Paper to be presented at the Workshop “In the Engine Room. Linking Perspectives in the Study of Intergovernmental Organizations as Actors” at ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 29 March - 2 April 2015 in Warszawa.

Comparing the Autonomy of International Bureaucracies –

An Ideal Type Approach*

Jörn Ege, German Research Institute for Public Administration Speyer

Draft version as of March 14 2015 – Comments welcome

Please do not quote without permission

Abstract: In this paper, I develop and apply a new typology of international bureaucracies that aims to capture the potential influence of these institutions on IGO policy-making. First, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy is modified in order to be applicable the working context and internal structure of IGOs. The main argument is that if one wants to capture and explain the potential autonomous behavior of international secretariats it is useful to distinguish between their ability to develop autonomous preferences (autonomy of will) on the one hand and the capacity to transform these preferences into action (autonomy of action) on the other. Second, ideal types of international bureaucracies are created by combining these two components of autonomy. In a third step, suitable indicators are developed in order to measure each of the two components and locate the secretariats of sixteen IGOs within the four-fold typology. In the last step, my analysis of the autonomy data indicates that mechanisms of member state control seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the occurrence of bureaucratic autonomy, whereas the policy field within which an IGO is active has important consequences for the autonomy profile of its secretariat.

Contact Jörn Ege German Research Institute for Public Administration Freiherr-vom-Stein-Str. 2, D-67324 Speyer ege@foev-speyer.de

* This work builds on my PhD thesis submitted at the Humboldt University Berlin in October 2014. It is also part of the research unit ‘International Public Administration’ supported by the German Research Foundation under Grant FOR # 1745 TP 02 BA 3658/5-1.

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1. Introduction

Because most problems our society is facing today do not stop at the geographical borders of

nation states, international governmental organizations (IGOs) are created to meet these

transboundary challenges on an international or even global scale. Preventing the spread of

infectious diseases (WHO), securing global financial stability (IMF), or fighting poverty by

providing development assistance (World Bank) are only some prominent examples of the

core mandates of these organizations. The increasing policy-involvement of IGOs has not

gone unnoticed in social science research. Scholars of International Relations, Public

Administration and (Organizational) Sociology increasingly study IGOs as autonomous actors

in world politics (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Kim, Ashley, and Lambright 2014; Ness and

Brechin 1988; Reinalda and Verbeek 1998; Weller and Xu 2010). In their efforts to determine

the “actorness” of IGOs, scholars have shifted their analytical focus away from the properties

of member states toward the internal features of these organizations (Conceição-Heldt, Koch,

and Liese 2015). By and large, scholars study the organizational interior either in order to

explain variation and change or to shed light on the consequences of these features for global

policy-making. In the course of this development, the secretariats of IGOs have attracted

attention and are increasingly studied as separate units of analysis (see Ege and Bauer 2013;

Liese and Weinlich 2006). Despite notable developments within this debate especially

throughout the last decade, however, there is still relatively little comparative research on

international bureaucracies (but see Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a; Hooghe and Marks

2014; Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). Hence, a systematic assessment of the factors that

account for variation in international bureaucracies’ role in public policy development and

implementation remains difficult.

This gap is surprising for two reasons. First, studying the role of international bureaucracies in

policy-making helps to shed light on the classic question of “who governs”. Therefore,

explicating the complex internal interaction between government representatives and

international civil servants is an important precondition for a more differentiated assessment

of the accountability and legitimacy structures in global governance difficult (Buchanan and

Keohane 2006; Zürn 2004). Second, scholars have convincingly shown that the internal

structure of an organization has important consequences for public policies (Egeberg 1999;

Hammond 1993). Notwithstanding a few prominent exceptions (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore

2004; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009a; Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Trondal 2011), the link

between the administrative basis and the quality of organizational output (such as

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performance, pathologies, bureaucratic influence, etc.) is still under-researched when it comes

to policy-making above the nation state. While today most scholars agree that international

bureaucracies matter, we know little about the relative degree of this influence and how

(possible) variation of this phenomenon can be explained.

The paper contributes to this debate by focusing on the concept of bureaucratic autonomy in

the context of IGOs. The autonomy of international bureaucracies can be studied from the

point of view of their informal features or with an eye to professional expertise or other forms

of policy-making authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt

2012). In this paper, the primary focus is on structural autonomy in the sense of formal

administrative competences, rules, arrangements, and resources. This is not to say that

informal autonomy or other nonstructural characteristics are unimportant, rather that structural

autonomy is seen as the precondition for any autonomous bureaucratic action at international

level and thus as a natural starting point for comparative research.

The paper is structured as follows. After illustrating the role of international bureaucracies in

IGO policy-making (section 2), I show that it is useful to distinguish between two basic

features of international bureaucracies: their ability to develop autonomous preferences

(autonomy of will) and the capacity to transform these preferences into action (autonomy of

action) (section 3). In section 4, this two-dimensional concept structure serves as a basis for

theoretically distinguishing four types of bureaucracies: 1) autonomous bureaucracies, 2)

innovation hubs, 3) politicized bureaucracies and 4) managers of the status quo. Each ideal

typical configuration of autonomy does not only have specific implications for the policy-

making capacity of the bureaucracy but can also be expected to be related to different causes.

Thus, I formulate expectations regarding the factors that may potentially account for the

variation within the four types of bureaucracies. In section 5, the typology and possible

explanatory factors are operationalized in order to allow for an application of the ideal typical

configuration of autonomy to the secretariats of sixteen IGOs. The results of the empirical

investigation of bureaucratic autonomy are presented in section 6, where I also confront the

theoretical expectations with empirical data. Section 7 summarizes the contributions of the

paper and provides an outlook on future research.

2. Setting the stage: international bureaucracies and policy-making

Some scholars have argued that “we need not focus on bureaucracies to understand IOs as

agents […] since many IOs have no meaningful staff, let alone autonomous bureaucracy”

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(Thompson 2006, 229–54). This argument, however, has been increasingly contested in recent

years. Especially after the publication of the book “Rules for the World” by Barnett and

Finnemore (2004) bureaucracy-centered publications have mushroomed. This increasing

interest in administration above the nation state is not surprising because the more research

becomes an analysis of global public policy (Stone 2008), the more important it becomes to

systematically consider international bureaucracies as relevant actors (Ege and Bauer 2013,

136) and “to understand how people within an institution work and what impact they may

have on its processes and outcomes” (Weller and Xu 2010, 216). Such a conclusion begs the

question how we should conceive of the role of international bureaucracies in policy-making

at a more general level?

