collision risk management in passenger transportation

Please cite this article in press as: Langard, B., et al. Collision risk management in passenger trans-portation: A study of the conditions for success in a safe shipping company. Psychol. fr. (2014),http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2014.11.001

ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelPSFR-330; No. of Pages 17

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Original article

Collision risk management in passengertransportation: A study of the conditions forsuccess in a safe shipping company

La gestion des risques d’abordages dans le domaine dutransport à passagers : étude des conditions du succès ausein d’une compagnie maritime considérée comme sûre

B. Langard1, G. Morel ∗,2, C. Chauvin3

Lab-STICC/IHSEV UMR CNRS 6285, centre de recherche, university of South Brittany, rue de Saint-Maudé,56321 Lorient cedex, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 1st October 2013Accepted 2 November 2014Available online xxx

Keywords:ResilienceMaritime transportationCollision avoidanceActivity analysisRisk management

a b s t r a c t

The purpose of this research study was to identify the conditionsfor success of collision avoidance in the area of passenger trans-port. We selected a shipping company considered safe, one thathas never been involved in a collision. Analyses focused on theactivities of the bridge watchkeeping officers were carried out toidentify the diachronic (i.e. anticipation) and synchronic mecha-nisms implemented in the context of managing the collision risk.We hypothesized that the conditions for success (i.e. controllingthe collision risk) were based on diachronic and synchronic mecha-nisms that would be highly developed by bridge watchkeeping offi-cers. The results validate this hypothesis and put the diachronic andsynchronic mechanisms at the centre of collision risk management.

© 2014 Société franc aise de psychologie. Published by ElsevierMasson SAS. All rights reserved.

∗ Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (B. Langard), [email protected] (G. Morel), [email protected]

(C. Chauvin).1 Main research topic: Ergonomics; Safety culture; Resilience; Maritime transportation.2 Main research topic: Ergonomics; Resilience engineering; Safety of system at risks.3 Main research topic: Decision making in dynamic situations; Risk management; Teamwork; Human-machine cooperation;

Human factors in the maritime domain.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2014.11.0010033-2984/© 2014 Société franc aise de psychologie. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psfr.2014.11.001

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2 B. Langard et al. / Psychologie française xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

Mots clés :RésilienceTransport maritimeAnticollisionAnalyse d’activitéGestion des risques

r é s u m é

Domaine d’application. – Le système étudié est le transport mar-itime. C’est un système considéré comme sûr, caractérisé par unniveau de sécurité de 10−5 (Chauvin, 2011). Ce niveau est inférieurà celui observé dans le transport aérien (10−6), mais il reste compa-rable à celle du transport ferroviaire. Les accidents maritimes sonttoutefois des événements qui sont particulièrement redoutés enraison de la valeur de la cargaison, de la présence de passagers, etdes risques de pollution.Cadre théorique. – Hollnagel, Pariès, Woods, et Wreathall (2011)définissent la résilience comme « la capacité intrinsèque d’un sys-tème à adapter son mode de fonctionnement avant, pendant etaprès la survenue de perturbations, de sorte qu’il puisse assurer lacontinuité de ses activités dans des conditions aussi bien prévis-ibles qu’imprévues ». L’un des quatre piliers de la résilience estl’anticipation. L’anticipation en situations dynamiques comprenddivers mécanismes de gestion des risques. La prévision et la plan-ification constituent des mécanismes diachroniques, tandis quela gestion des priorités entre plusieurs tâches, en fonction desexigences de la situation de travail, constitue un mécanisme syn-chronique (Amalberti, 1996).Problématique de recherche. – L’objectif de cette recherche est decaractériser les conditions de réussite du point de vue de la préven-tion des abordages dans le domaine du transport de passagers. Nousémettons l’hypothèse que les conditions de réussite sont basées surles mécanismes diachroniques et synchroniques qui seraient trèsdéveloppés par les officiers de quart à la passerelle.Méthode. – L’étude a été réalisée en partenariat avec une com-pagnie maritime franc aise de transport de passagers considéréecomme sûre. Les observations ont porté principalement sur lerisque d’abordage et l’activité des officiers de quart sur le pont. Nousavons filmé l’activité des officiers de quart et réalisé des chrono-grammes d’activité.Résultats. – Nous avons montré que les officiers de quart ontadapté leur attention aux contraintes de la situation (leur niveaud’attention varie en fonction du trafic ou des contraintes de naviga-tion) et ont ainsi utilisé des mécanismes synchroniques de gestiondu risque d’abordage. L’analyse des manœuvres d’évitement effec-tuées a montré que les officiers de quart anticipent largementles manœuvres d’évitement et donc utilisent également desmécanismes diachroniques de la gestion du risque d’abordage.Les manœuvres d’évitement ont été effectuées, en moyenne,26 minutes avant un abordage potentiel. L’analyse a égalementmontré que ces manœuvres permettent aux agents de libérer desressources attentionnelles. Les résultats valident l’hypothèse prin-cipale mettant les mécanismes diachroniques et synchroniques aucentre de l’activité de la gestion des risques d’abordage.

© 2014 Société franc aise de psychologie. Publié par ElsevierMasson SAS. Tous droits réservés.

1. Introduction

Maritime transportation is considered as a safe system. It is characterized by a safety level close to10−5 – i.e. one serious accident per 100,000 movements – (Chauvin, 2011). This level is certainly lowerthan that observed in air transportation (10−6), but it is comparable to that of railway transportation.

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For comparison purposes, the artisan systems deemed to be high-risk are characterized by a safetylevel of 10−3 (Amalberti, 2006; Morel, Amalberti, & Chauvin, 2009). However, maritime accidents areevents that are particularly feared because of the cargo value, the presence of passengers, and thepollution risks.

