competition policy number 2 newsletter · articles 2 competition policy newsletter 2000 number 2...

Also available online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/newsle/en/index.htm

INTRODUCTION

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address this conference onautomobile distribution in the new millennium. You have given thisconference the somewhat provocative heading “Who will be in thedriver’s seat?”. There is an obvious reply to this question: it should be theconsumer who is in the driver’s seat!

However, before the consumer can get behind the wheel of his or her newcar, the car has to be transferred physically and legally from its birthplace,the factory, via an importer and/or a dealer to the buyer. It is thisdistribution process at the beginning of the “life” of a new motor vehicleinvolving the manufacturer, the distributors and the consumer, on which Iwill focus.

The “highway code” for this process is the EC block exemption on motorvehicle distribution and servicing agreements, Regulation 1475/95. Even ifthis code is - from the legal point of view - not compulsory, all vehiclemanufacturers use it as a de facto binding framework for their distributionsystem. This Regulation dating from 1995 will expire at the end ofSeptember 2002.

Everybody would like to know of course what is going to happen to our“highway code” for motor vehicle distribution after this date. This willhave to be decided after the Commission has adopted its Evaluation Reporton the current Regulation. The Report has to be published by the end ofthis year. To discuss the future framework without first establishingwhether the existing Regulation has worked would be to “put the cartbefore the horses”.

ECCOMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

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ISSN1025-2266

c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTER2000number 2June

Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

ContentsArticles1 “Who will be in the driver’s seat?”, by Mario

MONTI, Commissioner of the EuropeanCommission, responsible for Competition

8 The Commission's review of the Aluminiummerger wave, by Dimitri GIOTAKOS, MergerTask Force

24 Horizontal agreements on energy efficiency ofappliances : a comparison between CECED andCEMEP, by Manuel MARTÍNEZ-LÓPEZ, DGCOMP-F-1

26 The Grand Alliance, by Eric FITZGERALD, DGCOMP-D-2

27 Plaintes contre des droits exclusifs en matièrede jeux de hasard rejetées, par Maija LAURILA,DG COMP-D-3

28 The Commission's assessment of the Eurovisionsystem pursuant to Article 81 EC, by AndrésFONT GALARZA, DG COMP-C-2

Opinion and comments34 Le dégroupage de la boucle locale : un pas de

plus dans la libéralisation destélécommunications. Exemple decomplémentarité entre la régulation sectorielleet les règles de concurrence du Traité, parChristophe de LA ROCHEFORDIERE, DGCOMP-C-1

Anti-trust Rules41 HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION

AGREEMENTS: Ensuring a modern policy, byJoachim LÜCKING, DG COMP-A-1

Mergers45 Case N°: COMP/M. 1672 – Volvo/Scania, by Dan

SJOBLOM, Merger Task Force48 Main developments between 1st January and 30

April 2000, by Anna PAPAIOANNOU, WalterTRETTON and Neil MARSHALL, Merger TaskForce

Liberalisation and State intervention55 Long-term supply agreements in the context of

gas market liberalisation: Commission closesinvestigation of Gas Natural, by MarianoFERNÁNDEZ SALAS, DG COMP-E-3

State Aid59 Main developments between 1st January and 30

April 2000

Information Section68 Competition DG Staff list70 Documentation97 Coming up

98 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

Beyond the EU’s Block exemptionBy Mario MONTI, Commissioner of the European Commissionresponsible for Competitionspeech delivered at Forum Europe Conference:“Who will be in the driver’s seat?”on 11 May 2000, Brussels

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Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June2

The future of motor vehicledistribution is a hot topic forseveral reasons:

First, many changes havetaken place since 1995 andmore are likely in the nearfuture. To give someexamples:

• Manufacturers are about tore-organise their distributionsystems in order to makethem more efficient: afterhaving obtained considerablecost savings from thesuppliers of car components,manufacturers are nowturning their rationalisationefforts to the distributionsector, which accounts for30% of the cost of a new car.

• In particular, manymanufacturers are reducingthe numbers of their dealers.The reorganisation of thedistribution network ofDaimlerChrysler in France orthe ending of all Hondadealer contracts in Germanyare examples of this.

• E-commerce is a new and fastdeveloping distribution tool:However, up to now, use ofthe Internet in the automobilesector has been limited to avirtual showroom. Actualsales via Internet arepractically inexistent.

• As regards consumers, amotor vehicle is an expensivepurchase and consumers payattention to prices. In view ofthe price differentials acrossEurope, new information

technologies and theincreased mobility ofconsumers, there are now realpossibilities for consumers toshop around and to try to findthe best deal.

In order to get a good deal,consumers sometimes wish tobuy a car abroad, eitherdirectly or via a so-calledintermediary. I shouldmention that consumersstrongly and rightfullycriticise the functioning of theInternal Market if they areunable to find a dealer who iswilling to supply them or ifthey are discriminated againstin relation to nationalconsumers. In our experience,this still happens in too manycases. In this respect, I wouldmention the campaign by theBritish Consumers’Association, who told me thatBritish car buyers feel thatthey are being “ripped off”and sent me some 20,000protest notes signed byBritish consumers. I believethat such consumer actionscannot be ignored when wediscuss the “highway code”for motor vehicle distribution.

It seems quite revealing thatsuch radical consumer actionappears to be limited to thecar sector.

Secondly, the subject oftoday’s conference is of greatinterest to those involvedbecause the “highway code”for motor vehicle distributionis now under review by two

European competitionauthorities:

• As you know, my DirectorateGeneral for Competition ispreparing an EvaluationReport on the BlockExemption Regulation formotor vehicle distributionand servicing agreements1,which is due to be publishedby the end of this year. Asthis evaluation process is welladvanced, I would like to usetoday’s forum to give you aninsight into our preliminaryfactual findings. I again stressthat this report will focus onthe current regime for motorvehicle distribution and willnot contain proposals as tothe future framework.

• On 10 April, the UKCompetition Commission’sreport on motor vehicledistribution in the UnitedKingdom was published bythe Secretary of Trade andIndustry, Mr. Stephen Byers.The Competition Commis-sion found that there is anurgent need for a radicalchange in view of thenegative effects the “highwaycode” generates on car pricesin the United Kingdom: theUK Competition Commis-sion’s radical suggestion is toprohibit selective as well asexclusive distribution agree-ments in the car sector.

In view of these findings, Mr.Byers has ordered as a first step 1 See Article 11 of Regulation

1475/95.

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Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 3

a number of interim measuresaiming at lowering resale pricesimmediately. However, he alsoclearly said that more drasticmeasures are being discussedwith the European Commission.

Let me now turn to thepreliminary findings of myDepartment in the currentevaluation exercise.

WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERSOF THE EVALUATION ?

The parameters with regard towhich this evaluation is carriedout are those on which the BlockExemption Regulation has beenbased when it was adopted forthe first time in 1985 and thenamended in 1995, after someserious “fine tuning”.

As to the three mainassumptions on which theRegulation is based:

The first assumption relates tothe existence of effectivecompetition in the motorvehicle industry.

• As regards competitionbetween car manufacturers,so-called inter-brandcompetition, the six largestmanufacturers in Europe(Volkswagen, Peugeot/Citroën, Renault, GeneralMotors, Ford and Fiat)together have a market shareof about 75% of the Europeancar market. We are thereforein an oligopolistic situation.Moreover, most motorvehicles are distributed in the

same way, via exclusive andselective dealers who aresubject to the same types ofrestrictions. This aggravatesthe oligopolistic effect.

However, it cannot be deniedthat the availability ofbetween 2000 and 4000 carversions in each countryunder about 50 brands withever shortening productcycles indicates that there iscompetition in the car market.Increasing concentration inthe industry (for instance theconcentrations Ford/Volvo,Renault/Nissan, or Daimler-Chrysler/Mitsubishi) and theplanned co-operation betweenGeneral Motors and Fiatindicate, however, that wehave to remain vigilant asregards competition at themanufacturing level.

• As regards competitionbetween dealers belonging tothe same network, so calledintra-brand competition, cardistribution agreements givedealers only limited scope todevelop this kind ofcompetition. One reason forthe limitation of real pricecompetition is the form of thedealer’s remuneration, whichis based on a standardmanufacturer discount, givinglarge or small dealers almostthe same margin.Competition between dealersalso seems to be dampenedby the allocation of exclusivesales territories, the exclusionof independent resellers andthe banning of certain typesof active marketing. These

restrictions prevent dealersopening subsidiaries or salesand service outlets outsidetheir contract territory andbecoming larger and moreefficient in this way.

As regards intra-brandcompetition in trade betweenMember States, i.e.competition among dealers ofthe same brand but located indifferent Member States,competition seems to be evenmore limited: the practice ofmanufacturers agreeing salestargets with their dealers,which are focussed onnational sales, and thepractice of allocating newvehicles to the dealers basedon such targets, gives dealersonly limited possibilities toengage in parallel trade.Therefore, dealers are limitedin their capacity to contributeto the creation of an InternalMarket for motor vehicles, inwhich consumers’ freedom topurchase new cars acrossborders should be a reality.

Moreover, the UKCompetition Commission hasfound, and the preliminaryfindings of my Departmenttend to confirm this, thatmanufacturers’ ability to enddealer agreements with onlytwo years notice, seems tomake it wise for dealers notto pursue a sales policy whichtheir manufacturers dislike.This is all the more the case,because dealers cannot easilyshift to another brand:normally all sales territories

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are already “occupied” byother dealers.

Based on these findings, itseems to me that the firstassumption on which theRegulation is based andwhich relates to the existenceof effective competition inthis sector seems to havebecome – to a certain extent -questionable.

The second assumption is thatcar dealers must also provideafter-sales services.

To put this in simpler words:some say there is a “natural link”between the sale of motorvehicles and after-sales services.In competition jargon, this istying, which is normallyconsidered as a seriousrestriction of competition.

According to recent indications,the existence of such a link isbecoming more and morequestionable, though it was usedto justify the right ofmanufacturers to oblige all theirdealers to offer after-salesservices. I note that the UKCompetition Commission alsoexpressed serious doubts in itsReport as to whether such tyingis not excessive and contributesto make car distribution lessefficient than it could otherwisebe.

No technical reasons seem toexist for such a link: the so-called pre-delivery inspectionsof new vehicles could be carriedout by the manufacturer or the

haulier, who delivers a new carto a dealer.

Looking at this “link” from theviewpoint of the dealers, basedon the information available, thesale of new cars is not veryprofitable. By contrast, the after-sales services are the mainsource of their revenue.Therefore, today’s dealers willnormally wish not only to sellcars, but also to provide after-sales services.

Moreover, consumer expecta-tions may suggest that a gooddealer has to provide after-salesservices.

Based on the above the rightgiven to manufacturers to forcetheir dealers both to sell cars andto provide after-sales services,seems to have becomequestionable. The questionwhether or not such a right isstill justifiable, is howevercomplex and needs to beanalysed carefully.

The third assumption on whichthe Regulation is based saysthat brand specialists areneeded for the repair of motorvehicles.

I will briefly address thisassumption. It is true that today’svehicles are more and morecomplex and contain electronicdevices, such as onboarddiagnostic systems. Thistechnical trend is likely toincrease in the future in view ofnew safety and environmentalrequirements. This suggests that

the maintenance and repair ofnew cars can be done byspecialists, who are closelyconnected to the manufacturerand who have the necessarydiagnostic equipment needed toprovide the full range of after-sales services.

However, one may questionwhether these specialists need tobe dealers or service outletsbelonging to the network of amanufacturer. If independentrepairers really would have fullaccess to all technicalinformation, as required underthe present Regulation, theseundertakings would be perfectlyable to repair and maintainmodern motor vehicles, as is alsorecognised by recent studies.

In conclusion: For all threeassumptions on which thecurrent regime is based, it seemsto me that one can have somedoubts as to whether they stillhold true today.

Let me now turn to theobjectives pursued by theRegulation.

The Regulation has fourobjectives.

The first objective is tostrengthen dealers’ indepen-dence, to give them moreleeway for their activity – inview of strengthening by thiscompetition at the dealer level.

The most important provisionsof the Regulation which seek toachieve this objective are thosewhich allow dealers freedom to

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determine the prices and salesconditions at which they sellcars, to use spare parts ofmatching quality or to give thema say on the annual level of salestargets, stocks and number ofdemonstration vehicles.

However, from where we aretoday in our assessment, it seemsthat these measures have not hadthe desired effect for dealers oron competition. Asmanufacturers have the right toselect their dealers based onquantitative criteria, and becausedealers cannot grow by openingnew sales outlets or new garages,today most dealers are small ormedium sized undertakings.Moreover, since dealershipcontracts can be terminated upontwo years notice, manufacturerscan largely control dealers andend the contracts of dealerswhose commercial behaviourthey dislike.

Dealers’ leeway to decide ontheir commercial policy isfurther limited by the marginsystem, which is common to allmanufacturers and importers andused throughout the EuropeanUnion: the margins of dealersare nearly the same everywhereand large dealers cannot obtainbulk rebates similar to thosegranted to fleet buyers.Therefore, dealers have littlefreedom to set their prices atdifferent levels from otherdealers in the same network.

The system of agreed salestargets and the planning andproduct allocation based on thesetargets do not seem to allow

dealers to react to changes indemand with sufficientflexibility; it creates rigidities inthe market, which are highlyunsatisfactory. To give anexample: if foreign consumerswant to order cars from a dealer,he is quite often unable orunwilling to sell cars for exportwithin reasonable delivery times,since his sales target and productallocation is in most cases basedon his normal business withinhis sales territory.

As regards dealers’ right to sellvehicles of different makes, socalled multi-marketing, theRegulation allows manufacturersto impose conditions, which - formost dealers - make this righteconomically unattractive.Therefore, not many dealers usethis right to sell cars of differentmakes.

The second objective of theRegulation relates to betteraccess for spare partproducers to dealers.

According to the informationreceived, most vehiclemanufacturers seem to limit thefreedom of spare part producersto supply spare parts directly todealers belonging to themanufacturers network2. It isindeed surprising to see thatmanufacturers seem to flout theRegulation in a way which is

2 According to the information

received from car part producers,car manufacturers ask their suppliersnot to sell such parts as spare parts(which match the quality of originalparts) to the dealers directly.

close to falling under one of itsblack clauses3: by suchbehaviour they risk loosing thebenefit of the Regulation fortheir whole distribution network.

In sum, the objective of givingspare part producers betteraccess to dealers does not seemto have materialised in practice.

The third objective of theRegulation relates to puttingindependent repairers in abetter position to compete inthe after-sales market

As regards the position ofindependent repairers, which theRegulation aims to strengthen bygiving them access to originalspare parts, my Department hasfound, that the independentrepairers are generally contentwith their ability to source spareparts.

Independent repairers shouldalso have access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to alltechnical information needed forthe repair and maintenance ofcars. To this end, a black clause4

was introduced into theRegulation in 1995.

Although pragmatic solutionsseem to have avoided majorproblems in the past, carmanufacturers do not appear tohave implemented transparentprocedures for givingindependent repairers unre- 3 Article 6 pt. 10 of Regulation

1475/95.4 Article 6 pt. 12 of Regulation

1475/95.

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stricted access to technicalinformation at reasonable pricesas required under the Regulation.

If this is the case, it is a majordraw back, becausetechnological knowledge is usedto hinder independent repairersfrom doing their job. Ifindependent repairers workwithout this knowledge, thiswould lead to safety problemsand also environmental damage.It works also against theEuropean Directive relating toair pollution by emissions ofmotor vehicles adopted on 13October 1998. This provides thatall manufacturers have to givefull and unrestricted access totechnical information upon areasonable fee to all repairers.

The fourth objective relates tomaterialisation of the InternalMarket objective in favour ofconsumers and the impact ofintermediaries' activity on thedevelopment of parallel trade.

As the Commission’s car pricereports show, prices are still seton a national basis and varyconsiderably from one MemberState to the other.

A recent test case for thefunctioning of the internal carmarket is the case of the UnitedKingdom. Prices for domesticbuyers are, as you know, veryhigh in this Member State ifconverted into euros, comparedto other markets with similar cartaxes.

Reasons for the price differentialbetween UK prices and prices on

the Continent include, on the onehand, the appreciation of thePound Sterling against the euro,and, on the other the fact thatright-hand drive vehicles aremore expensive because thenumbers of such cars are smallerthan the numbers of similar left-hand drive cars. It is true thatboth reasons are not attributableto the car manufacturers.

However, UK prices could onlyrise to these actual levelsbecause, it seems, non-Britishmanufacturers do not decreasetheir UK prices. Instead of usingthe cost advantage they have -due to their production outsidethe UK - to lower prices and totry to increase competition andtheir market share in the UnitedKingdom, foreign manufacturersprefer to earn greater profits andto sell less cars in this country,as the UK CompetitionCommission found in its report.Moreover, parallel trade by finalconsumers has clearly not beensufficiently significant inquantitative terms to putdownward pressure on Britishprices. Manufacturers also seemto use the possibilities given tothem by the Regulation to agreesales targets and on this basis toallocate new vehicles to theirdealers in a rather rigid way andwith the focus on the localdemand in the territory of eachdealer. This induces dealers todiscriminate in favour ofconsumers from their ownMember State against foreignbuyers.