International bureaucracies are established to assist governments and other stakeholders of

IGOs in institutionalized multilateral negotiations about international norms and in their

application. Such a mandate includes a variety of tasks. International bureaucracies are

responsible, e.g., to give legal advice, provide language and translation services, prepare

meetings, write policy reports, and handle working relationships with the member states of the

organization. In this paper, I adopt a more narrow perspective and focus on the role of

international bureaucracies during the process of transforming societal demands into policy

solutions in form of organization decisions (see Stone 2008, 25–29). While international

bureaucracies play an important role during different stages of the policy cycle, they are just

one part of a differentiated system of several organizational organs. In order to study policy-

making processes in this context, it is useful to apply a system-theoretical perspective and

conceive of an IGO as a political system (see Easton 1965) consisting of one or more

legislative assemblies, a political executive, and a secretariat with the Secretary-General on

top (see Rittberger, Kruck, and Zangl 2012).

The division of labor between these three organs is organized along similar lines as in national

political systems. The legislative assemblies, such as the General Assembly of the United

Nations, the OECD Council or the World Health Assembly, constitute the main deliberation

and decision making body of IGOs. The political executive is in charge of operational and

strategic tasks of the organization. This body coordinates between legislative and

administrative organs and is often equipped with limited decision making authority (Martinez-

Diaz 2009). The Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the Governing Body of

the ILO are good examples of these executive bodies. Finally, the international secretariat is

responsible for the day-to-day business of the IGO and supports the legislative and executive

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bodies. The mandate of these secretariats can be limited to the headquarters of the

organization (e.g. in case of the WTO secretariat) or include far reaching field activities such

as OSCE or UN missions. The Secretary-General (or its functional equivalent) is the highest

civil servant of the IGO, represents the IGO externally, and chairs meetings of the political

executive.

These basic organs form the common governance structure of IGOs, which is relatively stable

across organizations (Rittberger, Kruck, and Zangl 2012, 87). Due to the research focus of

this paper, the prime interest lies in the secretariat and the degree to which it is autonomous

from the member states of the organization and politics more generally. Since bureaucratic

autonomy includes relational aspects, it is also crucial to consider the broader organizational

context in which the executive head and the secretariat (as the “bureaucracy”) are embedded.

Figure 1 summarizes the role of the three organs graphically by conceptualizing the IGO as a

political system.

Figure 1 The IGO as a Political System

Source: Authors’ compilation. Abbreviations: SG: executive head.

Viewing the IGO as a political system serves as a useful heuristic devise to approach the

question of bureaucratic autonomy. Seen from this perspective, inputs are demands and

support that primarily come from the environment of the IGO (i.e. from member states via

(governments of the) member states

(3) secretariat

Input

(1) legislative organ(s)

(representatives of all member states)

SG

(2) political executive

(a selection of member state representatives)

IGO Output

NGOs and other transnational actors

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their representatives and transnational policy networks). Especially demands, however, can

also stem from within the bureaucracy itself (see Nay 2012). The output of an IGO is a

specific policy in form of a decision, which directly addresses the member states of the

organizations or leads to the establishment of operative programs such as UN peacekeeping

missions or development projects of the World Bank.

Looking at the specific mandates of international bureaucracies already indicates that the role

of these bodies during policy-making differs significantly between organizations. While the

role of some secretariats is indeed restricted to the provision of technical support, others are

delegated more far-reaching policy competences (Hooghe and Marks 2014). Formal

competences are, however, just one aspect of a bureaucratic organization’s potential to

influence policy output. In addition, their resources and internal structure are also found to

constitute important characteristics in this respect (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012). Thus, I use

the concept of bureaucratic autonomy, which goes beyond the formally delegated

competences, to compare the potential autonomous influence of international bureaucracies.

To achieve this objective, it needs to be clarified what it actually means for an international

bureaucracy to be autonomous and how varying qualitative types of this attribute can be

observed in real-world secretariats.

3. Theorizing bureaucratic autonomy as a hierarchical concept

The concept of bureaucratic autonomy is regularly used in the comparative study of

regulatory and executive agencies at both the national (Verhoest et al. 2004; Maggetti and

Verhoest 2014) and the European level (Groenleer 2009; Wonka and Rittberger 2010). In the

international context, the autonomy of IGOs (in the sense of the entire organizational system)

is considered a crucial institutional feature that explains why states act through these

organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1998) and to what degree they are able to wield

supranational influence (Tallberg 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that autonomy (and

independence) are prominent concepts applied in empirical studies of IGOs in both the

rationalist and the sociological tradition (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Reinalda 1998;

Reinalda and Verbeek 2011; Trondal 2011). Even though most of these studies rely—to

varying degrees—on intraorganizational and “bureaucratic” characteristics of IGOs as

observable implications of autonomy, the secretariats of IGOs are rarely conceptualized as

separate units of analysis. The studies that do concentrate on international secretariats and the

autonomy that these bodies possess can usually be found in the context of the European

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Commission as the main administrative apparatus of the European Union (Ellinas and

Suleiman 2012; Trondal 2008). Comparative works that expand the focus to other

international bureaucracies are largely missing (Bauer and Ege 2014). Thus, we know little

about the (relative) extent of the autonomy of international bureaucracies and its causes.

As regards the comparative study of bureaucracies, there is no consensus with respect to the

concept’s precise definition or how varying degrees of bureaucratic autonomy are best

measured (see Kim 2008, 33). Maggetti and Verhoest (2014, 239) provide a minimum

common denominator by arguing that autonomy “means, above all, to be able to translate

one’s own preferences into authoritative actions”. Relying on such a general definition that is

also used in related fields of research (see Carpenter 2001; Nordlinger 1981, 361; Skocpol

1985, 9), the authors provide an understanding that seems “both complex enough to be

realistic and general enough to travel across historical and spatial contexts (Caughey, Cohon,

and Chatfield 2009, 2) without aligning it too closely to the working context of their unit of

analysis (see Verhoest et al. 2004). Based on such an understanding, it can be argued that in

order to wield policy influence, a bureaucracy requires both of the capacity to develop

autonomous preferences and the ability to translate these preferences into action. Thus, the

distinction between “autonomy of will” and “autonomy of action” is taken as point of

departure to develop a typology of international bureaucracies that is able to capture (and

systematically order) empirical features that are expected to make a difference for the policy-

making capacities of real-world bureaucracies.