Maritime traffic is constantly growing. It has grown 240% in the space of 30 years and reached atotal of 8879 million tons of cargo in 2011. From 2005 to 2011, the number of ships grew 30.5%, andthe carrying capacity of the fleet grew 67.9% (UNCTAD, 2012). Despite these increases, the number ofmaritime accidents shows a clear and continuous decline. Since the late 1970s, the number of total shiplosses went from over 450/year to fewer than 150/year (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, 1999–2009; OECD,2001). The casualty rates of all types (i.e. the number of ship losses per 1000 operating vessels) hasbeen halved over a period of 15 years, from 3.1‰ in 1993 to 1.35‰ in 2008 (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay,1999–2009).

Our research has focused specifically on passenger transport. To this end, we entered into part-nership with a French shipping company specialising in cross-Channel transport in order to analysethis subsystem from the perspective of risk management and more particularly that of collision risk.Although collisions are the main cause of only 12% of total ship losses (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay,1999–2009), data from the insurance companies show that collisions constitute one of the three pri-mary causes of serious casualties4 (Graham, 2012). In European waters, collisions were the main causeof accidents in 2010 (EMSA, 2011). The same year, collisions and contacts with infrastructure repre-sented 45% of accidents5 (EMSA, 2011). Collisions also account for 50% of accidents in busy waterways(Mou, van der Tak, & Ligteringen, 2010). Collisions thus constitute the main risk in Channel cross-ings. Numerous studies have been carried out to identify the causes of accidents (e.g. Perrow, 1999;Pourzanjani, 2001; MAIB, 2004). In general, human and organisational factors have been identified asplaying a central role in this type of maritime incident (Chauvin, 2011; Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns,2006; Schröder-Hinrichs, 2010). A recent study based on investigation reports realised by the MAIB6

and the TSB7 (Chauvin, Lardjane, Morel, Clostermann, & Langard, 2013) showed the following results:

• 15.8% of collisions resulted directly from lack of signal perception;• 30.8% resulted from attention deficit or work overload;• 33.3% were directly related to loss of situation awareness.8

Most of the collisions were shown to result from lack of anticipation on the part of operators. Theanalysis of 49 collision cases from the MAIB reports from 1999 to 2012 showed that in 75% of cases,the Officer of the Watch (OOW) performed the required actions to avoid the collision with anothervessel, but too late. The analysis of watchkeeping conditions shows that in 38.8% of collision cases, theOOW was alone (or sole person in charge of the watch, despite the presence of other crew members).

The causes of collisions (i.e. failures) in the domain of maritime transportation are thus well-knownand clearly chronicled in the available literature. This is not the case, however, for the “success” con-ditions. According to Hollnagel, Pariès, Woods, and Wreathall (2011), this analysis phase is essentialbecause instead of focusing on failures, it highlights the conditions that make it possible to con-trol a dynamic situation. The authors stress that examining the activities of decision makers givesthe opportunity of identifying the conditions for success, namely everything that is done to avoidcollisions.

This perspective is adopted in the present paper. The paper shows the analysis of the activities ofthe bridge watchkeeping officers in order to identify the conditions for success in the perspective of

4 The other two causes of accidents are grounding and engine failure.5 The Lloyd’s statistics are global, but take total losses only into consideration. The considerable difference between the Lloyd’s

figures (12% of total losses) and those from the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) (about 28% from graph reading) isprobably related to the fact that after a collision, vessels are not necessarily lost (i.e. they can be repaired).

6 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (United Kingdom).7 Transportation Safety Board of Canada.8 Endsley defines situation awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and

space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36).

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preventing collision risks. It is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with the theoretical framework,based on the concepts of resilience, adaptation, and anticipation. Part 2 details the method of investi-gation. The third part indicates the findings that are discussed in the final part/conclusion.

2. Theoretical framework

From a theoretical standpoint, we chose to examine the issue of collision risk from the perspectiveof organisational resilience, as defined by Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson (2006). In this section, theconcept of organisational resilience is presented, along with the underlying concepts of adaptationand anticipation.

2.1. Examining risk management from the perspective of resilience

Organisational resilience has been defined by Hollnagel et al. (2006) as the capacity of a system toadapt to and cope with perturbations. As this definition indicates, the authors suggest that a resilientsystem requires three key attributes:

• anticipation: preventing the occurrence of a perturbation;• perception: preventing the worsening of the effects of the perturbation;• response: recovering and surviving after the perturbation.

This first view of organisational resilience was focused on the occurrence of perturbations solelyin the context of the management of unexpected or exceptional situations. The definition has movedinto the direction of taking ordinary situations into account. Hollnagel et al. have thus proposed anew, expanded definition of organisational resilience. It is “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjustits functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain requiredoperations under both expected and unexpected conditions” (Hollnagel et al., 2011, pp. xxxvi). Theauthors added a fourth characteristic of a resilient system: learning, namely learning from pastsituations, based on feedback from both failure and success conditions.

The concept of resilience is related to that of anticipation. It is also closely linked to that ofadaptation, whether at individual or organisational level. When resilience is seen as a personalitytrait, it covers a set of characteristics that enable individuals to adapt to the circumstances theyencounter (Connor & Davidson, 2003). At the system or organisational level, resilience refers to anadaptive capacity in the face of changing circumstances and challenges (Woods, 2006).

2.2. The concepts of adaptation and anticipation

The concept of adaptation is central in all those branches of psychology that deal with the relation-ships between individuals and their environment. It refers to “all the behaviour modifications thatare designed to ensure balanced relationships between an organisation and its environments and atthe same time the mechanisms and processes that underlie the phenomenon” (Bloch, Gallo, Dépret, &Casalis, 2002, p. 29). Adaptive processes are implemented each time a situation entails one or severalnew, unknown elements, or unfamiliar ones.

These mechanisms are particularly striking in a dynamic situation due to the unexpected eventsinherent in the situation. They help operators meet their main goal: controlling the situation (Hoc,Amalberti, Cellier, & Grosjean, 2004, p. 20). Hoc et al. (2004) explain that among the many characteris-tics of adaptation in dynamic situations, temporal adaptation is particularly worth focusing on since itresponds to the dynamics of the situation. Two strategies are available to control a dynamic situation;one is reactive, and the other is anticipative. Following a reactive strategy, operators respond to thechanging situation as it evolves. Following an anticipative strategy, operators anticipate the evolutionof processes, based on prior knowledge.

