madecomparatively rapid progress. Efforts toimprove the ballistic and cooling charac-teristics of the earlier .30-caliber Browningmachine guns produced the M1919A4 in1925, while later collaboration of Ord-nance, Air Corps, and Colt Company rep-resentatives developed the .30-caliber M2,which could be either fixed or flexible andpermitted either right- or left-hand feed.Similarly useful work on mounts went for-ward.26 Still more significant in terms ofWorld War II was the development of the.50-caliber machine gun. In 1930 whenthe water-cooled .50-caliber Browning ma-chine gun, M1921A, was standardized, theCoast Artillery was satisfied, but AirCorps, Infantry, and Cavalry still lackedwhat the Chief of Ordnance described as"suitably specialized Brownings."27 TheAir Corps needed lightness, rapid rates offire, and right- and left-hand belt feeds;tanks required heavy barrel guns with re-liable cooling systems. Neither the usingarms nor the Ordnance Department be-lieved it possible to have a single machinegun serve several diverse purposes, but inthe two years between 1931 and 1933 Dr.Samuel G. Green of the Ordnance Depart-ment succeeded in modifying the Brown-ing to make a single basic gun which,varied by special features for special pur-poses, could meet requirements for all serv-ices. The new model, the .50-caliber M2,was so designed that the operating mecha-nism was the same for each type of gun.The heavy barrel of the tank gun, thewater jacket, sleeve, and 45-inch barrel ofthe antiaircraft gun, and the lighter parts

of the aircraft gun, could each be affixedwithout modification of the receiver. Herewas an outstanding achievement, the bene-fits of which were to be felt all duringWorld War II; manufacturing, mainte-nance, and troop training were all easedby this simplification of design.

When the Spanish Civil War providedevidence of the operational value of vari-ous items of ordnance, American expertsbegan to question whether the .50-calibermachine gun were not really obsolete bothfor aircraft and antimechanized use. Theusing arms therefore ran large-scale tests ofthe .50-caliber in competition with severaltypes of light automatic cannon. The ver-dict was in favor of the machine gun.28

Artillery Projects

While small arms improvements, albeitslow, were thus reasonably satisfactory,artillery development, the primary objec-tive of the Westervelt Board report, madescant headway. The program of researchand development had started off energeti-cally in 1919 and 1920, but with the reduc-tion in funds after 1921 it contracted "tocover reasonably well only infantry, packand divisional matériel, the smallest cali-

25 Rpt from London, 31 Jul 40, sub: Mobilizationof Industry, Rearmament Policies, 2724-A38/12 IG6620, G-2 file.

26 (1) Lt Col Emanuel Schugar, Mr. William H.Davis, and Maj Berkeley R. Lewis, sub: UnitedStates Machine Guns, Caliber .30 and .50, PSP 36, pp.21, 48, OHF. (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1925, p. 37; 1927,par. 60.

27 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1930, passim. For earlier workupon .50-caliber machine guns see: (1) PSP, 36, p. 25,OHF; (2) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1926, par. 54, and 1927,par. 57; (3) Proceedings Coast Arty Bd, 15 May 23,sub: Project 82, Test of .50-caliber MG, OO472.54/1143, NA; (4) Proceedings Coast Arty Bd, 17Jan 25, sub: Project 324, Mount for Cal. .50 MG, OO473.93/572, NA; and (5) OCM 4425, 29 Jan 25.

28 (1) PSP 36, pp. 23, 30-32, 58-60, OHF. (2)Interv with Dr. Samuel G. Green, 27 Jun 49.


THE 75-MM. GUN M1923E. This is the improved model.

ber of antiaircraft matériel and one type oftank."29 Corps, army, and seacoast artil-lery projects, relegated to second place,scarcely moved forward at all. When, forexample, tests of 240-mm. howitzer maté-riel, conducted at Fort Bragg, North Caro-lina, in 1924 and 1925, showed the need ofmodifications, the work was indefinitelypostponed till money should be available.30

The smaller calibers fared somewhatbetter. Completion of a satisfactory 75-mm. mortar, the 1922E, was a source ofspecial gratification, inasmuch as its prede-cessor, the Stokes mortar used in WorldWar I, had proved dangerous to the user.The new mortar had a 50 percent greatermuzzle velocity, 150 percent greater range,and fired a standard artillery-type shell

with fragmentation superior to that of theStokes mortar.31 Ordnance engineers alsotook pride in the design and manufactureof a 75-mm. gun to supersede the French75, which the AEF used in World War I.Between 1920 and 1925 the Ordnance De-partment spent over $500,000 on thisassignment and turned out eight differentmodels. After thorough testing by the FieldArtillery, the 1923E with split-trail car-riage was standardized in 1926, and the

29 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1924, p. 11.30 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1925, pp. 14-15.31 (1) WDAB 1927, HR, pp. 278-79. (2) Ann Rpt

CofOrd, 1927. par. 63. (3) ODEP, I, 29-30; II, 20,OHF.

Most of the trouble with the Stokes mortar camefrom the fuze, which was not bore safe. Caliber BdRpt, p. 21, OKD 334.3/1.3, Ord Tech Intel files.


next year the Field Artillery received itsfirst battery of these new 75's.32 As aircraftassumed a larger role, attention focused onantiaircraft weapons, particularly a 3-inchgun. Joint antiaircraft exercises held yearlyafter 1925 by the Air Corps, Signal Corps,Corps of Engineers, Coast Artillery Corps,and Ordnance Department gave oppor-tunity to test all features of new matériel.The performance of the 3-inch antiaircraftgun, standardized in 1926, and of newcomputers, searchlights, and sound-locatorsystems was considered good, although thepercentage of hits on aerial targets re-mained low. In the manufacture of the3-inch gun, Watertown Arsenal appliedfor the first time in production the processof autofrettage or radial expansion. WhileFrench producers had long used this proc-ess, improvements in the method devisedby arsenal engineers produced a superiorforging so quickly and economically thatthe technique was soon applied to manu-facture of other guns. Another innovationwas the use of removable liners on the3-inch gun, a scheme that the Chief ofOrdnance estimated as saving 50 percentof the cost of retubing by earlier proc-esses.33 But since the gun had to be re-turned to the arsenal to have the linerreplaced, the advantage of the system dur-ing World War II was nil.

These achievements were only a fractionof what Ordnance Department plans en-compassed. Modernization of existing gunsand carriages about 1930 was given prece-dence over development of new with theresult, deplored by many officers, thatdesign of new matériel was brought prac-tically to a standstill for some years.34 Thescope of research and development workon artillery before 1940 is perhaps bestshown by sketching the progress on fouritems. The choice of the 75-mm. pack how-

itzer, the 37-mm. antitank gun, and the105-mm. and 240-mm. howitzers is basedupon the contemporary importance at-tached to the first two and upon the faithcombat troops later placed in the last two.

75-mm. Pack Howitzer

The 75-mm. pack howitzer belongs tothe specialized group of weapons assignedfor use in mountainous country where mo-torized or horse-drawn artillery cannot go.Easy disassembly for packing on mule-back is essential. Before World War I theOrdnance Department had spent a gooddeal of effort designing a mountain gunbetter than the English Vickers-Maxim2.95-inch then in use, but the project wasdropped when it was apparent that theAEF would have no use for mountainguns. In 1919 the Westervelt Board, reviv-ing the project pronounced a pack how-itzer to be "one of the items of artillery inmost urgent need of development." 35 Theideal weapon should have a caliber ofabout 3 inches, possible elevation of 45degrees, a minimum range of at least 5,000yards, and should be capable of beingpacked in four separate loads of about 225

32 (1) ODEP, I, 87, 101, OHF. (2) Ann RptCofOrd, 1926, par. 59; 1927, par. 66.

33 (1) APG, Rpt of AA Exercises by 61st CA (AA)and Ord Pers at APG, 7 Sep-8 Nov 26, pp. 1-4,58-59. (2) APG, Rpt of AA Exercises . . . 1927, pp.58-66; 1928, pp. 99-107, 121-38; 1929, pp. 56-57,63-64; 1930. p. 29, charts facing pp. 30, 51. Bothin NA.

For Congressional interest in antiaircraft tests see:WDAB 1929. HR, pp. 519-23; Ann Rpt CofOrd,1925, pars. 62, 104; 1926, pars. 92, 93; and ODEP, I,84, 212, OHF.

34 Memo, Maj J. H. Wallace, FA, for ChairmanOrd Tech Committee, 13 Dec 34, sub: PreliminaryEstimates for FY 1937, Project 5-R&D, AG 111(12-13-34), NA.

35 Caliber Bd Rpt, pars. 70-71, OKD 334.3/1.3,Ord Tech Intel files.


THE 75-MM. PACK HOWITZER M1920. The tube load is shown here; the recupera-tor and other four loads are packed similarly.

pounds each. A first postwar model, theM1920 which incorporated these features,was soon found unsatisfactory, chiefly be-cause recuperator, piston rod, and trailwere inadequate.36 The next six years sawintensive work on models designed to cor-rect these weaknesses and to furnish amountain gun at least as powerful as newforeign types. Greater range was particu-larly desired. The weapon standardized in1927 as the 75-mm. Pack Howitzer M1had a range of 9,200 yards and weighed1,269 pounds in firing position. It tookrank as one of the most efficient artilleryweapons yet devised.37 The Chief of FieldArtillery asserted: "It is a remarkableweapon with a great future . . . . In its

adaptability under pack it has exceededany expectations which could reasonablyhave been held considering the power ofthe weapon." 38 Some modifications, chieflyof the recoil mechanism, and a new car-riage were completed during the thirties.

36 (1) Ibid. (2) OCM 1621, 16 Aug 21.37 E. C. Goebert, "Our New Pack Artillery," Army

Ordnance, XIII, 75 (1932), 144-50. Maj. JonathanW. Anderson, FA, had submitted a summary of for-eign weapons in May 1922 upon which the OrdnanceCommittee based its decisions to redesign the Ameri-can model. See: (1) memo, Maj Anderson, FA repre-sentative on Ord Committee, for CofOrd, 4 May 22,sub: Pack Artillery Materiel, with atchd rpt, OO455.5/133, NA; and (2) OCM 2260, 21 Jul 22; 6407,12 Aug 27; 6499, 22 Sep 27.

38 OCM 6407, 11 Aug 27, and incl, ltr, CofFA toCofOrd.


But in spite of faith in the usefulness of thisweapon, only thirty-two pack howitzershad been manufactured by 1 July 1940.39

37-mm. Antitank Gun

What the ideal future antitank gunshould be the Caliber Board made noattempt in its 1919 report to state in detail,for the board assumed that developmentsof tank armor would necessitate use of abase-fuzed shell, probably of about 75-mm.caliber.40 It was a singularly propheticview. While a 37-mm. model for the Infan-try was designed and standardized in thelate twenties, development of a modernantitank gun was not begun in earnestuntil 1936. Long before then, Europeannations had been working on so-calledantimechanization weapons. Abroad, stop-ping the tank was considered the numberone military problem. In America as lateas the summer of 1931, the Field ArtilleryBoard had announced its continuing con-fidence in the recommendations of theCaliber Board of twelve years before: .50-caliber machine guns, 37-mm. guns witharmor-piercing shot, and 75-mm. gunswere suitable means of attacking tanksas built in World War I. "There has been,"stated the Field Artillery Board, "nochange in armor protection since then towarrant changing the recommendations ofthe [Caliber] Board."41

When the service tests conducted in1932 convinced both the Field Artilleryand the Infantry that the 37-mm. gun, theM2A1, should be marked for obsolescence,the Infantry was left with only an ineffec-tive 1916 37-mm. model. It was anotherthree years before the using arms proposeddevelopment of a weapon based upon re-vised military characteristics. Tests of aHotchkiss 25-mm. automatic antitank gun

during 1935 had produced little useful in-formation. Then in December reportsfrom the military observer in Berlin stirredthe Field Artillery and the Infantry to re-quest trial of a German antitank gun thatthe Rheinmetall Company was offering toforeign governments for test and quantitypurchase.42 This launched the OrdnanceDepartment upon serious study of anti-mechanization weapons.

After formal request of the Infantry fora new 37-mm. gun and the purchase of aRheinmetall model for test, Infantry,Field Artillery, and Ordnance spent overa year preparing, revising, and again re-stating desired military characteristics inkeeping with what was feasible.43 In Sep-tember 1937 the Chief of Staff injected anote of unexpected urgency in his instruc-tions to the Chief of Ordnance:

2. It appears that none of the greaterPowers have failed to develop and to havenow in use effective anti-tank and intermedi-ate anti-aircraft weapons, while we, on theother hand, have no weapons of this typewhatever.

3. I regard it as of urgent importance thatthe Ordnance Department concentrate in-

39 (1) Ltr. CofFA thru CofOrd to TAG, 18 Jan 29,sub: Procurement of 75mm Pack Howitzer Materiel,OO 472.2/626, NA. (2) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 10 Apr30, sub: War Reserve of 75mm Pack HowitzerAmmunition, OO 472.12/1406, NA. (3) OCM 9201,1 Oct 31 and 11660, 16 Aug 34. (4) Folders in OO472.2/1801-1950, Oct 39-Apr 40, NA. (5) GeneralSupply Div, FS, Consolidated Supply Rpt, Status ofPrincipal Items of Ord General Supply as of 1 Nov 39(Form 87), NA.

40 Caliber Bd Rpt, par. 76, OKD 334.3/1.3, OrdTech Intel files.

41 OCM 9145, 27 Aug 31.42 (1) OCM 10350, 15 Dec 33; 11397, 5 Apr 34;

11622, 26 Jul 34; 12558, 19 Dec 35. (2) FA Bd Rpt053-C, 19 Dec 35, NA.

43 (1) OCM 13348, 14 Jan 37; 13473, 25 Feb 37;13665, 8 May 37. (2) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 30 Aug37, OO 472.1/3367, NA. (3) Ltr, CofOrd to CofS, 2Sep 37, sub: Antitank and Antiaircraft Development,OO 472/3371, NA.


THE 37-MM. GUN M1916, with flash hider attached to barrel.

tensively on the development of efficientweapons of these two types, putting both ofthem on an equal first priority, and procur-ing, or developing something which hasalready been procured, so that in time ofneed we may be on a substantially equalfooting with a possible enemy.44

The program from that moment movedmore quickly. The comparison of the Ger-man 37-mm. gun with the American ex-perimental model evolved during 1937appeared to be all in favor of the latter.Where the German gun with a muzzle ve-locity of 2,650 feet per second would pene-trate 1 5/8-inch armor plate at 730 yards atnormal angle of fire and at 440 yards at a20 degree angle, the American gun with amuzzle velocity of 2,600 feet per secondwould penetrate at 1,060 yards and 800yards respectively. A French 25-mm. anda German 47-mm. gave less satisfactory

performance than either 37-mm. TheChief of Infantry therefore recommendedthat the specifications of the new mediumtank then under consideration include ar-mament of the "37-mm. anti-tank gunnow being developed by the OrdnanceDepartment."45 The design that waseventually accepted closely resembled theGerman Rheinmetall weapon though, bythe time the American 37-mm. antitankgun M3 was adopted, the German Armyhad antitank weapons ranging from 50 to80-mm., and the Red Army had an excel-

44 Memo, CofS for CofOrd, 3 Sep 37, sub: Antitankand Intermediate AA Development, OO 472/3373,NA.

45 Memo, CofInf thru CofOrd for TAG, 16 Nov 37,sub: Characteristics of Medium Tank T5, OI-470.8/550-B, cited in 37-mm Guns M5 and M6, PSP28, OHF.


lent 45-mm. gun battle-tested in the Span-ish Civil War.4 6

The American gun was designed for usenot only on tanks but also as a light fieldgun mounted on its own carriage, adaptedto towing either by truck or tractor or byits crew of four men. Hence the Infantrywas insistent that the weight of gun andcarriage together must not exceed 1,000pounds. This weight limit precluded a gunof larger caliber. The gun itself was basi-cally one and the same whether mountedon a carriage or in a tank, but because thegun when mounted in a tank had to beshortened six inches, it was redesignatedthe 37-mm. M5, and later, with a changein the breech mechanism, the M6. Theantitank gun M3, for mounting upon thecarriage M4, kept a hand-operated breechmechanism. This gun was 6 feet 10.5inches long, weighed 191 pounds, had amuzzle velocity of 2,600 feet per second, arange of about 12,000 yards, and couldfire 25 rounds a minute. Ordnance engi-neers expended only less effort upon thecarriage than upon the gun, inasmuch asthe traverse, elevating mechanism, andlocking devices were fixed to the carriage.47

The requirement for ammunition wasarmor-piercing shot capable of penetrat-ing 1.5 inches of armor on impact 20 de-grees from normal at a range of 1,000yards. By 1938 armor-piercing shot M51was standardized with tracer, and lateralso a high-explosive shell with the M38A1base detonating fuze.48

Thus, some four years were devoted todevelopment of the U.S. Army's first anti-tank gun which, in terms of what theSoviet Union and Germany had ready by1939, was obsolete before it was standard-ized. From a military observer in Europeword had come of developments in Ger-many, and observers in Spain during the

Spanish Civil War had opportunity tonote the outstanding performance of theRussian 45-mm. antitank gun. Yet the de-cision to push the 37-mm. was notrescinded. In August 1938, before theOrdnance Department had proceeded farwith procurement, the War Departmentissued explicit instructions to the Chief ofOrdnance:

1. The Infantry is designated as the mostinterested using arm for the 37mm antitankgun under AR 850-25.

2. No development funds will be expendedby the Ordnance Department during theFiscal Years 1939 or 1940 in the developmentof antimechanized weapons of larger than37mm caliber. If the necessity for an anti-tank gun of larger than 37mm caliber de-velops, the arm responsible for its develop-ment will be designated at that time.49

This decision of the General Staff, closingthe door to alternative design, was de-plored by many Ordnance officers. Thechief of the Artillery Branch of the Manu-facturing Division from 1937 to 1939 laterstated:

The Ordnance Department was wellaware that the 37mm gun was totally inade-quate as an antitank gun, and many and re-peated efforts were made to convince thevarious interested using services personnel ofthis fact.

The Infantry personnel were very muchimpressed with the compact design of theRheinmetall 37 and at one time in fact de-manded a duplicate. The deciding criterionwas the overall weight . . . 850 pounds.

46 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, Compari-son of American, German, and Japanese Ordnance,II, 156-57. (2) Dept of the Army Pamphlet 30-2,"The Soviet Army," Jul 49, p. 22.

47 OCM 14572, 14 Jul 38; 14762, 27 Oct 38; 14824,15 Dec 38; 15404, 10 Oct 39; 16197, 22 Oct 40; 16279,19 Nov 40.

48 OCM 14801, 25 Nov 38; 15105, 15 Jun 39.49 Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 11 Aug 38, sub: Responsi-

bility for Development of Antitank Guns and of Tacti-cal Doctrine for Their Use, OO 472.1/1736, NA.


This was considered the maximum that fourmen could comfortably wheel over theground.

It is my opinion that all of the early artil-lery of World War II . . . suffered from thecontinued insistence by the using arms onmobility even at the expense of strikingpower.50

This testimony leads to the conclusionthat General Williams' scheme of allowingthe using arms to have the final say abouttypes of equipment had been carried to anextreme where Ordnance experts could nolonger greatly influence important deci-sions. Yet a proposal of the Field Artilleryin December 1938 indicates that the Ord-nance Department missed an opportunitypartially to redeem the error imposed bythe Infantry demand for a light mobilegun and the consequent directive to de-sign nothing larger. The Chief of FieldArtillery, citing observers' information onthe antitank guns being built in Europe,requested that the War Department's in-structions be rescinded and a more power-ful weapon be produced for the Field Ar-tillery. The proposal was for a truck-drawn weapon weighing about 1,500pounds with a muzzle velocity sufficient topenetrate 2.5-inch armor at impact 20degrees from normal at a range of 1,000yards. But the Chief of Ordnance objectedthat the introduction of an additionalweapon with new types of ammunitionwould complicate production and supply,that the 75-mm. howitzer and 75-mm.field gun effectively supplemented the 37-mm. as antitank weapons, and that thegun requested by the Field Artillery couldnot weigh less than 2,700 pounds. TheField Artillery withdrew its request.51 Six-teen months later the Chief of Staff re-viewed the question. "It occurs to me,"wrote General Marshall in June 1940,"that we should initiate development of a

heavier caliber antitank gun than the 37-mm. Reports from abroad indicate thatthe 37-mm. has been found comparativelyineffective against the heavier type tankarmor and that a 47-mm. gun (possibly ona self-propelled mount) may be necessaryas an arm for corps and division antiair-craft battalions." 52

General Wesson's reply evinced no cor-responding anxiety. He repeated the sub-stance of his earlier statement that for itsweight the 37-mm. antitank gun was veryeffective; it would penetrate the armor onAmerican light and medium tanks. The47-mm. a study of which had been con-ducted in 1939, was not enough morepowerful than the 37-mm. to justify de-velopment. At least a 57-mm. would beneeded, and in view of the existence ofthe 75-mm. field gun, work on a 57-mm.seemed uncalled for. The 37-mm. supple-mented by the 75-mm. with armor-pierc-ing ammunition appeared to be adequate,though perhaps a more powerful gunmight be needed to combat heavy tanks.53

In conclusion he declared that the bestway to supply self-propelled antitank ar-tillery was to mount antitank guns ontanks.54 Six weeks later an observer in

50 Ltr, Col Steven L. Conner to author, 16 Jan 50.OHF.

51 (1) Memo, CofFA thru CofOrd for TAG, 6 Dec38, sub: Antitank Gun of Caliber Larger than 37mm.(2) Ibid., 1st Ind, CofOrd for TAG, 12 Dec 38. (3)Ibid., 3d Ind. CofFA for TAG. 1 Feb 39. All in OO472.5/9884, NA.

52 Memo. CofS for ACofS G-4, 3 Jun 40, atchd tomemo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 6 Jun 40, sub: Devel-opment of Heavier Antitank Gun . . . , OO472.1/2821, DRB AGO.

53 Seventeen months later the 3-inch gun M5 wasaccepted as the ant i tank weapon for use against themost heavily armored tanks. OCM 1 7407, 6 Nov 41.See Ch. X, below.

54 Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 7 Jun 40, sub:Employment of Antitank Artillery and AA Artilleryin Antimechanized Defense, OO 472/3674, DRBAGO.


London was again to protest large-scaleproduction of an "antitank gun whosepower does not guarantee success in en-gaging tanks known to be used by anyprospective enemy."55 But the programfor 37-mm. antitank guns continued.56

105-mm. Howitzer

In World War I the United States Armyhad used the .155-mm. howitzer as a divi-sional artillery piece, but its unsuitabilitiesfor that purpose—its lack of sufficientmobility to be a companion piece to the75-mm. gun, its wasteful consumption ofammunition, and its lack of volume offire—combined to convince the WesterveltBoard that a howitzer of about 105-mm.caliber should be developed. The reason-ing of the board was stated thus:

The consensus of opinion of artillery offi-cers is that the division artillery missions arebest fulfilled by a light field gun and a lightfield howitzer. . . . There are many in-stances where the terrain offers such protec-tion to infantry that the field gun cannotbring an effective fire. The howitzer has thegreat advantage that with a proper set ofcharges and therefore a choice of trajec-tories for the same range, protected positionscan be chosen for howitzers that guns couldnot use, and angles of fall on objectives ob-tained that the normal ammunition of gunswould not give. The low muzzle velocity ofhowitzers admits of their use in harassing fireand allows the use of a projectile double theweight of that of the field gun. Such a how-itzer renders excellent service in wire cuttingand is a useful projector of gas shells. To in-sure the mobility required of all divisionalartillery, the weight of the howitzer and car-riage should not exceed that of the field gunand carriage, or about 4,500 pounds.57

The board specified a howitzer mountedon a carriage permitting a vertical arc offire of from minus 5 degrees to plus 65 de-

grees and a horizontal arc of fire of 360degrees. The carriage should be usable in-terchangeably for either howitzers or divi-sional light guns. The projectile shouldweigh about 30 to 35 pounds and shouldinclude both shrapnel and shell. A maxi-mum range of 12,000 yards would answer.Semifixed ammunition and zone chargeswere to be used.

Based upon this recommendation, ex-perienced Field Artillery and Ordnanceofficers jointly drew up specifications, andin 1920 four carriages and four howitzerswere built for test. These models were un-satisfactory. In the course of the next year,at the request of the Field Artillery, a box-trail carriage was designed and tried outwith some success, although the Field Ar-tillery Board was unwilling to abandonaltogether the split-trail type of carriagebecause of the wider traverse it permitted.In the meantime, while the Ordnance De-partment worked upon improved Ameri-can models of both carriage and howitzer,the Field Artillery tested some of the Ger-man 105's, captured in World War I andrechambered to take American ammuni-tion. The using arm's enthusiasm over theGerman matériel was such that the FieldArtillery Board recommended its adop-tion for service use, but shortage of properammunition, the cost of putting the 300German howitzers into condition, and thelack of uniformity in those on hand fromwhich to prepare drawings for later quan-tity production led the Chief of Ordnanceto protest. The decision of the GeneralStaff was therefore to put the German

55 Radiogram, London to MID G-2, 21 Jul 40, sub:Selection of Production Types, 2724A38/11, IG 6620,DRB AGO.

56 See below, Ch. XI.57 Caliber Bd Rpt, par. 8, OKD 334.3/1.3, Ord

Tech Intel files.


howitzers in storage and have one batteryof four new American models manufac-tured for service test.58

For the next three years work upon the105 was pushed as rapidly as appropria-tions allowed, for, as the Chief of Ord-nance announced in 1926, the develop-ment of a satisfactory 105-mm. howitzerwas considered the most pressing Ord-nance problem. Some $400,000 had beenspent upon the project since the end of thewar. Cancellation of the requirement of acarriage so constructed as to be inter-changeable for gun or howitzer hastenedsuccessful design of a carriage, and inJanuary 1928 a split-trail type manufac-tured at Rock Island Arsenal was stand-ardized as the carriage M1. The howitzerstandardized at the same time had a rangejust under the 12,000 yards desired. Agreater deviation from the original specifi-cations was a horizontal traverse of only45 degrees instead of the 360 degrees stipu-lated at first. Over-all weight of howitzerand carriage was 3,750 pounds.59 Beforeany of this model was produced, modifica-tion of the chamber was initiated in orderto make possible loading of shrapnel asfixed ammunition. The altered howitzerwas called the M2 and officially adoptedin 1934. Later, the requirement for shrap-nel was canceled.60

Fourteen M2 models were manufac-tured and twelve were issued to the FieldArtillery for extended service test between1928 and 1933. Two were kept at Aber-deen Proving Ground for use in develop-ing ammunition. The howitzer provedsatisfactory, but in 1933 the Field Artil-lery requested redesign of the carriage toprovide high-speed characteristics and toeliminate the need of a recoil pit. Afterthorough study of the problem, design of

a new recoil mechanism and of a lightercarriage equipped with pneumatic tiresand antifriction bearings began in 1936.Though a satisfactory recoil mechanismwas completed in 1939, both experimentalcarriages had deficiencies. Reduction ofweight was particularly important; to ef-fect this, new military characteristics weredrawn up. Of the two new models de-signed according to the revised specifica-tions, the Field Artillery Board in January1940 pronounced one acceptable if certainminor defects were corrected in produc-tion models.61 The carriage M2 was ac-cordingly standardized on 28 March 1940.

Thirteen of the existing fourteen M1carriages were modified by adding adap-ters, drawbars, and brakes to make themsuitable for use as truck-drawn artillery,and these modified carriages, designatedM1A1, were classified as limited standard.At the same time design of the howitzerwas slightly altered by change in the trig-ger shaft and minor redimensioning ofother parts. These changes, applied on aproduction order for forty-eight M2 how-itzers placed in the summer of 1939, oc-casioned the change in nomenclature tothe 105-mm. howitzer M2A1.62 This was

58 (1) ODEP, I, 106-11, OHF. (2) Memo, CofFAfor CofOrd. 16 May 23, sub: Rpt of Tests of 105 mmHowitzers by FA Bd, OO 472.22/117, NA. (3) Memo,CofFA for CofOrd. 22 Oct 23, sub: Modification of105 mm Howitzers, OO 472.22/124, NA. (4) 4th Indto memo in (3), CofOrd for TAG, 3 1 Jan 25, sub:Approval of Rpt on Test of 105 Howitzers. (5) 5thInd to memo in (3), TAG thru CofOrd for CofFA, 14Feb 25. Last two in OO 472.22/141 , NA.

59 (1) ODEP, I, 105-29, OHF. (2) Ann RptCofOrd. 1926, pp. 13-14; 1927, par. 68; 1928, par. 58.(3) OCM 6684, 5 Jan 28.

60 OCM 11395. 5 Apr 34; 11933, 24 Jan 35.61 OCM 11020, 5 Oct 33; 12968, 2 Jul 36; 13051,

13 Aug 36; 15639, 23 Feb 40. OCM 15639 gives acomplete history of the project from 1933 on.62 OCM 15639, 23 Feb 40; 15692, 28 Mar 40.


the divisional artillery piece that reachedquantity production early in the war and,used in numbers by troops in every the-atre, won the appellation, "work-horse ofthe Army." Its rate of fire was twentyrounds a minute; it fired thirteen differentkinds of shell.

240-mm. Howitzer

The 240-mm. howitzer developmentproject is of peculiar interest, in spite of itsshort span of life during the peace years,for the plan to design a self-propelledmount for so big a weapon was audaciousin 1919. Like the other major artilleryitems upon which Ordnance designersworked before 1940, the original impetusto develop this huge howitzer came fromthe Caliber Board. Intent upon roundingout divisional and corps artillery withpowerful field army pieces, the CaliberBoard recommended an 8-inch gun with amaximum range of 35,000 yards and a240-mm. howitzer with maximum rangeof 25,000 yards. The 240-mm. howitzer1918M1 of World War I with a range ofabout 16,000 yards would serve as a pointof departure in designing the more power-ful weapon, but the carriage, to be of atype requiring the least possible prepara-tion for firing, was a knottier problem. "Notype of road mount is known which is sat-isfactory in this respect," stated the report,"but the Board has in mind the develop-ment of a caterpillar type. The maximumspeed need not exceed six miles perhour." 63 Its difficulties notwithstanding,this project was included in the list of de-velopments upon which the Ordnance De-partment immediately embarked. But the240-mm., because of the high cost of de-veloping it, stood low on the list.

In March 1920 the Artillery Division ofthe Ordnance Department informed theTechnical Staff that mounting on a cater-pillar-type carriage a howitzer of thepower recommended would bring theweight to some 115,000 pounds, far in ex-cess of the 40-ton limit the Corps of Engi-neers set for its highway bridges. Dividingthe load would therefore be necessary.64

Accordingly, after careful study of alter-natives, the decision was reached a yearlater to design a caterpillar mount drivenby an electric motor supplied with powerfrom a gas-electric generator set upon aseparate vehicle. The specifications alsocalled for a howitzer with a vertical arc offire from zero degrees to 65 degrees andfor a 345-pound projectile. In order to as-semble ballistic data, firing tests of theFrench Schneider 240-mm. howitzerM1918 and the American model 1918M1proceeded at both Aberdeen ProvingGround and Fort Bragg during the suc-ceeding two years, but no draftsman wasassigned to design of the carriage. Whilethe Ordnance Department realized thatthe problems involved must make redesignof the howitzer and new design of the car-riage a time-consuming undertaking, thepriority given the project was too low topermit it to survive the cuts in appropria-tions of 1924. It was suspended till moremoney would be available. That time didnot come for over fifteen years.65

63 (1) Caliber Bd Rpt. par. 48, OKD 334.3/1.3, OrdTech Intel files. (2) Crowell. America's Munitions,1917-1918. pp. 83-86.

64 Memo, Col G. F. Jenks for Technical Staff, 23Mar 20, sub: 240-mm. Materiel, copy in PSP 26, De-sign, Development and Production of Heavy MobileArtillery. OHF.

65 (1) OCM 1355, 29 Mar 21; 1585. 29 Jun 21;1594, 9 Aug 21; 2199, 9 Jun 22; 3156, 27 Jun 23; 4110,8 Sep 24. (2) ODEP, I. 155, 176, OHF. (3) Ann RptCofOrd. 1925. pp. 14-15. See above, Ch. II.


Development of Combat Vehicles

Tank Doctrine and Policy Statements

For tanks, problems in research and de-velopment were heightened by difficultiesthat did not obtain in other fields. Experi-mentation with small arms and smallarms ammunition had been a major con-cern of the Ordnance Department for overa hundred years. For artillery, the CaliberBoard's recommendations of 1919 createda consistent pattern of development,whether acceptable to the using arms inall particulars or not. But for tank develop-ment, the War Department made nosuch far-sighted, long-term plans. Sugges-tions from the Chief of Ordnance in Octo-ber 1919 that a tank board be appointedto recommend a permanent tank develop-ment policy netted no action. In fact,within the next few months the GeneralStaff, without making any study of the fu-ture of combat vehicles, arrived at two im-portant decisions that gravely and mostadversely affected development for yearsto come.

The first decision was to abolish theTank Corps created in 1918. The TankCorps, the only unit of the U.S. Army thathad war experience with tanks, was im-bued with enthusiasm and possessed ofprogressive ideas on tank development.The dispersal of the corps was dishearten-ing to tank advocates and, as one officerlater wrote, "was a clear indication thatthe future use of tanks in war was consid-ered of little importance." 66 The seconddecision, assignment of tanks exclusivelyto the Infantry, soon proved to be stillmore shortsighted. Other nations, to besure, at the time were similarly makingthe tank an adjunct of the Infantry, but inthe United States the General Staff got

this decree incorporated as law in the1920 National Defense Act. The purposewas to prevent the Tank Corps from everbeing reconstituted to plague the Infantryand other arms as a separate mechanizedforce comparable to the Air arm. The re-sult was twofold: for years it precluded thegrowth of any interest in cross-countrycombat vehicles by arms other than theInfantry, and later, when interest widened,it hampered plans to extend the use oftanks in war. As long as tanks were re-garded solely as support for the riflemenin attack, Infantry concepts of their usenecessarily predominated. When early inthe thirties the Chief of Staff recognizedthe interest of the Cavalry in mechanizedequipment, the War Department had toresort to elaborations of nomenclature inorder to adhere to the letter of the law:Cavalry tanks were labeled combat carsuntil in 1940 a separate Armored Forcewas established.

In the year following the Armistice,while the Ordnance Department waitedfor the General Staff to announce its policyon postwar tank development, Maj. R. E.Carlson, an American member of theAnglo-American Tank Commission, madea complete survey of the situation andtendered recommendations on types forfuture development.67 With these data asa guide and with the approval of the Chiefof the Tank Corps and the Chief of Infan-try, the Ordnance Department then em-barked upon design of a fast medium tank.But tanks are costly. Obviously it was un-

66 Maj Gen Charles L. Scott, Comments for Hist ofDevelopment of Combat Vehicles, 2 Mar 50 (here-after cited as Scott Comments for Hist of CombatVehicles), OHF.

67 Maj R. E. Carlson, Paper on Development ofTanks, 16 Mar 21, OKD 451.25/56, Ord Tech Intelfiles.


sound to spend large sums of money inproducing models that the General Staffwould not approve. In a machine so com-plex as a tank, achieving one desiredcharacteristic often necessitates sacrifice ofanother. Determination of what is to be aprimary consideration in design, what asecondary, must depend on clear under-standing of the tactical use intended.Though the Infantry, as the using armafter June 1920, was charged with stipu-lating the tactical requirements for tanks,these requirements in turn had to fit thegeneral principles of use which only theGeneral Staff was empowered to decide.

Between 1919 and 1922 the GeneralStaff made no move to commit itself. TheOrdnance Department had already spentmuch money on tank development. Someofficial statement of policy was imperative.In March 1921 the Ordnance Depart-ment submitted to the War Departmentan expanded version of the Carlson reportand two and a half months later requesteda formal declaration of approved policyand tactical requirements for all tanks.The answer, sent in an indorsementthrough The Adjutant General's office inApril 1922, established the principal basisfor tank development for the next decade.It read:

1. The primary mission of the tank is tofacilitate the uninterrupted advance of theriflemen in the attack. Its size, armament,speed and all the accessories for making it anoffensive force must be approached withabove mission as the final objective to be ob-tained in development.

2. As a matter of economy and simplicityin organization, the number of types of tanksshould be kept at a minimum. Reliance can-not safely be placed on a single type of tank,but two types, a light and a medium, shouldbe capable of fulfilling all assigned missions.

3. These types should be as follows:(a) The light tank not exceeding 5 tons

in weight and capable of being transportedon heavy motor trucks.

(b) The medium tank not exceeding 15tons in weight, thereby bringing it withinthe limits of average highway bridges, thecapacity of railroads and the limit of 15tons placed by the War Department on themedium pontoon bridge.4. Inasmuch as certain progress has

already been obtained toward developingtanks of the medium type, first considerationshould be given to that type, which is capa-ble of doing all that is required of a lighttank, except being transported on trucks. Inthe development of the medium tank, con-sideration should be given to the essentialsnecessary to make it a fighting machine. Itsspeed should be the greatest possible consist-ent with the limitation in weight, economy infuel, and radius of action. The control ofspeed should permit a reduction to that ofthe advancing riflemen.

5. The armament of medium tanks shouldconsist of machine guns and guns of heaviercaliber. The guns should be capable of firingupon enemy troops in trenches, and engagehostile tanks on a basis of equality; theyshould, therefore, be of as large caliber as isconsistent with prescribed weight limits andammunition supply, but no necessity is seenfor high angle fire. The radius of the action,vision and maneuverabilities of tanks shouldpermit complete fulfillment of the assignedmission. These essentials should be deter-mined after thorough study and experimentand concurrent with the development of pilottanks. Auxiliary vehicles, except signal tanks,should not be of a type special to the tankservice alone.

6. The tank is not likely to decrease in im-portance as a war weapon, but tank construc-tion is expensive and it must be expected thatfunds will be limited. It is, therefore, directedthat developments be conducted along thefollowing lines:

a. The Chief of Ordnance will be al-lowed great latitude in the development ofpilot tank for test purposes, in close coop-eration with the Chief of Infantry.

b. The first program will be the devel-opment of suitable medium pilot tankswith their equipment, of a weight not ex-ceeding 15 tons, and of a maximum speed


of not less than twelve miles per hour.c. That for the present funds and effort

will be applied principally to developmentpurposes rather than to the construction ofcomplete tank units.

d. The manufacture of complete tankunits will not be undertaken until suitablemedium pilot tanks have been developedand have been approved by the War De-partment as the best available type.

e. Tanks will not be designed with aspecial adaptation to chemical warfare, ex-cept that if it be found practicable to do sothe tanks should be made gas-proof andsupplied with a means of producing non-toxic smoke clouds. In this development,the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, willbe consulted.

f. The development of special auxiliaryvehicles for tank service alone will not beundertaken; but there is no objection tothe consideration of general purpose vehi-cles capable of meeting the general needsof the Army, as well as the special require-ments for tanks.

g. Expenditure of funds on existingtanks will be limited to the amount neces-sary to keep those in actual service in re-pair, and those in storage from deteriora-tion.68

The most significant feature of this out-line of policy is that it was an outline only.Its two pages are in marked contrast to thefifty-odd closely typed pages of the CaliberBoard report. Where the latter gave de-tailed analysis of artillery items and ex-plored doctrine of use, the General Staffannouncement of tank doctrine lay in thesingle sentence: "The primary mission ofthe tank is to facilitate the uninterruptedadvance of the riflemen in the attack." Onthis lone commandment hung all the lawand the prophets. Apart from specifyingweight limit and speed requirements, theGeneral Staff delegated to the Chief ofOrdnance and the Chief of Infantry allresponsibility for deciding the principalfeatures of tanks. But the 15-ton weightlimit in itself made a radical change in

the policy Ordnance and Infantry hadagreed upon and amounted to scrappingthe work already accomplished on 20-tontanks. The General Staff statement wasboth belated and restricting. Because ofthe money involved and because finalauthority to approve or reject an experi-mental model could not be delegatedalong with initial responsibility for design,the lot of the Chief of Ordnance, like thepoliceman's, was not a happy one. His staffhad to use its best judgment in selectingdesign features; the resulting tanks, builtat great cost, must satisfy not only theusing arm but the General Staff. Thedeclaration, "The Chief of Ordnance willbe allowed great latitude in the develop-ment of pilot tanks for test purposes," gaveno specific instructions. Later attempts toget the General Staff to amplify this origi-nal statement of policy produced variousenunciations, but some of these servedchiefly to sharpen the controversies thatinevitably emerged. A case in point wasthe switch in emphasis from medium tolight tank development. In the consideredjudgment of the men most familiar withproblems of tank design, developmentbefore 1931 suffered immeasurably "forlack of a definite and fairly constantpolicy." 69

It is true that the General Staff had nomore experience than Infantry or Ord-nance officers on which to base a sounddoctrine of tactical use of tanks. As withany major innovation, such as fighterplanes and bombers, doctrine must be

68 OCM 7814, 22 Aug 29. This item, containing ahistory of medium tank development up to August1929, was written by William F. Beasley, OrdnanceDepartment tank expert. The text of the indorsementas quoted above is given on pp. 9093-96. See alsoBeasley's similar History of Light Tank Developmentin OCM 7786, 1 Aug 29.

69 OCM 7814, 22 Aug 29, pp. 9088, 9103-04.


worked out by trial and error, and WorldWar I had ended before sufficient combatdata had been accumulated. Furthermore,it is important to note that experiments inemployment of tanks were limited by thecapabilities of the tanks available at anygiven time for tests or maneuvers. Doctrinedepended upon what tests proved tankscould do, just as development of modelspossessing certain capabilities dependedon designers' understanding of what wasneeded. Some money and time had to bededicated to exploring and charting blindalleys. Unlike modifications of a rifle de-sign, changes in tank design cost thousandsof dollars. The circle was endless: doctrinedepended on tactical use intended; tacticaluse depended on what tanks were capableof; what tanks were capable of dependedon developing models for predetermineduse. Had higher authority consistentlygiven the Chief of Ordnance the "greatlatitude" mentioned in the communica-tion of 1922 and invariably accepted asfinal the decisions that Ordnance andusing arms jointly reached, progress, engi-neers were convinced, would have beengreatly speeded.

While producing no new formal state-ment of doctrine, in 1927 a terse directivefrom General Charles P. Summerall, thenChief of Staff: "Organize a MechanizedForce," 70 was in time to influence stronglythe course of development. From the smalldetachment assembled at Fort Eustis, Vir-ginia—a detachment consisting of a fewpicked men from the Infantry, from thetank units of the Infantry, from the Cav-alry, the Artillery, the Engineers, theSignal Corps, and the Ordnance Depart-ment—there emerged a unit whose ideasand experimentation with mechanizedequipment laid the groundwork for muchof the useful work that followed. The

ability and enthusiasm of these men, in theface of the ridicule frequently directed atthem by officers of the older arms, wasfortified in 1931 by the succeeding Chief ofStaff, General MacArthur. "Every part ofthe army," he directed, "will adopt mech-anization and motorization as far as prac-ticable and possible." 71 This revolutioniz-ing order, though really only a repetitionof Westervelt Board recommendations, hadthe effect of arousing all parts of the Armyto interest in mechanization. Furthermore,MacArthur's order to the Cavalry to takeover the mechanized force project and,with Fort Knox, Kentucky, as headquar-ters, to expand it, opened the way to areappraisal of the doctrine enunciated in1922.

Ten years after the appearance of thefirst brief policy statement, General Mac-Arthur thus summarized General Staffviews in a report to the Secretary of War:

Upon this arm [Infantry] has always fallenthe brunt of the task of dislodging the enemyfrom defensive positions. The ideal machinefor assistance in this mission must of necessityhave a high degree of tactical mobility, evenat the expense of reducing, if necessary, roador strategic mobility. Remembering that thegreatest obstacle to tactical mobility is theband of fire laid down by the defense, anessential requisite in the assaulting tank issufficient armor to protect against the pre-ponderant mass of this fire, namely, that fromall types of small arms. More than this isimpractical, at least at present, because everyincrease in armor means a corresponding lossin speed and cross-country ability. Suffi-ciently heavy armor to protect from fieldguns would completely immobilize any ma-chine of usable size. For protection of thiskind the tank must rely upon rapid move-

70 Scott Comments for Hist of Combat Vehicles,OHF.

71 Ibid.


ment, surprise, proper use of ground, and thesupporting guns of its own army.72

While noting that the airplane had by thistime entered into the field of reconnais-sance, MacArthur indicated the new roleof the Cavalry in mechanized warfare:

. . . the traditional Cavalry missions of cov-ering the advance or retreat of the mainarmy, of conducting terrestrial reconnais-sance, and of exploiting victory by pursuinga disorganized army remain unchanged.Cavalry interest in mechanization has there-fore been centered principally in armoredcars and cross-country vehicles possessing ahigh degree of strategic mobility, with fight-ing power and tactical mobility an importantthough secondary consideration.73

Recognition that Cavalry as well as Infan-try had an interest in mechanizationhenceforward gave ordnance designers theadvantage of the mechanized Cavalry'sactive participation in the experimentalprogram but at the same time obliged theOrdnance Department to find compro-mises to satisfy both using arms. Fundswere too small to permit development ofa series of tanks for a variety of purposes.Therefore the general solution attemptedwas to develop tanks for the Infantry,modify these to adapt them to the Cavalrymission, name the Cavalry tanks combatcars, and add a line of fast, armored,wheeled scout cars for Cavalry reconnais-sance.

As the 1930's wore on, War Departmentconcepts of what were essential require-ments for tanks changed somewhat. Ord-nance experts for fifteen years had de-plored the imperviousness of the GeneralStaff to the idea that heavier protectivearmor and, particularly, more powerfulguns were of even greater importance thanhigh speed. The Chief of Staff in 1932 hadadmitted that recent developments inarmor-piercing ammunition were compli-

cating tank design and that the new high-velocity bullets promised penetration ofany armor then carried on Americantanks.74 But this admission led to no imme-diate revision of tank requirements ordoctrine. In fact in 1933 the Secretary ofWar announced that it was "absolutelyessential ... to insure, for any vehicleintended for use primarily with the Cav-alry or Infantry Division, the productionof a vehicle to weigh not more than 7½tons (preferably less) and to cost substan-tially less to manufacture than presenttypes." 75 The weight limit was predicatedupon the supposition that tanks had to betransported into battle on trucks. Partialconversion to a different view began whenobservers' reports started to pile up evi-dence from battlefields of the Spanish CivilWar.76 From this came indisputable proofof the vulnerability of light tanks.77 Two-man crews, no space for radio, insufficientarmor to withstand even .30-caliberarmor-piercing shot all added up to inef-

72 Rpt of CofS in Ann Rpt SW, 1932. p. 82.73 Ibid., p. 83.74 Ibid., pp. 83-85.75 12th Ind to ltr. AGO to CofOrd, 29 Apr 33, OO

451.24/622, cited in OCM 10676, 5 May 33.76 OCM 14073, 24 Nov 37.77 For example, see Liddell Hart, "Lessons of the

Spanish War," Army Ordnance, XVIII, 106 (1938),201-02; and Ernilio Canevari, "Forecasts from theWar in Spain," Army Ordnance, XVIII, 107 (1938),274-75.

The Italian, Canevari, contended that combattrials showed the need of motorizing artillery ratherthan infantry, but an American general drew differ-ent conclusions: "The Battle of Firente de Ebro con-vinced both sides that independent tank forces are adelusion and that the role of the tank is the moremodest but highly important one of helping the infan-try forward." Though, the American declared, thelight tank had proved to have a few uses, a moreheavily armed and armored slow-moving vehicle wasshown to be best for accomplishing the tank's primarymission of serving as accompanying mobile artilleryfor infantry. Brig. Gen. Henry J. Reilly, "ProvingGround in Spain," Army Ordnance, XIX, 114 (1939),335-36.


fectiveness.78 The General Staff and Infan-try belief that protection from small armsfire was all that was necessary was furthershaken by reports that foreign countrieswere building tanks with much heavierarmor and greater fire power than any theU.S. Army had. And finally, tank maneu-vers revealed the weaknesses of the Ameri-can combat vehicle.79 As a result of thesediscoveries, speed ceased to be the firstrequirement.80 Yet official announcementof revised doctrine failed to appear. Notuntil the Armored Force was created inJuly 1940 and the wishes of the Infantryceased to dominate and those of the Cav-alry prevailed did any basic change occur.The thesis proclaimed in a 1939 War De-partment field manual largely repeatedthat of the 1923 regulations: tanks were tobe employed to assist the advance of Infan-try foot troops; mechanized Cavalry wouldexploit successes. Tanks were to be GHQreserve.81

Progress of the Tank DevelopmentProgram

Within this framework, built of shiftingand often conflicting ideas of what charac-teristics ideal tanks should have, the Ord-nance Department's program of researchand development had to proceed. Thetank designer of every country is faced withthe highly technical problem of finding abalance between the three essential fea-tures of tanks: the guns to provide the firepower with which to fight, the armor plateto give crews protection and keep thevehicle in action, and the chassis andpower train to give mobility.82 Powerfulguns and turret mountings to insure cover-age of the field of fire and armor plateheavy enough to minimize the destructiveeffects of armor-piercing ammunition im-

mediately build up the weight the chassismust carry. A chassis strong enough tocarry a heavy superstructure must havevery powerful engines and a sturdy suspen-sion system. Unless the suspension be rea-sonably shockproof, a tank cannot longwithstand the wear and tear of cross-country operations, or travel far by roadwithout extensive overhaul. Unless enginescan be designed so extraordinarily com-pact as to give the needed power withouttaking up most of the interior of the tank,the frame of the chassis must be wide orhigh. A high silhouette makes a relativelyeasy target for enemy fire. A very widevehicle has less road maneuverability thana narrow one, may be unable to crossbridges, and may seriously impede militaryhighway traffic.

Weight and over-all dimensions thusbecame vital considerations; but powerplants, armor, and armament were equallyimportant for fighting vehicles. The Corpsof Engineers stressed the first, for theirswas the responsibility for bridges androads. The using arms were primarily con-cerned with getting easy maneuverability,speed and, later, fire power and protectivearmor. The Ordnance Department, whosemission encompassed maintenance, re-garded engines and suspension systems of


79 (1) Statement of Gen Craig, CofS, to HR Sub-committee, 21 Jan 38, WDAB 1939, HR, pp. 12-13.(2) Memo, Lt Col John B. Coulter for Exec Off,OCO, 14 Aug 37, OO 321.12/4285 Germany, NA.(3) Ltr, CofInf thru CofOrd to TAG, 16 Nov 37, sub:Characteristics of Medium Tank T5, OO 451.25/7258, NA.

80 See Army Ordnance. XIX, 110 (1938), 103.81 Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations,

FM 100-5 (Washington, 1939), Secs. 24-26, 35.82 See memo, Lt Col Gladeon M. Barnes for Assist-

ant Commandant Army War College, 15 Apr 38, sub:Tank Development Program for U.S. Army, Barnesfile. OHF.


utmost importance. In all the discussionthat follows, the reader must bear in mindthese desiderata which, by their tendencyto mutual irreconcilability, induced pro-longed controversy.

Furthermore, the degree to which wantof money hamstrung developments can begauged by a brief comparison of costs andappropriations. In 1931 the cost of a singleChristie tank without armor, engines, guns,or radios was $34,500. Seven years laterthe Chief of Ordnance estimated the costof a medium tank at about $50,000.83

While sums allotted to tank developmentbefore 1925 were relatively large, from1925 to 1939 the average was about$60,000 a year. That precluded buildingmore than one experimental model in anyone year. But to work out improvementswithout making test models was to relegateproblems to the realm of abstraction. Com-mercial corporations such as GeneralMotors had annual research budgets inthese years running up to $20,000,000. Forall development projects, not merely auto-motive, Ordnance Department fundsin the mid-thirties averaged about$1,680,000. At the end of 1939 the Chiefof Ordnance begged for $100,000 solely fordevelopment of diesel engines for tanks.84

For nearly fifteen years appropriationspermitted steady progress, but at a snail's,not even a caterpillar's pace.

The tank had first been used in combatby the British in the Somme offensive ofSeptember 1916. In the next two years theUnited States, collaborating with the Brit-ish and French, designed and built severaltypes: a 44-ton heavy tank, the MarkVIII; a 40-ton steam-propelled tank; anda Ford 3-ton and a Renault 6-ton tank.Influenced by its experience with these, theArmy after the Armistice inclined to favordevelopment of some heavy and some very

light tanks. A small tank force, whichcould be rapidly expanded if war came,was to be kept as a nucleus for training.Yet the first project launched was the de-sign of a medium tank, which, it washoped, would constitute an "all-purpose"Infantry tank.85

Heavy Tanks

The heavy tank program was shortlived. In March 1920 Brig. Gen. Samuel D.Rockenback of the Tank Corps assured aCongressional committee that a few moremonths would see the development of amuch improved heavy tank, "equal to anyfive of the Mark VIII."86 His optimismwas unfounded. Had the Tank Corps beenperpetuated, perhaps objections to heavytanks would have been withdrawn. Butwhen the National Defense Act named theInfantry as the using arm, work on designof heavy models was canceled and for thenext twenty years revival of the projectreceived no encouragement from the Gen-eral Staff. The reasons were three. First,any tank weighing more than twenty-fivetons was too heavy for the emergencybridges already developed by the Corps ofEngineers unless the bridges were rein-

83 (1) Robert J. Icks, "Four Decades of Mechaniza-tion," Army Ordnance, XVII, 102 (1937), 340. (2)Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 14 Jun 38, sub: Ex-penditure Program FY 1939, OO 111.3/6826, NA.

84 (1) ODEP, III, 3-33, OHF. (2) Interv withHarold W. Evans, Chief Automotive Engineer, OCO,15 Feb 50. (3) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 29 Nov38, sub: Estimates for R&D, FY 1941, OO 111.3/6906,NA. The fiscal records giving the exact breakdownof R&D appropriations before 1940 have beendestroyed.

85 (1) Record of Army Ord R&D, Tanks (hereaftercited as R&D, Tanks), pp. Aoo, 1A1, 1A200, OHF.(2) OCM 7786, 1 Aug 29, p. 9033. (3) Rpt of CofS inAnn Rpt SW, 1932, p. 83.

86 WDAB 1921, HR, p. 519.


forced, and reinforcement was time con-suming. The Engineers, themselves shortof funds for new development and fearfullest increasing weights make bridge con-struction a matter of days rather thanhours, protested against the adoption ofheavy tanks. The second reason for vetoingheavy tanks was the growing convictionthat smaller tanks had greater tactical use-fulness. British thinking was influentialhere; the opinion of the British, whoseArmy first used tanks in battle, was longdeferred to as authoritative.87 And, finally,the cost of building test models of heavytanks was so much greater than the cost oflight and medium tanks that it seemedwiser to spend the limited available fundsupon design of types that had prospects ofmeeting the avowed wishes of the usingarms than to invest money in building pilotmodels with which to demonstrate thecapabilities of 40-ton types. So, in the faceof occasional protests from the OrdnanceDepartment, heavy tank design was virtu-ally abandoned till combat experience inWorld War II forced the Army to revise itsviews.88

Light Tanks

Light tanks, though officially approvedby the War Department's statement of1922, received little attention before 1926.The objective set had been a tank of notmore than five tons, transportable bytruck. Portee, or transport to the line ofaction, was to avoid needless wear of tracksand chassis. The specifications first laiddown by the Infantry Board are of interestbecause they were so far removed fromlater concepts. They included a cruisingradius of fifty miles, speed of from two totwelve miles an hour across country, armorproof against .30-caliber armor-piercing

bullets, armament of one .30-caliber ma-chine gun and one 37-mm. gun so mountedas to be operable by one man, and provi-sion for a crew of two. Work along this linewas never pushed far. By 1926, when theInfantry's interest in light tanks began togrow, requirements were altered to attainspeed of twelve to twenty miles an hour,weight of not more than six tons, and a gunmount in which a .50-caliber and a .30-caliber machine gun would be inter-changeable.89 The preference for light, fasttanks over heavier ones was nourished, ifnot induced, by study of British ideas bothas expressed in the writings of Liddell Hartand as reported by the Secretary of Warafter a visit to Aldershot in 1927. A 1928revision of the Ten-Year-Program calledfor 72 light tanks, though originally nolight tanks had been included, and thereduction of the number of medium tanksfrom 64 to 16. Up to 1935 emphasis uponspeed and maneuverability mountedsteadily, culminating in instructions to theOrdnance Department to design a three-ton tank.90 Impractical though this partic-ular project soon proved, the work ex-pended on 5-, 6-, and 7-ton modelsbetween 1926 and 1935 gave engineersmuch useful data on which to proceedlater.

By 1935 the experimental light tanks,T2E1 and T2E2, were given limited pro-


88 R&D, Tanks, pp. 1A200-203, OHF. See below,Chs. IX and X.

89 (1) OCM 7786, 1 Aug 29, pp. 9031-34. (2)ODEP, III, 4, 22, OHF.

90 (1) Interv with Gen Scott, 21 Feb 50. (2) AnnRpt CofOrd, 1936, par. 56d(6).

Ordnance attempts to have the entire project ve-toed were overruled by the Deputy Chief of Staff. SeeOO 451.24/2109, 451.24/2119, 451.24/2120, and451.24/2138 files, DRB AGO, for the correspondenceon this subject.


curement status. This designation usuallymeant that full standardization and largeprocurement orders would follow unlessthe items were superseded by somethingbetter in the interim. These models laterbecame the M2A1 and M2A2. Manufac-tured at Rock Island Arsenal in 1935, theydiffered from each other chiefly in that theM2A1 had a single turret surmounted bya cupola and weighed 18,790 pounds,while the M2A2 had two round turretsand weighed 19,100 pounds. Each wasarmed with one .50-caliber machine gunand three .30-caliber machine guns. Maxi-mum armor thickness was % of an inch.The transmission was a sliding gear type.Continental W-670 gasoline engines using92 octane gasoline gave a maximum speedof 45 miles an hour. In the next two years,in order to meet the demands of the Cav-alry for vehicles with 360 degree turrettraverse, two models of what were thencalled "combat cars" were turned out.91

Most characteristics of these, however, soclosely paralleled those of Infantry tanksthat the distinction of name was droppedin 1940 and the original combat car M1was redesignated the light tank M1A2,combat car M2 the light tank M1A1. Themost important feature introduced in theoriginal combat car M2 was the GuibersonT1020 Series 4 diesel air-cooled radialengine as an alternate power plant. Withthe appearance of another light tankmodel in 1938, the Ordnance Departmentbegan to increase the thickness of protec-tive armor and slightly reduce road speed.The pilot tank of the next development, theM2A4, first manufactured at Rock Islandin 1939, carried still further the trendtoward greater weight and more power.This model, under production as the Ger-man panzers swept into Poland, embodiedmany of the principles continued in later

tanks. It marked a turning point in lighttank design.92

The M2A4 light tank was designed fora crew of four, a driver and assistant driverin the hull, a gunner and a commander-leader in the single turret. Entrance to thevehicle was through armored hatches,which were provided with peep-holes forvision in combat areas. In noncombatzones, the hatches could be opened, per-mitting direct vision and better ventilation.Armor was of thicknesses up to one inch,with heaviest armor on vertical and nearvertical surfaces, which experience hadshown were most likely to be hit. The tur-ret could be rotated through 360 degreesby means of a handwheel-controlled mech-anism. Power was supplied by either aContinental radial air-cooled aircraft-typeengine that operated on 80 octane gasolineor a Guiberson diesel engine. The trans-mission was of the synchromesh type, withfive forward speeds and one reverse. Thevehicle was supported by two bogies orsuspensions on each side, trunnioned onthe front and rear axles. Each bogie con-sisted of two solid-rubber-tired rollerswhich, mounted on volute springs, rodethe inside of the endless rubber-blocktrack. The action of the volute springs andarticulating bogie links kept track tensionconstant while negotiating obstacles orirregular terrain. The most importantchange from earlier models was the addi-tion of a 37-mm. gun. Three more .30-caliber machine guns were emplaced, onein the right bow and one on each sponson.Although 27-mm. guns had been used onlight tanks in World War I, later military

91 The Infantry, viewing tanks as a means of cover-ing the foot soldier's advance, considered forward firesufficient, whereas the Cavalry, envisaging use of atank emplaced at a crossroad, required all-round fire.

92 R&D, Tanks, pp. 1A1-1A2, OHF.


thinking had limited armament to .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns. Thisopinion was now discarded. The weight,just over twelve tons, brought this lighttank near the weight limit formerly set formedium tanks.93

Medium Tanks

Medium tank design had meanwhilepre-empted much concentrated effort,more than was expended on either heavyor light tanks during the 1920's. From 1919till the early 1930's, Ordnance engineersbelieved it feasible to achieve a model thatwould combine the essential characteris-tics of both the heavy and light tanks usedin World War I, provided that weight notbe restricted to fifteen tons. The first twopostwar models, the medium tanks M1921and M1922, weighed over twenty tonseach. While these designs were not com-pletely scrapped and revisions of the formerwere carried on for several years, War De-partment policy as set forth in the 1922indorsement quoted above made a lightermodel necessary. The fifteen-ton tank,Model 1924, was the Ordnance Depart-ment's attempt to meet this requirement,but any possibility of success was precludedby specifications of the Infantry and of theTank Board. The board insisted on armorprotection against .50-caliber armor-piercing bullets, a requirement that meantplate an inch thick; provision for a four-man crew; one six-pounder and one ma-chine gun, independently operable; and aspeed of twelve miles an hour.94 The Chiefof Infantry and the Chief of Ordnanceboth concurred in the protest of the presi-dent of the Tank Board, Col. Oliver S.Eskridge: " . . . everyone familiar withthe tank situation knows that an attemptto build a satisfactory tank within the 15-

ton limit is a waste of funds."95 Reluc-tantly, the General Staff in 1926 approvedshift of emphasis to a 23-ton tank, butordered continued attention to a 15-ton.Study of both types was therefore carriedon for the next nine years. Some of eachtype were designed, built, and tested, butnone was standardized.96

In summarizing the accomplishments oftank development work up to 1929, acompetent Ordnance engineer stressed theaccumulation of data and experience inthis field which lacked any technical his-tory to draw upon. But William F. Beas-ley, in his capacity of automotive man onthe Ordnance Technical Staff, observedthat progress had been greatly hamperedby "making perfection in an experimentalvehicle the criterion for its standardiza-tion" and by "too great a faith on the partof the non-technical people . . . that anydifficulty can be overcome by researchand development."97 These commentsheld true for the next decade. Further-more, Beasley contended, another sourceof delay in arriving at a basic design dur-ing the twenties had been the dispersionof effort and money upon development ofaccessories. Compasses, gun mounts, sight-ing devices, armor plate of increased re-sistance per unit of thickness, all neededimprovement. And a tank commanderbadly needed some better method of com-munication with his crew and with othertanks than shin-kicking and waving signal

93 Ibid.94 OCM 7814, 22 Aug 29.95 Ltr, Col Eskridge to CofInf, 2 Jun 24, sub:

Medium Tank. OO 451.25/2098, NA. Subsequentactions may be traced in the twenty- three indorse-ments.

96 (1) 23d Ind, ltr, TAG thru CofOrd to CofInf, 11Mar 26, OO 451.25/2098, NA. (2) Ann Rpts CofOrd,1929-35.

97 See Beasley, Hist of Light Tank Development, inOCM 7814, 22 Aug 29.


flags. Hindsight, in the opinion of someOrdnance engineers, suggested that theDepartment would have been better ad-vised to concentrate exclusively upon de-velopment of a successful chassis. Officersof the using arms, on the other hand,firmly believed that more effective tanksdepended as much upon having depend-able accessories as upon a reliable trackand engine.98

Perhaps another impediment to theevolution of a satisfactory full-trackmedium tank was expenditure of timeupon so-called Christie or convertibletypes, designed to operate either on tracksor on solid-rubber-tired bogie wheels. Awheeled vehicle could of course travelover roads at higher speeds without exces-sive wear on chassis and tires than coulda caterpillar-treaded vehicle. The trackscould be put on for cross-country maneu-vers. Over the advantages and drawbacksof Christie tanks controversy raged formore than twenty years and, indeed, is oc-casionally revived today in discussions ofRussian tanks that for a time were basedon Christie patents.

Engineers agreed that the convertibleprinciple was attractive even though "two-purpose equipment is in general violationof good engineering practice." 99 The TankCorps, anxious to try out convertiblemodels, in 1919 urged negotiation of acontract with Walter Christie who hadalready devoted extensive study to theproblem. In November 1919 an order forone experimental model was placed andsoon afterward the Ordnance Departmentbought a license to all Christie patents.Christie's first product was tested, returnedfor modifications, and in 1923 retested ex-haustively. But this, like later modelsChristie built, the Ordnance Departmentfelt displayed major weaknesses, primarily

mechanical unreliability. Notwithstand-ing the defects of the succession of con-vertible models tested, the using arms per-sisted in requesting development of thistype of tank. Their insistence derived fromtheir conviction that it could keep up withother motor vehicles better than any otherkind of tank. Christie's Model 1940, so-called because in 1929 its proponents con-sidered it "easily ten years ahead of itstime," in first trials achieved 42.55 milesan hour on tracks and 69.23 miles an houron wheels. Though these speeds were ad-mittedly possible only under favorableconditions of terrain and highway, the offi-cials of the American Automobile Associa-tion who supervised the test were im-pressed. The Infantry was enthusiastic.Following a test held before a board ofhigh-ranking officers of various arms andservices, the Ordnance Department wasinstructed to procure six of the tanks.100

Still, most Ordnance officers remainedskeptical, believing that the speed of theChristie failed to compensate for its lightarmor, light fire power, inability to makelong runs without overhaul, and lack ofroom inside for guns, radio, and ammuni-tion. In early 1932 the Chief of Ordnancereiterated a list of practical objections tothe convertible type chassis, the tacticaland strategic value of which had not, hebelieved, been fully demonstrated. But, hewrote, in view of opinion prevailing amongthe users, the Ordnance Department mustpursue the development until it arrived at

9 8 (1) Ibid., pp. 9098-9101. (2) Interv with GenScott, 21 Feb 50.

99 OCM 7522, 5 Mar 29, p. 8863.100 (1) Ibid. (2) C. C. Benson, "The New Christie,

Model 1940," Army Ordnance, X, 56 (1929) , 114-16.(3) Memo, TAG for CofOrd, 19 Mar 30, sub: Pro-curement of Christie Tanks Without Advertising, and1st Ind, CofOrd for TAG, 29 May 30, both in AG473.1 (3-1-30), OO 451/4229, NA.


conclusive results, pro or con.101 So the T3and T4 experimental medium tanks builtin the mid-thirties were both convertibletypes. Not until 1938, when the T5 ap-peared, was the convertible principleabandoned.102

Christie himself dropped the converti-ble feature from his models after the mid-thirties, but other elements of his designscontinued to attract attention, notably thesuspension system he employed. Independ-ently sprung wheels gave the vehicle goodriding qualities and increased maneuver-ability over rough terrain. But Christiealways submitted his tanks for trial withoutguns or gun mountings. The tests there-fore could not give final proof of the tanks'durability. Spectacular performance of testmodels unencumbered with the weightthat armor plate, turret, and guns mustadd was no proof of what the vehiclescould withstand when those essentialswere added.103 Examination of Christie'snew "High Speed Model T12," demon-strated in 1938, convinced Ordnanceautomotive experts that this tank, like itspredecessors, lacked the features essentialin a fighting vehicle. The fighting com-partment was much too small, the tankaccommodated only a driver and one gun-ner, the liquid-cooled engine, thoughpowerful, was an aircraft type that wouldbe difficult to procure, and the tracks wereof a kind guaranteeing only relativelyshort life. In short, the disqualifying weak-nesses of this light "High-Speed" tankwere those of earlier Christies.104 The sus-pension system, while having some advan-tage, was considered not sufficientlysturdy. Instead of adopting the Christiesuspension, the Ordnance Department re-sorted to heavy volute springs as promis-ing far greater strength and hence longerlife. Though rubber torsion suspensionhad been tried out for light vehicles in

1936, either horizontal or vertical volutespring suspension was used in every Amer-ican tank built after 1938 until in 1942torsion bar suspension was developed to apoint where it could be used for combatvehicles.105 Unfortunately, the faith inChristie's suspension system, which wascherished by some politicians, newspaperreporters, and officers of the using armswho were not in a position to recognize thedefects in the design, gave rise to the no-tion that the Ordnance Department tosave face was stubbornly refusing to accepta superior tank simply because it was thework of an independent designer. Mis-taken identification of Christie's independ-ently sprung wheels with torsion bar sus-pension persisted long after the war andaccounts for much of the criticism of theOrdnance Department's rejection ofChristie's design.106

The year 1938, which saw the appear-ance of Christie's new "High-Speed" lighttank, also brought forth the T5 models ofmedium tanks. The most prophetic devel-

101 Ltr, CofOrd to CG Rock Island Arsenal, 8 Jan32, sub: Studies for Combat Car T3, OO 451.24/514,NA.

102 (1) Inf Bd Rpt 917, Medium Tank T4, 18 Feb37, OO 451.25/6622, NA. (2) Ltr, CofOrd to CGRock Island Arsenal, 20 Sep 37, sub: Medium Tank.

T5, OO 451/8724, NA.103 Interv with Gen Christmas, 8 Nov 49.104 (1) Rpt of Inspection of Christie Tank at Hemp-

stead, L. I., 6 Oct 38, OO 451.25/8209, NA. (2)Memo, Col Barnes for Gen McFarland, 16 Mar 39,sub: Conference on Christie Tank, OO 451.25/8674,NA.

For more detailed description see: ltr, CG APG toCofOrd, 5 May 41, sub: Test of Bigley Tank (ChristieTank Model 1938), OO 451.25/5295, DRB AGO;and OCM 19608, 28 Jan 43.

105 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1936, par. 56a. The Ameri-can patent, No. 2024199, on torsion bar suspensionwas granted to Gladeon M. Barnes and Warren E.Preston in December 1935. French patents were ofearlier date.

106 For example, in Christie's vehicles the wheelstended to jump the tracks on a turn unless a highlyskilled driver were at the controls. With torsion barsuspension this was virtually impossible.


MEDIUM TANK T3, one of the Christie tanks.

opment in these was the experimentalmounting of a 75-mm, pack howitzer inthe turret of one model. A few Cavalryand Ordnance officers had indeed advo-cated this as early as 1935. Now it was aclear recognition of trends in Europeandesign. In 1937 German experts, after vis-iting Fort Knox, are reported to have statedthat the United States led the world bothin tank design and in organization ofmechanized units. If that was truth, notflattery, the lead was lost in 1938. In spiteof a report from Berlin describing the Ger-man experimental mounting of an 88-mm,gun in a tank, the Chief of Infantry de-clared so powerful a weapon as a 75-mm.needless.107 As a result of this judgment,the pilots of the M2 and M2A1 mediumtanks, built the next year, were each armedonly with a 37-mm, gun, eight .30-calibermachine guns, and a .45-caliber subma-

chine gun. Meanwhile, the mechanizedCavalry was clamoring for a self-propelledcannon to neutralize enemy antitank guns.Only when the War Department concededthat a 75-mm, howitzer mounted on acombat car chassis was virtually a tankwas a new decision reached; approval ofdesigning a tank equipped with a 75-mm,howitzer came at last in July 1940. TheArmored Force, headed by a Cavalry of-ficer, Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, was es-tablished that month.108

It is worth repeating that between 1919and 1938 none of the tanks developed was

107 (1) Scott Comments for Hist of Combat Vehicles,OHF. (2) Interv, 19 Jan 50, with Col Rene R. Stud-ler.

1 0 8 (1) R&D, Tanks, 1A41-43, OHF. (2) Intervwith Gen Christmas, 8 Nov 49. (3) Proceedings of aBoard of Officers . . . Hq Seventh Cavalry Brigade,2 7 Jul 38, and Inds 1 to 9 to ltr of transmittal, FortKnox, Ky., to CofCav, 25 Sep 38, OO 472/3496, NA.


standardized.109 The T5 was the first to beapproved. Accepted in June 1939, it wasdesignated the medium tank M2. Themedium tanks T4 and T4E1 were shortlythereafter designated Medium Tank M1,Convertible, Limited Standard, though theeighteen manufactured and used at FortBenning were declared obsolete in March1940. The caution that characterized theArmy expenditure programs during thetwenty years between world wars doubt-less accounts for the refusal to standardizeany tanks, no matter how promising. ButOrdnance automotive designers felt thatthis retarded tank development. They de-plored the policy on the grounds that useby troops in training and on maneuversrevealed weaknesses susceptible of im-provement in a fashion that provingground and formal service tests could notdo. The perfectionism complained of in1929 still obtained in 1938. This view theInfantry and Cavalry did not share; theyconsidered it the Ordnance Department'sjob to get "the bugs out of a design" beforeshipping a model to troops in the field.110

Opportunity to try experimental modelson maneuvers did exist, to be sure, afterthe first units of a mechanized Cavalrybrigade were organized in 1931. Themechanized force, assembled at FortMeade in the summer of 1928 in responseto General Summerall's famous four worddirective, had paved the way by trying outtactical employment of the tanks then onhand, and in the fall of 1930 that force'ssuccessor, a group at Fort Eustis, Virginia,carried on. When some months later theunit was transferred to Fort Knox, Ken-tucky, to form the nucleus of the firstmechanized Cavalry, collaboration of de-signers and users of combat vehicles wasassured. Still, the projected regiment ofmechanized Cavalry did not materialize;funds were insufficient to equip it. As late

as mid-1939 the tank forces consisted ofonly one mechanized Cavalry brigade ofhalf strength, the small, partially equippedtank companies with Infantry divisions,and the GHQ units of 1,400 men.111 Thesmall scale of operations possible with thefew tanks available for field trial duringthe 1930's gave indication rather than con-clusive proof of what American experi-mental models were capable and, still moreimportant, of what they were incapable.Officers of the mechanized Cavalryaverred that evolution of tactical doctrinewas not affected by delays in delivery ofequipment, that fundamentally principlesof tactical use of horse Cavalry applied toan armored brigade. But the OrdnanceDepartment continued to believe that thewant of enough tanks, armored cars, andauxiliary motor vehicles to conduct exten-sive maneuvers left automotive engineerswith only sketchy evidence on which tobase attempts at improved design. Only19 light tanks were completed in 1936, 154in 1937, and 74 in 1938. Medium tanksfinished were fewer.112

One handicap in the development of alltypes of combat vehicles during thetwenty years of peace calls for specialmention. This was the lack of suitable en-gines. The Ordnance Department itselfnever had money enough to develop anideal tank engine and, as private industry

109 In 1928 standardization of the medium tank Tlas the M1 was canceled by the War Department.See: (1) OCM 6723, 24 Jan 28; 6772, 9 Feb 28; 6925,12 Apr 28; and (2) Hist of Aberdeen Proving Ground,Vol. I, OHF.

110 Interv with Gen Scott, 21 Feb 50.111 (1) Ann Rpt SW, 1930, p. 125. (2) Ann Rpt

CofOrd, 1932, par. 23s. (3) Watson, Chief of Staff:Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 148. (4) Ltr, CofOrdto CG Rock Island Arsenal, 20 Nov 37, sub: Esti-mated Deliveries of Tanks and Combat Cars, OO451/8840, NA.

112 (1) Interv with Gen Scott, 21 Feb 50. (2) AnnRpt CofOrd, 1936, pars. 1 6a, 56a, 56d; 1937, par.19a; 1938, par. 23a.


had no need for an engine designed tomeet the peculiar requirements of tankpower plants, there was no commercialdevelopment. The lack of power obtain-able with the slow-speed marine enginesused first and in the later adaptations ofaircraft engines affected all other featuresof design. It lent color to arguments favor-ing development only of light tanks. Be-cause liquid-cooled engines were thoughtto be more vulnerable than air-cooled, theautomotive engineers centered attentionupon air-cooled types. To the success withthese before 1938, the Chief of Ordnance,with a touch of complacency, attributed"the superiority of our equipment overthat of foreign armies." 113 In 1936 Guiber-son air-cooled diesels were first tried. Butwhen the later 1930's brought aircraftneeds to the fore, the Air Corps protestedOrdnance pre-emption of aircraft enginesfor tanks just as the Navy later reserveddiesels for Navy use. The Ordnance De-partment was therefore obliged belatedlyto find some other solution of its problem.The compromises arrived at, as the devel-opment story of World War II will show,gave far from ideal answers.114

Auxiliary Vehicles

Apart from the achievements on tanksand combat cars, fulfillment of the CaliberBoard's hopes for motorization of the U.S.Army fell far short of the goal. Completemotorization would have meant self-pro-pelled mounts for every weapon the footsoldier could not carry and motor trans-port for men and supplies as well. Aboutmotorization of supply trucks and person-nel carriers there was little argument;these vehicles by the terms of the 1920National Defense Act were a responsibil-ity of the.Quarter master Corps. The mo-torization of artillery, on the other hand,

early came to be a controversial matter.In the years immediately following the ap-pearance of the Caliber Board report, theOrdnance Department undertook a seriesof development projects on self-propelledgun mounts, but in each case work washalted by lack of money, lack of intereston the part of the Field Artillery, or both.As late as 1938, between 40 and 60 per-cent of the Army's artillery was still horsedrawn. A good many artillerymen con-tended that horse draft was more satisfac-tory than machine; horses neither ran outof gasoline nor required repairs and spareparts. If the Field Artillery did not wantself-propelled guns, the Ordnance De-partment could not foist them upon theuser, even had the Ordnance Departmenthad funds to develop them. Only the in-sistence of the mechanized Cavalryenabled the Ordnance Department in1938 to resume work on gun motor car-riages. Yet when, after war broke out inEurope and Army appropriations in-creased, the Ordnance Department againrecommended development of a motorcarriage for the 105-mm, howitzer, theChief of Field Artillery remained adamantin his refusal. Towing, Brig. Gen. CharlesH. Danforth decreed, was better. Thusone very important feature of the Wester-velt program lapsed.115

Towing by tractor was relatively ac-ceptable to the Field Artillery. Horsescould always be substituted. So the devel-

113 Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1938, par. 64a(1).114 (1) Samuel H. Woods, Chief Engr Auto Div,

Ord Research Center, APG, The Development ofCombat Vehicles, Oct 43, p. 4, OHF. (2) Interv withGen Christmas, 8 Nov 49.

115 (1) Interv with Col Burnett R. Olmsted, 25 Oct49. (2) ODEP, I, pp. 68-228, OHF. (3) 2d Ind, ltr,CofFA to CofCav, 17 Dec 38, 3d Ind, CofCav toCofFA, 5 Jan 39, and 7th Ind, TAG to CofOrd, 12Apr 39, to ltr. Maj Bertrand Morrow to CofCav, 25Sep 38, sub: Letter of Transmittal. OO 472/3496,NA.


opment of a series of tractors and half-tracks had to be the Ordnance Depart-ment's answer to mobility for artillery.Though the Ordnance Department before1933 had procured and tested trucks fortowing artillery, thereafter, by War De-partment order, procurement of trucks, aspart of motor transport, was turned overto the Quartermaster Corps. The Ord-nance Department was left in charge of alltracked and half-tracked vehicles, withvery few exceptions, for all branches of theArmy.116 This division of responsibility forvehicles was maintained till 1942. Trackedvehicles were preponderantly of commer-cial design; the Ordnance Departmenttested various models and devised themodifications that military use required.The Air Corps used some tractors and theCorps of Engineers a number for construc-tion work, but otherwise most tractorswere for use as prime movers of artillery.Between 1932 and 1940 the Ordnance De-partment tested some twenty-three differ-ent commercial tractors requested by theField Artillery.117

Half-tracks similarly were developed bythe collaborating efforts of Ordnance en-gineers and automotive engineers in pri-vate industry. This type of hybrid vehicle,originating in France, was a small truck orpassenger car on which a half-track as-sembly was substituted for the conven-tional rear axle and wheel assembly. Thedesign aimed at combining the cross-country mobility of the tracked vehiclewith the highway speed of the wheeled. Itwas considered especially adapted to useas a personnel carrier or as a prime moverfor divisional artillery. Some fourteen half-track truck models, a half-track car, and ahalf-track personnel carrier were testedbefore 1940, though it was not until 1939that the armed services took any pro-

nounced interest in half-tracks. In thatyear their possibilities for various combatoperations apparently emerged. Accord-ingly, the Artillery Division of IndustrialService prepared drawings for a half-trackscout car, later labeled the T14, and apilot model was built in 1941. From engi-neering studies of this derived the threebasic models from which stemmed thewhole familv of half-tracks used in WorldWar II.118

Influence of Budgetary Restrictions

Ordnance research and developmentproblems between world wars may be fur-ther clarified by an analysis of what theDepartment planned and what it accom-plished in a given year. The fiscal year1937 is fairly typical of the period immedi-ately preceding the formal launching ofthe National Defense program. Appropri-ations for research and development for1937 were set at $1,350,000, $90,000 morethan for 1936 and $10,000 less than for1938 and 1939.119 While the War Depart-ment as a whole sought $9,000,000 for1937, the Bureau of the Budget cut the fig-ure to $7,160,400. Approved Ordnanceprojects numbered 224 and were classifiedinto 21 groups. Seventeen projects, most ofthem in the artillery ammunition group,still were based on Westervelt Board rec-

116 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1933, par. 18. (2) Intervwith Col Van Deusen. 25 Nov 49.

117 (1) Hist of Tractors, Detroit Arsenal, OHF. (2)Ann Rpt CofOrd, 1934, par. 53; 1935, pars. 56-57;1936, par. 56; 1937. pars. 60, 61; 1938, pars. 68-69.(3) OCM 13498. 4 Mar 37; 13888, 2 Sep 37.

118 (1) Hist of U.S. Half Track Vehicles, OHF. (2)Ann Rpts CofOrd. 1934-38, as cited n. 117(2) .

119 In several years larger sums were actuallyspent for research and development because transferof money earmarked for other purposes was author-ized. For example, see memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 6Apr 39, sub: WD Research and Development Pro-gram, FY 1941. G-4/29552, DRB AGO.


ommendations. With cost of material es-timated at about $300,000, 70 percent ofthe money was marked for salaries. Dis-tribution of money among the twenty-onegroups was as follows: $249,900 for artil-lery ammunition, including anti-mechani-zation weapons; $111,810 for procure-

ment of artillery ammunition for servicetest; $101,300 for development of mobileartillery; $76,620 for ballistics research;$67,774 for small arms; $65,000 for rail-way artillery; $64,000 for artillery firecontrol; $60,120 for tanks; and smalleramounts for the remaining thirteen groups.Even for individual projects of major im-portance, the sums allotted had to besmall: $2,500 for the light mortar, $800 forthe 81-mm, mortar. The $60,000 for tankswas spent largely on the medium tank T5.Most of the 224 projects had been on thebooks for several years before 1937, somefor over a decade. On twenty-one therehad been no progress at all; on thirty-fourwork was only 1 to 10 percent com-pleted.120

The question naturally arises as to whythe research funds were spread so thin tocover so many items when the urgency ofsome undertakings would appear whollyto obliterate the importance of others. Theanswer lies in the fact that the OrdnanceDepartment had to serve all branches ofthe Army. The Infantry would not acqui-esce in devoting all appropriations to ar-tillery development, nor would the Cav-alry agree to a program disregarding itsneeds for armored cars to permit improve-ment of small arms. Each service had toget a share. The Ordnance TechnicalCommittee mapped out the tentative dis-tribution of research monies, the GeneralStaff decided. In 1937 the apportionmentof projects showed Field Artillery holdingfirst place with 68 of the 224. Forty proj-

ects were for the Infantry, 35 each for theCoast Artillery and the Air Corps, 21 forthe Cavalry, a scattered few for the Engi-neers and Chemical Warfare, and the restfor "all Arms and Services." 121

The War Department as a whole appre-ciated the wisdom of devoting a largeslice of its available funds in peace yearsto research and development. For Ord-nance development work alone, the WarDepartment survey of 1929 had recom-mended an annual budget of not less than$3,000,000. But when total appropriationswere small, the operating needs of thestanding army and the cost of maintain-ing equipment already in existence tendedyear after year to eat up the lion's share ofappropriations. Thus for preservation ofammunition larger sums were allotted inthe early thirties than for research proj-ects.122 Tabulation of the relatively stableappropriations for research and develop-ment shows how the percentage of thetotal Ordnance appropriation shrank after1934, though after 1937, by transfer offunds, more than the original allotmentwas actually spent.

As 1939 approached, the General Staffdeliberately chose to reduce the researchbudget in the interests of having moremoney for actual rearmament.123 But theChief of Ordnance believed that a largeincrease for ordnance research and devel-opment was of vital importance. His con-tention was strongly supported by theChief of Field Artillery, the Chief of CoastArtillery, the Chief of Cavalry, and theChief of Infantry, who all concurred that

120 1st Ind, incl to ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 10 Oct 36,OO 111.3/6186, NA.

121 Ibid.122 (1) Survey of WD, 1929, p. 16, NA. (2) Ann Rpt

CofOrd, 1934, par. 12b. See above, Ch. III, pp. 64-65.123 Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Prepara-

tions, pp. 42-44.


TABLE 11—ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS FORRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 1921-40

a Data not available.

Source: Stat Br, OUSW, Weekly Stat Rpt Summary 3, 19 Jul 41, p. 9, DRB AGO; and interview with James A. Brown, R&D Serv,31 Mar 53.

the insufficient funds allotted Ordnancefor its development program over the pre-ceding five years had resulted in disas-trous delays. For example, the $276,400marked for all 1940 mobile artillery devel-opment, the Chief of Coast Artillery as-serted, would not even meet the cost ofwork on one item, the intermediate-cali-ber antiaircraft gun.124

General Tschappat's summary of thesituation in January 1938 was grimly fac-tual: the Ordnance backlog of untouchedartillery and automotive development

projects totalled $10,000,000, of smallarms projects $1,000,000. For ammunitionalone, a budget of $ 1,500,000 a year forseveral years was imperative inasmuch asnew methods and new matériel being de-veloped in a rearming world would add tocosts. Research, as distinguished from de-

124 (1) Memo, CofFA for ACofS G-4, lOJan 38,G-4/29552, P&E, R&D Program, 1938. (2) Memo,CofCav for CofOrd, 8 Jan 38, OO 1 11.3/6589. (3)Memo, CofInf for CofOrd, 7 Jan 38, sub: R&D Pro-gram, FY 1940, OO 11 1.3/6588. (4) Ltr, CofCAthru CofOrd to TAG, 8 Jan 38, sub: R&D Program,FY 1940, OO 111.3/6590. All in NA.


velopment work, had been equallycrippled for want of money. The Depart-ment had been unable either consistentlyto apply engineering principles workedout by industry in the decade past or toutilize techniques perfected in Ordnancelaboratories. A doubling of research activ-ity was essential for the future. In theabsence of qualified ordnance experts inprivate industry, the Department had torecruit and train its own designers and en-gineers, a costly business. Purchase of de-signs from abroad, even if desirable, hadbeen prohibitively expensive: the price re-cently quoted for rights to a foreign 37-mm, antiaircraft gun had approximatelyequaled the Ordnance Department'stotal annual research and developmentbudget. General Tschappat considered$2,500,000 for research and developmentin 1940 an absolute minimum.1 2 5 Con-gress appropriated $1,650,000 for thispurpose.

Perhaps the refusal of the Bureau of theBudget to allot larger sums to Ordnanceresearch and development and the reluc-tance of the Congress to vote as much asthe budget called for can be partly ex-plained by the tenor of the annual reportsof the Ordnance Department in the yearspreceding 1940. Neither in hearings beforeCongressional committees nor in annualreports to the Secretary of War did Chiefsof Ordnance betray anxiety. Instead oftelling the Congressional committees onmilitary affairs that American ordnance,thanks to lack of money, consisted largelyof the obsolete equipment of World War I,Chiefs of Ordnance year after year eitheravoided making any appraisal or else an-nounced that in quality particular items ofAmerican ordnance were as good as or bet-ter than those of any army in the world. Allofficers appearing before Congressional

committees were expected to confinethemselves to answering specific questions,and not to volunteer information oropinion. The result was that year afteryear congressmen, trusting to the testi-mony their questions elicited from the ex-perts, could believe that the United StatesArmy, though small, was equipped withthe very best. Similarly, the formal reportsfrom the Chief of Ordnance to the Secre-tary of War sounded confident; they pre-sented summaries of what had been donebut rarely mentioned what was left un-done. Because the published annual re-port of the Secretary of War, which in-cluded the summary statements of chiefsof arms and services, circulated widely,discretion apparently seemed the betterpart of valor. This explanation gainsweight from evidence in the correspond-ence between the Ordnance Departmentand the General Staff. There, occasionally,the Chief of Ordnance warned of the truesituation. It was General Tschappat's let-ter to The Adjutant General that bluntlydescribed the lag in Ordnance develop-ment work up to 1938. Some monthslater General Wesson reported to theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-4, that theOrdnance Department had not been ableto keep abreast of recent developmentsabroad. Yet in the spring of 1941 GeneralWesson told a House committee thatAmerican weapons were as good as "andin many instances superior to those of anyother army in the world." 126 In the face ofstatements in like vein repeated at inter-vals during the preceding years, Congresscould scarcely be expected to vote large

125 Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 8 Jan 38. OO 111.3/6554,NA.

126 (1) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 29 Nov 38,sub: Estimates for R&D for FY 1941, OO 111.3/6906,NA. (2) WDAB 1942, HR, p. 537.


sums of money to meet an exigency thatmembers had little reason to think existed.Here was a situation not limited to theOrdnance Department in dealing withCongress, but representing the twenty-year-long struggle of the whole War De-partment versus the holders of the pursestrings and lagging public opinion.

The Role of Technical Intelligence

As war is competitive and militaryequipment satisfactory only if it is as goodas or better than that of potential enemies,knowledge of what ordnance other nationswere developing was at all times of greatimportance to the United States Army. Inappraising the value of technical intelli-gence reports three questions arise. Wasadequate information available? If so, wasit studied? How fully and how promptlywas it applied? These questions have im-mediate bearing on the status of Ordnanceresearch and development before 1940.

The formal channel for technical intel-ligence was through the Military Intelli-gence Division of the General Staff. Ob-servers abroad dispatched their reports tothe Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who thenrelayed the reports to the arm or serviceconcerned. Though occasionally, particu-larly during the 1920's, the Ordnance De-partment sent an officer to Europe on aspecial mission, and during the SpanishCivil War the War Department stationedmen on the scene, the usual procedure wasto rely upon information forwarded by of-ficers, specifically detailed as observers.Ordnance officers with engineering back-ground were ideally the men to serve inthis capacity and to prepare the technicalreports on foreign ordnance.127 But thenumber of Ordnance officers qualified byexperience who also had the necessary

command of a foreign language and whohad private incomes large enough to meetthe expenses of a tour of duty abroad wassmall;1 2 8 in fact, between 1920 and 1940there were only nine, and between No-vember 1930 and May 1940 only two—Maj. Philip R. Faymonville in Moscow,and Capt. Rene R. Studler assigned toLondon. Thus General Williams' originalplan of frequently replacing Ordnance of-ficers abroad fell down and with it the op-portunity for them to report upon theirfindings in person, rather than in writing.In countries to which the Ordnance De-partment could not supply a liaison officerand during the early thirties when noOrdnance officer was assigned to foreignservice anywhere, officers of otherbranches of the Army transmitted infor-mation. Particularly important were Maj.Truman Smith's reports from Berlin.

Over the years a very considerable bodyof written data on foreign matériel accu-mulated in Washington. The long tours ofduty of both Major Faymonville and Cap-tain Studler, the former from July 1934 toFebruary 1939, the latter from July 1936to October 1940, gave the Ordnance De-partment the benefit of uninterruptedseries of letters during a specially criticalperiod. The reports from the Soviet Unionwere general in character, but those fromwestern Europe were of a character tocommand close attention, for the greatmunitions makers were located in Ger-many, France, England, Czechoslovakia,Switzerland, and Sweden. Though Cap-tain Studler was formally assigned to Lon-don, his mission was a roving one and

127 ODO 8, 31 May 17; 104, 4 Jan 18: 222, 25 May18; 297, 10 Aug 18, OHF.

128 The annual cost of a tour of duty in London inthe 1930's Colonel Studler estimated to have beenabout $10,000 in excess of Army pay.


included observation of developments inmuch of western Europe. The number, thedetails, and the timing of his studies madethem peculiarly significant.129 A list of thesubjects he covered in his 300-odd reportsreveals the scope of his work.130

Sometimes the information in reportswas perforce sketchy, consisting of photo-graphs, rather general descriptions, oreven merely guesses based on inference.Sometimes, particularly before the war be-gan, the data were detailed, though in theabsence of precisely dimensioned drawingsOrdnance designers could consider the in-formation suggestive rather than explicit.Technical intelligence reports could supplyfacts on the observed performance of apiece of equipment and could list generalcharacteristics; more exact details werevery difficult to obtain. Ordinarily, theWar Department could get engineeringdetails only by purchase from a Europeanmunitions maker or by an exchange ofinformation with a foreign government. Inany attempted exchange, American offi-cers again and again deplored the weak-ness of their positions. American militaryjournals, technical magazines, and news-papers so frequently spread across theirpages the essential information of a newAmerican development that liaison officersfound themselves with nothing to offer andcame away empty handed. Yet occasion-ally they apparently believed it possible tolocate supplemental data, for Ordnanceofficers serving as military observers com-plained of being kept in ignorance of whatfurther information the Ordnance Depart-ment might want. Their reports elicited noresponse, unless personal correspondentssupplied it, and the officers abroad wereleft unguided. If, as an Ordnance generallater averred, the Department followedtheir work closely and was balked of action

only by the indifference of the using armsand by want of money,131 the observersassembling the information never knewhow it was received at home. Real or seem-ing lack of interest in the Ordnance officein Washington tended to discourage thesearch for additional data. Reports wereprimarily valuable for the clues they gave.They indicated the lines of development topursue rather than how to pursue them.

How carefully men in the War Depart-ment studied technical intelligence reportsnaturally depended in some measure onwho saw them. Within the Ordnance De-partment distribution was orderly. Whena report landed in the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, from G-2—where it mighthave been kept for as long as four or fivemonths—it went first to such members ofthe Technical Staff as were concerned withthe subject and then passed on to theManufacturing Division engineer incharge of the particular item discussed inthe report. If the report dealt with tanks, itwent to the chief of the Artillery and Auto-motive Division of the Technical Staff andon to the engineer in charge of automotivedesign; if with antiaircraft, from the Tech-nical Staff to the engineers responsible forthat type of artillery and to the man in

129 Of Studler's work Col. Raymond E. Lee, in1940, wrote:

There are few, if any, other ordnance officers alivewho have had such opportunities for first hand studyand comparison of modern weapon development anduse as Major Studler has enjoyed.

For this reason, I recommend that his opinions begiven prompt and serious consideration by those au-thorities who are now making decisions of great mag-nitude and long range importance to the future of theU.S. Army.Rpt from London, 3 1 Jul 40, sub: Mobilization of In-dustry. IG 6620, 2724-A-38-12, DRB AGO.

130 See correspondence files of reports from London,Berlin, and Paris, 1936-40, OO 321.12/289, andIncls 1-3 of same file, DRB AGO.

131 Comments attached to ltr, Gen Barnes to MajGen Orlando Ward, 25 Jan 52, OCMH.


charge of artillery ammunition. Thencethe original report or a copy would usuallygo to an arsenal or to Aberdeen ProvingGround, or to both. The routing was de-signed to give the persons best able to usethe information full opportunity to studyit. The names of the men who receivedvarious reports are often still attached tothe original folders. Engineers and de-signers for each category of ordnance sawthe reports that touched their special fields.Presumably each man in turn could truth-fully say "Contents noted." Furthermore,from 1920 on an accession list, compiledmonthly, was distributed to division heads,so that anyone with a legitimate interestin the information could readily know ofany new material that had come in. Manyreports were circulated and recirculatedseveral times. They all ended in the files ofthe Ordnance library.

What use the information derived frommilitary reports was put to is harder toperceive. Reading, even studying, a docu-ment is not synonymous with grasping itsfull import, and understanding its signifi-cance is still different from acting upon it.Hints of European experiments or news ofachievements abroad may frequently havecaused uneasiness or curiosity among Ord-nance engineers, but as long as the De-partment had no money to exploit adiscovery, they could reason that furtherinvestigation was futile. The optimism, theintellectual vigor, the whole temperamentof the individual in charge of developingeach field of ordnance might determinewhether the Department pursued orignored a line of research. An underling'sideas could be quashed by the indifferenceof his superior. How deep an impressionparticular technical intelligence reportsmay have made must be largely a matterof speculation. The paternity of ideas is

nearly always difficult to fix. Though fewordnance development projects before1940 can be traced directly to militaryobservers' reports from abroad, some re-ports may have exerted pronounced in-fluence. A few specific examples may illus-trate the workings of the technicalintelligence system. In August 1937 Cap-tain Studler reported at some length onthe new German 47-mm, and 50-mm,antitank guns he had seen:

The 47mm anti-tank gun is considered ofinterest as representing a tendency to whichreference has been made in earlier reports.. . . The undersigned [has] expressed theopinion that replacement of the GermanArmy 37mm anti-tank gun by one of a largercaliber, probably 47mm or 50mm could beexpected.

It will be noted that the initial strikingenergy of the 47mm is approximately 36%greater than the corresponding energy of the37mm, with an increase of approximately15% of total weight of gun and carriage. It isrecognized that conclusions of value cannotbe drawn without complete data as to com-parable external ballistics and actual impactresults.

It is of supplemental interest to note that abarrel of a caliber of approximately 50mmand not less than 50 calibers long was seen bythe undersigned in a Krupp gun shop atEssen, Germany, on June 23, 1937. Kruppengineers at first denied that such a barrelwas in existence and later stated that it wasprepared for an experimental model of anti-tank gun. The same engineers indicated thatthe 37mm gun was considered inadequate byGerman military personnel.

On the following page of this report thereappears a tabulated statement of compara-tive characteristics of the various anti-tankcannon seen by the undersigned in the courseof the past 12 months. Weapons of a caliberless than 25mm have been excluded from thetabulation. The smaller caliber anti-tankguns include Rheinmetall, Solothurn, Oer-likon and Madsen.

The energy and weight figures given in thelast two lines of the tabulation are believed to


be of interest although they should not bemade the basis of evaluation without full con-sideration of the specific characteristics andof descriptive data contained in manufac-turers' catalogues or in individual reports towhich reference has been made. For exam-ple, the Schneider 47mm, the Bofors 47mmand the Madsen 37mm guns, all with rela-tively high energy indices, are provided withsteel tired carriages and are therefore notsuitable for high road speeds.

It will be noted that, of the guns listed,only the British has true all around trav-erse.132

The significance of this information, asCaptain Studler stated, lay in its indicationof a trend. The exact data were missing.The routing slip attached shows that even-tually the report reached the chief Ord-nance engineers in charge of artillery de-sign and in due course went on to menat Aberdeen Proving Ground and at Pica-tinny Arsenal. The men who did the actualwork at drafting boards apparently did notsee the letter. No one requested moreinformation.

Years later, when U.S. soldiers discov-ered that German tank and antitank gunsoutranged theirs, angry American officerscharged the Ordnance Department withineptitude for not knowing what high-powered armament German units pos-sessed.133 The Ordnance Department hadknown. G-2 of the General Staff and Ord-nance men alike had received warning in1937. But they had not acted upon theinformation. Several facts entered in. Inthe first place, Major Smith, in 1937 themilitary observer in Berlin through whomthe report quoted above was sent, dis-agreed with Captain Studler's prophecythat German antitank units would in thenear future be equipped with guns largerthan 37-mm. Major Smith's comment,appended as an indorsement, presumablyweakened the impact of Captain Studler's

report. In the second place, because theevolution of concepts of defense againsttanks had not yet gone far, a light-weightgun to accompany the infantry was stillthe goal sought. Much later, doctrinewould dictate use of tanks versus tanks,and bazookas or recoilless rifles for power-ful defense in infantrymen's hands againstattacking armored vehicles. Until doctrinechanged, the requirement of an antitankgun little or no heavier than the 37-mm,was bound to endure. For what it was, the37-mm, was a good weapon; it met therequirements as set up. In the third place,be it repeated, in 1937 and 1938 the dataavailable on the German 47-mm, was notenough to permit Ordnance engineers atRock Island and Picatinny Arsenals tobuild a 47-mm, gun and make ammuni-tion for it without starting nearly at thebeginning of the long development proc-ess. A Rheinmetall 37-mm, gun, on theother hand, was at that moment in thepossession of the Ordnance Department;it could complete adaptation of that designfor the U.S. Army relatively rapidly. Andthe General Staff wanted somethingquickly.134

On foreign tank developments technicalintelligence was copious. Because combatexperience with tanks after World War Iwas limited to the Italian campaign inEthiopia and the Spanish Civil War, de-signers of every nation were especiallyeager to profit from the experiments ofothers. Though the cost of building a pilotmodel precluded the possibility of testingevery innovation, Ordnance Departmentautomotive engineers scrutinized such data

132 Rpt from Berlin, 13 Aug 37, sub: Armament andEquipment — Organizational, Standard Rheinmetall47 mm AT Gun L/34, OKD 472.95/34/2, Ord TechIntel files.

133 See below. Ch. XI.134 See above, pp. 47-50.


as came into their hands. Some features offoreign design were nearly impossible tolearn; in the fall of 1936, in response to anOrdnance Department overture to theBritish proposing freer exchange of infor-mation, the military observer in Londonreplied that the British War Office hadnever permitted any foreigner to see theinside of a British tank.135 When in 1933 ayoung German, ostensibly as a personalhobby, published a book on combat ve-hicles, Taschenbuch der Tanks, a copy sent toWashington soon found its way into theOrdnance technical library and saw con-stant use. Its photographs, text, and tabu-lar comparisons of the chief characteristicsof successive models developed by everynation were so informing that the book wasliterally thumbed to pieces in the course ofthe next years.136 Comments appended to areport of the spring of 1939 cove ring recentGerman tank designs indicate that auto-motive engineers of the Ordnance Depart-ment continued to watch the work of othernations. Between 1936 and the end of 1939more than a score of reports on German,French, and British tanks and tank acces-sories came in. Apart from the ever-presenthandicap of too little money to test newdevices, American tank design was chieflyobstructed by the failure to modify doc-trine of tactical use. Neither designers'ignorance of foreign developments norbland assumption of the superiority ofAmerican automotive engineering wasresponsible for shortcomings in Americantanks of the 1930's.

Many considerations might affect thetreatment accorded any piece of technicalintelligence and its ultimate value. Thereports on the Mohaupt "explosive" mayserve as an example. In January 1939 amilitary liaison officer chanced upon atrail that led him to a young Swiss, Henri

Mohaupt, who described in general termsa new type of explosive which he claimedto have developed. A British commissionwas then secretly investigating Mohaupt'sdevice and upon payment of a fee laterwitnessed test firings. Correspondence be-tween the American military observerassigned to Bern, Switzerland, and theMohaupt Company followed, and in Julythe War Department cabled CaptainStudler to pursue inquiries. Captain Stud-ler's report, sent in August, contained aphotostat copy of the results of the testsconducted for the British commission anda summary of the most significant featuresof the explosive as Mohaupt himself setthem forth: its effect, "in certain cases"forty times that of TNT for equal weights,its stability, its low cost of manufacture,and the variety of uses to which it could beadapted. Mohaupt claimed also to havedeveloped a fuze that doubled the effect ofthe explosive. The British officers who hadbeen present at the tests surmised thatMohaupt was using the Neumann princi-ple but, as they assured Captain Studler,although Mohaupt had indeed demon-strated the results he claimed for his explo-sive, the price he was demanding had ledthe British to drop negotiations.137

While this report aroused some immedi-ate interest in the Ordnance Department,the refusal of Mohaupt and his associates

135 Ltr. London to ACofS, 8 Oct 36, sub: Exchangeof Information between the United States and For-eign Countries Concerning Tank Developments, OO321.12/4234, Eng, NA.

136 When a second edition appeared in 1938 engi-neers in the Ordnance Department were dismayed tofind included a detailed description of the new Amer-ican medium tank with special features, supposedlystill a carefully guarded military secret.

137 (1) Interv with Col Studler, 9 Jan 49. (2) Rptfrom London. 12 Aug 39, sub: Ammunition and Py-rotechnics, Mohaupt Explosive, OKD 471.86/280,Ord Tech Intel files.


to divulge any particulars of the construc-tion of his device unless the United StatesGovernment paid $25,000 in advance soonhalted negotiations: ". . . further interestof the War Department," the OrdnanceDepartment stated, "is contingent uponevidence that either England or some othermajor European power has acquired rightsfor use of the device."138 Thus, cautionabout spending money delayed matters fora year. Late in 1940 Mohaupt in personcame to Washington under the aegis of theAmerican agent of Edgar Brandt, theFrench munitions maker. Doubtless thefact that Mohaupt had in hand an actualmodel of a rifle grenade built to his designclinched his argument and won him op-portunity to make 200 grenades to test fireat Aberdeen Proving Ground. The dem-onstration at Aberdeen convinced theArmy and Navy men who witnessed it thathere indeed was an important "new formof munition." They at once recommendedpurchasing rights to employ the Mohauptprinciple in any form to which it mightprove adaptable.139

The curious fact then came to light thatthe essential features of this "new form ofmunition" had already been offered to theOrdnance Department by Nevil MonroeHopkins, an American inventor. The Ord-nance Technical Staff had rejected Hop-kins' design of a bomb built with a shapedcharge and rejected it without testing be-cause, the letter to the inventor had stated,his was not a new idea.140 Several monthslater the Technical Staff learned fromMohaupt what the British had alreadyguessed, that the Mohaupt projectileachieved its effect not by a new explosivebut by similar use of the Munroe principleof the hollow charge. By citing the Britishpatent of 1911 that had caused the UnitedStates Patent Office to deny Hopkins a

patent, the Ordnance Patent Sectionthereupon showed Mohaupt's "secret" tobe no secret. The upshot was that the Ord-nance Department was able to conclude acontract with Mohaupt's company at amuch lower price than the Swiss had firstdemanded.141 An adaptation of Mohaupt'sdesign later formed the basis of thebazooka rocket.142

Estimate of the value of technical intelli-gence reports on this new type of projectilemust be weighed today by recognition ofHopkins' contribution. The reports on theMohaupt projectile would have served anall-important purpose had they directedthe attention of American ammunitionexperts to the importance of Hopkins' pro-posal. But the Ordnance technicians whostudied the confidential papers fromEurope and Hopkins' hollow charge bombobviously saw no connection betweenMohaupt's development and Hopkins', in

138 Memo, Subcommittee on Explosives for OrdCommittee, Tech Staff, 2 Dec 39, sub: Mohaupt Ex-plosive—Submitted by Dr. E. Matthias, Zurich, Item1291-1, Ord Tech Committee files.

139 Memo, Subcommittee on Grenades, ArtilleryAmmunit ion and Bombs for Ord Committee, TechStaff, 30 Dec 40, sub: Project for Inaugurat ing theProcurement of Rifle Grenades following Designs De-veloped by Mohaupt, Item 16374, Ord Tech Com-mittee files.

140 "The use of the Munroe effect of explosive,"wrote the assistant to the Chief of Ordnance, "hasbeen proposed many times to the Military and Navalservices and the phenomenon has been known foryears . . . the type of bomb proposed by you wouldbe useful only as a special mission weapon and eventhen of questionable value." Ltr, Gen McFarland toNevil Monroe Hopkins, 28 May 40, OO400.111/11068, DRB AGO. Test of the "Dynamix"explosive Hopkins proposed took place at APG in1941 but in an ordinary bomb casing minus the hol-low charge feature. The "Dynamix" filler aloneproved impractical. OCM 20082, 15 Mar 43.

141 Patent 28030. Photostat copy in OD Patent Sec.Subsequently, Mohaupt's patent applications wereheld abandoned by the Commissioner of Patents forviolation of security.

142 See Ch. XII, below.


spite of the lead given them by British re-search chemists' conclusions cited in onereport from abroad. The British, in fact,supplied only with the photographic rec-ords of the Zurich tests and the Britishofficers' oral descriptions, which the mili-tary report made equally available to theUnited States, proceeded to develop hol-low charge projectiles of their own.143 Inthe United States the investigation wasdropped until the Brandt agent in Wash-ington intervened to get Mohaupt achance to demonstrate his grenade. Tech-nical intelligence was not involved in thattransaction; the 1939 reports from Europehad no influence whatsoever upon theOrdnance Department's decision manymonths later to test Mohaupt's grenade.

These examples indicate that utilizationof technical intelligence was at times bothprompt and intelligent, at other times lag-gardly and unimaginative. For the lapsesexplanations of a sort can be found: thesmall staff of officers and trained civiliansin the Office, Chief of Ordnance, before1940, with the consequent multiplicity ofassignments for each person which auto-matically reduced his time for thinkingthrough a problem; the limitations onOrdnance research and development im-posed by higher authority both throughcontrol of the purse strings and throughspecifying the characteristics that any newitem should embody; and finally the factthat the temper of the American people upto 1939 made American involvement inwar so unthinkable that vigorous pursuitof new munitions developments couldhardly seem urgent. Ordnance officers andemployees carried on their work in amilieu where everyone was more concernedwith butter than with guns. Nevertheless,the testimony to a deep-seated compla-cency, inimical to ideas not originating

within the upper echelons of the OrdnanceDepartment, cannot be brushed aside.144

Nevil Monroe Hopkins, though naturallya somewhat prejudiced judge, voiced thecharge: "To the 'expert' smug in his 'supe-rior' convictions, the writer often wouldlike to say—'Better not know so much thatmuch of it is untrue.' " 145

Still, the Ordnance Department was byno means alone in its too frequent do-nothing attitude. Every branch and serviceof the U.S. Army, including the Air Corps,displayed it.146 Indeed many weaknessesof Army Technical Intelligence before 1940may be fairly attributed less to impercep-tiveness or easy goingness of individuals onthe General Staff or in the Ordnance De-partment than to the lack of any system-atic routine for following up information.In the first place, military liaison officershad only very general instructions. NeitherG-2 nor the Ordnance Departmentthrough G-2 had mapped out charts orlists of items upon which data were desired.Military observers were obliged to exercisetheir own judgment on what would be use-ful. Correct estimates of what to look forbecame increasingly difficult as in thecourse of time the officer serving abroadlost touch with the work of the Ordnancemen at home. No regular two-way ex-change of information between the Office,Chief of Ordnance, and the observers wasprovided for. In the second place, whenthought-provoking information reached

143 (1) Directorate of Explosives Research, ResearchDept. Woolwich, England, "Cavity Effect" of Ex-plosives. A Summary of its History and Service Uses,Sep 41, Incl 1 to OO 350.05/1205, DRB AGO. (2)Group Capt. Claude H. Keith, RAF (Ret.), I HoldMy Aim (London, 1946), pp. 147-49.

144 Interv with Col Studler, 19 Jan 40.145 Nevil Monroe Hopkins, The Battleship Wreck-

ing Bomb, p. 3. photostat copy in OD Pat Sec.1 4 6 For example, Air Corps failure to adopt self-

sealing gas tanks before 1942.


the Ordnance Department, no recognizedprocedure existed whereby it could quicklyaffect policy decisions. An Ordnancedraftsman working on the American 37-mm, antitank gun might question whetherthe 37-mm, would be powerful enough inview of the German development of a 47-mm., but his job was confined to designinga weapon incorporating features deter-mined by higher authority, in this case a37-mm. He might discuss the question withthe engineer in charge of the section, thechief engineer, in turn, with the head ofthe Technical Staff Artillery Division, thelatter with the chief of the Technical Staffand with Ordnance Technical Committeerepresentatives of the using arm and of theGeneral Staff. Not only would this taketime, but the chances were at least eventhat somewhere along the line the discus-sion would get sidetracked. Both imagina-tion and persistence would be needed todrive home the point that a new Europeandevelopment was rendering obsolete anAmerican design. The users had to be con-vinced and then the Bureau of the Budgetand Congress had to be persuaded to sup-ply the money. It was no one person's jobto see that knowledge was translatedpromptly into appropriate action.

The General Staff looked to the Ord-nance Department for expert advice onmunitions; the Ordnance Department ex-

pected the using arms and G-2 to stipulatetheir requirements, based on over-all plansof tactical use and evaluation of competi-tors' equipment. Between these groupsimportant decisions could easily be delayedor altogether lost in the shuffle. The proc-essing of information was at times inordi-nately slow. If the dates on route slips be asafe index, a military report in the 1930'smight take nearly a year to circulate. Somereports remained with G-2 several monthsand took another six or seven to go therounds of Ordnance Department offices.147

Routing technical intelligence within theOrdnance Department was left to a clerkwho lacked authority to push matters. Bythe time decision to act upon a report wasreached, the information might well be outof date. Not until the summer of 1940 didthe General Staff awaken to the faultinessof its intelligence system and set up themachinery for more effective operations.148

147 The commanding officer at Aberdeen com-mented at the end of 1937: "Judging from the age ofthe . . . Reports received at the Aberdeen ProvingGround any method which would tend to speed upthe dissemination of information from abroad is de-sirable." 1st Ind, CO APG for CofOrd, 21 Dec 37,sub: Dissemination of Information, OO 321.12/4301Eng, NA.

148 (1) Memo ACofS G-2 for CofS, 16 Aug 40, sub:WD Special Regulation, War Dept, Intelligence,MID 350.051, DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, TAG to Chiefs ofAll Arms and Services, 6 Sep 40, sub: IntelligenceSections in the Office of Chiefs of Arms and Services,AG 321.19 MID, DRB AGO.

CHAPTER VIII

Wartime Organization andProcedures in Research and

DevelopmentIt is easy even for participants in the

military planning and labors of 1940 toforget the strains, the uncertainties, thehours of frustration, and the moments ofdespair that marked that summer. Fever-ish activity within the War Departmentaccompanied anxiety born of the successesof the German armies. As money flowedout for rearming the United States, theOrdnance Department set itself vigorouslyto its task. Pressure eased slightly after thefailure of the German blitz upon England,only to mount to a new height in the fall of1941 as war in the Pacific loomed evercloser and Hitler's subjugation of all conti-nental Europe seemed imminent. Whenthe disasters of late 1941 and 1942 occurredin the Pacific, grim determination lent newenergy to officers responsible for replacingthe lost equipment and supplying theArmy with weapons more efficient than ithad ever had before. The slowness of thebuild-up in 1943, the hopes for the inva-sion in mid-1944, the shock of the Ar-dennes offensive that December, and theultimate triumph of 1945 formed a back-drop of emotional tension in the arenawhere the Ordnance Department playedits part. The rest of this volume treats of

Ordnance research and development worktopic by topic, and thus sacrifices much ofthe drama inherent in the sweep of events.Though clarity has demanded a discussionbased on particular aspects of technologi-cal problems, the reader must rememberthat work proceeded in an atmospheredarkening and lightening with the defeatsand victories of Allied armies in the field.

Factors Immediately Conditioning Researchand Development

Because the time necessary to evolvethe complicated mechanisms of modernweapons from initial design to finishedproduct is long, logic suggests that Ameri-can soldiers must have fought World WarII mostly with equipment developed be-fore Pearl Harbor. Down into 1944 thiswas indeed the case. Yet before V-J Dayarrived, American and Allied troops wereusing a number of weapons that in 1941were scarcely more than vague ideas.While the truly revolutionizing new itemssuch as the amphibious cargo and person-nel carriers, the proximity fuzes, and thehoming bombs were not conceived withinthe Ordnance Department, its staff con-

WARTIME ORGANIZATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 217

tributed such innovations as armor-piercing-incendiary ammunition, bazoo-kas, and recoilless rifles. Equally essentialto victory were the series of developmentspushed to completion upon weapons andvehicles on which Ordnance technicianshad worked for years—the 90-mm, anti-aircraft and tank guns, the fire controldevices, the aircraft cannon, the tanks.Altogether, some 1,200 new or vastly im-proved items containing thousands of com-ponents were designed and producedbefore midsummer 1945. The difficultiesof achieving this feat bear review.

The first handicaps in this race againsttime were the late start and the necessityfor haste. During the peace years moneyfor Ordnance research and developmenthad been little. The backlog of projects in1940 was large. Yet in the summer of 1940research and development work upon newOrdnance matériel had to be relegated toa secondary role because the urgency ofgetting equipment into the hands of troopswas so great that quantity production ofaccepted items had to be the first task. Notuntil mid-1942 were experts of the Ord-nance Department released to work solelyupon design and development of newweapons.

Meanwhile, observation of combat inEurope and, later, actual fighting in thePacific and North Africa revealed weak-nesses and gaps in American equipmentthat added to the list of projects requiringinvestigation. Thereupon arose the prob-lem of contriving a system of communica-tion whereby Ordnance officers in thetheatres could transmit quickly to researchand development men in the zone of theinterior the exact nature of the changescombat experience dictated. Establishingmachinery to effect this took many monthsand was scarcely in operation until the

spring of 1943. Only delegation of manyresearch problems to other agencies en-abled the Ordnance Department eventu-ally to supply American and Allied forceswith arms and ammunition as good as orsuperior to the enemy's.

A third problem grew out of the climateand terrain to which fighting equipmentwas exposed. Corroding dampness, exces-sive heat, bitter cold, beach landings wherestores were drenched in salt water, opera-tions over coral reefs, desert sand, or pre-cipitous mountain trails, through thickjungle or deep snows, all threatened toimmobilize or seriously damage munitions.Prolonged, careful, and expensive experi-mentation was needed to find answers tothese problems. Money had not beenavailable in the twenties and thirties.Again the late start added to difficulties,although, in the absence of combat testing,some malfunctions could scarcely havebeen forestalled.

A final difficulty was the problem ofdesigning matériel that could be mass pro-duced by American industry from avail-able materials. No item, regardless of itsperfection of design, could be counted uponunless private companies could turn it outaccurately and quickly. In spite of theefforts of the Ordnance districts in the1930's to prepare manufacturers for muni-tions production, most firms in 1941 stilllacked experience. Hence, simplicity ofdesign was important. Machine-tool short-ages also emphasized this need. Further-more, private industry's inexperiencepointed to the wisdom of making as fewchanges in design as possible once con-tracts for manufacture had been let andproduction lines set up. It is true that insome instances success in devising a newpiece of equipment depended upon theability of manufacturers to make intricate


parts of extraordinary delicacy. Thus theproximity fuze was made possible by rind-ing producers who could make tiny tur-bines and generators and miniature radiocircuits of utmost exactness and make themby the hundred thousand. But in all casesthe less complicated the design, the surerthe Ordnance Department was of gettingmatériel fabricated to specification. More-over, since adequate stock piles of strategicraw materials had not been accumulatedin advance, or because sufficient quanti-ties of the ideal material nowhere existed,development of ordnance was handi-capped by the necessity of finding sub-stitute materials—synthetic rubber, plas-tics, new alloy steels,1 Shortages of tin andcopper launched the attempt to producesteel cartridge cases. Vehicles rode on syn-thetic tires. Rubber washers gave way toneoprene washers. Tank engines had to beadjusted to burn lower octane gasoline.Use of new materials required extensivepreliminary research.2

In view of the baffling problems to besolved and the dearth of men qualified byscientific training and experience to dealwith them, the success of the wartime re-search and development program standsas a triumph. It was a job demanding widecollaboration. President Roosevelt's cre-ation of the National Defense ResearchCommittee—NDRC, for short—in June1940 was an all-important step in aligningcivilian scientists to share in the task. TheOrdnance Department had opened nego-tiations some months earlier with the Na-tional Academy of Sciences to pursue anumber of investigations too remote fromthe immediate urgent problems at hand tobe handled by the overworked staff of theOrdnance Department itself. In Octoberthese projects, eighteen of them in thefield of ammunition, were turned over to

the NDRC. Other assignments followed.By thus enlisting leading civilian scientiststo undertake most of the basic long-rangeresearch for the military, the United Statesescaped the consequences that Germanyfaced after 1942 when lack of co-ordina-tion between projects, subordination ofresearch and development to production,and the resulting recourse to stop-gapmeasures lost the German nation the fruitsof its best scientific knowledge andpotential.3

For the scientist, a sharp distinctionexists between basic research, the seekingof new principles of broad application, andtechnical research, that is, the applicationof new knowledge or of previously existingknowledge to a specific new item. The roleof research in most government enterprisesis logically limited to the latter. Certainlythe military departments of the UnitedStates Government have rarely been freeto pursue basic research save in the realmof ballistics; their responsibility is to applythe broad findings of fundamental researchto specific military problems. Even theMANHATTAN Project was, strictly speaking,concerned largely with technical research,for much of the basic research upon thefeasibility of splitting the atom had pre-ceded the study of using this force in abomb. Thus, apart from the work of itsBallistic Research Laboratory, the Ord-nance Department never deliberatelyengaged in basic research, though occa-sionally men at Watertown, Picatinny,

1 A Strategic Materials Act permitt ing stockpilinghad been passed by the Congress in June 1939, butthe amounts accumulated under this law were lim-ited. See Millett. Mobilization Planning, MS. OCMH,p. 53.

2 See Ch. XVIII. below.3 See Brig. Gen. Leslie E. Simon. German Research in

World War II (New York and London. 1947). pp. 90-107.


and Frankford Arsenals found themselvesconstrained to carry on fundamental in-vestigations in such fields as metallurgyand explosives. The Ballistic ResearchLaboratory at Aberdeen Proving Groundwas an exception to the rule because studyof the behavior of projectiles inevitablyinvolves exploration of physical and chem-ical reactions of a basic character, andbecause no civilian institution in Americahad ever interested itself in this field.

Even technical research, the next step,came to be too complex and time consum-ing for the Ordnance Department tohandle unaided after 1940. Thereafteruntil the end of the war, the Army's jobon everything but ballistics was primarilyone of development rather than of basic ortechnical research. The delegation of re-search problems to the National DefenseResearch Committee, to university scien-tists, research foundations, and industriallaboratories released the engineeringtalents of the Ordnance Department forthe tasks of transforming laboratory inno-vations into equipment that could be massproduced. While there were exceptions,most Ordnance Department experimentalwork from 1940 through 1945 was concen-trated upon design and development.

Only after technical research is far ad-vanced can design begin. For design, theformulation of a pattern from which tobuild working models, is an engineeringprocess entailing the calculation of stressesand tolerances, and the determination ofthe mechanical and chemical forces re-quired and the strength of materialsneeded. From the designer's hand comethe blueprints and specifications fromwhich test models are built. Developmentcan proceed only when there is a model towork upon, inasmuch as development isconcerned with making a design practical

by testing, discovering deficiencies, anddevising corrections. In producing newmilitary equipment, development is quiteas essential as research. It may in fact con-tinue after an item is officially accepted forstandardization, although minor improve-ments are frequently labeled modificationrather than development. Changes intechniques of production aimed at increas-ing output, bettering quality, or cuttingcosts may result in slight modifications ofdesign, changes usually effected by so-called production engineers. When short-ages of strategic raw materials necessitateuse of substitutes, other engineeringchanges are often required.

In all these creative processes manypeople are involved. Patents are stillissued, to be sure, and titles to inventionsare still vested in particular individualswho establish their claims to having intro-duced original features into a device ormechanism. Yet patent offices of everynation ordinarily recognize only a fewfeatures of a design as constituting a novelpatentable contribution. Modern weaponsare nearly universally the product not ofone inventor, or even two or three collab-orators but of innumerable people. Thevery source of the initial idea is frequentlyhard to ascertain and the number of con-tributors to its development tends to pro-duce anonymity. When the OrdnanceDepartment requested the National De-fense Research Committee to undertakeresearch upon any one of a series of prob-lems, the NDRC in turn might delegateinvestigation of particular phases to scien-tists or several research groups at univer-sities or foundations. The VT, or radio,fuze, for example, evolved from that kindof collaboration; at the request of theNavy, the NDRC and NDRC contractorsworked out the basic electronic features,


MAJ. GEN. GLADEON M. BARNES,chief of the Research and Development Service.

ballisticians and fuze experts of the Ord-nance Department supplied the guidingdata to make the fuze workable in ammu-nition. Though the patent for torsion barsuspension for tanks reads in the name ofGeneral Barnes of the Ordnance Depart-ment, dozens of automotive engineersaided in the development. Consequently,the discussion of research and develop-ment in the pages that follow includes fewindividual names. Participation was sowide that rarely can individual credit beassigned fairly.

Evolution of Organized Research andDevelopment

Whoever else falls into anonymity,Gladeon M. Barnes cannot. From 1938 to1946, first as colonel, then as brigadiergeneral, and finally as major general, hewas a dominant figure in the Office, Chiefof Ordnance, on research and develop-ment matters and made his influencestrongly felt outside as well. As chief of theTechnical Staff before 1940, he scrutinizedevery project proposed and followed prog-ress on all approved. It was largely hisdecision that determined what researchshould be delegated to outside institutions.When in the summer of 1940 GeneralWesson transferred him to Industrial Serv-ice to direct production engineering,Colonel Barnes brought with him his or-ganizing capacity and drive. Though theimmediate problem then was to hurrythrough the blueprints and specificationson accepted matériel in order to get con-tractors started on production, Barnes'vision of the role research and develop-ment should occupy never deserted him.As soon as production was well launched,his opportunity came. By the summer of1942 ammunition plants were in opera-

tion, tanks were beginning to roll out of theTank Arsenal in Detroit, guns and car-riages were emerging from factories in adozen states, and fire control instrumentswere in process. Even the newly inventedbazooka and bazooka rockets were in pro-duction. Convinced, therefore, that thepeak of the crisis of initiating manufacturewas now passed, General Campbell, thenew Chief of Ordnance, placed GeneralBarnes in charge of a separate researchand development unit, first called theTechnical Division, later the Research andDevelopment Division and still later theResearch and Development Service.

Barnes was a skilled engineer, a grad-uate of the University of Michigan Schoolof Engineering. He was a man of variedordnance experience, an expert on artil-lery, sure of his own judgments. An impas-


sioned fighter for his own ideas, he wasunwilling to sit by patiently to wait for hissuperiors to arrive at a vital decision affect-ing ordnance, and when necessary wouldtake his argument directly to higherauthority. When he believed that actionwas urgently needed, he took upon himselfresponsibility for starting work not yet of-ficially authorized. His very inability tosee any point of view but his own was inmany ways an asset to the Ordnance De-partment at a time when swift action wasimperative, though his opponents regardedhis refusal to consider contrary opinion avery great weakness. He cut corners, setaside red tape, disregarded orthodox butdelaying procedures. His admirers admitthat he made mistakes, but they point outthat he never pushed upon others blamefor his own errors. On the other hand, justas he took all responsibility for mistakes,so, his critics aver, he took to himself creditfor the solid work of his predecessors andof his subordinates. He believed an ex-panded Ordnance Department quite ableto carry out a full research program with-out the intervention of any other agencyexcept in so far as the Ordnance Depart-ment itself might contract for particularinvestigative work with industrial and uni-versity laboratories. In 1940 he appearedto question the value of a special commit-tee of civilian scientists committed to thestudy of possible new weapons, but he wasthe man first chosen to serve as the WarDepartment liaison officer with the Na-tional Defense Research Committee.4 Itwas convincing testimony to his compe-tence. While many people found himlacking in warmth and devoid of per-sonal magnetism, throughout the war hisopinion carried as great weight with hisadversaries as with his supporters on par-ticular issues. His knowledge, his persist-

ence, and his forcefulness combined to fithim for the many-faceted job of directingwartime research and development.

The earlier provisions for Ordnance re-search and development assigned planningto the Ordnance Committee,5 design tomen in Industrial Service. The system wasthe outgrowth of General Williams' deter-mination after World War I to have theusing arms initiate requests for matériel tomeet their needs, specify the military char-acteristics they desired, and then test themodels designers evolved. The onus ofresponsibility for deciding what was neces-sary was thus shifted from the OrdnanceDepartment to the combat arms, them-selves not always in full accord.6 Still, thearrangement was workable for many yearslargely because the Caliber Board hadthoroughly mapped out so comprehensivea development program that a long seriesof projects stretched out before the Ord-nance Department to pursue as time andmoney permitted. The Ordnance Com-mittee with its representatives from theusing arms and General Staff discussed,accepted, and rejected specific proposals,listened to reports upon progress, maderecommendations to the General Staff forstandardization, and finally recorded theformal action whereby a new item wasadopted or an old one declared obsolete.The minutes of these meetings, the"OCM's," constituted a valuable sourceof information on the course of develop-

4 Hist of Ord R&D Serv. II. NDRC Liaison (here-after cited as NDRC Liaison) p. 11, OHF.

5 Early in World War II the name OrdnanceCommittee was unofficial ly superseded by the titleOrdnance Technical Committee. When the War De-partment ordered every technical service to establisha technical committee, the Ordnance Committee,though continuing to function just as it had for morethan twenty years, came to be called generally theOrdnance Technical Committee.

6 See Ch. VII, above.


ment of each item. The supervising unitwithin the Ordnance Department was agroup of trained engineers, the TechnicalStaff, headed by an experienced officer.As Colonel Barnes described it early in1940: "The Technical Staff is ... re-sponsible for research and developmentprograms and for the approval of basicdrawings of new material. It carries out allfunctions in regard to research and devel-opment, except the execution of thework." 7 The exception was a big one. Thework was done by men in Industrial Serv-ice in the Office, Chief of Ordnance, inWashington, at the arsenals, or at AberdeenProving Ground. Occasionally, as in thecase of research on powder, a commercialcompany undertook some investigation.The Technical Staff was an advising andrecording group, not in any real sense anoperating unit. The operating group inIndustrial Service, on the other hand, hadlittle say about policy and program.

As long as Caliber Board projects werein advance of any nation's accomplish-ments and as long as the tempo of develop-ment work was unhurried, the schemesufficed. But it was ill-adapted to pushingthrough the kind of intensive study of al-ternatives together with the search fortotally new scientific devices of war thatevents in 1939 and 1940 called for. Devel-opment work on existing models alsosuffered for want of a central head to co-ordinate it. Though in the summer of 1940General Wesson felt obliged to refuse Colo-nel Barnes' plea for a separate researchand development division dedicated solelyto these problems, his assignment of Barnesto an operating position in Industrial Serv-ice proved to be a beginning. In spite ofthe fact that his job was primarily con-cerned with production, Barnes encour-aged orderly progress on development

work and himself proposed new lines tofollow. The nearly seventy projects that helisted in May 1940 as requiring immediateattention indicate his awareness of whatneeded to be done.8 Yet a year after he hadtaken charge of production engineering heprotested the inadequacies of the organ-izational set-up:

1. The duplication of effort involved in thedesign and development of Ordnance maté-riel lies between the Technical Staff and In-dustrial Service. Take for example, the usualway in which a new project is initiated. Amemorandum is prepared in one of the divi-sions of the Industrial Service and sentthrough the office of the Assistant Chief ofIndustrial Service, Engineering to TechnicalStaff. Technical Staff personnel prepare theO.C.M. It becomes necessary for this secondgroup of officers and civilians to acquaintthemselves with this project, either throughcontact with the office of the Assistant Chiefof Industrial Service for Engineering or withthe divisions. Often it is necessary to havethese O.C.M.'s rewritten as the writer did notquite understand the project. A duplicationoccurs after the design has been prepared bythe initiating division since the drawingsmust be approved by both the office of As-sistant Chief of Industrial Service for Engi-neering and Technical Staff. After the O.C.M.is approved it is forwarded by letter to TheAdjutant General, and after the general de-sign has been approved by Technical Staff itsduties cease until the item is ready for test atAberdeen Proving Ground.

2. Drawings, designs, contacts with indus-try, follow-up, and all other work connectedwith development is the responsibility of In-dustrial Service. Design work is executed inthe Industrial Service in Washington, bycommercial companies, at the various arse-nals, or at the Proving Ground. Difficultiesare now encountered due to lack of authorityof the Industrial Service at the ProvingGround where the ballistic laboratory and

7 Memo. Col Barnes. 13 May 40, sub: Expansionof Research and Development Activities, Organiza-tion R&D Serv. Barnes file, OHF.

