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Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and SecurityPolicyAuthor(s): Mathias Koenig-ArchibugiSource: International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 137-174Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization FoundationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877891 .

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Explaining Government Preferences

for Institutional Change in EU

Foreign and Security PolicyMathiasKoenig-Archibugi

Abstract Some member-states of the EuropeanUnion (EU) want a suprana-tional foreign and security policy, while othermember-statesoppose any significantlimitation of national sovereignty in this domain.What explains this variation?An-

swering this question could help us to better understandnot only the trajectoryofEuropeanunification,but also the conditions and prospects of consensual political

integration n otherregional contexts and territorialscales. The main researchtradi-

tions in internationalrelations theory suggest different explanations. I examine the

roles of relativepower capabilities, foreign policy interests,Europeanized dentities,

anddomestic multilevel governancein determining he preferencesof the fifteenEU

membergovernmentsconcerningthe institutionaldepthof theirforeign and security

policy cooperation.I findthatpower capabilitiesandcollective identities have a sig-nificant influence, but the effect of ideas about the natureand locus of sovereignty,as reflectedin the domestic constitutionof each country,is particularlyremarkable.

Whatcan induce the governmentsof independentstates to relinquishone of their

most cherished possessions, that is, the right and the ability to act on the inter-

national stage accordingto their own judgment and preferences?This question is

particularlypressing in a time when international nterdependence s widely per-ceived as expanding and intensifying. As long as states remain central actors in

world affairs, the possibility of solving common problems and seizing mutuallybeneficialopportunitiesdepends cruciallyon theirwillingness to cooperateand-in

the view of many-to go beyond cooperation toward deeper forms of suprana-tional political integration.

Blueprintsfor the creation of global political structures ace the problem that,

as things stand,transcending he presentstate-centricworldwould requirethe con-

sent of the leaders of the states themselves. Certainly this is one of the reasons

Aprevious

version of this article waspresented

at the 4th ECPRPan-European

nternationalRela-

tions Conference, Canterbury,8-10 September2001. For their valuable comments, I would like to

thankFilippo Andreatta,Daniele Archibugi, Simone Borra,Nicola Dunbar,Fabio Franchino,Alkuin

Killiker, LeonardoMorlino,Angelo Panebianco,Eiko Thielemann,Ben Tonra,the editors of 10, and

threeanonymousreviewers. I am responsible for any mistakes.

InternationalOrganization58, Winter2004, pp. 137-174

? 2004 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818304581055



InstitutionalChange in EU Foreign and SecurityPolicy 139

policies are governed accordingto what has become known as the "Community

method,"that is, a complex set of institutionalrules and practices that ensure a

prominentrole for supranationalagencies and a high level of legalization. In for-

eign and security policy, on the contrary,supranational nstitutionshave little or

no power, and the obligations laid upon governmentsare vague or frequentlyig-

nored.1This seems to confirmthe skepticismaboutfunctionalspillovers thatStan-

ley Hoffmann voiced almost forty years ago: "Whenthe functions are concerned

with the ineffable and intangible issues of Grosspolitik,when grandeurandpres-

tige, rankandsecurity,dominationanddependenceareat stake,we arefully within

the realm of traditional nterstatepolitics."2To many internationalrelations scholars, the relatively feeble state of foreign

policy integration s far from surprising.Foreign and security policies are pivotalto state sovereignty, and for these authors, sovereignty-understood as the sur-

vival of the state as a distinct political entity in world affairs-is a "good"that

states value over all others. According to John J. Mearsheimer,"the most basic

motive driving states is survival. States want to maintaintheir sovereignty."3Ifstates are assumed to be "unitaryactorswho, at a minimum,seek their own pres-ervationand,at a maximum,drive for universaldomination,"4 henthe absenceof

consensual political and military integrationin WesternEurope is easily under-

standable.Even if one allows political integrationin exceptional circumstances,

such as massive external threatsor unique opportunities or territorial xpansion,5it can be arguedthat in WesternEuropethe benefits of an integratedforeign and

militarypolicy never outweighed the costs in terms of sovereignty.While this perspectivehas some empiricalmerit, it neglects a crucial aspect of

the WesternEuropeanexperience:therewas, and still is, considerablevariation n

the preferences of governments concerning foreign policy integration.The opti-mal level of political unificationin the EU is a matterof intense controversynot

only among its citizens, but also among its membergovernments.In the light of

these controversies, any interpretationof foreign and security policy integrationthat assumes a uniform concern for sovereignty and ignores differences between

government preferencesis bound to remaininadequate.The institutionaltrajectoryof Europeanintegrationis decided mainly during

IntergovernmentalConferences (IGCs), which since the 1980s have taken place

approximately very five years.These conferencesproduce"grandbargains,"whose

terms are generally written into the basic treaties of the EU. Europeangovern-ments have expressed divergent positions on the form and depth of foreign and

1. Until 1993 the institutionalarrangements or foreign policy coordinationamong EU member-

states were known as EuropeanPolitical Cooperation(EPC). Since the MaastrichtTreaty,they have

been called CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSP).2. Hoffmann 1965, 88.3. Mearsheimer1994/95, 10.4. Waltz 1979, 118.5. Riker 1975 and 1996.



140 InternationalOrganization

security policy integration,and as a consequence long and difficult negotiationshave ensued. For instance, duringthe IGC of 1996-97, which led to the Amster-

dam Treaty,EU foreign ministers or their personal representativesmet on morethantwentydifferentoccasions to discusspossiblerevisionsof theMaastrichtTreaty

provisions pertainingto the CommonForeign andSecurity Policy (CFSP)andthe

defense policy of the Union. In this time, dozens of position papers, nonpapers,and draft treaty articles on the CFSP were presentedand discussed by ministers

and officials.6Moreover,the AmsterdamTreaty negotiationswere relatively sim-

ple comparedto those that generatedthe foreign and security provisions of the

MaastrichtTreaty in the 1990-91 IGC, which occurred in the uncertain inter-

nationalcontext thatfollowed the end of the Cold War.7Those fierce negotiations

on European reatyreformreflect the existence of significantdisagreementsamong

governments about the depth of integrationin foreign and security policy, and

make clear that the CFSP is a "contested institution."8

Table 1 offers a synoptic presentationof these disagreements,with referenceto

the main treatyrevisions on CFSP that were considered in the IGC of 1996-97.

Foreach revision, the table indicates the position expressedby each member-state

duringthe prenegotiationphase. If implemented,these treatyrevisions would have

meant a higher level of sovereignty pooling or sovereigntydelegation in the insti-

tutionalstructureof the EU.9Sovereigntypooling occurswhen statesagreeto take

collectively binding decisions without the possibility of nationalveto. In the con-text of the 1996-97 IGC, to pool sovereignty meant to allow qualifiedmajority

voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministersfor all decisions pertainingto CFSP,or

at least for all decisions of implementation.Sovereignty delegation occurs when

6. McDonagh 1998.7. On the Maastrichtnegotiations,see Forster1999; LaursenandVanhoonacker1992; andMoravc-

sik 1998.

8. Gourevitch1999, 137.9. On the distinction between sovereignty pooling andsovereigntydelegation, see Moravcsik 1998,

67. In this articleI ignorethe negotiationson whetherto add defense policy to the competenciesof the

EU. Thatis, I am interested n changes of the "institutional apacity"and not of the "functionalscope"of the EU, to use Lindbergand Scheingold's 1970 terminology.Duringthe 1990s, most of the coun-tries that demanded a supranationalCFSP also wantedthe inclusion of defense among the competen-cies of the EU, and vice versa. However, the sets of countriessupporting he two reforms(increasingthe depth of integrationand extending it to defense issues) do not coincide perfectly. This is mainlybecause of France'sposition, which was and is stronglysupportiveof a Europeandefense identitybut

is opposed to supranationaldecision making for defense as well as for the CFSP.As remarkedby a

Frenchmemberof the EuropeanParliament,Jean-LouisBourlanges,France wants a strongEurope,as

do the Germans,butwith weak institutions,as do the British (quotedin Agence Europe6507, 23 June

1995). Since 1998, the British governmenthas no longer opposed a defense role for the EU, but-aswith France-the United Kingdomhas retained its hostility towardsupranationalprocedures,as op-

posed to intergovernmentaldecision making.The resultingconvergenceof the preferencesof FranceandBritain has madepossible the recentprogressin creatinga EuropeanSecurityand Defence Policyon an intergovernmentalbasis. Furthermore,duringthe 1990-91 IGC, the Netherlandshad the oppo-site combination of preferencesas France: t supporteda federalforeign policy butopposedthe devel-

opment of a Europeandefense. In sum, national positions on the two dimensions do not coincide

perfectly, and this article examines only the issue of the institutionaldepthof CFSP.



TABLE. Support or supranational integrationinforeign and security policy, 1996

A B D DK E F FIN GR

Allow QMV n Councilfor decisions of principle Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No

Allow QMVfor decisions of implementation Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes N.A.

Unifythe institutionalstructureof the EU Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes

Increase thepowers of the EuropeanCommission Yes Yes N.A. No N.A. No No Yes

Increase thepowers of the EuropeanParliament N.A. Yes Yes N.A. N.A. No No Yes

Finance CFSP throughthe Communitybudget Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N.A. Yes

Sources: eeAppendix.Note: A = Austria.B = Belgium. D = Germany.DK = Denmark.E = Spain.F = France.FIN = Finland.GR = Greece. I = ItalP= Portugal. = Sweden.UK= UnitedKingdom. MV= qualifiedmajorityoting.CFSP= Common oreign ndSecurityN.A.= noposition rmissingdata.




states transfersome decisional power to supranationalbodies. Specifically, in the

mid-1990s to delegate sovereignty meant to increase the role and powers of the

EuropeanCommission and the EuropeanParliament n CFSP,to mitigate the in-

tergovernmental atureof CFSPby unifyingthe "three-pillared"nstitutionalstruc-

tureof the EU, and to financeCFSPoperations rom the Communitybudget nstead

of ad hoc contributionsby the member-states.