Moreover, it is apparent thatmanufacturers are not too

pleased if dealers engage inparallel trade and dealers areafraid to displease theirmanufacturer. Therefore, I donot attach too much importanceto the fact that parallel trade intothe United Kingdom has tripledfor some manufacturers in thelast two years. What matters isthat it is still insufficient to putdownward pressure on prices inthe United Kingdom.

Finally, car intermediaries, whopurchase a new car in a foreignMember State in the name andon behalf of a final consumer,often face just the sameproblems as the consumer infinding a dealer who is willing tosupply.

Two other points have beenhighlighted by the evaluationexercise of my Department.

The Regulation has not beenapplied properly by the carindustry

Apart from the well-known caseagainst Volkswagen, where theCommission imposed a recordfine of 102 Million ECU forrestrictions of parallel trade, youmay be aware that myDepartment had to investigatesimilar alleged infringements ofother car manufacturers such asOpel Netherlands, Daimler-Chrysler, Peugeot/Citroën andRenault and a case of resaleprice maintenance relating to thenew Volkswagen Passat inGermany. However, these casesare still under investigation andany comment from me on their

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outcome would amount tospeculation.

This all indicates however, thatthe car manufacturers at least donot seem to have much respectfor the “highway code”, which isvery generous towards them.Such misconduct will of coursealso play a role in the evaluationexercise under way.

Another point relates to newmarketing or distributionmethods. Here the question wehave to ask is, are they possibleunder the Regulation?

The Internet is a new marketingtool, which creates importantopportunities in the car sector aselsewhere. However, it is notonly a tool for creating a virtualshowroom. It can also givedealers and intermediaries newbusiness opportunities. Becauseit knows no geographic barriers,the Internet allows dealers topromote their sales beyond theircontract area and is therefore atool which could very much helpto integrate national markets intoa wider Internal Market.

However, if we look at theRegulation and the twoCommission Notices relating tocar distribution, we can see thatthey are not at all adapted to amarketing tool like the Internet.More worryingly, myDepartment has had quite a fewcontacts with manufacturers andoperators and it seems that the

existing rules are used by somemanufacturers to prevent asmooth development of this newtool, where there is demand fromdealers and consumers.

The question of the sale of carsvia supermarkets is even moredelicate. Although there isdemand from supermarkets tosell motor vehicles, none of themhas so far succeeded in obtainingregular supplies from amanufacturer.

CONCLUSIONS ON THEEVALUATION SO FAR:

If I may return to the picture Iintroduced at the beginning ofmy presentation when Icompared the motor vehicleBlock Exemption Regulation toa “highway code”.

• Based on the workundertaken so far by myDepartment, it would seemthat the assumptions onwhich this “highway code” isbased are at leastquestionable. As regards theobjectives pursued by theRegulation, it seems thatmost of them have not beenachieved. In particular, itseems that the main driver ofthe distribution process is stillthe manufacturer and thatdealers do not have muchfreedom as regards the way inwhich motor vehicles aredistributed. Moreover, thecode has not contributed tointegrate the national markets

and, more regrettably, it hasnot been properlyimplemented by manymanufacturers, as theprocedures against manufac-turers for infringements of theRegulation show.

• If I may come back to thesubject of this conference:“Who is in the driver’sseat?”, the following pictureprobably best describes thecurrent situation, with only alittle exaggeration:

• The manufacturer is in theback seat of the car and givesinstructions to his chauffeur,the dealer, on how to drivedown the distributionhighway to the consumer,who buys the car. Themanufacturer finally managesto bring the car down to theconsumer, but not always, itseems, in the fastest, mosteconomic and smoothest waypossible: moreover, all toooften the manufacturerappears to instruct the dealer,who should really be the oneresponsible for driving thecar, to do things which areoutside the “highway code”.In addition, according toconsumers’ expectations, theEuropean “highway code”seems not in all respects thebest-possible solution tobring a new car to theconsumer.

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After the recent merger wave inthe oil industry5 which lastedfrom August 1998 to March2000, the Commission hasreviewed under the MergerRegulation concentrations in thealuminium sector, which couldbe qualified as the aluminiummerger wave. These were thethree-way merger between theCanadian aluminium producerAlcan, the Swiss Algroup(Alusuisse) and the FrenchPechiney, on the one hand, andthe merger between the U.S.aluminium producers Alcoa andReynolds, on the other. As aresult of the mergerinvestigation, the three-waymerger of Alcan, Alusuisse andPechiney - which would havecreated the world’s leadingaluminium company under thename APA - did not materialise,as Alcan and Pechiney decidedto cancel their agreement in thelight of the Commission’sopposition to the operation.However, the other half of thatmerger - Alcan/Alusuisse - wasauthorised with undertakings.

5 The following cases were notified to

the European Commission andreviewed under the MergerRegulation: BP/ Amoco;Total/Petrofina; Exxon/ Mobil; BPAmoco/Arco and TotalFina/ElfAquitaine.

Finally, the merger betweenAlcoa and Reynolds wasauthorised after the parties andthe Commission agreed on a setof substantial undertakings.

Through its review of thesecases, the Commission had theopportunity to investigatethoroughly all the stages of thealuminium supply stream, fromraw materials, such as bauxiteand alumina, to finishedproducts, such as aerosol cansand other packaging materials.This provided the Commissionwith a complete picture of thesector and enhanced itsadministrative efficiency indealing with subsequenttransactions in the same sector orin other related sectors (such asusers).6 Moreover, these casesgave rise to some interestinganalyses on product marketdefinition and on the competitiveassessment of mergers.

The purpose of this article is toset out the most importantfeatures, from a competition law

6 This is particularly true for the

current investigation into a mergerbetween producers of beverage cans,which use as a raw materialaluminium can body sheet, one ofthe products that the Commissionexamined in-depth in Alcan/Pechiney

point of view, of theCommission’s analysis of theabove cases. This is particularlyimportant as far as theAlcan/Pechiney case isconcerned, as no decision wasadopted (nor will any bepublished) after the withdrawalof the notification by the partiesbefore the legal deadline.

Two mega-mergers, threenotifications

The first important feature of theabove cases is that, while froman industrial point of view twomergers were under way – APAand Alcoa/Reynolds – from ajurisdictional point of view, theCommission received andreviewed three separate notifi-cations – that is, Alcan/Alusuisse(case COMP/M.1663, decisionof 14 March 2000), Alcan/Pechiney (case COMP/M.1715,aborted) and Alcoa/Reynolds(case COMP/M.1693, decisionof 3 May 2000). This is sobecause the APA merger wasstructured in such a way as togive rise to two concentrations.Indeed, the notificationrequirement of the APA mergerwas triggered by two separateand independent public offersthat Alcan launched, one for theshares of Alusuisse and the otherfor the shares of Pechiney.Although in the minds of thethree companies involved athree-way integration was thefinal aim of their merger, the twooffers were not conditional uponeach other, to the extent that onecould proceed without the other.

THE COMMISSION’S REVIEW OF THEALUMINIUM MEGER WAVEBy Dimitri GIOTAKOS, Merger Task Force

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The Commission considered thetwo transactions as constitutingdistinct and stand-aloneconcentrations, which had to benotified separately.

The separate notifications didnot prevent the Commissionfrom assessing the ultimatecompetitive effects of a three-way combination. In other terms,the structure of the deal was notaimed at circumventing theCommission’s assessment of theglobal effects of the three-waymerger, by assessing, andauthorising, each one of thetransactions separately from theother. Rather, this structure wasmotivated by otherconsiderations, such as nationallabour laws (Works Councilapprovals in France and inSwitzerland). However, it goeswithout saying that, from atactical point of view, the choiceof this structure for the dealwould spread the risk of thewhole of it being blocked.Indeed, after a four-month PhaseII investigation in both cases, theCommission decided toauthorise one of them(Alcan/Alusuisse) and wasprepared to block the other(Alcan/Pechiney). Had theparties submitted one singlenotification, none of the two legsof the three-way deal wouldhave gone through.

Summary of the Commission’sdecisions

In Alcan/Alusuisse threeaffected markets wereinvestigated, namely alumina tri-hydrate or ATH, a flame

retardant material; lithographicsheet, a flat rolled product usedin the offset industry ; and semi-rigid aluminium containers, apackaging product used forpetfood, human food, airlinecatering, etc.

In alumina trihydrate, thesubstantial combined marketshare of the merged firm wouldhave resulted in the creation of adominant position in the EEAmarket. In order to eliminate itand to restore the competitiveconditions prevailing prior to themerger, the parties proposed todivest one of the twooverlapping ATH plants, namelythe one operated by Alusuisse atMartinswerk, Germany.

In lithographic sheet, the mergerwould have resulted in aduopolistic dominant positionheld by the merged firm and itsmain competitor, VAW. Theresulting duopolistic structure ofthe market was supported,amongst others, by thesymmetrical market shares of thetwo competitors and theirstructural link in the Norf jointventure in Germany. These, andother elements pertaining to thenature of the product and of therelevant market, could haveinduced the two competitors intocollusive behaviour which couldhave substantially restrictedcompetition in the relevantmarket. In order to eliminatesuch a likelihood, the partiesproposed to divest theoverlapping production facility,namely the Star aluminiumrolling mill operated byAlusuisse at Bridgenorth, the

UK. This measure removed thecompetitive overlap, dispelledany possible doubts as to thecreation of a dominant duopolyand restored the competitiveconditions prevailing prior to themerger.

In semi-rigid aluminiumcontainers, the high market shareof the merged firm and theabsence of alternativecompetitive responses led theCommission to conclude that thetransaction would have created adominant position in this market.In order to eliminate any suchlikelihood, the parties proposedto divest machines (as well aslamination technology, customercontracts and contract-relatedequipment) that produce semi-rigid aluminium containers. Thecapacity of these machinesamounted to the overlap broughtabout by the merger. Thismeasure removed thecompetitive overlap and set forththe conditions for the potentialpurchaser to become a viableand long-term competitor in themanufacture and supply of semi-rigid aluminium containers.

In Alcan/Pechiney, theCommission conducted anenquiry into five affectedproduct markets, namely two flatrolled product markets and threepackaging markets. The flatrolled product marketsconcerned were can body sheet,a raw material used in theproduction of beverage cans, andfood can stock, similarly used inthe production of food cans. Thepackaging markets werealuminium cartridges, used to

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pack sealants and adhesives usedin the car and constructionindustry, flexible packaging forprocessed cheese and aerosolcans.

In can body sheet, theCommission found that themarket for aluminium can bodysheet is separate from that fortinplate (steel) can sheet, inwhich case the merger wouldhave resulted in a substantiallyhigh combined market share.Only four suppliers of thisproduct are active in the relevantgeographic market (the EEA),namely, apart from the parties tothe merger, VAW of Germanyand Elval of Greece. TheCommission could not regardthem as a competitive threat tothe possible exercise of marketpower by the merged firm. Elvalwas too small and regionally-focused to capture market sharefrom the merged firm; and VAWproduced all of its beverage canbody sheet at the Norf jointventure (jointly controlled withAlcan) and would be linked tothe merged firm through thatjoint venture. As a result of itscapacity constraints and itsimpossibility to remove themwithout the consent of its Norfpartner, VAW’s incentives tocompete would have diminishedsignificantly after the merger.Moreover, the arrangements onthe cost allocation between thetwo partners at Norf gave themerged firm the possibility ofraising VAW’s costs, by simplyre-arranging its product mix atNorf. This was considered torepresent a credible threat ofretaliation at the disposal of the

merged firm. Under thesecircumstances, the most rationalcourse of action to be followedby VAW was to align itsbehaviour on that of the mergedfirm and become a price taker.No mitigating circumstances tothe market power of the mergedfirm were found to exist.Consequently, the Commissionconsidered that theAlcan/Pechiney transactionwould have created a dominantposition in the market forbeverage can body stock.

The merger would have created adominant position in the marketfor food can sheet. Althoughfood cans are made of eithertinplate or aluminium,aluminium and tinplate can sheetwere found to constitute twoseparate product markets of EEAgeographic dimension. Thecombined market share of themerged firm would have beensubstantial whereas the nextcompetitor, VAW, would havefive times smaller a marketshare. However, as for beveragecan body stock, VAW’sincentives to compete wouldhave been reduced as a result ofits participation in the Norf jointventure. The remainingcompetitors were small,capacity-constrained and unableto capture market share from themerged firm without heavyinvestments in capacity andquality. As a consequence, theCommission considered that theconcentration would haveresulted in the creation of adominant position in the marketfor food can sheet in the EEA.

The merger also raisedcompetition problems in threepackaging markets, namelyaluminium cartridges, aerosolcans and flexible packaging forprocessed cheese (cheese foil).Although Alcan does notproduce aerosol cans and cheesefoil, the merger would havebrought together the respectivebusinesses of Pechiney andAlusuisse (which Alcan wasauthorised by the Commission toacquire), in those products.

In aluminium cartridges, theCommission found that themerger would have created thedominant producer and supplierof aluminium cartridges in theEEA.

As far as aerosol cans wereconcerned, the Commissionfound that tinplate andaluminium aerosol cans do notbelong to the same productmarket. There is a specificdemand for aluminium aerosolcans, motivated by the superiorcharacteristics of that metal. Themerged firm would have had aconsiderable share of thealuminium aerosol cans market,six times higher than its nearestrival. Moreover, it would havecontrolled by far the largestshare of overcapacity, whichexceeded the production capacityof any of the smaller suppliers,placing thus the merged firm inthe best position to win a pricewar. The Commission concludedthat the proposed concentrationwould have led to a dominantposition in the EEA market foraluminium aerosol cans.

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Finally, in the market for cheesefoil, the merged firm would havehad a large market share, threetimes that of the nearest rival.The merged firm would havebeen the only supplier withdedicated production lines forcheese foil which would havegiven the new company aconsiderable cost advantage overrivals. The Commissionconcluded that the proposedconcentration would have led toa dominant position in the EEAmarket for lacquered aluminiumfoil for the packaging of cheese.

Although the parties proposed aseries of undertakings that couldalleviate the Commission’sconcerns in almost all theproduct markets, they wereunable to sever their link withVAW - their immediatecompetitor in the flat rolledproduct markets - by disposingof their 50% participation in theNorf joint venture. Such adisposal was perceived as a deal-breaker and the partieseventually decided not toproceed with their merger andnotified to the Commission thecancellation of theAlcan/Pechiney leg of the three-way merger (for more details,see below: chapter onundertakings).

Finally, in Alcoa/Reynolds, theCommission identified competi-tion concerns in relation to threeproduct markets: the merchantmarket for smelter-gradealumina (SGA), the market forcommodity alumina hydrate andthat for high purity P0404aluminium.

Smelter-grade alumina is the rawmaterial used by smelters toproduce aluminium metal. Themerging parties’ combinedassets (alumina refineries) andglobal production capacitywould give them an outstandingposition as the largest supplier ofSGA to competing smelters.Moreover, the merger wouldbring under the control of themerged firm the lowest-costrefineries in the world, thoselocated in the Darling Range, ageographic area in Australia.Combining the refineries whichwere already in the portfolio ofthe merging companies with thelowest-cost refineries wouldhave resulted in the merged firmbeing capable of controlling theentry and future development ofcompetitors in this market. Thismeant Alcoa/Reynolds would beable to increase capacity oroutput at a very low cost todiscourage entry or expansion bycompetitors at times whenalumina prices are high. In orderto address these concerns Alcoaproposed to divest Reynolds’share in one of the DarlingRange refineries, namely, theWorsley refinery. This was theonly Darling Range asset thatReynolds would have contri-buted to the merged firm.Therefore, its divestiture remo-ved the competitive overlap.

In relation to commodityalumina hydrate (used as a rawmaterial for the production ofdetergents as well as in thepurification of water), themerger would have created adominant position in the EEAmarket. The parties offered to

divest Reynolds’ overlappingactivity in the EEA, namely its50-percent stake in AluminiumOxid Stade GmbH, a Germanalumina refinery controlledjointly with VAW. The removalof the competitive overlapeliminated the dominant positionthat would otherwise have beencreated in the commodityalumina hydrate market in theEEA.

Finally, in relation to P0404 highpurity aluminium, the mergerwould have created a verticalrelationship conducive tovertical foreclosure of adownstream competitor. P0404is a particular grade of primaryaluminium metal, used in themanufacture of aerospacealuminium alloys. Alcoa is aproducer of such alloys whereasReynolds is the outstandingproducer of P0404 and a supplierto Alcoa’s only competitor in theaerospace alloys market, namelyMcCook Metals. As a result ofthe merger and given theabsence of any ready reply byother smelters to commit to theproduction of P0404 forMcCook’s needs, McCook ranthe risk of losing its supplies ofP0404 raw material and,therefore, could have been shutout from the downstreamaerospace alloys market. Toaddress this concern, Alcoaoffered part of a smelter thatcurrently produces P0404 to athird independent party. Thiswill enable the acquiring party tosupply P0404 to non-integratedmanufacturers of aerospacealloys in sufficient quantities so

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as to cover a potential growth inthe demand for aerospace alloys.

