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Collecting Consciences: The Catholic Church and Populist Leadership in
Juan Perón’s Argentina and Salvador Allende’s Chile
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at
Syracuse University
Emma Louise Fountain
Candidate for Bachelor of Arts
and Renée Crown University Honors
Spring 2020
Honors Thesis in International Relations
Thesis Advisor: _______________________ Dr. Gladys McCormick
Thesis Reader: _______________________ Dr. Francine D’Amico
Honors Director: _______________________ Dr. Karen Hall
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Abstract
This paper identifies populism’s key actors and addresses three essential relationships. These actors are the political leader (the president), the religious leader (the Catholic Church), and the led (the people). The relationships examined here are those between the political leader and the led, the political and the religious leaders, and the religious leader and the led. This framework is then applied to the distinctly populist presidencies of Juan Perón in Argentina and Salvador Allende in Chile. Evidence for these cases comes from an assortment of sources, from contemporary accounts of leadership to recent reflections. Perón began his regime in 1946 with strong relationships on every front, but lost the support of the Catholic Church and subsequently the support of the people by the mid-1950s. Allende’s populism was a development of Perón’s populism. In the two decades that separated the Argentine leader from the Chilean, an activist movement within the Christian community undermined the Catholic Church’s political pull. Therefore, Allende’s weak relationship with the Church and powerful link to the people was politically successful. This comparison of Perón and Allende offers valuable insight on the viability of different modes of populism.
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Executive Summary
This interdisciplinary paper explores the roles of religion and politics in the populist
presidencies of Juan Perón and Salvador Allende. A definition of populism emerges through
identification of the key actors and three of their essential relationships. These actors are the
political leader (the president), the religious leader (the Catholic Church), and the led (the
people). The relationships examined here are those between the political leader and the led, the
political and the religious leaders, and the religious leader and the led. This framework is then
applied to the distinctly populist presidencies of Juan Perón in Argentina and Salvador Allende
in Chile. Evidence for these cases comes from an assortment of sources, from contemporary
accounts of leadership to recent reflections. Perón began his regime in 1946 with strong
relationships on every front, but lost the support of the Catholic Church and subsequently the
support of the people by the mid-1950s. Allende’s populism was a development of Perón’s
populism. In the two decades that separated the Argentine leader from the Chilean, an activist
movement within the Christian community undermined the Catholic Church’s political pull.
Therefore, Allende’s weak relationship with the Church and powerful link to the people was
politically successful. Comparison of Perón and Allende offers valuable insight on the viability
of different modes of populism.
This study relies on certain terms to define the boundaries of populism. First, the phrase
“political leader” refers to the two relevant presidents, with some additional reference to a
19th-century governor. Populism is this leader’s political style of choice.
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The “religious leader” in this paper refers to the institution of the Roman Catholic
Church. In both Argentina and Chile in these time frames, Catholicism was the majority religion
and the traditional religion affiliated with the state. In this study, I rely on testimony of ordained
Cardinals and Bishops, as communicated through the Conferencia Episcopal (Episcopal
Conferences) of Argentina and Chile, respectively.
Finally, the “led” is the community that makes up the nation. This study applies two
perspectives to this component: the religious and the political. The religious perspective of the
led is examined through comunidades eclesiasticas de base (Base Ecclesiastical Communities),
while the political perspective is seen through worker organization.
This project is especially pertinent in 2020, when a new wave of populist leadership has
swept the globe. Understanding the process through which populism can strengthen the base of
support for a president is a powerful thing – this understanding can reveal motivations. In a
democratic society, the right to vote confers the responsibility of electing leadership upon the
people. Our responsibility in this regard demands us to question the motives of our leaders, and
here I hope my research is relevant. Populism is a tactic used to win support, and it has a robust
political history. If we understand this history, we will be better equipped to see through the
empty promises of a politician trying to win power. Hopefully, this will bring us to more
qualified leadership, rather than to a president who only cares about how loudly his name can be
chanted at rallies.
Religion and politics shape each of our lives. These two great forces have always been
the architects of society, and the study of populism offers a window into a way in which these
forces can interact.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………. 7
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………10
Definitions……………………………………………………………………………………… 16
Political Leader ………………………………………………………………………... 16
Religious Leader………………………………………………………………………... 16
The People……………………………………………………………………………….17
The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 18
The Political Leader, the People, and Populism………………………………………...
22
Argentina………………………………………………………………………………………... 25
Juan Perón and the People……………………………………………………………... 25
Juan Perón and the Institutional Catholic Church……………………………………... 29
The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 32
Chile…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 37
Salvador Allende and the People……………………………………………………….. 37
Salvador Allende and the Institutional Catholic Church……………………………….. 40
The Institutional Catholic Church and the People……………………………………... 44
Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………... 47
Sources Cited and Consulted…………………………………………………………………… 50
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“The masses do not think, they feel.”
Rita de Grandis, 1999
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Acknowledgements
There are countless people who have brought me to this point, and it would be impossible
to name them all without writing another fifty pages. However, I will do my best in these few
paragraphs.
I started my undergraduate career as an International Relations major, and have been
amazed at the dedication of each of the professors I have encountered along the way. I chose IR
fairly arbitrarily, but I cannot imagine studying anything else. My world is bigger than I could
ever have anticipated four years ago. Not long after I began my time at Syracuse University, I
declared a major in Spanish Language, Literature, and Culture. While I may never fully grasp the
subjunctive, I have enjoyed every course I have taken with the Spanish department along the
way. This department is one of the most enthusiastic and welcoming communities I have
encountered. Thank you for the patience and compassion you have shown me again and again
throughout the years.
This thesis has been rattling around my brain ever since I took a course titled Religion,
Scripture, and Law in my sophomore year. Halfway through this semester, I declared a major in
Religion and began incessantly talking about how religion and politics occupy the same space. I
have found the professors in this department to be endlessly passionate and interesting, and I
appreciate every classroom lecture, office-hours meeting, and passing conversation on the bigger
(and smaller) questions in life. I feel especially proud and lucky to have been taught by many of
you.
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A few months after adding my Religion major, I landed in Santiago, Chile, for a
semester-long study abroad program. Mauricio Paredes’ emphatic lessons challenged me more
than I thought I could handle and changed the way I saw the world. It was there that I wrote my
first essays on the Church and governance in very hesitant Spanish, and, Mauricio, I will always
be grateful for your spirited guidance.
Formal work on this project began when I met Dr. Gladys McCormick in Spring of 2019.
This name had come up repeatedly as I asked around the Maxwell School for faculty who might
be willing to guide me through this process. Dr. McCormick, I remember leaving your office
buzzing with excitement to begin this project. I admit, that excitement mixed with terror as I took
Modern Latin America with you in the Fall, but your high standards have made this thesis
stronger and better than what I could have produced on my own. Thank you for always pushing
me to strive for more.
By now, I have taken three courses with Dr. Francine D’Amico, and if there was a way to
take any more, I would be the first to enroll. Dr. D, thank you so much for the kindness, advice,
and encouragement you have given me over these last few years. There is no way I would be
remotely close to where I am today without your support, and there is no adequate way to
express how much I have learned from you. Thank you.
There is a group of people at Syracuse who have been by my side every day through the
last four years. My friends: you are amazing, motivated, brilliant, ambitious, caring, curious, and
driven, and I cannot wait to see what you achieve. Thank you for laughing and crying with me,
for hunting down coffee at absurd hours, for telling me stupid jokes on bad days, and for
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believing in me. I love you all, and know that each of you has made an indelible mark on my life.
Thank you, thank you, thank you.
Finally, there are three people who have been my bedrock for as long as I can remember.