The diversityof governmentpositions challenges the view that the preservationof sovereignty is a basic goal sharedby all states. It also calls for an explanation:

why are some European governments more willing to pool and delegate sover-

eigntythanothers?The next section reviews variouspossibleanswersto this puzzle.

Possible Explanatory Factors: Interests, Capabilities,Identities, and Constitutional Cultures

There are several researchprograms n internationalrelationstheory,and each of

them stresses one particularset of factors as especially useful for explaining for-

eign and security policies in general and supranational ntegrationin particular.While it is often assumed that foreign policy decisions requiremulticausalexpla-

nations,there is little

clarityabout when the

predictionsof different theoretical

approachesshould be seen as complementaryand when they are competing. In

this article I consider a numberof explanatoryfactors thathave been highlighted

by different theoretical traditions,without trying to determineex ante how their

effects might be combined in each particularcase.

Broadly speaking,international nstitution-building an be interpreted romtwo

perspectives. The first assumes that governmentshave a purely instrumentalatti-

tudetoward nternational nstitutions.Accordingto this instrumentalist pproach,10institutions in general and specific aspects of institutionaldesign are not valued

per se,but

onlyas means to attain

exogenouslydefined

goals.Institutionsnot

onlyset constraintsto strategicaction, but they are themselves the object and outcome

of strategicaction. From the second perspective, the preferencesof governmentsfor certaininstitutions are not based primarilyon theiranticipatedcapacityto pro-duce well-defined outcomes, but on their coherence with entrenchedbeliefs and

normativecommitments.In a sense, each of the two approachesstresses a distinct

logic of action: a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness."1In this section I derive from these perspectives several more specific hypotheses

concerning the CFSP.

In the instrumentalistperspective,

the fact thatgovernmentsprefer

differentin-

stitutionalarrangements an be explained in referenceto theirvaryinginterestsor

their varying resources. This considerationforms the basis for selecting the first

10. Gourevitch1999, 142.11. March and Olsen 1998.




two causal factorsthatwill be considered n the examinationof institution-buildingin CFSP.

The first causal factor to be considered is the congruence between the antici-pated outcomes of a supranational oreign policy on the one hand, and each gov-ernment'sinterests in world affairs on the other.The importanceof this factor isstressed by rational institutionalism,12 which distinguishes preferences regardingsubstantivepolicy issues (or policy preferences)from preferences regarding nsti-tutional forms (or constitutionalpreferences) and explains the latter in terms ofthe former. Governments support or oppose the introductionof certain institu-tional and proceduralrules depending on whether they believe that these ruleswill produceoutcomes corresponding o theirexogenously determined nterestsor

not.13In the context of CFSP,EU governmentshave preferencesregardinga number

of issues of world politics and can be expected to support hose institutional ormsthat make their preferredoutcome more likely to happen. According to rational

institutionalism, the main determinant of a government's opposition to supra-national institutions in CFSP should be its concern that, once they are intro-

duced, the EU would make decisions that frequentlyrun against the preferencesof that governmenton particular nternational ssues. Specifically, with regardto

sovereignty pooling, the concern is that the governmentmight often be outvoted

in the Council of Ministers. With regardto sovereignty delegation, a governmentmight be concerned that on specific policy questions, the supranationalagencieswould be moreresponsive to the preferencesof a majorityof member-stateswhilethe governmentitself is in a minorityposition.

Supranationalntegrationmplies the abolitionof the nationalveto, and thismightbe especially difficult to accept for governments whose preferences can be ex-

pected to often be at odds with the view of the majority-that is, for preferenceoutliers. Rationalinstitutionalismexpects that (1) the more a governmentfears tobe outvoted, the less likely it is to accept supranational ntegration,and (2) the

fear to be outvoted depends mainly on the extent to which its policy preferencesconformto, or departfrom, the expected policy preferencesof a majorityof gov-ernments.In this analysis, this aspect is called "policy conformity."

When choosing institutionalrules, of course, governmentscannot know for cer-tain what theirpolicy preferencesandthose of the othergovernmentswill be oncethe rules are operative. However, it would be implausible to think that govern-ments choose rules behind a "veil of ignorance":because issues in world politicsdisplay a certaindegree of continuity,the governments'knowledge aboutpast and

12. See Keohane 1984; Martin 1992; Moravcsik 1998, 67-77; and Briuninger and K6nig 2000.13. See GarrettandTsebelis 1996; Gourevitch1999; andBriuningeret al. 2001, 49. Strictly speak-

ing, constitutionalpreferencesdependon interests as well as beliefs about how institutions will affect

outcomes-"theories," in the terminology of Vanbergand Buchanan 1989. This second aspect doesnot receive separateconsideration in this article, because it can plausibly be assumed that govern-ments do not have differentbeliefs about the operationof existing or possible EU institutions.




currentpreferencesis sufficient to form reasonableexpectations aboutfuturepol-

icy preferences.Hence the firsthypothesis to be tested is the following:

H1: Governments hat expect to be outliers with respect topolicy preferenceswill

be less supportive of supranational integration in the foreign and securityfieldthan governmentswith a high level of expectedpolicy conformity.

The second causal factor to be considered in this article is also connected to a

consequentialist approachto internationalpolitics, but this approachstresses dif-

ferences in resources ratherthan differences in interests.14Realist scholarsin in-

ternational elationsare less interested n the specificcontentandvariationof policy

preferencesthanin the means stateshave to obtain what they want.While realism

comes in many variants,all of them hold that the distributionof power capabili-ties among states is a crucial determinantof their behavior.'"A corollary is that

differences in the behavior of states can be explained mainly by looking at their

relative position in the state system.Some realist authors,as I have pointed out in the previous section, make as-

sumptionsabout state goals that are incompatiblewith the demonstratedwilling-ness of variousEuropeangovernmentsto deepentheir foreign and security policy

integration.Other variants of realism, however, do not rule out the possibility of

voluntary ntegration,but seek to explain it by referring o the distributionof power

among states. In particular,JosephGrieco has suggested a "neorealist" nterpreta-tion of the EU's Economic and MonetaryUnion, accordingto which the institu-

tional arrangementagreed upon at Maastrichtreflects the interest of France and

Italy in gaining "voice opportunities"vis-A-vis Germanyfor determiningmon-

etarypolicy in Europe.Grieco's thesis is that, "especially for weaker but still sa-

lient states, institutionalizationmight constitutean effective second-best solution

to the problemof workingwith, but not being dominatedby, a strongerpartner n

the context of mutuallybeneficial joint action (the first-bestsolution would be tobecome morepowerful andthus be on moreequal termswith the strongerpartner,or perhapseven not to require cooperation)."'6

Realist theoryleads to the expectationthatthe internationaldistributionof poweraffects each government'sinterest in a common foreign and security policy in a

differentway. More specifically, governmentswhose power resources allow them

to conduct an independentand effective foreign policy should see no need to re-

linquish their autonomy and have their hands tied by supranational nstitutions.

Weakercountries, on the contrary,should be interested in an integratedforeign

14. Hasenclevertal. 1997.15. See Waltz1979;andLegroandMoravcsik 998.16. Grieco 1996, 289. A similarargumentwith regardto Europeandefense cooperation s presented

byArt1996.



InstitutionalChange in EU Foreign and Security Policy 145

and security policy for at least two reasons.First, these countries can expect theirinfluence on world affairs to increase when the EU acts as a unit. The autonomy

they would lose would be offset by the collective power of the supranationalpol-

ity of which they are a part.Second, a tight institutionalstructurewould be a wayto constrain the strongermember-states,whose independentforeign policy mightbecome a threat o the interestsof the smaller countries n the future.By this logic,supranational ntegrationenhances the security of smaller states by augmentingtheir externalinfluence andby constrainingpotential sources of tension.

The hypothesis derivingfromrealism'semphasison relativepower resourcesisthus the following:

H2: Governmentswith higherpower capabilities will be less supportive of supra-national integrationinforeign and security matters than governmentswith lower

capabilities.

Both explanatory factors considered so far-policy preferences and relative

capabilities-suppose an instrumentaland calculating attitude toward European

institution-building n foreign and securitymatters.The other two factors consid-ered in this article reflect a logic of appropriateness atherthan of consequences.In international elationstheory,this logic is generallyemphasizedby constructiv-

ism, which regardsidentities, culture, and norms as independentdeterminantsofthe behavior of actorsin the international ystem. Some constructivistsemphasizethe processes of identity formation and transformationthat derive from inter-actions among states,17while others point to how the identities, values, and cul-turalattitudesof domestic social groupsaffect the behaviorof theirgovernments.'8The constructivisthypotheses considered in the rest of this article belong to thelatterversion of constructivism,which examines the domestic determinantsof in-ternationalbehaviorand thus takes a "bottom-up"perspective.

Whetherconstructivistsstress the systemic or the domestic sourcesof stateiden-

tity formation, they all hold that "variation n state identity, or changes in state

identity,affect the nationalsecurityinterestsor policies of states."19Furthermore,

"changesin the collective identity of societal actors transform he interestsof rel-evant collective actors that constitute the [international]system."201Constructiv-ists have describedthe changes in collective identities and values thatoccurred n

Europesince the MiddleAges, and have arguedthat these developmentssubstan-

17. AlexanderWendt is one such systemic constructivist,who nonetheless acknowledgesthat "cer-

tainly a complete theoryof stateidentity would have a substantialdomestic component."Wendt 1999,28.

18. This approachhas been called liberal constructivism-see Risse-Kappen 1996-or ideationalliberalism-see Moravcsik 1997.