Specific issues raised by thealuminium mergers

The review of the aluminiummergers raised a number ofspecific issues of interest tocompetition law practitioners.These are outlined in thefollowing paragraphs.

1. Flat rolled products maynot constitute one singleproduct market

First of all, the Commission hadthe opportunity to revisit itsprevious product marketdefinition in relation to flatrolled products.7 Flat rolledproducts (FRPs) are semi-finished products that areproduced in aluminium rollingmills. They constitute the rawmaterial for the manufacture ofseveral finished aluminiumproducts (ranging from industrialaluminium plate to householdfoil). FRPs comprise over fifteencategories of products, some ofwhich correspond to a specificend application, whereas someothers may be multi-purposeproducts (a large part of thelatter is stockist material whichcannot be allocated to specificsectors).

The crucial requirement of analuminium rolling mill is to beable to produce as many types of 7 Alcoa/Alumix (case N° IV/M.675,

21 December 1995); Alcoa/Inespal(case N° IV/M.1003, 24 October1997); VAW/Reynolds Metals (caseNO IV/M.1110, 19 May 1998)

FRPs as possible, so as tooptimise its product mix - that is,to shift production to those FRPswhich at a given place and timeoffer higher rolling (profit)margins. It is, therefore, verytempting to argue that FRPsconstitute one single relevantmarket, because of the highdegree of supply-sidesubstitutability. However, thisfinding was not confirmed by thein-depth investigation in theAPA cases. This has shown thatthe conditions of competition arenot the same across all the typesof FRPs, which may justify thedistinction of certain types ofFRPs as separate productmarkets.

Firstly, the degree of supply sidesubstitutability varies from oneFRP type to another. In general,aluminium rolling mills producea range of FRPs, the so-calledproduct mix. Different types ofFRPs sell at different prices andtheir relative profitability isreflected in the rolling margin(that is, the profit marginresulting from rolling aparticular type of FRP). Eachrolling margin ‘contributes’ tothe overall profitability of themill. As the ultimate goal of amill is to maximise itsprofitability, aluminiumproducers try to optimise theproduct mix of their mills, byproducing the highest-margintypes of FRPs within theavailability of their rolling andfinishing equipment. However,not all the mills are equipped toproduce all types of FRPs. Thus,when it comes to several specifictypes of FRPs – such as in

particular those of concern in theAPA cases, i.e., beverage canbody stock, food can stock andlithographic sheet – only a fewmills in the EEA are capable ofproducing them. Those types ofFRPs are products relativelydifficult to make and, as a result,they require a high degree ofmanagement commitment,workforce discipline anddifferent operating practices. Inaddition, the rolling marginsachieved in producing thesetypes of FRPs may be lower thanin other, more standardisedtypes. The high qualityrequirements and the relativelysmall rolling margins havedissuaded several mills fromsetting up production processesthat would enable them toinclude those products in theirproduct mix. All the more soconsidering that the buyers ofsuch types of FRPs require theirsuppliers to pass stringentqualification tests that may lastseveral years before a long termcommercial relationship is setup. Therefore, although thesupply-side substitutabilityargument seems relevant inrespect to the standard FRPscategories (standard sheet,plates, foil stock, etc.), it was notsupported by the marketinvestigation with respect toproducts such as those dealt within the APA cases. Rolling millsnot currently active in theproduction of those types ofFRPs could not start competingin those markets in a timely andimmediate fashion, even in caseof a non-transitory increase of5%-10% in the rolling margins.Therefore, on the supply-side,

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the presence of a large numberof mills could not influence thecompetitive conditionsprevailing in those types of FRPswhich were defined as distinctproduct markets.

Secondly, the conditions ofcompetition in those distinctmarkets were not influenced bythe existence of aluminium millsoutside the EEA. One could haveargued that the FRPs geographicmarket is not limited to the EEAbut also comprised EasternEuropean countries, Turkey, aswell as Russia and the CIS. Inearlier decisions in thealuminium sector, theCommission had defined themarkets for FRPs as being atleast EEA-wide. In the APAcases, the investigation on theconcerned FRP types showedthat competition took place atthe EEA level. Import dutiesvary from 7.5% to 12%. Even ifsome non-European countrieshave duty-free access to the EEAmarket, for customers thegeographic market for thosetypes of FRPs was determinedmore by the quality andtechnological guarantees of theproducers and by the need forjust in time deliveries and shortlead times. Long distancetransportation required a verygood control of the supply chainmanagement, stocks andlogistics. As non-EU producers,but also some smaller EU-basedproducers, reportedly had alower level of supply reliability,customers were required to holdlarger inventories for theirsupplies from Eastern Europeancountries and Turkey, relative to

the average rate of sales of theirfinished goods, than for theirsupplies by incumbent EU-basedsuppliers, including the mergingparties. The larger inventoriesincreased the customers’working capital related costs andtherefore their unit costs. For thisreason, almost no importswhatsoever had been recorded inthe EEA from Russia, Turkey orthe Eastern European countries,in particular for the types ofFRPs mentioned above.

As far as other types of FRPswere concerned, imports fromRussia and the CIS in 1998amounted to 0.7% of EEAconsumption, whereas thosefrom Eastern European countriesand Turkey to less than 5%. Thecategories of FRPs that wereproduced at rolling mills in thesecountries comprise thefollowing: standard 1xxx, 3xxxand 5xxx sheet; building sheet;foil stock; plate and heat treat,that is seven out of at leastfifteen categories of FRPs.

In conclusion, the Commissiondid not accept the argument thatFRPs should constitute onesingle product market. Thisproduct market definition set outclearly that supply-sidesubstitutability does not onlyrefer to the technical ability toshift production around variousproducts (which would thenconstitute one single market),but also to the economicfeasibility to perform such aswitch in a timely and immediatemanner as well as to theacceptance of the product by themarket place (which takes into

account accreditation and otherqualification procedures thatmay limit the readiness of theswitching).

2. Aluminium and steel(tinplate) beverage canbody sheet are distinctproduct markets

Can body sheet is used in themanufacture of aluminiumbeverage cans. However, asbeverage cans are made of eitheraluminium or steel, the questionthat arose was whether the rawmaterials, aluminium and steelcan body sheet, belonged to thesame or to two separate productmarkets.

The Commission concluded thatthe two raw materials do notcompete against each other. Thiscould appear to be incontradiction with a recentCommission decision followingan in-depth investigation 8,where it had been stated that“aluminium is considered bymost of the customers as a directsubstitute for tinplate” in that“major European canmanufacturers are able to makebeverage cans out of bothtinplate or aluminium”.Nevertheless, this precedent didnot bind the Commission for thepurposes of product marketdefinition in the Alcan/Pechineycase. The above statement wasnot part of a product marketdefinition analysis, but of thecompetitive assessment of thenotified operation. It was used to 8 Case N° IV/ECSC.1310 – British

Steel/Hoogovens (15 July 1999)

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prove that the said operationwould not lead to the creation ofan oligopolistic dominantposition held by manufacturersof tinplate can body stock, giventhe potential competitionstemming from aluminium.Therefore, the statement did notconsider the immediatesubstitution effect betweentinplate and aluminium in thepresence of a small butsignificant non-transitoryincrease in the relative prices ofthe two materials, which is thetest that the Commission uses inorder to delineate relevantproduct markets (SSNIP test).

Aluminium and tinplatebeverage cans have anapproximately 50:50 share in theEEA.9 Based on this splitbetween aluminium and tinplatecans, one could argue that thetwo raw materials competeagainst each other and that thereason for the market penetrationof tinplate lies in its pricedifferential compared toaluminium, a structurally moreexpensive metal. One could alsoargue that can makers have achoice between the two metalsand take decisions on the basisof their relative prices; that canmakers can and do switch theircan manufacturing lines fromaluminium to tinplate, when theeconomics of aluminium become 9 This is average EU data which does

not reflect the substantialdifferences of aluminium or tinplatepenetration in individual MemberStates. For instance, in somecountries (Nordic countries, Greece,Italy) only aluminium beverage cansare sold.

unattractive; and that, based ontheir switching threats, canmakers may discipline thepricing of aluminium can bodystock suppliers. Overall, onecould argue that aluminium andtinplate can body stock competefor market share and thereforebelong to the same productmarket.

However, the Commission’smarket investigation hasindicated that there are severalreasons limiting thesubstitutability betweenaluminium and tinplate canstock.

- Technical advantages

Aluminium is a lighter metalthan steel. The same goes foraluminium can body stock andof course for the can itself.Lighter cans contribute to thereduction of transport andhandling cost for can makers,bottlers and retailers. In addition,the number of cans obtainedfrom a kilogram of aluminium isdouble that obtained from akilogram of tinplate. Thissignificant logistic and handlingadvantage of aluminium overtinplate influences the choice ofcan makers and fillers.

- Mechanical properties andmarketing considerations

The mechanical properties ofaluminium are superior to thoseof tinplate. Aluminium offers abetter formability (e.g.,aluminium cans can beembossed and shaped), whichmay become a driving factor in

the choice of a bottler andtherefore of a can maker. Of allthe metallic cans, aluminiumones offer better printing quality.This may contribute to a bettermarketing of a brand ofbeverage. Brand owners woulduse aluminium for marketingreasons (launch of new productsand brands, re-positioning ofexisting failing brands, etc.) aswell as for some particulardesigns, colours and decorations,where tinplate cannot offer thesame appearance as aluminium.Finally, aluminium cans offermore brightness and metalliceffects, which reportedly play asignificant role in attracting theconsumer.

- Environmental considerations

Environmental reasons, inparticular recycling and theresulting high value ofaluminium scrap, keepaluminium and tinplate wellapart. As opposed to tinplatecans, used aluminium beveragecans are more attractive to thealuminium mills as they areuncontaminated metallurgicallyand can be re-melted to becomeagain aluminium cans. Tinplatecans have been regarded as lessattractive to recycle, asaluminium has a greater scrapvalue, which enters into play inthe perception of the consumerand most importantly in theeconomics of can manufacturing.

- Price factors

The deciding factor for thechoice of can makers is not onlythe relative price of the metal. In

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their choice, can makers are notonly driven by own costconsiderations, but also by twoother factors, that is, the demandof their customers, the bottlers,on the one hand, and theirexisting infrastructure of canmanufacturing lines, on the other(all the can makers have a mix ofaluminium and tinplate lines,although in differentproportions). Bottlers showpreferences for one or the othermetal, according to endogenous(i.e., marketing) or exogenousparameters (i.e., recyclingconstraints or incentives). Thus,can makers are not free in theirchoice of material, but have toaccommodate their customers’requirements and their ownprofitability.

One could argue that because oftheir ability to respond tochanges in relative prices, canmakers would produce moretinplate cans and feweraluminium cans on their existinglines, in case of a supra-competitive increase in the priceof aluminium. In response to thisargument, it has to be consideredthat the ability of can makers toswitch from one metal to theother is constrained by thedemand stemming from theircustomers, the bottlers. Asexplained above, the latter placeorders for a mix of aluminiumand tinplate cans, or in somecountries, for aluminium cansonly (all-aluminium countries).Since they pay practically thesame price for their cans,irrespective of the material used,their choice of the material is notdriven by cost considerations but

by other factors, as thosementioned above (marketing,environmental, etc.). For the canmakers to replace aluminiumcans with tinplate cans, they willhave to persuade their customersto accept this change. However,the bottlers will not accept this,primarily because of their ownreasons (marketing, environ-mental) and secondarily becausethey pay almost the same pricefor both types of cans.Therefore, the argument that canmakers may switch theiraluminium lines into theproduction of tinplate cans is notrelevant, as it does not considerwhether, independently of theprohibitive switching costs, thebottlers would accept such aswitch for cost reasons.

The Commission’s investigationhas shown that the relative pricesof aluminium and tinplate canbody sheet do not track eachother. Aluminium is morevolatile than steel and showsprice variations that are notreflected in the price of tinplate.The Commission examined theprice evolution of the twomaterials over the last sevenyears and concluded thataluminium has not beenconstrained by the relative priceof tinplate, but rather followedthe London Metal Exchange(LME) trends.

One could also argue that canmakers have switched fromaluminium to tinplate in the past,as a result of variations in theprice of aluminium. Indeed, twocan makers switched six lines totinplate, in 1996, as a result of a

price increase in aluminium.Because of the exceptionalcircumstances that prevailed inthe LME aluminium prices atthat time, the Commission didnot consider the 1996 switchesas being characteristic of anyprice competition between thetwo raw materials. Further to theMemorandum of Understandingbetween aluminium producingcountries of 1994, the LMEentered into a sharp anduncontrolled price increase ofmore than 50% compared to thelevels prevailing in 1993. As theprice of primary aluminiumsurged, the attractiveness oftinplate was enhanced. As aresult, six can lines in the UKand Italy were converted fromaluminium to steel. Theseconversions were neither easynor irreversible. They are,indeed, an isolated case and nofurther conversions of lines hastaken place since that date.These conversions weremotivated by the steep andartificial increase of the LMEprice and, in some way, theyreflected the discontentment ofend users of aluminium towardswhat they perceived as apermanent aluminium over-pricing. Given the exceptionalcircumstances prevailingbetween 1994 and 1996 (i.e., thesignificant price increase of theLME), these conversions of lineswere not characteristic of thedynamics of the can maker’schoice between aluminium andtinplate can body stock. Wouldthe LME prices have increasedby 5% to 10% (as they had inprevious years), it would bedoubtful whether such

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conversions would haveoccurred. Can makers questionedabout the economics of theswitches said that the decision toswitch lines was a major long-term business decision, whichhad very significant costimplications and which had to betaken with up to 12 months lead-time.

It can be concluded from theforegoing that the conversion oflines from aluminium to tinplate,and vice-versa, was not an easyalternative for can makers incase of an increase in the relativecosts of metals. Conversionshave occurred in the past underexceptional circumstances andhave probably helped canmakers to increase their leveragein their negotiations withaluminium producers. However,they are neither likely toconstitute a common feature ofthe market nor a credible threatto suppliers to defeat ordiscourage a 5% to 10% priceincrease in aluminium can bodystock.

- Manufacturing costs

The relative prices of the metalsare not the only indicators oftheir relative competitiveness.Can makers must also take intoaccount the can manufacturingcost of each metal, that is, thecost associated with theproduction of a beverage can.The cost structure of canmanufacturing contains featuresthat tend to equalise the finalcost for both metals,notwithstanding the significant

initial price difference in theinput metal.

In general, aluminium canmanufacturing cost is only 3% to5% higher than tinplate canmanufacturing cost, although theprice of aluminium can bodystock may be 30% higher thanthat of tinplate. The differingcost structure is due to severaladvantages that aluminiumpresents in its transformationprocess. The most important are:decoration and coating, wheretinplate requires extra internalcoating and extra externaldecoration; utilities, wheretinplate costs are higher(although washer chemicals foraluminium are environmentallydifficult to handle); depreciationis lower for aluminium as fewermachines are used; spoilage andscrap value, where tinplate hashigher spoilage rates andaluminium has much higherscrap value; metal cost, wheretinplate is cheaper at deliverystage, but total costs are similar.

Aluminium producers, however,do not take their pricingdecisions on the basis of theircustomers’ manufacturing cost,but rather on the basis of themetal price that they will chargeto can makers. Thus, a givenincrease in the aluminium canbody stock price does not implythe same increase in themanufacturing cost of beveragecans. For instance, a 5% to 10%price increase in aluminium canbody stock will result in a 3% to7% increase in the cost ofmanufacturing an aluminiumbeverage can. This is so because

several items in the aluminiumcan manufacturing cost structurecan compensate the higher priceof aluminium. For example,aluminium entails lowermanufacturing costs than tinplateand, more particularly, it has amuch higher scrap value thantinplate. Overall, a price increasebetween 5% to 10%, and theresulting lower increase in themanufacturing cost, would notnecessarily be defeated by aswitch of can makers to tinplate.

Overall, the Commission’sinvestigation has shown thataluminium presents objectivecharacteristics that detach it frompossible competition fromtinplate; that aluminium andtinplate can body stock prices donot track each other neither dothey present any pricecorrelation; that switching canmanufacturing lines to tinplate isnot easy and when it happened itwas prompted by an exceptionalincrease in the price ofaluminium; that the loss ofdemand for aluminium generatedby such switches was too smallcompared to the percentage ofthe price increase; and thataluminium suppliers can pricediscriminate against can makers.For all these reasons, theCommission took the view thataluminium and tinplate can bodysheet form two separate productmarkets.