Cellier defines anticipation as “an activity that involves evaluating the future state of a dynamicprocess, determining the kind of actions that need to be undertaken and the time when they need to

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be implemented, precisely in terms of this representation of the process in the future, and finally, car-rying out a mental evaluation of the possible consequences of these actions” (Cellier, 1996, p. 35). Thisactivity is based on calling up knowledge structures, mental models, or schemas. Amalberti (2001)asserts that mental models involve people’s ability to react to feared events; thus, they produce rec-tifications even though the actual execution of actions has not started yet. These rectifications oftenlead to modifications in the execution of actions so as to prevent those potential events that peoplewould not know how to deal with (Amalberti, 2001). Mental models and schemas are used to predictbut also to produce expectations. Denecker (1999) distinguishes between these two mechanisms: thefirst one (prediction) is symbolic, whereas the second (expectation) is subsymbolic.

Anticipating may also lead to planning. Van Daele and Carpinelli (2001) distinguish between plansthat are developed in high-risk situations under massive time pressure on the one hand, and plansthat are more “schematic” and developed in less risky situations under lower time pressure, on theother. In the former case, plans that are developed before execution are quite specific so as to avoidhard-to-implement modifications in the midst of execution. These plans show two characteristics.They are established in just “sufficient” detail as to enable adaptation to unexpected events, andthey incorporate unforeseen events (or “contingent events”) and the necessary responses to these.Such contingency plans have been highlighted in the domain of combat aircraft (Amalberti & Deblon,1992; Guérin, Chauvin, Leroy, & Coppin, 2013). In less risky situations with a lower time pressure,planning is carried out in real time. Plans are schematic and only gradually elaborated (Amalberti,1996).

In all cases, anticipation involves – in dynamic situations – various symbolic (forecasting and plan-ning) and subsymbolic (expectations) processes that are necessary for adaptation. Forecasting andplanning represent diachronic risk management mechanisms. Amalberti (1996) also identifies syn-chronic management mechanisms such as task adaptation in terms of the work situation demands.Such modulation affects the management of priorities, namely deciding between several tasks thatcould be carried out simultaneously. Amalberti shows that the number of tasks that are manageddecreases as the workload increases, and task splitting also decreases (Amalberti, 1996). The strate-gies that are implemented in order to perform a given task are also modulated. Sperandio (1977) hasshown that the workload represents an “intermediate” variable between the modes of operation usedby the operators and the task demands; the higher the task demands, the more economical the modesof operation.

Thus, resilience refers to the capacity of adaptation of a given system, which is based on fouressential attributes, including anticipation. In terms of dynamic situations, anticipation is requiredfor adaptation. In order to identify the conditions for success in the domain of collision preventionand to determine the level of resilience of the system under investigation, it is essential to identifythe diachronic (anticipation) and synchronic mechanisms (management of attentional resources) ofcollision risk management. We hypothesize that the conditions for success are based on diachronicand synchronic mechanisms implemented by the OOWs in the domain of passenger transport.

Before discussing the elements relating to the method used for this study, it is necessary to describethe tasks required of the OOWs and, in particular, the conditions of watchkeeping duties and relatedrules. The differences between the prescribed work programme and the actual work performed revealthe operators’ adaptation.

3. Description of the prescribed work on the bridge

3.1. Dense safety requirements

Within maritime transportation, safety requirements are extremely important. A number of inter-national regulations are applied (COLREG,9 SOLAS,10 STCW,11 etc.). Moreover, various internal safety

9 COLREG: The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.10 SOLAS: The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.11 STCW: The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers.

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procedures arise from the ISM code12 that forces all shipping companies to possess a safety manage-ment system (SMS). Compliance with all the regulations is controlled though a set of internal andexternal audits. At the local level (i.e. the ship level), the master’s permanent instructions supplementthis already dense set of regulations.

3.2. The organisation of the deck department and the bridge watchkeeping

3.2.1. The deck departmentThe passenger ship personnel is distributed across three departments:

• the deck crew who carry out navigation, docking and mooring operations, loading and unload-ing operations, and contribute to ship maintenance (exterior deck, garages, fire fighting and safetyequipment, etc.);

• the engine room crew who ensure the propulsion of the ship, the generation of energy, and contributeto ship and installation maintenance;

• the hotel operations department crew who ensure reception, catering, entertainment, and accom-modation of passengers.

These three departments report directly to the master. For this study, we focused on the deck crewwho con the ship and in particular on the management of collision avoidance activities. As far as thedeck department is concerned, the master is responsible for navigation and the safety of the ship andthe people being transported. He/she may temporarily delegate his/her responsibilities to the chiefmate or the ship officers.

3.2.2. Bridge watchkeeping conditionsThe deck officers take turns to provide the bridge watchkeeping operations. Once on watchkeep-

ing, the OOWs assume responsibility for the ship’s navigation and safety. They are responsible forthe watch, which is both visual and auditory (by sight and sound), and is maintained to provide forcontingencies detrimental to safety. Thus, the OOWs are responsible for taking the vessel to the port ofarrival, following the course as set by the master, while ensuring safety and, in particular, avoiding therisks of collision with other vessels in strict compliance with the international “steering and sailing”rules of COLREG7 (IMO, 1972).