The distinction between the autonomy of will and action is still too abstract to allow for an

empirical observation of these features. Thus, the two subconcepts need further specification.

The next step is to ask what it actually mean for an international secretariat to possess the

capacity to develop an autonomous will? First, because bureaucracies are not individuals but

corporate actors, the capacity to develop an autonomous will is dependent on their ability to

overcome obstacles to collective action and to interact with political actors as a unified

organizational entity (Mayntz 1978, 68; Schnapp 2004, 93). Such an ability is referred to as

“administrative cohesion” in the course of this paper. International bureaucracies can be

expected to be cohesive if staff members have similar national backgrounds and stay with the

organization over a longer period of time. Second, the development of an autonomous will

requires that the people that work for the organization are able to form distinct

(administrative) preferences. In the constellation at hand, this means that the secretariat (or

administrative agent) is able to develop potential solutions to a given policy problem that are

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not dictated by the (often short-term) interests of powerful member states but can be

independently developed within the administration itself. This ability is referred to as

“administrative differentiation”. Regarding the working context of international

bureaucracies, independent leadership (Cox 1969) and independent research capacities (Haas

1992) are two important means by which administrative differentiation can be achieved. If an

international bureaucracy is equipped with both sufficient internal administrative cohesion

and administrative differentiation capacities, it is able to develop independent preferences that

may be used during the policy-making process.

International bureaucracies that possess an autonomous will can, on the one hand, be expected

to develop potential policy solutions that are geared toward the good of all members (Jordan

1991, 354). In other words, they are capable of developing a particularly pro-active policy

style, shield itself from external influence of powerful member states and possess a strong

capacity of “upgrading the common interest” of its community (Haas 1961, 369–71). On the

other hand, the prevalence of an autonomous bureaucratic will may also lead to an increased

vulnerability of the IGO to the pathological side effects commonly associated with

uncontrolled bureaucratic self-interest such as insulation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 424–

29), unresponsiveness or agency slack (Conceição-Heldt 2013).

This brings us to the second subconcept of bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. the autonomy of

action. What does it mean for an international secretariat to possess autonomous action

capacities? Within the conceptual framework at hand it means that the bureaucracy possesses

the ability to translate its (potentially distinct) preferences into action. In order to be attributed

this ability, delegation research and principal-agent theory highlight that the statutory powers

(i.e., formal organizational competences vis-à-vis political principals throughout the policy

cycle) and independent administrative resources are crucial (Brown 2010; Hawkins et al.

2006a; Hooghe and Marks 2014). The competences of the Secretary-General as the

organization’s highest civil servant are particularly important in this regard. These

competences concern his or her ability to insert independent proposals into the political

process but also the ability of the entire bureaucracy under the lead of the executive head to

sanction those who do not comply with organizational rules (Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek

2008). As a second condition for the autonomous administrative action, the resources of an

organization need to be sufficiently independent from the good will of its members. While

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such an independence is formally guaranteed with regard to the staff resources of IGOs,1

financial resources are often collected on a voluntary basis from member states. Agency

research in the national context has shown that these budgetary constraints renders

independent administrative action difficult and leaves the administration highly dependent on

the political principals of the organization (Verhoest et al. 2004, 116; Gilardi 2002, 883). In

the context of IGOs, a similar logic is at work (Brown 2010, 149; Weisser 2009).

To sum up, figure 2 provides a final overview the (hierarchical) structure of international

bureaucratic autonomy by distinguishing the two subconcepts and four dimensions of

autonomy as outlined above.

Figure 2 The Different Dimensions of Structural Bureaucratic Autonomy

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Carpenter 2001; Caughey, Cohon, and Chatfield 2009; and Verhoest et al. 2004.

Conceiving of bureaucratic autonomy as a multi-dimensional concept that consists of different

subconcepts and dimensions eventually leads to the (unavoidable) question of how the

different hierarchical level are related to each other. Usually, the question of how to best

aggregate different conceptual levels is solved by building some sort of index, where the

1 For instance, the United Nations' Charter (Chapter XV, Article 100) states that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities” (see http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter15.shtml ) [accessed 20/01/2015]. Even in organizations outside of the UN family, similar articles exist to protect the independence of the international staff.

concept two subconcepts four dimensions

bureaucratic autonomy

1. autonomy of will

1.1. administrative cohesion

1.2. administrative differentiation

2. autonomy of action

2.1. statutory powers

2.2. administrative resources

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(scores of the) different dimensions are added up or are weighted according to their relative

importance for the general concept. In his study on the de facto independence of agencies,

Maggetti for instance argues that “[f]inally, results concerning (i) the self-determination of

preferences, and (ii) the autonomy of the activity of regulation of agencies can be once more

aggregated by simply calculating the mean value of the two components to obtain one

measurement” (2007, 279). While such a procedure is one possible way of tackling the

question of aggregation, I will take a different approach in this paper. The next section shows

how the structure of the autonomy concept as outlined above can be used to build a fourfold

typology of international bureaucracies.

4. A typology of international bureaucracies’ autonomy

Classifying objects into qualitatively distinct types rather than ranking them in additive

indices is particularly useful if the concept under study is multidimensional. Building

typologies allows researchers to develop more fine-gained analytic tools that take into account

the multidimensionality of the underlying concept by making theoretically justified

assumptions about the relationships between the different conceptual dimensions (Goertz

2006). In the field of organizational studies, for instance, such an approach has been found

useful to organize the complex cause-effect relationships between structure and organizational

behavior (Damonte, Dunlop, and Radaelli 2014; Fiss 2011; Grandori and Furnari 2008). In

international relations, explanatory typologies have also proved valuable for guiding empirical

research of international politics (Elman 2005).