Olivia, you have inspired me at every turn. You’ve talked me down from every ledge and helped
me find my way every time I was lost. Thank you for telling me to apply to Syracuse so many
years ago. Dad, thank you for the much-needed levity throughout my roughest times. There have
been many times when I’ve wanted to give up, but your insistence that I “hang tuff” always
seems to pull me through. Mom, thank you for being there. Thank you for reading every iteration
of this paper and patiently helping me through mental blocks with much-needed FaceTime dance
breaks. I could never have arrived at this point without you. To my family, thank you; I love you
so much.
I could not have done this – this project, nor this degree – without all of these people. I
am so grateful for my extraordinary community.
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Introduction
Church and state have fought for power over centuries of political development, yet this
struggle remains unresolved. Political, historical, and theological researchers are inclined to
fixate on the apparently diametric opposition of these two powers (hence the ubiquity of the
phrase “church and state”). However, untangling one from the other is an impossible task. I
propose that humans are inherently both political and religious, requiring that the state, created to
enact politics, engage with religion, and that the church respectively engage with politics.
Conflict, then, arises with diversity: there is no homogenous political or religious view, thus
presenting a problem when either power is given dominance over the other. Some countries
choose to conflate church and state, giving the executive both religious and political supremacy.
However, many countries, Argentina and Chile included, give primacy to the state; the executive
is a purely political figure and is the political authority of the nation. The state forms the laws
which the population must follow as citizens, while the laws of the church are not granted legal
status. This political state is tasked with promoting the well-being of the entire nation, and must
deal with the reality of pluralism. Although Argentina and Chile are majority Catholic countries,
and have been for many years, both have constitutions that feature freedom of religion as an
undeniable right. This leaves organized religions to form their own structures under the 1
guidance of the state. In this way, at the institutional level, church and state have materially
separated themselves.
1 Of course, enforcement matters more than existence with these constitutional rights.
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This satisfying divide does not exist on an informal level – again, people are inherently
both political and religious; they both vote and pray. The individual does not separate one from
the other. This reality complicates the job of the executive in a democratic nation, where
governance by the populous is the stated ideal. Democracy exalts the people, requiring
democratic executives to do the same: a politician must win the support of this population in
order to earn this office, making appeals to religion as well as politics viable.
This point prompted my interest in the power dynamics between the president and the
Roman Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile. Latin America has a robust tradition of
incorporating Catholicism into national identity, and presidents Juan Perón and Salvadore
Allende represent a political utilization of this tradition. Both leaders were undeniably populist in
their identification of the people as the most important facet of the nation, and I argue that this
form of populism relies heavily on an integration of religion and politics. I lean most heavily on
the definition of populism laid out by Alan Knight, who asserted that populism’s viability is
relational. For Knight, the leader’s ability to connect and identify with the led is the most
important relationship. While I agree with this point, I contend that there are three essential 2
relationships that are worth examining. To begin, we identify three actors. The first two of these
occur on the formal level. The Catholic Church is the formal religious institution, and in both
countries, the president is the political leader. The final actor is the most amorphous, and can be
labeled simply the led, or the people. This refers to the population that participates in politics and
religion. This phrasing is not intended to take agency from this group, but merely to emphasize
2 Knight, 1998
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their role in respect to their relationship with the political and religious leadership. Perón and
Allende focused on the working class as support bases in their campaigns, and so I follow suit.
With these three actors identified, the relationships I examine are those between the
president and the people, the president and the institutional Catholic Church, and the institutional
Catholic Church and the people.
In the case of Argentina, all three relationships were positive at the beginning of Perón’s
regime in 1946 (though all had soured by the 1950s). Three decades later, in the case of Chile,
the sole positive relationship was that between the president and the people.
Historical context is key in examining these differences. In the time between these two
cases, a split occurred in the religious community: the outbreak of liberation theology alienated
the institutional Church from the people, making an alliance between the president and the
Church less politically favorable. In this way, Allende’s populism is a logical progression of
Perón’s populism.
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Literature Review
Perón and Allende have been subjected to vigorous investigations over the years, many of
which center on their qualities as populist leaders. In this sense, my work here is nothing
revelatory. However, I hope to bring a new perspective with the introduction of religious
frameworks.
My studies benefitted from Alan Knight’s relational exploration of populism in Latin
America, which largely occurs through a political lens. Knight frames the connection between 3
the populist leader and the people as primarily anti-institutional, and labels this a distinctly
political standpoint. I expand this view to contend that the incorporation of the implicit and
explicit religious dimension furthers this anti-institutional stance. The use of this adjacent
terminology allows for a wider-ranging discussion of the magnetism of the populist leader.
Perón is commonly researched relative to his collaboration with either the Church or the
labor movement, but rarely are both elements addressed in the same investigation. I look most
often to Eduardo Elena’s multifaceted analysis of Perón’s campaign to ‘dignify Argentina,’
which does an excellent job of investigating the political motivations of the era. Once again I 4
was left wanting in terms of information explicitly concerning the Church and the people outside
the scope of Peronism. This frustration was somewhat appeased with David D’Amico’s
3 Alan Knight is a British professor who has written extensively on Latin American history, with a focus on twentieth-century Mexican politics. This western background should elicit some skepticism, but Knight’s work has been recognized and commended by the Mexican government and by various Latin America-based associations. This signals, to an extent, the viability of his work as not merely representative of a western mindset (Wilson Center, 2012). 4 Elena, 2011
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religio-historical analysis, which noted a connection between Perón’s populism and the ‘Third
World’ priests’ movement (liberation theology) in the late 1960s. Yet this was merely a passing 5
mention. I focus on Eva Perón as an expression of religiosity of the Argentine masses. Evita’s
religious role in the Perón regime is a heavily researched topic, with many scholars utilizing a
feminist perspective to make their arguments. Eva is a well-known figure (thanks, in part, to
Broadway and Hollywood romanticizations of her life ), and therefore continues to generate 6
much interest. More recent political investigations have begun to look at Eva’s importance to 7
Perón’s authority, where earlier forays labeled her a social climber who used her gender as a 8
means to secure power and money. Again, I relate these separate studies to one another in 9
exploring Eva’s religious and political role in Perón’s populist rule.
Allende is similarly well established as a populist president. Given the popularity of
liberation theology at the time, Allende’s (dis)engagement with the Catholic Church draws a
clearer divide between church and state than existed originally with Perón. While there is
substantial literature on Allende’s populism (specifically in his relationship with workers) and 10
on the Church hierarchy’s opinion of his governance, not much has been written about 11
Allende’s dimension as a religiously motivated leader. Instead, I use Knight’s definition of
populism and Peter Winn’s study of the Yarur textile factory as methods of triangulation to
5 D’Amico, 1977, p. 502 6 Evita, written by Tim Rice and scored by Andrew Lloyd Webber, premiered on Broadway in 1978. The film Evita was directed by Alan Parker and was released in 1996. 7 Misemer, 2008 8 Theweleit, 2009, p. 33; Patroni, 1999, p. 154 9 Misemer, 2008, p. 100; Navarro, 1999 10 Winn, 1986; Figueroa, 2013 11 Much of this comes from primary source analysis: specifically, documents from the Conferencia Episcopal.
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explore this dimension. Winn’s focus on these workers was especially useful in understanding
the dynamics of the Allende regime. Through his decades-long account of labor organization in
one particular factory, I gained valuable insight into the daily routines of workers and saw how
these routines were impacted by Allende’s actions.
Overall, each component of my study has a well-articulated library of research. I found
that these components generally stood independently, and therefore my main intention was to
explore the interdisciplinary relationship between both religious and political aspects of
populism.
I first define the important terms in order to properly understand these relationships.
Then, I examine the three relationships in Argentina, then do the same with Chile. Finally, I
present the differences between the cases.