8 Incl, sub: Estimates, to memo cited n. 7.


automotive design section have been builtup. All other design sections and laboratoriesare under the control of the IndustrialService.9

The upshot was the abolition of theTechnical Staff and the elimination of theduplicating efforts Barnes deplored butthe continuation of research and develop-ment activities as an adjunct of produc-tion.10 Only the Ballistic Laboratory atAberdeen Proving Ground functioned as atrue research unit undistracted by the pro-duction problems of Industrial Service.Though the new arrangement was an im-provement over the old, and though underboth systems some very important workwas accomplished, far more rapid progresswas possible when research and develop-ment became an independent division.That had to wait until June 1942.

In keeping with the major branches ofIndustrial Service, General Barnes dividedthe duties of his staff along commoditylines, an organizational scheme that he ad-hered to both while he was within Indus-trial Service and after he became chief of aseparate division. The principal categoriesof Ordnance matériel were always artil-lery, small arms, ammunition, and auto-motive equipment, but these were ofcourse susceptible of combination and sub-division. Just as artillery and automotivedesign had at one time been combined inone working unit, so in 1940 aircraft ar-mament was specifically included withartillery, while tank and combat vehicledevelopment was put into a separate sub-division. Two years later aircraft arma-ment development became so importantthat it was separated from artillery. As theTank-Automotive Center had by that timebeen set up in Detroit and automotive de-sign assigned there, a Tank and Automo-tive Development Liaison section was

added to the Technical Division in Wash-ington. Similarly, the rocket program, vir-tually in infancy in 1942, by 1944 hadgrown to proportions warranting a sepa-rate division for rocket development work.To care for the mechanics of administra-tion of all the commodity groups, an exec-utive office was always included in theorganization.

A number of special tasks remained thatfell clearly neither into any one of thecommodity development spheres nor intothe domain of administrative work. Thesewere grouped, therefore, into a unit called,for want of a more comprehensively de-scriptive name, the Service Branch. Afterthe summer of 1942 the Service Branchwas responsible for liaison with otheragencies dealing with technical develop-ments, such as the NDRC and the Na-tional Inventors Council; it co-ordinatedthe work of the ordnance laboratories atthe arsenals and issued the technical re-ports on their findings; it prepared anddisseminated the progress reports consoli-dated from the monthly reports of eachdevelopment branch; it formulated andsupervised investigations and tests of ma-terials to minimize use of strategic mate-rials and revised specifications accordingly;it supervised the activities of the BallisticResearch Laboratory and acted as a clear-ing house on ballistic information for theusing arms and services as well as for otherparts of the Ordnance Department; andfinally, through its Ordnance Intelligenceunit it was responsible for analyzing fea-tures of foreign matériel by study of itemssent to this country or described in reportsfrom abroad, and then for preparing the

9 Memo. Barnes for CofOrd. 14 Jul 41. sub: Sug-gested Reorganization of Ord Office. ReorganizationR&D Serv. Barnes file. OHF.

10 ODO 183. 29 Jul 41. OHF.

CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICE: 1 JULY 1945

Formerly the Service Branch combined Exec and Research and Materials.The broken lines indicate some of the important liaison relationships.

Source: Org Charts No. 40 through 48, July 1945, Control Br, OCO, OHF.


RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

Senate Subcommittee Rpt 5, 23 Jan 45, Pt. I., p. 309, 79th Cong, 1st Sess. The excess of expenditures over appropriations was madepossible by authorizing transfers from other funds.

summaries and intelligence bulletins fordistribution to other research and devel-opment groups to whom the analyseswould be useful. The Service Branch thustouched every special field of research anddevelopment, sorting, sifting, channelingdata, and making available to each groupthe pertinent information assembled by allthe rest. Later some shifting of labels andreshuffling of duties took place, as whenthe Service Branch became the Researchand Materials Division or when the tech-nical reports unit, enlarged to include thetechnical reference unit, was switched tothe Executive Division. But such changes,usually ordered with an eye to saving per-sonnel, did not reduce the scope of thework to be done.11

The machinery for handling this heavyload of diverse responsibilities was welllaid out on paper. Getting it to work de-pended on manning it. This was enor-mously difficult. As long as developmentwork was carried on as part of the produc-tion process, General Barnes could use theexperienced designers of the IndustrialService for such development work as timeallowed. But their number was small, andwhen research and development were sep-arated, Industrial Service pre-empted a

good many. To recruit for the TechnicalDivision men of the desired caliber whohad more than general knowledge of ord-nance was harder in 1942 than in 1940and nearly impossible by 1944. For exam-ple, two branches of the division in No-vember 1942 had 27 out of 72 authorizedmilitary assignments unfilled and 16 outof 45 professional civilian jobs in the Of-fice, Chief of Ordnance, still vacant. As-signment of reserve officers with scientifictraining was one answer, but the supply ofqualified men was limited at all times. InJuly 1945 the entire research and develop-ment staff in Washington numbered only153 officers, 24 consultants, and 357 civil-ians of all grades.12

Money for salaries was no longer astumbling block. Though after 1940 agreater proportion of funds than formerlywas spent for laboratory facilities, mate-rials, and contracts with outside researchgroups, appropriations for research anddevelopment were generous enough to

11 (1) Organization Charts, Schedules A and B forServ Br and Ammo Development Br as of 3 Nov 42,Barnes file, OHF. (2) ODO 5-44. 1 1 Nov 44 andODO 58-45. 23 Jul 45, OHF.

12 (1) Organization Chart, Ammo Div and Serv, 3Nov 42, Schedule B. (2) Organization Chart 40, Rev.1 Jul 45. Both in Barnes file, OHF.


provide attractive salaries.13

In recruiting research and developmentpersonnel, some units fared better thanothers, the Ballistic Research Laboratoryprobably best of all. Col. Hermann H. Zor-nig, whose genius and foresight had largelycreated the laboratory in the late 1930's,had built well. As its first director he hadstarted a program of vast importance.Consequently, because the laboratory wasunique and could transfer no part of itsduties to any other agency, Colonel Zornigwas allowed to begin enlarging his staffearly in 1940. A nonresident Scientific Ad-visory Council of eminent civilian scien-tists, appointed in July, interested a num-ber of distinguished physicists and chemistsin undertaking assignments at the Aber-deen laboratory. Oswald Veblen of theInstitute for Advanced Study at Princeton,Edwin Hubble of the Mount Wilson Ob-servatory, Thomas H.Johnson of the Bar-tol Foundation, Joseph E. Mayer ofColumbia University, Edward J. Mc-Shane of the University of Virginia, DavidL. Webster of Leland Stanford, and othersplaced the Ballistic Research Laboratoryin a position to apply some of the bestbrains in the United States to basic andtechnical research problems. Civilianscientists conducted most of the research,though after Pearl Harbor they generallydonned uniforms as reserve officers. InJune 1941, upon Colonel Zornig's trans-fer, Maj. Leslie E. Simon became director.Trained at the laboratory under ColonelZornig, Major Simon carried on the pro-gram without any break. In addition tothe staff at Aberdeen, a University ofPennsylvania Ballistic Research Labora-tory Annex was set up in 1942 to handlesome of the ballistic computations, espe-cially those on which the University's dif-ferential analyzer could be used. Alto-

gether by mid-1944 the Aberdeen groupnumbered about 740, including profes-sional people with very special qualifica-tions, officers, Wacs, and enlisted men. Allthe enlisted men picked for work in thenew supersonic wind tunnels laboratoryhad had earlier academic training inphysics, chemistry, mathematics, or engi-neering.14

Relations with Civilian Agencies

The distinction of the staff at the Ballis-tic Research Laboratory, abbreviated toBRL, was an asset to the Ordnance De-partment in more ways than one. In addi-tion to the effective work these men ac-complished, their stature added prestige tothe Ordnance Department in its dealingswith civilian groups such as the NDRC.The top-ranking scientists of the academicworld, in 1940 newly brought in on de-fense problems, not unnaturally tended atfirst to regard the military as men of ac-tion unsuited to cope with the intellectualproblems of the research laboratory, butrespect for the gifts of the officers at theBRL soon obliterated this condescension.In time, civilian employees of the Depart-ment's research staff also came to be rec-ognized as possessing the keen intelligenceand intensive knowledge of the academicscientist; indeed, many of them had beenrecruited from universities and importantindustrial research foundations. Personal-ity clashes, inevitable in any large group,gradually diminished.15

Purely professional differences of opinionabout how to solve any given problem and

13 See table, p. 225.14 Hist of Ballistic Research Laboratory. Ch. I. pp.

1-15. OHF.15 Interv. 12 Nov 49. with Col Claudius H. M.

Roberts, Chief of Ammo Development Br. R&DServ.


friction arising from uncertainties aboutwhere whose authority ended—uncertain-ties inherent in the somewhat vague or-ganizational set-up of the NDRC in rela-tion to the Army technical services—endured longer. Yet from start to finishrelations between the Ordnance Depart-ment and the chiefs of divisions of theNational Defense Research Committee,though not invariably cordial, produceduseful collaboration. During the firstmonths of NDRC's life, official machineryfor initiating an NDRC research projectwas slow moving: the technical servicessubmitted projects to The Adjutant Gen-eral for transmission to the NDRC "fromtime to time, as conditions warrant." InNovember 1940 this procedure was sim-plified by having requests for NDRC helpgo through The Adjutant General to theWar Department liaison officer to NDRC;this officer then arranged a conference be-tween the technical service and theNDRC. But by late 1942 this procedurealso proved needlessly roundabout. There-after the Ordnance Department, or anyother technical service, drew up its requestand hand-carried it to the War Depart-ment liaison officer, who in turn hand-car-ried it to the NDRC. In a matter of hoursthe appropriate subdivision of NDRCmight have the research programlaunched. The Ordnance Departmentthen assigned men from its own researchand development staff, usually at least oneofficer and one civilian expert on eachproject, to serve as liaison with theNDRC.16

The investigations thus delegated almostalways involved basic or prolonged tech-nical research that the Ordnance Depart-ment was not at the time equipped tohandle. A sampling of the more than twohundred projects the Department re-

quested the NDRC to undertake indicatestheir specialized nature: a basic study ofdetonations; the kinetics of nitration oftoluene, xylene, benzene, and ethylben-zene; jet propulsion; special fuels for jetpropulsion; determination of the mostsuitable normally invisible band of thespectrum for blackout lighting and meth-ods of employing it in combat zones; prob-lems involving deformation of metals inthe range of plastic flow; phototheodolitesfor aerial position findings; the VT fuze;and gun erosion and hypervelocitystudies.17

Occasionally the NDRC pursued proj-ects along bypaths or into realms that theOrdnance Department felt itself betterqualified to handle or considered untimelyto have explored at that stage of the war.An attempt of a division of NDRC to par-ticipate actively in tank developmentelicited a sharp protest from a vice presi-dent of the Chrysler Corporation after avisit of the NDRC group to a Chryslerplant in Detroit. He declared that thegroup's lack of familiarity with automotiveengineering would involve a costly wasteof the time of men who did understand itsproblems. Though one division of NDRChad pushed through design of the DUKW,the famous amphibian cargo carrier,18 and

16 (1) Memos. TAG for Chiefs of all Supply Serv-ices. 22 Aug 40. sub: Basic Research for National De-fense, AG 381. National Defense (7-29-40) M-WPD-M, and 15 Nov 40 (10-1 6-40) M-WPD-M. exhibitin NDRC Liaison, pp. 24. 27. OHF. (2) Interv. 12 Jul50, with Col Ralph M. Osborne. WD Liaison Officer.

17 NDRC Liaison. Projects OD-02, OD-9. OD-14,OD-16. OD-26. OD-27, OD-34. OD-48, OD-52,OHF.

1 8 NDRC enlisted the General Motors Corpora-tion to do the engineering and exper imenta l shopwork on this amphibian. The engineers of GeneralMotors gave it its name. D for the year 1942, U forutility. K for front-wheeled drive, and W for two reardriving axles. See J. F. Baxter, Scientists Against Time(Boston. 1946). p. 248.


could therefore claim some knowledge ofautomotive problems, the proposed tankproject was canceled. The NDRC reportlater explained that progress had beenblocked by "inability to secure the coop-eration of the Chief of the U.S. Ord-nance Department and the automotiveindustry." 19

Over rocket development also there wassome controversy. Though the conflicthere was largely between two differentschools of thought within the NDRC, andthe Ordnance Department was involvedchiefly as it had to support one or theother, the question of ultimate control ofthe rocket research program naturallycropped up. As interest in rocketrymounted, rivalry grew over who was to di-rect its course. General Barnes contendedthat all rocket development for the Armyshould be an Ordnance responsibility;though the Department should seekNDRC help in meeting Army needs, theNDRC, instead of plunging ahead onfruitless projects, should first "determinethe military requirements of a device be-fore proceeding with its development." 20

The Chief of Ordnance backed this viewby recommending to the Army ServiceForces that "all rocket activity" be co-or-dinated through the Ordnance TechnicalCommittee. The Ordnance Departmentwon its point, but not until the summer of1943 was satisfactory co-operation with theNDRC reached.21 While traces of com-petitiveness persisted, the general patternresolved itself into an arrangement where-by the NDRC assumed leadership in onerealm, the Ordnance Department inanother. The acquisition of basic technicaldata pertaining to rockets and the makingof prototypes of radically different rocketdesigns fell to the NDRC; the Ordnancedepartment primarily carried out functions

of engineering within the scope of at leastpartly known techniques, and of testingand removing "bugs" from developmentitems, whether originated in the NDRC orin Ordnance.22

Suspicious of outsiders and overprotec-tive of its own authority and prestigethough the Ordnance Department mayhave been at times, its attitude toward theNDRC was nevertheless understandable.Ordnance research men were first andforemost engineers rather than pure scien-tists. Years of study of the practical engi-neering difficulties of designing militaryequipment gave them particular respect forthe practical as opposed to the theoreticalaspects of a problem. Long experiencetended to make them impatient with anyassumption that the academic scientistcould readily master the engineeringknowledge necessary to translate a prin-ciple into a usable instrument or weapon.Thus the Ordnance Department was re-luctant to see the NDRC invade by everso little the field of design. When the civil-ian research men were engaged uponhighly technical investigations of physicaland chemical phenomena applicable toordnance, the Ordnance Department rec-ognized their findings as invaluable; whenthey undertook work impinging uponengineering, the Ordnance Departmentbecame wary.

1 9 (1) NDRC Liaison, Project OD-60, OHF. (2)Div 12. NDRC Summary Tech Rpt. 1948, I, 253.OHF, (3) Barnes Diary. 22 Aug 41 and 19 Mar 42,OHF.

20 Memo. Barnes for CofOrd. 19 Mar 43. sub:Comment on Interim Rpt on Rockets by Joint StaffPlanners. OO 471.94/182, DRB AGO.

21 (1) Memo. CofOrd for ASF, 8 Jun 43, sub: Rec-ommendations of Joint Chiefs of Staff, OO47 1.94/660. DRB AGO. (2) Barnes Diary. 30 Jul 43.OHF.

22 Interv, 12 Jul 50, with Dr. Colin M. Hudson.Guided Missiles Sec. R&D Serv.


Furthermore, the research and develop-ment staff, bound by the Army tradition ofnot defending itself to the public, sufferedfrom some criticisms it considered unjust.Accused by the NDRC of ignoring the po-tentialities of hypervelocity guns, Ord-nance ballisticians explained that researchhad first .to be directed at causes of gunbarrel erosion and means of lengtheningbarrel serviceability, problems more im-mediately important and more quicklysolvable. While NDRC men themselvessoon discovered that erosion studies werean essential preliminary and involved ex-ploration of a maze of possible causes,they deplored Ordnance postponementuntil January 1942 of a formal request forthese studies. By then Ordnance techni-cians had already expended considerableeffort on the study of a German taperedbore, high-velocity, light antitank gun andknew at first hand both the difficulties andthe costs of barrel erosion.23 As develop-ment of the types of hypervelocity weap-ons upon which a division of the NDRCwanted to lavish energy must be a time-consuming undertaking, the OrdnanceDepartment deliberately gave priority tothe less spectacular allied projects. Butwhen the NDRC successfully developederosion-resistant stellite liners for .50-cali-ber machine gun barrels and a nitriding-chrome plating process for small armsbores, the Ordnance Department grate-fully acknowledged its debt. It made im-mediate use of the exhaustive NDRCstudy of the mechanics of barrel erosionand acclaimed the sabot projectile for the90-mm, gun and the experimental 57-40-mm. tapered bore gun evolved by theNDRC and its contractors.24 Theseachievements secured, Ordnance Researchand Development Service was ready toencourage further work on hypervelocity

guns. The end of the war halted theplan.25 Another criticism voiced by civil-ian scientists charged the Ordnance De-partment with failure to develop arecoilless gun.26 The highly successful57-mm, and 75-mm, recoilless rifles usedin the last months of war were in fact con-ceived, designed, tested, and developed byOrdnance men, virtually unaided. State-ments belittling Ordnance research didnot grease the wheels of Ordnance-NDRCmachinery.

Relations with the NDRC were thusmarked by occasional differences ofopinion, flickers of mutual distrust and,after the war, some exasperation withinthe Ordnance Department at what its re-search staff felt to be NDRC's tendency toclaim credit for what the Ordnance De-partment had itself done. But it is easy to

23 (1) Baxter. Scientists Against Time. p. 31. (2) In-terv. 6 Jul 50. with Samuel Feltman. Chief of Ballis-tics Sec, R&D Serv. (3) John E. Burchard, ed.. Rockets,Guns and Targets (Boston, 1948), pp. 343-74. (4) Hy-pervelocity Development, Guns and Ammuni t ion ,OHF. See also Ch. XI. below.

24 Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 387-414. Upon thesabot, as upon the tapered bore gun, much additionalwork remained to be done after V-J Day.

25 NDRC Liaison. Project OD-52, OHF.26 Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New

York, 1949), p. 25. In discussing pre-World War IImilitary research programs, Dr. Bush states: "But thewhole gamut of new ordnance devices — rockets, re-coilless guns, guided missiles, proximity fuzes, bazoo-kas, frangible bullets—waited for the pressure of war,appearing then largely outside the organized systemof ordnance development, and sometimes in spite ofit." This judgment the Ordnance Department repudi-ates as grossly unfair, inasmuch as the Ordnance De-par tment itself developed two successful recoillessrifles, shared in the work on bazookas and rockets,and eventually, in spite of initial doubts, gave whole-hearted encouragement to NDRC work on guidedmissiles and VT fuzes. In development of the frangi-ble bullet. Ordnance records show that the OrdnanceDepartment was stopped by the Air Forces' unwilling-ness to develop an armored target plane. During thewar NDRC comments in a vein similar to Dr. Bush'sfanned the sparks of some resentment within the Ord-nance Department. See below. Ch. X.


exaggerate the importance of these diffi-culties. They rarely interfered with gettingon with the job. The undercurrent ofslight mutual distrust was never morethan an undercurrent.2 7 As the war woreon and Army men saw the fruits of NDRCresearch, their attitudes underwentmarked change. This shift was of utmostimportance in determining the role ofcivilian scientists in the postwar organiza-tion of the Department of Defense.

The roots of the Ordnance Depart-ment's initial distrust of the NDRC lay inthe century-old conflict of military versuscivilian. The Constitution vested controlof the Army in civilian hands, in the Presi-dent as Commander in Chief and the Sec-retary of War as his adviser. Beyond thatthe Army had always believed nationaldefense should be controlled by the mili-tary; civilians should be used for particu-lar jobs, but under the aegis of the WarDepartment. To this system the Office ofScientific Research and Development,under which the NDRC operated afterJune 1941, could well be a threat. Just asArmy control over design and manufac-ture of weapons had been challenged inthe 1850's, might not the NDRC in the1940's take unto itself the Army's directionof military research and development?That many men of the NDRC thoughtcivilian direction desirable there can be nodoubt. The official history of the Office ofScientific Research and Development,Dr. Baxter's Scientists Against Time, impliesthis attitude. "The failure to make themost of our possibilities in high-velocityordnance reveals inadequate civilian in-fluence upon strategic thinking," wroteDr. Baxter after the war.28 He repeatedlyhints at shortcomings of American ord-nance that civilian supervision of researchand development would have overcome.29

Throughout the war the Ordnance De-partment was strongly opposed to anysuch scheme. In explaining why Ordnanceofficers believed that neither the NDRCnor any other civilian agency should beallowed to govern Army research pro-grams, General Barnes later stated:

No group of scientists no matter how wisecould have undertaken this task with nopreparation. It had taken years to train Ord-nance officers to understand the meaning ofOrdnance equipment in war. NDRC organ-ized a number of very useful committees.However, their usefulness was handicappedby their lack of knowledge of the subject.They needed Ordnance leadership. Fromtime to time we attempted to give them thatleadership ... to tell them what waswanted. ... In my opinion, if throughsome political move NDRC had been giventhe Ordnance job the Allies would have lostthe war.30

In 1942 General Williams, Chief of Ord-nance from 1918 to 1930 and later WarDepartment liaison officer to the NDRC,attempted to allay the anxiety shared byall the supply services:

The liaison between the Supply Bureausof the War Department and the NDRC hasnot been as efficient as it should have been.One of the reasons for this was that there wasno clear line of demarcation between the ac-tivities of the NDRC and those of the Bu-reaus. This led to a certain amount ofconfusion. Also there was a slight feeling ofapprehension amongst the Bureaus becausethey feared they might lose some of their re-sponsibilities and that these would be as-sumed by the NDRC. It seems to me that

27 For an i l luminat ing discussion of this thornyquestion as viewed by men of the NDRC's Division 2,see Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 315-27. The point ofview there expressed is that military non-co-operationdid delay many important projects.

28 Baxter, op. cit., p. 31.29 Ibid., pp. 31. 36, 202. 254-56.30 Incl to ltr. Gen Barnes to Gen Ward. 25 Jan 52.

OCMH.


these apprehensions are groundless becausethe NDRC is a temporary organization thatin all probability will be dissolved shortlyafter the termination of the war. The dutiesand responsibilities of the Bureaus, as statedabove, continue in peace as well as in warand are just as important in peace as they arein war.

Closer and more cordial relationship be-tween the Bureaus and NDRC would begreatly to the benefit of the Bureaus.31

Gradually, Ordnance fears of the NDRCsubsided, though the "clear line of demar-cation" of authority was never officiallydrawn.

Nevertheless, uneasiness long remainedlest some scientific super agency be cre-ated that would strip the technical servicesof their research and development func-tions. A proposal to create an agency co-equal with, but independent of, Army,Navy, and Air Forces, to take charge of allnational defense research work soundedparticularly alarming.32 By comparisonthe Research Board for National Security,established in November 1944 as a sub-sidiary of the National Academy ofSciences, was innocuous since this boardreceived its funds from the military. Notuntil the Secretaries of the Army andNavy set up the Joint Research and De-velopment Board after the war to co-ordi-nate Army and Navy research programs,did Ordnance apprehensions disappear.33

Fifteen months later, in September 1947,the National Security Act of 1947 estab-lished within the Department of NationalDefense the Research and DevelopmentBoard where civilians and military menshared authority.34 In 1940 the OrdnanceDepartment would have considered suchan arrangement unthinkable, but war-time co-operation with the NDRC left itsmark.

With other civilian agencies engaged in

munitions development during the war,the Ordnance Department had no alter-cation. The National Inventors Councilfrequently submitted new designs of weap-ons and proposals for innovations, but itserved principally as an intermediary be-tween the inventor and the Ordnance De-partment. Manned by a group of giftedpeople including a former Chief of Ord-nance, Maj. Gen. William H. Tschappat,the council saved endless time for the mili-tary by screening the proffered ideas, win-nowing the familiar and "crackpot" fromthose that had some promise. Even thenthe council in some months passed on tothe Ordnance Department as many as ahundred "inventions" to study. Very fewcould be used, but the Department neitherwished nor dared to toss aside any withoutcareful examination.35 If the OrdnanceCommittee rejected the idea as impracti-cal or as a duplication of an idea already-recognized, there, without argument, thematter usually ended.

The Ordnance Department also dealtwith a number of committees organized toadvise on particular problems and withspecial groups within industry. Engineer-ing advisory committees drawn from pri-vate industry had been an outgrowth ofthe early months of the rearmament pro-gram. In the fall of 1940, at the OrdnanceDepartment's request, twenty-nine distinct

31 Memo, Williams. 9Jun 42. sub: Supply Bureausand NDRC, in NDRC Liaison, p. 38, OHF.

32 S 2721, S 2871, and HR 7742, 77th Cong, 2dSess.

3 3 (1) Ltr. Robert Patterson and James Forrestal toDr. Frank B. Jewett. 18 Oct 45, in Barnes file on Re-search Board for National Security. OHF. (2) Memo.Gen Barnes for ASF. 2 Feb 45, sub: Projects andFunds for the Research Board for National Security.OO 400.1 12/18444. DRB AGO. (3) Barnes Diary. 31Jan 45. OHF.

34 Research and Development Board, 1 Jun 50, p.7, OHF.

35 Interv with Dr. Colin Hudson. 12 Jul 50.


groups had been organized, each of themas an engineering advisory committee ona particular type of ordnance—the tankcommittee, the gun forging committee, thebomb fuze committee, the pyrotechnicscommittee, the metallic belt link commit-tee, and the like. The first purpose hadbeen to give manufacturers who had littleor no experience in making weapons op-portunity to thrash out engineering prob-lems with Ordnance officers and Ordnanceengineers. After the first meetings, whenby vote of the manufacturers' representa-tives the committees were given a perma-nent basis, the discussions produced notonly clarifications of existing proceduresbut also a number of sound ideas for im-proving designs and simplifying manu-facturing methods. These engineeringcommittees at the end of two years became"industry integration" committees, be-cause engineering problems had largelybeen solved and pressure shifted to in-creasing production of matériel by thethen well-established methods.

Another vital link between the researchand development staff of the OrdnanceDepartment and research groups of pri-vate industry was the series of researchadvisory committees. Some of these hadexisted for years. The Society of Automo-tive Engineers Ordnance Advisory Com-mittee, for example, had done yeomanservice during the 1930's by advising Ord-nance engineers on suspension and trans-mission problems of tank design. TheCommittee on Petroleum Products andLubricants gave the Ordnance Depart-ment the benefit of wide experience in thatspecialized field. Perhaps most useful ofall, among a host of valuable contribu-tions, was the work of the Ferrous Metal-lurgical Advisory Committee. Dividedinto eight subcommittees, its members

represented more than two hundred indi-vidual companies commanding 85 percentof the steel capacity of the country. Atfrequent meetings of these men with Ord-nance Department experts, research pro-grams were initiated that later resulted inimproved processes and conservation ofcritical alloys. Of the contributions of allthese groups General Barnes enthusiasti-cally noted: "Through these committees,the Ordnance Department has main-tained close contact with industry andwith the best scientific talent in the coun-try and has obtained the cooperation andassistance of these groups in the solutionof vital problems pertaining to Ordnancematériel."36

Relations with Other Military Agencies

Relations of the Ordnance research anddevelopment staff with civilian scientistshave been discussed at some length notonly because the ultimate outcome wassignificant but also because it was achievedin the absence of established precedents.The National Research Council of WorldWar I, intended to perform services likethose of the NDRC, had been started toolate, had had too nebulous authority, andhad died too early to provide a pattern forcollaboration in World War II.37 In the1940's working procedures and mutual

36 (1) Memo, Gen Barnes for Col Davies, OCO,Control Br. 30 Oct 43. sub: Abolition of Committees.Ord Engr Advisory Committees, Barnes file. OHF.(2) G. M. Barnes (Major General, United StatesArmy (Ret.)). Weapons of World War II (D. Van Nos-trand Company. Inc., New York, 1947), p. 10.

37 William F. Willoughby, Government Organizationin War Time and After (New York and London, 1919),p. 22, citing Exec Order of 1 1 May 1918. See also,Irving B. Holley, Jr.. Ideas and Weapons, Rpt 47 forthe Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 1947, pp.174-79.


responsibilities had to be evolved step bystep. Ordnance relations with other seg-ments of the Army, on the other hand, andwith the Navy and the Air Forces, fol-lowed a relatively familiar pattern. To besure, the creation of the Army GroundForces and the Army Service Forces andlater the creation of the New DevelopmentsDivision of the General Staff introducedsome new quirks, but controversy, when itoccurred, was still a family quarrel to befought out along well-known lines.

With the Navy, relations were almostinvariably harmonious. Co-operation withthe Bureau of Ordnance had had a long,untroubled history. Navy and MarineCorps representatives on the OrdnanceTechnical Committee effected constantliaison on development projects, and asteady exchange of formal and informalreports on work afoot enabled Army Ord-nance and Navy to collaborate. Further-more, after January 1943 high-rankingofficers of both Army and Navy held sev-eral special conferences to discuss researchand development problems common toboth services.38 Division of labor in newfields of research was usually sufficientlydefined to prevent duplication of effort.For example, while the Army SubmarineMine Depot was concerned with mines forharbor defense and the Naval OrdnanceLaboratory with mines for offense in enemywaters, joint efforts went into developingship detection devices for use in submarinemines for both purposes, and joint use ofmine testing facilities ensued in takingunderwater measurements. In the VT fuzeprogram the Navy agreed to sponsor thedevelopment of projectile fuzes for bothArmy and Navy antiaircraft gun shells, theArmy the development of fuzes for bombsand rockets for both services. Both services,as well as civilians, worked on adapta-

tions for using the fuzes in other groundweapons.39

Collaboration with the Army Air Forcesin developing air armament also was easedby years of close association. From 1922 to1939 an Ordnance liaison officer hadalways served at Wright Field where AirCorps experimental work was centered.When in the summer of 1939 the aviationexpansion program called for an extensionof Ordnance work, Maj. Clyde Morgan ofthe Ordnance Department was assigned aschief of the Ordnance section of the WrightField Materiel Division. Perpetuation ofthe division of responsibilities between theAir Corps and Ordnance Department asestablished in the 1920's made the AirForces responsible for development of allmatériel that was an integral part of theplane—the gun turrets, bomb shackles,and bomb sights—the Ordnance Depart-ment for the guns, the gun mounts, thebombs, and fire control mechanisms.40

Arguments inevitably occurred from timeto time over such controversial matters asthe advisability of wire-wrapping bombs orthe efficiency of the 20-mm, aircraft can-non but, until development of guidedmissiles began, differences were minor.41

38 For example, see: (1) Joint Rpt Army-Navy Con-ference on Ord R&D. 11 Feb 43, OO 337/5501, and(2) min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 15 Sep44, both in A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. See also in-terv, 15 Jun 51, with Col Scott B. Ritchie, DeputyChief R&D Serv.

39 (1) Col William H. Draper, Jr., and Capt LewisL. Strauss, USNR. Coordination of Procurement Be-tween the War and Navy Departments, Feb 45. II,14-15; III, 87, 90. (2) Record of Army Ord R&D,Submarine Mines, Ch. VII. (3) Joint VT Press ConfRelease, 27 Sep 45. p. 1. All in OHF. See also Ch.XII, below.

40 (1) Ordnance in the Air Forces, pp. 13-14, MSin Air University Hist Liaison Office. (2) Hist of OrdSec, Wright Field. Vol. I, Exhibits A to.J, OHF. (3)Interv, 14 Jul 50. with Harry S. Beckman, Bombs andPyrotechnics Sec, R&D Serv.

41 Barnes Diary, 21 Nov 42, 21 Aug 44, OHF.


In the summer of 1944 Brig. Gen.Richard C. Coupland, the Ordnance offi-cer assigned as liaison at Army Air Forcesheadquarters in Washington, urged thatthe Ordnance Department assume respon-sibility for development of all guided mis-siles, commenting that "projects of [this]type are running around loose and beingfurthered by anyone aggressive enough totake the ball and run." 42 Air Forces andOrdnance Department, as well as theNDRC, had for months been pursuinginvestigations of this type of weapon. Ger-man use of "buzz bombs" and later of thedeadly V-2 rockets, about which special-ists in the United States already knew agood deal, sharpened awareness of theurgency for work in this field. The fieldwas wide enough to be divided, but obvi-ously the duplication of research or thewithholding by one group of data useful tothe other must stop.43 A conference of rep-resentatives of the Air Forces and of theNew Developments Division of the GeneralStaff in September cleared the air. A Gen-eral Staff directive followed, charging theAAF with "development responsibility. . . for all guided or homing missilesdropped or launched from aircraft . . .[or those] launched from the ground whichdepend for sustenance primarily on the liftof aerodynamic forces." Army ServiceForces—in effect, the Ordnance Depart-ment—was to develop missiles "which de-pend for sustenance primarily on momen-tum of the missile." 44 Early in January1945 the General Staff requested the Ord-nance Department to attempt develop-ment of a missile suitable for antiaircraftuse, though the Air Forces was also work-ing on a ground-to-air missile.45 No ob-structive competition between the servicesresulted.

With headquarters of the Army Service

Forces, the Ordnance research and devel-opment staff faced some difficulties, par-ticularly during ASF's first year. Theinterposition of a new command betweenthe operating divisions of the OrdnanceDepartment and the policymakers of theGeneral Staff and the Secretary of War'soffice inevitably introduced new channelsthrough which communications must gobefore decisions were reached and Ord-nance requests approved.46 Since manyASF officers were unfamiliar with thepeculiar problems of Ordnance researchand development, Ordnance officers werefrequently irked at the necessity of makingtime-consuming explanations to the ASFDevelopment Branch of the whys andwherefores of Ordnance proposals. Never-theless, as time went on, General Barnes'staff found that watchfulness, plus patiencein interpreting a problem to GeneralSomervell's headquarters, generally servedto win ASF over. If General Barnes be-lieved a specially important project likelyto be side tracked, he bypassed routinechannels and went directly to GeneralSomervell, General Marshall, or even tothe Secretary of War. Thus, in the face ofAGF opposition, he persuaded GeneralSomervell of the wisdom of proceedingwith development of a heavy tank and gotMr. Stimson's express approval for makingthe 155-mm, gun self-propelled by mount-

42 Pers ltr. Gen Coupland to Gen Campbell, 7 Aug44, Barnes-Campbell Correspondence, DRB AGO.

43 (1) 2d Ind. CofOrd to ASF. 4 Mar 44. sub: De-velopment of AA Artillery Matériel. OO 471.94/2313,DRB AGO. (2) OCM 23905. 25 May 44. (3) BarnesDiary. 12 Sep 44.

44 Memo, DCofS for ASF, 2 Oct 44, sub: GuidedMissiles, OO 47 1.6/1 290'/1 DRB AGO.

45 Ltr. DCofS, to ASF. 18 Jan 45. sub: Guided Mis-siles Development, OO 471.6/1392. DRB AGO.

46 For differences of the Ordnance Department asa whole with ASF, see above, pp. 90-95.


ing it on a medium tank chassis.47 Thoughthe struggle during 1942 to get the highestpriority for Ordnance development workwas acute, and though later occasionalcontroversies arose, such as those over lim-ited procurement of the T24 light tank andover the heavy tank program, fairly ami-cable relations came to be the rule. TheASF Development Branch usually ac-cepted the Ordnance Department's judg-ment about the importance of individualprojects and only disapproved a programwhen it appeared to mean the diversion ofindustrial facilities from other more press-ing jobs. As long as ASF headquartersconfined itself to staff jobs of co-ordinationand eschewed what Ordnance officers re-garded as operational activities, jurisdic-tional troubles scarcely existed.48

In spite of ASF co-ordinating efforts,from time to time friction developed be-tween the Ordnance research staff and theCorps of Engineers and Signal Corps. Withthe Engineers the differences of opinionover weight and width of equipment inrelation to bridge capacity were as old astanks. The Engineers periodically pro-tested acceptance of vehicles and self-propelled artillery that exceeded author-ized limits by even a few inches or a fewpounds, for road and bridge maintenancewas difficult at best, and unloading tre-mendously heavy equipment from ships'holds multiplied problems.49 However jus-tified the Engineers' objections to addedweight and bulk, they were usually over-ridden. Assignment in 1944 to the Engi-neers of responsibility for all commercialtractors having top speeds of twelve milesor less per hour took out of the hands of theOrdnance Department control of someslow-moving artillery prime movers.50

With the Signal Corps some conflict waseventually inescapable because of the

interrelatedness of electronics, VT fuzes,and fire control instruments using radar.The Ordnance Department disclaimedany wish to "enter the radar business," asthe Signal Corps charged, but believedthat the Signal Corps should be used onlyas "an assisting agency" in all developmentwork on fire control and guided missiles.That, in effect, was the ultimate decisionreached jointly after V-E Day.51

When the Army Ground Forces was cre-ated, relations with the using arms werealtered somewhat by the interposition ofthe AGF Requirements Section betweenthe combat arms and the Ordnance De-partment. The advantages of the newarrangement were twofold: decisions werereached more quickly, and the require-ments of one arm were reconciled withthose of another. For example, instead ofthe Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Cav-

4 7 (1) Interv wi th Gen Barnes. 12 Jun 51. (2) In-terv. 29 Jun 51. with Brig Gen Wil l iam A. Borden.Asst to Gen Barnes, 1942 to Aug 43. (3) Interv, 2 Jul51, with Col John H. Frye. Chief Research and Ma-terials Div, R&D Serv, 1943-43.

4 8 (1) Barnes Diary, 23 Apr 42; 13-30 Sep 42; 25Jul 44; 26 Jul 44; 2 Aug 44; 9 Aug 44: 14 Aug 44; 16Aug 44; and 21 Aug 44, OHF. (2) OCM 21446, 2 Sep43. (3) Memo. SOS for CofOrd. 23 Sep 43. sub: LightTank T24. OO 470.8/415 Tank. DRB AGO.

49 See Ch. VII, above.5 0 (1) OCM 20342. 6 May 43; 22734 , 27 Jan 44;

25117 , 14 Sep 44; 26898. 8 Mar 45; 27662 , 17 May45. (2) 1st Ind, CofEngrs to ASF, 16 Sep 43, sub:120-mm. (4.7") AA Gun Matériel M1 (T1)— Stand-ardization Recommended, OO 472.93/1054. DRBAGO. (3) Barnes Diary. 11 Nov 43, OHF. (4) Memo.CofOrd for ASF. 12 Nov 43. sub: Assignment of De-sign, Development . . . for Commercial Type Trac-tors to Corps of Engineers, OO 451.3/702 Tractors,DRB AGO. (5) WD Cir 10. 6 Jan 44.

51 (1) Barnes Diary. 20 Oct 43. 23 Dec 44, and 30May 45, OHF. (2) 2d Ind, CSO to ASF, 8 Sep 44.and 4th Ind. CofOrd to ASF. 14 Oct 44. sub: Re-sponsibility for Director T38. OO 413.68/1078. Di-rector. DRB AGO. (3) Min. Conference on Fire Con-trol Equipment. 18 Jan 45. pp. 5. 10. OHF. (4) Memo,Barnes for Campbell. 10 May 45. sub: Ordnance Re-lationship with Signal Corps. Barnes — Campbell Cor-respondence, DRB AGO.


airy independently submitting requests fornew or improved equipment, to be used forthe same general purpose but havingslightly different features, the Develop-ments Division of the AGF RequirementsSection passed upon the need and pre-pared a single statement of the militarycharacteristics deemed essential. As in thepast, the request with all the pertinent de-tails was then processed through the Ord-nance Technical Committee to the appro-priate section of the Ordnance researchand development staff to act upon itself orto delegate to an outside agency. Moreoften than in peacetime, the OrdnanceDepartment also initiated projects throughthe Ordnance Technical Committee andsubmitted to the AGF models for commentand test.52 Particularly was this the case indeveloping tanks and self-propelled artil-lery. It was largely over these that conflictsbetween the Ordnance Department andAGF arose.

Pronounced differences of opinion aboutthe tactical utility of heavy tanks had firstbeen voiced in 1920 when "heavy" meantany tank weighing more than twenty-fivetons.53 For the next twenty years lack ofmoney as well as War Department dis-approval prevented the Ordnance Depart-ment from pursuing work upon heavytanks, but in 1940 and 1941 engineers ofthe Department's automotive section suc-ceeded in designing and building a sixty-ton model mounting in the turret a 3-inchgun and a 37-mm, gun. The tank wasstandardized in February 1942 as the M6.Notwithstanding this official approval, theAGF immediately objected. Further testsled the Armored Board to pronounce theM6 unreliable and much too heavy, andconsequently procurement was limited toforty tanks. Not one was shipped overseas.Periodic Ordnance proposals to modify the

M6 to eliminate its weaknesses never metwith approval.54 But General Barnes wasconvinced that before the war was over theground forces would need a heavy tank.He therefore set his arguments and plansin some detail before General Somervell,who concurred in Barnes' proposal to de-velop a much more powerful tank thanany the AGF was willing to adopt at thattime.55

Fighting in North Africa, in the spring of1943, was proving that American tanksmust have greater fire power than the37-mm, and 75-mm, guns on the Grantsand Shermans could furnish. Though theShermans, rushed to the British in theautumn of 1942, had helped to turn thetide at El Alamein, in the course of thewinter the Germans' increasing employ-ment of long-barreled, high-velocity 75-mm, guns on Panzer IV tanks and theappearance of sixty-ton Tigers mounting88-mm, guns gave Rommel's troops anadvantage. Nevertheless, the AGF was re-luctant to accept heavy tanks carryingthicker protective armor plate and mount-ing bigger guns. The commanding gen-eral, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, doubtlessfortified by the advice of officers in NorthAfrica, clung to faith in the superiority ofthe more mobile, maneuverable mediumtank. He demanded more powerful butnot heavier guns and tanks; the greaterweight of large-caliber guns tended to off-set the advantage of the greater mass of theprojectiles they fired. As muzzle velocity

52 Maj D. L. McCaskey, The Role of the ArmyGround Forces in the Development of Equipment ,AGF Study 34 (hereafter cited as AGF Study 34), pp.7-13, 21. OHF. The Requirements Section was atfirst a division at the operating level.

53 See Ch. VII, above.5 4 (1) AGF Study 34, pp. 37-38, 44-45, OHF. (2)

R&D, Tanks, pp. 1A200-204, OHF. (3) Interv withBarnes, 13 Jun 51.

55 Interv with Barnes. 13 Jun 5 1.


usually decreases with increased caliber,unless the gun barrel be excessively long, itwas axiomatic that the smallest caliberthat could deliver a sufficiently effectiveprojectile to destroy the target would bethe best. The problem was to design aweapon in which the various factors weremost effectively balanced. Use of high-velocity, tungsten-carbide-core, armor-piercing ammunition, known as HVAP,was a partial solution, and subcaliber pro-jectiles with discarding sabot might havebeen another. The discarding sabot type ofprojectile was not adopted by AGF becauseof probable danger to the user.56 GeneralMcNair also disapproved mounting a90-mm, gun in a medium tank.57 The M4series of medium tanks, plus a suitable tankdestroyer, would serve, he believed, to de-feat German armor.58 Though advancesin metallurgy by 1942 had enabled theOrdnance Department to build light butpowerful 76-mm, and 90-mm, guns out ofnewly developed, thin, higher physicalsteel, Ordnance men were convinced thatmedium tanks, whether mounting 76-mm,guns or 105-mm, howitzers, must be sup-plemented by heavy tanks. The conflict ofopinion, which was "fought out bitterlyaround 1943," was actually three-sided,involving the Armored Force as well asAGF headquarters and the OrdnanceDepartment.59

While General Barnes and his staffworked on a series of heavy models em-bodying the results of Ordnance experi-ence, the Army Ground Forces early in1944 undertook to draw up a lengthy listof specifications for a "general purpose"tank.60 These specifications the chief of thetank development unit at the Detroit TankArsenal later characterized as "amateur-ish."61 The wanted combination of lightground pressure, high speed, great fire

power, and heavy protective armor, Ord-nance engineers believed, comprised mu-tually irreconcilable features. When arequest was submitted for what the Ord-nance Department considered a physicalimpossibility, the Research and Develop-ment Service became indignant at accusa-tions of non-co-operation. Admittedly,pressure to achieve the "impossible" some-times produced astonishing results, but inprevailing Ordnance opinion shortcomingsin American equipment were attributablefar less to Ordnance ineptness than to theshortsightedness of the using arms and tothe frequent shift of AGF ideas. GeneralBarnes felt that battle trial of some experi-mental matériel would prove to combattroops that equipment was available thatmet their needs even though AGF had notthought of it. Between early 1943 and theend of the war he repeatedly urged thebattle testing of a series of heavy tanks thetank arsenal had developed. These tanksvaried in weight from 45 to 64 tons andcarried 90-mm., 105-mm., or 155-mm,guns. The models armed with 105-mm.

56 (1) AGF Study 34, pp. 49-50. OHF. (2) Interv.25 Jul 50. with Samuel Feltman, Chief Ballistics Sec.R&D Serv.

57 Ltr. Brig Gen Harold A. Nisley, AGF Ord Offi-cer, to Brig Gen Henry B. Sayler, Chief R&D Serv,1 1 Jun 47, Tank and Motor Transport, Barnes file,OHF.

58 (1) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, op. cit., pp.423-24. (2) Memo. AGF for CofS, 28 Nov 43. sub:Theater Requirements for New Type Tanks, AGF480.8/75, DRB AGO. (3) Memo. AGF for CofS, 30Nov 43, sub: Heavier Armament for Tanks and Self-Propelled Vehicles, AGF 480.8/76, DRB AGO.

59 See n. 57. The Armored Force frequent ly sup-ported the Ordnance position.

60 Hq Armored Center, Mil Characteristics for anImproved Medium Tank, 23 Sep 44, AGF 470.8/106GNRQT/7078, copy in Tank and Motor Transport,Barnes file, OHF.

61 Ltr, Col Joseph M. Colby, Chief Dev and EngrDept, Detroit Arsenal to Mr. F. Gordon Barber, R&DServ. 14 May 47. Tank and Motor Transport, Barnesfile. OHF.


and 155-mm, guns were not tested untilafter the war. The model mounting a90-mm, gun fared better. In the face ofsome opposition from the AGF, permissionwas at last secured from Secretary of WarStimson and General Marshall to sendoverseas twenty of the experimental model,the 46-ton T26E3. Nicknamed the Gen-eral Pershing, this tank with its 90-mm,gun M3 was first used by the 3d and 9thArmored Divisions in the drive from theRoer River to the Rhine. Despite conflict-ing reports of its performance the tank wasstandardized in March 1945 as the M26 62

Only less prolonged and heated was thedisagreement about the value of self-propelled artillery, though the 105-mm,howitzer motor carriage M7 had proveditself in British hands in North Africa. TheTank Destroyer Command took exceptionto Ordnance proposals to construct a tankdestroyer by mounting a 90-mm, gun upona 3-inch gun motor carriage, and GeneralMcNair also objected. Later, the 90-mm,mounted on a tank chassis was enthusiasti-cally received.63 Over medium self-pro-pelled artillery AGF headquarters againdiffered sharply with the Ordnance De-partment. General McNair cited a Britishreport on the battle at El Alamein whichstated that the artillery preparation for theadvance would have been handicapped ifit had been necessary to lift ammunitionto the raised platforms of self-propelledguns. When he added that the British hadnot paid much attention to self-propelledartillery, General Barnes, obviously con-sidering this no valid argument, tartly re-plied that the British "have not gone veryfar with anything else either." 64 In eachcase the Ground Forces was eventuallyconverted, but such items as the 155-mm,howitzer motor carriage M41 were notapproved until late in the war.65

The technicalities of tank and artillerydesign will be discussed below.66 Here it isnecessary only to note that the protractedarguments between AGF and the Ord-nance Department over these develop-ments were based wholly on professionaldifferences of opinion. In the field of smallarms such conflicts did not obtain. But aseach side vigorously defended its views ontanks and motorized artillery, each sure ofits Tightness, relations were often distinctlystrained. The controversy assumed suchproportions by the summer of 1944 thatthe General Staff appointed a board torecommend procedures to be followedafter the war. The report of the ArmyGround Forces Equipment Review Boardwas submitted in June 1945. It carried fur-ther a less drastic plan prepared by theGeneral Staff in 1940, revived in 1941, andthen dropped as impractical, to centralizeall Army research and development in aWar Department Technical Committee,which, it had been hoped, would hastenstandardization of new items and at thesame time provide sound doctrines of tacti-cal employment.67 The 1945 report flatly

62 (1) AGF Study 34, pp. 40, 43, 45-51, OHF. (2)R&D. Tanks, pp. 1A203-76, OHF. (3) Barnes Diary,25 Feb 44; 2 Mar 44; 2 Aug 44. OHF. (4) See Ch. X,below.

6 3 (1) Addendum to OCM 19845. 4 Mar 43. (2)Barnes Diary, 13 Mar 43 and 29 Sep 43, OHF. (3)3d Ind, ASF for CofOrd, 4 Nov 43, sub: 90-mm.Gun Motor Carriage T71, OO 472.14/74. DRBAGO.

64 Barnes Diary. 13 Apr 43. OHF.65 (1) Ibid., 8 Mar 44, and 6 Apr 44. OHF. (2)

OCM 24677. 10 Aug 44; OCM 24857, 24 Aug 44:OCM 28165, 28 Jun 45.

66 See Ch. X, below.67 (1) Memo. Col Barnes for Gen McFarland, Chief

of Ord Mil Serv. 9 Feb 40, sub: Research and Devel-opment for Ord Dept. R&D Misc, Barnes file, OHF.(2) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 2 Jan 41, and 1st Ind,CofOrd to TAG, 9 Jan 41, sub: AR 850-25, OO300.3/28. DRB AGO. (3) Barnes Diary, 29 Jul 41;30 Jul 41; 13 Aug 41; 23 Sep 41; OHF.


stated the necessity of vesting control of alldevelopment of ground force weapons inthe hands of the Ground Forces. "Thiswould necessitate the creation in ArmyGround Forces of development groupsorganized on a functional basis and staffedby users, technicians and civilian special-ists." 68 In his reply the Chief of Ordnancerepeated his department's conviction thatacceptance of this plan would bring disas-ter.69 No steps were taken to put the AGFrecommendations into effect.

Relations with Theatres of Operations

Theoretically, the Ordnance researchand development staff had no direct rela-tions with overseas theatres during thewar. The theatre Ordnance officer at-tached to each theatre headquarters wasthe liaison between Office, Chief of Ord-nance, and combat troops, and his reportswere expected to supply comment andcriticisms of ordnance in action. Informa-tion on enemy equipment might also betransmitted by military intelligence to theG-2 Division of the General Staff andthence to the Ordnance Department. Butthe system entailed delays, and before mid-1943 reports often lacked the specific datadesigners needed. Distance was inescapa-bly an obstacle and the chain of commandwas another. Proposals to dispatch specialOrdnance observers to European combatzones early in 1940 had been vetoed byG-2. In 1943 the first Ordnance TechnicalIntelligence units sent to overseas theatreswere not welcome—they added to prob-lems of bill-eting and feeding without mak-ing any immediate contribution to com-bat.70 While later they became an acceptedpart of the intelligence system and assem-bled invaluable data, throughout the warthe Chief of Ordnance—and chiefs of the

other technical services as well—felt ham-pered by faulty communications with thetheatres.71 The surest, quickest way of get-ting essential information proved to be anunofficial avoidance of "channels" andrecourse to personal letters from officers onoverseas duty directly to the Chief of Ord-nance or the chief of the Research andDevelopment Service. Both officers reliedupon this correspondence to supplementofficial communications.

Problems of Standardisation and LimitedProcurement

Two problems, be it repeated, were everpresent for the Ordnance research and de-velopment staff—the problem of devisingmatériel that would counter any develop-ments of the enemy and then the problemof getting new models approved in time tobe of real use in combat. Knowledge ofenemy ordnance and of what Allied troopsneeded to more than match it dependedupon the adequacy of military intelligence.The working of the military intelligencesystem, and particularly of OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence and the EnemyEquipment Intelligence teams, will be dis-cussed later.72 There remain to be exam-ined here the consequences of the time lagbetween the establishment of a require-ment and the moment when combat troops

68 Rpt of AGF Equipment Review Bd, 20 Jun 45,p. 2, OHF.

69 Ltr, CofOrd to ASF, 20 Sep 45, sub: WD Equip-ment Review Bd, OO 234/9289, DRB AGO.

70 Min, Wesson Conferences, 13 Mar 40, 21 Mar40, and 27 Mar 40, OHF. (2) Hist of Tech Intel Orgn,Unit "A," USAFIME, OHF.

71 The Chief of Engineers, for example, complainedof not getting information from the theatres and latein the war arranged with the chief engineer in theETO to send reports directly to him. Interv, 25 Jul50, with Brig Gen Cecil R. Moore, Chief Engr ETO.

72 See below, Ch. IX.


had in hand the new or improved weaponfilling the need. Even when the researchand development staff had detailed infor-mation from combat zones and, actingupon it, produced a design calculated tomeet the want effectively, months or yearsmight elapse before the innovation wasaccepted by the service boards for stand-ardization. Standardization ceased in thelatter part of the war to be a preliminaryto use of new items in battle, but beforelate 1943 it generally was, for the AGF waslong opposed on principle to sendingmatériel into combat that had not receivedthe stamp of approval of the testing boardsin the United States. Furthermore, with-out standardization of a weapon, quantityproduction was difficult to contrive.

Review of the official peacetime proce-dures for acceptance of new equipmentmay clarify the problem. Once standard-ization was achieved, the responsibility ofthe Research and Development Service fora particular item ended. It should benoted, however, that even under the pres-sure of war it took months after an articlewas standardized to compute quantitiesrequired, negotiate production contracts,complete manufacture, and distribute thefinished product to the fighting forces. Thelatter processes could not be greatly hur-ried.73 It was in the stages preceding large-scale procurement that the OrdnanceDepartment hoped to expedite matters inWorld War II by telescoping or skippingaltogether some of the ten steps prescribedfor standardization.

Of these ten steps the first five were un-avoidable and the first four usually takenrapidly. First came the decision, approvedby G-4 of the General Staff, that a specificneed for a new or improved item existed.Second was the statement of the militarycharacteristics that the article must have

in order to accomplish its purpose; physi-cal characteristics such as weight, length,and width, were listed only when theyaffected the military usefulness of the item.This statement was drawn up by a boardof officers of the using arm. An Ordnanceofficer represented the Department oneach board. The third step was the formalinitiation of a development program, aprocedure handled by the Ordnance Tech-nical Committee. The committee assignedto the project a classification, designatingits type, nomenclature, and later a modelor T number. Before 1942 the War De-partment had to approve classification;thereafter Army Service Forces assumedthat function. Classification changed dur-ing the course of development. Originallylabeled "required type," an experimentalmodel was further identified in later stagesas "development type." 74 Still later, whenvariations of a basic model of a develop-ment type were called for, the differenti-ations were marked by E numbers. Thus aseries of experimental tanks might be des-ignated T26E2, T26E3, and T26E4. Fol-lowing the first official classification, theproject was turned over to the appropriateunit of the Research and DevelopmentService to work out. Study of the problemmight have to be protracted to explorealternative methods of attaining the de-sired result. In designing and building afirst sample or pilot model, scientists,draftsmen, engineers, and techniciansmight collaborate for years. When a modelembodying the stipulated military charac-teristics was developed and ready for its

73 The complexities of those procedures, which fol-lowed the completion of the research and develop-ment task, are analyzed in Thomson and Mayo,Procurement and Supply of Munitions, MS. OHF.

74 "Required type" was also part of the classifica-tion of an item when it was formally accepted. It thenbecame "required type, adopted type."


first tests, its complete classification was"required type, development type, experi-mental type."

The next five steps in peacetime tendedto be long drawn out, as the tests upon thesemiautomatic rifle in the 1920's and1930's show. First the men who had de-signed and built the pilot model subjectedit to a series of engineering tests. Eachcomponent had to correspond to the speci-fications. A model that met these require-ments was then labeled "service-test type"and was ready for the next process—serv-ice testing. Service tests, conducted by aboard under control of the using arm oroccasionally by troops in the field, were todetermine the suitability of the equipmentfor combat in the hands of ordinary sol-diers. These tests almost always revealedhidden defects, parts too weak for service-ability, instruments inconveniently placed,interference of a control device with oper-ating mechanisms, and the like. Ordnanceengineers then undertook modifications ofthe original design to correct these faults.Even in so relatively simple a weapon asthe carbine, service tests produced a listof modifications required for acceptanceranging in importance from knurling ofthe butt plate to redesign of the rearsight.75 Modifications might run into thehundreds in complicated pieces such astanks and artillery. Service tests of themodified models followed until the serviceboards pronounced them ready for ex-tended service tests. Items such as thecarbine might be accepted without ex-tended service tests, but major items wereusually tested by tactical units in order togauge performance under more rigoroustrial than the service boards could effect.For these tests production in some quantitywas necessary and the equipment procuredwas classified as "limited procurement

type" within the broader classification of"development type." The manufacture ofthe first "limited procurement type"models gave the producer experience andenabled him to eliminate production bugs.

The final step was largely a formality.If the extended service tests proved theitem satisfactory, the Ordnance Commit-tee recommended standardization and theGeneral Staff, or after 1942 the Army Serv-ice Forces, approved it. The article thenbecame an "adopted type" and receivedan M number and name by which it wasentered on the standard nomenclature lists.Items less satisfactory than standard itemsmight be classified as "substitute standard"and procured merely to supplement supply.Equipment formerly standard but nowsuperseded by new was often classified as"limited standard" so that it could be usedin the field until the supply was exhausted.When equipment was no longer consid-ered suitable for its original purpose, itwas classified as either obsolescent or obso-lete. The latter was withdrawn from serv-ice as rapidly as possible.

Reducing the time consumed from thebeginning to the end of the developmentprocess had to be done largely in the test-ing stages. It is true that the AGF proposalto have development carried on under theaegis of the arm laying down the essentialmilitary characteristics of a new weaponwas clearly aimed at eliminating wasteefforts early in the game by preventing thedesigner from proceeding with a model inwhich the most important features weresacrificed to less important. The OrdnanceDepartment, on the other hand, believedthe solution of that problem lay not inrelinquishing development work to theuser but in obliging him to stipulate the

75 OCM 17278, 30 Sep 41.


alternative he considered preferable whenit must be either/or. If, for example, theArmored Forces wanted tanks with power-ful guns and great maneuverability, theymust rate heavy armor protection as ofsecondary importance.76

Closer collaboration before drafting-board work was completed and a first pilotmodel built, more careful consultation be-tween Ordnance policymakers and Ord-nance engineers, might sometimes havesaved time. Still more important was therole of the Ordnance member of the serv-ice board drawing up the statement of de-sired military characteristics of a new item.Building a sample incorporating unac-ceptable features could usually be avoidedif this Ordnance officer were at once acompetent engineer and a salesman skill-ful enough to persuade the board torequest what the Ordnance Departmentbelieved feasible and essential features ofdesign. Much depended upon his adroit-ness and ability. Unhappily, as the warwore on, the ideas of the service boards didnot always coincide with those of combattroops overseas, but that was a complica-tion the Ordnance Department could notresolve.77 Nevertheless, in developing mostnew items, when time was lost needlesslyit was in the course of service testing,modifying, retesting, and extended serv-ice testing. If, instead of being submittedto prolonged tests against dummy targetsin the United States, new matériel couldbe shipped to the active theatres for battletrial, then, the Ordnance Department con-tended, a dual purpose would be served:the research and development staff wouldhave indisputable proof of weaknessesand strong points of the new equipmentunder real, not simulated, combat condi-tions, and the armies in the field wouldhave the use of weapons usable even if far

from faultless. Later modifications couldbe made with greater certainty.

Here was a variation of the Ordnancepleas of the 1930's protesting the refusalof the War Department to standardizematériel until it was as nearly perfect aspossible. Ordnance engineers concurred inColonel Studler's statement of 1940: "Thebest is the enemy of the good." 78 But afterPearl Harbor official standardization wasnot the point at issue. It was the battletesting of T models. The AGF had somereasons for opposing the shipment to over-seas theatres of matériel not yet whollyproved. The scarcity of cargo space earlyin the war was one; the possible infringe-ment of Ground Forces control over tablesof equipment was another; danger to theuser, most compelling reason of all, was athird.79 A failure of a new item to accom-plish in battle what it was intended to domight cost far more than loss of time. TheOrdnance Department's job, the AGFargued, was to develop, manufacture, andissue battleworthy munitions; it should notexpect the using arms to risk the success oftheir mission—righting—to prove the ade-quacy of the Ordnance Department's per-formance. General McNair repeatedlyobjected to issuing matériel possessing

76 See pers ltr, Maj Gen Ernest N. Harmon, CGXXII Armv Corps, to Gen Campbell, 10 Feb 45,Campbell file. OHF.

77 Intervs, 22 Sep 50, with Col Studler, Chief SmallArms Sec, and with Col Richard Z. Crane, Chief ArtySec, R&D Serv.

78 See Ch. VII, above.79 The Ordnance Department was quite as intent

as the using arms upon issuing only safe items. Anexample is General Barnes' refusal to release thebazooka in June 1942, although War Department offi-cials and British and Soviet witnesses of its firstdemonstration were eager to get a considerable num-ber immediately. See Ch. XII, below. See also interv,22 Nov 49, with Gregory T. Kessenich, Chief, PatentSec OCO.


even minor defects of design.80 Moreover,battle testing small quantities of a newdevice introduced the hazard of giving theenemy a chance to develop Countermeas-ures before a successful new weapon couldbe fully exploited in large-scale attacks.

This line of reasoning was doubtless inkeeping with the caution of American fieldcommanders upon which German officersrepeatedly commented. German militaryprocedures from the beginning of the warfollowed the course the Ordnance Depart-ment wanted to pursue. Experimentaltanks and weapons were committed tofront-line action as soon as they could besupplied to a tactical unit. Combat deter-mined the modifications to be made inlater German models.81

Fortunately, in time, American theatrecommanders realized that by requestingexperimental items for special tactical op-erations they could get at least small lotsof matériel not yet standardized. Here amajor difficulty naturally lay in getting tothe theatres knowledge of what new de-velopments in the zone of the interior wereavailable upon request. Late in 1943 thedesperate urgency of throwing into battleevery kind of equipment designed not forwarfare as fought in 1918, but as Americansoldiers were fighting it in the jungles ofthe Pacific and against the ingenious andtenacious German armies in Italy, broughtabout an innovation in procedures. Thecreation of the New Developments Divi-sion of the General Staff in October 1943was the first step. Its duties includedarranging demonstrations of new items totheatre commanders and supervisingtechnical and scientific research and de-velopment missions in the theatres. Ship-ment of "limited procurement" items,largely begun with the Borden mission toinvestigate theatre needs for jungle war-

fare weapons, mounted steadily after 1943though before that October limited pro-curement had been authorized in a veryfew instances.82 Technical bulletins to ac-company these experimental weapons wereissued by Ordnance Field Service, andteams of instructors to teach troops how touse the new devices were sent abroad inincreasing numbers.83 An extension of theduties of the New Developments Divisionin August 1944 was significant: "Review[of] requirements for special or exceptionalitems whose future application can beforeseen, but for which the theatres of op-erations . . . have not established arequirement." 84

Meanwhile, General Barnes had founda way to inform both the General Staffand the theatre commanders of ordnanceT models obtainable, if asked for. Usingthe advertising principle that demand canbest be created by publicizing the meansof satisfying a want, Research and Devel-opment Service in the spring of 1944 be-gan to issue a series of descriptive illus-trated booklets on development itemsconsidered ready for combat trial. These

80 (1) Interv with Gen Scott, Armored Force, 21Feb 50. (2) Memo, Gen McNair for Gen Somervell,12 Apr 43, sub: Heavy Field Artillery, 472/108GNDCG (3-15-43). (3) Barnes Diary, 28 Jul 43, 29Jul 43, and 4 Sep 43, OHF.

81 (1) See Chs. IX and X, below. (2) H. M. Cole,The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, 1950), Ch. XIV.(3) Panzer Lehr Brigade 900 at Smolensk, 1941, MS# D-294, OCMH.

82 (1) WD Cir 267, 25 Oct 43. (2) OD Activities inLimited Procurement 1941-1944, OHF. The list oflimited procurement items before October 1943included a few experimental fuzes and other ammu-nition development, two fuze setters, two tank tele-scopes, and a 90-mm, antiaircraft gun mount.

83 The first technical bulletin to be issued for a non-standard weapon was for the Grenade LauncherSight, T59, sent to the Pacific in October 1943.Interv, 20 Sep 50, with Fordyce Edwards, ChiefPublications Sec, FS.

84 WD Cir 333, 15 Aug 44.


"kangaroos" or "matchfolders," so nick-named because they fitted readily into apocket, were printed in some quantity anddispatched overseas with demonstrationteams or Ordnance officers departing fora theatre.85 Within the zone of the interiorofficers of the using arms as well as theGeneral Staff got the matchfolders. Howlarge a part these booklets played in creat-ing theatre demands for experimentalitems may be problematical. In some casesthe matchfolders probably reached divi-sion or even company officers who, other-wise unaware of the existence of the newdevice, could then request a chance to tryit in action. Certainly information on Tmodels was disseminated far more widelyby these folders than formerly.86 By thespring of 1945 new weapons under limitedprocurement numbered 141, and new am-munition items 76.87 While not all of thesewere tried in combat, enough were tomake battle testing a generally acceptedsystem.

Even standardized equipment was sub-ject to field modifications overseas as ex-perience showed a weakness correctableon the spot. An example was the installa-tion of a turret lock on the light armoredcar in order to hold the turret in positionwhen traveling. The change was devisedin the theatre, and a drawing was pre-pared at theatre headquarters and circu-lated to the officers and depot companiesconcerned and then OCO-Detroit wasnotified.88 Later, changes such as thismight be incorporated in new productionmodels manufactured in the United States.Improvisations in the field to meet unfore-seen combat conditions were numerousand sometimes of considerable permanentvalue.89 Here official approval was usuallyobtained long after the innovation hadserved its purpose.

Frequently a weapon first sent intocombat as a T model was standardizedsoon afterward, but some matériel re-mained on limited procurement through-out the war. Thus the multiple rocketlaunchers for 4.5-inch and 7.2-inchrockets, both used in the European andPacific theatres in late 1944 and 1945,were not approved for standardization,though the Ordnance Department wouldhave welcomed their official acceptance.In other cases the Research and Develop-ment Service preferred to keep as long aspossible the closer control of manufacturethat limited procurement permitted. The57-mm, and 75-mm, recoilless rifles conse-quently kept their T numbers until thesummer of 1945, in spite of their satisfac-tory performance during the spring inGermany and on Luzon and Okinawa.The development of the recoilless rifle wasan exception to many rules: no require-ment was established and no OrdnanceCommittee Minutes prepared until afterthe Small Arms Section of the Researchand Development Service had built aworkable model and successfully fired it ina demonstration at Aberdeen. The faitaccompli created the requirement.90 Onlywhere matériel was excessively bulky,complex, and expensive did AGF reluc-

85 (1) Kangaroo file, OHF. (2) Interv, 3 Oct 50,with F. Gordon Barber. Developments VizualizationAid Sec. R&D Serv. 1944-45.

86 That some of these booklets were prepared pri-marily to promote "sales" is shown by the folder onthe medium T25E1 and heavy T26E1 tanks. In thisa sizable part of the brief text is dedicated to urgingincreased limited procurement orders. Kangaroo file.OHF.

87 Limited Procurement Supplement to Catalogueof Standard Ord Items, 1 Mar 45, DRB AGO.

88 ETO Ord Tech Bull 53. 12 Jun 44, DRB AGO.89 See Ch. X. below.90 (1) Interv with Col Studler. 22 Sep 50. (2) OCM

22989. 24 Feb 44: OCM 28073. 21 Jun 45; OCM28547, 26 Jul 45.


tance to sanction battle testing endure. Yeteven the 46-ton General Pershing tankeventually was sent to the European thea-tre for battle trial before standardization.Just as the reason for setting up Researchand Development as a separate operatingdivision in the Ordnance Department hadbeen the necessity of speeding the develop-ment process to get improved equipment

to the battle fields as fast as possible,so Research and Development Servicelearned quickly to cut through red tape.A broad interpretation of what limitedprocurement meant opened the way forthe research and development staff to doits job well.91

See AR 850-25.

CHAPTER IX

Competition and CollaborationWith Foreign Designers

Most wars are won by outwitting theenemy or by overpowering him with sheermass of matériel and men. Only rarely inhistory has an army been so imbued withconfidence in itself or with faith in therighteousness of its cause that it triumphedover heavy odds. Germany in 1939 and1940 had established itself as the greatestmilitary power in the world, a powerwhose tactics were brilliant and whoseweapons appeared to be the most effectivemen had ever seen. Though the Americanpublic even in 1940 was still hoping thatthe United States might keep out of theEuropean war, the U.S. Army was hur-riedly building up its strength in men andequipment to be in a position to defy thispower. That challenge meant for the Ord-nance Department two primary tasks—putting into the hands of American andAllied troops the greatest possible quantityof matériel, and having available weaponsequal to or better than those of the enemy.

The story of quantity production willbe told in another volume of this series.Quality was first and foremost a problemof research and development. The suc-ceeding chapters of this volume will dis-cuss the equipment that the OrdnanceDepartment developed for the U.S. Armyin comparison with the major items theenemy employed. To explain how differ-

ences and similarities came about, it isnecessary at this point to look briefly atthe circumstances that enabled the ThirdReich to equip its army as it did; to reviewthe limitations imposed upon the U.S.Ordnance Department; to trace the stepsby which the Ordnance Department after1940 learned the essential features ofenemy designs; and to note how the UnitedStates and its allies pooled scientific andtechnical data in the ceaseless search forweapons superior to any the enemy couldcommand.

Ordnance Research and Developmentin the German Army

For the Ordnance Department, compe-tition with foreign designers meant pri-marily competition with Germany. Italynever loomed as a serious contender in thestruggle for superiority of weapons, whileJapanese equipment, largely imitative ofAmerican and European design, was ad-mittedly inferior to both in quality. NotJapanese engineering genius but natureposed the most serious challenge in thePacific where topography, jungle growth,mildew, and corrosion, rather than enemyfire power or armor, were likely to neutral-ize the effectiveness of American matériel.A quite different contest unfolded with the

RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN DESIGNERS 247

senior partner of the Berlin-Rome-TokyoAxis. Traditionally well versed in the artof ordnance design and able to draw on avast pool of capable scientists, technicians,and skilled labor, Germany was a com-petitor who time and again threatened tooutstrip the United States in the race forputting deadlier and more efficient weap-ons in the hands of the fighting forces.

In little over twenty years Germany hadrisen from crushing defeat to be the might-iest military power in the world. The lim-itations that the victorious Allies of WorldWar I had imposed in the hope of foreverpreventing Germany's resurgence as athreat to world peace had had preciselythe opposite effect. To quote a statementattributed to Generaloberst Franz Halder,the German Army Chief of Staff from 1938to 1942, "Germany, as a result of the pro-visions of the Versailles Treaty, had to dis-arm and thus denude itself of everythingreminiscent of the first World War. Ger-many consequently started from the mostelementary beginnings, unencumbered,and thereby had a distinct advantage overthe Allies who clung to many things thatno longer were in tune with the changedtimes." l To forestall misunderstandings, itis well to point out that the divorce fromthe past was in the realm of tactical doc-trine rather than of technology. Advancedtactical thinking, not superweapons andmountains of matériel, made the GermanArmy.

To understand how Germany in 1939,a bare four years after formally renounc-ing its obligations under the Treaty of Ver-sailles, was able to put into the field anarmy so well trained and equipped that itheld virtually the entire world at baynecessitates at least cursory examinationof the secret rearmament activities duringthe interwar period. To begin with, large

quantities of weapons that should havebeen scrapped or delivered up to the Allieswere carefully cached by the Army, theNavy, and an armaments industry, alleager to save what they could. In May1919 the Army issued orders to spirit allfully usable matériel as well as certainsemimanufactured parts out of zones likelyto come under Allied occupation. At leastone of the participants in that operation,the Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesellschaft ofcannon fame, reported that by August,little over a month after Versailles, itsshipments to the interior ceased because"the demand had been met." Among themore noteworthy items for this particularproducer were—shades of things tocome—parts for two types of 88-mm, flakguns.2 As an interesting sidelight, the guid-ing genius behind the Army's effort toamass a hoard of weapons against the dayof Germany's return to power reputedlywas Capt. Ernst Roehm, later the notori-ous chief of Adolf Hitler's storm troopers,who was to meet his end in the blood purgeof June 1934. The success of his undertak-ing can be gauged by the statement thatone third of the matériel that the Armyneeded and procured after the Fuehrer'saccession consisted of Roehm's trophiesfrom World War I.3

Hand in hand with the salvage of thisimportant, though relatively small, store of

1 Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden,1950), p. 144.

2 NI-9041, Die Abteilung Artillerie-Konstruktionen derFried. Krupp A.G. u. die Entwicklung von Heeresgeschuet-zen von November 1918 bis 1933, a historical MS com-piled by the Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesellschaft,Essen, in 1941 (hereafter cited as Krupp MS), Nuern-burg Military Tribunals (Subsequent Proceedings),German Military Documents Section (hereafter citedas GMDS), DRB AGO.

3 (1) Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 103. (2) ErnstRoehm, Die Geschichte eines Hochverraeters (Muenchen,1928), pp. 113-18.


forbidden ordnance went the more vitaltask of developing new items. If Germanyfailed to keep step with developments offoreign powers, it could never hope to re-gain what it considered its rightful placein the sun. Within Germany such workwas severely handicapped by the necessityfor stringent secrecy. Nevertheless, a greatdeal was accomplished through dummybusiness firms that ostensibly engaged inpeaceful commercial or technical pursuitswhile in reality devoting themselves ex-clusively to weapons research and develop-ment. A Krupp branch office in Berlin wasonly one of several enterprises functioningas a blind of this sort. Disguised as part ofa legitimate engineering company, theKrupp branch designed artillery carriages,among them modern mobile carriages forthe very guns that another concern wasthen in the process of modifying for sta-tionary coastal employment as prescribedby treaty terms.4 While such illicit activi-ties inside Germany were largely restrictedto theory, no similar hurdles stood in theway of practical research and develop-ment abroad. Krupp's co-operation withBofors in Sweden was a case in point. Inreturn for license rights to certain steeland artillery patents, employees of theGerman firm were given unlimited accessto plant facilities and technical informa-tion on current developments. From 1921to 1935 a delegation of Krupp experts at-tached to the Swedish munitions firm kepta steady stream of information flowingback to their employer, who in turnpromptly advised the Reichswehr. Underthe sponsorship of Krupp German officerswent on inspection tours to Bofors to wit-ness test firings of the latest in artillery andammunition.5

Most important of all, and in a sensemost extraordinary, were the war prep-

arations of the Reichswehr itself. At thesame time that the fatherland publiclybemoaned its reduction to military im-potence, the hard core of German sol-diery's elite, the officers of the 100,000-man army, ceaselessly worked towardbuilding an even better war machine thanthe one that had come so close in 1918 toworsting a global host of opponents. Thesewere the men who evolved the specialbrand of mechanized and mobile warfarethat the world, in a later vocabulary, wasto know as the blitzkrieg. Economic andindustrial mobilization as well as militarytraining for a future war of liberation werestudied, planned, and partially put intopractice with meticulous detail. As earlyas 1924 the Army Weapons Office set upan economic mobilization staff for theambitious, albeit later substantially scaled-down, project of marshaling the resourcesfor an armed force comprising 63 Infantry,5 Cavalry, and 30 Frontier Guard divi-sions. Since the need for secrecy preventeddirect contact with industry, which wouldhave to produce the arms and equipmentfor that army, a nationwide undergroundorganization served to procure the re-quired data for integrating essential manu-

4 Krupp MS, GMDS DRB AGO.5 Ibid. German Army diehards, to be sure, believed

that Krupp and other big industrial leaders wereinitially not co-operative enough. A historical reportentitled Die Entwicklung der Dienststelle fuer Wehrwirt-schaft in Waffenamt 1924-1933 (hereafter referred to asGerman Secret Rearmement 1924-33) states that oneof the difficulties encountered in secret industrial mo-bilization measures before 1933 was "the indifferenceof numerous industrialists toward the problems of na-tional defense, their lack of faith in the restoration ofGermany's [military] strength, or their fear of econ-omic damage in foreign business connections . . . ."It cited Krupp as belonging to that category. See Ger-man Secret Rearmament 1924-33, OCMH. This his-torical report, comprising documents and excerptsfrom captured files of the Feldwirtschaftsamt, was com-piled by the Foreign Office, London, in 1945.


factoring facilities into the over-all plan.6

But all the staff planning, research, de-velopment, and industrial preparationcould be of no avail in the absence ofhighly trained combat forces capable oftranslating the newly evolved tactics andtechniques into practice. Here the Reichs-wehr encountered its most serious difficul-ties. Its forces were severely limited innumber, and the primary weapons for thenew type of warfare—the tank and themilitary airplane—were prohibited bytreaty. Within Germany, armored train-ing was restricted to tin-and-pasteboarddummy tanks, and flight training to oc-casional highly secretive excursions withflimsy sport aircraft. If the future armywas to be built on more solid foundationsthan these, the Army had to find morefavorable ground than blighted Germany.And so began a long and fruitful period ofcollaboration with a power similarly intenton rebuilding its military establishment:the Soviet Union.

The exact time of the commencement ofRusso-German military collaboration can-not be determined, though subsequentevents lend credence to the belief thatsecret clauses in the Treaty of Rapallo in1922 represented the cornerstone of thesubsequent rapprochement between the RedArmy and the Reichswehr.7 Each countryhad something valuable to offer the other.The Germans had their highly skilledcadre of military leaders, steeped in anintellectual tradition, who could teach thenew class of Soviet officers the doctrines oftactical and strategic command. Men likeTukhachevski and Ogorevitch partici-pated in inspection tours and war gamesand studied German manuals to the pointwhere they finally were more familiarwith the contents than their German col-leagues. With a view to securing for its

armament factories such unimpeded prog-ress as would some day benefit not onlythe Soviet Union but also the fatherland,the Germans similarly contributed to therejuvenation of Russian industry.8 Germantechnicians, engineers, and skilled me-chanics went east to teach and supervise.The Reichswehr set up in the Soviet Unionentire munitions plants that were man-aged and largely or wholly staffed withGermans.9 Lack of money, the stumblingblock in American ordnance research anddevelopment during the 1920's and 1930's,was hardly a consideration. Only secrecywas of the essence, and, assured of the dis-creet handling of rearmament matters, theGerman Government did its best to padbudgets and hide appropriations for mili-tary expenditures.10

In return for contributions towardstrengthening Soviet power, the Russiansfurnished Germany with the very facilitiesfor practical troop training that couldnot be maintained within the Reich. Be-tween 1924 and 1930 three German mili-tary installations were set up on Sovietterritory: a fighter pilot and air observerschool at Lipetsk, a gas warfare school atSaratov, and an armored school at Kazan.The secrecy surrounding the entire setup,and the security measures for insuring that

6 German Secret Rearmament, 1924-33, OCMH.7 (1) MS. The Reichswehr and Soviet Russia, Gen-

eral der Flieger Wilhelm Speidel (hereafter cited asMS # P-043 (Speidel)) , OCMH. (2) LeonhardShapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series (Washington, 1950),1,381-83.

8 MS # P-043 (Speidel), OCMH.9 MS. Ennnerungen, Feldmarschall Walter von

Blomberg, GMDS DRB AGO.10 (1) MS # P-043 (Speidel), OCMH. (2) MS, Ad-

miralty Translation of the [German] Navy's BattleAgainst the Treaty of Versailles, OCMH. (3) Wlady-slaw Wszebor Kulski (pseud. W. M. Knight-Patter-son), Germany from Defeat to Conquest (London, 1945),pp. 394-407" (4) Cecil F. Melville, The Russian Face ofGermany (London, 1932), pp. 124-28.


secrecy, bordered on the fantastic. Menand machines had to be bootlegged acrossthe frontiers. Ammunition and weaponsimpossible to disguise were carried insmall sailboats all the way from GermanBaltic ports to Leningrad. German soldierskilled in accidents while training onSoviet soil were smuggled back in coffinspacked in boxes ostensibly containingmachine parts. Particularly knotty prob-lems were solved in even more unusualways. The fighter planes used at theLipetsk air base, for example, had beenpurchased abroad and were powered byBritish engines that could not be over-hauled locally. With their sailboat seatransport organization, the Germans man-aged to send a certain number of engineseach year to English factories where theywere overhauled and subsequently re-turned to Lipetsk.11

The number of trainees at the severalschools varied, as did local conditions ofindependence from Soviet interference. AtLipetsk the German fliers had practicallyunlimited freedom of movement, while thetank students at Kazan apparently weresubject to a more rigid regime restrictingthem to a fenced-in cantonment and evenrequiring them to wear Red Army uni-forms. Nevertheless, professional relationswith the Russian hosts were generallysatisfactory and the Germans, despite nu-merous complaints that they gave morethan they received, accomplished whatthey had come for. German officers par-ticipated in Red Army maneuvers; Ger-man Air observers conducted joint exer-cises with the Red Air Force; Germantankers learned the refinements of armoredwarfare and tested equipment such as thelatest experimental models of Krupptanks. A small but select body of militaryleaders, including, among others, Heinz

Guderian of later panzer fame, gathereda wealth of practical experience in thewarfare of tomorrow.1 2 When, upon theaccession of Hitler in 1933, German activi-ties in the Soviet Union gradually ceasedbecause of the steadily mounting open re-militarization in Germany itself, a highlytrained cadre stood ready to take over thereins of a brand new army.

German rearmament between 1935 and1939 marked the culmination of the pains-taking efforts to preserve the military tra-ditions of bygone years of glory and re-create a war machine that once morewould command the respect, if not dread,of the world. After 1933 the production ofup-to-date weapons had begun in earnest,with the accent on the mobility and strik-ing power of a well-integrated ground-airteam. German tanks underwent a radicaltransformation. Their formerly woodencannon suddenly spouted fire and theirerstwhile make-believe armor gave way tosteel plate.13 By 1935 even the niceties of apro forma adherence to treaty obligationswere ready to be discarded and, alongwith the reintroduction of compulsorymilitary service, the wraps taken off awell-equipped and even better organizedarmy. It is worth remembering that at atime when America had not a singlearmored division and still considered thetank a mere adjunct and supportingweapon for the infantry, Germany startedwith the premise that the tank is a weaponin its own right—the primary offensiveground weapon, in fact, of mobile warfare.Slowing the tank to the rate of advance offoot troops or roadbound artillery would

11 MS # P-043 (Speidel), OCMH.12 (1) Ibid. (2) Interrogation of Gen Ernst Koestring,

HIC WDGS G-2, OCMH.13 Heinz Guderian, Achtung — Panzer (Stuttgart,

1937 ?), pp. 137-58.


slow an entire offensive, hostile forceswould have time to regroup, and opera-tions might once again degenerate intoposition warfare in which the objective—forcing a quick decision by destroying theenemy army—could never be achieved.The logical procedure lay not in slowingdown the tank but in motorizing support-ing infantry and artillery elements andwelding all three into one unit capable ofdelivering a decisive blow in the very open-ing stage of hostilities. How correct thesedeliberations and conclusions had beenwas demonstrated in the well-nigh ridicu-lous ease with which the panzer divisions,rolling over the level terrain of northernEurope, subjugated Poland and France.

In the United States, Germany's spec-tacular successes left an impression no lessprofound than in the rest of the world. Forone thing, they provided the impetus to-ward the creation of the Armored Forcefor which a number of officers had beenclamoring in vain for more than a decade.For another, they set the pace for a revisionof combat techniques and correspondingbasic reorganization of United States Armyforces. But above all, the swiftness andthoroughness of German victories set up aclamor for more and better weapons. TheOrdnance Department, only recently comefrom rags to riches, was expected to stampnew matériel out of the ground. "Theenemy was at the gates and was about toland in New York City in the imaginationof the hysterical people of that time . . . ,"wrote the wartime Chief of Ordnance inspeaking of those trying days.14 A full-fledged myth was in the making aboutamounts and capabilities of German maté-riel in general and German tanks in par-ticular. While Germany on the eve of theBattle of France had a grand total of 3,379tanks, only 2,574 of which actually rolled

westward on May 10,15 French estimates,for example, pegged their number at any-where from a staggering 8,000 to a con-servative 3,700.16 In reality, French tankstrength alone almost certainly equaled,and, combined with British tanks on theWestern Front, beyond a doubt surpassedthe German total.17

Fully as fanciful were reports about thetanks themselves. An article stated:

One weapon used by the Germans, theheavy break-through tank, came as a surpriseto many—military men as well as civilians.. . . Then on May 10, 1940, German break-through tanks, estimated to weigh seventytons, armed with 77mm or 155mm cannonand flame throwers, opened up a hole in theLittle Maginot Line. Through this gap poured. . . massed armored divisions closely backedby infantry in trucks. The age of mechaniza-tion had come into its own. . . ,18

Other accounts perpetuated the legend of"cannon-proof" panzers.19 But Germanyneither had cannon-proof nor superheavymonsters. German machines held little, ifany, edge over their adversaries in over-allcombat capability. The majority of Ger-man tanks were of the Panzer I and PanzerII types that the Wehrmacht itself admitted

14 Ltr, Gen Campbell to Gen Harmon, 21 Mar 45,OHF.

15 MS # P-059, German Tank Strength and LossStatistics, Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand(hereafter cited as MS # P-059 (Mueller-Hille-brand)), OCMH.

16 Theodore Draper, The Six Weeks' War (NewYork, 1944), p. 47. The official data of the Vichy-French Ministry of War ran to 7,600. See Daniel Vil-froy, War in the West (Harrisburg, 1942), p. 23.

17 Figures on French tanks in metropolitan Francein 1940 vary from a low of 2,965 to a high of 3,615,while British tank strength is uniformly cited at 600.Cf. (1) Draper, op. cit., pp. 47-48; (2) Vilfroy, op. cit.,p. 23; and (3) Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, "Armor inDefeat," Armor, LIX, 204 (1950), 16-23.

18 Capt. C. R. Kutz, "Break-Through Tanks,"Army Ordnance, XXI, 123 (1940), 242.

19 See Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm(Boston, 1949) p. 476.


to be useless against all but a weak anddemoralized enemy and unsuited for em-ployment against hostile armor.20 The six-ton Panzer I, for example, had been provedobsolete during the Civil War in Spain—obsolete not only as much as any produc-tion-type weapon is in terms of those in thedrafting stage, but obsolete in terms ofequipment currently in use by the opposi-tion. With "onionskin" armor and the firepower of only two turret-mounted machineguns, it was easy prey for Soviet 45-mm,tank and antitank guns on the Loyalistside. The contemporary characterizationof the light tank as a "mechanical toy, amere tactical runabout" fitted the Panzer Ito the proverbial T.21 The 10-ton PanzerII, first issued to German armored forces in1936 but never sent to Spain, fell into thesame category.22 The only material im-provements over its predecessor lay inslightly greater fire power, a 20-mm, can-non turret-mounted coaxially with onemachine gun.

The first-line tanks of the blitz days inFrance, the Panzer III and the Panzer IV,similarly were far from being super-weapons. Lightly armored, both werehighly vulnerable to antitank and directartillery fire.23 As to armament, the PanzerIII carried a 37-mm. gun, an adaptationof the same antitank gun that as far backas 1937 had proved to be outmatched byforeign matériel.24 The Panzer IV, armedwith the 75-mm. Kw. K. (L/24), a gun-howitzer with a maximum muzzle velocityof 1,500 feet per second, was more anarmored field piece than a tank designedfor toe-to-toe combat with enemy tanks.25

All told, German successes in the earlystages of World War II resulted frommethod of employment of weapons—panzer divisions versus single tanks, theheavy mobile punch versus a continuous

front—and a highly proficient body oftroops. From the days of the Reichswehr,attention had focused on training theindividual German soldier; mechanizationdid not obscure the fact that even the bestmatériel becomes useless in the hands ofmen unable to use it properly. Once thepeace-trained, battle-hardened core of theWehrmacht languished in Allied prisoner-of-war enclosures, or lay buried beneaththe Russian snows and North Africandesert sands, no effort of German weaponsdesigners could stave off defeat.

Design and development of Army ord-nance were in the hands of the ArmyWeapons Office. Though roughly analo-gous to the U.S. Army Ordnance Depart -

20 MS, The Private War Journal of GeneraloberstFranz Halder (hereafter cited as Halder Diary), entryfor 18 Feb 40, OCMH.

A breakdown of German tanks by type shows thefollowing (1 April 1940):

Panzer I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,062Panzer I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,079Panzer I I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 9Panzer I V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,750

The remaining 629 vehicles were: flame thrower tankson Panzer II chassis (7) ; Czech-origin 35(t) and 38(t)tanks armed with 37-mm, guns (426); and command-ers' versions of Panzer I through IV armed only withmachine guns (243). Self-propelled artillery and tankdestroyers were as good as nonexistent at the time.MS # P-059 (Mueller-Hillebrand), OCMH.

21 Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller (British Army, Ret.)"The Tank in Spain," Army Ordnance, XIX, 109(1938), 25.

22 OI Special Interrogation Rpt 34, 4 Mar 47(hereafter cited as OI-SIR/34), OCMH.

23 Ibid.24 (1) Fuller, loc. at., p. 27. (2) Brig. Gen. Henry J.

Reilly, ''Proving Ground in Spain," Army Ordnance,XIX,' 114 (1939), 334.

25 The abbreviation Kw. K. stands for Kampfwagen-Kanone, literally battlewagon cannon. The abbrevia-tion L/24 expresses caliber length. In German prac-tice it denotes length of the gun including breech butexcluding muzzle brake. One caliber length equalsthe diameter of the gun bore. Given that diameterand the number of caliber lengths, the length of thegun can readily be computed.


ment in these functions, its scope ofresponsibilities extended to somewhat dif-ferent fields from those of its Americancounterpart. In addition to small arms,artillery, and ammunition, for example,the Army Weapons Office had charge ofall types of engineer and signal equip-ment. Design and development of antiair-craft artillery, on the other hand, wereduties of the Air Force.26

Within the over-all organization of theGerman Army, the Army Weapons Officecame under the Chief of Army Equipmentand Commander in Chief of the Replace-ment Army, who had charge of armsdevelopment as well as procurement. Con-trol over the commencement of newprojects rested with the using arms, and,through them, the General Staff and ulti-mately Hitler. The impetus for a projectmight come from a number of quarters:the Army Weapons Office itself, theFuehrer, private industry, soldiers in thefield. Particularly the latter have beencredited with submitting many useful ideasand constructive criticisms.27 Once a re-quirement was set up, the Army WeaponsOffice prepared the technical specificationsand farmed out the development projectto private industrial firms. As a rule, anidentical contract was let to two competi-tors in order to add incentive for the designof the best product possible. Pilot modelswere returned to the Weapons Office forproof tests, upon completion of which theitem was demonstrated to the using armsfor their approval or rejection. Then usu-ally followed a limited, or, if necessary, alarge-scale battle test. Standardization andfurther modifications thereafter were up tothe using arms, subject, in the case ofmajor questions, to the decision of theCommander in Chief of the Army or theCommander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

During peacetime and the early blitzyears that system worked well enough. Butonce the war spread to new and largerareas and the mounting fury of combatgave rise to an ever-increasing demand formore powerful weapons, the process ofdevelopment grew more and more hap-hazard. The Fuehrer's promises of the mir-acle weapon to turn the tide became moreeloquent as one abortive offensive followedthe other, with the result that wholly un-seasoned projects were rushed virtuallyfrom the drafting board to the front. Timeand again the good features of suchweapons were so heavily outweighed by alack of reliability that repercussions ontroop morale overshadowed the short-range propaganda effect. A comment fromthe Russian front after the first majorbattle test of the Panther tank illustratesthe point:

In closing, I can't get around adding a fewwords on a very sad story, despite the factthat it was exactly the way I had thought itwould be: Panther. There were a great manywho expected the decision to come from thenew, untried weapon. The initially completefailure therefore had a somewhat depressingeffect, particularly since, on the basis of theFuehrer Order, special expectations had beenaroused. ... So long as one builds such avaluable weapon, one must not build in anunusable gasoline pump or deficient gaskets.There is no shadow of a doubt that the ma-jority of technical deficiencies resulted from

26 Unless otherwise cited, material in the rest ofthis section is based on MS # T-l 1, Section B-15,OCMH. This manuscript is a 2,200-page co-operativestudy on the German High Command (OKH), pre-pared between 1946 and 1948 by General Franz Hal-der and a group of former German general staff offi-cers under the auspices of the Historical Division,EUCOM. Section B-15 was written by General derArtillerie Emil Leeb, at one time the chief of the ArmyWeapons Office.

27 Intel Rpt EF/AM/56, Part I, "General Appre-ciation of the Rationalization of the German Arma-ments Industry," Karl Otto Saur, in IN FIAT I350.09-78, 1 Jun 46, Ord Tech Intel files.

PANZER II, THE "LYNX," mounting a 2-cm. gun.

8 RAD PAN ERSPAHWAGEN, mounting the 7.5-cm. short-barreled gun.

THE "PANTHER," mounting a 7.5-cm. gun.

PANZER VI, THE "TIGER," mounting an 8.8-cm. gun.


substitute materials which simply did notmeasure up to standard. . . . The effective-ness of the Panther weapon is noteworthy. Ata range of 7,900 yards a [Soviet] T34 [tank]was knocked out with the first round.28

Even if it wanted to, the Army WeaponsOffice could do little to remedy the situ-ation. From early prewar days the largemajority of ground-force research and de-velopment had been conducted by privatefirms, with the Army's technical agencymerely playing a testing and acceptancerole. Its own research and development notonly was extremely limited in scope butpoor to boot.29 The unbroken string ofswift victories between September 1939and autumn 1941 provided little stimulusfor improving on time-honored customsand procedures. Came the denouement ofthe catastrophic first winter in Russia anda lack of the new and better weapons withwhich to re-equip almost the entire Army,the Weapons Office was an easy target forthose eager to obtain control over groundordnance design and production. From thetime that Hitler finally decreed the con-version of industry to an all-out war effortuntil the collapse of Germany in May1945, influence over Army research anddevelopment passed more and more intothe hands of essentially nonmilitaryauthorities such as Albert Speer, the Min-ister for Armaments and War Production,Heinrich Himmler, whose SS was bent onbuilding an industrial empire all its own,and, above all, the Fuehrer himself.

Just as he personally participated in theconduct of operations, to the point wherehe ultimately made troop dispositions downto battalion level and lower,30 so Hitlerincreasingly concerned himself with thedetails of armament design. Every modifi-cation, every new project was brought tothe personal attention of the Commander

in Chief of the Armed Forces for notice andapproval. The soundness of basic princi-ples and the ratio of economic expenditureto probable long-range returns from a newweapon mattered less and less as the mili-tary situation continued to deteriorate. Solong as an idea held even faint promise ofa weapon with which to equalize the grow-ing disproportion between German andAllied resources of manpower and maté-riel, that idea was tried. Though it standsto reason that not all of the thousand andone projects resulting from this, theFuehrer's policy, were worthless, the netgains little justified the reckless prodigalitythat achieved them.

Limitations Upon American OrdnanceResearch and Development

In contrast to the political control exer-cised over the German Army, the Chief ofStaff of the U.S. Army had the final voicein decreeing American doctrine of tacticaluse of weapons. Though each of the usingarms worked out its concepts of the bestmeans of accomplishing its own mission,the Chief of Staff had to approve them orresolve conflicts of doctrine arising betweenone arm and another. The Ordnance De-partment was then responsible for design-ing the fighting equipment with which toexecute the maneuvers planned. If evolu-tion of doctrine were tardy, then designwould also be delayed, for design of

28 Ltr, Oberstleutnant von Grundherr, 14 Jul 43,in experience and inspection report binder, Panzer-offiz.ier beim Chef Generalstab des Heeres, Akte E, Band2,Erfahrunger ( Reiseberichte), GMDS DRB AGO.

29 For an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of Ger-man research and development, see Col. Leslie E.Simon, German Research in World War II (New Yorkand London, 1947).

30 MS # T-l 13, Unification or Co-ordination: TheArmed Forces Problem, General der Artillerie WalterWarlimont, OCMH.


weapons for any army is necessarily shapedby the purpose for which the weapons areto be used. To revert, as an illustration, tothe problem of tank employment overwhich controversy had been vigorous in the1930's, if the tank were to be regarded asprimarily a means of supporting the infan-try, tank design would stress cross-countrymaneuverability and fire power enough tocombat infantry heavy weapons but notenough to fight a battle with enemy tanks.If, on the other hand, a tank were to beused as a part of an armored force, designwould be focused on fire power sufficientto engage enemy tanks directly and onprotection for the tank's crew. Ordnanceautomotive experts had complained in the1920's of being handicapped by failure ofthe General Staff to define tank doctrine,and revision of doctrine of the 1930's, cul-minating in the creation of the ArmoredForce in 1940, had required further exten-sive changes in tank design. A less well-known but perhaps still more serious situ-ation occurred in development of mines.Partly because the War Department onlybelatedly recognized the tactical impor-tance of powerful antitank mines and mineexploders, and partly because the Corps ofEngineers requested only small mines, de-sign of adequate land mines was delayedat least two years. Ordnance ammunitionspecialists, to be sure, might have arguedvigorously the case for mines comparableto the German Teller mines, but combatinexperience together with Engineer insist-ence would still have militated againstearly success in persuading the using armto approve big mines. The mine clearanceproblem was not satisfactorily solved at all.Whether it could have been met before theend of the war, had the Ordnance Depart-ment been requested five years sooner tostudy it, may be a question, but certainly

tardy demand for sound devices made thetask of development more difficult.31

As the Chief of Staff determined how aweapon was to be used, so after 1919 thecombat arms were empowered to list thecharacteristics it should possess.32 Thus twolimitations were imposed upon ordnancedesigners: they must devise matériel forpredetermined purposes and they mustaccept the decisions of the combat arms asto what military characteristics would bestserve in each weapon to accomplish thesepurposes. The customer was to be re-garded, if not as always right, at least asright until combat proved him wrong.That would be late in the game. In WorldWar II special Ordnance missions, sent toactive theatres to observe performance ofAmerican weapons or to prepare recom-mendations for new equipment for, say,jungle warfare, provided Research andDevelopment Service with useful informa-tion and some understanding of combattroops' opinion. But redesign or majorchange had still to be approved by boardsof the using arms. The fact that the person-nel of those boards changed rather fre-quently forced Ordnance designers at in-tervals to refight their case for any givenproposal. Moreover, service boards wereby no means always well informed on com-bat problems. While the Ordnance De-partment could attempt to dissuade theuser from establishing requirements thatOrdnance experts considered inappropri-ate or impossible to achieve, neither theChief of Ordnance nor the chief of Re-search and Development Service had au-thority to reject a development projector to modify it materially once it had beenordered.

31 See Ch. XIII, below.32 See above, p. 29.


At the risk of belaboring the obvious, thefact must be repeated that the OrdnanceDepartment was a service, quite literally aservant, of the using arms. This fact is fre-quently misunderstood even within theOrdnance Department itself. Thus oneOrdnance writer summarizing the warwork of Ordnance Research and Develop-ment Service declared:

It is a common belief that the evolution ofnew tactics dictates the use of new weaponswhen, in fact, the reverse is true. For theeffective employment of new weapons, newmethods of use (tactics) must inevitably bedevised. The Research and DevelopmentService, conscious of its responsibility to theusing arms and of the necessity for increas-ingly decisive weapons, took the initiative inthe development of much materiel withoutwaiting for the need to be felt on the battle-field.33

There is, of course, an element of truth inthe statement regarding the relation ofweapons to their use. Tactics of modernwarfare were revolutionized by the intro-duction of bombers, fighter planes, andtanks in World War I. At the end of WorldWar II the atomic bomb promised to bringabout many changes in strategic and tacti-cal planning. The Ordnance Department,apart from three or four officers advisingon fuze problems, had no share in theMANHATTAN Project. Future developmentof accurate guided missiles might necessi-tate further revisions of doctrine. But be-tween 1940 and 1945 the Ordnance De-partment neither devised any weapon thatforced fundamental changes in tacticaldoctrine, nor, save in a few instances, didit anticipate a tactical need by designingan innovation before the fighting forceshad requested it. If Ordnance engineersdid submit an innovation without havinghad a specific request, they were obliged toconduct a difficult sales campaign to pre-

vent flat rejection on the grounds that norequirement for it existed.

The Chief of Staff in 1945 emphasizedthe injustice of criticisms aimed at theOrdnance Department:

In some of the public discussions of suchmatters [the quality of American ordnance]criticism was leveled at the Ordnance De-partment for not producing better weapons.This Department produced with rare effi-ciency what it was told to produce, and theseinstructions came from the General Staff ofwhich I am the responsible head, transmit-ting the resolved views of the officers with thecombat troops or air forces, of the com-manders in the field.34

General Campbell also realized clearly therestrictions upon his Department. In dis-cussing with officers of the line the advis-ability of developing a trackless tank,Campbell announced:

As long as I am in the Chair, the OrdnanceDepartment is going to act as a servant of theline of the Army—its public. If the line wantsan 18 wheeled car that will run sidewise, wewill do our best to give it to the line. If wedon't think it can be made, we will advise youto that effect. If you still want it, we will tryour best to get it. That is our stand in this carright now. . . . It is up to the line to deter-mine, with our advice, what they would liketo have done in this car. As far as the Ord-nance Department is concerned, it is yourdecision.35

Experienced Ordnance officers recog-nized that more persuasiveness on the partof the Ordnance Department might occa-sionally have saved effort expended onweapons that, when completed, proved

33 PSP 8 K OHF.

34 Biennial Report of The Chief of Staff of The UnitedStates Army-July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to The Secre-tary of War, p. 97.

35 Conference on the Trackless Tank, Col. WilliamA. Borden, Chairman, 11 Jul 42, Tank and Automo-tive Br, Combat Vehicle Sec files, Project KG 218,DRB AGO.


unable to accomplish their purpose. Theinability of Ordnance officers to induce theInfantry to abandon its demand for a37-mm, tank gun is one example.36 Ord-nance engineers used engineering languagethat manifestly often carried little convic-tion to the combat arms. The layman mustnevertheless be astonished at the OrdnanceDepartment's acceptance of responsibilityfor designing weapons it had deemed un-suitable for the purpose intended and haddemurred at developing. Instead of re-minding the using arm that any particulardevelopment had to follow the specifica-tions laid down by the user and that weak-nesses in the resulting weapon were oftendue to the combination of characteristicsdemanded, the Ordnance Department wasprone to insist that the weapon under criti-cism was the best of its kind. For the sakeof the morale of the general public in war-time, there was reason to announce em-phatically and repeatedly that Americanfighting equipment was the finest in theworld. But within the War Department theOrdnance Department exposed itself tounwarranted criticism from other branchesof the Army by not explaining the natureof the limitations imposed upon OrdnanceResearch and Development Service.

Ordnance technicians and engineers, onthe other hand, were not invariably in thevan. Conservatism marked some phases oftheir thinking. An example may be foundin their unwillingness in 1940 to push de-velopment of incendiary bombs, in spite ofurgent communications from a militaryobserver in London and later from an.offi-cer of the Army Air Forces who had wit-nessed the blitz. Several incendiary bombshad been under development during the1930's, but Ordnance ammunition expertsby 1940 had come to the conclusion that ademolition bomb could do everything an

incendiary could, and more. They turneddeaf ears to descriptions of the effectivenessof the magnesium-filled incendiaries thatthe Germans had rained upon London.The upshot of this indifference was thetransfer of the project to the ChemicalWarfare Service, which had long had re-sponsibility for chemical fillers. Conse-quently it was the Chemical WarfareService, not the Ordnance Department,that developed the so-called napalm bombthat proved peculiarly effective toward theend of the war and later in Korea.37

A few blind spots notwithstanding, byand large the Ordnance Department metits assigned responsibilities with distinction.In most cases, as General Marshall stated,shortcomings in American fighting equip-ment in World War II were attributablenot to Ordnance Department slow-witted-ness, but to War Department and GroundForces instructions. That public opinionand Congress all through the 1930's sostressed defense as opposed to aggressivewarfare that Army planning was willy-nilly influenced by what amounted to adefinite national policy, doubtless largelyaccounts for delays in evolving tacticaldoctrine for offense.38 Those delays in turnretarded Ordnance research and develop-ment work. Comprehension of the limits ofOrdnance responsibilities is essential to anunderstanding of the story that follows.

Technical Intelligence

In peacetime, development of Americanordnance might be regarded as a searchfor absolutes rather than relatives. Since

36 See above, pp. 182-86.37 (1) Intervs. 4 Apr 51. with Col Studler and with

Mr. Frederick V. Ludden, Ammo Br, R&D Div. (2)OCM 15342, 13 Sep 39 and 15427, 25 Oct 39.

38 See Watson, op. at., pp. 16-36.


the enemy to be overmatched was un-known, the problem became one of findingthe best possible means of defeating anyhostile force without considering where afuture battle would take place or exactlywhat equipment the future enemy wouldemploy. Yet there were clear advantagesto thinking in terms of besting a particulararmy and its matériel. The designer inevi-tably could most readily focus his ener-gies on Countermeasures when faced withknowledge of what he must compete with.Americans had long realized that informa-tion about the types of equipment in use orunder development by foreign armies wasan aid, if not actually a starting point, forordnance research and development workfor the U.S. Army. But during the 1930'stechnical intelligence, that is, data on de-tails of foreign design and manufacturingmethods, was so intertwined with militaryintelligence that what filtered through tothe Department was casual and tendedto leave research to proceed in a nearvacuum. The U.S. Army's disregard ofdevelopments in foreign munitions before1940 is a perpetual source of astonishmentto the European.

When the disasters on the Continent oc-curred in the spring and summer of 1940,American military intelligence still derivedonly from military observer and liaisonreports sent through American embassies.Realization of the need of more andexacter knowledge of foreign weapons hadled the Chief of Ordnance in March torequest the appointment of two additionalOrdnance officers as assistant military ob-servers. Accordingly, in May, ColonelZornig went to Berlin and Capt. GervaisW. Trichel to Paris. Captain Trichel's mis-sion terminated in June, and ColonelZornig's in July at his own request, whenhe discovered that sources of exact infor-

mation were closed to him.39 Meanwhile,the extent of what the Ordnance Depart-ment did not know about German,French, and British ordnance is plainlyrevealed in a list of questions prepared bythe Office, Chief of Ordnance, in June1940. A week before the fall of France theChief of Ordnance asked that military ob-servers in Europe find the answers, and, ifpossible, send samples of foreign equip-ment for study in the United States. Whenthe replies came back in the late fall, thepapers were circulated narrowly. It is hardto believe that the information had notbeen long available in Ordnance files. Forexample, the first question on artilleryasked whether the French 75-mm, and155-mm, gun (GPF) recoil mechanismswere secret; the answer was that neitherhad been secret since 1918. Moreover,many of the answers to questions on Ger-man matériel are known today to havebeen inaccurate, for captured Germandocuments giving official data on charac-teristics and performance show how muchmisinformation the reports contained.40

But long before the General Staff discov-ered that, it was obvious that means wereinadequate for obtaining knowledge ofwhat ordnance resources the future enemypossessed.

At the end of August 1940 the GeneralStaff inaugurated an Army-wide intelli-gence system. Every service was to have aunit. The Ordnance Military IntelligenceSection was established in September. Itsduties were to collate, digest, and dissemi-nate the information that came from G-2reports and to prepare statements of what

39 Min, Wesson Conferences, 21 Mar 40, 23 Mar40, 11 Apr 40, and 4 May 40, OHF.

40 Special List of Questions on Ord Materiel, 13Jun 40, and Reply 1st Ind, 27 Nov 40, OKD 470/204.1, Ord Tech Intel files.


further information the Ordnance Depart-ment needed in order to solve its currentproblems. But the section had no immedi-ate part in collecting data abroad and, inthe months that followed, much of whatthe G-2 reports contained dealt with coun-tries that were soon to be allies.41 Never-theless, the machinery was now in exist-ence for making use of intelligence reports,and the scope and effectiveness of the intel-ligence network was to increase greatly astime went on. Circulating Military Intelli-gence Division special bulletins was thefirst step in keeping the services informedon foreign developments. By December1940 G-2 had evolved its procedures aboutas follows: when an incoming report notedthat German tanks were carrying 2-incharmor plate and recommended corre-sponding increases on American tanks,G-2 sent the information to G-4, the In-fantry, the Engineers, the Armored Force,and Ordnance. If the arms and servicesconcurred, G-4 would initiate action toput the change into effect.42 The chief dif-ference between this system and earlierprocedures lay in the speed with whichaction could be hurried through becauseevery branch of the Army was informedsimultaneously. Indeed General Marshall,in discussing Army Intelligence, observedthat right up to the time of Pearl Harborthe United States had little more thanwhat its military observers "could learn ata dinner, more or less over the coffeecups."43

Within its first year the Ordnance Mili-tary Intelligence Section found its taskgrowing in volume and complexity. Fromthe data supplied by the special bulletinsof G-2, the small staff of the Ordnance sec-tion periodically prepared detailed anal-yses of information bearing on ordnance.The Ordnance Intelligence Bulletins,

averaging monthly nearly fifty pages, circu-lated among interested agencies outsideand units within the Department, so thata considerable body of facts—or guesses—on foreign matériel became available topeople needing the data. After May 1941the reports of the Ordnance section of anew War Department Special ObserverGroup sent to the United Kingdom thatmonth supplemented routine commu-niques.44 Meanwhile the Ordnance De-partment was not wholly dependent uponG-2 sources for information. Even beforethe Lend-Lease Act passed, Ordnancetechnicians could profit by the exchangeof scientific findings among British, Cana-dian, and American scientists of NDRC.45

And, as it became clear that the UnitedStates was actually, even if not yet for-mally, committed to supporting GreatBritain in the war against Germany, theBritish put at the disposal of the U.S.Army data both on British weapons andon what British intelligence had uncoveredon German weapons. British technical in-telligence bridged the gap for the UnitedStates until such time as the U.S. Armyhad trained technical intelligence to actfor itself, and, in fact, throughout the warthe Ordnance Department used British,Canadian, and Australian reports onenemy equipment.46

After Pearl Harbor Ordnance officers

41 Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 16 Aug 40,sub: WDSR MID WD Intelligence, AG 321.19 MID,DRB AGO.

42 (1) Special MID Bull 17, 26 Sep 40, G-2/2657-23. (2) Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 2 Dec 40, OO350.051 MID. Both in DRB AGO.

43 Hearings . . . , Senate, 80th Cong, 1st Sess, onS758. 30 Apr 47, p. 493.

4 4 (1) Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 14 Aug 41,350.051 MID. (2) Ord Tech Services in ETO, AGAdm 604F. Both in DRB AGO.

45 Baxter, op; cit., pp. 120-23.4 6 See below n. 77.


assigned to theatre headquarters preparedregular monthly reports which sometimescontained explicit information uponenemy ordnance. As early as March 1942the communications of the Ordnance of-ficer in the Middle East described featuresof German weapons encountered by theBritish in the recent battles for NorthAfrica, and a series of photographs of cap-tured equipment arrived at AberdeenProving Ground soon after. Some actualspecimens of German matériel also wereshipped to the States, although in 1942they formed a thin trickle compared to theflood that was to reach Aberdeen in thesummer of 1943.47 Study of the weaponsthemselves naturally gave research men inthe zone of the interior more useful knowl-edge than they could derive from reportswritten overseas, even when they were ac-companied by sketches. The chief value oftheatre reports to the Research and Devel-opment Service lay in the detailed com-ments on performance of American ord-nance. Later in the war special missionssent to active theatres undertook to assem-ble information upon the functioning ofparticular types of Allied equipment, tosee what other types were needed, or to in-troduce new experimental models. But onenemy weapons neither these special mis-sions nor the theatre Ordnance officercould ordinarily supply all wanted tech-nical data.

Early in 1942 General Barnes was con-vinced that research and developmentwould benefit by a more direct flow oftechnical information than the theatrescould readily transmit under the existingsystem. That summer, as soon as he be-came head of the separate division forresearch and development, he launchedhis proposal. He persuaded G-2 and the

rest of the War Department that, becausetrained Ordnance observers could collectessential detailed data on enemy equip-ment more competently than could officerstrained only in general military intelli-gence, specially briefed Ordnance teamsshould be sent to the active theatres. Thefirst Ordnance intelligence mission accord-ingly went to North Africa soon afterward,in fact some months before Americancombat troops landed there. A series ofunits for more permanent overseas assign-ment could not be provided so quickly.Working out a systematic scheme of in-doctrinating Enemy Equipment Intelli-gence units, as they came to be called, tookseveral months. The first of these newteams left the States in December 1942.48

Others followed, until by V-E Day unitsfor every theatre had been organized anddispatched. Though originally their mis-sion was to collect samples of enemy equip-ment and all possible data on it to send toResearch and Development Service in theStates, in time the units served combattroops more directly by issuing bulletins inthe theatres containing information onhow to use against the enemy his ownweapons captured in an advance. So use-ful was the work of the Ordnance teamsthat early in 1944 the commanding gen-eral of the Army Service Forces orderedevery technical service to organize similarunits. Enemy Equipment IntelligenceService teams thus became accepted parts

47 (1) Progress Rpt Ord Sec, Actg Ord Off MilNorth African Mission to CG Mil North African Mis-sion, 31 Mar 42, MNAM Folder, Rpts file, OHF. (2)Memo. Capt Everett S. Davis for Chief of Intel DivASF, 10 Jul 43, sub: Weekly Activities Rpt of OrdIntel Unit, OO 3 19.1/3462 Misc, DRB AGO.

48 (1) Interv with Capt Ernest V. Cameron, OrdTech Intel, 10 Oct 50. (2) Ord Opns in Middle EastTheatre, OHF. (3) WD Tng Cir 81, 6 Nov 42.


of American armies overseas.49

These teams were drawn from groupswho had trained as tank maintenance menand as small arms, artillery, and ammuni-tion specialists. Familiarity with the fea-tures of American equipment qualifiedthem more readily to recognize distinctiveand noteworthy characteristics of enemymatériel, a consideration peculiarly im-portant when captured items could not bereturned intact to the zone of interior foranalysis. In the last year of the war, thea-tre intelligence staffs recruited additionalmen for Enemy Equipment Intelligenceunits by taking volunteers with special ex-perience. At no time did the OrdnanceDepartment make any pretense of givingthorough training in intelligence work. Aweek of intensive preparation at AberdeenProving Ground followed by a week'sbriefing by the Military Intelligence Divi-sion of the General Staff and by the branchchiefs of Ordnance Research and Develop-ment was all that was possible. Experiencein the field proved to be the best school-ing.50 The officers who had the task ofmaking this new service fulfill its missionin the theatres had a pioneering assign-ment as difficult as it was important.

In Europe, where Allied invasion of theContinent would give direct access to Ger-man factories, laboratories, and experi-mental stations, the theatre Ordnance of-ficer, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Sayler, realizedsome months before D Day that an oppor-tunity would exist to go beyond captureand study of particular pieces of enemyequipment; captured German correspond-ence, laboratory equipment, and records,as well as interviews with prisoners of warwho had been engaged in German ord-nance research, would enormously enlargeknowledge of enemy development plans

and methods. Acting upon GeneralSayler's suggestion, the Chief of Ordnancearranged to have technical specialistsassigned to this task, and in October 1944the first group, designated the Researchand Development Branch of the TechnicalDivision of the Office of the Chief Ord-nance Officer, ETOUSA, began its work.The resulting information was assembledand disseminated by a joint British andAmerican agency, the Combined Intelli-gence Objectives Sub-Committee, usuallycalled CIOS, with headquarters in Lon-don. The data thus accumulated in thelast six months of the war in Europe,though collected too late to be applied toweapons in World War II, were of utmostlong-term value to the Ordnance Depart-ment. The work of the CIOS representsan important phase of Allied co-operationon research problems.51 In the Pacific nocomparable investigation was possibleuntil American troops occupied Japanafter the war.

The form that technical intelligenceactivities took in the battle zones and be-hind the combat lines is part of the storyof Ordnance service overseas. Researchand Development Service in the zone ofinterior was affected only by the arrival ofcaptured items at Aberdeen or of photo-graphs sent to the Office, Chief of Ord-nance, along with such analyses of enemy

49 (1) Capt Ernest V. Cameron, Hist of the OrdTechnical Intelligence Organization (hereafter citedas Hist Ord Tech Intel) , and incl, copy of ltr , CGASF to CG US Forces in ETO, 14 Mar 44, sub: En-emy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams, OHF.(2) FM 30-15, 7 Dec 43, DRB AGO.

50 (1) Interv with Capt Cameron, 2 Oct 50. (2) Ltr,Gen Barnes to Col Holger N. Toftoy, 19 Jun 44, sub:Ord Tech Intel Teams in Ord Tech Services in ETO,Annex 5, AG Adm 604F, DRB AGO.

51 Ord Tech Services in ETO, AG Adm 604F,DRB AGO.


equipment as could be made in the thea-tres. The Ordnance intelligence unit inWashington was responsible for the ulti-mate disposition both of actual specimensand of information about them, but a For-eign Materiel Section established at theAberdeen Proving Ground was the firstconsignee of enemy weapons and vehicles.From Aberdeen the intelligence unit in theOffice, Chief of Ordnance, might shortlydecide to send an item to an arsenal or toa commercial laboratory for study—aGerman machine gun to SpringfieldArmory, a sample of foreign alloy steel toWatertown, a fire control instrument toFrankford Arsenal. The resulting reportsupon the enemy equipment, whetherstudied by the Aberdeen Foreign MaterielSection and the Ballistic Research Labo-ratory, by an Ordnance contractor, or byan arsenal, were assembled by the intelli-gence staff of Research and DevelopmentService who then prepared and distrib-uted summaries of the findings. The sum-maries might be incorporated in thetechnical information letters sent to thetheatres of operations monthly after April1943 or might be circulated only amongagencies within the United States.Throughout the war the bulk of the sig-nificant work on enemy weapons tookplace at Aberdeen where the firing range,laboratory, and proving facilities madepossible comparative tests of Americanand foreign ordnance.52

The Foreign Materiel Section of theproving center at Aberdeen was formallyestablished in September 1942, though ithad antecedents in the museum whereforeign equipment of World War I andafter, all carefully catalogued, had stoodon display. Before the end of the year Lt.Col. George B. Jarrett, newly returnedfrom the Middle East, was appointed chief

of the section. Jarrett, an arms collector inprivate life and the curator of the originalmuseum at Aberdeen, was eminentlyqualified to make the new unit effective.While he was still in the Middle East hehad anticipated the need of studyingenemy equipment thoroughly and had ar-ranged to ship a few lots back to the Prov-ing Ground. This was the only whole-hearted attempt made up to that time toassemble enemy ordnance for technicalanalysis. The matériel was put to imme-diate use in schooling the first EnemyEquipment Intelligence units preparingfor overseas duty. As the number of itemsarriving at Aberdeen multiplied, the workof the section increased enormously andthe section became a branch with sectionsunder it. One section took charge of themuseum exhibits, which were continuedfor the benefit of a host of visitors—guestsat Proving Ground demonstrations, news-paper men, and especially officers detailedto examine the specimens. Another sectionmaintained the Foreign Materiel BranchLibrary and made analyses of foreign de-signs and engineering features. A thirdsection acted as liaison with the Office,Chief of Ordnance, and arranged for ship-ments of items or components to desig-nated laboratories and agencies.53

By the fall of 1943 shipments of as muchas twenty-six carloads of captured enemyequipment were rolling into Aberdeen atone time. It was not an indiscriminate col-

52 (1) ODO 327, 19 Aug 42 and 344, 12 Oct 42,

OHF. (2) Hist of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Vol. II,Ch. 8, Exhibits H and Q. ; Vol. III, Ch. 4; and Vol.IV., Ch. 4, OHF.

53 Hist of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Vol. III, Ch.4, OHF. In the paragraphs that follow the data deriveeither from the History of Aberdeen Proving Groundhere cited, or from interviews with Colonel Jarrett,Captain Cameron, and Colonel Frye, held respectivelyon 25 October 1950. 2 November 1950, and 11 Sep-tember 1951.


lection, as Enemy Equipment Intelligenceteams dispatched only new or newly modi-fied matériel. Furthermore, the firstsample of each new item captured in theEuropean and Mediterranean theatreswent to the United Kingdom, so that onlya second specimen could go to the UnitedStates. Still the accumulating mass of for-eign matériel was tremendous. Deducingfrom it all possible useful information re-quired careful organization. A descriptionof the successive steps in handling a cap-tured German tank may serve to illustratethe process of studying foreign equipmentat the Proving Ground. The Office, Chiefof Ordnance, co-ordinated the test pro-gram in order to guarantee its proceedingwith maximum efficiency and to preventneedless damage to a specimen or un-authorized destruction.

When a tank was captured and ship-ping space found, the Enemy EquipmentIntelligence unit sent word to the intelli-gence section of Ordnance Research andDevelopment Service in Washington thatthe tank was en route to the United States.Upon its arrival, port authorities notifiedthe commanding general at Aberdeen,and, after it reached the Proving Ground,the Foreign Materiel Branch photo-graphed it inside and out and reportedupon its condition to the intelligence sec-tion in the Office, Chief of Ordnance. Theintelligence section then communicatedwith other units of Research and Develop-ment Service—the tank division, theartillery division, the ballistics division, thematériel branch—and with agencies out-side the Ordnance Department, such asthe Signal Corps, if the tank's communica-tion system appeared to have unusualfeatures, or the Chemical Warfare Service,which was interested in the power plantoxygen supply and its susceptibility to gas

contamination. Even a branch of the StateDepartment might be concerned, if mark-ings on parts of the tank promised to dis-close where parts had been manufacturedand thus indicate economic conditions inGermany. On the basis of the requestssubmitted by all these groups, the Intelli-gence Section prepared a directive to gov-ern the order and character of the tests tobe conducted. Occasionally, some otherdivision of Research and DevelopmentService drew up the test directive, to whichthe Intelligence Section then gave concur-rence. Not until the order from the Office,Chief of Ordnance, appeared could testsbegin at Aberdeen.

After the staff at Aberdeen had its in-structions in hand, it frequently had tomake considerable repairs before the tankcould be subjected to road or firing tests.It often demanded sound engineering andgreat care to ensure accurate reconstruc-tion of the original model. The first trialthen might very well be a road and cross-country test to compare the speed andmaneuverability of the enemy vehicle withan American counterpart. A check of thetime required to traverse the German tur-ret and scrutiny of all electrical controlswithin turret and body might be the nextprocedure. Anything novel about theheadlights or searchlights had to be noted.Specialists studied the characteristics ofthe suspension system, the tracks, and thetreads, if not already revealed by photo-graphs. The Society of Automotive Engi-neers War Engineering Board, which gavethe Ordnance Department invaluableassistance throughout the war, mightundertake careful examination of thedesign, methods of fabrication, and ma-terials used. Chemical and performanceanalyses of the oils and lubricants em-ployed might be called for. The fire con-


trol and sighting devices might be strippedoff and sent to the laboratory at FrankfordArsenal for study, or optical expertsbrought to Aberdeen might witness per-formance of the sights in firing tests on therange. If the ammunition for the tank gunshad new features of design or used un-familiar types of fuze or power, the testsmight include laboratory examination ofa few shells. The projectile might requireextensive metallurgical analysis at Water-town Arsenal. In firing the guns, crewsand officers had to keep records of theirrange, accuracy, and penetrating power.Ballisticians of the Research Laboratorymight have to prepare comparative tabu-lations of the German and American bal-listic performance.

Upon completion of these tests, Amer-ican guns would ordinarily fire at the tankin order to find the spots of greatest weak-ness, test the resistance of the Germanarmor plate, and establish the effectiverange of American guns and shells de-signed to combat this type of enemy tank.For example, firing new experimentalhigh-velocity armor-piercing 90-mm, shellat a German Panther tank supplied toOrdnance ammunition experts importantinformation needed to perfect this HVAPammunition. Metallurgical study of apiece of the tanks' armor might follow ifits resistance to penetration or method offabrication deviated from what past ex-perience had led the Ordnance Depart-ment to expect. The final report upon aGerman tank might thus consist of a goodmany separate studies. Having assembledthese and checked for consistency in thefindings and terminology, the foreign ma-tériel staff dispatched copies of the full re-port to the technical intelligence unit ofthe Office, Chief of Ordnance, to the chiefof Research and Development Service, toG-2 of the General Staff, and to any other

units known to have legitimate interest inthe data.

Usually men at Aberdeen put the firstcaptured specimen of a new piece ofenemy ordnance through careful perform-ance tests, including firing of German am-munition against American tanks. Latersamples of enemy equipment were usedeither for verification of the first set of find-ings, for target tests of improved Americanammunition, or for a check on the qualityof materials and minor changes in designemployed in later enemy models. Tech-nical intelligence officers overseas en-deavored to send a specimen of eachweapon to Aberdeen every six months inorder to enable the staff to observe anychanges in design and materials. Contin-uous laboratory study of critical parts,components, and fabricating methods wasof some strategic value because it providedclues to the current status of enemy man-power, raw material supplies, and produc-tion facilities. Sometimes American expertsdirectly copied features of an enemy designand sometimes, by applying an engineer-ing principle used in the captured weapon,were able to improve upon the original.

Technicians and military experts in thezone of interior could thus scrutinize everydetail of any piece of captured equipment.In actuality, exhaustive analyses wererare. An NDRC contract with the BattelleMemorial Institute, negotiated in April1943, aimed specifically at obtaining fullinformation from a series of such studies.But NDRC's summary report at the endof the war declared: "Very little benefitwas derived from these studies due largelyto the fact that this office [OCO] providedinadequate guidance and direction to theNDRC contractor." 54 The Ordnance De-partment unfortunately could not spare

54 NDRC Liaison, Project OP-113, OHF.


men to give Battelle the necessary indoc-trination. Because time was short and at-tempt to ape a foreign competitor mightdelay vital production, most studies ofenemy ordnance concentrated primarilyupon comparisons of performance withAmerican.

By the summer of 1944 the OrdnanceDepartment had collected enough data onforeign weapons to issue the Catalogue ofEnemy Ordnance Materiel, one volumeon German and one volume on Japanese.The form was like that of the Catalogue ofStandard Ordnance Items. A considerablelist of errata appended to later issues ofthe Enemy Ordnance Catalogue testifiedto need for constant revision. Both Ord-nance Department and officers of theGround Forces received copies of theseloose-leaf volumes. The catalogues did not,of course, contain estimates of perform-ance of enemy equipment. These ap-praisals went to the Chief of Staff in alengthy secret report of May 1945, entitledComparison of American, German andJapanese Ordnance.55 Before the war wasover, many men of Ordnance Researchand Development Service knew a greatdeal about their competitors' products.

Collaboration with Allied Nations

As soon as Britain's doubts aboutAmerican co-operation in the fight againstthe Nazi regime were dispelled, the WarOffice released a mass of technical andscientific data to be used in developmentsin the United States. The Tizard Missionof September 1940, a precursor of theseries of special missions to America, toLondon, and to Ottawa, included repre-sentatives of the British Army, Navy, andAir Force, the Canadian defense servicesand the National Research Council ofCanada. In the early days the United

States got more help on basic researchthan it gave, though later this conditionwas reversed, and the American scientificcontributions to the joint war effort cameto be of vast importance.56 Following theenactment of the Lend-Lease Act inMarch 1941, systematic interchange of in-formation and development planningbegan. NDRC set up a branch in London,and in April the British Central ScientificOffice was opened in Washington underthe direction of a distinguished Britishphysicist. From the latter office a long listof special technical reports was regularlysubmitted to the Ordnance Department,with the understanding that copies of anyreport would be made available uponrequest.57 The full collaboration of scien-tists, accustomed to pooling scientific datathrough journals and conferences thatrecognized no international boundaries,was less astonishing than the co-operationquickly established between American,British, and Canadian military representa-tives.

The first move of the U.S. Army in join-ing efforts with the British on both pro-curement and research and developmentprograms was the creation of the SpecialObserver Group sent to London in May1941. To the Ordnance section of thisgroup Col. John Coffey was assigned. Themission of the Ordnance section includedstudy of "British establishments" andpreparation of reports upon them for theChief of Ordnance in the States. "Britishestablishments" was in time interpreted to

55 Comparison of American, German, and JapaneseOrd, prepared for CofS, 6 May 45, OHF. See belowpp.275-87.

56 See Baxter, op. cit., pp. 119-35.57 (1) List of Documents from British Sources re-

ceived by British Central Scientific Office in June1943, OO 350.05/4295, DRB AGO. (2) 1st Ind, ColRitchie. Chief Serv Br, Tech Div, to CO WatertownArsenal, 21 Jun 43, OO 350.05/2218, DRB AGO.


mean manufacturing plants as well asmilitary installations, so that informationupon British manufacturing techniqueswas available to the Ordnance section. Byjoint agreement in August, copies of pro-ceedings of the British Ordnance Boardwere thereafter sent regularly to the Office,Chief of Ordnance, in the States and min-utes of the Ordnance Technical Committeeto London.58 Other than the British boardproceedings, the information dispatchedto Washington during 1941 and early 1942dealt largely with gaps in equipment orwith recommendations for changes in type.For example, a report of late February1942 urged a number of changes: use of20-mm, antiaircraft guns in place of 50-caliber machine guns that were ineffectiveagainst dive bombers; discard of 37-mm,or 3-pounder tank guns because of theirinability "to enter a slugging match withequivalent German guns" and because ofthe tanks' "insufficient mobility to outrunthe [German Panzer IV] tanks"; adoptionof 40-mm. Bofors antiaircraft guns asintegral parts of equipment for each ar-mored, motorized, or foot division; in-crease in the range of 105-mm, howitzersand improvement in their antitank fight-ing characteristics. Furthermore, to speedthe receipt of information, this reportrecommended that technical data godirect to the office that had requestedthem, instead of through G-2 channels, arecommendation that shortly was put intoeffect.59

After the formation of Headquarters,European Theater of Operations, UnitedStates Army, ETOUSA, in the summer of1942, the Ordnance section of the SpecialObserver Group became the OrdnanceSection of the new headquarters. For Re-search and Development Service in thezone of the interior the value of this Ord-

nance unit grew when in April 1943 itsfunction was broadened to include:

a. ... investigate, follow up, and report tothe War Dept, on foreign research and de-velopment of all Ordnance and relatedmatters.

d. Report on proving ground apparatus andequipment and any manufacturing proc-esses of interest to the Chief of Ordnance.

g. Furnish representation for ETO on theBritish Ordnance Board, various commit-tees, sub-committees, panels, etc., dealingwith research and development of Ord-nance when such representation is re-quested by the British.00

Thereafter, the volume of explicit infor-mation rolling into the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, bearing on research and devel-opment in the United Kingdom increasedrapidly. The stream of reports andmemoranda included discussion of testsand experiments under way on Americanmatériel in Britain, descriptions of Britishexperimental work, and sometimes dataon German ordnance collected by theBritish.61 Only when D Day transferredmost activity to the Continent did infor-mation from London shrink in impor-tance.

On no other type of matériel was col-laboration with the British so extensiveand carefully organized as on tanks, tank

58 (1) Ord Tech Services in ETO, AG Adm 604F,DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, CofOrd to MID G-2, 23 Jun 45,sub: Ord Tech Liaison with the British, British Re-lations, Barnes file, OHF.

59 Ltr, MID GS to ACofS G-2, 23 Feb 42, sub:Final Rpt on Temporary Duty as Mil Observer inBritish Isles, OO 350.05/209, DRB AGO.