19. Jeppersonet al. 1996, 52.20. Hall 1999, 5 (italics omitted).




tially altered the way governmentsrelated to their externalenvironment.21 or in-

stance, Rodney Bruce Hall has arguedthatthe nineteenth-century ransitionfrom

a legitimating principle based on territorialsovereignty to the principles of na-tional sovereignty and self-determinationtransformed he interests and practicesof states.22

Many think that since World WarII, a further shift in collective identities has

occurred in Europe, as nationalismhas declined significantly among West Euro-

pean publics.23According to some authors,this decline is part of a general trend

toward the endorsement of postmaterialistvalues.24Many observersof Europeanaffairshold that European ntegration"has been accompaniedby a weakening of

exclusive nationalism andby what might be describedas multipleidentity,thatis,

the coexistence of identities to local, regional, and supranational erritorialcom-

munities, alongside an identity with the nation."25

Asserting thata commonEuropean dentityis progressivelydevelopingin West-

ernEurope s not incompatiblewiththerecognitionof substantialdifferencesamongcountries in this dimension. European dentity formationcan be promotedor hin-

deredby a numberof factors,both at the individualandcollective level. The latter

might include a diversityof historicalexperiences,especially those relatedto wars,and geographical features of countries, such as peripheral ocation or insularity.These differences can affect the degree to which collective identities are

Europeanized.Constructivistsargue that the attitudeof national governmentvis-h-vis Euro-

pean integration s shapedby the way theirpopulationsor theirelites relatethem-

selves to Europe.A widespread perceptionof belonging to a Europeanentity, in

additionto-or even as a substitutefor-national belonging, is considereda ma-

jor determinantof government policies on supranational ntegration.26A strong

degree of European identity promotes the perception that authorityis "shared"

with otherEuropeansrather han"lost"to foreigners,andthus facilitatesthe trans-

fer of competencies to the supranationalevel.

Generally speaking, collective identities might affect government policies to-wardEuropeantreatyreformthroughtwo types of causal mechanism.In the first,members of the political elite make choices on Europeanpolitical integrationon

the basis of their identities. In the second, members of the general public form

21. See Hall 1999; Reus-Smith 1999; Cronin 1999; and Philpott 2001. According to Reus-Smith,

"[c]ulturallyandhistorically contingentbeliefs about what constitutes a 'civilized' state, and how suchstatesoughtto solve cooperationproblems,exert a far greater nfluence on basic institutionalpractices

than do materialstructural onditions, the strategicimperativesof particularcooperationproblems,orthe stabilization of territorialproperty rights."Reus-Smith 1997, 583.

22. Hall 1999.23. Dogan 1994.24. Inglehart1990, 408-14.25. Hooghe and Marks2001, 43.26. See Larsen 1997; Marcussenet al. 1999; Banchoff 1999; Risse 2001; and Hansen andWwever

2002.



InstitutionalChangein EU Foreign and SecurityPolicy 147

preferenceson Europeanpolitical integrationon the basis of their identities, and

political elites engaged in political competitionadjusttheir stance towardthe EU

to what they perceive arethe preferencesof theirpotentialvoters. In the firstcase,identities influencepolicy directly;in the second case, their influence on policy is

mediatedby instrumentalnterests. In reality,it is plausible to assume thatthe twocausal mechanisms tend to operatesimultaneously,generatingvariouspatternsof

interaction.As Thomas Risse notes, "[p]olitical elites (including party elites) tryto promoteideas (includingidentity constructions)with an eye on gaining poweror remainingin government."27Political elites are constrainedby public opinion,but the latteris malleable to the discourses propagatedby the former,as researchon public and elite supportfor European ntegrationhas shown.28

The hypothesis deriving from the constructivistemphasis on collective identi-ties is the following:

H3: Governments f countrieswithstrong[mass/elite] identificationwith "Europe"will be more supportiveof supranational integrationinforeign and security pol-

icy than governmentsof countries with less Europeanidentification.

The text in brackets ndicatesthat two versions of the hypothesis shouldbe tested:

oneconcerningthe generalpublic and the otherconcerningelite identities.The balance between national and European dentity may not be the only com-

ponent of political culture that affects the willingness to create supranationalpo-litical structures. deas abouthow the exercise of public authority s best organized

might also exert an influence. Some scholars believe that "where states have an

opportunity,they will seek to create internationalrules and institutions that are

consistent with domesticprinciplesof politicalorder."9Forinstance,Daniel Deud-

ney has hypothesized that, when polities with multiple centers of authority-or

"Philadelphiansystems"-cannot avoid interactingwith otherpolities, they finda

policy of "binding"-that is, a reciprocallimitationof autonomyby means of in-stitutionallinks-more "congenial"than balance-of-powerpractices.30Similarly,Anne-MarieBurley has arguedthatpost-WorldWarII multilateral nstitutions are

projectionsof the U.S. New Deal regulatorystate.31Some proponentsof the "dem-

ocraticpeace"thesis arguethatdemocratic states tend to "export" he principleof

peaceful conflict resolutionwhen dealing with each other.32

In the context of the EU, it has been noted that adaptation o supranationaln-

tegration is easier for some countries than for others. In particular,the institu-

tional structuresof the EU strongly resemble those of the Federal Republic of

27. Risse 2001, 202-3.28. Wessels 1995.29. Ikenberry1998, 163.30. Deudney 1996, 213-16.31. Burley 1993.32. Maoz andRussett 1993.




Germany,ensuringa high degree of "congruence"between the two constitutional

orders.33 t can plausibly be arguedthat this "strikingly good fit"34makes Euro-

pean political integrationmore welcome to the Germanpolitical and administra-tive elites than to other Europeans, such as the British, whose domestic state

structuresare considerably different from the EU. Wolfgang Wagnerhas shown

that, duringthe negotiations on the MaastrichtTreaty,the governmentsof coun-

tries with entrenchedparliamentary epresentationat the regional level wanted a

strongerEuropeanParliament,whereas the countrieswith no regional parliamentswere opposed.35

Based on these considerations,the fourthcausal factor examined in this article

is the constitutional culture that prevails in a country,and specifically the legiti-

macy and practiceof multilayeredgovernancein the domestic context. Two typi-cal constitutional cultures can be envisaged from this perspective. One conceives

sovereignty as a unitary and indivisible attributeof a polity. With reference to

France,Stanley Hoffmannhas pointed to "thetendencyto look at sovereigntynot

as a bundle of discretepowers and separablestate functions,but ratheras a talis-

man, indivisible andinalienableyet eminently losable."36Similarly,J.C. D. Clark

notes that "the United Kingdom's dynastic unification, crucially combined with

the union of Church and State at the Reformation,endowed her with a unitary,absolutist doctrine of sovereignty,

....

within which the concept of 'sharingsover-

eignty' became a contradiction n terms."37This idea of a "supreme, rresistible,

absolute,uncontrolledauthority, n which ... the rightsof sovereignty,reside"(asSir William Blackstone's Commentaries ormulatedit) is still at the basis of the

British legal system.38This conception is generallyhostile to the vertical division

of powers, which is seen as a threatto the integrityof public authority.Accordingto a differenttype of constitutionalculture,public power can be, and should be,distributedamong multiple territorial evels, in accordancewith the principle of

subsidiarityor comparative efficiency. In the first type, the exercise of sovereign

power is concentratedand "monocentric;" n the second type it is diffuse and

"pluricentric."The fourthhypothesis consideredin this article is thus:

H4: Governmentsof countries wherea monocentricconceptionofpolitical author-

ity prevails will find it more difficultto accept a supranationaltransferof powersin the CFSP than governmentsof countries where the pluricentric constitutional

culture is stronger.

33. See Bulmer 1997; Schmidt 1999; and Buller andJeffery2000.34. Bulmer 1997, 76.35. Wagner2002.36. Hoffmann 1995, 254.37. Clark 1991, 60.38. Quotedby Goldsworthy 1999, 10. On the central role of the sovereigntyof Parliament n En-

glish political culture and its implicationsfor European ntegration,see Clark 1991 andLarsen 1997.




In other words, a constitutional culture that emphasizes multilayeredgovernancewithin the boundariesof the state predisposes its leaders to accept and promote

the creationof an additionallayer of governance, if this seems to increase policyeffectiveness. This predisposition facilitates institutionalisomorphism. The idea

of indivisible sovereignty,on the contrary,creates a conceptual obstacle to supra-nationalpolitical integration.

It is importantto note that the analyses below are not based on measures of

"culture,"but on an index measuringdomestic institutionalstructures.In a later

section, I will arguethat this index is suitablefor assessing the hypothesis formu-

lated above. The validity of my conclusions about the impact of constitutional

culturewill depend crucially on the plausibility of that argument.In this section I have identified four factors that might plausibly explain the

variance in government support for a supranational oreign and security policy.Each of these factors is stressed by a different "school"in internationalrelations

theory,but this does not exclude the idea thatthey can complementeach otherin

explaining governmentalpreferences concerning political integration.Most importantly,each causal factor is formulatedin such a general way that,

taken together,they encompass a large numberof more specific explanationsad-

vanced in the literature.For instance, national characteristicssuch as neutralsta-

tus and a "special relationship"with the United States can be subsumed under

preferencesover policies; and factors such as the consequences of a peripheralor

insularlocation, of historical experiences and memories, and socialization effects

deriving from EU membershipcan be subsumed underthe question of European

identity.An explanatoryframework that focuses on the four variables discussed

above can hope to grasp many of the relevant differences between the member-

states. Even so, the expectationis that the variablesconsideredcan explain a sub-

stantialpartof the variance-not the total variance.

Explanatory StrategiesThe previous section has identifieda numberof possible influenceson the willing-ness of European governments to establish a supranational oreign and security

policy. The hypotheses, however, have been formulated n such a general way as

to leave unspecified the characterof the causal links. Before the hypotheses can

be tested empirically,this charactermust be made explicit. This article considers

two possible interpretationsof the causal link concept. According to the first in-

terpretation, he causal factor increases the probabilityof the outcome (net of the

effect of otherrelevant causes).According

to the second interpretation, he cause

(by itself or in combination with othercauses) representsa necessary and/or suf-

ficient condition for the outcome to occur.The firstunderstandingunderpinsmost

quantitativeresearch.The second understandingunderpins,sometimes implicitly,

many qualitativecomparative,"small-N"investigations.39

39. See Ragin 2000, 313; andMahoney2000.




In this article I posit that both approachesare legitimate for the study of the

problem at hand.40Therefore, in the following I will ask two related questions

with regardto the four explanatoryvariables consideredabove: (1) Do these vari-ables affect the probabilitythata governmentis supportiveof a supranational e-

form of the CFSP, ceteris paribus? and (2) Are any of these causal conditions

necessaryand/or sufficientfor supranationalism, y themselves or in combination

with other causal conditions?