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Definitions
Political Leader: President
Perón’s and Allende’s styles of populism are closely examined in this study. Rhetoric
used by populist leaders is crafted to reflect the hopes of the people. Allende and Perón were
both quick to invoke religious sentiments to garner support, neatly utilizing religiosity as a
personalistic form of communication to endear the leader to the led. Rather than relying on
devotion to the teachings of the institutional Catholic Church, these leaders instead called upon
general values and emotions. This looked different under either president, where Perón was
closer to the establishment of the Church than was Allende. With both, the empathic connection
was especially powerful, thanks to the deeply Catholic traditions of Argentina and Chile. This
internalized religiosity is an essential means through which the people fostered trust in their
leader.
Religious Leader: Institutional Catholic Church
The Church establishment mainly concerns traditional hierarchies and “official”
representatives. Much of the position of the formal Church is seen through statements from each
country’s respective Conferencia Episcopal (Episcopal Conference). This organization acted as
the mouthpiece of the Catholic Church, issuing proclamations penned by ordained Cardinals and
Bishops (national and regional religious authorities). In 1955, these national conferences joined
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to form the Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELAM). This forum hosted many key
discussions on the role of liberation theology (a Christian activist movement) within the
Christian community throughout the second half of the 20th century. 12
The People
I identify two perspectives within the community of the people for the sake of
comparison with the institutional level. However, these labels are only for comparison. The led is
the group of people that make up a nation, and are not materially divided into religious and
political camps. This is why these are merely perspectives. Where I previously discussed the
division of church and state, it is now useful to consider both a specifically religious and a
specifically political perspective of this population. The former can be termed the social church,
and is best defined in opposition to the formal. The social church is the manifestation and
interpretation of Catholicism in everyday society outside the direct control of the institutional
Church. It is the end result of religion’s osmosis into a community’s culture, whether that 13
community be an entire nation or a single family unit. This popular church is the church created
by the people; it is the social aspect of spirituality that contrasts the Holy See’s tradition-heavy
formalities. The perspective of the social church will be seen in discourse originating from local
organizations, such as athletic clubs and small prayer groups.
12 Cruz, 2014 13 In the cases of both Argentina and Chile, this religion is Catholicism simply because of its cultural dominance at the time. While other religions were in practice, they are not relevant to this study.
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The political perspective on the led is, again, frustratingly slippery. I use labor unions as
an example of this areligious organization. Both Perón and Allende looked to blue collar 14
workers to form their base, each deftly utilizing networks built by labor unions to make political
connections. Perón, in fact, led the Department of Labor and Welfare before becoming president.
He and Allende campaigned heavily on the promise of giving voice to labor unions, so
examining these groups gives valuable insight on the symbiotic nature of these presidents’
populist messages. 15
The Institutional Catholic Church and the People
Since Spanish colonizers arrived in Latin America in the 1600s and forcibly spread their
religion through violence and manipulation, the Catholic Church has played a large role in
shaping society – both in daily life as well as in the administration of the state. A western
mentality may ambitiously perceive the religious as the perfect politically neutral conduit
through which to form a community, but the Church has truly never been neutral. In the 19th
century, residuals of colonialism (when a monarch claimed his authority as given directly by
some higher power, which was then substantiated by the church) meant close ties between the
Church and the political state. While social Catholic adherence rose and fell throughout the
14 Organization that is not explicitly religious. 15 Labor unions, blue-collar workers, the working class: I use these terms variously to refer to the populations to which Perón and Allende appealed. However, this population is not homogenous, nor do I mean to detract from the important distinctions within these groups. For the sake of my argument, I felt it best to generalize, but there is excellent literature on specific labor movements in both Argentina and Chile for those interested in understanding this element to a deeper degree.
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years, Catholicism remained steadfast as the prevailing religion. One scholar notes that the 16
Catholic Church dominated civil society across Latin America, existing as the traditional
authority for “ministering to the poor and shaping ceremonial life across the colonies.” An 17
example of utilization of this theo-political relationship in the time of early independence comes
from Argentina, under caudillo leader Juan Manuel de Rosas.
The caudillo reigned in the chaos of post-colonial Latin America. He, like the populist,
was charismatic and individualistic, but lacked the democratic tendencies that endeared the
masses. Caudillos were strongmen authoritarian rulers, reliant on violence as an immediate
reaction to opposition. Juan Manuel de Rosas, known as the “Restorer of the Laws,” was one
such strongman. He picked up on the potential of charismatic leadership in the aftermath of
Spain’s withdrawal from Argentina, becoming governor of Argentine capital Buenos Aires (and
therefore the de facto national leader) in 1828 and reigning over a bitterly divisive era until
defeat in 1852. His authoritarian regime allowed no room for opposition, and his mazorcas
(armed followers) were responsible for thousands of murders. Rosas serves as an archetype for
caudillo rule in Latin America in the 1800s. Like the populist, he fostered a cult of personality to
become an idol of the people. However, unlike the populist, he was not interested in distancing
himself from the elite – in fact, his moneyed background was what propelled him to prominence.
Rosas adeptly adopted the guise of religiosity to unite his base, and a bifurcated political 18
climate encouraged the population to be emphatic in their support. He centered his regime upon
Catholicism (embracing the institution), setting a decidedly traditionalist tone for his Argentina.
16 Pike, 1968 17 Dawson, 2015, p. 2 18 Dawson, 2015, p. 2
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He formed a coalition known as “the Holy Federation.” As a leader, Rosas promoted the
narrative that his regime was supported by the Catholic Church (greeting any objections with
brutality), thus drawing support from the base that hoped to see the power of a waning Church
restored. This goal was aided by the hyperbolized political breaks of the time, which largely 19
fell upon religious lines. Rosas’ traditionalist Catholic Federalist’s hatred of the minority
population of liberal Protestant Unitarians was reciprocated in full. Esteban Echeverría, a famous
Argentine writer from this time, captured this hatred in El matadero, or The Slaughterhouse.
This short story concludes with the following lines:
“In those days, the slaughter yard’s butchers-cum-executioners were the apostles who by
dagger and fist spread the gospel of the Holy Federation, and it is easy to imagine what
sort of federation would emerge from their heads and knives.” 20
The religiously charged language is hard to ignore. Echeverría directly likens Rosas’ followers to
Jesus’ apostles, and foresees a vicious war prompted by evangelizing Catholic Federalists. Rosas
was a dictator, not a democratic leader, but like more contemporary populists, he understood the
importance of linking religion and politics.
In the 20th century, Rosas’ model of religious and political governance was still viable.