60 Hq ETOUSA, Ord Office Order 15, 27 Apr 43,cited in Ord Tech Services in ETO, AG Adm 604F,DRB AGO.

61 See correspondence in OO 350.05, May 43 toJun 44, DRB AGO.


guns, and tank accessories. In September1941 a mission headed by General Wesson,Chief of Ordnance, went to London toconfer with the British War Office andMinistry of Supply on production and de-sign problems. British officials at the con-ferences made some specific requests of theU.S. Army, but offered at the same time areasoned exposition of what two years offighting had taught the British about tankand artillery design. British proposals forsome heavier tanks with wider tracks andmore powerful guns reinforced the viewsof the automotive experts of the OrdnanceDepartment and doubtless helped even-tually to convince the ground forces thatbigger tanks were necessary. Descriptionof the guns and armor that the Germanshad been using against the British inAfrica made a telling argument.6 2 InMarch 1942 a British mission came toWashington to carry the discussions fur-ther, though its primary objective was tostraighten out questions of procurement.The British Tank Mission and the UnitedStates Tank Committee reached agree-ment on a wide range of questions con-cerning armored fighting vehicles, butequally important were the proposals forfuture collaboration. A joint agreementlaid down a general policy of maintaining"the fullest of mutual exchange of infor-mation and of coordination of plans."63

Accordingly, members of the British Armystaff in Washington, the British Air Com-mission, and War Supplies Ltd. began toattend meetings of the Ordnance Techni-cal Committee and shortly thereafterCanadian representatives also were ad-mitted.64

In August an American Technical Mis-sion went to London. The discussions thatoccurred that August covered far morethan combat vehicles. Indeed, the initial

request for the mission listed several itemsupon which British developments hadgone so far that the U.S. Army could onlysave duplicating effort by examining Brit-ish findings and techniques in the UnitedKingdom—notably, a shoulder-type anti-tank projector with half-round bombs,Probert rifling for guns using forwardbanded shell, the "Little John two-pounder squeeze attachment," the Burneyrecoilless gun, and rocket projectiles.65

Consequently, the mission included ex-perts in seven different fields. GeneralBarnes represented the United States onproblems of artillery, self-propelledmounts, and fighting vehicles; ColonelZornig on metallurgy and gun ammuni-tion; Col. Robert G. Butler on aircraftbombs; Col. Horace A. Quinn on aircraftarmament; Col. Gervais W. Trichel on firecontrol; Mr. Samuel Feltman on ballistics;and 2d Lt. Edward G. Uhl on rockets.Tours of British installations gave theAmerican mission firsthand knowledge ofwhat lines the United Kingdom was fol-lowing, and conferences held group bygroup permitted careful exploration of de-tails on each type of matériel. The generalconclusions stressed the wisdom of creat-ing routines for fuller, regular exchangeof information between Britain and theUnited States, for officials of both nationsrecognized that liaison was still far from

6 2 General Staff Note for Gen Wesson ... onspecific points concerning tank design and produc-tion . . . arising from a meeting ... at the WarOffice, 27 Sep 41, and Min of Mtg Held at ClaridgeHotel, 30 Sep 41, OO 334.8/4800½, DRB AGO.

63 Findings and Final Min of Joint British TankMission and U.S. Tank Committee, 30 Mar 42, OHF.

64 Ltr, CofOrd to MID G-2, 23 Jun 45, sub: OrdTech Liaison with the British, British Relations,Barnes file, OHF.

65 Msg 2788, Greenwell to CofS, action copy toCofOrd. 9 Jun 42, OO 350.05/810, DRB AGO. Fordescription of the main features of these items, seeCh. XII, below.


complete. They proposed that further ex-change of visits be scheduled and thatofficers assigned to such missions be re-quired to submit written reports on theirfindings; the reports should be widely andpromptly circulated. A final statementread:

The question of urgency in production[and] conservation of critical materials em-phasise the necessity for a true appreciation ofsimplification in design, with a greater degreeof standardisation on common items betweenthe two countries, together with the mainte-nance of a high quality in manufacture suf-ficient to perform the duty for which theweapon is required.66

In keeping with the spirit of these rec-ommendations, arrangements were madeon both sides of the water for close liaison.From London, Col. Frank F. Reed of theOrdnance Section at ETO headquartersregularly sent to Research and Develop-ment Service minutes of the North AfricanArmored Fighting Vehicles meetingswhere every detail was threshed out peri-odically.67 Transmitting records of testsand reports on experimentation sometimesran into a long series of communicationscovering a period of many months. Forexample, correspondence and military ob-server reports describing work on the so-called Sherman DD device began in June1942 and continued into December 1943.68

American Ordnance officers assigned toBritish experimental stations or provinggrounds had access to all information, andnothing Research and Development Serv-ice in the States wanted to know aboutBritish research and development was de-nied it.69 Still, it was clear that written re-ports were no substitute for technicalmissions. "The best means of close coop-eration and exchange of technical infor-mation," wrote theatre headquarters in1943, "is believed to be through the mis-

sions sent to this theatre." The report wenton to state that the missions should be sentapproximately every three months, andfrom time to time officers assigned to thetheatre should be returned for temporaryduty in the States.70 In January 1944Colonel Reed began regularly to attendmeetings of the British Ordnance Board.

Despite a statement of the August mis-sion implying awareness of shortages ofmaterials in both Britain and America, co-operation in conserving raw materials andfinding ways of using substitutes wasslower than collaboration in other realms.General Barnes upon his return from Lon-don had observed that the British up tothat time had undertaken no experimenta-tion on use of substitute materials. "Due tothe liberal supply of strategic materialsfrom the United States," he wrote, "theBritish have not felt the same urge to makesubstitutions as has been the case in theOrdnance Department where pressuresexist." 71 Six months later an Anglo-Ameri-can Conservation Committee with head-quarters in London was established withthe stated purpose of promoting inter-change of information on "all subjects re-

66 U.S. Technical Mission, Joint Rpt and Findings,Ministry of Supply, London, 26 Aug 42, p. 8, OHF.

fi7 Ltr, Col Reed, Ord Sec HQSOS ETOUSA, toTech Div OCO, 11 Nov 43, sub: Min of Twenty-sec-ond North African AFV Meeting, OO 350.05/7469,DRB AGO.

68 (1) Ltr, Col Reed to Tech Div, 11 Nov 43, sub:Sherman DD (Straussler Flotation Gear), OO350.05/7389, DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, Col Reed to TechDiv, 1 Dec 43, sub: Sherman DD, OO 350.05/7854,DRB AGO. DD is the abbreviation for "duplexdrive," a system adapted for amphibious use of tanks.

69 Interv with Lt Col William J. Durrenberger,R&D Serv. 22 Nov 50.

70 Incl to ltr. HQSOS ETO to CofOrd, 6 Jun 43,sub: Agenda . . . for Discussion with Maj Gen JohnC. H. Lee, OO 350.05/3728, DRB AGO.

71 Ltr, Barnes to Campbell, 3 Sep 42, sub: Rpt ofU.S. Tech Mission to Great Britain OO 350.05/1243,DRB AGO.


lating to economy in use and manufac-ture, including substitution, simplification,standardization, elimination and salvage,and also . . . [of making] recommenda-tions for the adoption of improved prac-tice ... in order that the critical mate-rials available to the United Kingdom andthe United States shall be used to thegreatest advantage." Studies were to covereighteen raw materials, including alumi-num, asbestos, copper, rubber, and zinc,and several processed items such as carbonelectrodes and tempered roller bearings.72

Thus another significant effort was joinedon research and development problems.

Although the flow of information toWashington in the first eighteen months ofthe war was fuller than from Washingtonto headquarters in the United Kingdom,British officers stationed in the UnitedStates were in a position to send directlyto British officials data on developments inAmerica. Moreover, after midsummer of1943 the Ordnance Department sent theBritish between 3,000 and 5,000 technicaland industrial reports every month.7 3 Inspite of an occasional complaint that someAmerican officers were niggardly in givingout information on manufacturing proc-esses to British representatives in theStates, by and large exchange was freeenough to benefit both countries.74

An example of the kind of data submit-ted from London to the Ordnance Re-search and Development staff in the zoneof the interior may indicate how muchtime and money collaboration saved evenwhen British innovations were not adoptedby the United States, or when experimentsproduced negative results. In January1944 Colonel Reed sent a report on Brit-ish tests of a two-speed epicyclic tank gen-erator drive. He included the cover sheetof the British Department of Tank Design

and the Fighting Vehicle Establishments'report on the generator fitted to the Brit-ish Humber armored car Mark II. Thetwo-speed epicyclic drive and a magneticclutch were so set up that the generatorwould rotate at 3.17 times the enginespeed; at 800 revolutions per minute themicro switch would automatically openand the generator would then drive at 1.1times the engine speed. Tests had revealedweaknesses in the magnetic clutch thatwere in process of correction. Designs ofsimilar equipment for other armored fight-ing vehicles, Colonel Reed wrote, wereunder development. The American auto-motive experts did not attempt to installthis type of generator in American tanks,but having at hand the information onBritish experiments made it unnecessaryfor the Detroit Tank-Automotive Center

72 Memo, Dir Resources and Production Div ASFfor CofOrd, 19 Mar 43, sub: Organ of Anglo-Ameri-can Conservation Committee, OO 334.8/17850, DRBAGO.

73 Interv, 15 Dec 50, with Col Frye, Chief of Re-search and Materials Div, R&D Serv, 1943-45.

74 An extreme example of the inevitable difficultiesthat sometimes occurred was the situation that arosein the spring of 1945 when a "British Mud Commit-tee" requested permission to visit various Americanmanufacturing plants. The official interchange onmatters that affected military design had been com-pleted, but the British committee had then expresseda strong wish to see establishments making automo-tive transmissions. The Ordnance Department ar-ranged for the visits with a few provisos about notinterfering with production. When, according to theindignant report of one Ordnance officer, the Britishguests arrived at each of the several installations, theydiscussed very quickly anything relating to militarywork and proceeded to question company officialsclosely on American practice and plans for postwarproduction of automatic transmissions for buses,trucks, and private cars. Upon request for similar in-formation on British plans, the Americans were toldthat the English group had not been authorized todivulge any detail. To this unusual behavior theAmerican officers objected strenuously. Memo, MajParker Berg for Col John Raaen, OD Exec Off, 16Mar 45, sub: Visits by the British Mud Committee,British Relations. Barnes file, OHF.


to undertake a similar investigation.75

More positive advantages were in time-saving through adoption of some Britishdevelopments. An outstanding examplewas the Canal Defense Light, a powerfulsearchlight mounted in a specially designedGeneral Grant tank turret, designed to aidin night river crossings. British researchdeveloped the CDL unaided. Delivery ofcomplete drawings to the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, enabled the Ordnance Depart-ment to build 500 of these special turretsin eighteen months, whereas at least twoyears of preliminary work would havebeen necessary otherwise.76 The fact thatthe CDL device was not widely used didnot diminish the value of the collaboration.

Nor was exchange confined to theUnited States and the United Kingdom.In addition to British intelligence findingssometimes relayed to the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, from the British Supply Mis-sion in Washington, the Canadians andAustralians supplied considerable usefuldata. From the latter came information onJapanese weapons that supplemented whatAmerican intelligence found. Frequentlythe Australian reports came by way ofLondon, inasmuch as full liaison dictatedhaving the information available to Britishas well as to American Ordnance.77 TheUnited States reciprocated by giving toBritish Empire representatives completecopies of the monthly and semimonthlyreports on all research and developmentprojects and releasing detailed drawingsand other specific data when requested.78

With other allies, exchange was limited bycircumstance. The Combined Chiefs ofStaff early in 1944 arrived at a statementof policy on release of information to theChinese by making the criterion the im-mediate usefulness of data to the ChineseArmy in resisting Japan.79 When political

reasons made it desirable to give to Chinesemilitary observers or military missions ac-cess to British and American military es-tablishments, special instructions were tobe drawn up in advance stipulating ex-pressly what was not to be shown. As theChinese had little technical data to tradeother than information derived from studyof captured Japanese weapons, that planseemed reasonable.80

The problem with the USSR was lesssimple. The Russians were ready to trans-mit through the American ambassador inMoscow information on captured Germanordnance and comments upon the per-formance of British and American equip-ment supplied under lend-lease, butshowed no willingness to share with their

75 Ltr, Col Reed to Tech Div OCO, 5 Jan 44, sub:Two-speed Epicyclic Generator Drive, OO350.05/8760, DRB AGO.

76 (1) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 22 Nov 42, sub: CDLEquipment, OO 350.05/1949, DRB AGO. (2) Ltr,Gen Barnes to CG Hq SOS, 4 Feb 43, sub: CDLEquipment, filed in Final Hist Rpt, AFV and Weap-ons Sec, Hq ETOUSA, V-E Day, OHF. (3) Interv, 1Dec 50, with Maj John H. Savage, Tank and AutoBr, R&D Serv.

77 (1) Ltr, British Supply Mission to Tech DivOCO, 6 Nov 43, sub: Pacific Warfare Tank Types,OO 350.05/7211. (2) Ltr, Special Advisor SmallArms Production, Canadian Dept of Munitions andSupply, to CofOrd 26 Oct 42, OO 350.05/1534. (3)Ltr, Inspection Bd of U.K. and Canada Tech Servicesto Tech Div OCO, 10 Aug 43, OO 350.05/4754. (4)Ltr, Australian Mil Mission to Ord Tech Intel Div, 1Sep 43, sub: Japanese Bombs, OO 350.05/5301. (5)Ltr, Hq ETO to CofOrd, 23 Nov 43, sub: JapaneseLight Tank M2595, Metallurgical Features, OO350.05/7786. All in DRB AGO.

78 See ltr cited n. 64.79 The Combined Chiefs of Staff consisted of the

U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff ortheir designated representatives in Washington.

80 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG's AAF, AGF, ASF,USAFCBI (Rear Ech), USAFCBI (Forward Ech), 21Jan 44, sub: Disclosure of Mil Information to the Chi-nese, OO 350.05/8925. (2) Incl to memo, Chief ofSmall Arms Br, Tech Div OCO, for Ord Intel Unit,6 Nov 42, sub: Small Arms (Japanese), OO350.05/6017. Both in DRB AGO.


allies the fruits of Soviet military scientificresearch.81 When, in the spring of 1943,the Ordnance Department was requestedby the Joint Intelligence Committee tomake recommendations on what disclo-sures should be made to Russia, the Ord-nance Department listed several thatshould be excluded. The shaped chargewas one. "The entire effectiveness ofshaped charges," the Ordnance Depart-ment indorsement stated, "depends uponthe detailed design of the round and thisin turn upon the principles of operation.It is believed inexpedient to release this in-formation." Similarly, data on the prox-imity fuze were not to be released. For .30-caliber and .50-caliber incendiary am-muntion, specifications and round draw-ings might be sent, but not details of themanufacturing processes. As the effective-ness of this type of incendiary ammunitionagainst aircraft self-sealing tanks de-pended "entirely upon the dimensions ofthe bullet tip," the manufacturing proc-esses whereby those dimensions were ob-tained and the cold-working process thatmade the bullet nose sufficiently brittlewere pronounced to be a military secret.Yet probably because the United Stateswas supplying Russia with a large amountof equipment, the Ordnance Departmentfelt justified in requesting from the USSRanswers to a number of specific questions.For example, did Russian experience showsingle or dual tires to be better for mud op-eration and what was the type of tread de-sign and construction? Were the Russiansusing rubber on shear-type bogie wheelsand how good was it? Was crude or syn-thetic rubber used for tire repair? If syn-thetic, what kind? And if a combination,what composition? Still more searchingand less likely to elicit answers were ques-tions about Russian antitank mines,

grenades, and self-destroying shell fuzes.82

The question of exchange dragged oninto the fall, but at the Teheran Confer-ence an agreement was reached calling forreciprocal exchange of data on rockets.83

Accordingly, when a military mission wentto Moscow in April 1944, the OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence unit attached wasinstructed to be ready to give out informa-tion on American rocket developmentsand, in return, to learn essentials on Rus-sian. The primary purpose of this Ord-nance unit was to study and send back tothe States items of German equipmentthat the Russians had captured but whichhad not yet appeared on the WesternFront. Consequently, when the list of ques-tions prepared by the Ordnance team con-cerning the detailed characteristics ofRussian rockets went to the Soviet ForeignOffice, the American officers were re-minded that the Ordnance group hadbeen admitted to Moscow to study Ger-man weapons, not Russian. There thematter ended.

The collection of German matériel onexhibit in Moscow was, however, so exten-sive as to be well worth careful exami-nation. Many items were new to theAmerican experts at that time. Most valu-able perhaps were a German 88-mm. Pak43 and a 75/55-mm. antitank gun, one ofeach of which the American unit was per-mitted to ship back to Aberdeen. Therewas also an array of other vehicles andweapons, a good many of Czechoslovakian,

81 Paraphrase of telegram, Moscow to Dept ofState, 5 Jun 42. OO 350.05/657, DRB AGO.

82 1st Ind, 3 May 43, to memo, Secy Joint IntelCommittee, Combined Chiefs of Staff, for CofOrd, 9Apr 43. sub: Disclosure of Tech Information toUSSR, OO 350.05/3033, DRB AGO.

83 Incl to memo, OCO for Joint Intel Committee,19 Nov 43, sub: Disclosure of Tech Information toUSSR, OO 350.05/7457, DRB AGO.


French, Hungarian, Italian, or other na-tional origin. A Russian major general wasin charge of the exhibit and had a large,competent staff of specialists ready to dis-cuss with the Americans the noteworthyfeatures of the captured equipment. TheOrdnance unit took careful photographsand notes, sent long reports back to theStates, and shipped to Aberdeen speci-mens of a good many items as well. Fur-thermore, a series of meetings held at theForeign Office produced some informationfrom tank experts of the Red Army andautomotive engineers, though the historianof the American mission observed: "Ouroperations were . . . limited by the factthat all contacts had to clear through theforeign office resulting in a considerabledelay and . . . the additional barrier ofthe presence of an officer of the foreign of-fice ... at all conferences." 84

Some ordnance of Russian design wason hand at Aberdeen Proving Groundafter 1942, for leaders of the USSR, con-cerned with getting a steady flow of maté-riel to the Russo-German battle front, sawthat some give to balance the take was in-escapable. Thus a Russian T34 tankmounting a 75.2-mm. cannon was pre-sented to the Proving Ground in 1943.Nevertheless, when the foreign matérielstaff there cut out a piece of the T34'sfrontal armor to analyze metallurgically,the Soviet delegation, on discovering suchmayhem, protested vigorously. The tank

had been donated to the museum, not tothe laboratory. A piece of American armorplate was hastily welded back into thehole; the Russian plate was subjected tothorough study.85

Free exchange of technical data betweenthe Western Allies and the USSR wasnever obtained. Requests of the OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence unit in Moscow tovisit the battle fronts or Soviet provinggrounds were refused. By late fall of 1944,as the Allied advance through France andLuxembourg was making available ampleinformation about German equipment ofall types, the Ordnance mission to Mos-cow was dissolved. What the UnitedStates learned about Soviet ordnance dur-ing World War II largely came from maté-riel captured from the Germans who hadtaken it from the Red Army in battle, frominterviews with prisoners who had servedin campaigns in the USSR, and, towardthe end of the war, from captured Germandocuments.86 After V-E Day OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence units were able tostudy more carefully Soviet equipmentpicked up in Germany. These studiesformed the backbone of knowledge theUnited States Army assembled on Sovietarmament.

84 Hist of Ord Intel Unit — Russian, in Hist of OrdTech Intel, OHF.

85 Interv with Col Jarrett, 25 Oct 50.86 See above, n. 84.

CHAPTER X

The Search for Greater Mobilityin Ground Warfare

Factors Determining Vehicular Development

The keynote of U.S. Army operations inWorld War II was sounded by the roar ofthe internal-combustion engine. Two dec-ades of American automotive research anddevelopment had relegated animal power,the major tactical prime mover of 1917-18,to the category of military curiosa. Billionsof mechanical horsepower in more thantwo million combat and transport vehiclessupplied by the Ordnance Departmentlent American armies unprecedented mo-bility and maneuverability, two of theprimary requisites for attaining the ulti-mate objective of military operations—thedestruction of hostile military forces inbattle.1

Destruction itself is the result of firepower, but fire power minus ability tomaneuver is ineffective both in offense andin defense.2 World War I demonstratedthat offensive fire power lacking a high de-gree of battlefield mobility cannot, eventhough quantitatively vastly superior, forcea decision over an equally static, resolutedefender suitably armed for his role. Aswath of machine gun fire against unpro-tected assault infantry produced the sameresult as the murderous hail of artilleryfire: it forced the opponent into the bowelsof the earth, into safety, instead of anni-

hilating him. Warfare then deterioratedinto a meaningless contest of stamina inwhich ephemeral victor's laurels went tothe captor of a few acres of shell-pockedsoil. Insatiable, the Moloch of attrition wasalso impartial, demanding ruinous sacri-fices from victor and vanquished alike.With neither side able to break the stale-mate with the means at hand, bothsearched frantically for ways in which toregain freedom of maneuver. The Britishwere the first to come up with a workablesolution: mechanical transport with firepower and crew protection in a vehiclecapable of traversing almost any kind ofterrain over which foot troops would haveto advance. The cover name given thecontrivance in its development stage hungon; the track-laying armored combatvehicle became known as the tank.

Advantageous as it proved in lending theattacker once more the ability to move onthe field of battle, the tank of 1916-18 wasfar from a panacea for the ills of positionwarfare. To begin with, the tank itself was ahulking, lumbering affair that traveledmore slowly cross country than man could

1 (1) Civ Production Admin, Official MunitionsProduction of the United States, July 1, 1940 to Au-gust 31, 1945, 1 May 1947 (hereafter cited asOMPUS), pp. 225-55, OHF. (2) FM 100-5, FS Regu-lations: Operations.

2 For a discussion of fire power, see Ch. XI, below.


walk. Quite apart from its thin coat ofarmor—crew protection against onlysmall arms fire—its speed, or lack of speed,spelled extreme vulnerability to hostile de-fensive weapons. Secondly, friendly artil-lery, as well as supply, was drawn by horse,or at best, slow-speed tractor, and as suchwas incapable of rolling fast enough crosscountry to support a sustained advance inthe face of organized resistance. Trucks,though used for transporting infantry,were road bound. Their solid rubber tires,primitive springing, and, above all, lack ofadequate motive power, precluded theiruse save on improved traffic routes. Thedivision, the basic tactical troop unit,could move as a whole only on foot or byrail. True mobility of ground forces incombat was not to be achieved until tech-nology perfected mechanical transport tothe point where its inherent character-istics—speed, great tractive power, andeconomy of operation—could be employedin front and rear echelons alike, and anentire army could fight on the move overmost types of terrain. By 1939 that pointhad been reached.

World War II soon dispelled whateverdoubts existed about the merits of merefire power, however concentrated, versusa lesser degree of fire power coupled withmobility. The fall of France dramaticallyproved that an army unable or unwillingto maneuver was doomed when con-fronted by an adversary resorting to highlymobile conduct of operations. Intricatefortifications bristling with heavy artil-lery—the embodiment of memories of1914-18—proved worse than useless whenthe enemy chose to bypass rather thanbreach them. Tanks employed as pillboxesinstead of mobile weapons to carry thefight to the enemy were deathtraps pureand simple. Throughout the war the same

lessons were repeated over and over again.Mobile attack invariably carried the dayover immobile defense, whether its namewas Maginot Line, Atlantic Wall, or Sieg-fried Line. In 1940 the German tide inlittle over a month engulfed the sameblood-drenched territory between the Ger-man frontier and Paris that in World WarI had been the scene of four years ofstruggle. In 1944 the relentless sweep ofAmerican mechanized armies covered thesame ground in less than twenty days.

Remarkable enough in itself, the com-plete motorization of U.S. ground forces,the basis for their unrivaled striking power,becomes even more extraordinary in thelight of the swiftness with which it was ac-complished. Beginning with only a hand-ful of completely developed military motorvehicles at the outbreak of war in Europe,the Ordnance Department eventually fur-nished to the Allies some forty major typesof combat vehicles and sixty-odd majortypes of transport vehicles.3 This achieve-ment became possible only through closestco-operation with industry, a long-stand-ing tradition in Ordnance automotive re-search and development. During theinterwar years of lean funds and publicapathy toward armaments, only assistancesuch as that of the Ordnance AdvisoryCommittee, sponsored by the AmericanSociety of Automotive Engineers, hadenabled the Ordnance Department tokeep step with developments abroad.4

With the advent of war challenging Amer-ica to outproduce the Axis in equipmentcapable of superior performance in all fourcorners of the earth, the Industry-Ord-nance team proved one of the most potentweapons in the arsenal of democracy.Automotive, metallurgical, electrical, and

3 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 228.4 Barnes, Weapons of World War II, p. 199.

THE SEARCH FOR GREATER MOBILITY IN GROUND WARFARE 277

rubber engineers from industry, serving onnumerous specialized advisory boards andcommittees, helped solve a million andone perplexing, sometimes seemingly in-superable, problems arising over the de-sign of ordnance vehicles. The militaryand civilian engineers of the OrdnanceDepartment in turn familiarized their col-leagues with the many particular require-ments of military motor transport foreignto private industry.

Paramount in the design of any militarymotor vehicle stood reliability. SinceAmerican equipment saw action thou-sands of ocean miles away from its fac-tories, distance alone ruled out shuttlingto the United States for major overhaul.Not even the huge industrial plant ofAmerica would have sufficed to equip U.S.and Allied troops if part of industry weredevoted to the repair rather than the pro-duction of weapons. Finally, shippingspace was so limited throughout the warthat each cubic foot diverted from thebuild-up of Allied strength overseas post-poned the prospect of victory. Once over-seas, motor vehicles had to be capable oftraveling under their own power the oft-times considerable distances from docksideto battlefield before embarking on theirintended missions. Mechanical failure inaction was intolerable. Each deadlinedtank and truck impaired the strikingpower of Allied ground forces, put evengreater strain on already overburdenedsupply lines, and added to the workload ofrear area maintenance and repair facil-ities. However well suited commerciallyproduced vehicles were for civilian use,they were unable to withstand the rigorsof military employment. Though someclasses, notably wheeled transport vehicles,were largely adapted from standard com-mercial design, these too required numer-

ous modifications emphasizing cross-coun-try mobility, ruggedness, dustproofing,waterproofing, corrosion-proofing, mini-mum bulk, and minimum weight. Ap-pearance of vehicles and components hadto yield to the purpose they were meant toserve. Ease of operation, maintenance, re-pair, and replacement were prerequisite toefficient field service.5

Perhaps the broadest and most basicquestion to be answered was whether largeor small-size transport best answered mili-tary needs. Honest differences of opinionexisted, with each proponent musteringalmost equally cogent arguments. Thosefavoring large vehicles set forth the econ-omies of reduced over-all requirements inmaterial, labor, and fuel, and in operatingand maintenance personnel; in rebuttal,the other camp pointed out the greatermaneuverability of small vehicles andtheir greater ease of operation and mainte-nance, which required less highly skilledmanpower. Less bulky to ship, moreover,light trucks could be sent overseas ingreater numbers than heavy types, andthe more trucks an army had in the field,the less vulnerable it was to immobilizationfor lack of transportation. The ultimatedecision in favor of the small vehicle gavelittle cause for regret:

The greatest advantage in equipment theUnited States has enjoyed on the ground inthe fighting so far [wrote General Marshallin the summer of 1945], has been in our mul-tiple-drive motor equipment, principally thejeep and the 2½-ton truck. These are the in-struments which have moved the UnitedStates troops in battle while the GermanArmy, despite the fearful reputation of its'panzer armies' early in the war still de-pended heavily on animal transport for its

5 Col. Joseph M. Colby, "Tank and AutomotiveDevelopment," Journal of Applied Physics, XVI, 12,(1945), 767.


regular infantry divisions. The United States,profiting from the mass-production achieve-ments of its automotive industry, made all itsforces truck-drawn and had enough trucksleft over to supply the British armies withlarge numbers of motor vehicles and sendtremendous quantities to the Red Army.6

Not so unqualified was the praise ac-corded Ordnance track-laying equipment,especially when it came to that best knownof combat vehicles, the tank. From thelanding of U.S. troops in North Africauntil V-E Day, tanks drew increasinglysevere criticism. In January 1945 HansonBaldwin wrote in The New York Times:

Why at this late stage in the war are Amer-ican tanks inferior to the enemy's? That theyare inferior the fighting in Normandyshowed, and the recent battles in theArdennes have again emphatically demon-strated. This has been denied, explainedaway and hushed up, but the men who arefighting our tanks against much heavier,better armored and more powerfully armedGerman monsters know the truth. It is hightime that Congress 'got to the bottom of asituation that does no credit to the War De-partment. This does not mean that our tanksare bad. They are not; they are good. Theyare the best tanks in the world—next to theGermans'.7

And on 22 March The Washington Post tookup the cudgel with the statement:

A Bronx cheer comes out of Germany togreet the news that the Pershing tank hasgone into mass production. It is the opinionof the men at the front, apparently, that theywill get the new tank in numbers when it isno longer needed, i. e., when the war is over... an investigation is thoroughly in order.It should take up the reasons for the long de-lay in getting the Pershing into production.It should likewise find out why our tanks areinferior to the enemy's.

No investigation ever materialized. Thefacts were clear. From the very beginningof the tank program, the Army had staked

its fortunes on the medium tank as thefighting tank of its armored divisions and,for better or for worse, remained unshakenin its choice until 24 January 1945 when,after extensive testing, the Armored Boardfinally recommended that the Pershing or,as it was then known, the heavy tankT26E3, be considered battleworthy afterincorporation of minor modifications, andbe standardized and shipped to troops.8

Up to then no recommendations of theOrdnance Department had been able topersuade the using arms to adopt aheavier vehicle than the Sherman. Aheavy tank, the M6, had been developed,standardized, and put into production in1942, but a letter from the commandinggeneral of the Armored Force to the com-manding general of the Army GroundForces on 7 December of that year statedthat because of its sixty-ton weight andlimited tactical use no requirement for itexisted.9 The same laconic "no require-ment" was the standard reply to any pro-posed vehicle violating the weight limits ofArmy Regulations 850-15, which pre-scribed that no tank weigh more than 30tons or exceed 103 inches in width, thoughas one Ordnance tank specialist observed,Hitler's tanks violated this American rule.10

That, tank for tank, neither the Ameri-can Grant nor its successor, the Sherman,was a match for the more heavily armoredand armed German Tiger, U.S. troops

6 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United StatesArmy, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, pp. 95-96.

7 The New York Times, January 5, 1945, p. 4.8 Ltr, Armored Bd to CG AGF, 20 Jan 45, sub:

Heavy Tank T26E3—Recommendation for Approvalas Battleworthy, OO 470.8/2192 Tank, DRB AGO.

9 Ltr, CG Armored Force to CG AGF, 7 Dec 42,470.8/4 GNOHD, copy in Hist of Heavy Tanks M6,OHF.

10 Col. Joseph M. Colby, "From Designer toFighter," Armored Cavalry Journal, LIX, 1 (1950), p.15.

HEAVY TANK M6 AND MEDIUM TANK M3, above and below, respectively.


learned in the early days of the fighting inNorth Africa. Nor were the troops' chancesany better when, in Italy and France, theycame up against the Panther. The only un-questioned advantages of the Americanvehicles were their reliability and theirsomewhat greater radius of action. For therest, they had to depend on superiority innumbers to surround their adversaries andknock them out in flank attacks. "But," asGeneral of the Army Omar N. Bradley ob-served, "this willingness to expend Sher-mans offered little comfort to the crewswho were forced to expend themselves aswell." 11 Well known though they were tothe men at the front, the inadequacies ofthe Sherman failed to sway the using armsin their determination that this was the verytank with which to defeat Germany. Asearly as August 1943 the Ordnance De-partment pointed out that the Sherman wasbecoming more obsolescent each monthand urged the standardization of two typesof the newly developed T20-series tanks,the T23E3 and T20E3, in order to set upproduction facilities for these better gunnedand better armored vehicles. "Attention isinvited to the fact that unless action alongthis line is taken at an early date it will notbe possible to supply field units with anyquantity of the T20 series tanks during thecalendar year 1944 . . . ," wrote GeneralBarnes. The request was denied.12 WhenLt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, CommandingGeneral, ETO, in November 1943 recom-mended that highest priority be given thedevelopment of the T26, armed with a90-mm, gun, in order to counter the in-creased armor protection and fire powerof German vehicles,13 the Army GroundForces voiced its misgivings about thetrend toward heavy tanks as inconsistentwith American combat doctrine. A mem-orandum from Brig. Gen. William F.

Dean, the chief of the Requirements Divi-sion, AGF, to General McNair remarked:

. . . [the radiogram from General Devers]intensifies the pressure upon Army GroundForces to immediately commit ourselves tothe early production of a thick-skinned tankcarrying the 90-mm. Gun. The British andthe Ordnance have been convinced for sometime that we should initiate such procure-ment without further delay. . . . Actionrecommended: a. That the Army GroundForces go on record as not favorably consid-ering procurement of T26 at this time. b. Thatany further procurement be deferred pendingfull service test of pilot models.

General McNair, in reply, approved thoserecommendations, adding, "I see no reasonto alter our previous stand in reply to acommunication from the Armored Com-mand—essentially that we should defeatGermany by use of the M-4 series of me-dium tanks. There has been no factualdevelopments overseas, so far as I know,to challenge the superiority of the M-4." 14

Once again the verdict read that no re-quirement existed at that time for amedium or heavy tank of the T26 type.15

By D Day the status of American armorwas as precarious as that of the panzerdivisions in 1941-42, at which time Ger-many had lost qualitative superiority onthe battlefield to the Soviet Union. Only

11 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York,1951), p. 41.

12 5th Ind, Chief of Tech Div OCO for Hq ASF,12 Aug 43, and 6th Ind, Hq ASF for OCO Tech Div,23 Aug 43, to basic memo, Asst Chief T-AC for Chiefof Ind Div OCO. 20 Jul 43. OO 470.8/103 Tank,DRB AGO.

13 Radiogram, USFOR London to WAR, signedDevers, 14 Nov 43, CM-IN 8556, 470.8/611 Tanks,DRB AGO.

14 (1) Memo, Requirements Div AGF for CG AGF,18 Nov 43, and (2) memo, CG AGF for RequirementsDiv AGF, 19 Nov 43, Binder 1, AGF McNair file470.8, DRB AGO.

15 Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 9 Dec 43, Binder 1,AGF McNair file 470.8, DRB AGO.


the causes underlying these crises differed.The American situation was one of choice,while that of the Germans had been one ofnecessity. Before beginning its EasternCampaign Germany, counting on sub-jugating the Red Army in the customaryfew months of blitzkrieg, had let armordevelopment lag, while a badly informedintelligence apparatus fed the belief thatexisting panzer types far outstripped any-thing the Russians had been able to build.As a result, German tanks that crossed theSoviet frontier during the morning hoursof 21 June 1941 were identical with thosethat the year before had terrorized theworld by their exploits in France. They allwere there: the machine-gun-toting Pan-zer I which lasted exactly thirteen daysbefore being recommended for retirementas a burden on the troops; the Panzer IIwith its 20-mm, cannon, so ineffective thatproduction of the series stopped the monthafter the invasion; 16 the Panzer III withits face lifted by the addition of armor anda 50-mm, gun replacing the former37-mm, primary armament; and finallythe Panzer IV, unchanged from the 1940version save for similarly strengthenedarmor protection. Initial successes of theGerman armies bade fair to substantiatethe estimates of Soviet tanks. Knifing theirway through unorganized resistance, thepanzers took a murderous toll of anti-quated Russian machines. But even withinthe first two weeks of the campaign, anominous note was sounded in the East:reports of Soviet vehicles topping anythingthe Germans had in the way of armamentand armor.17 Though first data turned outas exaggerated as is usual in the case ofsurprise encounters of new weapons incombat, the truth was formidable enough.The panzer divisions had stumbled on thefirst-line tanks of the Russians: the 32-ton

T34, and the 52-ton KVI which out-gunned, outarmored, and outmaneuveredevery other tank then on the battlefield.18

At that time began the race of gun poweragainst armor protection which, for therest of the war, was to become the biggestproblem of both Allied and Axis designers.

A large part of Germany's tremendouslosses during the first six months of cam-paigning in the East were, to be sure, dueto factors other than enemy action.19 Thegreatest foe of mechanized equipment, forexample, turned out to be the muddyseasons and, axiomatically, the Russianwinter. In 1941, as in the years following,these natural phenomena wreaked morehavoc with German fighting strength thanAllied ground and air efforts combined.20

Lacking the ground clearance and flota-tion system of their Soviet counterparts,German vehicles helplessly floundered inthe bottomless quagmires of autumn andspring mud. Attempts to plow forcefullyahead only compounded disaster. Enginesand bearings burned out, gears stripped,and, once winter frost or summer sunmade possible the resumption of move-ment, the countryside was littered with

16 (1) Halder Diary, 23 Dec 40, and 4 Jul 41,OCMH. (2) MS # P-059 (Mueller-Hillebrand),OCMH.

1 7 (1) Halder Diary, 25 Jun 41, OCMH. (2) HeinzGuderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg,1951), p. 148.

18 KV stood for Klementi Voroshilov, who as Com-missar of Defense had been instrumental in the devel-opment of the Soviet armored program.

19 From June to December 1941 total tank lossesamounted to 2.757. MS # P-059 (Mueller-Hille-brand), OCMH.

20 Graphic descriptions of German difficulties inthe conduct of mechanized warfare during autumn,winter, and spring in the Soviet Union may be foundin Department of the Army pamphlets No. 20-230,"Russian Combat Methods in World War II"; No.20-290, "Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign";and No. 20-291, "Effects of Climate on Combat inEuropean Russia."


unsalvageable wrecks. The trials of winterproved equally severe since neither Ger-man soldiers nor their weapons wereequipped to fight in the bitter cold. TheRussians, adapted to the climate and ter-rain of their homeland, held the upperhand.21 Decimated and nearly stripped ofarms, the Wehrmacht emerging from itsfirst winter in the East was no longer thefighting machine of the blitz years. Itscadre of battle-tempered veterans hadbeen shockingly thinned and in anotheryear, after Stalingrad, would be only amemory. Replacements, trained in theshort period that wartime permits for thispurpose to friend and foe alike, were atbest only substitutes. No superweapon,however powerful, could ever fill that void.

Chastened by their encounter withSoviet armor and antitank defenses, theGermans proceeded to overmatch them.No other course was open. In 1941 pro-duction had fallen to some 500 vehiclesshort of six months' battle losses,22 andeven with all-out industrial mobilizationGermany lacked the plant facilities tocompromise quality to get quantity. Withnew vehicle designs still in the develop-ment stage but more powerful guns readyto be installed, the first step was improvi-sation. Existing tanks were up-gunned andup-armored, albeit with little permanentsuccess since the USSR invariably wasprompt in countering with similar meas-ures. Moreover, each modification en-tailed additional weight and, in theabsence of equal increases in power andflotation, contributed nothing towardbridging the gap between Russian andGerman mobility and maneuverability.On the contrary, the added strain onalready overloaded engines and geartrains made German tanks less and lessreliable.23 But in German eyes the missionof the tank—the same, incidentally, as in

American combat doctrine, break-throughand exploitation—demanded that firepower and armor keep step with the evolu-tion of defensive weapons.

Any conclusion that the German trendtoward heavier vehicles denoted a de-parture from the tried and proven con-cepts of armored warfare would be erro-neous. German service schools in 1943, forexample, reiterated the maxims that hadbeen the key to the earlier successes of thepanzer divisions. "The mission of the tankunit," students were taught, "consists ofopening the way for other elements [of thearmored division] into and through theenemy. All missions (combat missions) areexecuted by means of the concerted unit attack, inwhich antitank weapons and artillery areto be annihilated and hostile armored for-mations counteracted." 24 In other words,the tank had to be capable of overcomingall types of hostile weapons, which is along way from saying that these were itsprimary objectives. American authoritiesdetermining the characteristics of U.S.armor held different views. "There can beno basis for the T26 [90-mm, gun] tank,"Army Ground Forces officially replied tothe suggestion of introducing the betterarmed and armored, and consequentlyheavier, vehicle than the Sherman, "other

21 (1) Oberkommando des Heeres, Organisations Abteil-ung (III), Beitrag zum KTB 9.1.1942. (2) Ltr, AOK2to Oberkommando Herresgruppe Mitte, Betr: Winter-Erfahrungen, 28 May 43, H Gr Mitte Abt la, Anlagenzum Kriegstagebuch: Erfahrungsberichte, Heft 3. (3) Ex-perience Rpt, 24: Pz Div, 19 May 44, Panzer-Officerbeim Chef Generalstab des Heeres, Erfahrungsberichte, AkteE, Band3. All in GMDS DRB AGO.

22 MS # P-059 (Mueller-Hillebrand), OCMH.23 Fuehrervortrag am 28.6.44, General Inspekteur der

Panzertruppen, Fuehrer Vortrags Notion II, GMDS DRBAGO.

24 Panzer-Lehrgaenge "Panther," Kommandeur, Auszugaus dem Vortrag des Major Streit vor den Kommandeuren(Kommandeur Lehrgang Erlangen), September 1943, inmiscellaneous correspondence 1944, General Inspekteurder Panzertruppen, GMDS DRB AGO.


than the conception of a tank versus tankduel—which is believed unsound and un-necessary. Both British and Americanbattle experience has demonstrated thatthe antitank gun in suitable numbers anddisposed properly is the master of the tank.Antitank guns either must be put out byarmored infantry or equivalent means, oravoided by tanks. The primary mission oftanks is the destruction of those hostile ele-ments which are vulnerable to them—notantitank guns." 25

Underlying the Ordnance Depart-ment's insistence on introducing a basic-ally new tank was its awareness of theinherent limitations of the Sherman, or forthat matter, of any tank, for despite its far-from-fragile appearance, a tank representsa mechanism as finely balanced as awatch. Its merits lie in the fact that it com-bines four essential military character-istics: fire power, maneuverability, speed,and crew protection. Each of these is, inthe final analysis, a function of weight.Cross-country mobility, for example, re-quires low unit ground pressure, whichmeans either a light hull—thin armor,light armament, light power train—or elsea wider, and therefore heavier, track witha correspondingly larger and heavier en-gine and transmission. During World WarII no tank of practical size could simul-taneously feature maximum armor, firepower, speed, and maneuverability. Everyvehicle was a compromise, with qualitiesdeemed more desirable by its users accen-tuated at the expense of those they con-sidered of lesser importance. But once asatisfactory compromise had been devised,further modifications of major importwould inevitably upset that balance andpunish the tank by limiting its effective-ness and reliability. It was precisely thisdanger that loomed in the case of theSherman.

Its early participation in the fighting inNorth Africa had shown the Sherman tobe in every respect superior to the Axistanks then on the battlefield. It had con-tributed a large share to the British victoryat El Alamein, its baptism of fire, and hadplayed a prominent role in the westwardpursuit of the Italo-German forces. TheBritish forces had the highest praise for theone tank that finally ended a long reign ofGerman qualitative superiority. Germanreports, in turn, gloomily forecast thedoom of Rommel's troops unless equip-ment capable of dealing with the newAmerican vehicles was sent promptly andin force.26 But only a few months later,during encounters with a token contingentof German Tiger tanks in Tunisia, theSherman proved to be outgunned and out-armored—a state of affairs that becameeven more pronounced with the advent ofthe Panther tank in Italy.

True, the Sherman had qualities noteven remotely duplicated in any Germanvehicle. Time and again, for example, inboth Africa and Italy it took enemy strong-holds in mountainous terrain that no Ger-man tank could hope to traverse.27 Inpoint of reliability, it similarly outshoneboth the notoriously undependable Tigerand the Panther. But it was small com-

25 Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 30 Nov 43, sub:Heavier Armament for Tanks and Self-Propelled Ve-hicles, Binder 1, AGF McNair file 470.8, DRB AGO.

26 (1) Rpt, Gen Barnes to Gen Devers, 18 Jan 43,sub: Ord Annex to Rpt of Visit Abroad, OHF. (2)OKD 385/153.1 quoted in Intel Summary 2, 6-13Feb 43, OCO-D, OHF. (3) OKD 451.25/417.1 andOKD 451/136.1 quoted in Intel Summary 5, 8-15Mar 43, OCO-D, OHF. (4) Rpt, Abendmeldung DAKan Pz AOKuom 3.11.1942, AOK Afrika files, GMDSDRB AGO.

27 (1) Bradley, op. cit., p. 87. (2) Inspection Rpt, 15May 44, Maj Gerlach OKH/InfAbt ReflVc ( PZ Abw),Benefit ueber die Frontreise zu H Gr C28.4-6.5.44, GMDSDRB AGO. (3) War Diary, XIV, Armee KTB 18 Mai44, GMDS DRB AGO. (4) OI-335-44 cited in IntelSummary 53, 9-19 Aug 44, OCO-D, OHF.


fort to the tanker to know that he couldcount on reaching the scene of action, ifat the same time he was equally certain ofadverse odds upward of two to one of everleaving that scene alive.

Placing American armored forces oncemore on a par with their opponents meanteither up-gunning and up-armoring theSherman or supplanting it with an entirelynew vehicle. The first solution, Ordnancedesigners knew, would prove at best only astopgap because the balance between firepower, speed, maneuverability, and crewprotection that distinguished the tank inthe days of El Alamein would be lost. Gen-eral Barnes opposed such a policy of im-provisation on principle, though for a longtime without success. The inevitable resultwas that during the fighting in France,Belgium, and Germany the now badlyoverloaded Sherman not only was still out-gunned and outarmored but on too manyoccasions, particularly in mud, snow, andice, outmaneuvered as well by the Pan-ther. The second solution, one that mighthave been adopted as early as August 1942when the first of the T20-series tankswas released for production, came to passonly after General Barnes almost single-handedly overcame the determined op-position that for more than two years hadprevented the introduction of a vehicleradically departing from the tried andtrue pattern of the Sherman. But while ac-colades for the Pershing tank from theETO, proved, if nothing else, that theOrdnance Department's labors had notbeen in vain, one poignant question re-mained unanswered: Did the interveningadvances in development warrant thedelay in getting the new weapon onto thebattlefield? 28

From almost the first day of World WarII, sharply differing points of view pre-

vailed on the acceptability of new groundweapons. Two issues were involved: thedevelopment of items for which no formalrequirement had been established, and thebattle testing of new equipment. As to thefirst, Army Ground Forces, for example,vigorously opposed development of weap-ons that it considered not absolutely essen-tial, regardless of how much they might bedesired by men in the field. The OrdnanceDepartment, on the other hand, believedin maintaining a strong lead over theusing services in the development of newitems. For one thing, Ordnance techni-cians spent their entire service careers inthe study of ordnance, so that their knowl-edge of the capabilities and inherent limi-tations of weapons exceeded that of lineofficers, whose careers were concernedwith the tactical use of equipment. AsGeneralmajor Heinz Guderian, the fatherof the German panzer forces, once put itwhen reminded that all technicians werestrangers to the truth: "Certainly there isa lot of lying, but one to two years as a ruleuncover that fact, when the ideas of thetechnicians turn out to be unworkable.The tacticians also lie; but in that instancethe truth comes out only after the next lostwar, and then it is too late." 29

In the case of tanks, the Ordnance viewhardly proved incorrect. The tank capableof holding its own against enemy armor,in other words, the heavy tank advocatedby the Department since 1942, proved in-dispensable in large-scale ground opera-tions. The Ordnance Department, which

28 (1) OCO Tech Div, Hist of Medium Tank T20Series, OHF. (2) Col. Joseph M. Colby, "From De-signer to Fighter," Armored Cavalry Journal, LIX, 1(1950), 14. (3) Ltr, Harmon to Campbell, 10 Feb 45,OHF. (4) Barnes MS, Tank Development, OHF.

29 (1) Guderian, op, cit., pp. 25-26. (2) AGF Study34, pp. 14-15, OHF. (3) Barnes MS, Tank Develop-ment, OHF.

MEDIUM TANK M4, THE SHERMAN, AND HEAVY TANK M26, THEPERSHING, above and below, respectively.


as late as 1943 was criticized for proposingsuch a vehicle, was barely a year there-after criticized for its absence from thebattlefield. ". . . our tanks when forcedto engage in tank vs. tank action," wrotethe Army Ground Forces in January 1945,"have had to close to short ranges in orderto destroy the opposing tanks. The destruc-tion of the enemy has been accomplishedat great cost in tank matériel and person-nel and is reflected in the current criticalshortage of tanks." 30

The issue of battle testing was morecomplex. Army Ground Forces insistedthat no new weapons, however promisingthey looked, be sent overseas until a smallnumber had been tested by the prospec-tive users and all corrections deemed nec-essary had been incorporated. Ordnanceengineers for several reasons deplored theseemingly interminable delay in getting anew tank into action.31

Had the Germans been equally insistenton mechanical perfection and as reluctantto battle test new tanks, they would hardlyhave been able to regain the lead in firepower and armor once they lost it in 1942.As it was, they scored telling successes byrushing virtually the pilot models of theirnew heavy vehicles to the battlefield. Thusthe Tiger, which to the very end of hostili-ties remained ridden with glaring mechan-ical weaknesses, was a formidable enoughfoe in action to become almost synony-mous with German prowess in weaponsdesign. Similarly the Panther, with itshigh-velocity gun and sloping frontalarmor, found no match in American tanksuntil the advent of the General Pershingin 1945. That the Panther in 1942 hadbeen rushed from the drawing board toproduction line in a scant nine monthsand consequently was so full of the pro-verbial bugs that another year and a half

passed before it was pronounced really fitfor combat, detracted little from its killingpower. In the ETO U.S. troops, whoseShermans mechanically outlasted theirGerman adversaries as much as five toone, "were reaching a point where theywere becoming afraid to fight in the M4[Sherman] due to lack of fire power." 32

Perhaps the most vital clue to the Amer-ican tank problem during World War IIcould be found in that indefinable stand-ard of tactical utility, reliability, and du-rability called "battle worthiness" which,in effect, meant all things to all men. Timeand again an alleged lack of that qualityresulted in a delay in getting a heaviertank than the Sherman into action. Moreoften than not the sole reason was the lim-ited durability of mechanical components.Yet no measuring stick, statistical or other-wise, was ever devised to ascertain the lifeexpectancy of combat vehicles on the bat-tlefield. The Russian view, though foundedon a much less complicated communica-tions problem, offered an interestingparallel in that respect. On the assumptionthat a tank was almost certain to beknocked out after a brief period of fight-ing, the Russians considered a lifetime offourteen hours for its mechanical compo-nents to be excellent. American tanks, bycomparison, were required to last for aminimum of forty hours. Arbitrary or not,this emphasis on durability rather than re-

30 Ltr, CG AGF to CG ASF, 30 Jan 45, sub: HeavyTanks T29 and TSO, OHF.

31 (1) Ltr, Campbell to Harmon, 21 Mar 45, OHF.(2) AGF Study 34, p. 15, OHF. (3) Barnes MS, TankDevelopment, OHF.

32 (1) Barnes MS, Tank Development, OHF. (2)Ltr, Harmon to Campbell, 10 Feb 45, OHF. (3) Inter-rogation of Speer, CIOS Item 28, file XXVI-13, ReichMinistry of Armaments and War Production, DRBAGO. (4) Notes for Rpt to Hitler, 5 Mar 44, GeneralInspekteur der Panzertruppen, Fuehrer Vortrags Notion,Bd. I, GMDS DRB AGO.


liability for the useful life of a tank de-prived American troops of weapons thatmight, with telling effect, have contributedtoward shortening the war.33

The mobility of each combat and trans-port vehicle depended above all on theperformance of its components. Powerplant, gear trains, and the like had tofunction reliably and had to be properlyattuned. Maximum output at minimumbulk and weight was particularly impor-tant because light-weight, heavy-duty ve-hicles required less power for just theirown propulsion and furnished more forthe job they were meant to do. Compo-nent development therefore comprised oneof the principal phases of Ordnance auto-motive research and development duringWorld War II

The magnitude of the work accom-plished precludes any comprehensivetreatment save in scores of volumes. A tankhad more than a dozen major components,each consisting of several subassembliesthat in turn were made up of perhaps hun-dreds of parts. Over 25,000 separate partsin all went into a single tank, and eachmight require complete reworking to per-mit the construction of an improved ve-hicle. Space limitations alone dictate anaccount of only some high lights from therecord. Others, intrinsically significant,are of too technical a nature to discusshere. So notable an innovation as thecross-drive transmission, for example, wasas complex as it was promising. Hence,discussion in the following pages will dealonly with the development of two vital butmore readily described features—enginesand flotation devices.

Engines

The basic factor determining militarymobility was the internal-combustion en-

gine. Two of the obvious advantages of theinternal-combustion engine over pack anddraft animals were its greater power out-put per unit of weight and its ability topropel heavy loads at high speeds. From amilitary point of view, particularly that ofan army with supply lines as long as thoseof U.S. forces in overseas theatres, its othercharacteristics were even more valuable.Fuels and lubricants took up less cargospace than forage and, unit for unit of de-livered energy, were less expensive. Motorvehicles were more easily transported byrail and water than animals and requiredfewer men with less training for their op-eration. In service, the gasoline or dieselengine did not eat when it was not work-ing, was not subject to fatigue, and wasless vulnerable to injuries than the horseand mule.

To be suitable for military purposes, en-gines had to pass tests far more stringentthan for commercial purposes. They hadto function with equal certainty in tropi-cal heat and arctic cold, in desert sand-storms and jungle moisture. They had tobe capable of long periods of trouble-freeperformance with a minimum of care andmaintenance. Above all, they had to fur-nish sufficient power to permit sustainedhigh speeds over all kinds of terrain.

In some types of military motor trans-port the engine problem could be solvedwith relative ease. Wheeled cargo and per-sonnel carriers, for example, had much thesame power requirements as civiliantrucks. Designed and developed by Amer-ica's automotive industry in co-operation

33 (1) Ltr, Col Joseph M. Colby to F. GordonBarber, 14 May 47, OHF. (2) Barnes MS, TankDevelopment, OHF. (3) Min of Mtg with Lt GenLebedev, Deputy Chief of the Supreme Directorate ofArmored Corps, Red Army, and Ord Intel Unit atMoscow, 22 Jun 44, OHF. (4) Interv, 16 Nov 51, withMarion W. Cullen, Tank and Auto Br, R&D Div.


with the Quartermaster Corps, these ve-hicles presented relatively few difficultiesin point of motive power when the Ord-nance Department assumed responsibilityfor their design, development, and produc-tion in the summer of 1942. But all themore exasperating were the obstacles thathad to be surmounted in powering motor-ized equipment such as tracked vehicles ingeneral and medium tanks in particular.An Ordnance expert intimately ac-quainted with wartime automotive re-search and development summed up thesituation as follows:

Our World War II difficulties in obtainingan engine of approximately 500 horsepowerfor the medium tank is an excellent exampleof our military engine problem and the awfulconfusion, loss of time, inefficient utilizationof management, manpower, facilities, andmaterial occurring at a critical time. In orderto power the medium tank we had to employsix improvised engines, build two new plants,completely tool four plants (one of themtwice), and partially tool two plants. Theseengines came with 5,165 spare parts, 6 sets oftools, 6 sets of maintenance literature, and aconstant flow of engineering changes andmass tests to make the improvisations suitablefor tank use.

The effect of this situation on training,supply, and maintenance is apparent. Thefact that our tanks dominated all battlefieldsof this war is a tribute to those of the militaryand of American industry who had the re-sponsibility of getting tanks into the hands offighting soldiers. The confusion and waste ischargeable directly to the fact that our lackof vision as a nation resulted in insufficientappropriations to have an engine for militaryuse developed, tested, and ready for the emer-gency.34

All told, at least five factors combined tomake the medium tank engine one of thethorniest problems of Ordnance researchand development during World War II.First and foremost stood the peculiar powerrequirements of tanks in general.

The tank, unlike trucks or other wheeledvehicles, had to operate primarily awayfrom improved roads and highways andconsequently needed a much bigger sup-ply of power to insure maximum speed andmaneuverability. (See Fig. /.) In addition,the space limitations of the tank called fora power plant and installation of unusualcompactness with no sacrifice of accessi-bility for quick adjustment, repair, or re-placement—the larger the engine, thelarger and heavier the hull had to be, andthe more time required for routine main-tenance and repairs, the longer the tankwould be out of action. This need for com-pactness in turn endangered technicaldifficulties with cooling systems, air intakeand engine exhaust arrangements, airfilters, and the like, all of which had a di-rect bearing on the net horsepower avail-able for the primary job of propelling thetank. Since no analagous power or in-stallation requirements confronted thedesigners of commercial automotive ve-hicles, the Ordnance Department duringthe interwar years had had to begin vir-tually from scratch in arriving at anysemblance of a solution to the tank engineproblem. Here entered the shortage offunds, the second factor responsible for thedifficulties in procuring a satisfactory en-gine for the medium tank during WorldWar II.

During the 1930's money for the designand development of a power plant specifi-cally adapted to the unique requirementsof full-tracked combat vehicles had simplynot been available. Private industry un-derstandably had been little interested indeveloping a specialized engine in view ofthe limited orders that the Army was able

34 Col. Joseph M. Colby, "From Designer toFighter," Armored Cavalry Journal, LIX, 1 (1950), 16.

CHART 9—POWER FOR TANKS

Source: James R. Caster, "Power for Tanks," Automotive and Aviation Industries,Vol. 89, Sio. 5 (1 September 1943), p. 17.


to place.35 Consequently, the OrdnanceDepartment had had to compromise onadapting to tank use whatever existingtype of engine would most closely live upto the desired standard, and the moderntank engine had from its very beginningbeen an improvisation.

The Wright-Continental R-975

The engine chosen by the OrdnanceDepartment for its prewar tanks was aradial, air-cooled aircraft model, the Con-tinental R-670, later redesignated W-670.Practical experience had indicated that anengine of minimum length and with across section fitting into a square was theideal answer to the space problem. Cool-ing by air similarly made for minimumbulk as well as weight, and eliminated theplumbing intricacies of water-cooled powerplants. The 250 horsepower eventually de-livered by the Continental W-670 afterseveral years of modification provided ahigh degree of mobility for the peacetimevehicles, which up to 1938 weighed a max-imum of 15 tons. Average engine lifemounted to better than 500 hours beforea general overhaul became necessary. Inshort, over-all performance was eminentlysatisfactory.36 But, needless to say, for the30-plus-ton General Grants and GeneralShermans of World War II an output of250 horsepower was woefully inadequate.This introduces the third element of themedium tank engine problem—weight.

On the basis of their favorable experi-ences with air-cooled radials in light ve-hicles, Ordnance designers in 1938 hadlooked for a more powerful engine of simi-lar type for the new 20-ton medium tank.They finally chose the 9-cylinder, 400-horsepower Wright Whirlwind, a powerplant widely used in training planes and

other light aircraft. After several engineer-ing changes, the first installation in themedium tank T5, Phase III, proved amarked success.37 The R-975, as theWhirlwind was known officially, wasadopted for the recently standardizedmedium tank M2. But by mid-1940, prooftests of America's newest and heaviesttanks had barely begun when events inEurope necessitated the development ofan even heavier vehicle, the medium tankM3 or General Grant. With the 30-tonM3 the engine problem became acute astests of the pilot tank at Aberdeen ProvingGround uncovered serious deficiencies ofthe R-975. The drawbacks of improvisa-tion became painfully apparent. Availablespace was insufficient for the engine itself,for proper cooling, and for ready access toaccessories. Excessive oil consumption,carburetor air temperatures, and the like,substantially lowered power output andresulted in poor performance. "The engineas presently installed," reported Aber-deen, "is definitely underpowered. Im-provements to this installation have in-creased the horsepower available but theH.P./Wt. ratio is still too low to give com-pletely satisfactory performance." 38 Re-ports from maneuvers in the southeasternUnited States similarly indicated that theengine was unsatisfactory as to perform-ance and life.39 Officers of the Proof De-

35 Lt. Col. Robert J. Icks, "Engines for Tanks,"Society of Automotive Engineers Journal, LI (1943), 39.

36 For a complete development record see Hist ofDevelopment of Continental Radial W-670 Engine,OHF.

37 First Partial Rpt of Pilot Medium Tank T5,Phase III, and Second Partial Rpt on Ord Program5366, 16Jan 39, p. 21. Ord Tech files.

38 APG Rpt 10-57, First Rpt on Design and Test ofMedium Tanks, M3 and Thirty-First Rpt on OrdProgram 5464, 14 Jan 42, p. 25, Ord Tech files.

39 Ltr, CG APG to CofOrd, 25 Nov 41, sub: WrightEngine R-975-EC2, OO 412.5/489-46, DRB AGO.


partment at Aberdeen recommended"that additional consideration be given toother power plants with a view to increas-ing the H.P./Wt. ratio as well as improv-ing the accessibility." 40

Now, if ever, the moment had come fortackling the tank engine problem at itsvery roots. Funds for research and devel-opment were plentiful. But the hour waslate, too late to await the completion of abasically new engine. By 1941 U.S. andAllied troops desperately needed everyvehicle that could possibly be produced.As a result, the Ordnance Departmenthad to retain the R-975 despite its short-comings.

Following the adoption of the GeneralGrant and the subsequent rapid expan-sion of medium tank production, manu-facture of the Wright engine was substan-tially increased. Continental MotorsCorporation, the manufacturer of theW-670 engine for the light tank, began toturn out the R-975 as well. But even theincreased production was insufficient tosatisfy the huge demand. In fact, the Pres-ident's directive of 25 September 1941that a production of 1,000 medium tanksper month be reached by April 1, 1942and that this figure be subsequently fur-ther increased, perhaps even doubled,made it clear that the facilities of no singleengine producer would suffice. Moreover,the Ordnance Department soon found it-self competing for radial engines with thesimilarly mushrooming aircraft produc-tion program of the Air Forces, a fact thatunderscored the necessity for not only en-listing additional manufacturing facilitiesbut also for including different types ofpower plants in the tank program.41

Thanks to the initiative of Ordnance engi-neers and the wholehearted co-operationextended them by America's automotive

industry, development of alternate engineshad meanwhile progressed far enough toforestall a crisis.

The General Motors 6046(Twin 6-71) Diesel

The first type to be ready was the Gen-eral Motors 2-cycle diesel engine 6046Twin 6-71, a modification of a commercial6-cylinder design with which the Ord-nance Department had originally experi-mented in its light tanks.4 2 The mediumtank installation consisted of two of theseengines joined at their fan ends by a heavyjunction plate and at the flywheel ends bya double clutch housing and by a transferunit that transmitted power to a singlepropeller shaft. The two clutches were op-erated by a single pedal, with adjustablelinkage providing uniform engagement.Engine synchronization—the two unitswere geared together and consequentlyhad to operate at uniform speeds—wasoriginally accomplished by two separatehand throttles, an arrangement that laterwas changed to a linkage system terminat-ing at a single throttle lever. Clutch lock-out cables leading to the instrument panelpermitted the driver to disengage either

40 APG Rpt 10-57, op. cit., p. 25, Ord Tech files.41 Allocation of R-975 engines to the tank and air-

craft production programs was the subject of volumi-nous correspondence during the months of October,November, and December 1941 between the UnderSecretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Ord-nance, and the Chief of the Air Corps. The OrdnanceDepartment's success in adapting engines of differenttypes to use in the medium tank finally resulted in theallocation of Wright's production to the aircraft pro-gram and Continental's production to the tank pro-gram. Pertinent letters and memoranda are containedin the following files: USW-Production, RG 104;USW-Tanks. RG 104; and 412.5 Production Div ASFEngines, RG 205. All in DRB AGO.

42 For a complete development record, see MS, OrdDev of General Motors 2-cycle diesel engine 6046(Twin 6-71), OHF.


engine in event of its failure, so that onemight operate without the drag of theother. The margin of reserve power wasgenerous. As the result of an innovation infuel injection, the rated horsepower ofeach of the two component engines hadbeen raised from 165 to 210. At the gov-erned engine speed of 2,100 revolutionsper minute, a medium tank on hard-sur-faced roads could travel at 30 miles anhour with both, and at 20 miles an hourwith only one engine in operation.

Installation of the engine in the Grantor Sherman, both of which had been de-signed around the shorter Continentalradial, necessitated some slight modifica-tions of the tank interior. The bulkhead ofthe engine compartment, for example, wascut away to allow the transfer gear case toprotrude slightly into the fighting com-partment. This solution avoided the weightincrease that would have accompanied alengthening of the hull. Since the heavierengine added about one ton to the weightof the tank, such a saving was highlydesirable.

The pilot tank equipped with the 6046unit arrived at Aberdeen Proving Groundon 30 December 1941, and tests continueduntil April 1942, when a total of 4,201miles had been accumulated. A numberof difficulties such as the failure of an in-jector came to light during that period,though none was regarded as serious. Aspecial report on the then existing powerplant for the medium tank stated:

The power plant has very good perform-ance. Mileage and cruising range are betterthan that of the vehicles with gasoline en-gines. The cooling and starting characteris-tics of these engines are equal to or betterthan those of the standard production M3tanks. When the engine failures encounteredin this new installation have been corrected,the dual 6-71 engines should make a very de-

pendable powerplant. Most of the engine re-pairs can be done without removing the en-gines from the vehicle.43

But tests on other pilot models as well asexperience with production Grants andShermans powered by the 6046 units re-vealed a variety of more far-reaching de-fects. Most of them were attributable tofaulty manufacturing, inspection, and as-sembly caused by the rapid expansion ofproduction. Some, on the other hand,were due to inherent weaknesses of eitherthe unit itself or the installation dictatedby the limited space of the tank. The dualclutches, for example, were a prime sourceof trouble. Unless they were perfectly syn-chronized, one carried a heavier workloadthan the other and quickly failed. Sincesynchronization demanded almost day-to-day adjustments and troops in battle wereeither too busy fighting or prone to neglectthis bothersome maintenance task, clutchfailures were common.

Another trouble source was the aircleaners which, because of space limita-tions, were too small to keep dust and gritfrom reaching working parts and shorten-ing engine life. There was no similar diffi-culty in connection with air cleaners onother tank power plants because they didnot have two characteristics of the 6046unit: diesel engines, and 2-cycle engines.

Unlike their gasoline counterparts, die-sel engines consume the same volume ofair at high or low speeds, and for this reasonincrease was comparatively simple from165 to 210 net horsepower in the compo-nent engines of the 6046 unit. An increasein the output of the fuel injectors accom-panied by a modification of the cylinderliners sufficed to obtain the higher poweroutput. In a gasoline engine no similar

43 Ibid., citing APG Special Rpt on Existing En-gines for Medium Tanks.


increase would have been possible evenwith supercharging. Though advantageousin this instance, the unvarying air con-sumption tended to make for a correspond-ingly large volume of air intake andnecessitated larger air cleaners. As a2-cycle engine, moreover, the 6046 usedmuch more air than the other tank en-gines, which were of the 4-cycle type. In a4-cycle engine the burned gases are ex-pelled positively by a separate stroke of thepiston, while in a 2-cycle engine they areblown out by a blast of scavenging airnearly 30 percent in excess of the volumedisplaced by the piston. A 2-cycle enginerunning at the same speed as a 4-cycle en-gine takes in air twice as often and there-fore needs at least twice as much air.

Considering these circumstances, theair-cleaner problem in diesel tanks be-comes readily understandable. Given ade-quate space, cleaners large enough toprevent engine failures due to dust couldreadily have been installed. Dust was noproblem for the General Motors dieselwhen buses were driven over hard-surfacedhighways, but became a serious one whenthat same engine powered tanks driving inconvoy over dirt roads and cross country,or when tank crews failed to service the aircleaners at the required intervals. Further-more, the fact that servicing requiredbreaking the air duct between the cleanersand the engine created a hazard thatadded another, perhaps unnecessary, causefor breakdowns. For since the air cleanerswere mounted directly on the engine, thisoperation opened a large hole into whichnuts or even wrenches disappeared all tooeasily. Starting the engine then wreakedhavoc with the blower, and the vehicle wasdeadlined.44

Despite its mechanical imperfections,the 6046 proved its mettle in combat. No

doubt much of its popularity originallystemmed from a belief that diesel tankswere less apt to burn than their gasolinecousins upon being hit by enemy projec-tiles. Ordnance and Armored Force testsconclusively proved this assumption wrongby establishing that the large majority oftank fires were started not by the ignitionof fuel but by the explosion of ammunitionunprotected in bins. Other reasons for itspreference were fully warranted. Like alldiesels, the 6046 developed greater torqueat low engine speeds than gasoline powerplants and therefore required fewer gearchanges. For plain lugging power it had noequal. In the summer of 1943, for example,the U.S. military observer in Cairo re-ported that gasoline-powered tanks fre-quently were overspeeded and overworkedin an effort to keep up with the diesel vehi-cles.45 A later report from the same sourcestated that in the opinion of drivers, re-pairmen, and officers of the British EighthArmy the diesel-powered Sherman was thebest.46

The Chrysler A-57 Multi-Bank

Of all the wartime engine developments,the Chrysler multi-bank A-57 was themost striking example of the resourceful-ness of America's Industry-Ordnanceteam. Frankly an expedient for avertingthe threatened shortage of air-cooled ra-dials in 1941, the A-57 came into existencewithin the spectacularly short time of fourmonths.47 A hurry-up call from Ordnance

44 Ibid., pp. 10-11.45 Rpt from Cairo, cited in Intel Summary 21,

15-22 Jul 43, OCO-D, OHF,46 Rpt from Cairo, cited in Intel Summary 25, 2-13

Sep 43, OCO-D, OHF.47 Unless otherwise cited, material in this section is

based on MS, Ord Development of Chrysler A-57(Multi-Bank) Tank Engine, OHF.


for medium tank engines reached Chrys-ler in early July 1941, and on 15 Novem-ber the first of the new engines wascompleted and installed in a Grant. Testresults were impressive enough to warrantits prompt adoption.48

The speed with which the A-57 cameinto being was made possible by the use ofstandard commercial parts and accessories.Rather than design an entirely new powerplant requiring many months to reach theproduction stage, Chrysler resorted to amultiple installation of its tried and proven"Royal" six-cylinder in-line engine. Origi-nal plans called for four of these to bespaced at 90 degrees around a commoncrankcase, but when Ordnance insisted onmore power, a unit of five engines waschosen. The output of each was trans-mitted to a common bull gear that drovethe propeller shaft. Production models ofthe A-57 delivered 370 horsepower at agoverned speed of 2,600 revolutions perminute.

Despite complex appearance, the Chrys-ler engine was rugged and, if removed fromthe tank, easy to maintain. No failures ofthe gear box were reported. The radiator,one of the most vulnerable parts of liquid-cooled tank engines, was well protected bythe power unit placed between it and thefan. Accessories such as carburetors andwater pumps were the same as those usedin automobiles. Nonstandard parts such asignition wire harnesses and distributorswere generally made in accordance withautomobile specifications. Because engine,radiator, and fan were mounted together,the power unit could be removed from thetank in one simple operation. Removal in-volved lifting the engine cover, disconnect-ing the propeller shaft, two air-cleanerducts, two exhaust pipes, the gasoline andoil lines, a single plug for all wires, the

choke, throttle, and tachometer, andfinally unscrewing three mounting bolts. Acrew of four required only one hour for theentire process. Placed on a dolly, the unitcould be repaired, tuned and tested, andthen put back into the tank.

Since the A-57 was longer and heavierthan the Continental radial, some struc-tural changes in the tank were necessary.The hull had to be lengthened by some 11inches; the rear bogie and idler of the tracksuspension had to be moved toward therear to correct the imbalance resultingfrom the addition of roughly three tons ofarmor plate and excessive engine weight.So modified, however, the Chrysler-powered tank turned out to have slightlylower ground unit pressure than other ver-sions. Many tests proved that the engineprovided greater drawbar horsepower thancompeting gasoline types. The usual expe-rience was that the A-57 could pull itsvehicle in one gear higher.

Aberdeen Proving Ground began testingthe multi-bank Grant in February 1942.General operation of the engine was satis-factory and the installation furnishedample power for the vehicle. But when theengine was disassembled following the test,inspection revealed that overheating hadcaused two piston rings to stick and haddamaged the connecting rod bearings andinserts. Installed in the tank, moreover, thecomponent engines and accessories weredifficult to get at because the compart-ment, originally intended for the 45-inch-wide Continental radial, was badlycrowded by the 55-inch-wide Chryslerunit. That the light automobile accessories

48 OCM 17578, 26 Dec 41, designated the mediumtank M3, with riveted hull and the Chrysler A-57power plant as medium tank M3A4; OCM 1 7855, 6Feb 42, designated the medium tank M4, with weldedhull and the Chrysler A-57 power plant as mediumtank M4A4.


and materials failed to stand up under theextreme heat and heavy vibration in thetank aggravated the problem consider-ably.49 Subsequent tests of a Sherman tankwith the Chrysler engine showed similarresults, and the conclusions and recom-mendations of the proof officers read:

Conclusions

1. On the basis of this test it may be con-cluded that:

a. The engine furnishes adequate powerfor the Medium Tank M4A4 but continualfailures of a minor nature make maintenanceof this vehicle extremely difficult.

b. The maintenance of the Multi-Enginepower plant is difficult due to the inaccessi-bility of the parts requiring constant atten-tion. This condition is caused by an extremelycrowded engine compartment.

c. The water pump and generator drivebelts are subject to overload and resultantfailure which may result in serious damage tothe engine due to faulty cooling.

d. The ignition system is especially com-plicated and troublesome.

e. The engine cooling radiator is easilyclogged with dirt and foreign particles whichseriously interfere with cooling of the engine.

f. The operation of the vehicle in gen-eral is satisfactory. Due to the added power ofthe engine, the driving effort for this vehicleis less than that required for Medium Tankspowered with Wright radial engines.

Recommendations

1. On the basis of the tests conducted onthis vehicle it is recommended that:

a. Considerable redesign be initiated inorder to make the parts requiring constantattention and minor adjustments more acces-sible so it will be possible to work on theseparts in a minimum of time with the engineinstalled in the vehicle.

b. The five individual water pumpsshould be replaced by a single, large, shaftdriven pump. This change would eliminate

the necessity of having five water pump drivebelts as well as clean up the engine in general.

c. The electrical system be made morereliable by installing heavier, dust proof, con-nections in all wiring. Particular attentionshould be paid to the distributor caps andsimilar parts whose successful operation de-pends on porcelain or plastic dielectrics.These parts should be made heavier so therough treatment they receive in combat vehi-cles will not cause them to crack or break.

d. The engine radiator be made moreaccessible to facilitate easier cleaning of thisunit. To accomplish this it is believed that aredesign of the fan shroud could be madewhereby the entire radiator could be easilyreached by an air or steam hose.

e. The cylinder heads on #3 and #4engines be held in place by means of capscrews instead of studs in order that the cylin-der head gaskets could be replaced withoutthe necessity of removing the whole powerplant as is now the case.

f. Extensive redesign should be made inan effort to reduce the weight of the multi-engine power plant. It is believed that theconcentration of weight in the rear of thevehicle shortens the life of various suspensionparts.50

Except for the weight problem, none ofthe reported difficulties proved insur-mountable. And had aluminum been usedas extensively on the A-57 as it was on theother tank engines, that objection, too,could have been overcome. The belt-drivetroubles were corrected by using a singlegear-driven water pump and placing thegenerator in a cool spot on the floor, whereit was driven by a belt from the propellershaft. Accessibility was improved by rais-ing the five carburetors to a line above theengine and moving the thermostats fromthe cylinder heads to fittings in the top

49 First Partial Rpt on Chrysler Multi-EnginePower Plant and First Rpt on Ord Program 5634, 28May 42, p. 12, Ord Tech files..

50 First Rpt on Test of Medium Tank M4A4, Pilot,and Twenty-Second Rpt on Ord Program 5568, 18Mar 43, pp. 4-6, Ord Tech files.


tank of the radiator. All modificationscompleted, the distributors, thermostats,fuel pump, water pump, and oil filterswere readily serviced through the reardoors of the engine compartment. Thespark plugs on the bottom banks wereaccessible through openings in the floor.But before all these improvements hadtaken place, experiments on other engineshad been started.

In October 1942, five Chrysler-poweredGrants and an equal number of Shermansunderwent tests by the Desert WarfareBoard. The board was greatly impressedby the pulling power of the engine, butfound that breakdowns of accessories madeit unreliable. Neither tank was found suit-able for combat. Doubtlessly influenced bythis verdict, a conference of representativesof the Allies in early November decidedthat the M4A4 was not acceptable. Otherinfluences responsible for that decisionwere probably the facts that the trend ofoperations in the European and Africantheatres had allowed a considerable re-duction in the medium tank program for1943 and that the passing of the enginecrisis had made it more feasible for theOrdnance Department to limit the num-ber of engines. Nevertheless, 7,500 Chrys-ler-powered Shermans were built, andafter several improvements the engineultimately gave a remarkable account ofitself.

Gasoline versus Diesel

While before 1942 the Armored Forcehad favored all-out dieselization, it com-pletely reversed its stand during the earlymonths of that year. The turning pointcame on the occasion of a conference on 26February for the purpose of reviewing thefuel problem and its impact on the stand-

ardization of engines. A thorough discus-sion brought out a number of maintenanceand supply difficulties likely to be encoun-tered on the battlefield if diesel as well asgasoline-powered equipment were used.Adequate quantities of diesel fuel wouldbe available in the United States but notin most theatres of operations. The major-ity of vehicles were gasoline-powered, andthe use of diesels would necessitate a dupli-cate supply system. General Barnes andColonel Christmas, the representatives ofthe Ordnance Department, stated that thetime for deciding on any particular type ofpower plant had not yet arrived, that bythe end of another year the Ordnance De-partment could, if necessary, supply anentire line of either diesel or gasoline en-gines, but that in the meantime it wouldhave to resort to the maximum numberprocurable of both in order to assure thesuccess of the tank program. GeneralDevers, representing the Armored Force,declared that the Armored Force wouldnot push the requirement for diesels andwould not require diesel engines for vari-ous combat vehicles. "This represents,"noted General Barnes, "a complete 'about-face' for the Armored Force which up tothis time has been demanding that theOrdnance Department use diesel engines100% for all combat vehicles and tanks." 51

Following the conference General Som-ervell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, advo-cated a stringent curtailment in the use ofdiesels by U.S. forces. He listed his reasonsfor such a policy as follows:

1. The Chief of the Armored Force hasrecommended that diesel engines be used in

51 (1) Min of mtg held at Room 4302, MunitionsBldg., Thursday, 26 Feb 42, Tab B to memo, GenSomervell, ACofS, for CofS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Use ofDiesel Powered Equipment in the Armored Force,DRB AGO. (2) Barnes Diary, 27 Feb 42, OHF.


all equipment of the Armored Force. This, ofcourse, will greatly complicate the fuel supplyproblem . . . the maximum production ofdiesel fuel required will interfere to some ex-tent with production of aviation gasoline, tol-uene for explosives, and butadiene for syn-thetic rubber. It will also result in a largesurplus of gasoline with no outlet.52

A directive from the War Departmentissued a week after General Somervell'smemorandum adopted his recommenda-tions virtually verbatim. All wheeled andhalf-track vehicles were to be gasolinepowered. For tanks, development of gaso-line engines should be pushed in order tosupplant all diesel-powered tanks asquickly as possible. The latter were not tobe shipped overseas but held for service inthe United States and for training. Use ofthe Guiberson diesel engine was to be dis-continued as soon as other types wereavailable.53

This final decision marked a particu-larly sharp reversal of previous trends. TheGuiberson engine, a radial, air-cooled die-sel, had been in use in American lighttanks since 1935.54 A more powerful modeldeveloping 370 horsepower had beenunder development for medium tankssince 1938.55 After testing this engine, theArmored Force Board in September 1941had recommended that it be consideredmore suitable for use in medium tanksthan the Continental radial and that asmany medium tanks as possible beequipped with it. On the strength of thatrecommendation an entire new plant hadbeen built at Garland, Texas. But duringthe conference of February 1942 GeneralDevers announced that he wanted no fur-ther orders placed for Guibersons becausethey had been found unreliable. In Aprilhe wrote to General Somervell, now Com-manding General, Services of Supply,stating:

In view of our past experience, and thepresent world situation as to the supply ofDiesel fuel, the Armored Force does not de-sire any type Guiberson Radial Diesel enginesfor use in Light or Medium Tanks. It is re-quested that action be taken at once to dis-continue the production of Guiberson Ra-dial Diesel engines, and that existing facilitiesbe utilized to increase the production of otherstandard types of tank engines.56

General Barnes vigorously dissented,outlining the position of the Ordnance De-partment in the gasoline versus dieselcontroversy:

. . . [General Devers] makes reference to thepresent world situation as to the supply ofdiesel fuel as a reason for discontinuing themanufacture of Guiberson diesel engines. Re-liable information available to the OrdnanceDepartment does not indicate any difficultyin obtaining diesel fuel in any theaters ofoperation where gasoline may be obtained,and diesel fuel has a number of obvious ad-vantages over gasoline. In fact, the OrdnanceDepartment considers the diesel engine theproper ultimate engine for tanks and believesthat every effort should be made to expeditethe development of adequate diesel enginesfor all tanks. It should be noted in passingthat our Army as well as the armies of otherUnited Nations employ large numbers oftrack laying tractors of commercial originwhich tractors are equipped with diesel en-gines; these tractors are being procured forthe Corps of Engineers, the Air Corps, FieldArtillery and other branches of the Army.Gasoline propelled commercial tractors are to

52 Memo, Gen Somervell, ACofS, for CofS, 28 Feb42, sub: Use of Diesel Powered Equipment in theArmored Force, DRB AGO.

53 Ltr, TAG to CG's Field Forces, Armies, Corps,Army Air Forces, Chief of Armored Force, and Chiefsof Arms and Services, 7 Mar 42, sub: Use of DieselPowered Equipment in the Armored Force, copy inFolder 2-2842, AG 412.31, DRB AGO.

54 OCM 12371, 30 Sep 35, provided for test ofGuiberson T-1020 engine for combat cars and tanks.

55 OCM 14702, 20 Sep 38; 15403, 13 Oct 39.56 (1) Hist of Ordnance-Diesel Engine Develop-

ments, OHF. (2) Ltr, Gen Devers to CG SOS, 28 Apr42, ASF Production Div files, DRB AGO.


all practical purposes unobtainable. Further,both the British and the Russians are usingand are obtaining from the United Statestanks and other vehicles employing dieselengines.

With respect to the Guiberson ModelT-1400 Radial Diesel Engine for the mediumtank, this is a new development type engineof which 670 only are on order. The cancella-tion of this project would therefore have butslight effect on the 1942 production of me-dium tanks, however, since the War Depart-ment has already invested a considerable sumof money in this project, it is recommendedthat this project be allowed to carry on forseveral months until a reasonable quantity ofthese engines have been installed in tanks andgiven an extended test in the hands of troops.This is considered to be in the best interest ofthe Government and should have no appreci-able effect on our tank program. It will be re-called that it was in the summer of 1940 thatthe Chief of the Armored Force requestedthat all tanks for the Armored Force beequipped with Guiberson diesel engines, atwhich time the Ordnance Department tookthe position that this engine was not wellenough developed to warrant such a decisionand the decision was accepted to continuewith the production of the Guiberson dieselengine in a limited way to further its develop-ment. This is the policy which has been fol-lowed since that time.

In any case, the development of new tankengines such as the Guiberson diesel tankengine is a matter of years and since the Ord-nance Department considers that a dieselengine for tanks should be developed, we be-lieve these projects should be allowed to con-tinue in their present status until further dataare available.57

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1942production of Guiberson diesels was can-celed and the plant at Garland turnedover to the Continental Motors Corpora-tion for the manufacture of R-975 gasolineengines. Production of the General Motorsdiesel continued, in order to fill British andRussian requirements which at the timeamounted to two thirds of America's tankoutput. While development work on die-

sels for medium tanks proceeded apace,none of the projects—an 18-cylinderGuiberson radial and a 9-cylinder radial—were to be put into production, since in themeantime a satisfactory gasoline engine,the Ford GAA, had made its appearanceand development of other gasoline powerplants had shown sufficient promise towarrant abandonment of diesels.

The Ford GAA

The Ford GAA tank engine had its ori-gins in a development by the Ford MotorCompany for the Air Force. Realizing theneed for an aircraft engine with nominaldisplacement but higher specific outputthan existing designs, Ford in 1939 initi-ated development of an upright 60-degree,V-12 liquid-cooled power plant with a dis-placement of 1650 cubic inches.58

Design studies began in the summer of1940, and by November of that same yeara 2-cylinder model was fully assembledand ready for testing. There followed ex-tensive investigations of combustion-cham-ber design, bearing materials, and enginetiming in an effort to obtain peak perform-ance. Within three months the output wasraised from 115 to roughly 150 horsepower,much better progress than could have beenmade with a multi-cylinder model. Augustof 1941 saw a full-scale 2-cylinder enginemounted on the test stand, ready for a trialrun.

Knowing of the good results obtainedwith the 2 cylinder model, and urgentlyneeding a high-output engine for its 30-ton

57 3d Ind, Gen Barnes, Asst Chief of Ind Serv,OCO, to CG SOS, 12 May 42, on basic communica-tion, Gen Devers to CG SOS, 28 Apr 42, ASF Produc-tion Div files, DRB AGO.

58 Unless otherwise cited, material in this section isbased on Hist of Development of Ford Tank Engines,OHF.


medium tanks, the Ordnance Departmentapproached Ford with a proposal to de-velop a power plant to take the place of theunderpowered R-975 radial. After a sur-vey of the medium tank's engine compart-ment, Ford engineers suggested thatshortening their engine from twelve toeight cylinders would permit the earlyproduction of an adequate power plantnecessitating a minimum of alterations tothe existing hull. Design and layout of theproposed engine commenced in September1941, and by January of 1942 the firstmodel was completed.

The new tank engine consisted of fivemajor assemblies: the cylinder block andcrankshaft, including pistons and connect-ing rods; the cylinder heads; the accessorydrives; the end cover; and the oil panassemblies. Each of the assemblies consti-tuted an integral unit and was arrangedfor easy handling and replacement by sol-dier mechanics. Extensive use of aluminumaccounted for light weight. The cylinderblock and crankcase, for example, thebulkiest and therefore heaviest compo-nents of every engine, were made of onesingle aluminum casting. Aside from theweight saved and the ease of handling, thisone-unit treatment also resulted in struc-tural rigidity in absorbing the high loadsand stresses of the engine without unduedistortion. Pistons, cylinder heads, the endcover, the oil pan, and the camshaft coverlikewise were aluminum castings. The ex-haust manifolds, ordinarily made of castiron, were made of two stainless steelstampings welded together — anotherweight-saving feature. Installed, the engineweighed only 1,575 pounds, 2,825 poundsless than the hitherto lightest-weightliquid-cooled power plant for mediumtanks—the General Motors diesel—andonly slightly over 200 pounds more than

the air-cooled Continental radial. TheFord GAA's output of 450 net horsepowerwas the highest developed by any of themedium tank engines mass produced dur-ing World War II. The Continental radialdeveloped 400, the General Motors diesel375, and the Chrysler multi-bank 370.59

Because of the high horsepower-to-weightratio, high output, and compactness of theFord engine, the Ordnance TechnicalCommittee in January 1942 authorized itsuse as an alternate power plant for theSherman tank.60

The first three vehicles of the new serieswere completed in June and immediatelyunderwent tests at the General MotorsProving Ground. Proposing minor modifi-cations and further testing, the ProvingGround recommended that the OrdnanceDepartment accept the vehicle. Equallyfavorable reports resulted from subsequenttrials. Beginning in November 1942 theArmored Force conducted 24-hour-a-dayoperations of seventeen tanks and upontheir conclusion stated that the engine wassufficiently satisfactory to warrant furtherdevelopment. At the same time a series ofendurance tests was conducted at Aber-deen Proving Ground and, under the su-pervision of Ordnance engineers, byChrysler and General Motors. Nothingmore strikingly illustrates the co-operationof the Industry-Ordnance team than thefact that here two competitors wereactively engaged in furthering the cause ofa third.

Although first results revealed thatengine life was unsatisfactory, continuousimprovements eventually remedied themost objectionable faults. Structural weak-

59 Handbook of Ordnance Automotive Engineering(hereafter cited as Handbook of Ord Auto Engr), Vol.I, Sec. II, p. 11.

60 OCM 17678, 20 Jan 42.


nesses in the crankcase, for example, wereovercome by increasing wall thickness andribbing sections and by changing the de-sign of the main-bearing caps. When therigid crankcase caused fatiguing andbreaking of the crankshaft, a developmentprogram was instituted for evolving asturdier crankshaft by combining variousformulas of steel-making and heat treat-ment. In July 1943 the proving center ofAberdeen Proving Ground, reporting thatthe Ford GAA engine was very satisfactoryfor medium tanks and, because moreaccessible, more easily maintained andserviced than other medium tank powerplants, recommended that:

a. The Ford model GAA engine be ap-proved for production as a power plant in themedium tank in such quantities as aredeemed necessary to supply demands of thepresent and immediate future.

b. The necessary corrective modificationsbe placed on the production units as soon aspossible.

c. Further development work be carriedout on this engine with a view to increasingits mechanical reliability.61

By the summer of 1943 the Ford enginewas well on the way to becoming thestandard power plant for medium tanks.Following a comparative endurance test ofSherman tanks powered by the severalengines in current use, the Armored ForceBoard had in May of that year found theFord to be the best and had recommendedits adoption for all medium tanks. Al-though the outcome of an endurance runat Aberdeen Proving Ground betweenOctober 1943 and February 1944 was notwholly so favorable, the Ford engine per-formed more satisfactorily than the Conti-nental radial, its only serious rival. TheGeneral Motors diesel was out of the pic-ture for two reasons: first, because of theban on the use of diesels overseas, and, sec-

ond, because its endurance qualities wereunpredictable and its reliability the lowestof all engines tested. Employment of theChrysler multi-bank unit had long sincebeen vetoed, although, interestinglyenough, it was found to exceed all others inreliability as well as in economy of oil con-sumption and in maintenance. Enduranceof the Continental was unsatisfactory, par-ticularly under full-load operation overhilly terrain. Overspeeding the engine tobrake the vehicle while descending hillswas responsible for four out of five majorbreakdowns.

While the endurance qualities of theFord GAA were not considered satisfac-tory because none of the test engines metthe 400-hour requirement, its performancebefore failure was excellent and all failureswere similar. Correction of two basic de-fects—burning out of exhaust valves andbreakdown of cylinder-head gaskets—offered prospects of an immediate increasein engine life. Accessibility was equal orsuperior to other engines tested; fuel con-sumption was lowest of all gasoline-pow-ered plants; maintenance requirementswere lowest and rose only after the valvesand head gaskets began to give trouble.All told, the Ford GAA presented betterpossibilities of immediate improvementthan any other engine tested.62

The service record of the Ford enginefully justified the expectations of its supe-rior performance. Continuous modifica-tions of design weaknesses ultimately re-sulted in a power plant that was by far themost popular with the men on the battlefronts. Reports from Europe, for example,

61 (1) First Rpt on Ford Tank Engine, EnduranceTest and First Rpt on Ord Program 5658, 31 Jul 43,pp. 7-8a, Ord Tech files. (2) R&D, Tanks, OHF.

62 First Partial Rpt on Engines for Combat Vehicles,Endurance Test of, and First Rpt on Ord Program5739, 15 Mar 44, Ord Tech files.


noted that the engine "served well and re-liably during combat operations. Usingpersonnel preferred this engine to the aircooled radial type engine because of itshigher horsepower and torque outputs." 63

Had production capacity been greatenough, the Ford engine would unques-tionably have been adopted as the one andonly power plant for American mediumtanks.

Flotation for Tracked Vehicles

In the early 1930's when Ordnance en-gineers faced the problem of increasing thecross-country mobility of combat vehicles,they turned more and more to the use oftracks instead of wheels. Tracks not onlyenabled tanks and gun motor carriages tocross ditches and pass over other obstaclesthat stopped wheeled vehicles but also, be-cause of greater ground contact area, pro-vided more support in mud and sand. Thesupport, or flotation, provided by trackscame to be of particular importance as theweight of tank armor and armament in-creased beyond the capacity of wheels tosupport it on soft ground.

Design of tracks for the light-weight,slow-moving tanks of World War I hadbeen a comparatively simple matter, butduring World War II, as more powerfulengines and improved suspensions in-creased the speed and cruising range oftrack-laying vehicles, development of suit-able tracks became extremely difficult.When designers thought in terms of pro-ducing the ideal all-purpose track, theyfound themselves confronted with a num-ber of irreconcilable requirements. Smoothoperation on the highway, for example,could be achieved only at the cost of dras-tically reduced traction in mud and onrough ground. Wide, cleated tracks, which

provided the most flotation and tractionfor off-highway operations, had many fea-tures that made them undesirable for gen-eral use: they caused more noise andvibration and added to steering difficul-ties; they increased the wear on the sus-pension mechanism; and they offeredmore resistance to movement, thus addingto the already great burden on the tankengine. Ordnance engineers constantlystrove to develop a light-weight track, butthey could not save on weight at the costof durability, for the track had to be strongenough to support the vehicle, take thesevere pounding of cross-country travel,and withstand the impact of gun fire andmine explosions. Throughout World WarII four aspects of track development wereof primary importance—the demand fortracks wide enough to carry heavy loadsunder all circumstances, the need of bettertraction, the conflicting requirements forsteel and rubber tracks, and the search foradequate, inexpensive track pins.64

Wide Tracks and Extension Devices

The theoretical solution to the problemof providing adequate flotation for tanksand other track-laying vehicles operatingon soft ground was the essence of simplic-ity: make the tracks wider. Widened tracksdistributed the weight of the vehicle overa larger area and thus lessened the pres-sure exerted on each square inch of

63 Engine, Ford, Models GAA and GAP, Perform-ance Rpt—U. S. Materiel, ETOUSA, 15 Aug 45, OrdTech files.

64 For general comments on the requirements oftank tracks, see: (1) Capt N. G. McLean, AutomotiveProof Manual, pp. 45-46, OHF; (2) John M. Nickel-,sen, Tracks for Ord Vehicles, OHF; and (3) Hand-book Ord Auto Engr, Vol. I, Sec. V, OHF. TheNickelsen volume includes descriptions and photo-graphs of all tracks developed between January 1940and January 1945.


ground. But the use of wider tracks raiseda host of thorny problems of design. Theymade steering more difficult, required theuse of dual bogie wheels, and made neces-sary the adoption of altogether differentsuspension systems. Further, as the Ord-nance Department reported in the fall of1944, tracks wide enough to bring theground pressure down to seven pounds persquare inch, as requested by the ArmyGround Forces, "will result in an overallvehicle width in excess of the 124-inchmaximum shipping width now permittedunder AR 850-15." 65 Nevertheless, duringthe winter of 1942-43 when observers inNorth Africa reported that Americantanks had run well in sand but had boggeddown in the mud of Tunisia because theirtracks were too narrow, Ordnance engi-neers promptly made the development ofwider tracks a high-priority project.66 Atthat time the tracks of the Sherman tankswere 16.5 inches wide, with a ground pres-sure of 14 pounds per square inch. Theirimmediate replacement by wider trackswas impossible, not primarily because ofany difficulty in designing a wider track,although that presented its problems, butbecause a wider track would not fit exist-ing suspensions. Because of the problemsinvolved in redesigning the whole suspen-sion system and making the productionchangeover, tanks with wide tracks did notbecome available until late in 1944.67

While tanks with new suspensions wereunder development, Ordnance engineersproduced, as temporary expedients, exten-sion devices known formally as extendedend-connectors, informally as duck bills.These were short metal plates that couldbe bolted to the outside end of each trackblock to widen the track of the Shermanfrom 16.5 to approximately 20 inches.They increased flotation by 21 percent and

brought the ground pressure for vehiclesweighing 35 tons down to less than 12pounds per square inch.68 They could beattached to the tracks of any medium tankin the field without undue difficulty andwith a total weight increase of only 350pounds. By the spring of 1944 these exten-sion devices, packed in kits, were availablefor shipment to overseas theatres to be in-stalled for specific operations at the discre-tion of the theatre commanders. InOctober 1944 the Army Service Forcesdirected that all narrow-track mediumtanks shipped overseas be equipped withextended end-connectors, and at the sametime theatre commanders were notifiedthat similar extension devices were avail-able for the M5 light tank, increasing itstrack width from 11.5 to 15 inches.69

To develop extended end-connectors forattachment to the outside of tank trackswas not a particularly difficult task, butattaching them to the inside of the trackwas a different story because there was noroom for them between the track and thetank hull. Pending development of tankswith narrower suspensions, Ordnance en-gineers devised so-called outboard spacersto hold the suspension of the Shermanseveral inches out from the hull to make

65 2d Ind, CofOrd-D to CG ASF, 18 Oct 44, onbasic ltr, AGF to ASF, 16 Aug 44, sub: Improved Flo-tation for Armored Track-Laying Vehicles, AGF470.8, DRB AGO.

66 (1) Rpt of Maj J. M. Sills and Mr. Errol J. Gayon trip to NATOUSA, 20 Mar 43, Sec B, p. 5, OHF.(2) Ann Rpt R&D Serv, 30 Jun 43, p. 46, OHF.

67 For citations of documents pertaining to thedevelopment of horizontal volute suspensions, dualbogies, and wide tracks, see OCM 22782, 3 Feb 44.

68 (1) OCM 22821, 3 Feb 44. (2) Ltr, AGF to ASF,4 Mar 44, OO 470.8/855 Tanks, DRB AGO. (2)Nickelsen, Tracks for Ordnance Vehicles, pp. 127-30,OHF.

69 (1) Ltr, ASF to CofOrd, 25 Oct 44, OO400.37/19133, DRB AGO. (2) OCM 25529, 26 Oct44; 26645,8 Feb 45.


TRACK EXTENSIONS being installed by the crew of a Sherman tank during a lull in com-bat operations at Baesweiler, Germany.

room for attachment of extended end-con-nectors.70 When the extension devices wereattached to both sides of the track theygave it a width of approximately 23.5inches and a unit ground pressure of only10 pounds per square inch, as comparedwith its original 16-inch width and 12-to-14-pound pressure. The speed with whichthey could be attached and the length oftime required to get new tanks with widetracks into production led the OrdnanceCommittee to approve installation of ex-tended end-connectors on both sides oftracks in so far as castings and other criti-cal components were available. Althoughthe Ordnance Department considered theinstallation of the spacers and inside track

extensions in the field impractical, it ap-proved, at the request of Army GroundForces, procurement of kits that wouldpermit field installation.71

A further application of the extensionprinciple was approved in January 1945.It was an extended grouser, nicknamedthe platypus, that could be bolted to ex-

70 OCM 24618, 3 Aug 44; 25529, 26 Oct 44; 25753,16 Nov 44.

71 (1) OCM 25529, 26 Oct 44. (2) Final Hist Rpt ofArmored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Sec., HqETO, 6 Jun 44-24 May 45, p. 17, OHF. For furtherinformation on the advantages of extended end-con-nectors, see also Mediterranean Area Armored Fight-ing Vehicles, Tech Rpt 26, cited in Intel Summary 66,30 Apr-15 May 45, and MTOUSA AGF Board Rpt255, 27 Dec 44, cited in Weekly Battle PerformanceRpt 16, 26 Mar 45, OHF.


tended end-connectors to improve bothflotation and traction. The term grouserwas used to describe either detachablecleats, which could be fastened to the trackto provide more traction, or the tread de-sign on the track block. In the latter senseit was termed an integral grouser. The32.5-inch grousers, which extended fromthe inside of the track block outward be-yond the extended end-connectors, re-quired no modification of the suspensionand gave the tank a ground pressure ofapproximately 8 pounds per square inch.Longer grousers, 37 inches in length, werealso developed for attachment to Shermantanks equipped with spaced-out suspen-sions and extended end-connectors on bothsides of the track. The long grouserbrought the ground pressure down to 7pounds, the figure that the Army GroundForces had earlier fixed as the maximumfor effective operation. Both the long andthe short grousers could be installed in thefield. Both were approved for productionearly in 1945.72

Late in 1944 tanks with newly designedsuspensions and wide tracks came off theproduction lines. The new Sherman, theM4A3E8, had a 23-inch track and a hori-zontal volute suspension. The light andheavy tanks both now had torsion bar sus-pensions, and tracks 16 inches and 24inches wide, respectively. One of the majordesign changes necessitated by adoption ofthe new suspensions and wide tracks wasthe use of dual bogie wheels. Althoughthis change doubled the number of bogiewheels required for each tank, it distrib-uted the load on each wheel more evenlyand resulted in longer wheel life. By thetime these tanks saw service in Europe, ex-perience had shown that a track 23 or 24inches wide was not wide enough to keepa tank from bogging down in deep mud.73

Extended end-connectors on the old-model medium tanks had widened thetrack to 23.5 inches, but the use of ex-tended grousers to provide additionalwidth had proved necessary. To make thenew wide-track tanks serviceable in deepmud the only answer was repetition of theearlier process of adding extension devices.In March 1945 the Ordnance Committeeapproved production of kits for field instal-lation of 24-inch grousers on the 16-inchtracks of the light tank M24. Thesegrousers added 3,000 pounds to the weightof the vehicle but lowered the ground pres-sure to about 8 pounds per square inch.By mid-July even longer grousers, 28inches in length, had been developed forthe M24, and kits to permit their installa-tion were available but did not arrive over-seas in time for combat use. V-J Day foundthe 39-inch extended grouser for the wide-tracked M4A3E8 and M26 tanks still inthe development stage.74

Track Profiles

While developing wider tracks to in-crease flotation, Ordnance engineers werealso concerned with designing tracks withsufficient traction to keep the vehiclesgoing in deep mud and on icy roads. In1940 all American tanks rode on smoothrubber-block tracks which, in addition to

72 (1) OCM 25529, 26 Oct 44; 26607, 8 Feb 45;26921, 8 Mar 45. (2) Ann Rpt R&D Serv, 20 Jun 45,p. 97, OHF.

73 "The units are beginning to receive the M4A3E8with the horizontal volute suspension and wide track,"the ETO reported in March 1945. "The mobility inthe mud is superior to that of the M4A3. ... A lowerground pressure than that now provided is still re-quired if the units are to have satisfactory mobility."Second Letter, Rpt of Activities, ETO New Develop-ments Div, to WD New Developments Div, 14 Mar45, Opns Rpts 97-1117 (15145) Mar 45, DRB AGO.

74 OCM 26753, 22 Feb 45; 27938, 7 Jun 45; 28848,23 Aug 45; 3 1978, 22 Jan 48.


being shock absorbent and long lasting,gave adequate traction on hard-surfaceroads under normal conditions. Whengreater traction was needed for muddyroads and cross-country operation, tankcrews put on detachable steel grousers,much as a motorist would put chains onhis car. These detachable grousers couldbe bolted to the track blocks and then beremoved when the tank returned to thehighway. As a rule, they were not put onevery track block but only on every sec-ond, third, or fourth block, depending onthe amount of traction needed and thenumber of grousers available. The com-bination of smooth rubber-block tracksand detachable steel grousers was highlysatisfactory in most respects, but it had onemajor disadvantage: the installation andremoval of the grousers was difficult andtime consuming. In cross-country opera-tions, vehicles frequently encountered somany different types of terrain that it wasimpractical to install and remove thegrousers at every turn.7 5

In 1941 Ordnance engineers attemptedto solve this problem by developing the so-called rubber chevron track with a V--shaped tread on each block to giveincreased traction. To a remarkable degreethese tracks combined the good highwayperformance of the smooth-block rubbertrack with much of the traction of the de-tachable steel grouser. Although tanksequipped with this type of track also car-ried detachable steel grousers for use onextremely soft ground, the grousers wereused so little in North Africa by tanks witheither smooth or chevron rubber tracksthat the Army Ground Forces in 1943recommended that tanks no longer be re-quired to carry them.76 The rubberchevron track came closest to meeting theneeds of the armored units in North Africa,

but just as its development was completedearly in 1942 the rubber crisis forced Ord-nance to search for a substitute.

Well before Pearl Harbor experimentswere under way with steel tracks as pos-sible alternatives to rubber tracks. Most ofthese early steel tracks had cleats, or in-tegral steel grousers to provide traction inmud. In comparison with the steel tracksdeveloped later, these early types were re-garded as flat tracks because their grouserswere quite shallow. Deep grousers werenot provided in 1941 and 1942 for tworeasons: shallow grousers afforded suffi-cient traction for most purposes, and deepgrousers were too hard on the suspensionsand caused too much resistance to move-ment. Toward the middle of the war whenAllied armored forces had to contend withdeep mud and swamps, steel tracks withdeeper grousers to provide more tractionwere adopted in spite of their disadvan-tages in other respects. The designs usedfor the grousers on steel tracks includedparallel bars, interrupted parallels, andchevrons, not unlike the tread designs ontruck tires. Generally, the armored forcespreferred the chevron design, but all typesremained in use throughout the war be-cause of the production difficulties inchanging over to chevron only.77

75 For a report on combat experience in the Pacificwith detachable grousers, see Pacific Warfare Bd Rpt3, GHQ U. S. Army Forces Pacific, 18 Jun 45, AGSpecial Files of Observers Rpts 4-7.13/45, DRB AGO.

76 Ltr, Armored Force Bd to CG AGF, 28 May 43,sub: Elimination of Grousers, and inds, ASF 470.81,Parts and Accessories No. 2, DRB AGO.

77 (1) Lt Col Jean E. Engler, Rpt on Observationsin NATOUSA, 12 Jul-20 Aug 44, Mission files, OHF.(2) NAF RAC Liaison Ltr 5, cited in Intel Summary35, 14-20 Jan 44, OCO-D, OHF. (3) Col George G.Eddy, Rpt on Special Mission with New Weaponsand Demonstration Bd in ETO and NATOUSA, 4Feb-1 May 44, Mission files, OHF. (4) Interv, 17 Sep51, with Marion Cullen, Tank and Auto Br, R&DDiv. (5) Interv, 25 Oct 51, with Everett W. Holt,Maint Br, FS Div.


When American tanks encountereddeep snow and ice, crews found smooth-block rubber tracks and steel tracks of allkinds totally unsatisfactory.78 As tests bythe Ordnance detachment at Camp Shiloin Manitoba, Canada, during the winterof 1942-43 had demonstrated, steel trackswere particularly unsatisfactory on icyroads. Designed for use in mud, not for op-eration on hard, slippery surfaces, flat steeltracks as a rule failed to cut into the ice.When sharper steel grousers with parallel-bar design were used, they offered no re-sistance to sideslipping and were sometimesderisively referred to as ice skates. Thesteel track with chevron design was moreeffective in preventing sideslipping, butthe occasions when it cut into the ice wereso infrequent that the track was of littleuse. The rubber chevron track gave by farthe best traction on ice but, because of theloss of natural rubber imports and difficul-ties in producing chevron tracks of syn-thetic rubber, most tanks were notequipped with this type of track. In theabsence of a suitable track for operationon ice, units in the field resorted to im-provisation. Some welded small sections ofsteel bar to the running surface of the trackblocks to form ice cleats; others weldedsharp steel spikes to end-connector wedges;still others substituted a rubber track blockfor every sixth steel block and attached asteel grouser on the block mid way be-tween. The war ended before a satisfactorytrack or detachable grouser for operationon ice was developed.79

Steel Versus Rubber Tracks

Throughout World War II the relativemerits of steel and rubber tracks consti-tuted one of the most controversial aspectsof the track development program. From

1940 to 1945 the steel track and the rubbertrack competed for favor; each had itsloyal supporters and each could claimsuperiority under certain conditions. Butno track, it should be noted, was madeentirely of steel or entirely of rubber. Rub-ber track blocks were molded on a steelframework consisting of two tubes, orbinoculars as they were often called, thatextended horizontally through the blockto hold the track pins. In both steel andrubber tracks, rubber bushings were usedon the track pins to absorb vibration andreduce wear, and were credited with giv-ing American tracks a much longer lifethan enemy tracks.80 Early in 1944 steeltracks with rubber backs to cushion theshock on bogie wheels came into use, forexperience had shown that all-steel blocksmaterially shortened the life of the run-ning gear.81

Before the United States entered thewar, particularly during 1940 and 1941,the smooth rubber track dominated thefield. In those years all U.S. Army trackedvehicles rode on rubber because it hadsmooth riding qualities, did not damagehighways, provided adequate traction onhard-surface roads, and, by cushioningshocks, added many miles to the life ofbogie wheels, support rollers, and othersuspension components. Steel tracks gave

78 For a compilation of data on this topic see Armorin Winter Warfare, a research report prepared at TheArmored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, June 1950,OHF.

79 (1) Armor in Winter Warfare, OHF. (2) FinalHist of AFV and Weapons Sec. ETO, p. 19, OHF. (3)ETO Battle Experiences No. 27, 16 Jan 45; No. 42,21 Jan 45; No. 45, 23 Jan 45; No. 61, 14 Feb 45; OpnsRpt, Battle Experiences ETO, 1-106, 97-11.5, DRBAGO.

80 (1) Handbook of Ord Auto Engr, Vol. I, Sec. V,OHF. (2) Barnes, op. cit., pp. 208-09, OHF.

81 OCM 22819, 3 Feb 44, authorized procurementof 200 sets of the rubber-backed T74 track for servicetests.


better results in mud than did smooth rub-ber tracks, but caused more vibration,added to steering difficulties, and increasedresistance to movement. Steel tracks wereless desirable in terms of weight, always animportant consideration in Ordnance de-sign, for they weighed about 25 percentmore than rubber tracks. As far as tractionin mud was concerned, development ofrubber chevron tracks in 1941 partlyevened the score; when detachable steelgrousers were used, a vehicle equippedwith rubber tracks could plow throughmud as well as one equipped with steeltracks.82

The loss of rubber imports after PearlHarbor forced a revision of plans for pro-duction. As synthetic rubber was not yetavailable in quantity, nor expected toreach mass production for another year,the only solution was adoption of steeltracks. In January 1942 the Under Secre-tary of War directed the Ordnance De-partment to discontinue the use of rubberfor tracks at the earliest possible date, andin June the Chief of Ordnance reportedthat development work on steel tracks hadprogressed sufficiently to permit changingover from rubber to steel before the end ofthe year.83 But by March 1943 the change-over had not yet been made, and GeneralCampbell reported that large quantities ofnatural rubber would still be required fortank tracks during the last quarter of 1943.He described some of the difficulties ofconverting to steel tracks as follows:

The Ordnance Department has been in-tensively working on the development of steeltracks for light and medium tanks to replacethe present rubber block track as a conserva-tion matter. . . . Success has been attainedin building steel tracks which will have satis-factory life, but the principal difficulty hasbeen the destructive effect of the steel trackupon the running gear of the tank. Our tanks

are noted abroad for their sturdiness, reliabil-ity and their ability to keep going under ad-verse conditions. An important factor in thisresult has been the use of rubber tracks. It isbelieved that the tank mechanism, especiallythe suspension system, in time can bechanged to withstand the beating which itreceives from the steel track. The time re-quired to make the tank equipped with steeltracks the equivalent in reliability to thepresent tank equipped with rubber tracks,however, cannot be accurately predicted.84

In view of the excellent performance ofrubber tracks in North Africa and the dif-ficulties encountered in developing satis-factory steel tracks, the Ordnance Depart-ment recommended in the early part of1943 that steel tracks be abandoned alto-gether and that all tanks be equipped withrubber tracks. After thorough study of theOrdnance proposal, General Minton, di-rector of the ASF Resources and Produc-tion Division, agreed that henceforth alltanks destined for shipment overseasshould be equipped with rubber tracks."This opinion is concurred in by everyonewith whom I have discussed the question,"wrote General Minton. "General Deverswill back it 100% . . . . " At the sametime, because of the shortage of naturalrubber, ASF directed Ordnance to pushits synthetic rubber track program to aconclusion as soon as possible and to putsteel tracks on tanks to be used in theUnited States for training.85

82 Rubber for Mechanized Warfare, p. 55, OHF.83 (1) Rpt, Elimination of Rubber in Tank Tracks,

Tank Automotive Production, ASF Production Divfile, DRB AGO. (2) OCM 17918, 12 Mar 42.

84 Ltr, CofOrd to Mr. William M. Jeffers, WPB,n.d., sub: Rubber Tracks, OO 451.25/4061, DRBAGO.

85 (1) Memo, Gen Minton for ACofS for Materiel,SOS, 12 Mar 43, sub: Rubber Tracks . . . , ASF470.8 Tanks, DRB AGO. (2) Memo, CG ASF forCofOrd, 19 Mar 43, sub: Rubber Tracks . . . , Tankand Automotive Products, ASF Production Div file,DRB AGO.


No sooner had these policies been estab-lished than demand arose for their rever-sal. First came a strong appeal from theArmored Force for the elimination of steeltracks on training vehicles because thesteel threatened to destroy the paved roadsover which they ran. ASF, promptly ac-ceding to this request, directed Ordnanceto supply rubber tracks for all tanks,whether for service overseas or in theUnited States, and to cancel all contractsfor steel tracks.86 This policy had not beenin effect more than a few months whenstrong criticism of rubber tracks, and anappeal for steel tracks, came from troopsfighting in Sicily and Italy. Armored forcesin Italy reported that, during operationson rocky mountain roads, holes were fre-quently gouged in rubber tracks, reducingtheir average life to less than 500 miles.87

Under these circumstances, field com-manders requested that rubber tracks bereplaced with the more durable steeltracks in spite of the disadvantages of moredifficult steering, greater wear on bogiewheels, and reduction of speed. In view ofthis situation, ASF authorized Ordnanceto ship steel tracks from existing stockswhen requested by overseas commanders,and to resume steel-track production.88 Inthe meantime, the rubber industry had de-veloped a rubber-backed steel track thatovercame many of the drawbacks of theall-steel track. New steel-track productionin 1944 consisted largely of this improvedtype.89

During the early part of 1943 the rubberindustry had succeeded in producing asatisfactory smooth-block track of syntheticrubber but had not been able to make anacceptable synthetic chevron track. InAugust ASF directed Ordnance to limitits production of synthetic rubber tracks tothe smooth-block type but to continue its

efforts, in co-operation with industry, todevelop a suitable synthetic chevron track.Although the national stockpile of naturalrubber was running low, Ordnance re-quested permission to continue productionof chevron tracks of natural rubber sincecombat forces had found them superior toall other tracks. It was while this requestwas under consideration that troops over-seas reported difficulties in using rubbertracks on rocky terrain and asked for steeltracks instead. In December 1943 ASFheadquarters, recognizing the futility ofover-all directives prescribing the type oftrack to be issued, granted the Chief ofOrdnance authority to manufacture bothsteel and rubber tracks and to issue what-ever type he and the using arms jointlydetermined to be most suitable for specificoperations.90

Track Pins

Still another important factor in trackdesign was the type of connections used toassemble tracks.91 In World War II Amer-ican tanks were the only combat vehiclesthat rode on tracks assembled with rubber-bushed track pins. These pins had been

86 Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 12 Jun 43, sub:Rubber Tracks . . . , Tank Automotive Products,ASF Production Div file, DRB AGO.

87 (1) Memo, Dir Production Div, for Dir ReqmtsDiv, ASF, 2 Nov 43, sub: Rubber and Steel TankTracks, ASF Production Div file 423, Rubber. (2)Tech Info Ltr 16, Ord Sec, Hq NATOUSA, 30 Oct43, AG 470.81 (12 Oct 43), DRB AGO.

88 (1) Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 24 Nov 43, sub:Medium Tank Tracks, and 1st Ind, CG ASF, 12 Dec43, OO 470.8/610 Tanks, DRB AGO. (2) OCM22537, 30 Dec 43.

89 Rubber for Mechanized Warfare, pp. 56-58,OHF.

90 Ibid.91 Recommended Program for Postwar Develop-

ment of Tank-Automotive Materiel, 8 Jun 45, p. 4,Exhibit 5, OCO-D Development Div Hist, Vol. X,1 Apr-30 Jun 45, OHF.


developed during the early 1930's as a re-placement for plain steel, or "dry," pins,which performed adequately on low-speedtractors but wore out rapidly on higher-speed combat vehicles. "Doughnut"rubber-bushed pins, rubber rings vul-canized to steel track pins and then in-serted into track blocks under pressure,gave rubber-bushed tracks several advan-tages over those with plain steel pins.Tractive resistance was materially less,especially at speeds over 20 miles an hour,and under heavy loads power loss wasproportionally smaller. Track life waslonger because the bushing itself absorbedvibration and so prevented wear, and,finally, noise was greatly reduced. Thediameter of the track pins and the thick-ness of the bushing were varied to give thestrength required for each vehicle.

The high manufacturing cost of dough-nut rubber-bushed pins prompted furtherresearch. In the summer of 1941 Ordnanceengineers carried on experiments withsleeve or Harris bushings that were nearlyas long as the pins.92 This design was ex-pected to be cheaper to manufacture, pro-vide more uniform stress in the rubber,and have higher strength under load anddeflection. But, because the rubber filledthe tube completely, there was insufficientroom for compression, and continuing de-flection caused the bushing to disintegrate.Consequently, American tracks through-out the war used only the doughnutrubber bushing. The Germans and Japa-nese employed all-metal pins but encoun-tered problems of enormous proportionsin keeping their vehicles supplied withtracks. Life of enemy tracks was approxi-mately 600 miles, in contrast to 3,000 milesfor many American tracks. At the end ofthe war Ordnance designers were continu-ing unabated the search for a dry steel

track pin as efficient as the expensiverubber-bushed pin.93

The double-pin method of track blockconstruction was used exclusively untillate in the war when single-pin steel trackswere introduced on the M18 gun motorcarriage, the M24 light tank, and certainwide suspension tanks of the M4 series.While lighter in weight and cheaper tomanufacture, single-pin tracks were diffi-cult to disassemble in the field, made morefrequent adjustment of track tension nec-essary, and had shorter life than thedouble pins since the angular movementthat had to be taken up by the track-pinbushing was approximately twice that re-quired if two pins were used. The single-pin tracks, tried on the wide suspensionM4A3E8 tank when first used in the ETOearly in 1945, gave such inferior servicethat they were quickly replaced by thedouble pin.94 But single-pin tracks for theM18 gun motor carriage and the M24light tank gave less trouble and remainedin use.95

By the end of 1943 one fact had becomeclear: no single track could meet all com-

92 (1) OCM 16935, 3 Jul 41; 18265, 21 Mar 42. (2)Nickelsen, Tracks for Ord Vehicles, p. 36, OHF. (3)Aberdeen Proving Ground Rpt 21-30, title: FirstMinor Rpt on Goodyear T-41 Standard Rubber BlockTrack with Harris Bushing for Medium Tank M3,and Third Minor Rpt on Ord Program 5365, 20Jul 42.

93 See OCO-D Development Div Monthly Rpts, 10Nov 42-10 Jan 45, OHF.

94 (1) Handbook Ord Auto Engr, Vol. I, Sec. 5, p. 2,OHF. (2) Nickelsen, Tracks for Ord Vehicles, OHF.(3) OCM 19606, 28 Jan 43; 19908 and 19925, 11 Mar43; 21418, 26 Aug 43; 21500, 9 Sep 43; 22033 and22034, 4 Nov 43; 22246, 2 Dec 43; 22642, 13 Jan 44;23583, 20 Apr 44; 23958, 25 May 44; 26573, 1 Feb 45;26753, 22 Feb 45.

95 Interv with Marion Cullen, 27 Sep 51. In antici-pation of possible difficulty with single-pin M4 tanktracks, dual-pin tracks had also been produced. Thusno delay ensued in changeover.


bat requirements. Best results could beachieved only by employing several types,each designed for a particular purpose.Smooth rubber tracks were best for fasttravel over good roads; steel or rubbertracks with detachable steel grousers werebest in mud; rubber chevron tracks gavethe best traction on ice; on rocky terrainsteel tracks lasted longer than rubber. De-velopment could not be limited to pursuitof the ideal all-purpose track but had to bespread out over a wide field, includingtracks made of steel, natural rubber, andsynthetic rubber, and embodying variousdesigns to improve traction.96

Flotation for Wheeled Vehicles

The major problem of World War II inproviding flotation for wheeled vehicleslay in developing suitable synthetic rubbertires to replace natural rubber. This taskbecame imperative when crude rubberimports from the Far East were cut off bythe Japanese after Pearl Harbor. The en-suing shortage became so critical that onlyrigid conservation and rapid developmentof synthetic tires could stave off collapse ofboth civilian and military wheeled trans-port.97 The vast majority of tires for mili-tary wheeled vehicles were standard com-mercial tires of the highest qualityobtainable—whether of synthetic or natu-ral rubber, or a mixture—and most had amodified tread to give increased tractionfor off-road travel. But for two particularpurposes tires had to be specially designed.First, to enable combat vehicles to travelsome distance after tire deflation by punc-ture or gun fire, tires had to have extrastrong shoulders and sidewalls. And sec-ond, low-pressure, high-flotation tires hadto be developed for traversing soft ground.

Combat Tires

Long before World War II the OrdnanceDepartment had begun the search for tiresproof against gun fire. Experiments in the1930's with sponge rubber fillers insertedin standard casings and with bullet-seal-ing (self-sealing) tubes proved the formergenerally unsatisfactory. The sponge fillers,while puncture proof and impervious tosmall arms fire, were difficult to mount,apt to develop flat spots when a vehicleremained idle for a few days, added con-siderable weight, and were subject toblowouts resulting from the heat generatedby the semisolid fillers.98 Bullet-sealingtubes, on the other hand, added negligibleweight and rode as well as ordinary pneu-matic tires but had unreliable bullet-seal-ing qualities. This type of tube could seala hole two inches long without loss of morethan 60 percent of initial air pressure inthe tube, but could not seal the largerholes caused by projectiles 20-mm. orlarger or by small caliber bullets tearingthrough the tube longitudinally. Further-more, the plastic coating inside the tubehardened at extremely low temperatures,losing its effectiveness, and under ordinaryconditions the heat generated within thetire sometimes caused the plastic to flow tosuch an extent that the wheels became un-balanced. Despite these limitations, theOrdnance Committee in the spring of1940 approved bullet-sealing tubes forpneumatic-tired combat vehicles. A yearlater changes in tube composition gavesomewhat improved performance.99 In ad-dition to work on bullet-sealing tubes and

96 See Handbook Ord Auto Engr, Vol. I, Sec. V,OHF.

97 See Ch. XVIII, below.98 OCM 10727, 25 May 33; 12596, 16 Jan 36;

14962, 30 Mar 39.99 OCM 16917, 26 Jun 41. For additional informa-


modified solid rubber tires,100 engineersin 1940 began experimenting with stand-ard commercial pneumatic tires equippedwith beadlocks, devices designed to pre-vent deflated tires from creeping on therim. To use beadlocks, the tires had to bemounted on special divided rims. Sincetests showed that standard tires lacked thestrength to support the vehicle for morethan a short distance after a road hazardor gun fire had deflated the tube, atten-tion centered on developing tires withstrengthened sidewalls and shoulders. Thestronger tires with beadlock devices, calledcombat tires, had many more plies than astandard tire of the same size and also in-terliners of highest quality rubber, whichadded greatly to the stiffness of the tirecasing. Thickness notwithstanding, com-bat tires when inflated had riding qualitiessimilar to standard tires. By the spring of1941 combat tires that could run seventy-five miles deflated had been developed.The Ordnance Committee approved lim-ited procurement of these in May 1941and the following October standardizedcombat tires with commercial heavy dutyinnertubes and divided rims for all combatvehicles,101 and later for scout cars, half-tracks, and a few transport vehicles.

The American combat tire was pat-terned after a somewhat heavier "run-flat" tire developed by the British for theirarmored cars.102 In contrast to the Britishrubber beadlocks, American metal bead-locks, by permitting the tube to carrymore air, resulted in a lower operatingtemperature within the tire. Trouble with

segmented beadlocks at first used onAmerican combat tires led to design of amore rugged hinged type standardized inOctober 1942.103 The run-flat advantageof the combat tire was largely offset bothby the extra quantity of rubber needed inits construction and by the complexity ofmanufacture. During 1942 and 1943 theOrdnance Department, besides carryingout a development program for syntheticcombat tires, conducted unsuccessful ex-periments with a tubeless combat tire andwith steel restrictor rings for standardtires.104 As a conservation measure, theOrdnance Committee in March 1943 ap-proved construction of lower quality natu-ral rubber combat tires and a reduction ofapproximately 50 percent in the original75 mile run-flat requirement. Approval ofa 40-mile run-flat requirement for all com-bat tires came in November 1943.105 Testshad shown that the high operating tem-perature generated by synthetic sidewallsthick enough to support the vehicle overgreater distances when no air was in thetube seriously restricted inflated mileage.

In the meantime, as a further rubber

tion on sponge fillers and bullet-sealing tubes see: (1)OO 400.703/11528, OO 451.92/279, OO 451.92/320,OO 451.92/346, OO 451.92/388, OO 451.92/394,and OO 472.12/3953 files, all in DRB AGO; (2) listof R&D Projects in Progress in Ind Serv, OCO, FY1941, OHF; and (3) rpts prepared in conjunction withAberdeen Ord Program 5229, OHF.

100 The "zero pressure" tire tried in 1940 on a105-mm. howitzer carriage was in effect a hollow shellof a solid rubber tire vulcanized to a steel rim. Sinceit was hollow, it flexed readily and gave a smootherride and better traction than a regular solid tire, butat high speeds rapid flexing caused heat failure. (1)OCM 15940, 11 Jul 40. (2) OO 472/986 and OO472.22/1018 files, DRB AGO.

101 OCM 16743, 22 May 41; 17341, 16 Oct 41.102 During the rubber shortage the British preferred

metal to synthetic rubber beadlocks that took a per-manent set after they were installed. Rubber forMechanized Warfare, OHF.

103 OCM 19066, 22 Oct 42.104 (1) See Ch. XVIII, below, for conservation of

rubber. (2) OCM 19004, 8 Oct 42; 19490, 23 Dec 42;21295, 12 Aug 43; 22433, 29 Nov 43. (3) Rubber forMechanized Warfare, OHF. (4) Lt Col Burton J.Lemon, OCO-D, Rubber, The Ordnance Story ofRubber, Its Problems and Solutions, MS, OHF.

105 OCM 19922, 11 Mar 43; 22089, 11 Nov 43.


conservation measure, use of combat tireson certain antiaircraft artillery carriageswas discontinued because, the Army Serv-ice Forces stated, "These guns are gen-erally used outside the actual combatzone, they are usually in a semipermanentemplacement, the prime mover is notequipped with combat tires." 106 Indeed,by late 1943 the shortage of military trucktires had become so acute that sharplycurtailed use of combat tires for all vehi-cles was considered. Two to four truck tirescould be produced for every combat tire,and experience had shown that the latter,though highly desirable, was not essen-tial.107 Fortunately, drastic curtailmentproved unnecessary, and throughoutWorld War II large quantities of combattires continued to roll off production lines.

High Flotation Tires

Operations in North Africa in 1942 andearly 1943 proved that regular tires didnot provide sufficient flotation in desertsand. Concurrently, need arose for greaterflotation in muddy cross-country terrainand on beaches. Tires developed to fillthese dual requirements were originallycalled "desert" tires. But, in as much asdesert warfare ended while they were stillunder development, they came to be usedprimarily for cross-country operations,and the name gradually became "cross-country" tire.

Initial development work centered ontires for the two most important transporttrucks, the 2½-ton 6x6, and the 4-ton 6x6.By January 1943 a satisfactory tire for the2½-ton transport and amphibian DUKWhad been developed, and by May one forthe larger truck.108 The design of bothtires was a compromise. The mud andsnow tread, which was thinner than thestandard because of the larger ground

contact area, gave traction in mud. Thelarge cross section and the greater flexibil-ity from thin sidewalls provided flotationand cooler running in hot sand. The extraplies afforded protection against rocks.These tires were operated at low pressureon sand and in mud and were reinflatedby air compressors when they ran on hardroads. Because of their greater size, a sin-gle high-flotation tire was mounted oneach wheel instead of dual tires on rearwheels.

High-flotation tires, like combat tires,had to be mounted on wheels with dividedrims and beadlocks. The beadlocksclamped the casings to the rims to preventcreeping at low pressures. These largertires in some cases also required vehicularmodifications such as the alteration ofbrake drums or limitation of the spring ac-tion to prevent tire interference with cargobodies.109 For installation on transport ve-

106 Memo, ASF to OCO, 28 May 43, sub: Elimina-tion of Combat Tires on AA Gun Carriages, OO451.92/3581, DRB AGO. See also OCM 21063, 15Jul 43.

107 (1) Ltr, AGF to ASF, 23 Sep 43, sub: Substitu-tion of Standard Heavy Duty Tires for Combat Tires,Binder 1, ASF 451.92 Tires. (2) Message, WAR toAlgiers, 22 Oct 43, CM-OUT 9838, and Algiers toWAR, 12 Nov 43, CM-IN 7371, cited in memo, ASFRubber Br to ASF Dir of Rqmts, 15 Nov 43, sub: Useof Combat Tires, OO 451.92/496. (3) Ord Tech Com-mittee Subcommittee Item R-222, 17 Nov 43, sub:Non-Combat Type Tires for all Towed, WheeledArtillery Materiel, Incl Mobile Artillery Carriages,AA Gun Carriages, Caissons, Limbers, and AmmoTrailers Recommended, cited in 1st Ind, ASF toOCO, 18 Nov 43, OO 451.92/496. (4) 2d Ind, OCOto ASF, 28 Nov 43, sub: Use of Combat Tires, OO451.496. (5) Memo, OCO to ASF, 4 Dec 43, sub:Combat Tires, OO 451.92/498. (6) Memo, OCO toASF, 6 Dec 43, sub: Use of Combat Tires, OO451.92/453. All in DRB AGO.

108 OCM 19547, 21 Jan 43; 19817, 25 Feb 43;20340, 6 May 43; 20580, 27 May 43.

109 (1) OCM 21221 , 5 Aug 43; 23334, 30 Mar 44.(2) Rubber for Mechanized Warfare, OHF. (3) Intervwith Marion Cullen, 19 Sep 51. (4) Interv, 2 Oct 51,with Gerald S. Reinsmith, Tank and Auto Br, R&DDiv.


hides with regular wheel equipment, Ord-nance engineers had to devise complicatedkits containing the new tires, chains, aircompressors, proper tubes, rims, bead-locks, and other equipment. Since theOrdnance Department was concernedwith over-all vehicle performance, nottires alone, these so-called desert kits alsocontained equipment for improving en-gine-cooling characteristics. Unfortu-nately, most of the kits were still in the de-velopment stage when the Germans weredefeated in North Africa, and only a fewfor the 2½-ton truck were available forservice in that campaign.110 Although theseries of desert kits was later standardized,no widespread use was ever made ofthem.111

Interest in the tires themselves remainedbecause, in addition to excellent flotationin sand, they offered some advantage inmud. When the end of the North Africancampaign shifted emphasis from tires fordesert warfare to problems of mud flota-tion, Ordnance engineers developed aslightly different high-flotation tire for the2½-ton truck and modified the tire for thelarger truck. Both tires had a full depthtread that gave better traction and greaterwear. The desert tire for the 2½-ton truckwas used mainly on the DUKW.112 Forordinary highway use the high-flotationtire had certain disadvantages. It madetrucks more difficult to drive and main-tain and reduced their ability to climbgrades. Moreover, it required more cruderubber than a regular tire and, even ifpressure were carefully regulated to matchchanging terrain, was less durable.

Although recognizing the drawbacks ofhigh-flotation tires, the Ordnance Depart-ment, in response to requests from theusing arms and services,113 developedanother series of kits called cross-countrykits, which enabled men in the field to in-

stall these tires on transport trucks,trailers, and tractors, and to substitutelarger, regular-size tires for smaller tires oncertain vehicles in order to improve mudflotation.114 Development work continuedon kits for a limited number of additionalvehicles.115

Auxiliary Flotation Devices forArtillery Carriages

The flotation difficulties encountered bywheeled artillery in European mud wereintensified in jungle terrain. The Bordenmission sent to the Pacific in 1943 reportedthat to increase the maneuverability of ar-tillery pieces, "track-laying vehicles of lowunit ground pressure and excellentgrouser action must be employed as primemovers, and greater flotation must begiven to the towed load by use of skidplates or other suitable means." Of fieldexperiments with B-25 aircraft tires on the105-mm. howitzer carriage, the missioncommented:

. . . greater ground clearance was provided,the tires did not hang up on stumps butbounced off and the stability of the carriagein firing was not impaired. However, thesedesirable features were measured against thecasualties which would result from the use of

110 (1) Col Lemon, Rubber, The Ordnance Storyof Rubber, OHF. (2) Rubber for Mechanized War-fare, OHF.