This article aims to answer the firstquestionusing multivariate ogistic regres-sion. Correlationalmethods, however, might not be equally suited for answering

questions of the second kind, which are expressed in logical terms. Sufficiencyandnecessity can be conceptualizedas set-theoreticrelationships,and for this rea-

son I will examine the second research question using a novel method that hasbeen developed by CharlesRagin and is based on fuzzy-set logic.41 Both explan-

atory strategies involve a comparisonbetween the member-statesof the EU, al-

though the logic of comparison is different.42Moreover, both types of cross-

national comparative investigation are intended as a complement to, not as a

substitutefor, detailed case studies at the countrylevel.43

Logistic regressionis used frequentlyin the analysis of social andpolitical data

anddoes not requirean introduction.Ragin's fuzzy-set methodis less well known,and thus a brief descriptionis appropriate.The method is a formal tool for quali-

tative comparisonsthat builds on a previous technique, QualitativeComparative

Analysis (QCA),44 which is based on Boolean algebra and has been applied to

various topics in political research,including internationalalliances, coercive di-

plomacy, revolutionarymovements, the breakdownof democraticregimes, and the

development of welfare states.45Similar to its predecessor, fuzzy-set analysis is

specifically designed to deal with situationsin which the numberof cases is mod-

erate (between about 5 and50) andcausalityis multiple (differentcauses can gen-erate the same outcome) and conjunctural the impact of a factor on the outcome

depends on its interactionwith other factors-that is, what matters are combina-

tions of causes).

Comparedto QCA, the main strengthof fuzzy-set analysis is that it is not re-

stricted to situations in which the outcome and the causes are either present or

absent;it can also be applied to observationsdisplaying more or less of a certain

40. Mahoney 2001, 589 notes that it is "anopen questionwhetherrelationshipsbased on the logicof necessary and sufficient conditions or relationshipsderived from linear correlationswill be found

more frequentlyby researchers."41.

Ragin2000.

42. Anotherstudythat combines logistic regressionanalysis with Ragin's QualitativeComparative

Analysis (the precursorof his fuzzy-set method) is Kiser et al. 1995.43. The following collections includecase studieson single countries:Hill 1996; Howorth andMe-

non 1997; and Manners and Whitman 2000. The most satisfactoryanswerto the researchquestionsofthe present article is likely to emerge from the dialogue between country-level case studies and the

kind of comparative nvestigation conducted here.44. See Ragin 1987; and Ragin et al. 1996.45. See, for instance,Amentaand Poulsen 1996; Berg-Schlosserand De Meur 1994;Chernoff1995;

Goodwin 2001; Harvey 1999; andWickham-Crowley1992.




property.This is because fuzzy sets embody both qualitativestates (full member-

ship andfull nonmembership n a set) and variationby level (degrees of member-

shipbetween0 and 1). In addition, uzzy-set analysiscan incorporatea probabilistic

interpretationof causality and take into account statisticalsignificance.46

Comparedto quantitativemethods, fuzzy-set analysis is designed for the dis-

covery of patternsof causal necessity and sufficiency in intermediate-sizedN's. It

is very sensitive to causalcomplexity, thatis, multipleandconjunctural ausation.

The use of interaction erms is subjectto stringent imitationsin most quantitative

methods, whereas fuzzy-set analysis starts by examining all possible combina-

tions of causal conditions (saturated nteraction)and then simplifies the model in

a top-down manner.47

In a nutshell, researchersusing fuzzy-set QCA do the following. First,they usesubstantiveand theoreticalknowledge to assign fuzzy-set membershipscores to

cases in both the outcome and the causal conditions in which they are interested.

Second, they look for causal conditions with membershipscores that are consis-

tently greaterthan outcome membershipscores. If there is a causal condition in

which this happens in all cases, then this condition passes the test of necessity.

Third, to examine sufficiency they compare the membership scores of the out-

come with the score of all logically possible combinations of the causal condi-

tions, andthey look for combinationswith membershipscores thatareconsistentlylower than outcome membershipscores. If there is a combinationfor which this

happensin all cases, then this conditionpasses the test of sufficiency.Researchers

eliminate those expressions that pass the test of sufficiency but are logically re-

dundantand obtain a logically parsimoniousstatementof causal sufficiency.This

statement is then evaluated in terms of any simplifying assumptionthat it incor-

porates (simplifying assumptionsare statements about the hypothetical outcome

of combinationsof causal conditions that do not occurin the populationstudied).48

Operationalization and Data

In this article, logistic regression and the fuzzy-set method are used to analyzeevidence collected from all the states that were EU members in 1996. This re-

quires an operationalizationof the causal factors that is sufficiently precise to al-

46. Probabilistictechniques

for statisticalsignificance testing

infuzzy-set QCA require

apopula-tion with a relatively large number of cases. Since the populationconsidered in this article includes

only thirteencountries,I conduct what Ragin calls a "veristic" test of necessity and sufficiency. In a

veristic test, one single disconfirmingcase is consideredenoughto reject the hypothesisof sufficiencyandnecessity. This criterion is common in small-N comparativestudies. Mahoney2000. It seems ad-

equatein the context of the present study because its deterministiccharacter s balancedby the prob-abilistic characterof logistic regression analysis.

47. Ragin 2000, 72.48. A paper describing the various steps in more detail is available at (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/

koenigar/fuzzy.htm).Accessed 8 September2003. For a full exposition, see Ragin 2000.




low comparisonsbetween fifteencountries and thattakesinto account the difficultyof collecting in-depth homogeneous data for such a range of countries.

The first task is to operationalizethe outcome variable,that is, the preferencesof governments concerning the degree of supranationalism n their foreign and

security policy cooperation.In most areasof politicalresearch, o identify the pref-erences of actorsis more difficult than to ascertaintheirbehavior,which is gener-

ally visible. To determine the preference ordering of collective actors such as

nationalgovernmentsis even more difficult, given theircomposite nature and the

possibility of internaldisagreementsand even conflicts. In this article, the prob-lem of determiningpreferencesis solved by relying on the public statementsthat

the governmentsthemselves issued to illustratethe position they intended to pro-

mote at the IntergovernmentalConferencesfor the institutionalreformof the EU.The audiences for these statements were theirparliamentsand publics, as well as

the governmentsof othermember-states.The prenegotiationphaseof the IGC held

in 1996-97 seems a useful context to elicit these positions, as all fifteen govern-ments preparedand publicized papers outlining their stance on a broadrange of

issues expected to be on the negotiating table.49 As noted above, the position of

each member-stateon the most important reatyrevisionsconcerningCFSPis sum-

marized n Table 1. The explanationof how the informationcontainedin that table

provides the input(outcome variable)for the analyses is given in the next section,

as the two methodsemployed differ in this respect.The assessment of the first explanatoryvariable, "policy conformity,"requires

a way to identify governmentsthat tend to be preferenceoutliers with respect to

various internationalproblems.Here I use voting behaviorin the UN GeneralAs-

sembly as a proxy,because UN delegations vote on a numberof issues of world

politics that might be the topic of CFSP decisions. In fact, about 95 percent of

roll-call votes in the period 1991-96 fell into four categories:disarmament,colo-

nialism, the Middle East, and human andpolitical rights (includingthe conflict in

former Yugoslavia).50 These issue areas either already belong to the CFSP's re-

mit,51 or governmentscan reasonably expect them to be added to the EU's com-

petencies in the future.52 considered the five sessions held between the end of

the Cold War and the startof the IGC of 1996-97 (Sessions 45th to 50th). Duringthis period,the GeneralAssembly adopted434 resolutionsby recordedor roll-call

vote, and in 176 cases the vote of EU membercountries53was not unanimous.For

49. These documents are listed in the Appendix. They are treated here not as indicatorsof the op-timal level of integration preferredby each governmentin absolute terms, but as indications of their

relative location on the continuumfrom nationalsovereignty to supranationalgovernance.50. Voeten2000, 209.51. Conseil de l'Union Europdenne,2003.52. Votingbehavior in the UN Assembly is an imperfectindicator of the "true"preferencesof gov-

ernments,because there are several incentives for misrepresentation.However, this indicator seems auseful way to determinehow often the position of each governmentdiffers from the position of mostotherEU governments,andthus its relative tendencyto be a preferenceoutlier.

53. 1996 membershipstatus.




each of these 176 "contentious"resolutions, I determinedhow each EU member-state voted (three possibilities: "yes," "no," or abstention) and how many other

member-states oted in the sameway ("partners" enceforth).54 ince in 1996 therewere fifteen EU members,this numbercanrangefroma minimumof zero (thestateis isolated) to a maximumof thirteen (the state is part of a majorityof fourteen

against one dissenter).)5Each country is given a conformity score, which equalsthe average numberof partners t had in the 176 resolutions.A low average is an

indicationthatthe state is a preferenceoutlier,while a high averageindicates thatits policy preferencesgenerally coincide with those of a majorityof EU member-

states.

The average numberof partners,or "likeminded" tates, determinesthe likeli-

hood that a governmentwould have its preferencesoverrun n hypotheticalvotesin the EU. This proxy certainly has several limitations. For instance, it can cap-turethe risk, but not the cost, of being outvoted,because the latterdependson the

relative importanceof the issues for the governments. However, short of an in-

depth analysis of the foreign policy preferencesof each EU government,this ap-

proach would seem the best way to systematically compare the disadvantageof

supranationalism hat each state has to bear because of disagreementsabout thebest way to respond to internationalproblems. This proxy, for instance, would

indicate that a countrysuch as Italy (averagenumber of partners:9.9) can be al-

most certainto be partof either a majorityor a blockingminority,while the United

Kingdom (5.3) would be much more uncertain about its ability to thwart un-

desired decisions in case of a vote.