The importance of both the social and institutional Catholic Church remained, as the majority of
Chileans and Argentines still at least nominally identified as Catholic. This nominal 21
self-identification was the only legitimacy needed to guarantee the relevance of the institutional
19 Dawson, 2015, p. 2 20 Echeverría, 1871. Translation from Dawson, 2015, p. 59 21 Winn, 1986, p. 85
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Catholic Church. By definition, this branch of the Church has official supremacy. Those who
make up the institutional Church have been tasked with the administrative role of shaping the
social church. This role carries with it an intrinsic power, certainly over laypeople but also over
priests and other low-ranking Church officials. Given this relationship, the Church must
recognize its internal bifurcation. It has a vested interest in the reconciliation of these branches
(institutional and social) so as to carry out its task most efficiently. Documents disseminated by 22
the institutional Church in its administrator role sought to ‘reign in’ the Catholic population as it
drifted towards the radical on the political spectrum; the social church similarly addressed
directives from the institutional Church that went against the ideals of liberation theology. 23
However, the division between the branches continued to grow, especially given the inherently
political nature of the religious liberation theology movement. The rebellious base (the social
church) thus destabilized the power of the administrator (the institutional Church). Allende’s
brief presidency is then a progression of Perón’s early years in office. In Argentina under Perón
(from 1946-55), the split was minimal, and the Catholic community was a relatively united body
which delegated certain roles to its formal and informal actors, but which overall was unanimous
in its goals. This was different 20 years later in Chile: by 1970 and the election of Allende, the 24
informal branch of the Catholic Church had undergone a fundamental change, thanks mainly to
the tireless work of politically-minded priests such as Gustavo Gutiérrez. In the 1960s, 25
22 The ‘task’ of the Church is a tricky matter, but most simply, here I mean it as the promotion of Catholicism. 23 These goals are aligned with liberation theology, which promotes activism in defense of the poor. While the social church was not a cohesive group, it did have in common these shared goals. 24 D’Amico, 1977 25 Sigmund, 2011
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liberation theology became immensely popular among those ‘lower’ in the hierarchy of the
Church. Comunidades eclesiasticas de base (Base Ecclesiastical Communities) were the result of
an initiative by the Catholic Church to strengthen the connection between the people and the
Church, and serve as a useful marker of disunity. This initiative established prayer groups that
would regularly meet to discuss their personal commitment to the faith, hopefully bridging the
widening gap between the institutional and the social. However, this development, beginning in
the mid-1960s, backfired, in that these often-rural communities instead became catalysts for
political radicalization and promotion of liberation theology. The communities included the
blue-collar workers that would support Allende in the upcoming elections. Liberation theology
taught that the Church had a responsibility to uplift and to advocate for the poor, and became 26
the basis for an activist movement. As liberation theology gained purchase, the social wing of the
Church became politicized, and the rift between the social and institutional Church grew larger.
In Allende’s Chile, the two faces of the Church were actively opposed to one another, while in
Perón’s Argentina, this was not the case.
The Political Leader, the People, and Populism
Populism is a political style that has repeatedly found footing in times of turmoil. In the
cases of Chile and Argentina, charismatic authority as an essential component in leadership
evolved from early caudillo rule (1800s proto-populism) to the contemporary populism of Perón
and Allende. Rosas, Perón, and Allende all came to power in times of social unrest. This
26 Gutiérrez, 1973
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emergence in a time of crisis is a recurrent theme, harkening back to the savior role of a
charismatic politician. Populism’s viability rests in the leader’s ability to connect and identify 27
with the people, as explored by Alan Knight. This relational aspect is key; populism places the 28
people at the forefront and promises that the leader will be beholden to the interests of this
population. The leader serves at the behest of the people and relies almost entirely on their
mandate. This reciprocity can translate to a religious connection, as sharing a religion with
constituents can make a candidate more relatable (and therefore more popular). The personal 29
religiosity of these constituents creates a community with shared values and morals. This leader
can then identify with this community by appearing as a compañero or compadre (companion,
buddy) to garner support, something at which Perón and Allende excelled. This tactic
emphasizes that the candidate in question is not a politician, instead, he is an outsider – like the 30
people. In Latin America, the term el pueblo (the people, the town) evokes a rural image
quintessential to communal identity and casts the leader as emerging from the core of the country
rather than the institution; the leader takes on “the people as an identity.” 31
27 Robert Tucker’s 1968 work, “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” explores this savior role as a religious position. 28 Knight, 1998 29 Tucker, 1968 30 I intentionally use “he.” The leaders I discuss here are all men, and the ways in which they presented themselves to the public was gendered. Gender roles deeply impact politics, and a woman candidate would have a distinctly different style of populism. I do refer extensively to Eva Perón (the wife of Juan Perón), and her impact on her husband’s populism. However, she herself was not elected to office, and was therefore not beholden to the people through populism in the same way as her husband. 31 Knight, 1998
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Knight touches upon another component of populism: class consciousness as a driving
force. He noted that the leader adopts “pejorative (elitist, snobbish) labels and wears them with
pride.” This usurpation of the terminology of social hierarchies distances the populist from the 32
political elite. The audience is made to be an active participant in leadership, as their populist
representative is seen as an amplification of their voice. The most vibrant example of this comes
from Perón’s Argentina. His followers proudly declared themselves to be descamisados (shirtless
ones), thus taking a condescending label of their economic status and repurposing it as a symbol
of Argentine authenticity. This inherent connection between class and populism explains 33
Perón’s eagerness to secure the support of blue-collar workers and Allende’s similar enthusiasm
20 years later.
With the official Catholic Church in opposition to the more radical liberation theology
wing, the Vatican and the Pope (Pius XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI respectively held this office
in the time frame of this study) sought to encourage heads of state to veer away from Marxism.
In Chile, this anti-leftist conservatism in the institutional Church was spurred by the failure of the
Christian Democratic party to represent the interests of the Vatican, and by the subsequent 34
struggle of the Church to retain the confidence of its congregation.
32 Knight, 1998 33 Knight, 1998 34 Adriance, 1992
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Argentina
Juan Perón and the People
Juan Domingo Perón rose to power on the shoulders of workers, fueled by populism’s
sentimental perception of mutual adoration. The fact of this base of support is virtually concrete,
according to the academic community. Perón was a member of the armed group that enacted a 35
golpe de estado (coup d'état) and took over the Argentine government in 1943. Within this
military regime, the young Perón earned a position as the head of the Department of Labor and
Welfare. He was a popular figure, but in 1945 he fell out of favor with the regime and was 36
arrested. Notably, this arrest only served to inflate his popularity among the people, confirming
Knight’s identification of a populist leader as in defiance of the established state. Mere days after
his initial arrest, the regime released Perón from prison, conceding to demands from mass
protests. This day, October 17th, 1945, was celebrated as “Loyalty Day,” and marks a turning 37
point in Perón’s ascent to the presidency. Upon his release, Perón addressed the crowds gathered
in Buenos Aires in protest of his ‘wrongful’ imprisonment to announce his retirement from duty.
His carefully chosen words prompted cries of “We want Perón! We want Perón!”, and “This is
the people of Perón!” 3839
35 Alston, 2009, p. 21 36 Goebel, 2011, p. 67 37 Goebel, 2011, p. 67 38 Perón, 1945 39 This phrase makes more sense in Spanish: “Este es el pueblo de Perón.” El pueblo is a single community as well as a collective, and has a stronger connotation with identity than its English counterpart.
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“I hang the honourable and sacred uniform handed to me by my fatherland, to now wear
the civilian coat and join the suffering and sweating masses that produce the work and the
greatness of our nation… And I also give… my first embrace to this great crowd… This
is the people. This is the suffering people that represent the pain of our motherland,
which we have to defend… This is the people of the fatherland. The same people who in
this historic square, before the Congress, demanded that their will and rights be respected.
It is the same people that must be immortal, because no human treachery or evil will be
able to subdue this great people in feeling or in numbers… From today I will feel a real
pride of being Argentine, because I interpret this collective movement as the rebirth of a
consciousness of the working class… Of a consciousness of the working class that is the
only thing that can make our fatherland great and immortal… So, ladies and gentlemen, I
would like to take this opportunity, as a simple citizen, part of this sweaty mass, to
embrace you deeply and close to my heart, as I would do with my mother…. I aspire to
be loved by you… Remember, workers: unite!... In this beautiful country the unity of all
Argentines will be built on the unity of those who work.” 40
The following year, Perón won the presidency on a platform promising a prioritization of labor
rights. His new wife, Eva Duarte Perón (married four days after his rallying speech on October
17), became the bridge between the presidency and the people. This Peronato would last two 41
terms, until the Armed Forces once again led a golpe de estado and Perón was forced to flee in
1955. During this time, a positive relationship with workers was key to securing power. Perón’s
40 Perón, 1945 41 The term “Peronato” refers to Perón’s years in office from 1945 to 1955.
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deft populist maneuverings ensured a mandate from the people, by first reorienting the definition
of nationalism and then by aligning himself with cultural stars.