111 OCM 21221, 5 Aug 43.112 See n. 109(2), 109(3), and 109(4).113 For further information on the development of

high-flotation tires and the downward adjustments ofrequests for these tires see (1) correspondence and minof mtgs filed in OO 451.92/521, OO 451.92/1998,OO 451.92/4338, OO 451.92/4549, OO 451.92/4610and OO 451.92/4641; (2) Binders 1 and 2, ASF451.92 Tires; (3) Engr Bd Rpt 796, Low PressureTires in Mud, 1 Mar 44, ASF 451.92, 1 Mar 44. Allin DRB AGO.

114 OCM 24265, 29 Jun 44, standardized a series ofcross-country kits. The regular tires used were the7.50-16 and the 14.00-20, 20 ply.

115 OCM 25229, 28 Sep 44.


these tires which are more susceptible to de-flation when hit by fragments than are com-bat tires, and as a result the theater did notfavor introduction of these larger airplanetires.116

The first auxiliary flotation devices devel-oped by the Ordnance Department wereshoe plates, or skid pans, for the 105-mm.and the 155-mm. howitzer carriages.117

These steel plates, fitted under the axleand trails of the carriages, supported theload when the wheels sank in the mud.However, the ditch-like ruts that thewheel dug in the mud often hinderedprime movers that followed. To overcomethis, in 1944 wooden mud sleds that fittedunder the wheels were designed for the105-mm. howitzer, lighter artillery, andcertain cargo and ammunition trailers. Aswooden sleds could not support the weightof the 155-mm. howitzer,118 early in 1945teams were rushed to the theatres to intro-duce steel sleds, combining less weight andmore durability with sufficient strength tosupport greater loads.119

Self-Propelled Artillery

Self-propelled artillery was one of themost controversial weapons of the war. Inthe 1930's, when the Ordnance Depart-ment had urged the advantages of motor-izing guns and howitzers, the Field Artil-lery had contended that towed artillerywas more maneuverable, less conspicuous,less likely to be deadlined for repairs, andless expensive. In the case of the self-pro-pelled field gun, these arguments persisteddown to the summer of 1944. On the otherhand, the self-propelled antitank gun or"tank destroyer" advocated by the Ar-mored Force was accepted early in WorldWar II. It differed from the tank in havingthinner armor and an open, rather thanenclosed, turret. It was therefore lighter

and faster but, while giving the crewgreater visibility, also gave them less pro-tection from enemy fire. A more vulner-able vehicle than the tank, the self-pro-pelled antitank gun was designed for hit-and-run tactics rather than for slugging itout with the enemy. Since combat demon-strated that it was valuable not onlyagainst tanks but also in support of infan-try and armor, the term "tank destroyer"came to be a misnomer. The self-propelledfield gun bore little resemblance to eithertank or tank destroyer. The big gundwarfed its carriage, a tank chassis with-out turret or inner compartment for crew.But the carriage enabled the gun to moveout of action before the enemy could getthe range and to get closer to the targetthan had hitherto been possible for heavyartillery. In the end, the using serviceswere converted to gun motor carriages forfield guns as well as for antitank guns.120

116 Borden Rpt, Jungle Warfare Mission, Missions,Barnes file, OHF.

117 (1) OCM 23692, 4 May 44; 25523, 30 Oct 44;25901, 30 Nov 44. (2) WD Tech Bull 9X-44, 24 Jan44; 9X-45 and 9X-46, 28 Jan 44; 9X-56, 18 Feb 44.(3) Files OO 473.2/237, OO 472/374, OO 428/29,and OO 472.2/229, DRB AGO. (4) Opns Div WDGSInformation Bull, Vol. I, No. 7, 10 Apr 44, atchd tomemo, ASF for CG ETO, 14 Apr 44, sub: Skid Pansfor Field Artillery, ASF 472.2 (14 Apr 44) Opns Rpts,DRB AGO.

118 ETO Immediate Rpt 20 (Combat Observa-tions), 27 Dec 44, Special Collection Combat Rpts,97-11.5 (14207), DRB AGO.

119 (1) ASF R&D file 451.91-1945, DRB AGO. (2)OCM 23876, 18 May 44; 24421, 20 Jul 44; 25823,23Nov 44; 26042, 14 Dec 44. (3) Artillery Transporta-tion Accessories: Sleds, Skis and Shoe-Plates, MS,OHF. (4) Daily Log of Activities of Mud Sled Dem-onstration Teams in Pacific Ocean Area and WesternPacific Area, 7 Jul-17 Aug 45, Special CollectionCombat Rpts 8-5.0707/45 (17036), DRB AGO.

120 (1) OCM 16341, 19 Dec 40. (2) PSP 46, Pt. D,Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery, pp. 5-14, OHF. (3)Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 603, 607. (4) EddyRpt, p. 49, OHF. (5) Col. John Lemp, FA, and Maj.Ernest C. Hatfield, Cav, "Tank Destroyers as AssaultGuns," Field Artillery Journal, XXXV (1945), 244-45.(6) Lt. R. L. McNelly, FA, "Tank Destroyers at


Gun motor carriage development forWorld War II began in June 1940 whenthe Secretary of War, on the recommenda-tion of the Board of Officers on the Devel-opment of Equipment for Armored Divi-sions, directed the Ordnance Departmentto develop a mount for the 75-mm. anti-tank gun and suggested the chassis of thelight tank. The newly established ArmoredForce appended its own recommendationfor the medium tank chassis, because of itscapacity to carry more ammunition anda larger crew, and asked that the 105-mm.howitzer be considered as the weapon.Substitution of the howitzer—inherentlysupport rather than antitank artillery—was comparatively easy, but the mountpresented problems. The first requisite,high speed, meant light weight, but lightweight meant either less carrying capacityor thinner armor. The Ordnance Depart-ment was inclined to favor a new commer-cial high-speed tractor and proposed usingthe more powerful 3-inch gun as theweapon.121

Offsetting the difficulty of adapting thetank chassis to this new purpose was theadvantage of expediency. Eventually afaster motor carriage designed especiallyfor self-propelled artillery was developed;in the meantime, after experimentationwith wheeled carriages and half-tracks, at-tention centered on the medium tankchassis. By dispensing with a closed turretand reducing the armor, engineers couldgive the medium tank M3 or M4 the mo-bility and speed of a light tank, togetherwith adequate power and room for ammu-nition and crew.122 Artillery so mountedsoon proved itself on the battlefield. The

first to see action was the 105-mm. how-itzer mounted on the medium M3 tank,rushed to the British early in 1942. Desig-nated the M7, but called "The Priest" be-cause of its pulpit-like machine gun plat-form, it helped to defeat Rommel at ElAlamein. Observers were impressed by itseffectiveness in getting the enemy off bal-ance.123 Another early weapon developedfor antitank use was the 3-inch gunmounted on the medium tank M4, themotor carriage designated the M10. It waspopular in North Africa and Italy.124 Tocombat the thicker armor encountered inEurope, the new 90-mm. gun was mountedon the same M4 chassis. When a new lighttank, the M24, became available, the105-mm. howitzer was mounted on itschassis. For antiaircraft work, two 40-mm.guns on the M24 chassis served.125

The one motor carriage designed espe-cially for self-propelled artillery was anoutgrowth of tank destroyer developmentinitiated by the War Department G-3 in

Work—Without the Book," Field Artillery Journal,XXXV (1945), 396-98. (7) Barnes, op. cit., pp. 248-57. (8) Lt. [Col.] Lewis R. Softer, FA, "An M12 Bat-talion in Combat," Field Artillery Journal, XXXV(1945), 29-31.

121 (1) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 19 Jun 40, sub: 75-mmSelf-Propelled Gun Mount, and inds, 9 Jul 40, 17 Jul40. and 24 Aug 40, OO 472.12/6305, DRB AGO. (2)OCM 16341, 19 Dec 40.

122 (1) Memo, WDGS G-3 for ACofS G-4, 30 Jul41. sub: Military Characteristics for Development ofNew Equipment—a Self-Propelled Mount for Anti-Tank Weapons (Light Type), and ind, 17 Dec 41, OO472.1/2349, DRB AGO. (2) OCM 16867, 19 Jun 41;16933, 3 Jul 41; 17245, 18 Sep 41; 17294, 2 Oct 41;17303, 9 Oct 41; 17377 and 17390, 30 Oct 41; 18098,23 Apr 42. (3) R&D Study, 37-mm. Gun Motor Car-riages, OHF.

123 (1) OCM 18007, 2 Apr 42; 17760, 5 Feb 42. (2)Barnes Diary, 2 Aug 43, OHF. (3) PSP 46, Pt. D, App.D, pp. 47-49, OHF. (4) Barnes Rpt to Gen Devers onMission to North Africa, p. 2, OHF. (5) New YorkWorld Telegram, July 21, 1943.

124 (1) OCM 18006, 2 Apr 42; 18313, 4 Jun 42;18597, 6 Aug 42. (2) Eddy Rpt, pp. 5, 22, 49, OHF.(3) Barnes Diary, 6 Nov 43, OHF. (4) Lt. Col. J. P.Barney, FA, "TD's Approach Maturity," Field Artil-lery Journal, XXXIV (1944), 775.

125 (1) OCM 25812, 23 Nov 44; 23978, 1 Jun 44.(2) Barnes Diary, 13 Sep 43; 31 Jan 44; 23 Nov,44.(3) Barnes, op. cit., p. 242. See also Ch. XIV, below.


1941. The objective was a very fast, lightlyarmored, cross-country tracked vehiclewith a low silhouette; it was to be equippedwith the Christie suspension. Though G-3proposed using the 37-mm., in April 1942,following a conference between GeneralMoore of the Army Ground Forces' Re-quirements Division and General Barnesof Ordnance, a 57-mm. gun was substi-tuted. A few months later when the TankDestroyer Center asked for the 75-mm.gun, a carriage designated the T67, mount-ing the larger gun, was built.126 After testsat Aberdeen comparing this model withother types of tank destroyers, the newlyestablished Special Armored Vehicle Boardin the fall of 1942 selected the T67 as themost satisfactory. Further developmentbrought about the substitution of oneWright radial engine for two Buick enginesand the more powerful 76-mm. gun for the75-mm. In its final form the carriage, nowthe T70, had the new torsion bar suspen-sion. It was faster than any track-layingvehicle ever before produced; on levelground it could do better than 50 miles anhour. So promising was the design and sogreat was the demand for an effective anti-tank weapon, that the Army ServiceForces in January 1943 ordered 1,000T70's manufactured without extensiveservice tests. Testing was carried onthroughout 1943 concurrently with pro-curement.127

Improvements provided better slopeclimbing and better performance in lowgear. The T70 was standardized in April1944 as the M18. Despite early forebodingsabout the thinness of its armor, it gave ex-cellent service, especially when the 76-mm.gun was fired with tungsten carbide coredammunition. Like the self-propelled 3-inchand 90-mm. guns, the 76-mm. often func-tioned as an assault gun in support of

infantry and armor. Much of the credit forgetting it to the battlefield belonged toBrig. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, commanderof the Tank Destroyer Center, but Ord-nance engineers were justifiably proud ofthe M18 as one of the major artillery de-velopments of the war.128

Self-propelled field guns might not havegot overseas at all had the Ordnance De-partment not early developed a motor car-riage for the 155-mm. gun and contrivedits acceptance by the using services. In thespring of 1941 the Ordnance TechnicalStaff began development of self-propelledmounts for field guns in calibers up through155-mm. Experiments showed that tankchassis could be successfully adapted byadding a spade to keep the vehicle steadywhen the gun recoiled. Ammunition andcrew could be carried in an accompanyingvehicle.129 In the face of AGF opposition,it was only by persuading General Somer-vell to go to the Secretary of War that Gen-eral Barnes got authority to manufacturea model, the M12, mounting a 1918-type155-mm. gun. The Army Ground Forcesturned down the 4.5-inch self-propelledgun, authorized only a pilot model for the155-mm. howitzer, and anticipated no re-quirement during 1943 and 1944 for self-propelled field guns beyond a hundred

126 Memo cited n. 122(1). (2) Memo, WD G-3 forG-4, 2 Dec 41, sub: Development of Gun Motor Car-riage with Christie Suspension for Tank DestroyerUse, OO 472.1/3996, DRB AGO. (3) OCM 18039,9 Apr 42; 19185, 19 Nov 42.

127 OCM 19438, 7 Jan 43; 22918, 15 Feb 44.128 (1) Ibid. (2) Eddy Rpt, pp. 5, 63, OHF. (3) Cole,

op. at., pp. 603, 607. (4) Barnes, op. cit., pp. 246-47.(5) McCaskey, Role of the Army Ground Forces inthe Development of Equipment, Study 34, Hist Sec,AGF, 1946, p. 65. (6) Ltr, Col Colby, Chief of Devel-opment and Engr Dept, OCO-D, to Mr. F. GordonBarber, OCO R&D, 14 May 47 [sub: McCaskeyStudy], OHF.

129 (1) Memo, Gen Somers, Chief of Tech Staff Ord,for Asst Chief of Ind Serv, Engr, 3 May 41, sub: Self-


M12's. Standardized in 1942, the M12'sdid not get overseas until 1944.130 Never-theless, successful tests of medium self-propelled field guns at Fort Knox andreports from overseas, especially of theRussians' tactics in bringing big guns outof protected positions to fire point-blankon German dugouts, impelled the ArmoredBoard in December 1943 to recommendimmediate production of gun motor car-riages for medium and heavy artillery. TheArmy Ground Forces disapproved therecommendation pertaining to the heavyguns, but the Ordnance Department wentahead with pilot models even heavier thanthe M12. Thus a new 155-mm. gun, the"Long Tom," and the 8-inch howitzermounted on M4 tank chassis were readywhen demands from both European andPacific theatres brought about author-ization for procurement in July 1944.131

In the advance across France andthrough the Siegfried Line, the M12's livedup to General Barnes' expectations. Gen-eral Hodges considered them invaluable.They could be brought up to within a fewhundred yards of strong fortifications andblow them to pieces. Even more effectivewas the self-propelled Long Tom, the firstgun to fire on Cologne. Gun motor car-riages, by making possible the employmentof heavy cannon for direct fire, introduceda tactical innovation and thus showed howtechnicians at times could influence tacti-cal doctrine. By V-E Day the foresight thatinspired the development of these powerfulweapons and the drive that got them intocombat was vindicated. By V-J Day the8-inch gun and the 240-mm. howitzermounted on heavy tank M26 chassis wereready for shipment to the Pacific.132

Airborne Equipment

When in April 1940 German para-troopers dropped from the skies intoNorway, and in May landed behind Alliedlines at Fort Eben Emael in Belgium, mili-tary men realized that the Russian para-chute demonstrations in prewar maneuvershad inspired a new application of mobility,perhaps even a new form of warfare. Yetsince soldiers minus effective weaponscould have scant value in the enemy rearsave as intelligence agents, in the UnitedStates search for matériel suited to para-chute and glider delivery necessarily wenthand-in-hand with training men and de-signing aircraft to employ the new tech-nique. Paratroopers could land carryingshoulder and side arms with them, andmachine guns and ammunition chestscould be separately parachuted withoutgreat difficulty. Splitting the load into sev-eral parcels might even permit droppinglight-weight artillery. Heavier weapons, ifmade to fit into aircraft, could be flown inlater. But if infiltrating units could be sup-plied with greater mobility than their legs

Propelled Mounts, OO 451/839, DRB AGO. (2)OCM 16859, 19 Jun 41; 17082, 7 Aug 41.

130 (1) PSP 46, Pt. D, App. A and App. D, pp. 4-15,OHF. (2) Gen G. M. Barnes, Research and Develop-ment in the Ordnance Department During the Sec-ond World War, 28 Sep 45, p. 18, OHF. (3) OCM18584, 6 Aug 42; 18727, 27 Aug 42; 21396, 26 Aug43. (4) Barnes Diary, 8 Mar 44, OHF. (5) Interv withH. W. Evans, 4 Apr 52. (6) Ltr, Gen Barnes to GenWard, 25 Jan 52, OCMH. (7) Ltr, CG AGF to CGASF, 16 Oct 43, sub: Medium and Heavy CaliberSelf-Propelled Guns, OO 472/372, DRB AGO.

131 (1) PSP 46, Pt. D, App. C, pp. 5-89, OHF. (2)OCM 23098, 9 Mar 44; 23279, 23 Mar 44; 23482, 13Apr 44; 23653, 27 Apr 44; 24413, 13 Jul 44; 27119,29Mar 45. (3) Barnes Diary, 8 Mar 44, OHF. (4) EddyRpt, pp. 1,62, OHF.

132 (1) Ltr, Gen Barnes to Gen Campbell, 6 Mar 46,sub: Rpt on Heavy Tank Mission, OHF. (2) OCM27119, 29 Mar 45. (3) Barnes, op. cit., pp. 248-57. (4)Capt. Richard W. Van Home, FA, "Short RangeFiring Against the Siegfried Line," Field Artillery Jour-nal, XXXV (1945), 75.


would furnish, their fighting potentialwould clearly be enormously enhanced.

Airborne Tanks

With this thought in mind, the Ord-nance Department in February 1941 helda conference with representatives of G-4 ofthe General Staff, the Armored Force, andthe Air Corps to consider the possibilitiesof developing a special light-weight tankand an aircraft to transport and land it.Plans for Ordnance to develop the vehicleand for the Air Corps to develop the car-rier took shape quickly.133 As the PressedSteel Car Company of Pittsburgh hadalready informed the British PurchasingCommission that an airplane could be ob-tained without major change in design totransport a 7.5-ton tank, the list of tenta-tive military characteristics for the pro-posed tank included a weight limitationset at that tonnage.134 Design studies beganat once.

Of the several designs submitted, that ofthe Marmon-Herrington Company wasconsidered most satisfactory. Manufactureof one pilot model, designated the T9, wasapproved in the fall of 1941 and followedin January 1942 by a contract for two addi-tional pilot models.135 In the two later pilotmodels changes in the original specifica-tions led to assigning a separate designa-tion, T9E1. In as much as experimentswith the first pilot had demonstrated thatan increase in weight to 7.9 tons was neces-sary if the tank were to retain many of theimportant features required, both theArmy Air Forces and the British, who werealso interested in airborne tanks, agreedthat new models might run to thatweight.136 The first T9E1 pilot was com-pleted in November 1942 and was sent to

Aberdeen Proving Ground for various roadand firing tests. The second pilot, com-pleted shortly thereafter, was shipped toEngland for test.137

Meanwhile, ASF in April 1942 hadapproved quantity production of T9E1tanks even before development and stand-ardization were completed. Consequently,the first production models came off theline in December 1942. Extensive tests in1943 and 1944 by Ordnance and by theArmored Board, together with flight testsin C-54's, initiated several essentialchanges both in new vehicles and, by fieldmodifications, in those already pro-duced.138 In August 1944, after productionhad ceased, the T9E1 airborne tank wasadopted as a limited standard vehicle andredesignated the M22. Altogether 830 hadbeen built. Although several hundred wereshipped overseas to both U.S. and Alliedforces, none was used in combat. In mid-1945, with no future need contemplated,the M22 tanks were declared obsolete.139

This checkered career was the conse-quence of discovery that while the M22tank could be satisfactorily transported inC-54's, the tank itself possessed many limi-tations. It had insufficient armor to with-stand .50-caliber armor-piercing ammuni-tion; its engines developed very lowhorsepower; its meagre gas capacity gave

133 (1) R&D, Tanks, OHF. (2) Barnes Diary, 10Feb 41, OHF.

134 (1) R&D, Tanks, OHF. (2) Memo, Lt Col J. E.Upston, WDGS, to Gen Gerow, WPD, 19 Feb 41,sub: Aero Tank, War Plans Div, Folder 4308, WDGSfiles, DRB AGO. (3) OCM 16747,22 Mar 41; 17087,7 Aug 41.

135 OCM 19545, 21 Jan 43.136 OCM 19773, 18 Feb 43.137 OCM 19871,4 Mar 43.138 (1) OCM 24935, 31 Aug 44. (2) Files OO

470.8/352 and OO 470.8/782, DRB AGO. (3) AGFfile, Opns Rpt.

139 OCM 28265, 5 Jul 45.


it a limited range of operation; it carriedonly the light 37-mm. gun; it had too littlespace for cargo and crew; and it had poorover-all mechanical reliability. AGF ex-hibited little interest in this airborne tanknot only because of these shortcomings butalso because of the time consumed in get-ting it into action. Landing, reassembling,and driving it from the nearest airfieldcapable of handling C-54's to the scene ofcombat, perhaps as much as 100 to 200miles, took so long that the enemy couldget to the battlefield tanks with muchgreater fire power and armor. The air-borne tanks would probably then beoutnumbered. 140

The Airborne Center in the summer of1944 submitted to the ASF plans for animproved airborne tank to be carried in-side larger planes then under developmentand suggested investigation of the possi-bility of transporting the tank suspendedbeneath the plane so that launching froma low-flying carrier could be made nearthe scene of battle. The AAF commentedthat the C-82 was the only plane underdevelopment probably capable of carryingthe proposed tank internally. Flight rangeof the C-82 carrying such a tank would belimited by the reduced fuel load. More-over, previous research had established theimpracticability of launching a tank froma plane in flight, since the average loadedcargo plane had a minimum flying speedof well over 100 miles an hour and thespeed the tank could attain was only 40 to50 miles an hour. Attempts to attach atank beneath the fuselage of a plane andthen lower the tank to the ground after theplane had landed also proved unsuccess-ful. The Ordnance Department pointedout that a tank with the larger engine,more powerful gun, and heavier armor de-sired could not be built within the essential

weight limitations imposed by aircraft andgliders under development. Improvementof an airborne tank would have to dependupon improving components such as infi-nitely variable transmission, torsion barsuspension, center guide tracks, and a newturret.141

Since rapid development of such anairborne tank would entail establishmentof priorities that possibly would interferewith other high-priority projects, the entirematter was restudied. Since it was knownthat a tank could not be launched from aplane in flight, that the M22 was insuffi-ciently armored to be employed properlyin a tank role, that the largest planes underdevelopment would be unable to carry asufficiently heavy model, and, finally, thataircraft could be used more effectively inairborne operations to transport otherweapons and additional troops rather thanan inadequate combat vehicle, the Air-borne Center in December 1944 declaredthat no need existed for a special airbornetank.142

Nevertheless, the decision to foregodevelopment of a special airborne tank didnot lessen the long-standing AGF desire forair transport of standard tanks. In the lat-ter part of 1944 Ordnance engineers beganstudying the possibilities of carrying theM24 light tank in the C-82 plane, which,

140 (1) OCM 24935, 31 Aug 44. (2) 5th Ind, ColColby to OCO-D, 18 Oct 44, sub: Test of AirborneTank, OO 470.8/1448 Tanks, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, LtCol E. Bibb, 28th Airborne Tank Battalion, to BrigGen James G.Christiansen, WDGS, 8 Aug 44, Drawer9980, AGF 470.8, DRB AGO.

141 (1) Ltr, Airborne Center to ASF, 4 Jul 44, sub:Test of Airborne Tank, with attached blueprints. (2)2d Ind, AAF to ASF, 14 Aug 44. (3) 5th Ind, OCO-Dto ASF, 18 Oct 44. All in OO 470.8/1448 Tanks,DRB AGO.

142 (1) Ltr, cited n. 141(1) . (2) 9th Ind, Hq AirborneCenter to Armored Center, 26 Dec 44, DRB AGO.


though still in the development stage, wasdesigned to carry 10 tons of cargo. Thesolution was to use two planes, disassem-bling the tank so that its total weight couldbe distributed into equal loads of less than10 tons, loads that the dimensions of theC-82 cargo space could accommodate.Preliminary studies showed that this couldbe achieved by carrying the tank hull inone load and the turret, suspension, tracksand ammunition in a second. In February1945 the Ordnance Committee approveda complete, detailed study of means of par-tially disassembling and transporting theM24 and T24E1 light tanks and the self-propelled 76-mm. tank destroyer M18 inboth the C-82 and the XCG-10A glider.The glider, recommended by the AGF forstandardization and procurement, hadcargo capacity comparable to that of theC-82. This study was to include design ofequipment for dismantling and reassem-bling vehicles, for handling the variouscomponents, and for fastening themsecurely in the plane during flight.143

Of the two development projects set upat the tank center in Detroit, one concernedwith C-82 transport and the other withglider transport of the light tank M24, thelatter was the subject of marked differencesof opinion within the AAF. The planworked out by May 1945 during confer-ence between Ordnance and AAF repre-sentatives met with AGF disapproval inJune. The project for transporting the M24in the C-82 met with more success. By June1945 the equipment required to assemblethe tank in the field had been designed andtrial loadings and unloadings in a C-82fuselage were under way. Tests showed thata five-man crew using one set of tools couldunload and reassemble the tank in fourhours and forty minutes or, using two setsof tools, in three and a half hours or less.144

Airborne Artillery

The development of light-weight,compact artillery had long been an Ord-nance goal. To this aspiration the introduc-tion of airborne operations gave new impe-tus, and development of artillery designedespecially for air transport accordinglybegan in the fall of 1941. As larger cargoplanes and gliders appeared, an ever-increasing variety of weapons could beflown to the battlefields. In 1943 the Ord-nance Department began investigating thepracticability of transporting by air allitems of corps and division artillery. Testsconducted in 1943 and early in 1944showed that the equipment for the105-mm. howitzer, 155-mm. howitzer, and4.5-inch gun battalions could be success-fully carried in the largest available planes,the C-47, B-17, and B-24, though disas-sembly of some items before loading wasnecessary. The 155-mm. gun, 8-inch how-itzer, 8-inch gun, and 240-mm. howitzerall proved too large.145 Experimental useof aluminum and magnesium in artillerycarriage components, such as wheels andtrails, began in 1944 and continued afterthe war. The only artillery items designedspecifically for air transport during WorldWar II were the 105-mm. howitzer M3 andits carriage M3A1, the multiple 50-calibermachine gun mount M55, and the 40-mm.antiaircraft gun carriage M5.

143 OCM 26541, 1 Feb 45; 26715, 15 Feb 45.144 (1) OCO-D Development Div Hist, Vol. X, 1

Jan-31 Mar 45, Ch. 6, OHF. (2) OCO-D Develop-ment Div Monthly Rpts, Feb, Mar, May, and Jun 45,Projects KG-518 and KG-519, OHF. See also ltr,OCO to ASF, 12 Jul 45, sub: Equipment for LoadingLight Tank M24 in a C-82, Cargo Plane—Test byAirborne Board, and inds, OO 470.8/2205 Tanks,DRB AGO.

145 (1) OCO Tech Div Rpt, FY 1943-44, OHF. (2)First Rpt on APG Project Ord Program, 8-12 Feb 44,OHF.


In the fall of 1941 need was felt for a105-mm. howitzer transportable by air.Difficulty in getting the standard weapon,without disassembly, through the doorwayof the cargo planes necessitated consider-able change in both howitzer and carriage,a problem solved by shortening the barrel27 inches and using the smaller 75-mm.field howitzer carriage. Howitzer and car-riage were standardized in March 1943 asthe M3 and M3A1, respectively. The M3fired the same 33-pound shell as the origi-nal M2 105-mm. model, but maximumrange was reduced from 12,000 yards toslightly over 7,000 yards. Yet its lightweight, only 2,500 pounds for both thehowitzer and its rubber-tired, high-speedcarriage, made the weapon valuable notonly in airborne operations but also in am-phibious operations, mountain warfare,and for use over soft jungle terrain. Twocompletely assembled M3 105-mm. how-itzers and carriages could be transportedin a C-47 in contrast to only one M2model and carriage disassembled into fivemajor units.146

Equally, or perhaps even more successfulwas the development and production of amultiple .50-caliber gun mount and trailerfor airborne operations. When paratrooperscaptured an enemy airfield it was of the ut-most importance to set up an adequate de-fense immediately in order to hold the field.Against dive bombers and strafing planes,the new trailer mount M55 was invaluable.Its four heavy barreled .50-caliber machineguns in a power-operated turret weremounted on a two-wheeled trailer andcould be carried in either a CG-4A glider orin a C-47 plane. The trailer was equippedwith removable pneumatic-tired wheelsand mechanical jacks for emplacing themount and leveling it in firing positionwhen the wheels were removed.147

To meet the need for a larger caliberautomatic gun and mount that could betransported by air for use as either anti-tank or an antiaircraft weapon, Ordnanceengineers redesigned the 40-mm. antiair-craft gun carriage M2A1. The modifiedcarriage, standardized as the M5 in Sep-tember 1943, weighed considerably lessthan its ground counterpart; its width wasdecreased to permit passage through thedoorways of the C-46, C-46 A, C-47, andC-54 and it rode on two pneumatic tires.The chassis consisted of a center base withone permanently attached outrigger andthree removable outriggers which, alongwith the gun barrel, had to be removed be-fore loading the carriage into the plane.Three men could emplace the carriage inapproximately five minutes and raise itfrom firing to traveling position in abouteight.148

Paracrates

For equipment to be dropped from air-planes to paratroopers or other groundforces, reducing the weight and bulk ofeach item solved only part of the problem.There still remained the matter of protect-ing the items from being damaged whenthey hit the ground, and to the develop-ment of protective containers for this pur-pose Air Forces and Ordnance engineersdevoted considerable attention. They notonly developed containers for dropping

146 (1) OCM 17261, 25 Sep 41; 19910, 3 Mar 43.(2) APG Rpts on Ord Program 5824, 19 Jul 42, andOrd Program 6077, 8-12 Feb 44, OHF. (3) Hist ofRock Island Arsenal, Vol. II, 1939-December 1943.(4) Correspondence filed in AGF 472.2/105-mm.Howitzer-Rg 600, OO 472.22/181, OO 472.22/704,OO 472.22/3002, and OO 472.22/5139, all in DRBAGO.

147 (1) OCM 22521, 30 Dec 43. (2) OCO Tech DivRpt, FY 1944, OHF. See also Ch. XIV, below.

148 OCM 18883, 20 Aug 42; 21099, 20 Jun 43;21280, 9 Aug 43; 21516, 9 Sep 43.


weapons from planes but also added sev-eral new words to the English language,chief among them being "paracrate," theofficial name for containers that could befloated to earth by parachute, "parachest,"a trunk-like container for ammunition, and"paracaisson," a small, collapsible, hand-drawn ammunition cart.149

The first and most important paracrateswere for the 75-mm. pack howitzer, aweapon developed in the late 1920's foruse in mountainous territory and laterequipped with pneumatic tires for airborneuse. The relatively light units into whichthis weapon could be broken for transportby mule pack were equally well suited totransport by airplane and drop by para-chute. To protect the parts from the shockof landing, during the early months of1942 engineers designed a series of plywoodParacrates to fit each of the seven majorparts of the weapon, plus a parachest tohold ten rounds of ammunition and a para-caisson to transport the ammunition afterit hit the ground. The nine loads variedsomewhat in weight but averaged about300 pounds; they were floated to theground by parachutes of different colors toaid in the identification of the loads. Whentested in the fall of 1942 in actual air dropsat Fort Bragg, these containers gave fullprotection to the weapon and suffered littledamage themselves in the process. RockIsland Arsenal immediately produced fiftysets for further test by the using arms, andin June 1943, with the approval of the FieldArtillery Board and the Airborne Com-mand, the entire series was standardized.150

When combat troops later reported diffi-culties in finding and reassembling all theparts of the howitzer because of their widedispersal when dropped, a harness was de-signed to hold the nine packages together.

While these containers were being tested

and approved, Ordnance engineers turnedattention to reducing their weight andbulk, making them of some material otherthan plywood and redesigning them sothey could be readily disassembled forshipment overseas. In September 1943 ex-perimental paracrates of corrugated steelwent to Camp Mackall in North Carolinafor test. When dropped from an altitude ofabout 1,000 feet upon hard-baked soil theygave good protection to the weapon andwithstood the shock of landing better thanthe plywood crates. Further, as the steelcontainers were held together by nuts andbolts, they could easily be shipped unas-sembled at a great saving of shipping space.Because of their many advantages, thesteel crates eventually replaced those madeof plywood. During 1945 when the scarcityof light-weight metals eased somewhat,consideration was given aluminum andmagnesium paracrates, but the war endedbefore these lighter containers went intoproduction.

The 75-mm. pack howitzer was by farthe most important weapon for whichParacrates were used, but Ordnance engi-neers also worked on the development ofcontainers for a variety of other weaponsfrom 37-mm. guns and mounts and flamethrowers to 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortarsand 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles.During 1945 work continued on paracratesfor larger experimental matériel and theheavy barreled .50-caliber machine gun.151

Trucks

Pressure of time, coupled with acuteshortage of light-weight metals, precluded

149 See Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, p. 161.150 (1) Ibid. (2) OCM 20854, 24 Jun 43. (3) Ann

Rpt R&D Serv. FY 1943, p. 17.151 Ann Rpts R&D Serv, FY 1943, 1944, and 1945.


undertaking an elaborate program of de-signing special airborne trucks and focusedattention on means of disassembling stand-ard vehicles to permit their passage throughthe plane doorways into the narrow cargospace. The ¼-ton jeep could be easilyrolled into a plane without disassembly,but the larger trucks required modifica-tions ranging from the relatively simpleremoval of fenders, bumpers, and otherexterior parts of the ¾-ton truck to cuttingthe frame of the 2½-ton truck back of thecab, splitting the vehicle into two separateunits. After this operation, performed atthe factory, the two units were bolted to-gether by steel plates and the truck wasthen classified as an airborne vehicle.When it was to be transported by air, thesteel plates were removed and the twoparts of the vehicle were loaded on twoC-47's. The accompanying airborne prep-aration kit contained a two-wheel dolly

that served to support the front half of thetruck while it was being loaded on theplane.152

If the vastly greater mobility in groundwarfare that airborne operations promisedwas not fully realized in World War II, thepotentialities of the technique for the futurewere nevertheless well understood. Ad-vances in metallurgy before V-J Day werestill too slight to enable engineers to designand build many types of vehicles andweapons at once sufficiently compact, lightweight, and sturdy to be suited to air trans-port. But the research and developmentprogram mapped out embodied the hopethat in the postwar period developments inairborne ordnance would keep pace withthe training of troops in landing andusing it.

152 (1) OCM 20856, 24 Jun 43; 21235, 5 Aug 43;26686, 15 Feb 45; 26917, 8 Mar 45. (2) OCO-D De-velopment Div Hist, Vols., V, VI, VII, OHF.

CHAPTER XI

The Search for Increased FirePower in Ground Warfare:

Launchers and Fire ControlFire power on the battlefield had a two-

fold mission: to destroy hostile troops andmatériel, and to facilitate maneuver offriendly forces by compelling the enemy todeploy and seek shelter. To fulfill this mis-sion effectively, fire power had to becapable of responding to the tactical re-quirements of combat troops from therifleman to entire corps and armies. Al-though the theoretical ideal would havebeen a single weapon answering all thoseneeds, no such solution was feasible up tothe end of World War II. Physics, chem-istry, and the other sciences involved in thedesign of weapons had not discovered theprinciples or materials to equip the in-dividual with the fire power of heavyartillery. The ideal could only be ap-proached through the development ofweapons that narrowed the gap betweenthe destructive effect of large-caliber gunsand that of small arms. The extent towhich that gap was narrowed between1940 and 1945, and the successes and fail-ures experienced along the way, make upthe story of Ordnance research and devel-opment in the search for greater fire powerin World War IL

The Scope of the Problem

Raising the fire power of Americanground forces was a slow and difficultprocess. During the interwar years theOrdnance Department stood practicallyalone in exploring the data basic to theconstruction of improved firearms. Vir-tually no American in civilian life hadconcerned himself with investigations toresolve the numerous mysteries of ballis-tics, with the development of high yield-strength steels for more powerful guns,with the design of more accurate and saferfuzes, or with the composition of bettermilitary propellants and high explosives.That progress had been made in thesefields, or that American know-how in theart of weapon design had survived theinterwar period at all, redounds almost ex-clusively to the credit of the Ordnancearsenals and their laboratories.1

Efforts upon the outbreak of war inEurope to purchase indulgence for pastsins of omission came too late. True, thesudden increase in appropriations permit-

1 See Chapter II, above.

INCREASED FIRE POWER: LAUNCHERS AND FIRE CONTROL 325

ted the arsenals to reopen shops and aug-ment skeleton staffs, but the years lostcould not be brought back. The emer-gency was too pressing, the time lagbetween the beginning of research and de-velopment on new matériel and its readi-ness for issue to troops too great to permitthe diversion of limited available talentand facilities to fundamental innovations.Aside from one or two exceptions, Amer-ican combat troops consequently enteredthe war and won their victories with basi-cally the same types of weapons as those ofWorld War I: the rifle, machine gun,mortar, field gun, and howitzer.

Unlike the designer of military motorvehicles, who could draw on the vast ex-perience and technological progress ofprivate industry in supplanting the horsewith the internal combustion engine, thedesigner of military small arms and artil-lery was, in a manner of speaking, limitedto breeding a better horse. His wartime ef-forts focused primarily on bettering theperformance of existing weapons andadapting them to novel tactical require-ments. Amphibious, jungle, and airborneoperations, improved protective charac-teristics of potential targets such as thehigh speed and thick armor of moderntanks, demanded not only lighter weightand greater mobility, but also greater hit-ting power, greater accuracy, and higherrates of fire than ever before.

Serious problems arose at every steptoward those goals, and the solution of onedifficulty immediately begot a host ofothers. Gun metallurgy, for example,made tremendous strides in developingbetter steels. Whereas prewar cannon steelhad an elastic limit of roughly 60,000pounds per square inch, some steels de-veloped during the war had a limit of

160,000 pounds.2 But translating thatprogress into more powerful guns presup-posed the development of more powerfulpropellants with decreased erosion, flash,and smoke characteristics. And the higherinitial velocities of projectiles attainablewith these propellants in turn posed com-plex problems in connection with rotatingbands, clearance and crimping of cartridgecases, and twist and form of tube rifling.These were but some of the hurdles in in-terior ballistics, that part of the sciencedealing with the motion of projectiles con-cerned with their behavior while still inthe gun. Equally complex problems, dis-cussed later,3 presented themselves in ex-terior and terminal ballistics, realms ofscience dealing with the motion of the pro-jectile after it leaves the muzzle and itsbehavior upon impact on the target.4

World War II marked the first time inhistory that American troops wereequipped with a complete line of all re-quired types of weapons, from side arms tothe heaviest artillery piece. Not all theseweapons were actually new developments;many of the best known, such as the75-mm. and the 155-mm. guns, had beenadapted from foreign designs. But unliketheir fathers in World War I, U.S. troopsbetween 1941 and 1945 were never de-pendent on foreign matériel. Thankslargely to the farsightedness of the Wester-velt Board of 1919, modern versions of allbut three large-caliber weapons—the120-mm. antiaircraft and 8-inch field gunsand the 240-mm. howitzer, all completed

2 Barnes, Weapons of World War II, p. 231.3 See Ch. XII, below.4 For explanation of the theory and application of

interior, exterior, and terminal ballistics see, Maj.Gen. Thomas J. Hayes, Elements of Ordnance (NewYork, 1938).


early in the war—stood ready by the timeof Pearl Harbor.5

Until America's enemies and theatresof operations were actually known, the re-quired characteristics of weapons were ofnecessity determined largely by guess. De-velopment after 7 December 1941 there-fore became a hectic race against the clockto adapt rifles, guns, and howitzers to serv-ice in arctic cold, desert heat, and junglemoisture, and at the same time to keeptheir performance abreast of an enemy astechnically competent as the Germans.The task was so great and so intricate thateven its most significant aspects can merelybe touched upon in these pages.

Increasing Muzzle Velocities

Perhaps the best-known and mosturgent phase in the development of greaterfire power was the quest for increasedmuzzle velocities. Muzzle velocity, thespeed with which the projectile leaves thebore of a gun, was important primarily indirect-fire weapons such as field guns andtank and antitank guns, because it deter-mined range, flatness of trajectory, andpenetrating power of the projectile. Inindirect- or plunging-fire weapons such ashowitzers and mortars, on the other hand,it controlled largely range alone.

The muzzle velocity of a given guncould be stepped up in several ways. Thetube might be lengthened, the projectilemade lighter, the propellant charge in-creased, or more powerful powder em-ployed. Each method had its drawbacks.Lengthening the tube, for example, meantunbalancing the piece and limiting its mo-bility, as was illustrated by the superlongcannon of the German Tiger II and Pan-ther tanks which, for all their power, seri-

ously handicapped the vehicles in crossingditches or passing through towns andforests.6 Again, an increased or morepowerful propellant charge built upgreater gas pressure that might rupturethe tube unless its walls were thickened ormade of stronger steel.

While gun designers based many newweapons on existing ones or their com-ponents in order to permit quantity pro-duction in the shortest time possible, theyobtained improved performance, as wellas the weight savings required by mobilewarfare, by use of new and better mate-rials. The story of the 76-mm. tank gunwas a case in point. As soon as events inNorth Africa indicated the need for a gunof greater power and penetrating abilitythan the 75-mm. gun M3 of the Shermantank, Ordnance engineers began work onjust such a weapon. If the new cannonwere to reach the battlefield quickly andin quantity, it would have to fit into thetank without major modifications to turretor mounts and at the same time obviateneed for the lengthy process of developingnew ammunition. Taking the existing3-inch armor-piercing round as theirstarting point, Ordnance engineers de-signed around it a new high-velocityweapon made of high-quality steel. Thewhole development process was incrediblyshort. The project was initiated on 20August 1942 and the completed gun, des-ignated the 76-mm. M1, was standard-ized on 10 September, less than a monthlater. That same autumn, eighty of thenew guns were produced and ready for

5 (1) Col. William R. Gerhardt, "Artillery MaterielResearch and Development," Journal of AppliedPhysics, XVI, 12 (1945), pp. 757-58. (2) Barnes,Weapons of World War II, p. 113.

6 (1) Observations on Armored Tactics, 25 May 45,SAIC/23, OCMH. (2) OI-SIR/34, OCMH.


installation.7 Compared with the 75-mm.gun M3, the 76-mm. gun M1 weighedroughly 300 pounds more, but attained amuzzle velocity approximately 600 feetper second higher firing armor-piercingammunition and almost 1,300 feet per sec-ond higher firing high-explosive ammuni-tion. Realizing that still heavier gunswould be required to insure Americansuperiority on the battlefield, GeneralBarnes in September 1942 ordered the ini-tiation of a project adapting the high-powered 90-mm. antiaircraft gun to use incombat vehicles. Design of the 90-mm.tank gun T7 was completed in Decemberof the same year, but neither the 76-mm.nor the 90-mm. weapons were destined tosee action until the autumn of 1944.8

Despite the urgent representation ofOrdnance officers, all efforts to get thehigh-powered tank guns to the front failed.In the case of the 76-mm. gun, for exam-ple, the first production weapon mountedin a tank was successfully fired from a pilottank in September 1942, but in Novemberthe Armored Force recommended thatquantity production be deferred until ithad thoroughly tested several pilot modelsand determined their tactical suitability.The Ordnance Department was specifi-cally instructed to limit procurement totwelve Sherman tanks mounting the 76-mm. gun. Shortly thereafter the entireproject was dropped and was not reviveduntil the following spring when the ArmyGround Forces approved the diversion ofenough tanks mounting the new gun toequip one company. As a result of theseand similar delays, the first productiontanks equipped with the 76-mm. gun werenot completed until January 1944. Almostidentical circumstances kept the 90-mm.weapon off the battlefield. Until autumnof 1943 all attempts to interest the Army

Ground Forces in the weapon were unsuc-cessful. As a result, the 90-mm. gun motorcarriage M36, the first vehicle to mountthe cannon, was not standardized untilJune 1944, and in July General Dwight D.Eisenhower had to send Brig. Gen. JosephA. Holly, the chief of his Armored Fight-ing Vehicles and Weapons Section, to theUnited States to expedite getting the bestAmerican armor-piercing gun to thetroops.9

The Army Ground Forces objected inparticular to what they believed was atrend toward making guns bigger insteadof better. In connection with an Ordnanceproposal to mount a 105-mm. on a pro-jected tank, for example, the AGF stated:

... in our army we are using an increase inmass of the projectile rather than velocity tosecure improved penetrative ability. This con-dition is intolerable and must be corrected atthe earliest possible date through the use ofcannon specifically designed for use in tanksand gun motor carriages and by the use ofnew propellants which will furnish very highvelocities with greatly reduced smoke andflash as compared to present propellants. Thedeficiencies in the penetrative power of ourpresent 75mm. 76mm and 90mm guns ascompared to comparable German cannon isa matter of grave concern to our GroundForce commanders and this headquar-ters . . . .10

So far as penetrative power was concerned,7 (1) Interv, 14 Nov 51, with Paul M. Netzer, Can-

non Sec, R&D Div. 14 Nov 51. (2) OCM 18650, 20Aug 42; 18865, 10 Sep 42. (3) Catalogue of StandardOrd Items (2d ed, 1944), pp. 197-98.

8 (1) TM 9-2300, pp. 39, 45. (2) Memo, Gen Barnesfor Gen Campbell, 11 Oct 44, sub: Hist of TankGuns, OHF.

9 (1) Barnes MS, Tank Development, OHF. (2)Memo, Barnes for Campbell, cited above, n. 6(2).(3) Ltr, Gen Campbell to Gen Harmon, 21 Mar 45,OHF. (4) Ltr, Col Colby to Mr. F. Gordon Barber, 14May 47, OHF. (5) Final Hist Rpt, AFV and WeaponsSec, Hq ETOUSA, MS, n.d., OCMH.

10 Ltr, CG AGF to CG ASF, 30 Jan 45, sub: HeavyTanks T29 and T30, photostat in OHF.


the problem was far less one of muzzlevelocity than one of production limitations.For when firing the most powerful ammu-nition, tungsten-carbide core, the mostpowerful German tank gun—the 8.8 cm.Kw. K. 43 (L/71) of the Tiger II or RoyalTiger—and the U.S. 90-mm. gun M3—ofthe gun motor carriage M36 and the Per-shing tank—had almost identical veloc-ities: the German gun attained 3,240 andthe American 3,350 feet per second. Ger-man no less than American ballisticiansand designers were aware that increasingthe muzzle velocity and penetrative powerof a given weapon beyond a certain pointcreated problems such as excessive erosion,as well as a need for longer tubes, cham-bers, and cartridge cases, but did not pro-duce a greater effect beyond the projec-tile's point of impact. The Germans, too,therefore chose the quicker and more re-liable course of using a bigger gun whenthey wanted a greater destructive effect.German vehicle armament such as the128-mm. cannon of the Jagdtiger or tank-destroyer version of the Tiger II, as well asthe 150-mm. weapons under developmentfor superheavy tanks such as the 180-tonMaus, which was almost completed by theend of the war, gave ample evidence of thedefinite tendency toward bigness.11

Perhaps the best illustration of thelimited usefulness of hypervelocities andextraordinary penetrating power were theexperiments with tapered bore weapons.In these, the projectile was squeezed to asmaller diameter as it traveled from thebreech to the muzzle. Presenting a largecross-sectional area to the powder gasesand a small cross-sectional area to the air,the projectile attained high velocity whileencountering little air resistance. Amer-ican experiments in the application of thisprinciple indicated that cylindrical bore

artillery employing special projectilesserved every purpose of tapered bore gunsand at the same time avoided intricatemachining problems. The Germans, afterdiverting plant facilities for the actual pro-duction of three sizes of tapered bore anti-tank guns, eventually came to the sameconclusion and dropped the project. Al-though light in weight and capable of goodarmor penetration, the guns were difficultto manufacture, had a limited effectiverange because of rapidly decreasing veloc-ity, wore out after about 1,000 rounds, andcaused little serious damage after thesmall projectile cores had penetrated thetank armor.12

Rocket Launchers

Another important phase in the Ord-nance Department's quest for greater firepower began when tactical developmentsabroad demonstrated the urgent need forhand and shoulder weapons of so radicallyimproved performance as to exceed thelimitations of conventional design. Evenbefore the attack on Pearl Harbor, thefighting in Europe and North Africashowed that currently used small armswere incapable of defeating modernarmor. American designers who mean-while were developing small-size missilesthat, by embodying the shaped-chargeprinciple, would penetrate great thick-nesses of steel plate, likewise failed whenthey tried to launch them. The recoil in-

11 (1) TM 9-2300, p. 45. (2) Heereswaffenamt Hand-buck, Blatt G241, GMDS DRB AGO. (3) IllustratedRecord of German Army Equipment 1939-1945, Vol.III, compiled by The War Office, London (1947), pp.7-9, 36-40, OCMH. (4) Interrogation of Col Fried-rich Geist, former Chief of Development Br, TechDept, Speer Ministry, 4 Aug 45, OHF.

12 (1) Simon, German Research in World War II, p.189. (2) G. B. Jarrett, Achtung Panzer: The Story ofGerman Tanks, 1948, MS, photostat, OHF.


duced in weapons based on the conven-tional principle of internal combustionseverely damaged the launching deviceeven when it rested on the ground; firingit from the shoulder was obviously out ofthe question. The search for a practicablemeans of getting a shaped-charge missileon its way to the target finally ended whenrecourse to rocket propulsion eliminatedrecoil altogether. The launching device,the bazooka, was merely a tube, open atboth ends, that fired an electrically trig-gered rocket. While the new weapon hadless accuracy and range than a rifle ormachine gun, it lent the individual soldierhitting power heretofore possible only withartillery guns.

Although the most difficult problem inthe development of the bazooka centeredon its propulsion, several significant modi-fications to the launcher itself provednecessary during the course of the war.Thus, when reports from the field beganpouring in late in 1942, a number ofchanges were introduced—a web sling tofacilitate carrying, a shield to protect theface of the soldier firing the launcher, anda correction to ensure contact between thelauncher and the band on the rocket. Atrigger-operated magnet replaced the bat-teries powering the firing mechanism ofthe first models. The new device, relativelyimpervious to extremes of temperatureand dampness, facilitated field mainte-nance and supply, particularly in thetropics where fungus tended to corrodeand affect electrical connections. Wire-wrapping the launcher tube to give greaterstrength and eliminating the contactorbox constituted modifications markedenough to require by July 1943 a newmodel designation, the M1A1.13 Moredrastic changes followed almost at oncewhen the Commanding General, Airborne

Command, requested a model that couldbe taken apart and carried in two approxi-mately equal loads for paratroop use. Theusing arms also asked for a better sight,addition of a safety switch, improved shapeof a two-position stock, and other lessermodifications. These were incorporated inthe rocket launcher standardized in Octo-ber 1943 as the M9. In the last modelstandardized before the war ended, weightwas reduced more than five pounds bymaking the tube of aluminum instead ofsteel. This, the M18, never got to thefront.14

Despite the simplicity of the rocketlauncher as compared to a rifle, machinegun, or conventional artillery piece, thebazooka's development again illustratesthe fact, familiar to every designer, thatone desired change usually entails a hostof other changes. The two-piece bazookasoon showed weakness in the coupling ringby which the two lengths of the launchertube were screwed together; much sturdierforged coupling components then had toreplace the original ring. Substitution ofthe mechanical electric firing mechanismfor the batteries solved some problems onlyto create others when pronounced devia-tions in performance appeared in the field.To cope with this situation the Departmenthad to procure testers enabling Ordnanceunits in the theatres quickly to determinewhether or not the electric firing mecha-nisms were functioning. The testers in turnrequired modifications as faults showedup.15 The noteworthy feature of this storyof constant redesign is that production ofthe bazooka continued uninterrupted,

13 (1) OCM 19696, 11 Feb 43; 19800, 25 Feb 43;21203, 5 Aug 43.

14 OCM 21882, 21 Oct 43; 25894, 30 Nov 44;26985, 15 Mar 45; 27497, 3 May 45; 27761, 24May 45.

15 OCM 23408, 6 Apr 44; 24922, 31 Aug 44.


MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER T34 mounted on a Sherman tank.

and, imperfections notwithstanding, Alliedtroops in all parts of the world used it withgreat effectiveness.

Despite the wartime progress in rocketdevelopment, many unsolved problemsremained. Neither shoulder weapons suchas the bazooka nor multiple launcherssuch as the 4.5-inch T34, a sixty-tubecluster fired from the Sherman tank, werevery accurate. Their primary value lay, inthe first instance, in giving the foot soldierfor the first time in history the equivalentof hand-carried artillery powerful enoughto stop tanks, and in the second instance,in providing a ground weapon that couldquickly cover an area with a hail of fire.Compared with conventional artillery,their only unquestioned advantage wasthe low cost of the simply made launchingdevice. Otherwise, their inaccuracy maderocket weapons a poor substitute for ar-

tillery.16 That the enemy experienced simi-lar difficulties is evidenced by thecomment of a German general who, whenasked his views on the Panderschreck, thecounterpart of the bazooka, replied: "Fautede mieux, on se couche avec safemme." 17

Recoilless Rifles

The last year of World War II saw theintroduction of two new weapons withmany of the advantages but substantiallyfewer disadvantages than those of rockets:the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles.Both fired regular artillery-type shells atvelocities and with an accuracy compa-rable with those of standard guns, but en-tirely without recoil. Both were light

16 Barnes, Weapons of World War II, pp. 48-49, 177.17 Observations of Armor Employment, SAIC/17,

24 May 45, OCMH.


enough to be hand-carried into action.The 75-mm. model could be fired fromthe standard tripod of the .30-caliber ma-chine gun; the 57-mm. rifle weighed amere 44 pounds and was readily fired fromthe shoulder or from a combination bipod-monopod.18

Development of the recoilless rifles tookan amazingly short time. Early in 1943 theSmall Arms Division of the Research andDevelopment Service commenced a studyof the principles involved, and shortlythereafter directed Frankford ArsenalLaboratory to make a detailed analysis.With help from data on foreign nonrecoilguns, derived primarily from Germanspecimens captured in North Africa, anda complete computation of interior ballis-tics, the whole basic theory of the projectedweapons was worked out and the first pilotmodel completed on 27 July. Test resultsfrom the pilot formed the basis for design-ing the weapon proper, and in Octoberthe first gun was completed. DesignatedRifle, Recoilless, 57-mm., T15E1, theweapon was successfully proof-fired atAberdeen Proving Ground between 8 and10 November. Design of the 75-mm. ver-sion began in March 1944 and the firstpilot was completed and fired that Sep-tember.19

The principle of the recoilless featurewas relatively simple. A perforated car-tridge case allowed a portion of the pro-pellent gases to escape to the rear throughvents in the breech. Pre-engraved ratherthan solid driving bands on the projectileobviated problems of engraving pressuresand contributed to the smooth functioningof the rifle. Anyone doubting its perform-ance could put a glassful of water on thetube and fire without spilling a drop.

Reports from users overseas were en-thusiastic. Both in the Pacific and in the

European theatres the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles proved highly effectiveagainst point targets such as tanks andpillboxes. Airborne troops, who at last hada really light-weight, high-powered weap-on for their specialized missions, testified,"The effective range of the [75-mm. re-coilless] gun for direct fire is the range ofvisibility. It is as accurate as an M1 rifleand you can hit a tank any place you de-sire. . . ." 20

Very Heavy Artillery: "Little David"

But while the mobility of modern armiesgave rise to the development of powerful,close-support weapons such as the bazookaand the recoilless rifle, it well-nigh doomedto extinction those types of artillery thatby their very size and weight were ill-adapted to overseas shipment as well as tohigh-speed, cross-country warfare. In theage of attack and heavy bombing aviation,airborne operations, and, finally, super-sonic rockets and guided missiles, the siegehowitzer and superrange gun were bothtoo vulnerable and too limited in useful-ness to warrant the man-hours and mate-rials that went into making and operatingthem. Although the Germans devoted un-told efforts to the design and constructionof large-caliber railway mounts and over-sized mortars, these monsters made littleelse than good news copy. The 80-cm."Gustav," for example, a railway gun fir-ing a 16,540-pound projectile over a rangeof over 29 miles (51,400 yards), required acomplement of some 40 separate cars,

18 TM 9-2300, pp. 84-87.19 Design, Development and Production of 57-mm.

Rifle, T15E3, 75-mm. Rifle, T25, PSP 78, May 1945,OHF.

20 (1) Excerpt from Observer's Rpt 71 [ETO], n.d.,in Press Release folder, OHF. (2) Barnes, Weapons ofWorld War II, p. 52.

75-MM. RECOILLESS RIFLE M20, AND THE "LITTLE DAVID" 914-MM.MORTAR T1, above and below, respectively.


could move only on double-track lines,and took 45 minutes just for the loading ofa single round. Its performance at Sevasto-pol and Leningrad was disappointing.21

The Ordnance Department developedonly one superheavy weapon, the 914-mm.mortar T1, "Little David." For sheer size,it topped anything even the Germans hadever attempted. Comprising two major as-semblies, the tube and base, it weighed172,900 pounds. Despite the necessity ofusing two powerful tractors to tow tubeand base, officers of Research and Devel-opment Service quaintly pronounced thisgiant "highly mobile." Its projectileweighed 3,650 pounds, including 1,589pounds of high explosive, and was fired bya maximum propelling charge of 218pounds of powder. Its range was roughly9,000 yards. Five men were needed to loadthe propelling charge, two to ram the pro-jectile into the muzzle, and two equippedwith hand brushes had to crawl into thebore to clean it.

Development on Little David began inMarch 1944 as the result of a requirementfor a new weapon to destroy partiallyburied, reinforced-concrete works that theArmy expected to meet in the ETO. By 31October the tube and base section of thefirst pilot had arrived at Aberdeen. Subse-quent test firings revealed the need for sev-eral modifications in the base componentsand the method of emplacement becauseof the severe shock of firing and the heavyrecoil. Following numerous test firings andfurther changes of tube, base, and ammu-nition, the weapon was demonstrated toGeneral Marshall, General Somervell, andother high-ranking officers on 16 July 1945.The end of hostilities soon after canceledplans for shipping the weapon to the Pacificand prevented the use of Little David incombat.22

Fire Control

Since the most efficient performance ofa weapon in firing its projectiles is uselessif fire is so faultily directed as to miss thetarget, one of the most important Ord-nance efforts to provide Allied forces withgreater fire power was to obtain more ac-curate fire control. Devices for observingtargets and aiming weapons had been un-der study and development by Ordnanceengineers for many decades before 1941,but World War II brought a need for awide variety of new and improved firecontrol instruments both for antiaircraftbatteries and for firing at fast-movingground targets such as tanks and trucks.23

The basic principles of fire control instru-ments used in World War II were the sameas those of World War I, but after 1940Ordnance engineers worked steadily to-ward increasing the accuracy and range offire control matériel, reducing the work re-quired of gun crews, providing illumina-tion for night firing, and designing instru-ments that would be light enough for easytransport and yet strong enough to with-stand rough handling. In addition, Ord-nance engineers were constantly facedwith the necessity of designing instrumentsthat, although built with the precision ofa fine watch, could be speedily mass pro-duced with minimum use of skilled man-power and strategic materials.24

The term "fire control instruments"

21 (1) Simon, op. at., pp. 190-91. (2) Guderian,Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, pp. 271-72 . (3) MS# T-111, Sec. B15 (Leeb). (4) TM-E 30-451. Hand-book on German Military Forces, VI1-33. OCMH.

22 Record of Army Ord R&D, 914-mm. MortarM1, n.d., OHF.

23 See: (1) Ch. XIV, below; (2) Crowell, America'sMunitions, 1917-1918, Book I, Ch. 6; and (3) The Ord-nance Sergeant, IV, 2 (1942).

24 The Research and Development Service in 1944prepared a four-volume detailed and comprehensive


covers a large number of items, rangingfrom the simple iron sights on a .30-caliberrifle to the complicated instruments em-ployed in directing a large artillery pieceat an unseen target many miles away. Itincludes both "on-carriage" and "off-car-riage" equipment, the former consistingchiefly of such instruments as sighting tele-scopes and elevation quadrants, and thelatter including range finders, binoculars,observation telescopes, compasses, andplotting boards. A mere listing of all thefire control instruments used in World WarII, with model numbers and modifications,would fill a small book. Discussion herecan cover only the general principles guid-ing the research and development work ona few representative classes.25

Telescopes and Binoculars

At the start of World War II Ordnancedesigners of telescopes and binocularswere seriously handicapped by a lack ofdomestic production of many types of op-tical glass. Before 1941 the United Stateshad imported from Germany types notmade in America, but the outbreak of warabruptly cut off this source of supply. As aresult, Ordnance designers did not have afree hand in developing instruments em-bodying the most advanced scientific prin-ciples since they could use only the typesof optical glass that the United States glassindustry could produce in quantity. In1940 only five standard types could be

used, and not until 1944 was a wide rangeof glasses available.26 Not only the Ord-nance Department but also the Navy, theArmy Air Forces, and other branches ofthe service were keenly interested in sight-ing, aiming, and photographic equipment.In many instances the development andproduction problems of all services wereclosely related. As none of the militaryagencies had adequate facilities and suffi-cient trained personnel to carry on single-handed the research required for an ag-gressive development program, they allturned for assistance to leading manufac-turers of optical instruments and to univer-sity laboratories. In this process the Na-tional Defense Research Committee andother government agencies performed in-valuable service in co-ordinating anddirecting a large share of the essentialresearch.27

The fact that each caliber of gun posedspecial problems for the designers of firecontrol matériel was another major influ-ence on Ordnance research and develop-ment in this field. No matter what effortswere made at standardization, sightingand aiming equipment, particularly tele-scope reticles, had to be tailored to fit theindividual weapon and its ammunition.Not only did each caliber require a specialtelescope, but each telescope required aspecial mount, and in many cases Ord-nance engineers devoted as much effort tothe design of the mount as to the design ofthe telescope itself. The mount had to holdthe telescope in exactly the right positionin relation to the gun tube and the controlgears, and had to provide for carefully

history of the development of fire control instruments.(Development of Fire Control for Antiaircraft Artil-lery, 4 vols., OHF.) These volumes contain countlessreferences to pertinent documents and are illustratedwith hundreds of photographs of all types of fire con-trol instruments. There are also a brief history of theFrankford Arsenal Fire Control Design Division anda comprehensive study of the production and procure-ment of fire control matériel in the Ordnance Histori-cal files.

25 See Ordnance Sergeant, op. cit.26 Interv, Oct 51, with John E. Darr, Jr., Chief of

FA Fire Control Br, R&D Serv.27 Div 16, NDRC, Optical Instruments, Vol. I (Wash-

ington, 1946).


regulated movement of the telescope overa wide range of vision. Since nearly everynew design or major modification inweapons and ammunition demanded somechange in the sighting and aiming appara-tus, the development of fire control instru-ments and mounts was a never-endingprocess.

In designing telescopes to meet the re-quirements of the using arms, Ordnanceengineers frequently found themselvesfaced with the task of reconciling the ir-reconcilable. Three of the fundamentalcharacteristics of a telescope—degree ofmagnification, extent of the field of view,and size or complexity of the instrument—were so interrelated that a gain in onecharacteristic usually meant a loss in oneor both of the others. Greater magnifica-tion could be achieved only at the cost ofdecreasing the field of view unless addi-tional elements were used and the tele-scope was made bulkier and heavier. Simi-larly, the field of view could not bewidened without sacrificing magnificationor enlarging the instrument. Because itwas impossible to design a telescope thatwas at one and the same time small insize, powerful in magnification, and broadin its field of view, Ordnance designershad to evaluate the importance of each ofthese characteristics in terms of the pur-pose for which each telescope was intendedand then adopt the most acceptable com-promise.

As weapons with greater recoil, such asthe 3-inch gun, came into more generaluse, need arose for telescopes with a longer"eye distance," the distance between theobserver's eye and the eyepiece of the tele-scope. This introduced another set of ir-reconcilable factors. When, for example,the Tank Destroyer Board requested a 3-power direct-sighting telescope with an eye

distance of eight inches for use with the 3-inch gun motor carriage, the OrdnanceDepartment had to report that telescopesbuilt to these specifications would resultin such a restricted field of view, such asmall exit pupil, or such a large instrumentthat none would be acceptable. A close ap-proximation to the desires of the Tank De-stroyer Board was achieved in the springof 1943 with the T108, a 3-power telescopewith an eye distance of 6.5 inches. A novelfeature of this instrument was its use ofplastic rather than glass optics. Althoughthe Tank Destroyer Board received theT108 enthusiastically, the Ordnance De-partment recommended that it be givenonly limited procurement status until fur-ther experience with plastic optics underfield conditions had been gained. Whenproduced with glass optics, this telescopewas standardized in the spring of 1944'asthe M79C.28

The straight tube telescope was one ofthe most extensively used instruments forthe control of direct fire, but it had certaindisadvantages, chief of which was that thegunner in sighting had to stand behind thegun where he might be in the way of othermembers of the gun crew. This drawbackwas eliminated by the use of a more com-plicated instrument, the elbow telescope,which permitted the gunner to stand toone side of the gun. With the exception ofits roof prism, which bent the light rays ata right angle, the optical characteristics ofthe elbow telescope resembled those of thestraight telescope and followed the samecourse of development. Roof prisms, how-ever, were difficult to manufacture in

28 (1) Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, pp.111-18, OHF. (2) OCM 23542, 20 Apr 44; 23923, 25May 44. For a discussion of the use of plastic optics intelescopes during the war see Optical Instruments, Vol.I, Ch. 8.


quantity, and during 1942 productionlagged behind military requirements. Tomeet this exigency Frankford Arsenal inthe fall of 1942 constructed an experi-mental telescope with an inverting prismbut, by the time it had been tested andfound satisfactory by the using arms, pro-duction on the roof prism instruments hadcaught up with demand. The remarkableincrease in the roof prism production rateresulted from the co-operative efforts ofthe NDRC, the Bureau of Standards, andthe Ordnance Department in developinga method for using grinding machines toperform a large part of the work formerlydone by hand by skilled craftsmen.29

The panoramic telescope was far morecomplicated than either the straight tubeor elbow telescope, and to improvement ofits design Ordnance engineers devoted alarge share of their efforts. The panoramictelescope combined a telescope and peri-scope so that the observer, without expos-ing himself or changing his position, couldsee in any direction. It could be used to laythe weapon in direction for indirect fire orto sight for direct fire. At the start of WorldWar II the standard panoramic telescopewas the M12, adopted in August 1940 toreplace the M1917, which had been ingeneral use since World War I.30 It incor-porated improvements in optical designand manufacturing methods that had beenmade during the interwar years. The M12originally had a reticle similar to that ofthe M1917, with horizontal and verticalcrosslines and a mil scale on the horizontalline but, as this was not suitable for directfire against moving targets, it was replacedon medium artillery weapons by a grid-type reticle with vertical lines to measurelead and horizontal lines to measurerange. This reticle enabled one man to aimthe gun quickly at a moving target, but as

a rule the panoramic telescope was usedonly for laying the gun in direction whilea quadrant was used for laying it in eleva-tion for indirect fire against a distant, sta-tionary target.31

In 1940, when the task of supplying theexpanding Army with thousands of binoc-ulars suddenly loomed large, the standardmilitary binocular was the Type EE, aWorld War I instrument. The inadequaciesof the "Double E" binocular had beenrecognized as early as 1921 when responsi-bility for development of binoculars hadbeen transferred from the Signal Corps toOrdnance, but no substantial progress hadbeen made during the peace years towarddesigning a new binocular or modifyingDouble E to make it waterproof and shockresistant.32 To meet the urgent supply re-quirements established in 1940, the Ord-nance Department was forced to supple-ment existing stocks of Type EE bypurchasing binoculars of commercial de-sign that could be speedily produced bythe optical industry. To avoid the delayinvolved in developing, testing, and set-ting up production facilities for a newdesign, a Bausch and Lomb binocularwith approximately the same militarycharacteristics as the Type EE was stand-ardized in November 1940 as the M3, andothers of the same type manufactured byother companies were later standardizedunder different model numbers.33 After

29 (1) Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, pp.91-105, OHF. (2) Optical Instruments, Vol. I, pp.394-406.

30 OCM 16005, 8 Aug 40, approved in OCM16045, 29 Aug 40, standardized the M12 and reclassi-fied the M5, a modified version of the M1917, assubstitute standard.

31 Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, pp. 16-67,OHF.

32 OCM 1376, 8 Apr 21.33 (1) OCM 16247, 17 Nov 40; 16278, 22 Nov 40.

(2) Fire Control Materiel, Procurement and Produc-


thousands of M3-type binoculars had beenissued, reports came in from overseas ob-servers describing the disastrous effect onthese instruments of unavoidable roughhandling, submersion in water duringlanding operations, and exposure to ex-tremes of temperature. The M3 was thenredesigned to make it stronger and morenearly waterproof, and, at the same time,the laboratory at Frankford Arsenal devel-oped a new compound, capable of with-standing extremely high and low temper-atures, for sealing the optical lenses to themetal cells. To prevent the condensation ofmoisture on the optical elements within thebinoculars, a small amount of silica gelwas placed in each to absorb whatevermoisture penetrated the casing. The newmodel was standardized early in 1943 asthe M13 and continued, with only minormodifications, as the standard militarybinocular for the rest of the war.34

Another widely used instrument forspotting targets and observing the effectsof artillery fire was the battery com-mander's telescope, commonly called theBC scope. During World War I, and formany years thereafter, the standard BCscope was the M1915, a 10-power binocu-lar with a very narrow field of view. Vari-ous attempts were made to widen the field,provide illumination for the reticle, andmake other modifications in this instru-ment during the 1920's and 1930's, but itwas not until 1935 that the Field ArtilleryBoard, after summarizing the deficienciesof the M1915, called for the developmentof an entirely new instrument. The field ofview of the M1915, the board pointed out,was so small that, when observation of fire

was made, many rounds fell outside itsfield. In addition, its light-transmittingpower was low and its angle-measuringsystem inaccurate and hard to keep inadjustment.35

Nearly seven years elapsed before anewly designed BC scope was ready fortest early in 1942. The new instrument hada larger field of view, better light-transmit-ting qualities, an improved reticle, andother advantages. Although the Field Ar-tillery Board found it superior in manyrespects to the M1915, it also found thenew instrument inaccurate in the measure-ment of angles, largely because, by specifi-cation, it was designed for use by anobserver wearing a gas mask. When theField Artillery Board dropped this require-ment, the telescope was modified to correctits inaccuracies and was standardized asthe M65 early in 1943. While this workwas in progress, the M1917, a telescope ofFrench manufacture similar to the M1915but of higher power, was provided with aninstrument light and adopted as substitutestandard.36

Range Finders

In the development of range finders foruse with field artillery and heavy infantryweapons, Ordnance engineers faced manyof the same problems encountered withtelescopes and binoculars. Since rangefinders operate on the principle of measur-ing the acute angle of a right-angled trian-

tion of Binoculars, Foreword, PSP 33, OHF. The M3,M8, and M9 were essentially the same, but their partswere not interchangeable because they were made bydifferent companies.

34 (1) OCM 20063, 1 Mar 43; 20307, 29 Apr 43.(2) TM 9-1580, Mar 45.

35 Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, pp. 286-98, OHF.

36 OCM 19755 standardized the M65, and OCM1 8934 made the M1917 substitute standard. Whenit was found that the M1917's in stock had been madeby four different manufacturers and were not identi-cal they were redesignated M1917B1, M1917B2,M1917B3, and B1917B4. OCM 19219, 19 Nov 42.


gle that has the range finder as its base andthe target as its apex, the accuracy andeffective range of the instrument depend inlarge measure on the length of the rangefinder and its degree of magnification. Arange finder with a tube 30 inches long ob-viously has more limited potentialitiesthan does one 30 feet long. Large rangefinders could be installed at fixed installa-tions such as seacoast artillery batteries,but, for an army on the move, the rangefinder had to be small, usually not morethan one meter in length, and easily trans-ported. The smaller range finders, more-over, had to be rugged enough to maintaintheir precise optical arrangements intactunder rough handling.37

The standard Field Artillery rangefinder of World War I was the one-meterM1916, an inverted-image, coincidence-type instrument that measured rangesfrom 400 yards to 20,000 yards. Withslight modifications this instrument re-mained standard for the next twenty years,although Ordnance and the Field Artil-lery both saw the need for a range finderthat would be lighter, more rugged, lessvisible, and better adapted for quantityproduction. Late in 1939 work on threeimproved experimental models was begun,but none proved markedly superior to theM1916. Finally, in the summer of 1942samples of one-meter range finders beingproduced in Canada for the British Armywere procured for test by the fire controllaboratory at Frankford Arsenal and bythe Field Artillery Board and the InfantryBoard. One of these British instruments,designated T16, was lighter, less bulky, andmore accurate than any other range finderyet tested. Furthermore, it was more easilymanufactured, cost less, and used less stra-tegic material. It was therefore standard-ized in December 1942 as the M7 for fieldartillery use and, with modifications, as

the M9 for infantry. At the same time theM1916 was classified as limited standardand development of all other experimentalone-meter range finders was canceled.38

Sights for New Types of Weapons

The introduction during World War IIof the recoilless rifle and the bazookabrought the need for new sights but posedno serious fire control problems. The ab-sence of recoil with the 57-mm. and75-mm. recoilless rifles actually simplifiedsighting, as it permitted the use of tele-scopes with short eye distances.39 Whenthe earliest bazookas appeared in 1942they were equipped with simple ring sights,which did not prove accurate enough tosatisfy the using arms. An optical sightingdevice was then developed but had to beabandoned because the calcite crystals re-quired for its manufacture were not avail-able. The hinged-bar sight, adopted in-stead, showed appreciable inaccuracy inalignment when in combat and was soonreplaced by a reflecting sight that could bemounted without modification of eitherlauncher or sight bracket. It consisted of aplane disc-shaped ocular having a smallreticle at its center opposed to a concavetransparent mirror that partially reflectedthe reticle pattern and partially trans-mitted light. All bazookas produced in late1944 and in 1945 were equipped withthese reflecting sights.40

37 Ordnance Sergeant, IV, 2 (1942), 132-33.38 (1) Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, Ch. 1,

OHF. (2) OCM 19194, 19 Nov 42; 19310, 10 Dec 42.39 See OCM 26926, 15 Mar 45, for a detailed dis-

cussion of telescopic sights for the 75-mm. rifle. OCM25247, 28 Sep 44, and 25346, 5 Oct 44, recordedadoption of the rifle and stipulated that telescopicsights calibrated in yards for direct fire and panoramicsights for indirect fire be provided.

40 (1) Rocket Launchers, PSP 20, pp. 21-22, OHF.(2) OCM 21964, 28 Oct 43; 22673, 20 Jan 44; 25177,21 Sep 44; 25414, 12 Oct 44.


Night Lighting Devices, Filters, andLens Coatings

The development of special night light-ing devices for fire control instruments wasa minor but significant field of researchduring World War II. During World WarI ordinary commercial flashlights shieldedwith a helmet or other object had beenused for illuminating the scales and levelsof aiming devices, but during the 1930'sOrdnance engineers turned their attentionto the development of lights specially de-signed for fire control instruments. Thebattery commander's telescope M1915 wasthe first for which a lighting unit wasstandardized.41 Designated InstrumentLight M1, it consisted of a battery casewith one dry cell clamped to the telescopeand a flexible cord leading to a lamp thatcould be directed on the scale and level.For large-caliber weapons elaborate light-ing systems powered by storage batterieswere developed only to be rejected by theusing arms on the ground that they weretoo difficult to install and service, used anexcessive amount of exposed cable, andwere too expensive. As a result, the flash-light type using standard dry cells wasadopted for all fire control instruments.

A different approach to the night lightproblem was through the use of materialsthat glowed in the dark. As early as 1939the Field Artillery Board had tested reticleswith luminous lines and dots but had re-jected them because they glowed only afterit was too dark to see the target.42 Lumi-nous materials were successfully used onthe level vials of the gunner's quadrant, aninstrument that had long been an espe-cially difficult problem because it was nor-mally used in an exposed position andcould not be illuminated by a conventionallight without danger of being seen by theenemy. Early in 1944 luminous vials were

tested by the using arms and approved forissue, with first priority going to unitsequipped with the 155-mm. gun and the8-inch howitzer. Meanwhile, immediatelyafter Pearl Harbor, General Barnes hadhopes that infra-red illumination could beused for directing night fire, and a requestwent to NDRC to work out an electrontelescope capable of penetrating darknessas well as fog and smoke. Even for smallarms some efforts went into devising sightsfor night firing. While investigations ofvarious methods proceeded in the UnitedStates, the problem was also explored inthe United Kingdom. The WeaponsBranch of the Ordnance Maintenance Di-vision in the ETO reported late in 1943that an illuminated collimator, attachableto rifle or carbine but easily removable forday service, had given satisfactory per-formance in tests at ranges up to fiftyyards. But decision of the using arms thatthese devices were not needed canceledfurther work.43

Another minor but important phase offire control research was concerned withantiglare filters and protective lens coat-ings. In October 1942 the Desert WarfareBoard conducted tests on red, amber, andneutral filters submitted by the OrdnanceDepartment, but reported that, althougheach had advantages under certain condi-tions, none was sufficiently helpful to war-rant adoption. More successful were exper-iments with nonreflecting coatings onglass surfaces and the use of solid glassprisms in periscopes in place of mirrors. All

41 OCM 15609, 8 Feb 40.42 OCM 15094, 15 Jun 39.43 (1) Memo, Gen Barnes for Mr. H. W. Dix, 12

Dec 41, sub: Infra-red Illumination, OO 334.9/1281,DRB AGO. (2) Memo, Col Joel G. Holmes, DeputyChief Ord Off, Hq ETO, for Small Arms Div, R&DServ. 25 Dec 43, sub: Night Sighting Device forSmall Arms, OO 350.05/8546, DRB AGO. (3) Interv,5 Nov 51, with Amos C. Bonkemeyer, Light WeaponsSec, Small Arms Div, R&D Serv.


during the war years Ordnance engineerscarried on numerous experiments to de-velop antirain and antifog coatings, hoodsfor protection against sun and rain, andmechanical modifications to increase easeof operation. An Ordnance detachmenttested the performance of all types of firecontrol equipment under conditions of ex-treme cold at Fort Churchill in Canadaduring the winter of 1943-44 and broughtback much valuable information on bothdesign and maintenance. In June 1944Frankford Arsenal formed a committee tostudy the protection of fire control instru-ments and their carrying cases from theravages of fungus growth and other typesof deterioration experienced in tropicalclimates. The committee directed its effortschiefly toward the use of protective coat-ings, the development of moistureproofsealing, the incorporation of silica geldesiccants, and the employment of a vola-tile fungicide within the instruments.44

the M6, for the 37-mm. gun, then consid-ered an antitank weapon, and other sightsof similar design were developed later forother guns. To enable antiaircraft weaponsto perform their secondary mission of fir-ing at ground targets, they also wereequipped with sighting telescopes havingantitank reticles.45

Before 1940 the only way tank crewscould make observations without openingthe turrets and exposing themselves toenemy fire was through direct vision slotsin the turret. These narrow openings werenot satisfactory because they weakened thearmor and exposed the crew to dangerfrom shell fragments. In search of a bettermeans of observation, the Ordnance De-partment in 1937 tested various devicesoperating on the periscopic principle, in-cluding the Gundlach periscope developedby an officer of the Polish Army.46 Foreignobservers considered the Gundlach peri-scope superior to anything else availableat that time, but it proved unsuitable forAmerican tanks, which did not haveenough space in the turret to permit theobserver to move his head from side to sideas the periscope required. In the fall of1940, therefore, Ordnance engineers beganwork on the design and manufacture oftwo experimental tank periscopes, the Tland T2, each containing a straight tele-scope for gun sighting. As these periscopeswere linked with the gun so that their line

Sighting Equipment for Armored Vehicles

The important role assumed by tanksand other armored vehicles in the late1930's created new problems for the de-signers of fire control matériel, for it meantthat guns used against tanks had to beaimed far more rapidly than in the dayswhen they were employed only againststationary targets, and the tanks them-selves had to be equipped with ingeniousdevices for observing and sighting. Broadlyspeaking, Ordnance designers met the firstof these problems by developing telescopeswith so-called antitank reticles, whichenabled the gunner to take the proper leadon the target and adjust for range at thesame time. A telescopic sight with an anti-tank reticle was standardized in 1938, as

44 (1) Various exhibits in the History of FrankfordArsenal, Fire Control Design Division, Vols. VI-X,OHF, provide detailed information on the FortChurchill tests and the tropicalization mission sentto the Canal Zone in early 1945. (2) On the use ofsilica gel and volatile fungicides, see OCM 25525, 26Oct 44, approved by OCM 25774, 16 Nov 44.

45 (1) Fire Control for FA and Inf Weapons, p. 106,OHF. (2) Fire Control for Armored Vehicles, Sec. II,OHF.

46 OCM 13485. 25 Jan 37.


of sight moved with it, the gunner, withoutmoving his head, could aim the weaponfor direct fire simply by centering theproper telescope reticle markings on thetarget. The linkage mechanism was hardto keep in adjustment, but after comple-tion of tests at Aberdeen Proving Groundearly in 1941 the two periscopes werestandardized as the M1 for the 75-mm.gun and the M2 for the 37-mm. gun.When the heavy tank M6 was standard-ized later, the M1 periscope, with a differ-ent telescope, was used with the heavytank's 3-inch gun.47 In spite of these devel-opments, reports from overseas observersstated that, because of poor periscopicvision, tank crews generally preferred tofight with turrets open.48

Following standardization of the M1and M2, several other periscopes weretested and adopted but it was not until1943 that a major new development ap-peared. This was a periscope with onehigh-powered telescope on the right sidefor sighting distant targets and a periscopewith a reflex reticle on the left side forsighting near-by targets. Frankford Ar-senal in February 1942 submitted sketchesof such a periscope with the designationT8, and completed two pilots by July. TheT8 offered much greater accuracy and sta-bility of bore sighting than did existingperiscopes, but its manufacture requiredthe use of highly skilled optical and me-chanical workers for long periods of time,and the cost of each periscope amountedto approximately $1,000. After extensivetests the Armored Force Board and theArmy Ground Forces concluded that oneT8 was so much superior to existing peri-scopes that its standardization was war-ranted in spite of the high cost. After mod-ifications to facilitate quantity production,the instrument was standardized as the

M10 and was put into production in thesummer of 1944.49

In addition to the periscopic telescope,tank gunners used a straight telescopemounted inside the tank for direct sightingthrough an aperture in the turret. To mini-mize danger to the crew, this aperture waskept as small as possible—no larger, in theearly part of the war, than a .30-caliberbullet. The problem was to provide a tele-scope small enough to fit this keyhole-sizedaperture, powerful enough to give ade-quate magnification and a wide field ofview, and yet short enough to be used inthe space available inside the turret. Prog-ress toward meeting these specificationswas steady, beginning in the fall of 1942with standardization of the M51, a3-power telescope with a field of view ofmore than 12 degrees. During the winterof 1942-43 several new telescopes with bet-ter optical characteristics were developed,and in July 1943 one was standardized asthe M70. It was later replaced by a5-power telescope, the M71, which had awider field of view and increased light-gathering power. The M71 was standardequipment on nearly all tanks early in1945. A major innovation in tank tele-scopes appeared near the end of the warwhen the M83, a variable-power instru-ment, was standardized. This telescopecould be readily adjusted to provide4-power magnification with a relativelywide field of view or 8-power magnifica-tion with a much narrower field. Theformer adjustment was used for aiming at

47 (1) OCM 16654, 24 Apr 41; 16753, 22 May 41;18059, 13 Apr 42; 18283, 28 May 42.

48 (1) Intel Summary 12, 3-11 May 43, OCO-D,OHF. (2) Interv with Gordon A. Harrison, 21 Mar 51.

49 OCM 22064, 11 Nov 43; 22390, 16 Dec 43. Atthe same time the M3 and M5 became obsolete andthe M4 and M8 limited standard.


near-by targets or for locating distant tar-gets and the latter for sighting on distanttargets.50

Gyrostabilizers

In contrast to their success in improvingtelescopes and periscopes, Ordnance engi-neers made little progress in other areas.

.In spite of persistent efforts to adapt infan-try and field artillery range finders to tankuse, no satisfactory range finder for tankswas developed. In 1944 and 1945 attemptswere made to evolve an integrated tankfire control system that would properly re-late the ranging, computing, and aimingfunctions, but at the end of the war thisproject was still in the development stage.51

More difficult than the design of sightingdevices themselves were some of the prob-lems of utilizing them to best advantage.To realize fully the benefits from a high-power tank telescope, for example, it hadto be able to function while the vehiclewas moving. If the gunner could accu-rately lay his weapon only at a dead stop,his tank might present, at least momen-tarily, a choice target for hostile artillery.Some means had therefore to be devisedfor stabilizing vehicle armament duringtravel over rough terrain. Borrowing apage from the Navy, which had long em-ployed such a mechanism on its water-borne artillery, the Ordnance Departmentadopted the gyrostabilizer.52

The working principle of the gyrostabi-lizer rested on the well-known behavior ofthe gyroscope—a rapidly spinning wheelor disc that tends to resist movement awayfrom the axis about which it is spinning.The gyro control, the heart of the gyro-stabilizer, consisted basically of a gyro-scope mounted on the gun cradle with itsaxis parallel to that of the gun. Any slight

displacement of the gyro control from itsvertical position set forces in motion thatreturned it, and with it the gun tube, to itspoint of origin. The gun thus maintainedits aimed position while the tank movedover the rises and depressions of averagerough terrain. But it is well to rememberthat the gyrostabilizer neither aimed thegun to begin with, nor kept it on targetwhen the tank went up or down hill orwhen the target moved. Its sole functionwas to keep the manually aimed gun on aline of sight selected by the gunner.

The problems attendant upon thedevelopment of a gyrostabilizer for vehiclearmament were numerous. Unlike thegyrostabilizer of the naval vessels, the en-tire mechanism had to fit virtually into anutshell and had to withstand shocks farmore severe than those occasioned by thebuffeting of wind and waves. Despite thefact that at the outbreak of war develop-ment had barely passed the laboratorystage and the few stabilizers that did reachthe front quickly went out of adjustment,subsequent improvements were markedenough to merit careful attention. Whena newly designed mono-gyro control wasfound to increase the percentage of hits bya factor of two or three to one as compared

50 (1) OCM 19044, 22 Oct 42; 20837, 24 Jun 43;21070, 15 Jul 43; 20892, 1 Jul 43; 21134, 22 Jul 43;24247, 29 Jun 44; 27509, 3 May 45; 27936, 7 Jun 45.(2) Hist of Frankford Arsenal, Fire Control DesignDiv, VII, 19-20, OHF. (3) Optical Instruments, pp.444-51.

51 Memo, Lt Col Louis Rossetto, Chief of Fire Con-trol Design Div, Frankford Arsenal, for CofOrd, 8Sep 45, sub: Review of Mission of Fire Control De-sign Div, and incl, cited in Hist of Fire Control DesignDiv, Vol XII, OHF.

52 Unless otherwise cited, material concerninggyrostabilizers is based on the following: (1) Hand-book Ord Auto Engr, IX, 8-12, OHF; (2) R&D,Tanks, 1A9-10, 1A53-54, OHF; (3) DevelopmentRecord of Traversing Mechanisms and Stabilizers,n.d., OHF.


with unstabilized guns, the device wasimmediately placed in production. Withfurther improvements, it was used there-after on numerous light tanks, many of themedium General Grants, and the entireseries of General Shermans.

Although their stabilized guns gaveAmerican tankers a clear-cut advantageover their opponents—most notably theGermans, who by the end of the war hadnot succeeded in building a workable sta-bilizer 53—reports from overseas indicatedlimited use of the gyrostabilizer in combat.In 1943 an officer returned from the fight-ing in Sicily stated that despite very care-ful maintenance no one used the gyrostabi-lizer to good advantage. He believed thatit had possibilities only if it were simplifiedand if extensive training were given thetroops on its operation. All told, he thoughtgyrostabilizers not worth the effort to putthem in tanks; accuracy of fire was so im-portant that tank crews preferred to haltbefore firing.54 Again, a report on the ETOin late 1944 stated, "experience has proventhat tank crews have no faith in gyrostabi-lizers and will not use them. No amount oftraining seems to convince the tank crewsof the value of firing while moving. Thegyrostabilizer is an expensive piece of tankequipment never used, and it could be leftout of tanks scheduled for theaters of oper-ations." 55 Consistent evidence in the sametenor finally moved Ordnance to recom-mend the abandonment of stabilizers, astep that would have permitted a reduc-tion of both maintenance time and ex-pense. But that recommendation wasdisapproved, and the stabilizer remained.Intensive training of troops in its use madeits mark at the very end of the war. In mid-August 1945 AGF reported, "many tankbattalions are using gyrostabilizersextensively." 56

Fire Control for SeacoastDefense Batteries

Although none of the seacoast gunbatteries guarding the coasts of the UnitedStates went into action against an invad-ing enemy fleet during the war, for yearsbefore Pearl Harbor, and months after, theCoast Artillery Corps and the OrdnanceDepartment devoted much attention tothe development of fire control systems forthese weapons. Since coastal guns, alongwith antiaircraft guns, were designed fordefense of United States territory, they hadhigh priority during the period when na-tional military policy emphasized defenseagainst invasion, and remarkable improve-ments were made in the speed, range, andaccuracy of the guns to keep them abreastof developments in the design of naval ves-sels. The problems of designing fire controlapparatus for seacoast artillery, thoughsimpler in most respects than for antiair-craft, were nonetheless challenging. Sea-coast guns had to be aimed rapidly and atlong range against fast-moving, heavilyarmored targets in a field of fire that usu-ally offered no landmarks or referencepoints. Because large seacoast guns woreout after firing only a few hundred roundsand could not be used again until they

53 CIOS Preliminary Target Investigation Rpt by12th Army Group, cited in Intel Summary 72, 31 Jul-8 Aug 45, OCO-D, OHF.

54 Interv, Col P. W. Gillon and Maj D. W. Hop-pock with Capt Norris H. Perkins, formerly of 66thArmored Regt, at Walter Reed Hospital, 1 Oct 43,copy in Overseas Ltrs, Misc, OHF.

55 Office memo, Maj W. F. Jordan, Tank and Mo-tor Transport Div, R&D Serv, for Col W. A. Weaver,Exec Asst, R&D Serv, 20 Nov 44, sub: Notes onEquipment for Armored Division Based on BattleExperience, Misc Missions folder, Barnes file, OHF.

56 Memo, Lt Col Severin R. Beyma for CG AGF,28 Jul 45, sub: Use of Stabilizers on Tanks, and 1stInd, Hq AGF for CG ASF, 15 Aug 45, OO 470.8/2236 Tanks, DRB AGO.


were relined at an arsenal, it was highlydesirable that the number of misses be keptto a minimum. Most of the instrumentsused for aiming seacoast guns were basi-cally the same as those used with fieldartillery weapons, but others, such as gundata computers and transmission systems,were developed to meet problems peculiarto seacoast artillery.

During World War I many differentinstruments were needed to provide sea-coast guns with accurate firing data. Atypical position-finding problem requiredthe use of a plotting board, set-forwardrule, prediction scale, deflection board,range correction board, percentage correc-tor, and spotting board. As each of theseinstruments was operated by from one tofour men, the number of "read and set"operations required, the time consumed,and the possibilities for error were all great.The Coast Artillery Corps as early as 1919drew up specifications for a computing de-vice that would perform many of thesecalculations automatically, thus savingtime and manpower and eliminating somechances for error. Two decades of researchand development finally led to the stand-ardization in September 1940 of the gundata computer M1 for use with long-rangebatteries. It was a 5,000-pound instru-ment, approximately seven feet long, threefeet wide, and three feet high, costingabout $100,000. It consisted of nine inter-connected units, a target position genera-tor, wind component indicator, ballisticcorrection unit, predictor, range elevationconverter, parallax unit, and three trian-gle-solvers. For use with small coastalguns, the Coast Artillery Board in thespring of 1941 recommended that a sea-coast computer be constructed along thesame lines as the electrical antiaircraftdirectors then under development. This

recommendation led to the standardiza-tion in May 1943 of gun data computerM8.57

While work on gun data computers wasunder way, fire control engineers also in-vestigated possible ways of transmittingdata from observation posts to plottingrooms, and from plotting rooms to gun po-sitions. At the start of the war data of thistype were transmitted orally by telephone.The observers at each post took readingssimultaneously at the sound of a bell thatrang at stated intervals, and then tele-phoned the data to the plotters. Thismethod of transmission was slow andoffered many opportunities for error on thepart of the operators; when gun data com-puters were adopted the oral transmissionof data by telephone became definitelyoutmoded. To enable the computing de-vices to operate with full effectiveness, itwas necessary to provide them with a con-stant flow of data transmitted instantane-ously and accurately from the observingstations and a corresponding outflow ofcomputed data to the gun positions. Thelatter type of transmission covered rela-tively short distances and posed less diffi-cult problems than did the longer-rangetransmission of data from so-called base-end stations, which might be as far asthirty miles from the plotting room. Underthe aegis of NDRC the various compo-nents of a long-range data transmissionsystem were developed during 1942, in-cluding azimuth transmitters, elevation

57 (1) OCM 20330, 6 May 43; 20564, 24 May 43;(2) Ltr, CA Bd to CG AGF, 8 Apr 43, sub: ComputerT12, OO 413.68/466, DRB AGO. When this com-puter was adapted for use with different guns, mounts,and ammunit ion, a capital letter was added to thedesignation, as M8C, M8D, and so on. For detaileddescription of the M8, see Hist of Frankford Arsenal,Fire Control Design Div, III, 5-6, OHF.


transmitters, and corresponding receivingdevices. Early in 1943 these items werestandardized as parts of the computerswith which they were used.58

The seacoast fire control apparatus usedduring World War II depended upon somany observation posts and such an elabo-rate system of communication, and opera-tion presented so many technical difficul-ties, that competent authorities feared thesystem would collapse in an actual attack.Little use had been made of radar fordirecting fire of seacoast artillery, but itssuccessful employment by the Army AirForces and the Navy led, at the end of thewar, to a study of its potentialities for sea-coast defense. Yet two years after a decisionof 1946 to install radar at all modern bat-teries, the plan was abandoned because of

the increasing effectiveness of other meansof defense.59 In 1948 all large-caliber sea-coast guns and their fire control instru-ments were declared obsolete. Thus endedthe long and important history of Ord-nance efforts to develop instruments foraiming the large guns guarding thenation's coastal frontiers.

58 (1) Fire Control for Seacoast Arty, pp. 68-76,OHF. (2) OCM 17044, 31 Jul 41; 18037, 9 Apr 42;18621, 13 Aug 42; 18999, 8 Oct 42; 19603, 28 Jan 43.

59 Rpt of WD Seacoast Defense Armaments Bd, 1Nov 46. OHF. In 1946 a board of officers appointedto survey the nation's seacoast defenses recommendedthat radar be installed immediately at modern bat-teries and that only those elements of the old firecontrol system be retained as were necessary for theoperation of batteries not equipped with radar devices.Signal Corps radar then began to replace the moreconventional instruments unti l the Obsoletion of allseacoast guns canceled the work.

CHAPTER XII

The Search for IncreasedFire Power: Ammunition

Neither smoothly functioning guns norperfection of aim can make fire accurate ifthe projectile is unstable in flight, since theflight characteristics of a projectile firedfrom any kind of weapon, whether fromrifled gun bore or smooth mortar or rocket-launcher tube, affect the projectile's abilityto reach its target. Hence, exterior ballis-tics are as important as interior ballistics,fire control, or the terminal ballistic ele-ments that determine the effect upon thetarget when reached. Study of the motionof projectiles through the air and theirbehavior during flight constitutes a special,highly complicated branch of science, theproblems of which are frequently bafflingeven to experts. Various design features ofthe projecting weapon, such, for example,as the dimensioning of the chamber of agun or the twist of the barrel rifling, mayhave as much bearing upon accuracy offire as does the character of the propellantor the shape of the projectile. The desiredresult depends upon a complex of factors.Gravity, air drag, wind forces, the weightand distribution of the weight of the pro-jectile, the velocity at which it is launched,and the angle of projection must all bereckoned with.1 Careful observation ofthese phenomena and computation ofexact data require elaborate measuringinstruments and computers. Germany was

far ahead of the United States and Britainin this field of work. As early as 1940 Ger-man scientists were using an intermittentlyoperating supersonic wind tunnel in de-veloping radio-controlled bombs, rockets,and flak shell, while the U.S. Army wasstill trying to obtain data for bombs androckets at subsonic velocities. After thecompletion of the Wright Field wind tun-nel, the Air Forces and Ordnance Depart-ment were in a better situation than for-merly, but not until the fall of 1944 was asupersonic tunnel ready for use at Aber-deen Proving Ground.2 Nevertheless,throughout the war the work of Ordnanceballisticians, particularly at the BallisticResearch Laboratory, was vitally useful.Though their services in providing thearmed forces with the means of obtainingaccurate fire were essential, the discussionhere must be limited to some of the simplerphases of the intricate problems involved.

Barrel Rifling and Design of Projectilesfor Conventional Weapons

In conventional artillery and smallarms, the rifling of the barrel gives the pro-

1 For explanation of theory and application of ex-terior ballistics see Hayes, Elements of Ordnance, Ch. X.

2 Record of Army Ord R&D, Ballistic ResearchLaboratory, APG, Pt. I, pp. 222-24, OHF.

INCREASED FIRE POWER: AMMUNITION 347

jectile a spin calculated to ensure sufficientstability in flight to carry it to its target.Stability is important solely because it is abig factor in achieving accuracy. Projec-tiles fired from smooth bore launchersusually had to rely upon fins for stability,though German technicians in World WarII produced a curiously shaped finlessmortar projectile which, shot from an un-rifled bore at a low velocity, obtainedstability from the air flow about it.3 Amer-ican Ordnance engineers before the warwas over evolved rifled tubes for a 4.2-inchchemical mortar and for the enormous914-mm. Little David. But most Americanmortars, like most American rockets usedin World War II, were fin stabilized, notspin stabilized.

Except for hand grenades and mortars,which fired only at relatively short ranges,the U.S. Army had used rifled weaponsalmost exclusively since the 1870's. Conse-quently, despite incomplete knowledge ofwhy projectiles shot from rifled bores be-haved as they did, Ordnance ballisticiansby trial and error over the years and bystudy of the findings of French scientistshad arrived at sound general principlesof gun bore and projectile design. Theyearly learned that a long twist in therifling might produce so little spin on theprojectile that its stability in flight wouldbe adversely affected, whereas a needlesslyshort twist not only put excessive pressureon the barrel but might actually lessen theprojectile's range. During World War IIdesigners studied or restudied virtuallyevery rifled weapon then in use or underdevelopment to determine the most sat-isfactory rifling twist. Though produc-tion problems forbade making desirablechanges in many guns, in some the advan-tage offset the cost. For example, the76-mm. tank gun, originally rifled with a

twist of one turn in 40 calibers, was latermade with one turn in 32 in order to geta faster spin on the projectile. Conversely,when experiments at Springfield Armoryindicated that the twist in Garand riflebarrels was shorter than necessary andthat two grooves would serve as well asfour, because of the effect upon productionno revision of design was authorized. Two-groove barrels were, however, made forthe 1903 and 1917 rifles, arms for whichdemand was less.4

Shapes of standard projectiles, on theother hand, were not much changed fromthe elongated boat-tailed contour estab-lished as standard before World War IIbegan. Thus, correcting inaccuracies in the105-mm. high-explosive shell proved to benot a question of redesign of the projectile,but of improved banding, closer dimen-sions, smoother finish of the shell, and useof two granulation powders, that is, pow-ders of two different cross-sectional thick-nesses. When a new weapon was underdevelopment, refinements were sometimeseffected in the projectile, such as the thin-ogived, long boat-tailed shape given the120-mm. projectile to reduce air drag. Butover-all restudy of this feature of ballisticalelements in conventional ammunition hadto await the postwar era.5 Mortars, also,though newer to the U.S. Army than ar-tillery and shoulder arms, underwentrather few important changes in projectiledesign. Fixed tail fins and the cylindricalor tear-shaped contours standard before

3 Interv, 9 Oct 51, with George Stetson, BallisticsSec, R&D Div.

4 (1) Interv, 10 Oct 51, with Herman A. Matson,Chief of Cannon Sec, R&D Div. (2) Interv, 2 Feb 44,with Col George A. Woody, CO Springfield Armory.(3) Springfield Armory Experimental Div MonthlyProgress Rpt, Apr 43, OHF. (4) Hist of SpringfieldArmory Vol. II, Book II, pp. 249b-249c, OHF. (5)OCM 19053, 22 Oct 42.

5 See n. 3, above.


1940 remained the accepted design for allbut the giant Little David. The Bureau ofStandards, at Ordnance Department re-quest, worked out a redesign of the 60-mm. shell in order to improve stability byshifting the center of gravity further fromthe center of pressure and by some reshap-ing of the fins, but this model was notready in time for use in World War II. Theshell for Little David was nearly cone-shaped and was pre-engaged.6

Special Projectiles To GiveHypervelocity

Some exploration of new types of am-munition for both artillery and small armsdid take place, in hopes of attaining hyper-velocities without excessive barrel erosionor radical changes in design of the pro-jecting weapon. Hypervelocity, producinga flattened trajectory in the projectile'sflight, would of course not only improvethe chances of a hit by shortening the timeof travel toward a moving target, but, byconserving the kinetic energy of the pro-jectile, would heighten the destructive ef-fect of a strike. Thus, the search for hyper-velocity involved, simultaneously, consid-erations of interior, exterior, and terminalballistics. Its advantages in increasing ac-curacy of fire were clear. Against a tank1,500 yards distant moving at 30 miles perhour, NDRC later figured that a shot firedat a velocity of 3,550 feet per second re-duced the lead needed with 2,030 feet-per-second velocity from 105 feet to 60 feet andquadrupled the allowable error in estimat-ing range.7 But apart from lengthening thegun barrel and thereby adding undesir-able weight, the means of getting velocitiesof more than 3,000 feet per second reducedthemselves to two: an increase of the pow-der charge in relation to the weight of the

projectile or use of higher potential pro-pellent powders.

In the first category one possible solu-tion lay in applying the "squeeze prin-ciple" to fire a specially designed projectilefrom a gun barrel narrowed by taperingthe bore or by addition of a conicaladapter. As early as 1932 the OrdnanceDepartment had tested a tapered boresporting rifle with a skirted bullet designedby an American-born German engineer,Hermann Gerlich. From a barrel of whichthe grooves in the middle section werediminished in depth from .75-mm. to 13-mm., a 125-grain monel metal bullet firedat a muzzle velocity of 4,406 feet per sec-ond. But as accuracy was unsatisfactoryand the bullet tended to fall apart on im-pact, the rifle was clearly unsuitable as amilitary weapon.8 Not until 1942, follow-ing discovery of the German Army's ap-parent success with artillery tapered boresand British interest in an application tosmall arms, did the Ordnance Departmentrenew investigation of possibilities in asmall-caliber weapon. Patterning its workin general on the British Littlejohn gundesigned by a Czech named Janecek,Frankford Arsenal in July 1942 began de-velopment of a projectile to fire from a .45-inch .50-caliber machine gun barrel witha muzzle adapter that reduced the exitdiameter to .35 inch. A projectile with a

6 (1) R&D Serv, Development of 60-mm. and 81-mm. Mortar Ammunition, pp. 12-15, 17-18, 21-22,25, 27-28, 31. OHF. (2) Barnes, Weapons of World WarII, pp. 168-74.

7 Div 1, NDRC, Summary Tech Rpt, Hyper-velocity Guns, 1946, p. 10, Arty Br, R&D Div files.This study analyzes every aspect of hypervelocityknown in World War II and describes fully theNDRC research program in this field.

8 (1) Extract, NDRC Rpt A43, Brief Hist ofTapered Bore Guns, copy in Hypervelocity Develop-ment, Guns and Ammo, OHF. (2) Interv, 2 Nov 51,with Dr. Frederick H. Carten, Ammo Br, R&D Div.


GERMAN 28/20-MM. ANTITANK GUN

.35-inch hard core was surrounded by asoft envelope that bulged in the center soas to leave at that point a void between thecore and the envelope. The projectile wasrotated by the rifling in the cylindrical sec-tion of the barrel bore, but on reaching thetapered portion, the projectile's deform-able envelope was swaged into firm con-tact with the core so that the bullet left thegun with a reduced diameter and with theshape of a conventional armor-piercingprojectile. Despite extended research on alarge number of types of bullets, the labo-ratory technicians found no design withsuitable exterior ballistics. Bullets tendedto disintegrate upon emerging from thebarrel and had such ballistic instabilitythat muzzle velocities proved greater infire from a barrel without the conicaladapter than from a barrel with it. Incen-diary ammunition, moreover, could not befired from this type of weapon. The wholeproject of producing caliber .50/.35 am-munition was therefore dropped in the fallof 1943.9

Meanwhile, the Ordnance Departmenthad been trying various applications of thesqueeze principle to artillery projectiles. In1941, when the British captured fromRommel's army, near Halfaya Pass, alight antitank gun with bore tapered from28-mm. to 20-mm. and a few rounds of its"arrowhead" ammunition, American in-terest in Gerlich-type weapons revived. Areport describing the distinctive featuresof both gun and ammunition, and Britishreports of tests, inspired the OrdnanceCommittee to request immediate designof weapons and projectiles as nearly iden-tical to the German as possible. At thesame time, because a report from the Bal-listic Research Laboratory indicated thatequally high velocity could be obtainedwithout tapered bores, the decision wasreached to make several cylindrical boreguns employing ammunition similar to the

9 Record of Army Ord R&D, Vol. II, Small Armsand Small Arms Ammunition (hereafter cited as SAand SA Ammo), Book 2, Small Arms Ammunition,p. 171, OHF.


hard-cored soft-sleeved German type, inorder to compare performance with thatof American copies of the German andwith that of a captured model to be sent toAberdeen.10

While awaiting completion of the Amer-ican 28/20 matériel, Ordnance engineersexperimented with affixing tapered adapt-ers to the muzzles of standard 37-mm. and,later, 57-mm. guns, so that from the formerthe projectiles would emerge with a28-mm. diameter, from the latter with40-mm. Though capture of a German ar-rowhead projectile for a 41/29-mm. gunin mid-1942 showed that the Germanswere then placing a good deal of faith intapered bore weapons, careful tests con-vinced the Ordnance Department by late1943 that in all artillery a cylindrical borewithout an adapter but using a light hard-cored projectile served every purpose ofthe tapered bore. The former suffered farless wear, gave greater accuracy of fire,and over long ranges maintained highervelocities.11 Thereafter the Ordnance De-partment bent its efforts to developingtungsten carbide-cored rounds for con-ventional weapons and delegated toNDRC the pursuit of discarding sabotprojectiles and other ways of attaininghypervelocity.12

Propellants for Conventional Weapons

Because getting a shot to the target de-pended on other factors than design of thelauncher and the shape of the projectile,propellent powders and primers also hadto be considered. Indeed, to get sufficientvelocity to ensure accurate fire from con-ventional weapons, use of a more powerfulpropellant was the only alternative to in-creasing the ratio of propellant to weightof the projectile. Ordnance specialists had

long known that in other weapons besidesthe 105-mm. howitzer the nature of thepropellent powders influenced accuracy offire. Unfortunately, during the 1920's and1930's money for research in this realmhad been so meagre that, apart from de-veloping relatively smokeless nonhygro-scopic powders, the Ordnance Departmenthad accomplished little.13

The qualities of the ideal propellantwere easy to name: a chemical composi-tion producing neither flash nor smokeand causing little barrel erosion, havinglow flame temperature and low chamberpressure, yet giving very high velocity,14

a powder largely impervious to moistureand made of readily available materialseasily manufactured in quantity. Achiev-ing any one of these features was no poser.The trouble came in trying to combine allwanted qualities in one package. Lowflame temperature threatened to cause lossof velocity; reduction of flash increasedsmoke. While improved ignition systemsin artillery ammunition contributed tolessening both obscuration and muzzleflash, the chemical composition of the

10 (1) OCM 17188, 25 Aug 41. (2) HypervelocityDevelopment. Guns and Ammo, OHF.

11 (1) See n. 10(2), above. (2) Memo, Military Mis-sion North Africa for CofOrd, 1 Jul 42, sub: GermanArrowhead 41/29-mm. (Gerlich AT), OO 350.05/1046, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, Gen Barnes to Dr. Van-nevar Bush, 20 Jan 42, OO 334.9/1523, DRB AGO.

12 (1) Memo, Maj Charles D. Bordman, Hq AGFfor CG ASF, attention Dir Requirements Div, Devel-opment Br, 13 Mar 44, sub: Sabot Ammunition, andinds 3 thru 10. OO 385.2/125, DRB AGO. (2) NDRCLiaison, OD 52, OHF. (3) Memo, Gen Barnes for CGASF, 22 Mar 44, OO 385.2/1495, DRB AGO. (4)Rpt Artillery Ammo Br, R&D Serv, 30 Nov 45, OO471.14/830, DRB AGO. (5) Div 1, NDRC, SummaryTech Rpt, Hypervelocity Guns, pp. 557-58, ArtilleryBr, R&D Div files.

13 See above, Ch. VII.14 Occasionally reduced rather than heightened

velocity was desirable, as in the case of short-rangehigh-angle firing. See discussion in Barnes, Weaponsof World War II, p. 78.


powder remained the chief factor to con-sider. Adding potassium sulphate to pro-pellant for antiaircraft fire, where flash-lessness was all important, helped to solveone problem. But it was no answer to thedemand for a wholly smokeless and flash-less propellant for field artillery wheresmoke would obscure gunners' vision andmuzzle flash reveal the tank or batteryposition.

The search for a compound at oncesmokeless and flashless had its beginningin the requirement established by theWestervelt Board in 1919. Ordnancechemists, following British experiments, inthe early 1920's offered the using armssamples of nitroguanidine which, to a de-gree unobtainable in any other knownpropellant, had both properties. But nitro-guanidine in combustion gave off suchnoxious ammonial fumes that the FieldArtillery vetoed its use. The OrdnanceDepartment, with no customers in pros-pect, then abandoned all thought of build-ing plants to make it. But ammunitionspecialists found no satisfactory substitute.Twenty years later the Navy seized uponnitroguanidine as the one feasible answerto novel conditions of combat. For the firsttime American ships in the Pacific werehaving to fight in small harbors wheremaneuvering was all but impossible. Flashby night betrayed the vessel's position andsmoke by day made second rounds inac-curate. Negotiations with Canada in 1943for purchase of nitroguanidine from theone plant upon which British and Cana-dian forces were also depending succeededin meeting Navy needs but left no surplusfor the U.S. Army. Until shortly beforeV-E Day the Army Ground Forces wereunconvinced of the value of this propel-lant. By then, urgent demand could notcreate facilities to produce it in quantity,

and the Ordnance Department could pro-cure only small lots for test and experi-mental firing.

Whatever the advantages of nitroguani-dine, neither that nor any other knowncomposition was ideal for all purposes.Even in conventional artillery and smallarms ammunition, where ballisticians un-derstood propellant behavior better thanin rockets and recoilless rifle ammunition,compromises were inescapable. The pri-mary requisite for one weapon or one par-ticular use tended to be different from thatfor every other. Propellants suitable for a90-mm. shaped charge, where low velocitywas acceptable, would not answer for a76-mm. tungsten carbide-cored projectile,the design of which was directed at achiev-ing very high velocity. In addition to theseproblems, World War II introduced thenew element of extremes of temperature atwhich ground firing must take place whenAllied troops were fighting in dry desert,damp jungle heat, and in the subzero win-ter weather of northern Europe. Series ofpropellants, therefore, were needed tocover widely varying contingencies.15 Sincebasic research as well as prolonged appliedresearch was necessary, many problemsremained unsolved at the end of the war.But the field was explored more thoroughlythan ever before in the United States, andlines of investigation were clarified forpostwar development.

In processing propellants, industry andOrdnance made considerable advancesduring the course of the war. One newmethod, developed by the Hercules Pow-der Company, for washing nitrocellulose

15 (1) Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 15Sep 44, p. 17, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (2) In-terv, 15 Oct 51, with Lt Col Roy E. Rayle, ProjectileSec, R&D Div. (3) Interv with Bruce Anderson, 7Mar 52.


in a continuous filter instead of in largetubs by the old "settle and decant" system,washed more thoroughly and thus im-proved the stability of the nitrocellulose.The DuPont Company found that, in win-ter, use of preheated alcohol to dehydratenitrocellulose reduced the dehydrationtime cycle, bettered the yield, and madea more uniform product, which in turnmade better powder. The Radford Ord-nance Works carried on extensive experi-ments to improve manufacturing and test-ing techniques as well as to find betterchemical compositions. Yet in the springand summer of 1945 reports of the Com-bined Intelligence Objectives Subcommit-tee, established to locate data in Europeon Axis research and manufacturing pro-cedures, indicated that Germany had de-veloped several processes more effectivethan those of the United States. The mostnovel German method was one of castingpropellent grains by adding a paste ofmoist nitrocellulose and diethyleneglycol-dinitrate, DEGN, to molten TNT andpouring the mixture into steel molds tocool. Grains as large as 1,000-mm. werecast this way. After the war complete setsof the German equipment deemed mostuseful and novel went to Picatinny Arse-nal for study.16

Design of Projectiles for New Weapons

Meanwhile, rockets and, later, recoil-less rifles, were introducing unfamiliarballistic problems. Both types of weaponwere so designed as to fire at low velocities,the bazooka as low as 260 feet per second,the 57-mm. recoilless rifle at just over1,200, and the 75-mm. at only 1,000 feetper second. While those velocities wouldmake no difference in the ultimate strikingpower of hollow-charge projectiles, the

slowness of flight gave a curved trajectorythat made judging range and lead moreuncertain and thus lessened the chances ofa hit. As rockets, carrying their propellentcharges within their casings, were initiallyheavy but lost weight as the propellantburned during flight, maintaining stabilitywas peculiarly difficult. In recoilless rifleammunition the propellant, though firingthe projectile minus the shell, necessarilylost some of the energy needed to imparthigh muzzle velocity because of the partialdissipation of the gases rearward. Yet testsproved the accuracy of the recoilless gunscomparable to that of small-caliber artil-lery.17

For ground-launched rockets, as formortar shell, fins affixed to the round ap-peared at first to be the most practicalway to provide stability, though in retro-spect the question arises why no one in1940 recalled that the famous Hale rocketof 1855 was spin stabilized. Doubtless theexample of the British, who at the time ofthe Battle of Britain had to produce rocketsquickly, if at all, influenced American de-signers. And finned rockets promised to besimplest to design and make. But the opti-mum shape of the fins and the method offastening them to a rocket, which must beshot out of a tube launcher, remained to bedetermined. The 3.25-inch target rocket,designed not for combat but for trainingantiaircraft gunners, was launched fromlong rails since accuracy of fire was unim-portant. Consequently, in that model largeflat-ended fins that gave adequate stabil-ity of flight could readily be hooked ontothe rocket case and cause no interference

16 Smokeless Powder Program of Ord Dept inWorld War II, PSP 17, pp. 14-16, 50-52, 57-70,OHF.

17 Design. Development and Production of the 57-mm. Rifle T15E3 and 75-mm. Rifle T25, PSP 78, Pt.1, p. 4, and Pt. 2, p. 13, OHF.


when the rocket was fired. Fins on tube-launched rockets had to be designed to fitthe launcher. The principal features of thefirst American combat model, the 4.5-inchrocket, were folding fins and electrical fir-ing. The rocket itself was long and slim.Fins, folded back into the neck of the case,opened up by inertia and were kept openby air flow after the rocket emerged fromthe tube. The smaller 2.36-inch bazookarocket, on the other hand, was built witha series of fixed fins somewhat resemblingthe feathers of an arrow but fitted into thenarrowed case neck so as to have the samediameter as the rocket motor. Fixed finsshrouded by an outer ring were also usedon the 7.2-inch series developed in 1943.18

When Allied troops encountered Ger-man rockets and discovered that they werespin stabilized, the Ordnance Depart-ment, convinced that the Germans musthave good reasons, undertook to developa series of similar design. Only as the mul-tiple-nozzled experimental types weretested did the virtues of spin stabilizationbecome clear. Accuracy was greatly im-proved because the flow of gases throughthe eight canted vents rotated the rocketat about 10,000 revolutions per minute,thus keeping it on its course, whereas infiring finned models frequent slight mis-alignments of the thrust with the axis ofthe rockets caused veering. When the lat-ter type was launched at low velocityacross the wind, the fins tended to act likea weather cock and swing the projectileinto the wind. Furthermore, a folding-finrocket equipped with a proximity fuzemight develop enough flutter in the fins asthey unfolded to activate the fuze prema-turely. Elimination of fins and fin ringsreduced parasitic drag on the rocket andthus lengthened range even with a heavierexplosive charge in the warhead. And,

finally, finless rockets were easier to loadquickly into multiple and automaticlaunchers. The first 4.5-inch spin-stabilizedmodel, the T38, in fact proved to be as ac-curate when fired from a short launcheras from a long one, though postwar testsshowed long launchers necessary for otherrockets. Two variations of the T38 werestandardized in the spring of 1945, whilework on spin-stabilized 7.2-inch rocketswas pushed vigorously.19 But as shaped-charge rockets would lose much of theireffect if rotated in flight, all high explosiveantitank (HEAT) rounds were fin stabi-lized.

Rocket Propellants

Difficult though the program was forimproving propellants for conventionalweapons, the question of developing suit-able rocket propulsion was still harder toanswer. From the very beginning everyoneconcerned with rocket research agreedthat single-base powders would lack thenecessary energy and that double-base,that is, nitrocellulose and nitroglycerinecombined, must be used. Double-basepowder made by the solvent process hadbeen manufactured in the United Statesfor a number of years for use in intermedi-ate and heavy artillery. This method em-ployed a solvent of acetone and alcohol tomake a glue-like substance, or colloid,from which grains or flakes could then beformed. About 1939 the Hercules PowderCompany found a way of producing a sol-ventless double-base powder plasticized

18 (1) Rockets, Development, Production and Per-formance PSP 20, pp. 2, 4, 9-10, 14, OHF. (2) Interv,18 Oct 51, with Lt Col Berkeley R. Lewis, Rocket Sec,R&D Div. (3) OCM 17047, 31 Jul 41.

19 (1) Interv with Col Lewis, 18 Oct 51. (2) PSP 20,pp. 19-22, 41-42, 46-47, OHF. (3) OCM 26967, 15Mar 45; 27298, 12 Apr 45.


by heat and pressure and then rolled outinto sheets for mortar increments. Butneither was readily adaptable to rockets,where a solid stick or grain, not sheetpowder, was needed, and where the essen-tial quality of even burning precludedusing a grain with so much as a minutecrack or fissure. For even a tiny crack ina burning grain of powder would createpeaks of pressure at particular spots of theencasing rocket motor tube and thuseither burst the tube or cause erraticflight.20 Consequently, to get safely usablerocket propellant made by the solventprocess meant using grains of small crosssection—in technical phraseology, thin-webbed powder—in which malformationsoccurring in drying would be few and in-spection could be exacting. A method ofmanufacturing solventless double-basepowder by a dry-extrusion process hadbeen developed in the late 1930's by theBritish. This produced much thicker-webbed, and therefore longer-burning,grains but required enormously heavypresses to extrude or compact and forceout the powder into the desired shape.21

In 1941 American scientists split intotwo schools of thought on the relativemerits of solvent and solventless double-base powders for rockets. Dr. Charles C.Lauritsen of the California Institute ofTechnology, and in 1941 vice chairman ofone of the NDRC divisions, had beenmuch impressed by British rocket workand strongly recommended dry-extrudedpowders. Though at that time no facilitiesexisted in the United States for producingit, the Navy, with contracts let throughNDRC to the California Institute ofTechnology, chose to focus efforts on ob-taining thick-webbed solventless types.The Ordnance Department, on the otherhand, agreed with the views of Dr. Clar-

ence N. Hickman of the Bell TelephoneLaboratories, then chief of an NDRCgroup working on rocket developments atIndian Head, Maryland. Hickman advo-cated use of wet-extruded powder becauseof the shorter burning time and greaterstrength of the thin-webbed grains pro-duced by this process. Quite apart fromtheoretical advantages, the urgency ofquickly getting some usable type led Ord-nance to center its program about solventpowder. When toward the end of the warthe Army's rocket specialists concludedthat the long-burning, thick-webbed sol-ventless powder was after all generallybetter for rocket propellant, Navy pre-emption of facilities for dry-extrusionobliged the Army to continue to relylargely upon the wet-extruded.22

Wet-extruded propellant was made bysuspending the powder in a solvent thatswelled the nitrocellulose to make a dough.The dough was forced through dies to formsticks, or grains, of powder from whichevaporation then dried the solvent. Assatisfactory drying to produce flawlessgrains could be obtained only with thin-webbed powder, it was clearly necessary touse a number of small grains in eachrocket in order to get a sufficiently heavy

20 (1) For a fuller account of developments in bothsolvent and solventless powders, see PSP 17, and Dr.E. H. Hemmingway, Historical Rpt on SolventlessRocket Program, both in OHF. (2) A series of ab-stracts of the detailed reports of the work done byRadford Ordnance Depot is contained in K. E. Bal-liet, Summary Rpt, 1 Oct 45, in a collection of theJohns Hopkins University Applied Physics Labora-tory.

21 (1) Interv with Col Lewis, 23 Oct 51. (2) Interv,25 Oct 51, with Harry La Tourette, Chief of Raw Ma-terials Sec, Ammo Div, Ind Serv, 1945.

22 (1) PSP 20, pp. 14-16, OHF. (2) Interv, 11 Sep51, with Dr. Colin Hudson, Guided Missiles Sec, R&DDiv. (3) For an account of the work done at the Cali-fornia Institute of Technology for the Ordnance De-partment, see Hist of ORDCIT Project to 30 Jun 46,MS, OHF.


charge. That, in turn, complicated theproblem of designing a trap to hold theseries of powder sticks in the rocket motor,so that unburned portions of the grainswould not be ejected by the high-pressuregases in front of the motor ends. Col. LeslieA. Skinner of the Ordnance Departmentand Dr. Hickman eventually found theanswer in a stamped metal ring with scal-lops through which passed "cage" wires.The centrally perforated powder stickswere then hung on these wires. The wireshad rivet heads to hold them in the scal-loped ring.23 When experiments began onspin-stabilized rockets, the problem aroseof how to keep the rotation from rattlingthe powder sticks around in the spinningtube, thus causing uneven burning. Devel-opment of a new powder compositionmade into a single thick-webbed grainwith a redesigned trap to hold it in placepromised to be satisfactory.24

Early in 1944, indeed, powder chemistsfound several new chemical compositionsthat offered advantages over the typesoriginally employed. The new were slowerburning, operated at lower pressures, andwere therefore usable at a wider range oftemperatures. Moreover, they could beproduced by either the solvent or the sol-ventless process. Before the new composi-tions were available, the fast-burningpropellants tended to develop such highpressures within the motor tubes as tomake them unsafe to use at very high tem-peratures. Premature explosions close tothe launcher endangered life and limb ofthe user and friendly troops in the vicinity.At low temperatures the rocket might failto ignite or might burn only intermittently.In fact, frequent motor failures in the4.5-inch rocket, standardized in Septem-ber 1942 as the M8, obliged the OrdnanceDepartment to discontinue mass produc-

tion in June 1943 and restudy the design.As reducing the amount of propellant pre-sented the alternative of lowering the payload proportionately or else of lesseningthe range, designers undertook to strength-en the motors without increasing theirweight. Motors made of heat-treated,seamless, alloy-steel tubing proved able towithstand an internal pressure of 10,000pounds per square inch and, coupled witha stronger head, extended service tempera-ture limits to cover a range of 20° to120° F.25

The Bazooka Rocket

Though the bazooka and the bazookarocket had a preternaturally short historyfrom the inception of the idea to the mo-ment when combat troops first fired rocketsfrom the new shoulder launcher, the storyof the weapon's development may serve toillustrate the uncertainties attending theevolution of rockets as modern militaryweapons. The birth of the bazooka meritsattention for several reasons. The weaponwas an innovation. It combined great firepower with great simplicity. It met quiteadmirably a particular need. It was de-signed, produced, and placed in the handsof troops in record time. And, perhapsbecause of its spectacular features, the taleof how it took shape has been confused byrival claimants for credit. As one of theparticipants in the project later wrote, "thenumber of 'inventors' of the bazooka hasfallen and risen as troubles developed and

23 Burchard, ed., Rockets, Guns and Targets, pp. 20-21.

24 PSP 20, pp. 27-28, OHF.25 (1) PSP 20, pp. 17-19, 27, OHF. (2) OCM 22778,

17 Sep 43. (3) For discussion of the difficulties ofrocket design, particularly before thick-webbed pow-ders were available, see Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp.11-13.


were cured, the stage having been reachedin one part of its career where only thosewho worked on it could be found to claimany connection with it." 26

The bazooka and the bazooka rocketcame about in a rather devious fashion.The shaped charge, fired by rocket pro-pulsion, and the launcher were the resultof several men's pooled efforts. Rocketswere used long before Francis Scott Keywrote of "the rockets' red glare." 27 Theprinciple of the shaped charge was pro-mulgated by the physicist C. E. Munroe asearly as 1880, when he discovered thatshaping high explosive with a hollow coneat its forward end focused the explosivewaves on one point and thus gave greaterpenetration per unit weight of the explo-sive. The innovation embodied in thebazooka lay in the combination and adap-tation of these well-known principles andbasic inventions, which imagination andskill converted into a practical newweapon. The design was steadily improvedupon as production of the first models wentforward.

Rockets, today part and parcel of theaccepted equipment of national defense,were little considered in America between1860 and 1940; they were superseded whenrifled artillery offered greater accuracy offire. Though signal rockets were widelyused during World War I, only one manendeavored to revive interest in rockets asa supplement to conventional artillery fire.That man, Dr. Robert H. Goddard, Pro-fessor of Physics at Clark University, wasthe true father of modern rocketry. In thefall of 1918 this gifted physicist offered theOrdnance Department the fruits of hisinvestigations: a 1-inch, a 2-inch, and a3-inch tube launcher, each 5.5 feet long,and designed to fire, by an electric mecha-nism, rocket projectiles of 1.4 pounds, 8.5

pounds and 16.5 pounds, respectively. Justbefore the Armistice he demonstrated his"recoilless gun" or "rocket gun" at Aber-deen Proving Ground with results thatOrdnance Department witnesses summar-ized as proving the validity of the principlehe employed. Goddard had to use a wickfuze in place of the electric firing mecha-nism, which he had not had time to per-fect, and solid sticks of powder instead ofnitroglycerine sticks with a single perfora-tion. Yet even with these crude substitutesmarring the performance, the report of theproof officer admitted the possibility thatthese guns "could be developed to operatesuccessfully against tanks." But the lack ofsuitable powder and need of further workupon the electrical firing mechanism cou-pled with the Armistice led the OrdnanceDepartment to shelve the project. God-dard died without receiving any acclaimfor this pioneering work, though compari-son of his rocket gun with the bazookaadopted twenty-four years later shows howclosely the 1918 model approximated thelater weapon. Only the circumstance thatDr. Hickman, then a young Ph. D. fromClark University, worked with Goddard in1918 gave some continuity to the studiesthat produced the antitank rocket weaponof World War II.28

In 1933 the U.S. Army created aone-man rocket unit by assigning Capt.Leslie A. Skinner to study the possible useof rockets. Skinner was handicapped bylimited funds to expend on research and

26 Col. Leslie A. Skinner, "Birth of the Bazooka."Army Ordnance, XXVII, 146 (1944), 261.

27 For discussion of earlier rocket developments, seeJames Cutbush, System of Pyrotechny (Philadelphia,1825), and Henry B. Faber, The History and Develop-ment of Military Pyrotechnics, 3 vols. (Washington,1919).

28 Memo rpt . . . Test of 1" 2" and 3" RecoillessGuns, Ord Program 2594, APG, 20 Nov 18, photostatin OCO Patent Sec files.


by the indifference of his fellow officers.Hence, before 1940 the project made littleheadway. The British, on the other hand,in the mid-thirties perceived the potentialusefulness of rocket barrages against air-craft, where volume and power of firemight compensate for lack of accuracy. Bythe time of the Eondon blitz the Britishhad developed rockets that took some tollof the Nazi bombers and fighters. TheNavy in September 1940 requested NDRCto undertake a jet-propulsion research pro-gram, and in December the Army, urgedon by the British experience, made a simi-lar request. At the same time the OrdnanceDepartment purchased British rockets anda projector for study. Thus, the Americanrocket program was born.29

The 2.36-inch bazooka rocket was notinitially part of the Army rocket programat all. It grew out of the search for a wayto use a shaped-charge projectile that anindividual soldier could fire from theshoulder. The first shaped-charge projec-tile to get serious consideration from theArmy was the rifle grenade designed byHenri Mohaupt.30 A grenade fitted with aspecial Mohaupt head and designed forfire from a spigot launcher was producedand standardized as the high-explosiveantitank grenade M10. The spigotlauncher resting on the ground much likea mortar had the serious drawback of dis-persing the fire widely. Firing the grenadewith blank cartridges from a rifle or froma .50-caliber machine gun necessitatedresting the butt on the ground in order toget an elevation high enough to get suffi-cient range. The heavy recoil severelydamaged the guns.31 Without a suitableprojector, the powerful new projectilepromised to be relatively useless.

At this point the chief of the OrdnanceDepartment Patent Section, Gregory J.

Kessenich, already familiar with the de-tails of the Mohaupt shaped charge, con-ceived the idea that the basic faults of theantitank grenade could be remedied byconverting the grenade into a rocket.Using a rocket made with a hollow chargeand launched from a shoulder projectorthat an individual soldier could carry andfire would give the destructive effect of thegrenade but would eliminate both thehigh-angle trajectory and the breakage ofthe rifle stock that made the M10 antitankgrenade unsatisfactory. Early in August1941 Kessenich, armed with sketches em-bodying his idea, presented his proposal toCol. Wiley T. Moore, chief of the engineer-ing group of the Small Arms Division.Colonel Moore, who had just designed anattachment for the rifle to fire the riflegrenade, immediately saw the possibilitiesof Kessenich's sketches and approved hisenlisting the interest of Major Skinner ofthe Ordnance rocket unit. The sketchesand a copy of the Westfaelisch Patent of1911, which covered the hollow chargephases of the plan, Kessenich accordinglyturned over to Major Skinner.

Experimentation with rockets hadmeanwhile been progressing at the NavyFiring Ground at Indian Head, Maryland,where Major Skinner and his assistant, 2dEt. Edward G. Uhl, were collaboratingwith Navy experts and a group of civilianscientists under Dr. Hickman of NDRC.Some months later Major Skinner com-pleted a first conversion of the M10 gre-nade by adding a rocket element to thebase of the grenade. About the same timeEieutenant Uhl completed a tube launcher

29 Ammo Div, Ind Serv, Rockets, Notes on DesignDevelopment and Production (hereafter cited asRocket Notes), pp. 1-2, PSP 20, p. 3, OHF.

30 See Ch. VII, above.3 1 (1) See above, n. 26. (2) Small Arms Div, Ind

Serv, Rocket Launchers, PSP 20, pp. 5-8, OHF.


THE BAZOOKA. The original 2.36-inch model M1 is shown at left, the improved model M9at right.

that looked like a piece of stovepipeequipped with a trigger and handle. Thehandle contained dry batteries to supplyenergy electrically to ignite the rocketmotor. In April 1942 Colonel Moore, thenat Frankford Arsenal, produced a factory-made 54-inch launcher and factory-madeparts for the converted grenade.32 Withthe further help of Dr. Hickman and theNDRC group, the Ordnance rocket unithad a few "respectable" antitank rocketsready for trial by May 1942. Captain Uhl,dressed like "the man from Mars," firedthe first rocket from his shoulder at the testground of NDRC, and the next day dem-onstrated launcher and rockets at Aber-deen Proving Ground. He improvised asight by using a piece of nail found on theground. The new weapon was christenedthat day: its resemblance to the comedian

Bob Burns' bazooka led the colonel whofired some of the rockets to dub the devicethe "bazooka." The name stuck.