3. The assessment of the Norfjoint venture (Alcan/VAW)

Another crucial feature in theCommission’s analysis was theexistence of Aluminium Norf

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GmbH (“Norf”), a 50:50 jointventure rolling mill betweenAlcan and VAW, which wouldhave become APA’s immediatecompetitor after the merger.

One could argue that Norf is nota classical production jointventure but a time sharingfacility, which would not restrictcompetition between the parentcompanies as a result of themerger. It has been structured insuch a way, as to minimise theinformation flow between theparents. Thus, one parent couldnot anticipate the competitiveactions of the other.Competitively sensitiveinformation, i.e., information onthe parents’ own customer bases,selling prices, quantities offinished product delivered, etc.,is out of the scope of the jointventure, and therefore remainsout of the parents’ reach.Moreover, as the final productdifferentiation may take place ata later stage for certain productsand could even be done at millsother than Norf (e.g.,lithographic sheet), ultimatelyone parent could not know theexact product mix nor thediffering cost basis of the otherparent. Finally, since the Norfarrangements do not involveprofit sharing between Alcan andVAW, it is not rational for theparents to engage in collusivebehaviour.

The Commission considered thatthe degree of interdependencestemming from the jointoperation of Norf prevents itfrom qualifying as a simple timesharing facility. In substance,

Norf operates as a productionjoint venture. The Commission'sanalysis took into account theco-operative aspects of its jointoperation, in particular, thegoverning principle of consensusbetween the parents, resultingfrom the various agreementsconcerning the operation ofNorf. The large amount ofindustrial co-operation to beachieved between the parents isan indication that the degree ofintegration of the parents in Norfgoes beyond what could becharacterised as a time sharingfacility. Norf is the only rollingmill joint venture world-wide10.When it was set up, it wasconsidered to be a rather riskyproject as it was alreadygenerally accepted that it couldonly be operated at a sufficientlevel of efficiency if both parentswould ‘pool together’. At Norf,there are joint productionfacilities and one single labourforce serving the needs of bothparents in the same way. Interms of the costs pertaining tothe operation of Norf, it has, sofar, been in the interest of bothparents to reduce them by

10 There exists another rolling mill

joint venture between Alcan andARCO in Logan, USA. However,this is not comparable to Norf inmany respects. First, ARCO hasdivested its aluminium activities andthe Logan mill is only managed byAlcan; second, the Logan mill ismuch smaller in scale and thereforeless complicated to operate thanNorf; and third, Logan can onlyproduce can body and end stockand, therefore, even if it were jointlyrun, it would not entail such acomplex management of twodifferent competitive product mixes.

maximising the utilisation of theassets. Although each parentdetermines its product mix byhimself, the required productionprocess is determined by theNorf management. For example,the production routing of allproducts being manufactured atNorf is evaluated by thecommon technical staff of thejoint venture. At Norf, there isone common departmentresponsible for determining theproduction sequences for bothparents, which makes itstechnical findings available toboth parents. According to manyanalysts, it would not have madeeconomic sense to jointly buildand operate Norf if a certain FRPtype produced by one of theparents would be produceddifferently by the other parent.

At Norf, there are severaldedicated production lines(including both the hot and coldmilling process and the finishingmachines, such as the slitters) forthe various types of FRPs thatNorf can produce. Thededication of lines stems fromthe common interest of bothparents to reduce their commoncosts. Therefore, up to now,there have been joint programsby the parents to reduce, throughstandardisation, the number ofalloys and specifications used inthe production of various typesof FRPs. Such a commonapproach responds to theexpectation by the parents that itshould lead to the minimisationof complexity costs and to thegeneration of economies ofscale. The current optimisationat Norf is based upon the

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suggestions made by the Norfmanagement to the parents. Theparents will then agree on suchstandardisation, in the interest ofmaximising the utilisation of theassets and of minimising costs.Finally, investments in Norf andthe determination of the propertechnology have, so far, beenjointly agreed by both parents.

For the foregoing reasons, it canbe concluded that the Norf jointventure is not a time-sharingfacility. Consequently, theCommission considered that thepresence of the two largest EEAproducers of FRPs in a jointstructure which manufacturesproducts in which the mergedfirm would acquire importantmarket positions, might posecompetition problems. Thesewould stem from the legalstructure of Norf and theresulting de facto co-operationbetween the parents; from thestrong dependence of VAW onNorf and its capacity constraintsin other rolling mills; from thepossibility of Alcan to vetoinvestments proposed by VAW;and from the ability of themerged firm to raise VAW’scosts and hence decrease itsability to compete. Overall, theasymmetrical capacityconstraints in favour of themerged firm, and the crediblethreat of retaliation on VAWwould have created a situationwhere collusion among theparents of Norf would besustainable in the long run. Thissituation is analysed here below.

Firstly, the legal structure atNorf requires a constant

consensus-based co-operationbetween the parents. For Norf tobe able to effectively continue itsoperations after the merger, theparents would have to agree onseveral aspects concerning theproduction process. This wouldhave increased the transparencyand predictability in thecompetitive strategies of theparents. For instance, technicaland financial co-operationbetween the parents would havebeen necessary in order to carryout, under unanimous decision-making, the implementation ofbusiness plans. Not only majorinvestments would have requiredthe consent of both parents, butalso routine operations wouldhave created opportunities forco-operation (e.g., maintenanceand modernisation works). Theargument concerning thelimitations to the exchange ofinformation between the parentsdisregarded the differencebetween a pre-merger situationand a post-merger one. Thequestion was whether thecompetitive situation wouldchange following the proposedmerger. In that respect, one mayargue on an ex-post basis, that ina pre-merger situation theexchange of information did notprevent two joint venturepartners from competingeffectively with each other. Bycontrast, the post-merger relationbetween the same parents is amatter of the future, to beassessed in the context of themarket structure likely to prevailfollowing a notifiedconcentration. In the presentcase, after the merger, for Norfto be able to effectively continue

its operations, the merged firmand VAW would have to agreeon several aspects concerningthe production process.

Secondly, the merger would alterVAW’s incentives to compete.Ultimately, VAW would havemore incentives to align itscompetitive behaviour on that ofthe merged firm rather thancompete aggressively against it.This stemmed from thecombination of two factors:VAW’s strong dependence onthe output of Norf and itscapacity constraints, on the onehand, and the possibility ofAlcan vetoing expansion orother investments (the latter inconjunction with theovercapacity of the merged firm,which would have the largestunder-utilised rolling capacity inthe EEA), on the other hand.

VAW was found to be totallydependent on Norf for a numberof FRPs (beverage can bodystock and end stock, lithographicsheet, brazing sheet, etc.). Priorto the merger, Alcan was alsodependent on Norf; howeverafter the completion of the APAmerger, the combined entitywould no longer depend on Norf,as additional hot rolling capacitywould be brought along by theother merging partner. If VAWdecided to compete fiercelyagainst the merged firm with aview to capturing additionalmarket share, it would need toincrease its rolling capacity.Thus, VAW would need to reachan agreement with the mergedfirm. The latter could haveblocked such an investment if it

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had perceived that this wouldenable VAW to compete againstit.

Thirdly, economic theory sug-gests that the firms’ asymme-trical capacity constraints affectthe degree of collusion in theshort run, as well as in the longrun. This is further enhancedthrough the possibility of acredible threat of retaliation. Inthe APA cases, the existence ofasymmetric capacity in favour ofthe merged entity and theexistence of de facto punishmentmechanisms, stemming from thefunctioning of Norf, wouldaffect the incentive of VAW toengage in a price war.

The condition relating to theasymmetry of capacityconstraints was illustrated by thefact that the merged firm wouldhave the largest over-capacity inthe EEA. The condition relatingto the credible threat ofretaliation was illustrated by theasymmetry in the degree ofdependence of VAW and themerged firm on Norf. Themerger would enable the mergedfirm to raise rival VAW’s costs.Because of the additional rollingmills it would acquire from itsmerging partners, the mergedfirm would be more flexible onthe supply-side to shiftproduction to and from Norfthan was the situation for Alcanprior to the merger. Therefore,the merged firm could increaseVAW’s costs at Norf while re-organising its production aroundthe merged firm’s new rollingsystem (it was announced thatsuch a post-merger re-

organisation would result in costsavings of several hundredmillion dollars). Ultimately, thebenefit of raising VAW’s costsis that VAW would be forced tocharge higher prices tocustomers, and this wouldincrease the demand for themerged firm’s output, thusenabling it to raise the prices.Alternatively, if VAW decidednot to increase its prices, itwould suffer a decrease in itsprofitability.

The way in which the mergedfirm could increase VAW’s costswhile re-organising its productmix at Norf could be describedas follows. As mentioned above,the functioning of Norf is basedon the common optimisation ofthe parents’ product mix. Anychange in the product mix islikely to alter the cost situation atNorf. Under certain circum-stances, the change in the coststructure may be more harmfulfor one parent than for the other.For instance, as the costs to beborne by each partner are basedon the factual level of utilisationof the facilities, should themerged firm decide to re-distribute some FRPs away fromNorf, or to replace certain FRPswith others, VAW would have tobear the costs arising out of theunused capacity, dispropor-tionately. Any change in theproduct mix of Norf wouldimpact on the operation of theproduction process and of theaccompanying equipment (i.e.,cast house, types of alloys, scrapchain, number of passes,finishing equipment, etc.). Thiswould disturb the cost sharing

equilibrium on the basis ofwhich Norf has been able tooptimally function to date.Additionally, in the day-to-dayoperation of Norf, the parentcompanies would have to pooltogether to work efficiently. Thediminution of the relativecommitment by one parentwould impact negatively on theprofitability of the other. GivenVAW’s strong dependence onNorf, it was more likely that arelaxation of the merged firm’scommitment to Norf would raiseVAW’s costs and affect itsability to compete.

However, one could contest theeconomic rationale of such anattempt to raise the otherpartner’s costs so as to weakenits competitive position post-merger. A strategy consisting inraising rivals’ costs would besound if the deterioration of therival’s cost basis were greaterthan that of the merged firm’s. Inthe APA cases, a re-allocation ofthe product mix of Norf wouldnot make economic sense if ithad as a result to leave themerged firm’s share of Norfunutilised, as this would amountto a severe opportunity cost.Thus, a change in the productmix of Norf, or the re-distribution of certain productsaway from Norf, would have tobe compensated by keeping Norfre-loaded. The Commissioncalculated the impact on themarginal cost of VAW and ofAPA as a result of the re-allocation of two of the affectedproduct markets (i.e., lithogra-phic sheet and beverage canbody stock) away from Norf and

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the re-loading of Norf by othertypes of FRPs. In the case oflithographic sheet, it wasestimated that both parents’marginal costs would increaseand that VAW’s costs wouldincrease slightly more incomparison to those of themerged firm. In the case of otherFRP types, in particular,beverage can body stock, theincrease would be more sharpfor VAW, as the re-allocation ofthat product away from Norfwould have resulted in costsavings for the merged firm anda cost increase for VAW.Overall, the resulting costdifference to the detriment ofVAW would have been quiteimportant (between 5% and10%).

The Commission did not agreewith the argument that a costpunishment on VAW wouldinflict a dissuasive cost increaseto the merged entity. Under bothre-allocation scenarios in thepreceding paragraph, VAW’scost penalty was bigger that themerged firm’s. Nor could theCommission accept that VAW’scost variation was too small toprevent it from competingaggressively. The marginsachieved in the rolling businessare minimal. Therefore, a smallscale variation in the cost basismay have significantconsequences on thecompetitiveness of a producer.As a result, VAW would not bekeen to engage in a price war. Itwould, on the contrary, align itsbehaviour on that of the mergedfirm, in the expectation tomaximise its profits at a given

output through higher pricesrather than higher market share.

In addition to that, and quiteapart from the situation ofdependency of VAW vis-à-visNorf, the fact remained that anyattempt on the part of either thenew entity or VAW to gainmarket share at the expense ofeach other would necessarilyhave an immediate effect on therate of capacity utilisation andthe product mix at Norf andconsequently on the coststructure of both parties. Thevery existence of Norf thusmodified the incentives of theparties to compete. Furthermore,the very fact that the cost basisof all FRP types manufactured atNorf would be the same for bothparties, diminishes, by itself, theamount of price competition thatthe parties could realisticallyimplement vis-à-vis each other.

Furthermore, the merged firmand VAW competed with eachother in a multitude of othermarkets. The prospects forretaliation in such other markets,stemming from multi-marketcontacts, could provide a furtherrational reason for the alignmentof strategies between the mergedfirm and VAW.

As a consequence of theforegoing elements, theCommission considered that theexistence of Norf wouldsignificantly reduce competitionbetween the merged firm andVAW. In accordance with theapproach which must befollowed in the context ofmerger control, the Commission

assumed the most rational courseof action which, in the marketsanalysed in the APA cases,would be the alignment of thecompetitive strategies of themerged firm and VAW.

4. Undertakings that wereunable to form the basis foran authorisation inAlcan/Pechiney

In order to address theCommission’s concerns as to thecohabitation of APA and VAWin the Norf joint venture, theparties proposed to remain ajoint partner in Norf, inexchange for loosening the jointventure link. The partiesproposed undertakings in orderto remove (i) the concerns aboutthe flow of confidentialinformation between the parentcompanies, by putting in placeconfidentiality obligations andfirewalls between the parties andVAW; (ii) the concerns aboutAlcan’s possibility to raiseVAW’s costs by changing itsproduct mix at Norf, byproposing to amend the currentNorf cost allocation formula soas to ensure that no action of theparties would negatively affectthe costs to be borne by VAW atNorf; and (iii) the concernsabout Alcan’s right to blockinvestments aiming at expandingVAW’s capacity at Norf, byproposing to amend theprovisions relating to capacityexpansions and allow any partyto expand capacity at Norfunilaterally.

Overall, the parties offeredundertakings which provided for

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the amendment of its existingjoint venture agreements withVAW. However, theseundertakings could not beperformed by the parties alonebut could only be implementedwith the prior agreement ofVAW. Besides the fact that theseundertakings were not self-executing, the Commission didnot consider them able toeliminate the risk of collusion atNorf. Firstly, the undertakingrelating to the veto right oninvestments concerned onlyinvestments related to theinstallation of new facilities atNorf (i.e., a new rolling mill).All the remaining investmentswere not caught by theundertaking (i.e., de-bottlenecking of currentcapacities, maintenance work,modernisation of workingmethods and other day-to-dayimprovements). Moreover, theundertaking was qualified, inthat the parties would not vetoany expansion by VAWprovided that such expansionwould not “adversely affect theexisting operations of the otherparty at Alunorf”. This provisionwould be subject tointerpretation and highly likelyto give rise to vivid discussionsbetween the parties and VAW.Secondly, as to the undertakingto put in place “stringentconfidentiality procedures” atNorf, the Commissionconsidered that besides the factthat such ‘firewalls’ could not beeffectively monitored, anyconfidentiality procedures withrespect to production schedulesand sales forecasts couldadversely affect the functioning

and competitiveness of Norf.Indeed, if the parent companieswere selective as to theinformation they would pass onto the Norf production staff, thenNorf could not co-ordinate andoptimise its production processin advance but would have towait for each individual orderput by the parents up to the totalcapacity which they are entitledto use. Consequently, nostandardisation with respect tothe alloys, routing or otherproduction processes would bepossible, due to the fact that noforecast business plan could beestablished. Ultimately, thiswould harm only VAW, asAPA’s relative dependence onNorf would be reduced after themerger owing to the other rollingmills that the merging partnerwould bring together.

Overall, the clearest undertakingwould be the disposal of Alcan’s50% stake in Norf. This,however, appeared to be adifficult task for Alcan andeventually led the Commissionto consider a prohibitiondecision. Prior to its adoption,Alcan and Pechiney decided toput an end to their merger plansand formally withdrew theirnotification.

5. The product marketdefinition and thecompetitive assessment inAlcoa/Reynolds

The last of the aluminiummergers the Commission had todecide on was the mergerbetween U.S. aluminiumproducers Alcoa and Reynolds.

This case raised interestingissues in terms of both productmarket definition andcompetitive assessment ofmergers. These issues wereraised in the analysis of thesmelter-grade alumina market.

Smelter-grade alumina (SGA) isa raw material to produceprimary aluminium. It is a whitepowder that comes out of therefining process of bauxite. SGAis then smelted into aluminiummetal, through an electrolysisprocess that takes place inaluminium smelters.