Together with his beloved wife Eva, Perón redefined the Argentine national identity to
frame workers as the core of the country. Under the Peronato, nationalism meant a respect for
those traditionally ignored by state leaders – that is, the working class. Perón made the claim that
allegiance to him was the only “legitimate expression of national identity.” This populist 42
symbolism solidified the link between the leader and the led: each was beholden to the other.
One union organizer, Doña María Roldán, acknowledged this symbiosis with the knowing
remark, “I think that Perón, without the support of the people, wouldn’t have been Perón.” 43
Many members of this working class belonged to unions, making unions a useful segment of the
population to study when measuring the response to Perón’s leadership. His previous position as
head of Labor and Welfare meant that even before his election, Perón had an advantageously
close relationship with union groups. This comfortable relationship continued throughout his
presidency, and was immortalized in Perón’s 1949 Constitution: Article 37 singled out workers
as citizens with special rights (such as special guarantees for decent wages, social security, and
safe working conditions). 44
In conjunction with this, Perón’s nationalism was fundamentally Catholic. This was
nothing new – Argentina had long been a Catholic country. However, Perón supported a
conservative Catholicism that he saw as ‘ideal’ for the Argentine citizen. Peronist publications
branded his platform as right-wing Catholic nationalism, and Perón himself frequently 45
42 Goebel, 2011, p. 66 43 James, 2001, p. 44 Elena, 2011, p. 128 45 Goebel, 2011, p. 76
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celebrated his movement as pro-Catholic. This repurposed the people’s Catholic identity as 46
fundamental to Perón’s status as a leader. This claim led to the eventual disagreements between
the Peronato and the Catholic Church: both powers “sought the loyalty of laboring classes and
youth,” but Perón asked for political loyalty while the Church sought religious support. These 47
competing dominant leaders fought for allegiance of the same groups, and by 1955, it was clear
that the Church and the state could not coexist. Perón attempted to pull these potential
constituents away from a reliance on the Church by forming social groups that resembled similar
clubs established by Catholic Action (a group run by the institutional Church). These would
presumably replace the socialization and community structure previously provided by local
branches of the Church. 48
Perón deftly utilized popular culture as another means to exalt the working class as the
Argentine ideal, as seen in his promotion of certain art forms and cultural figures. One tango
singer, Hugo del Carril, was known for singing the ‘Perónist March.’ This, among others, was
broadcast to the nation via popular radio programs. Additionally, Perón made the birthday of 49
author José Hernández a national holiday. Hernández wrote the gaucho (cowboy) epic Martín 50
Fierro, and Perón applauded this tale as an embodiment of Peronist Argentina that was
“incorruptible, stalwart, and freedom-loving.” These actions are in line with Barbero’s 51
definition of populism as the convergence of nationalism and popular culture. 52
46 Perón, 1958 47 D’Amico, 1977, p. 500 48 D’Amico, 1977, p. 500 49 Goebel, 2011, p. 84 50 Goebel, 2011, p. 82 51 Goebel, 2011, p. 82 52 de Grandis, 1999
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Perón’s message was received with vigorous enthusiasm. Many felt a fierce devotion to
this man and his wife to a point that inspired incredible partisanship. One account of this
emotional political atmosphere casts Perón as the new Rosas: Jorge Luis Borges’ and Adolfo
Bioy Casares’ La Fiesta del Monstruo tells the story of a Perón rally that turns sour when 53
supporters decide to converge on an individual Jewish bystander and enact violence for the sake
of violence. The point of this story, when taken as parallel to Esteban Echeverría’s 1871 work El
Matadero, is to denounce the zealous supporters of a vile authoritarian ruler. 54
Juan Perón and the Institutional Catholic Church
In Argentina, the Catholic Church had always been prominently featured in the de facto
administration of the nation. Its traditional role as the official state religion (and as the majority
religion) resulted in considerable influence in guiding political issues. In his early years, Perón
did not directly contradict this role. However, as his regime progressed and sought to claim the
form of loyalty previously reserved for the Church, Perón began to pressure this traditional
power. Under the Peronato, the Roman Catholic Church was required to register its priests and
secure government approval of bishops in order to receive federal funding. This act of creating 55
a registry solidified the hierarchy of the state over the Church, signaling that the latter was a
subordinate. This subordination became ever more militant as Perón’s rule progressed. One
journalist from the United States, after visiting Buenos Aires, recalls that
53 Domecq, 1947 54 Goebel, 2011, p. 72 55 D’Amico, 1977, p. 495
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“One parish magazine, a few months ago, published an article stating the Church’s case
in the present controversy. The pastor was promptly put in jail. He was still there when I
left the Argentine.” 56
Despite these conflicts, Perón’s regime promoted Catholicism (the religion, not just the
institution) at every turn. One Argentine scholar even declared in 1959 that “Perón was the
Argentine president who most favored and helped the Catholic Church throughout our national
history.” 57
On the other side of the equation, the Catholic Church did support Perón in the early
years, but the relationship soured in his second term. For the most part, the Church sought to
support a president who, in turn, promoted Catholicism. As was its prerogative, the Church and
the clergy favored Perón because of his socio-religious programs, rather than on account of his
politics. In many documents published by the Church, officials emphasize a reluctance to 58
comment on political matters. In one open letter from November 1945 encouraging citizens to
vote, officials of the Church enthusiastically cite Pope Pius XII.
“‘It is hardly necessary to recall that, according to the teachings of the Church, it is not
forbidden to have a political preference without prejudice to Catholic teaching about
authority,’ and that the Church ‘does not disapprove of any forms of government, as long
as they are conducive to the common good of citizens.’” 59
The Church proclaimed its own neutrality all while maintaining that a Catholic vote seeks the
best for the faith and the country: the public good is superior to the good of the party.
56 Silva, 1955 57 Badanelli, 1959, p. 39 58 Marsal, 1955, p 148, 151-152 59 Copello, 1945
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However, clashes over policy did occur, and many scholars postulate that it was the
eventual divide between the institutional Church and Perón that led to the loss of the popular
mandate in 1955. This is a valid claim: in 1954, Perón threatened to disestablish the Catholic 60
Church in Argentina. The Church responded by excommunicating Perón in 1955, after which he
was overthrown by a golpe de estado. After 1951, Perón leaned into his authoritarian tendencies.
He fought the Church on many fronts, and in his final years clearly lost the fight along with his
supporters. This strategic loss is obvious in one story of the juxtaposition between a Perón rally 61
on the 1st of May and a Catholic Mass on the first Friday of this same month in 1955, both
located in the Plaza de Mayo. The first event, promoted tirelessly by Peronist propaganda, was
sparsely attended. Just a few days later, the same Plaza was inundated with the faithful,
pronouncing the slogan “nos somos el pueblo también” (“we are the people too”): Perón no
longer held spiritual command of the people. 62
Perón’s relationship with the institutional Church was key to maintaining popular
support. As his regime progressed, the break in this relationship ensured a loss of power. His
political style relied on a projection of religious authority (as a Church-mandated leader).
Populism, for Juan Domingo Perón, was distinctly Catholic, but when he infringed upon the
jurisdiction of the institutional Catholic Church, he lost the support of both the institution and the
people.
60 D’Amico, 1977, p. 499 61 D’Amico, 1977 62 Silva, 1955
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The Institutional Catholic Church and the People
The relationship between the Catholic Church and the led in Argentina was unremarkably
close. Argentina’s population was still majority Catholic, and most Argentines were aware of the
position of the institutional Church as the authority on official Catholic matters. Closer ties 63
between religion and politics allowed for an individual to capture the love of the masses for
political gain by becoming a semi-religious figure herself. This was the role of Evita Duarte
Perón, Juan Perón’s beloved wife.