The effectiveness of the rocket withdummy heads fired at a moving tank im-pressed the onlookers. A few days later aformal demonstration was held at CampSims, D. C., when high-ranking officials ofthe War and Navy Departments, Alliedgovernments, and NDRC witnessed thereal thing in action against a medium tank.British observers now opened negotiationfor samples and Russian military staffmembers present at this trial immediatelyrequested that they be supplied with some

32 (1) Interv, 6 Feb 50, with Gregory Kessenich,Chief of Ord Patent Sec. (2) Memo, Lt Col CharlesE. Herrstrom, Chief of Ord Patent Br, for Maj H. H.Ferguson, Legal Div, 18 Nov 44, sub: AT Rockets andLaunchers, copy in Ord Patent Sec files. (3) Blue-print, 13 Mar 42, Ord Patent Sec files.


of the new launchers even though develop-ment was still in progress. General Mar-shall at once issued verbal orders that5,000 launchers and 25,000 antitank and5,000 practice rockets be procured. TheE. G. Budd Company made the rockets.On 30 June 1942 the Ordnance Commit-tee formally standardized the 2.36-inchantitank rocket as the M6, and thelauncher as the M1.33

The bazooka is thus an example of aco-operatively developed weapon in whichthe Army, Navy, and civilian agencies allplayed a part. It provided a powerfuladdition to infantry armament. The pro-jected rockets could penetrate three inchesof homogeneous steel armor plate at anangle of impact up to 30 degrees from nor-mal, and retain full penetrative power upto their maximum range of 650 yards.Fired against masonry, girders, railroadtracks, or heavy timber, as well as againstarmor plate, they were highly destructive.While improvements upon both rocket andlauncher were admittedly necessary, thefirst models were satisfactory enough towarrant Obsoletion of the original antitankgrenade from which the rocket had de-rived. Orders for 120,000 rockets wereplaced in June and in July for 75,000launchers to be completed by the end ofthe year. Modifications of design of rocketfins and launcher sights were incorporatedinto the production units as these orderswere filled.34

More drastic changes soon becamenecessary. Misfires obtained with the origi-nal type of ignition squib led first to substi-tution of a new type, but by May 1943reports of serious malfunctions had becomeso frequent that the services were instructedto suspend use of the rocket pendinginvestigation. The Ordnance TechnicalCommittee recommended a new design of

rocket motor body, using a different steelin the stabilizer tube and employing a newtype of powder trap and fuze-base cover.Still more important as a safety measurewas reduction of the propellant. Extensivetests showed that powder sticks cut from23 inches to 20.75-21 inches in length gavesufficient propulsion but greatly lessenedthe danger of prematures even at extremetemperatures. With these changes ap-proved, the standard bazooka rocket wasdesignated the M6A1, the practice rocketthe M7Al. Teams equipped with the newparts, materials, tools, and repair kits tomake the modifications of both rockets andlaunchers were sent to the active theatresin July 1943.35 Some months later theM6A3 and M7A3 rockets were standard-ized with ogives reshaped to lower theangle of effective impact and with cylindri-cal fixed fins to increase stability in flight.Substitution of copper cones for steel re-sulted from discovery that copper conesobtained about 30 percent greater armorpenetration than the steel cones of identi-cal design.36 Moreover, in response totheatre requests the Ammunition Divisionof Industrial Service developed waterproofwire clamps to seal the fuze assemblyagainst entry of water around the safetypin and thereby reduce malfunctions dueto moisture.

Because rockets were relatively littleknown weapons, improvements oftenhinged upon fresh basic research. Hence,at the request of the Ordnance Depart-

33 (1) OCM 18246, 20 May 42; 18421, 30 Jun 42.(2) Skinner, loc. cit., pp. 262-63. (3) PSP 20, pp. 8-10,OHF. (4) Rocket Notes, pp. 4-11, OHF.

34 (1) PSP 20, pp. 10-12, OHF. (2) Rocket Notes,pp. 10-16, OHF.

35 OCM 20534, 27 May 43; 20684, 10 Jun 43;21080, 15 Jul 43; 21203, 5 Aug 43.

36 OCM 21679, 8 Sep 43; 22933, 17 Feb 44; 28141,28 Jun 45.


ment, the Bureau of Standards in the sum-mer and fall of 1944 conducted a numberof wind-tunnel tests of fin assemblies, andPicatinny Arsenal investigated ignitioncharacteristics calculated to give the mostdependable functioning of the 2.36-inchrocket at all temperatures. Fuzes also re-quired careful study. Experiments to de-velop a whole series of special bazookarockets—smoke, incendiary, chemical, andothers—brought about standardization ofthe M10, a smoke rocket, but no others.37

In every case the commercial companieshaving production contracts collaboratedboth in the designing work and in findingshortcuts in methods of manufacture. Jointefforts of the Atlas Powder, DuPont, Her-cules, and American Cyanamid Com-panies improved rocket powders, whileconcerns assigned contracts to develop ex-perimental components or assemblies, par-ticularly fuzes, added to the knowledge ofwhat new features were desirable orattainable by mass-production methods.Throughout the war the scientists ofNDRC and the universities with whichthey contracted were amassing data onexplosives that were invaluable in allphases of the rocket program.

The success of the 2.36-inch bazookarocket inspired NDRC to propose develop-ment of a still more powerful type withgreater range and a velocity increase fromthe 265 feet per second of the M6A3 to 500feet per second. The resulting T59 un-happily proved in tests to be dangerousto the user and quickly became a bone ofcontention between scientists of NDRCand the Ordnance Department. Theformer, having let considerable advancepublicity concerning their new "super-bazooka" rocket reach the theatres, sus-pected that Ordnance men were needlesslydelaying its production and issue. But post-

war developments were to vindicate theOrdnance Department when more thansix years' work still failed to remove thebugs from the rockets.38 Work upon theT59 nevertheless led to investigation of thepossibility of a larger antitank rocket,which, like the 2.36-inch, could be pro-jected from a shoulder launcher.39 Whiledevelopment of a 3.5-inch Navy rocket forair-to-ground fire had begun in February1944 only to be dropped in March 1945, a3.5-inch antitank rocket was still wanted.40

The project was initiated in August 1944.The first experimental model, the T80,was charged with 1.9 pounds of cyclotol.Though it obtained longer range andhigher velocity than the standard bazookarocket, it fell short of that achieved by theT59 with its eight pounds of pentolite. Yetthe cyclotol in the T80 would, researchmen believed, ensure penetration of 8-inchhomogeneous armor plate. Static, flight,and penetration tests in March supplieddata on which to base a revised design, butV-J Day arrived before this was proved.41

Once the projectile had reached itstarget, the final job was to do the greatestpossible damage. The rate of speed atwhich the projectile was traveling at themoment of burst was of course important,but the ultimate result was determined bythe quality of the ammunition itself. SomeGerman ammunition was of better qualitythan American because it was more per-fectly fabricated. But it had to have moreexacting machining and more careful heat-

37 (1) OCM 24671, 10 Aug 44; 25125, 14 Sep 44.(2) Rocket Notes, pp. 17-23, OHF.

38 Interv with Dr. Colin Hudson, 11 Sep 51.39 OCM 24666, 10 Aug 44; 25110, 14 Sep 44;

25252, 26 Sep 44.40 OCM 22884, 10 Feb 44; 27184, 5 Apr 45.41 (1) OCM 28409, 14 Jul 45; 28796, 8 Aug 45. (2)

PSP 20, pp. 1-12, OHF. (3) For history of the projectand postwar development, see OCM 32304, 5 Aug 48.


treating than U.S. mass-production re-quirements permitted. To increase firepower by otherwise improving the effec-tiveness of the projectile was a continuingproblem for the Ordnance Department.Experts in terminal ballistics attempted tosolve it in several ways. One was to im-prove the fuze. Another was to use a morepowerful explosive in the warhead or touse an old explosive in a new way, apply-ing the shaped-charge principle. And withspecific targets in mind, designers devisedspecial types of projectiles having the mass,size, and mechanical strength required todefeat different kinds of enemy defenses.

Fuzes

Artillery fuzes were likened by anNDRC scientist to "the old-time Armymule, ornery but indispensable."42 Theorneriness was inherent in their delicateand complicated mechanism, which wasdirected toward detonation at exactly theright time, not too early and not too late.Extensive work in the 1920's and 1930'shad produced several families of fuzesadapted to use in any caliber artilleryshell.43 Designated point-detonating (PD)or base-detonating (BD) according to theirposition on the projectile, fuzes were fur-ther classified as "impact" or "time," de-pending on whether or not they functionedonly when striking a target. Time fuzes didnot require impact but were set by turninga time ring before firing. As the shell leftthe muzzle, a time element, either a clock-work mechanism or a slow powder train,began to work, and the fuze functioned atthe moment it had been set for. Time fuzeswere valuable for fragmentation effect, forsmoke or illuminating shells, and especiallyfor antiaircraft fire. Impact fuzes, usedagainst targets of varying degrees of resist-

ance, were of several types: supersensitive,superquick, nondelay, delay, or a com-bination of these. Supersensitive actionwas necessary against insubstantial targetssuch as airplane fabric. Against more solidtargets, superquick fuzes were used whenpenetration was not desired, nondelay fordetonation at the moment of penetration,and delay—usually of .05, .15, or .25 sec-onds — when penetration in varyingdegrees was wanted.

Fuzes need not be single purpose, thoughmany were. Selective-type fuzes could beadjusted in the field for more than onekind of action, such as superquick and de-lay, or time and superquick. For example,the M48 fuze, used with the 75-mm.,3-inch, and 105-mm. high-explosive shell,and the M51, its counterpart for largercalibers, could be set to function immedi-ately on impact or with a delay of .05 or.15 seconds. In all fuzes, mechanical safe-guards restrained the firing pin until theright moment for detonation arrived.When the gun fired, the sudden and vio-lent forces arising from acceleration re-moved one set of safeguarding devices. Inflight the centrifugal force of the shell as itrotated about its longitudinal axis removedthe last set of safeguards and the fuze wasarmed, that is, free to function.44

Engineers strove with some success toadapt the fuzes developed before 1940 tothe tactical situations of World War IL Thechief problem, determining the most effec-tive delay times, was difficult to solve be-cause the resistance of targets variedgreatly.45 On the whole, troops in all the-

42 Burchard, ed., op. cit., p. 104.43 See Ch. VII, above.44 (1) TM 9-1900, pp. 107-10. (2) Catalogue of

Standard Ord Items, 1944, II, 651-65. (3) OCM22839, 10 Feb 44.

45 (1) OCM 22272, 2 Dec 43; 22839, 10 Feb 44. (2)OCO Tech Div, Rpt of FY 1943-44, pp. 22-24.


atres preferred the combination to thesingle-purpose fuze.46 One important re-quirement for use in air-burst neutraliza-tion was an accurate, long-delay time fuzewith a superquick functioning feature. TheM67 mechanical time fuze could be set fora delay of 75 seconds, but as it dependedon the turning of gears in flight and had noprovision for detonating on impact it wasunsatisfactory for neutralization.47 Onepossibility for development was the M54, apowder-train type of time fuze with thedesired superquick action. But the maxi-mum range of the M54 was only 25 sec-onds. The problem of how to triple thatrange was not fully solved when the warended.48

The most important point-detonatingfuze developed during the war was a radi-cal departure from other types, as it had asteel nose that adapted high-explosiveammunition to concrete-piercing uses.Since 1940 designers had been trying tofind a way to destroy fortifications made ofconcrete reinforced with steel bars, such asthe Siegfried Line. Against such targets,standard high-explosive shells would throwthe fuze and become duds. Armor-piercingammunition, based-fuzed, though better,lacked enough power to remove earth orsandbags placed in front of the concrete, toblow the reinforcing bars and debris fromthe impact area, or to cause large enoughcraters to make successive hits effective.The best solution was a completely newhigh-explosive shell with a base-detonatingfuze. But that meant a new round for eachweapon, further complicating the alreadycomplicated ammunition situation, andlong delay in getting ammunition totroops. A more expedient answer was asteel nose fuze that could be attached tohigh-explosive rounds already in the field.Col. George G. Eddy began the develop-

ment at Aberdeen in the summer of 1943.Tests against prototypes of West Wall forti-fications showed the most practical designto be a fuze body made of molybdenumsteel, heat treated for greater strength,with the delay assembly of the M48 andM51 fuzes and a modified booster. Devel-oped in a matter of weeks, the steel nosefuze, standardized as the M78, was rushedto General Devers in Africa and success-fully tried out at Cassino. Later it helpedto breach the Siegfried Line and the log-and-earth bunkers encountered in thePacific.49

The concrete-piercing fuze and thelong-delay superquick time fuze were ex-amples of developments to meet new tacti-cal conditions and new targets. Fuzes forrockets, on the other hand, presented stillanother problem. Conventional artilleryfuzes were not suitable because, thanks tothe comparatively long burning time ofrocket propellant, the rocket reached itsmaximum velocity much more slowly thanthe artillery shell, had virtually no setbackforce, and attained very much lower veloc-ities. With these differences in mind, engi-neers designed new fuzes for the 2.36-inchbazooka rocket and the 4.5-inch, themodels chiefly employed for ground fire inWorld War II. The bazooka rocket, pri-

46 OCM 21680, 30 Sep 43; 24288, 6 Jul 44; 28145,28 Jun 45.

47 (1) OCM 22839, 10 Feb 44. (2) Borden Rpt, OrdAnnex, p. 2, OHF. (3) Eddy Rpt, p. 2, OHF.

48 Min Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, p. 31, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

49 (1) Ltr, Chief of FA to CofOrd, 10 Jan 40, sub:Military Characteristics of Weapons of Greater Power,and ind, 26 Apr 40, OO 472/3631, DRB AGO. (2)OCM 16366, 27 Dec 40. (3) Standard Artillery andAmmunition Against Reinforced Concrete Pillboxes,First and Second Progress Rpts, 5 Jan 44, 15 Feb 44,OCO Tech Div, OHF. (4) R&D Serv, Ann Rpt FY1945, p. 26, OHF. (5) Barnes, op. cit., p. 130. (6) EddyRpt, p. 4, OHF. (7) Ltr, Brig Gen George G. Eddy toGen Ward, 26 Feb 52, OCMH.


marily an antitank weapon with an armor-piercing head, used a base-detonating fuze.When the first fuze proved prone to func-tion prematurely, designers found that abore-riding pin provided greater boresafety. The pin, held in place by the wallof the launcher while the rocket was trav-eling through the launching tube, was re-leased at the muzzle and the fuze was thenarmed. Later simplification of design re-duced the number of parts from thirteen toseven. The new fuze, the M400A1, com-bined with the metal parts adopted for theM6A3 bazooka rocket, gave the M6A5rocket greater plate penetration and sensi-tivity than that of any earlier model.50 In-stead of the base-detonating fuze of the2.36-inch, the 4.5-inch was equipped witha point-detonating fuze. Though two fuzeswere at first thought to be necessary, onewith superquick action, another with ashort delay to permit airburst from rico-cheting rockets, preliminary studies indi-cated that the two requirements could becombined successfully in one fuze, the set-ting of which could be adjusted for eithersuperquick action or a delay of .10 second.The fuze embodying these features wasstandardized in the summer of 1943 as theM4. Used not only with rockets but alsowith mortars, it was especially valuable inthe South Pacific. The 4.5-inch rockets,particularly when launched in rapid suc-cession from multiple-tube projectors, hada high-explosive effect peculiarly useful fordispersed fire against enemy concentrationsand area targets.51

But barrage fire depending for effect onsaturating an area rather than on placingshots squarely on a particular target wasfrequently futile. With time-fuzed fire,relatively few bursts could be properlyplaced, and because the many shots neededto get on target destroyed the element of

surprise, the enemy would have warningand could seek shelter. What was neededwas a fuze that would operate not by timebut by proximity to the target, for airburstsoccurring at just the right distance wouldmake foxholes useless and divest revet-ments and trenches of means of providingshelter from attack. Development of thatkind of fuze occupied some of the best sci-entific brains of America and Britain andbecame one of the technological triumphsof the war.

The Navy had been considering the pos-sibility of devising an influence fuze evenbefore the National Defense ResearchCommittee was established in June 1940.Hence, this project was the first that theNavy asked NDRC to study. In Septem-ber the Tizard Mission to the UnitedStates made available to American scien-tists the fruits of British research upon theproblem, data of great value in advancingAmerican work. The British had beenfocusing attention upon fuzes for bombsand antiaircraft rockets. For shells, Britishphysicists had regarded the difficulties asvirtually insuperable. The Army requestfor NDRC help on proximity fuzes camein mid-January 1941. NDRC assigned theresearch on bomb, mortar, and rocketfuzes to a division under Dr. Alexander H.Ellett, and shell fuzes to a section headedby Dr. Merle A. Tuve.

Though sometimes popularly assumedto stand for "variable time" or "vacuumtube," VT was merely a code name. Themeans of operating VT fuzes to detonatewithout regard to time but rather at agiven distance from the target could con-ceivably be several. NDRC began inves-

50 OCM 28141, 28 Jun 45.51 (1) OCM 20830, 24 Jun 43. (2) Burchard, ed.,

op. cit., p. 105. (3) R&D Serv, Ann Rpt FY 1944, p.23 and FY 1945, pp. 59-60, OHF.


tigation of each method that appearedeven remotely feasible—acoustic, photo-electric, radio and, after consultation withthe British, radio-pulse fuzes triggeredfrom the ground. The characteristics listedas essential by the Ordnance Committeefor bomb and rocket fuzes give some ideaof the complexity of the problem; in artil-lery and mortar shells space limitationsand the violence of setback made a solu-tion even more difficult than in bombs.The first stipulation was that the fuze mustfunction when passing within effectivefragmentation range of the target, whetherin daylight or darkness, and in any kind ofweather. Secondly, there must be a self-destructive feature to prevent injury ofAllied troops and damage to equipmentin case of missing the enemy target.52

Separate storage of the power unit, pre-sumably batteries, was also required, sothat fresh units could be attached shortlybefore use. And, lastly, the mechanismmust have sufficient ruggedness to with-stand the rotational and setback forces ofconventional artillery.53

The answer NDRC finally came upwith was a radio-operated fuze triggeredby reflection from ground, aerial, marine,or submarine target. The underlying prin-ciple was simple enough. Anyone familiarwith electronics would immediately com-prehend it, for it was essentially an appli-cation of short-wave transmission andreflection from the target, with use of theso-called Doppler frequency. Containedwithin the fuze was a miniature transmit-ting and receiving oscillator, an amplifier,an electrical firing circuit, and electricaland mechanical safety devices. The radiotransmitter broadcast a continuous signalthat was reflected back to the fuze as itapproached its target. As the oscillator re-ceived the signal back, an interference, the

Doppler frequency, was set up, which,when intensified sufficiently by the ampli-fier, passed a signal through to set off thefiring circuit and detonate the projectile.If this sequence was simple to understand,fitting the mechanisms into the confinedspace of a fuze was complicated in the ex-treme. Several nations had issued patentsfor proximity devices, but no patent ex-plained how the mechanism was to bemade. By the end of the war Germany hadin production a radio-operated fuze forrockets and had made some progress indesign of acoustic fuzes. None of these sawservice, presumably because productionproblems had not been solved satisfac-torily.54 The triumph of American re-search lay in successfully designing a fuzethat could be manufactured by assembly-line methods.

As was true of fuzes operating on timeor impact, VT fuzes were a considerablefamily. Each weapon had to have its ownfuze, differing in particulars from that de-signed for every other weapon. The inten-sive study and elaborate, ingenious testingthat produced effective, safe proximityfuzes for bombs, rockets, antiaircraft andfield artillery shells, and, by the very endof the war, for 81-mm. mortars must com-mand the utmost admiration. The tech-nical research was chiefly the work ofNDRC and its contractors. Three univer-sities, the Department of Terrestrial Mag-netism of the Carnegie Institution, theBureau of Standards, and some twentycommercial companies all contributed.Infinite patience and wide scientificknowledge went into development of theproximity fuze, but without the experts ofthe Army and Navy who supplied the es-

52 See below, Ch. XIV.53 NDRC Liaison, Project OD-27, OHF.54 Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 222.


VT FUZE. Air burst of a 105-mm. HE shell and dust rising as shell splinters strike the groundin the impact area.

sential data to make the elaborate elec-tronic device practicable in ammunition,the laboratory achievement must havecounted for little. The first fuzes were fartoo big and clumsy to be useful in combat.And after gradual, step-by-step correctionsof that obstacle, the models hand-made atlaboratory bench by skilled technicianshad still to be adapted to mass production.Success in the end was the result of the fullcollaboration of civilian scientists, Armyand Navy ordnance specialists, and ex-perienced industrial engineers.55

The first VT fuzes used in combat werefired in January 1943 from Navy guns onthe cruiser Helena to bring down a Japa-nese plane. For the next eighteen monthsuse was restricted to the U.S. and BritishNavies, lest the enemy salvage enough

pieces to copy the design. In the summer of1944 Army antiaircraft batteries in Eng-land fighting off the German buzz bombattacks were issued some of the new fuzesand employed them with effect, but theirwidest and most deadly application wasagainst enemy ground troops. In October1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff ap-proved preparation for release of VT fuzesfor ground warfare in Europe. From stock-piles that had been accumulating since thefall of 1943, shipments to Europe built upample supplies. Teams of officers sent to in-struct ETO artillerymen in the proper useof this new killing device had the scene setto put it into action on Christmas Day

55 (1) Barnes, op. cit., pp. 115-16, 221-42. (2) Intervwith Samuel Feltman, 15 Sep 50.


1944.56 Generalfeldmarschall Gerd vonRundstedt's sudden stealthy move to cutthe supply lines of the U.S. First Army inthe Ardennes hastened the day. Thoughonly 3,000 VT fuzes were issued to theVIII and V Corps stemming the enemyadvance, and though the wooded terrainreduced the effectiveness of the fuzes, thesurprise produced was considerable. Herewas a truly secret weapon. After the Battleof the Bulge, Allied ground forces used VTfuzes in dozens of actions. In interdictoryfire the effect was to deny the enemy use ofkey bridges and roads, for, as GeneralEisenhower's headquarters cabled, "bythe unprecedented effectiveness of unseenfire at all hours of day and night, theenemy has been severely upset . . . ." 57

Introduced nearly simultaneously into thePacific theatre, there also the "funny fuze"in rockets and bombs disrupted theenemy.58

High Explosives

Increasing the destructive effect at thetarget meant not only using suitable fuzesbut also the most powerful explosive con-sonant with safety and dependability. Theexplosive in the warhead of an artilleryshell had to be able to stand the shock ofsetback when the projectile was fired andthe shock of impact against steel or con-crete. That is another way of saying thatit had to be obedient to the fuze. Trinitro-toluene, commonly called TNT, possessedthis essential quality to a gratifying degree.It would not explode until the initial weakimpulse from the detonator had set off abooster charge consisting of a smallamount of a highly brisant explosive suchas tetryl or PETN.59 Considerable powercombined with insensitivity, which madefor easy loading, stability, and safety in

handling and transport, made TNT andamatol, a mixture of TNT and ammoniumnitrate, the preferred fillings for most high-explosive artillery shells at the outset ofWorld War II. That they remained so waslargely due to their availability in largequantities. As the war progressed and am-munition in general became more com-plex in design and more specialized infunction, demand arose for improvedexplosives. This demand could not be metto any extent because the explosives devel-oped between wars did not get into large-scale production in time. Nevertheless,throughout the war the Ordnance Depart-ment sought both to find ways of usingmore powerful new explosives and toadapt old ones to special purposes.60

There were at hand several explosivesof higher shattering effect, or brisance,than TNT. The most important were, first,cyclotrimethylene-trinitramine, which theAmericans called cyclonite and the Britishcalled RDX, "Research Department Ex-plosive"; second, pentaerythritol tetraniteor PETN; and third, ethylenedinitramineor EDNA, later named haleite. RDX andPETN were far too sensitive to be used inthe pure state in a shell. It was thereforenecessary to mix them with oils or waxes,or with other explosives, to form usablecompositions. The British had managed todesensitize RDX by mixing it with 9 per-cent beeswax to form Composition A, forpress-loading into shells; with 39.5 percent

56 (1) Col. C. H. M. Roberts, Text of Broadcast forState Department "University of the Air" on theProximity Fuze, 23 Apr 46, OHF. (2) Barnes, op. cit.,pp. 86-87.

57 Quoted in Joseph C. Boyce, New Weapons for AirWarfare (Boston, 1947), p. 159.

58 Barnes, op. cit., p. 88.59 L. R. Littleton, The Bursting Charge Explosive

Train, OHF.60 (1) R&D Serv, Ann Rpt FY 1943, p. 75, OHF.

(2) Barnes, op. cit., p. 73.


TNT and 1 percent beeswax to form Com-position B, chiefly for bomb loading; andwith 11.7 percent of a plasticizing oil toform Composition C, for demolitionwork.61 These formulae were brought overby the Tizard Mission in 1940. In Amer-ica development of Compositions A, B,and C was undertaken by the DuPontCompany under contract with NDRC.Because the Ordnance Departmentwanted Composition A in granular forminstead of the lump form specified by theBritish, DuPont produced a granular mix-ture designated Composition A3; but ithad low priority in the very tight RDXprogram and played little part in groundwarfare.

More promising than RDX for shellloading was haleite. From the 1920's on-ward chemists at Picatinny had beentrying to find a compound that wouldhave the high brisance of RDX withoutits sensitivity to friction and impact. Re-search on this problem, principally by Dr.George C. Hale, chief chemist, led to thediscovery of ethylenedinitramine, orEDNA, the first entirely American highexplosive. More powerful than TNT, itwas slightly less powerful than RDX butwas less sensitive. Its stability gave it animportant advantage in considerations ofmanufacture, loading, storage, transpor-tation, and use in the field. This advan-tage was offset in prewar days by the highcost of manufacture of one of its interme-diates, ethylene urea. But, by the com-bined efforts of NDRC and the DuPontCompany, the obstacle was removed, andin the late spring of 1943 EDNA wasadopted for testing purposes. Designatedhaleite in honor of Dr. Hale, this new ex-plosive could be press-loaded into smallshells without a desensitizing agent, and itsderivative, ednatol, a mixture containing

42 percent TNT, could be melt-loaded intolarge shells as easily as was amatol. Delayin solving manufacturing problems, how-ever, prevented haleite from getting intocombat.62

The most sensitive of all high explosiveswas PETN, which was even more readilydetonated by fuze-booster systems thanwas RDX. It was desensitized by mixingit with TNT to form a composition namedpentolite, which was extensively used indetonators, bazooka rockets, rifle grenades,boosting devices, and in the shapedcharges of high-explosive antitank shells.63

Much of the work of improving high-explosive compositions was directed atfinding the most efficient filling for anti-tank shells. For armor-piercing projectiles,relatively insensitive ammonium picrate,"Explosive D," had long been preferred.As it was not likely to detonate on impact,the shell could penetrate the tank beforeexploding. But experience with Germanheavy tanks in North Africa showed thatsomething more was needed in the way ofpower and fragmentation, coupled withgreater incendiary effect within the tank.Chemists at Picatinny accordingly triedseveral expedients. In armor-piercingshell, addition of a small amount of pow-dered aluminum to cyclotol—a mixture ofRDX and TNT—to ednatol, or to TNTproduced more brisance than Explosive Dand increased sensitivity to impact. Inhigh-explosive antitank shell fillings, con-versely, the difficulty was the exact oppo-site. The high sensitivity of pentolite madeit liable to detonation by target impact so

61 Dr. R. O. Bengis, Super Explosive Program RDXand its Compositions A, B and C, PSP 16, I, 41, OHF.

62 (1) PSP 16, I, 53-57, 65, 74-75. (2) Baxter, op.cit., pp. 256-57. (3) OCM 20757, 17 Jun 43; 20021, 25Mar 43. (4) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal Tech Group,III (April-May 1943), pp. 36-38, OHF.

63 Barnes, op. cit., pp. 73-74.


that the problem was to tone it down to theproper degree of insensitivity. Among sev-eral possibilities considered were the addi-tion of wax to the pentolite, the reductionof the PETN content, and the substitutionof ednatol or Composition B. None wasentirely satisfactory.64

The search for an explosive compositionof the greatest possible power and brisancetook a new turn after analyses of foreignexplosives at Picatinny during 1943.Hitherto, research had been concentratedon two-explosive compositions such aspentolite, Composition B, or ednatol. Theexamination of a Soviet 76-mm. high-explosive armor-piercing round suggestedthe possibility of employing ternary mix-tures. Tests revealed that castable ternaryexplosive mixtures such as RDX-Tetryl-TNT and Haleite-PETN-RDX offeredgreat promise not only for armor-piercingprojectiles but as fragmentation ammuni-tion for weapons designed to produce blastand for demolition charges. Further studyshowed that the haleite ternaries wereunstable. The best combination seemed tobe 28 percent PETN, 43.2 percent RDX,and 28.8 percent TNT, a mixture desig-nated PTX-2 (Picatinny Ternary Explo-sive). More brisant than any of the binarycompositions, it was more stable than50/50 pentolite, and less sensitive to im-pact. Preliminary firings at Picatinnyindicated that it would be particularlyadapted to shaped-charge ammunition.At V-J Day, PTX-2 was still in the testingstage.65

In spite of intensive effort, chemists atPicatinny and NDRC's laboratories failedduring the war to develop any new ex-plosive composition for shell loading thatwas wholly satisfactory and readily avail-able in quantity. The obstacles were oftendisheartening. The characteristics of an

explosive might be considerably affectedby impurities existing in the raw materialto begin with or admitted in manufacture;the instability of PETN, for example, wasprobably due to impurities in its raw ma-terial, pentaerythritol. Other variablesthat had to be taken into account were thedifferent methods of testing and differencesin interpreting results. Assuming that acomposition had been hit upon thatpromised to combine greater brisance withless sensitivity, there was still the questionwhether it could be economically manu-factured, safely handled, and made un-changing in character in temperaturesranging from arctic cold to tropical heat.In the search for explosives with specialproperties, much work had been done inthe field of aluminized explosives, but, al-though aluminized TNT (tritonal) wasused in bombs, much remained to be done.At the end of the war the Ordnance De-partment felt that deeper study of thefundamental properties of all high explo-sives was essential to effective developmentin the future.66

If no new explosive for artillery shellcame into use during the war, a new wayof employing explosives nevertheless did.The effect of a hollow-charge or shaped-charge projectile against armored targetswas first successfully demonstrated by thebazooka and the rifle grenade. The intenseforward jet of the charge, serving to focuspart of the energy of the explosion in alimited area, gave to the light-weight low-velocity rocket the armor-piercing advan-tages hitherto possessed only by high-velocity artillery. The antitank rifle

64 OCM 18386, 22 May 42; 20757, 17 Jun 43;23762, 11 May 44; 23846, 18 May 44; 30120, 31 Jan46.

65 OCM 24213, 22 Jun 44; 25099, 14 Sep 44; 30120,31 Jan 46.

66 OCM 30120, 31 Jan 46.


RIFLE GRENADES. M9A1 rifle grenade and launcher (left); rifle grenade, adapted fromthe 60-mm. mortar shell (right).

grenade, containing only four ounces ofpentolite, would penetrate up to fourinches of homogeneous armor plate at anormal angle of impact. If not so powerfulas the antitank rocket, which had equalpenetration at angles of impact as great as50 degrees,67 the M9A1 rifle grenade stilldid excellent, albeit less publicized, worknot only against tanks but against bunkersand pillboxes, where its good fragmenta-tion characteristics were especially valu-able. There were times when the infantry-man preferred it to the bazooka becausethe grenade launcher could be fitted onthe rifle he already had and did not in-volve carrying an extra weapon.68

Application of the shaped-charge prin-ciple to artillery naturally proceeded also.The choice of howitzers was logical be-

cause their low velocity made conventionaltypes of armor-piercing projectiles ineffec-tive, whereas for a shaped charge lowvelocity was an advantage. Before PearlHarbor in an atmosphere of great secrecy,work began upon a shaped-charge shell,the "HEAT," for the 75-mm. howitzer.The designers, paying careful attention tothe length of the ogive, the filler, and thestriking velocity, came up with a 13.5-pound shell of the same length as the cor-responding high-explosive round. Thehigh-explosive, antitank shell, containinga filler of 50/50 pentolite, at a muzzle

67 (1) Antitank Weapons, pp. 1, 4, OHF. (2) OCM16374, 30 Dec 40. (3) Baxter, op. cit., p. 260.

68 (1) Barnes, op. cit., p. 2. (2) Barnes Diary, 29 May43; 5 Jun 43; 7 Aug 43; 9 Aug 43; 8 Jan 44; 30 May44; 31 May 44, OHF. (3) Borden Rpt, Observations,p. 7, OHF.


velocity of approximately 1,000 feet persecond would penetrate 3 inches of homo-geneous armor plate. A similar shell forthe 105-mm. howitzer appeared simul-taneously.69 Standardized in late 1941,HEAT shells were produced in time totake part in the North African tank battlesearly in 1943. The Ordnance Departmenthad high hopes that they would succeed inpenetrating the German heavy armorplate that had defeated solid armor-pierc-ing ammunition.70 But though sometimessuccessful, performance of shaped chargeswas not dependable. When they workedthey worked like a charm, but they were in-effective disconcertingly often. In an effortto find out why, the Ordnance Depart-ment, with the help of NDRC and theNavy, intensified its research. In somecases observers in the field had blamedfaulty manufacture, but investigatorsproceeded on the assumption that designof the round and the principles of oper-ation needed improvement. Because of thedifference in behavior of the nonrotatedrocket and the rotated shell, the effect ofspin was carefully studied as well as themethod of fuzing. One of the most impor-tant discoveries was that increase in platepenetration was directly proportional toincrease, up to approximately three cal-ibers, in "stand-off" distance, that is, thedistance from the base of the cone to thetarget at the moment of detonation. Yetthis finding was only a beginning, and thesolution to the puzzling behavior of hol-low-charge projectiles was not foundduring World War II.71

Special Purpose Projectiles

Shifting conditions of battle in a war onmany fronts and the constant demand forgreater fire power against all kinds of tar-

gets spurred development of new projec-tiles and the adaptation of old ones to newpurposes. In addition to changing themethod of fuzing or using different fillers,the size, shape, and weight of the warheaditself, and the material of which it wasmade, had to be studied carefully withspecial targets in mind. The shell directedagainst troops or lightly armored defenseswas necessarily different from that fired attanks or concrete fortifications. Still an-other type would be required for smokescreening or signaling. And within thesecategories, a shell that might be effectivein the European theatre might be unsuitedto the jungle and cave warfare of thePacific. Thus, the 105-mm. howitzer alonefired some thirteen different types of am-munition, delivering to the enemy projec-tiles that varied in persuasive power fromthe shaped charge to the propagandaleaflet.72

Of ammunition employed primarilyagainst troops, perhaps the most interest-ing development was the adaptation ofcanister to modern warfare. This ancienttype of projectile was the simplest imagi-nable, a cylindrical sheet-metal can filledwith small steel shot set in a matrix ofresin. But in jungle warfare canisterproved surprisingly effective for stoppingmassed Japanese attacks and for clearing

69 OGM 17638, 19 Dec 41; 17639, 20 Dec 41.70 (1) Barnes Diary, 18 Jan 43, OHF. (2) Barnes,

Weapons of World War II, p. 82.71 (1) OCM 23765, 11 May 44; 23846, 18 May 44;

24214, 22 Jun 44; 27628, 10 May 45. (2) Barnes Diary,18 Feb 43, OHF. (3) Memo, Col Zornig for GenBarnes, 24 Nov 42, sub: British Development and Useof Shaped Charges, OO 350.05/1850, DRB AGO.(4) Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, p. 28, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (5) Min, JointA&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 26 Jun 46, p. 34, A&NMtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (6) Development and ProofServices, APG, Vulnerability of Armored Vehicles toBallistic Attack, Sep 50, p. 75, OHF.

72 Barnes, op. cit., pp. 77, 119.


jungle undergrowth. Containing neitherfuze, ogive, nor bursting charge, it de-pended for operation on the shock of dis-charge, which ruptured the case andscattered the shot forward. The canistermost used was the M2, containing 122steel balls, which was fired from the 37-mm. antitank gun. Larger rounds contain-ing 390 balls were developed for the75-mm. and 105-mm. howitzers as a partof the extensive program for jungle weap-ons begun in the fall of 1943.73

Aside from canister, departures fromprewar design were few in projectiles foruse against troops and light emplace-ments. Developments were chiefly con-cerned with fuzes calculated to give greaterrange and more effective burst, and withproviding terminal ballistic data to enablefield commanders to make optimum use ofthe weapons. At the Ballistic ResearchLaboratory, in the course of intensive basicresearch on fragmentation, ultra-high-speed X-ray equipment was developedthat enabled technicians to make radio-graphs showing what happened to a shellimmediately after detonation. These re-markable pictures gave more insight intothe nature of fragmentation than any yetattained and offered much promise forfuture development.74

Similar in ballistics to the high-explo-sive shell was the chemical shell. Thefilling, whether gas or smoke, was the re-sponsibility of the Chemical Warfare Serv-ice, but the Ordnance Department sup-plied the case, the burster—a tubecontaining tetryl running down the centerof the cavity—and the fuze, usually asuperquick or combination time-and-superquick type. As gas was not used incombat, Ordnance concentrated on devel-oping various types of smoke shells. Somehad no burster. For example, the base-

ejection type depended on an expellingcharge of Slack powder that forced thesmoke canister out of the base of the shell.It could lay down a smoke screen, or sig-nal with colored smoke, but its construc-tion made it useless for certain weapons.Of all smoke ammunition, the older andmore versatile burster shell filled withwhite phosphorus turned out to be themost useful in combat. It was valued notso much for its screening ability, whichwas limited, as for its good qualities bothas a spotting agent for signalling to aircraftobservers and as a means of producingcasualties and demoralization among en-emy troops.75 Phosphorus caused severeburns that were slow to heal. The whitephosphorus (WP) shell developed for the60-mm. mortar in the fall of 1943 was im-mediately popular in the theatres andbrought about a demand early in 1944 forWP shells in calibers from 75-mm up.76 Afavorite with the infantryman was the WPrifle grenade, which was extremely usefulin cleaning the enemy out of open trenchesor smoking him out of bunkers and fox-holes.77

Of necessity, Ordnance Research andDevelopment Service focused much of itswork in terminal ballistics on developing

73 (1) Loading and Assembling Artillery Ammuni-tion, Oct 45, PSP 18, OHF. (2) Barnes Diary, 11 Oct43, OHF. (3) Barnes, op. cit., p. 122. (4) Weapons forJungle Warfare, 1 Nov 43, pp. 61-63, OHF. ,

74 (1) Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D,1 Oct 45, p. 28, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (2)Barnes, op. cit., pp. 304-06.

75 (1) OCM 23319, 30 Mar 44; 26098, 21 Dec 44.(2) Barnes Diary, 27 Apr 43; 28 May 43; 24 Aug 43.(3) Min A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 15 Sep 44,p. 15, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

76 (1) Eddy Rpt, pp. 4, 21, 39-40, 54, OHF. (2)Borden Rpt, Observations, p. 13, OHF. (3) OCM26323, 11 Jan 45. (4) Weapons for Jungle Warfare, 1Nov 43, p. 50, OHF.

77 (1) OCM 23532, 20 Apr 44; 23758, 11 May 44;23868, 18 May 44. (2) Barnes Diary, 8 Jan 44, OHF.(3) Barnes, op. cit., p. 93.


projectiles able to penetrate the heavytank armor, pillboxes, log bunkers, andstrong concrete fortifications that opposedthe American advance from 1942 on. Re-ports from North Africa early in 1942 oftests on captured German tanks showedthat under existing conditions Americanarmor-piercing shot usually failed to pene-trate German face-hardened armor. Atthe ranges required in desert fighting, thiswas true even of high-velocity weaponssuch as the 90-mm. gun. When shot didpenetrate, fragmentation was insufficientto wreck the tank interior. To increase thearmor-piercing quality, Ordnance engi-neers added to all calibers of armor-pierc-ing shell a device already developed forthe less powerful 37-mm. antitank shell, asteel armor-piercing cap with a windshieldaffixed for improved ballistics. To increasethe destructive effect after penetration,these armor-piercing-capped—APC—pro-jectiles were provided with a small cavitycontaining a bursting charge of ExplosiveD and with a base-detonating fuze. Withthese improvements, the 90-mm. APCM82 projectile, for example, would effecta deeper penetration of face-hardenedarmor plate at a thousand yards than the90-mm. armor-piercing.78 American 75-mm. APC ammunition, though then madewithout an explosive charge, was creditedwith saving the day in Libya, as Britishuncapped ammunition was ineffectiveagainst German face-hardened plate.APC projectiles with the explosive chargewere late getting into production, partlybecause the base-detonating fuze was notavailable.79

Hardly had the new APC high-explo-sive ammunition reached the battlefieldswhen the even more heavily armoredPanther and Tiger tanks made their ap-pearance. They could not be knocked outeven by the 90-mm. M82 or the M62 APC

provided for 3-inch and 76-mm. guns.This new threat called for a shell of radi-cally different design. The Ordnance De-partment's answer was "HVAP." Theprinciple underlying the effectiveness ofHVAP—hypervelocity armor-piercing am-munition—was that the energy of a pro-jectile is a function of the square of thevelocity. Light-weight, hard-cored projec-tiles could attain hypervelocities, that is,from 3,000 to 4,000 or more feet per sec-ond, and thus have more than double theenergy and hence penetrating power ofthose fired at ordinary velocities, whichseldom exceeded 2,600 feet per second.Study of captured ammunition for theGerman tapered bore gun established thepossibilities of the German design.80 Ithad a core of tungsten carbide, a materialof such density and hardness that it wouldnot shatter on impact at high speeds, assteel was likely to do. To adapt this projec-tile to standard cylindrically bored weap-ons, the best method appeared to be to usea lighter weight shell made with an alumi-num alloy jacket. Testing of a first experi-mental model, the T24, designed for the37-mm. gun, began at Aberdeen in thespring of 1942. That summer NDRC, atOrdnance request, undertook basic re-search on the behavior of hypervelocityprojectiles at the target.81

Despite the approximately 50 percentgreater penetration of this new type ofprojectile as compared to that of standardarmor-piercing ammunition, no 37-mm.HVAP was made for service use, nor was

78 (1) Barnes Diary, 4 Apr 42, 18 Jan 43, OHF.(2) OCM 18340, 21 May 42; 18386, 22 May 42. (3)Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III, 531-32.

79 (1) Barnes Diary, 18 Jan, 18 Feb 43, OHF. (2)OCM 18340, 11 Jun 42.

80 See above, pp. 348-50.81 (1) OCM 17188, 25 Aug 41. (2) Hypervelocity

Development, Guns and Ammo, pp. 3-16, OHF. (3)Barnes Diary, 6 Apr 42; 20 Apr 42, OHF. (4) Bur-chard, ed., op. cit., p. 277.


HVAP for bigger shells pushed until 1944.Before that time the Ordnance Depart-ment considered the existing 75-mm. and3-inch armor-piercing projectiles capableof defeating any enemy tank so far met onthe battlefield, and tungsten, importedfrom China, was in critically shortsupply.82 But after D Day U.S. com-manders in France cabled urgent appealsfor weapons of high velocity to use againstthe German heavy tanks, more heavilyarmored than anticipated. The OrdnanceDepartment then went quickly into action.Thanks to the earlier development work,the HVAP shot T4 for 76-mm. and 3-inchguns was in the field by September. Thisachievement was close to a record forspeed. Unfortunately, the T4, althoughan improvement over any precedingarmor-piercing ammunition, failed tosolve the major problem, for it did not suc-cessfully penetrate the glacis plate of thePanther tank at practical ranges.83 Con-tinued development produced an im-proved design, the T4E20, standardizedearly in 1945 as the M93. By then a 90-mm. HVAP round had been developedwhich, following combat tests, was stand-ardized as the M304 in June. Containingan 8-pound core of tungsten carbide as op-posed to the 4-pound core of the 76-mm.HVAP shot, and at the same time attain-ing a muzzle velocity about 400 feet persecond greater, the 90-mm. shot could de-stroy the German Panther and Tigertanks at ranges up to 2,000 yards. Againstthe King or Royal Tiger it was only par-tially effective.84 Foreseeing future needfor penetrating even thicker armor at moredifficult angles of presentation, the Ord-nance Department carried an extensiveHVAP development program into thepostwar period. 85

Breaching the heavy concrete obstaclesand massive masonry walls encounteredby the American forces in Europe requiredthe utmost in explosive power, much morethan most armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing ammunition could deliver. TheEngineers' demolition blocks, and notablyshaped-charge blocks, were effective whenfighting was at close quarters,86 but at longranges the problem remained of getting ahigh-explosive shell that would penetrateand not break up on impact. The bestsolution found was a special steel fuze thatcould be used with high-explosive ammu-nition of 75-mm. to 240-mm.87 A stillsturdier fuze together with an explosivemore brisant than TNT promised evenbetter results. In the interim, the Ord-nance Department pushed work on am-munition for the 914-mm. mortar thenunder development. Though the shell forthe Little David with its 1,584 pounds ofhigh explosive proved in tests to have farmore destructive capacity than any pro-jectile ever previously conceived, at theend of the war its accuracy was still unsat-isfactory.88

82 (1) Barnes, op. cit., p. 88. (2) Barnes Diary, 5 May42, OHF. (3) Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 281, 320-21.

83 (1) Burchard, ed., op. cit., p. 319. (2) OCM 24680,10 Aug 44. (3) Barnes Diary, 25 Jul 44; 10 Aug 44;11 Aug 44, OHF. (4) Ltr, Gen Holly, Hq Communi-cation Zone ETO, to Gen Borden, 7 Sep 44, Over-seas Letters Misc, Barnes file, OHF.

84 (1) Tabulation prepared by Ballistics Sec, R&DDiv, 13 Sep 51, OHF. (2) OCM 26551, 1 Feb 45;28147, 28 Jun 45. (3) Armor-Piercing Ammunitionfor Gun, 90-mm. T15, Jan 45, OHF.

85 Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 26Jun 46, p. 28, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

86 Weapons for Jungle Warfare, 1 Nov 43, pp. 30-32, OHF.

87 See above, p. 362.88 (1) Barnes, op. cit., p. 174. (2) Min, Joint A&N

mtg. on Army Ord R&D, 26 Jun 46, p. 29, A&NMtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (3) Interv with Col Rayle, 10Mar 52.

CHAPTER XIII

The Development of BetterProtection

Just as armies needed mobility and firepower in modern warfare, so, if they wereto survive to achieve victory, they had tohave the best possible protection fromenemy fire. Inasmuch as no war in historyhas ever been won by defensive tacticsalone, the age-old formula decreeingoffense to be the best defense still obtainedin World War II. But military men recog-nized that in both offense and defensearmor plate on tanks, sheathing on air-craft and helmets and other kinds of bodyarmor were likely to provide valuable safe-guards to fighting men. There were, ofcourse, various other ways of reducingcombat hazards for troops. For example,the discovery that tank crews were subjectto fire within the fighting compartmentcaused by exploding of shells resting in theammunition racks led the Armored Forcetoward the end of the war to developso-called wet packs, a system of ammuni-tion stowage that surrounded the rackswith water. The search for smokeless, flash-less propellants for artillery was aimed atpreventing battery crews from exposingthemselves to counterfire. Simpler protec-tive measures were the camouflage paint-ing and netting for gun emplacementsdeveloped by the Corps of Engineers, theOrdnance Department's non-light-reflect-ing finishes for weapons, and, above all,

for infantrymen, intrenching tools for dig-ging foxholes. More revolutionary was theincreased use of mines to halt enemyattacks. Mines, to be sure, might be listedas weapons, but as their primary purposewas defense, they fell also into the categoryof protective devices. Besides these meansof giving what might be called passive pro-tection, there were the developments ofmatériel to provide added protection totroops in an advance. Use of smoke shell toscreen movements was a familiar method,whereas mine exploders to clear pathsthrough enemy mine fields were a distinctinnovation.

Armor Plate

Of all the problems involved in givingfighting men the utmost protection possi-ble, the optimum thickness, quality, andshape of armor plate for combat vehicleswas one of the most difficult. When doc-trinal change at the end of the 1930'sdecreed that tanks must be invulnerable tomore than small arms fire, the OrdnanceDepartment quickly had to find ways ofgiving additional protection. Armor wasessential not only to safeguard tank crewsbut also to prevent damage to an expensivepiece of equipment. Yet to sacrifice mobil-ity and fire power by affixing excessively

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER PROTECTION 375

heavy armor plate would be to make thetank unsuited to its combat mission. Whilearmor as such was far from a new devicefor protecting troops and equipment fromenemy explosives and missiles, the racebetween offensive effectiveness of armor-defeating weapons and defensive effective-ness of steel plate reached an unprece-dented pace between 1940 and 1945. Sincemilitary operations had become highlymobile, neither men nor equipment couldseek safety in the ground as in the years ofposition warfare in World War I. Com-bined with the speed of fighting vehicles inevasive action, armor spelled the differ-ence between combat utility and worth-lessness and also between life and death forthe crews.

At the outbreak of World War II Ameri-can experience in the manufacture andapplication of armor was extremely lim-ited. Private manufacturers had virtuallyno background in the production of steelsfor armored ground weapons. Inasmuch asArmy contracts for this product had beeninfinitesimal during the frugal interwardecades and public sentiment discouragedresearch and development on war matériel,Ordnance know-how was similarly re-stricted. Before Hitler's steel-clad legionsdemonstrated otherwise, the users ofarmored vehicles in the U.S. Army hadaccepted the theory that armor was meantto stop only small arms fire. Conforming tothat concept, protective plate on Americantanks, combat cars, and armored cars until1941 measured a maximum of 1.25 inchesin thickness, as contrasted with more than4 inches at the end of World War II.1 Inorder to save money, the large majority ofvehicles built before 1941 carried notarmor but merely mild steel plate. Re-search and development in the field ofarmor protection against large-caliber,

high-velocity missiles and high-power ex-plosives therefore dated only from the timethat United States participation in the warwas imminent.

To protect occupants and functionalmechanisms of combat vehicles againstattack, armor had to possess two principalcharacteristics: the ability to defeat hostileprojectiles, and the capacity to absorb theimpact energy of projectiles without rup-turing. The two types of armor in use dur-ing World War II, face-hardened andhomogeneous, had these qualities indifferent degrees.

Face-hardened armor had primarily ahigh degree of hardness. As its name im-plies, it consisted of alloy steel hardened ononly one side—the one facing enemyattack. Beneath the hardened outer sur-face face-hardened plate was relatively soft.While it had the advantage of lendingitself readily to the production of a largerange of surface hardnesses, it had thedrawbacks of being expensive to manufac-ture, difficult to weld, and requiring from3 to 5 percent nickel, a material in criti-cally short supply. Rolled alloy steel of thistype was used as armor on light combatvehicles and for outer stations on aircraft.But face-hardened plate was unsuitablefor large sections such as castings. Againstcapped projectiles it was ineffective. Fur-thermore, its toughness factor was rela-tively low, a characteristic resulting in atendency to spall—to tear, splinter, orthrow off lethal fragments on the inside ofthe surface under attack. Although speci-fications for face-hardened armor werechanged in late 1942 in an effort to obtain

1 Medium tank T5, Phase III, built in 1938, car-ried 1 7/16 inches of armor on its turret but only 1¼inches on its hull. Plate of 1¼-inch thickness likewiseconstituted the maximum protection of medium tankM2A1, the immediate forerunner of the GeneralGrant. R&D, Tanks, OHF.


greater toughness and to limit back-spall-ing tendencies, subsequent tests showedthat under arctic conditions the productwas still unsatisfactory in those respects.2

Homogeneous armor had above all ahigh degree of toughness. Unlike the face-hardened type, it was essentially uniformlyhard throughout its depth. It was morequickly manufactured than face-hardenedarmor and more easily machined andwelded. In addition, homogeneous armorcould more easily be produced in any de-sired shape. It could be rolled in the formof plate or cast in the form of completecomponents such as turrets, gun mantlets,hulls, and rear-drive casings. Because massproduction of vehicles in wartime prohib-ited using the materials, man-hours, andmachine-hours needed for processing face-hardened armor, homogeneous armor,which previously had been used only ex-perimentally, came to be adopted as theprimary protective material for Americancombat vehicles. Beginning with theauthorization in June 1940 for procure-ment and test of a cast homogeneous upperhull for the General Grant medium tank,both cast and rolled homogeneous armorreplaced the face-hardened type.

Firing experiments showed that atangles upward of 30 degrees homogeneousarmor offered substantially the same pro-tection against armor-piercing high-explo-sive shell that face-hardened plate gave,but the latter was somewhat superioragainst armor-piercing shot. The contoursof castings could readily be made to followthe most favorable ballistic lines, whereascurved surfaces produced by welding seg-ments of flat plate would always offer cer-tain straight expanses more vulnerable toattack. Perhaps even more significant, par-ticularly during the early war years whenproduction was the watchword, was the

time saved in the assembly of vehicles. Atank embodying cast major components,such as a turret, could be turned out inmaterially less time than one in whichthose components had to be fabricated bywelding.

Among the foremost problems in armorresearch and development during WorldWar II was that of arriving at specificationsthat guaranteed a satisfactory productwithout delaying production, the para-mount consideration in America's arma-ment program. Specifications in use be-tween January 1939 and September 1940contemplated the use of rolled armor plateonly. Alloy contents of steel, heat treat-ment, and methods of fabrication were atthe option of the manufacturer, who hadto submit to the Ordnance Departmentsamples of each lot for two ballistic tests,one determining resistance to penetrationand the other determining resistance toshock. Both tests consisted of firing .30-caliber, .50-caliber, and 37-mm. armor-piercing shot against the sample plates.While the Ordnance Department consid-ered using both rolled face-hardened androlled homogeneous plate, the penetrationrequirements set forth in the specificationswere so high that only face-hardened armormet them. By the autumn of 1940 the rap-idly changing picture of American needsin fighting vehicles introduced elementsnecessitating a radical departure from pre-vailing practices and standards.

America's new tanks were designed fortactical roles in which they would have towithstand large-caliber artillery projec-tiles, so that toughness and resistance toback spalling assumed much greater im-portance than theretofore. Homogeneous

2 R&D Serv, Armor Plate, Development and Pro-duction 1940-45, OHF. Unless otherwise stated, allmaterial in this section is from this manuscript.


armor consequently came to be used inincreasing quantities. Yet because require-ments for armor steel increased a thou-sandfold with the rapidly mounting pro-duction of weapons, shortages in alloymetals forced the development of newanalyses that markedly reduced the con-tent of critical materials such as nickel,chromium, and vanadium.3 Specificationsgoverning armor steel began to be writtennot with a view to obtaining a productideal in every respect, but with the intentof getting the best possible result consist-ent with the limitations inherent in massmanufacture.

Between 1940 and the end of World WarII little in the American armor programremained static. Changes in the composi-tion of armor steels, improvements in ob-taining the desired physical properties withthe requisite degree of uniformity, andnovel testing procedures expediting accept-ance of the finished product were intro-duced whenever and wherever they prom-ised to further the purpose of providingU.S. and Allied troops with better protec-tion. Following experience gained at CampShilo, Manitoba, during the winter of1942-43, for example, the Ordnance De-partment in co-operation with industrydevised two entirely new acceptance tests.

Experiments at Shilo showed that cur-rent methods of acceptance-testing armorby means of ballistic attack under normalconditions gave no assurance of satisfac-tory performance in subzero temperatures.In fact, the very validity of those tests ascriteria of good armor became question-able. Face-hardened plate, for instance,turned out to behave unsatisfactorily inextreme cold, and, while homogeneousarmor preserved its shock properties fairlywell, it likewise revealed an increasedtendency toward cracking and back spall-

ing. Ballistic tests, though necessary foraccumulating design information, werepatently wanting in accuracy for accept-ance testing of armor. What were neededwere qualitative tests applicable to produc-tion inspection.

Early in 1943 the so-called fracture testfor steel soundness was developed andeventually became mandatory for deter-mining the acceptability of armor steels. Inthis test, plate specimens from every heatwere hardened and then slowly broken ina press, thereby revealing the presence andfrequency of laminations—characteristicsconducive to back spalling. A material ad-vantage of this test lay in the fact that itcould be applied early enough in the treat-ment of steel to reject whatever was unfitfor high-quality armor. Another test, thefibre fracture test developed by WatertownArsenal, was made on specimens of plateas well as production plate for the purposeof controlling processing and heat treat-ment. The specimens were broken with asharp blow and acceptance or rejectionwas determined by the structure revealedby the fracture. A fracture dull or fibrousin appearance indicated adequate heattreatment and high absorption of energybefore failure. A fracture crystalline inappearance, on the other hand, indicatedeither unsatisfactory heat treatment orexcessive hardness, either of which wasindicative of low absorption of energybefore fracture.

Other important work on armor andallied problems was done in the field ofwelding. Because of the wide use of face-hardened steel, which lost its hardness atplaces subjected to the heat of welding, theinterwar years had seen little progress inthis method of fabricating combat vehi-

3 See Ch. XVIII, below.


cles. Armor was commonly joined by rivet-ing, but riveted joints had a number ofweaknesses. Studies and test firings atAberdeen Proving Ground at the outbreakof World War II, for example, showed thatheavy machine gun fire drove rivets intothe fighting compartments of tanks andthere created a hazard fully as lethal asshell fragments. Furthermore, bullet splashentered through riveted joints, and, underthe impact of armor-piercing projectiles assmall as 37-mm., the joints parted at theseams. Although some of these shortcom-ings were corrected in ways such as seal-welding rivet heads to the interiors ofvehicles, the greater strength of weldedjoints as well as the time saving in produc-tion soon led to the wholesale adoption ofwelding.4

Only tremendous progress in the devel-opment of new materials and techniques—the result of Ordnance teamwork withexpert groups such as the Subcommitteefor the Welding of Armor of the FerrousMetallurgical Advisory Committee—madethat changeover practicable and success-ful. An obstacle such as the difficulty ofwelding face-hardened plate was over-come by devising a method of joint con-struction that eliminated the necessity ofwelding directly to the hard surface of thearmor. Even better results were obtainedin later work with face-hardened armorwhen its edges were protected during thehardening process, so that welding theedges was similar to welding homogeneousplate. The need for conserving criticalalloying metals was met by the develop-ment of low-alloy electrodes. Productionspeed-ups were made possible by the de-velopment of an automatic process ofsubmerged-arc welding. The utility of allthese advances in the fabrication of armorsteel, as well as those in the development

of higher-quality steels proper, dependedin the final analysis, however, on twocardinal elements—structural design andits applicability in practice.

Even the thinnest coat of armor addedsubstantial weight to any combat vehicleand thereby impaired its mobility, theprincipal asset of motorized equipment.Invulnerability against attack from allvarieties of explosives and all types andsizes of projectiles would have required aprohibitively heavy covering of armor. Inpractice, therefore, a compromise betweenoptimum protection and weight require-ments was reached. Sloping the surfacesexposed to attack increased the effective-ness of a given layer of armor in two ways:it increased its thickness when measuredfrom a horizontal plane, a measurementknown as armor basis, and it offered a lessfavorable surface for attack because pro-jectiles were more likely to bounce off thanto penetrate. The value of sloped surfaceson armored vehicles was dramaticallyillustrated by tests which proved that atidentical optimum obliquities the averageresistance to penetration of purposely se-lected plates of good and poor qualityvaried little. Some experimental work onuse of spaced armor also proceeded, bothin the United States and in Germany, inan attempt to safeguard against shaped-charge attack by causing the energy of thecharge to exhaust itself against an outersheath of armor or of low-density materialattached to the armor plate proper. Butwhile various methods of applying theprinciple of an insulating space or materialwere tested, neither the enemy nor theAllies arrived at a satisfactory answer.5

4 APG Development and Proof Services, The Vul-nerability of Armored Vehicles to Ballistic Attack,1950, p. 145, OHF.

5 Ibid., pp. 34, 75-77.


Wartime improvements in design, thework of the Armor Branch at AberdeenProving Ground, were manifold. Thesloped, streamlined surfaces of Americantanks of late wartime vintage, for example,bore little resemblance to the boxlike hullsof prewar vehicles. Desirable featuresfound in enemy equipment were promptlyadopted. Thus, the sharp-nosed bow of theGerman Panther tank, which the Germanshad copied after their unpleasant experi-ences with the similarly shaped RussianT34, made its appearance in the GeneralPershing. Invisible but no less vital designchanges added to the protection of U.S.and Allied tank crews. Doors and escapehatches were modified for greater resist-ance to shock; ventilating devices wereredesigned to provide more positive pro-tection against bullet splash; gun shieldswere improved so that projectiles and frag-ments were less likely to impair the func-tioning of guns through burring or damageto trunnions. If riot yet ideal, Americanvehicular armor plate by the end of WorldWar II was not only producible in quan-tity but also gave troops and equipment fargreater protection than that deemedattainable in 1940.

Body Armor

Armor for aircraft was a problem inwhich the Ordnance Department becameinvolved because of its experience in estab-lishing specifications for tank armor, butthe task was largely one for aircraft de-signers, and Ordnance participation waschiefly advisory. Development of bodyarmor, on the other hand, grew into a jobof considerable proportions.

For ground troops the principal articlewas the helmet, a high-manganese steel

cap designed to afford greater protectionby fitting further down over the ears andneck than did the old "tin hat" of WorldWar I. The new model was standardizedin 1941 and produced in great quantity,some 22,000,000 before the end of the war.Though eventually armored vests werealso standardized for the ground forces, itwas body armor for flyers that engagedmost attention. The unit of the SmallArms Division of Research and Develop-ment Service, to which this developmentproject was assigned in the summer of1943, soon found occasion to consult thearmor workshop of the MetropolitanMuseum of Art, where experts were famil-iar with every kind of armor in existence,from Roman cuirasses down through themedieval knight's chain mail and the gold-inlaid steel plates of the sixteenth centurygrandee. Study of the strong points andweaknesses of these centuries-old samplesaided in the development of armor for themost modern of all soldiers, the flyer.6 Inthe fall of 1943 Ordnance specialists de-vised an extremely useful new method oftesting the protection afforded by varioustypes of material. This so-called 20-mm.triangulation fragmentation test utilizedthe static detonation of 20-mm. high-ex-plosive incendiary projectiles at a distanceclose enough to the armor under test toattack it with fragments of the size andvelocity that caused most combat casual-ties. Examination of the materials afterfragments had penetrated permitted acomparative evaluation based on the "re-tained casualty producing power" of the

6 (1) R&D Serv, Body Armor, OHF. (2) Develop-ment of Body Armor, Chs. 1-4, preliminary draft MSprepared by Engineering Experiment Station Schoolof Mechanical Engineering, Purdue University, OHF.(3) OCM 21021, 15 Jul 43; 21350, 19 Aug 43; 21525,9 Sep 43; 27904, 7 Jun 45.


BODY ARMOR of the type used by members of the U.S. Army Air Forces.

fragments.7 Tests of fabrics, laminates,steels, aluminum, and composites of metalsand fabrics showed the best material to bea combination of aluminum and nylon.Flyers' full-armored vests, half-armoredvests, aprons, groin armor, and neck armorwere then made of this material exclu-sively.

Toward the end of the war the superior-ity of this light-weight material led to itsadoption for helmets for all soldiers. Whilethe sacrifices of mobility entailed by wear-ing any kind of armor raised the questionof its utility for most ground troops, forairmen it was of great value. Of theground forces, only Engineer units as-signed to mine clearance had greater needof protection than of mobility. As theeffects of exploding antipersonnel mines—

Schuetzenminen and "S" mines—weresevere, and as crotch armor promised togive useful psychological as well as phys-ical protection, an adaptation of flyers'armor was worked out in the fall of 1944.Some 4,000 pieces were issued to the Corpsof Engineers.8

Land Mines

Armor provided passive protection forequipment and troops at all times, butagainst an enemy advance protectioncould be supplied not only by fire powerbut also by land mines strewn in his

7 Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, pp. 8-9, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

8 (1) Ibid. (2) Development of Body Armor, Ch. 5,OHF.


path. While the War Department was slowto endorse a vigorous program of minedevelopment, combat experience soonshowed that heavy antitank mines andsmaller antipersonnel mines had come tobe essential munitions in warfare. Uselessif an army were moving forward, theygave very real protection to troops in re-treat or units stalemated before an aggres-sive enemy force. Reports from France in1940 and from Russia in 1941 had carriedindications of the importance of mines asa cheap and effective means of stoppingtanks. The evidence multiplied when thegreat tank battles in North Africa began.Sown by the hundreds of thousands overthe desert, the Germans' flat, deadly"Teller mines" protecting Rommel's armywere a major obstacle to the British EighthArmy in Libya and later to the Americansin Tunisia. Though not wholly ignored bythe U.S. Army before the North Africancampaign, antitank and antipersonnelmines alike were only then recognized asvital. A tour of North Africa after the vic-tory in May 1943 convinced GeneralMcNair that the land mine was "almosta new arm of warfare." 9

From 1926 to 1937 the Chief of Engi-neers had had responsibility for antitankmine development. Progress had beenslow. From time to time the EngineerBoard manufactured experimental mod-els, simple metal boxes containing TNTand a contact fuze made by Picatinny Ar-senal, but it was not until the fall of 1936that steps were taken leading to activedevelopment. At that time the trend wastoward a design that should be a standarditem of issue to all ground combat troops—infantry, cavalry and mechanized—aswell as to the engineers. Because the minewould no longer come under the generalcategory of demolitions and because itsmost complex part was a fuze, manufac-

ture of which was properly an Ordnancefunction, the Chief of Engineers recom-mended that responsibility be transferredto Ordnance. The transfer was authorizedby the War Department early in 1937, anddevelopment work began at Picatinny.10

The Infantry Board wanted a minestrong enough to disable a medium tankand yet light enough to be carried by afoot soldier. It must function under lighttanks weighing about three tons, must becapable of being immersed in water forseveral hours, must be easily armed anddisarmed in daylight and darkness by menwith little training, must operate aboveground as well as below, and must havetwo fuzes. The board suggested that it con-tain 5 or 6 pounds of TNT or the equiva-lent and that it not exceed one foot 2inches in length, 6 inches in width, 5.25inches in height, and 19 pounds in weightwhen loaded.11

The mine designed by the PicatinnyTechnical Group was made of steel andwas circular in form rather than rectangu-lar, because by methods of manufacturethen current a cylinder was easier to make.It was about 7.25 inches in diameter, 3.25inches high, weighed approximately 10pounds, and contained about 5.5 poundsof TNT. It had one fuze, inserted in a wellat the top, instead of two; but a cover plateextended the full diameter of the minewould work the fuze if a vehicle ran overany portion of the plate. Thus, one fuzeserved the purpose of two. Pressure on theplate crushed a thin collar between the

9 (1) The New York Times, May 16, 1943. (2) BarnesDiary, 14 Dec 42-31 Jan 43, OHF.

10 (1) Ammo Development Div, R&D Serv, LandMines, Aug 45, pp. 6-9, OHF. (Hereafter cited asLand Mines.) (2) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal Manu-facturing Group, Explosives Dept, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 376,OHF. (3) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal Tech Group, II,28A, OHF. (4) OCM 13428, 11 Feb 37; 13502, 4 Mar37; 14665, 1 Sep 38.

11 OCM 13428, 11 Feb 37.


striker head and the fuze body, broketwo shear pins, and operated a spring-loaded firing pin that functioned thedetonator. When service tested early in1940, this experimental model revealeddefects that necessitated modifications.The fuze was unsafe for handling, and thesolid pressure plate was susceptible toblast, so that the mines could not be placedclose together. The fault in the fuze wascorrected by inserting between the strikerhead and the body of the fuze a safety forkthat had to be removed by hand. The de-fect in the mine case was corrected by sub-stituting for the cover plate a "spider"consisting of a steel rim around the perim-eter of the mine with crosspieces intersect-ing at the fuze. Tests showed that themines thus modified would stop a lighttank and, thanks to the spider design,could be placed as close as eighteen inchesapart. The mine was standardized in lateOctober 1940 as the antitank mine M1,the fuze as the M1 antitank mine fuze.12

Yet even at the time of standardizationthere were intimations that the M1 was in-adequate. Shortly after the fall of France,Engineer and Ordnance officers had ob-tained from an officer of the French Corpsof Engineers, Maj. Pierre Delalande, anaccurate description of the Germans'powerful Teller mine, which containedtwice as much explosive as the M1 andwhich had impressed Major Delalandewith its effectiveness. After discussions withhim, the Chief of Engineers asked Ord-nance to develop a heavy deliberate anti-tank mine that would contain from fifteento twenty pounds of explosive. The Chiefof Ordnance objected. He considered theuse of the M1 in pairs to be a better solu-tion, because of the supply problem. Asthe Engineers did not agree, Ordnancemade an M1 model with the body deep-

ened to permit fifteen pounds of TNT. Intests it blew a hole through the floor of alight tank and hurled the cupola five feet.Then the Engineers decided that after allno military requirement existed for solarge a mine. The project was canceled.13

A more productive result of early re-ports from Europe and conversations withMajor Delalande was the beginning ofantipersonnel mine development. Theantipersonnel mine had been in the fall of1939 a secret weapon of the Germans.Buried in great quantities between theSiegfried Line and the Maginot Line, themine was first discovered in the ArndtForest in Lorraine by French patrols whonicknamed it the "Silent Soldier." It wasa bounding device that projected adelayed-action shell. In co-operation withMajor Delalande, Ordnance engineersconstructed a model; from this and froma British copy of the Silent Soldier, they de-veloped a mine consisting of a tube con-taining a mortar projectile, connected atthe tube's lateral end with a smaller tubecontaining a fuze and propelling charge.Pressure on the fuze pressure button or apull on the fuze pull ring set off the chargeat the base of the larger tube, projectinga shell that exploded when it was two tosix feet from the tube. The first model, theM2, was cleared for procurement in April1942.14 But it was difficult to manufacture,had an erratically functioning fuze, andwas unsatisfactory when buried in the

12 (1) OCM 15453, 9 Nov 39; 15504, 7 Dec 39;16165, 10 Oct 40; 16204, 24 Oct 40. (2) Land Mines,p. 22, OHF. (3) Hist of Picatinny ManufacturingGroup, Explosives Dept, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 416, OHF.

13 OCM 16585, 8 Mar 41; 17909, 1 Mar 42; 17959,14 Mar 42.

14 (1) Lt. Col. Paul W. Thompson, "Mines by theMillions," Infantry Journal, LI, 6 (1942), 14. (2)OCM 16585, 8 Mar 41; 17587, 17 Dec 41; 18013, 2Apr 42; and 18060, 10 Apr 42. (3) Land Mines, pp.61-64, OHF.

LAND MINES. The U.S. bounding antipersonnel mine (upper left); the German "S" mine,nicknamed "Bouncing Betty" (upper right); and the U.S. antitank mine M6 (below).


ground since it was not waterproof. In aneffort to make it waterproof, designersmade model after model. Finally, thetubes and base were welded together andin this form the M2A4 and M2A4B2 werestandardized. In operation they were thesame as the M2 except for the fuze; thenew and safer fuze had a three-prongedtop similar to that on the German succes-sor to the Silent Soldier, the "S" mine.15 Inaddition to the bounding mine, Ordnanceand the Corps of Engineers developed afragmentation mine that inflicted injuryby bursting into pieces. This consisted ofa small hollow cast-iron block filled withTNT and equipped with wells for receiv-ing a fuze similar to that used in the M2A4mine. This mine was developed in a fewmonths and standardized in August 1942as the antipersonnel mine M3.16

In 1941 Ordnance engineers began thesearch for satisfactory nonmetallic mines.This trend resulted from a report that theBritish had a detector for metallic mines.A nonmetallic antitank mine, developedby the Onandaga Pottery Company, wasstandardized in the spring of 1943 as M5.Not unlike the German Topfmine, it con-sisted of an inverted ceramic bowl sepa-rated from its ceramic base by a rubbercushion that activated a plastic plunger.The fuze was also nonmetallic: the plungerforced a piston to break a glass ampulecontaining a reactive primer mixture. Themine was too heavy in proportion to itsexplosive power; with about the sameamount of explosive as the M1, it weighedthree pounds more and took up 64 percentmore shipping space. For this reason, Ord-nance requested the Department of Agri-culture's Forest Products Laboratory todevelop plywood and plastic mines—typesextensively used by the enemy. But the ex-perimental models were neither powerful

enough nor very safe. Field requirementsfor a nonmetallic mine were never verylarge and lessened after the United Statestook the offensive since, after an advance,troops had difficulty in locating their ownmines. Early in 1945, at the request ofArmy Ground Forces, Ordnance beganwork on a heavy nonmetallic mine butcanceled the project after V-J Day. At thattime a project for a nonmetallic antiper-sonnel mine requested by AGF in thesummer of 1944 was also canceled.17

Throughout World War II the most im-portant mine development continued tobe the metallic antitank mine. The modelstandardized in October 1940 as the M1was followed by a slightly modified mine,the M1A1. Just when a further and evenslighter modification, the M4, was nearingstandardization in the spring of 1943, theentire subject of land mines was broughtsharply into focus by the events of theNorth African campaign. At that time theM1A1 was being procured in great quan-tities, in spite of the fact that it had neverbeen tested against anything stronger thana light tank. By 1943 there were powerful

15 OCM 21880, 21 Oct 43; 24160, 22 Jun 44.1 6 (1) Land Mines, pp. 69-71, OHF. (2) OCM

17698, 29 Jan 42; 18041, 8 Apr 42; 18521, 23 Jul 42.17 (1) OCM 19807, 25 Feb 43; 25596, 2 Nov 44;

26069, 14 Dec 44; 28794, 20 Aug 45; 29073, 13 Sep45; 29153, 20 Sep 45. (2) Land Mines, pp. 27-31, 33-34, OHF. (3) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III,595. (4) Picatinny Arsenal Manufacturing Group,Explosives Dept, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 4 1 7 . (5) Ltr, GenCampbell to Mr. H. Leroy Whitney, ChairmanWPB, 9 Aug 44, sub: Tests by Forest Products Labo-ratory, OO 476/1192, DRB AGO. (6) Baxter, ScientistsAgainst Time, pp. 102-03. (7) Memo, CG ASF forCofOrd, 25 Aug 44, sub: Non-Metallic AntitankMines, OO 476/1200, DRB AGO. (8) Ltr, CG AGFto CG ASF, 1 Sep 44, sub: Military Characteristics ofNon-Metallic, Antitank and Antipersonnel Mines,OO 476/1261, DRB AGO. (9) Ltr, CG ASF toCofOrd, 5 Sep 44, sub: Non-Metallic Antitank Mines,OO 476/1226, DRB AGO. (10) Barnes.Diary, 16, 17May 44, OHF.


arguments for a heavier mine: the effec-tiveness of Teller mines in North Africa,the appearance of the huge German MarkVI tanks, and the example of the Britishwho in the fall of 1942 had increased thecharge of their antitank mine from fivepounds to ten. The Engineers, pointingout that Ordnance had no officer assignedsolely to antitank mines, asked for morevigorous development and, backed by theArmy Ground Forces, requested that athorough test program be put into effect.18

Consequently, at Aberdeen in April theM1A1, M4, and M5 were tested againstthe Teller mine. Mine for mine, the Ger-man model came off best, but the finalconclusion of Aberdeen's commandinggeneral was that when greater strengthwas needed, the M1A1 should be used inmultiples. In this solution General Barnes,who had made a tour of North Africa latein December 1942 and was still convincedthat "we do have a satisfactory mine,"concurred.19

The Ground Forces and Engineers outof their combat experience, especially withRommel's employment of mines at Kas-serine Pass, thought otherwise. Underbattle conditions, the use of small minesin pairs presented problems of conceal-ment, excavation, and emplacement.When General McNair went to NorthAfrica in mid-May to evaluate certaintypes of training and weapons, the use ofland mines was one of two importantpoints of controversy uppermost in hismind.20 General Bradley wrote GeneralMarshall, "Unless we can immediatelydevelop mines better than the German 'S'and German Teller types, I would suggestthat we adopt them both and start produc-tion immediately." 21 Ordnance officers inNATOUSA tested the M l mine againstcaptured enemy tanks and found that it

would not stop the Mark VI. They pro-posed an explosive charge often or fifteenpounds and a mine case like the Tellermine's. Of the antipersonnel mines, theInfantry thought the M2 as good as the"S" mine. Both Infantry and Engineerswanted, in addition to a large deliberatemine, a hasty light antitank mine. More-over, General McNair recommended moreextensive use of mines by all branches ofthe Army.22 The recommendations com-ing from North Africa were bolstered by asurvey of all theatres made by ASF and byfurther and more comprehensive tests atAberdeen, where the M1A1, M4, and M5were again compared with Teller mines,and a British hasty mine, the Hawkinsgrenade, was also carefully studied.23 As a

18 (1) Land Mines, pp. 16-26, OHF. (2) OCM16204, 24 Oct 40; 19903, 1 1 Mar 43. (3) Ltr, Presi-dent Engr Bd to CofEngrs, 19 Feb 43, sub: Develop-ment of Antitank Mines, Data for Reopening ProjectDM 294, and ind, 5 Mar 43, OO 471.6/524, DRBAGO. (4) Barnes Diary, 23 Jun 43, OHF. (5) Mes-sage W-1528, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 28 May 43,OO 386.3/359, DRB AGO.

19 (1) OCM 20649,3 Jun 43. (2) Barnes Diary, 6May 43, and 22 Jun 43, OHF.

20 (1) The New York Times, May 16, 1943. (2) LandMines, p. 19, OHF. (3) Time, XLI, 13 (1943), 14.

21 Ltr, Gen Christiansen, CofS AGF, to CG ASF, 16Jul 43. sub: Development of Deliberate AntitankMine, OO 476/313, DRB AGO.

22 (1) Ibid. (2) Message, AGWAR to Crawford forHall, 11 May 43, CM-OUT 7765, OO 386.3/349. (3)Message W-1419, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 26 May43, OO 396.3/357. (4) Message W-1528, Eisenhowerto AGWAR, 28 May 43, OO 386.2/359. (5) Memo,Maj David F. Shepherd, Ammo Off NATOUSA, forChief Ord Off NATOUSA, 14 Jun 43, sub: Report ofTests of Antitank Mines versus Armored Vehicles,and ind, 21 Jun 43, OO 350.05/4508. All in DRBAGO.

23 (1) OCM 19903, 11 Mar 43; 20649, 3 Jun 43,23463, 13 Apr 44; 20423, 13 May 43; 20163, 4 Apr43. (2) Ltr, CofOrd to Dir Proving Center, APG. 10May 43, sub: Mines, Antitank, U.S. and Foreign —Tests to Determine Characteristics and Effects Pro-duced by, and ind, 1 1 Apr 44, OO 47 1.6/568, DRBAGO. The Hawkins grenade is not to be confusedwith standard American grenades.


result of these investigations the OrdnanceDepartment immediately began develop-ment of a heavy mine as destructive as theTeller mine, and of a light one for con-venient and versatile use in multiplesagainst tanks and singly as booby traps.And notwithstanding the Infantry's favor-able report on the M2 antipersonnel mine,Picatinny Arsenal was instructed to studythe German "S" mine and work on a newdesign.24

Designers of the heavy mine attemptedto correct faults both of the M1A1 and ofthe German mine. Used above groundthe M1A1, because it was too tall, tendedto tip when a tank ran over its rim; whenit was buried, earth and rocks would workinto the space between spider and mineand prevent the fuze from functioning.The new mine was low and, instead of aspider, had a pressure plate like that of theTeller mine, but covering only about halfthe area of the mine. This corrected a de-fect of the Teller mine No. 1, the pressureplate of which covered it entirely andmade it subject to detonation from blast.In Teller mine No. 2, the Germans re-duced the area of the pressure plate. Tellermine No. 3 had a covering pressure platewith radial flutings that gave maximumarea with minimum susceptibility to blast.In Teller mine No. 4 a mushroom-headtype that screwed into the main ignitersocket replaced the pressure plate.25

By late August 1943 the Ordnance De-partment had four pilot models ready fortest. Both the Ordnance Technical Divi-sion and the Engineer Board's TechnicalStaff preferred the one designated T6E1.This had a thin metal shell, weighedtwenty pounds, and contained twelvepounds of TNT, thus fulfilling the GroundForces requirement that the mine be 60percent explosive. Offering the greatest

possible area to tank tracks, the mine casewas about three inches high and thirteenin diameter, and had activating wells inthe sides and bottom for booby trapping.Inside, a stack of four Belleville springssupported the pressure plate and providedthe tension fixing the 350-pound loadunder which the fuze would function. Thefuze well in the center was closed by a re-versible plug that could be screwed downin either a safe or an armed position. Thisfeature met the important requirementthat arming be the last step in mine lay-ing. The fuze was chemical, similar to thatof the nonmetallic mine.26

The light hasty mine had the same gen-eral shape as the British Hawkins grenademine but was more powerful. The bodywas a flat metal can—readily availablecommercially—loaded with tetrytol, anexplosive 20 percent more effective thanTNT. The same chemical fuze used in theheavy mine was inserted in the flat side ofthe can and covered by a pressure plateshaped to the contour of the mine body;it would function under a load of approxi-mately 200 pounds. Loaded, the mineweighed only about four pounds. It waspre-eminently an infantry mine. It couldbe carried in the cargo pocket of combattrousers and was therefore availablewherever men on foot could go. The In-fantry Board was enthusiastic about it.27

A new antipersonnel mine under devel-opment at Picatinny resembled the Ger-

24 (1) R&D Serv, Antitank and AntipersonnelMines, Introduction, OHF. (2) Land Mines, pp. 36-43, OHF. (3) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal Tech Group,V, 36, OHF. (4) OCM 26024, 14 Dec 44.

25 Middle East Tech Intel Summary 101, 30 Jun43, Apps. B and C, Ord Tech Intel files.

26 OCM 21730, 7 Oct 43.27 (1) OCM 21551, 16 Sep 43; 25174, 21 Sep 44.

(2) R&D Serv, Antitank and Antipersonnel Mines,pp. 8-12, OHF. (3) Hist of Picatinny Arsenal TechGroup, IV, 43, OHF.


man "S" mine rather than the Americantwo-tube M2A4. Within a canister about4 inches in diameter and 4.5 inches highwas a cast-iron projectile loaded with .7pounds of TNT, propelled by a charge ofblack powder set off by a three-prongedfuze in the canister's top. This model wasmore compact than the two-tube bound-ing mine, easier to manufacture, and muchmore nearly waterproof. It was also a gooddeal heavier: three pounds had beenadded to the projectile and burstingcharge to produce more than double thenumber of effective fragments of theM2A4. Tests were encouraging, and onV-J Day the new model was about to sup-plant M2A4.28

Because of the urgent need in the sum-mer of 1943 for the heavy antitank mineand the hasty mine, procurement beganthat fall before either was standardized.After correction of minor defects in theT6E1, notably a tendency to leak, it wasstandardized in September 1944 as theM6. At the same time the hasty minewas standardized as the M7. Thanks tothe early procurement program, whichconstituted a tooling-up for full-scale pro-duction, at the end of 1944 2,500,000 M6mines and 750,000 M7's were on hand inthe zone of the interior. There were nonein the European theatre. General Barnes,who considered the M6 a much moreeffective antitank mine than any other inexistence and the M7 very valuable, triedin vain to get both mines used in the thea-tres.29 Overseas, stocks of M1 and M1A1mines were excessive, and operational re-quirements for land mines were lessening.While General Barnes' faith in them ap-pears to have been justified, the new minescame too late. Except for the brief Ger-man break-through in the Ardennes inDecember 1944, U.S. forces were on the

offensive from D Day on and had only re-stricted need for field fortifications andobstacles.30

Mine Exploders

Whereas mines diminished in impor-tance as the United States and Alliedarmies advanced, the problem of neutral-izing enemy mine fields became increas-ingly pressing when the United Statesbegan to plan its offensive in Europe andthe Pacific. Mines had worked so well forthe enemy in North Africa that they wereused even more widely in Italy. The Ger-man antipersonnel mine, sown in belts andpatches, would take a man's foot or leg off.Especially dangerous was the Schuetzenminethat appeared for the first time in Italy.The antitank mine, buried by the thou-sands, row upon row, would disable a tankby shattering the track and suspensioncomponents. The five or six million minesthat Rommel laid in his defense of thecoast of Europe, not only in mine fields butin holes cut in paved roads, slowed theAmerican advance and caused consider-able losses in men and equipment.31 In the

2 8OCM 25913, 30 Nov 44; 26024, 14 Dec 44;28794, 20 Aug 45; 29073, 13 Sep 45.

29 (1) Ltr, Gen Barnes to Gen Simpson, 3 Jan 45,sub: [M6 and M7], OO 476/1340, DRB AGO. (2)Barnes, Weapons of World War II, p. 94.

30 (1) Memo, CG ASF for CinC SWPA, 14 Sep 44,sub: Mine, AT, Light, T-7, and ind, 14 Dec 44, OO476/1348, DRB AGO. (2) Final Report of the ChiefEngineer European Theater of Operations 1942-1945(hereafter cited as Rpt of Chief Engr ETO), p. 162,copy in OHF. (3) Barnes Diary, 16 May 44 and 17May 44, OHF.

31 (1) Barnes Diary, 14 Dec 42-31 Jan 43, OHF. (2)Baxter, op cit., pp. 100-103. (3) Harrison, Cross-Chan-nel Attack, p. 164. (4) Eddy Rpt, pp. 31-32, 70, Mis-sions, Barnes file, OHF. (5) Rpt of Chief Engr ETO,pp. 163-64, OHF. (6) Mine Exploder Mission to Eu-ropean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 4 April1944 to 19 October 1944 (hereafter cited as Mine Ex-ploder Mission ETO), p. 32, OHF.


use of mines the Japanese were not far be-hind the Germans. At one point in theOkinawa Campaign mines held up a U.S.division for more than a week.32 From alltheatres came urgent requests for an effec-tive mine clearing device.33

Mine fields could be cleared by remov-ing the mines by hand. The NDRC haddesigned detectors for both metallic andnonmetallic types, although they were notinfallible, especially those for the non-metallic. When detectors were not avail-able or were not trusted, a man crawlingon his knees and probing carefully into theground ahead of him with his bayonetcould dig up a mine safely if he were care-ful enough. But because of booby-trap-ping, this hand method was risky and atbest was time consuming. The safest andquickest way to clear a path was to det-onate the mines, either by blast or by pres-sure. For sympathetic detonation the En-gineers used some of the devices employedto blast openings through wire entangle-ments, such as demolition snakes andBangalore torpedoes, that is, tubes filledwith high explosive. At various times otherdevices were considered—artillery fire,aerial bombs, hoses filled with liquid ex-plosive, and rocket-propelled charges.34

The Ordnance Department supplied theBangalore torpedo, an old siege weapon,and a few other items, but in general mineclearance by explosives was the responsi-bility of the Chief of Engineers. To theChief of Ordnance were assigned develop-ment projects for mine field clearance bypressure. The pressure method grew inimportance as experience revealed seriousdrawbacks to the use of explosives. Ban-galore torpedoes, demolition snakes, andother detonators would clear lanes in minefields but would leave along the edges"tender" mines, with partially sheared

pins, that would go off at the slightesttouch; furthermore, as the war progressed,new blast-resistant Teller mines appeared.These considerations stimulated the searchfor an effective mechanical mine ex-ploder.35

At the outset no belligerent had muchexperience that the Ordnance Depart-ment could tap. In the winter of 1941 theRussians cleared a German mine fieldsouth of Leningrad by marching over ittightly closed columns of soldiers shoulderto shoulder.36 This method could hardlybe recommended. The first mechanicalmine exploder reported to the OrdnanceDepartment was one developed by theFrench. A drawing sent in a Corps of En-gineers memorandum in 1940 showed atank propelling three sets of roller disks,two mounted on the front and one on the

32 Baxter, op. cit., p. 102.33 Mine Exploder Mission to Southwest Pacific

Area and United States Army Forces in the Far East,28 March 1945 to 1 June 1945, p. 11, OHF.

34 (1) OCM 18484, 16 Jul 42; 19663, 4 Feb 43;26022, 14 Dec 44; 26810, 1 Mar 45. (2) Ltr, CG Ar-mored Force to CG AGF, 6 Oct 42, sub: Transmittalof Rpt, and 5th Ind, 30 Dec 42, OO 47 1.6/307, DRBAGO. (3) Ltr, Engr Bd to CofEngrs, 17 Mar 43, sub:Plan for Mine Field Clearing Tests, OO 471.6/558,DRB AGO. (4) Ltr. Engr Bd to CofEngrs, 7 Jul 44,sub: Vehicle for Snake, Demolition, Liquid Filled,OO 476/1151, DRB AGO. (5) Memo, CG ASF toCofOrd, 18 Sep 44, sub: Rpt on Bombing as a Methodof Clearing Mines and Barbed Wire, OO 476/1245,DRB AGO.

35 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III, 598.(2) Rpt of Chief Engr, ETO, p. 163, OHF. (3) Baxter,op. cit., p. 102. (4) Ltr, Deputy CofOrd to OCO, 9Feb 43, sub: Mine Sweepers, General Developmentof; Characteristics of Land Mines of the United Statesand of Foreign Countries, OO 471.6/399, DRB AGO.(5) Middle East Tech Intel Summary 101, 30 Jun 43,Apps. B and C, Ord Tech Intel files. (6) Memo,CofEngrs for CG ASF, 12 Jun 44, sub: Developmentof Project DM 506, Equipment for the Passage ofEnemy Minefields, and 3d Ind, 25 Jul 44, OO476/1108, DRB AGO.

36 "Peculiarities of Russian Warfare," German Re-port Series MS # T-22, Department of the Army,Hist Div, Rev. ed., 1949, p. 46.


rear. The Tl, the American modeladapted from the drawing, had steel disks2.25 inches thick and 40 inches in diam-eter. Each of the three units mounted fourdisks and the units front and rear werespaced so as to clear a path slightly widerthan the tank. Tests of this crude rig atAberdeen early in 1942 showed that itwould detonate mines, but it fell far shortof possessing the other characteristics de-sired in a mine exploder: indestructibility,maneuverability, and simplicity of design.Yet, since the multiple-disk principleseemed sound, Ordnance engineers con-tinued development on the French type ofexploder.37

In the next important model the Ord-nance Department strengthened the disksagainst mine injury by making them ofarmor plate, and improved control of thedisk units by moving the rear unit to thefront. The three units, which now consistedof six disks each, were supported looselyon a shaft to permit movement over un-even ground, and were mounted on atank recovery vehicle, the hoist of whichcould lift them out of mine craters orditches. The disk assembly alone weighedabout eighteen tons and the whole con-traption was nicknamed the "Earth-worm." 38 Obviously something was still tobe desired in the way of maneuverabilityand simplicity. The next development wasa simpler model with two roller units in-stead of three. It depended for full groundcoverage on two tanks operated in tandem.This transitional model led to a third, theT1E3 or "Aunt Jemima," similar in de-sign but equipped with enormous diskseight feet in diameter. Instead of beingpushed, these disks were driven through achain drive taken from the sprockets of thetank. Driving the disk units increasedmaneuverability since they could be ex-

tracted from mine craters or ditches with-out a hoist. The disks, with large ovalholes that dissipated high-explosive pres-sure, were less liable to damage by Tellermines than anything yet devised. The ovalholes also somewhat reduced the weightbut, even so, the assembly weighed nearlythirty tons.39

The promise displayed by the driven-disk exploder did not halt investigation ofother types. Early in 1942 Ordnance engi-neers experimented with use of heavy steelslabs hanging from a boom fastened on thefront of a light tank. These slabs, pushedover the ground ahead of the tank, woulddetonate mines, but tests of the pilot modelshowed that the explosions damaged theexploder. The drag-weight method wassoon abandoned.40

Another early device was the well-pub-licized flailing exploder, copied from onedesigned by the British in North Africa.Hastily improvised at the Eighth ArmyCairo base, the British "Scorpion" usedsteel chains attached to a revolving rollerto beat the ground in front of a tank. Onthe basis of drawings sent to the UnitedStates in the summer of 1942, the LamsonCorporation began the manufacture of anAmerican model, the T3. Before it was

37 OCM 16285, 8 Nov 40; 20847, 24 Jun 43. For ageneral discussion of this and other mechanical minefield clearance devices, see: (1) Minefield ClearanceDevices, 10 Dec 43, Kangaroo Folder, OHF; and (2)W. P. Wood, Mine Exploders and Excavators, Rec-ord of Army Ord R&D, August 1945 (hereafter citedas Mine Exploders), MS, OHF.38 (1) OCM 20847, 24 Jun 43. (2) Ltr, Maj Arra S.

Avakian to Chief Ord Off NATOUSA, 2 Jul 44, sub:Mine Exploders T1E1 and T1E3, OO 476/1137,DRB AGO.

3 9 ( 1 ) OCM 22128, 18 Nov 43. (2) Memo, MajBrooks Walker, OD, for Mr. William Beasley, OrdR&D Serv, 4 Sep 44, sub: Mine Exploders, OO476/1208, DRB AGO. (3) Barnes, op. cit., p. 96.

40 (1) OCM 18069, 16 Apr 42. (2) Wood, Mine Ex-ploders, pp. 61-70, OHF.


completed, General Barnes in December1942 visited the Eighth Army tank schoolin North Africa and witnessed a demon-stration of the Scorpion. It whipped updust that clogged the tank engines andwas too slow; nevertheless, General SirHarold R. L. G. Alexander and Maj. Gen.D. J. R. Richards so impressed GeneralBarnes with the possibilities of their admit-tedly crude Scorpion and with the urgentneed for an American mine exploder tocombat German mines that he recom-mended to General Devers the manufac-ture of at least fifty T3's for immediateshipment overseas. Thirty were pushed tocompletion and shipped in the spring of1943. They were the first mechanicalmine exploders sent overseas. Unhappily,they did not fulfill the promise of theirBritish prototype. Installation in theAmerican model of a hydraulic system toraise and lower the boom made the unitheavier and less maneuverable than theoriginal Scorpion. The flails threw mudand debris against the tank and were oftenbroken off by mine explosions. Twelve T3'sused by a mine field clearing company ofEngineers in Italy were discarded as un-satisfactory.41

When clearing mine fields became anurgent necessity early in 1943, many noveldevices were proposed. General Barnessuggested mounting a bank of machineguns high on the top of a tank and shoot-ing into the ground.42 The John DeereCompany submitted the T7, consisting ofhollow rollers to be filled with dirt orgravel. Col. Allison R. Williams, an ArmyService Forces officer, designed a unit de-pending on a series of hydraulic shock-absorbed plunger rods that could be raisedand lowered rapidly to pound the groundahead of a tank. The York Safe and LockCompany made a pilot model, the T8.43

Another proposal was for a very heavystudded drum, the T9, to be rolled aheadof a tank.44 As the Engineer Board had en-listed NDRC aid, NDRC sponsored a de-sign of a self-propelled device, consisting oftwo wheels eight feet in diameter, thatcontained gasoline engines and supportedlarge disks between them; the device wassteered by remote control.45 The OrdnanceCommittee also considered a device for ex-cavating mines from mine fields withoutdetonating them. It had been under de-velopment, mainly by the Engineers, sinceOctober 1942. From a simple bulldozerblade attached to the front of a tank, aV-shaped moldboard had been evolvedwith teeth extending forward and down-ward that could dig up buried mines andthrow them out of the path of the tank. Inthe summer of 1943 when mine-excavatordevelopment was taken from the Engi-neers and assigned to the Ordnance De-partment, the most promising model ap-peared to be a combination of severaltypes.46

Because of the demand from the the-atres, all mine-clearance models werepushed to completion and tested through-out the summer and fall of 1943 at Aber-deen and at the Armored Force Board's

41 (1) Barnes, op. cit., p. 96. (2) Ltr, Deputy CofOrdto OCO. 23 Nov 42, sub: Mine Detonating Device—Lamson Corporation, OO 471.6/325, DRB AGO. (3)OCM 20966, 8 Jul 43. (4) Barnes Diary, 14 Dec 42-3 1 Jan 43. OHF. (5) Eddy Rpt, p. 70, OHF. (6) Ltr,Maj Avakian. Ord Sec Hq NATOUSA, to OCO, 24May 44, sub: Mine Exploder, T1E3; First InterimReport on Field Test of Two in NATOUSA, OO476/1083, DRB AGO.

42 Barnes Diary, 16 Apr 43, OHF.43 (1) OCM 20862, 24 Jun 43; 21268, 12 Aug 43.

(2) Barnes Diary, 5 Apr 43 and 1 Jun 43, OHF.44 OCM 21443, 2 Sep 43.45 Ltr, Col Karl B. Schilling to Exec Off Engr Bd,

30 Jun 43. sub: Mechanical Devices for ClearingMinefields, OO 476/340, DRB AGO.

46 OCM 20862, 24 Jun 43; 21394, 26 Aug 43;21577, 16 Sep 43.

MINE EXPLODERS. The driven-disc type T1E3 (above), and the "Scorpion" type (below).


testing ground at Fort Knox, Kentucky.By December some evaluation was possi-ble. The driven-disk exploder seemed tofulfill the requirements most nearly, withthe pushed-disk exploder as secondchoice.47 The automatic plunger type wasimpractical for use on uneven ground andits indestructibility was doubtful. Theroller drum was acknowledged to be "rela-tively indestructible,"48 but it was alsorelatively immovable. It weighed 42 tonsand could hardly be budged, even withthe aid of a second tank. A lighter, 32-tonversion was ineffective and not much moremaneuverable. A modification of the T3flail exploder was ineffective over unevenground because, in an effort to make thedevice lighter, the hydraulic boom-lower-ing system had been eliminated. Inas-much as the NDRC exploder and the T7proved susceptible to damage by mines,work on these devices was early aban-doned. The mine excavator seemed prac-tical only for use in loose beach sand.49

Early in 1944 the Ordnance Depart-ment recommended procurement of 75driven-disk Aunt Jemima T1E3 exploders.At the request of Army Ground Forces 75Earthworms were added, in spite of Ord-nance engineers' belief that the modelwould not stand full mine detonation.Four of the first production T1E3's wereshipped overseas in May, two to Englandto be used in a test and demonstration mis-sion, and two to Italy. After the tests, Ord-nance officers reported that the exploderswere satisfactory except for a tendency invery hard soil to bridge, or cross withoutdetonating, a buried mine.50 After the in-vasion, field tests in Normandy of bothtypes of disk exploder showed other de-fects. The Earthworm, as Ordnance engi-neers had predicted, was susceptible todamage by mines. Aunt Jemima some-times broke down and was too slow to

head an advance. In operation over aver-age soil it could do only three miles anhour; on roads its best speed was twelve.One irate division commander describedit as the most effective roadblock histroops encountered in Europe. As theground of Europe began to freeze, thetendency to bridge mines manifested itself.The Engineers preferred the flail exploder,despite its defects.51

Yet one important characteristic of agood mine exploder, indestructibility, hadbeen demonstrated by the Aunt Jemimatime and again. After field tests in Nor-mandy, the officer in charge suggested thata different tactical use might increase itseffectiveness. He recommended two cate-gories of mine exploders, the first to includehighly mobile devices that could moverapidly with an armored spearhead, thesecond to include slower and heavier ex-ploders that could be loaded on tank trans-porters and taken wherever mine fieldresistance was severest or where specialconditions obtained. Along with the T1E3in the second category he placed thenewest type of mine excavator, the T5E3,which had proved valuable as a beachclearer in the invasion of southern France.52

47 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to Chief, Detroit Tank-Auto-motive Center, 18 Mar 43, sub: Mine Exploder De-velopments, OO 471.6/527, DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, ColGerald B. Devore, President Armored Force Board, toCofOrd, 8 Apr 43, sub: Request for Personnel for Testof Mine Removing and Detonating Devices, OO47 1.6/563, DRB AGO. (3) OCM 22509, 30 Dec 43.

48 OCM 25160, 30 Aug 44.49 (1) Ibid. (2) OCM 22509, 30 Dec 43; 23837, 18

May 44.50 (1) OCM 22509, 30 Dec 43; 23837, 18 May 44.

(2) Barnes Diary, 21 Apr-13 May 44, OHF. (3) MineExploder Mission ETO, OHF. (4) Ltr, Maj Avakianto CofOrd Off NATOUSA, 2 Jul 44, sub: Mine Ex-ploders T1E1 and T1E3, OO 476/1137, DRB AGO.(5) See also n. 40(6).

51 (1) Rpt of Chief Engr ETO, p. 164, OHF. (2)Baxter, op. cit., p. 102. (3) Barnes Diary, 14 and 15Feb 44, OHF.

52 (1) Mine Exploder Mission ETO, pp. 34-35,OHF. (2) OCM 23744, 11 May 44.


In the first category he suggested the T12,a newly developed device to clear minefields by exploding bombs over them, andone old device, the flail exploder. Interestin the flail exploder had been revived bythe performance of the British "Crab,"successor to the Scorpion, in Normandy.Development of the T12, a medium tankon which a platform for launching spigotbombs replaced the turret, was the majorOrdnance contribution to schemes of mineclearance by detonation. Renewed interestin the use of explosives was the result of theconclusion reached by the Eddy missionthat explosives, because they were quicker,were better than mechanical exploders forclearing mine fields.53 The advantage ofthe T12 over the Bangalore torpedo lay inits bombs exploding over the mine fieldrather than along the ground. An earlyreport of German success in explodingmines by setting off a 200-kilogram chargeplaced 14 centimeters above the groundhad suggested the efficiency of this method.It was the only way to detonate the newblast-resistant Teller mines.54

Combat experience perpetually sharp-ened awareness of the need not only for asatisfactory means of destroying antitankmines but also for a mechanical exploderfor antipersonnel mines. In one theatretroops had to be carried over a mine fieldon a large platform mounted on sled run-ners spaced to conform with the tracks of atowing tank. The problem was especiallyserious in France where the rapidity of theAmerican advance did not permit the time-consuming method of hand removal. Inthe November battle for Metz, for exam-ple, one company ran squarely into a minefield containing about twelve thousandmines and was forced to attack straightthrough, taking its losses.55 A mechanicalantipersonnel mine exploder consisting oftwo rows of small concrete disks towed be-

hind a tank had been under developmentat Aberdeen for some time, but had notprogressed beyond the experimental stagewhen in the fall of 1944 theatre demandsbecame urgent. The outcome was the com-pletion of the T13, an armor-protectedcargo carrier pushing a series of light-weight rollers.56

During the fall of 1944, when combattroops and Ordnance Department recog-nized the vital necessity of finding answersto the problem of mine fields, engineers atAberdeen tried out several new devices.High in favor was a new disk type of anti-tank mine exploder submitted by theChrysler Corporation. Another was a mod-ification of the driven-disk Aunt Jemima,incorporating improvements recommend-ed in theatre reports. A third, a series ofrocket launchers mounted on a trailertowed behind a medium tank, was testedby the Engineers and found to be moreeffective than the T12 as a detonating de-vice. Development on the T12 was discon-tinued, and the Ordnance Committee,concluding that the flail exploder wasunsatisfactory, recommended that it alsobe dropped. Meanwhile, tests were madeof an improved flail exploder, the "Rota-flail," which NDRC had designed. It wasstill under development in the summer of1945.57 Perhaps the most promising new

53 (1) Wood, Mine Exploders, pp. 159-63, OHF.(2) Eddy Rpt, p. 11, OHF. (3) OCM 23097, 9 Mar44. (4) Memo, CofEngrs for CG ASF, 12 Jun 44, sub:Development of Project DM 506, Equipment for thePassage of Enemy Minefields, OO 476/1108, DRBAGO.

54 (1) OCM 19663, 4 Feb 43. (2) Ltr, Engr Bd toCofEngrs, 22 Aug 42, sub: Antitank Mine FieldClearing Device, OO 471.6/316, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr,CofOrd to Hq ASF, 16 Dec 43, sub: Clearance ofMine Fields, OO 476/1001, DRB AGO.

55 (1) Baxter, op. cit., pp. 100, 102. (2) Cole, TheLorraine Campaign, pp. 401-02.

56 OCM 24822, 24 Aug 44; 26036, 14 Dec 44.57 (1) OCM 26036, 14 Dec 44; 27570, 10 May 45.

(2) Barnes Diary, 6, 7 Dec 44, OHF.


development was a mine-resistant vehicle.The idea was not new; Colonel Bouchierofthe British Army Staff had suggested it inthe summer of 1943, but at that time theTank-Automotive Center had rejected itin favor of a self-propelled exploder ofthe NDRC type. A year later interest wasrevived by the discovery that the enemywas using coupled and delayed actionmines that would immobilize the vehiclepropelling a mine exploder. Acting onsuggestions of Colonel Williams, the Re-search and Development Service beganstrengthening the tracks and suspensionson the M4 tank and adding armor plateunder the floor. Since preliminary testswere encouraging, development on themine-resistant vehicle continued into 1945,but the war ended before the OrdnanceDepartment had found any wholly satis-factory way of protecting troops fromenemy mines.58

Controlled Underwater Mines

A further protective device, a controlledunderwater mine system for harbor de-fense, became an Ordnance responsibilityin 1942. Though differing in characterfrom the task of providing protection fortroops in combat, the development, pro-curement, and maintenance of equipmentto safeguard the home front from attack byenemy ships assumed almost equal impor-tance, particularly during the first half ofthe war. Underwater mines used as weap-ons of offense were the responsibility of theNavy but, used defensively as part of thedefense of harbors in the United States andits territories, were the responsibility, first,of the Army Corps of Engineers and then,from 1901 to 1942, of the Coast ArtilleryCorps. When the reorganization of theWar Department transferred the responsi-bility to the Ordnance Department, the

Coast Artillery Corps Submarine MineDepot at Fort Monroe, Virginia, was as-signed to the Artillery Division of Ord-nance Industrial Service. The word "De-pot" is misleading, for storage was a minorfunction. Indeed, a few of the heavier partsof the controlled mines were shipped di-rectly from manufacturers to harbor de-fenses. Ordnance specialists not only de-signed and supervised procurement, in-spection, and repair of all parts but alsotrained technicians in operating and main-taining the electrical control units for themines. Underwater matériel required toplant a single group of mines weighedapproximately fifty tons, and there mightbe six to thirty groups in a large harbor.59

The kind of controlled mine developedin 1869 has been used in United Statesharbors ever since. It required an electricalconnection through a cable to a shore con-trol station or "mine casemate" from whichthe operator could manually control thefiring or nonfiring of a mine that had beenstruck or influenced by a passing ship. Thesystem standard in March 1942 was desig-nated the M3. Underwater were buoyantmines in groups of 19; for each group of 19there was a selector box housed in a water-tight distribution box and connected withthe shore station by a cable. The selectorassembly in the box provided a means of

58 (1) Baxter, op. cit., p. 103. (2) Ltr, Chief of TechDiv OCO to Chief of Tank-Automotive Center, De-troit, 17 Jul 43, sub: Mine Exploders, OO 476/357,DRB AGO. (3) Memo, Col Colby, Tank-AutomotiveCenter, for OCO, 4 Aug 43, sub: Antitank Defense;Mine Exploders, Suggestions of Col Bouchier, OO476/357, DRB AGO. (4) Memo, William Beasley,Chief of Tank and Motor Transport Div, R&D, toCG OCO Detroit, 3 Aug 44, sub: Exploder Mines,T14, and inds, 11 Aug 44 and 2 Sep 44, OO476/1068, DRB AGO. (5) OCM 25031, 7 Sep 44;26036, 14 Dec 44.

59 (1) WD Cir 57, 2 Mar 42. (2) Ord Off Memo602, 28 Mar 42, OHF. (3) Submarine Mine Depot,Hist of Controlled Submarine Mines, 1943, pp. 6-8,OHF.


CONTROLLED MINE SYSTEM AND THE M3A1 MINE

electrically selecting, testing, or firing anymine in the group it controlled. The buoy-ant mine cases, which were connected bywire rope and electrical cable to cast-ironanchors, contained from 300 to 500 poundsof granular TNT and housed a firing de-vice that was actuated by the impact of avessel. When a ship struck a buoyant mine,a signal appeared on the mine controlpanel in the casemate ashore and the minecould then be fired by closing the properfiring switch. The shore installations con-sisted of the mine casemate, a storehouse,a loading room, a cable tank for storage ofcable, a mine wharf and derricks, trackageor roads, a group commander's station,base end stations, a plotting room, andcable terminal huts.60

The greatest advantage of the M3 systemover European systems was in firing singlemines rather than whole groups. Thismethod left small gaps of less than 300 feetin a line of mines, instead of 500 yards ormore.61 Most British harbors used the loop

system, consisting of a loop of electric cablein which a current set lip by a passing steelship would be carried to shore by a "tail"cable. The loop enclosed a row of mooredmines, the sinkers of which were also con-nected to the shore by the tail cable. Allmines in a group had to be fired simultane-ously, leaving a large gap in the defenses.62

The Germans did not employ controlledmines until after the raids at Dieppe on 19August 1942 and at St. Nazaire on 27March 1943 had demonstrated the weak-ness of net and boom defenses. Thereafter,they converted offensive magnetic needlemines into defensive mines, connectingthem to a shore station by cable. The short -

60 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 231-54.(2) Morland King, Submarine Mines, Record ofArmy Ord R&D, September 1945 (hereafter cited asSub Mines), p. 22, OHF.

61 Rpt, Col H. C. Reuter, A Summary of HistoricalInformation Pertaining to Controlled SubmarineMining, 5 Sep 49 (hereafter cited as Reuter Rpt),filed at Submarine Mine Depot, Fort Monroe, Va.

62 J. S. Cowie, Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying(London, 1949), pp. 103-05, 138.


age of submarine cable in Germany, how-ever, limited the number and size of theircontrolled mine fields considerably. TheJapanese throughout the war used a buoy-ant mine system generally similar to thatof the United States, and it was a deterrentto U.S. submarines.63

The United States system of mine con-trol was capable of improvement both inits underwater and its shore equipment.Under water, the buoyant mine with itslarge steel mooring ropes was a hindranceto the operation of friendly vessels, and torestrict huge fleets to narrow channelsthrough the mines was not practicable. Forthis reason, it was desirable to supplant thebuoyant mine with a large ground minethat would not need contact to be actuatedbut could be influenced by a magnetic de-vice. Development along these lines hadbeen under way at the Submarine MineDepot since 1938.64 Ashore, the mine case-mate was vulnerable to enemy action;therefore the Coast Artillery Corps hadbeen developing a small portable systemoperable at any point where 110 volts, 60cycle, single phase A.C. of 2 kilowatt ca-pacity was available. A pilot model of suchan emergency control system, constructedby the Submarine Mine Depot beforeNovember 1941, was under test at the timethe Ordnance Department took over thesubmarine mine projects from the CoastArtillery Corps.65

Of the two problems, the developmentof an effective ground-mine system was atonce the more pressing and the more diffi-cult. By 1944 Ordnance engineers hadevolved from the experimental model of1941 the desired portable shore installa-tion, which was standardized, with a fewchanges, as emergency mine control M4.It was a compact unit for the control of 10groups of 19 buoyant or 13 ground mines,designed either for parallel operation in

mine casemates along with the M3 or forindependent operation on landing boats,mine planters, or in any emergency shelterthe tactical situation required.66 That atactical situation would arise requiring theuse of an emergency mine control in U.S.harbors early in 1942 was possible but didnot seem likely. On the other hand, enemysubmarine activity off the Atlantic coastthroughout 1942 rendered more than everurgent a satisfactory replacement for buoy-ant mines. It was not generally known atthe time, but some of the German subma-rines operating along the Eastern seaboardwere mine layers: they closed ChesapeakeBay to traffic for two days in June andthree in September, bottled up New Yorkharbor for three days in November, andfor brief periods closed Jacksonville, Flor-ida, Charleston, South Carolina, and Wil-mington, North Carolina.67 Use of minesweepers to remove mines planted by theenemy was impossible in harbors wherebuoyant mines were present; when groundmines were present, such sweeping waspossible. German development of influ-ence-operated mines that German subma-rines or airplanes could sow in Americanharbors was a primary reason for acceler-ating the development in the United Statesof a controlled ground mine system.68

In other respects also, submarine war-fare dictated the turn submarine mine re-search was taking. Buoyant mines planted

63 Reuter Rpt, pp. 7-8, Fort Monroe, Va.64 (1) Ibid. (2) Ord Off Memo 602, OHF. (3) OCM

18588, 6 Aug 42.65 (1) OCM 18576, 30 Jul 42. (2) Sub Mines, pp.

7-8, OHF.66 (1) Sub Mines, pp. 7-8, OHF. (2) Catalogue of

Standard Ord Items. II, 255. (3) 1st Ind, ltr, Col R. E.Dingeman to Col D. S. Lenzner, CO Sub Mine Depot,5 Nov 47, sub: Hist of Development of SubmarineMines, 14 Nov 47, OO 314.7/13, DRB AGO.

67 Baxter, op. cit., p. 39.68 (1) OCM 18571, 30 Jul 42. (2) Sub Mines, p. 23,

OHF.


at 100-foot intervals were originally de-signed for protection against enemy surfacevessels. They were a poor screen againstsubmarines whose beams approximated 25feet. During experiments conducted in thePhilippines, a submarine actually navi-gated through a buoyant mine field with-out arming a single mine.69 Summing upthe situation in July of 1942, GeneralBarnes wrote, "The maintenance of aneffective buoyant mine defense has beenfound impracticable in approximately 50percent of United States harbors." 70

Until 1943, when nearly 4,000 buoyantmines were replaced by ground mines, theResearch and Development Division of theSubmarine Mine Depot centered attentionon devising an influence-operated groundmine that could be controlled by the stand-ard M3 system. The mine case presentedno special difficulty. It required a water-tight container for 3,000 pounds of granu-lar TNT, a firing device, and a detector. Itshould be capable of submersion in 100feet of water, able to withstand the shockof explosions occurring 150 feet away, andusable with existing planting facilities.Under development since May 1941, thecase in July 1942 had a flat base and awelded steel cylindrical body with a cone-shaped top. In the lower part of the case, afiring device labelled the M5 was locatedwith the booster charge electrically con-nected to it. A bail was attached to the topfor raising or lowering the mine.71 In oper-ation, the magnetic field of an approach-ing vessel induced a minute current in thewindings of a coil rod which caused a seriesof relays to operate, enabling the minecontrol system to select the mine.72 Whenthis experimental case showed no appreci-able deterioration after nine months' sub-mersion, the model was standardized asthe M3. Tests in October 1942 led to modi-fications—the addition of 400 pounds

weight in the bottom of the case to improvestability of the mine on the sea bottom,greater strength of construction, and arigid bail that could not be moved by tidalaction to arm the mine. This case becamethe M3A1.73

Mine case M3A1 had to be loaded withgranular TNT and the electrical detectionand operating units installed at the harborswhere it was to be planted. Early in 1944the Joint Army-Navy Ammunition StorageBoard recommended to the Secretary ofWar that submarine mines be loaded atOrdnance depots instead of at the place ofuse. This led to the construction by theSubmarine Mine Depot of two mine casemodels that were loaded with cast TNT—the Tl, made of 1/8-inch and 3/16-inchplate and having no base weight, and theT2, made by conversion of the M3A1 minecase. Firing tests of these and of the NavyMark 18 mine, which was under consider-ation as a cast TNT preloaded mine oflighter weight, were conducted in theChesapeake Bay. Only the T2 proved ableto stand the shock of 3,000-pound TNTexplosions at 125 feet. Loaded with castTNT, flat on top, and low in height, thismodel exerted much more pressure persquare foot on the bottom of the sea thanthe M3A1 and presented only half asmuch area to wave action. These stabilitycharacteristics were of special interest be-cause of unsatisfactory performance by agroup of thirteen M3A1 mines that hadbeen planted in San Francisco Harbor inApril 1944 on a rocky bottom where watercurrent velocity as high as five miles anhour was encountered. Apparently becauseof mine case movement, nine of the thir-

69 Sub Mines, p. 23, OHF.70 OCM 18571, 30 Jul 42.71 (1) Sub Mines, p. 17, OHF. (2) OCM 18588, 30

Jul 42.72 Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 254-55.73 Sub Mines, pp. 18-19, OHF.


teen were spuriously armed nearly everyday between April and August. False arm-ings made the operation of the M3 controlsystem unreliable. Consequently, the CoastArtillery Board recommended in October1944 that the Tl, the T2, and the Navymine be tested for stability under thesevere hydrographic conditions prevailingin San Francisco Harbor. The test was de-ferred, however, pending the outcome oftests of new firing devices then being con-ducted at the New London submarinebase.74

A sensitive firing device for use in theground mine had been the subject of con-siderable research since 1942. The task,begun by NDRC, was carried on by theSubmarine Mine Depot in co-operationwith the Navy and by several private labo-ratories.75 Firing device M5 was not satis-factory against small submarines of the"O" type in water more than 80 feet deep.The problem was to develop a firing devicethat would be sensitive enough to detectsmall submarines of the latest type runningat 5 miles an hour or less in 100 feet ofwater and yet would be sufficiently stableto avoid false armings. With regard to thesensitivity requirement, the main difficultylay in the M3 mine control system itself,which did not permit transmission of elec-tric power from shore to mine. Power wasnecessary to operate equipment that wouldamplify the very small currents generatedin firing devices by influence detectors.76

Development of an effective firing de-vice, therefore, was carried on simultane-ously with development of a revised minecontrol system, and models of one weretested with models of the other. By Decem-ber 1943 firing device T5E22, employingan electronic amplifier, was ready for test.When planted against "O" and "R" typesubmarines at New London, it demon-strated sensitivity at a depth of 100 feet. It

was tested with a model of the new minecontrol system, T7. Because of instabilityand limitations imposed by mine controlT7, the Coast Artillery Board disapprovedthe T5E22, but its basic principle was em-ployed in a later model, firing deviceT5E23, developed at the Submarine MineDepot. The T5E23 provided means bothof sending a signal ashore for interpreta-tion and of testing the device, includingthe detector, from shore. Operated with animproved mine control, the T8, in tests atNew London, it gave high-actuation effectagainst "O" and "R" submarines.77

An improved mine control system wasneeded not only in order to transmit powerto operate each mine but also because soonafter Pearl Harbor the Japanese had prob-ably captured a complete M3 system in-stalled at Corregidor.78 By February 1944,four types of mine controls were under de-velopment. One employed a separate test,selection, and firing for each mine; a sec-ond, a simplified version of the first, hada single indication frequency system; athird used bypass equipment with the M3to supply small amounts of power to mag-netic amplifiers in each mine; and thefourth, the T7, was a modification of theM3 that permitted powering the electronicfiring devices from shore. Each of these

74 (1) Sub Mines, pp. 20-21, OHF. (2) Ltr, CO SubMine Depot to CofOrd, 20 Sep 44, sub: Mine CasesTl and T2, and inds, 27 Oct 44 and 3 Nov 44, OO400.112/193, DRB AGO. (3) Memo, CofS for CGAGF, 23 Nov 44, sub: Service Tests of Mine Cases Tland T2 in the Harbor Defenses of San Francisco,OPD 476.1 (20 Sep 44), DRB AGO.

75 (1) OCM 18571, 30 Jul 42; 18609, 18610, 18611,and 18614, 6 Aug 42. (2) Sub Mines, pp. 26-31, OHF.

76 (1) Sub Mines, p. 8, OHF. (2) OCM 18575, 30Jul 42.

77 (1) Sub Mines, pp. 32-33, OHF. (2) OCM 27390,19 Apr 45. (3) 1st Ind, ltr, Col Dingeman to ColLenzner, 14 Nov 47, sub: Hist of Development of SubMines, 314.7/13, copy in Sub Mine Depot files, FortMonroe, Va.

78 OCM 18575, 30 Jul 42.


four types of control had some insuperabledisadvantage. On 23 February 1944 thecommanding general of Army ServiceForces approved a project for developinga scanner type of control, the T8, combin-ing the best features of the four controlsunder study and at the same time simpli-fying the circuits so that bulk was reducedabout one half. The Rudolph WurlitzerCompany of Tonawanda, New York, sug-gested the system and the Submarine MineDepot developed it.79 It was an electro-mechanical control, each basic unit ofwhich would supply power and operate upto ten groups of thirteen mines, with eachgroup operated over a single shore cable.It consisted of three units—one centralizedcontrol cabinet; ten group cabinets, one foreach group of thirteen mines; and one se-lector assembly for each group. Because ofthe power equipment necessary for themine electronic detectors, the T8 weighedmore than twice as much as the standardM3 system and was more than three feetlonger. It required one man per ten-groupcontrol as compared with one man for allgroups in the M3, and there might be fromone to four ten-group control units in acasemate. The increased personnel re-quirement, however, was considered offsetby the additional information gained bycontinuous surveillance of the signal influ-ences of every mine in a mine field, in con-trast to the single mine actuation possiblewith the M3 control.80

From mid-October 1944 until January1945, mine control T8, with the T5E23firing devices and mine cases M3A1 andT2, was under test at the New Londonsubmarine base. It demonstrated thesoundness of its design and its reliabilityunder field conditions. Results were alsosatisfactory with the T5E23 firing device.Within a three-week period twelve mineswith T5E23 firing devices in depths be-

tween 95 and 110 feet missed only 4.4 per-cent of 226 courses by "O" and "R" typesof submarines that passed within 100 feetof a mine. Some of the firing devices werefound to be unstable, but the feasibility ofinterpreting the signals decreased mate-rially the effect of instability and permittedstudy of its causes. The tests indicated thatmine case motion was probably the majorcause.81

The original plan was to include pilotmodels of the mine control T8 and firingdevice T5E23 in the test of Tl, T2, and theNavy Mark 18 mines to be conducted inSan Francisco Harbor. The test was to bein two phases, the first to determine howmuch the effectiveness of existing minefields, using the standard firing deviceM5, could be increased by the substitutionof different mine cases, and the second todetermine the suitability of the Tl, T2,and Mark 18 mines when employed withthe new, highly sensitive firing deviceT5E23 and mine control T8. In late Janu-ary 1945 the Submarine Mine Depotbegan a program, involving all depart-ments of the depot, to construct experi-mental matériel and ship it to the HarborDefenses of San Francisco. The coming ofV-E Day put a stop to those preparations.The equipment for the San Francisco test"sat on the shelf" until 1946, when testsresumed.82

Next to the development of an effective79 (1) Ind cited n. 77(3). (2) OCM 22912, 17 Feb

44. (3) Sub Mines, pp. 5-6, OHF.80 OCM 23471, 13 Apr 44; 24081, 8 Jan 44.81 (1) Ltr, CO Sub Mine Depot to CofOrd, 4 Jan

45, sub: Summary of Development Projects for Monthof December 1944, OO 400.112/109, DRB AGO. (2)8th Ind, Coast Artillery Board to CG AGF, 25 Jan 45,sub: Service Tests of Mine Cases T1 and T2 in Har-bor Defense of San Francisco, to basic memo, CofSfor CG ASF, 23 Nov 44, both in OPD 476.1 (20 Sep44). (3) OCM 26960, 15 Mar 45. (4) Sub Mines, pp.33-34, OHF.

82 (1) OCM 27668, 17 May 45. (2) Historical Rpt,Submarine Mine Depot, First Quarter 1945, Navy


ground mine system, the most importantsingle project was the search for a suitablemine fire control system to provide infor-mation on enemy approach as far ahead ofthe mine field as practicable. The need forsuch a listening device was emphasized ina report of 4 May 1942 from the com-manding general of Harbor Defenses ofManila and Subic Bays, Corregidor, P.I.,requesting some method of determiningwhether mines were being armed by shellbursts and bombs or by an approachinghostile vessel. The characteristics desiredin such a device were to provide earlyinformation regardless of the size of thevessel and to indicate the class of the vesseland probable speed. Projects set up at theSubmarine Mine Depot used such varieddevices as hydrophones, magnetic loops, asonic barrier, and a microphonic cable.83

The system employing hydrophones wasthe most satisfactory. After extended testsat Fort Monroe and San Francisco, it wasstandardized in July 1943 as audio recep-tion system M1. The underwater equip-ment consisted of two hydrophones, cover-ing four groups of mines, connectedtogether and to the shore equipment bysingle-conductor submarine cable; theshore equipment consisted of a preampli-fier, an amplifier, and a sound recorder.The operator could hear vessels at dis-tances of from five hundred feet to twomiles, depending on hydrographic condi-tions, and could distinguish between minesbeing armed by underwater explosions,wave action, and the approach of a vessel.

In San Francisco Harbor, where fogs andbad weather were frequent, the system re-ported 87 out of 92 submarine test-cross-ings. An improved audio reception system,designed to filter out fish noises and pro-vide vastly better acoustic detection ofmidget submarines, was standardized in1945.84

Between 1942 and 1945 redesign of minesystem equipment, such as distributionboxes, selector boxes, and cables, elimi-nated critical materials and expeditedproduction. With these minor changes,mine control system M3, using groundmines instead of buoyant mines after 1943and aided by the audio reception system,remained in operation throughout WorldWar II. Its tactical operational effective-ness in the defense of United States harborswas never put to the test; at least no con-firmed report ever came in of the destruc-tion of any German or Japanese submarineby United States controlled mines. On theother hand, they unquestionably preventedenemy submarines from seeking entranceto American harbors, for the Axis Powersknew of the presence and fire power ofthese controlled mines. Testimony to thestrategic importance of the system lies inthe fact that no German submarine wasknown to have attempted entry into UnitedStates harbors and that all enemy mineswere laid at least 3,000 yards seaward ofthe line of controlled mines.85

Bureau of Ord Harbor Defense files. (3) Interv, 20Nov 50, with Col Reuter, Chief of R&D, Sub MineDepot, 1939-48. After the war the prompt return toprivate life of many scientists delayed for some threeyears the completion of new mine controls.

83 (1) OCM 18572 and 18574, 30 Jul 42; 18831, and18832, 3 Sep 42. (2) Submarine Mine Depot, Hist ofControlled Sub Mines, 1943, p. 43, OHF. (3) SubMines, p. 36, OHF.

84 (1) Sub Mines, pp. 36-39, OHF. (2) OCM 18573,30 Jul 42. (3) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II,252. (4) Ind cited n. 77(3).

85 (1) Reuter Rpt, p. 9, Fort Monroe, Va. (2) SubMines, pp. 40-55, OHF. (3) Submarine Mine Depot,Hist of Controlled Sub Mines, 1943, p. 16, OHF.

CHAPTER XIV

Antiaircraft Defense:Ground-to-Air Weapons

Developments in aircraft design follow-ing World War I opened up prospects of atype of warfare that would dwarf in sig-nificance all air operations of the 1914-18period. The Italo-Ethiopian War and theSpanish Civil War amply confirmed theimportance of defense against bombingraids and focused attention of the UnitedStates Coast Artillery Corps and Ord-nance Department upon the need of long-range, accurate, powerful antiaircraftguns. Though the Air Corps, tutored byBrig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, the fa-mous Billy Mitchell, for a decade hadnursed the belief that well-armed fighterplanes would make antiaircraft gunssuperfluous, Ordnance officers foresaw theneed of antiaircraft artillery as well asfighters.1 The 3-inch antiaircraft gunstandardized in 1927 was a good weaponfor use against aircraft of the 1920's buthad neither the range to be effectiveagainst planes flying at the heights at-tainable by 1937 nor the fire control mech-anisms needed to track accurately enemycraft flying at the greater speeds of themore modern planes. Even before the out-break of war in Europe, American preoc-cupation with defense made logical thededication of utmost effort to design of im-proved antiaircraft weapons. Later theBattle of Britain and realization of the

overwhelming advantage that clearing theskies of enemy craft would give, when thetime came for a full-scale offensive againstthe Continent, further stressed the wisdomof perfecting antiaircraft equipment ofevery kind—guns, mounts, tracking de-vices, and ammunition.

The problem of reaching targets flyingat great heights did not loom large forantiaircraft batteries in World War ILMost enemy planes operated at not morethan 10,000 feet and the 3-inch antiair-craft gun M3 had a slant range of 15,000feet. Newer guns had much greater range.2

Command of necessary range by no meanssolved the problems of effective antiaircraftfire. It is important to remember that be-cause airplanes, unlike ground equipment,operate freely in three dimensions, accu-rate fire control is as much more complexfor antiaircraft guns than for groundweapons as solid geometry or sphericaltrigonometry is than plane geometry ortrigonometry. Add to that complexity thefactor of the speed at which modern planesfly—whereby the fourth dimension of timeis introduced—and success in destroying

1 Interv with Gen Barnes, 13 Jun 51.2 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 209.

(2) Interv with Gen Barnes, 13 Jun 51. (3) Interv,5 Jul 51, with Samuel Feltman, Associate Chief ofResources and Materials Br, R&D Serv. (4) Barnes,Weapons of World War II, p. 149.


enemy planes by ground fire might appearto become a matter of luck. To convertchance into some predictable proportionof destructive hits to number of targetsfired at was a challenge that the OrdnanceDepartment faced through much of thewar.

Of the various ways of meeting the chal-lenge, a steady barrage of fire was one.Against low-flying craft, use of guns withrapid cyclic rates would increase thechances of a strike by sheer volume of fire.A machine gun, or better still batteries ofmachine guns, could saturate the path ofthe enemy plane with a rain of bullets,provided the gunners had estimated range,height, and direction correctly. But thatmethod, necessarily employed under somecircumstances, was extravagant of ammu-nition inasmuch as fire control on a ma-chine gun could consist only of sights.Against high-flying planes machine gunfire was too short-ranged to be reliable.Furthermore, even a direct hit might lackdestructive power if the energy of the bul-let were nearly spent upon impact, if theplane's armor plate were so heavy as toprevent penetration, or if upon penetra-tion the projectile did little damage. Spe-cial ammunition was required to fore-stall those contingencies. Artillery, on theother hand, though having long range,power, and shell bursts covering a consid-erable area, could not fire fast enough toblanket the skies, even if guns wereequipped with automatic fuze setter-ram-mers. As the skies are wide and a plane atany distance is a mere speck, the saturationtechnique manifestly was useful only fordefense against close-in attack. In fact,every shot against moving planes, Ord-nance experts had long realized, must bean aimed shot, whether fired from a ma-chine gun or a larger weapon. British ex-

periments in defending the Channel andLondon by sending up barrages of rocketswere spectacular and thus helped civilianmorale, but were of doubtful value becauseof rockets' inaccuracy at that time. SinceGeneral Barnes considered antiaircraftrockets useless unless accuracy could beimproved, the Ordnance Departmentabandoned its rocket development plansas soon as sufficient antiaircraft artillerybecame available.3

A more efficient way of improving anti-aircraft fire, in the opinion of Army Ord-nance, was to develop and employ am-munition and weapons of very high muzzlevelocities. The greater velocity would flat-ten the trajectory of projectiles' flight and,by lessening time of flight, insure a largerproportion of hits. Supervelocity, however,introduced the problem of excessive barrelerosion, and, as antiaircraft artillery shots,regardless of velocity, had to be aimedproperly to be effective, tracking deviceswere essential. They might be electro-mechanical systems that computed firingdata and directed the gun's fire on thebasis of optical observation, or they mightemploy radar linked with an electroniccomputer that transmitted the data toelectric controls on the gun's mount. Bothtypes of director would greatly assist inkeeping on the target. Finally, fuzes cal-culated to function only when within agiven distance of the enemy craft wouldguarantee a large number of lethal strikesregardless of the plane's speed. Use of allthese means in combination promised the

3 (1) Interv with Gen Barnes, 13 Jun 51. (2) Interv,25 Jun 51, with Dr. Colin Hudson, Guided MissileBr, R&D Serv. (3) Memo, CofS for Gen Barnes, 15Aug 41, OO 334.9/705, DRB AGO. (4) OCM 16336,19 Dec 40. (5) Col Borden, Summation of Observa-tions in North Africa and United Kingdom, 15 Apr43 to 22 May 43, p. 6, Misc Missions, Barnes file,OHF.