The Commission found thatsome of the aluminiumproducers in the world, such asthe parties to the merger, areintegrated vertically, frombauxite mining, alumina refiningand aluminium smelting, to theproduction of FRPs and otherfinished aluminium products.The vertical integration in thisindustry suggested that there aretwo types of demand for SGA: acaptive demand (i.e., aluminaconsumed internally byintegrated firms) and a merchantdemand (i.e., surplus aluminathat is not used internally byintegrated firms and which ismade available for sales to third,non-integrated, parties). Three-quarters of total aluminaproduction is used captively. TheCommission conducted adetailed investigation to checkwhether such ‘captive’ aluminacould be diverted to the‘merchant’ market, in case of a5% to 10% increase in the priceof ‘merchant’ alumina. Theresults of the investigation

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suggested that this would not bethe case, notably because of thehuge economic penalty thatintegrated aluminium producerswould incur by reducing thelevel of SGA supplies to theirown smelters. Based on itscalculations, the Commissionfound that the opportunity costof unutilised smelter capacitywould be higher than anypossible profits stemming from adiversion of ‘captive’ SGA tothird-party sales. As aconsequence, the Commissionconsidered that since ‘captive’SGA is out of the scope of the‘market’, it could not influencecompetition in the market for thesales of SGA to third parties and,therefore, decided to exclude itfrom the relevant productmarket. The latter wouldcomprise only merchant SGA,that is alumina which is indeedthe object of sales and thereforeof price negotiation. It is in thisarea that the Commissiondecided to investigate the effectsof the merger.

The Commission then examinedthe conditions under which SGA‘merchant’ sales are made.Supplies of SGA to third partiesare made either through long-term contracts (usually rangingfrom 5-10 years) or through spotsales (contracts than run for lessthan a year). The former aremotivated by the desire ofsmelters to ensure in advance asatisfactory level of SGA supplyover a long period of time. Thelatter are sales made mainly toRussian, CIS and Chinesesmelters, as well as to othersmelters that may run into

temporary shortage of rawmaterial. Quite importantly, thespot sales are made at a certainprice, which reflect theconditions of supply and demandin the SGA market. The shortestthe SGA market, the higher thespot price, and vice-versa. As aconsequence, the spot marketwas often used as a referenceprice for the negotiation (or re-negotiation) of long-termcontracts and as a reliableindicator of supply and demandequilibrium.

One could argue that, since theCommission excluded from therelevant product market ‘captive’SGA sales, on the basis thatthese cannot influence thecompetitive conditions on thefree market, it should alsoexclude from the relevantproduct market long-termcontracts of ‘merchant’ SGA,since future SGA productioncommitted under long-termcontracts will not becomeavailable for sales to the freemarket for a long period of time.This argument could be true, iflong-term contracts contained afixed-price mechanism.However, the great majority oflong-term contracts featured aprice range, which allowed theircounterparts to re-negotiate themthroughout their duration.11 The

11 The Commission identified one

long-term contract which featured afixed-price with up-front payment.The quantity of SGA concerned wasobviously out of the scope ofcompetition in this market. As aconsequence, the Commission didnot include the corresponding SGA

price range is a percentage of thedaily aluminium LME quotation(e.g., 11% to 14% of LME).Such contracts include a put-callclause and the seller or the buyermay exercise their optionaccording to the LME price,their own financial position and,most importantly, according tothe conditions of supply anddemand in the SGA market (i.e.,long or short market). This priceflexibility, built into such long-term contracts, led theCommission to consider thatthere is still scope to exercisemarket power throughout theduration of such contracts.

The existence of the spot sales,as an indicator of thecompetitive situation in SGA,was one of the most importantfeatures of the Commission’sanalysis of the merger. TheCommission found that the spotprice was very sensitive to SGAoutput variations and that a smallcutback in SGA productioncould heavily influence the spotprices and, ultimately, theput/call mechanics built into thelong-term contracts.12 The nexttask was, therefore, to examinewhether the merged firm wouldhave, as a result of the merger,the possibility of unilaterallyprovoking variations in SGA

quantity in its calculation of therelevant product market.

12 This conclusion was also supportedby a real-life experiment : anexplosion in an alumina refinery inthe U.S.A., in July 1999, reducedthe amount of world-wide SGAoutput by 2%, which in turn led toan immediate increase in the spotprice of 34%.

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output, thus exercising marketpower in the negotiation or re-negotiation of long-termcontracts.

The merger would bring togethera series of alumina refineriesbelonging to Alcoa andReynolds. The most importantelement in this respect was thatthe merger would bring underthe control of the merged firmalumina refineries located in thelowest end of the alumina costcurve.13 Moreover, Reynoldswould bring in a refinery locatedat the highest end of the costcurve. The Commission was,therefore, led to examinewhether the control of the topand bottom ends of the aluminacost curve by the merged firm -which would also become thelargest SGA producer world-wide - would confer it the abilityto control the economics of themarket, notably through thepossibility to deter entry orexpansion by competing aluminarefineries.

According to the base-loadfacility theory, the control oflow-cost plants would confer theability to bring spot prices down,through capacity or outputexpansions, whereas accordingto the swing-facility theory, thecontrol of high-cost plants wouldconfer the ability to raise pricesthrough shut-downs. These twotheories featured in the

13 The four refineries located in the

Darling Range, a geographic area inAustralia, where Alcoa controlledthree and Reynolds one refinery,respectively

Commission’s analysis, whichconcluded that the merged firmcould, by a mere announcementthat it will increase or decreaseits SGA output, influence thespot prices and therefore thelong-term contacts mechanics.As a result, the merged firmcould ‘regulate’ the entry orexpansion of competing SGAproducers. For instance, eachtime a competitor intended toincrease capacity, the mergedfirm could announce an increasein its output. This would be acredible threat, since bycontrolling the base-loadfacilities, the merged firm couldexpand its capacities at a verylow cost. This would, in turn,bring the SGA spot price down,and as a result it would affect thenet present value of the plannedinvestment of rival firms.Ultimately, the lower return oninvestment would discourage orat least postpone the rivals’planned expansions.

Inversely, by controlling theswing facilities, the merged firmwould have the ability to raiseSGA prices independently of itscompetitors or customers, bytemporarily closing them down.From a corporate finance pointof view, such a temporary shut-down of high-cost refineriescould only be profitable to themerged firm, since on top of thebenefit of idling a low-margin orunprofitable plant, this wouldalso ensure increased margins atthe level of the low-costfacilities. However, mostimportantly, the increase in theSGA spot prices would benefitthe merged firm in relation to the

price negotiation (or re-negotiation) of long-term SGAsupplies, of which it controlledthe largest part world-wide.

On the basis of the above, theCommission concluded that theacquisition of Reynolds byAlcoa would confer upon themerged firm the ability toexercise market power in themerchant market for SGA. Inorder to alleviate these concerns,the parties agreed to divest thetwo critical refineries thatReynolds would contribute to themerger, namely, the low-costWorseley refinery in the DarlingRange (Australia) and the high-cost refinery in Sherwin, Texas(USA). This remedy removedcompletely the overlap in theSGA market and restored thecompetitive conditions prevai-ling before the merger.

It would be unfair not to mentionthat this successful mergerreview and remedial action wasconducted by DG COMP’sMerger Task Force in close co-operation with the AntitrustDivision of the U.S. Departmentof Justice. The intensity of theco-operation, which the mergingparties welcomed and assisted byproviding relevant waivers forthe exchange of information,should serve as an excellentexample of the way in whichforeign antitrust agencies willhave to co-operate in theframework of the growingglobalisation of the economy.

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On 15 Mai 2000, theCompetition Directorate-Generalclosed its examination of anagreement concluded under theaegis of the EuropeanCommittee of Manufacturers ofElectrical Machines and PowerElectronics (CEMEP) andnotified between January andApril 2000 by some of theparticipants14. In general, theagreement aims at improving theenergy efficiency of the productsmanufactured and sold by theparties. The examinationrevealed that the agreement wasnot capable of appreciablyrestricting competition and theparties have been informedaccordingly through anadministrative letter15.

The CEMEP agreement aims atgearing the EU market towardshigher efficiency motors therebysaving energy in their operation.These environmental objectivesare similar to those of anagreement regarding domesticwashing machines notified byCECED and ultimately

14 OJ C 74 of 15.3.2000, p.5.15 IP/00/508 of 23.5.2000.

exempted by the Commission16.However similar the objectives,the Commission concluded thatthe CECED agreement wascaught by the prohibition ofArticle 81, paragraph 1, thoughfulfilling the conditions for anexemption. A comparisonbetween both cases illustratestherefore how the restrictions bywhich a similar environmentalobjective is attained aredeterminant in the assessment ofthis type of horizontalagreements under Article 81,paragraph 1.

The CEMEP agreementconcerns Standardised lowvoltage motors (“SLVmotors”)17. SLV motors arewidely used for pumps,ventilators and compressors. Inaddition to monitoring assuredby CEMEP, the agreement

16 Commission decision of 24.1.2000

(not yet published). EC CompetitionPolicy Newsletter, February 2000,p.13.

17 Motors covered by the CEMEPagreement are defined as totallyenclosed, fan ventilated, three phaseA.C. squirrel cage induction motorsranging from 1.1 to 90 kW with 2 or4 poles, rated for 400 V-line, 50 Hz,S1 duty class in standard design.

consists basically of twocommitments:(a) By 31.12.2000 at the latest,

SLV motors covered by theCEMEP agreement will beclassified under efficiencyclasses 1 (high), 2 or 3based upon objectivecriteria. The information onthe efficiency class must bemade available incatalogues and rating platesusing a common logo. Suchlabelling element waspresent as well in theCECED agreement, whichwas however based onexisting EC labelling ofwashing machines pursuantto Commission directive(EC) 95/12/CE18.

(b) Taking 1998 and 1999 asreference years for,respectively, 4-pole and 2-pole SLV motors underclass 3, the parties committhemselves to jointlyreducing by at least 50%their joint sales ofefficiency class 3 SLVmotors in the EC by31.12.2003. A joint target isalso set forth in the CECEDagreement, though defineddifferently, i.e. a weightedaverage of energy efficiencyfor all the products sold(0.24 kWh/Kg load)19.

18 OJ L 136 of 21.6.1995, p. 1.19 The technical definition is

interchangeable in practical terms:changes in the composition of jointsales under various energy-efficiency categories, result in a newweighted average efficiency and a

Horizontal agreements on energyefficiency of appliances : acomparison between CECED andCEMEP

By Manuel MARTÍNEZ-LÓPEZ, DG COMP-F-1

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Unlike CECED, parties tothe CEMEP agreementenjoy considerable discre-tion as to how theycontribute to the attainmentof the joint target.

The parties to the CEMEPagreement hold a majorproportion (80%) of the ECmarket, like CECED’s (95%). Inboth agreements, futureparticipation by non-members isunrestricted. Both agreementsaffect mainly the composition ofoutput, not the total amount ofsuch output. However, theachievement of the CECEDtarget results mainly fromindividual obligations placed onthe parties as to their productionand sales of different energyclasses. As a matter of fact, theCommission singled out in itsCECED decision the individualcommitment not to manufactureor import machines pertaining tocertain energy-efficiency classesas having as its object therestriction of competition, also inregard, notably, to the parties’market share, the non negligibleshare of output directlyconcerned, likely price increasesin the short run and theimportance of the energy-efficiency class as a productattribute in the marketconcerned. In other words,competition actually takes placeon energy-efficiency to a non-negligible extent and theCECED agreement provides

new weighted average efficiency isnecessarily brought about bychanges in such composition, ceterisparibus.

each party with the certainty thatcompetitors will not meetdemand for lower efficiencymachines.

Parties to the CEMEP agreementnotified to the Commission arenot bound by similarcommitments as to theirindividual behaviour in themarket regarding production andsales. Beside the scope of theprovisions, their economiccontext is also different. There isno widely established definitionof energy efficiency of SLVspresent in the market and,accordingly, competition doesnot appreciably take place onthis product characteristic.CEMEP actually makes visible aproduct attribute which allowsfor product differentiation. Incontrast, the definition andlabelling of energy-efficientwashing machines was alreadyclaerly established and oftenstressed in advertising when theCECED agreement was enteredinto. The magnitude of parties’production subject to technicalupgrading in CEMEP is 2.5times higher than in CECED,since class 3 SLV motorscurrently account for 70% oftotal EC sales. However, therange of price increases whichcould be expected from suchupgrading is considerably lower.SLV motors are furthermorepurchased by industrial users.Moreover, third party productionand imports not subject to theagreement, which could act as acompetitive constraint, play agreater role in the SLV marketthan in that for washingmachines.

In view of the foregoing andconsistent with the assessmentthat the agreement could begranted negative clearance, it isnot necessary to examinewhether the conditions of Article81, paragraph 3 are fulfilled and,in particular, whether theCEMEP agreement contributesto technical and economicprogress and whether a fair shareof the benefits resulting fromimproved environmentalconditions accrue to consumers.Both this conclusion and theanalysis in this case are fully inline with similar cases dealt within recent past20.

20 See cases COMP/37.231 ACEA (IP

98/865 of 16.10.1998), 37.634JAMA and 37.612 KAMA (IP99/922 1.12.1999).

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On 30 March 2000, theCommission, applying Article 7of Regulation 870/95,21 decidednot to oppose exemption of theGrand Alliance consortiumagreement. This decision was thelast decision to be taken underRegulation 870, bringing thetotal number of exemptionsgranted under that regulation toeleven. The block exemptionprovided for in Regulation 870has subsequently been renewedby Regulation No 823/2000,22

with minor amendments, for afurther period of five years. Inaccordance with the transitionalarrangements provided for inRegulation 823, the GrandAlliance will benefit fromexemption for the life of thatRegulation; i.e. until April 2005.The Grand Alliance consortiumcomprises the carriers Hapag-Lloyd Container Linie GmbH,Malaysia International ShippingCorporation BHD (MISC),Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK),Orient Overseas Container LineLimited (OOCL) and P&ONedlloyd. Although the GrandAlliance operates joint linershipping services on severalmajor trade lanes, exemptionwas sought only for the 21 Commission Regulation 870/95 of

20 April 1995 – OJ No L89 of21.4.95, p. 7.

22 Commission Regulation (EC) No823/2000 of 19 April 2000 – OJ 20April 2000.

consortium’s service betweenports in Northern and SouthernEurope and ports in the Far East.

All Grand Alliance lines operatewithin the Far Eastern FreightConference (FEFC) on the FarEast trades. Article 6(1) ofRegulation 870 provided that aconsortium operating within aconference, in order to benefitautomatically from exemption,must possess a share of the directtrade between the range of portsit serves of less than 30%.23 Asthe Grand Alliance exceeded thisthreshold, 24 it applied forexemption under the simplifiedopposition procedure providedfor in Article 7 of theRegulation. Under thisprocedure, which has beenmaintained, with minoramendments, in Regulation 823,a consortium with a trade share25

exceeding the above thresholdbut below 50%, will be deemedexempt unless the Commissionraises objections within sixmonths of notification.

With regard to the GrandAlliance notification, oneelement gave the Commission

23 In Regulation 823, the words ‘trade’

and ‘trade share’ have been replacedby ‘market’ and ‘market share’.

24 The exact figure is confidential.25 Amended to ‘market share’ in

Regulation 823.

some cause for concern. TheFEFC lines together have asignificant share of the totalvolume carried by containervessel on the Far East trades.While independent linescertainly offer some competitionto the conference lines, it is notas strong as that provided byindependents on most othermajor trades. This, together withthe fact that individual servicecontracts – which provide someassurance of competitionbetween carriers – are not afeature of the Far East trades, ledthe Commission to request theGrand Alliance to supplement itsnotification with further andmore detailed evidence ofeffective competition.26

Following an extendedexamination, the Commissionwas finally satisfied that themembers of the consortium are,and will remain, subject toeffective competition. Evidencewas provided, inter alia, offrequent switching by shippersboth as between the members ofthe Grand Alliance and asbetween these lines and otherlines. The lines were also able toprovide proof of considerablefluctuation of the market sharesof the individual Grand Alliancelines over a relatively short time-span. Both of these elementsindicate that there is substantialcompetition on service, if not

26 It is a condition of exemption that

the consortium members are subjectto actual or potential effectivecompetition, either on price orservice or both (Article 5 ofRegulations 870 and 823).

The Grand AllianceBy Eric FITZGERALD, COMP-D-2

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price, between the consortiummembers and between theselines and outsiders (otherconference lines andindependents).

As the consortium clearlyfulfilled all other conditionsfor exemption set out inRegulation 870/95, the

Commission accordinglydecided not to opposeexemption.

Le 21 mars 2000, dans le cadredes procédures d’infractionsprésumées, la Commission adécidé de suivre les propositionsde la DG Concurrence et declasser cinq plaintes alléguantdes infractions notamment auxrègles de concurrence parcertains Etats membres(Autriche, Grèce) en matière dela réglementation des jeux dehasard.