Working Argentines adored Evita. This is a simple fact, attested to by stacks of literature
proclaiming the goodness of this woman. While Evita was fundamentally a political figure (as
wife of the president and as an authority in the Department of Labor), she essentially became a
religious icon through her interaction with the masses. Eva had previously been a radionovela
star, and her skill as a captivating voice was prominently featured during the Peronato. Those
that heard her speak, as well as those who saw her either in person or broadcast over television
waves, recount an “overwhelming” spectacle. Without Eva, Juan likely would not have gained 64
the same level of popular support. Indeed, she was essential to his populist style. As a public 65
figure, Eva took great pains to ensure that her gifts to the poor (in providing appliances,
medicine, or even housing) were orchestrated in a way that was selfless and “purposefully
anti-bureaucratic.” This quality satisfies Knight’s condition that the populist rejects the 66
institutional standards and instead functions at the empathetic level of the masses. While her
63 D’Amico, 1977; Elena, 2011 64 Dawson, 2015 65 Patroni, 1999, p. 154 66 Elena, 2011, p. 140
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husband was known to adopt the slang of lower-class Argentines, Eva was the true conduit 67
between the people and political authority.
Evita’s material influence was most obviously represented in the work done by the
Fundación Eva Perón (Eva Perón Foundation, or FEP). This organization was founded in 1948,
and by 1954 had grown to have a budget larger than some federal institutions. The FEP was a 68
discretionary foundation, dedicated to uplifting the needy in whatever way Evita deemed best.
Letters poured in from all corners of Argentina, begging Eva for salvation; it was here that the
deification of Eva Perón began. She responded to these letters with generosity and grace, and
Juan Perón deftly amplified her rapport with the people through vigorous media promotion. One
such example is a cartoon of two children talking about going to the post office to pick up a toy.
When one asks who has sent this toy, he responds, “Don’t you know…? Evita!” Stories like 69
this were everywhere, promising a better life at the behest of Eva Perón. Her renowned
graciousness found its way into folklore (encouraged, no doubt, by the president). The letters that
arrived in the FEP office often contained discourse saturated with religious imagery, painting
Eva as a saint. One beneficiary of the FEP wrote that “all good Argentines” would “idolize”
Evita and “vote now and always” for Perón, acknowledging the joint supremacy of Eva and 70
Juan as both religious and political.
“You can hardly walk a hundred yards along a Buenos Aires street without encountering
a row of pictures of Juan Perón and his late wife, Evita. Every second hoarding bears the
legend: ‘Perón cumple, Evita dignifica’ (‘Perón does it, Evita graces it’). Another
67 Elena, 2011, p. 68 68 Elena, 2011, p. 124 69 Elena, 2011, p. 131 70 Elena, 2011, p. 147
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common notice runs: ‘Eternal glory to Evita Perón.’ At one street corner an eternal flame
burns before a bust of Evita, and bouquets of lilies are placed before it every day. Peasant
women in from the country sometimes kneel and pray before the bust, some of them
probably under the impression that it is the Virgin.” 71
That Evita could have been taken for la Virgen is an extraordinary sentiment. Her identification
with this Catholic figure tied the religious population to a political leader. This bridging of the
gap between Catholicism and secularism was manifested in Evita’s portrayal as this iconic leader
in the Chrisitan faith. There are countless investigations into Eva as a Mary-figure that was both
political and religious. Many of these accounts note that Eva took an active role in this portrayal,
in that she perpetuated her saintly status. Misemer gives an interesting take on this narrative,
blending the fairytale of Cinderella and the tradition of marianismo (worship of Mary) to explain
Evita’s specific importance to the masses. She was able to become a religious icon while 72
steadfastly remaining in her primary role as a political authority.
Notably, Eva was not a woman religious (as defined by one scholar of gender studies,
Mary Katzenstein): she held no official position in the Church. This does not mean that she 73
existed separately from the Church. In fact, there was a tradition in Latin America of female
symbolism relative to the Catholic Church, best described by Misemer in a 2008 work.
“Many saw women as being morally superior to men and therefore thought they should
be in charge of the morality of the nation. In this way, women were allowed to carve out
71 Silva, 1955 72 Misemer, 2008, p. 105 73 Katzenstein, 1998
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a niche in the mostly patriarchal system of Christianity that excluded them from the upper
echelons of power within the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.” 74
Eva used her status as a layperson to endear herself to Argentines; she was seen as a commoner,
coming from outside of both religious and political hierarchies. This plebeian origin story had its
political fairytale ending, and almost had a similarly quixotic conclusion in the religious world.
In 1952, news of Eva’s cancer and subsequent death rocked the nation.
“Evita’s death was a monumental theatrical event for the Argentine nation that lasted for
weeks. When news of her passing was announced, the city ground to a halt. Cinemas and
theaters closed down, interrupting movies and plays that were in progress; restaurants,
bars, and discotheques also closed immediately, leaving the city with an unusual
silence.” 75
This tragic moment was marked by national mourning, and in the days following her death, a
movement began to canonize Eva Perón formally. Her descamisados wanted their beloved
standard bearer to truly become Santa Evita. This request was denied by the Vatican, but 76 77
Eva’s informal position as a saint to the masses had already been established. Although she may
not have been Katzenstein’s woman religious, she was certainly a religious figure.
Critical literature concerning Eva’s active role in Perón’s rule was sparse until the 1970s,
when Perón’s return to Argentina prompted a resurgence in Evita’s idolization (and subsequently
in denunciations of her work). This likely is due to the restrictions on literature under Perón in
his first two terms: there exists a wealth of Peronist propaganda exalting Eva, and there are
74 Misemer, 2008, p. 108n8 75 Misemer, 2008, p. 109 76 Navarro, 1999 77 San Martín, 2019
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thousands of anecdotal accounts of her wonders. However, Perón did not permit the publication
of opposition literature, and this included any disparagement of his wife. It was not until the later
1950s, when Perón was overthrown and the succeeding authoritarian regime crumbled, that
critical scholarship began to appear. On a global scale, interest in Eva’s legacy was especially
piqued after the emergence of Andrew Lloyd Webber’s 1978 musical Evita and its 1996 film
adaptation. In years since, Eva has continued to captivate imaginations, and the request that she 78
be canonized was renewed (and denied) in 2019. Her religious status among the masses in 79
conjunction with Juan Perón’s worker-centric political platform is emblematic of this Catholic
populism.
78 Navarro, 1999 79 San Martín, 2019
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Chile
Salvador Allende and the People
In Chile, Salvador Allende’s 1970 election to the presidency was a victory for union
workers. In general, the relationship between Allende and these workers was positive, especially
when he was first elected. This can be seen through two labor groups: the Yarur textile factory
workers and the Central Única de Trabajadores (Central Union of Workers, or CUT). At the
time of his election, Allende was an established political figure, known for running socialist
campaigns for president. He was widely regarded to be “the voice of the people.” He shirked 80 81
the tradition of wearing formal dress for his inauguration, favoring the more plebeian business
suit. This emphasized Allende’s direct link to the people: he would be their voice, their leader. 82
His populist messaging paralleled religious teachings, although unlike Perón, he was not 83
deliberately presenting himself as religious. One might even apply the same directive of Vatican
II to his campaign message: Allende certainly hoped to embody a preferential love for the 84
common people. This loyalty to the people was read by Allende’s constituents as loyalty to the
80 Dawson, 2011 81 Winn, 1986, p. 66 82 Winn, 1986, p. 72 83 However, Allende himself was not working in conjunction with the Church. 84 The Puebla document, as referenced by Escobar (1986), declares “the Church’s preferential love for the common people.”