AIRCRAFT DEFENSE: GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPONS 403

most nearly foolproof system of antiaircraftdefense conceivable, and before the warwas won employment of that combinationbrought deadly results. Whereas onehit in every 2,500 artillery shots was aver-age in 1940, that ratio in some engage-ments was reduced to about one in every300 by late 1944.4

Volume of Fire for Defense AgainstLow-Flying Aircraft

Machine Guns

For saturating fire against strafing at-tacks the .50-caliber machine gun was re-garded by both the Ordnance Departmentand the using arms as a satisfactory weap-on. The .30-caliber machine gun was toolight to serve under most circumstances,though for training it answered as well asthe .50-caliber and was cheaper to use. Inthe 1930's the Coast Artillery, then thearm concerned with antiaircraft defense,preferred the .50-caliber water-cooled gun,the basic M2 equipped with an outerwater-filled jacket and a water pump forcooling the barrel. Yet because a watersupply might be hard to maintain undersome combat conditions, an air-cooledheavy-barreled model was also designedfor ground use where long bursts of firemight be necessary. The added amount ofmetal in the barrel absorbed heat just aswater-cooling dissipated it. To increasevelocity and accuracy and to reduce flashand smoke, the barrel was lengthenedfrom 36 to 45 inches for the heavy-barreledand the water-cooled models in 1937 and1938, respectively.5 The former, firing 400to 500 rounds a minute, the latter, 500 to650, had both proved their dependability,and attempts to increase greatly thosecyclic rates threatened to impair efficiency

and durability. Though early in the warthe rate on each type was successfullypushed about 50 rounds a minute higher,and increase in belt-lift capacity wasachieved in 1944, most improvementswere minor. Smoother functioning also re-sulted from improved manufacture, asproducers learned how to provide betterfinishes and eliminate interferences be-tween moving parts. In the last months ofthe war an experimental barrel lightenedfrom 28 to 20 pounds permitted consider-ably faster rates of fire. But by that timethe danger from enemy aircraft had solessened that the Ground Forces believedthe added wear on the barrel too great towarrant establishing a requirement for thefaster-firing gun.6

If .50-caliber antiaircraft machine gunsthemselves required few changes after1940, their mounts were another story.The tripod mount adopted in the 1930'shad been designed for a different tacticaluse from what the changes in air warfaredemanded in 1940. By then, the Chief ofCoast Artillery labelled existing mountstoo heavy, too hard to transport, and hav-ing insufficient elevation to be suited toclose-in defense against low-flying, high-speed targets. Complex sighting devices fortracking at ranges beyond a thousandyards were no longer necessary for ma-chine guns. A mount capable of beingtransported in and fired from a ¼-ton or1½-ton truck would have to be consider-

4 (1) Intervs, 5 Jul 51, with Samuel Feltman andwith Dr.. Wilhelm Jorgensen, Chief of AA Fire Con-trol Sec, R&D Serv. (2) Barnes, op. cit., p. 158.

5 OCM 10717, 25 May 33; 10787, 22 Jun 33;14187, 13 Jun 38; 15314, 31 Aug 49.

6 (1) OCM 15314, 31 Aug 39; 20774, 17 Jun 43.(2) Machine Guns, PSP 36, pp. 24-26, 42-57, OHF.(3) Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, Book II, pp.137-38; Book III, pp. 263-64, 529-30, 707-10, OHF.(4) Interv, 17 May 51, with Paul W. Welsh, Jr., Ma-chine Gun Sec, R&D Serv.


ably lighter than the 500-pound mountthen standard. Upon the basis of two de-signs prepared after careful study by RockIsland Arsenal, the Heintz ManufacturingCompany of Philadelphia in 1942 builtan acceptable model which was standard-ized as the M3. The new mount weighed380 pounds including the armor-plateshields for the gunner, had the desired ele-vation of — 15 to 90 degrees, and a simplering sight. Early in 1943, before the M3'swere available, the need for antiaircraftequipment became so urgent that someimprovisation was imperative. Speciallydesigned elevator cradles that could be af-fixed to existing ground mounts permittedusing for antiaircraft defense the thousandsof heavy barreled caliber .50's in thehands of troops in all theatres. The cradle,standardized in August 1943, was light,sufficiently stable, and readily attached tothe tripod ground mount. Though theseelevator cradles were a makeshift, the80,000 put into service before midsummerof 1944 supplemented the supply of anti-aircraft mounts at a time when strafingplanes were a threat in every theatre ofoperations.

Meanwhile, the Airborne Commandrequested mounts that could be put intoaction faster than the standard M3.Search for a mount weighing less than 160pounds, transportable by two men, andpossessing good stability, went forwardduring 1943 and culminated in a satisfac-tory model, the M63, in May 1944. TheM63 was based on a Heintz Manufactur-ing Company design that Maj. John H.Kochevar of the Airborne Commandmodified by supplying a quadruped basewith horizontal legs and a folding, T--shaped trigger extension attached to thecradle. It weighed only 144 pounds. Near-ly 48,000 were produced before V-J Day

and filled the need for mounts that couldbe airborne, landed from small boats, orcarried into places inaccessible to vehi-cles.7 For protection to ships and landingcraft, mounts were assembled with pedes-tal bases that could be bolted to the deck.The Army for the most part adopted Navymodels for use on tank lighters and similarcraft needing antiaircraft machine guns.8

As volume of fire could be increased notonly by more rapid rates of fire but alsoby multiplying the number of guns trainedupon a target, multiple mounting of cal-iber .50's was recognized early in the waras a sound method of adding to the pro-tection of moving convoys. The first mul-tiple machine gun carriage completed in1942 was a 4-wheeled trailer on which 4heavy-barreled caliber .50's were placedon a power-driven armored mount havinga self-contained power unit. A turret, rest-ing on a steel base plate anchored to thefloor of the trailer, provided 360 degreestraverse. The turret could also be em-placed in a half-track to make a self-pro-pelled unit. A centrally located gunner'sseat was situated between two trunnionsectors, each of which supported two gunsand two 200-round ammunition chests. Asight base with a reflector sight, the MEIX developed by the Navy, moved withthe trunnions. The guns were normallyfired electrically but, in event of powerfailure, could be fired by a hand mecha-nism. In 1943 a variation of this M51 car-riage was designed for airborne use. Aportable 2-wheeled trailer mount, light

7 (1) SA and SA Ammo, Book 3, Machine Gunsand Related Items, pp. 120-27, OHF. (2) OCM16305, 16 Nov 40; 18103, 21 Apr 42; 18192, 7 May42; 21349, 19 Aug 43; 22846, 10 Feb 44; 23769, 11May 44; 24319, 6 Jul 44. (3) Machine Gun Mounts,PSP 43, pp. 18-19, 25-26, 36-37, OHF. Hereaftercited as PSP 43.

8 PSP 43, pp. 27-29, 33-35, OHF.


and compact enough to be stowed in aC6-4A glider or a C-47 transport plane,was equipped with mechanical jacks per-mitting rapid emplacement and levelingfor firing once the trailer wheels had beenremoved. In most features identical withthe mount of the M51 carriage, the mounton this M55 model provided a specialarmor shield and a handlebar control ofturret movement and firing.9 Still moreeffective for some purposes than quadruple.50-caliber mounts was a combination oftwo water-cooled machine guns and a 37-mm. automatic gun in a special cradlemounted on a half-track.10 This mount,standardized as the 37-mm. antiaircraftM15, was appraised in a report fromNorth Africa.

The proficiency of this mobile weapon canbe attributed to three characteristics: its mo-bility enabling it to work well in close sup-port of combat troops in forward areas andalso to effectively patrol roads over whichheavy traffic must travel under constantthreat of bombing and strafing; its flexiblefire power combining the volume of caliber.50 with the knocking power of the 37-mm.;and the facility with which its fire is con-trolled by using the tracer stream of onecaliber .50 to bring it on the target beforeopening with the full volume of its armament.Numerous cases are cited where a 'mousetrap' effect has been obtained when enemyplanes came in much closer on the initialcaliber .50 fire than they would on light can-non and are caught by the 37-mm.11

Improved Ammunition

The destructive effect of antiaircraftmachine gun fire depended quite as muchupon the type of ammunition used as uponvelocity or volume. Though there wassome difference of opinion about the valueof tracer, the using arms tended to believeit was an aid to accuracy. Certainly pene-tration could be improved by use of armor-

piercing ammunition, and deadliness byemployment of incendiary. A cartridgeembodying all those features could be themost desirable of all. Between 1940 and1942 Ordnance experts investigated thepossibilities of explosive bullets but devel-opment of better types put an end to thiswork.12 Thanks to an Ordnance develop-ment program of the 1930's, one kind oftracer armor-piercing cartridge was avail-able for small arms in 1940. As the warprogressed some work was expended ondeveloping special .30-caliber ammunitionfor machine guns,13 but most .30-caliberarmor-piercing ammunition was used inrifles and carbines in place of ball ammu-nition. After mid-1943 antiaircraft bat-teries used the smaller weapon only rarelyand the Army Air Forces never. Hence thediscussion that follow deals largely withcaliber .50's and artillery.

The most urgent requests for improved.50-caliber ammunition from 1940 onwardcame from the Air Forces.14 But the Anti-aircraft Command was also concerned,particularly after the Lend-Lease Actmade British problems and experience inantiaircraft defense a strong consideration.

9 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 153-54.(2) OCM 17969, 26 Mar 42; 18020, 4 Apr 42; 18845,3 Sep 42; 18963, 1 Oct 42; 19140, 5 Nov 42; 20025,25 Mar 43; 21241 , 22 Apr 43; 2 2 1 1 7 , 18 Nov 43;22521, 30 Dec 43.

10 OCM 17313, 10 Sep 41.11 Quoted on pp. 141-42, Weapons of World War II,

Gen. G. M. Barnes, 1947, D. Van Nostrand Com-pany, Inc.

12 SA and SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 64-71, 190-96,OHF.

13 For example, a project authorized in April 1945called for development of a .30-caliber tracer withpreliminary dim trace, followed by a bright trace upto 1,000 yards, which would provide "sufficient ob-servability for tracer-controlled antiaircraft fire." Thiswas to be a long-time, continuing, peacetime devel-opment. See SA and SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 88-90,OHF.

14 See Ch. XVI, below.


British faith in tracer ammunition fortifiedthe belief of the American AntiaircraftCommand in the usefulness of tracer toguide machine gun fire. The trajectory ofa tracer bullet is visible for a given distancebecause a chemical element incorporatedin the cartridge provides a trail of flame orsmoke. Consequently, in response to aseries of requests, throughout the war Ord-nance technicians undertook dozens of re-search projects on various types of tracerto supplement the one kind available in1940. But lack of agreement among theusing arms about what characteristicswere essential resulted in the OrdnanceDepartment's spending much money andeffort to produce a great number of types,many of which were never adopted forcombat. Though down into 1944 the Anti-aircraft Command used the .50-caliberM1 tracer, standard in 1940, late in 1942the command headquarters requested acartridge with a bright trace increasedfrom 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The argumentof the Antiaircraft Board was that thegreater length of trace would enable the.50-caliber machine gun used as a subcali-ber weapon on 37-mm. and 40-mm. gunsto duplicate more nearly the effect of fireof the larger guns. The desired features oflengthened trace and minimum flash atthe gun were successfully achieved in acartridge standardized in July 1944 as theM17. This replaced the M1 for antiair-craft use until March 1945, when a stillbetter cartridge, the M20, was available.The M17 continued to be used for train-ing even after the war.15

Whatever its value for improving accu-racy, tracer alone lacked power to piercearmor plate and therefore was ineffectiveagainst the armored planes and the self-sealing fuel tanks employed by the Axis

Powers. Even armor-piercing cartridgesfrequently failed to do much damage.Thus, the need for ammunition of greaterlethal effect was apparent a year beforethe United States became a belligerent.British experience pointed to the useful-ness of incendiary. The first .50-caliber in-cendiary, the M1, was designed for aircombat, but antiaircraft batteries alsoused it for a time while awaiting develop-ment of an armor-piercing-incendiarybullet requested in the fall of 1942 forground use. Study of a Soviet 13.2-mm.and an Italian 7.7-mm. armor-piercing-in-cendiary assisted Frankford Arsenal indevising a cartridge with an armor-pierc-ing core inserted into the M1 incendiarybullet jacket. The bullet weighed 649grains, and 14 grains of a special incendi-ary mixture were added in the bulletjacket. Tests during 1943 proving it satis-factory, the new armor-piercing-incendi-ary cartridge was adopted under thedesignation M8.16 Thereafter the GroundForces used a linkage of four M8 car-tridges to one tracer.

A single cartridge incorporating armor-piercing, incendiary, and tracer charac-teristics had not yet been evolved. TheOrdnance Department began experiment-ing with a modification of the M8 late in1943. By omitting the lead base filler usedin the M8, adding several more grains ofincendiary mixture, and inserting in thebase of the core a new tracer mixture,Ordnance experts had an armor-piercing-incendiary tracer model ready for servicetests by June 1944, when the Air Forcesestablished a requirement for ammunition

15 SA and SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 73, 80, 91, 103-04, OHF.

16 Ibid., pp. 35-36.


of this kind. While preparations wereunder way for manufacturing a largequantity for combat test, the OrdnanceDepartment furnished samples to theAntiaircraft Board as well as to otherboards of the services and to the Navy. Foraircraft use, this T28 had indisputablevalue, but whether it would meet the needsof the Ground Forces was uncertain. Thefindings were universally approving. TheAntiaircraft Board pronounced the tracefeatures superior to those of the M1 tracer,because the initial trace was dimmer andthe smoke along the trajectory less. Sincethe armor-piercing-incendiary character-istics added deadliness, the CommandingGeneral, Army Ground Forces, recom-mended standardization. The cartridgewas designated the caliber .50 armor-piercing-incendiary tracer M20. Its draw-backs were two: the complexity of designmade manufacture difficult, and thechemical composition of the ammunitionled to rapid deterioration in storage. Thesecond fault was common to all tracer am-munition, and the demand for the M20was so great that no problem of prolongedstorage arose during the war. The hitchwas rather one of keeping supply some-where near the level of demand, a prob-lem rendered acute by the difficulty ofmanufacture. But the M20 gave bothGround and Air Forces a tracer cartridgewith ballistic performance identical withthat of the round for which the tracerserved as fire control. Time of flight of theM20 was exactly that of the M8 armor-piercing-incendiary at all points of thetrajectory.17 The adoption of the armor-piercing-incendiary tracer marked thepeak of accomplishment in machine gunammunition used against aircraft duringthe war.

Artillery Fire for Defense AgainstClose-in Attack

37-mm. Guns

The limitations of machine guns madelight artillery essential for defense againstrelatively close-in attack. Light artillerycould be equipped with fire controlmechanisms that could not be used onmachine guns; and an artillery projectile,if only because of its far greater mass,could destroy a target that machine gunbullets might hit without seriously damag-ing. After World War I, by general agree-ment, a project was given high priority todevelop an antiaircraft gun of about37-mm. caliber to fill the gap between ma-chine guns and comparatively slow-mov-ing intermediate and heavy artillery. Ord-nance designers, assisted by John Brown-ing of machine gun fame, and later by theColt's Patent Fire Arms Company, pushedforward work upon a 37-mm., and, afterstandardization of a model in 1927, Water-town and Frankford Arsenals carried ondevelopment of a carriage and sightingsystem. Yet progress was slow, particularlyon the fire control and sighting devices,which were of considerable complexity andnot very satisfactory in operation. Never-theless, by the fall of 1938, as the war wasdrawing closer, a carriage, standardizedas the M3, and a sighting system, M2,coupled with a so-called control equip-ment set, the M1, were put into produc-tion, while orders for the gun itself went toWatervliet Arsenal and Colt.

The next two years saw numerous mod-ifications. The muzzle velocity of the gunwas lowered to prevent premature bursts

17 Ibid., pp. 107-08.


from new self-destroying tracer ammuni-tion and to lessen barrel erosion; and be-fore 1940 was out, the sighting and controlsystem was scrapped in favor of a Britishdevelopment, the Kerrison predictor and"oil gears." The latter were electrohy-draulic power-control units mounted onthe carriage and linked by an electricaldata transmission system to the mechani-cal director; the separate, off-carriageKerrison predictor computed the firingdata as it tracked the target.18 This Britishremote control system, originally designedfor use with 40-mm. Bofors guns, was soundeniably superior to the American thatthe Ordnance Technical Committee rec-ommended adopting the British type forall new 37-mm. carriages. So equipped,the carriage was designated the M3A1.While tracer shell alone was a poor substi-tute for an accurate tracking system, atracer element was incorporated in all37-mm. ammunition. If the director failedto work, the tracer would still providesome fire control, and at all times wouldprovide a check upon the accuracy of thetracking mechanism. Moreover, when thecombination mount M15 was put intoservice, its two .50-caliber machine gunshelped to keep the 37-mm. on the target aswell as to increase volume of fire.19

40-mm. Bofors

Meanwhile the 40-mm. Bofors hadshown its capabilities. The carriage of theBofors differed little from the American.The gun itself, in the opinion of many ex-perts, was a better weapon than the37-mm. in several respects. The Britishstrongly advocated adopting the 40, andit was obvious that manufacturing facili-ties were too few to produce both 37's and40's in quantity. The Swedish Bofors'gun

and carriage together weighed some 575pounds less than the 37-mm. mounted onits carriage. The Bofors was somewhatsimilar in design, fired a projectile halfagain as heavy at 270 feet per secondhigher muzzle velocity, and had a slightlyfaster cyclic rate than the 37-mm. Anautomatic loading mechanism fed car-tridges into a loading tray from whichthey were pushed into the chamber by amechanically operated rammer. Thoughthe 40-mm. barrel when fired at a rate of140 rounds per minute tended to overheat,a new barrel could be emplaced in abouttwo minutes. The 4.3-mile range of theforeign weapon exceeded the 6,200-yardmaximum range of the American, but useof the director actually limited effectiverange of the Bofors to about 3,000 yards.Still, in many situations the advantages ofthe director more than offset the reductionof range.20

Endeavors in 1937 to purchase Boforsfor test had come to nothing, owing to aseries of mishaps.21 Not until the fall of1940 did the United States obtain models,the Navy one in October, the Army one inDecember. Only close collaboration be-tween the Army, the Navy, and the Britishenabled the United States to hasten nego-tiations for manufacturing rights and theOrdnance Department to get drawingsand construction of two pilot models

18 See below, pp. 38ff.19 (1) OCM 12664, 20 Feb 33; 13766, 1 Jul 37;

13796, 15 Jul 37; 14738, 13 Oct 38; 14912, 1 Mar 39;15811, 17 May 40; 15908, 27 Jun 40; 16309, 20 Nov40. (2) Design. Development and Production of 37-mm. and 40-mm. AA Guns, PSP 29, OHF. (3) Interv,27 Jun 51, with Granville Taliaferro, Artillery AmmoBr, R&D Serv.

20 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 203-06.(2) Interv with Gen Barnes, 13 Jun 51, and with Sam-uel Feltman, 5 Jul 51.

21 The misunderstandings with the Bofors Companythat halted purchase in 1937 and 1938 are describedin PSP 29, pp. 22-23, OHF.

ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS. 37-mm. (above) and Bofors 40-mm. (below).


started even before contracts with theSwedish company were formalized. TheArmy officially adopted the air-cooledBofors as the 40-mm. automatic antiair-craft gun M1 in April 1941, with theexplicit statement that as soon as quantitymanufacture was achieved, the 40-mm.was to supersede the 37-mm. antiaircraftgun.22 That moment was not reached untilthe summer of 1943, a delay that had beenprolonged by the necessity of transposingthe metric measurements of the foreigndrawings to United States Ordnancestandards. Minor changes resulted fromtests in the summer of 1942. The most im-portant was the decision to follow Britishpractice and the original Bofors design ofincreasing the twist of the rifling from oneturn in 45 calibers at the breech to oneturn in 30 at the muzzle. The increasingtwist lengthened accuracy life from 4,200service rounds to approximately 6,000.23

All Bofors ammunition was in the formof fixed rounds, either armor-piercingwith tracer or high-explosive shell. Beforemidsummer 1943 American manufactur-ers found it hard to make. The British per-cussion fuze, in particular, was so complexthat as early as January 1942 the Ord-nance Technical Committee recommendedsubstitution of a simple plunger type ofpoint-detonating fuze similar to those theOrdnance Department had long used. Be-fore this PD fuze M64 got into quantityproduction, the Navy was turning out itsMark 27 PD fuze which answered thesame purpose. Consequently the Armyalso used the Mark 27 with high-explosiveshell, though in the interests of more eco-nomical manufacture, the Ordnance De-partment developed another PD fuze, theM71.24

Both mount and carriage also weresomewhat modified, partly to ease manu-facture and maintenance, partly to im-

prove performance. The Firestone Tireand Rubber Company, who accepted thecontract for the first pilot models, suc-ceeded in producing a welded frame to re-place the riveted construction of the origi-nal mount, a far more efficient and easilyfabricated bearing for the traverse mecha-nism, cheaper and more easily installedbushings for bearings, and steel tubing in-stead of forged and machined axles. Thecarriage was modified by adding four-wheel electric brakes and a few other im-provements. Some slight differences be-tween the model manufactured for theBritish and that for the U.S. Army led toassigning the nomenclature M2 to the lat-ter carriage, M1 to the lend-lease model.To increase the tracking rate in followinga high-speed target approaching from anunexpected direction at short range, newgears with a higher gear ratio were in-stalled in the carriage, now labeled theM2A1. Addition of "cartwheel" sightswas another improvement. The diameterof the forward ring was first increased toprovide for leading a target traveling at300 miles an hour at a 1,000-yard rangeand later was increased to cover targetsmoving at 400 miles an hour.25

As combat experience in North Africaemphasized the need of combining maxi-mum fire power and mobility with a mini-mum number of vehicles, in 1943 variouscombination mounts on both half-tracks

22 The Navy adopted a water-cooled model, manyparts of which were dissimilar to the Army Bofors.

23 (1) OCM 16647, 24 Apr 41. (2) PSP 29, App. D,and p. 36. citing Ord Program 5444, 30 Jul 42, OHF.

24 (1) OCM 17703, 26 Jan 42. (2) Interv, 6 Jul 51,with Robert Cuthill , Ammo Br, Ind Serv. (3) Ltr,Gen Grain. London Munitions Assignment Bd, toGen Campbell, CofOrd, 14 Jun 43, OO 350.05/3676,DRB AGO.

25 (1) J. E. Trainer, "Antiaircraft Gun Carriages,"Army Ordnance, XXII, 130 (1942), 543-44. (2) OCM17499, 4 Dec 41; 21027, 15 Jul 43; 21098, 22 Jul 43;21639, 23 Sep 43; 22378, 16 Dec 43. (3) Catalogueof Standard Ord Items, II, 206.


and tank chassis were tried out—twin40-mm. guns, a 40-mm. gun together withtwo .50-caliber machine guns, and twin40-mm. with twin machine guns. Any ofthese promised to increase volume of fireconsiderably. The most satisfactory provedto be two 40-mm. antiaircraft gunsmounted on the chassis of the light tankM24, in 1944 designated the M19 twin40-mm. gun motor carriage.26 Experi-ments with mounting a 75-mm. antiair-craft gun on this carriage began early in1945 but were incomplete by the end of thewar. For airborne use, a somewhat light-ened 40-mm. carriage, the M5, was devel-oped. The gun barrel and detachable out-riggers had to be removed before loadinginto a transport plane but, after landing,three men could emplace the carriage infive minutes.27

At one stage of the war, after manufac-ture of 37-mm. antiaircraft guns hadstopped, the question arose of whether aweapon between the .50-caliber machinegun and the 40-mm. gun would not be anadvantage. Both the Germans and theItalians used 20-mm. ack-ack, but alwayswith ammunition containing a self-destroy-ing feature which neither British norAmerican 20-mm. ammunition possessed.The danger of serious casualties to Alliedtroops, unless fire were only over water,was too great to risk. Furthermore, theatrereports in 1944 indicated no real need foran antiaircraft gun at once more powerfulthan a caliber .50 and lighter and smallerthan the Bofors.28

Defense Against Fast-Flying Aircraftat High Altitudes

Longer Range: Rockets

High-flying enemy bombers and pro-tecting escort planes had if possible to be

brought down before crews unloaded thebombs. For that purpose light artillerysuch as the 37-mm. and 40-mm. guns hadinsufficient range and power. Powerfulground fire, as both American and BritishOrdnance experts knew, was a vital sup-plement to Allied fighter craft, particu-larly early in the war when American,British, and Russian planes were outnum-bered by enemy. In the spring of 1941 theOrdnance Department requested NDRCto investigate the use of jet propulsion forantiaircraft projectiles in order to shortentime of flight, increase vertical range, andsimplify the projecting weapon. Work onthe fundamental research this project in-volved had not gone far when it got freshimpetus from Dr. Lauritsen, vice chairmanof one of the NDRC divisions. The Britishhad invested a great deal of effort andmoney in getting antiaircraft rockets intoaction because, after Dunkerque, artillerywas in extremely short supply, and 3-inchunrotated rocket projectiles and launchershad been developed to the point wherethey could be used. British "UP-3's" whenfired with time fuzes had a ceiling of about22,000 feet. Because the potentialities ofthese antiaircraft rockets greatly impressed

26 (1) 1st Ind, Col Gerhardt for NATOUSA, AttnCol David J. Crawford, 6 Apr 43, sub: Changes ofDesign of Certain Items of Ord Equipment, OO350.05/2501, DRB AGO. (2) Memo, Col Crawford,Theatre Ord Off NATOUSA, for CofOrd, 6 May 43,sub: New and Proposed Mountings for AutomaticWeapons, OO 350.05/3284, DRB AGO. (3) Memo,Col Francis A. Englehart, OCO, for Col Crawford, 21Jun 43, sub: Automatic AA Weapons, OO 350.05/3851, DRB AGO. (4) Memo, Barnes for Campbell,26 Jun 43, sub: Col Thomas H. Nixon's Letter,Barnes-Campbell Correspondence, Barnes file, OHF.(5) OCM 23746, 11 May 44.

2 7 ( 1 ) OCM 26544, 1 Feb 45. (2) Catalogue ofStandard Ord Items, II, 107.

28 Memo, Col Englehart for CG Hq AAF, 10 Jan44, sub: Artillery Opns, New Georgia Campaign, and1st Ind, Col H. C. Porter, Actg Field Dir AmmoPlants, for OCO, 19 Jan 44, OO 350.05/8721, DRBAGO.

90-MM. ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN during a practice alert in Iceland.


Lauritsen, the NDRC representative inLondon in the summer of 1941, the Amer-ican armed services after study of Laurit-sen's report contracted with the CaliforniaInstitute of Technology to carry this devel-opment further. The resulting work uponrocket propellants was valuable for otherpurposes but was not put to use for anti-aircraft rockets since, by the time the nec-essary preliminaries were finished, power-ful long-range artillery was available inquantity. The greater accuracy andhigher velocity of rifled guns made anti-aircraft rockets needless. From the Cali-fornia Institute of Technology, however,did come the data that enabled the Ord-nance Department to produce the 3.25-inch target rocket which was of help intraining antiaircraft gunners.29

Longer Range: The 90-mm. Gun

Long before the United States had somuch as considered antiaircraft rockets,the Ordnance Department had beenworking upon powerful long-range artil-lery. Though the 3-inch gun M3 did infact command adequate range for mostWorld War II antiaircraft defense, andthough it served the U.S. Army well onBataan, its muzzle velocity of only 2,600feet per second and its light, 12.8-poundprojectile were drawbacks. Aware of theseshortcomings, in 1938 the Coast Artilleryhad requested a larger-caliber gun, with ahigher muzzle velocity, capable of firing a21-pound projectile to a greater heightthan the 3-inch could reach. Since a CoastArtillery Board report of 1939 spoke ofbombers flying at 250 miles per hour at analtitude of 32,000 feet and of even fastercraft under design which could operate ata ceiling of nearly eight miles, 1939 sawthe start of work upon a still longer-

range gun calculated to reach planes atheights of 56,000 feet.30

The 1938 project, a 90-mm. antiaircraftgun, was rushed to completion in 1940.The selection of that caliber had been de-termined by the weight of a shell thatcould be hand loaded; anything in excessof forty pounds for a complete round wouldbe too heavy for men to handle for morethan a few minutes at a stretch, andmechanical loading systems up to thattime had not been reliable. To obtaingreater stability and a self-cocking firingmechanism, several changes in the originaldesign of both mount and gun were ef-fected in late 1939 and early 1940. As testsshowed the modifications to be adequate,gun and mount were standardized in Feb-ruary 1940.31 Almost at once, however, afuze setter and spring rammer was hurriedinto production to facilitate ammunitionloading. In the field, gunners usually dis-connected it, as crews thought hand-ram-ming faster and considered the springrammer dangerous because it sometimesstruck the loader or mashed his fingers.The spring rammer was admittedly a stop-

29 (1) NDRC Liaison, Project OD-26, 8 Apr 41,OHF. (2) Memo, Dr. Lauritsen, Vice Chairman DivA, NDRC, for Dr. Bush, 1 Aug 41, sub: Expansion ofProgram of Rocket Developments, quoted in Bur-chard, ed., Rockets, Guns and Targets, pp. 24-28. (3)Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 89-92. (4) 1st Lt EdwardG. Uhl, Rpt on British Rocket Development, 24 Sep42, OHF. (5) Rpt on U.S. Tech Mission, 26 Aug 42,Barnes file, OHF. See also n. 3.

30 (1) Ltr, OCO to Henry Dreyfus, 29 Jun 42, OO350.05/1056, DRB AGO. (2) Memo, Capt D. W.Hoppock, Development Analysis Sec, OCO, for ColSeleen, 11 Jul 42, sub: Weekly Performance Rpt ofOrd Manufactured Materiel in Action, OO 350.05/1 100, DRB AGO. (3) Coast Artillery Bd Rpt, Pro-

ject 1153, 8 Mar 39 and Project 1116, 8 Feb 38, citedin Design, Development, and Production of 90-mm.and 120-mm. AA Guns, PSP 29, OHF. (4) OCM14531, 9 Jun 38.

31 (1) OCM 15641, 23 Feb 40; 15688, 21 Mar 40.(2) PSP 29, pp. 7, 10, OHF.


gap until a better, albeit more compli-cated, mechanism could be perfected. Anelectrically controlled rammer and fuzesetter required linkage with mechanical orelectric directors.

When the automatic fuze setter-rammerdeveloped by the United Shoe MachineryCompany was accepted by the OrdnanceDepartment, the potential rate of fire ofthe 90-mm. gun increased. But it nevergot above 27 shots per minute, even inpractice firing. This electrically controlledfuze setter-rammer, designated the M20,was ingenious. The crews fed a completeround of ammunition into slowly rotatingramming rolls that drew the round intothe fuze setter jaws. There it stopped untilthe jaws received the position signal fromthe remotely located electric director andthen rotated the fuze to set it as directed.Thereupon the jaws opened and the roundwas automatically rammed into thebreech, the breech closed, and the roundwas fired. This decreased the "dead time"between setting the fuze and the momentof firing. As a fast-flying plane could movea considerable distance in that interval,use of the automatic fuze setter-rammernotably improved accuracy.32 Only hyper-velocity, largely a matter of ammunitionwith flatter trajectory, could further mul-tiply efficiency of the gun itself.

The Search for High Velocity

The 90-mm. was to have been a high-velocity gun and, at its inception in 1938,its proposed 2,800 feet per second mighthave been called high velocity. The Ger-man 88-mm. Flak 36 had a muzzle velocityof 2,690 feet per second. Unhappily, thewalls of the first shell designed for the 90-mm. proved to have insufficient strengthto withstand the pressures upon them when

the rotating bands engaged the rifling.Special heat treating would give theneeded strength, but in 1941 manufactur-ing capacity for that process was too lim-ited to count upon. The alternative was toincrease the thickness of the shell walls, achange that increased weight and reducedthe amount of explosive charge, therebydecreasing muzzle velocity to 2,700 feet asecond. When the German 88-mm. Flak 41gun with its velocity of 3,280 feet per sec-ond and its high-explosive ammunitionappeared, the American 90 was outclassedin that particular. Unlike field guns, anti-aircraft artillery never fired in direct com-petition with enemy ack-ack. If the Amer-ican gun brought down its target, it mat-tered little that the gun was less powerfulthan its German counterpart. Yet thechallenge of the German guns remained.33

The 90-mm. M2 was, to be sure, somounted as to enable it to fire at tanks andother ground targets, a versatility that wonit the label of "triple threat" gun. But itwas the 90-mm. M3, designed specificallyfor antitank use, that was pressed into useas a field gun. Velocity of the AA gunnever got above 2,700 feet per second.

The difficulty for the U.S. Armywas partly logistical. Increased velocitiesspelled excessive barrel wear unless erosionresistant gun tubes could be developed orpowders combining high-potential with acool-burning, noneroding chemical com-position. For Germany, with her interiorlines of supply, barrel replacement was

32 (1) PSP 29, pp. 14-22, OHF. (2) Catalogue ofStandard Ord Items, II, 210-11, 213-15. (3) OCM17213, 11 Sep 41; 19946, 15Jan 43; 20401, 13 May43.

33 (1) OCM 21269, 12 Aug 43. (2) PSP 29, pp. 12-13, OHF. (3) Barnes, Weapons of World War II, pp. 88-89. (4) The War Office, Illustrated Record of GermanArmy Equipment, 1939-1945, Vol. II, Artillery, Pt. 2,MI-10 (London, 1948), copy in Ord Tech Intel files.


GERMAN 88-MM. AT PORTE FERRAIO, ELBA. This was the multipurpose artil-lery piece of the German Army.

very much easier than for the Allies, whosematériel had to be shipped from theStates. The official German weapons hand-book gave an estimated life of 1,500 roundsto the 88-mm. Flak 41 gun, 2,000 to 2,500rounds with supercharges to the Flak 36and 37.34 Life of the 90-mm. antiaircraftguns was limited to about 1,600 roundsbecause the mechanical time fuzes ordi-narily used failed to function properly afterthe barrel was somewhat worn. Yet infiring against German V-1 missiles in thesummer of 1944, experience showed that,with VT fuzes, life of barrels might be ex-tended to 1,900 rounds, depending uponhow rapid the rate of fire was and howlong sustained. On the problem of achiev-ing hypervelocity without creating an im-possible maintenance situation, the Ord-nance Department and its contractors

throughout the war expended much time,effort, and money.35

Inasmuch as practicable solutions woulddepend upon considerable basic researchinto the mechanics and chemistry of barrelerosion, the Ordnance Department re-quested NDRC to undertake a compre-hensive study of the problem. The work,under the guidance of Dr. L. H. Adams,

34 (1) Ord Handbook, German Army Weapons Of-fice, H15/27, GMDS DRB AGO. Yet after V-E DayAmerican interrogation of Hauptdienstleiter Saur,one of the heads of German war production, elicitedthe statement: "Gun erosion was never a problem. Inthe L/56 the metallurgical qualities of the steel hadworsened three times during this war. The 8.8cmguns did not only do their 5000 but 8000 rounds,8.8cm 41 L/74 should take 500 rds, did 1800." Inter-rogation of Hauptdienstleiter Saur by Dr. Henry B.Allen, 2 Jul 45, Ord Tech Intel files.

35 Intervs, 17 Jul 51, with Bruce Anderson, Artil-lery Ammo Br, R&D Serv, and Paul Netzer, Artil-lery Br, R&D Serv.


was primarily important because of thesolid foundation of knowledge it laid downupon the causes of erosion. But NDRC'ssixteen contractors on this project—re-search institutions and private compa-nies—also contributed by exploring variousapplications of this knowledge. WhileNDRC success in developing liners formachine gun barrels36 was not duplicatedfor artillery, some inconclusive experimentswere tried: using replaceable steel linersfor artillery, employing pre-engraved pro-jectiles so as to lessen the friction betweenthe projectile and the lands of the rifledbore, and a protecting metal sleeve to befitted over the junction of the cartridgecase and the projectile. More promisingwere the studies of erosion-resistant mate-rials, notably molybdenum and hot-hardalloys, and the sabot projectile developedfor the 90-mm. gun. But as the NDRCproject was concerned with the over-allproblem of hypervelocity, in May 1944 theOrdnance Department began work onhypervelocity specifically for 3-inch, 90-mm., and 105-mm. antiaircraft fire.37V-JDay arrived before this development pro-gram had made much headway.

Indeed, the only high-velocity Americanantiaircraft gun, the 120-mm., saw littleaction, partly because its development andproduction lagged by more than a yearbehind that of the 90-mm., and partly be-cause its weight made transport difficult.Nevertheless, even in 1939 the OrdnanceDepartment had been convinced that amore powerful antiaircraft weapon thanthe 90-mm. would in time be needed. De-sign of the 90-mm. was scarcely off thedrawing boards when the Ordnance De-partment persuaded the Coast ArtilleryBoard of the wisdom of having Ordnancedevelop a heavy antiaircraft gun. Whereasthe limits of fire control in 1938 had pre-

cluded the use of a longer-range gun thanthe 90-mm., by 1939 developments inradar and electronics held out hopes ofeffectively reaching to greater heights. Theproject accordingly launched in June 1939,though modified somewhat during thenext sixteen months, called for a gun witha muzzle velocity of 3,100 feet per second,and able to fire a 50-pound projectile to analtitude of 56,000 feet. The ammunitionhad to be semifixed, that is, the 50-poundprojectile separate from the 51-poundsealed powder case. As 50-pound loadswould be too heavy for hand loading, apower-operated ammunition tray andrammer was necessary. These characteris-tics were incorporated in the model stand-ardized in 1944 as the 120-mm. AA gunM1. An automatic fuze setter to ease andexpedite firing permitted a rate of 10rounds per minute. Ordnance designersregarded the 120-mm. as the best gun theAllied armies had for bringing down ene-my aircraft at high altitudes. The 61,500-pound weight of the gun and mount wasone objectionable feature, and the 123.5-inch width was another. Only 550 gunswere manufactured and none was shippedto Europe. The 90-mm. and lighter weap-ons served as antiaircraft defense againstthe Luftwaffe.38

Fire Control and Tracking Devices

Guns, ammunition, and firing mecha-nisms were by no means the only elements

36 For a further discussion of this topic, see below,Ch. XV.

37 (1) NDRC Liaison, Project OD-52, OHF. (2)OCM 23832. 18 May 44. (3) Interv with Paul Netzer,17 Jul 51.

38 (1) PSP 29, pp. 50-63, OHF. (2) Catalogue ofStandard Ord Items, II, 216-17. (3) OCM 15059, 1Jun 39; 19709, 11 Feb 43; 21389, 26 Aug 43; 22734,27 Jan 44. (4) Interv with Bruce Anderson, 17 Jul 51.


to consider in making the best possibleantiaircraft equipment. Sighting, travers-ing, and elevating mechanisms, and track-ing devices were equally essential. Ma-chine guns with their limited range re-quired only simple sights, and only whenmultiple-mounted on power-driven turretswere the guns electrically traversed. Firecontrol for heavier, more powerful weap-ons naturally had to be more complex. Infact, because the speed at which divebombers and low-flying strafing planesoperated made effective close-in fire moredifficult than at long-range targets, devis-ing accurate fire control mechanisms forlight antiaircraft artillery was one of theknottiest problems Ordnance faced in1940. Hand-tracking and aiming werelikely to be inaccurate; the mechanicalcontrols developed in the 1930's for the37-mm. gun were clumsy and slow. Themost satisfactory answer was found in theadoption of a British mechanical directorlinked with gears on the gun that automat-ically elevated and traversed the gun as thedirector transmitted its computations. TheKerrison predictor, named for its Britishinventor, Col. K. E. Kerrison, was some-what modified for use with American guns,a task undertaken by NDRC. Later, addi-tion of a stereoscopic range finder, an alti-tude converter, and an electric mechanismfor setting slant range into the director'smultiplying mechanism produced themodel labeled the M5A2 director. Im-proved oil gears to traverse and elevate thegun were also installed on the remote con-trol system on the gun. Bofors sights on the40-mm. and telescopes on the 37-mm. pro-vided either for direct sighting or for usewith the Kerrison predictor. On the 37-mm., one telescope to track in azimuthand one to track the target in elevationwere attached to the top carriage and

cradle so that each moved with the gun.Because the Kerrison predictors could notbe mounted directly upon either the 37-mm. or 40-mm. carriage, they could not beused when the guns were moving to pro-tect convoys or covering troops in forwardareas. To permit aiming when the directorwas unusable, Frankford Arsenal devel-oped a mechanical computing sight con-taining a mechanism by which the direc-tion and speed of the target were set in.Parallel linkage of the two tracking mech-anisms completed the computing sight.39

Directing fire of larger-caliber, heavierantiaircraft guns was only slightly less diffi-cult. The original design of the 90-mm.lacked automatic controls. Manual opera-tion of wheels to traverse and elevaterapidly a gun with a fifteen-foot barrelwould require great exertion on the part ofthe gun crew, if indeed men at hand con-trols could keep on a fast-moving target atall. Consequently, though the OrdnanceDepartment before 1940 had objected toautomatic power controls as likely to beunreliable, it ran tests of a Sperry Gyro-scope Company power system for the new90-mm. gun during the summer of 1940.This first remote control system was, asFrankford Arsenal pointed out, "a com-plex combination of electrical, mechanicaland hydraulic units," which would be ex-pensive to build, difficult to maintain inthe field, and would double the load onthe gun's power generator.40 Nevertheless,despite defects, the apparatus did work anddid provide a method of relative accuracyin laying guns against targets moving at

39 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 329-33,338-40, 345-47. (2) OCM 19539, 2 1 Jan 43. (3) Fora general discussion of this problem of tracking, seeBaxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 212-17.

40 psp 29, citing memo, CG Frankford Arsenal forCofOrd, 8 Jan 40, sub: Power Control System for90-mm. AA Gun, OHF.

FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS. Director T30 (above) and height finder M1 (below).


high angular speeds as well as against tar-gets at short ranges where manual trackingwas extremely difficult. In February 1941the Ordnance Committee therefore recom-mended standardization of the Sperryservo-system as remote control system M2.To simplify its installation and servicing,some redesign followed. Extensive redesignwas necessary for the mount in order toaccommodate the controls. The newmount embodying these changes was des-ignated the M1A1.41 It was a mobile unitresting on a single-axled, two-wheeledbogie drawn by a trail.

Sighting on the M1A1 mount was byelbow telescopes. Off-carriage equipmentincluded a bore sight, as well as a heightfinder to determine the slant range or alti-tude of an enemy plane and to transmitthe resulting data to the director. This tele-scopic device, largely perfected by theEastman Kodak Company, was funda-mentally a 13.5-foot stereoscopic rangefinder that converted slant range to alti-tude. The remote control system was linkedby cable to an off-carriage mechanicaldirector that computed the firing datacontinuously. Power was supplied by aseparate generating unit located near by.42

When the more elaborate fire control sys-tem for the 90-mm. gun M2 was devel-oped, a good many changes in its mountwere necessary, though it would haverequired some redesign in any case inorder to install the fuze setter-rammer andthe shields added to protect the gun crew.The gun itself differed from its predeces-sors only in minor details. The remote con-trol system of the first 90-mm. models wasreplaced on the new mount by the M12system, which permitted the gun to be de-pressed to —5 degrees so that it could befired against ground targets and fast-mov-ing torpedo boats. The greater weight of

the M2 mount and gun, 32,300 pounds ascompared to 19,000, demanded a two-axled trailer. The M12 remote control sys-tem operated on the same principle as theM2, from which it derived, but the M12was connected with an electrical off-car-riage director instead of with a mechanicaldirector.43

The electric directors—the M9 series forthe 90-mm. antiaircraft guns and the M10for the 120-mm.—were extremely compli-cated devices. As they weighed about 3,500pounds, they were installed in separatetrailers. The major components of eachdirector were a tracker, a computer, apower unit, and an altitude converter, allinterconnected by a cable system. Fromthe tracker, used only when the target wasvisible, data on range, elevation, and azi-muth of the plane were transmitted to thecomputer. When the target was invisible, aradar system was used. The computermust seem to the layman to be a miracu-lous electric brain. The position of the tar-get—its elevation, its azimuth, and itsrange at a given moment—was transmittedin polar co-ordinates to the computer,which transposed them to Cartesian, orrectangular, co-ordinates. As the speed atwhich the target was moving had to betaken into consideration to determinewhere to point the gun so that target andprojectile would arrive at the same positionin space simultaneously, the time element,introduced by velocity, had also to be fig-ured. The computer mechanism made

41 (1) PSP 29, citing memo, Col Alexander G. Gil-lespie for Tech Staff, OCO, 11 Jan 40, sub: Initiationof Project for Automatic Remote Control System forAA Guns, OHF. (2) OCM 16453, 6 Feb 41; 16755,22May 41; 16871, 21 Jun41 .

42 Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 211 , 330-34,338-41.

43 (1) Ibid., pp. 213-15. (2) PSP 29, pp. 17-20,OHF.


continuous automatic electrical computa-tions of firing data and transmitted themcontinuously to the gun. The advantagesof electric directors over mechanical direc-tors were several: improved tracking; com-plete ballistical solutions for nonstandardmeteorological conditions of wind, tem-perature, and air density; the eliminationof some errors inherent in the mechanicalprediction system; a much shorter mini-mum slant range; and nearly twice themaximum horizontal range.44 Still theweight and bulk, as well as the complexityand cost, of this fire control equipmentmade it suitable only for big antiaircraftguns.

So intricate a device as the electricdirector did not, of course, spring likeAthena whole from the head of Zeus. Theproposal, conceived by Dr. D. B. Parkin-son, came in June 1940 from the Bell Tele-phone Laboratories to the Chief of theSignal Corps who, after investigation ofthe rather detailed plan, pronounced itsound.

The story runs that Parkinson, who forsome time had been interested in problemsof fire control, dreamed one night of anelectric computer that directed antiaircraftfire so exactly that as the "ping" of a firedshell sounded in the dreamer's ears downcame a plane, another ping and anotherplane fell—always one shot to a kill. Fas-cinated by the somewhat fantastic idea hisdream had given shape to, Dr. Parkinsondescribed it to his chief, Dr. Lovell, whorecognized more than fantasy in it and di-rected his young assistant to try workingout details.

Meanwhile, the creation of NDRC ledthe Bell Telephone engineers to approachDr. Warren Weaver's section, which wasconcerned with fire control. In Septemberthe enthusiasm over the plan evinced by

members of the British Tizard Missiongave added impetus. As the problem in-volved automatic laying of the AA gunas well as use of radar for tracking theplane, the Ordnance Department tookover from the Signal Corps. The specifica-tions for a 90-mm. electrical director wereworked out in the next six weeks, with theOrdnance Department, the Bell Labora-tories, and NDRC collaborating. A yearafter formal initiation of the project, afirst model was ready for the Coast Artil-lery test. NDRC's contribution lay princi-pally in its careful analysis of the mathe-matical problems involved. Some modifi-cations of the pilot model followed, inkeeping with Coast Artillery Board recom-mendations, but upon incorporation ofthese changes the director was standard-ized as the M9 in February 1942, onlynineteen months after the inception of theidea. Though mathematically complex,the director was far easier to manufacturethan the mechanical director it superseded.Many of the parts of the M9 and its latervariations were standard commercial ap-paratus, and only where commercial partslacked precision were specially made partsneeded.45

Proximity Fuzes

While all other methods of increasingthe proportion of effective antiaircraft hitswere under consideration, the questionarose of whether a fuze could be developedthat would operate not by time but byproximity to the target. Impact-detonatingammunition would have been ideal formost antiaircraft fire had cyclic rates of

44 (1) Interv with Dr. Wilhelm Jorgensen, 13 Jul 41.(2) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, II, 343-44.

45 (1) NDRC Liaison, Project OD-28, OHF. (2)Baxter, op. cit., pp. 212-15.


weapons been sufficiently high and firecontrol of greater accuracy. But early inthe war the difficulty of computing the tar-get's range exactly led to reliance on me-chanical time fuzes. These, if correctly setwith proper allowance for dead-time,might explode the shell at the exact mo-ment when the plane was within the coneof flying fragments, but in practice theburst was likely to occur anywhere alongseveral hundred feet of shell path.46 Use ofinfluence fuzes promised to improve theeffectiveness of antiaircraft fire as much asany other single means conceivablycould.47

For antiaircraft fire, two requirementsof the proposed fuze were only less impor-tant than the primary stipulation that itfunction when passing within effectiverange of the target. Because antiaircraftbatteries usually fired over friendly ter-rain, the fuze must have a self-destructivefeature to guarantee that, in case of miss-ing the target, no friendly troops or civil-ians would be injured or valuable equip-ment damaged. Secondly, the mechanismmust have sufficient ruggedness to with-

stand the rotational and setback forces ofantiaircraft weapons. Success in meetingthese and the numerous other difficultrequirements enabled the Army to issueproximity fuzes to AA batteries in the sum-mer of 1944 when the German buzz-bombattacks on England began. Forewarned ofthe impending attack, the Ordnance De-partment shipped the fuzes to the UnitedKingdom and stored them under guarduntil specialists had instructed AA gunnersin use of what Lt. Gen. George S. Patton,Jr., later called the "funny fuze." The re-sult of the last four weeks of the V-1 bomb-ings showed mounting effectiveness: de-struction of 24, 46, 67, and 79 percent ofthe targets fired at. The British creditedthe proximity fuzes, together with Ameri-can antiaircraft artillery, radar, and firecontrol, with saving London from the buzzbomb.48

46 Interv, 25 Jul 51, with S. Seymour Podnos, Fuzeand Booster Sec, R&D Serv.

47 See above, Ch. XII.48 (1) Barnes, op. cit., p. 86. (2) Col. C. H. M.

Roberts, Text of Broadcast for State Department"University of the Air" on the Proximity Fuze, 23 Apr46, OHF.

CHAPTER XV

Aircraft Armament: Weaponsfor Air-to-Air Combat

The problems antiaircraft batteries hadto deal with in countering the powerful at-tacks of Axis aircraft were matched, per-haps more than matched, by those theArmy Air Forces encountered. Aircraftmanufacturers in the United States duringthe 1930's had been building planes capa-ble of ever-increasing speeds, but as speci-fications for military craft had slighted theconcomitant developments—faster-firingguns, protecting armor, and self-sealingfuel tanks—these netted relatively scantconsideration before 1939. Fuel tanks, asan integral part of the plane, were an AirCorps responsibility. Before 1940 the AirCorps had rejected the idea of armoredplanes, and only when General Henry H.Arnold insisted, after checking the reportsof the Battle of Britain, was any attentiongiven to use of protecting armor. Testingsuitable materials and preparing specifica-tions then fell to the Ordnance Depart-ment because of its experience in ballisticsand knowledge of the behavior of plate onarmored vehicles under fire.1 But themajor task of the Ordnance Departmentin developing matériel for the Army AirForces was to design guns and ammuni-tion for attack.

The Problem of Speed

When President Roosevelt in January1939 requested of the Congress vast sums

of money to produce 50,000 aircraft, onlyOrdnance experts and a handful of AirCorps officers fully appreciated the needof equipping these planes with very fast-firing guns, with more guns per plane, orwith both, in order to score hits on enemyplanes traveling at new high speeds. Gen-eral Arnold, to be sure, as early as thesummer of 1937 had requested the Ord-nance Department to increase the cyclicrate of the .50-caliber aircraft machinegun, and the Springfield Armory andColt's Patent Fire Arms Company hadspent some time on study of the problem.But funds were skimpy, and progress hadbeen proportionately slight. Furthermore,the Air Corps had submitted no list of re-quired military characteristics.2 Whetherto add more guns to a plane to increase itsvolume of fire was a matter for the AirCorps to decide; the quality of those guns,in keeping with the user's specifications,was up to the Ordnance Department.3

American fighters in 1939 carried noth-ing heavier than .30-caliber and .50-cali-

1 Interv, 26 Jul 51, with Col Quinn, Artillery Br,R&D Serv.

2 SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, Machine Guns and Re-lated Items, p. 25, OHF.

3 During the war the number of caliber .50's perfighter was increased from four to six, and on bombersto fourteen and sixteen. Col Rene R. Studler, AirCraft Guns and Ammunition, MS in Machine GunSec, R&D Serv, OHF.

WEAPONS FOR AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT 423

her machine guns in multiple mounts onthe wings, fuselage, and nose of the plane.4

Though the standard .50-caliber Brown-ing machine gun M2 of 1939 could fire 600rounds a minute on a rigid test mount, insome planes that rate was reduced byabout 100 rounds a minute, partly becauseof the aircraft mount's resilience and partlybecause of the heavy ammunition-beltloads on the gun's feed mechanism. The.30-caliber aircraft gun fired 1,200 roundsa minute, but its muzzle velocity was lowand its bullet light.5 Aircraft guns had tobe mounted in confined spaces, so that anyredesign or modification must, if possible,retain the external dimensions of the orig-inals in order to minimize modification ofthe plane to accommodate the new models.Not until late September 1939 did the AirCorps establish the military characteristicswanted in a machine gun of cyclic raterapid enough to be effective in the short-ened "on-target" time of new planes. Bythen it was clear that what would sufficeto hit a target moving at 200 miles an hourwould not serve against aircraft flying at300 to 400 miles an hour.

Higher Cyclic Rates

Accordingly, the Air Corps' major re-quirement for the new gun was a cyclicrate of at least 1,000 rounds a minute andas much more as other features would per-mit. The time of bullet flight was to be .7second for 600 yards and at that rangepenetrations of .75-inch armor plate mustbe possible when armor-piercing bulletswere used. The over-all length of the gunshould be kept within 68 inches andweight as low as was consistent with effi-cient performance. Other requirementswere full automatic fire, controlled byhand and by trigger motor, right-hand

and left-hand ammunition feed, adapta-bility to mounting for either fixed or flex-ible use, and the least possible trunnionreaction, that is, the lowest possible strainon the shafts upon which the gun wasmounted in the plane. Air-cooling the gunwith an aerodynamic barrel jacket extend-ing at least 20 inches aft of the muzzle waslisted as essential. The Colt's Patent FireArms Company, which owned JohnBrowning's patents, undertook design of agun to meet these requirements, only tohave each model tested during the nexttwo years show such serious defects as tobe wholly unsatisfactory. In 1940 engi-neers at the Springfield Armory, by light-ening the barrel of the standard M2 ma-chine gun and by substituting doubledriving springs for a single spring, pushedthe cyclic rate up to 800 rounds a minute,but that was still far below the 1,000rounds a minute the Air Corps wanted.6

Increasing the cyclic rate of a gun suchas the .50-caliber M2, designed to fire at650 to 800 rounds per minute, resulted inadded stresses upon the barrel and all themoving parts. Even if other componentswere strengthened enough to avoid exces-sive breakage, the problem of barrel ero-sion would remain. The hot gases gener-ated by the explosion of the powder chargesoftened the bore surface, the chemicalcomposition of the powder attacked themetal, and the high temperature and pres-

4 See above, Ch. VII, for the earlier history of ma-chine gun development.

5 (1) From 1930 on, the .50-caliber had graduallysuperseded the .30-caliber, and in 1943 the AAFdiscontinued use of the smaller gun altogether. SA &SA Ammo, Book 3, p. 53. (2) See also memo, AAFOrd Officer, Wright Field, for CofOrd, 2 Dec 42, sub:Extracts from Correspondence Between Bell AircraftCo. and their Foreign Representatives, OO 350.05/1862, DRB AGO.

6 (1) OCM 15382, 29 Sep 39; 15738, 4 Apr 40. (2)SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, p. 24.


sure tended to expand the bore in a veryfast-firing gun. Inaccuracy would there-fore soon develop unless barrel erosioncould be lessened by cooling the barrel, byusing a heavier barrel, or by improvingthe barrel's metallurgy.7 In February 1942the Ordnance Department requestedNDRC to study the whole problem.NDRC let contracts to some twenty-sixcompanies, universities, and other researchinstitutions, each of which followed out aparticular line of investigation. Two and ahalf years of work, notably that of theCrane Company and the Geophysics Lab-oratory of the Carnegie Institution, pro-duced a liner of a special alloy which,fastened into the breech end of the barrel,greatly reduced erosion. Further experi-mentation showed that combining thismaterial at the breech end with chromiumplating extending to the muzzle end gavestill higher erosion resistance and bettergeneral performance.8

In the interim, efforts to develop a ma-chine gun of high cyclic rate had contin-ued. Early in 1942 the High StandardCompany of New Haven offered a prom-ising design, though the models tested thatsummer at Aberdeen lacked both thestrength and the reliability to be accept-able. Later models, built under a develop-ment contract with the Ordnance Depart-ment, showed marked improvements butstill failed to meet all requirements.Throughout, High Standard worked onthe basis of designing a high-speed gun inwhich changes from the M2 would be keptto a minimum. This came to be a bighandicap. Consequently, in August 1943the Ordnance Department entered intocontract with the Frigidaire Division ofGeneral Motors Corporation, with theunderstanding that a gun be developedusing the basic mechanism of the M2 air-

craft gun but with no restrictions upon thenumber of changes that might be made.In short, the Ordnance Department aban-doned any plan of having parts of the newgun interchangeable with those of the M2.Frigidaire's first model was ready for testin March 1944. It was essentially a newgun; only minor components were inter-changeable with the standard M2. Nu-merous changes were still needed but, byadopting some features of the High Stand-ard experimental models, Frigidaire suc-ceeded by the fall of 1944 in producing aweapon, the T25E3, that had a cyclic rateof 1,250 or more rounds per minute andfunctioned well enough to warrant fabri-cation of a hundred for AAF and Navyservice test. By the next April the guns thathad been carefully service-tested at WrightField were proving so far superior to theM2 that the Air Forces requested imme-diate standardization of the new model.The latter then became the .50-caliber air-craft gun M3, and the M2 was reclassifiedas limited standard.

Development of a machine gun withcyclic rate increased from 800 to 1,200rounds per minute, at the cost of only apound in weight and with no significantchange from the over-all dimensions of theslower-firing M2, was so impressive anachievement as to merit some particulars.It was accomplished largely by twelve new

7 ( 1 ) Div I, NDRC Summary Tech Rpt, HyperVelocity Guns, passim, OHF. (2) Proceedings of aSymposium on Gun Barrel Erosion, 26 Apr 50, copy inMachine Gun Sec, R&D Serv, OHF.

8 (1) NDRC Liaison Project OD-52, OHF. (2) SA& SA Ammo, Book 3, pp. 151-56, OHF. (3) OCM26230, 4 Jan 45. (4) For discussion of the steps in thisresearch program, see Burchard, ed., Rockets, Guns andTargets, pp. 370-93. Burchard, indeed, declared thatthe combination of special liner and plating gaveresistance ten to fifteen times that of an ordinary steelbarrel, but Ordnance specialists found this claimgreatly exaggerated.


features. First was a bolt of improved met-allurgy and design with holes drilledthrough to reduce weight. Second was anextractor with a reversible ejector whicheased ammunition feeding. Third was thesubstitution of a pneumatic barrel bufferfor the older oil buffer, a change that pro-duced smooth operation regardless of ex-tremes of temperature. Alteration of thecurvature of the accelerator resulted inmore effective use of the energy of the bar-rel and barrel extension to accelerate boltrecoil, while a Belleville spring back-platebuffer, using cupped steel washers, accel-erated counterrecoil of the bolt. Rigidlymounted breech-lock depressers added tostability of the gun's components duringoperation. Redesign of the back-plate andof the breech-lock cam strengthened theconstruction and gave smoother function-ing, and an improved firing pin providedabout five times as long a life as that of theM2 firing pin. The two features incorpo-rated from the High Standard guns werea special cover assembly to increase am-munition belt-life capacity and split belt-holding pawls to improve ammunitionfeeding. Use of the new erosion-resistantlining for the barrel, moreover, permittedfiring long bursts without loss of accuracyor marked drop in velocity.9

Unfortunately, few M3's saw action inWorld War II, as only some 2,400 werecompleted before September 1945. Yet inthe fall of 1944 Ordnance engineers per-ceived that some desirable proven featuresof the High Standard and Frigidaire high-speed models could be readily applied tothe M2. Among the parts to be used wereHigh Standard's extractor assembly, recoilbooster, wide top-cover assembly and splitpawls, as well as two parts designed byFrigidaire for the still unperfected T25E3model. With improved metallurgy, use of

a lined barrel, removal of the oil from theoil buffer, and one or two lesser changes,this modified M2 gun, the T36, could fireslightly over 900 rounds a minute. In Oc-tober 1944 the Air Forces requested 31,336of these, but rapid progress on the T25E3limited output to some 8,000.10

Encouraging though these developmentswere, still faster-firing aircraft guns wouldclearly be advantageous. The Germans,indeed, believed that extremely high cyclicrates would offer the best possible methodof combating high-speed craft. Toward theend of the war observers reported on aGerman development program to intro-duce aircraft machine guns with cyclicrates well beyond those under develop-ment in the United States. The object wasto lay down a dense curtain of fire from avery short range. These experimental gunsfired short bursts, with firing initiatedphotoelectrically when the plane was inthe proper position.11 From the Americanpoint of view the great drawback of the de-vice was that it did not permit continuousor prolonged fire, a feature the AAF re-garded as more important than a single,very fast burst. In 1945 the maximum ratethe Ordnance Department set as its goalwas 1,500 rounds a minute. SpringfieldArmory for a time worked on a design ofa totally new mechanism suitable for high-speed operation, and Frigidaire designerscontinued efforts to increase the rate of theM3 to 1,500 rounds per minute, but thewar ended before either type had reachedthe stage of extended testing.12

9 (1) SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, pp. 25-39, OHF.(2) Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol. II, Book 3, pp.263-64, 383-88, 529-32, 705-10, OHF. (3) OCM25695, 14 Dec 44; 27496, 3 May 45.

10 (1) SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, p. 43, OHF. (2)OCM 25399, 12 Oct 44; 28134, 28 Jun 45.

11 Ordnance CIOS History, p. 11, OHF.12 (1) SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, p. 45, OHF. (2)

OCM 28138, 28 Jun 45.


METALLIC LINK BELT installation in the nose of a P-38.

Improvement in the metallic link beltsfor aircraft machine guns was also neededto make them sturdier and flexible enoughto use in restricted spaces such as theplane's tail. The complexity of the prob-lem may be envisaged by study of the ac-companying photograph of an installation.A project to improve the link began in thespring of 1940, and, while the Air Corpsaccepted a modified link early in 1941,search for a design still more serviceableand easier to manufacture continuedthroughout the war. If, in addition to get-ting a high degree of strength combinedwith great flexibility under strain, a light-weight link could be made, the advantagesfor aircraft guns would be important. Be-fore V-J Day designers tried some twenty-eight variations of the standard one-piecelink and several two-piece types. Not onlydesign but also materials and heat-treating

affected performance in all metallic links.As the light weight of aluminum and plas-tic suggested substitution of these materialsfor steel, considerable study of a nylon linkwent forward, but the effect of extremes ofclimate upon plastic links and the inelas-ticity of aluminum prevented developmentof anything as satisfactory as the steel typesused in World War II. In these, loweringthe hardness of the steel largely overcamebrittleness.13 Addition of a sprocket toserve as a booster to the feed mechanismalso relieved strains.

Higher Muzzle Velocities

Faster-firing guns were not the onlyanswer to the greater speeds of enemy air-

13 (1) SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, pp. 128-45, OHF.(2) Metallic Link Belt, Fabric Ammunition Belt, PSP36, OHF. (3) OCM 16396, 16 Jan 41; 16494, 20 Feb41; 20031, 9 Mar 43; 21747 , 7 Oct 43; 22073, 3 Nov43; 26729, 15 Feb 45.


craft. Flatter trajectory of fire obtained byhigher muzzle velocity was an even sureranswer and was sought simultaneously.The NDRC study of hypervelocity notedat the end of the war that, in attacking tar-gets moving in three dimensions, heighten-ing the muzzle velocity of guns by 50 per-cent would more than triple the number ofhits. In any given gun, unless the barrelwere lengthened, thereby increasing theweight of the gun, or unless the metallicammunition components were changed,the only way to increase muzzle velocitywithout adding to pressures was to usehigher-potential powder. But higher-po-tential powders, like increased cyclic rates,spelled the probability of excessive barrelerosion. This could be avoided only bykeeping the temperature of powder com-bustion low. Extensive experimentation,largely at Frankford Arsenal, produced.50-caliber ammunition with muzzle ve-locity heightened from 2,700 to 2,880 feetper second, but even with lined barrels thedanger of "keyholing" after firing rela-tively few rounds forbade more powerfulcharges. As the interior surface of the bar-rel wore, the projectile tended to deform sothat it lost velocity and tumbled in flight,and upon impact made a keyhole-shapedmark. If the barrel became excessively hotthe bullet might even break through thewall of the barrel. At the very end of thewar tests at the Ordnance research anddevelopment center indicated that a newlydeveloped lighter-weight cartridge, thearmor-piercing-incendiary T49, using asingle-base powder, would give muzzlevelocity of over 3,400 feet per second, butthe erosion properties of the T49 were stilla drawback.14

The German point of view on highmuzzle velocities in aircraft weapons offersa contrast to the American concept:

Investigation of German small arms devel-opment and production revealed that, asconcerns automatic weapon design, the at-tainment of a high cyclic rate appeared to bea primary consideration. This was particu-larly true in the case of automatic weaponsdesigned for aircraft use. Apparently Ger-man authorities believed that a relatively lowmuzzle velocity was acceptable if a high rateof fire could be obtained. High velocities re-quired larger and heavier rounds with a con-sequent reduction of cyclic rate . . . ,15

Training Devices for BetteringMarksmanship

Use of power-driven turrets developedby the Air Forces to enable the aircraftgunner to locate his quarry quickly andtrack him accurately was another meansof dealing with the problem of hitting atarget moving at high speed.16 There re-mained the human factor in marksman-ship. Whatever the perfection of gunmechanisms, Army and Army Air Forcesboth knew that soldiers must be welltrained in their use; few weapons werehighly effective in the hands of the ineptor inexperienced. Where speed of handand quickness of eye were so vital as to theaircraft gunner, his training became ofmore than usual importance. Skeet shoot-ing, firing at a towed airborne sleeve or"drone," and shooting a camera gun wereused in the early part of the war, but theshortcomings of those methods of trainingwere so obvious that the Air Forces in Sep-tember 1942 requested a conference with

14 For exhaustive discussion of the research on thiscomplex problem, see SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, Ch.1, OHF.

15 Rpt of CIOS, G-2 Div, SHAEF (Rear), The In-telligence Exploitation of Germany, 15 Sep 45, p. 44,OHF.

16 All mechanisms that were integral parts of theplane were the responsibility of Army Air Forces. Seeabove, Ch. VIII, section on military agencies.


the Ordnance Department to discuss waysof improving upon them. The Air Forcesproposed that the Ordnance Departmentdevelop a projectile that would disinte-grate upon impact without harm to thetarget or its crew, but a projectile with bal-listics similar under training conditions tothose of the service ammunition undercombat conditions. The Air Forces, agree-ing that a suitably armored target planewould be essential to successful use of afrangible cartridge, undertook to developan armored plane. Two months later theAir Forces changed its mind about thearmored target plane and informed theOrdnance Department that unless a bulletcould be made that would shatter againstan unarmored craft, the whole projectmust be abandoned. The Ordnance De-partment dropped it. Research men ofNDRC later charged that "one or twowillful men in the Ordnance Departmentnearly stopped the development alto-gether." The Ordnance staff averred thatthe Air Forces had tied its hands.17

At this point, one or two Air officers,convinced of the value of the idea, per-suaded the Air Forces to turn the problemover to NDRC and approve a researchcontract with Duke University. Experi-ments were to be confined to work upon a.30-caliber bullet because, though .30-cal-iber machine guns were ineffective in com-bat against the armor plate of World WarII planes, the firing characteristics werenearly identical with those of the morepowerful .50-caliber, and the smaller-cal-iber ammunition was cheaper. In thecourse of the next year men at Duke andNRDC came up with a 90-grain bullet ofpowdered lead bonded with bakelite that,fired from a modified .30-caliber aircraftmachine gun, at a distance of 50 yards dis-integrated against a quarter inch plate of

dural placed normal to the line of fire, or,if the bullet perforated the plate, causedlittle or no damage. This achievement wasencouraging, though it still did not meetthe Army Air Forces specifications. TheAir Forces then requested the OrdnanceDepartment to continue the development,but Maj. Cameron Fairchild, AAF, Pro-fessor Paul Gross and associates at Duke,members of NDRC, and the BakeliteCorporation, who had been the chief pro-ponents of the program thus far, largelysaw it through.

The technical difficulties were various.Beside making a frangible bullet with theproper ballistics and adapting the machinegun to firing ammunition with reducedpowder charge, a plane had to be built,armored enough to be safe and yet able tofly. A hit indicator system had to be de-vised and a plan worked out for vectorialscaling of bomber and fighter velocities,for the bullet muzzle velocity, and for thering sight size. The bullet T44, finally pro-duced in some quantities and used at sev-eral training fields toward the end of thewar, was slightly heavier than the first ex-perimental type. The machine gun wassatisfactorily modified and the scalingproblem solved. The Air Forces did buildan armored plane upon which hits werescored automatically by electrically am-plifying the vibration caused by the bul-let's impact and thus flashing a light onthe nose of the plane. Yet in spite of thesesuccessful developments, only a small frac-tion of bullets manufactured were fired.After the war Air Forces psychologists con-cluded that trainees were prone to get falseideas of aiming and firing because the bul-

17 For a detailed account of the conflict over thefrangible bullet development see Burchard, ed., op.cit., pp. 328-37.


let simulated too much. The frangiblecartridge was then declared limited stand-ard.18

Tracer Ammunition for BetteringMarksmanship

As an aid to accurate fire, tracer ammu-nition had long been held in high regardby the Air Corps. In 1924 an improved.30-caliber tracer cartridge was standard-ized as the M1, the combat characteristicsof which remained unchanged until PearlHarbor. But after the Battle of Britain in1940 the British, though praising tracer asa medium of fire control, wanted a con-trolled length of trace and, in order tominimize the blinding effect upon the gun-ner, a delay of 150 yards before the bright-burning powder ignited. Satisfactory typeswere developed in the course of the nexttwo years, but Obsoletion of .30-calibermachine guns for Army aircraft resultedin limiting .30-caliber tracer to ground useand, in small quantities, to use by thenaval air forces.19 Caliber .50 tracer, onthe other hand, mounted in importance asthe war progressed. A type standardizedin 1931 as the M1 formed the basis of the.50-caliber tracer most widely used by theAir Forces during the first two years of thewar, though improvements were made inthe original bullet by changing tracer andigniter mixtures, by increasing velocity330 feet per second, and by developingclad-steel bullet jackets. Frankford Arse-nal modifications of the M1 produced am-munition with a controlled bright trace of550 plus or minus 50 yards, and later atype, standardized as the M10, which notonly eliminated risk of blinding the gunnerand gave a sufficient glow during the firstmoments of flight to permit him to retaintrace image but also had ample intensity

to enable him in daylight firing to followthe trace for the duration of the ignition.Thus, the M10 could be used in both nightand day combat. It had, moreover, theadvantage of longer life with less deteri-oration in storage than several other typesof tracer ammunition.20

Another variation of the M1 tracer wasdeveloped between 1942 and 1944, a so-called headlight tracer, which gave afrontal visibility three times as bright asthe M1. Initial reports from active theatresindicated that the psychological effectupon enemy pilots gave this bright-burn-ing tracer particular value. The Tenth AirForce in December 1944 stated: "Prelim-inary reports indicated that they [caliber.50 headlight tracer cartridges] . . . makeadjustment of fire easier. Enemy pilotsseem to be less aggressive and show a tend-ency to break off combat at longer rangethan with standard ammunition . . . ."21

And the Commanding General, StrategicAir Forces in Europe, cabled: "Brillianttracer indicates enemy fighter to othergunners in formation, which enables ourplanes to spot enemy aircraft more effec-tively at greater distances. . . . [This]ammunition is an important factor inbreaking up enemy fighter attacks at ex-treme ranges." 22 Furthermore, pilots atthat time believed that this tracer used inground strafing disturbed flak tower oper-ations. It was therefore standardized as thecaliber .50 headlight tracer M21. Only

18 (1) OCM 24926, 31 Aug 44; 25101, 14 Sep 44;28268, 5 Jul 45. (2) Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp.192-93. (3) Interv, 24 Oct 50, with Col Studler. (4)Interv, 3 Aug 51, with Dr. Frederick Carten, AmmoSec, R&D Serv. (5) SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, Ch. 5,OHF.

19 SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 80, 190, OHF.20 Ibid., pp. 73, 91-103.21 Quoted in SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 100-103,

OHF.22 Ibid., p. 103.


after the war did the Air Forces concludethat enemy pilots had been less easilyscared by this ammunition than first re-ports stated.23 The M21 was then dropped.

The Problem of Effective Striking Power

Incendiary Ammunition

Rapidity of fire, flat trajectory, and ac-curacy of aim might solve the problem ofscoring hits against enemy planes flying athigh speeds, but if shots failed to disablethe plane or crew, the effect of accuracywas lost. Greater striking power could beachieved by increasing machine gun muz-zle velocities, by using air cannon thatfired bigger projectiles, or by employingrockets. The threat of encountering enemyarmor plate capable of withstanding .50-caliber machine gun fire did not actuallymaterialize in World War II, but bulletpenetration of the plane's armor did notnecessarily knock out aircraft. Enemy useof self-sealing fuel tanks necessitated devel-opment of effective incendiary ammuni-tion.24

A .30-caliber- incendiary had been usedin World War I but, because of difficultiesin manufacture, was later discarded fortracer. When in 1939 and 1940 tests of in-cendiary characteristics of the tracershowed it to be unsatisfactory, search forsuitable incendiary ammunition beganagain. The Chief of Cavalry and Chief ofthe Air Corps in July 1940 submitted re-quirements for incendiary .30-caliber and.50-caliber rounds that upon strikingwould ignite a gasoline or oil tank or pipe-lines from the tank. Time of flight was tobe approximately that of standard ammu-nition and the center of impact was to bewithin twelve inches of the center of im-pact of standard Air Corps ammunition.

Fortunately the British had made someprogress with the problem. During theBattle of Britain in the fall of 1940 theyhad employed a .303-caliber incendiarycartridge that was effective against Ger-man bombers. But, like the World War Iincendiary, its design was so complex thatsimplification was essential for quantitymanufacture. Frankford Arsenal, assignedthe task of redesigning the British .303both to adapt it to mass production and toconvert it to .30-caliber, succeeded inevolving a satisfactory bullet and cartridgeby September 1941. This became the .30-caliber incendiary M1 and was issuedlinked in the ratio of two armor-piercing-two incendiary-one tracer, until in 1943the Army Air Forces discarded .30-calibermachine guns altogether.25

More urgently needed was an effective.50-caliber incendiary. The first accepta-ble design was the work of the RemingtonArms Company, whose staff had alreadyhad considerable experience in work onSwiss patents for incendiary ammunition.The Remington development was basedupon the British .303 B Mark VI Z andwas adopted in September 1941. The bul-let was a flat-base type with lead baseclosure and steel body and was chargedwith 35 grains of incendiary mixture, 50percent magnesium alloy and 50 percentbarium nitrate. A few months later Frank-ford produced a type of .50-caliber boat-tailed bullet that equalled Remington'sin performance and proved better adaptedto mass production. The Frankford de-sign was standardized and the Remingtonbecame the Caliber .50 Incendiary M1Alternate.26

23 (1) OCM, 27138, 29 Mar 45. (2) Interv with Dr.Garten, 11 Jul 51.

24 SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, Ch. 1, OHF.25 OCM 20272, 26 Mar 43.26 SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, pp. 19-26, OHF.


By 1942 flyers had come to regard sometype of incendiary as indispensable forair combat. "These pilots, who are in dailyconflict with the enemy, swear by the ef-fectiveness of the incendiary ammunitionand would as soon go up without theirmachine guns as without this type ofammunition."27 But the M1 incendiarydid not serve every purpose. In the springof 1943 the air forces were suffering heavylosses of B-17's in daylight bombing op-erations over Europe, partly because theM1 incendiary, though excellent againstenemy fighters approaching from mostangles, was ineffective against frontal at-tack.28 The protection afforded by the en-gine of the enemy craft served to exhaustboth the incendiary and the penetrationenergy of the projectile before it got to thefuel tank. Ordnance small arms ammuni-tion specialists consequently suggested useof the M8 armor-piercing-incendiary de-veloped for antiaircraft defense. The M8,when manufactured in relatively smallquantities, proved more efficient thaneither armor-piercing or standard incendi-ary rounds, but, when manufactured bymass production methods with the typesof powder then available, retention of itshigh velocity became impossible. Inas-much as armor-piercing-incendiary withless velocity lost most of its penetrating andits incendiary properties, the OrdnanceDepartment recommended that untilsomething better could be perfected theM1 incendiary continue to be used forgeneral air combat and straight armor-piercing for ground strafing.29 The some-thing better than either standard incendi-aries or the M10 tracer emerged in thespring of 1944 in the T28 armor-piercing-incendiary tracer standardized in March1945 as the M20.30 Air Forces theatrecommanders were authorized to request

such quantities as they saw fit.Meanwhile, in the winter of 1943-44,

increasing German employment of jet-propelled aircraft burning kerosene cre-ated the need for .50-caliber ammunitioncapable of igniting aviation kerosene. Halfa dozen different Ordnance plants workedon the problem. The Des Moines Ord-nance Plant produced the most satisfac-tory model, a 500-grain bullet containing90 grains of an incendiary mixture com-posed of 50 percent magnesium aluminumalloy, 40 percent barium nitrate and 10percent potassium perchlorate. A single-base powder was used that was found to besuperior to double-base powder for firingextended bursts. Quantities of the DesMoines cartridge, listed as the T48, wereshipped to the theatres in the winter of1944-45 and proved so effective that inMay 1945 the T48 bullet was standardizedas the .50-caliber M23 and the round asincendiary cartridge M23. A report ofJune 1945 from Headquarters, U.S. Stra-tegic Air Forces in Europe, was enthusias-tic: "Most pilots stated that aircraft burstinto flames more readily when hit withthis type ammunition in contrast to armor-piercing-incendiary ammunition. Manyenemy aircraft burned after having beenhit only two or three times. . . . Onepilot destroyed 10 aircraft on a single mis-sion by firing short bursts." 31 This testi-mony notwithstanding, design of incendi-

27 Ibid., p. 15, quoting from Military Reports on theUnited Nations, 15 Aug 43.

28 See discussion in Wesley F. Craven and James L.Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: Vol. II,Europe: TORCH To POINTBLANK, August 1942 ToDecember 1943 (Chicago, 1949) (hereafter cited asAAFII), pp. 321-43.

29 SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, p. 41, OHF.30 (1) Ibid., p. 107, citing Ord R&D Center Firing

Record, S-41123 and S-42584. (2) OCM 27137, 29Mar 45.

31 Quoted in SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, p. 33, OHF.


ary and armor-piercing-incendiary ammu-nition remained at the end of the war aproblem requiring much additionalstudy.32

Air-to-Air Cannon

To provide more destructive fire power,an alternative to the use of high-velocitymachine guns and incendiary ammunitionlay in mounting cannon in aircraft.Though the greater weight, heavier recoil,and smaller ammunition capacity were dis-advantageous, the bigger guns would havelonger range as well as greater strikingpower. The development of air cannonhad had a considerable history before1940. In World War I some 37-mm. gunshad been mounted in planes, but in 1920Ordnance Department engineers, believ-ing it possible to design a gun betteradapted to air combat, began work upona fully automatic 37-mm. aircraft cannon.Though the project was suspended in1925, some ten years later the question ofthe most effective type of air armamentwas reopened. During 1936 AberdeenProving Ground conducted a series ofcomparative tests of the destructive powerof .50-caliber machine guns and 20-mm.,25-mm., and 75-mm. guns firing high-explosive instantaneous-fuzed projectilesagainst aircraft frames so loaded as tosimulate the stresses of planes in flight.The outcome of these tests was an AirCorps request for development of threetypes of aircraft cannon, two automatic,one semiautomatic. Design of a high-velocity automatic gun was given firstpriority, its essential features to include acaliber of not less than 20-mm. or as muchlarger as would permit full automatic fire,weight not in excess of 300 pounds, a mini-mum muzzle velocity of 2,850 feet per

second, a maximum of 4,000 pounds trun-nion reaction, a magazine carrying at least50 rounds, and a high-explosive impact-fuzed projectile. A lighter gun with a lessermuzzle velocity, 2,000 feet per second, wasgiven second priority. The third type de-sired, a gun capable of firing a time fuze-impact shell at a muzzle velocity of 1,500to 2,000 feet per second, was not to exceed75-mm. in caliber.33

While some work proceeded simulta-neously upon all three projects, it was thesecond that was first concluded when inDecember 1939 a Colt automatic cannonwas recommended for standardization asthe 37-mm. automatic gun M4. It was notan ideal weapon: it would not fire at anelevation of more than 70 degrees, muzzlevelocity was just 2,000 feet per second,cyclic rate was only 150 rounds per min-ute, and weight without the mount andaccessories was 213 pounds. But the AirCorps felt that the need was acute for someaircraft weapon more powerful than the.50-caliber machine gun, and the 37-mm.M4 would function in most positions ir-respective of gravity.34 Two and a halfyears later the Air Forces and OrdnanceDepartment sponsored a modification ofthis cannon to provide a disintegratinglink-belt feed, a device better suited to air-craft installation than the magazine of theM4. The resulting 37-mm. M10, fed fromeither the right or left side, was acceptedin April 1944 chiefly for use in the nose ofP-63's.35 The weight was 18 pounds more

32 See discussion, SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, pp.46-48, OHF.

33 (1) R&D Serv, Design Development and Produc-tion of 37-mm. Gun M4, PSP 30, pp. 1-6, OHF. (2)OCM 13366, 11 Jan 37.

34 (1) PSP 30, pp. 7-10, OHF. (2) Incl 1 to ltr,CofOrd thru OASW to TAG, 4 Jan 40, sub: Stand-ardization of Gun, Automatic, 37-mm. M4, OO472.1/2483, NA.

35 OCM 2347 7, 13 Apr 44.


than the 213 pounds of the M4, but cyclicrate reached 165 rounds per minute.

But any 37-mm. cannon was necessarilytoo heavy, too bulky, and too slow-firingto meet all the specifications listed for air-craft armament to supplement .50-calibermachine guns. As several 20-mm. cannonof foreign design had been tested in themid-thirties without giving satisfactoryperformance, in the spring of 1937 Ord-nance designers began work upon a new.90-caliber gun, that is, about 22.8-mm.If a suitable weapon of American designcould be developed, the Ordnance De-partment could avoid all the complica-tions inherent in the purchase of a foreignmodel. The .90-caliber project was even-tually canceled because the urgent needof the Air Corps for a light cannon pre-cluded taking time to get all the bugs outof the one experimental model com-pleted.36

Instead, the Ordnance Departmentfound a foreign weapon that in essentialfeatures would meet the immediate de-mand. In the very month that the Ord-nance Committee had established the .90-caliber project, a report had arrived fromParis describing a new Hispano-Suiza20-mm. gun made under Birkigt patents.This so-called 404 type promised to meetall American requirements. The OrdnanceDepartment accordingly purchased onegun and 2,000 rounds of ammunition tostudy. While waiting for the shipment toarrive, Aberdeen tested a Danish Madsen23-mm., a 20-mm. Rheinmetall, a 20-mm.Swiss Oerlikon, and a 20-mm. FrenchHispano-Suiza of earlier design, the lasttwo guns borrowed from the Navy. Amplecomparative data were therefore availableagainst which to check the newer Hispano-Suiza model. Tests of the latter took manymonths. The gun was a combination gas-

operated blowback type and fired 600rounds per minute at a muzzle velocity of2,850 feet per second. Weight was 137pounds. Tests established accuracy life tobe 10,000 to 12,000 rounds. The gun couldbe mounted in aircraft wing or fuselage orfired through the propeller hub but wasnot designed for synchronized fire betweenthe propeller blades. It fired electrically byremote control. Though some uncertaintyabout its adequacy still endured, inas-much as Air Corps and Ordnance expertsagreed that the 404 type Hispano-Suiza ap-peared to have more desirable featuresthan any other intermediate caliber can-non tested, in the spring of 1939 the Ord-nance Department bought thirty-threeadditional guns from the French andbegan negotiations to secure Americanmanufacturing rights.37 A year later Gen-eral Arnold, urging haste in procuringguns of this type, restated the need:

... as a result of the recent developments inleakproof gas tanks, the caliber .50 may be-come ineffective against this component inthe near future. The 37-rnm. aircraft cannonhas a somewhat limited application due to itsbulk and comparatively slow rate of fire. Itsapplication to the tail gun and engine nacellemounts on bombers and wing mounts onpursuit airplanes is very difficult without com-promising to an unwarranted extent the de-sirable performance of the airplane involved.It has, therefore, became apparent that a gunof greater power than the caliber .50 and ofless power than the 37-mm. will be requiredto meet certain installations where the 37-mm.could not be effectively employed.38

36 OCM 13515, 9 Mar 37; 13638, 26 Apr 37; 14766,10 Oct 40. A model designed for antitank use was testfired in 1940, but the aircraft design was dropped inlate 1939. See APG Rpt on Ord Program 5082, OrdTech files.

37 (1) R&D Serv, Hist of 20-mm. Guns, M1 andAN-M2, pp. 1-8, OHF. (2) Catalogue of StandardOrd Items, II, 377.

38 Ltr, Gen Arnold, CofAC, to Gen Wesson, 11 Apr40, OO 472.91/2101, DRB AGO.


20-MM. AIRCRAFT GUNS. After cleaning the guns, British mechanics replace them in thenose of a plane.

The option on manufacturing rights al-ready obtained was then taken up and inMay 1940 the gun was approved for stand-ardization as the 20-mm. automatic gunM1. Watervliet Arsenal prepared drawingsfor contractors because the French draw-ings not only would be delayed in arrivalbut also would give dimensions computedin metric measurement that would have tobe transposed into feet and inches. Somenine months later, when changes in dimen-sions of some parts were adopted, the M1was made substitute standard and thenewer model declared standard as theAN-M2. "AN" meant that the Navy aswell as the Army had adopted the gun.Three types of ammunition were availableby 1942, armor-piercing with tracer, whichhad a muzzle velocity of 2,563 feet per

second; ball with a muzzle velocity of 2,820feet per second; and high-explosive incen-diary with muzzle velocity of 2,820 feet persecond but effective range of only about200 yards.39

Though, in the interest of saving time,the design of the 20-mm. automatic can-non was purchased, Ordnance engineershad to devise a number of modifications tomake it fully satisfactory for air combat.Different planes required different typesof adapters to control the gun's recoil, dif-ferent kinds of firing mechanisms, and dif-ferent types of loading devices or chargers.If with one type of adapter a 60-roundmagazine were used, a muzzle brake hadto be screwed to the barrel to reduce recoil

39 2d Ind. CofOrd for CG SOS, 21 Mar 42, sub:Reply to Cablegram 723, 350.05/278, DRB AGO.


distance. If that same adapter were usedwith a disintegrating link-belt feed mecha-nism, the muzzle brake had to be replacedby a thread protector. The Navy de-manded a hydraulic charger, the ArmyAir Forces a manual charger. The Britishwanted a sear mechanism instead of anelectric trigger. Altogether there wereseven different types of this 20-mm. air-craft gun in use during the war. In 1943,after prolonged tests, minor changes wereintroduced to reduce malfunctions. Thedimensions of the powder chamber wereslightly reduced, a new type of extractorspring replaced the original, the firing pinwas transformed into a floating firing pin,and the breechblock slide springs werestrengthened. The 40,000 guns alreadymanufactured were altered in keepingwith the last three of the four changes.40

Toward the end of the war a faster-firingmodel, the M3, was developed. Weight ofgun and feeder combined was reduced byone fifth, to 112 pounds; muzzle velocitywas slightly lowered, but cyclic rate wasincreased to an average of 750 rounds perminute. Furthermore, use of new auto-matic belt-feed mechanisms notably in-creased pull.41 Of the 134,633 20-mm.guns produced, over 26,000 were con-verted to the M3 models in the last fifteenmonths of the war.42 Study of ammunitionfor these cannon went forward simulta-neously with investigations of smaller cali-ber cartridges.

The third type of cannon the Air Corpsrequested in 1937 was to be approximately75-mm. in caliber. Preliminary planningfor developing such a weapon began thenext summer and experiments started in1939 with mounting a 75-mm. field gun inan airplane. The difficulties were fargreater than with light cannon. The origi-nal 37-mm. gun of World War I had in-

deed been designed for aircraft, and the20-mm. was not very much bigger orheavier than the .50-caliber machine gun.But no one had ever before attempted air-craft installation of so large a gun as a 75;no one could prophesy how its weight andrecoil would affect flight; and no one couldstate authoritatively what type of fire con-trol would serve best if so heavy a weaponwere to prove feasible in aircraft at all. Inview of these uncertainties, before planshad gone beyond the drawing board stage,the Ordnance Department persuaded AirCorps technicians at Wright Field that thefirst gun, mount, and fire control equip-ment should be the simplest possible. Fir-ing at a predetermined distance from theenemy plane would simplify range findingand fuze setting, while a fixed gun withmaximum recoil would reduce the stresseson the plane. After study of performanceof this type installation, both Ordnanceand Air Corps would have data on whichto base further developments.43 The AirCorps undertook to supply a B-18 Doug-las plane for experimental mounting andfiring of the gun, first at Aberdeen andthen at Eglin Field in Florida.

In June 1940 the 75-mm. field gun witha special mount was fired from a B-18against a towed target. An Air Corps pilotand co-pilot flew the plane, but no mem-ber of the Air Corps Board witnessed thetests. The Ordnance experts directing thetest firings reported that, for a first phase

40 (1) R&D Serv, Hist of 20-mm. Guns, M1 andAN-M2, pp. 37-40, OHF. (2) Catalogue of StandardOrd Items, II, 377-78.

41 OCM 28717, 9 Aug 45.42 OMPUS, 1 May 47, p. 147, OHF.43 OCM 13366, 11 Jan 37; 13515, 16 Mar 37;

14807, 29 Nov 38. Copies of other important docu-ments relating to the development and testing of the75-mm. aircraft cannon are contained in OCO TechDiv, 75-mm. Aircraft Gun M4 and Airplane GunMount M6, MS, OHF.


development, the gun and stereoscopicrange finder performed encouraginglywell. A fourth shot fired at 1,500 yards wasa direct hit, and range errors were not ex-cessive. Nevertheless, the final section ofthe report submitted by the Ordnanceofficer in charge, Capt. Horace A. Quinn,foreshadowed abandonment of the project:

(1) The Air Corps Board, so far as I wasable to determine from discussion, althoughadmitting the effectiveness and accuracy ofthe 75-mm. gun in an airplane was not pre-pared to accept it as a standard weapon.Opinion was expressed that the .30 Cal.probably could still be used against aircraftalthough (based on trends abroad) they wererecommending that it be replaced with the.50 Cal. gun. Interest was also expressed inantiaircraft bombing to accomplish the sameresult as would be accomplished with the75-mm. gun. The board was also anxious toknow if a small caliber gun, 50-mm. for ex-ample, would be just as effective as the75-mm. However, as I understood their reac-tions they would recommend that the de-velopment continue.44

Yet to all intents and purposes, there the75-mm. air-to-air cannon project dropped.General Arnold himself was reportedlyimpressed by the possibilities of a guncapable of hits at a 2,000 yard range, butotherwise the Air Corps of this period wasdominated by small arms enthusiasts whopinned their faith to machine guns. Tacti-cal need of the powerful 75, moreover,failed to materialize for air combat, andnot until long after World War II did theAir Forces request such a weapon.45 Whenin 1944 two successful models of 75-mm.aircraft guns were developed, they weredesigned for strafing.

Aircraft Rockets

A similar shift of original plans attendeddevelopment of aircraft rockets. The com-

prehensive program, inaugurated jointlyby Army, Navy, and NDRC in the sum-mer of 1941, had stressed work upon anti-aircraft and plane-to-plane rockets. ArmyOrdnance and Navy undertook work uponthe latter. The Ordnance Department hadbuilt a 4.5-inch rocket, standardized in1942 as the M8, for either a plane-to-planeor ground artillery fire, with the only dif-ferentiation the fuze. But, though the 4.5-inch was put to use in ground warfare andin ground strafing, it saw no service in air-to-air combat, in spite of three years ofOrdnance and Air Forces experimentationwith various applications.46 American air-craft rockets used in World War II turnedinto weapons for ground strafing.

To fire rockets against aircraft effectively,planes would have to be built big enoughto carry automatic launchers and fastenough and maneuverable enough to keepfire directed at the target. The launchinginstallation, therefore, must not be so heavyas to retard that essential speed. A systemof reloading the projector while the planewas in flight would also be highly desirable.Though the Air Forces postponed design-ing a special type of plane, in November1942 a contract with the United ShoeMachinery Company called for buildingautomatic projectors designed by Ord-nance engineers and for studying a maga-zine installation suited to various types of

44 Memo, Capt Quinn, thru Chief of Artillery Div,Tech Staff, for Chief of Tech Staff, 5 Jul 40, sub:Aerial Test of 75-mm. Aircraft Mount T1, copy in75-mm. Aircraft Gun M4 and Airplane Gun MountM6, OHF.

45 Interv with Col Quinn, 13 Aug 51.46 (1) Memo, CofS for Gen Barnes, 15 Aug 41, OO

334.9/705. DRB AGO. (2) Min, mtgs of Sec H, DivA, NDRC, 19 Aug and 27 Aug 41, 334.9, DRB AGO.(3) Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 24-25. (4) Interv, 11Jul 51, with Dr. Hudson, Guided Missiles Sec, R&DServ, in 1942-43 assigned to Wright Field Ord Sec.(5) OCM 18187, 24 Apr 42; 19022, 13 Oct 42.


planes. But the launchers when groundtested in the spring of 1943 were dubbedtoo heavy and too slow firing for air useand that phase of the project then lapsed.47

Another scheme grew out of an Eighth AirForce request for an upward-firing rocketlauncher to protect B-17 formations fromplanes bombing them from above. Thedevelopment, known by the code nameSUNFLOWER SEED, was worked out in Eng-land, using a special British rocket, and aB-17 so equipped was flown to the UnitedStates for study. At the same time techni-cians at Wright Field evolved a somewhatsimilar vertical-firing installation using theAmerican M8 rocket; this was tested atboth Aberdeen and Eglin Field during thespring of 1944. The rockets behaved as thedesigners hoped, but the low velocity of theprojectiles and the lack of flexibility in aim-ing them led to the conclusion that neitherSUNFLOWER SEED nor its American variantwould serve the intended purpose. And bySeptember 1944, with the cessation of over-head bombing attacks against Alliedbomber formations, tactical need for sucha weapon disappeared. Results generallysimilar to those obtained with the vertical-firing launchers followed when test datawere assembled on a rearward-firingbreech-loading 4.5-inch rocket launchermounted in a B-17 bomber. Consequently,until scientists could develop rockets ofhigher velocity, even rockets with proxim-ity fuzes promised little for defensive aircombat.48

For fighter craft the problem was some-what different. In the summer of 1943 theGermans employed aircraft rockets withsome success against unescorted Alliedbombers, but as soon as Allied fighterrange increased so that fighters could pro-vide cover for bombers, this threat sub-sided. The Army Air Forces found fighters

equipped with conventional armamentadequate to combat enemy rocket-carryingplanes because, one explanation runs, therocket installation created a drag thatslowed the enemy plane enough to make itan easy mark.49 For Allied fighters, whichby then were operating far from their bases,plane-to-plane rockets, in Air Forces opin-ion, offered no advantage. Had theseplanes had to fight enemy craft over Eng-land or the United States, tactical needmight well have dictated using Americanrockets in air-to-air combat. Toward theend of the war the Air Forces experimentedsomewhat with a scheme to fire an air-to-air bomb and asked the Ordnance Depart-ment to supply the explosive container anda special VT fuze, but the project was in-complete at V-J Day and canceled at theAir Forces' request in 1946.50

Ordnance Department interest in plane-to-plane rockets received fresh encourage-

47 Hist Div Intel T2, Air Tech Serv Command,Wright Field, Aircraft Rockets, 14 Dec 45, filed inOffice, Air Force Directorate R&D, Pentagon. To thisstudy were appended blueprint copies of all docu-ments cited: (1) memo, Col Franklin O. Carroll, Chiefof Experiments Engr Sec, Wright Field, for CGMateriel Command, AAF, Washington, 25 Apr 42;(2) Ord Project (535) 43-13126-E, 21 Nov 42; (3) ltr,Col Quinn to CG AAF, 1 7 Mar 43, sub: 4½" RocketProjectors T4 and T2; (4) memo rpt, Engr Div, Ma-teriel Command, AAF, 2 Apr 43, sub: Status ofRocket Projects; (5) memo, Brig Gen Benjamin W.Chidlaw, Chief of Materials Div, AAF, for Robert A.Lovett, USW for Air, 29 May 43, sub: Rocket Devel-opments. All in DRB AGO.

48 (1) Interv with Dr. Hudson, 13 Sep 51. (2) Air-craft Rockets, 1st Ind, 15 Dec 43, Col Franklin C.Wolfe, Chief of Armament Laboratory, Wright Field,to memo, Col Turner A. Sims, Jr., Dept CofS, forEngr Div, 10 Mar 44, sub: Sunflower Seed Projects.(3) Memo, Lt Col Harry A. Donicht, CO 732d AAFBase Unit, for CG Materiel Command, AAF, 5 Sep44, sub: CT1-1625. Last two in DRB AGO.

49 (1) The Rocket Panel of the Joint Board on Sci-entific Information Policy, US Rocket Ordnance,Development and Use in World War II, p. 67, MS,OHF. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 678-79.

50 OCM 26891, 8 Mar 45; 28794, 20 Aug 45; 31030,19 Sep 46.


ment in June 1945 when American expertsin Germany discovered that the Germansapparently had a fully developed powerfultype ready for production. Colonel Simon,then on a special mission to investigateGerman research and development proj-ects, at once dispatched to General Barnesa file of data on the German 55-mm. air-craft rocket "believed to be the hottestthing to come out of Germany." A sampleof this rocket was found at a research labo-ratory in Luebeck. Colonel Simon wroteGeneral Barnes:

By actual trials, they had shown that whenthese rockets were fired from a jet-propelledplane, they were almost certain of at least onehit, and one hit is sufficient to effect thedestruction of an airplane. The rocket has theright size, the right ballistics, a velocity ofabout 1700 feet per second. THIS LOOKSLIKE THE CHANCE FOR A QUICKPAY-OFF ON SHOOTING DOWN SUI-CIDE BOMBERS, AND YOU WELLKNOW HOW BADLY WE NEED SUCHA WEAPON NOW."51

V-J Day arrived before study of this rocketwas far advanced, and only postwar testsproved it no better than American typesequipped with influence fuzes.52

As American techniques in makingrocket powders improved and velocitiesaccordingly increased, the potential ad-vantages of rockets for air-to-air combatbecame more evident. Though havinglower velocity and lesser accuracy thanprojectiles fired from rifled bores, wing-mounted rockets had great power and norecoil, and the launchers, by comparisonwith conventional gun mounts, were simpleand light.

The Problem of Functioningat High Altitude

Because progress in aircraft design by1940 was enabling planes to fly at 36,000

feet or higher, study of the effects of alti-tude upon air ordnance was also essential.Engineers feared that the thinness of theatmosphere at great heights might makefuel-air mixtures in gasoline tanks too richto be ignited by the incendiary ammuni-tion that was effective at lower altitudes,and might even affect the flash propertiesand stability in flight of all types of ammu-nition. At the temperatures encountered athigh altitudes, perhaps as low as 50° or60° F. below zero, gun steels might becomeexcessively brittle and oils in buffer mech-anisms and lubricants too thick to functionproperly. Here were contingencies withwhich no ordnance designer at the begin-ning of World War II was familiar.

Testing at high altitudes and subzerotemperatures was not easy to arrange.Making a series of controlled recordingsnecessitated working on the ground ratherthan in the air, and no laboratory facilitiesexisted in the United States at the altitudedesired. In the late fall of 1943, therefore,experts from the Ordnance Research andDevelopment Center at Aberdeen ProvingGround were sent to Mount Auconquilchain Chile to conduct tests at some 19,000feet above sea level. The outcome of testsof the .50-caliber incendiary cartridge M1and of the armor-piercing-incendiary M8showed ignition efficiency of the formerunimpaired and of the latter somewhatdecreased. Camera films proved both typesable to destroy enemy aircraft at 36,000feet. Study of the effects of severe cold ongun steels and oils was part of the missionof the WinterDetachment sent to CampShilo in Manitoba in December 1942. All

air ordnance tested there performed satis-

51 Ltr, Col Simon to Gen Barnes, 8 Jun 45, ZornigMission, Barnes file. OHF.

52 Interv with Dr. Hudson, 15 Oct 51.


factorily if lubricated with suitably thinoils.53

Nevertheless, inasmuch as improved oilbuffer assemblies in machine guns wouldminimize oil leakage at high temperaturesand congealing at low, during 1943 Spring-field Armory experimented with use of newsynthetic packings, new finishes, and de-sign modifications, until the FrigidaireDivision of the General Motors Corpora-tion evolved the pneumatic type buffer thatused no oil at all. Two helical springs ab-sorbed the recoil and functioned so well intests in the fall of 1944 that this mechani-cal buffer was incorporated as a feature ofthe M3 aircraft machine gun. Not only didthe air-and-spring type buffer dispensewith the use of oils, the spring actionallowed markedly increased rates of fire.Furthermore, in the modified M2 aircraftgun, engineers found it possible to use theoil buffer without oil.54

The problem of powerful, dependablearmament for air-to-air fighting thusemerged as one of balancing the gainsagainst the drawbacks of every given typeor combination of types of guns. To copewith the speed of an enemy plane, Alliedaircraft could saturate the path of flightwith fire by sheer number of guns. But asair drag increased with every additionalgun mounted and, more important, as theweight of guns and ammunition belts and

the limited space in aircraft for stowingammunition put a ceiling upon numbers,the AAF installed not more than eight.50-caliber machine guns per fighter andsixteen per big bomber. Considerablyheavier guns had greater range than .50'sbut necessarily had a lower cyclic rate,could fire fewer rounds, and suffered thehandicap of pronounced recoil. The ad-vantage of the heavy powder charges ofrockets and the lack of recoil was obvious,but the weight of rockets and the imprac-ticability of carrying more than 14 on aplane constituted equally clear disadvan-tages. And for air-to-air fighting, rocketswere virtually still untried. Experiencetaught the Air Forces that the .50-calibermachine gun was an eminently reliableweapon for the combat conditions of WorldWar IL The 1,453,829 .50-caliber aircraftguns produced testifies to their usefulness.50

Nevertheless, by V-J Day indicationspointed to the probability that more pow-erful, bigger guns would be employed in-creasingly as aircraft structures becameheavier and stronger and their speeds stillgreater.

53 (1) SA & SA Ammo, Book 2, Ch. 1, OHF. (2)Shilo Camp Winter Detachment, pp. 5, 11, 17, 19-21,36-38, OHF.

54 (1) Hist of Springfield Armory, Vol II, Book III,pp. 705-06, OHF. (2) SA & SA Ammo, Book 3, p. 43,OHF.

55 OMPUS, p. 153, OHF.

CHAPTER XVI

Aircraft Armament:Guns and Rockets forAir-to-Ground Attack

Air-to-air righting in World War IIordinarily took place to prevent enemycraft from reaching their ground or navalobjectives, to forestall enemy reconnais-sance, and to ward off attacks upon Alliedbombers and strafing planes. Clearing en-emy planes from the skies to give the Alliesair superiority was an essential prelimi-nary to employing Allied air power foroffense. But because men live on the earth,not in the air, air offensives ultimately hadto be directed at ground targets. Inevitablyair combat and air-to-ground offensiveswere not wholly separable. Yet aircraft de-signed for use in strategic and tacticalbombing missions or in close support ofground forces were usually equipped withordnance somewhat different from thatmounted on escort fighter planes. The ma-chine guns employed on fighters were ef-fective for strafing infantry, but for knock-ing out armored forces or for destroyingfortifications, ships, and submarines, otherweapons were needed.

Air Cannon

Use of aircraft cannon was naturallyone method of achieving the power re-quired for heavy strafing. Early in 1943,

therefore, the Air Forces requested a high-velocity fully automatic cannon capable offiring a 1.92-pound armor-piercing projec-tile at 2,900 feet per second and a 1.34-pound high-explosive shell at 2,600 feetper second. Though the gun was to beusable in air combat, it was wanted pri-marily for strafing mechanized groundforces. Consequently, it was to function atpositions of elevation from plus 35 degreesto minus 75 degrees, mounted either innormal position or on its right or left side.It must fire at temperatures as low as- 5 2 ° F. On the other hand, for air-to-ground fire a cyclic rate of only 120 roundsper minute would be satisfactory, andweight of gun tube and feeding devicemight run to as much as 400 pounds.Trunnion reaction was not to exceed10,000 pounds. The Oldsmobile Divisionof the General Motors Corporation under-took this project, basing design upon thestandard 37-mm. antiaircraft gun M1A2,modified for aircraft installation. The pilotmodel failed to meet fully every specifica-tion—trunnion reaction was 13,000-poundmaximum instead of 10,000, and themount limited gun rotation to 45 degreesfrom the normal vertical position, insteadof permitting 90 degrees, but operation

GUNS AND ROCKETS FOR AIR-TO-GROUND ATTACK 441

was sufficiently satisfactory to make thedesign acceptable. Standardized in Jan-uary 1943 as the M9, the gun had an aver-age cyclic rate of 140 rounds per minute.Muzzle velocity with armor-piercing am-munition reached 3,050 feet per second,and, most important of all, a shot fired ata 500-yard range could penetrate 3.1inches of homogeneous armor plate.1

Meanwhile, long before work on the M937-mm. cannon began, Ordnance engi-neers had been trying to develop a stillmore powerful strafing weapon. The 75-mm. field gun tested in plane-to-plane firein the summer of 1940 had established thefeasibility of mounting a big gun in air-craft. Though further work on that firstdevelopment project had lapsed, the AirCorps had evinced some interest in ascheme to install a 75-mm. in a plane builtto mount it for fire against ground targets.In mid-1941 the Douglas Aircraft Com-pany, instead of using the B-18 first tried,undertook to adapt a new medium bomb-er to take a specially designed cannon andmount. Though a Douglas XA26B didmount a 75 and fire it successfully in June1942, the bomber that eventually carriedthe 75-mm. into action was the B-25 madeby the North American Aviation Corpo-ration. In 1941 Ordnance engineers towhom design of the gun, mount, and firecontrol system was assigned had for guid-ance only the knowledge that the job waspossible. It meant a completely fresh start,for the field gun tried as an air-to-airweapon could not readily be modified tomeet the new requirements for air-to-ground fire. In one respect only was the de-signers' task simplified: impact fuzes andaiming by ordinary gun sights would suf-fice for effective strafing of stationary orslow-moving ground targets, whereas prox-imity fuzes or preset fuzes and elaborate

range finders would have been neededagainst aerial targets.2 Still the problemswere peculiarly difficult.

The 44-inch recoil mechanism of theground-mounted gun was impossible touse in the confined space of a plane. Short-ened recoil would increase trunnion reac-tion, and mounting the conventional hy-dromatic recoil and counterrecoil cylindersabove or below the gun tube would makethe gun silhouette too large. Ordnance en-gineers found the answer in step-by-stepmodification of the 75-mm. M3 tank gunand in development of a new mount. Thesingle-shot, hand-loaded weapon with itsvertical sliding, automatically operatedbreechblock was fired electrically. Anejector mechanism spewed out the shellcase after the round was fired. A hydro-spring recoil mechanism using two cylin-ders mounted above and below the gunbarrel reduced the silhouette somewhat.The stronger construction of the newerbombers enabled Ordnance engineers tolet the plane absorb part of the recoil shockand thus limit the recoil stroke to the21-inch length of the round, a spaceneeded in any case to load the gun. In thefirst models an automatically functioningmuzzle cover that opened when the breechwas closed and closed when the breechopened was provided to prevent fumesfrom pouring into the gunner's compart-ment after firing and to ease ammunitionloading, but this feature was found unnec-essary and later dropped.

1 (1) R&D Serv, Design, Development and Produc-tion of 37-mm. Gun M9, OHF. (2) Catalogue ofStandard Ord Items, II, 380. (3) Ltr, Gen Barnes toTAG, 5 Mar 42, sub: High Velocity 37-mm. Gun inAircraft, OO 350.05/207, DRB AGO.

2 (1) OCM 16188, 24 Oct 40; 18145, 20 Apr 42;18699, 1 Aug 42. (2) Interv, 13 Aug 51, with VictorA. Lucht, engineer in charge of 75-mm. aircraft gundevelopment in 1942.


The model accepted in the summer of1942 was designated the 75-mm. aircraftgun M4, and its mount the M6. Gun andmount together weighed 893 pounds.Muzzle velocity with high-explosive am-munition averaged 1,974 feet per second,with armor-piercing-capped ammunition,2,024.3 The ammunition was the same asthat standard for ground guns, a consider-able advantage in procurement. More-over, on at least one occasion, this inter-changeability was of importance in thefield. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault in hismemoirs described how one of his officerssaved the day for Chinese troops equippedwith three old French 75-mm. field gunsbut no ammunition. Sacrificing some ofhis cherished supply of 75-mm. aircraftshell, the pilot dropped enough to theChinese to put their guns into action. Fromthe Pacific theatres after 1942 came testi-mony to the effectiveness of the gun forstrafing. Its fire destroyed pillboxes andsank naval vessels. In July 1943, for exam-ple, two B-25 bombers mounting 75-mm.air cannon attacked a large Japanese de-stroyer off the coast of Cape Gloucesterand in two runs, firing seven shots on eachrun, riddled the ship from stem to sternand left it sinking.4

Even before the 75-mm. M4 was stand-ardized, Ordnance engineers began workupon a light-weight, mechanically-loadedair cannon. An entirely new recoil mech-anism in which the cylinder was concen-tric about the gun tube reduced bothsilhouette and weight. By using a newhigh-strength alloy steel having an elasticlimit of 130,000 pounds per square inch,the designers lowered the weight of thegun alone to 406 pounds. When metallur-gical tests at Watertown Arsenal and firingtests at Erie Proving Ground establishedthe greater strength of hollow quenched

over solid quenched gun tubes and breech-blocks, the former method of manufacturewas included in the specifications. Anautomatic fuze setter-rammer saved thespace required for manual loading andpermitted firing at a rate of 30 rounds perminute. Two models of this light-weightcannon varying from each other only inminor details were standardized in 1944 asthe 75-mm. AN-M5A1 and the M10.5

Early in 1943 the 37-mm. M9 for straf-ing mechanized ground troops and the 75-mm. M4 for destroying heavily armoredground targets were serving their purposewell enough to inspire work upon a stillmore powerful gun. Tests at Eglin Field,Florida, comparing the effectiveness of ex-isting rockets and air cannon pointed tothe superiority of the latter. Developmentof a 105-mm. aircraft gun, therefore, wasstarted in July 1943 with endeavor toadapt a 105-mm. howitzer to use for air-to-ground attack. A year later numerouschanges necessitated by the excessive blastof the first models led to making a new ap-proach. The resulting T7 105-mm. aircraftgun was test fired late in 1944 only to showthat the feed mechanism required furtherstudy. Before the changes were completedthe war ended and the project was can-celed.6

3 (1) R&D Serv, 75-mm. Automatic Guns and Ma-terial, pp. 1-17, OHF. (2) Catalogue of Standard Ord.Items, p. 381. (3) OCM 19025, 15 Oct 42.

4 (1) See Ch. IX. Charles F. Romanus and RileySunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, a volumein preparation for the series UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II, MS, OCMH. (2)Barnes, Weapons of World War II, p. 70.

5 (1) R&D Serv, 75-mm. Automatic Guns and Ma-terial, pp. 12-23, 44-45, OHF. (2) OCM 22659, 20Jan 44; 23727. 4 May 44; 25652, 2 Nov 44; 24945,31Aug 44. (3) OCO. Monthly Rpts, R&D Projects,Progress Rpt on 75 mm. Feed Mechanism T13E1, 13Nov 44 and 10 Jan 45, OHF.

6 (1) OCM 23117 , 9 Mar 44; 23348, 30 Mar 44;24296, 6 Jul 44; 29264, 4 Oct 45. (2) Interv withVictor Lucht, 16 Aug 51.


Rockets

More than a year before any model ofcannon for ground strafing was approved,the drawbacks of mounting heavy guns inaircraft were recognized. This knowledgeintensified the search for other types ofpowerful air armament. Accurate bombsights would increase the effectiveness ofbombs, and airborne homing torpedoesbetter the percentage of hits in antisubma-rine warfare. But neither of these was thedirect responsibility of Army Ordnance,although work of the Ballistic ResearchLaboratory at Aberdeen in compiling acomplete set of ballistic tables for use withthe Norden bomb sight contributed great-ly to more effective bombing. Rockets, onthe other hand, were the immediate con-cern of the Ordnance Department, as wellas of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance andthe Air Corps. If accurate rockets could belaunched from aircraft, the problem ofstrafing might be largely solved. In De-cember 1940 the Ordnance Departmentrequested NDRC's assistance in develop-ing a 4.5-inch rocket primarily for use inaircraft. The fruits of British research onrocketry, in 1940 far in advance of Amer-ican and promptly put at the disposal ofthe United States, greatly expedited prog-ress on adaptation of this ancient weaponto conditions of modern warfare.

British research before 1942 had beendirected at developing rockets for antiair-craft and plane-to-plane fire, but in theUnited States the Army's attention earlycentered upon other phases. The bazookawas the first Army device to use a rocketin combat. Yet an Ordnance officer hadfired an experimental 4.5-inch aircraftrocket before anyone had seriously con-sidered the application of rocket propul-sion to an infantry weapon. This 4.5-inch

rocket, though originally designed foreither ground or plane-to-plane use, wasin actuality employed in the latter capac-ity in China, and then only experimentally.For strafing, however, it came to be a valu-able weapon, adding to the fears of "theAmerican harassment" repeatedly ex-pressed by German ground troops.

To produce dependable, powerful rock-ets involved solving innumerable new en-gineering and ballistic problems. Motortubes strong enough to withstand the highpressures of the propellent powders mustbe as light as possible, particularly for air-craft rockets. Propellants must create pres-sure high enough to attain the desiredrange but must be safe to handle, easilymanufactured, and of composition to burnreadily at a wide range of temperatures.Getting suitable even-burning powder was,in fact, the biggest poser of all. Nozzles toreduce the rate of flow of propelling gasesmust not raise internal pressures to thepoint of bursting the tubes. Traps andcages, by which to suspend the propellantsticks in the motor tubes, must be so de-signed as to retain the powder in the tubesuntil the sticks were completely burned,but without permitting the traps to inter-fere with the even, quick burning of thepowder and without adding excessiveover-all weight or reducing the rockets'pay load. A safe reliable ignition systemwas essential. Some means of stabilizingthe rocket in flight and fuzes that wouldfunction properly with low-velocity projec-tiles must be devised.

Despite these obvious difficulties, devel-opment of a 4.5-inch rocket for air use ini-tially proceeded with deceptive rapidity.Tentative military characteristics wereagreed upon in the summer of 1941 afterOrdnance ammunition experts had hadopportunity to study samples of British


rockets. That fall, Maj. Leslie A. Skinner,the only Ordnance officer to work on rock-etry during the 1930's, successfully madea few 4.5-inch rockets, using old fire-extin-guisher cylinders as casings. This caliberappeared to be the smallest that could con-tain a reasonable-size burster tube andwarhead and enough propelling charge togive about 1,000 feet-per-second velocity.Fired at Aberdeen in December 1941these rockets, for all their crudity, werestable in flight and performed fairly well.They weighed about 33 pounds apiece andcarried 3.8 pounds of explosive. Redesignfor production began at once. Before thewar was over, considerable criticism wasdirected at the Army and Navy for devel-oping two separate rockets for essentiallythe same purpose but with a difference ofhalf an inch in diameter. The sheer chanceof having old fire extinguisher tubes avail-able had determined the size of the Armymodels.7

By April 1942 both the Ordnance De-partment and the laboratory staff atWright Field dared hope that a usable air-craft rocket was about ready. Aberdeenfirings from the ground had indicatedreasonably satisfactory accuracy of the re-designed 4.5-inch model and the proba-bility of no damage to the plane structure.Fins that unfolded after the projectile leftthe tube gave adequate stability in flight.8

Wright Field designed a mount for alaunching tube under the wing of a P-40,while plans got under way for installationof projectors in the bomb bay of an A-20Aplane to permit reloading while the planewas in flight. The chief of the Experimen-tal Engineering Section at Wright Field,considering the rocket project vital, urgedthe Commanding General, Materiel Com-mand, AAF, to inform the Chief of Ord-nance of its importance. "In view," he

wrote, "of the rapid progress which hasbeen made and the information availableon its employment abroad, particularly bythe Russian Air Forces, it is suggested thatthe military characteristics for such aweapon be reviewed."9 The OrdnanceDepartment needed no prodding. Confi-dence in the 4.5-inch model ran so highthat the Ordnance Committee had alreadyrecommended standardization and limitedprocurement of some 3,500.10

Six weeks later belief still endured thatthe difficulties so far encountered could beovercome quickly "if vigorously prose-cuted." ll Better ammunition, namely pro-pellent powder of uniform thickness or"web" having neither internal fissures norexternal cracks to interfere with evenburning, was a problem the Ordnance De-partment hoped to have answered by mid-summer. Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon,Chief of Air Staff, on 10 June set 1 Octoberas the goal for having rockets available forthe AAF in TORCH, the invasion of NorthAfrica. Delivery of 15,000 for testing to

7 (1) OCM 17047, Jul 41. (2) R&D Serv, RocketDevelopment, PSP 20, pp. 1-2, 14, OHF. (3) R&DServ, Rockets. Development, Production and Per-formance, 1940-1945, Project Paper 20, pp. 8-9,OHF. See also testimony of Robert Patterson atHearings on H Res 465, 26 Apr 44, p. 82.

8 Historical Office, Air Materiel Command, WrightField, Ohio, Aircraft Rockets, 1945, and attchd memo,Col Clyde H. Morgan, Ord Off, Wright Field, forChief of Experimental Engr Sec, Wright Field, 3 Apr42, sub: Installation of Rocket Gun in P-40 Airplane.Unless otherwise noted, with the exception of refer-ences to OCM's, copies of all documents hereaftercited on aircraft rockets are contained in blueprintcopy form in this Wright Field compilation, on file inHq US AF, Office of DCofS for Development.

9 Memo, Col Carroll, Chief Experimental Engr Sec,AAF Materiel Command, for CG, Materiel Com-mand, AAF, 25 Apr 42, sub: Rocket Development forAircraft Armament.

10 OCM 18187, 24 Apr 42.11 Memo rpt, Experimental Engr Sec, AAF Mate-

riel Command, 8 Jun 42, sub: The Four and One-HalfInch Aircraft Rocket.


begin in August was requested. On 6 Julya 4.5-inch rocket was successfully firedfrom a P-40E plane in flight without in-jury to the plane, a performance that for-tified faith in the future of aircraft rock-ets.12 Procurement then was raised to600,000. But there the project boggeddown because of the powder bottleneck.General Barnes wrote that the first 15,000rockets could not be shipped until furtherexperimentation and tests established thesafety of the propellant and the rockettubes. That moment arrived only sevenmonths later, in March 1943. Overopti-mism earlier, plus premature notices ofprospective availability of rockets for thecombat zones, made the unavoidable de-lays hard to explain to men who failed tocomprehend the magnitude of the task.13

Even Dr. Bush, Chairman of the Office ofScientific Research and Development,protested the slowness of progress. Maj.Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer, Chief of Air Staff,assured Dr. Bush in January 1943:

Realizing the many problems confrontingthe development section of the Ordnance De-partment, we have no criticism of that De-partment for not having had everything con-nected with this program available and inorder "for a long time." Personally, I feelthat splendid progress has been made by thedifferent groups concerned with variousphases of this program, considering the com-plexity of the problems, dealing as it doeswith new propellants, new fuzes and newtypes of launching equipment.14

How to obtain suitable propellant wasthe first question, and the second was howto hold multiple small grains in the rocketmotor. The Ordnance Department's an-swer to these problems fortunately couldbe one and the same for aircraft rocketsand ground-launched rockets.15 The planto develop a single type of 4.5-inch rocketfor Air Forces and Ground Forces alike

permitted the Ordnance Department todedicate far greater resources in technicaltalent and testing facilities, and, later, inproduction and inspection, than wouldhave been possible otherwise. Most prob-lems were common to the two applica-tions.16 The differentiation of aircraft rock-ets from ground rockets was to be solely inthe fuze. To develop the best kind suited toair use required extensive experimenta-tion. For some types proximity fuzes wereto be tried, for others impact fuzes. Whenin June 1943 impact-fuzed high-explosiverockets were test fired at Eglin Fieldagainst water targets, observers reportedfunctioning satisfactory and the splashpattern of fragments effective. Proximityfuzes, on the contrary, when tested boththen and at intervals later, gave manyduds and some prematures. ConsequentlyVT fuzes were not employed.17 Their use-

12 (1) Memo, Gen Harmon, Chief of Air Staff, forCG Materiel Command, 10 Jun 42, sub: Rocket Pro-jectiles. (2) Memo rpt Experimental Engr Sec, AAFMateriel Command, 15 Jul 42, sub: Air Firing of 4½Inch Rocket from P-40E Airplane—AAF No.41-25008.

13 (1) Memo, Col John T. Murtha, Jr., Chief ofArmament Sec, AAF Materiel Command, for CofOrd,24 Aug 42, sub: Rocket, 4½" and 2.36" for Test bythe Army Air Forces, and 1st Ind, Col Scott B. Ritchie,Deputy Chief of Tech Div, 9 Sep 42. (2) Memo forrecord, Col William H. Joiner, ACofS AAF, 10 Sep42, sub: Rocket Program-Conference at Pentagon. . . 9 Sep 42.

14 (1) Ltr, Dr. Bush to Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold, 8Jan 43. (2) Ltr, Gen Stratemeyer to Dr. Bush, 29Jan 43.

15 See above, Ch. XII.16 OCM 19022, 13 Aug 42. The Ordnance Com-

mittee at this meeting recommended one designation,M8, for both air and ground 4.5-inch rockets. In April1943 AGF established a requirement for 11,000,000of these.

17 (1) Memo, Col Carroll for CG Materiel Com-mand, AAF. 26 Oct 42, sub: General Status Infor-mation. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Benjamin W. Chidlaw,ACofS AAF, for Gen Arnold, 3 Jan 43, sub: CurrentStatus of Rocket Projectile Div. (3) Comment 2, GenChidlaw for ACAS Materiel, Maintenance and Dis-


fulness would have been chiefly for air-to-air combat, and by mid-1944, with enemyair power on the wane, the Air Forces hadlargely discarded plans for special new air-to-air weapons. Some work on influencefuzes for rockets continued down to V-JDay, but it was aimed at a long-term de-velopment rather than at one for imme-diate use.18

Projectors were still another feature ofaircraft rocket installation that proved tobe troublesome. In March 1943, after suc-cessful ground tests at Aberdeen, the Ord-nance Department dispatched two experi-mental launchers to Wright Field. Thesewere admittedly too heavy but were to befollowed by aluminum alloy tube models,which would be very much lighter. Theywere designed for mounting in bomb baysto permit reloading while in flight. Thoughthe models of this design were never air-tested, one sample of a redesigned lighter-weight automatic launcher was eventuallyshipped to Burma, where firing establishedthe soundness of its principle of operation.After the war this launcher supplied thebasis of an extensive development proj-ect.19 But in World War II, after mid-1943, the "rocket gun" gradually droppedout of sight in planning, for at that pointthe Air Forces turned attention to jettison-able three-tube steel or plastic clusters tobe mounted under the wings of aircraft.20

Such a device precluded the possibility ofreloading in flight, but omission of a re-loading feature permitted more rapidcompletion of safely usable launchers. Thethree-tube plastic clusters, in fact, ap-peared to be sufficiently satisfactory to

warrant an initial Ordnance procurementorder of 5,000, and in October 1943 theAAF asked for 10,000 more. Soon after de-livery of the first 5,000 in December, theAAF pushed its requirements for 1944 tonearly 200,000, far more than could bemanufactured with the limited supply ofplastic. Since magnesium-alloy tubes metall essential requirements, they weremanufactured in considerable numbers tosupplement the plastic. Though the com-bat theatres used some of both types oflauncher, thousands were stored in theUnited States by the spring of 1945, liter-ally an unwanted, obsolescent commodity.

This accumulation of large stocks wasdue partly to the unexpectedly long life oftube launchers in service, and partly to thesmall number jettisoned in action. But theprincipal reason was the lack of proper air-craft mountings for the clusters. The Navy"zero rails," short simple posts beneath thewings from which the rocket could be sus-pended and launched without using tubesat all, were proving perfectly satisfactory.The speed of the aircraft gave sufficient di-rectional stability to fixed-fin rockets tomake needless any guide rail. Easy tomanufacture and install, the zero rails hadthe further advantage of creating less drag

tribution Div, 26 May 43, sub: Rockets. (4) Com-ment 3, Gen Coupland for same, 22 Jun 43, sub:Aircraft Rockets. (5) Col Joiner, memo rpt for record,7 Jun 43, sub: Trip to Eglin Field in Connection with4.5" Rockets.

18 Memo, Col James F. Phillips, CG Materiel Com-mand, AAF, for Brig Gen Edward M. Powers, DeputyACAS Materiel and Services Div, 7 Jun 45, sub:Rockets.

19 (1) Ibid. (2) Interv with Dr. Colin Hudson. 11Sep 51. (3) Air Technical Serv Command, Instruc-tions to Procurement Div, 2 Apr 45, sub: Cancellationof Procurement for 4½ Rocket Launchers.

20 (1) Memo, Col Quinn, OD, for CG MaterielCommand, AAF, 17 Mar 43, sub: 4½ Rocket Projec-tors T4 and T2. (2) Memo, Gen Chidlaw for DirectorMilitary Requirements, 18 Mar 43, sub: 4½" Rockets.(3) Memo, Gen Chidlaw for CofOrd, 17 Apr 43, sub:Procurement of 4.5" Rocket Launcher Clusters. (4)ATSC, memo rpt. 27 Nov 44, sub: Closeout of Ex-penditure Order 552-452 (Development of a RocketGun).

AIRCRAFT ROCKET INSTALLATIONS. Typical installations on Air Forces andNavy aircraft.


than tube launchers. By the time mountswere available for the latter, the Army AirForces had adopted both the zero rails andthe Navy 5-inch rockets. Still, because ofthe large quantities of 4.5-inch rocketsavailable, commonsense dictated usingthem. Installation of adapters, which in-clude a large fixed fin, a bayonet type ofigniter, and lugs, permitted firing thesmaller rocket from the zero-lengthlauncher designed for the 5-inch. Usedwith these adapters the 4.5-inch, the NinthAir Force reported, then compared favor-ably in accuracy with the 5-inch and werean acceptable substitute until the 5-inchwere in larger supply.21

The AAF switch from the Army 4.5-inch rocket to the Navy 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rocket, HVAR, nick-named "Holy Moses," grew out of delayin Air Forces procurement of mounts, im-patience over the slowness of Ordnancedevelopments, and discovery in the sum-mer of 1944 that some HVAR's were im-mediately obtainable. Six months earlierMaj. Gen. Barney M. Giles, Chief of theArmy Air Staff, had written the com-manding general of the Army ServiceForces listing the shortcomings of ArmyOrdnance rocket development. Statingthat the 4.5-inch types were inaccurate,subject to fuze trouble, limited by extremesof temperature, and lacking in adequatevelocity, Giles concluded:

The Ordnance Department personnel haverepeatedly stated that they were working onthese difficulties, and that before winter theAir Forces would have another improvedrocket. To date no recent improvement in therockets that are being furnished to the ArmyAir Forces has been noted; in fact presenttests underway at the Proving Ground on acurrent lot of ammunition indicate less satis-factory operation than previous lots tested atthat station.

7. The experience of the Navy and ofour Allies establishes the rocket as a weap-on of prime and possibly decisive important[sic]. . . .

8. It is requested, therefore, that the Ord-nance Department redouble its efforts tofurnish the Army Air Forces a rocket suitablefor combat use.22

Up to the fall of 1943, the 4.5-inchrocket, it is true, had had a checkeredcareer. The mass production begun thepreceding spring had been halted in Junewhen service tests showed that motor tubesand some other components failed to func-tion properly in extreme temperatures.Reducing the propellent charge in rocketsalready manufactured, though shorteningeffective range, made them safe to use athigh temperatures, while strengthening themotor tube and redesigning the warheadpartly corrected the weakness of the newrockets. Later, a slight modification of thefin blade produced a model labeled theM8 A3.23 But some months before GeneralGiles aired his concern, the Ordnance De-partment itself had taken steps to "re-double its efforts" to speed rocket work. Aseparate Rocket Development Branch,created within Research and Develop-ment Service in September, expanded rap-idly from a staff of 2 officers and 13 civil-ians to 15 officers and 31 civilians. Largersums of money allotted to rocket projectsenabled the chief of the branch, the gifted

21 (1) Memo, Col Donald B. Diehl, ChairmanArmament Sec, Materials Div. for CG Materiel Com-mand, Wright Field. 31 Jul 44, sub: Aircraft Rockets.(2) Memo rpt, 21 Feb 45, sub: Monorail Type RocketLaunchers. (3) Memo, Maj J. K. Sun, Assistant Ordand Chemical Off, Hq Eighth AF, for Ord andArmament Off Eighth AF Div, 30 May 45, sub: Air-craft Rockets. (4) Rockets, Development, Productionand Performance, 1940-1945, Project Paper 20, pp.20-21,OHF.22 Memo, Gen Giles for CG ASF, 18 Dec 43, sub:

Aircraft Rockets, 4.5-inch.23 (1) Rocket Development, June 1945, pp. 17-19,

OHF. (2) OCM 20555, 27 May 43; 22778, 3 Feb 44.


TABLE 12—COMPARISON OF 5-INCH AND 4.5-lNCH ROCKETS

Source Memo, Lt Col J. W. Gruitch for C. W. Bunch, Office of Commitments and Requirements Div, 15 Aug 44, sub: Comparison of4.5" Type and 5" HVAR Rockets, Hq USAF file, Office of DCofS for Development.

Col. Gervais W. Trichel, to intensify andwiden the program and to establish closerties with research groups of the Navy,NDRC, and AAF units at Wright Fieldand Eglin Field. As the AAF also enlargedits research and testing staff and openedMuroc and the Dover Air Bases, Armyaircraft rocket developments moved morerapidly.24

Dissatisfaction with the first modifica-tions of the M8 rockets revealed the neces-sity of designing motor tubes strong enoughto withstand an internal pressure of 10,000pounds per square inch. Experimentationproved that heat-treated alloy-steel seam-less tubing gave the desired strength andextended the rockets' temperature rangefrom -20° to 120° F.25 The OrdnanceTechnical Committee designated this high-strength rocket the T22.26 By August 1944a comparison of these new types of 4.5-inchwith the Navy HVAR 5-inch rocketsshowed that the latter was by no meanssuperior in every respect. (Table 12, above.)While the HVAR thus carried about 50percent more high explosive, had con-siderably greater muzzle velocity, and was

equipped with both a nose and a basefuze, the 4.5-inch was so designed that itcould be fired from an automatic launcherand could be launched in other directionsthan in the line of flight of the plane. Thefact that the HVAR had an excellentunderwater trajectory, which the 4.5-inchlacked, constituted no particular advan-tage of HVAR for Army Air Forces useinasmuch as the AAF had ceased to par-ticipate in sea search and antisubmarinewarfare in July 1943, and Wright Field in-vestigation of rocket launching devices forvertical bombing of submarines had fadedout thereafter.27 Moreover, a comparisontabulated after zero rails and adapters forthe 4.5-inch rocket had come into use

24 (1) 1st Ind, Gen Styer, CofS ASF, for CG AAF,23 Dec 43. (2) Ltr, Col Joiner to Col Diehl, 5 Nov 43.(3) Ltr, Col Joiner to Col Bogert, Wright Field, 10Nov 43. (4) Tech Div Memo No. 22, 23 Sep 43, OCO.(5) Ord Department Organization Chart, 48, 1 Jun44, OHF.