The OOWs must comply with three regulation levels:

• COLREG. This regulation issues the “steering and sailing” rules applicable to all vessels. It requiresvessels to maintain a permanent visual and auditory watch. It defines the various collision risksituations and the procedures that need to be followed to avoid these. When two power-drivenvessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel, which has the other one on herstarboard side shall keep out of the way (Rule 15). She is the “give-way” vessel. The other one – the“stand-on” vessel shall keep her course and speed (Rule 17). However, COLREG does not specifythe conditions (distances13 or TCPA14) required for vessels to manoeuvre to avoid collision. Hence,the OOWs need to evaluate the situation. Cockcroft and Lameijer (2011) recommend a DCPA of 1to 1.2 NM15 and that the distance between vessels at the time of manoeuvre should be 2 to 3 NM.The analysis of manoeuvres in the English Channel has shown that passenger ships usually keepa passing distance of 1 NM (DCPA) and manoeuvre at a distance comprised between 5 NM and

12 ISM: International Safety Management Code.13 DCPA: Distance at Closest Point of Approach; Estimation of the distance between the two vessels when they are closest to

one another if they keep the same course and speed.14 TCPA: Time to Closest Point of Approach; Estimation of the time remaining before the two vessels on a collision route reach

DCPA if they keep the same course and speed.15 One nautical mile (NM) corresponds to 1.852 km.

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8 NM (Chauvin, 2001). The distance is closer in high-density traffic zones; in the Dover Straits, thecar-ferries carry out manoeuvres at a distance of 3 to 3.5 NM (Chauvin & Lardjane, 2008);

• company internal procedures. These define the role and obligations of the OOWs, and reinforce theCOLREG requirements. Hence, on the vessels of the company under investigation, a two-person teamis responsible for the bridge watchkeeping duties. The officer is systematically accompanied by adeckhand. The role of the watchkeeping deckhand, who is always on the bridge, is to monitor thewaters at all times and to report any potential danger to the OOW. These procedures also require thebridge presence of the master, the chief mate (or an officer), and a helmsman for delicate operationssuch as port manoeuvres and fairway navigation. The company procedures also determine the rou-tine procedures for watchkeeping shift handover and establish general safety regulations (callingthe master in case of difficulties, doubts, or reduced visibility; watching the VHF safety channels;etc.). It should be noted, however, that this second level of regulations always allows the OOWs toassess the situation;

• the master’s permanent instructions. These follow the company regulations but give more detail oncertain features (e.g. the DCPA to adhere to or the proper watchkeeping conditions in foggy weather).

3.2.3. Additional tasksAdded to their OOW duties, the officers perform various administrative tasks; these relate to

personnel management, relations with the shipping company departments, inventory monitoring,and the updating of charts and nautical documents. They are also required to contribute to thegeneral upkeep of the bridge and its navigation equipment and the sick bay management (if thereis no medical staff). They also have to attend the regular ISM meetings and carry out the safety testsas part of the testing programme for all safety and rescue equipment. Furthermore, they activelyparticipate in the training of the crew regarding safety.

4. Method

4.1. The selected application domain

In order to determine the conditions for success in collision prevention, we chose to investigate ashipping company considered safe that had never been involved in a collision (Source: Bureau EnquêtesAccidents Mer). The ships of the company under study do more than 5000 crossings a year. For thepast year alone more than 800,000 nautical miles were travelled (approx. 1.5 million km a year).This French shipping company is specialised in cross-Channel transport. These high-density trafficnavigation zones mean that the company ships are strongly exposed to collision risks.

4.2. The situation under investigation

4.2.1. Observation frameworkObservations were conducted on board cross-Channel ferries over a period of 14 days and for 9

crossings (see Table 1). These crossings enabled us to observe and describe the general activities of the

Table 1Duration of the observations according to the watchkeeping schedule.

Watchkeeping schedules Duration of the observations %

23 h 00–3 h 00 14:43:33 3203 h 00–7 h 00 6:47:23 1507 h 00–11 h 00 8:36:29 1911 h 00–15 h 00 7:42:30 1715 h 00–19 h 00 4:54:33 1119 h 00–23 h 00 2:49:10 6Total 45:33:38 100

The lower representation of the 19:00–23:00 watch is due to the systematic port stop-over for at least one hour and a halfduring this watch period (at least, since in adverse weather, the start was sometimes delayed).

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Fig. 1. Relationship between the variables and the dynamics of the situation.

bridge officers and to collect the necessary information to analyse the 38 encounter situations withother vessels that were managed by the OOWs (i.e. management of collision avoidance activities).

4.2.2. ParticipantsThe operators selected for these observations were the OOWs. They were six officers and two chief

mates, seven men and one woman. All have several years of experience in this area and are thusconsidered experts. All these officers work on the same vessel and carry out the same number ofcrossings and between the same two ports. Each officer works a 4 hours on/8 hours off watchkeepingschedule over seven consecutive days on board, then spends seven days on land.

4.2.3. EquipmentTo conduct observations, the following equipment was used:

• two digital cameras recorded 57 h of activities. The first camera recorded the general activities ofthe OOWs whereas the second one recorded the images shown on the main radar display to enablethe analysis of encounter situations between the vessels;

• two dictaphones recorded the verbalisations;• one Pocket PC equipped with Easyergo© software collected 45 h and 33 min of activity

chronograms16 (21 h 28 min during the day and 24 h 05 min at night).

4.2.4. Data collectedIn order to identify the conditions for success and in particular the synchronic and diachronic

mechanisms of collision risk management, the following data were collected:

• the activity chronograms and the officers’ verbalisations. The systematic data thus extracted enabledthe analysis of instances of double tasks during the watch and particularly during the managementof collision avoidance activities;

• the camera focused on the main radar display collected the following data (see Fig. 1): the helm anglefor the manoeuvre “�helm” (◦), the distance between the two vessels at the time of the manoeuvre“dnav” (NM), the DCPA at the time of the manoeuvre “DCPAman” (NM), the TCPA at the time of themanoeuvre (min) “TCPA”, the DCPA when the two vessels passed each other “DCPApass” (NM), the

16 The difference between the video length and that of the activity chronograms is explained as follows: the first crossing wasobserved and filmed according to a first protocol that was not reused for the activity chronograms. The video clips, however,were used for the analysis of the manoeuvres. The variation is also explained by the interview times given to the observer andby the latter’s meal breaks; over those periods, the pre-installed camera continued to run.