To measure the second causal factor-power capabilities-I rely on the Com-

posite Index of MaterialCapabilities (CIMC)developed by the Correlatesof War

(COW) Project, which is probablythe most commonly used power index in the

internationalrelationsliterature.The CIMCresults from two demographic ndica-

tors (totalpopulationandurbanpopulation),two industrial ndicators(energycon-

sumptionand steel production),andtwo militaryindicators(militaryexpendituresand armedforces size). For each of these indicators,the COWresearchteam cal-culates the total score (in people, tons, dollars,etc.) for the international ystem in

a given year,ascertains the percentageshareheld by each state, andcalculates the

averageof thesepercentageshares.56 n this article,however,I considereach state's

share of the EU total, because I am interestedin the differences in power amongmember-states only. The CIMC used here is for 1992, the last year for which

dataon EU countries are currentlyavailable in the National MaterialCapabilitiesData set.57

54. Data from UN (variousyears).55. The maximumnumberof partnersa governmentcan have in a vote is thirteenbecause I do not

consider the resolutionsvoted unanimouslyby all fifteen EU member-states.56. Singer, Bremer,and Stuckey 1972.57. Singer and Small 1990/1999.




In comparisonto other possible indicators of national power capabilities, the

CIMChas the advantageof expressingeconomic power as well as military power,

and potential military power (expressed by the economic indicators) as well asactual power. The inclusion of the economic dimension is useful because eco-

nomic coercion and incentives are importanttools of foreign and security policyeven when the possibility of using military force remains essential. Considering

potential military power is importantto do justice to the neorealist position ac-

cordingto which structural actorsultimatelygovern internationalpolitics: in this

logic, potential capabilities are crucial because states will sooner or later trans-

form them into actualmilitary capabilitiesas a result of the competitivenatureof

the internationalenvironment(a state that fails to do so is a clear anomaly from

the point of view of neorealism).58However, the results reportedin the next sec-tion are robustalternativemeasurementsof nationalcapabilities.59

Concerning my thirdcausal factor,the studyof nationaland supranationalden-

tity is occasionally conductedby means of discourseanalysis.60However,the state

of the art in EU studies does not yet allow the use of this sophisticatedtool to

compareall EU member-states.Another common way to operationalizeEuropean

identity is to rely on the results of opinion polls. The standardsource on publicattitudes towardEuropean ntegration s the Eurobarometer urvey,which is con-

ducted periodically in all member-stateson behalf of the EuropeanCommission.

The survey questionthat will be used in this article is the following: "Inthe nearfuture do you see yourself as ... ?"where five answersarepossible: (1) Austrian/

Belgian/Danish/etc. only, (2) Austrian/Belgian/Danish/etc. and European, (3)

European and Austrian/Belgian/Danish/etc., (4) Europeanonly, and (5) don't

know. For each country,I construct a "Europeandentity score,"which equals the

sum of the percentagesof all respondents ndicating"European" s (partof) their

identityminusthepercentageof respondentsndicating"[nationality] nly."I pooledthe data from four different Eurobarometer urveys, which were conducted be-

tween March 1992 and December 1995.61

58. Waltz 1993, 66-67.59. The results reported n the following sections are not affected substantially f the gross domes-

tic product(GDP) or total populationare used as indicatorsof materialcapabilityinstead of the CIMC.

Regardingmilitaryindicators,the number of personnelcommitted for the new EuropeanRapidReac-

tion Force at the CapabilitiesPledging Conference (November 2000) could be consideredan approx-imation of the military capabilities thateach state could deploy abroad n the medium term. National

shares correlatealmost perfectly with each state's CIMC (Spearman'srho = 0.94). Data from NATO

2001.60. See Larsen 1997; Marcussen et al. 1999; and Hansen andWxever2002.

61. The Eurobarometer urveys used are: No. 37 (fieldwork:March-April 1992), No. 40 (field-work: October-November 1993), No. 43.1 (fieldwork:April-May 1995), and No. 44.1 (fieldwork:November-December 1995). See Reif and Melich 1995, 1997; and Reif and Marlier 1998a, 1998b.

These surveys were selected because they include all the questions relevant for the hypothesis. Fig-ures for Austria and Sweden are taken from surveys No. 43.1 and 44.1 only; figures for Finland are

takenfrom No. 40, 43.1, and44.1.




Two differentEuropean dentity scores were computed:one for all respondentsand one for the respondentsthat scoredhighest on the "opinion leadershipindex"

developed by the Eurobarometernvestigators.62Opinionleadersarea broadercat-

egory than political elites, but their responses can be considered fairly good ap-proximations of elite positions, as they are "the political stratum closest to the

political elites."63

A comparisonof the scores of the general public and the scores of the opinionleaders reveals three things: (1) In every country,the European identity score of

opinion leaders is positive (thatis, the numberof respondentsfeeling European s

largerthan the number of "nationalsonly"), while in five out of fifteen countriesthe score of the generalpopulation s negative (thatis, the respondentsnot feelingEuropeanoutnumber hose who do). (2) In every country, he opinionleadersscore

higher than the general population (the average difference is 23 points, with aminimum of 11.1 and a maximum of 33.8). This patternclearly matches the re-sultsof a numberof studies on public support orEuropean ntegration.643) Cross-

nationally, the opinion leaders' scores and the mass scores are almost perfectlycorrelated(Spearman'srho = .97). In otherwords, high levels of opinion leaders'identificationwith Europe correspondto high levels of mass identification, andvice versa. Because of this high correlation,two different models have been esti-mated in the next section: one with the scores of opinion leaders and the other

with the scores of the generalpublic.In order to assess the fourth causal factor, it is necessary to estimate whether

the constitutionalculture of a countryis closer to the monocentricor to the pluri-centricideal type. The actualinstitutionalstructureof the polity can be considereda proxy of that culture, as it is plausible to assume a broad correspondencebe-tween the predominantviews on the legitimatedistributionof public authorityandthe rules concerning regional governance in each country. Liesbet Hooghe and

Gary Marks have developed a twelve-point index of regional governance in EU

countries,based on the degree of constitutionalfederalism,the presence of specialterritorialautonomy,the role of regions in centralgovernment,and the existenceof regional elections.65 In the following analysis, I use the scores they assign toeach EU member-state or 2000, with one modification: one of their dimensions,

special territorialautonomy,is left out because it is often seen as an exceptionalsolution to a specific political problemrather hanthe institutionalconsequenceofa distinctive way to conceive political authority.Later in this article, I elaborateon why constitutionalcultureis the most plausible causal mechanismlinking sub-

62. On the constructionof the opinion leadership ndex, see Reif andMarlier1998c, 1089, or otherversions of the Eurobarometer odebook. In the four surveys used, 7,249 respondentsout of a total of

58,443 (12.4 percent)received the highest score on that index.63. Wessels 1995, 145.64. Notably Inglehart1977.65. Hooghe and Marks2001, 191-212.




TABLE . Fuzzy-setmembershipscores of EU member-states

Europeanized Europeanizedidentities identities High Strong High

Supranationalist (general (opinion policy regional material

government public) leaders) conformity governance capabilities

Austria 0.92 0.18 0.00 0.70 0.80 0.09

Belgium 1.00 0.63 0.69 0.97 0.80 0.14

Denmark 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.96 0.00 0.05

Finland 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.80 0.00 0.09

France 0.33 0.84 0.93 0.26 0.40 0.68

Germany 0.92 0.47 0.37 0.88 1.00 1.00Greece 0.75 0.36 0.21 0.49 0.10 0.14

Italy 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.60 0.64

Luxemburg 0.92 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.00

Netherlands 1.00 0.53 0.54 0.94 0.30 0.18

Portugal 0.67 0.42 0.19 0.98 0.10 0.05

Spain 0.83 0.55 0.28 0.59 0.60 0.41

UK 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.86

national regional governance and supranationalorientationin the case of CFSP

reform.

This completes the description of the data that will be used in measuringthe

five variables involved in the following analyses.Forthe logistic regressionanaly-

sis, no furthermanipulationof the datais necessary:they will be used as input as

they appearin the original data sets.66The fuzzy-set analysis, however, requiresthe transformationof the raw data into fuzzy-set membershipscores.

In the following fuzzy-set analysis, the relevantpopulationconsists of thirteen

member-statesof the EU that participatedin the IGC of 1996-97. Ireland and

Sweden have not been included because of too little informationabouttheirposi-tions. Onthebasis of the datapresentedabove,I have assignedto eachEU member-

state a fuzzy-set score in the outcome and in the four causal conditions. These

scores are listed in Table 2. With regard to the outcome, the governments that

supportedall treatyrevisions listed in Table 1 are consideredfully in the "set of

supranationalistgovernments"and consequently are assigned a fuzzy-set score

66. The data set is available at (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/koenigar/data.htm).Accessed 8 Septem-

ber 2003. Policy conformity ranges from 5.30 to 9.97 (mean: 8.70); materialcapabilitiesranges from0.00 to 22.00 (mean:6.94); European dentityof the generalpublicrangesfrom -23.00 to 49.10 (mean:

13.69); European dentity of opinion leaders ranges from 10.80 to 66.20 (mean:36.30); and regional

governance ranges from 0.00 to 10.00 (mean: 3.41). The highest correlationcoefficient among the

independentvariables (apartfrom the two identity scores) is 0.53. Other statistics confirm that the

analysis below is not affectedby multicolinearityproblems(thevarianceinflation factorvalues areall

well below 10, the average variance inflation factor is close to 1 and the tolerance statistics are all

above 0.40).