25 See above, Ch XII.26 See discussion in Craven and Cate, eds., AAFII,

pp. 321-43.27 Air Tech Serv Command, memo rpt, 6 Dec 44,

sub: Retractable 7.2" Antisubmarine Launchers.


might have made the lesser weight of the40-pound rocket a more obvious asset.And finally, because the AAF employedrockets only for strafing, the 4.5-inch hadan eminently desirable distinctive feature:its design enabled the pilot to fire bothrockets and machine guns simultaneouslyby merely harmonizing with the gun sight.

Meanwhile, the existence of rather ex-tensive facilities able to produce the thin-webbed wet-extruded powder grains usedin Army 4.5-inch rockets, coupled with therelatively limited sources of supply forthe thick-webbed dry-extruded powdersneeded for the 5-inch, pointed to the wis-dom of designing a rocket at least nearlyequalling HVAR in power, yet employinga solvent type of propellent powder. Earlyin 1944 the Ordnance Department re-quested NDRC to undertake the project,and by October experimental lots of the"H" 4.5-inch rocket were ready for test.Mounted on zero rails on P-47's andB-25's, these first "super 4.5-inch" rocketsperformed well. Damage to the planes wasslight and easily preventable, and disper-sion of fire was not excessive. Though the"H" rocket carried a 39-pound payload,HVAR a 48-pound, and though velocityof the former at long range was consider-ably lower than that of the 5-inch, the newrocket with its faster-burning propellantgot up more speed quickly and, over shortranges, attained higher velocities. Formany kinds of mission a weapon possessing

these characteristics would be better thanHVAR. A thousand of the "H" 4.5-inchrockets were accordingly made for furthertesting, but no production order followed,because as the tactical situation in thespring of 1945 altered, the probabilityshrank that any need would arise for thistype of short-range rocket.28

Aircraft rockets played a smaller part inAAF combat than in naval air forces en-gagements, just as operations over Europewere different in character from those overthe Pacific areas. Nevertheless, the knowl-edge gained in World War II about rocketdesign and performance was quite as valu-able to the Army as to the Navy. An ArmyAir Forces officer prophetically summa-rized the importance of the Ordnance andAAF rocket developments when he wrotein 1943:

In view of the potentialities of rockets as anew aircraft munition, ... we should goafter them hard, although I have never felt,nor suggested that any of our "new weapons"would very strongly influence the outcome ofthe present war. My own view is that newweapons of one war become of real usefulnessduring the war after that in which they areintroduced, and that we shall have to slugout this war for the most part with the guns,bombs and other munitions which we had orhad in sight when we entered it.29

28 (1) ATSG memo rpt, 18 Nov 44, sub: PreliminaryRpt on Launching of 4.5" Rockets from AAF Air-craft. (2) Interv with Dr. Hudson 20 Sep 51.

29 Ltr, Col Joiner to Col Diehl, 5 Nov 43.

CHAPTER XVII

BombsOf all aircraft weapons of World War

II, bombs were the most widely used inair-to-ground operations. Bomb design,unlike design of antiaircraft equipmentand weapons for air-to-air combat, waslittle affected by the rate at which planesof the 1940's could travel. Though thespeed of the modern bomber made accu-rate aiming difficult, the swiftness of theship's flight concerned Ordnance ballis-ticians only in preparing appropriatebombing tables. Before the end of the war,progress in aeronautics did introducechanges in the development programwhen bombers appeared that were capa-ble of carrying 10,000-pound bombs andbigger, and did present new problems ofbomb ballistics when stratosphere flightsbecame feasible. But through most ofWorld War II the Ordnance Department'smajor difficulty in bomb development wasin adjusting to the frequent changes ofdoctrine of air warfare. Yet no change instrategic or tactical planning lessened theimportance of bombs; in relation to weightand cost, bombs had a higher destructivepotential than any other one weapon.They required no complicated, heavy,launching devices as did air cannon, and,under favorable conditions of weather,could be dropped on the target fromheights from which rocket fire became in-accurate. And before the war ended, theAllied air forces found that small bombsused to strafe in tactical support of ground

troops were more effective than machinegun fire.

Developments to 1940

The bomb is the oldest aircraft weapon.The first ever dropped in combat from anairplane fell among a group of Arabs in aTripolitan oasis on 1 November 1911.How the Arabs felt about it we do notknow, but the bombardier, LieutenantGavotti of the Italian Army, reported thatfrom his altitude of about 2,300 feet he sawa cloud of black dust and running men.The bomb he dropped was a round gre-nade, a little larger than an orange, filledwith potassium picrate. Holding it be-tween his knees, Lieutenant Gavotti fuzedit, armed it, and dropped it over the sidewith one hand, while he guided the planewith his other hand.1 Military men every-where were quick to perceive the promiseof this new kind of warfare. Targets un-reachable by other means now came with-in range.

World War I bombers carried grenadesand small-caliber shells and before the warwas over dropped bombs of 1,000 kilo-grams. In the United States three kinds ofbombs were developed. The largest,weighing from 50 to 1,600 pounds, was thedemolition bomb, a light steel case made

1 Maj. J. A. Swaney, Bomb Development, Recordof Army Ord R&D (hereafter cited as Swaney, BombDevelopment), pp. 9-10, OHF.


of sections welded together and filled withTNT. Its purpose was to demolish build-ings by blast, that is, the pressure or shockwaves sent out by the explosion. The sec-ond type was the fragmentation bomb ofabout twenty pounds, consisting chiefly ofrejected artillery shells, while the thirdtype was the incendiary bomb, loadedwith oil emulsion, thermite, or metallicsodium. The three types differed in kindand amount of filler and in thickness ofcase but had operational features in com-mon. Fins designed to provide stability inflight usually extended almost half thelength of the case. Shortly after the Armi-stice, Americans began work on a safetydevice, used by the French and Britishduring the war, a mechanism that allowedthe bomb to be dropped unarmed and toarm itself in flight. When the bomb left theairplane, a small wind vane in the fuze be-gan to turn and after a certain number ofrevolutions armed the bomb. In the air-plane the vane was restrained by an arm-ing wire threaded through it; the wire waswithdrawn as the bomb was released. Thearming wire could be left on the bomb if itbecame necessary to unload over friendlyterritory.2

In 1921 the War Department conveneda Bomb Board to conduct an extensiveprogram for testing bombs against variouskinds of structures and surfaces. The tests,running over a period of two years, pro-vided data that guided the Ordnance De-partment and the Air Corps through the1930's. Ordnance engineers strengtheneddemolition bomb cases by forging them asnearly as possible in one piece, with aminimum of welding, and substituted forthe long fins of World War I short box finsthat gave greater stability in flight.3 Uni-formity of fragment size of the fragmenta-tion bomb was achieved by encasing thebody in rings cut from steel tubing or in

wound steel coil. For low-level bombing,experiments with means of delaying theaction of the fragmentation bomb suffi-ciently to permit the airplane to get to asafe distance before the bomb detonatedproduced a parachute attachment in placeof fins. The parachute slowed descent andcaused the bomb to strike the ground withits axis nearly vertical so that the frag-ments tended to be scattered aboveground instead of being buried. Collab-oration with the Chemical Warfare Serv-ice developed bombs that could be filledeither with a fire-producing substance orwith gas or smoke. The filling was the re-sponsibility of the Chemical Warfare Serv-ice, the case of the Ordnance Department.The case had thin walls like the demoli-tion bomb but had a burster tube runningdown its center. Shortly before the UnitedStates entered World War II, developmentof the incendiary bomb became entirelythe responsibility of the Chemical WarfareService.4

The filling for demolition and fragmen-tation bombs was trinitrotoluene. TNTwas eminently stable, capable of beingstored for long periods of time without de-terioration, and, as it was relatively insen-sitive to blows and friction, it could besafely handled and shipped. It was easilymelted for casting into bombs. Anothervirtue was its ready susceptibility to det-onation by tetryl or the other highly sen-sitive explosives used in boosters. At thebeginning of World War II, shortage ofTNT for a time necessitated substitution

2 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp. 11, 14, 112,OHF. (2) Gen. H. H. Arnold, "Wings, Bombs, andBullets," Army Ordnance, XXV, 140 (1943), 317-18.

3 (1) OCM 11476, 17 May 34. (2) Swaney, BombDevelopment, pp. 295-99, OHF.

4 (1) Min, Wesson Conference, 6 Oct 41, OHF.(2) Barnes Diary, 6 Oct 41, OHF. (3) Ltr, SW to Chiefof Chemical Warfare Serv, 3 Sep 41, sub: IncendiaryBombs, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. See also above,p. 259.

BOMBS 453

in large bombs of amatol, a mixure ofTNT and ammonium nitrate. Amatol hadslightly less shattering power—brisance—than TNT, and somewhat less sensitivityto detonation. Later, increased productionpermitted the use of straight TNT.5

Blast Versus Fragmentation, 1940-41

As World War II approached, the WarDepartment, realizing the need for speed-ing the manufacture of demolition bombsand for making interchange of bombs pos-sible between the Army and the Navy,called together a committee made up ofrepresentatives from the Navy Bureau ofOrdnance, the Army Ordnance Depart-ment, and the Air Corps. On the commit-tee's recommendation, the Army's 600-pound and 1,100-pound demolition bombswere discarded, and new 500-pound and1,000-pound bombs that could be carriedon aircraft of either service were standard-ized.6 In determining basic policies, a fur-ther and more far-reaching step was takenearly in 1941 with the creation of a sub-committee of the Joint Aircraft Commit-tee. The latter had been established inSeptember 1940 to insure systematic andequitable allocation of aircraft between theBritish and the U.S. Air Corps. The func-tion of the special subcommittee, composedof members of the Ordnance Department,the Air Corps, the Navy, and the RoyalAir Force, was to recommend standardtypes of aircraft bombs and test programsfor developing them.7 From this commit-tee's discussions first emerged the argu-ments pro and con on whether blast effectsof bombing were more destructive thanfragmentation effects. Long after the com-mittee ceased to be active, some contro-versy over this matter endured and,indeed, majority opinion swung back andforth several times during the war.

The findings of the subcommittee wereinitially influenced by the experiences ofthe British in the Battle of Britain. TheBritish member, Group Captain CharlesCrawford, thought American bombs toofragile and therefore likely to fracture onimpact, becoming duds of a low order ofdetonation. Largely because of this opin-ion and Group Captain Crawford's reportthat fragment damage was in many in-stances greater than the blast damageinflicted by German bombs dropped onEngland, the subcommittee recommendedthat a series of bombs with walls thickerthan those of the old demolition bomb bedeveloped by the Ordnance Departmentin 250, 500, 1,000, and 2,000-pound sizes.They would be about 30 percent high ex-plosive by weight, in contrast to the demo-lition bomb's 55 percent. Following Britishnomenclature, they were called generalpurpose bombs, since the burst of theirthick cases into damaging fragmentswould make them effective against a vari-ety of targets. For targets that generalpurpose bombs could not penetrate, suchas concrete fortifications and the decksof most ships, the subcommittee recom-mended that the Ordnance Departmentdevelop 500-pound and 1,000-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs, the Navy armor-piercing bombs for use against the veryheavily armored decks of capital ships anddepth bombs to be used against sub-marines. Two types of special purposebombs already in existence were recom-mended for standardization, the 20-pound

5 H. S. Beckman, "High Explosive Bombs," ArmyOrdnance, XXXII, 164 (1947), 99.

6 OCM 15079, 8 Jun 39. The 100-pound bombs ofboth services were already identical. The Army's300-pound and 2,000-pound bombs were not used bythe Navy.

7 Rpt 1, Rpts of Joint Aircraft Committee (JAC) onBombs, 3 Mar 41, copy in Demolition Bombs: Design,Development and Production, Vol. II, 1 Aug 44,OHF.


fragmentation bomb as the M41, and the100-pound gasoline incendiary bomb asthe M47. Early in March 1941 the sub-committee's final recommendations on thestandardization of aircraft bombs, "Case217," were approved by the Joint AircraftCommittee.8

The general purpose bombs, modeledon the British thick-walled bombs of low-explosive content, had been accepted withsome reservations by the American mem-bers of the subcommittee. Tests of UnitedStates prewar demolition bombs, whichhad a 55 percent explosive charge, had notindicated any great degree of malfunctionon impact.9 Moreover, reports comingfrom London and Berlin indicated in thespring of 1941 that German bombs, withan explosive charge of about 50 percentand a case no stronger than that of theAmerican demolition bomb, accomplishedmore by blast than did the British bombby fragmentation. An observer in Londonreported: "The British have learned bybitter experience that the havoc caused byblast is far more destructive in towns andcities than the localized splinter effect andrelatively little blast effect of small, thick-er-walled bombs." 10 Finally, with a shiftof earlier attitudes, the British themselvessupported the case for blast. On 17 April1941 the RAF dropped on Berlin thefamous 4,000-pound blockbuster. Since ithad a thin case, it could carry 2,990pounds of high explosives and the blasteffect was unlike anything seen before.The bomber crew reported that the shockcould be felt in the aircraft as high as14,000 feet and that flame, debris, andsmoke were seen to spread over largeareas.11

Impressed by the reports of the destruc-tion inflicted by this tremendous bomb,General Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Air, requested the Chief of Ordnance todevelop a 4,000-pound light-case bombnot later than 1 July 1941. The bomb thatresulted, developed on schedule and testedbetween 2 and 5 July, weighed 4,166pounds of which 3,221 pounds was theweight of the explosive charge. Its per-formance was very satisfactory, but the AirCorps retreated from its position, statingthat it would rather carry two 2,000-pound GP bombs than one 4,000-poundblast bomb. General Barnes and GeneralSomers, then chief of the Technical Staff,also doubted whether the 4,000-pounderwould be as effective as two 2,000-poundbombs. Nevertheless, Robert A. Lovett,Assistant Secretary of War for Air, sensedthe importance of the larger bomb and, ona directive from the War Department, de-velopment continued. In August the4,000-pound light-case bomb was stand-ardized as the M56.12

A more immediately productive resultof reports from abroad in 1941 was the de-

8 (1) Ibid. (2) OCM 16358, 18 Dec 40; 16605, 1 Apr41. (3) Min, Wesson Conference, 12 Mar 41, OHF.

9 Rpt 2, Rpts of JAC on Bombs, 4 Aug 41, in Demo-lition Bombs, Vol. II, 1 Aug 44, OHF. See also n. 7,above.

10 (1) Second wrapper ind, Dir Air Corps Bd toCofAC, 2 Oct 41, to ltr, Chief of AAF to CofOrd, 18Aug 41, sub: Additional Types of General PurposeBombs to be Tested for Determining Army-Navy-British Standard. (2) Ltr, Dir Air Corps Bd to CofAC,14 May 41, sub: Sizes of British Bombs Used AgainstGermany, and ind, 5 Jun 41. All in AAF 47 1.6, DRBAGO.

11 (1) Ltr, Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris to Re-corder, JAC, 2 Oct 41, sub: Effect of Very Large BlastBombs. (2) Ltr, Air Marshal Harris to Gen Arnold,14 Jul 41 [sub: RDX as Bomb Filling]. Both in AAF471.6, DRB AGO.

12 (1) Min, Wesson Conferences, 3 Jul 41, 22 Aug41, OHF. (2) Barnes Diary, 7 Jul 41, OHF. (3) Ltr,CofOrd to DCofS for Air, 17 May 41, sub: Develop-ment of Large Demolition Bombs, OO 471.62/714,DRB AGO. (4) Ltr, Robert Lovett to CofAC, 2 Jun41, sub: Heavy Bombs, AAF 471.6 DRB AGO. (5)OCM 17071. 7 Aug 41; 17152, 20 Aug 41.

BOMBS 455

velopment of general purpose bombs con-taining a larger charge of explosive. Thecase strength of their thick-walled Britishprototype that carried only 30 percent ex-plosive was partly a virtue of necessity:limited British forge capacity necessitatedfabricating the bomb by casting. Amer-ican manufacturers could spin and forgesteel bombs equal to the English in casestrength yet able to take explosive chargesof 50 percent. Essentially a modification ofthe old demolition bomb with a strongercase, general purpose bombs in 250-pound, 500-pound, 1,000-pound, and2,000-pound sizes were standardized inthe fall of 1941.13 The Army estimatedthat this series would fill about 90 percentof its requirements and could be used ef-fectively against all land targets exceptthose with armor or heavy concrete pro-tection. For such highly resistant targets,the JAC subcommittee recommended a1,500-pound solid-nosed bomb similar tothe Navy's 1,600-pound armor-piercingbomb and containing about 15 percentexplosive filler. As supply of this type couldnot possibly meet the combined demandsof the Army, the Navy, and the British,the 500-pound and 1,000-pound thick-walled general purpose bombs originallyauthorized by the Joint Aircraft Commit-tee, containing 30 percent explosive filler,were tested to see whether they would fillthe requirement. They were found satis-factory and, provided with steel nose plugsinstead of nose fuzes and with tail fuzeslike those in general purpose bombs, theywere standardized as SAP, that is, semi-armor-piercing bombs.14

Chemical Bombs

At the opposite extreme in case strengthfrom the semi-armor-piercing bombs were

the thin-walled chemical bombs. Exceptfor photoflash and target-identificationbombs for which the Ordnance Depart-ment had sole responsibility, developmentfor chemical fillers was assigned to theChemical Warfare Service. One bomb atfirst sufficed for incendiary, gas, andsmoke purposes. Made of light sheet metal,it was about 70 percent filler. Its bluntrounded nose distinguished it from explo-sive bombs. Later somewhat modified, itwas manufactured in large quantities. Itwas employed with excellent effect as anincendiary but as a gas bomb was unsatis-factory because its welded constructionmade it subject to leakage. This did notmatter in the case of the incendiaries,which were shipped empty and filled inthe field with a gasoline and rubber solu-tion. But gas bombs had to be shippedloaded and then stored for long periods.An attempt to develop a leakproof, gas-filled bomb resulted in a slightly largerand heavier model made of 3/16-inch steeltubing, somewhat longer than the 100-pound general purpose bomb but of muchthe same construction.15

The trend toward larger chemicalbombs with thicker cases continued. Atthe request of Chemical Warfare Service,

13 (1) Min 10, Min of Committee on Aircraft Ord;18 Apr 42. (2) Rpt 3, 25 Sep 41, and Rpt 4, 5 Nov 41,Rpts of JAC on Bombs. All in Demolition Bombs,Vol. II, 1 Aug 44, OHF. (3) OCM 17336, 9 Oct 41;17490, 24 Nov 41. (4) Ltr, CofAC to CG Air ForceCombat Command, 17 Oct 41, sub: Equipment, Mis-cellaneous, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO.

14 (1) See n. 13(2). (2) OCM 17457, 12 Nov 41. (3)Swaney, Bomb Development, p. 262, OHF.

15 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp. 51-98,OHF. (2) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III,581-82. (3) OCM 19301, 10 Dec 42. (4) Ltr, CG AirTech Serv Command to CG AAF, 17 Feb 45, sub:Unsatisfactory Rpt re M47A2 H-Filled Bombs, andinds, 23 Mar 45 and 6 Apr 45, OO 471.2941, DRBAGO. (5) Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 289. (6)Interv, 17 Apr 53, with Joseph A. Llompart, Bombsand Pyrotechnics Sec, Ammo Br, R&D Serv.

BOMBS. Lt. M. S. Crissy with the first bomb to be dropped from the air, San Francisco, Cali-fornia, January 1911. The Wright airplane pilot is Philip O. Parmalee (above). Bombs developedby the Ordnance Department (below).

BOMBS 457

Ordnance later developed 500-pound and1,000-pound sizes for different types offillers, incendiary as well as gas. After ex-periments with several thin-case models,Ordnance engineers in the end simplyconverted general purpose bombs tochemical by welding in longitudinalburster walls and by making holes in thebase plugs through which the cases couldbe filled. The designers took great care toavoid even the most minute crevices, es-pecially at the filling hole, which wasclosed by a special plug and gasket. Theburster, consisting of a waterproof fibertube filled with about two and a halfpounds of tetrytol, was given a tight seal.With these changes, general purpose bombstaken from existing production lines be-came chemical bombs. They proved strongenough to withstand shipment and roughhandling and had much better ballisticcharacteristics than the first chemicalbombs.16

Fuzes

The fuzes for all bombs were agreedupon by the Joint Aircraft Committee.General purpose bombs had both nose andtail fuzes. The nose fuze functioned when astriker head plunged a firing pin into anexplosive train consisting of primer, det-onator, and booster. The tail fuze, the pur-pose of which was to detonate the bomb ifthe nose fuze failed to function, was acti-vated by a plunger operated by inertiaand was the same for all bombs except forits arming vane shaft. The vane shaftvaried in length according to the size ofthe bomb, so that the vane would be posi-tioned sufficiently to the rear of the bombbody to be in the airstream. The tail fuzereduced the percentage of duds to about 0.1percent. Another use for this fuze became

increasingly important. In dive bombing,the bomb had to become armed in ahurry.17 Designers reduced the revolu-tions of the arming vane from the 675 re-quired in the earlier tail fuzes, to 175 in anew series, and then to only 18 revolu-tions. In addition, Ordnance developedfor skip bombing or "masthead" bombingof ships a series of very sensitive fuzes thatcould delay explosion either from 4 to 5seconds, from 8 to 11 seconds, or, later, 8to 15 seconds, depending on the primerdetonator used. These highly sensitivefuzes were produced in great quantities in1943 and were popular in the theatres.Used with the 500-pound bomb they werecredited with helping to sink the Japanesefleet. As the rapidity with which they be-came armed made them dangerous to useon carrier-based aircraft, at Navy requestthe Ordnance Department developed aseries in which the arming time was in-creased from 18 to 150 revolutions.18

Early in 1943 an urgent requirementarose for bombs fuzed for a delay of fromone hour to twenty-four hours. Maj. Gen.James H. Doolittle wanted them to ham-per and restrain workers unloading shipsat enemy dock installations in NorthAfrica; Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr.,needed them to keep the Japanese con-fined to their dugouts in the Aleutians.19

At the time, the Ordnance Departmentwas developing two types of long-delay

16 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp. 99-110,131-36, OHF. (2) OCM 19442, 7 Jan 43; 23068 and23072, 2 Mar 44.

17 (1) Min 12, Min of Committee on Aircraft Ordand Armament of Working Subcommittee on Stand-ardization, 19 Jun 42, in Demolition Bombs, Vol. II,1 Aug 44, OHF. (2) Bomb Fuze Development, Recordof Army Ord R&D, Nov 45 (hereafter cited as BombFuze Development), pp. 8-15, 73-74, OHF.

18 (1) Bomb Fuze Development, pp. 74-77, OHF.(2) Barnes Diary, 5 Mar 43, OHF.

19 Barnes Diary, 4 Jan 43 thru 29 Mar 43 OHF.


fuzes. One with an adjustable clockworkmechanism proved unsatisfactory becausethe enemy could stop clock mechanismswith magnets or by injecting acid intothem. The other, a chemical fuze, was stillin the experimental stage when the suddendemand from the theatres made quick ac-tion necessary. A copy of the British No.37 Mark IV pistol was hastily tested andstandardized in three lengths. A celluloiddisc restrained its cocked striker. When thefuze became armed an ampoule of acetonebroke and dissolved the celluloid. Thedelay time could be varied from 1 to 144hours by changing the concentration of theacetone or the thickness of the disc, orboth. To prevent the enemy from with-drawing the fuze, it was booby trapped.This introduced a factor of unreliabilityand danger. The bomb could explode inmidair if the downward flight unscrewedthe antiwithdrawal feature and caused itto function. Modifications aimed at greatersturdiness and safety followed, but the AirForces still raised objections, especially tothe antiwithdrawal feature, which pre-vented the bombs from being defuzed if abombing mission were canceled.20

The Ordnance Department also workedout countless variations of fuzes to meetthe needs of the using services and to keeppace with bomb and aircraft development.In 1944 new high-level "stratosphere"bombing presented problems just as theearly low-level bombing had done. Forexample, the B-29 bomber released manybombs simultaneously from a great height,so that with quick-arming nose fuzes theysometimes bumped into each other anddetonated just below the ship. Increasingthe number of threads on the fuze armingscrew and striker gave a longer armingtime. New delay elements were incorpo-rated both in this nose fuze and in the

standard tail fuze to adapt them to usewith new types of bombs such as the VB-1(Azon-1). For glide bombs, which ap-proached the target at a flat impact angleand sometimes had shrouded noses andspecial tails, Ordnance engineers designeda fuze in which the arming screw, con-nected with an anemometer vane mountedon the side of the bomb, entered the strikerat 90 degrees instead of the top. As the warended work was proceeding on specialfuzes with long arming distances for robotbombs.21

Of the specialized fuzes, one of the mostsignificant was the diaphragm fuze thatoperated by blast to explode the bombabove ground. First considered for use inthe 20-pound fragmentation model, it wascopied from a British fuze that utilized theair blast from a preceding bomb or an aircushion effect from the ground. A verylight firing pin was secured to a flexible,slightly convex metal diaphragm. Whenpressure snapped the diaphragm to a con-cave position, the fuze functioned. A num-ber were tested in 20-pound fragmentationbombs, some dropped singly and some in

20 Bomb Fuze Development, pp. 87-92, OHF.21 The Ordnance Department also supplied war-

heads and destructor sets for robot bombs and otherkinds of guided missiles. The development of air-sustained guided missiles was an AAF responsibility.(1) See above, Ch. VIII, pp. 49-50. (2) Bomb FuzeDevelopment, pp. 8, 24-25, 57-58, OHF. (3) OCM26598, 8 Feb 45; 26683, 15 Feb 45. (4) Ltr, CG AAFto CofOrd, 6 Jan 43, sub: Destructors, Type T-4 forGlide Bombs, and ind, 16 Mar 43, OO 471.62/789,DRB AGO. (5) Ltr, Air Ord Off to CofOrd, 26 Jun44, sub: Storage Classification of Kits, Accessory,Bomb, T2, T3, and T4, OO 471.62/2332, DRB AGO.(6) Ltr. CG AAF to CofOrd, 9 Aug 44, sub: Bomb,Flying, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (7) Ltr, CG AAF toCofOrd, 12 Dec 44, sub: JB-2 Bombs, OO 471.62/2783, DRB AGO. (8) Ltr, Gen Arnold to CG Mate-riel Command, 2 Aug 44, sub: Combining AAF andOrd Experience on Guided Missiles, AAF 471.6, DRBAGO. (9) Ltr, Howard Bruce, Actg Dir Materiel, toACofS Opns Div, WDGS, 3 Mar 45, sub: JB-2 (BuzzBomb), OO 471.62/2866, DRB AGO.

BOMBS 459

pairs, but the results were so disappointingthat further development was abandoned.On the other hand, the British who early inthe war had had the notion that a bombburst in the air would be especially effec-tive because of less shielding by buildings,began experiments with the blast-operatedfuze in general purpose bombs and arousedthe interest of U.S. Air officers. Conse-quently, at the request of the Army AirForces, the Ordnance Department modi-fied its earlier models for trial in generalpurpose bombs. The new type, incorpo-rating features that made for greater safetyand even more sensitivity, was tested with100-poundx, 500-pound, and larger GPbombs. So fuzed, 500-pound bombsdropped in threes would detonate at ap-proximately 25 feet, vertically, from eachother. The fuze was standardized late in1944 as the M149 and, at the urging ofArmy Air Forces, the Ordnance Depart-ment gave it high priority.22

Except for fuzing, World War II saw fewchanges in the general purpose and semi-armor-piercing bombs that had beenstandardized in the fall of 1941. In orderto make the 500-pound, 1,000-pound, and2,000-pound sizes more effective againstwater targets, the Navy's Mark 30 hydro-static fuze, which functioned by waterpressure, was adopted for both Army andNavy use as the AN-MK 30. To accom-modate it, the bombs were given a largertail fuze cavity and assigned new designa-tions.23 Another minor change followed anAAF discovery that the antiwithdrawalfeature of the long-delay tail fuzes couldbe circumvented by removing the baseplate or adapter-booster. Ordnance engi-neers added locks for these parts.24 In thefirst year of the war the Air Forces used inmost operations the 500-pound and 1,000-pound general purpose bombs, which

would destroy such vital targets as con-crete docks, steel bridges, and light cruis-ers. The 500-pound was the bomb thatGeneral Arnold gave the credit for sinkingabout 39 Japanese ships in the MakassarStrait.25

The New Role of Fragmentation Bombs

When the United States forces began tomove forward the need for a bomb to beused against troops became clear, and thetheatres began to demand the 20-poundfragmentation bomb. Standardized in1940 and adopted by the Joint AircraftCommittee early in 1942 as the AN-M41,26 this small bomb weighed not morethan 23 pounds, even with a parachute at-tachment. It was not dropped singly, butby sixes in a cluster that would fit in anairplane's 100-pound bomb station. Clus-tering was made possible by the use of anadapter consisting of a hollow rod to whichthe bombs were wired. When the adapterwas released from the aircraft an armingwire was pulled, activating a cartridgewith a steel slug that cut the wires holdingthe bombs. The bombs fell free, armingthemselves with their own arming vanes.Later design modification eliminated thecartridge and substituted clamped straps

22 (1) OCM 20017, 25 Mar 43; 25458, 19 Oct 44.(2) Burchard, ed., Rockets, Guns and Targets, p. 262.

23 (1) Burchard, ed., op. cit., pp. 3, 95. (2) OCM18348, 6 Jun 42. (3) Rpt 10, Rpts of JAC on Bombs,25 May 42, in Demolition Bombs, Vol. II, 1 Aug 44,OHF.

24 OCM 22610, 13 Jan 44; 22731, 27 Jan 44.25 Gen. H. H. Arnold, "Wings, Bombs, and Bul-

lets," Army Ordnance, XXV, 140 (1943), 319.26 (1) Barnes Diary, 4 Jan 43, OHF. (2) Arnold, loc.

at., pp. 319-20. (3) Craven and Cate, eds., The ArmyAir Forces in World War II: III, Europe: Argument ToV-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago, 1951)(hereafter cited as AAF III), p. 106. (4) OCM 18187,7 May 42.

THE PARAFRAG BOMB IN ACTION. Old Namlea Airdrome, Boerce Island, Nether-lands Indies, is shown during a low-level bombing attack by the U.S. Fifth Air Force.

BOMBS 461

for the wires.27 "Wicked little weapons,"according to Brig. Gen. George C. Kenney,they proved their value in the battle forNew Guinea and became increasinglypopular. If accurately placed, they couldharass front-line infantry and disrupt linesof communication far more completelythan could machine gun fire. They wereespecially effective against parked aircraft,airdromes, supply trains, and encamp-ments. By the spring of 1943 the effective-ness of fragmentation bombs was so wellestablished that the Army Air Forces re-quested the development of new types, andbefore the war was over even fighter craftwere supplied with them.28

The first new antipersonnel bomb was a4-pounder copied from the German 2-kilogram "Butterfly" bomb. It got itsname from two curved sections of its casethat opened on release and formed wingsthat rotated in the air and slowed descent.It could be fuzed to detonate in the air, onimpact, at any delay up to thirty minutes,or upon being disturbed. Delivered beforean attack, it could deny the enemy use ofhis airdromes, antiaircraft installations,and supply areas. Butterfly bombs weredropped in clusters, either in a cluster of24 bombs that fitted into a 100-pound sta-tion or in one carrying 90 that fitted in a500-pound station. Engineers at Aberdeenmade numerous tests to find the right tim-ing and altitude for the release of thecluster from the aircraft and the openingof the cluster, in order to forestall excessivewind drift or damage to the butterflymechanism. At the end of a year of tests,both bomb and cluster were standardizedbut, as the timing of the cluster openingwas still not wholly satisfactory, testingcontinued into the summer of 1945. Fuzefailures and the tendency of the cluster toopen too soon after release sometimes

made experience with the bomb in thefield discouraging.29

Two fragmentation bombs developed in1943 were like the 20-pound bomb butwere five and ten times its size. The de-mand for such bombs came from theMediterranean theatre, and urgently fromthe Southwest Pacific Area where Alliedofficers could testify to the effectivenessof Japanese 60-kilogram fragmentationbombs. As a counterweapon, GeneralKenney converted general purpose bombsinto fragmentation bombs by wrappingthem with heavy wire and used themeffectively around Japanese airdromes andbivouac areas. In the summer of 1943 theOrdnance Department designed two sizes,a 90-pound model to be used in a clusterof six in a bomber's 500-pound station anda 260-pound model to fit in the 100-poundstation. Both the lighter bomb, standard-ized as the M82, and the 260-pound, theM81, were similar to the 20-pound bomb,except for their fins. The cluster adapterfor the M82 resembled that for the 20-pound except in size. Because one purposeof large fragmentation bombs was to reach

27 (1) OCM 17049, 31 Jul 41. (2) Ltr, Gen McFar-land, ACofOrd, to TAG, 21 Nov 41, sub: Adapter,Cluster, M2 and Cluster, Fragmentation Bomb M3,AAF 47 1.6, DRB AGO. (3) James A. Bradley, Frag-mentation Bombs, Pt. II, pp. 1-5, OHF. (4) Interv,23 Oct 51, with Harry S. Beckman, Bomb Sec, R&DServ.

28 (1) Arnold, loc. cit., pp. 319-20. (2) Swaney,Bomb Development, pp. 165, 178, 206, OHF. (3) Ltr,CofOrd to CofS A-4, AAF, 28 May 43, sub: Com-parison of Bombs with 50% and 30% Explosive Filler,OO 471.62/1156, DRB AGO. (4) George C. Kenney,General Kenney Reports (New York, 1949), p. 13. (5)Interv with Dr. H. M. Cole, 28 Sep 51.

29 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp. 205-50,OHF. (2) OCM 20957, 8 Jul 43; 24164, 22 Jun 44.(3) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 9 Jun 43, sub: Anti-Personnel Bombs, OO 471.6/742, DRB AGO. (4) Ltr,Lt Col William S. Cox, Jr., OD, to Ord Off AAF POA(Admin), 5 Mar 45, sub: Report on Use of ButterflyBombs in Recent Operations, OO 471.62/3009, DRBAGO.


targets enclosed in revetments, the AAFwanted an above-ground airburst, butuntil proximity and diaphragm fuzes be-came available late in 1944, the standardnose fuze that functioned on impact hadto serve.30 Comparison tests of the single260-pound M81 with the 20-pound M41cluster proved that the large fragmenta-tion bomb was better for destroying highlyresistant and concentrated targets such asarmored vehicles, parked aircraft, andPT boats, but that against unprotectedtroops and lightly armored vehicles andaircraft the cluster of 20-pound bombs wasmore effective. In the field, the AAF con-sidered the 20-pound more versatile anduseful than either the 260 or 90, so that aproposal of early 1944 to develop frag-mentation bombs of 500 and 1,000-poundsizes was not pursued.31

Use of New Explosives

In the war-long argument over the rela-tive merits of blast and fragmentation, thependulum now began to swing backtoward blast, partly because by 1944 theAAF would have aircraft capable of de-livering larger and heavier loads. Theheaviest bombers available in early 1943,the B-17 and the B-24, could carry bombsup to 4,000 pounds, but only on the wings.The B-29, expected to be ready early in1944, was designed to carry 10,000 pound-ers in its interior. These considerations

led the Army Air Forces officially to re-verse the position taken in 1941 that nobomb larger than 2,000 pounds was re-quired. Achieving greater blast meant re-newed emphasis on large thin-case bombsof high explosive content. Reports fromEngland in the fall of 1942 had stressedthe effectiveness of such bombs. Hundredsof 4,000 pounders had been dropped overGerman cities and towns with such satis-

factory results that the British were pre-paring bombs weighing as much as 12,000pounds. Furthermore, the Air Forces haddiscovered from combat reports that 2,000-pound bombs had practically no effectagainst buildings adequately protected bysandbags. In spite of the earlier verdict,the Ordnance Department had alreadydone some work on very large bombs.Mainly because of British interest,32 theAAF had requested a limited number of a4,000-pound light-case type standardizedin August 1941, and early informationfrom Wright Field about B-29 capacityhad inspired a request for a 10,000-poundbomb. About 600 of an experimentalmodel 10,000 pounder were actually man-ufactured before the project was canceled.When Air Forces interest in large bombsrevived, tests of the 4,000-pound bombs atAberdeen indicated that loading with newand more powerful explosives was thesimplest means of increasing blast effectwithin size limitations.33

30 (1) Barnes Diary, 12-14 Jan 44, OHF. (2) Ltr,CG AAF to CofOrd, 23 Apr 43, sub: Large Fragmen-tation Bombs, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (3) OCM20617, 3 Jun 43; 22367, 5 Dec 43; 25955, 7 Dec 44.(4) Bomb Fuze Development, pp. 66, 105, OHF.

31 (1) OCM 22367, 16 Dec 43. (2) Ltr, Air Ord Offto CofOrd, 29 Sep 44, sub: Operational Use of 90-lband 260-lb Fragmentation Bombs, OO 62/2609,DRB AGO. (3) Bradley, Fragmentation Bombs, Pt.II, pp. 59-60, OHF. (4) Baxter, op. cit., p. 257.

32 See above, p. 454.33 (1) Memo, Lt Col Robert G. Butler, Jr., for Gen

Barnes, 9 Sep 42, sub: Report of Trip to England,August 1942, Barnes file, OHF. (2) Memo, Col Car-roll, Chief of Experimental Engr Sec, Wright Field,for Chief of Material Div, Office of CofAC, 9 Oct 41,sub: 4,000 Bomb Installation for Heavy Bomber(B-17 and B-24) Airplanes, AAF 47 1.6, DRB AGO.(3) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 8 Oct 42, sub: RelativeDestructive Effect of Demolition Bombs of VariousSizes, and ind, 16 Oct 42, OO 471.623/41, DRBAGO. (4) OCM 22125, 30 Oct 43; 19594, 28 Jan 43.(5) Ltr, CofOrd to Hq AAF, 14 Jan 43, sub: Tests ofAerial Bombs—Summary of Notes of ConferenceHeld on 1 1 Jan 43, and inds, 14 Jan, 6-18 Mar 43,OO 471.62/825, DRB AGO.

BOMBS 463

The earliest departure from TNT forbomb fillings was cyclonite or RDX, anexplosive long known for its great powerand brisance but generally considered toosensitive. The British had developed amethod of desensitizing it by mixing itwith beeswax and had used it with "terri-ble" effect 34 in the 4,000-pound bomb theRAF dropped on Berlin in April 1941.The following summer Air Marshal ArthurT. Harris had pressed for large-scale pro-duction of RDX in America. The UnitedStates Navy was also interested in the ex-plosive because of its effectiveness under-water, especially in a mixture with TNTand aluminum called torpex. But theOrdnance Department, while willing tostart production for the British and theNavy, held back until May 1943 on theuse of RDX in its own bombs, and thenadopted only a less sensitive mixture withTNT, known as RDX Composition B.This first significant change in bomb load-ing came about as a result of AAF in-sistence that the large fragmentationbombs developed in 1943 would need thegreater power of RDX Composition B toburst their thick walls with the greatesteffect. The loading, with TNT surroundsfor greater safety, was authorized.35

Though the Army Air Forces liked it andthe Joint British-American Committee onAircraft Ordnance and Armament ap-proved it for all Army-Navy standardmunitions, Composition B was used inonly about 40 percent of the general pur-pose bombs. The reasons were two: first,the short supply caused by competition be-tween it and high octane gasoline and syn-thetic rubber for production facilities and,second, the serious doubts of a number ofOrdnance officers about the advisability ofusing it.36

Throughout World War II the Ord-

nance Department, believing itself in abetter position to evaluate bomb fillingsthan were the using services, was "ex-tremely cautious in its recommendationsfor any so-called improved explosive.. . ." 37 Much of this caution concerningRDX mixtures was justified. The most im-portant weakness of Composition B was itstendency to detonate high-order withoutfuze action under the shock of impact.This made it undesirable for skip bomb-ing. It was also more prone than TNTprematurely to deflagrate—decomposewithout detonating—when employed indelayed-action bombs dropped from highaltitudes. Sensitivity to shock was not aconsideration in the case of fragmentationbombs because they were not intended fordelay fuze action on hard impact; but itwas obviously a factor in the case of gen-eral purpose bombs. And the sensitivity oftorpex-loaded depth bombs cost the Navyseveral serious accidents.38 The problemmight have been solved by the new Ameri-can explosive ednatol, which was used inthe blast tests of 1943-44, but by the time

34 Ltr, Air Marshall Harris to Gen Arnold, 14 Jul41 [sub: RDX], AAF 471.6, DRB AGO.

35 (1) Baxter, op. cit., pp. 253-59. (2) Ltr, CG AAFto CG ASF, 29 May 43, sub: Requirements for RDX,Large Fragmentation Bombs, OO 47 1.62/1183, DRBAGO. (3) OCM 22843, 10 Feb 44. (4) Memo, GroupCaptain Crawford, British Air Commission, for ACofSG-2, 7 May 42, OO 350.05/653, DRB AGO.

36 (1) Min 19, Min of Committee on Aircraft Ordand Armament, 8 Apr 43, sub: Case No. 3021, Adop-tion of RDX Composition B, in Demolition Bombs,Vol. II, 1 Aug 44, OHF. (2) OCM 20021, 25 Mar 43.

37 1st Ind, CofOrd to CG AAF, 7 Mar 43, sub: Tri-tonal Loading for GP Bombs, to ltr, Air Ord Off toCofOrd, 6 Mar 45, OO 471.62/2919, DRB AGO.

38 (1) Ltr, Air Ord Off to CofOrd, 17 Nov 44, sub:Bomb, G.P. 500 Ib (RDX Comp filled) and inds, 5,22, 26 Feb 45 and 7 Jun 45, OO 471.62/2710, DRBAGO. (2) Ltr, Hq AAF to CofOrd, 10 Sep 43, sub:Blast and Fragmentation Effect of Demolition andGeneral Purpose Bombs, and ind, 22 Apr 44, OO471.6/971, DRB AGO. (3) OCM 31926, 18 Dec 47.


it was in production in any quantity, thewar had ended.39

After 1943 of far greater interest thaneither RDX Composition B or ednatolwere the new aluminized fillings. UntilWorld War II the use of aluminum inexplosives had not been extensive, andtests in England in 1941 had failed to indi-cate any significant difference betweenaluminized explosives and amatol or Com-position B. In 1943 the discovery that Ger-man bombs containing aluminum wereextremely effective spurred research andled to the development of minol, a mixtureof aluminum with amatol, and tritonal, amixture with TNT. For their 4,000-poundbomb the British favored Minol 2, a mix-ture 20 percent aluminum, 40 percentTNT, and 40 percent ammonium nitrate,and they requested that it be used in their4,000-pound bombs being loaded in theUnited States. The British had learned, byusing new methods of blast measurementand interpretation, that Minol 2 producedan area of demolition approximately 80percent greater than the area obtainedwith a TNT filler. Ordnance technicianshad independently arrived at a similarlyhigh opinion of the blast effect contributedby aluminum by comparing the perform-ance of 2,000-pound and 4,000-poundbombs loaded with minol, TNT, ednatol,and the RDX mixtures. As between minoland tritonal, they preferred tritonal, whichcontained no ammonium nitrate because,when even the slightest degree of moisturewas present in the air, aluminum acted onammonium nitrate and produced "spew-ing"—the evolution of hydrogen gas—andeven explosions. Tritonal was much safer,and the British were won over to it.40

When reports on the successful loadingof 4,000-pound British bombs with tritonalat the Nebraska Ordnance Works came to

the attention of the Army Air Forces, arequest followed for further testing of thenew explosive, especially with a view tousing it in large, light-case bombs for jun-gle warfare. Ordnance engineers, compar-ing tritonal with Composition B and TNT,found it almost equal to Composition B inpeak pressure value, yet as insensitive asTNT, and hence safe to load and use. Afterthese tests, the Ordnance Committee rec-ommended that tritonal supplant TNT asa loading in all general purpose and light-case bombs.41 Other bombs were filled withexplosives suited to their particular pur-poses. For fragmentation bombs, RDXComposition B continued to be the pre-ferred filling because it had more brisancethan tritonal. The 2,000-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs developed early in1944 were loaded with picratol, a mixtureof TNT and ammonium picrate, or withExplosive D, which was of all explosivesthe least sensitive to shock and friction andwas therefore the best to mix with TNT ina bomb that had to withstand severe shockand stress before detonating.42

Use of Air Bursts

Loading large, light-case bombs withthe new aluminized explosives was one wayto increase blast effect. Another way wasair-burst fuzing. The idea that a bomb

39 (1) See above, p. 368. (2) Hist of Picatinny Ar-senal Tech Group, V, October-December 1943,50-51, OHF.

40 OCM 24163, 22 Jun 44.41 (1) OCM 24163, 22 Jun 44; 26023, 14 Dec 44;

26892, 8 Mar 45. (2) Ltr, AAF to CofOrd, 3 Jun 44,sub: Bombs, 2,000-lb, Tritonal Filled, and ind, 22Aug 44, OO 471.62/2285, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr andinds cited n. 38(1). (4) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 4 Jan45, sub: Bombs, General Purpose, Tritonal Filled, andind, 7 Mar 45. OO 471.62/2919, DRB AGO.

42 (1) OCM 26892, 8 Mar 45; 23255, 23 Mar 44.(2) U.S. Military Academy, Explosives (West Point,1950), p. 23.

BOMBS 465

would be more effective if it were explodedin the air rather than on the ground grewout of abstract mathematical work carriedon by NDRC on the theory of the inter-action of shock waves: a special kind ofnonacoustic reflection from the ground,known as the Mach effect, redistributedthe energy of the explosive and widenedthe area affected by it. The theory waslater supported by reports of observers inLondon who witnessed the great destruc-tion wrought by German V-1 bombs thathad struck the tops of trees and explodedabove ground. Proximity fuzes promisedto provide means of exploding bombs atroof-top level or above. As the VT fuzeproject got under way 43 Ordnance officersconsulting with scientists of NDRC con-cluded that a tail proximity fuze for thelarge, light-case bombs could be developedin a fairly short time. This plan was soonshelved in favor of an effective nose prox-imity fuze that would either produce airburst of itself or activate a new, supersensi-tive tail fuze of the cocked-firing-pin type.44

From NDRC studies begun in 1941several experimental types of nose proxim-ity fuzes evolved, of which the most prom-ising were the T50 and T51. They provideda burst height of 60 feet over water whenreleased from 10,000 feet or less, and of 18to 42 feet when released over ground, de-pending on reflectivity and terrain. Fol-lowing NDRC's basic research, the SignalCorps, in co-ordination with the OrdnanceDepartment, carried on work on thesefuzes until late 1944, when Ordnance wasgiven responsibility for the fuzes.45 De-velopment was slow, both because of thevery nature of the device and because ithad to be adapted to bombs of variouskinds and sizes and to use in new high-altitude, high-speed aircraft. One of themost difficult problems was to allow for the

correct timing between drop and arming,that is, the "minimum safe air travel" foruse in various tactics such as high-level,low-level, and naval bombing. One answerwas a new air-arming mechanism thatwas given a considerable range of safe airtravel by making a simple adjustment atthe factory or in the field. Without waitingfor entirely satisfactory solutions to this andother problems, because of intense interestin the theatres, the War Department au-thorized limited procurement of the T50in late 1943. Combat tests were postponedby a decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staffforbidding employment of the fuze overland until October 1944, and then AAFdistrust of the fuze caused further delay. Itwas not employed until February 1945when the Seventh Air Force dropped prox-imity-fuzed fragmentation, general pur-pose, and chemical bombs at Iwo Jima.Soon afterwards the T51 was also tested incombat.40

Of the two, the Ordnance Departmentpreferred the T51, believing it more reli-able than the T50 in producing the rightheight of burst and better functioning be-cause less sensitive. It was also more versa-tile. Whereas the T50 was limited to

43 See above, Ch. XII.44 (1) OCM 19939, 18 Mar 43; 22776, 3 Feb 44; (2)

Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct 45,pp. 33-35, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (3) Bur-chard, ed., op. cit., pp. 259-62.

45 (1) OCM 17715, 27 Jan 42; 21 1 17; 1 7 Jul 43;26444, 18 Jan 45; 28150, 28 Jun 45. (2) Ltr, CofOrdto Dir Camp Evans Signal Laboratory, 30 Sep 44, sub:Fuze, Bomb, Nose, TSO Series-Service Tests, and inds,18 Oct 44, 9 Nov 44, 12 Dec 44, OO 471.82/3601,DRB AGO. (3) See George Raynor Thompson andDixie R. Harris, Signal Corps: The Outcome, a vol-ume in preparation for UNITED STATES ARMYIN WORLD WAR II, MS, OCMH.

46 (1) OCM 21994, 4 Nov 43; 28150, 28 Jun 45.(2) Report of Activities of VT Bomb Fuze Team inPacific Ocean Area, 10 January 1945 to 28 February1945, OHF. (3) Baxter, op. cit., p. 241. (4) Boyce, NewWeapons for Air Warfare, pp. 212-16.


500-pound bombs, the T51 model wouldprovide air burst on all bombs that nor-mally took the AN-M103 nose fuze up tothe light-case 4,000 pounder. Designatedthe T51E1 after minor modifications, thefuze was standardized in June 1945 as theM166.47 The largest bomb for which it wasadopted was the 2,000-pound general pur-pose AN-M66. It was tested with the4,000-pound bomb but caused too high aburst.48

The Search for More Powerful Bombs

By September 1944 some of the 4,000-pound light-case bombs were loaded andin the theatres, but the Air Forces hadmade little use of them. No use whateverhad been made of the 10,000-pound. Withthe appearance of the B-29, which couldcarry in its interior bombs 125 inches longand 50 inches in diameter, however, theArmy Air Forces decided that very largebombs would be desirable. A request for10,000-pound bombs of the light-case, gen-eral purpose, and semi-armor-piercingtypes to fit the B-29 bomb bay was fol-lowed by one for a 4,000-pound generalpurpose bomb to be used to penetrate thevery thick bombproof structures that theJapanese were expected to erect to protecttheir main positions. Ordnance designers,having anticipated the need of a 4,000-pound general purpose bomb of this type,had a model ready by the end of the year.Concerning the 10,000-pound bomb of thegeneral purpose type containing a 50 per-cent explosive filler, they had serious res-ervations, based on belief that the lengthlimitation of 125 inches prohibited a truesemi-armor-piercing bomb of more than5,500 pounds, and that a heavier onewould lack the flight or penetration char-acteristics to be expected of its weight. The

same consideration applied to the generalpurpose 10,000-pound bomb. OrdnanceResearch and Development Service waswilling to undertake the development ofboth types but pointed out to the AAF thatneither would have characteristics any-where near ideal. The truth was, the B-29could not carry in its bomb bay an effec-tive 10,000-pound bomb. This fact wasadmitted within the Air Staff itself, and forthe time being the development of verylarge bombs was necessarily stalemated.49

Lacking "super-super" blockbusters andthe airplanes to carry them, the Air Forceshad to depend on the bombs already onhand to meet the tremendously increased,requirements during and after the invasionof Europe. Improvisation had to serve. Toincrease payloads of all aircraft, as well asto fill efficiently the huge racks of the B-29,the Ordnance Department designedadapter clusters that would hold two orthree bombs and fit in a station designed

47 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to Office of Chief Signal Off, 19Sep 44, sub: Military Characteristics of Fuze, Bomb,Nose T50 and T51, OO 471.82/3552, DRB AGO.(2) OCM 28150, 28 Jun45.

48 (1) Ltr, Air Ord Off to CofOrd, 23 Apr 45, sub:AAF Bd Rpt, Preliminary Guide to Tactical Employ-ment of Airburst Fragmentation and General PurposeBombs, Project 4324A471.6, and ind, 5 May 45, OO471.62/3090, DRB AGO. (2) Burchard, ed., op. cit.,pp. 263-64. (3) OCM 28852, 23 Aug 45. (4) Interv,24 Oct 51, with Hoyt W. Sisco, Fuze Sec, R&D Serv.

49 (1) Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 15Sep 44, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF. (2) Ltr, CGAAF to CofOrd, 27 Sep 44, sub: 4,000-lb. GeneralPurpose Bomb, and ind, 29 Sep 44, OO 62/2602,DRB AGO. (2) Ltr. CG AAF to CofOrd, 1 7 Nov 44,sub: Bombs, 10,000 Pound Size, and ind, 24 Nov 44,OO 471.62/2702, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, CofOrd toOffice of ACofAS, Materiel, Maintenance, and Dis-tribution, 6 Dec 44, sub: Development Status ofBombs, 10,000-Kb Size—RMD-17, OO 471.62/2733,DRB AGO. (4) OCM 25519, 26 Oct 44. (5) Memo,Brig Gen Mervin E. Gross, Chief of RequirementsDiv, Office of ACofAS, for ACofAS, Opns Commit-ments and Requirements, 21 Nov 44, sub: LargeBomb Development, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO.

BOMBS 467

for one bomb. One model held three 100-pound GP bombs, another two of the 250-pound size, and another two 500-pounders.In this way, bomb loads were increasedfrom 50 to 200 percent.50 For low-levelbombing the Ordnance Department sup-plied general purpose bombs with anti-ricochet devices—parachute assembliesand a prong or nose spike that stuck in theground and kept the bomb from bouncing.But for the penetration of heavily fortifiedGerman defenses, such as concrete struc-tures with roofs from 10 to 20 feet thick,something more powerful was needed thanany bomb or rocket then in use. In thisexigency Ordnance engineers pushed for-ward modifications of 2,000-pound GPbombs to incorporate the "shaped charge"or Munroe principle.51

Also called the "hollow charge" princi-ple, it had been applied to small fragmen-tation bombs as far back as 1941. Ordnancedesigners, modifying the 20-pound M41 inthis way for use against tanks, had obtainedan intense forward jet along the longitudi-nal axis of the bomb, and had succeeded inpenetrating 3.5-inch armor plate. But diffi-culty with the fuze made the model unac-ceptable.52 Late in 1942 the Army AirForces, having learned that the British hadused the Munroe principle in a "CS"bomb designed to defeat capital ships, hadasked Ordnance to develop a large shaped-charge bomb. But Air Forces interest inthe project was short lived, and it was can-celed less than a year after it had begun.In the interim Ordnance designers hadproduced two bombs that corresponded insize to 2,000-pound and 4,000-pound dem-olition bombs. Because of the difficultyof loading shaped-charge bombs to con-form to those weights, they were designatednot by pounds but by inches in diameter.The smaller was the 23-inch Tl, the larger,

the 34-inch Tl. Four models of each,shipped to Aberdeen after the project wascanceled, were there in May 1944 whenthe AAF asked for the reactivation of the23-inch Tl. Tests indicated need of furtherdevelopment. While that work was goingon, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance askedthe Army and NDRC to participate in aproject to develop shaped-charge generalpurpose bombs. Development began onshaped-charge 100-pound, 500-pound,1,000-pound, and 2,000-pound models,and, as the Army Air Forces also wantedthese bombs, they were given an "emer-gency urgent" rating. Nevertheless, theydid not get into combat. Testing continuedinto the summer of 1945.53

50 (1) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 13 Jun 44, sub:Adapter Clusters for 100 lb, 250 lb, and 500 lb GPBombs, OO 471.62/2279, DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, CGAAF to CofOrd, 26 Jul 44, same sub, and ind, 29 Jul44, OO 47 1.62/2451. (3) Ltr, Gen Arnold to CG AirMateriel Command, 1 Sep 44, sub: Multiple Suspen-sion of Bombs, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (4) Ltr, CGAAF to CofOrd, 17 Jun 44, sub: Immediate Increasein Bomb Tonnage, OO 471.62/2312. (5) Swaney,Bomb Development, pp. 310-14, OHF.

51 (1) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 18 Nov 43, sub:Anti-Ricochet Devices, OO 47 1.6/1073. DRB AGO.(2) Ltr, Air Ord Off to CofOrd, 24 May 44, same sub,OO 471.62/2243, DRB AGO. (3) OCM 26459, 25

Jan 45. (4) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 24 Mar 45, sub:Anti-Ricochet Devices for Bombs, and ind, 5 Apr 45,AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (5) Ltr, Gen Coupland, AirOrd Off, to Col Phillip Schwartz, Armament and OrdOff, USSAFE, 12 Dec 44 [sub: Shaped ChargeBombs], AAF 471.6, DRB AGO.

52 OCM 20018, 23 Mar 43.53 (1) Ltr, Gen Chidlaw, ACofS, to CofOrd, 21 Dec

42, sub: Capital Ship Bomb, OO 471.62/734, DRBAGO. (2) Ltr, Dir AAF Bd to CG AAF, 13 Feb 44,sub: Shaped-Charge Bombs, and inds, 25 Feb 44, 4Aug 44, AAF 47 1.6, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, CofOrd toDir Ord Research Center, APG, 3 Jun 44, sub: Pro-gram for Hollow Charge Bomb, and ind, 2 Aug 44,OO 471 .62 /2140 , DRB AGO. (4) Ltr, CofOrd toDir Ord Research Center, 18 Apr 44, sub: Targetsfor Bombs, Shaped Charge 23" and 34" Tl, OO471.62/2161, DRB AGO. (5) OCM 24290, 6 Jul 44;26549, 1 Feb 45. (6) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp.308-10. OHF.


The Role of Pyrotechnics

In the last year of the war bomb devel-opment was affected not only by the needto overcome strong fortifications but alsoby changes in Air Forces doctrine. Oneexample was the increased use of incendi-aries. By August 1944 the AAF Board hadcome to the conclusion that "where there isvulnerability to fire, the damage by fire isgreater than by demolition," 54 a conclu-sion, to be sure, that an Ordnance observerhad reached during the London blitz of1940 but which the Ordnance Departmenthad not acted upon. As primary responsi-bility was shifted to Chemical WarfareService in November 1940, the decision in1944 to increase the incendiary bomb pro-gram under the highest priority affectedOrdnance very little. More important forthe Ordnance Department was the changein AAF doctrine that initiated 24-hourbombing operations. Night bombing,always favored by the Royal Air Forcebut hitherto opposed by the United States,gave new importance to pyrotechnics.Flares and signals to be released or firedfrom aircraft or projected from the groundhad been an Ordnance Department re-sponsibility since 1920. The signals werecases filled with different kinds of composi-tions that would produce colored smoke orfireworks effects. Especially importantwere hand signals for downed fliers. Air-craft flares came closer to the usual bombdesign. Aircraft flare AN-M26, designedto provide illumination for night bom-bardment, contained its illuminant in around-nosed, finned-tail cylinder and de-veloped 800,000 candlepower for a periodof about three minutes. It had a drag sleevethat slowed its descent and a mechanicaltime fuze that functioned the illuminant ata predetermined time after release. A very

much smaller parachute flare was em-ployed for reconnaissance, and a tow-targetflare towed by an airplane provided apractice target for antiaircraft gunners.The case designed for the M26 flare wasversatile. It was modified at different timesto drop "chaff' or "window"—metal strawfor jamming enemy radar and thus pro-tecting a bomber from flak—and propa-ganda leaflets, although for the latter theclosed adapter clusters used for butterflybombs eventually proved preferable.55

The most important developments inpyrotechnics concerned photoflash bombsfor high-altitude night photography andmarkers to identify targets at night. Theprewar M46 photoflash bomb had theround-nosed shape of a chemical bomb,weighed about 50 pounds of which halfwas the flashlight powder, and was func-tioned by a mechanical time fuze. It gavea light of 500 million candlepower. Thepowder consisted of an oxidant potassiumperchlorate or barium nitrate combinedwith a fuel mixture composed of magne-sium and aluminum. The Army Air Forceswanted a photoflash bomb that would givemore light at high altitudes and that wouldbe less susceptible to detonation by flak.The Ordnance Department attempted tomeet the first requirement by furnishingtwo experimental large-sized models, onecontaining 50 pounds of flashlight powder,

54 Ltr, Maj Gen H. A. Craig, ACofAS, to CofAS,14 Aug 44, sub: Study of Employment of IncendiaryBombs, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO.

55 (1) OCM 26238, 4 Jan 45; 27737, 24 May 45. (2)Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III, 499-609. (3)Ltr, Maj Gen N. F. Twining, Hq Fifteenth AF, toCG AAF/MTO, 8 Aug 44, sub: "Chaff' Bomb, andinds, 21 Aug, 18 Oct 44, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (4)Ltr, Gen Arnold to President AAF Bd, 12 Aug 44,sub: Propaganda Leaflet Bombs, AAF 471.6. DRBAGO. (5) Ltr, CofOrd to Dir Ord Research Center,APG, 9 Aug 44, sub: M26 Flare Cases Modified forPropaganda Leaflet Bombs, OO 471.62/2494. DRBAGO.

BOMBS 469

and the other containing 100. To providegreater safety from flak, pyrotechnics ex-perts tried two methods, a less sensitivepowder and a bomb case with thickerwalls. Loading a "safe photographic pow-der," developed by the British, into boththe M46 case and the 250-pound generalpurpose bomb case failed to provide theanswer, as the British powder gave lesslight, pound for pound, than the Ameri-can. Hence the Ordnance Departmentconcluded that solution of the problem layin the heavy-walled case. Finally, NDRCwas called in and established the relation-ship between case strength and chargeweight and composition. Picatinny Arsenalexperimented with different combinationsof case, filler, and initiating system. Theresult was a photoflash bomb that pro-duced approximately three times as muchlight as the M46. Because of urgent needfor it in the theatres, its development wasgiven an "A" priority late in December1944, but further research was requiredand continued into the postwar period.56

Target identification bombs grew out ofa technique evolved by the British to im-prove the accuracy of their night bombing.A "Pathfinder Force" equipped with spe-cial navigational aids flew over a target inadvance of the attacking force and droppedvarious kinds of candles and flares, some toilluminate the general area and others tomark with color the special target. Onemunition designed specifically for thiswork was a stabilized bomb that ejectedsixty-one pyrotechnic candles at a prede-termined altitude. In the United States theearliest research on target identificationmarkers produced five bombs of this kind.All were a modification of the 250-poundgeneral purpose bomb and differed onefrom another only in the type of candlethey contained. A mechanical time nose

fuze caused the bomb to eject its candlesat the moment when a mechanical timeflare fuze ignited them. The candles weresmall flares, about a foot long and oneand one half inches in diameter, thatburned with either red, green, or yellowlight for about three minutes. Each targetidentification bomb carried sixty-one ofthese signal candles, which together madea pattern of colored light approximately100 yards in diameter around or on a tar-get and were designed to be visible fromaltitudes as high as 35,000 feet. To keep thecandles from being disturbed while theywere on the ground, one type of candle hadin its case a small cast-iron cylinder con-taining black powder that would ignite atthe end of the burning time of the candle,that time being from one to two minutes.These sporadic explosions were intendedto keep the enemy from disturbing thecandles as they lay on the ground.57 As theAAF extended its night operations, espe-cially low-level bombing and strafing ofilluminated targets by fighters and lightattack bombers, need arose for ground-burning flares that would produce a mini-mum amount of smoke and thus leave thetargets as clear as possible. For this purposethe Ordnance Department developed flare

56 (1) Catalogue of Standard Ord Items, III, 600-601. (2) OCM 19651, 4 Feb 43; 22298, 9 Dec 43;25381, 12 Oct 44. (3) Ltr, CG AAF Proving GroundCommand, Eglin Field, to CofOrd, 22 Dec 43, sub:Oxidants for M-46 Photoflash Bombs, and ind, 30 Dec43, OO 471.6/1003, DRB AGO. (4) Ltr, Air OrdOff to CofOrd, 20 Sep 44, sub: Bomb, Photoflash,M46, AAF 471.6, DRB AGO. (5) Ltr, Gen Arnold toPresident AAF Bd, 29 Dec 44, sub: Increased Priorityon Photo Flashbomb Projects, AAF 471.6 DRB AGO.(6) Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, pp. 32-33, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

57 (1) OCM 21439, 2 Sep 43; 26238, 4 Jan 45. (2)Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 25 Oct 44, sub: "Pathfinder"Pyrotechnic Requirements. AAF 470.9, DRB AGO.(3) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 31 Oct 44, sub: TargetIdentification Bomb Development, AAF 47 1.6, DRBAGO.


bombs loaded with smokeless units.58 Atthe end of the war Army and Navy expertsagreed that future developments must beaimed at greatly increasing the candle-power, burning time, and visibility of allpyrotechnics, especially the photoflashbomb.59

Problems of High-Altitude Bombing

Meanwhile, the increased heights atwhich new types of aircraft could operateintroduced a new problem in bomb design."Stratosphere" bombing tests conductedat Muroc Army Air Base in the summer of1944 profoundly affected the future of allair-to-ground munitions, bombs, and pyro-technics alike. Ordnance ballisticians foundthat bombs dropped from 35,000 feet, theceiling of the B-17's used in the test,behaved quite differently from thosedropped at lower altitudes. The fin struc-tures did not stand up well, and the bombs,especially the 1,000 and 2,000 pounders,were unstable in flight. This discovery ledto the development of heavier fins as wellas parts for strengthening the fins on bombsalready in the theatres. A result more sig-nificant for the future was the decision ofthe Chief of Air Staff to enlarge and elabo-rate the stratosphere bomb-testing pro-gram in 1945. With the B-29's then avail-able, the Ordnance Department was ablefor the first time to prepare bombing tablesfor altitudes above 35,000 feet. In the un-usually clear air at Muroc the ballisticcamera provided accurate data not onlyfor extreme altitudes but for plane speedsfaster than any previously known. Thefuture design of both bombs and fuzeswould have to be adapted to altitudes upto 60,000 feet, to plane speeds of 600 milesan hour, and to temperatures as low as-65° F.60

The Development Program, 1945

With these adaptations in mind, theOrdnance Department directed its long-range program for fuze development to-ward more versatile fuzes, with the ulti-mate goal a single fuze that would serveevery purpose by adjustment of armingtimes, delay times, sensitivity, and the like.The trend in bomb development generallywas toward fewer but more effective andmore accurate types for use in future air-planes of higher ceilings, faster speeds, andgreater carrying capacity. Specifically, itwas toward larger and more powerfulbombs.61

In Lancaster heavy bombers, modifiedfor the purpose, the Royal Air Force was,by June 1944, using a 12,000-pound bombwith tremendous effect. The blast bomb ofthis size, with approximately 75 percentexplosive content, caused entire buildings

58 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to Kilgore Manufacturing Com-pany, 12 Dec 44 [sub: Bombs, Smokeless, T24E1], OO4 7 1 . 6 2 / 2 7 6 7 . DRB AGO. (2) Ltr, CofOrd to COSouthwestern Proving Ground, 30 Mar 45, sub: Testof Target Identification Bombs, 250 lb T26, OO471.62/2997. DRB AGO.

59 Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, p. 32, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

60 (1) Ibid., p. 8. (2) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 13Sep 44, sub: Bomb and Fuze Requirements for FutureDevelopment, OO 47.1.62/2578, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr,CofOrd to CG AAF, 14 Nov 44, sub: Planes forStratosphere Bombing Trials, OO 452.1/302, DRBAGO. (4) Memo, Gen Barnes for Gen Campbell, 30Nov 44, sub: Bombs for High Altitudes, Barnes-Campbell Correspondence file, DRB AGO. (5) Ltr,CG AAF to CofOrd, 7 Dec 44, sub: Bomb Fin Modi-fications, and inds. 12 Dec 44 and 16 Feb 45, OO471.62/2730, DRB AGO. (6) Ltr, CG AAF toCofOrd, 18 Oct 44, sub: Bombs for Minimum Alti-tude Attacks, OO 471.62/2595, DRB AGO. (7) Ltr,CofOrd to CG AAF, 23 Feb 45, sub: Personnel forHigh Altitude Bombing Program at Muroc Army AirField, OO 471.62/2936, DRB AGO. (8) Ltr, CG AAFto CofOrd, 14 Apr 45, sub: Stratosphere BombingProgram, OO 471.62/3068, DRB AGO.

61 Min, Joint A&N mtg on Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct45, p. 32, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file, OHF.

BOMBS 471

to disintegrate and collapse into rubble.62

In addition to this giant, the British werepreparing early in 1945 a new 12,000-pound bomb called "Tallboy," and a22,000-pound bomb, the "Grand Slam,"to destroy heavily fortified targets such asU-boat pens and underground factories.The 12,000 pounder and the 22,000 pounder were relatively heavy-walled

bombs with approximately 43 percent ex-plosive and were fuzed in the base only.The Army Air Forces saw the possibilitiesof huge earth-penetrating bombs of thesesizes, envisaging them as large generalpurpose bombs to be employed for bothblast and fragmentation effect, as well as tocause cave-ins and earth shock and to reachvital underground installations.63 After astudy of the so-called long bombs, the AirForces Board asked the Ordnance Depart-ment, which already had drawings of theBritish bombs and fuzes, to hasten engi-neering studies on medium and large"pressure vessels," the 12,000-pound and22,000-pound general purpose bombs. Themodels that resulted differed from theirBritish prototypes in being made of steelforgings welded to rolled steel plate, insteadof cast steel. The smaller, 21 feet long, car-ried about 5,600 pounds of explosive; thelarger, 25 feet long, carried about 10,000pounds. The main difference in the designof these bombs and that of the conventionalaircraft bombs was in the tail and finassembly, a slender, hollow cone that tookup almost half the total length of the bomband carried four radial airfoil fins. Therewere three tail fuzes, but no nose fuze. Tosave time, the test models were equippedwith British fuzes and detonators, thoughthe absence of an air-arming feature in theBritish fuze was a disadvantage. On V-JDay the bombs were still in the testingstage.64

The 22,000-pound British Grand Slam,termed "the most destructive missile in thehistory of warfare until the invention of theatom bomb," 65 was the largest explosivebomb employed in World War II. By theend of the war the United States had amodel nearly twice its size. It weighedabout 44,000 pounds, of which 17,600 washigh explosive. Though the ratio of explo-sive charge to weight was only about 41percent, the Ordnance Department placedthis colossus in the general purpose bombcategory. It was loaded with tritonal. Indesign it resembled the Tallboy and GrandSlam, with a tail assembly that took up 122inches of its total 322. By V-J Day severalsamples of the experimental model wereready for testing whenever the B-36bomber became available.66

In the meantime Ordnance engineers,studying ways to correct the unsatisfactoryfeatures that had been of necessity copiedfrom the British Tallboys, designed an air-arming fuze, and new fin assemblies made

62 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 531, 539.(2) Swaney, Bomb Development, p. 292, OHF. (3)Keith Ayling, Bombardment Aviation (Harrisburg,Pennsylvania, 1944), p. 191.

63 (1) Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 9 May 45, sub:Bombs, G. P., Large, OO 471.62/3162, DRB AGO.(2) Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (London, 1947),p. 252.

64 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, p. 367, OHF.(2) Ltr, Air Vice Marshal R. B. Mansell, British AirCommission, to Office CofOrd, 22 Dec 44, sub: British"Tallboy" (Medium) and "Grand Slam"; AmericanPressure Vessel (Medium) and Pressure Vessel(Large), OO 452/78, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, CG AAFto CofOrd, 3 May 45, sub: Bombs, Tallboy, 12,000-Kband 22,000-Kb, OO 452/99, DRB AGO. (4) OCM28279, 5 Jul 45. (5) Min, Joint A&N mtg on ArmyOrd R&D, 1 Oct 45, p. 32, A&N Mtgs, Barnes file,OHF.

65 Harris, op. cit., p. 252.66(1) OCM 27278, 12 Apr 45. (2) Memo, Col

Crosby Field, OCO Chicago, to Chief of Ammo Sup-ply Div, FS, 4 Apr 45. sub: Storage of "Tallboy," OO471.62/2972, DRB AGO. (3) Swaney, Bomb Devel-opment, pp. 370-71. OHF.


of steel instead of aluminum. As the ex-treme length of the British fins presented aproblem of stowage as well as ballistics, theAir Forces suggested collapsible fins. TheOrdnance Department objected on thegrounds that they were not only liable tofailure but would, by the necessary delayin opening, increase the range and deflec-tion errors. On the whole, a long bomb tailwas not economical from the standpoint ofweight of explosives carried. Yet long finsgave the stability needed to place the bombon the target. In efforts to solve the ballis-tics problem, Aberdeen engineers ran su-personic wind-tunnel tests of scaled-downTallboy models to determine just what bal-listic gain was present to offset the loss ofspace. The answer was not found beforethe end of the war. By that time the Ord-nance Department had initiated a long-range project of research on very largebombs. Significantly for all bomb develop-ment, the project covered research on thebest size and shape of bomb to fit in thebomb bays of the future. Henceforth therewould presumably be a closer relationshipbetween the weapon and its carrier.67

Testimony of the World War II Record

The largest bomb dropped by the AAFin World War II, the 4,000-pound blastbomb, would not fit in the bomb bay of theB-17 or the B-24, the heavy bombers em-ployed in European operations, but had tobe carried under the wings. The B-29could carry the 4,000 pounder comfortablyand in quantity, but as that ship did notget into combat until the late spring of1944, it was pre-eminently a Pacificbomber. By the time the B-29 was operat-ing in large numbers, incendiaries formedthe greatest part of its load. The terribleeffectiveness of incendiaries had beenstressed in interim reports of the United

States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS),a group of specialists who had been evalu-ating bomb damage in Europe since shortlyafter the invasion. Their findings showedthat the M47 incendiary of about 100pounds was twelve times as effective, bombfor bomb, as the 500-pound general pur-pose bomb against targets classified asreadily inflammable, and one and a halftimes as effective against targets classifiedas fire-resistant. Another important conclu-sion of USSBS was that precision bombingof the "pin-point" or "pickle-barrel" typewas a myth. Only about 20 percent of thebombs aimed at precision targets fell with-in the target area—a circle of 1,000-feetradius around the aiming point. Thecauses were various: weather conditionsand enemy opposition, time limitations ontraining combat crews, and irregularitiesin equipment. The greatest promise forimprovement in accuracy was the guidedbomb, for whose development the AAF wasresponsible. Except for a brief and verysuccessful experience with Azon bombs inBurma, Allied guided bombs had no influ-ence in World War II.68

67 (1) Swaney, Bomb Development, pp. 368, 370,OHF. (2) Ltr, Dir ATSC to CG AAF, 27 Feb 45, sub:Large Bombs in VHB Aircraft and inds 5, 13 Mar 45,OO 471.62/2933, DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, CG APG toCofOrd. 29 Jun 45, sub: Dispersion of Bombs, OO471.62/3298, DRB AGO. (4) Min, Joint A&N mtgon Army Ord R&D, 1 Oct 45, A&N Mtgs, Barnesfile, OHF. (5) Memo, Brig Gen Joe L. Loutzenheiser,ACofAS, Plans, for ACofAS, Opns, Commitments andRqmts Div. 7 Dec 44, sub: Very Large Bomb Pro-gram, AAF 47 1.6, DRB AGO.

68 The Azon bomb, developed by NDRC, was a1,000-pound general purpose bomb with a radio re-ceiver in its tail that enabled the bombardier to con-trol its flight by radio. It got its name from the factthat it could be guided only to the right or left, thatis, in azimuth only. (1) Baxter, Scientists AgainstTime, pp. 198-99, 289. (2) Third Report of the Command-ing General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War,November 12, 1945, p. 41, Air Force Library. (3) Lin-coln R. Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard. CombatScientists (Boston, 1947), pp. 195-201, 281-84.

BOMBS 473

The performance of the bombs devel-oped by the Ordnance Department wasdifficult to evaluate, especially sincebombers carried mixed loads that con-tained incendiaries as well as high explo-sives; but the record permits several con-clusions. The semi-armor-piercing bombsencountered targets that defeated them.Fragmentation and general purposebombs, on the other hand, generally pos-sessed the four salient characteristics re-quired: the ability to be carried by andlaunched from aircraft; proper flight char-acteristics under conditions of use; suit-ability of the design for mass production,handling, and storage; and, most impor-tant of all, adequate terminal ballisticeffect at the target, that is, power to destroythe objective. Of these the first was largelya matter of aircraft design and thus an AirForces responsibility. Destructive poweralso depended in part on the capacity ofthe bomber to carry a sufficiently bigbomb. On the question of flight stability,Ordnance engineers admitted that severalof the standard bombs were probably nomore than marginally stable and neededmore fin area. Production engineeringproblems were largely solved, especially forthe general purpose bombs, the cases ofwhich could be produced in quantity andmodified to many uses. For example, the250-pound size was adapted for pyrotech-nics, the 500 and 1,000-pound cases werereadily converted to chemical bombs, andthe standard 1,000-pound general purposebomb became an Azon bomb when fittedwith a special tail. Toward the end ofWorld War II the problem of fitting theproximity fuze into existing bombs ledscientists of NDRC to urge that all bombsand fuzes be designed as an entity. Forlogistic reasons the Chief of Ordnancedid not agree, and the newly established

project was canceled in spite of NDRC'sbelief that it would lead to new weapons ofsignificantly greater effectiveness. For therest, the application of new principles ofdesign, such as the shaped-charge bomband the very large bomb, was delayed bythe AAF's lack of interest early in the war.Most of the war was fought with the bombsstandardized in 1941.69

Thus, bomb developments from PearlHarbor onward suffered from want of asound over-all scheme of employment de-termined in advance. Yet no nation atpeace could establish any proved plan.World War I offered neither Air Forces norOrdnance Department guidance in a de-velopment program for World War II, ifonly because the aircraft of the earlierperiod bore scant resemblance to theplanes of the 1940's. Between wars no op-portunity existed to appraise accuratelythe relative merits of blast and fragmenta-tion under various circumstances, ofblockbusters and showers of small bombs,of incendiaries and high explosives, ofsemi-armor-piercing types and shapedcharges. Tests at Aberdeen during the1920's and 1930's were at best simulationsof combat, so that conclusions derivedfrom that evidence were of necessity sub-ject to frequent change when actual fight-ing and unanticipated tactical conditionsshowed earlier assumptions faulty. Hence,during the war, shifts in Air Forces doc-trine canceled development projects half-

69 (1) Graven and Cate, eds, AAF II, p. 245. (2) Ltr,Irvin Stewart, Exec Secy NDRC, to WD Liaison Offwith NDRC, 10 Mar 45. sub: Cancellation of ProjectOD-190 — Development and Design of Bombs andFuzes as an Entity, and ind, 28 Apr 45, OO 62/3122,DRB AGO. (3) Ltr, Col Philip R. Faymonville, WDLiaison Off for NDRC, to NDRC, 4 May 45, samesub, OO 471.62/3149, DRB AGO. (4) Ltr, CG APGto CofOrd, 29 Jun 45, sub: Dispersion of Bombs, OO47 1.62/3298, DRB AGO. (5) Baxter, op. cit., p. 198.


way completed and substituted new onesthat might in turn be quickly abandoned.Experience revealed that many of the nu-merous types of bombs on hand were notwell suited to the purpose for which theyhad to be used, a purpose quite differentfrom that for which they had been orig-inally designed. Partial divorce of casedesign from fuze design, and, far worse,disregard in aircraft design of the shapeand size of the bombs the ship might haveto carry, tended to create confusion thatcould only be resolved by last-minute re-course to makeshifts. In fact, in the lastyear of the war improvisation came to bevirtually the order of the day.

Still, however short of ideal as muni-tions, bombs were far and away the most

important weapons of the Allied air forcesthroughout the war. Questioning of theultimate value of bombarding cities be-hind the battle lines dropped out of sight.Not only did strategic bombing missionsover Europe and, in the last months of thewar, over Japan loom large in Allied oper-ations, tactical bombing and strafingplayed an increasingly big part. In air-to-ground attack machine guns and cannondwindled in importance as the war pro-gressed, while rockets, though coming intoever-wider use, were still too new to rivalbombs. And when the atomic bombs weredropped, most of the world concluded thatbombs would henceforward be the singlemost valuable weapon a belligerent couldemploy.

CHAPTER XVIII

Conservation of Materials

Early Neglect of Conservation

Before World War II, conservation ofmaterials was not a major consideration inthe design of military equipment in theUnited States. In fact, extravagance ratherthan economy was the order of the day.Instead of carefully studying each part of aweapon or vehicle in terms of its militaryfunctions, determining the maximumstrength or wearing quality required of it,and then manufacturing it of the mostreadily available material that providedthe required strength plus a suitable mar-gin for safety, Ordnance designers tendedto specify the highest quality materialavailable thus giving the part strength farin excess of maximum needs. In 1941 asurvey of Ordnance items to discover waysof conserving critical materials revealedthat, in a multitude of parts not subject tohigh stresses, alloy steel was prescribedwhen carbon steel would have been ade-quate, and that electric-furnace steel wasspecified for certain purposes even thoughopen-hearth steel would have been just assatisfactory. This prodigality in the use ofmaterials was not confined to the designersof military equipment but was commonthroughout American industry. Emphasisin military circles on high standards of per-formance under adverse conditions prob-ably influenced military designers to bemore wasteful than their counterparts in

private industry, but openhandedness inemploying material resources was so com-mon before 1941 that it stood virtually asa national characteristic.1

The most obvious reason for this condi-tion was the wealth of resources foundwithin the United States or under the con-trol of friendly, near-by nations such asCanada and Mexico. With an abundantsupply of most essential minerals at handthere was no apparent necessity for par-simony in their use. For the Ordnance De-partment there were also other reasons forneglecting conservation, among them thenational policy that envisaged mobiliza-tion in time of war of a comparativelysmall military force for defense only. Toproduce the munitions that might beneeded by this small force in time of emer-gency, the resources of the United States,with a few exceptions, were certainly morethan adequate. Under such circumstancesthere was no strong pressure for materialsconservation, except for the few items onthe War Department list of strategic ma-terials, and even for those the emphasis

1 (1) Ord Materials Br, Conservation of Materials,Rpt of Progress and Development. 15 Jun 42 (here-after cited as Conservation of Materials), copy inDrawer T-237, Ord Exec Office file, DRB AGO. (2)Intervs, summer 1951, with Col Frye, wartime chiefof Ord Conserv Br. (3) For a critical account of WarDepartment prewar conservation policies, see Indus-trial College of the Armed Forces, Study R87, Con-servation Within the ASF, particularly pp. 125ff,ICAF Library.


was on building up a reserve stockpilerather than on curtailing their use.2

In some instances, designers in the pre-war years chose a critical material for aspecific use without giving due consider-ation to the fact that some other, noncrit-ical, material would have been just assatisfactory. Metallurgical developmentsin industry were proceeding so rapidly andalong so many different lines that it wasoften impossible for Ordnance designers,who were not themselves metallurgists, tomake intelligent choices among materials;and, since conservation of materials wasnot emphasized, metallurgists and produc-tion engineers did not normally partic-ipate in the process of selecting materialsor designs for new items of equipment. Be-cause of the high cost of experimenting andtesting, and because of the insistent de-mand for dependability in weapons, de-signers generally took a conservative stand,reasoning that it was more economical, atleast in the short run, to continue the useof tried and proven materials and manu-facturing methods than to experiment withsubstitutes. "If our designs, as some peoplehave said, were 'wrapped around a millingmachine,' " General Campbell wrote, "it•was because we simply could not affordproduction-engineering studies of our vari-ous models or pilots." 3 In some cases sub-stitute materials and mass-productionprocesses that would have saved criticalmaterials, man-hours, and machine-tooltime on quantity production were not usedbefore the war because they could not beeconomically applied to the small-scaleproduction of the peace years. In othercases, critical material needed in only oneor two parts of a weapon was also specifiedfor several other parts for the sole purposeof maintaining production of the smallquantity actually required each year.4

This is not to say, however, that theOrdnance Department neglected metal-lurgical research before World War II. Formany years, as the Army agency havingprimary interest in the use of metals, it hadcarried on intensive metallurgical testingprograms at its arsenals and laboratories.As early as 1873 it had established a metal-lurgical testing laboratory at WatertownArsenal, and during the years before andafter World War I Ordnance pioneered inthe development of molybdenum high-speed tool steel, in the use of macroetch-test and radiographic-inspection methods,in welding constructional steels, in deter-mining the effects of cold working and lowtemperatures on the physical properties ofsteel, and in studying the causes of seasoncracking of brass.5 There were laboratoriesat all the manufacturing arsenals where,within the limitations of the budget, metal-lurgical research pertaining to Ordnancematerials was carried on. But the emphasiswas not placed primarily on conservation.

The War Department had carried oncontinuous studies of sources of strategicand critical materials 6 for many years pre-

2 For further information on prewar military con-servation policy, see: (1) ASF Manual M-104, Strate-gic and Critical Raw Materials; (2) G. A. Roush,Strategic Mineral Supplies (New York, 1939); and (3)Significant Papers Expressing Stockpiling Policy ofthe Military Services, folder in ASF Resources andProduction Div files, DRB AGO.

3 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 292.4 Conservation of Materials, p. 2, DRB AGO.5 (1) Summary of the War Department's Metallur-

gical Research and Development during World WarII, p. 13, OHF. (2) Armor Plate Development andProduction 1940-45. pp. 43-45, OHF.

6 The words "strategic" and "critical" were oftenloosely used as interchangeable in discussions of ma-terials, but the Army and Navy Munitions Board inthe prewar years defined the former as "those mate-rials essential to the national defense for the supplyof which in war, dependence must be placed in whole,or in part, on sources outside the continental limitsof the United States, and for which strict controlmeasures will be necessary." Critical materials were

CONSERVATION OF MATERIALS 477

ceding the outbreak of World War II, butnot until the early months of 1941 did itissue specific instructions on conservingcertain widely used metals. On 25 Febru-ary 1941 the Under Secretary of Warwrote to the chiefs of all the supply armsand services calling their attention to theneed for conserving zinc, and during thenext three months he issued similar memo-randa on conserving aluminum, nickel,and tungsten. During this period the Officeof Production Management, created inJanuary 1941 and later replaced by theWar Production Board, also took an in-terest in the matter and established a con-servation section to promote the adoptionby industry and government of measuresto conserve scarce materials. Shortly afterthe President's declaration of a state of un-limited national emergency on 27 May1941, the Under Secretary of War estab-lished a conservation section within hisoffice headed by an Ordnance officer, Maj.Norris G. Kenny, and issued a directive toall the supply arms and services outliningthe War Department conservation policy.7

Principles of the Conservation Program

Long before these steps were taken theOrdnance Department, on its own initia-tive, had organized a conservation sectionand had established the basic principles ofits conservation program. In October 1940,as the multibillion-dollar defense produc-tion program was getting under way, Maj.John H. Frye, an industrial metallurgist incivilian life, was assigned to the staff ofGeneral Barnes to promote effective uti-

lization of materials in Ordnance produc-tion.8 Major Frye was soon joined by otherofficers and civilian specialists and duringthe early months of 1941 this small groupinitiated studies leading to the revision ofmany specifications for the purpose of con-serving critical material. In February 1942conservation sections were established ineach operating branch of the IndustrialService, with over-all co-ordination of theirefforts centered in Major Frye's section.9

The Ordnance conservation effort wasborn of necessity, and was intensely prac-tical in nature. From its beginning in late1940, the program was geared to the con-stant fluctuations in the supplies of a widerange of essential materials, and was de-signed to keep war production going inspite of shortages. When faced with inade-quate supplies of various materials neededfor the manufacture of munitions, Ord-nance adopted the policy of economizingwherever possible to make its limited allo-cations of critical materials cover all es-sential requirements. It was recognizedthat too much devoted to one use wouldinevitably mean too little available forsomething else. "We were not saving ma-terials just for the sake of saving them,"Colonel Frye once remarked. "We weresaving critical materials on items wherethey were not needed so we would haveenough for other items where these mate-rials were needed." 10

Perhaps the most important principleunderlying the Ordnance conservation ac-tivities in World War II was that substitu-

those that were expected to pose similar but lessserious procurement problems. See statement by Col.Harry K. Rutherford, OASW, in Hearings Before theCommittee on Military Affairs, HR, 76th Gong, 1st Sess,pp. 108ff.

7 Memo, OUSW for Chiefs of Supply Arms andServices, 11 Jun 41, sub: Conservation of Certain. . . Materials, ASF Purchases Div 400.8, DRBAGO.

8 (1) Hisc of Materials Branch, Pt. II, OHF. (2)Interv with Col Frye, 18 Jul 51.

9 Ord Office Memo 589, 12 Feb 42, OHF.10 Interv with Col Frye, 18 Jul 51.


tions were to be made only after a carefulengineering analysis of each affected itemof equipment. No attempt was made tointroduce sweeping changes without tak-ing into consideration the military func-tions of each item, and the Ordnance De-partment resisted efforts by higher head-quarters to impose such changes. "It canreadily be appreciated," General Barnesonce wrote, "that mandatory edicts orwholesale substitutions are inconsistentwith sound engineering design. Most warmaterial was designed in times of plentifulmaterials. To change these designs now, itis necessary that the service functions andthe nature of stresses involved be con-sidered for each part." ll

In this process of studying equipmentwith an eye to substituting less critical ma-terials, Ordnance engineers were, of course,required to maintain unimpaired the mili-tary characteristics of each item. Conserva-tion was not to be practiced at the cost oflowered efficiency, except in cases of direnecessity. The term "downgrading" wassometimes used to describe the substitutionprocess, but it was not a fairly descriptiveterm. The purpose of the substitution wasto eliminate waste caused by improper useof scarce materials; it was not a matter oflowering the quality of any item by makingit of inferior material. When, to cite onesimple example, the trigger guard of the.30-caliber M1 rifle was changed fromchrome-vanadium steel to molybdenumsteel, the rifle continued to be just as goodas it ever was. Molybdenum steel providedall the strength required in a trigger guard;nothing was to be gained by making theguard any stronger, and critical materialswere wasted when chromium and vana-dium were used to gain unnecessary addedstrength.

Another guiding principle of Ordnance

conservation activities was co-operationwith industry. At virtually every step inthe process, industrial specialists contrib-uted to the solution of difficult problems.Hundreds of companies working on Ord-nance contracts developed new designs orimproved production methods to savelabor, machine-tool time, and critical ma-terials. Materials-saving suggestions fromcontractors and their employees were so-licited by the Ordnance Department, par-ticularly in the latter half of 1942, throughpublication of promotional literature thatdescribed the need for conservation andlisted specific examples of design changesalready adopted to save time and ma-terials.12

In a more orderly manner, the resourcesof large sections of American industry wereput at the disposal of the Ordnance De-partment through its day-by-day co-opera-tion with trade associations and engineer-ing societies. Through these organizationsOrdnance was able to tap the best engi-neering talent in the country to aid in solv-ing its problems. When, for example, needarose for developing a special kind of steel,members of the American Iron and SteelInstitute were called upon for help; whenthe problem concerned trucks or combatvehicles, the Society of Automotive Engi-neers came to the rescue; when it con-cerned plastics, rubber, die-casting, metal-stamping, phenolic finishes, or any other

11 Memo, Gen Barnes for Mr. Glancy, OUSW, 28Feb 42, sub: Conservation . . . Materials. OO 400/4949, DRB AGO.

12 The first pamphlet of this kind was "Tremen-dous Trifles," published by the Ordnance Depart-ment in August 1942. It was followed by two similarpublications. "Metalurgency" in October 1942 and"Battlenecks"' in January 1943. Copies are in Historyof Production Service Branch, OHF. One of the mostenergetic promoters of this suggestion program wasMr. George E. Whitlock, a prominent industrialistwho received the first civilian award from the Armyfor his conservation efforts.


major material or industrial process, theappropriate industry association lent aid.

When Ordnance made its first monthlyreport to the newly formed conservationunit in the Office of the Under Secretaryof War in August 1941, only four materialswere separately reported on: silk, alumi-num, chlorine, and zinc.13 The reportstated that Ordnance had taken steps toconserve silk by experimentally replacingit with cotton or rayon in powder bags, toconserve chlorine by changing the bleach-ing specifications for certain types of paper,and to conserve zinc by using porcelain-coated roofing and siding sheets in place ofgalvanized sheets and terne (lead-tin alloy)sheets. With aluminum, efforts were beingmade to substitute other materials wher-ever possible, and an investigation wasunder way to determine whether primaryaluminum could be saved by manufactur-ing some items of secondary aluminum byusing the die-casting process. In additionto these specific steps, the report declaredthat Frankford Arsenal had recently issueda hundred-page booklet entitled "Mate-rials Specifications Handbook for Use ofDesign Engineers of Ordnance Equipmentin Selecting Emergency Substitute Mate-rials." 14

Although it did not mention all the con-servation activities that were under discus-sion or in progress at the time, the reportclearly indicated that the Ordnance con-servation program was just getting underway in August 1941.15 A great deal of un-certainty was still in the air, both as tofuture production goals and as to the needfor drastic conservation measures. Short-ages had not yet become acute and thenation was still at peace. Plans for a hugemunitions production program had beenformulated, but everything was still on amore or less tentative basis.

With the attack on Pearl Harbor thewhole situation changed overnight. Therewas uncertainty for a long time as to theprecise requirements of the armed forcesand as to national production goals, buteveryone knew in December 1941 that warproduction would soon shift into high gearand that demands for critical materialswould reach hitherto unheard-of propor-tions. The outbreak of war made the needfor conservation of materials not onlynecessary but urgent, particularly for theOrdnance Department and its contractors.

The Ordnance conservation programencompassed an almost infinite variety ofmaterials and manufacturing processes. InJanuary 1940 the Army and Navy Muni-tions Board approved a list of fourteenstrategic materials and fifteen critical ma-terials, nearly all of them used in greateror less degree in the production or storageof munitions.16 But the bulk of the Ord-nance conservation effort was concen-trated on four materials: alloy steel, cop-per, aluminum, and rubber. As efforts toconserve each of these materials were mademore or less independently, although con-currently, they are here discussed sepa-rately.17

13 Memo, CofOrd for Planning Br, OUSW, 11 Aug41, sub: Conservation of Strategic Materials, OO400/2221 , DRB AGO. This memo was signed byMajor Frye and Maj. W. P. Rawles, who were jointlyresponsible for maintaining liaison with the OUSWon conservation.

14 This publication was also mentioned in the an-nual report for 1941 of the Assistant Chief of Indus-trial Services, Research and Engr Br, pp. 35-36,OHF.

15 In comparison, see Conservation of Materials,the 165-page report of 15 June 1942, cited in foot-note 1.

16 The Strategic and Critical Materials, Army andNavy Munitions Board. March 1940, ASF Require-ments and Production Div G-1927, DRB AGO.

17 Much detailed information on the various con-servation measures adopted by Ordnance is contained


Steel and Its Alloys

During World War II no metal wasmore widely used by the Ordnance De-partment than steel. Literally hundreds ofitems ranging from small bullet cores tolarge bombs, heavy guns, trucks, and tankswere made primarily of steel. During 1942and 1943 Ordnance used steel at the rateof more than one million ingot tons amonth and took from 50 to 65 percent ofall steel allotted to the Army. A conserva-tive estimate of the total quantity of steelused for Ordnance production between1940 and 1945 is 50 million tons.

Fortunately, the steel industry was oneof the largest and most highly developedeconomic enterprises in the United Statesat the beginning of World War II and wasable to supply the huge quantities neededfor war production. In 1940 Americancompanies produced over 65 million ingottons of steel and productive capacity roserapidly until by 1944 nearly 90 millioningot tons were produced, more than threetimes the annual German output. TheOrdnance program was never seriouslyhampered by lack of steel, although occa-sional difficulties arose from faulty dis-tribution. In 1942-43 sufficient steel wasavailable to permit manufacture of steelcartridge cases when the shortage of brassbecame acute, the production of steel tanktracks to conserve rubber, and adoption ofsteel ammunition boxes when other mate-rials proved unsatisfactory. As far as Ord-nance was concerned, the pinch came onlyin certain types of steel for which the de-mand in war greatly exceeded normal

peacetime production. These types pos-sessed qualities of hardness, elasticity,toughness, or ease of fabrication that madethem particularly valuable in the manu-facture of munitions. Armor plate, for ex-ample, had to be hard enough to stopenemy projectiles; armor-piercing am-munition had to be even harder to pene-trate enemy armor. The pins that held atank track together had to have long-wear-ing qualities, while the steel used in truckcabs and fenders had to be soft and pliableenough to be formed between dies.

Long before World War II, metallurgistshad succeeded in producing steels withthese characteristics, but only by makingliberal use of ferroalloys. After Pearl Har-bor, and to some extent even before thatdate, this practice was threatened by ashortage of both alloys and electric-furnacecapacity. At the time that military require-ments were skyrocketing, the United Statessteel industry found itself cut off from mostof its foreign sources of tungsten, chro-mium, vanadium, manganese, and otherferroalloys.18 Even with the more accessiblemetals such as nickel and molybdenum thedemand for a time greatly exceeded thecapacity of existing productive facilities.To meet war production schedules underthese circumstances, Ordnance and in-dustry introduced a rigid conservationprogram guided by three fundamentalprinciples: substitution of other materialsfor alloy steel; improvement of manufac-turing processes to reduce waste; and morewidespread use of low-alloy steels.

Even with plain carbon steel, which con-tained no scarce alloys and was relativelyabundant, Ordnance engineers endeav-

in two sources: Conservation of Materials, DRBAGO. and Quarterly Review of Materials and Con-servation Progress, prepared by the Materials Branchof the Technical Division, OCO (hereafter referred toas Quarterly Review), DRB AGO.

18 For a detailed report on supplies of ferroalloysearly in the war. see memo, USW for CofOrd, 19 Feb42, sub: Conservation of Ferro-Alloy Metals, OO470.1/8, DRB AGO.


CHART 10—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF STEEL USED, BY ARMY AGENCY: 3d QUARTER,1942 AND 1943*

*Total Army monthly average use in 3d Quarter of 1943 was 1,834,000 ingot tons: 1942 was 1,930,000 ingot tons.**Transportation, Quartermaster, and other Army agencies.

Source: Quarterly Review (December 1943), Charts 3-A and 3-B, DRB AGO.

ored to avoid waste, using equally satis-factory and more readily available sub-stitutes when they could be found. Butfinding a suitable substitute was not alwaysa simple matter. It involved careful con-sideration of many factors such as relativecost, ease of manufacture, and effect onproduction of conversion to the new mate-rial. The most outstanding example of thiskind of substitution in Ordnance produc-tion during World War II was the use ofwood to replace steel in truck and trailerbodies. The substitution of wood for steelin the 2½-ton truck reduced the numberof pounds of steel per body from 1,700 to700; in the 1½ ton truck the reduction wasfrom 1,275 to 600 pounds per body. Whenmultiplied by the thousands of trucks andtrailers produced for the Army during thewar, the savings were estimated at 75,000

tons in 1942 and more than 350,000 tonsin 1943. Initiated by the Motor TransportService of the Quartermaster Corps earlyin the war period, this project was con-tinued after the MTS was transferred toOrdnance in August 1942 and proved tobe the second largest source of steel con-servation in the Ordnance productionprogram.19

The measure adopted by Ordnancewhich ranked first as a steel-saver was nota matter of substitution or change in de-sign but a refinement in the manufactur-ing process. Next to tanks and trucks,Ordnance used more steel for high-explo-sive shells than for any other class of items,and achieved its largest saving of steel by

19 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart 5,DRB AGO. See also Army Ordnance, XXIII, 135(1942), 525.


the simple device of decreasing the weighttolerance of shell forgings as contractorsgained experience and improved theirforging techniques.20 By observing closertolerances, industry not only saved thou-sands of tons of steel in the course of asingle year but also saved countless man-hours and machine-hours because theforgings required less machining.21 Similarsavings were made in hundreds of otherinstances. In the Birmingham District, forexample, the 155-mm. shell-lifting plugwas redesigned as a hollow cup ratherthan a solid block. The change cut theweight of the plug from about 28 ounces to10. It saved over 300 tons of steel in theproduction of one million plugs and at thesame time eliminated shrinks from thecastings. With the 81-mm. mortar shell,large savings of steel resulted from a com-bination of a change in design and an im-proved method of fabrication. Instead offorming the hollow shell by machiningfrom a solid forging, two drawn steel sec-tions were welded together. The result wasa saving on 1943 procurement of 6,000tons of steel and 750,000 machine-hours. 22

No matter what steps were taken, how-ever, there was simply no substitute forsteel in the great majority of Ordnanceitems. Scattered marginal savings werepossible in all classes of munitions, butthere could be no wholesale substitution ofany other material. As a result, on a per-centage basis the over-all conservation ofsteel by Ordnance was small—less than 5percent of the computed requirement of 14million tons for the year 1943. But that 5percent amounted to 622,000 tons, roughlyequal to the weight of finished steel in13,000 medium tanks. During 1942, beforesteel conservation measures had becomefully effective, the saving amounted to96,000 tons.23

More important than the over-all savingof plain carbon steel was the saving ofstrategic alloys, particularly nickel, chro-mium, vanadium, tungsten, and molyb-denum. Here the Ordnance Departmentmade an impressive record. A comparisonof 1943 requirements for nickel as com-puted before and after conservation meas-ures were applied shows a drop from40,000 tons to 14,000 tons; with vanadiumthe same comparison shows a drop fromnearly 750 tons to 250 tons; with molybde-num a reduction from 10,500 tons to 8,000tons. The saving of molybdenum was com-paratively small because, at the beginningof the war production program, molybde-num was abundant and was freely used asa substitute for other ferroalloys. It was notuntil the summer of 1942 that this in-creased use of molybdenum caused ashortage for a few months and brought theneed for conservation measures.24

Ordnance had two primary uses fortungsten—ammunition, and tool and diesteels. As early as spring 1941 the arsenalswere directed to reduce their use of tung-sten in tools and dies wherever possible,but the savings in this area were neces-sarily limited.25 It was in production ofarmor-piercing small arms bullet cores,and in certain types of artillery ammuni-tion, that the greatest savings were made.At the beginning of the defense period an

20 Conservation of Materials, pp. 13 1-32, DRBAGO. See also Barnes Diary, 28 Apr 42, OHF.

21 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart5-B, DRB AGO.

22 For these and many other examples, see "Tre-mendous Trifles," "Metalurgency," and "Battle-necks," Hist of Production Serv Br, OHF.

23 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart 5-A,DRB AGO.

24 Ibid., Charts 8, 9, and 10.25 Ltr, Barnes to Arsenal Commanders, 24 Apr 41,

sub: Conservation of Tungsten, copy in Conserva-tion of Materials, App. 24, DRB AGO.


electric-furnace steel known as WD 74100,containing up to 4 percent tungsten, wasused for all armor-piercing small armscores, although Frankford Arsenal andWatertown Arsenal had experimentedwith many other types of steel during the1920's and 1930's and had found some tobe nearly as good as the tungsten steel.26

As the volume of small arms productionrose steadily in 1940 and early 1941 andtungsten became extremely scarce, Ord-nance switched from tungsten steel tomanganese-molybdenum steel for armor-piercing cores. This effected an estimatedsaving of over 7,500 tons of tungsten in1942-43 production.27 When electric-fur-nace steel-making capacity became criti-cal, Ordnance engineers discovered theycould make satisfactory cores for both .30-caliber and .50-caliber ammunition fromopen - hearth manganese - molybdenumsteel. Later, acceptable .30-caliber coreswere made from high-grade carbon steelwithout the addition of any alloys at all.As a result of these efforts, satisfactorybullet cores were produced without usingeither critical alloys or electric-furnacecapacity—and, in the process, the rate ofproduction increased and the cost per unitdecreased.28

Among the military agencies, Ordnancetook the lead in conserving steel and itsalloys, but the development of low-alloysteels was a broad national effort in whichthe Department was but one keenly inter-ested participant.29 The American Ironand Steel Institute, the War ProductionBoard, and many other agencies, bothpublic and private, co-operated in produc-ing, testing, and cataloguing many typesof steels using minimum quantities ofscarce alloys, the so-called National Emer-gency (NE) steels. These steels not onlyused less of the alloying elements but were

compounded with alloy scrap to savevirgin alloy metals. Ordnance adoptedand used these lower-alloy steels in thou-sands of items and parts of items withoutsacrificing performance capabilities. On asingle piece of equipment the savingbrought by the substitution was oftensmall, but when multiplied by millions ofitems it added up to substantial quanti-ties of scarce material. When, for example,a National Emergency steel was substi-tuted for a chrome-vanadium steel in theoperating rod handle of the M1 rifle, thesaving in the course of a year amountedto several tons of chromium and vanadiumon this one part alone. In the 90-mm.antiaircraft gun several parts were madeof low-alloy NE steels and others of plaincarbon steel with an estimated saving dur-ing 1943 of 150 tons of critical nickel. Inbreechblocks for the 75-mm. and 76-mm.guns the quantity of nickel required perthousand blocks was reduced from 3,500pounds to 700 pounds, and proportionatereductions were made in recoil, recuper-ator, and counterrecoil cylinders. In theproduction of .50-caliber and .30-calibermachine guns, large savings resulted fromthe use of pearlitic malleable iron cast-ings.30 The ease with which this type ofmalleable iron could be fabricated made itparticularly valuable for machine gun pro-duction and led to its substitution for alloy

26 Ltr, CO Watertown Arsenal to CofOrd. 4 Nov40, OO 470.1 /130, DRB AGO.

27 Conservation of Materials, p. 145, DRB AGO.28 Ord Materials Br, Summary of War Depart-

ment's Metallurgical Research and Development dur-ing World War II, p. 29, OHF. See also Conserva-tion of Materials, p. 145, DRB AGO.

29 See Col. John H. Frye. "Development and Ap-plication of Military and Special Steels for OrdnancePurposes," a paper read before the General Meetingof the American Iron and Steel Institute, 25 May 44,OHF.

30 Conservation of Materials, pp. 125-26, DRBAGO.


steel in the trunnion blocks and in the side,top, and bottom plates of the caliber .30and caliber .50. Use of castings in place ofmachined steel forgings for each heavy-barrel .50-caliber weapon saved, in weightof material machined off, 37 pounds aswell as considerable manpower and ma-chine-tool time, both of which were criti-cal. 31

Important as such savings were, how-ever, the greatest conservation of steelalloys was not made in small arms or artil-lery items but in tanks, trucks, and artilleryammunition. Ordnance used more steel ofall kinds for tanks and trucks than for anyother single purpose — approximately7,000,000 tons during 1943. For artilleryammunition it consumed over 4,000,000tons during that year as compared withless than 1,000,000 tons for artillery andapproximately 1,550,000 for small arms.32

In tank production, the greatest savingsof strategic metals were made by usinglow-alloy armor plate. At the start of theWorld War II production program it wasnot customary for the Ordnance Depart-ment to specify the chemical compositionof the armor plate it purchased, nor to pre-scribe the processing methods used bymanufacturers. The only requirement wasone of performance. Each armor producerused a steel-making formula that differedin some respects from those used by otherarmor producers. But all the compositionshad one characteristic in common: allwere rich in nickel, chromium, and vana-dium, some containing as much as 5 per-cent nickel.33 "The main consideration,"wrote the Ordnance Materials Branch,"was to produce good armor plate with-out regard to cost or strategic alloys." 34

In 1941, when the Tank and CombatVehicle Division of Ordnance surveyed theformulas used by manufacturers of armor

plate and compared the quantities of ferro-alloys required for each tank with theexisting schedules for tank production, itbecame apparent at once that sufficientquantities of alloys would not be availableto produce tanks with such steel. The samesurvey supported the idea that ratherlarge reductions in the alloy content ofarmor plate could be made without lower-ing the ballistic quality. Shortly after PearlHarbor, when the shortage of steel alloysbecame acute, Ordnance directed itsarmor producers to keep their use of alloysbelow certain percentages. At the sametime, because there were not enough facil-ities to produce rolled armor in the enor-mous quantities needed for the tank pro-gram, Ordnance turned to the use of cast-steel armor. Thousands of ballistic testsproved that cast-steel armor was morethan 90 percent as efficient as rolledarmor, and that it had distinct advantageswhen the design called for curved surfaces.Acceptable cast armor was made withoutany vanadium and with only .5 percentnickel and .5 percent chromium.35 Changesin armor composition brought the need fordeveloping new welding materials andtechniques, since low-alloy armor couldnot be successfully welded by the same

31 (1) Small Arms Div Ind Serv, Hist of U.S.Machine Guns, Caliber .30 and .50, pp. 139-44,

OHF. (2) Monthly Rpts of Maj Frye to Chief ofServ Br, Tech Div, OO 319.1, DRB AGO.

32 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart 5-B,DRB AGO.

33 Conservation of Materials, p. 134, DRB AGO.34 Ord Materials Br, Summary of the War Depart-

ment's Metallurgical Research and Development dur-ing World War II, p. 20. OHF. For a discussion ofarmor and its production, see Armor Plate, Develop-ment and Production, 1940-45, OHF.

35 (1) Conservation of Materials, pp. 134-35, DRBAGO. (2) Ord Materials Br, Summary of the WarDepartment's Metallurgical Research and Develop-ment dur ing World War II, pp. 19-22, OHF. (3)Armor Plate. Development and Production, 1940-45,OHF.


CHART 11—STEEL ALLOYS REQUIRED PER MEDIUM TANK (M4) WITH AND WITHOUTCONSERVATION MEASURES

methods used with high-alloy armor.36

In analyzing the automotive componentsof tanks—the transmissions and differen-tials as distinguished from armor plate andguns—the Society of Automotive EngineersWar Engineering Board gave invaluableassistance. This board was composed oftop-flight engineers from all the leadingautomobile companies, and its purpose wasto make available to the Army, withoutcost and with a minimum of red tape, thebest technical advice on automotive engi-neering. Among scores of projects under-taken by this board for the OrdnanceDepartment was one designed to reducethe quantities of critical materials used intanks. In September 1942 the War Engi-neering Board appointed four subcommit-tees to study conservation of materials in

the tank—one committee each for track,suspension, transmission and final drive,and miscellaneous (turret, gun mount,traversing and elevating mechanism).37

Each committee determined the maximumstress to which each part would be sub-jected while in use and recommended thatit be made of steel just strong enough to dothe job required of it. In 1943 alone, it wasestimated that the work of these commit-tees on the M4 tank resulted in the savingof 3,500 tons of nickel, 1,000 tons ofchromium, and 500 tons of molybdenum.38

36 Arsenal Laboratory Research Record, Ch. IX,Welding, OHF.

37 Unconfirmed Min of Mtg of Chairman's SteelCommittee of SAE War Engineering Board at theRackham Building in Detroit, 29 Sep 42, OHF.

38 Ltr, Norman G. Shidle, Exec Ed of The SAE Jour-nal, to Col Frye, 3 Aug 43, OHF.


In artillery ammunition, one of theearliest and largest savings resulted fromthe elimination of nickel in 75-mm. and3-inch armor-piercing-capped shot. Beforethe war, shell manufacturers had used steelcontaining a high percentage of nickel,averaging 3.5 percent, but, as tests showedthat nickel was not needed to produce shotwith the required ballistic properties, theuse of nickel steel in shot bodies was dis-continued in April and May 1942.39 Ac-cording to estimates, during the nexteighteen months this one change savednearly 4,000 tons of nickel. A similarchange was made in the smaller 37-mm.armor-piercing-capped shot bodies; a steelcontaining up to 4 percent tungsten wasreplaced by a chrome-molybdenum steelwhen tungsten became very scarce. In thelatter half of 1942 the Ammunition Branchcarried on an important project to con-serve molybdenum in the production ofbomb bodies. Ordnance engineers deter-mined that, by using heat treatment, itwas possible to make satisfactory bombbodies from plain carbon steel, and afterthe first of May 1943 all bomb steel was ofthis type. The saving of molybdenum dur-ing 1943 exceeded 1,000 tons.40

The success of Ordnance efforts to con-serve ferroalloys was officially recognizedin the spring of 1943 by the commandinggeneral of the Army Service Forces. Inresponse to a memorandum from GeneralCampbell outlining some of the achieve-ments of the Department in conservingsteel alloys, and reporting arrangementsthat had been made to place British andCanadian technical representatives onvarious Ordnance conservation commit-tees, General Somervell wrote: "Congratu-lations on the splendid results achieved inconservation of critical materials by theOrdnance Department as outlined in yourmemorandum. . . . You are to be com-

mended for extending these conservationactivities to our Allies by placing Britishand Canadian technical representatives onOrdnance Department committees." 41

Copper and Its Alloys

Of the nonferrous metals, Ordnanceused more copper than anything else. Itused more copper than all the other tech-nical services combined, taking between75 and 85 percent of the entire Army allot-ment. The bulk of the copper allotted toOrdnance early in the war went to makebrass cartridge cases, and to make gildingmetal, another copper-zinc alloy, for smallarms bullet jackets. Early in 1942, as re-quirements for ammunition mounted intothe billions of rounds, Ordnance produc-tion schedules called for the use of 800,000tons of copper in 1942, and nearly twicethat amount during 1943.

During the 1920's and 1930's copperand zinc had not been considered by theWar Department as strategic materialsthat might be unavailable in time of war.42

It was recognized that tremendous quanti-ties of copper would be required for am-munition, naval vessels, and electricalequipment, but, as the United States wasa leading producer of copper and South

39 Conservation of Materials, pp. 149-50, DRBAGO. Copies of pertinent directives are in the appen-dix of this work.

40 Memo, Col Frye for Chief of Serv Br, Tech Div,10 Apr 43, sub: Report on Conservation, OO 3 19.1,DRB AGO.

41 (1) Memo, CG SOS for CofOrd, 5 Mar 43, sub:Conservation of Critical Ferro-Alloys, OO 470.1/294,DRB AGO. (2) Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS, 6 Feb43. sub: Conservation of Critical Ferro-Alloys, OO400.12/3552, DRB AGO. Copies of both memos inBarnes file, OHF.

42 See historical tabulation of strategic materialslists, Capt. G. K. Heiss, "Why a Raw Material Re-serve?" Army Ordnance, XX, 115 (1939), 32.


CHART 12—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF COPPER USED, BY ARMY AGENCY:4TH QUARTER, 1943*

*CMP budgeted allotment to Army was for a monthly average use of 163,721 tons.**Transportation, Quartermaster, and other Army Agencies.

Source: Quarterly Review (December 1943), Chart 18-B, DRB AGO.

America was a major foreign source ofsupply and one from which the UnitedStates was not likely to be cut off in time ofwar, the possibility of a crippling shortageseemed remote.43 Even as late as January1940 copper and zinc were not included oneither the strategic or critical lists preparedby the Army and Navy Munitions Board,but after adoption of a multibillion-dollarmunitions production program in the sum-mer of 1940 the picture began to change.In the spring of 1941, with lend-lease re-quirements added to the needs of UnitedStates forces, Ordnance was informed thatzinc was henceforth to be used only whenno satisfactory substitute could be found,and during the summer the threat of aneventual copper shortage had to be con-sidered.

The Ordnance program to conservecopper during World War II covered a

wide front and involved innumerable sub-stitutions and design changes. Some nettedlarge savings while others brought onlysmall reductions in requirements, but theyall helped in some measure to stretch theavailable supply. A booster for high-explosive shells, for example, was con-verted from brass bar stock to a steelstamping with estimated savings of 83,000tons of brass in 1943 production. Changinga gasoline tank cap and strainer from amachined brass casting to a low-carbonsteel stamping for certain types of vehiclessaved several hundred tons of brass, andsubstitution of steel for copper in radiatorsof trucks netted even greater savings.44

43 Memo, SW for Secy Interior, 15 Feb 35, ASFResources and Production Div 470.1/129.6, DRBAGO.

44 (1) "Tremendous Trifles," OHF. (2) QuarterlyReview (December, 1943), DRB AGO. (3) Hist ofDevelopment Br, OCO-D, IV, OHF.


CHART 13—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF COPPER USED BY ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, BYTYPE OF MATÉRIEL: 4TH QUARTER, 1943*

*CMP budgeted allotment to Ordnance Department was for a monthly average of 122,627 tons.

Source: Quarterly Review (December 1943), Chart 19-B, DRB AGO.

Steel Cartridge Cases

The Ordnance Department's most far-reaching effort to conserve copper was theprogram to manufacture cartridge casesof steel instead of brass. Before 1940 car-tridge cases had been made almost exclu-sively of brass because only brass possessedthe peculiar physical characteristics re-quired. The wall of the case, for example,must be elastic enough to expand underpressure and then contract instantly whenthe pressure is released. The expansion isnecessary to provide obturation duringfiring, that is, a tight seal against thebreech wall of the weapon to prevent anygases from being driven back into thebreech. After firing, the empty case mustsnap back to its original size so that it maybe readily ejected from the gun. Because of

the high pressures generated within thecase when the powder ignites, the casemust have great tensile strength at thehead end, but the mouth must be annealedto much lesser strength to permit the nec-essary expansion. Cartridge cases made ofbrass not only met these exacting require-ments but also possessed other advantages.They did not rust when exposed to the ele-ments. After firing, brass artillery casescould be cleaned and used over and overagain. Brass cases were relatively easy tomanufacture and a well-established brassindustry stood ready to supply the essentialalloy stock for the purpose.45

The manufacture of steel cases was not

45 For a description of manufacturing methods andrequirements, see Charles O. Herb, "Steel CartridgeCases from a Chase Brass Plant," Machinery, Vol. 50,No. 2 (October, 1943).


altogether new in 1941, but it was nearlyso. A few steel cases for artillery ammuni-tion had been made in the United Statesand Germany during World War I, but theresults had not been altogether satisfactoryin either country.46 Because of the abun-dant supplies of copper and zinc availableto the United States, and the many diffi-culties inherent in the use of steel cases,little attention was paid to the matter dur-ing the years between the wars. In 1939and 1940 a few cases made of seamless steeltubing were submitted to the OrdnanceDepartment by commercial producers fortest but none proved satisfactory. As a re-sult, when Ordnance engineers and repre-sentatives of industry were suddenly facedin 1941 with the problem of manufacturingsteel cases they had to begin virtually fromscratch.

The problems involved seemed at first tobe insurmountable. It was, of course,essential that the steel case be just as effec-tive as the brass. No substitution that im-paired the performance of ammunition incombat could even be considered. Further,the steel case had to be perfectly inter-changeable with the brass case in order tosimplify its use on the battlefield. Toachieve these results, it was necessary todevelop a new type of steel with the elas-ticity required of cartridge cases—and doit without using appreciable quantities ofcritical alloying elements or scarce heat-treating equipment. New techniques fordeep drawing steel had to be devised andtested, and a protective coating had to bedeveloped for application to the finishedcase to prevent corrosion. Following thesolution of these and other design problemsit was necessary to devise manufacturingprocesses that would make the substitutionof steel for brass feasible in terms of cost,machine tools, and manpower, and also in

terms of volume production running intomillions of rounds per month. Finally, itwas highly desirable, if not actually man-datory, that the manufacturing techniquesbe of such a nature that the facilitiesalready engaged in the manufacture ofbrass cases could be used, with a minimumof readjustment, to produce steel cases.47

Artillery Cases

Since the artillery cases appeared toraise fewer problems than did small armscases, they were attempted first. After aperiod of unsuccessful experimentationwith low-carbon steel, small quantities ofacceptable artillery cases were producedby the fall of 1941 from heat-treated mildalloys.48 Experimentation was then di-rected toward the production of cases frommedium-carbon steel with only manganeseadded, and by January 1942 GeneralBarnes was able to report to Mr. WilliamS. Knudsen, co-chairman of OPM, thatthe results of experimental work done upto that time indicated that artillery casesof all sizes from 20-mm. through 105-mm.could be made of steel, at least in smallquantities.49 When this report came to the

46 Ord Materials Br, Summary of the War Depart-ment's Metallurgical Research and Developmentduring World War II, pp. 29-30, OHF. For data onGerman conservation of copper in ammunit ion seereport, Item 28, of Combined Intelligence ObjectivesSubcommittee, G-2 Div, SHAEF, sub: Reich Ministryof Armament and War Production, file XXVI-13,Ord Tech Intel files.

47 (1) See CIOS rpt cited n. 46. (2) R&D Serv, Car-tridge Case Development Project, OHF.

48 See reports from Frankford Arsenal laboratorylisted in R&D Serv, Cartridge Case Development Proj-ect, OHF.

49 Memo, Barnes for Knudsen, 15 Jan 42, ASFResources and Production Div 470.1/129.6(3). DRBAGO.


attention of the Under Secretary of War,he immediately directed the Chief of Ord-nance to make plans for converting pro-duction of all artillery ammunition to steelon short notice. He mentioned the growingshortage of copper and cited the fact thatthe Ordnance ammunition program wasat that time taking 86 percent of all copperallotted to the Army.50

All during the first half of 1942 Ord-nance had to carry on its steel ammunitionproject under constant pressure to accom-plish in a few months what normally wouldhave taken years. Because of the activitiesof enemy submarines in the Western Hem-isphere, the loss of Chilean copper importswas considered a possibility early in 1942;at the same time, the ammunition require-ments for the United States armed forcesand for the supply of friendly nationsreached astronomical proportions. Thesituation became so critical that not onlydid Mr. Patterson and Mr. Knudsen takea keen interest in it but Vice PresidentHenry A. Wallace also gave it his personalattention early in April.51 In May 1942 thechief of the Small Arms Branch of the In-dustrial Service reported that both theLake City and the Denver OrdnancePlants were operating with less than oneweek's supply of brass, and that it ap-peared probable that both would have toshut down before the end of the month forlack of material.52 Under these circum-stances the development process wasstreamlined, research and productionbeing telescoped to a remarkable degree.

Because of the urgency of the situationthere was a tendency to minimize themany technical difficulties inherent in theproduction of steel cases and to adopt anoverly ambitious conservation program.Work was begun on all sizes of artillery

cases from the 20-mm. up through the105-mm., and in May 1942 a report to theASF chief of staff stated: "Mass productionof all cartridge cases (except 3-inch, 90-mm. and small arms) will be realized dur-ing 1942. . . . Steel cases are through thetalking stage and are now productionitems." 53 But more than a year later thechief of the Ordnance Ammunition Branchhad to report that, "with the exception ofthe 20-mm. cases, rejections are still run-ning at rather high rates, indicating thatthere is still a large amount of developmentwork to be completed before steel cartridgecases will be produced in sufficient quanti-ties to meet the Army Supply Program." 54

The Ordnance Department did notpresume to carry on this project alone butenlisted the aid of private industry, partic-ularly steel producers and steel fabricators.By May 1942 contracts had been let withmany different companies for productionof 20-mm., 37-mm., 40-mm., 57-mm., 75-mm., and 105-mm. cases, and a CartridgeCase Industry Committee had been formedto serve as a central clearing house of in-formation on the manufacture of steel

50 Memo, USW for CofOrd, 29 Jan 42, sub: PilotPlant for Production of Steel Cartridge Cases, ASFResources and Production Div 470.1/129.6(3), DRBAGO.

51 (1) Memo. Mr.H. C. Peterson, Special Assistantto USW, for CofOrd, 2 Apr 42, and (2) Gen Wes-son's reply. 9 Apr 42, both in OO 470 .873 /11115 ,DRB AGO.

52 Memo, Chief of Small Arms Div for Asst Chieffor Production. Ind Serv, 12 May 42, sub: Small ArmsAmmunition Production, copy in R&D Serv, Devel-opment and Production of Military Small Arms Am-munition, OHF.

53 Memo. Brig Gen Lucius D. Clay. Deputy CofSfor Requirements and Resources, for CofS SOS, 8May 42, sub: Report on ... Steel Shell Cases, AG471.'87 (5-8-42) (1) . DRB AGO.

54 Memo, Brig Gen Rosswell E. Hardy, Ammo Br.for Chief of Production Serv Br, 20 Jul 43, sub: In-creased Production of Artillery Ammunit ion Cases,OO 471.873/17788. DRB AGO.


TABLE 13—STEEL CARTRIDGE CASES IN WORLD WAR II

Source: Ammo Br, Ind Div, OCO, OHF.

cases.55 This group acted in an advisorycapacity to all concerns engaged in car-tridge case manufacture and helped solvetechnical problems as they arose. A similarcommittee was formed by the producers ofthe steel used in cartridge cases and an-other by the manufacturers of the finishesused to prevent corrosion. The members ofthese committees were representatives ofcompanies that were normally competitorsbut they unstintingly shared their techni-cal knowledge to advance the productionprogram.56 As a result of these efforts, thir-teen types of steel artillery cases reachedthe stage of quantity production. (SeeTable 13.) Of this number, ten were givensome degree of official acceptance byaction of the Ordnance Committee. Thecases for the 40-mm. AA gun, the 57-mm.recoilless rifle, the 75-mm. recoilless rifle,and the 3-inch AA and AT gun were ac-cepted as fully standard while the other sixwere classified as substitute standard.

Small Arms Cases

The development of steel small armscases was carried on concurrently with thedevelopment of steel artillery cases, but,with the exception of one caliber, pro-gressed more slowly.57 Because of the ex-tremely high pressures generated in smallarms cartridges, the substitution of steel forbrass posed more difficult problems than itdid in artillery cases. At the outset of theproject a broad division of labor between

55 For tabulation of numbers of contracts and quan-tities of steel cases on order in June 1942, see Conser-vation of Materials, DRB AGO.

56 Campbell, Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 298. Forsimilar testimony and the names of committee mem-bers and participating companies, see Lt. Col. H. R.Turner, "Steel Cartridge Cases," Army Ordnance Re-port, No. 5, 1 July 1944, published by Army OrdnanceAssociation, Washington, D. C.

57 For a detailed and technical exposition of thesteel cartridge case project, see SA & SA Ammo, Book2, Vol. 2, Ch. 15, OHF. This volume also devotes achapter to the effort to make aluminum cases.


government and industry was agreedupon: development of commercial typesof ammunition, such as shot-gun shellsand the .22-caliber, was left largely tothe commercial arms manufacturers whileOrdnance facilities centered their attentionon the .30, .45, and .50-calibers.58

Of all the small arms cartridges, the.45-caliber, a short, squat case, proved tobe the easiest to convert to steel. Develop-ment work at Frankford Arsenal pro-ceeded rapidly during 1941 and early1942, and by the summer of 1942 the steelcase went into production at the Evans-ville Ordnance Plant.59 Other plants weresoon added and by June 1943 over onebillion cases had been produced. Afterthorough testing by the using arms, as wellas by Ordnance, the .45-caliber steel casewas accepted as standard in January1943.60

Research on the .30 and .50-calibercases was carried on at Frankford Arsenaland at four government-owned contractor-operated plants—Milwaukee, in Wiscon-sin, Lowell in Massachusetts, Denver inColorado, and Twin Cities in NewBrighton, Minnesota. A host of technicalproblems arose with these calibers. One ofthe most difficult resulted from the inelas-ticity of steel, which caused the cases toexpand and stick in the chamber after theywere fired. A great deal of effort still hadto be put into development of a suitableprotective finish for the steel cases. Never-theless, by the spring of 1943 the OrdnanceDepartment reported that .30 and .50-caliber ammunition was "passing from theresearch stage into the production develop-ment stage." 61 Several million .30-calibersteel cases and a quarter of a million .50-caliber cases had been produced, andschedules calling for the manufacture of150 million rounds of .50-caliber and 210

million rounds of .30-caliber per monthduring the latter half of the year had beenestablished. Arrangements were beingmade to submit both calibers to the usingarms for test, with the expectation thatthey would be accepted first for trainingpurposes and then, as improvements wereintroduced, for unrestricted combat use.62

At this stage in the process a sudden shiftin plans occurred. In May 1943, at therecommendation of Brig. Gen. James Kirk,chief of the Ordnance Small Arms Branch,the scheduled production of .30 and .50-caliber steel cases was slashed from a totalof 360,000,000 per month to 125,000,000.General Kirk reasoned that the new rate ofproduction would be high enough to estab-lish the feasibility of producing small armsammunition with steel cases but lowenough to eliminate the possibility of pro-ducing large quantities of ammunitionthat might, "because of the present state ofthe art, and lack of standardization, be amore or less complete loss." 63 This decisionwas the beginning of the end of the pro-duction of steel cases, both small arms andartillery, in World War II. A further dropin the production schedule occurred in Julyand by November 1943 all work on the .30and .50-caliber steel cases was stopped ex-cept for experimental production lines at

58 Lt. Col. Boone Gross, ''Development of Steel Car-tridge Case for Small Arms Ammunition," a paperprepared in the spring of 1943, ASF Resources andProduction Div 47 1.87 Cartridge Cases, DRB AGO.

59 For an informal account of this plant's operations,see W. W. Stout. Bullets by the Billion (Detroit, 1946).

60 OCM 19493, 14 Jan 43.61 Gross, "Development of Steel Cartridge Case

. . . ," ASF Resources and Production Div 47 1.87Cartridge Cases, DRB AGO.

62 Ibid. The .30-caliber carbine case was stand-ardized in October 1945 by OCM 29368.

63 Min of conference in Howard Bruce's office, 22May 43. sub: Small Arms Ammunition with SteelCases. ASF Resources and Production Div 471.87 Car-tridge Cases, DRB AGO.


Frankford Arsenal. Three factors promptedthis action: inferiority of most steel cases tobrass cases, increased availability of copperresulting from greater production by cop-per mines and effective conservation ef-forts, and a sharp reduction in over-allrequirements for small arms ammunition.64

Although a great deal of progress wasmade in converting cartridge cases frombrass to steel, it was never possible to pro-duce enough acceptable steel cases. Theambitious goals established for the steel-case project early in 1942 were not at-tained. To meet the requirements of theArmy Supply Program, Ordnance had tocontinue the production of brass cases upto the limit of its brass allocation.65 Thevalue of the steel-case program was that itsupplemented, rather than replaced, brassproduction. In addition, the wartime expe-rience with steel cases led eventually to afresh attack on the problem, in whichArmy and Navy co-operated, in the post-war years.66

Bullet Jackets

Another major step taken by Ordnanceengineers to conserve copper was the sub-stitution of clad steel for gilding metal insmall arms bullet jackets. For many yearsbefore World War II, the lead or steel corein small arms ammunition was coveredwith a jacket of gilding metal composed of90 percent copper and 10 percent zinc.The gilding-metal jacket was needed fortwo reasons: to provide a soft coat for thebullet core and to give the projectile thedesired shape. A bullet hard enough to givegood penetration of the target was too hardfor the rifling in the bore of the weapon. Inflight, a long slender bullet encounteredless air resistance and was more stable, but

a blunt-nosed bullet gave better penetra-tion of the target. These conflicting re-quirements were met by forming the bulletcore of hard steel shaped to give maximumpenetration and then covering it withsofter gilding metal shaped to give the bestflight characteristics. Any space within thejacket not filled by the steel core was filledwith lead alloy, partly for ballistic balanceand partly for improved penetration.67

In searching for a substitute for gildingmetal, Frankford Arsenal had producedsteel jackets plated with cupro-nickel asearly as 1898, and had tested various typesof cupro-nickel-clad steel cases during the1920's and 1930's, but without much suc-cess.68 In 1941 experiments were made inthe use of steel jackets coated with copperand others coated with gilding metal, andOrdnance engineers, working in close co-operation with metallurgists from privateindustry, soon developed a copper-platedsteel jacket for .45-caliber bullets that wentinto production in the summer of 1942.The base material was a low-carbon steelwith a very thin coating of electro-depos-ited copper on both sides. This copper-plated ammunition was promptly acceptedby the using arms, and within a fewmonths all .45-caliber ammunition in pro-

64 See, for example, the statement in the QuarterlyReview: "Copper is now available for all military andessential civilian needs and the probability is that thetrend toward increased supply over demand will con-tinue." Quarterly Review (December. 1943), DRBAGO.

65 Memo, Gen Hardy for Chief of Production ServBr, 20 Jul 43, sub: Increased Production of ArtilleryAmmunition Cases. OO 471.873/17788, DRB AGO.

66 W. F. Stevenson, "Steel Cartridge Cases Advancetoward Standardization," Steel, Vol. 129, 2 (1951), 72.A typographical error in the chart accompanying thisarticle makes inaccurate the data presented in thelower third of the chart.

67 For further technical details of this nature, seeHayes, Elements of Ordnance.

68 SA and SA Ammo, Book 2, Ch. 16, OHF.


CHART 14—COPPER REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDNANCE MATERIEL: 1943

duction was copper plated.69 For .30 and.50-caliber, progress was slower, but a sat-isfactory steel jacket coated with gildingmetal was put into production in the fall of1942. Both it and the copper-coated jacketcould be made with 75 percent less copperthan was needed for the solid gilding-metaljacket.