Ces décisions étaient motivéesnotamment par les principesdécoulants de la jurisprudenceassez récente de la Cour dejustice (voir arrêts du 21septembre 1999 dans l’affaire C-124/97 Läärä concernant desmachines à sous et du 21 octobre1999 dans l’affaire C-67/98Zenatti concernant la collecte deparis). Selon cette jurisprudence,les Etats membres jouissentd’une large marge d’appréciationquant à l’organisation desactivités dans ce secteur et quantà la protection qu’ils souhaitentaccorder aux citoyens. En effet,

selon la Cour, une autorisationlimitée de ces jeux dans un cadreexclusif, qui présente l'avantagede canaliser l'envie de jouer etl'exploitation des jeux dans uncircuit contrôlé, de prévenir lesrisques d'une telle exploitation àdes fins frauduleuses etcriminelles et d'utiliser lesbénéfices qui en découlent à desfins d'utilité publique, s'inscritdans la poursuite des objectifsd’intérêt public. En outre, laquestion de savoir s’il estpréférable, plutôt que d'octroyerun droit exclusif d'exploitation àun organisme, d'adopter uneréglementation imposant auxopérateurs intéressés lesprescriptions nécessaires, relèvedu pouvoir d'appréciation desÉtats membres, sous réserve quele choix retenu n'apparaisse pasdisproportionné au regard du butrecherché.

Cette jurisprudence concernecertes l’interprétation des règlesdu marché intérieur et plusprécisément de la libre prestation

des services et non des règles deconcurrence. Néanmoins, laCommission doit en tenir compteen appréciant une plaintealléguant une violation desrègles de concurrencecommunautaires du fait de lamême législation nationale.Comme la Cour a en principeadmis une limitation de l’offredes jeux de hasard dans l’intérêtpublic ainsi que l’existence d’undroit exclusif dans le but decontrôle, la Commission ne peutconsidérer que les règles deconcurrence s’opposent à detelles circonstances. Enl’absence d’un abus identifiabled’une position dominante et detoute autre violation entraînéepar les droits spéciaux ouexclusifs en question, laCommission ne pouvait donnersuite aux plaintes susvisées.

Toute personne souhaitantprésenter une plainte à laCommission en cette matière estdésormais invitée à mettre enévidence l’abus de la positiondominante dans le chef del’entreprise détenant le droitexclusif ou spécial, faute de quoisa plainte est susceptible d’êtreclassée sans suite.

Plaintes contre des droits exclusifs enmatière de jeux de hasard rejetées

Par Maija LAURILA, DG COMP-D-3

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I – INTRODUCTION

The Commission exempted on10 May 2000 the Eurovisionsystem from 1993 until 2005.This is a new significant episodein the long and complicatedhistory of the Commission’sassessment of the Eurovisionsystem pursuant to article 81 ECwhich has been marked by theconflicting interests of Europeanpublic and commercialbroadcasters and the 1996 Courtof First Instance' s annulment ofthe Commission’s decisionwhich exempted the Eurovisionsystem.

This article intends to give anoverview of the Commission’sreasoning behind the just grantedexemption. The interpretationand the legal implications of theabove-mentioned ruling of theCourt of First Instance are notaddressed in this article.

II CHRONOLOGY/BACKGROUND

The European BroadcastingUnion (EBU) is an association ofradio and televisionorganisations which in particularco-ordinate televisionprogramme exchanges among itsactive members. In addition, in

the framework of Eurovision,EBU active members participatein the joint acquisition andsharing of sport rights. The EBUhas 68 active members in 49countries situated in theEuropean broadcasting area and50 associate members in 30countries outside the area. TheEBU members are the mainEuropean public broadcasters.

On 3 April 1989 the EuropeanBroadcasting Union (“EBU”)applied for negative clearance orfor exemption pursuant toArticle 81(3) of the EC Treatyfor the Eurovision system.

On 11 June 1993 theCommission adopted a decisionpursuant to Article 81(3) ECgranting a conditional exemptionuntil 25 February 1998 to thenotified EBU’s provisions. Theexemption was subject to a sub-licensing scheme of the EBU tothird parties of the jointlyacquired television rights tosport events.

On 11 July 1996 the CFIannulled the Commissiondecision following an appeal bya number of European televisionchannels27.

27 Metropole Télévision SA and Reti

Televisive Italiane SpA and

The EBU appealed the CFI’sruling before the Court of Justicebut withdrew it in May 2000.Therefore, the annulment of theCommission decision stands.

On 1st September 199928 theCommission published anArticle 19(3) Notice showing itsintention to exempt theEurovision system.

On 10 May 2000 theCommission adopted a decisionexempting the Eurovisionsystem pursuant to Article 81(3)from 1993 until 200529.

III THE NOTIFIEDARRANGEMENTS :THE EUROVISIONSYSTEM

The notified arrangements arethe so-called “Eurovisionsystem”, that is, the rules whichgovern within the EBU and theEurovision/Sports system: (1)the joint acquisition of televisionsports rights (2) the sharing ofjointly acquired television sportsrights (3) the exchange of thesignal for sport events (4) theaccess scheme for non EBUmembers to Eurovision sportsrights (5) The sublicensing rulesrelating to exploitation ofEurovision rights on pay-TVchannels.

Gestevisión Telecinco SA andAntena 3 de Televisión vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities, joint cases T-528/93,T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93,European Court Reports 1996, p. II-0649.

28 OJ C 248/4, 1.9.99.29 Not yet published.

THE COMMISSION’S ASSESSMENTOF THE EUROVISION SYSTEMPURSUANT TO ARTICLE 81 EC

Andrés FONT GALARZA, DG COMP-C-2

➣ ARTICLES


The parties made some changesto the notified arrangements.These changes, which are part ofthe notified Eurovision system,are the 1993 and the 1999 accessschemes for non-members.

1. The access scheme for nonEBU members toEurovision sports rights(1993)

Under the scheme submitted tothe Commission on 26 February1993, the EBU and its membersundertake to grant non-memberbroadcasters extensive access toEurovision sports programmesfor which the rights have beenacquired on an exclusive basisthrough collective negotiations.The 1993 scheme grants live anddeferred transmission rights tothird parties of jointly acquiredEurovision sports rights. Inparticular the non-EBU membershave significant access to theunused rights, i.e. for thetransmission of sport events forwhich an EBU member does nottransmit any part or only a minorpart of the sports event. Theterms and conditions of accessare freely negotiated between theEBU (for trans-nationalchannels), or the member(s) inthe country concerned (fornational channels), and the non-member. However, the EBU andits members will in nocircumstances grant lessfavourable access than isstipulated in these sublicensingrules.

2. The sublicensing rulesrelating to exploitation ofEurovision rights on pay-TV channels (1999)

As an addition to the generalrules on EBU non-members’access to Eurovision SportProgrammes adopted on24.02.1993, the EBU adoptedand submitted to theCommission on 26.03.1999 a setof sublicensing rules relating toexploitation of Eurovision rightson pay-TV channels.

Pursuant to the 1999 set of ruleswhen an EBU member transmitspart of a sports event on itsnational general programmechannel and part on its pay-TVchannel:- A non-EBU member has all

rights stemming from the1993 rules for thebroadcasting on its free-to-air or pay-TV channels, liveor deferred. In addition;

- A non-EBU member has theright to transmit on its pay-TV channel identical orcomparable competitions tothose presented on the EBUmember’s pay-TV channel.

The introduction of those 1999rules on pay TV by the EBU wasthe necessary consequence of theevolution of the Europeantelevision market which led theEBU members to enter thethematic channels’ segment.Digital technology offers thetechnical potential for more andmore such channels, and thelarge majority (if not the totality)of such further channels willcertainly be both thematic (in

terms of programming) and payTV (in terms of financing).Therefore, in the late 1990swhen the possibilities fortechnical delivery wereexploding and as a consequence,a multitude of different channelswere on offer and audiencesbecame more and morefragmented, the EBU membershad to adapt and to diversifytheir programming offeraccordingly with thematicchannels. In this context, the1999 access scheme becamenecessary in order to ensure thatthe joint acquisition origin of theEBU’s rights would not unfairlyplace other pay-TV competitorsin disadvantage.

The complete text of thesublicensing rules have beenpublished by the EBU oninternet: http://www.ebu.ch andit is annexed to the Commissiondecision. It is also important tonote that the EBU and itsmembers can grant morefavourable access than thatstipulated in the sublicensingrules.

IV THE RELEVANTMARKET

1. Product market

The EBU considered that themarket relevant for theassessment of the case is themarket for the acquisition oftelevision rights to importantsporting events in all disciplinesof sport, irrespective of thenational or internationalcharacter of the event. The EBUis only active in the acquisition

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of television rights to sportsevents of a pan-Europeaninterest30.

The Commission decided thatthe market definition proposedby the EBU was too wide andthat there is a strong likelihoodthat there are separate marketsfor the acquisition of some majorsport events, most of theminternational. The Commission’sassessment in this marketdefinition issue is particularlyinteresting as a precedent forfuture cases in the TV sportsrights domain. The Commissionapplies the substitutability test asset out in its Commission Noticeon the definition of relevantmarket for the purposes ofCommunity competition law31.

The Commission started bysaying that sports programmeshave particular characteristics;they are able to achieve highviewing figures and reach anidentifiable audience, which is aspecial target for certainimportant advertisers.

However, the Commission findsthat the attraction of sportsprogrammes and hence the levelof competition for the televisionrights varies according to thetype of sport and the type ofevent. Mass sports like football, 30 Sport events of a pan-European

interest include for example; TheOlympic Games, the Football WorldCup, the European footballChampionships; the World andEuropean Athletic Championships;Wimbledon, the US and Frenchtennis Opens; the NBA basketball.

31 (97/C 372/03)

tennis or motor-racing generallyattract large audiences, thepreferences varying fromcountry to country. By contrast,minority sports achieve very lowratings. International events tendto be more attractive for theaudience in a given country thannational ones, provided thenational team or a nationalchampion is involved, whileinternational events in which nonational champion or team isparticipating can often be oflittle interest. In the last tenyears, with increasedcompetition in the televisionmarkets, the prices for televisionrights to sport events haveincreased considerably. This isparticularly true with regard tooutstanding international eventssuch as the Football World Cupor the Olympic Games.

The preferences of viewersdetermine the value of a programto advertisers and pay TVbroadcasters32. In free to airtelevision we cannot directlyobserve viewers’ reactions tochanges in the price ofbroadcasts, and hence we cannotdirectly observe evidence on theprice elasticities of demand. Thisis also true for pay-TV sincepay-TV contracts usuallyinvolve monthly or annual

32 The same that the customers

substitutability determine theupstream market of the supply ofdigital interactive television servicesby service providers to contentproviders as the Commission hasdecided in its decision of 15September 1999 – case 36.539 –British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, OJ L 312, 6 December 1999.

payments for bundles ofchannels, but not individualprices for each program.However, if we observe thatsports broadcasts achieve thesame or similar sized audienceswhether or not they arecompeting with simultaneouslybroadcast sports events, there isstrong evidence that these eventscould determine the subscribersor advertisers’ choice of a certainbroadcaster.

Indeed, data on viewerbehaviour, among major sportingevents, shows that for at leastsome sporting events which havebeen analysed such as theSummer Olympics, the WinterOlympics, the Wimbledon Finalsand the Football World Cupviewing behaviour does notappear to be influenced by thecoincidence of other majorsports events being broadcastsimultaneously, or nearlysimultaneously. That is, viewingfigures for the major sportsevents appear to be largelyindependent of whatever othermajor sports are broadcast nearin time to them33. Therefore, the

33 When major sport event A is

broadcast simultaneously withanother major sport event B, eventA achieves (on average) the sameaudience as it does when event B isnot available. For instance, there isevidence that the elasticity ofdemand in the UK for theWimbledon Finals with respect tothe World Cup Football is verysmall, and probably zero. WorldCup Football viewers do not appearto watch Wimbledon Finals, evenwhen the World Cup is notavailable. The same can be said withregard to the Premier League

➣ ARTICLES


offer of such sport events couldinfluence the subscribers oradvertisers to such an extent thatthe broadcaster would beinclined to pay much higherprices.

However, the Commission didnot find it necessary for thepurposes of this case to exactlydefine the relevant productmarkets. Taking into account thepresent structure of the marketand the sublicensing sets of rulesgranting access to non-EBUmembers to the EurovisionSports Programmes, theCommission considered thatthese agreements do not raisecompetition concerns , even onthe basis of markets for theacquisition of particular sportevents such as the SummerOlympics.

2. Geographic market

The Commission did not findnecessary for the purposes ofthis case to exactly define therelevant geographic market.Taking into account the presentstructure of the market and thesublicensing sets of rulesgranting access to non-EBU

Football broadcast by BSkyB inrelation with the top-30/40 mostviewed sport programs in free-to-airTV in the UK. The test indicatesthat viewers of Premier Leaguematches do not substitute to othermajor sports events when broadcaston the same day. Source : “Marketdefinition in European SportsBroadcasting and Competition forSports Broadcasting Rights” byMarket Analysis LTD, a study forCompetition DG of the EuropeanCommission, October 1999.

members to the Eurovision SportProgrammes the agreements didnot raise competition concernseven on the basis of nationalmarkets for the acquisition ofsports rights as well as for thedownstream markets of free-to-air and pay-TV broadcasting.

V MARKET STRUCTURE

As a result of the new entrantsand the increased capacitydevoted to sports broadcasts,there are fierce bidding conteststo obtain valuable sportsbroadcasting rights. The effect ofthat seems to be a transferring ofprofits away from downstreambroadcasters and towardsupstream rights owners. Theprices of sporting events TVrights have therefore increasedsharply.

In this context, the EBU hassignificantly lost market share inthe relevant markets for the lastten years. This is the mostrelevant fact underlying theCommission’s exemptiondecision.

The new market structureconfirms that digitisation and theconvergence process can inprinciple be a factor whichincreases competition in theabsence of “technical or content”bottlenecks which couldforeclose the new emergingmarkets. The new capacity leadsto the entrance of newcompetitors in the market. Newcompetitors should bring morecompetition in the TV sportsmarket under normal marketcircumstances.

VI THE COMMISSION’SASSESSMENT

The decision concludes that thenotified arrangements fall withinthe scope of Article 81(1) EC,but that subject to the conditionsand obligations in the decisionand following the changes madeas a result of the Commission’sintervention, the criteria ofArticle 81(3) EC are met.

1. ARTICLE 81(1) EC

1.1 Restriction of competitionbetween the EBUmembers as a result of thenotified agreements

The EBU rules governing thejoint acquisition and sharing oftelevision rights to sport eventsand the use of the Eurovisionsignal have as their object andeffect the restriction ofcompetition between themembers.

1.2. The joint acquisition ofrights

As a result of the EBU statutes(Article 13(4)) and from thenature of Eurovision as asolidarity system, the EBUmembers bind themselves tojointly acquire television rightsto sport events. Therefore, thejoint acquisition of rights withinthe framework of Eurovisionrestricts and, in many cases,eliminates competition betweenthe participants in the Eurovisionsystem. Instead of biddingagainst each other, membersparticipate in joint negotiationsand agree among themselves the

➣ ARTICLES


financial and other conditions forthe acquisition of the rights.

1.3 The sharing of theEurovision rights

The Eurovision rights are sharedbetween the EBU membersparticipating in the jointacquisition of the rights for aspecific sports event. Allmembers participating in theagreement are entitled to the fullbenefit of the rights regardless ofthe territorial scope of theiractivity and regardless of theirtechnical means of broadcasting.However, members whocompete for the same nationalaudience (several members inone country or membersbroadcasting from their countryinto the country of anothermember in the same language)have to agree among themselveson the procedure for attributing apriority to one of them.

1.4 The exchange of theEurovision signal

For events which take placewithin the Eurovision area thecoverage (television signalconsisting of basic video andinternational sound-feed) isproduced by a member in thecountry concerned and isavailable to all other membersvia the Eurovision programmeexchange system. TheEurovision programme exchangesystem is based on reciprocity :whenever one of theparticipating members covers anevent, in particular a sportsevent, which takes place on itsown national territory and is of

potential interest to otherEurovision members, it offers itscoverage free of charge to all theother Eurovision members on theunderstanding that in return itwill receive corresponding offersfrom all the other members inrespect of events taking place intheir respective countries. Theoriginating member alsoprovides the necessaryinfrastructure to other interestedmembers such as commentarypositions, etc.

2. ARTICLE 81(3) EC

All conditions pursuant toArticle 81(3) EC are met in theCommission's view. TheEurovision systems improvesdistribution and the coverage ofthe relevant sport events in thebenefit of the European viewers.The restrictions areindispensable to attain thatobjective. In addition, the EBUhas modified the notifiedagreements to include a set ofsublicensing rules which makesure that non-EBU membershave extensive access to theEurovision sport rights. Thiscounterbalances the restrictiveeffects of the joint acquisition ofthe sport rights. The schemeswill provide extensive live anddeferred transmission access fornon-members on reasonableterms .

3. CONDITIONS ANDOBLIGATIONS

The Commission imposedbasically the same conditionsand obligations upon the EBU asthose in its 1993 decision to

ensure a proper functioning ofthe access schemes for non EBUmembers of the relevantEurovision sports rights.

3.1 Conditions

In order to ensure contractualaccess for third parties to thetelevision rights to sports eventsacquired within the frameworkof Eurovision such contractualaccess must be allowed underthe agreements with the rightsowners (sport organisers orrights agents). It is therefore acondition for the exemption thatthe EBU and its membersfinalise only agreements whichallow the EBU and its membersto grant access to third parties inaccordance with the accessscheme for non EBU membersto Eurovision sport rights andthe sublicensing rules relating tothe exploitation of Eurovisionrights on pay-TV channels or,subject to the approval of theEBU, on more favourableconditions.