InstitutionalChange in EU Foreignand SecurityPolicy 157

of 1. The governmentsthat rejected all treaty changes are considered to be fullyout of the set of supranationalistgovernmentsand receive a fuzzy-set score of 0.

The other governmentsare assigned intermediatescores exactly in proportiontothe numberof treaty changes they supportedor opposed.

With regardto the causal conditions, I have assigned fuzzy-set scores to coun-tries according to a standardizedcriterion: the countrywith the lowest value on

each variable (as recordedin the data sources presentedearlier in this section) is

assigned a fuzzy-set membershipscore of 0, the countrywith the highest value is

assigneda fuzzy-set score of 1, and all other countriesreceive intermediate cores.67

Two comments on this procedureare necessary.The first concerns the decision to retain all the variationto be found in the raw

data.According to Ragin, one of the advantagesof fuzzy sets over conventionalratio or interval scale measures is the possibility of eliminating variation in the

data that is not meaningful from the point of view of the researchquestion. For

instance, if a researcher s interestedin how democratic states conduct wars and

has identified a thresholdbeyond which states can be consideredfully democratic,then it can be advisable to ignore any furthervariation in levels of democracy

beyond that threshold.

In the case of the four causal conditions examined here, however, no variation

can be declared clearly irrelevant on the basis of prior informationat the case

level or theoreticalconsiderations. In such situations,any truncationof the origi-nal dataruns the risk of being arbitraryand controversial.The safest option is to

retain all naturallyoccurringvariationand invite readersto replicate the analysiswith different fuzzy-set scores if they believe that more appropriatebreakpointscan be identified.

The second comment concerns the countries that are classified as fully in or

fully out of the set of countrieswith a relevant characteristic.I maintain that the

countriesthat are assigned a score of I or 0 because they display the maximumor

minimumvalue on the four variablescorrespond o the countriesthatcan be con-

67. More specifically: (1) the country with the most "conformist"preferences in the UN General

Assembly receives a fuzzy-set score of 1, while the countrythatis more often a preferenceoutlierhasa score of 0; (2) the countrywith the highest materialcapabilitieshas a score of 1, while the weakest

country has a score of 0; (3) the country with the most developed layer of regional governance is

assigned a fuzzy-set score of 1, while the most centralized one has a score of 0; (4) the countrywiththe highest proportionof people feeling European n the Eurobarometerurveyis assigned a fuzzy-setmembershipscore of 1, while the countrywith the lowest proportionreceives a score of 0; and finally(5) the countrywith the highest proportionof opinion leaders feeling European n the Eurobarometer

survey is assigned a fuzzy-set membershipscore of 1, while the country with the lowest proportionreceives a score of 0. Scores arenormalized to unit intervalby applyingthe following equation:

vi - min(v)

max(v) - min(v)

where mi is the fuzzy-set membershipscore of the ith country,vi is the original value of the variablefor the ith country,and the max(v) andmin(v) are the maximum and minimumvalues respectively.




sideredfully in or fully out of each set on the basis of other substantive andtheo-reticalknowledge. Because space constraintspreventa detailed discussion of those

countries,the following offers a quick overview. Germanyhas been describedbystructuralrealists as the potentially dominantpower in Europe68and can be con-sidered to be fully in the "set of Europeancountrieswith high materialcapabili-ties." Conversely, Luxemburgcan be seen as fully out of that set. On the other

hand,LuxemburgandItalycan be seen as fully in (orvirtually fully in) the "setofcountries with Europeanized dentities,"69while Britain can be considered fullyout because "theprevailingEnglish identitystill perceives Europeas the (friendly)'other.'"70Germanyis fully in the "set of countries with strong regional gover-nance," while a number of member-statesdo not display any federal features.71

Finally, Luxemburgcan be seen as fully in the "set of policy-conformist coun-

tries,"because it lacks virtuallyall characteristics hat could set it apartfrommostof its Europeanpartners: t has no "specialrelationship"with a non-EUpower, nolinks to formercolonies, no special geopolitical interestsin otherregions, and no

military personnelpermanentlystationed abroad.The United Kingdomhas oppo-site characteristics notably a strongtendency to supportU.S. policies) and, con-

sequently,many opportunitiesfor dissenting from its EU partners: or this reasonit can be consideredfully out of the set of conformist countries. In sum, I contendthatthe membershipscores obtainedthroughthe standardized roceduredescribed

above, including those of full membershipand full nonmembership,are corrobo-ratedby additionalsubstantive and theoreticalknowledge. Overall, the followinganalysis reflects the best estimate of membershipscores by the presentauthor.

Logistic Regression Analysis

The units of observation of the regressionanalysis are the governments'decisionsto

supportor oppose specific treatychangesthatwere on the agendaof the 1996-97IGC. As indicated above, six possible changes were particularlyrelevant for thecreation of a supranationalCFSP. The outcome variable is dichotomous (supportof or oppositionto the treatychange) and the numberof observations s seventy.72

The four hypotheses articulatedearlier in this article can be reformulatedwith

greaterprecision: the probabilitythat a specific treaty change is supportedby a

government ncreaseswhen (1) the policy conformityof the government s higher,(2) its level of materialcapabilities is lower, (3) European dentification s stron-

ger, and (4) domestic regional governanceis stronger.These hypothesesare tested

68. Waltz 1993.69. Koenig-Archibugi2003.70. Risse 2001, 199.71. Hooghe andMarks2001, 191-212.72. This is less thanninety (six revisions multiplied by fifteen governments),because the position

of certaingovernmentson particular ssues could not be ascertained.




TABLE. Logistic regressionof governmentsupport or supranational

CFSP, 1996

Model 1 Model 2

POLICY CONFORMITY -.532 -.566

(.307) (.318)MATERIAL CAPABILITIES -1.086*** -1.231***

(.197) (.206)EUROPEAN IDENTITY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC .072**

(.021)EUROPEAN IDENTITY OF OPINION LEADERS .086***

(.028)REGIONALGOVERNANCE 2.780*** 3.081***

(.501) (.517)Constant 4.759 3.271

(2.837) (2.963)Numberof observations 70 70

Log likelihood -14.6454 -14.4633

Pseudo R2 0.6790 0.6830

WaldX2 38.27*** 46.67***

Correctlyclassified 92.9% 92.9%

Note:The iguresn eachcellgivethe ogistic egressionstimatewithrobusttandard

rrorsorrectedorclusteringat thecountryevel inparentheses.

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

by estimating logistic models with robuststandarderrorsand clustering by coun-

try.73Given the non-independenceof same-countryobservations, the analysis is

best seen as exploratoryratherthan definitive. Table 3 presents the results of the

models.

Overall, the models performwell, predictingabout 93 percentof all cases cor-

rectly, which is an 80 percentreductionin errorfrom the null model thatpredictsabout 64 percent correctly.The explanatoryvariables account for about 68 per-cent of the variation in outcome. Consideringthe individualvariables,all have a

statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a governmentwill supporta

supranationalistreaty change, with the exception of policy conformity.That im-

pact is in the expected direction.

To facilitate the interpretation f logit coefficients, I use statisticalsimulationto

convert them into probabilities and confidence intervals, which provide a more

73. The models were estimated in STATAusing a Huber/White/sandwich estimatorto calculate

robuststandarderrorsthat are corrected for clusteringby country.StataCorp2001. Clusteringallows

the relaxation of the assumptionthat decisions takenby the same governmentare independent.I con-

tinue to assume thatobservations are independentacross countries.




TABLE. Predictedprobabilities of support or supranationalism

Probabilitythata treaty change

is supported 95%

(averagepredicted confidenceVariable value) interval

MATERIALAPABILITIES Minimum .9999 .9998-1Maximum 0 0-.0002

REGIONALOVERNANCE Minimum .0034 .0002-.0157Maximum 1 1-1

EUROPEAN IDENTITY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC Minimum .5934 .2090-.9082Maximum .9939 .9738-.9994

Note:Thevaluesrepresenthepredictedrobabilityf supports thespecified ariables at its minimum rmaxi-mumvaluewhile heother ariablesreheldat theirmean.

intuitive illustrationof the relationshipbetween the variables.74Table 4 reportsthese probabilitiesandconfidence intervalsfor threeexplanatoryvariables(policy

conformity is not included as it did not reach statistical significance in the mod-

els). To save space, only the results for model 1 are reported, as the results ofmodel 2 are similar.The values in the second column of Table 4 express the av-

erage probabilitythat a particulartreaty change is supportedwhen one explana-

tory variable is set at its maximum or minimum in the sample, while all other

explanatoryvariables are fixed at their mean. The values in the thirdcolumn indi-

cate the range in which 95 percentof the predictedvalues generatedby the simu-

lationfell." Thequantities n Table4 represent ounterfactual tatements,ndicatingwhich probabilityof supportcould be expected in hypotheticalcases that displaycertain values of the explanatoryvariables (that is, one variable at the maximum

or minimumvalue and all others at their means).Table 4 shows that, all else being equal, as materialcapabilities decrease from

the maximum value found in the data (that of Germany)to the minimum value

(thatof Luxemburg),the probabilityof supportrises from 0 to almost 1. In other

words, the absence of support s certainwhen capabilitiesareat theirhighest, and

the presence of support is virtually certain when they are at their lowest. Ex-

tremely narrowconfidence intervals confirmthat the marginof error is very low.

Similarly,shiftingthe level of regional governancefrom its minimum(thatof Ire-

land and othercountries) to its maximum (Germany) ncreases the probabilityof

supportfrom almost 0 (certain absence) to 1 (certain presence), ceteris paribus.

74. I use the technique developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg2000 and implementedin theirsoftware CLARIFY.Tomz,Wittenberg,and King 2001.

75. The simulationprocess was repeated 1000 times, thus the lower and upperbounds of the con-fidence intervalcorrespondto the numbersin the 25th and 976th position respectively.