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Fig. 2. A typical day for the deck crew.

time elapsed between the discovery and the manoeuvre “t1” (min), the time elapsed between thediscovery and the passing “t2” (min).

5. Findings

The presentation of findings is divided into two parts. The first part describes the activities of theOOWs. The second part shows the results related to the management of 38 encounter situations withother vessels in the waters (i.e. collision avoidance activities).

5.1. Description of the activities of the OOWs

The deck crew consists of the master, the chief mate (1st officer), three officers (including one all-rounder), the bosun, four assistant bosuns and six deckhands (midshipmen may be present dependingon the time periods). The person in charge is the chief mate.17 Fig. 2 shows one typical day for thedeck crew. The general activities focus on the watch, manoeuvres, maintenance, and administrativetask management.

For example: officer 11-3 keeps the 23:00 to 03:00 watch and the 11:00 to 15:00 watch. Officer3-7 keeps the 03:00 to 07:00 watch and the 15:00 to 19:00 watch. The all-rounder officer keeps the07:00 to 11:00 watch (plus the 19:00 to 23:00 watch in the engine room). Finally, the chief mate alsokeeps the 19:00 to 23:00 watch. It should be remembered that in this company, the deckhands arealso involved in the watchkeeping activity in a systematic way.

As far as the OOWs are concerned, the procedures do not provide for additional tasks duringthe watch. Officers are remunerated on the basis of 9 h and 30 min of work per day. In addition tothe 8 h spent keeping watch, they thus have one hour and a half available to perform those addi-tional tasks. However, depending on the seasons (faster turnaround times in summer), this timeframe may not be sufficient. Officers then keep watch for an extra 30 min so as to release the chiefmate. The latter’s schedules are more split (see Fig. 2), and he/she also needs to carry out impor-tant administrative management tasks (i.e. management of the deck crew). These constraints thuscause a deviation from the regulations, since the OOWs have to perform additional tasks during thewatch.

The analysis of the 45 h and 33 min of activity chronograms revealed three types of activitiesperformed when keeping watch. These are:

17 The master is at the top of the hierarchy but delegates part of his/her responsibilities to his/her department heads: thechief mate (for the deck service), the chief engineer (for the engine room), and the chief steward (for the hotel operationsdepartment).

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• watchkeeping and conning the vessel. The OOWs spend 72.4% of their time on this activity, whichinvolves carrying out a visual and auditory watch of the waters and conning the vessel. To this end,they have a set of instruments such as radar, binoculars, ECDIS,18 AIS,19 etc.;

• watchkeeping and carrying out a double task (keeping the bridge logbook, carrying out actions onthe engine supervision system, etc.), which accounts for 22.5% of their activities. In all cases, theykeep direct watch on the waters. It should be noted that communications with the outside worldor with other departments and informal discussions between the officer and the deckhand are alsoincluded in the double task category, accounting for 65.5% of activities;

• other tasks (computerised administrative management, toilet visits, etc.) that account for 5.1% ofthe OOWs’ working time. These tasks do not fall under watch or conning activities. While they arebeing performed, the OOWs are no longer keeping watch over the waters, and the task is delegatedto the on-watch deckhand.

At first glance, the proportion of “other tasks” could appear considerable. However, it is impor-tant to remember that in the shipping company under investigation, bridge watchkeeping duties areperformed by one officer and one or two deckhands. Bridge watchkeeping is not limited to the offi-cer’s watch on the waters; it is fully shared. The role of the watchkeeping deckhand, who is always onthe bridge, is to monitor the waters at all times and to report any potential danger to the OOW. Thepresence on the bridge of a second watchkeeping person thus provides a guarantee of safety. It alsoenables the officers to perform additional tasks without compromising the ship’s safety, all the moreso as the average duration of these “other tasks” is less than one minute.

During a crossing, the task demands vary. Three periods can be distinguished:

• period 1 is called “fairway navigation”. It follows the docking and departure manoeuvres and involvesnavigating in confined waters. This is a critical, demanding period, since it involves managing navi-gation and collision avoidance activities while avoiding the major risk of grounding. The master andthe chief mate are systematically present during all the fairway operations;

• period 2 is called “sea navigation”. The vessel navigates from the departure port’s exit channel to thearrival port’s entry channel. This is the least demanding navigation period. It involves few encountersituations with other vessels (although there are occasional encounters with groups of fishermen);

• period 3 is called “navigating the lane” following the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). The TSS is anarea where maritime traffic is dense, with all the vessels from the Dover TSS going in the directionof the Ushant TSS.20

This is the area where the collision risks are most serious. Vessels enter an area where collisionavoidance manoeuvres are numerous and particularly difficult to manage.

Crossing the Channel thus involves a succession of navigation periods: fairway navigation afterdeparture, then “sea navigation” before crossing the traffic lane, then another “sea navigation” periodbefore arriving at the entry channel of the port of arrival (see Fig. 3).

Table 2 shows the distribution of the three activity categories (i.e. watchkeeping and conningthe vessel, double task, and other tasks) in terms of these three periods (i.e. fairway navigation, seanavigation, and traffic lane). It can be observed that the proportions of watchkeeping only are moreimportant in periods 1 and 3. Instances of double tasks and additional tasks are consequently lessimportant than in period 2. This finding must be correlated with the officers’ workload that is moreimportant in periods 1 and 3. Hence, the OOWs adjust their activities according to the work situationdemands.

18 The Electronic Charts Display Information System (ECDIS) is an electronic chart display and information system.19 The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by vessel traffic services to

transmit information such as vessel position, speed, course, etc.20 The Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is a traffic management system that regulates traffic in certain areas and makes vessels

take either the upstream or the downstream lane.

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Fig. 3. The three navigation periods for a passenger ship.

Table 2Distribution of the three categories of activities in terms of the navigation period.