While bureaucratic autonomy is often seen as a genuinely multidimensional concept (Kim

2008; Yesilkagit 2011; Verhoest et al. 2004), the relationship between its varying dimensions

and “flavors” is rarely theorized or studied empirically.2 The benefits of a typology approach

for studying the autonomy of international bureaucracies lies in its ability to link conceptual

reasoning (such as the distinction between autonomy of will and action as well as its

respective dimensions) to empirical observations. Viewing the subconcepts, dimensions and

indicators of autonomy as sufficient or necessary conditions (using the Boolean operators

AND and OR) and conceptualizing the effect of their presence and absence on bureaucracies’

policy-making capacities promises to provide a more differentiated account of the empirical

reality.

2 In the comparative study of executive agencies, however, the causal link between formal (de jure) and actual (de facto) autonomy has been subject to empirical investigation (see Hanretty and Koop 2012; Maggetti 2007; Yesilkagit and van Thiel 2008).

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Next, I make use of the hierarchical structure of the autonomy concept and theorize about the

relationship of the two subconcepts (autonomy of will and autonomy of action) with the

overall autonomy of a bureaucracy. Following Fiss (2011), I use an ideal type approach for

this purpose. “[I]deal types are analytical constructs for use as yardsticks for measuring the

similarity and difference between concrete phenomena” (Fiss 2011, 474). Thus, I understand

international bureaucracies’ autonomy of will and action as ideal typical concepts that can be

either absent (0) or present (1).

The theoretical reasoning behind the autonomy concept put forward in the previous section

already suggests that in order to be truly autonomous, an international secretariat needs to

possess both an autonomous will and the capacity for autonomous action. Thus, the presence

of each subconcept constitutes a necessary condition for an administration to be autonomous.

If one of the two attributes is absent, the bureaucracy may still be potentially influential, but is

viewed as qualitatively distinct from a truly autonomous bureaucracy. Hence, only the

common presence of both subconcepts constitutes a sufficient condition for an autonomous

bureaucracy. Combining the two subconcepts in a fourfold table illustrates that the common

presence of autonomy of will and autonomy of action characterizes just one particular types

of administration.

Table 1 Four types of international bureaucracies

auto

nom

y of

will

Combination: 1/0

innovation hubs

Combination: 1/1

autonomous bureaucracies

Combination: 0/0

managers of the status quo

Combination: 0/1

politicized bureaucracies

autonomy of action

Table 1 reveals that in addition to autonomous bureaucracies, there are three other ideal

typical combinations of the two subconcepts. Referring to the specific implications of these

bureaucracy types for organizational policy-making, I term them “innovation hubs”,

“politicized bureaucracies” and “managers of the status quo”. Innovation hubs are secretariats

that are characterized by a substantial autonomy of will but do not possess significant

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autonomy of action. Regarding the role of these bureaucracies in policy-making, it can be

expected that their influence is particularly pronounced in the early stages of the policy cycle,

especially in problem definition and policy initiation. Innovation hubs are able to frame

discussions among member states, NGOs and the epistemic community at large (Haas 1992),

act as policy entrepreneurs (Nay 2012), engage in a pro-active administrative style (see e.g.

the paper presented by Schmidt et al. in this workshop) and offer particularly innovative

solutions to the challenges within the mandate of the organization. On the other hand,

however, the ability of these secretariats to influence policy outputs is highly contingent on

their ability to persuade member states in the legislative and executive organs of the IGO.

Once a innovation hub type of secretariat has been delegated the power to exercise certain

(executive) tasks, it may however be able to pursue them autonomously, at least as long as

there is no majority among the member states in favor of sanctions or withdrawal of these

powers.

International secretariats are considered politicized bureaucracies, if their autonomy of will is

absent, while possessing autonomous action capacities. I call these bodies “politicized”

because when it comes to policy development and implementation, administrative preferences

can be expected to be closely aligned to those of its political principals (for a similar

understanding of politicization see Bauer and Ege 2012). In contrast to innovation hubs, the

strength of this type of administration lies in the later stages of the policy cycle. Their

influence can be expected to be particularly strong with regard to the implementation of

organizational decisions either by monitoring the implementation in the member states or by

implementing policies themselves via organizational projects and field missions.

Finally, managers of the status quo show neither of the two subconceptual characteristics

developed above. This does not mean that these bodies are irrelevant for understanding

policy-making in IGOs. In contrast to the other three types, however, autonomous

administrative influence is even more context dependent, fragile and less likely in general.

While the type of truly autonomous bureaucracies combines the executive powers of

politicized bureaucracies with the independent preference formation capacity of innovation

hubs, managers of the status quo are mainly in charge of providing technical assistance to the

member states either at the IGOs headquarters or in the organization’s field missions and

offices.

But why are some administrations more autonomous than others and what factors can

potentially explain the differences between the four types? In this regard, the typology is

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useful because it allows disentangling the underlying causal factors leading to different types

of bureaucracies. Next, I will formulate hypotheses regarding possible determinants of

international bureaucratic autonomy.

First, it can be expected that the field of activity of an IGO explains whether the autonomy

profile of the secretariat resembles the ideal typical configurations of innovation hub,

politicized bureaucracy, status quo managers or autonomous bureaucracy. Such an

expectation can be further differentiated into considerations about the salience of the specific

task of the bureaucracy for the members of the IGO and a functional explanation. According

to the logic of political salience, we would expect the members of an IGO to be concerned to

see powerful autonomous bureaucracies handling political matters which are of great

importance to them. Scholars have presented evidence that when it comes to activities within

the field of international security, countries are particularly reluctant to tolerate autonomous

secretariats because their involvement is perceived to violate decisive areas of the national

sovereignty of its members (see e.g. Cox and Jacobson 1973; Finkelstein 1974). Thus,

bureaucracies of organizations with a mandate in international security should not be expected

to be particularly autonomous with regard to both autonomy of will and action and thus reflect

the manager of the status quo type of administration. In order to explain the autonomy

intensities of bureaucracies that are active in other policy fields, a salience-based explanation

is difficult because in contrast to security matters, the political salience of the specific issue at

hand is difficult to evaluate in general terms as it varies within a given policy field (see

Biermann et al. 2009, 50).