3.2 Obligations

In order to assist theCommission during theexemption period in checkingwhether the rules on contractualaccess for non EBU members toEurovision sport rights and thesublicensing rules relating to theexploitation of Eurovision rightson pay-TV channels are appliedin an appropriate, reasonable andnon-discriminatory way, theEBU must be under theobligation to inform theCommission of all amendmentsand additions to the access

➣ ARTICLES


schemes and of all arbitrationprocedures concerning disputesunder the access schemes.

VII - CONCLUSION

Irrespective of the legal debatewhich followed the 1993Commission decision and theconsequent annulment by the

ruling of the CFI in 1996, thenew Commission exemption ofthe Eurovision systemconstitutes an importantprecedent in the domain ofproduct market definition for TVsports rights and clarifies theCommission’s policy withregard to the assessment of jointbuying arrangements of

exclusive rights. TheCommission’s exemption of theEurovision system is consistentwith a market structure in whichthe EBU members havesignificantly lost market share inEurope in the last years as aresult of increased competitionfrom other powerful commercialbroadcasters.

OPINION AND COMMENTSIn this section DG COMP officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It isimportant to recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officialsconcerned. They have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not berelied upon as a statement of the Commission’s or DG COMP’s views.


La Commission a adopté le 26avril 2000 une Recommandationaux Etats Membres et uneCommunication sur le« dégroupage de la bouclelocale » des réseaux detélécommunications desopérateurs historiques34.Derrière cette terminologieabsconse (en anglais « local loopunbundling ») se cache l’un desprincipaux enjeux deconcurrence dans le secteur destélécommunications, à savoir lemanque – voire l’absence - deconcurrence sur les terminaisonsde réseaux des opérateurshistoriques, qui permet à ceux-ci,malgré la libéralisation de latéléphonie vocale35 depuis le 1erjanvier 1998, de garder des partsde marchés hégémoniques, dansbien des cas proches de 100%,sur les marchés d’appels locauxet de services d’accès auxabonnés. L’accès à la bouclelocale est devenu un nouvelenjeu avec le développement

34 Non encore publiée. Ces textes sont

diponibles sur le site internet de laDG Concurrence, pagehttp://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/index_en.htm.

35 Cf. Directive 98/10/CE.

d’Internet : les communicationspermettant aux utilisateursd’avoir accès à leur serveurInternet sont descommunications locales etdoivent donc habituellement êtreacheminées par la boucle localedes opérateurs historiques. Pourcette raison, afin de favoriser laconcurrence dans lescommunications et ledéveloppement d’Internet, laCommission, suivant en cela lesconclusions du Conseil européende Lisbonne36, a recommandéaux Etats Membres de mettre enoeuvre d’ici la fin de l’an 2000le dégroupage de la bouclelocale. Plusieurs États membresont d’ailleurs déjà renduobligatoire le dégroupage ou fixéformellement des dates à cettefin (Autriche, Danemark,Finlande, Allemagne, Italie,Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni).

Les caractéristiques de laboucle locale. Situationconcurrentielle.

La boucle locale, que la langueanglaise désigne aussi bien par

36 Voir http://www.ispo.cec.be/

eeurope-initiative.htm

local loop ou last mile, est laterminaison de réseau desopérateurs télécom reliant leurdernier répartiteur aux abonnésdu réseau. Cette boucle localeest, sauf exception, pour chaqueligne composée d’une paire filsde cuivre. Sur cette paire decuivre transitent descommunications en modenumérique ou analogique, surdes fréquences hertziennespermettant d’acheminer de lavoix et des données, mais ayantnormalement une capacitéinsuffisante pour acheminerrapidement des images ou desvolumes importantsd’information (la capacitédisponible avec les technologiestéléphoniques traditionnelles estinférieure à 50 kbits/s).

Le contrôle de cetteinfrastructure, qui est un réseaude distribution de détail deservices téléphoniques auxparticuliers, s’avère actuellementdéterminant dans la concurrenceque livrent les opérateursexistants aux nouveaux entrantspour le maintien de leurs parts demarché. Certes, depuis le 1erjanvier 1998, compte tenu desobligations des Directives« téléphonie vocale » et« interconnexion »37, lesopérateurs historiques doiventaccorder l’interconnexion et lasélection d’appels à leursnouveaux concurrents. L’optionde présélection d’opérateur est

37 Cf. Directives 98/10/CE et la

directive 97/33/CE, amendée par ladirective 98/61/CE.

Le dégroupage de la boucle locale : un pasde plus dans la libéralisation destélécommunications. Exemple decomplémentarité entre la régulationsectorielle et les règles de concurrence duTraité

Par Christophe de LA ROCHEFORDIERE,DG Comp-C-1

➣ OPINION AND COMMENTS


même obligatoire38 depuis le 1erjanvier 2000. Mais comme lesnouveaux entrants n’ont entemps normal pas de bouclelocale, l’interconnexion, associéeà la présélection d’opérateur, neleur permet habituellement qued’offrir des services sur lescommunications non locales39,que ce soient les communi-cations inter-régionales ou bieninternationales.

Dans la directive sur laréalisation de la pleineconcurrence sur le marché destélécommunications40, la Com-mission distinguait plusieursservices de téléphonie fixe dedétail, à savoir le raccordementinitial, l'abonnement mensuel,les communications locales,régionales et internationales. Ilconvient naturellement desurveiller attentivement lescatégories de services établies dela sorte, en raison notamment dela rapidité des évolutionstechnologiques, et de lesréexaminer régulièrement, au caspar cas ; toutefois, à l'heure

38 Cf. Directive 97/33/CE, amendée

par la directive 98/61/EC39 Sauf si la sélection / présélection

d’opérateur inclut lescommunications locales. Cf.Directive 98/61/CE du ParlementEuropéen et du Conseil 24septembre 1998 amendant laDirective 97/33/CE (JO L268,3.10.1998). Début 2000 la plupartdes Etats Membres n’avaient pasencore mis en oeuvre les obligationsde la directive pour lasélection/présélection des appelslocaux.

40 Directive 96/19/CE, 20econsidérant, JO L 74, du 22.3.1996,p.13.

actuelle, ces services ne sontnormalement pas substituablesles uns aux autres et ils peuventdonc être considérés commeautant de marchés en cause41.Un particulier peut grâce à laprésélection avoir deuxopérateurs : l’un pour lesservices d’accès (l’opérateurhistorique), et un autre (unnouvel entrant) pour les appelstéléphoniques. Ceci impliqueque les conséquences concurren-tielles du contrôle de la bouclelocale par les opérateurshistoriques ne soient pasanalysées sur l’ensemble agrégédes services de détail, mais surchaque marché spécifique définide la sorte.

De plus, un nouveau marché esten voie d’apparition, celui desservices de télécommunicationsà haut débit qui peuvent êtrefournis sous forme de servicesDSL (digital subscriber line) parla boucle locale. C’est vers cesnouveaux services queconvergent les regards de tousles acteurs et leurs stratégies. Lesnouveaux services de type DSLutilisent une autre gamme defréquences que les servicestéléphoniques classiques, desorte que les abonnés, de mêmequ’ils peuvent recevoir sur leurstransistors radios des émissionsen ondes moyennes et enmodulation de fréquence, vontsur les mêmes lignes télépho-niques pouvoir simultanémentbénéficier de services à bande

41 Cf Communication de la

Commission sur la définition dumarché en cause, JOCE C273 du09/12/1997.

étroite – les communicationstéléphoniques traditionnelles - etde services à large bande, parexemple l’ADSL42. Ladifférence est saisissante, levolume d’information pouvantpasser par la bande large étant deactuellement de l’ordre de 1 à 10Mbits pour une ligne desservieen ADSL. Nous faisons de lasorte un saut de trois chiffresdans les capacités detransmission disponibles sur lapaire de cuivre, sans qu’il faillechanger celle-ci (seuls lesmodems de terminaison auxdeux bouts de la ligne de cuivredoivent être ajoutés, ainsi qu’unséparateur entre lescommunications à bande étroiteet à large bande). L’enjeu estconsidérable, parce que sur le filde cuivre pourront désormaiscirculer non seulement la voix etles données, mais aussi la vidéo.Quand on sait que les imagessont beaucoup plus gourmandesen capacités de transmission quela voix et les données, on a là unfacteur de véritable explosion duvolume de trafic de télécom-munications. Le marché desservices télécommu-nications,loin d’être saturé en raison dudéveloppement d’Internet, pour-rait même connaître unenouvelle jeunesse.

42 L’ADSL–asymetric digital sub-

scriber line- une une variante parmila famille des services DSL.L’ADSL consiste à faire descendredu réseau vers l’abonné des volumessupérieurs à ceux qui remontent del’abonné vers le réseau.



Le caractère indispensable del’infrastructure

La Commission note dans saCommunication que la bouclelocale est une infrastructure sansl’accès à laquelle, si l’opérateurhistorique est le seul à fournir leservice, aucune concurrence nepourra apparaître sur les marchésen cause tels qu’elle les définit :

i. les services d’accès auxparticuliers, que ce soit pourles services traditionnels àbande étroite (la connexion,l’abonnement mensuel) ou lesnouveaux services à largebande ;

ii. le marché descommunications locales43.

Certes, une concurrence partiellepourra apparaître sur tel réseaucâblé existant, telle boucleoptique ou telle « boucle radio »(les fréquences de boucles radios- wireless loops en Anglais - sonten cours d’attribution dansplusieurs Etats membres), maishabituellement pas au niveaunational dans des conditionséconomiques concurrentiellesavec la paire de cuivre. Ilapparaît en effet que les réseauxcâblés sont dans la plupart descas des réseaux ne desservantpas la population sur le territoirenational tout entier ; de plus,l’introduction des services àlarge bande sur les réseaux

43 Sauf dès que la sélection et la

présélection d’opérateurs incluentégalement, comme le prévoient lesdirectives communautaires, lesappels locaux.

câblés exige de nouveauxinvestissements importants. Lecâble, à la différence de la pairede cuivre, doit être partagé entrede nombreux utilisateurs, et lestechnologies de large bande nesont pas stabilisées à un niveauqui les rendent parfaitementsubstituables et compétitivesavec les technologies DSL sur lapaire du cuivre.

La Commission souligneégalement que la boucle localeest une infrastructure qui ne peutpas être dupliquée à un coûtraisonnable et dans desconditions normales derentabilité.

L’une des raisons ayant conduitla Commission à de tellesconclusions est la définition dumarché géographique pertinentauquel donne accès cetteinfrastructure de distribution deservices. En effet, lesinfrastructures des opérateurshistoriques ont été construites auniveau national lorsqu’ils étaienten position de monopole. Depuisla libéralisation complète de latéléphonie vocale ne 1998, laconcurrence se développe auniveau national, les nouveauxopérateurs ayant des licencesnationales leur permettantd’offrir des services de détail surl’ensemble du territoire d’un Etatmembre, comme ils le font parexemple pour lescommunications à longuedistance. De sorte que lesnouveaux entrants, sauf casparticuliers, visent normalementle marché national, pourvu qu’ilsaient accès aux infrastructures dedistribution de services leur

permettant de le faire. Il estnormalement hors de portée d’unquelconque intervenant, comptetenu du niveau absolu des coûts,de dupliquer l’intégralité de laboucle locale, soit les millions delignes desservant l’ensemble desabonnés du territoire national,que ce soit avec la technologieexistante de la paire de cuivre ouavec des technologies desubstitution telles que le câble oula fibre optique. LaCommunication note égalementque les réseaux de boucle localeradio qui font actuellementl’objet d’attribution defréquences dans plusieurs EtatsMembres ne paraissent pasactuellement compétitifs surl’ensemble du marché et nepermettraient à l’heure actuelleque de cibler des clientèles trèsspécifiques telles que les PMEou les professionnels. La bouclelocale est donc indispensable à lafourniture de services de détailsur les marchés identifiés ci-dessous.

L’accès et ses conditions

Ainsi sont remplies lesconditions restrictives –caractère indispensable del’infrastructure pour délivrer leproduit/service, impossibilitétechnique et/ou économique decréer une infrastructureéquivalente et absence sansl’accès à l’infrastructure deconcurrence sur le(s) marché(s)de référence - qu’a posées laCour dans l’Arrêt Bronner44, 44 Cf. l'arrêt de la Cour du 26

novembre 1998, Oscar BronnerGmbH & Co. KG contre Mediaprint



pour que l’accès à uneinfrastructure soit requis en vertude l’article 82 du Traité. Cetteinterprétation de la jurisprudencepeut apparaître très limitatif,restreignant l’application de ladoctrine des « infrastructuresessentielles » à un casparticulier, celui où il n’existepas d’autre concurrence sur lemarché tel que défini. En réalité,compte tenu des caractéristiquesde la boucle locale, il permet derésoudre la question de l’accès.En effet, si ainsi que l’indique laCommunication il existe déjàune forme de concurrence sur laboucle locale de l’opérateurhistorique, par exemple parcequ’un autre opérateur a déjàobtenu l’accès, alors un refusd’accès peut être traité commeun abus « classique » de positiondominante sous forme dediscrimination.

Il est par ailleurs à noter que laCommission a considéré dans laCommunication une autre formed’abus en tant que telle, lalimitation de la production, desdébouchés ou du développementtechnique au préjudice desconsommateurs, et ceindépendamment de la conditionprécédente. Compte tenu du rôlestratégique de la boucle localepour le déploiement de nouveauxservices à large bande, il apparaîtqu’un refus de débouclage auraitinéluctablement cet effet dès lorsque le nouvel entrant souhaite

Zeitungs- und ZeitschriftenverlagGmbH & Co. KG, MediaprintZeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH& Co. KG et MediaprintAnzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co.KG, Affaire C-7/97

offrir de nouveaux services àhaut débit tels que l’ADSL. LaCommission, se basant surl’Article 82, indique de la sorteque doivent être traitées avec unerigueur particulière lesinfractions se traduisant par ungel du développement denouveaux produits et services.Le droit de la concurrencepermet donc d’accompagner etmême d’encourager lesmutations dues au changementtechnologique.

Un refus d’accès à cetteinfrastructure indispensable estalors un abus de positiondominante et une infraction del’Article 82 du Traité45 quipourra selon les cas être traitécomme un refus de vente, unediscrimination (par exempleentre une filiale de l’opérateurhistorique et le nouvel entrant)ou la limitation de la production,des débouchés ou dudéveloppement technique aupréjudice des consommateurs.La Communication de laCommission souligne égalementque des délais excessifs, desconditions contractuellesdiscriminatoires pourront êtreconstitutives d’abus de positiondominante. D’autres pointssensibles devront être réglés parvoie réglementaire nationale oucontractuelle et concernent interalia les conditions de co-localisation dans les installationstechniques de l’opérateurhistorique (le nouvel entrant doitpar exemple pouvoir installer sesmodems ADSL dans les locaux 45 Cf. notamment décision Sealink , JO

L 15 du 18.1.1994 pp 8-19.

de l’opérateur dominant), ainsique la répartition et la bonne findes obligations de services demaintenance.

L’un des points sensiblesqu’aborde également laRecommandation est celui duprix du dégroupage : il estnormal que les opérateurshistoriques fassent payer un droitd’accès à cette infrastructure, aumême titre qu’ils le fontlorsqu’ils accordent l’intercon-nexion sur leur réseau. Puisqueles directives communautairesprévoient que les tarifs desopérateurs historiques doiventêtre alignés sur leurs coûts, laquestion est de savoir quels sontces coûts et leurs méthodesd’évaluation. Un consensusémerge dans les pays tels que lesEtats Unis qui ont initié ledégroupage de la boucle localeen 1996 sur le fait que ces coûtsdoivent être non pas des coûtshistoriques des ex-monopoles(largement amortis et désormaissans signification économique)mais les coûts incrémentaux àlong terme46 qu’encourent lesopérateurs sur leur réseau. Danssa Recommandation laCommission n’a pas pris defaçon tranchée position sur la 46 En Anglais Long Run Incremental

Cost (LRIC). Il s’agit des coûtsaditionnels afférents à la fournituredu service, comparés avec les coûtsde l’opérateur en l’absence defourniture du service. Ces coûtsincluent l’actualisation de tous lesinvestissements d’entretien et demise à jour technologiqueprévisibles à moyen et long terme. Ils’agit donc d’un flux de dépensesfutures actualisées et non pas d’uncoût historique.



méthode à privilégier : de fait, àl’article 1 de laRecommandation, elle considèrequ’il s’agit d’une responsabilitéqui incombe aux autoritésnationales de régulation.