Categories of activities Period 1Fairway

Period 2Sea navigation

Period 3Traffic lane

All threeperiods

Watchkeeping and conning the ship 4:00:0095.7%

23:29:0267.7%

5:30:2982.6%

32:59:3172.4%

Double task 0:08:443.5%

9:02:4226.1%

1:02:2615.6%

10:13:5222.5%

Other tasks 0:01:590.8%

2:10:536.3%

0:07:181.8%

2:20:155.1%

Duration 4:10:43 34:42:37 6:40:18 45:33:38

The average duration of the observation periods were as follows: fairway navigation: 29′04′′ (SD = 12′47′′), Sea navigation:2 h 31′07′′ (SD = 1 h 02′52′′), navigating the lane period: 54′11′′ (SD = 15′33′′).Cooperation within the officer/deckhand team was not investigated. Cooperation varies greatly from one team to the next. Theprescribed role of the on-watch deckhand is to carry out a visual and auditory watch of the waters and to warn the OOW of anyvessel on a collision route.

5.2. The management of encounter situations

The radar video clips enabled the identification of two different types of vessel course alterations:course alterations and collision avoidance manoeuvres. The latter include three distinct phases:

• phase 1: between the detection of signals on the waters (i.e. from the other vessel) and the executionof the avoidance manoeuvre (course alteration);

• phase 2: between the execution of the avoidance manoeuvre and the actual passing of the twovessels;

• phase 3: return to the planned route.

We identified and analysed 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres.

5.2.1. General findingsTable 3 shows the general data related to these 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres.The average time t1 observed is 9.53 min (SD = 9.91). Collision avoidance manoeuvres are performed

at an average TCPA of 26.37 min (SD = 15.67); in other words, the officer manoeuvres on average 26 minbefore a potential collision. This corresponds to an average distance dman of 7.82 NM21 (SD = 4.35). At

21 7.55 NM ≈ 14 km.

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Table 3General data related to the 38 collision avoidance manoeuvres identified.

t1 (Min) t2 (Min) �barre (◦) dman (NM) DCPAman (NM) TCPA (Min) DCPApass (NM)

Average 9.53 36.00 10.95 7.82 0.64 26.37 1.81Standard deviation 9.91 18.48 9.21 4.35 0.36 15.67 1.39Min 1.00 12.00 3.00 2.50 0.10 9.00 0.80Max 47.00 91.00 40.00 24.00 1.20 81.00 6.20Median 6.50 33.00 7.50 6.85 0.70 21.50 1.3525th Percentile 2.00 21.00 5.00 4.50 0.30 13.00 1.0075th Percentile 15.00 52.00 12.00 10.50 0.90 34.00 2.00

the time of the manoeuvre, both vessels are effectively on a collision route since the average DCPAman

observed is under 1 NM.The angle of the course alterations performed during collision avoidance manoeuvres, namely

�helm, gives information regarding the degree of anticipation of the manoeuvre. As a general rule, theless anticipation, the more �helm must be important to avoid the collision. Our observations revealedthat the average �helm was 10.95◦ (SD = 9.21). The standard deviation is important as 6 manoeuvresrequired �helm well over the average value. However, the value of the 75th percentile shows that75% of the manoeuvres observed did not require �helm over 12◦. The amplitude remains low, but issufficient for the manoeuvre to be perceived by the other vessel. The first overall results thus showthat collision avoidance manoeuvres are performed with anticipation.

The average DCPAcpass represents a fundamental element, since it is the only one that is expresslyprescribed in the company under investigation. It is part of the master’s permanent instructions: “Allmanoeuvres must be performed clearly and well on time. As far as possible, a DCPA of 2 nauticalmiles22 (NM) must be held to for large vessels. It is necessary to avoid a DCPA lower than 1NM whenpassing a vessel off the bow and when the visibility conditions are deemed to be poor”. The perma-nent instructions also stipulate that “Navigation safety takes priority over the timetable”. The averageDCPApass observed for the 38 manoeuvres is 1.81 (SD = 1.39). The 5 DCPApass lower than 1 NM (andsuperior to 0.8 NM) involved passing fishing vessels along the coast. Passing merchant vessels alwaysinvolved a DCPApass superior to 1 NM. Out of the 17 encounter situations of this type, 8 involved aDCPApass superior to 2 NM, and 9 involved a DCPApass between 1 and 2 NM. Of those 9 cases, 4 involvedmanoeuvres off the bow of a vessel. In general, it thus appears that the instructions laid down by thecompany are adhered to.

These overall results clearly show anticipative management of encounter situations. OOWsmanoeuvre very early, by anticipation, so as to remain within a safety net where collision risks arecontrolled, in accordance with the company prescriptions. To narrow down results, we show the datain terms of:

• the crossing period (i.e. traffic lane vs. sea navigation);• the “status” of the other vessel (i.e. “stand-on” vessel vs. “give-way” vessel);• the type of vessel (i.e. merchant vs. fishing).

5.2.2. The collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the crossing periodTable 4 shows the data according to crossing periods (to note: there were no collision avoidance

manoeuvres during the fairway period).Findings show that dnav, TCPA at the time of the manoeuvre, and DCPApass are significantly higher

when the vessel is in a lane period, namely in a zone where maritime traffic is dense. The situationsobserved concerned primarily interactions with merchant vessels. When in the lane, these vesselsfollow a well-defined course, which makes it possible for the OOWs to manoeuvre very early. Thisanticipation strategy enables them to keep room for manoeuvre to manage new conflict situations inoptimum conditions.

22 One nautical mile (NM) is equivalent to 1.852 km.

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Table 4Characteristics of collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the crossing period.