As an alternative way of approaching this issue, I draw on a functional explanation that is

based on the reasoning that the functional requirements of a specific policy issue is reflected

in the problem-solving capacities of an organization (Haas 1964; for a recent application see

Hawkins et al. 2006b). In order to develop expectations regarding the link between the

requirements of a particular issue area and the autonomy type of an international bureaucracy,

I distinguish two broader fields of activity of an IGO: economic regulation on the one hand

and social and environmental regulation on the other.3 An international bureaucracy in the

field of economic regulation is expected to require a certain level of autonomous action

capacities to be powerful enough to fulfil its mandate vis-à-vis its clients. This is true for

international (development) banks that are responsible to decide over loans and monitor the

3 This distinction is based on the reasoning that a regulation is “termed ‘economic’ when it deals with the price, entry, exit and service of an industry, while it is termed ‘social’ when it concerns non-economic issues such as health and safety” (Gilardi 2002, 891; see also Meier 1985, 5).

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implementation of project in the member states and for headquarters-based organization that

regulate international trade. Since the decisions guiding these tasks are increasingly

formalized and “rule-based” (Gehring and Kerler 2007), a particularly pronounced ability to

develop innovation solutions is not required. On the contrary, member states may even fear

that an autonomous will allows these institutions to become “runaway agents” (Elsig 2007).

Hence, the bureaucracies of these organizations can be expected to follow the type of a

politicized bureaucracy. In contrast, the fields of social and environmental regulation, where

the requirements for new (technical) solutions are high (such as in the field of climate change,

migration or health regulation) and member states are less willing to invest their own

expertise and research capacities because they fear that new regulations might not be in their

(short-term) interest, an autonomous will is an important requirement for international

bureaucracies. Thus, one would expect an innovation hub type of administration as the typical

administrative arrangement in this policy area.

Finally, IGO scholars in the rationalist-institutionalist tradition argue that bureaucratic

autonomy mainly depends on the ability of member states to control the administration

(Abbott and Snidal 1998; Lake and McCubbins 2006). Similar to the principal-agent

relationship between national administrations and political actors (Damonte, Dunlop, and

Radaelli 2014; McCubbins and Schwartz 1987), the mechanisms of member state control over

the international secretariats and the decision-making in IGOs more generally can take very

different forms (Elsig 2011). In order to apply this logic to the question of bureaucratic

autonomy, I focus on two ways of how member states are able to exercise control within

IGOs: the establishment of mechanisms of internal oversight and the power of member states

to veto decisions within the legislative body of the IGO. With regard to the typology

developed above, the explanatory power of these two mechanisms is expected to be different

for international bureaucracies with a high degree of autonomous will (innovation hubs) as

compared to those with strong autonomous action capacities (politicized bureaucracies).

While innovation hubs should be characterize by mechanisms of internal oversight to

guarantee responsible administrative behavior and prevent malfeasance, member states may

instead rely on their veto power during actual decision-making if the preferences of the

bureaucracy are already in line with those of the political principals. Since veto powers are

highest under unanimity and qualified majority voting, these kinds of decision rules can be

expected in IGOs with a politicized bureaucracy. Truly autonomous bureaucracies, in

contrast, should be characterized by both internal oversight AND member state veto powers.

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Table 2 summarizes the different the “independent variables” (or “conditions” in the

terminology of Boolean logic) that may potentially account for the shape of an international

bureaucracy with regard to its autonomy.

Table 2 Expectations about the predominant type of bureaucracy under specific conditions

Condition manager of the status quo

innovation hubs

politicized bureaucracy

autonomous bureaucracy

Policy field Security x

Economic regulation x

Social and environmental regulation x

Control capacity of members

Internal oversight x x

Veto power x

5. Application of the typology: Sampling and operationalization

In order to illustrate the applicability of the typology and to confront the factors outlined

above with empirical reality, the secretariats of 16 IGOs are selected from the population of

over 260 organizations listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of

International Associations 2013). When selecting these organizations, I do not apply a

particularly rigid sampling procedure. It has been taken care, however, that the sample covers

the most prominent “usual suspects” in the pertinent debate (Haftel and Thompson 2006,

254). Because it can be expected that the policy field is a relevant explanatory factor for the

type of administration, organizations operating in different policy fields are selected. Table 3

summarizes the characteristics of the organizations selected and provides additional

information on the year of foundation and membership size.

15

Table 3 Sample of international bureaucracies

headquarters foundation policy field members

SEC ECO SOC

ASEAN Jakarta 1967 x x 10

ECB Frankfurt 1992 x 17

EU COM Brussels 1952 x x x 27

IAEA Vienna 1957 x 158

IDB Washington 1959 x 48

ILO Geneva 1901 x 183

IMF Washington 1944 x 188

IMO London 1959 x 170

OECD Paris 1961 x x 34

OSCE Vienna 1990 x x 56

UN New York 1945 x x 193

UNESCO Paris 1945 x 195

WB Washington 1944 x 188

WHO Geneva 1946 x 194

WIPO Geneva 1967 x 185

WTO Geneva 1995 x 155

Source: Authors’ compilation. Note: Three types of policy field are distinguished: security (SEC), economic regulation (ECO) and social and environmental regulation (SOC). Information as of 2014.

In order to measure bureaucratic autonomy, observable indicators need to be developed. In

line with the ideal type logic, I use dichotomous indicators that take into account if the

respective administrative traits are present or absent. Usually, each of the four theoretical

dimensions of autonomy (see figure 2) is measured by means of two indicators. Similar to the

question of how to make sense of different combinations of the subconcepts of autonomous

will and action, this fact highlights the necessity to specify rules for aggregation.4 Depending

on the appropriate theoretical argument described in the course of the operationalization

process, I use the logical operators OR and AND (see e.g. Goertz 2006; Ragin 1989). A

4 For “administrative resources”, only one indicators is used to measure the underlying dimension. Thus, no aggregation rule is specified.

16

combination with OR means that a dimension is coded “1” if at least one of the two indicators

of this dimension is present. In such a case, each indicator is seen as a sufficient condition for

the respective administrative feature (or outcome) at the dimensional level. Just as outline in

section 3, a combination with the logical AND is based on the notion of “necessity” and

means that in order for a dimension to be present, both indicators need to be present. In order

to further aggregate the dimensions into the subconcepts, a combination with a logical AND is

used just as for the aggregation of subconcepts into the overall concept (see section 4).