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social church and, more specifically, to liberation theology. In contrast to Perón, Allende’s 85
Catholic populism circumvented direct association with the institutional Catholic Church.
One specific factory serves as a case study for the relationship between blue collar
workers and Allende in the 1960s through his murder in 1973. In the Yarur textile factory,
workers became highly politicized on a national level in the years leading up to Allende’s
election. There was a union for these factory workers, but it was run by the Yarur family,
rendering it an unrepresentative organization. In the late 1960s, Amador Yarur (son of the
respected founder of this textile mill) owned the factory. Amador was widely regarded as a poor
imitation of his father, and was known to be steadfastly dedicated to the prevention and
expulsion of any communist ideology from his employees. Workers were aware of pernicious
soplones (informers) who would eagerly report any suspicious activities to Don Amador. 86
Amador worked hard to seed mistrust and to decentralize organization among his employees.
This strategy ultimately failed.
In the 1960s, worker demographics began to skew younger and more educated. These
workers increasingly came from larger cities or from migrant families, and brought with them a
powerful working-class identity and a strong sense of social solidarity. This change catalyzed 87
the activist movement within the factory as the 1970s neared. The new, younger employees felt
empowered to speak out against Don Amador and his regime, and small dissociated movements
began to grow within the Yarur factory. Various publications began to emerge around this time,
85 One expert in Chilean history notes that Allende “wanted people to make a conscious decision to participate in their own liberation.” (Figueroa, 2013) 86 Winn, 1986, p. 81 87 Winn, 1986, p. 84
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including La Firme. These publications spread leftist (often Marxist) ideology and encouraged
workers to defy Don Amador as well as to support popular presidential candidate Salvador 88
Allende. La Firme endorsed Allende as “the workers’ candidate” and openly mused that he
might bring “an independent union to the factory and the Yarurs’ reign of terror and exploitation
to an end.” 89
These Yarur workers function as a case study of Allende’s constituents. Don Amador had
previously allowed select candidates to speak at the factory, and in some strange calculation to
win back the favor of his workers, he allowed Salvador Allende to do the same in 1970 before
the national elections. Yet Amador’s graciousness was limited: although this speech was
permitted, attendance was heavily discouraged through various intimidation tactics. However,
despite these barriers, the speech was attended by around 500 workers. In this speech, Allende
spoke explicitly about how he would remove Don Amador from his leadership position and
return power to the workers. This injected the workers’ activist movement with immense 90
energy: although barely a handful of workers felt safe enough to applaud at the close of the
speech, there was tangible excitement within the factory to get Allende elected. Winn 91
concludes, “Chile’s workers might have been responsible for Allende’s nomination and surging
campaign, but he could claim credit, in turn, for enlarging and accelerating the worker’s
88 Winn, 1986, p. 97 89 Winn, 1986, p. 97 90 Winn, 1986, p. 99 91 According to one recollection, a measly four people in the audience expressed support of Allende in this way (Winn, 1986, p. 99).
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movement at the Yarur mill.” This symbiotic relationship is indicative of the capability of 92
Allende’s populism.
The Yarur workers aimed to regain control of their union. This desire was fulfilled after
Allende’s election in 1970 when his Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, or UP) party allied with the
Central Unica de Trabajadores. This alliance demonstrated Allende’s dedication to the people
and clearly promoted workers’ rights. Part of this deal was that workers (rather than managers or
owners) had to be involved in union management. This caveat reflects precisely the struggles of 93
the Yarur workers, and underlines the critical and reciprocal relationship between the leader and
the led. The UP-CUT agreement brought the workers even closer to the leaders, as CUT
functioned as a revolving door for political candidacy: leadership within CUT was a viable step
to becoming a national political leader.
Salvador Allende and the Institutional Catholic Church
Allende’s populism was not reliant on the institutional Church. This allowed his
constituents affiliated with liberation theology to comfortably support his political platform
without compromising their religious beliefs. While Allende never explicitly rejected the
Church, he implicitly distanced himself from the hierarchy. However, to retain a semblance of
power, the institutional Church had to continue to insist upon the unity of the Catholic
community, despite the growth of liberation theology. It is no surprise, then, that Allende did not
have a positive relationship with the formal Catholic Church. This stemmed from his socialist
92 Winn, 1986, p. 100 93 Zapata, 1976
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political views and his affiliation with the anticlerical Masons. The Church had spurned 94
Allende from early on, notably in its backing of Eduardo Frei against Allende in former
elections. This animosity did not change after Allende’s election. The institutional Church’s 95
alignment with middle-ground politics (embodied in part by the Christian Democratic party)
resulted in repeated condemnations of Allende’s left-wing views. While the messaging of both 96
may have been similar in looking to protect and uplift the poor, the Church was too dedicated to
eliminating potential communism in Chile to align with Allende.
In the years leading up to and during Allende’s leadership, the institutional Catholic
Church put out various statements that give valuable insight to its views on political events. As
late as 1970, the Church was still claiming unity between the formal hierarchy and base
communities, however, this unity did not exist. This disconnect is noted in comments 97
concerning the 1968 Plenary Assembly of Chillán, where members of the Catholic hierarchy
gathered to discuss the administration of the Church. The institutional Church recognized the 98
growing divide and strove to recommit to laypeople. In one resolution, the Conferencia
Episcopal de Chile (Episcopal Conference of Chile, or CECH) pledges that “the Bishop will seek
to support particularly the work of the people (priests, the religious and laity) who are more
engaged in these key points of social change.” These goals show that the Church was 99
concerned with the relationship between the hierarchy and the laypeople. Cardinal Archbishop
94 Winn, 1986, p. 55 95 Winn, 1986, p. 61 96 Winn, 1986, p. 66 97 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970) 98 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970) 99 CECH, “Pastoral Orientaciones III” (1970)
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Raúl Silva Henríquez was the highest ranking Catholic authority in Chile at this time. On July
20, 1970 (months before Allende’s September election), Henríquez released a written statement
concerning the intertwined character of the Church and the state.
“A Christian does not cease to be a citizen. On the contrary: his same faith, his Baptism,
commits him forever to a supportive Christ, servant and liberator of his brothers. And that
will mean, to some extent depending on his vocation, some kind of participation in
political life.” 100
In this speech, Henríquez declared the importance of a formal church that does not engage with
politics. His call for unity overshadowed all else, and though he recognized that a Christian
person is certainly a political citizen, he insisted that the Catholic Church itself will not endorse
one particular political option. This argument is an optimistic one: the Church has always
demonstrated certain political preferences. Instead, this statement may be read to indicate a 101
distancing from more activist grassroots movements claiming ties to Catholicism, such as the
social groups to which many union workers belonged. Henríquez’s call for harmony is, in fact, a
recognition of deep discord. The Archbishop simply requested that politics be left out of any
religious conversations; liberation theology and Catholic activism were, however, too far gone –
this apoliticism was never an option. Henríquez closed his speech aspiring for “a Church that
does not want to win votes, but educates in the faith it loves and expects.” The first part of this 102
goal directly contradicted Allende’s campaign strategy of “collecting consciences” rather than
100 Henríquez, “Iglesia, Sacerdocio y Política” (1970) 101 I mean this to say that the Church is a large enough body that it is always political; even a claim that it is abstaining from politics is a political claim. 102 Henríquez, “Iglesia, Sacerdocio y Política” (1970)
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votes; try as the Church might, the politician cannot disregard the electoral strength of a 103
religiously motivated voting base.
With Allende’s election, the traditionally robust relationship between the formal Church
and the leader was visibly strained. In previous years, the CECH had sent a delegation to visit the
winning candidate in the presidential election at the close of the nationwide vote. However, on
September 2nd, 1970, Carlos Oviedo Cavada, the Secretary General of the CECH, issued a
statement notifying president-elect Allende that he would not be receiving this same visit.