Traffic lane(14 manoeuvres)

Sea navigation(24 manoeuvres)

t ddl p-value

�helm (◦) 10.46 13.20 .69 36 .50SD = 10.08 SD = 12.40

dman (NM) 11.60 5.86 4.93 36 .000018**

SD = 4.89 SD = 2.33DCPAman (NM) 0.74 0.58 1.25 36 .22

SD = 0.35 SD = 0.37TCPA (Min) 39.00 19.80 4.37 36 .0001**

SD = 18.75 SD = 8.45DCPAcrois (NM) 2.64 1.40 2.75 34 .0096**

SD = 1.82 SD = 0.91t1 (Min) 14.07 9.96 .81 36 .42

SD = 20.92 SD = 10.51t2 (Min) 48.84 37.32 .95 36 .35

SD = 19.44 SD = 41.19

**p < .01.

Table 5Collision avoidance according to the preferential right of the vessel.

Stand-on vessel Give-way vessel t dll p-value

�helm (◦) 9.50 13.00 1.05 35 .30SD = 7.83 SD = 8.36

dman (NM) 7.15 10.77 2.07 36 .045*

SD = 3.32 SD = 6.99DCPAman (NM) 0.65 0.57 .52 36 .61

SD = 0.36 SD = 0.40TCPA (Min) 24.58 34.29 1.5 36 .14

SD = 13.22 SD = 23.46DCPAcrois (NM) 1.65 2.38 1.27 35 .21

SD = 1.27 SD = 1.75t1 (Min) 8.97 12.00 .73 36 .47

SD = 8.15 SD = 16.27t2 (Min) 32.90 49.71 2.30 36 .027*

SD = 15.73 SD = 24.52

*p < .05.

5.2.3. Collision avoidance manoeuvres depending on the status of the vessel (give-way or stand-onvessel)

Table 5 shows the data according to the status of the vessel. Rules 15, 16, and 17 of COLREG (IMO,1972) stipulate that when two power-driven vessels follow courses that intersect, in such a way thatthere is a collision risk, the vessel that has the other on her own starboard side (i.e. the give-wayvessel) must keep out of the way. The stand-on vessel must maintain her course and speed. Yet, sevencollision avoidance manoeuvres designed to avoid give-way vessels (six merchant vessels and onefishing vessel) were observed.

Findings show that dman and t2 are significantly higher when the car-ferry is the stand-on vesseland manoeuvres so as to avoid a give-way vessel. So as not to act in contravention of the regulations,the avoidance manoeuvres must be executed at a distance that is sufficiently long for COLREG not tobe applicable yet. However, there are no significant differences regarding the TCPA and �helm appliedto these manoeuvres.

5.2.4. Collision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of other vesselCollision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of other vessel. Table 6 shows the data

according to the type of other vessel.

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Table 6Collision avoidance manoeuvres according to the type of vessel.

Merchant vessels Fishing vessels t dll p-value

�helm (◦) 9.06 10.90 .69 35 .50SD = 4.54 SD = 9.63

dman (NM) 11.05 5.47 5.02 36 .000014**

SD = 4.27 SD = 2.55DCPAman (NM) 0.68 0.60 .73 36 .47

SD = 0.38 SD = 0.35TCPA (Min) 34.75 20.27 3.12 36 .0035**

SD = 16.77 SD = 11.79DCPAcrois (NM) 2.44 1.35 2.52 35 .016*

SD = 1.68 SD = 0.92t1 (Min) 11.06 8.29 .85 36 .40

SD = 12.31 SD = 7.53t2 (Min) 44.71 28.95 2.85 36 .0071**

SD = 19.4 SD = 14.64

*p < .05;**p < .01.

When comparing the 17 encounter situations with merchant vessels with the 21 encounter situ-ations with fishing vessels, findings show that the OOWs manoeuvre significantly later in the case offishing vessels. Consequently, the distance dnav at which the officers manoeuvre is also significantlysmaller. The same applies to t2. The anticipation difference between fishing and merchant vessels isexplained by activity differences, and, therefore the different behaviours of these two types of vessels.Fishing vessels navigate at a speed of 3 or 4 knots23 when they are fishing and a speed of 6 or 10 knotswhen they are full ahead. In contrast, merchant vessels navigate at a much higher speed, which cango up to 25 knots for some (e.g. container ships). Moreover, merchant vessels follow a well-definedcourse, whereas fishing vessels often change direction in order to exploit a particular area. The move-ments of fishing vessels may thus appear to the OOWs as more random, hence unpredictable. Hence,the OOWs will tend to wait longer before beginning a collision avoidance manoeuvre so that the lat-ter is not nullified by a course alteration from the vessel involved. However, there are no significantdifferences between fishing vessels and merchant vessels in terms of �helm applied to manoeuvres.The low speeds of fishing vessels mean that action may be taken later in complete safety.

5.2.5. Instances of double tasksWe also examined the instances of double tasks, but this time specifically in terms of collision

avoidance activities (i.e. the 38 manoeuvres identified). During the management of collision avoidanceactivities by the OOWs, the instances of additional tasks and/or double tasks equal or superior to 30 swere recorded (n = 174). Findings show that the instances are significantly less frequent during Phase1 (i.e. between the detection of signals from the other vessels on the waters and the execution of theavoidance manoeuvre) than during Phase 2 (i.e. between the execution of the avoidance manoeuvreand the actual passing of the two vessels) (t(68) = 2.37, p < .05). These findings may be interpreted asfollows: once signals are detected, officers start manoeuvring so as to release attention resources,which then enables them to execute other tasks synchronously during Phase 2.

Differences exist, however, when narrowing down results in terms of the status and type ofthe other vessel. When OOWs manoeuvre for give-way vessels, they perform less watchkeeping(F[1.27] = 6.08, p < .05) and more additional tasks (F[1.27] = 11.50, p < .01). Moreover, the time spentwatchkeeping is significantly more important (F[1.27] = 9.2, p < .05) for fishing vessels (82% of theactivity) than for merchant vessels (67% of the activity), whereas the time spent on additional tasksand double tasks is significantly higher for merchant vessels (respectively: F[1.27] = 4.65, p < .05 etF[1.27] = 5.02, p < .05). In contrast, the number of instances of double tasks and of additional tasks is sig-nificantly lower when dealing with fishing vessels rather than merchant vessels (t(33) = −2.14, p = .05).