Administrative cohesion is an important aspect of bureaucratic autonomy because only

administrations that are sufficiently coherent will be able to overcome collective-action

problems and develop an autonomous will. An international bureaucracy is internally

coherent if administrative staff is both homogenous AND tenured. As regards the first

condition, scholars have pointed out that international bureaucracies are a lot more

heterogeneous than national administrations because their staff come from a variety of

countries and hence have different cultural backgrounds (Balint, Bauer, and Knill 2008, 681;

Liese and Weinlich 2006, 497). In general, low staff homogeneity undermines administrative

cohesion (Beigbeder 1988, 6; Michelmann 1978; Wille 2007, 43). While for some

organizations this inherent diversity may cause only minor challenges for internal coherence

because there is a sufficiently large common cultural basis for cooperation, bureaucracies of

IGOs with universal membership like UNESCO, WHO, or ILO are expected to have greater

difficulties to reconcile staff from over a hundred different countries. Thus, in order for an

administration to be considered homogenous, at least half of its personal must come from the

ten largest staff-contributing countries.5 As regards the second (necessary) condition for

administrative cohesion, administrative longevity constitutes a classical resource of

bureaucratic influence and power (Weber 1978) that is also relevant for international

bureaucracies (Langrod 1963, 63). Because unlimited employment is less common in the

international civil service, a rather low threshold is applied for measuring this trait.

Administrative longevity is coded as present if at least 50 percent of staff of an IGO is

working on unlimited contracts.

In order to capture the capacity to develop preferences that are distinct from the political

principals in an IGO, administrative differentiation is operationalized by taking into account

5 Nationality-based homogeneity of staff is only one possibility to approach this phenomenon empirically. The professional background (medical staff, lawyers, or economists) would also appear as a suitable to capture internal cohesion (Momani(2005). Because it is difficult to gather comparative data on the varying professional groups within IGOs, homogeneity is interpreted along national cleavages only.

17

the internal employment history of the executive head. The underlying logic is that the SG has

to fulfill a dual role as both a political and an administrative leader. If an external candidate is

“implanted” from outside into the organization (from the diplomatic service or high-ranking

political positions in the member states), as is the case in the OSCE or the EU, he or she is

expected to be committed to the political side of the job and less able to play an independent

role. To avoid a narrow focus on the incumbent SG, independent leadership is coded as

present, if at least one of the last five executive heads had previous working experience inside

the secretariat. Independent research capacities are a second “path” to administrative

differentiation. In-house research helps the secretariat not only to define potentially relevant

policy problems and develop its own solutions (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009b, 319), but

also serves as a way to legitimize these solutions based on their neural expert authority and

their moral standing (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Thus, the secretariat is attributed

independent research capacities if it has its own centralized research department at its

disposal. Because both indicators (independent leadership and independent research) are seen

as alternative ways to achieve administrative differentiation, the aggregation rule is based on a

logical OR.

As regards the capacity for autonomous action, the statutory powers of the IGO vis-à-vis its

member states are of crucial importance. To empirically capture this dimension, I distinguish

between agenda-setting and sanctioning competences of the secretariat. Agenda competences

are present if the SG possesses an explicit right of initiative during the meetings of the

legislative assembly. Second, the most powerful sanctioning competence available to an

organization is taken into account. Sanctioning competences are present, if the secretariat is

able to sanction non-compliant addressee of its policies (also via the political bodies of an

IGO). If the organization can only rely on mechanisms of “naming and shaming”, sanctioning

competences are coded as absent. As with the previous dimension, agenda-setting and

sanctioning are interpreted as alternative and equally important paths for an international

bureaucracy to be attributed administrative competences. Thus, a combination with OR is

used to move from the level of indicators to the theoretical dimension.

Finally, the independence of an IGO’s income to finance the execution of its mandate is

selected as (the only) indicator to measure administrative resources. While some IGOs are

completely self-financing (such as the IMF and the WIPO), independent financing is also

present if the secretariat can rely on mandatory contributions from member states (see

Amerasinghe 2005, 359–65). If the secretariat however is dependent on voluntary

18

contributions, independent financial resources are absent. For a better overview of the

different indicators, table 4 provides a final summary.

Table 4 Summary of indicators measuring the four dimensions

Dimension Feature and indicator Variable Combination

Aut

onom

y of

Will

COHESION

Homogeneity of staff (nationality-based) Homogenous staff is present, if the ten largest staff-contributing countries account for a minimum of half the personnel of the secretariat.

staff_homogen_dicho

AND

Administrative longevity Longevity is present, if 50 percent of the staff (or more) is tenured.

staff_permratio_dicho

DIFFERETATION

Independent leadership Independent leadership is present, if at least one of the last five executive heads had previous working experience inside the secretariat.

sg_internal_dicho

OR Independent research capacities Independent research capacities are present, if the secretariat has its own centralized research department.

research_dicho

Aut

onom

y of

Act

ion

COMPETENCES

Agenda competences Agenda competences are present, if the SG possesses an explicit right of initiative.

sg_agenda_dicho

OR Sanctioning competences Sanctioning competences are present, if the secretariat is able to sanction non-compliant addressee of its policies (also via political bodies).

sanctioning_dicho

RESOURCES

Independent financial resources Independent financing is present if the secretariat can rely on mandatory contributions from member states.

income_dicho

-

In order to operationalize the factors that can potentially account for variation in the ideal

types, the information on the field of policy activity of an IGO is based on my own coding as

displayed in table 3. Information on the veto power is collected from the website and

documents of the organization and coded present if the regular decision rule in the highest

legislative organ of the IGO is unanimity or qualified majority. In case of simple majority, it

is coded as absent. In order to measure internal oversight, I rely on the data of Grigorescu

(2010), who collected information on oversight mechanisms (such as inspections, personnel

evaluations, investigations, and transparency requirements) within 73 international

19

bureaucracies. Internal oversight is coded present if, from a total of six possible mechanisms,

more than half of these functions have been installed within the secretariat.

6. Descriptive findings and analysis

After information on the different indicators has been collected, I am now able to locate the

sixteen international bureaucracies within the two-dimensional autonomy space.6 To

summarize the results, each bureaucracy in the sample is placed in the cell that reflects the

specific configuration of bureaucratic will and action.