Again, extremely narrowconfidence intervals indicate that error s very unlikely.Finally,all else being equal,as European dentityincreases from its minimumvalue

(corresponding o Sweden) to its maximumvalue (Luxemburg),the probabilityof

supportrises from 0.59 to 0.99. This effect is smallerthanthe impact of capabil-ities andregional governance,but still substantial.The confidence intervals of theminimum are large: this means that, while one can be confident about the exis-tence and directionof the relationship,one is less certain about the precise mag-nitude of the effect of European dentity.

Fuzzy-Set Analysis

This section reports the results of the applicationof the fuzzy-set method to thescores in Table 2.76 As in the previous section, two separate analyses are con-

ducted, the first considering the Europeanidentity of the general public and thesecond considering the European dentity of opinion leaders only (the other pos-sible causal conditions remain the same).

The firstresult is thatfor none of the four causal conditions, fuzzy membershipscores in the outcome were in all cases less than or equal to fuzzy membershipscores in the causal

condition. This suggests that none of the causal factorsexam-ined is necessaryfor supranationalism.This applies regardlessof whetheropinionleaders' identity or mass identity is considered.

The second result is that, after algebraic simplification, the analysis of suffi-

ciency yields the following solution: there is one combination of causes that issufficientfor supranationalism-the combinationof regional governanceandpol-icy conformity.In fuzzy-set notation,this solution can be expressed as follows:

regionalism*conformity --supranationalism

where the symbol * indicates the logical "and,"and -- means "is sufficient for."

Again, this result applies regardlessof whether leaders' opinion or mass opinionis considered.

It shouldbe noted that the sufficiency solutionjust reportedcan be describedas

conservative,because it does not use any "simplifyingassumptions." n QCA, sim-

plifying assumptionsare statements about the hypotheticaloutcome of combina-

tions of causal conditions that do not occur in the populationstudied.They are areflection of the limited diversityof naturallyoccurringsocial phenomena.On the

basis of substantiveknowledge about the object of study, the researchermay as-sume that a given combinationof causal conditions, if it had occurred,would have

76. As mentionedabove, I conducteda "veristic" est, thatis, one single disconfirmingcase is con-sidered enough to reject the hypothesis of sufficiency and necessity. The analysis was aided by the

computerprogramfs/QCA. Ragin and Drass 2002.




been sufficientfor the outcome. If such an assumption s included in the analysis,the result may be differentthan it would have been otherwise.

Varioussimplifying assumptionshave been consideredin the present analysis,but only one of them seems plausible enough to justify its inclusion in the final

solution: the assumptionthat the combinationof regional governance, low capa-

bilities, strongEuropean dentityof the generalpublic, and low policy conformityis sufficient for supranationalism.77 his assumptionseems plausible because the

presence of the firstthreefactorsnamed,which areconsideredfavorableto supra-

nationalismon thebasis of boththeoryandtheprecedingregressionanalysis,should

be able to offset the single opposing factor (low policy conformity).If one incor-

poratesthis assumption nto the analysis, two combinationsof causes pass the test

of sufficiency:

regionalism*conformity + regionalism* dentity(mass)*-capabilities

--supranationalism

where the symbol + indicates the logical "or"and - indicates the negation of a

causal condition. In plain English, this means that either the combinationof re-

gional governance and policy conformity,or the combinationof regional gover-

nance, European identity of the general public, and low power capabilities issufficientfor supranationalism.This indicates that thereare two pathsto suprana-

tionalism,both involving regional governance.Regional governanceappears o be

sufficient for supranationalismf it is combined either with policy conformityor

with two otherfacilitatingconditions:strong European dentityof the generalpub-lic and low materialcapabilities. If one looks at the European dentity of opinionleaders ratherthan that of the general public, only the first causal combination

appearssufficient.

I have shown that the main result of the fuzzy-set analysis is that the combina-

tion of regional governanceand policy conformityis sufficient for supranational-ism. Figure 1 presents this result in graphicalform: for each one of the thirteen

governments examined, it is the case that its membership in the fuzzy set of

77. Thesimplifying ssumptionshatwere considered utnot accepted rethefollowing:n the

analysiswithgeneralpublicopinion,

identitymass).conformity-regionalism*apabilities,

-identity mass) conformityo-- egionalismcapabilities,identitymass) --conformity--regionalism--capabilities,

and n theanalysiswithopinioneaders'dentity:

--identityleaders)conformity-decentra*apabilities,

identityleaders)conformity--regionalism*apabilities.




1- *NL *B

0.9- * LUX 01 *A *D

a. 0.8-

.L

* GR

o 0.7-SP

o 0.6-

0.

1 0.4

?oF0 0.3-

Co 0.2-

0.1-

0 UKI I I I I I I I I I I0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Combination f regionalgovernanceandpolicyconformity

Note:A = AustriaB = BelgiumD= GermanyDK= DenmarkE = Spain F= FranceFIN= FinlandGR= Greece I= ItalyL= LuxemburgNL=The NetherlandsP = PortugalUK= UnitedKingdom

FIGURE. Supranationalism,regional governance, andpolicy conformity

supranationalistgovernments(y-axis) is at least as high as its membership n theintersection of regional governanceandpolicy conformity (x-axis).

Discussion

Regression and fuzzy-set analyses have yielded the following results:

1. Strong regional governance increases the probabilitythatgovernments

prefera supranational oreign and security policy, ceteris paribus,and itrepresentsa sufficient condition for supranationalismwhen combined with

policy conformity (or with low materialcapabilities and Europeanizedmass identities, under reasonableassumptions).

2. Higher materialcapabilitiesdecrease the probabilitythatgovernments

prefera supranational oreign and security policy, ceteris paribus.




3. More Europeanized dentities increase the probabilitythat governments

prefera supranational oreign and securitypolicy, ceteris paribus,although

the impact seems somewhat smallerthan that of regional governanceandmaterialcapabilities.

4. Policy conformitydoes not significantlyaffect the probabilityof suprana-

tionalism, but in combination with strong regional governanceit becomes

sufficient to generate supranationalism.

5. None of the four causal factors is a necessary condition for supranational-ism. In otherwords, governmentsthat supporta supranationalCFSP are

not necessarily weak, federal, conformist,or Europeanized.Indeed, among

the most vocal supportersof foreign policy integration,one finds a power-ful state such as Germany,a governmentwhose citizens declare little Euro-

pean identificationsuch as Austria,a centralizedstate such as Luxemburg,and a moderatepolicy outlier such as Spain. This negative finding high-

lights an importantpoint: none of the factors examinedhere representsan

insuperableobstacle to supranationalism-that is, an adverse condition that

cannot be overcome even when other,more favorable,characteristicsare

present.

Anumber of issues deserve closer attention.The first concerns policy confor-

mity,which has no statisticallysignificanteffect on the probabilityof supranation-alism accordingto regression analysis, but is sufficient for supranationalismf it

is found together with a high degree of supranationalgovernance according to

fuzzy-set analysis.As indicatedabove, the two analyticalstrategieshave different

explanatoryaims and, therefore,the fact that a causal factor is shown to be rele-

vantby one of them andirrelevantby the other is not necessarilya problem.How-

ever, it is a findingthatdemandsan explanation.The most plausibleinterpretationis the following. A pluricentricconstitutionalcultureremoves an importantcon-

ceptual obstacle-the idea of national sovereignty as unitary and indivisible-from the transferof decisional powers to the European evel. The anticipation hat

most decisions made in supranational ora would correspondto the government'ssubstantivepolicy preferences adds to this permissive factor a positive incentive

to support supranationalization, nd it is the combination of permissive and posi-tive conditions that makes this particularconjuncturesufficient for the outcome.

This linkage deserves to be explored in furtherresearch, possibly by using in-

depthcase studies.78The second point concerns the impact of regional governance itself. As indi-

cated above, constitutionalculture is measured ndirectly,using the actual institu-tional structureof a countryas a proxy.While the assumptionof a correspondencebetween ideas and institutionsseems reasonablein this case, one should take into

78. In the logistic regressionanalysis, the coefficient of the interactionterm between regional gov-ernance and policy conformityis not statisticallysignificantat conventionallevels.




account that domestic structures-and specifically institutions of regional gov-

ernance-can affect national positions on supranational ntegrationin ways that

do not necessarily reflect constitutionalideas and norms.79 n several policy do-

mains,the transferof policymakingcompetenciesto European nstitutionscanhave

the effect of redistributing he political resources that confer influence in the do-

mestic political arena.Concerning specifically the distributionof power between

regional and centralgovernments, TanjaBorzel has arguedthat "[f]or regions of

unitaryandweakly decentralizedstates,Europeanizationmay offer additionalop-

portunitieswhich could strengthentheir autonomyvis-a-vis the central state, al-

though less resourceful regions often lack the resources to fully exploit these

opportunities.In highly decentralizedstates, on the contrary,regions suffera sig-nificant loss of theiradministrative ompetenciesfrom Europeanization,which re-

sults in an uneven distributionof 'say and pay' between the central state and the

regions."80 The strategic interpretation uggests that the affected political actors

anticipatethe potentialredistributiveeffect of Europeanizationand develop pref-erences on further ntegration accordingly.

This argument,which points to the logic of expected consequences ratherthan

the logic of appropriateness,81s useful for explaining the preferencesof national

and regional actors in a number of importantpolicy areas.But in the case of for-

eign and security policy, the link between domestic structuresand government

positions on supranationalism s much more likely to be due to culturalfactors

than to strategicaction. This is attributable o the characterof the policy domain

that is consideredhere. The causal mechanismbased on strategiccalculationcan

be expected to operateonly when specific institutional nterestsare at stake.How-

ever, regional governmentsnormallydo not participate n the foreign and security

policymakingof their states.Therefore,neitherthey nor the nationalgovernmentsshould expect a change in relative power as a result of Europeanization. n other

words, the transfer s distributionallyneutral,andas such it is unlikely to motivate

strategicmoves andcountermoves based on institutionalself-interest.On the con-

trary, he explanationbased on the logic of appropriateness nd constitutionalcul-

ture refers to a general attitudetoward the vertical division of powers, which is

independentof the specific issues being debated.Thusthe most plausibleinterpre-tation of the strongand significantrelationshipbetween regional governanceand

integrationistpreferences shown in the previous section points to the importanceof differences in constitutionalculture,as hypothesizedin this article.