As the accompanying chart indicates,the greatest savings of copper in Ordnanceproduction were made by the Small ArmsBranch, which cut its consumption during1943 by approximately 100,000 tons. Thisfeat was achieved largely by the successfuldevelopment of steel cartridge cases for.45-caliber ammunition and the conversionto steel or gilding-metal-clad steel for bul-let jackets. The saving of copper in theartillery ammunition program was less,approximately 75,000 tons in 1943; thesaving of copper in artillery and in tanks

and vehicles was small chiefly becausethese classes of matériel were not large con-sumers of copper. The success of Ordnanceefforts to conserve copper, coupled withincreased production by the copper indus-try, resulted in a marked improvement inthe copper supply picture in the fall of1943. By December the Ordnance Mate-rials Branch was able to report that it was"no longer necessary to use substitute ma-terials for military applications where cop-per and copper alloys will provide bettermilitary characteristics and increase theuseful life of materiel." 70

69 Memo, CofOrd for SOS, 10 Feb 43, sub: Com-bined Copper Committee Questionnaire, 470.1/291,DRB AGO. (2) Ord Materials Br, Summary of WarDepartment's Metallurgical Research and Develop-ment during World War II, p. 40, OHF.

70 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart20-B, DRB AGO.


CHART 15—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF ALUMINUM USED, BY ARMY AGENCY:4TH QUARTER, 1942*

Aluminum

Aluminum did not appear on War De-partment lists of strategic materials untilthe year 1936, but after that date it rapidlycame to the front as one of the most criticalmaterials in the war production program.71

In the fall of 1940 production of aluminumwas barely sufficient to meet the demandsfor the aircraft program, which was givenfirst priority for primary aluminum. In thespring of 1941 the Under Secretary of Warand the Office of Production Managementcalled the aluminum shortage to the atten-tion of the supply arms and services anddirected them to eliminate aluminum fromtheir equipment wherever possible by sub-stituting other less critical materials suchas iron, steel, wood, and plastics.72

The Ordnance program to conserve

aluminum actually began in the spring of1941 when a survey of all Ordnance itemscontaining aluminum or other critical ma-terial was undertaken. As a first step in theprogram, all aluminum parts were exam-ined with a view to determining whichcould be made of some less critical mate-rial without sacrifice of military efficiency.When this study was completed shortlyafter Pearl Harbor, it revealed that suchsubstitutions could be made without sig-nificant design changes in 337 aluminumparts with an estimated saving on plannedproduction of 20,000 tons of aluminum.7 3

Small arms ammunition chests, for exam-71 Capt. G. K. Heiss, "Why a Raw Material Re-

serve?" Army Ordnance, XX, 115 (1939), 32.72 Memo, OUSW for Chiefs of Supply Arms and

Services, 15 Apr 41, sub: Conservation of Aluminum,ASF Purchase Div 400.8, DRB AGO.

73 Memo, Barnes for Wesson, 4 Feb 42, sub: Pro-


CHART 16—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF ALUMINUM USED BY THE ORDNANCEDEPARTMENT, BY TYPE OF MATERIEL: 4TH QUARTER, 1942*

pie, could be of steel rather than alumi-num; handles of inspection gages could beconverted from aluminum to plastic; steeland plastic might be substituted for alumi-num in parts of bomb fuzes and mortarfuzes; and malleable iron and steel used inparts of gun mounts and carriages.74 Byeliminating aluminum in the platform,handwheels, and miscellaneous parts of the90-mm. gun mount, the quantity of alumi-num required for this one item was re-duced from over 400 pounds to about 25pounds per mount.75 The second step inthe Ordnance campaign to conserve alu-minum was to study those items in which

substitute materials could not be usedwithout significant design changes or elab-orate tests. The items offering the leastdifficulty were to be investigated first andthose that were expected to entail compli-cations were left until later. As the twolargest consumers of aluminum in the Ord-nance Department were the AmmunitionDivision and the Tank and Combat Vehi-cle Division, efforts were concentrated onthe items procured by these two divisions.By February 1942 General Barnes wasable to report that aluminum had beenlargely eliminated from tanks and combatvehicles except for fans, transmission hous-

gram for the Conservation of Aluminum in OrdnanceMaterial, ASF file 400.8, DRB AGO. See also the de-tailed list entitled "Aluminum parts for which alter-nate or substitute materials have become mandatory"in Conservation of Materials, pp. 27-50, DRB AGO.

74 Conservation of Materials, pp. 22-26, DRBAGO. See also charts and text in Quarterly Review(December, 1943), DRB AGO.

75 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart 36,DRB AGO.

CONSERVATION OF MATERIALS

ings, and motors, and that new motorsusing less aluminum were under develop-ment. In artillery ammunition the situ-ation was different. "Reductions of alumi-num for ammunition will in general bedifficult to make," General Barnes wrote,"since this metal was built into the designsof fuzes and other intricate parts of highexplosives ammunition. Fuzes and similarcomponents were developed only afteryears of experimentation. Considerabletime will be required for tests of redesignedparts to determine whether the substitu-tions will be feasible." 76

One of the earliest substitutions foraluminum in artillery ammunition was theadoption of the plastic M52 fuze for the60-mm. and 81-mm. mortar shell. Afterextensive proof firings, the plastic fuze wentinto production early in 1942 with a savingof approximately one pound of aluminumfor each fuze, or a total of 17,500 tons in1942-43. The body of the M54 fuze wasconverted from aluminum bar to a forgingwith further substantial savings. The wind-shields of 75-mm. armor-piercing-cappedshot M61, formerly made of primary alu-minum, were converted to steel with esti-mated savings of 4,500 tons of aluminumduring 1943. Steel also replaced aluminumin firing pins for artillery ammunition.

There were many other such substitu-tions, but the principal saving in artilleryammunition did not come from the substi-tution of some other material; it came fromthe use of secondary rather than primaryaluminum. The use of secondary alumi-num was made possible by application ofthe die-casting process by which the metalcould be formed into intricate shapesneeding little or no machining. Ordnanceengineers encountered two major problemsin adapting the die-casting process to mu-nitions production. They had to modify

the design of the items to make them suit-able for die-casting, and they had to de-velop new casting alloys that could bemade from aluminum scrap containing ahigh percentage of impurities. Expertsfrom the die-casting industry co-operatedwith the Ordnance Department in solv-ing both problems. One of these industrialexperts, Mr. William During, initiatedmany design modifications while servingas a consultant on die-casting to GeneralBarnes. An extensive experimental andtest program had to be completed beforea high-strength alloy capable of producingsound castings of intricate shapes and thinwall sections was developed. This alloywas used successfully from September 1942until the end of the war, and in the post-war years became the standard aluminumalloy for industrial die-casting.77

As with all manufacturing processesthat use dies, aluminum die-casting wasnot economically feasible for producingitems in small quantities, but was wellsuited for the mass production requiredduring World War II. Substitution of sec-ondary aluminum die-castings for partsmachined from primary aluminum barstock netted a saving not only from the useof lower grade material but also fromelimination of the scrap losses incurred inmachining operations. "By comparisonwith screw machine procedure," the Ord-nance Department reported in June 1942,"die-castings require only a 10 percentexcess in raw material as compared to netweight of finished product, and half of thisis ordinarily re-cast in subsequent oper-ations. Bar stock scrap runs from 30 to 300

76 Memo cited n. 73.7 7 (1) R&D Serv, Summary of War Department

Metallurgical Research and Development, pp. 40-41.OHF. (2) Interv with Col Frye, 5 Jul 51.


percent, and this waste becomes secondaryscrap and is lost to the virgin metalmarket."78

When aluminum requirements for 1942,computed before conservation measureswere adopted, were compared with thequantity of aluminum actually used inOrdnance production during the year, theover-all saving was roughly 14,500 tons.(See Chart 17.) The same comparison for theyear 1943 showed a saving of 62,500 tons,of which approximately 45,000 tons werein ammunition and 15,000 in tanks andother vehicles. Even these large figures donot indicate the full extent of Ordnanceconservation of aluminum, for they do notshow the saving of primary aluminum thatresulted from the use of less critical second-ary aluminum in die-castings. By the fallof 1943 nearly 60 percent of all aluminumused by the Ordnance Department was ofsecondary grade.79

While Ordnance engineers were doingeverything possible to conserve primaryand secondary aluminum, equally signifi-cant efforts were made by the aluminumindustry to increase production. Total na-tional production of aluminum more thandoubled in the eighteen months betweenJanuary 1942 and June 1943, from about45,000 tons a month to nearly 95,000 tonsa month, and further increases were madein the latter half of 1943. As a result, thealuminum crisis ended that summer. "Theincreased production of aluminum, com-bined with effective conservation," theOrdnance Department reported in Sep-tember, "has resulted in aluminum becom-ing readily available and non-critical atthe present. . . . Under these circum-stances additional conversions and sub-stitutions are unnecessary, although down-grading to the lowest purity limits prac-ticable is desirable." 80

Rubber

In terms of strategic materials, the mostserious consequence for the United Statesof the outbreak of war with Japan and thesubsequent Japanese advances into Ma-laya and the East Indies was the loss ofcrude rubber imports. Although the nationhad on hand in December 1941 the largeststockpile of natural rubber in its history—about 527,000 tons—this reserve amountedto less than one year's supply. Small quan-tities of natural rubber could still be im-ported from Latin America, Liberia, andCeylon; a certain amount of reclaimedrubber became available each year; and afew thousand tons of synthetic rubbercould be produced by existing facilities.But none of these sources was more thana drop in the bucket when compared tothe enormous military and civilian re-quirements for rubber in 1942.

The rubber crisis was of particular con-cern to the Ordnance Department becauseat the start of the war it was, among Armyagencies, the second largest user of cruderubber, taking about 20 percent of thetotal Army allotment.81 At that time itused rubber primarily for tires on combatvehicles, for track blocks, bushings, andbogies of tanks, and for hundreds of mis-cellaneous items such as gaskets, hoses, fan

78 Conservation of Materials, pp. 114-15, DRBAGO.

7 9 Quarterly Review (December, 1943), Chart15-B, DRB AGO.

80 Quarterly Review (September, 1943), Chart 16,DRB AGO.

8l For fur ther details on this and other aspects ofthe rubber problem see: (1) R&D Div. Rubber forMechanized Warfare; (2) Lt Col Burton J. Lemon,OCO-D. Rubber, The Ordnance Story of Rubber,Its Problems and Solutions (hereafter cited as Lemon,Story of Rubber) ; and (3) Ord Dept FS, Require-ments. Development, Production, Distribution andConservation of Tires for Army Motor Vehicles,1942-1945. All in OHF.


CHART 17—ALUMINUM REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDNANCE MATERIEL: 1943

belts, and electrical cables. In the summerof 1942 when Ordnance took over fromQuartermaster the responsibility for motortransport vehicles, including the procure-ment of millions of tires and tubes, it be-came by far the largest user of rubber inthe Army, taking between 80 and 90 per-cent of the Army allotment.82 Thereafterthe task of conserving the Army's limitedallotment of crude rubber was almost ex-clusively an Ordnance responsibility.

Both the Quartermaster Corps and theOrdnance Department had inauguratedrubber-conservation programs long beforethe attack on Pearl Harbor. As early as1936 Ordnance had tested tires with syn-thetic tread for the 75-mm. gun carriage,and in 1941 had launched a survey of allOrdnance items made of rubber with aview to substituting synthetic rubber or

some other material wherever possible.Late in 1941 the Quartermaster Corps hadinaugurated a program for repairing andrecapping all Army tires that were wornor damaged, and had taken steps to im-prove tire maintenance in the field. But anall-out effort to conserve rubber in mili-tary equipment did not begin until afterPearl Harbor. Then, under pressure ofnecessity, means were found to producethe essential tires, tank tracks, and otheritems needed by the armed forces beforethe national stockpile of crude rubber wasexhausted.

There were many ways in which smallsavings of rubber could be made by chang-ing the specifications for Ordnance equip-

82 WD Cir 245. Responsibility for all replacementtires and tubes—except those for airplanes—was as-signed to Ordnance by WD Cir 86, 27 Mar 43.


ment. In some parts, reclaimed rubbercould be used instead of new rubber; inothers the quantity of rubber could be de-creased without serious loss of efficiency;and in still others some substitute materialssuch as felt or paper could be used in placeof rubber. In April 1942, for example, theSmall Arms Branch revised its specifica-tions for recoil pads and water chest hosesto permit the use of reclaimed rubber inthese items with estimated savings during1942-43 of more than 1,000 tons of naturalrubber. By reducing the amount of rubberin adhesive tape used for ammunitionpackaging, and at the same time using ahigher percentage of reclaimed rubber, theAmmunition Branch reported in thespring of 1942 that it would save 800 tonsof natural rubber. A steady flow of suchconversions and substitutions continuedthroughout 1942 and 1943 until practi-cally all the so-called mechanical rubberitems were converted to some other ma-terial. While these measures helped to con-serve the nation's stockpile of naturalrubber, their total effect was small. Theywere undertaken because no one knewwhen the war would end, how long thestockpile of rubber would last, or when theday might come when the saving of even asingle pound of crude rubber might beimportant.

Synthetic Rubber

Far more important in the long run wasthe conversion from natural to syntheticrubber, but this step could not be takenduring 1942 because synthetic rubber sim-ply was not available in large quantities.The synthetic rubber industry in theUnited States was still in its infancy andmuch remained to be learned of the phys-ical properties of the various synthetic

compounds. Annual production was onlyabout 8,000 tons—roughly 1 percent ofthe yearly consumption of natural rub-ber—and large-scale production could notbe achieved until new plants to producethe most promising types had been con-structed.83 After synthetic rubber becameavailable, elaborate tests had to be madeunder simulated combat conditions to de-termine how it could best be used in mili-tary equipment. In this long and compli-cated process the rubber industry, variousexecutive agencies of the government, andthe Ordnance Department maintained theclosest co-operation. In government-ownedplants the rubber industry produced hugequantities of synthetic rubber. As far asOrdnance items were concerned, rubbercompanies manufactured the tires, tubes,and other synthetic products in their ownfactories and provided the laboratory testfacilities; Ordnance supplied the test ve-hicles and proving grounds and bought theexperimental products.

The four synthetic rubber compoundsmost widely used by Ordnance were GR-S(Buna-S), GR-M (neoprene), GR-N(Buna-N), and GR-I (butyl).84 Each hadmany of the qualities that made naturalrubber a useful industrial material, butnone proved to be a perfect substitute.GR-M was more like natural rubber thanany of the other synthetic materials, and

83 In May 1941 the federal government authorizedconstruction of plants with an annual capacity of40,000 long tons of Buna-S. After Pearl Harbor thiscapacity was quickly raised to 705,000 tons of Buna-S, 132,000 tons of butyl, and 40,000 tons of neoprene.In 1945, production of synthetic rubber reached820,000 tons. Industrial Mobilization For War: 1940-1945, I, Program and Administration (Washington, 1947),377.

84 The symbol GR-S stood for the words "Govern-ment Rubber-styrene," GR-M for "GovernmentRubber-monovinyl-acetylene," GR-N for "Govern-ment Rubber-acrylon-nitrile," and GR-I for "Gov-ernment Rubber-isobutylene."


was, in addition, more resistant to oil andflame. But it had one serious defect—at ex-tremely low temperatures it became hardand brittle.85 When this fact was revealedby tests, further use of GR-M for tires wascanceled, and it was thereafter limited toitems such as V-belts, radiator and brakehoses, vibration insulators, fire controlcables, and sponge rubber for seats andcrash pads. Although GR-N was suitablefor tires, it was used exclusively for me-chanical rubber items because it could notbe produced in the large quantities neededfor tire manufacture. GR-S, made frompetroleum and alcohol, was selected fortires and tank tracks partly because of itsphysical properties and partly because itcould be manufactured more easily thanany of the other compounds. During WorldWar II about 90 percent of all syntheticrubber produced in government-ownedplants was GR-S, but it was stiffer thannatural rubber and when flexed rapidlyand continuously it generated excessiveheat. Tire tread made of GR-S was notonly easily chipped by stony terrain butalso required a thin layer of natural rub-ber between it and the carcass to provideproper adhesion. It tore too readily to be agood material for inner tubes, and washard to repair because of its lack of adhe-siveness. As the quality of GR-S was im-proved by industrial chemists, it came tobe the standard synthetic for military tiresand tank tracks, but as a material for innertubes it was replaced in 1944 by GR-I,which held air even better than did natu-ral rubber and could be patched moreeasily than GR-S.

Combat Tires and Tank Tracks

Before the transfer of motor vehicles toOrdnance in August 1942, Ordnance rub-

ber-conservation efforts were centeredmainly on combat tires and tank tracks.The combat tire was given particular at-tention because it used almost twice asmuch natural rubber as did the standardtype of highway tire. Designed to run flatfor 75 miles after being punctured, it hadthick sidewalls that provided support forthe vehicle while the tire was run flat. Asa substitute for the combat tire, Ordnanceexperimented after Pearl Harbor with theuse of so-called restrictor rings on standardtires. These were steel flanges which, se-curely fastened to the rim, partially en-cased the sidewalls of the tire. When thetire was punctured the restrictor rings gaveenough support to prevent complete col-lapse of the tire, but their development wasdiscontinued after tests showed that theycaused steering difficulties, increased thedanger of axle breakage, and made impos-sible the use of chains for driving onmuddy ground.86 Fruitless efforts were alsomade to conserve rubber by developing atubeless combat tire. As a result, during1943 it became necessary to sacrifice qual-ity for quantity. The requirement that thetire run flat for 75 miles was cut to one of40 miles, thus reducing substantially theamount of rubber needed for each tire.87

About the same time, the number of com-bat tires to be manufactured was reducedwhen the War Department announcedthat such tires would no longer be requiredon various gun carriages. Toward the endof the year, when acceptable combat tiresmade of synthetic rubber came into pro-duction, the combat tire ceased to be aserious problem.88

85 OCM 21222, 5 Aug 43.86 Lemon, Story of Rubber, pp. 35-37, OHF.87 OCM 22089, 11 Nov 43.88 Memo, Chief of Rubber Br ASF for Dir of Re-

quirements Div ASF, 15 Nov 43, sub: Use of CombatTires, and inds, OO 451.92/496, DRB AGO.


While these efforts went forward to con-serve rubber in combat tires, Ordnanceengineers also turned attention to the useof steel tracks to replace rubber tracks ontanks. Although steel tracks did not en-tirely eliminate the requirement for rub-ber, since they had to be fitted with rubberbushings, their use nevertheless brought animportant saving of rubber. Steel trackshad disadvantages, however, and for somepurposes were not as satisfactory as rubbertracks. They gave less protection to thesuspension components, for example, andprovided poorer traction on pavement andon ice and snow. These facts, coupled withthe dwindling supplies of natural rubber,pointed inescapably to the conclusion thattank tracks had to be made of syntheticrubber.

During the winter of 1942-43, whenimproved synthetic rubber came into pro-duction, Ordnance launched an extensiveprogram to develop and test synthetictracks. By October 1943 the performanceof the synthetic smooth block T16 for thelight tank was so satisfactory that it wasapproved for use, and by May 1944 thesynthetic smooth block T51 for the me-dium tank was approved. For half-trackvehicles, one third of the production sched-ule was switched to synthetic in October1943 and by May 1944 the proportion ofsynthetic production had risen to twothirds. When Allied forces in Italy re-ported their preference for steel ratherthan rubber tracks for use on rocky, moun-tainous terrain, Ordnance produced arubber-backed steel track for mediumtanks that helped reduce the wear on bogiewheels encountered in the use of all-steeltracks. Production of acceptable chevron-type tracks of synthetic rubber proved dif-ficult and was not achieved until near theend of the war. The use of synthetic rubber

for bogie wheel tires was also hard to ac-complish, chiefly because of the heavyweights involved in tank suspensions. ByOctober 1943 synthetic rubber was ap-proved for the bogies of light tanks andhalf-tracks, and, beginning in January1944, one fourth of the bogies for the me-dium tank were made of synthetic rubber.But by the spring of 1945 the bogie of theheavy tank T26E3 had not yet been con-verted to synthetic rubber.89

Truck Tires

Transfer to Ordnance of responsibilityfor motor transport vehicles in August1942 opened an entirely new phase of theOrdnance rubber conservation program.Thereafter approximately 65 percent ofthe Ordnance rubber allotment went intopneumatic tires and tubes, as comparedwith only 35 percent used in tanks, me-chanical rubber items, and self-sealing fueltanks. When the Tank-Automotive Centerwas established at Detroit in September1942, a Rubber Branch headed by Col.

Joseph M. Colby, and later by Lt. Col.Burton J. Lemon, was made an integralpart of the new headquarters.

Conversion of pneumatic tires fromnatural to synthetic rubber was a gradualprocess which began with the small tires,moved on to the mediums, and ended withthe large tires only partially converted atthe end of the war. The changeover hadto be geared both to the gradually increas-ing supply of synthetic rubber and to theresults of tests under field conditions.There was no easy short-cut to the produc-tion of good synthetic military tires, no

89 Lemon. Story of Rubber, pp. 113-50, OHF. Achart on p. 114 of this reference summarizes the prog-ress in converting tank tracks and bogies up to thefall of 1944.


CHART 18—MONTHLY AVERAGE USE OF SYNTHETIC RUBBER BY THE ORDNANCEDEPARTMENT: 4TH QUARTER, 1942; 3D QUARTER, 1943

way to solve the problem except throughthe painstaking trial-and-error process ofbuilding and testing tires by the thousands.The highways and country roads adjacentto Aberdeen Proving Ground provided apermanent testing ground on which therubber components of tanks, trucks, andamphibian vehicles were tried out. AtCamp Shilo, Manitoba, in the winter of1942-43, and on the Alaska Highway dur-ing the winter of 1943-44, Aberdeen de-tachments conducted tests of syntheticrubber products in snow and ice and sub-zero temperatures. The Army Desert TestCommand at Camp Seeley, California,established in March 1942, conducted en-durance tests in extremely high temper-atures over miles of hot, dry terrain. Themost extensive tire-testing operation of

this kind was carried on under Ordnanceauspices at Normoyle Field in Texas wherefrom 200 to 300 vehicles ran for 24 hoursa day, 7 days a week, over a 165-mile testcourse, completing 22,000,000 vehicle testmiles by June 1945.

In the Army's small-tire group the mostimportant tire was the 6.00-16 for ¼-tonjeeps and passenger cars. The first tests ofthis tire with synthetic tread on a naturalrubber carcass in 1942 were so promisingthat new tests were conducted with tiresmade entirely of synthetic rubber. Thesetires performed so well, most of them run-ning twice the required mileage, that theOrdnance Technical Committee approvedtheir procurement in December 1942. Be-fore conversion to synthetic rubber, each6.00-16 tire required 10 pounds of natural


rubber and nearly 6 pounds of reclaimedrubber; after conversion, only 4 ounces ofnatural rubber and 2 pounds of reclaimedrubber went into each tire. By June 1943the use of synthetic rubber was extended toall tires in the small-tire group.90

Of the three size groups of Army tires,by far the most important, in terms of rub-ber conservation, was the medium-sizegroup, including tires from seven to teninches wide. Nearly three fourths of all therubber used for Ordnance tires went intothese sizes, which were used on trucks ofall weights up to six tons. In contrast to thequick and relatively easy conversion of thesmaller tires, the use of synthetic rubberin medium-size tires presented many diffi-cult problems. Because these tires hadthick sidewalls and carried heavy loads,they ran at high temperatures, whichweakened both the rubber and the tirecord. A partial solution to this problemwas found in the use of rayon cord, whichstood up much better under high temper-atures than did cotton cord. Tires madewith rayon cord required fewer pliesand therefore less rubber than did cotton-cord tires, and tests demonstrated that, inthe medium-size tire group, synthetic tiresmade with rayon gave nearly as good serv-ice as did natural rubber tires.91 The onlydifficulty lay in the shortage of the par-ticular kind of rayon needed. In spite ofrapid expansion of rayon cord productionfacilities, through the efforts of the WarProduction Board, there was enough rayoncord only for the 9.00-20 and larger tiresin which cotton was totally unsatisfactory.For the other sizes, reinforcing cotton pliesknown as "cap plies" had to be placedover the regular plies to give addedstrength. As a result of these and other ef-forts, the production of all medium-sizetires with 35 percent synthetic content—

synthetic tread on natural rubber car-cass—was approved by the OrdnanceTechnical Committee in June 1943, and amonth later the percentage of syntheticwas doubled. For medium-size tires withhighway tread this percentage remained at70 for the rest of the war, but in October1943 the percentage of synthetic rubberauthorized for medium-size tires with mudand snow tread was raised to 90, and laterto 92.92

Conversion of large-size tires to syntheticrubber was delayed for three main reasons:it was difficult to make them of syntheticrubber; the military requirement for largetires was comparatively small until the endof 1943; and the smaller tires used prac-tically all the available synthetic rubber.During the winter of 1943-44 extensivetests were made of large tires in sizes from11.00-20 to 13.00-24 made of 70 percentsynthetic rubber with rayon instead of cot-ton cord. The results led the OrdnanceTechnical Committee to give its approvalto these tires in April 1944. The 14.00-inchtruck and trailer tires were not made withsynthetic rubber except for the 14.00-20tire with mud and snow tread, for which35 percent synthetic rubber was approvedin the spring of 1945.

Conversion to synthetic rubber was byno means complete at the end of the war.In many items natural rubber still had tobe used if performance was not to be seri-

90 OCM 19323. 10 Dec 42 and 20730. 10 Jun 43.91 Memo. CG T-AC for CG SOS, 27 Feb 43, sub:

Rayon Versus Cotton Cord in Military Tires, Exhibit18. Lemon, Story of Rubber, OHF. See also OCM19389, 24 Dec 42, and 24823. 24 Aug 44. Experimentswere also conducted with wire for t ire cord but theresults were not altogether satisfactory.

92 For dates of conversion to synthetic rubber foreach tire size, and OCM citations, see R&D Div,Rubber for Mechanized Warfare, Chronology of Im-portant Steps in Production of Synthetic Tires, Tubesand Flaps, OHF.


TABLE 14—SUMMARY OF CONVERSIONS TO SYNTHETIC RUBBER BY V-J DAY

Source: Ordnance Digest, 27, 9 (September, 1945), 10, OHF.

ously impaired. In addition to use in large-size, tires, small quantities of natural rubberwere used in all tires as an adhesive be-tween tread and carcass, and in scores ofvery small items, such as the cores of tirevalves and tire gauges, natural rubber wasessential. By the summer of 1945, 86 per-cent of all Ordnance tire production hadbeen converted to synthetic rubber, andconversion of mechanical rubber items tosynthetic construction was over 95 percentcomplete. The more difficult conversion oftank tracks and bogies stood at 65 percent.Efforts continued during the summer of1945 to curtail the use of natural rubber inOrdnance items, but everyone recognizedthat the worst of the rubber crisis was over."Primarily owing to the Ordnance De-partment's program," the Ordnance Re-search and Development Service reported,

"the total of crude rubber required by theindustry for mixing with . . . syntheticwas only 10,000 tons per month in 1945, arate that equalled imports. The OrdnanceDepartment required about 2500 tons permonth, a figure far below its proportionateshare of the consumption before conver-sion and one indicating the success of theOrdnance program." 93

Preservative Materials

Closely allied to the Ordnance conserva-tion program was the effort to preservefinished items of equipment by the use ofrust-preventive and corrosion-preventivecoatings and the employment of advancedpackaging methods to save shipping space

93 R&D Div, Rubber for Mechanized Warfare, p.7, OHF.


and prevent damage from rough handling.The waste of material resulting frombreakage or from corrosion was just as realas the waste resulting from improper useof critical materials in the original design.It was, in some respects, even worse. "If,for any reason," an Ordnance reportstated, "matériel arrived in an overseastheater in unusable condition due to im-proper packaging, ... it represented aloss of the raw materials from which it wasmanufactured, a loss of man-hours whichwere required to process and move it, a lossof packaging materials, a loss of space intrucks, depots, railroad cars and ships—inshort, so much loss that it would have beenfar better if the item had never beenmade."94 And, of course, the morale ofcombat troops suffered when unservice-able ammunition or equipment was re-ceived.

At the outset of World War II the meth-ods and materials used for preserving andpackaging Ordnance matériel were littlemore advanced than they were at the closeof World War I. No special considerationhad been given to the problem of develop-ing preservative materials during the1920's and 1930's because War Depart-ment plans in those years did not envisagethe shipment of vast quantities of militaryequipment to widely scattered overseasbattlefronts. Contracts with manufacturersordinarily called for no higher standardsof packaging for military supplies thanthose prescribed by common carriers forshipment of commercial goods at the low-est applicable freight rates.95 These pack-aging methods had proved reasonably sat-isfactory for normal shipments of com-mercial material in time of peace, but theyproved wholly inadequate for the ship-ment of military equipment in time of war.Packaging materials and preservatives in

World War II not only had to protect ma-tériel against a wide variety of climaticconditions, from subzero temperatures inAlaska to steaming jungles in the SouthPacific, but they also had to guaranteethat equipment would arrive in service-able condition after it had made a longsea voyage, been exposed to rain, corrosivesalt spray, and abrupt changes in temper-ature, and been landed with primitiveequipment at a bombed-out port or newlywon beachhead.

Although responsibility for the develop-ment of packaging methods for Ordnancematériel rested with Field Service duringthe early months of the war and was thentransferred to Industrial Service, the Re-search and Development Service playedan important role in developing the pre-servatives needed to prevent rust, corro-sion, and fungus growth.96 An industrialpackaging expert, Mr. Neil A. Fowler, wasengaged early in 1942 to serve as a con-sultant to General Barnes on packagingand preserving Ordnance matériel, andlater Dr. G. A. Greathouse of the Depart-ment of Agriculture was employed to studymeans of protecting matériel from damageby mold. The Materials Branch gave itsattention primarily to protection againstfungi and to the development of preserva-tive greases, oils, and paints, while Field

94 Development of Packaging in Ord Dept, 1941-45, PSP 58 (hereafter cited as PSP 58), p. 5, OHF.

95 Memo. Col Raaen, Exec Off OCO, to Mr. JuliusH. Amberg, 14 Jul 44. sub: Packaging of AutomotiveSpare Parts, Exhibit 2 in PSP 58, II, OHF.

"Items of artillery were presumably to be shippedon a magic carpet." wrote the author of an Ordnancereport on prewar packaging, "through an atmosphereeverlastingly free of rain, snow, fungus, or any otherhazardous influence." Hist of Packaging and Mark-ing International Aid Materiel, Exhibit 7 in PSP 58,II, OHF.

96 PSP 58. p. 52, OHF. For a discussion of packag-ing methods, see Thomson and Mayo, Procurementand Supply of Munitions, MS, OHF.


Service and Industrial Service, working inclose co-operation with industry and theForest Products Laboratory of the Depart-ment of Agriculture, developed protectivewrapping materials and devised improvedmethods of using the materials in packingand crating Ordnance supplies. Thesemeasures furthered the Ordnance con-servation program by preventing wasteall along the supply lines which stretchedfor thousands of miles from factories tofighting fronts.

The essence of the problem facing theMaterials Branch was that most Ordnancematériel, being made of metal, was subjectto rust or corrosion when it became wet ordirty. Even minute quantities of water,dirt, or salt spray could work havoc. Themoisture in the air within a package, if itcondensed on metal parts when the tem-perature dropped suddenly, could causerust; the moisture in a man's fingerprintwas capable of causing rust on an exposedmetal part. The solution to the problem,although difficult to achieve, was clearenough: matériel had to be kept clean andbone dry either by enclosing it in moisture-proof packages or by covering it with aprotective coating such as paint, oil, grease,or a plating material. The search for, andstandardization of, such protective coat-ings and wrapping materials for Ordnancematériel became vitally important duringWorld War II.

Painting and Plating

Two of the most widely used methods ofprotecting Ordnance matériel against rustand corrosion before the war were paint-ing and plating. Wherever practicable, ex-posed parts were given a coat of paint thatserved the dual purpose of protecting the

finish and providing camouflage coloring.Parts for which paint was not suitable, andfor which permanent protection wasneeded, were plated with such metals aszinc, cadmium, nickel, or chromium.When the outbreak of war brought anacute shortage of plating materials, Ord-nance was forced to adopt a thinner plat-ing on many items and to eliminate platingaltogether on others. At the same time,while paint itself was rapidly becoming ascarce material, experience in overseasoperations revealed that many of thepaints used in 1941 did not provide ade-quate protection for military equipment.Ordnance, as the custodian of Army paintspecifications, therefore undertook a pro-gram to conserve paint, standardize mili-tary paints, and develop paints with betterprotective qualities.97

Late in 1942, as reports came in of ex-cessive corrosion of the metal boxes inwhich small arms ammunition was packed,the Materials Branch started work on de-veloping a rust-inhibiting paint for thesecontainers to replace the lusterless olive-drab paint originally adopted primarilyfor camouflage purposes. Modificationsmade in a one-coat paint used by theEngineer Board on aircraft landing matsproduced a remarkably effective semiglosspaint for ammunition containers. Its usewas soon extended to a wide variety ofother containers. Later, when hermeticallysealed boxes were adopted for small armsammunition, the method of packing andpainting these boxes required a quick-dry-ing paint. Industrial chemists promptlydeveloped a paint that permitted painting,stencilling, and packaging the containerwithin twenty minutes. At the same time,intensive efforts were made to provide a

97 Hist of Materials Branch, Pt. III. OHF.


suitable protective finish for steel cartridgecases under development during 1942 and1943.

Oils, Greases, Plastics

Not all classes of Ordnance items couldbe protected by paint. Many had to becoated with oil or grease and enclosed in aprotective wrapper while in storage andtransit. Aircraft machine guns fell into thiscategory, and the effort to develop suitablepreservative materials for them may becited as a typical example of the work ofthe Materials Branch. At the start ofWorld War II the Ordnance Departmentwas still using a heavy grease, popularlyknown as cosmoline, to rustproof suchweapons. It gave excellent results, but itwas hard to remove. When weaponscoated with this compound arrived over-seas they had to be given a thoroughcleaning or "degreasing" before they werefit to use, and if even a small portion of thegrease were left on the weapon, it mightfail to function in extremely low tempera-tures. In 1942 Ordnance engineers, work-ing in close co-operation with a machinegun manufacturer, discarded the heavygrease in favor of a light preservative oilthat would lubricate working parts satis-factorily and provide a certain amount ofprotection against rust. To supplement theaction of this protective oil, a wrappingmaterial was needed that would be notonly waterproof but also moisture-vapor-proof. Experience had shown that in dampweather the moisture in the air was able topass through most waterproof materialsand then condense on the metal partswithin the package. After extensive ex-periments a material was found that wasmoisture-vaporproof, flexible, tough, andtransparent. But, when tests were made on

weapons coated with oil and enclosed inthe moisture-vaporproof material, theweapons still rusted. The explanation layin the condensation of moisture from theair trapped within the package and withinthe gun itself. The problem was solved byplacing a dehydrating agent within thepackage to absorb the moisture before itdid any harm. "In the past two years," theSmall Arms Division reported in June1945, "not a single case of a rusted ma-chine gun packaged in this manner hasbeen reported." 98

In the fall of 1943 a new type of materialwas adopted for protecting Ordnanceparts and assemblies of moderate size andweight. This was a thermoplastic materialcomposed of oils, waxes, and ethyl-cellu-lose which, after application to the itemby a hot-dip bath, formed a tough elasticcoating that not only gave good protectionagainst corrosion but could be quickly re-moved by slitting and peeling." For manytypes of parts, use of this strippable coatingwas more economical than the light oil ina moisture-vaporproof wrap. In 1945 itwas estimated that Ordnance installationsand contractor plants were using the newcompound at the rate of 150,000 pounds amonth.100 Another strippable compound,attracting wide attention in the spring of1945 but not adopted before the end of thewar, was a cellulose-acetate-butyrate-basematerial that had the advantages over theethyl-cellulose compound of being fairlytransparent, applicable at lower tempera-tures, and more easily stripped from re-cesses. Further studies, in which Ordnanceco-operated with other branches of theservice, were begun in the fall of 1944 on

98 Hist of Packaging of Cal. .50 Aircraft MachineGun, Exhibit 33, PSP 58, OHF.

99 PSP 58, pp. 59-60, OHF.100 Ibid., pp. 59-60.


a spray-type strippable compound de-veloped by the Navy for long-time storageof all types of war matériel and productionequipment.

Automotive Matériel

The preservation of automotive ma-tériel, including tanks, trucks, and spareparts, was one of the most importantphases of the Ordnance program and wasone of infinite complexity. Late in 1942when the problem was referred to theSAE War Engineering Board for study,the board appointed numerous subcom-mittees to deal with the preservation ofsuch items as engines, cooling systems, bat-teries, and service parts, and to recom-mend cleaning methods, corrosion-preven-tion compounds, and packaging materials.As the subcommittee recommendationswere received, tested, and approved theywere incorporated into the appropriateOrdnance specifications or packaging reg-ulations.101 One of the most successful de-velopments in this field was the applica-tion of alkyd resin varnishes to the elec-trical systems of vehicles to prevent themfrom "drowning out" after exposure toheavy rains or submersion in water. Tankhulls were prepared for shipment in thesame way as aircraft machine guns—amoisture-proof and vaporproof wrap en-closing a dehydrating substance. Less suc-cessful was the effort to develop an exteriorpaint for automotive vehicles. Before thewar, lusterless enamel was specified forthis purpose largely because of its camou-flage value, but it was too porous to giveadequate protection in areas of extremehumidity and heavy rainfall. Because thepaint shortage precluded using two coats—the semigloss covered with the lusterless—the Ordnance Department recommended

that, in spite of the sacrifice of camouflageprotection, semigloss enamel be adoptedfor all vehicles. This recommendation wasnot finally approved by higher authorityuntil very near the end of the war.102

Perhaps the most unusual problem ofmatériel preservation that Ordnance facedduring World War II was the rapid deteri-oration of equipment caused by mold ormildew in extremely hot and humid areas.It was not a new problem by any means,but it had never before assumed such largeproportions as in 1944 when fightingstarted on a large scale in the South Pa-cific. Supplies deteriorated at an alarmingrate. Textiles rotted and fell apart; corkand paper gaskets disintegrated; leatherholsters and instrument cases became cov-ered with fungi that caused the threads tobreak; electrical instruments failed be-cause fungus growth on the fabric-sheathedwires caused short circuits. The MaterialsBranch began studying methods of pro-tecting equipment against mold early in1944 and in April of that year published apamphlet on the subject.103 In September1944 an Artillery Tropicalization Missionwas sent to the Panama Canal Departmentto investigate measures used in that area toprevent deterioration of Ordnance maté-riel by mold. With the aid of industry andother branches of the Army, Ordnancesoon developed means of controlling moldon a wide variety of items and issued sev-eral of the early Army specifications in thisfield. A varnish containing a fungicide

101 C. E. Heussner and C. O. Durbin, "Materialsfor Preparation and Preservation of Vehicles andComponent Parts for Storage and Shipment," SAEJournal, Vol. 52, 12 (December, 1944), 564-72. Seealso Hist of Materials Branch, Pt. III , OHF.

102 Hist of Materials Branch, Pt. III, OHF.103 The Prevention of Deterioration of Material by

Mold, copy in Hist of Materials Branch, OHF.


proved effective in controlling mold onelectrical equipment and gaskets. Forleather items, neat's-foot oil mixed with afungicide gave excellent protection. Guncovers, tarpaulins, vehicle tops, and cot-ton cordage were protected by the use ofcopper naphthenate as a fungicide. Diffi-culties were experienced with some items.For example, the fungicide used onwooden ammunition boxes caused derma-titis, but the fungus problem was generallywell under control by the spring of 1945.104

The successful efforts of the MaterialsBranch to develop effective preservativesprovided a fitting supplement to its effortsto promote the conservation of strategicmaterials in the design and manufacture

of Ordnance items. It constituted the "fol-low through" that was essential to the safearrival of supplies in the theaters of opera-tions. It sharply reduced some of the ap-palling losses of equipment that occurredearly in the war, and entirely eliminatedothers. When combined with the extensiveefforts of the Field Service and the Indus-trial Service in developing and applyingadvanced packing methods it contributedin very large measure to the success of theOrdnance program to conserve strategicmaterials.

104 Interv with Mr. Clayton R. Cornthwaite, OrdMaterials Br, 5 Sep 51. For details as to specificationnumbers and chemical compositions of fungicides,see Hist of Materials Branch, Pt III, OHF.

CHAPTER XIX

Unresolved Problems ofResearch and Development

The end of fighting in World War IIfound the Ordnance Research and Devel-opment Service with several hundred proj-ects under way and scores of problems stillunsolved. The long list of specific questionsthat had arisen but remained unansweredshowed no lack of energy or of imaginationon the part of Ordnance engineers, butrather the complex interrelatedness offactors to be considered in any major de-velopment and the vastness of the realm ofapplicable science still scarcely explored.That neither Ordnance specialists nor sci-entists of the National Defense ResearchCommittee had, for example, learned whatmade predictable the behavior of a shapedcharge must be recognized as the conse-quence of the limited knowledge of aero-dynamics, explosives, chemistry, and phys-ics generally. In time, such phenomenacould either be analyzed and sorted outinto categories in which comprehendednatural laws applied or be relegated to thearea of natural forces usable but not under-stood. In view of the tremendous facilitiesfor scientific investigation in the UnitedStates, Americans could safely cherish thebelief that problems solvable by scientificresearch would be dealt with as quickly,perhaps more rapidly, in the United Statesthan in any other country in the world.That such a program might take years

could cause no profound dismay since, inthe competition with other nations thatunderlies war, the scientific progress inother countries might outstrip the UnitedStates in some particular applications butcould surely not keep pace in others. SoGerman science had preceded Allied indeveloping guided missiles but, providen-tially for the armies fighting the Axis, hadlagged far behind in making possible theemployment of proximity fuzes.

Comforting though these reflectionsmight be in the long view, for the Ord-nance Department the series of problemsthat were unresolved on V-J Day consti-tuted an abiding challenge. They were oftwo kinds, those requiring patient investi-gation of means of improving any givenweapon, and those involving matters oftactical usage, logistics, and the basic the-ories of how a citizens' army should beequipped. To cite a single example of thefirst kind, research into ways of producinga longer-ranged, accurate, and more pow-erful rocket to be fired from a shoulderlauncher was a project calling for extensivepostwar work. Far more fundamental werethe controversial questions arising fromconflicting views of what types of weaponsmodern warfare demanded. The Ord-nance Department, as has been repeatedlystated, had no final voice in those decisions.


Yet its opinion carried weight, at the end ofthe war perhaps more than in 1941 whenexperience had not yet lent force to theOrdnance line of reasoning.1

Global war had, to be sure, manifestedthe undesirability of having a single type ofweapon for universal use. Thus, the Ord-nance Department learned that to limitdesign of tanks, whether light or medium,to one standard pattern was to court disas-ter. Wide tracks to give flotation in mudand swamps were needed in some actions;narrower tracks and less powerful engineswere adequate in others. Rubber tracksgave better service over paved roads andsmooth surfaces; steel were all but essentialfor rocky terrain and coral reefs. But ac-ceptance of the thesis of variations ofdesign did not settle the argument ofwhether many relatively thinly armored,rather lightly gunned combat vehicles weremore valuable than fewer very heavy tanksthat were harder to ship and much moreexpensive to build and operate. Six yearsafter V-J Day the proponents of the lum-bering, powerful, heavy tank were to en-counter occasionally the criticism that theU.S. Army had let itself be overmecha-nized; repeating the argument heard aboutthe Italian campaigns of 1943-45, the con-tention was that a few units of horse cav-alry in Korea could have cleaned outpockets of resistance where a vehicle wasunable to go.

Still, granting the wisdom of adaptationsof some features of a weapon to give theversatility required for effective use undervarious conditions of combat, climate, andterrain, the question remained as towhether multiplicity of design createdmore problems than it solved. Quite apartfrom any difficulties in production, sup-plying special spare parts for, and trainingtroops in the use of, a variety of weapons

might make the drawbacks more con-siderable than the advantages. The Ord-nance Department's largely successfuleffort to make all ammunition of a givencaliber usable in any model of any type ofgun of that size paid off again and again.The much less successful endeavor to haveparts for vehicles interchangeable betweenone make and another convinced Ord-nance automotive engineers that uniform-ity of mechanisms was vitally important.Yet within the Ordnance Department, asin the Army at large, differences of opinionendured over whether to place emphasisupon multipurpose weapons or on specialequipment for special purposes. The visibleeffectiveness of the German 88-mm. gun atonce as a field artillery piece, an antitankweapon, and an antiaircraft gun inspireddesign features of the American 90-mm.that warranted General Barnes' calling the90-mm. a "triple-threat" gun. But the re-sult was a series of compromises that madethe gun less well suited to any one of thethree uses than would otherwise have beenpossible.

Even what constituted the most essentialfeatures of infantry weapons was a matterof some argument throughout the war. Thefast cyclic rate and thirty-round magazineof the 8.5-pound M3 submachine gun pro-vided the infantryman and paratrooperwith a spray of fire, but precluded aimingshots carefully. Conversely, the Browningautomatic rifle, though capable of shortbursts at an even higher cyclic rate, hadonly a 20-round magazine and, with itsbipod, weighed over 19 pounds. But itcould achieve an accuracy unobtainable

1 In the brief summarizing paragraphs that follow,unless otherwise noted, the substantiating documen-tary evidence covering the particular examplesalluded to here is in the chapters where the develop-ment of each item in turn is discussed.

UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 513

with the more portable submachine gunand had double the range. So the questionarose whether, when choice was necessary,the scatter fire of the lighter, short-rangeweapon was more useful than the accu-rately aimed longer-range fire of theheavier. Attempts to copy a very light-weight German machine gun and a ma-chine pistol seemed waste effort to menwho believed the .30-caliber Browningmachine gun and the BAR the best weap-ons foot soldiers on the move could have.Troops advancing through the villages andwooded stretches of Lorraine and theArdennes found reassurance in the soundof their submachine guns rattling away atscattered enemy, but the fact that "nearlyevery unit carried more BAR's than calledfor in the Tables of Equipment" testifies tothe faith American soldiers placed in theheavier weapon.2 True, an infantry com-pany might be given a diversity of smallarms so that the BAR's of some squadswould supplement the submachine gunsand rifles of others. But the new emphasisput upon the individual soldier's combatcapacity and his indoctrination in fightingnot only as a member of a team but, whennecessary, as a one-man army carried im-plicitly the assumption that every individ-ual must be armed as adequately as possi-ble. One man could not pack both a"Tommy" gun and a BAR.

How much the factor of weight shouldbe considered in infantry equipment was aquestion as controversial as that of aimedversus area fire. The M1 rifle gave the in-fantryman a weapon of greater power thanthe short-ranged carbine but saddled himwith over four pounds more weight. Whichwas more important for the individual sol-dier, the utmost mobility and least possiblefatigue or more, longer-range killing power,and hence greater self-confidence? Ord-

nance Research and Development Service,neither able nor invited to give a categori-cal answer, could only strive to developinfantry weapons combining light weightand fire power more satisfactorily thanthose of the enemy.

The importance of achieving lightweight and sturdiness in equipment washeightened, moreover, by the growing roleof air warfare and the introduction of theparachute technique to drop men and sup-plies behind enemy lines. Obviously maté-riel that would survive parachuting ordelivery by glider must still possess lethalcharacteristics if it were to be of any use. Aserviceable airborne tank had not been de-veloped by V-J Day, and even the 105-mm.airborne howitzer, because of its reducedrange, proved less valuable than its de-signers had hoped.

Whether extensive recourse to nightfighting demanded special equipment notonly for bombers but for ground troops wasanother moot question. Whether infra-redrays, for example, could be effectively usedto facilitate driving vehicles at night was amatter for further study. Though the Corpsof Engineers had primary responsibility forinfra-red applications, Ordnance assistancewas enlisted on the problem. On V-J Dayits future was uncertain. Battlefield floodlighting had scarcely been tried at all. Inlate 1942 interest in a secret British devel-opment had run high. Five hundred CanalDefense Light vehicles were built in theUnited States under high priority, in antic-ipation of need of powerful searchlightillumination for night tank battles.Mounted on General Grant medium tanks,some sixty of these were employed in theRhine river crossings in February 1945,but no other use occurred. The "illumi-

2 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 603.


nated front" that was to be widely advo-cated in Korea was after all not part of thetactics of the 1944-45 campaigns in eitherEurope or the Pacific.

The logistical and tactical considerationsto be borne in mind in determining whatlength of life American weapons shouldhave were never fully evaluated duringWorld War II. Shortages of tungsten, chro-mium, molybdenum, rubber, and a dozenother materials obliged the Ordnance De-partment to find substitutes even at theexpense of producing less long-wearingitems, but it was usually necessity ratherthan reasoned choice that changed thespecifications. Nevertheless, as the war pro-gressed, the observant could see the logicof frequently using stamped metal parts inplace of forgings or a wide variety of cheap,readily worked materials in lieu of moredurable but more expensive kinds. Ger-man and Russian infantry weapons provedthat inexpensive short-lived articles, pro-duceable at fractional cost and thereforecheaply replaceable, in many cases servedevery purpose adequately. The Americansubmachine gun M3, with most of its partsstamped out of sheet metal, was one appli-cation of the new realization that greatdurability was not necessarily a vitalrequirement for any small weapon.

But while tacitly admitting the validityof the thesis in the case of small arms, theGeneral Staff and the Ordnance Depart-ment were far less persuaded of the sound-ness of the principle applied to more com-plex items. Where replacements must beshipped halfway around the world, thecost of having equipment wear out need-lessly fast was naturally too high to con-template. On the other hand, enemy firecould demolish in a moment matériel withyears of life left in it when struck. Unlikemachines designed to run until deliberately

scrapped, weapons of war were constantlysubject to destruction long before theywore out. The Germans put the Panthertank into action with an engine requiringreplacement after, at most, 625 miles oftravel, whereas Sherman engines wereknown sometimes to have a life of over3,000 miles. Advantageous though thegreater endurance must be if achievedwithout sacrifice of essential features andwithout large additional expense or slow-ing of quantity production, the reasonablechance that enemy fire would destroy thetank before the engine had lived out its lifemade its durability a doubtful asset. TheSoviet Army, like the German, acceptedmatériel with a service life span far belowwhat the U.S. Army demanded. In theRussian view, usable, albeit makeshift,equipment was good enough to be blownup. But in the United States the century-old concept of building military equipmentwith a solidity to last at least through anentire war was too deeply ingrained to becast off readily. The question of what itemswere best made as cheaply as possible withscant regard to service life was one that theOrdnance Department was only begin-ning to study at the end of the war.

Equally fundamental was the questionof overelaboration versus oversimplifica-tion of military equipment. Improvisationsin the field often did a job as well as a de-vice carefully worked out on drawing boardand production line. When the researchand development staff in Washingtonlearned that American soldiers in the jun-gles of the Pacific had been sticking razorblades into tree trunks to prevent Japanesesnipers who had infiltrated through thelines at night from taking position in thetrees, draftsmen immediately began mak-ing drawings of a device by which a bristleof knife blades could be clamped to a tree


trunk. A commercial company under con-tract produced several experimental ver-sions of this gadget before the scheme wasvetoed as quite needless.3 More bizarre andamusing than significant, this episodenevertheless exemplified a growing tend-ency to gild the lily of simplicity on the onehand and to develop and nurture the ex-tremely elaborate on the other.

When armies had been supplied onlywith rifles, bayonets, revolvers, and sabres,with cannon and howitzers, mortars, andhand grenades, or even with machine guns,designing, manufacturing, and keepingsatisfactory weapons in usable conditionwas relatively easy. Training soldiers to usethem properly was correspondingly rou-tine. When World War I inaugurated bothair and tank warfare, the task became farmore complex, and by the end of WorldWar II the advances of science made thepossible applications to military usage soinfinitely various as to tempt the generalstaffs of all countries to junk most earliertypes of killing devices. Just as the single-shot rifle was largely superseded by thesemiautomatic, and the revolver by thesemiautomatic carbine or the submachinegun, so artillery fire control instrumentsdirected by eye, hand, and prefigured fir-ing tables were replaced by highly intricateelectrical computers, frequently fed databy radar. To train soldiers in the use of suchequipment and to teach crews to maintainit meant lengthy courses of instructionmeticulously planned and executed.

Any Russian peasant trooper could seein a moment how to use the "MolotovCocktail," a bottle filled with gasoline andstoppered with a rag set alight and hurledinto a tank to set it on fire. Had he neededto be taught how to use a proximity fuzeon a rocket, preliminary schooling wouldhave been necessary. Nor was the better-

educated soldier of the U.S. Army alwaysready to make use of new equipment, ad-vance instruction in its employment not-withstanding. Thus the patience, ingenu-ity, and money spent in the United Stateson developing gyrostabilizers for tank gunsproved largely wasted until the very end ofthe war, inasmuch as hastily trained tankcrews, finding them too difficult to man-age, usually disconnected them. When theywere used, specially schooled maintenanceteams stationed far to the rear had to ad-just and repair them at frequent intervals,with the consequence that gunners of mostarmored units through much of the warpreferred tanks minus this refinement. Ifthe U.S. Army must count on having littlemore than a year in which to preparedraftees for military service, dare it rely onequipping its forces with weapons so com-plicated that the high school graduatescomposing the citizens' army could com-prehend the principles of employment andcare of only a very few items? Might thedangers inherent in this kind of specializa-tion not exceed any benefits? Though thesewere not questions for the Ordnance De-partment to answer alone, they were prob-lems the nation's Military Establishmenthad to face before it could arrive at an in-telligently planned development program.

Hand-in-hand with these questions ranthe matter of over-all costs in both moneyand materials for complex new weapons.Bred in the belief that its natural resources,if not inexhaustible, were at least ample forimmediate national needs, the Americanpeople at the opening of World War II hadbeen unprepared to accept the idea thatsome matériel might be too expensive touse, and that less than perfection must do.The Russians put into action tanks the ex-

3 SA & SA Ammo, Book 1, Pt. 3, p. 134.


terior finish of which was so rough thatAmerican engineers deemed them unsuit-able because somewhat less likely to causea projectile to glance off than would therounded contours of the American. Againthe provision for crew comfort withinAmerican combat vehicles had no counter-part in Russian-built tanks. Here, to besure, the argument lay in the relative valueof unfatigued crews versus cheaper tanks.Yet World War II experience forced recog-nition of the possibility that American de-sign and fabrication was refined to thepoint of extravagance. A German general,comparing Russian and American tanks,remarked: "In my opinion, your Westerntank is much too complicated, much tooexpensive." 4

After the war, so one story runs, militarytacticians were startled by the dollars andcents aspect of wider use of proximity fuzesin place of impact or time fuzes; when in-quiry revealed that the cost differentialwas close to ten to one, the plea for issueof a larger proportion of influence fuzeswas withdrawn. In the heat of combat, sol-diers naturally forgot that they were tax-payers as well as fighting men, but theOrdnance research and development staffwas coming to realize that it must keepcosts constantly in mind. National policyhad of course to determine the balance tobe maintained between the armament pro-gram and the national economy as a whole.For the Ordnance Research and Develop-ment Division the problem remained ofhow to carry out any policy when settled.

The swiftness with which combat condi-tions and doctrine of tactical employmentof weapons shifted in World War II natu-rally made carefully thought-out tables ofequipment extremely difficult to compileand revise. Piecemeal standardization ofitems from 1940 onward multiplied models

from which to choose matériel for any par-ticular type of engagement, but the WarDepartment had made no thorough over-all study of what a modern army wouldneed since the Westervelt Board report,completed in 1919. By early 1943 the Ord-nance Department believed a carefulreappraisal overdue. In March Brig. Gen.Roland P. Shugg, then attached to the Of-fice, Chief of Ordnance, pointed out toGeneral Somervell and Lt. Gen. Joseph T.McNarney the desirability of "a compre-hensive survey of the necessary moderngun power and armor to win the Europeancampaign. We need immediately anotherWestervelt Report." 5 Though in late 1943and during 1944 several special missions,such as the Eddy mission to Europe andthe Borden "Jungle Warfare" mission tothe Pacific, brought back a series of recom-mendations, the "comprehensive survey"wanted by the Ordnance Department hadto wait till a year after the war.

The upshot was inevitably not only con-siderable waste effort spent during the waron specific developments requested by theusing arms and then canceled before re-sults could be tried but, after the war, atangle of conflicting views about whatprojects should be pursued and fitted intoan all-embracing armament plan. Thenew weapons employed in the last year offighting, the Axis' dreaded V-2 rocket, theproximity fuzes, and above all, the atombomb, unavoidably introduced elementsof confusion. Why expend time and moneyon improving conventional weapons likelyto be outmoded at the drop of a hat or an

4 Transcript of discussion following lecture by Lt.Gen. Anton von Bechtolsheim on German Strategyversus the USSR in World War II, given at NationalWar College, Jan 52.

5 Memo, Gen Shugg for Gen Somervell and GenMcNarney, 5 Mar 43, OO 350.05/2578 SW, DRBAGO.


A-bomb? Hints thrown out in the pressthat warfare would soon be revolutionizedby the use of very-long-range artillery fir-ing an atomic warhead tended to raisequestions of the utility of such a weapon asthe 914-mm. mortar. Admittedly onlyguesses, these rumors affected public opin-ion and made Ordnance research and de-velopment planning more difficult. Untilthe first report of the Army EquipmentReview Board appeared in the summer of1946, uncertainty left the Ordnance De-partment with no logically constructedlong-range program of development tofollow.

Achievements during the war had ex-ceeded the most optimistic hopes of menfamiliar with the obstacles to overcome indesigning military equipment. Science,allied as never before with military re-search and development, had sent weap-ons into action that rivaled Buck Rogers'extravagancies. But if much of the devel-opment program had been haphazard,Ordnance Committee attempts at co-or-

dination notwithstanding, the fundamentaldifficulty was more subtle. Clearer differ-entiation of the respective roles of the purescientist, the design engineer, and the tech-nician engaged in testing and modifyingthe products of the first two was needed."The world," said Brig. Gen. Leslie E.Simon, in speaking of the applications ofscience, "muddled through by randomprocesses rather than through the applica-tion of purposive procedure."6 PerhapsJohn Dewey's pronouncement on adjust-ing to life could be applied to devisingways to kill: "If ever we are to be governedby intelligence, not by things and bywords, science must have something to sayabout what we do, and not merely abouthow we may do it most easily and econom-ically." 7

6 Brig. Gen. Leslie E. Simon, ACofOrd, "OnBridging the Gap Between Research and Develop-ment," speech given at Fifth Annual Conference onAdministration of Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., 24Sep 51. copy in OHF.

7 Quoted, ibid.

Bibliographical Note

In the preparation of this volume theauthors have relied primarily upon fourcollections—the studies, copies of support-ing documents and personal records of in-dividual Ordnance officers, which togethercomprise the Ordnance Historical Files;the papers assembled in the DepartmentalRecords Branch of the Adjutant General'sOffice in Alexandria, Virginia; the mate-rials housed in the War Department sec-tion of the National Archives; and reportsand correspondence still in possession ofthe subdivisions of the Office, Chief ofOrdnance, in the Pentagon. In addition,several manuscripts prepared by the Officeof the Chief of Military History haveproved useful, as have several publishedworks, notably the volumes of the seriesScience in World War II, Scientific Researchand Development. Army Ordnance, the bi-monthly publication of the American Ord-nance Association, has been of far moreuse than any other periodical.

The Ordnance Historical Files were col-lected during the war by the staff of theOrdnance Historical Branch. The back-bone of this material is the series of type-script historical reports submitted by thedivisions and staff branches of the Office,Chief of Ordnance, and by all the majorfield installations, including the arsenals,districts, depots, proving grounds, trainingcenters, OCO-Detroit, the Field Directorof Ammunition Plants, and others. In thiscollection is a group of project papers, thatis, studies of particular Ordnance prob-lems, and of project supporting papers,prepared during or immediately after the

war either by members of the HistoricalBranch or by specialists in other branchesof the Department. The quality and cover-age of the project papers varies greatly,but many of them contain photographs,charts, and statistical tables of interest, andthe copies of pertinent documents assem-bled in the project supporting papers areboth intrinsically valuable to the historianand indirectly useful because of the leadsthey give to the whereabouts of furtherdata. Of the collections of individuals'papers in the Ordnance Historical Files,the Barnes file, a partial transcript of Gen-eral Barnes' conferences and some of hissemiofficial correspondence, and GeneralBarnes' diary are particularly helpful onquestions involving research and develop-ment. For over-all problems and organiza-tional matters, a useful source is the recordof General Wesson's regular 11 o'clockconferences at which he discussed with hisstaff most of the problems facing the De-partment during the defense period.

For the history of the Department in theyears before 1940, the records in the Na-tional Archives are essential, though ma-terial such as the bound volumes ofOrdnance Department Orders are stillavailable in the Executive Office of theOffice, Chief of Ordnance. For the warperiod, a major source is the collection ofOrdnance papers, both classified and un-classified, in the custody of the Depart-mental Records Branch of the AdjutantGeneral's Office in Alexandria. Informa-tion on certain controversial subjects,moreover, was found in the central files of


the Adjutant General's Office, and in thefiles of the Army Service Forces, ArmyGround Forces, the Under Secretary ofWar, and the G-4 Division of the GeneralStaff. For data on German equipment, theauthors made extensive use of the files inthe Foreign Studies Branch of the Office,Chief of Military History, and in the Ger-man Documents Section of the Depart-mental Records Branch, AGO.

The most important single source forthe history of research and developmentfrom 1919 through World War II is theseries of Ordnance Committee Minutes.These are still housed in the Pentagon inthe keeping of the Ordnance TechnicalCommittee Secretariat. The Minutes listthe action taken and frequently some ofthe discussion about each Ordnance itemon which the Department undertook re-search and development from the end ofWorld War I to the present. Other mate-rials in files of the subdivisions of the Re-search and Development Division of the

Office, Chief of Ordnance, in the Penta-gon are only less useful. Among these theSummary Technical Reports prepared onparticular problems by units of the Na-tional Defense Research Committeeshould be singled out for mention. Unclas-sified information in the Executive Officeis contained in such volumes as the Ord-nance Reports published in 1889 and in thetypescript volumes "Ordnance Develop-mental and Experimental Projects 1920-1925." Officially published statistics of theArmy, the Official Munitions Productionof the United States, by month, July 1,1940-August 31, 1945, popularly known asOMPUS, is cited for World War II; Leon-ard P. Ayres and Benedict Crowell forWorld War I.

Supplementary to these written recordsis the information the authors have ob-tained in a host of interviews and fromcorrespondence with men intimately con-cerned with the work discussed in thisbook.

List of Abbreviations

AA AntiaircraftAAF Army Air ForcesACofAS Assistant Chief of Air StaffACofOrd Assistant Chief of OrdnanceACofS Assistant Chief of StaffActg ActingAdmin AdministrativeAEF American Expeditionary

Forces (1917-18)AF Air ForceAFV Armored Fighting VehiclesAG Adjutant GeneralAGCT Army General Classification

TestAGD Adjutant General's Depart-

mentAGF Army Ground ForcesAGO Adjutant General's OfficeAGWAR Adjutant General, War De-

partmentAmmo AmmunitionA&N Army and NavyANMB Army and Navy Munitions

BoardAnn AnnualAPC Armor-piercing-cappedAPG Aberdeen Proving GroundAR Army RegulationsArty ArtilleryASF Army Service ForcesASW Assistant Secretary of WarAT AntitankAtchd AttachedATSC Air Technical Service Com-

mandAuto AutomotiveBAR Browning automatic rifleBd Board

Br BranchBRL Ballistic Research LaboratoryBT Base detonatingBull BulletinCA Coast ArtilleryCBI China-Burma-IndiaCC Clearance CommitteeCDL Canal defense lightCG Commanding generalCIOS Combined Intelligence Objec-

tives SubcommitteeCir CircularCiv CivilianCO Commanding officerCofAC Chief of Air CorpsCofAS Chief of Air StaffCofCA Chief of Coast ArtilleryCofCav Chief of CavalryCofEngrs Chief of EngineersCofFA Chief of Field ArtilleryCofInf Chief of InfantryCofOrd Chief of OrdnanceCofS Chief of StaffConf ConferenceCPD Civilian Personnel DivisionDA Defense aidDCofS Deputy Chief of StaffDev DevelopmentDir DirectorDist DistrictDiv DivisionDoc DocumentDRB AGO Departmental Records

Branch, Adjutant General'sOffice

EDNA EthylenedinitramineEng EnglandEngr Engineer (s) (ing)


ETO European Theater of Oper-ations

ETOUSA European Theater of Oper-ations, U.S. Army

EUCOM European CommandExec ExecutiveFA Field ArtilleryFDAP Field Director of Ammunition

PlantsFisc FiscalFM Field manualFNH Flashless nonhygroscopic pow-

derFS Field ServiceFY Fiscal yearG-2 Intelligence Division of the

War Department GeneralStaff

G-3 Operations and Training Divi-sion of the War DepartmentGeneral Staff

G-4 Supply Division of the WarDepartment General Staff

GHQ General HeadquartersGMDS German Military Documents

SectionGO General OrderGOCO Government-owned, contrac-

tor-operatedGp GroupGP General purposeGPF Grande Puissance FillouxGS General StaffHE High explosiveHEAT High-explosive, antitank (am-

munition)Hist HistoryHP HorsepowerHq HeadquartersHR House of RepresentativesHVAP High-velocity, armor-piercingHVAR High-velocity aircraft rocketICAF Industrial College of the

Armed Forces

IG Inspector GeneralIncl InclosureInd Industrial, indorsementInf InfantryIntel IntelligenceInterv InterviewIPF Initial Protective Force

JAC Joint Aircraft CommitteeJIT Job Instructor TrainingJMT Job Methods TrainingJRT Job Relations Training

LL Lend-leaseLtr Letter

Maint MaintenanceMAT Mechanical Aptitude TestMG Machine gunMID Military Intelligence DivisionMil MilitaryMin MinutesMNAM Military North African Mis-

sionMPTS Military Plans and Training

ServiceMtg MeetingMTP Military Training ProgramMTS Motor Transport ServiceNA National ArchivesNADA National Automobile Dealers

AssociationNATOUSA North African Theater of

Operations, U.S. ArmyNCO Noncommissioned officerNDRC National Defense Research

CommitteeNE National EmergencyOASW Office of the Assistant Secre-

tary of WarOC Ordnance CommitteeOCD Office of Civilian DefenseOCM Ordnance Committee MinutesOCMH Office of the Chief of Military

HistoryOCO Office, Chief of Ordnance

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 523

OCO-D Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit

OCT Office, Chief of Transporta-tion

OD Ordnance DepartmentODEP Ordnance Developmental and

Experimental ProjectsODES Ordnance Department Field

ServiceODO Ordnance Department OrderOff OfficerOHF Ordnance Historical FileOKH Oberkommando des Heeres (High

Command of the Army)OMPUS Official Munitions Production

of the United StatesOO Ordnance OfficeOPD Operations DivisionOpns OperationsOrd OrdnanceOrgn OrganizationORTC Ordnance Replacement Train-

ing CenterOSW Office of the Secretary of WarOTC Ordnance Training CenterOUSW Office of the Under Secretary

of War

Pers Personnel, personalPETN Pentaerythritol tetranitePL Public LawPMP Protective Mobilization PlanPOA Pacific Ocean AreaPOW Prisoner of warPSP Project Supporting PaperPT Point detonatingPub PublicPWA Public Works Administration

QMC Quartermaster Corps

RAF Royal Air ForceR&D Research and DevelopmentRDX Research development explo-

sive cycloniteRegt Regiment

Res ResolutionRet RetiredRpt ReportRqmts RequirementsRTC Replacement Training Center

S SenateSA Small armsSAE Society of Automotive Engi-

neersSAIC Special Allied Interrogation

CommissionSAP Semi-armor-piercingSC Service commandSec SectionSecy SecretaryServ ServiceSHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied

Expeditionary ForceSNL Standard Nomenclature ListSO Special OrderSOS Services of SupplyStat Statistics, statisticalSTM Strength of the Army ReportsSupp SupplementSupt SuperintendentSW Secretary of War

T-AC Tank-Automotive CenterTAG The Adjutant GeneralTech TechnicalTIG The Inspector GeneralTM Training manualTng TrainingTNT TrinitrotolueneTQMG The Quartermaster GeneralTWI Training Within Industry

U.K. United KingdomUSAF United States Air ForceUSAFCBI United States Army Forces in

China-Burma-IndiaUSAFIME United States Army Forces in

the Middle EastUSSAFE U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Eu-

rope


USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Re-publics

USW Under Secretary of WarUTC Unit Training CenterUXB Unexploded bomb

V-E Victory in EuropeVHB Very heavy bomberV-J Victory in Japan

WD War DepartmentWDAB War Department appropria-

tions billWDGS War Department General StaffWPA Works Progress Administra-

tionWP White phosphorusWPB War Production BoardWPD War Plans Division

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of OperationsNorthwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the BulgeThe Last Offensive


The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro TroopsManhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Japan

Index

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 34, 60, 331, 341, 362, 379,385, 432

ammunition tests at, 346, 427, 438artillery development projects at, 187-88bomb tests at, 461-62, 472Foreign Materiel Branch, 263-65museum established at. 264rockets and launchers, tests at, 358, 437, 444, 446study of enemy equipment at, 261-67, 273-74, 350study of Soviet equipment at, 274study of technical intelligence reports at, 210-11,

213synthetic rubber tires and tracks, test at, 503tanks and tank engines, tests at, 210-11, 290-92,

294, 299-300, 318training activities at, 100, 110, 122-34, 140-41, 146,

148, 150, 263Accepted Schedules of Production, 55-56Adams, L. H., 415-16Affiliated Units, 10, 141-43, 146-47Air Corps. See Army Air Forces.Air Corps Board, 435-36Air Force. See Army Air Forces.Airborne Center, 319-20Airborne Command

and airborne tank development, 318-20modification of machine gun mounts for, 404modified bazooka launcher requested by, 329paracrate tests by, 322

Airborne equipment, 12, 317-18, 513artillery, 317, 320-21, 411, 513bazooka launcher, 329machine gun mounts, 404-05paracrates, 321-22recoilless rifles, 229, 229n, 244, 330-31tanks, 318-20, 513trucks, 322-23

Aircraft armamentartillery, 432-36, 440-42design, problems of, 422-23, 438-40machine guns, 422-32rockets, 436-38, 443-50

Alaska Highway, 503Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G., 390Allied Expeditionary Forces, 23-24, 179Allis-Chalmers Company, 143Allocation of plants, 50, 55-56, 76Amatol Ordnance Depot, 61American Automobile Association, 199American Cyanamid Company, 360American Designers Act, 35American Forge Company, 58

American Iron and Steel Institute, 478, 483American Locomotive Company, 78American Roadbuilders Association, 143American Society of Automotive Engineers. See

Society of Automotive Engineers.American Technical Mission to London, 269-70Ammunition, 512. See also High explosives; Projectiles;

Propellants.artillery, 11, 24-25, 25n, 75, 174-75, 184, 347-49,

410, 481-82, 484, 486, 488-91, 494, 497. See alsoArtillery ammunition,

bombs, 75, 173, 451-74developments during 1919-1940 period, 172-75grenades, 213, 347, 357, 359, 368-69, 371, 386, 451mines, 233, 257, 380-400mortar, 3, 179, 333, 347-48, 363, 373, 517packing of. See Preservative materials,rockets, 213-14, 242n, 244, 328-30, 338, 347, 352-

63, 402, 411, 413, 436-39, 443-50small arms, 11, 75, 172-75, 348-50, 405-07, 405n,

428-32, 438, 480, 482-83, 488-89, 491-94, 507-08. See also Small arms ammunition,

special training, 428-30storage and renovation of, 39, 60-64, 172-73. See

also Depots; Field Service.Anglo-American Conservation Committee, 270-71Anglo-American Tank Commission, 189Anglo-French Purchasing Board, 66. See also Lend-

lease.Anniston Ordnance Depot, 81Antiaircraft Board, 406-07Antiaircraft Command, 405-06Antiaircraft weapons

ammunition for, 402, 405-07, 414-16artillery, 402, 407-11design, problems of, 401-03fire control and tracking devices for, 416-20machine guns, 403-05proximity fuzes, use in, 420-2 1rockets, 402, 411-13

Appropriations, 16, 77budgetary restrictions on research and development

1919-1940, 195, 204-08, 324-25during World War I, 20-21, 20nfor educational orders, 35, 57-58increase in, for arsenals, 324-25June 1940-1945, 66-72, 77, 2251919-June 1940, 30-31, 35, 40-52, 57-58, 64, 66,

195, 204-08, 324-25Armor. See Armor plate; Body armor.Armor plate, 374-79, 422, 484-85Armored Board. See Armored Force Board.


Armored Command, 280Armored Fighting Vehicles Meetings, 270Armored Force, 5

on airborne tanks, 318creation of, 189, 194, 201, 251on fires in tanks, 293and gas versus diesel tank engines, 296-98and heavy tanks, 237, 278and high-powered tank guns, 327

Armored Force Board, 236, 278, 297, 300, 318, 341,390-92

Armories, 14-16, 17n. See also Arsenals; Harpers FerryArmory; Springfield Armory; individual arsenals byname.

Armstrong, Brig. Gen. Donald, 108-10Army Air Forces, 3-5, 50, 75n, 90, 141, 158-59, 173,

180, 214, 345-46, 401. See also Airborne equip-ment; Bombs; individual air forces by number.

aircraft armament for, 178, 233, 422-50aircraft rockets for, 443-50and guided missiles, 234improved ammunition for, 405-07Materiel Command, 435, 437, 444, 449, 462ordnance service at air bases, 63special training ammunition for, 428-30and tank engine versus aircraft engine production,

203, 291, 291nArmy Air Forces Board, 468, 471Army and Navy Munitions Board

Clearance Committee, for foreign orders, 76and conservation of materials, 476n, 479, 487machine tool surveys by, 56mobilization plans of, 51

Army Desert Test Command, 503Army Equipment Review Board, 517Army Ground Forces, 3-5, 94, 158-59, 259, 351, 445

and airborne tanks, 318-20on battle testing of new equipment, 826on control of development of new and improved

weapons, 235-39, 284Equipment Review Board, 238establishment of, 4, 90-91, 235-36and gyrostabilizers for tanks, 343and heavy tank controversy with Ordnance,

236-39, 278, 280-86on high-powered tank guns; 282, 327-28improved ammunition for, 406-07and mines, 384-86and Ordnance unit training, 141, 144-46on periscopes for tanks, 341on self-propelled artillery, 238-39, 314-17and tracks, 302-05

Army Industrial College, 29, 50Army Ordnance Association, 37, 103Army Service Forces, 4, 6, 105-06, 262, 385, 486

approval of Ordnance decentralization by, 118Control Division, 94-95, 104, 118establishment of, effect on Ordnance organization,

90-95, 114-20

Army Service Forces—Continuedinfluence on Ordnance civilian personnel policies,

158-61, 164-66, 168influence on Ordnance replacement and unit train-

ing, 134-36, 141, 144-46lack of Ordnance representation within, 94Services of Supply redesignated ASF, 91nand tank tracks, 302, 307-08

Army Supply Program, 67, 91, 493Arnold, General Henry H., 454, 459

and 75-mm. aircraft gun, 436improved machine gun requested by, 422new type aircraft gun requested by, 433protective armor for planes requested by, 422

Arsenals, 9, 23, 38. 43, 55, 57, 152, 161-62. See alsoArmories; individual arsenals by name.

administrative organization of, 35-36aid to private companies and individuals, 7, 17, 17n,

56, 56nestablishment of, 16functions of, 6-7, 20-21, 36, 65, 118, 324principle of interchangeability of parts adopted by,

15-16production capacity of, 6-7, 57, 66, 324-25reconditioning of machine tools stored at, 56safety programs at, 161supervision of, 87

Artillery, 16, 20n. See also Artillery ammunition;Artillery weapons, U.S.; Coast Artillery Corps;Field Artillery.

Artillery ammunition, 75. See also High explosives;Projectiles; Propellants.

adoption of French designs in World War I, 22, 24conservation of strategic materials in, 481-82, 484,

486, 488-91, 494-98development of, 174-75, 184, 346-73for 40-mm. guns (Bofors), 410steel cases for, 489-91, 494system of interchangeable fuzes for, 173-74

Artillery Tropicalization Mission, 509Artillery weapons, U.S., 11, 18, 46-47, 58, 74-75. For

foreign artillery weapons see individual countries byname.

adoption of French designs in World War I, 22, 24airborne, 320-21, 513aircraft armament, use as, 432-36antiaircraft weapons, use as, 401-03, 407-11auxiliary flotation devices for artillery carriages,

313-14"Columbiad," 17development projects, 1919-1940, 178-88production lag during World War I, 21-25self-propelled. See Self-propelled artillery.Westervelt Board recommendations on, 170-723-inch gun, 180, 236, 238, 315, 341, 401, 413, 4164.2-inch mortar, 3474.5-inch gun, 316, 3208-inch gun, 317, 320, 325-268-inch howitzer, 317, 320, 339

INDEX 529

Artillery weapons, U.S. — Continued20-mm. gun (Hispano Suiza), 268, 433-3522.8-mm. gun (.90-caliber gun), 43327-mm. gun, 19737-mm. gun, 177, 180, 182-86, 196-97, 201. 211,

215, 236, 259, 268, 316-17, 322, 340-41, 405,407-08, 417, 432-33, 435, 440-41

40-mm. gun (Bofors), 248, 268, 315, 320-21, 408-11, 417

47-mm. gun, 185, 21157-mm. gun, 185, 31657-40-mm. gun, 22960-mm. mortar, 322, 348, 37175-mm. gun, 74, 179-80, 186, 236, 315-16, 325-27,

341, 411, 435-36, 441-42, 48375-mm. howitzer, 180-82, 201, 321, 322, 37175-mm. mortar, 17976-mm. gun, 237, 316, 326-27, 347, 48381-mm. mortar, 32290-mm. gun, 229, 237-38, 280, 282, 315, 327-28,

413-16, 417-20, 483, 512105-mm. gun, 237-38, 327, 416, 442105-mm. howitzer, 180, 186-88, 237, 268, 315,

320-21, 327, 370-71, 442, 513120-mm. gun, 325-26, 416, 419155-mm. gun, 237-39, 316-17, 320, 325, 339155-mm. howitzer, 238, 316-17, 320240-mm. howitzer, 179, 180, 188, 317, 320, 325-26914-mm. mortar (Little David), 3, 331-33, 347-48,

373, 517Assistant Secretary of War, 32, 85

allocation of plants by, 55and educational orders, 57machine tool surveys by, 56mobilization planning by, 51, 53-54

Associated Equipment Distributors, 143Atlanta Ordnance Depot, 127, 144, 146Atlas Powder Company, 360Atomic warfare, 516. See also MANHATTAN Project.Augusta Arsenal, 38, 60-61, 144Automotive vehicles, 3-4, 11, 60, 203, 275-78, 325,

512. See also Flotation; Night lighting equipment;Office Chief of Ordnance-Detroit; Tires; indi-vidual items by name.

Bakelite Corporation, 428Baldwin, Hanson W., 278Baldwin Locomotive Company, 78Ballistic Research Laboratory, 167n, 218-19, 223, 226,

264, 346, 349, 371bomb sight development at, 443University of Pennsylvania, Ballistic Research Lab-

oratory Annex at, 226Barnes, Brig. Gen. Gladeon M., 85, 88, 230, 234, 262,

454and American Technical Mission to London,

269-70appointed Chief, Technical Division, 98on battle trial of experimental matériel, 237, 243-44

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Gladeon M.—Continuedon conservation of materials, 270, 477-78, 489, 497as dominant figure in Ordnance research, 1938-

1946, 220-25and heavy tanks, 236-37, 280, 284on mines and mine exploders, 385, 387, 390, 397on rockets, 228, 402, 438, 445on self-propelled artillery, 238, 316-17and tank engines, 296-97and 90-mm. gun, 327, 512

Barrels. See Gun barrels; Tapered bore guns.Barroll, Col. Morris K., 90Baruch, Bernard, 96Battelle Memorial Institute, 266-67"Battlenecks," 478nBaxter, James Phinney, 230Bazooka. See Rockets.Beasley, William F., 198Bell Telephone Laboratories, 420Benicia Arsenal, 38Binoculars, 334, 336-37Birmingham Ordnance District, 482Black Hills Ordnance Depot, 154Board of Officers on the Development of Equipment

for Armored Divisions, 315Board of Ordnance and Fortification, 21Board of War and Ordnance, 14Boards. See individual boards by name.Boatwright, Brig. Gen. Walter P., 105, 111-12, 169n,

170nBody armor, 379-80Bofors. See Artillery weapons, U.S., 40-mm. gun.Bomb Board, 452Bomb disposal training, 147-49Bombs, 75, 173. See also Bomb disposal training;

Guided missiles.armor-piercing, 453, 455, 459, 466, 473atomic. See MANHATTAN Project.Azon, 458, 472-73, 472nblockbuster, 7, 454, 466bomb-handling equipment for air bases, 63British, 452-55, 458-59, 462-64, 469-72butterfly, 461chemical, 259, 455-57, 468, 473depth, 453, 463developments to 1940, 451-53fillings. See High explosives.fragmentation, 453-55, 458-62fuzes for, 457-59, 465-66, 470, 473-74general-purpose, 453-56, 459, 466-67, 471-73German, 453-54, 461, 464-65glide, 458Grand Slam, 471-72incendiary, 259, 468, 472Japanese, 461large bomb development, 466-67, 470-73napalm, 259photoflash, 455, 468-69pyrotechnic, 455, 468-70


Bombs—Continuedsemi-armor-piercing, 453, 455, 459, 466, 473shaped charge, 467, 473sights for, 233stratosphere tests of, 470Tallboy, 471-72target identification, 455, 469-70

Bomford, Col. George, 17Book of Standards, 34Borden Mission, 243, 313, 516Boston Procurement District, 105Bouchier, Col., 394Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., 280, 385Brandt, Edgar, 213-14Bricker, Col. Edwin D., 43British Air Commission, 269British Central Scientific Office, 267British Eighth Army, 381British matériel

bombs, 452-55, 458-59, 462-64, 469-72flares, 469mines and mine exploders, 382, 385-86, 389-90,

393, 395rockets, 269, 352, 357, 402, 411-12, 437, 443-44tapered bore guns, 348-492.95-inch gun (Vickers-Maxim), 180

British Ministry of Supply, 269British Mud Committee, 271nBritish Ordnance Board, 268, 270British Purchasing Commission, 75-76, 318British Royal Air Force, 453-54, 463, 470British Supply Mission, 272British Tank Commission, 78British Tank Mission, 269British War Office, 212, 269Brown, John, 17nBrown, Lewis H., 96Browning, John, 407, 423Bruce, Brig. Gen. Andrew D., 316Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr., 457Budd, E. G., Company, 359Bullet jackets, clad-steel, 493-94Bulletins, technical, 8-9Bullitt, William C., 49Buna-N (GR-N). See Conservation of materials,

rubber.Buna-S (GR-S). See Conservation of materials, rubber.Bureau of the Budget, 69, 204, 207Bureau of Ordnance. See Navy Department.Bureau of Standards

and proximity fuze, 364redesign of 60-mm. shell, 348rocket design, 360telescope prisms, 336

Burns, Maj. Gen. James H., 76, 95Bush, Vannevar, 229n, 445Butler, Col. Robert G., 269Butyl (GR-I). See Conservation of materials, rubber.

Caliber Board. See Westervelt Board.California Institute of Technology, 354, 413Callan, Brig. Gen. Robert E., 169n, 170nCamp Perry, Ohio, 139, 144-45Camp Santa Anita, California, 135, 144, 144nCamp Seeley, California, 503Camp Shilo, Manitoba, Canada, 306, 377, 438, 503Camp Sims, D.C., 358Camp Sutton, North Carolina, 142-43Campbell, Lt. Gen. Levin H., 94, 118-20, 145,

159-60. 258, 476, 486appointed Chief of Ordnance, 88, 95military career before becoming Chief of Ordnance,

85, 88-90, 95, 98-99moves toward decentralization, 106, 108, 110,

112-14, 118other organizational changes by, 100-105, 114-20,

134, 220Canal defense lights, 272, 513. See also Night lighting

equipment.Cannon Suboffice, Industrial Service, 107Capron, Lt. Col. Webster A., 169nCarlson, Maj. R. E., 189Carnegie Institution, 150

Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, 364Geophysics Laboratory, 424

Carney's Point Plant, 162Cartridge Case Committee, 490-91Cartridge cases, steel, 480, 488-93Case, J. I., Company, 143Case, Brig. Gen. Rolland W., 98, 101-02Catalogue of Enemy Ordnance Materiel, 267Catalogue of Standard Ordnance Items, 267Cavalry, 5, 22, 29, 46-47, 91, 178, 205, 430

mechanization of, 192-94, 202and tank doctrine and policy, 189-203

Cavalry Board, 176-77Chaffee, Brig. Gen. Adna R., 201Charleston Ordnance Depot, 38, 62Chavin, Brig. Gen. R. S., 116Chemical Warfare Service, 120, 169, 205, 265

and bombs, 259, 452, 455-56, 468and chemical shells, 371

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L., 442Chicago Procurement District, 36, 94Chief of Staff, 4, 46, 79, 85, 177, 182, 185, 258Christie, Walter, 199-200Christmas, Brig. Gen. John K., 110-13, 296Chrysler Corporation

and mine exploders, 393and tank engines, 227, 293-96, 299

Chrysler Tank Arsenal. See Office Chief of Ordnance-Detroit.

Civil Service Commission, 153-54, 156-57Civil War, 11, 11n, 16-19Civil Works Administration, 43Civilian Advisory Council, 134Coast Artillery Board, 398

INDEX 531

Coast Artillery Corps, 5, 16, 20n, 21, 25, 46, 91,205-06, 394, 396

on antiaircraft artillery, 180, 413on fire control devices, 343-44and machine gun development, 178, 403and Westervelt Board, 169, 169n

Codd, Lt. Col. Leo A., 103Coffey, Col. John M., 267Colby, Col. Joseph M., 502Cold weather tests

on Alaska Highway, 503at Camp Shilo, Canada, 306, 377, 438, 503at Fort Churchill, Canada, 340at Mount Auconquilcha, Chile, 438

Colt, Samuel, 17Colt Patent Fire Arms Company, 178, 407, 422-23"Columbiad," 17Columbus General Supply Depot, 38Combat car. See Tanks, light.Combat vehicles. See individual items by name.Combined Chiefs of Staff, 272, 365Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee

(CIOS), 263, 352. See also Intelligence, technical.Commissary General of Military Stores, 14Commissary General of Ordnance, 16Committee on Petroleum Products and Lubricants,

232Compton, Kaufman T., 134nConservation of materials, 21 8

aluminum, 426, 479, 495-98Anglo-American Conservation Committee, 270-71beginnings of program for, 476-79chlorine, 479copper, 479, 486-94early neglect of, 475-76optical glass, 334-35plastics, 335, 426, 496, 508-09preservative materials and packaging, 8, 505-10rayon tire cord, 504rubber, 307-08, 310-11, 479, 498-505, 514silk, 479steel, 479-86tungsten, 482-83, 514zinc, 479

Continental Army, 14Continental Congress, 14Continental Motors Corporation, 290-91, 298Control Branch, Ordnance, 103-04Control Bureau, Ordnance, 26Controlled Materials Plan, 99Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.Corrosion-prevention materials. See Preservative mate-

rials.Council of National Defense, Advisory Committee of,

24, 25nCoupland, Brig. Gen. Richard C., 234Craig, General Malin, 177Crain, Brig. Gen. James K., 87-88, 90

Crane Company, 424Crawford, Group Captain Charles, 453Crawford, Ivan C., 134nCrowell, Brig. Gen. Benedict, 59, 157, 157nCrowell Committee

on civilian personnel policy, 157on educational orders, 59

Crozier, Brig. Gen. William B., 20-22, 25-26, 29Curtis Bay Ordnance Depot, 38, 61-62, 64

Danforth, Brig. Gen. Charles H., 203Danish matériel, 433Davies, Col. Clarence E., 103-04Davis, Dwight F., 50n, 57Davis, Jefferson, 19Davis, Col. Merle H., 105Dean, Brig. Gen. William F., 280DeCamp, Maj. George W., 159Defense Aid. See Lend-lease.Defense Aid Requirements Committee, 77Del Campo, Maj. A. R., 140Delalande, Maj. Pierre, 382Delaware Ordnance Depot, 38, 61-63Denver Ordnance Plant, 490, 492Department of Agriculture, Forest Products Labora-

tory, 384, 507Depots. See also individual depots by name.

administration of, 35, 38-39, 87, 99, 113-14construction of, during World War II, 63-65,

80-82, 90, 113construction of, following World War I, 37-38during World War I, 37effects of lend-lease on, 80-82functions of, 8, 20, 36-39, 59-64, 113, 161motor supply depots transferred from Quartermas-

ter, 8, 113safety programs at, 161schools and unit training centers at, 38-39, 126-27,

144Des Moines Ordnance Plant, 431Desert Warfare Board, 296, 339Detroit Procurement District, 105Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 280, 296-97, 307, 362, 390Dewey, John, 517Dillard, Col. James B., 169nDirectors, electric, 419-20, 515. See also Fire-control

and tracking devices.District offices. See also individual offices by name.

administrative organization of, 37, 87, 105-06closing of, after World War I, 36establishment of, 6, 26-27functions of, 6, 54-57, 65, 87, 118machine tool surveys by, 56number of employees at, 152re-establishment of, in 1922, 34, 36-37, 55supervision of, 87

Division of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, 23Doherty, Robert E., 134n, 150


Doolittle, Maj. Gen. James H., 457Douglas Aircraft Company, 441Dover Air Base, 449Drewry, Col. Guy H., 105Du Pont Company, 162, 173, 352, 360, 367Duffy, Lt. Col. Irving A., 105Duke University, 428DUKW, 227-28, 227n, 312-13During, William, 497

Eastman Kodak Company, 419Eddy, Col. George G., 362, 393Eddy Mission, 393, 516Educational orders, 65

appropriations for, 35, 57-58Crowell Committee on, 59and Educational Orders Act of 1938, 31, 57-58expediting of, 35twenty-year campaign for, 21n, 57-59

Eglin Field, Florida, 435, 437, 442, 445, 449Eighth Air Force, 437Eighth Army, British, 381Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 327, 366Ellett, Alexander H., 363Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams, 262-65. See

also Intelligence, technical.Engineer Board, 381, 386, 390, 507Engineers, Corps of, 16, 21, 25, 180, 205, 513

and mine exploders, 388, 390and mines, 257, 381-85responsibility for low-speed commercial tractors,

235width and weight limitations imposed by, 194-96,

235, 278Ennis, Brig. Gen. William P., 169nErie Ordnance Depot, 64Erie Proving Ground, 38, 144, 442Eskridge, Col. Oliver S., 198ETOUSA, Ordnance Section, 268, 270Evansville Ordnance Plant, 492Expenditure Program, 67Explosives. See High explosives; Propellants.Extended end connectors, 302-04

Fairchild, Maj. Cameron, 428Fairless, Benjamin F., 96Faymonville, Maj. Philip R., 208Feltman, Samuel, 269Ferrous Metallurgical Advisory Committee, 232, 378Field Artillery, 5, 16, 20n, 21, 29, 46-47, 91, 205-06

and artillery development, 179-82, 185-87self-propelled artillery, lack of interest in, 203-04,

314and Westervelt Board, 169, 169n

Field Artillery Board, 182, 186-87, 322, 337-38Field Director of Ammunition Plants, 96, 106-07Field Service, 31, 45-46, 51

effects of lend-lease on, 80-82establishment of, 20, 23, 29, 59Field Service School, 61, 122-23, 128

Field Service—ContinuedField Service Zones, 96, 113-14functions of, 8-9, 19-20, 34-35, 37-39, 59-64, 84,

87, 101-03, 161, 243, 506-07organization of, 34-35, 84, 87, 90, 96, 99, 114-17,

160-61safety programs, 161

Filters, for optical devices, 339-40Fire control and tracking devices, 333-34

for armored vehicles, 340-43, 515bazooka sights, 338binoculars, 334-37directors, electric, 419-20, 515filters, antiglare, 339-40gyrostabilizers, 342-43, 515Kerrison predictors, 408, 417lens coatings, 339-40night lighting, 339optical glass shortage, 334-35range finders, 337-38, 419remote control systems, 417-19for seacoast defense batteries, 343-45telescopes, 334-37, 340-42, 419tracking devices for antiaircraft weapons, 402,

416-20Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 410Fiscal Division, 103Flares, 468Flemming, Arthur S., 157nFlotation

auxiliary devices for artillery carriages, 313-14tracked vehicles, 301-10wheeled vehicles, 310-13

Ford Motor Company, 298-301Foreign matériel. See individual countries by name.Forest Products Laboratory, Department of Agricul-

ture, 384, 507Fort Bliss, Texas, 60Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 188Fort Churchill, Canada, 340Fort Crook Ordnance Depot, 144Fort Eustis, Virginia, 192, 202Fowler, Neil A., 506Frankford Arsenal, 331, 479

ammunition development at, 95, 348, 406, 427, 430basic research in metallurgy and explosives at,

218-19, 483civilian employees at, 152, 162-63, 165mission of, 7, 16. 36and optical and fire control devices, 36, 337-38,

407, 417and steel cartridge cases, 492-93study of enemy equipment at, 264-66training programs at, 162-63

French matérieladoption of French designs in World War I, 22, 24,

2820-mm. gun, 43325-mm. gun, 183

INDEX 533

French matériel—Continued75-mm. gun, 24, 179105-mm. howitzer, 24155-mm. howitzer, 75

Frye, Maj. John H., 477Fungus-prevention materials. See Preservative mate-

rials.Fuzes

artillery, 173-74, 361-66, 402, 410bomb, 457-59, 465, 496concrete-piercing, 362, 373mine, 381-84, 386-87mortar, 496-97proximity (VT), 218-20, 233, 235, 273, 363-66,

402, 420-21, 445-46, 465-66, 473, 511, 516rocket, 362-63, 445use of plastics in, 496-97

Gages, 17, 19, 24n, 60, 107Garand, John C., 175-76Gatling gun, 18Gavotti, Lt., 451General Motors Corporation

Frigidaire Division, 424-25, 439Oldsmobile Division, 440Overseas Operations, report on spare parts by, 101Proving Ground, 299and tank engines, 291-93, 299

General Office, 33, 84, 87General Staff. See War Department General Staff.General Staff College, 32Geneva Convention, and employment of POW's at

depots, 154Gerber, Col. Theodore C., 107Gerlich, Hermann, 348German matériel, 13

bombs, 346, 453-54, 461, 464-65German Army ordnance research and development,

246-56, 346-47guided missiles, 12, 234, 346, 415, 511mines, 257, 380-87, 393, 395-96mortars, 346-47rockets, 234, 346, 437-38, 516Russo-German research collaboration, 249-50tanks, 250-56, 252n, 278-86, 328, 514tapered bore guns, 229, 328, 348-5020-mm. gun, 252, 281, 411, 43337-mm. and 47-mm. guns, 182-83, 210-11, 215,

252, 28150-mm. to 80-mm. guns, 183, 210, 28175-mm. gun, 236, 25275/55-mm. gun, 27388-mm. gun, 201, 236, 247, 273, 328, 414-15, 415n,

512105-mm. howitzer, 186128-mm. cannon, 328150-mm. gun, 32880-cm. gun (Gustav), 331-33

Giles, Maj. Gen. Barney M., 448

Glancy, Brig. Gen. A. R., 110-11Goddard, Robert H., 356Government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO)

plants, 6-7, 106-07, 162Greathouse, G. A., 506Green, Samuel G., 178Grenade mine, British Hawkins, 386Grenades, 213, 347, 357, 359, 368-69, 371, 451Gross, Paul, 428Grousers, 303-04Guderian, Generalmajor Heinz, 250, 284Guided missiles, 258

confusion over development responsibility for,234-35, 458n

German, 12, 234, 346, 415, 511Gun barrels. See also Tapered bore guns.

erosion, 229, 325, 328, 348, 402, 414-15, 423-25,427

rifling, 269, 325, 346-47Gun motor carriages. See Self-propelled artillery.Gyrostabilizers, 342-43, 515

Halder, Generaloberst Franz, 247Hale, George C., 367Half-track vehicles, 203-04, 297, 405, 410-11. See also

individual vehicles by name.Hammond, Harry P., 134nHarding, Warren G., 30Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F., 444Harpers Ferry Armory, 14-16Harris, Air Marshal Arthur T., 463Harris, Maj. Gen. Charles T., 52, 57, 84-88, 93, 98Harris Board, 118-19Hatcher, Col. James L., 90Hatcher, Brig. Gen. Julian S., 98, 100, 114, 116,

122-24, 129, 134, 134n, 175Hauseman, Col. David N., 105Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, 38, 62, 152Hayes, Maj. Gen. Thomas J., 98-99Heintz Manufacturing Company, 404Helmets, 379-80Hercules Powder Company, 351-54, 360Hickman, Clarence N., 354, 356-58High explosives. See also Mohaupt, Henri; Propellants;

Shaped charge.aluminized, 368, 463-64amatol, 366, 452-53, 464ednatol, 367, 463-64Explosive D, 367, 464haleite (EDNA), 366-68pentolite, 367-69PETN, 366-68picratol, 464PTX-2, 368RDX, 366-68, 463-64ternary mixtures, 368TNT, 75, 366-68, 452-53, 463-64torpex, 463use of, in shells and bombs, 366-70, 452-53, 462-64


High Standard Company, 424-25Himmler, Heinrich, 256Hitler, Adolph, 253, 256Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H., 317Hoe, R., and Company, 58Hof, Maj. Gen. Samuel, 40Holabird Ordnance Depot, 127, 144Hollow charge. See Shaped charge.Holly, Brig. Gen. Joseph A., 327Hopkins, Harry L., 95Hopkins, Nevil Monroe, 213-14Howard, Col. Graeme K., 111Howitzers. See Artillery weapons, U.S.; foreign countries

by name.Hubble, Edwin, 226Huebner, Brig. Gen. Clarence R., 134Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 87, 90, 118-19HVAR, 448-50. See also Rockets.Hypervelocity, 229, 326-28, 348-50, 414-16, 426-27.

See also Projectiles; Propellants; Tapered boreguns.

Indians, employment of at Ordnance depots, 154Industrial mobilization plans

educational orders, 21n, 31, 35, 57-59, 65effects of defense aid on, 75-801919-June 1940, 28-29, 35-36, 50-57, 65-671937 Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP), 53-54

Industrial Service. See also Manufacturing Service.functions of, 6-8, 33-37, 84-87, 101-03, 221-23,

506-07Manufacturing Service renamed Industrial Service,

35organization of, 85-90, 96-99, 101-03, 114packaging methods, development by, 8, 506-07suboffices, 106-13, 311

Industry integration committees, 232, 490-91"Industry-Ordnance Team," 11Infantry, 5, 22, 29, 46, 48, 91

and machine guns, 178and mines, 385-86peacetime Ordnance research projects for, 205-06and semiautomatic rifle, 59and tanks, 189-94, 198-99, 201-02and 37-mm. gun, 182-85, 259

Infantry Board, 22, 29, 176-77, 196, 338, 381, 386Infra-red rays. See Night lighting equipment.Inspection Gage Suboffice, Industrial Service, 107.

See also Gages.Inspection of matériel, 14, 107. See also Gages.Inspector General, The, 47, 61, 146Inspectors, training of, 6, 36Intelligence, technical, 17, 24n, 28, 28n. See also

Spanish Civil War.Catalogue of Enemy Ordnance Materiel, 267Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee

(CIOS), 263, 352December 1941-1945, 261-74, 454Enemy Equipment Intelligence Teams, 262-65

Intelligence, technical—Continuedestablishment of Military Intelligence Section in

Ordnance, 260-61exchange of, with USSR, 273-74Joint Intelligence Committee, 2731919-December 1941, 32, 46, 169, 182, 185-86,

208-15, 259-61, 267-69Ordnance Technical Intelligence Units, 239,

273-74International aid. See Lend-lease.International Aid Division, 104-05. See also Lend-

lease.International Harvester Company, 143Italian matériel, 246, 411Italian Service Units, employment at Ordnance

installations, 154

"J" programs, 163-65, 168Japanese matériel, 246, 387-88, 396, 461Jarrett, Lt. Col. George B., 264Job Instructor Training. See "J" programs.Job Methods Training. See "J" programs.Job Relations Training. See "J" programs.John Deere Company, 143, 390Johnson, J. E., 134nJohnson, Louis. 56-57, 59Johnson, Thomas H., 226Joint Aircraft Committee, subcommittee on aircraft

bombs, 453, 455, 457, 459Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board, 397Joint Army-Navy Research and Development Board,

231Joint British-American Committee on Aircraft Ord-

nance and Armament, 463Joint Intelligence Committee, 273. See also Intelli-

gence, technical.Jungle Warfare Mission. See Borden Mission.

Kane, Maj. Thomas J., 148Keeper of Military Stores, 14Keller, K. T., 96Kelly, Col. Paul C., 135-36Kenney, Brig. Gen. George C., 461Kenny, Maj. Norris G., 477Kerrison, Col. K. E., 417Kerrison predictors, 408, 417Kessenich, Gregory J., 357King, Col. David M., 42Kirk, Brig. Gen. James, 492Knudsen, William S., 59, 489-90Kochevar, Maj. John H.. 404Kutz, Brig. Gen. Harry R., 98, 125, 134n, 150

Lake City Ordnance Plant, 490Lamson Corporation, 389Larned, Col. William E., 163Lauritsen, Charles C., 354, 411-13Legal Division, 103, 105Lemon, Lt. Col. Burton J., 502

INDEX 535

Lend-leaseeffect of, on Field Service, 80-82foreign orders for munitions, 1938-June 1940,

65-67June 1940-1945, 67-82, 104-05shipment of Ordnance "surplus" after Dunkerque,

72-75Lens coatings for optical devices, 339-40Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, 144Lewis, Brig. Gen. Burton O., 85, 88-90, 93, 95,

103-05Lewis guns, 21. See also Machine guns.Liddell Hart, B. H., 196Lodge, Henry Cabot, 66-67Lovett, Robert A., 454Lowell Ordnance Plant, 492Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 116

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 176,192-93

MacGregor, Col. Stephen, 90Machine guns, 18, 74, 229

as aircraft armament, 178, 422-27, 439ammunition for, 405-07, 428-32, 438as antiaircraft weapons, 403-05barrel liners for, 416conservation of steel in, 483-84high altitude tests of, 438-39increase in rate of fire, 402-03, 416, 422-26Lewis, 21metallic belt links for, 426mounts for, 178, 321, 403-04multiple machine gun carriages, 404-05submachine guns, 201, 512-14as tank armament, 178, 196-98, 201

Machine tools, 6, 15-17, 65-66foreign requests for, 7 7shortages of, 56, 76, 217storage of, 36, 57, 60surveys of, 56

Maintenance, 8-9, 19-20, 34, 60. See also Field Serv-ice; Spare parts.

Maintenance Division, 34, 60. See also Field Service.MANHATTAN Project, 12, 218, 258, 516Manuals, technical, 8-9Manufacturing Service. See also Industrial Service.

functions of, 33-37renamed Industrial Service in 1938, 35

March, General Peyton C., 169Marksmanship training. See Training, military.Marmon-Herrington Company, 318Marshall, General of the Army George C., 34, 66, 73,

91, 185, 234, 238, 259, 261, 359, 385Martin, Sgt. Hugh E., 129Materials shortages. See Conservation of materials.Matériel, foreign. See individual countries by name.Materiel Command, AAF. See Army Air Forces.Mayer, Joseph E., 226McFarland, Brig. Gen. Earl, 84, 87-88, 98

McMahon, Col. Fred A., 105, 116McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J.

on battle testing of equipment, 242-43and mines, 381, 385and self-propelled artillery, 238and tanks, 236-37, 280

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 516McShane, Edward J., 226Medical Department, 25Metallic belt links. See Machine guns."Metalurgency," 478nMetropolitan Museum of Art, 379Mexican War, 20, 20nMiddletown Ordnance Depot, 61Miles, Col. Francis H., Jr., 161Military Appropriation Act of 1940, 67Military Intelligence Division, WDGS. See War De-

partment General Staff.Military Plans and Training Service, 100, 116-17Military Training Division. See Military Plans and

Training Service.Milwaukee Ordnance Plant, 492Mine exploders, 387-94Mines

antipersonnel, 380-87antitank, 257, 380-87British mines and mine exploders, 382, 385-86,

389-90, 393, 395controlled underwater, 233, 394-400German, 257, 380-87, 393, 395-96Japanese, 387-88, 396

Minton, Brig. Gen. Hugh C., 84, 94, 105, 307Mississippi Ordnance Plant, 144Mitchell, Brig. Gen. William L., 401Mobility of ground weapons, 12, 275-323Mobilization plans. See Industrial mobilization plans.Mobilization Training Programs

MTP 9-1, 132-34MTP 9-2, 139-40MTP 9-3, 139-41MTP 9-4, 139-40MTP 21-3, 138

Mohaupt explosive. See Mohaupt, Henri; Shapedcharge.

Mohaupt, Henri, 212-14, 357Moisture-vaporproof materials. See Preservative ma-

terials.Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 316Moore, Lt. Col. Thomas, 103Moore, Col. Wiley T., 357Morgan, Maj. Clyde, 233Morgan Ordnance Depot, 61Mortars, 74, 363

4.2-inch mortar, 34775-mm. mortar, 17981-mm. mortar, 322914-mm. mortar (Little David), 3, 331-33, 347-48,

373, 517Motor Transport Service. See Quartermaster Corps.


Motor vehicles. See Automotive vehicles; individual ve-hicles by name.

Mount Auconquilcha, Chile, 438Mount Rainier Ordnance Depot, 127, 144Mud sleds, 314Munitions Assignments Board, 95Munitions Board, Army and Navy. See Army and

Navy Munitions Board.Munitions Board, Ordnance Department. See Ord-

nance Munitions Board.Munroe effect. See Shaped charge.Muroc Army Air Base, California, 449, 470Muskets, 14. See also Rifles.Muzzle velocity, increase of, 326-28. See also Hyper-

velocity.

Nansemond Ordnance Depot, 38, 62, 144National Academy of Sciences, 218, 23 1National Automobile Dealers Association, 142-43National Defense Act of 1916, 21n, 24nNational Defense Act of 1920, 30, 32, 45, 50-51, 189,

195, 203National Defense Advisory Committee, 76National Defense Research Committee, 219, 221, 223

and bombs, 467, 469, 473controversy with Ordnance over development pro-

jects, 226-31, 266creation of, 218, 363and gun barrel erosion, 229, 415-16, 424and high explosives, 367-68, 370hypervelocity study by, 229-30, 348, 350, 372, 427London branch of, 267and mine exploders, 388, 392and mines, 398and optical and fire control devices, 334. 336, 339,

344, 417, 420and proximity fuze, 363-64, 465, 473and rockets, 228, 354, 357-58, 360, 411, 436, 443,

449-50and shaped charge, 511and special training ammunition, 428

National Inventors Council, 223, 231National Machine Tool Builders Association, 56National Metal Trades Association, 160National Recovery Act, 42nNational Research Council of Canada, 267National Research Council of World War I, 232Navajo Ordnance Depot, 154Naval Ordnance Laboratory. See Navy Department.Navy Department, 3, 24-25, 42, 50, 65, 76n, 159, 345,

351, 407, 508-09. See also Bombs.allocation of plants by, 55Bureau of Ordnance, 443, 453, 467and controlled underwater mines, 394-400machine guns and mounts for, 404Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 233and proximity fuze, 363-65and rockets, 354, 357-59, 436, 443-44, 446-48and shaped charge, 370

Navy Department—Continuedand tank engines, 20320-mm. gun (Hispano-Suiza), 43440-mm. gun (Bofors), 408-09, 410n

Nebraska Ordnance Works, 464Neoprene (GR-M). See Conservation of materials,

rubber.New Cumberland General Depot, 38New Development Division, WDGS. See War Depart-

ment General Staff.New York Procurement District, 55, 105New York Times, The, 278Night lighting

battlefield floodlighting, 513-14to facilitate night driving, 272, 513for fire control instruments, 339

Ninth Air Force, 448Normoyle Field, Texas, 503Normoyle Ordnance Depot, 127, 144North African Armored Fighting Vehicles Meetings,

270North American Aviation Company, 441Nye Committee, 53

Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit, 96, 108-13, 118,502

Office of Civilian Defense, 147-48Office of Production Management, 90, 477, 495Office of Scientific Research and Development, 230Ogden Arsenal. See Ogden Ordnance Depot.Ogden Ordnance Depot, 38, 60-64, 81Oils, 508-10. See also Preservative materials.Onandaga Pottery Company, 384Onthank, A. Heath, 156-57Optical devices. See Fire control and tracking devices.Optical glass, 334-35. See also Fire control and track-

ing devices.Ordnance Board, 18, 33. See also Ordnance Depart-

ment Board.Ordnance Book of Standards, 34Ordnance Committee

and bazooka, 359co-operation with British Ordnance Board, 268establishment of. 33, 170nfunctions of, 5, 33-34, 84, 205, 221-22, 517and fuzes, 364, 410and 90-mm. gun directors, 419renamed Ordnance Technical Committee, 221nand tank tracks, 303-04

Ordnance Corps. See Ordnance Department.Ordnance Department

decentralization of, 100, 106-14, 118during World War I, 20-29effect of creation of ASF on, 4, 90-95, 114-20history before World War I, 14-20mission during World War II, 3-13organization of, functional versus product, 113, 119organization 1919-1939, 32-40organization 1940-1942, 84-90, 95-114

INDEX 537

Ordnance Department—Continuedorganization 1943-1945, 114-20other relations with Army Service Forces. See Army

Service Forces,renamed Ordnance Corps, 3and transfer of Motor Transport Service from

Quartermaster Corps, 100, 108, 110, 113, 127,144, 152, 203-04, 481, 499, 501-02

Ordnance Department Board, 103, 116-17. See alsoOrdnance Board.

Ordnance Munitions Board, 37, 50Ordnance Provision System, 38Ordnance Replacement Training Centers. See Re-

placement Training Centers.Ordnance Salvage Board, 60Ordnance School, The. See Schools, Ordnance School

(Aberdeen).Ordnance Sergeant, The, 129Ordnance Soldier's Guide, 138Ordnance Technical Committee. See Ordnance Com-

mittee.Ordnance Technical Intelligence Units, 239, 273-74.

See also Intelligence, technical.Ordnance Training Center, The, 110. See also Train-

ing, military.Ordnance Unit Training Centers. See Unit Training

Centers.Organization of Ordnance Department. See Ordnance

Department.Outland, Col. George W., 127-28, 135

Packaging materials and methods. See Preservativematerials.

Paints, 507, 509-10. See also Preservative materials.Panama Ordnance Depot, 38, 152Paracrates, 321-22Parkinson, D. B., 420Parts Control Division, 100-103Patents, 35, 219-20Patterson, Robert P., 91, 93, 490Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 421Pederson John D., 175-76, 176nPennell, Col. Ralph McT., 169nPenniman Ordnance Depot, 61Periscopes. See Telescopes.Perry, J. L., 59Pershing, General of the Armies John J., 25-26, 46Personnel, civilian. See also Training, civilian.

conservation of manpower, 160-61during World War I, 22, 22nemployee relations, 164-67increase in, 1938-1945, 9, 84, 88, 152-53influence of ASF on Ordnance personnel policies,

158-61peak number in World War II, 9, 164recruiting of, 153-55, 225-26struggle with War Department for delegated au-

thority, 156-58, 168

Personnel, military. See also Training, military.during World War I, 22-23, 23n1919-1939, 32, 39, 43-46, 1211940-1945, 9, 84, 121-50

Pew, Walter C., 159Philadelphia Procurement District, 36, 57, 105Philippine Insurrection, 18Philippine Ordnance Depot, 38, 152Picatinny Arsenal, 19, 211

basic research in metallurgy and explosives at, 172-73, 218-19, 367-68

civilian personnel at, 158, 160, 162-63, 165establishment of, 16and land mines, 381-86and photoflash bombs, 469and rockets, 360study of foreign weapons at, 352

Pistols, 17-18Pittsburgh Procurement District, 57, 105, 160Plant allocation system. See also Industrial mobiliza-

tion plans.effects of lend-lease on, 76plant surveys by districts, 50, 55-56

Pomona Ordnance Depot, 144Portage Ordnance Depot, 81Powder. See Propellants.Preservative materials, 6, 8, 505-07, 514

for automotive matériel, 509-10oils, greases, and plastics, 508-10painting and plating, 507, 509-10

Pressed Steel Car Company, 78, 318Prime movers, 313. See also Half-tracks; Tractors;

Trucks.Priorities, 24-25, 25n, 50, 76, 76nPrisoners of war, employment of at depots, 154Procurement districts. See District offices.Procurement planning. See Industrial mobilization

plans; Industrial Service.Production studies. See Industrial mobilization plans.Projectiles

armor-piercing (AP), 371-72armor-piercing-capped (APC), 372canister, 370-71chemical, 371high-explosive, 175high-explosive antitank (HEAT), 369-70hypervelocity, 348-50, 427hypervelocity armor-piercing (HVAP), 237, 372-

73for recoilless rifles, 352redesign of shape of, 174-75, 370sabot, 237, 349-50shaped charge. See Shaped charge.Westervelt Board recommendations on, 169-70

Propellants, 351-52. See also High explosives.black powder, 18development of, 1919-1940, 172-73double-base powder, 173, 353-54flashless, 173, 350-51


Propellants—ContinuedMohaupt explosive, 212-13powder storage problems, 172-73for rockets, 353-55smokeless powder, 18, 75, 173, 350

Protective mobilization plans. See Industrial mobiliza-tion plans.

Proving grounds, 87. See also Aberdeen ProvingGround; Erie Proving Ground; General MotorsProving Ground.

Public Works Administration (PWA), 31, 42nPullman-Standard Company, 78Purveyor of Public Supplies, 14Pyrotechnics, 468-70. See also Bombs.

Quartermaster Corps, 120Motor Transport Service, 100, 108, 110, 113, 127,

144, 152, 203-04, 481, 499, 501-02and transfer of automotive schools to Ordnance,

100, 127, 144Quinn, Col. Horace A., 269, 436Quinton, Maj. Gen. Alfred B., Jr., 56, 79, 90, 98-99,

105

Raaen, Col. John C., 103, 112Radford Ordnance Works, 162, 352Range finders, 337-38, 419Raritan Arsenal, 38, 61-62, 73, 122, 141, 144Red River Ordnance Depot, 139, 144, 146Reed, Col. C. Wingate, 117, 142Reed, Col. Frank F., 270-71Reimel, Brig. Gen. Stewart E., 111-12Remington Arms Company, 430Remote control devices. See Fire control and tracking

devices.Replacement Training Centers. See also Training,

military.Aberdeen, 100, 123-24, 131-39Camp Santa Anita, California, 135, 144, 144n

Requirements, 6. See also Industrial mobilizationplans.

Research advisory committees, 232Research and Development Board, Department of

National Defense, 231Research and Development Board, Joint Army-Navy,

231Research and Development Service, 6, 225. See also

Technical Staff,budgetary restrictions on, 1919-1940, 195, 204-08,

324-25collaboration with Allied Nations, 267-74determination of military characteristics and types

of weapons by, 18, 21, 29, 256-59establishment of, 85, 96, 98, 117organization of, 1940-1945, 85, 96, 98, 117, 220-26,

448relations with civilian agencies, 226-32relations with military agencies, 232-39relations with theaters of operations, 239unresolved problems of, 511-17

Research Board for National Security, 231

Revolutionary War, 14Revolvers, 17-18Rheinmetall Company, 182Richards, Maj. Gen. D. J. R., 390Rifles, 3-4, 11, 14. 24, 229

bolt action, adoption of, 18breech-loading, 17-18Browning automatic (BAR), 74, 512-13Enfield, 74-75Garand, 58-59, 69, 175-77, 347, 483, 513Krag-Jorgensen, 18muzzle-loading, 17-18Pedersen, development work by, 175-77percussion musket, 17recoilless, 229, 244, 322, 330-31, 338, 352semiautomatic (M1). See Garand.Springfield 1903, 18-19, 74, 177tapered bore, 348-49

Robinson, Col. Clinton F., 91Rockenback, Brig. Gen. Samuel D., 195Rockets, 223, 511. See also Guided missiles.

aircraft rockets and launchers, 436-39, 443-50bazooka rockets and launchers, 213-14, 242n, 328-

30, 338, 355-63, 369, 443British co-operation in development of, 269, 357,

402, 411-12, 437, 443-44co-operation of other agencies in development of,

228, 355-59, 411-12, 436, 443-50exchange of information with USSR, 273fuzes, 362-63, 445-46German, 234, 437-38, 516ground rockets and launchers, 244, 352, 402, 411,

413, 436, 445. See also bazooka rockets andlaunchers.

HVAR, 448-50multiple launchers, 330Ordnance conflict with NDRC over development

of, 228projectile design, 347, 352-53propellants for, 353-55Rocket Development Branch, 117, 448-49SUNFLOWER SEED, 437

Rock Island Arsenal, 6-7, 16, 36, 38, 60, 107, 162-63,187, 211, 322, 404

Roehm, Capt. Ernst. 247Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 31, 48-49, 54, 58, 65, 69,

73, 78-79, 95, 218, 422Rossford Ordnance Depot, 367Royal Air Force, British, 453-54, 463, 470Rubber. See Conservation of materials, rubber.Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von, 366Russell, Lt. Col. Everett P., 103Russian matériel. See Soviet matériel.Rust-preventive materials. See Preservative materials.

Safety programs at Ordnance installations, 161Salvage Board, Ordnance Department, 60San Antonio Arsenal, 38, 60, 127Sandy Hook Ordnance Depot, 61Savanna Ordnance Depot, 38, 60-64, 81, 127, 141

INDEX 539

Sayler, Brig. Gen. Henry B., 236Schedules of Production, 55-56Schenectady General Depot, 38Schools, 22-23, 87. See also Training, military,

automotive, 100, 127, 144Bomb Disposal School, 147-49Field Service School, 61, 122-23, 128Officer Candidate School, 121, 127, 129-31Ordnance School (Aberdeen), 100, 122-31Ordnance Specialist School, Raritan Arsenal, 38,

122-23Ordnance Specialist School, Watertown Arsenal,

122Scientific Advisory Council, 226Seacoast defense batteries, fire control for, 343-45Secretary of War, 4, 16, 23, 53-54, 196, 207, 315

civilian personnel policies of, 156, 158-59on conflict over design of and types of weapons, 21-

22and educational orders, 57-58, 58nopposition to private munitions industry, 18-19, 19nand Ordnance storage problem at end of World

War I, 37, 60and rearmament program of 1925, 46on standardization versus search for ideal weapons,

177Selective Service Act of 1940, 123-24, 131, 133, 149Seleen, Lt. Col. Paul M., 77, 103-04Self-propelled artillery, 12

airborne, 320-21, 411development of, 1919-1940, 201, 203-04Ordnance controversy with using services over

value of, 203-04, 238-39, 314-17, 327twin 40-mm. guns on M24 tank chassis, 410-11Westervelt Board recommendations on, 170, 203width and weight limitations imposed by Engineer

Corps, 23575-mm. gun on M24 tank chassis, 41176-mm. tank destroyer M18, 32090-mm. gun motor carriage M36, 327

Seneca Ordnance Depot, 144Services of Supply, 4, 91n. See also Army Service

Forces.Seven Pines Ordnance Depot, 61Seventh Air Force, 465Shaped charge, 273, 328-29, 351, 353, 356-61, 368-

70, 373, 511and bombs, 467Mohaupt and, 212-14, 357

Shoe plates, 314Shortages of materials. See Conservation of materials.Shugg, Brig. Gen. Roland P., 516Sighting equipment for armored vehicles, 340-42. See

also Fire control and tracking devices.Signal Corps, 21, 25, 180, 345n, 420

and binoculars, 336conflict with Ordnance over development responsi-

bility, 235and electric directors, 420and proximity fuzes, 465

Simon, Brig. Gen. Leslie E., 226, 517Simpson, Brig. Gen. Bethel W., 135Skid pans, 314Skinner, Col. Leslie A., 355-57, 444Slaughter, Col. W. R., 139Small arms ammunition, 1 1, 75. See also Grenades;

Rockets; Small Arms Ammunition Suboffice.armor-piercing, 405-07, 430-32, 438, 482-83clad-steel bullet jackets, 429, 493-94development of, 1919-1940, 172-75incendiary, 273, 405-07, 430-32, 438increased velocity of, 348-50packaging of, 175, 507-08shortage of tungsten for, 482-83special training, 428-30steel cartridge cases, 480, 488-89, 491-93storage and renovation of, 39, 60, 62-64, 172-73tracer, 405-07, 405n, 429-31

Small Arms Ammunition Suboffice, Industrial Serv-ice, 107

Small arms weapons, 3, 11, 74. See also Bazooka; Ma-chine guns; Pistols; Revolvers; Rifles; Rockets.

Smith, Maj. Truman, 208, 211Society of Automotive Engineers

and conservation of materials, 478, 485Ordnance Advisory Committee, 232, 276War Engineering Board, 265, 485, 509

Somers, Brig. Gen. Richard H., 88, 98-99, 454Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 4, 145, 316, 516

conflict with General Burns, 95and creation of ASF, effect on Ordnance, 91-94,

103-04, 119, 234on decentralization within technical services, 108and manpower conservation, 160and tanks, 236, 296-97and transfer of Motor Transport Service to Ord-

nance, 108Soviet matériel, 514

Russo-German research collaboration, 249-50study of, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 273-74tanks, 274, 281, 286, 515-1645-mm. gun, 183-84, 25275.2-mm. gun, 274

Spanish-American War, 18Spanish Civil War, 178, 184, 193, 208, 211Spare parts, 15, 19, 512

establishment of Parts Control Division, 98, 100-102

General Motors report on, 101-02lack of, in World War I, 23

Spare Parts Board, 101-02Sparta Ordnance Depot, 60-61Special Armored Vehicle Board, 316Special Observer Group, sent to London in 1941,

267-68Speer, Albert, 256Sperry Gyroscope Company, 162, 417-19Springfield Armory

civilian employees at, 43, 160, 165-66establishment of, 14


Springfield Armory—Continuedfunctions of. 6, 16, 36, 36nand small arms weapons, 6, 16, 17n, 58-59, 59n,

175-76, 347, 422-23, 425, 439storage of machine tools at, 60study of enemy weapons by, 264

Springfield Procurement District, 105Springfield Trade School, 366Standard Nomenclature Lists, 9, 34, 38Standardization of equipment, 17, 177-78, 202, 239-

45, 516. See also Ordnance Committee.Steese, Col. Charles M., 90, 99Stevenson, Alexander R., 134nSt. Louis Procurement District, 105, 107Stimson, Henry L., 234-35, 238Storage. See also Depots; Field Service.

of ammunition, 39, 60-64, 172-73of machine tools, 60-61

Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 429Strategic raw materials. See Conservation of materials.Stratemeyer, Maj. Gen. G. E., 445Studler, Col. René R., 208, 210, 212, 242Submachine guns. See Machine guns.Submarine Mine Depot, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 233,

394, 396-400Submarine mines. See Mines, controlled underwater.Summerall, General Charles P., 192, 202SUNFLOWER SEED, 437. See also Rockets.Surveyor of Ordnance, 14Swedish matériel, 408-10Swiss matériel, 433

Tank-Automotive Center. See Office, Chief of Ord-nance-Detroit.

Tank Board, 198Tank Corps, 189-95, 199Tank Destroyer Board, 335Tank Destroyer Center. See Tank Destroyer Com-

mand.Tank Destroyer Command, 238, 316Tank destroyers, 237, 314-16, 320. See also Self-pro-

pelled artillery.Tank engines, 197, 202-03, 287-90

Chrysler A-57 multi-bank, 293-96Ford GAA, 298-301gasoline versus diesel, 296-98General Motors 6046 diesel, 291-93Wright Continental R-975, 290-91

Tanks, 7, 74-76, 78, 205, 211-12, 275-76, 512. See alsoTank engines.

AGF controversy with Ordnance over heavy tanks,236-39, 269, 278-87, 512

airborne, 318-20, 513amphibious, 270, 270nAnglo-American Tank Commission, 189British collaboration in design of, 268-69Christie or convertible type, 199-200comparison of American and German, 13, 212,

250-56, 278-87, 328, 514

Tanks—Continuedconservation of materials in, 481-82, 484-85, 494development program, 1919-1940, 194-203doctrine and policy statements, 1919-1940, 189-94,

211, 236-39, 250-52, 257fires in, causes of, 293gyrostabilizers for, 342-43, 515heavy, 195-96, 236-39, 269, 278-87, 512light, 196-98medium, 198-203, 236-39, 278-87night lighting equipment for, 272, 513-14sighting equipment for, 340-42Soviet, 274, 281, 515-16suspensions, 200. 304trackless, 258tracks for, 306-10, 512United States Tank Committee, 269width and weight limitations, 194-96, 235, 278

Tapered bore guns, 229, 328, 348-50Technical Division, 98. See also Research and Devel-

opment Service; Technical Staff.Technical intelligence. See Intelligence, technical.Technical Staff, 33-35, 84-85, 88, 209, 222-23. See also

Research and Development Service.Telescopes, 334-37, 340-42, 419Tenth Air Force, 429Theatres of operations

introduction of new weapons in, 243-44Research and Development Service co-ordination

with, 239Tires

combat, 310-12, 501high notation, 312-13rayon cord for, 504repairing and recapping, 499synthetic rubber, 498-505tests of on Alaska Highway, 503tests of at Camp Shilo, Manitoba, 503for trucks. 502-05

Tizzard Mission, 267, 363, 367, 420Tobyhanna Ordnance Depot, 61Toledo Ordnance Depot, 61TORCH, 444Tracking devices. See Fire control and tracking de-

vices.Tracks, 512

conservation of rubber in, 480, 499, 502pins for, 308-10profiles of, 304-06steel versus rubber, 306-08synthetic rubber, 502wide tracks and extension devices, 301-04

Tractors, 60, 74development of, 1919-1940, 203-04for loading bombs at air bases, 63low-speed commercial, 235for towing artillery, 170, 172, 203-04, 276Westervelt Board recommendations on, 170-72

Trailers, 60, 63, 481

INDEX 541

Training, civilian, 9-10, 161-64. See also Personnel,civilian.

Training, military, 38-39, 149-50, 515. See also Re-placement Training Centers; Schools; UnitTraining Centers,

affiliated units, 10, 141-43, 146-47bomb disposal, 147-49at civilian trade schools and factory schools, 126-

27during World War I, 22-23, 23nmarksmanship, against high-speed targets, 146.

427-30marksmanship, rifle, 135, 138, 145-46Mobilization Training Programs, 132-34, 138-411920-1940, 221-25officer candidate, 129-31plans for in 1940, 123-24replacement, 100, 124, 131-39technical Ordnance training, 8-10, 124-29transfer of automotive schools from Quartermaster,

100, 127, 144unit, 100, 123-24, 139-47

Training Company, 40th, 123-25Training Within Industry Service, 10, 163-65, 168Transport vehicles, 275-77, 325. See also individual

items by name.Transportation Corps, 9"Tremendous Trifles," 478nTrichel, Col. Gervais W., 260, 269, 448-49Tripp, Col. Guy E., 27, 57-58Trucks, 3-4, 11, 23, 60, 275-78, 325, 512. See also

Flotation; Tires,airborne, 322-23for bomb loading at air bases, 63conservation of steel in, 480-81, 484, 487DUKW, 227-28, 227n, 312-13for towing artillery, 203-04transfer of Motor Transport Service from Quarter-

master, 100, 108, 110, 113, 127, 144, 152, 203-04,481, 499, 501-02

Westervelt Board recommendations on, 170-72Tschappat, Maj. Gen. William H., 40, 206-07, 231Tullytown Ordnance Depot, 61Tuve, Merle A., 363Twin Cities Ordnance Plant, 492

Uhl, 2d Lt. Edward G., 269, 357-58Umatilla Ordnance Depot, 81Under Secretary of War, 4, 77-78, 90-91, 93

and conservation of materials, 477, 479, 489-90,495

and Ordnance unit training. 145and tank tracks, 307

Unit Training CentersAberdeen, 100, 124, 140-41, 146Atlanta, 144, 146Camp Perry, 139, 144-45Holabird, 144

Unit Training Centers—ContinuedMississippi (Flora), 139, 144Pomona, 144Raritan, 139, 141, 144Red River, 144, 146Santa Anita, 135, 144, 144nSavanna, 127, 140-41

United Shoe Machinery Company, 414, 436United States Employment Service, 153United States Steel Corporation, 73United States Steel Export Company, 75United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 742United States Tank Committee, 269University of Pennsylvania, 226USSR matériel. See Soviet matériel.

Veblen, Oswald, 226Visual training aids, 128-29, 132, 145

Wadsworth, Col. Decius, 15, 17Wagner, Col. Herman U., 140Wallace, Henry A., 490War Council, 26War Department, 24. See also War Department Gen-

eral Staff.Civilian Personnel Division, 156-59, 168Orders "M," 158-59, 168Orders "N," 157-58reorganization of 1920, effect on Ordnance, 32reorganization of 1942, effect on Ordnance, 4, 90-

95Special Observer Group, 261

War Department General Staff, 6, 37, 46, 77-78, 514.See also Chief of Staff; General Staff College.

and airborne tank, 318and budgetary restrictions on Ordnance research,

204-08and depots, 63-64, 80-82direction of Ordnance activities, extent of, 4-6, 91and expenditures and appropriations, 48, 67, 205and guided missiles, 234mobilization planning by, 47-48, 51, 53-54New Development Division, 233-34, 243-44on standardization versus search for ideal weapon,

177-78tank doctrine and policy, 1919-1940, 189-94, 198,

256-57and tank engines, 296-98and technical intelligence reports on enemy equip-

ment, 208, 214-15, 239, 260-63, 266-68and training, 123-124, 133-34, 139, 141on 37-mm. antitank gun, 184on 105-mm. howitzer, 186-87

War of 1812, 16War Industries Board, 25War Manpower Commission, 153. See also Training

Within Industry Service.War Policies Commission, 52War Production Board, 6, 477, 483, 504


War reserves. See Industrial mobilization plans.War Resources Board, 65War Supplies Limited, 269Washington Post, The, 278Watertown Arsenal

artillery development at, 180, 407limited funds for, 42metallurgical research by, 218-19, 264, 377, 476,

482-83mission of, 6, 16

Watervliet Arsenalhistory of, 1919-1940, 36, 42-43labor shortage during World War II, 154mission of, 6, 16and 20-mm. gun (Hispano Suiza), 434and 37-mm. gun, 407

Webster, David L., 226Weeks, John W., 43, 50n, 57Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M., 54, 69, 104, 207

appointment as Chief of Ordnance, 40and civilian personnel policies, 156-58eleven o'clock conferences of, 87and lend-lease, 73succeeded by General Campbell, 95views on training, 123, 125, 133, 142Washington staff of, 84-85, 87-88, 100-101, 220,

222

Westervelt, Brig. Gen. William I., 43, 43n, 169-72,169n, 170n. See also Westervelt Board.

Westervelt Board, 28, 40, 169-73, 175, 178, 180, 182,186, 188-89, 191-92, 203-05, 221-22, 325-26,516

White, Col. Herbert, 103Whitlock, George E., 478nWhitney, Eli, 15Wilcox Act, 63Willard, Arthur C., 134nWilliams, Col. Allison R., 390, 394Williams, Brig. Gen. Clarence C., 26, 29, 32, 40, 43-

44, 46, 175, 185, 208, 221, 230-31Wilson, Col. W. I., 140Winchester Repeating Arms Company, 58, 59nWingate Ordnance Depot, 38, 61, 81, 90, 154Woodbury Ordnance Depot, 61Woodring, Harry H., 53Woods Company, S. A., 58Works Progress Administration (WPA), 31World-War I, 11, 11n, 20-29, 32, 51, 57, 61, 125Wright Field. See Army Air Forces, Materiel Com-

mand.Wurlitzer, Rudolph, Company, 399

York Safe and Lock Company, 392

Zornig, Col. Hermann, 226, 260, 269

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1990 242-456/00019

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