Table 5 Correspondence between ideal types and empirical cases

auto

nom

y of

will

innovation hubs

WIPO, IMO

autonomous bureaucracies

EU

managers of the status quo

OSCE, ECB, WHO, UNESCO, IAEA,

ASEAN, ILO, UN

politicized bureaucracies

IMF, WB, WTO, IDB, OECD

autonomy of action

The administration of the European Commission (i.e. the Directorates-General below the level

of Commissioners) is the only international bureaucracy in the sample possessing both

autonomy of will and autonomy of action. Truly autonomous bureaucracies thus seem to be a

particularly rare empirical phenomenon. The second interesting observation is that with an

empirical equivalence of only two secretariats (the administration of WIPO and IMO), the

ideal type of innovation hub is also not very common among real-world bureaucracies. The

cell indicating the absence of an autonomous will paired with autonomous action capacities

(politicized bureaucracies) is populated by the secretariats of IMF, WB, WTO, IDB, OECD.

Finally, with an empirical coverage of half of the cases in the sample, managers of the status

quo are the predominant type of bureaucracies. Bearing in mind that the organizations under

6 Information on structural bureaucratic autonomy is collected from the websites of the organisations or requested directly from the secretariats. Depending on the specific indicator concerned, this included budget reports, the organization’s constitution or founding documents, the rules and procedures of the organizational bodies, the reports of the Secretary-General (or functional equivalent) to legislative and executive bodies, the organization’s annual reports, staff manuals, and staff rules, as well as organisational charts, information from the Yearbook of International Organizations, and other information available on the organisation website. A table with the scores of the different cases at the level of indicators, dimensions and subconcepts can be found in annex 1 at the end of this paper.

20

study cover the most prominent organizations, these findings indicate that structural

autonomy is not a very common characteristic of the international system altogether.

By and large, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy uncovers important empirical variation

within the sample. The next question is whether the “independent variables” outlined above

can explain the observed variance in the four autonomy types. In order to analyze the

empirical manifestation of the ideal types with an eye to the hypothesized expectations, I do

not apply a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) even though my dichotomous (crisp-set)

data would probably allow for such a formalized procedure. Since the data on sixteen cases is

relatively easily assessable, I will compare my expectations regarding the profile of a given

bureaucracy with the empirical manifestation under the specific (hypothesized) conditions

“manually” (see table 5).

According to the logic of political salience, it has been argued that bureaucracies of IGOs

with a security mandate should resemble the type of status quo managers. The empirical

results show that out of the four organizations active within the field of security, three are

managers of the status quo (IAEA, OSCE, UN), which constitutes confirmatory evidence for

my expectations. As the fourth IGO with a security mandate, the European Union with its

commitment to a “common foreign and security policy” constitutes an autonomous

bureaucracy and is thus a contradictory case. Since the EU is also highly active in the two

other fields and security policy is the area where its responsibilities are smallest, the empirical

findings can nonetheless be interpreted to support the salience explanation. Second, it has

been argued that bureaucracies with a mandate in economic regulation show characteristics of

a politicized bureaucracy. This expectation is fully in accordance with the data because all

organizations in the lower-right quadrant of table 4 are active in economic regulation. Except

for the OECD case, economic regulation even constitutes the only area of activity of these

organizations. Third, the functional logic would lead us to expect that bureaucracies active in

social and environmental regulation should resemble the ideal type of innovation hubs.

Because this type of bureaucracy is only covered by only two cases, the empirical basis to

assess this hypothesis is weak. While the case of the IMO is in accordance with the

expectation, the WIPO as an economic organization contradicts the functional argument.

Overall, the empirical findings show that the policy field within which an IGO operates

matters strongly for the shape of their bureaucracies.

21

The second kind of explanation is based on the rationalist assumption that the control

capacities of member states constitute the most important determinant of bureaucratic

autonomy.

Thus, we would expect international bureaucracies with the autonomy profile of an innovation

hub to be characterized by strong internal oversight. Due to the limited empirical diversity of

this ideal type, the possibility to put this explanation to test is restricted. As far as we can tell

from the case of IMO and WIPO as the only two types of innovation hubs in the sample, the

expectation cannot be confirmed because in both cases, oversight mechanisms are absent.

Regarding the last hypothesis, which postulates that member states control politicized

bureaucracies by means of decisional veto powers, empirical evidence is mixed. While the

OECD and the IMF secretariats as politicized bureaucracies do indeed feature a member state

veto, the other three empirical cases of this configurational type (WB, WTO, IDB) are

characterized by simple majority voting.

The results of the analysis of the five hypotheses are summarized in table 6. The general

finding is that the policy field within which an IGO is active helps to explain the type of

bureaucracy we observe. Especially for IGOs that are active in the fields of security and

economic regulation, empirical evidence of the application of the ideal types to the sixteen

cases has confirmed the initial expectations. On the other hand, the existence of internal

bureaucratic oversight and member states vetoes do not seem to bear explanatory value for the

configuration of autonomy of will and action in the respective secretariats.

Table 6 Correspondence between hypotheses and empirical data

SEC ECO SOC oversight veto ideal type

ASEAN 0 1 1 0 1 managers of the status quo

ECB 0 1 0 no data 0 managers of the status quo

EU 0 (-) 1 1 1 (+) 1(+) autonomous bureaucracies

IAEA 1 (+) 0 0 0 0 managers of the status quo

IDB 0 1 (+) 0 1 0 (-) politicized bureaucracies

ILO 0 0 1 1 0 managers of the status quo

IMF 0 1 (+) 0 0 1 (+) politicized bureaucracies

IMO 0 0 1 (+) 0 (-) 0 innovation hubs

OECD 0 1 (+) 1 0 1 (+) politicized bureaucracies

OSCE 1 (+) 0 1 0 1 managers of the status quo

UN 1 (+) 0 1 1 0 managers of the status quo

UNESCO 0 0 1 0 0 managers of the status quo

22

WB/IBRD 0 1 (+) 0 1 0 (-) politicized bureaucracies

WHO 0 0 1 1 0 managers of the status quo

WIPO 0 x 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 innovation hubs

WTO 0 1 (+) 0 0 0 (-) politicized bureaucracies

Notes: 1: condition is present; 0: condition is absent; grey fields indicate that an expectation has been formulated. (+): expectation confirmed; (-) expectation not confirmed.