23 The knot is a unit of speed equal to one nautical mile per hour (1 NM/h = 1.852 km/h).

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The officers’ cognitive resources are consequently more brought into play in the case of encountersituations with fishing vessels.

6. Discussion/conclusion

The goal of this research study was to identify the conditions for success for preventing collisionsin the area of passenger transport. We selected a shipping company considered safe, one that hasnever been involved in a collision. The analyses focused on the activities of the OOWs, particularlythe collision avoidance activities, and they were designed to identify the diachronic mechanisms (i.e.anticipation) and the synchronic mechanisms implemented in the context of managing the collisionrisk.

We hypothesized that the conditions for success (i.e. controlling the collision risk) were based ondiachronic mechanisms and synchronic mechanisms. The findings shown validate this hypothesis. Asfar as the synchronic management is concerned, we have shown that the OOWs adjust their activitiesin terms of the work situation demands. The modifications occur in two directions:

• when the task demands are important (e.g. interactions with fishing vessels), the time devoted totasks additional to watchkeeping and conning the ship is reduced;

• conversely, anticipation leads to the release of attention resources, since the proportion of the timedevoted to tasks that are additional to the main task increases when manoeuvres are executed at anearly stage.

As far as the diachronic management is concerned, we have shown that the OOWs control both theexternal risks (the collision risk) and the internal risks (the cognitive costs). This control is based ontheir ability to anticipate and, in some cases, to avoid encounter situations. In some cases, in particularas regards interactions with give-way vessels, we have shown that OOWs execute a manoeuvre, evenwhen they are the stand-on vessel, in order to avoid having to fall within the scope of a COLREG rule.Chauvin and Lardjane (2008) made the same observation from a study of the car-ferries crossing theDover Straits.

OOWs anticipate manoeuvres in order to remain within a safety net (as described by Amalberti,1996) and to retain a workload level that enables them to manage efficiently all the activities for whichthey are responsible. Anticipation – which is an essential characteristic of organisational resilience – isthus a key factor in this system and contributes largely to the conditions for success regarding collisionrisk prevention. At this stage of our research, it is not possible to determine the degree of resilience ofthe system under consideration, insofar as the other three characteristics of resilience have not beeninvestigated in a reasoned and systematic way.

Conning a ship is part of the category of activities that control a process in dynamic situations. Inthis respect, it shares a number of characteristics with car driving (Chauvin & Saad, 2004) and withair traffic control. In these three domains, various studies have also shown the operators’ anticipa-tion strategies. In the car driving domain, Van der Hulst, Rothengatter, and Meijman (1998) haveshown that drivers use a hierarchy of adaptive strategies designed to control the time pressure. Theyanticipate a lot, when they can do so (in normal conditions of visibility). When anticipation con-ditions are reduced, they compensate by reducing speed so as to be able to respond to potentialdanger. When this compensatory strategy cannot be implemented, drivers need to maintain a highattention level so as to be able to respond appropriately to events that may occur. These authorshave observed that whenever possible, drivers try to reduce the time pressure and its related drivingcosts; they will choose a strategy that demands a high attention level only when no other option isavailable.

These strategies are sometimes mentioned in terms of different styles or profiles: some operatorsprefer acting sooner while others prefer waiting until all elements of a situation are available (Martin,2013; Martin, Hourlié, & Cegarra, 2013). This observation can be made in terms of the Efficiency– Thoroughness – Trade-Off (ETTO) principle, as defined by Hollnagel (2009). Hollnagel explains thatthe existence of a sustainable system depends on the trade-off between efficiency (acting beforeit is too late) and thoroughness (ensuring that the situation is fully understood and that actions are

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appropriate to the goals). Hence, there are different cognitive styles depending on whether individualsfavour efficiency or thoroughness.

In the maritime domain, Habberley and Taylor (1989) have identified two types of officers: someengage manoeuvres at an average distance of 5.3 NM and reach an average passing distance of 1NM (DCPA), while others engage manoeuvres at an average distance of 3.2 NM to reach a DCPA of0.5 NM. The authors have shown that there is a relationship between anticipation and expertise.The most highly skilled officers manoeuvre earlier, with greater amplitude, to reach higher CPAs.Similarly, Chauvin and Lardjane (2008) have shown that car-ferries engage manoeuvres earlier thancargo vessels, and that the car-ferry officers thus anticipate more than officers working on other typesof vessels.

Martin (2013) uses the notion of maturing-time (MT) proposed by Averty Athènes, Collet, andDittmar (2002) to analyse the time elapsed between conflict detection and the moment when theresolution action plan is implemented. The examination of the average participant MT shows impor-tant variations depending on individual participants, as its value varies by up to 100%. The descriptiveanalysis of the distribution of MT values has shown three distinct groups of air traffic controllers: thosewho act soonest; those who use an intermediate MT value; and those who wait. Martin et al. (2013)explain that when operators assess the action-related uncertainty level as too high, they may decideto delay the action until the most appropriate time.

In our study, maturing-time corresponds to the time elapsed between detection and manoeu-vre “t1”. Our results thus show the profile of OOWs who act as soon as possible when conditions allowit. Only encounter situations with fishing vessels may compel them to wait, which demands increasedattention on their part. In general, OOWs favour efficiency over thoroughness.

Limitations of the study. The study was carried out on only one ship that belonged to a shippingcompany considered safe and over a period of 57 h only. Furthermore, it was not possible to establishcomparisons between the OOWs in light of the small crew size. In future, it would thus be worthextending this study to several vessels in the same company and with longer observation times. Finally,only one of the four characteristics of resilience, namely anticipation, was examined. Investigating theother three characteristics of resilience would thus be another fruitful extension of this study.

Disclosure of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest concerning this article.

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collision risk management in passenger transportation

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