The thirdpoint that needs attention concerns the impact of Europeanidentityand the causal mechanisms that may link it to government supportfor suprana-tionalism. The two possibilities discussed above are: first, that the identities of

political elites affect government policies (direct causal path); and second, that

79. I am gratefulto the editors of IO for bringingthis importantpoint to my attention.

80. Borzel2002,32-33.81. See March and Olsen 1998; and B6rzel and Risse 2000.




mass identities affect government policies throughthe mediation of instrumental

interests of political leaders (indirectcausal path). The analysis conducted above

shows thatEuropean dentitymatters,but is unableto indicatewhich causalmech-anism matters most or how they interact.This is because the measureschosen to

representmass identities and opinion leaders' identities are almost perfectly cor-

related (althoughin every country,opinion leaders feel considerablymore "Euro-

pean"thanthe generalpublic).The clarificationof the relativeweight of the causal

mechanisms and theirinterplay s an important opic for research,possibly throughcase studies at the countrylevel.82

The final point concerns the possibility of generalizingthe findingsbeyond the

EU. For instance, it could be arguedthat federal domestic structureshave a posi-

tive influence on the propensityto join internationalgovernancestructures,all else

being equal.The ceterisparibusclause mustbe stressed,as countriessuch as Swit-

zerland and the United States show that this cannot be an overridingfactor.The

strong national identity of the Swiss and their strong preferencefor isolationism

in security policy might counteract an integrative impetus stemming from their

federalism. The United States is a model case of federalism,but it is also a global

hegemonic power and this lattercharacteristicmight be more influentialin deter-

mining its attitudetoward transfersof sovereignty.The presenceof other,possibly

stronger,factors does not imply, however, that a federalist constitutionalculture

has no influence on foreign policy.83

Conclusion

In this article, I have tried to explore systematicallythe sources of the preferencesof WesternEuropeangovernmentsconcerning the institutionalform of their for-

eign and security cooperation.In contrastto the assumptionsof certain theorists

of internationalpolitics, I have stressed that the preservationof national sover-eignty is not a goal shared equally by all governments, because some of them

have shown a willingness to promote strongforms of political integration n Eu-

rope. The desire to perpetuate he stateas an autonomousactorin worldpolitics is

a variable,not a constant.

82. Such as Marcussenet al. 1999.83. The fact that the United States is less willing to compromise its sovereignty than most of its

Western allies should not overshadow another crucial comparison: as argued by G. John

Ikenberry,of all powers that won majorwars in modem history, the United States has accepted thestrongestconstraintson its power throughinternational nstitutions."Americanpower is not only un-

precedented n its preponderancebutit is also unprecedentedn the way it is manifestwith andthroughinstitutions." See Ikenberry2001, 258. A counterfactualthought experimentmight ask whether the

same level of self-bindingwould have been attainedhad the United Statesbeen a countrywith a cen-

tralistic constitutionalculture.Similarly,a comparisonwith the foreignpolicy of Canada,which shares

with the United States various institutional and culturalcharacteristicsbutoccupies a differentrankin

the internationaldistributionof power, might be useful in this context.




This articlehas considereda numberof possible explanationsforthe diversityof

preferences,which were drawnfromresearchprograms hatemphasizeinstrumen-

talattitudes oward nternationalnstitutionsand fromapproaches hatstressthelogicof appropriatenessn institutionalchoice. Regression andfuzzy-set analyses show

thatbothapproaches ontribute mportant nsightsaboutthe causes of nationalpref-erences. Differences in power resources, stressedby the realist tradition n generalandby the "voice opportunity" hesis in particular, ndeed explain partof the dif-

ference: all else being equal, governmentsof weaker countriesare more likely to

supportsupranationalCFSP institutionsthan governmentsof strongercountries.

In addition, he constructivist esearchprogramprovides mportantnsights.First,the shareof a country'spopulationthat feels "European" ffects the position of its

government with regardto constitutionalchange in EU foreign and security pol-

icy. The link between collective identity and governmentpolicy holds regardlessof whether one looks at the identity of the general public or at that of "opinionleaders." Second, and more strikingly,this article has shown that the strengthof

regional governance in a countryis stronglyrelatedto the preferenceof its gov-ernment with regardto sovereignty pooling and delegation in foreign affairs.This

suggests that attitudes owardsupranational ntegrationareshapedby distinctcon-

ceptions of sovereignty and political authoritythatprevail in the political culture

of the member-states.Governmentsof countrieswhose domestic constitutionsre-

flect and reinforce a positive attitudetowarda multilayereddistributionof author-

ity tend to support furtherintegrationin foreign and security policy more than

countrieswhere sovereignty is consideredindivisible.

In contrastto materialpower capabilities,Europeanized dentities, and domes-

tic regional governance, the second factor derived from rationalistapproaches-

policy conformity(that s, the tendencyto havepreferenceson specificpolicy issues

of worldpolitics that areconsistent with thepreferencesof most otherEU member-

states)-has no statistically significant effect on institutional choice, at least as

this variable is measured n this article.However, even this factormay play a role,

because fuzzy-set analysis reveals that in combination with regional governance,it constitutesa sufficient condition for supranationalism.

These results lend support o the argument hat the relationshipsamongthe main

researchprograms n internationalrelationstheory can be complementaryas well

as competitive. While I have comparedthe explanatorypower of hypotheses in-

spired by different theoreticalperspectives, I have avoided a "gladiator" tyle of

analysis, where "one perspective goes forth and slays all others."84A substantial

numberof scholarsof international elations,while identifyingthemselves primar-

ily with one research tradition,do not expect their theories to fully explain the

phenomena n which they are interested.85This article hasderivedspecific hypoth-

84. Checkel 2001, 243.85. See, for instance, Grieco 1996, 282; Russett and Oneal 2001, 90; Legro and Moravcsik 1999,

49; and Checkel 2001, 243.




eses from the core tenets of some influentialresearchprogramsin international

relations theory,and found that most of them are helpful in explaining the diver-

sity of nationalpositions on sovereignty pooling and delegation. Hence, this arti-cle has contributedto moving the study of Europeanpolitical integrationfurther

away from "monocausal mania"86and toward a more satisfactory multicausal

synthesis.

Appendix: Sources on Government Positionson CFSP Reform, 1996

Austria:

* Regierungskonferenz1996: OesterreichischeGrundsatzpositionen, 6

March 1996.

* Leitlinienzu den voraussichtlichenThemender Regierungskonferenz 996,

June 1995.

Belgium:

* Note politique du gouvernementau parlement concernant la CIGde 1996,October 1995.

* MWmorandume la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourgen vue de la

CIG, March 1996.

Denmark:

* Bases of Negotiations: An Open Europe-Intergovernmental Conference

1996, 30 November 1995.

* Agendafor Europe: The 1996 IntergovernmentalConference.Report of theDanish Foreign Ministry,June 1995.

Finland:

* MemorandumConcerningFinnish Points of ViewwithRegard to the 1996

IntergovernmentalConference of the European Union, 18 September 1995.

* TheIGC and the Securityand Defence Dimension-Toward an Enhanced

EU Role in Crises Management,memorandumby Finlandand Sweden, 24

April 1996.* Finland's Points of Departureat the IntergovernmentalConference-Report

to the Parliament, 27 February1996.

86. LegroandMoravcsik 999,50.




France:

*Declaration du Gouvernement ur la prdparationet les perspectives de laConferdnce ntergouvernementale,AssembldeNationale, 13 March 1996.

* Orientationssur la PESC--siminaire franco-allemand des Ministkresdes

Affairesetrangeres a Fribourg, 27 February1996.

* ConfidentialMemorandumon France's Guidelines or the IGC 1996, pub-lished in Le Figaro, 20 February1996.

Germany:

* Deutsche Zielefiir die Regierungskonferenz, 6 March 1996.

Greece:

* For a Democratic European Union with Political and Social Content-Greece's Contribution o the 1996 IGC, 22 March 1996.

Ireland:

* Challenges and OpportunitiesAbroad: Irish WhitePaper on Foreign Pol-

icy, 26 March 1996.

Italy:* Posizione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza ntergovernativaper la

revisione dei Trattati,18 March 1996.

* Dichiarazione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza ntergovernativa,23

May 1995.

Luxemburg:

*Aide-mdmoiredu gouvernement uxembourgeoissur la CIG96, 30 June

1995.

* Mimorandumde la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourgen vue de la

CIG, 7 March 1996.

TheNetherlands:

* Between Madridand Turin:Dutch Priorities on the Eve of the 1996 IGC.

Communicationof the Government o the Parliament, March 1996.

* EuropeanForeign Policy, Securityand Defence: TowardStrongerExternalAction by the European Union, 30 March 1995.

* Mimorandumde la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourgen vue de la

Cig, 7 March 1996.

Portugal:

* Portugal e a conferencia intergovernamental ara a revisao do tratado dauniao europeia, March 1996.




Spain:

* Elementospara unaposicibn espaiiola en la Conferencia intergubernamen-tal de 1996, March 1996.

Sweden:

* Memorandumon the FundamentalInterestsof Swedenwith a View to the1996 IGC, 2 March 1995.

* GovernmentReport. TheEU IntergovernmentalConference1996, 30 No-vember 1995.

* TheIGC and the SecurityandDefence

Dimension-Toward an EnhancedEU Role in Crises Management,memorandumby Finlandand Sweden, 24

April 1996.

UnitedKingdom:

* A Partnership of Nations: TheBritishApproachto the European Union

IntergovernmentalConference1996, 13 March 1996.

* Memorandumon the Treatmentof European Defence Issues at the 1996

IGC, 2 March 1995.

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