7. Conclusion and outlook

International bureaucrats are a group of actors whose influence on policy-making is likely to

grow under conditions of increasing internationalization and globalization. The influence of

these actors is determined by the characteristics of their organizational apparatus and also by

the quality of the relationships between the IGO’s bureaucratic apparatus and its political

actors. Proceeding on the assumption that autonomy constitutes the basis for bureaucratic

influence on policy-making, I have focused on the structural basis of the autonomy of

international bureaucracies in order to conceptualize, compare and explain differences in the

configuration of autonomy in sixteen international bureaucracies.

Overall, the paper has provided insights into the multifaceted concept of bureaucratic

autonomy and has advanced research in three areas, in particular. First, I have developed a

hierarchical theoretical conceptualization of bureaucratic autonomy that is applicable to the

context of international secretariats. Viewing autonomy as a concept that goes beyond the

competences and resources of the bureaucracy and takes into account the capacity of the

administration to develop autonomous preferences is an important supplement to the

conventional empirical focus on the relationship between the organization and its member

states in traditional IGO research. Second, the development of ideal types that serve as a

yardstick for measuring the similarity and difference in the ability of international

bureaucracies to develop autonomous preferences and the capacity to transform these

preferences into action offers interesting insights into the policy-making capacities

international secretariats and its causes. Operationalizing the typology and subsequently

applying it to sixteen cases, the paper thirdly uncovers empirical variation in international

bureaucratic autonomy and reveals that the policy field within which an IGO is active helps to

explain the type of bureaucracy we observe.

23

The paper has provided a valuable contribution to previous efforts of systematically studying

the black box of IGO secretariats and the consequences of these internal features for global

governance. It thus advances our understanding of bureaucratic autonomy in the international

context both conceptually and empirically. Yet, there are three areas where I see potential for

further conceptual, analytical and methodological specification of the approach of this paper

that should be addressed in future research.

First, the paper puts a strong conceptual focus on the relationship between autonomy of will

and autonomy of action, which served as a basis for developing the four ideal types. The

relationship between the different dimensions however has received less attention yet. Even

though it is justifiable to argue that cohesion and differentiation constitute necessary (and

jointly sufficient) conditions for an autonomous will,7 the hierarchical structure of the

autonomy concept promises further analytical leverage at the dimensional level. For future

research, it can be promising for instance to apply an ideal type approach at the level of

dimensions and theorize not only about instances where both cohesion and differentiation are

present (as in this paper) but also about configurations where one of the two conditions is

absent. Empirically, such a conceptual specification would allow researchers to more fully

exploit the potential the concept and investigate empirical variation within ideal types that so

far have not been conceptualized (within managers of the status quo type of administration

for example).

The second area that should be addressed in future research concerns the causes of autonomy.

While the distinction between the three policy fields and the two control mechanisms allow

for a first evaluation of the factors leading to autonomous bureaucracies, the analysis can

benefit from a further specification of the causal mechanisms. It would for instance be useful

to investigate in more detail the underlying problem structure within a policy area. Based on

Lowi’s classical typology (1964), one could distinguish between regulatory, distributional and

redistributional issues or, as Hawkins et al. (2006b) suggest, expect variation in autonomy

depending on whether the underlying problem is one of intergovernmental coordination,

collective action, arbitration, or credible commitment. Despite the general appear of these

suggestions, it must be highlighted however that the more differentiated the nature of the

policy issue is conceptualized, the more one needs to shift the analytical focus to the level of

individual policies. As regards the mechanism of member state control that turned out to be

largely irrelevant explanatory factors in the analysis, one could move beyond internal

7 The same argument can be made for autonomous action. 24

oversight and member state veto power and consider other ways of political control.

Furthermore, it can be concluded that I have formulated explicit expectation only about

certain combinations of conditions. The white cells in table 5 however have so far remained

outside the analytical focus. In order to evaluate further configurations of conditions of

bureaucratic autonomy, QCA would be an appropriate method that is also suitable to

empirically investigate ideal types (Fiss 2011; Hudson and Kühner 2013). If it is necessary to

this end to enlarge the sample of IGO secretariats, particular attention should be devoted to

meet the challenges posed by limited empirical diversity in order to increase the analytical

leverage of QCA.

Finally, the autonomy concept arguable provides a useful tool to investigate the consequences

of different types of administrations for specific instances of policy-making in form of

organizational decisions. Conducting policy studies that are based on the different intensities

or types of autonomy would allow researchers to include other relevant variables for

bureaucratic influence in order to study the complex interaction of political, situational and

bureaucratic factors that eventually determine the shape and content of global public policies.

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Annex 1 Autonomy scores of the sixteen bureaucracies and aggregated values

IGO COHESION DIFFERETATION

Aut

onom

ous

Will

COMPETENCES RES

Aut

onom

ous

Act

ion

AUTONOMY TYPE

staff_homogen_dicho

staff_permratio_dicho Total

COH

sg_internal_dicho

research_dicho Total

DIFF

sg_agenda_dicho

sanctioning_dicho Total

COMP

income_dicho

Dimension combination with AND combination with OR

combination with OR

Subconcept combination with AND Total combination with AND Total

OSCE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 manager of the status quo

ECB 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 manager of the status quo

WIPO 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 innovation hubs

IMO 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 innovation hubs

WHO 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 manager of the status quo

UNESCO 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 manager of the status quo

IMF 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 politicized bureaucracy

IAEA 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 manager of the status quo

ASEAN 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 manager of the status quo

ILO 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 manager of the status quo

WB 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 politicized bureaucracy

WTO 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 politicized bureaucracy

EU 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 autonomous bureaucracy

IDB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 politicized bureaucracy

UN 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 manager of the status quo

OECD 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 politicized bureaucracy

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Annex 2 List of abbreviations

Abbreviation Full name

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

EU European Union

ECB European Central Bank

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IGO international governmental organisation

IDB Inter-American Development Bank

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMO International Maritime Organization

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SG Secretary-General

UN United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

WB/IBRD World Bank Group / International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

WHO World Health Organization

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

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