Oviedo claimed that this was due to the unusual circumstances of the election, in that Allende
had received a plurality rather than an absolute majority. However, this is an indicator of the
distance between the socialist president and the traditionalist Church. This was precisely the
widespread interpretation by the media, as Oviedo was pressured to issue another statement
denying this implied disagreement in the days following this announcement. 104
This turmoil prompted many more statements from the CECH. Notably, on September
24th, the Plenary Assembly of the Conference felt compelled to issue yet another explanation. 105
This opened with the insistence, “No one in Chile wants to see the episcopate or the clergy acting
in politics. Neither do we.” This strong stance was undermined in the following sentiment: “But
the country is living in tense hours. Of joy and hope for some, of fear and anguish for others.
That is why we are going to give our opinion about the present moment that we want to be
inspired only by the Lord’s opinion.” This statement then appealed once again for an open 106
103 Figueroa, 2013 104 Oviedo, “Declaración… Sobre la visita de los representantes…” (1970) 105 Asamblea Plenaria, “Declaración de los obispos chilenos sobre la situación…” (1970) 106 Asamblea Plenaria, “Declaración de los obispos chilenos sobre la situación…” (1970)
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dialogue – it lamented the divide in the Catholic community. This prompts the question, was this
community ever truly cohesive?
The Institutional Catholic Church and the People
The answer to this question lies with the organizations that sprung up among the social
church. Christians for Socialism was one such religious group that explicitly marketed itself as
political, to the point that it collaborated with the leadership of the Unidad Popular. This 107
organization stemmed from an April 1971 meeting of the Group of 80, which was a summit of
priests and other Catholic laypeople inspired by the teachings of liberation theology. In July of
the same year, a similar Group of 200 priests met for reflection. This swelling social movement
of priests infuriated the CECH. The Conferencia Episcopal de Chile responded to a 1972
meeting of Christians for Socialism in a scathing letter which reiterated the institutional
Church’s distaste of directly mixing the religious with the political.
“We have insisted, and we insist again, our priests must refrain from taking partisan
political positions publicly. The opposite would be to return to a surpassed clericalism
that nobody wants to see appear again.” 108
Any preconceptions of unity and harmony, which had been preached two years earlier, fell away,
with the decisive condemnation from Oviedo after a lack of response to the organization of the
Latin American meeting of Christians for Socialism.
107 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 108 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972)
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“We would not be pleased if our silence could be interpreted as approval of that meeting.
Nor would we be pleased if this same silence was used to obtain the presence or
participation of representatives of other Episcopates in that meeting.” 109
In a more conciliatory tone, the Bishop then remarked,
“However, we would be very pleased to hear from the Bishops of that Conference about
the organization of these priestly groups, their connection with the local Hierarchy and
the future April meeting.” 110
This middle point is of most interest: Oviedo acknowledges that there was a failure of connection
between this sizable group of activist priests and the “local Hierarchy,” or the formal Church.
Once again, this highlighted the break between the religious authorities and their
constituencies. 111
When dealing with the perspective of this constituent population, the relationship
between the institutional Church and the people was weak. Instead, Catholicism manifested in 112
the form of social groups – either explicitly established base communities or the more informal
youth groups. Many people in the Yarur worker community were members of (or had grown up
as members of) various groups aimed at promoting health and companionship. These athletic
groups became focal points of the community and served as accidental forums for religious
109 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 110 Oviedo, “Carta circular…” (1972) 111 Another interesting document here was issued by the CECH in 1973 (in August, mere weeks before the golpe de estado that removed Allende from power). Titled “Christian Faith and Political Action,” this clearly enunciates the ideals of the formal church as directly in contrast to its informal counterpart. 112 Winn, 1986, p. 85: “The Catholic church, to which most Chileans nominally belonged, was particularly weak among working-class males, whose religious experience was often limited to the major rites of passage and annual holidays.”
Fountain 46
development. This religious development was therefore dissociated from the institutional 113
Catholic Church – like a game of telephone, the formal messaging was interpreted and
reinterpreted to the point that it no longer resembled the apolitical goodwill of the Vatican nor
the “gospel of social harmony and peaceful reform” beloved by the Christian Democratic
party. 114
The unity formed among these workers through this shared religio-political experience
directly shaped the conversation around union power. The ideas communicated via these social
church outposts allowed workers to forge a strong ideological connection which boosted their
ability to bond in the face of oppression from Amador Yarur and his control of the company
union. In this way, religion – and the bond formed by Catholic-based groups – empowered
workers to take back ownership of their union and to exercise their collective power. In turn, the
empowerment of workers served as the platform upon which Allende marketed his claim to
political influence.
113 Winn, 1986, p. 84 114 Winn, 1986, p. 85
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Conclusions
Church and state cannot be separated in lived experience. While this is a useful tactic for
academic purposes, in reality, humans will always be inextricably tied to both religion and
politics – both are realms that aim to shape the very way in which we live. However, these two
dimensions are rarely considered together in the study of populism. Perón and Allende both
serve to show the value of explaining value through a political as well as a religious lens. To
varying degrees, each leader gained authority through a populism that blended religion and
politics. This blend is particularly relevant given the wave of populism that has recently swept
the globe. Presidents and prime ministers are using these same blended populist tactics to win
support, and responsibility falls to the electorate (every one of us) to understand the respective
implications. That is, invocations of God are politically effective; and the Church is always
political.
Juan Perón’s rule in Argentina can be viewed as the precursor to Salvador Allende’s rule
in Chile. The two men came from different sides of the political spectrum – where Perón was a
conservative traditionalist, Allende was a progressive socialist – but shared much in terms of
their style of leadership. However, their regimes were significantly different, thanks to a stark
change in the role of the Catholic Church over time. Going back even further, Juan Manuel de
Rosas fits this model. His proto-populism set the stage for Perón’s veiled authoritarianism, which
gave way to Allende’s personalist grassroots presidency. In this earliest iteration, the Catholic
Church sat as the clear dominant power in society and lent its power to Rosas, and there was
little to no conflict between the Church and the state.
Fountain 48
In Perón’s time, the Church occupied a different role. Increasing plurality in the religious
composition of the country necessitated the leadership of an areligious figure, and so Perón was
mandated to represent the interests of the people. However, the Church was still viewed
favorably by the population: while democratic development pushed the Church out of official
political (de jure) authority, it retained its de facto spiritual leadership. Perón tapped into this
leadership and sought to redirect the support of the people from the institutional Catholic Church
to his Peronist political platform.
Finally, Allende’s populism was distinct in that he challenged the Catholic Church. He
sidestepped the previously required alliance with the institution and instead sought loyalty
directly from the voters – a loyalty that was built upon a religious-like devotion. This heavy
emphasis on individuals logically led to a strong link between Allende’s leadership and labor
unions, in that labor unions represented a form of social organization that was not explicitly
religious.
Both Perón and Allende lost political power abruptly and violently. While Perón was
excommunicated and exiled, Allende was murdered in the presidential palace during Augusto
Pinohet’s golpe de estado. Both leaders were succeeded by military dictatorships, which in their
own ways fostered special relationships with the Catholic Church. This mode of expulsion gives
way to a form of political martyrdom which, when in conjunction with the scope of these 115
leaders’ populist bases, has resulted in a staggering legacy. Millions of Argentines and Chileans
today recognize Perón and Allende as national symbols of the people.
115 Perón did come back to Argentina and in 1973 was once again elected as president, but promptly died, leaving behind an unremarkable third term.
Fountain 49
Religion and politics shape each of our lives. These two great forces have always been
the architects of society. The study of populism allows for an understanding of how these forces
interact, and gives us insight into the causes and consequences of our political choices.
Fountain 50
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