Les opérateurs devront êtrecohérents dans leurs méthodesde tarification : il ne serait pasnormal en particulier que l’accèsà la boucle locale soit facturé surla base de coûts incrémentaux delong terme alors que les servicesde détail du même opérateurseraient encore tarifés aux coûtshistoriques. De telles pratiquesde prix sont susceptibles de setraduire par des abus de positiondominante sous l’article 82 dutraité. La Communicationsouligne notamment à cet effetque le risque d’effet de ciseauxsur les marges (‘marginsqueeze’) est plus élevé lorsqueles tarifs de l'opérateur historiquen'ont pas été totalementrééquilibrés selon le principe decouverture des coûts.

D’une manière générale, un effetde ciseaux sur les marges, qui estune pratique de prix constitutived’un abus au sens de l’article 82du traité47 lorsqu’elle émaned’un opérateur dominant intégréverticalement, est susceptibled’être mis en évidence quand ilapparaît que les opérateurshistoriques facturent l’accès à laboucle locale à des prix qui, si ilsleur étaient imposés, rendraientla délivrance de leurs servicescorrespondants d’accès aux 47 Cf. Décision British Sugar, Journal

officiel n° L 284 du 19/10/1988 p.0041 - 0059

particuliers impossible au prixoù ils la facturent, compte tenudes coûts supplémentairesafférents à la fourniture de cesservices de détail. Il en résulteque les prix d’accès facturés auxnouveaux opérateurs (laconnexion et la locationmensuelle) doivent, par ligne,être sensiblement inférieurs auxtarifs de détail correspondantsdes opérateurs historiques. Cetterelation est d’ailleurs reconnuepar les opérateurs : Telia etTelenor, en vue de l’approbationde leur fusion par laCommission48 (approbationfinalement sans effet puisque lafusion a ex-post échoué),s’étaient engagés à ce que lescoûts d’accès à leur bouclelocale soient en tous casinférieurs d’un facteursubstantiel à leurs tarifscorrespondants de détail.

La Recommandation de laCommission

La Recommandation de laCommission porte sur troisoptions :

(i) Le dégroupage total de laboucle locale (dégroupagede l'accès à la paire decuivre pour la fournitureconcurrentielle de servicesavancés par des tiers).Cette option se traduit parune perte complète parl’opérateur historique desa relation commercialeavec l’utilisateur, quirésilie son abonnement

48 Cf. décision du 13.10.1999, à

publier.

auprès de lui et quis’abonne aux servicesproposés par le nouvelentrant : ce dernier luiapporte aussi bien latéléphonie traditionnelleque les nouveaux servicesde type ADSL.

Le dégroupage completsuppose que le nouvelentrant soit un opérateurcomplet de services detélécommunications àmême de délivrer unelarge gamme de servicesaux utilisateurs.

(ii) La seconde option qui doitselon la recommandationêtre accessible auxutilisateurs et auxnouveaux entrants estl’utilisation partagée dela paire de cuivre. Danscette option, le nouvelentrant et l’opérateurexistant partagent la mêmeligne de cuivre : le nouvelentrant offre des services àlarge bande (type ADSL)alors que l’opérateurhistorique continue à offrirà l’abonné des services àbande étroite (technique-ment, le trafic à bandeétroite et le trafic à largebande sont distingués aumoyen d'un séparateurplacé avant le commu-tateur de l'opérateur enplace). L’abonné ne résiliedonc pas son abonnementauprès de ce dernier, maissouscrit un nouvel abon-nement auprès du nouvelentrant pour les services àlarge bande.



Dans la pratique, cetteoption de dégroupagepartiel convient aux petitsopérateurs qui n’ont pasune offre complète deservices et qui nesouhaitent pas prendre lerisque de voir l’opérateurhistorique abandonnertoute relation commercialeavec l’utilisateur (ce quipourrait mettre en cause laqualité du service demaintenance del’infrastructure). Lenouvel opérateur aurasouvent tendance à faire àl’utilisateur une offreconjointe avec un offreurde services internet. Cetteoption a fait l’objet decommentaires trèsdéfavorables de certainsopérateurs historiques, quicraignent manifestementqu’elle accélère l’entréede nouveaux opérateurs deservices à forte valeurajoutée (type ADSL)spécialisés sur ce type deproduits : l’expérience desEtats Unis, où l’ouverturede la boucle locale a étéintroduite en 1996, montreque c’est sans doute là quese trouve le potentiel leplus important dedéveloppement dudégroupage.

(iii) Une troisième option estprévue par larecommandation mais neconstitue par un véritabledégroupage de la ligne :l’opérateur historiqueinstalle une liaisond'accès à haut débit qui

va jusqu'à l'abonné, puis larend accessible à des tiersafin de leur permettre defournir des services à hautdébit aux clients. Cettedernière option placeplutôt que les opérateursconcurrents en position desimples revendeurs sur laboucle locale, mais peutavoir un intérêtcommercial transitoirepour eux en attendantqu’ils soient en mesured’installer leurs propreséquipements et dedemander le dégroupage,partiel ou total, àl’opérateur existant.

La Commission a considéré queces trois types d’accès à laboucle locale devraient êtreaccessibles simultanément, lenouvel entrant et leconsommateur (et nonl’opérateur existant) devant avoirle choix.

Conclusions

Une certaine prudence estnécessaire dans l’interprétationdes droits d’accès à la bouclelocale des opérateurs historiquessous les règles de concurrence, etles modalités du dégroupage àprivilégier. Comme le note laCommission dans laCommunication, compte tenu dela rapidité des évolutionstechnologiques, les définitionsdes marchés pertinents etl’analyse quant au caractèreindispensable de la boucle localepour la fourniture de services surces marchés devront être

réexaminés chaque fois qu’uncas se présentera.

Le dégroupage de la bouclelocale est cependant un bonexemple de complémentaritépossible entre la régulationsectorielle ex-ante et l’applica-tion du droit de la concurrence.La Recommandation de laCommission aux Etats Membresadoptée le 26 avril derniern’impose rien à ce stade, c’est dela soft law, les Etats Membres nesont pas actuellement contraintsau dégroupage de la bouclelocale. Mais la Commission adonné un signal clair : si ledégroupage n’est pas mis enoeuvre par la voie réglementaireau niveau national, il pourra dansbien des cas l’être en vertu del’Article 82 du Traité. Lesopérateurs historiques confrontésà des demandes d’accès à laboucle locale devront com-prendre que, dans la majorité descas, leur intérêt bien compris estde l’accorder, de façon nondiscriminatoire, sans quoi ilss’exposent à des actions eninfraction de l’Article 82 duTraité. Ultérieurement, la softlaw sera durcie : ainsiqu’annoncé par M. Liikanen le26 avril lors de la présentation àla presse des orientations desuivi de la « Revue 1999 »adoptées par la Commission, ledégroupage sera par la suiteintroduit dans le nouveau cadreréglementaire communautaire etdeviendra obligatoire.

Le chemin qui mène à uneconcurrence équitable sur laboucle locale est toutefois seméd’embûches, comme le montre



l’expérience de l’Allemagne, quia introduit le dégroupage depuis1998 : deux ans plus tard,Deutsche Telekom contrôleencore environ 99% du marchédes services d’accès et descommunications locales. Lesconditions dans lesquelles a étéorganisé ce dégroupage en sontresponsables :- la loi allemande ne prévoit pasl’option prometteuse dudégroupage partiel proposé parla Recommandation de laCommission. Il est vrai

qu’Internet, le commerceélectronique et les services àlarge bande de type ADSLn’avaient pas en 1998 ledéveloppement et l’actualitéqu’ils ont aujourd’hui ;- le régulateur national amaintenu les prix de détail desabonnements de DeutscheTelekom inférieurs aux prixd’accès à la boucle locale,imposant de la sorte un réeldésavantage compétitif auxnouveaux concurrents.

L’effet combiné de laRecommandation de laCommission – ou de touteréglementation sectorielle àvenir - et des règles deconcurrence applicables sousl’Article 82 du traité pourraitdésormais permettre un impactplus rapide du dégroupage surl’ouverture du marché auxnouveaux opérateurs. Il faut lesouhaiter en vue d’une diffusionaccélérée d’Internet et ducommerce électronique enEurope.

ANTI-TRUST RULES

Application of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st February and 31st May 2000


After the successful reform ofthe EC competition rules onvertical restraints, theCommission is now focusing onupdating its policy oncollaboration agreementsbetween competitors (horizontalco-operation agreements). Theseagreements are potentiallyrestrictive of competition andcould thus fall under Article 81of the Treaty. Guidance for theassessment of horizontal co-operation under the Communitycompetition rules is currentlygiven by way of two blockexemption Regulations (onresearch and development(R&D) agreements49 andspecialisation agreements50) and

49 Commission Regulation (EEC)

No 418/85 of 19 December 1984on the application of Article81(3) of the Treaty to categoriesof Research and DevelopmentAgreements as amended byCommission Regulation (EEC)No. 151/93 of 23 December1992, OJ L 53, 22.2.1985 p.5,OJ L 21, 29.1.1993 p. 8.

50 Commission Regulation (EEC)No 417/85 of 19 December 1984on the application of Article81(3) of the Treaty to categoriesof specialisation agreements asamended by CommissionRegulation (EEC) No 151/93 of23 December 1992, OJ L 53,

two Notices51 (dealing withparticular problems such as theassessment of co-operative jointventures). As the blockexemption Regulations willexpire on 31 December 2000,and as the existing Notices havebecome largely outdated, theCommission is considering howthe future assessment ofhorizontal co-operation shouldreflect changes in the economicand legal environment.

As a result of these reflections,the Commission on 27 April2000 published

• a draft block exemptionRegulation on the applicationof Article 81(3) of the Treatyto categories of specialisationagreements,

• a draft block exemptionRegulation on the applicationof Article 81(3) of the Treatyto categories of research and

22.2.1985 p.1, OJ L 21,29.1.1993 p. 8.

51 Notice on Agreements, decisionsand concerted practices in thefield of co-operation betweenenterprises (OJ C 75, 29.7.1968p3); Notice concerning theassessment of co-operative jointventures under Article 81 (OJ C43, 16.2.1993, p.2).

development (R&D)agreements,

• draft Guidelines on theapplicability of Article 81 tohorizontal co-operationagreements.

The objective of these documentsis to clarify the application ofcompetition rules in the area ofhorizontal co-operationagreements. The drafts have beenmade public both on theInternet-site of the CompetitionDG (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/entente/other.htm) and inthe Official Journal (C-118 of27.04.2000). The publicationstarts the public consultationprocess on this reform.

Orientations for Reform

The starting point for this reformis the recognition that horizontalco-operation betweencompetitors can have bothnegative and positive effects onthe market. On the one hand,horizontal co-operation may leadto competition problems. This isthe case if the parties to a co-operation agree to fix prices,output or share markets, or if theco-operation enables the partiesto maintain, gain or increasemarket power and thereby causesnegative market effects withrespect to prices, output,innovation or the variety andquality of goods.

On the other hand, horizontal co-operation may also often beuseful and pro-competitive.Companies need to respond toincreasing competitive pressureand a changing market place

HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATIONAGREEMENTS: Ensuring a modernpolicyBy Joachim LÜCKING, DG COMP-A-1

➣ ANTI-TRUST RULES


driven by globalisation, thespeed of technological progressand the generally more dynamicnature of markets. Co-operationcan be a means to share risk,save costs, pool know how andlaunch innovation faster. Inparticular for small and mediumsized enterprises co-operation isan important means to adapt tothe changing economicenvironment. Consumers willshare these gains, provided thateffective competition ismaintained in the market.

European competition policydoes already take into accountthese dangers and benefits, butthe existing system ofnotifications and authorisationsputs an administrative burdenboth on companies withoutmarket power and theCommission. A review of thepresent policy towardshorizontal co-operationagreements based on a wide-ranging consultation ofEuropean companies showedthat industry regards the existingblock exemption regulations astoo narrow, inflexible, and toofocused on legal clauses.Industry also expressed a needfor clearer guidance on theassessment of other types of co-operation, not covered by anyblock exemption.

A review of cases dealt with bythe Commission under Article 81showed that around 40% of thesecases concerned horizontal co-operation agreements. Themajority of these (58%) involvedforms of co-operation notcovered by any block exemption

regulation. However, the numberof horizontal co-operationagreements creating competitionproblems was limited.

It is therefore necessary toincrease the relevance of theblock exemptions for industryand to adopt a more economicapproach both for the blockexemptions and for the treatmentof individual cases, whilemaintaining a strict approachtowards anti-competitiveagreements.

The draft documents thus aim togive better guidance to marketparticipants. They will replacethe fragmented and partlyoutdated notices and regulationsin this area. The review is alsoan essential pillar in our attemptsto modernise competition policy.The approach is very similar tothat recently adopted for verticalagreements. By virtue of theclarified rules, the Commission’sservices will be freed fromexamining cases which are of nointerest for competition policyand they will thus be able toconcentrate on more importantcases.

The draft block exemptionRegulations

The draft block exemptionRegulations are supposed toreplace the existing Regulationson Specialisation (CommissionRegulation (EEC) No. 417/85)and R&D (CommissionRegulation (EEC) No. 418/85).These Regulations expire on 31December 2000. The adoption ofthe new Regulations before the

end of this year is thus desirable.They are based on the existingenabling Regulation52.

In comparison to the existingRegulations the drafts have beenrevised so as to make them moreuser-friendly and to increase itsscope and clarity. The currentblock exemptions on R&D andSpecialisation not only definecategories of agreements whichare covered, but also list theexempted clauses. These so-called "white lists" are deletedfrom both block exemptions.Instead they exempt allconditions under whichundertakings pursue R&D andspecialisation agreements,subject to certain conditions andthe exclusion of hardcorerestrictions. The idea is to moveaway from a clause-basedapproach and to give greatercontractual freedom to theparties of such agreements.

In addition to this increase inflexibility, several changes in thedraft block exemptionRegulation on R&D shouldincrease their scope andusefulness for industry. Forexample, it is proposed toincrease the market sharethreshold for exemption from20% to 25%. If the agreement

52 Council Regulation (EEC) No

2821/71 of 20 December 1971 onthe application of Article 81(3) ofthe Treaty to categories ofagreements, decisions, andconcerted practices modified byRegulation (EEC) No 2743/72 of 19December 1972, OJ L 285,29.12.1971, p.46, OJ L 291,28.12.1972, p.144.



foresees joint distribution of theproducts which were jointlydeveloped, the market sharethreshold could be increasedfrom currently 10% to 25%. Therequirement to draw up aframework programme prior toentering into R&D agreementshas been deleted, as experiencehas shown that it is not practicalfor companies to enter into suchagreements prior to undertakingR&D. To protect competition ininnovation, a provision has beenadded which allows thewithdrawal of the blockexemption in those cases wherean agreement would eliminateeffective competition in R&D ona particular market.

As regards the draft blockexemption Regulation onSpecialisation, it is not proposedto increase the market sharethreshold (currently 20%).However, the practical scope ofthe Regulation will be increased,through the deletion of theturnover threshold, and throughthe coverage of unilateralspecialisation as an increasinglyimportant form of outsourcing.On the other hand, safeguardsagainst potentially harmfulspecialisation agreements havebeen introduced. This applies tothe obligation of a cross supplyobligation between twocompanies engaging inreciprocal specialisation so thatno party leaves the marketdownstream of production.

The draft Guidelines

The draft Guidelinescomplement the draft blockexemption Regulations. Theydescribe the general approachwhich should be followed whenassessing horizontal co-operationagreements. They are thusapplicable to R&D andproduction agreements notcovered by the block exemptionsas well as to most other types ofcompetitor collaboration. Thefollowing types are covered:R&D, production, purchasing,commercialisation, standardi-sation, and environmentalagreements.

All types of horizontal co-operation agreements areanalysed according to a commonanalytical framework. Thisframework can be summarisedas follows: a horizontal co-operation agreement restrictscompetition if it is likely toreduce competition in the marketto such an extent that negativemarket effects as to prices,output, innovation or the varietyor quality of goods and servicescan be expected. To cause arestriction of competition theparties normally needappropriate tools to co-ordinatetheir behaviour and a certaindegree of market power.Consequently, a co-operation hasto be assessed in its economiccontext taking into account both,the nature of the agreement andthe parties’ combined marketpower which determines -together with other structuralfactors - the capability of the co-operation to reduce overall

competition to such a significantextent.

These two categories of criterianormally have to be assessedtogether. There are, however,some instances where the natureof a co-operation indicates fromthe outset the applicability ofArticle 81(1). This concernsprimarily agreements that havethe object of restrictingcompetition by means of pricefixing (including pure salesagencies), output limitation orsharing of markets, customers orsources of supply. These‘hardcore’ restrictions arepresumed to have negativemarket effects and not to resultin any efficiency gains orbenefits to consumers. They aretherefore generally prohibited.

On the other hand, there are alsosome agreements for which itcan be said from the outset thatArticle 81(1) does not apply.These include agreementsbetween non-competitors,agreements between competingcompanies that can not carry outindependently the project oractivity covered by the co-operation, or agreementsconcerning an activity farremoved from the marketinglevel.

For all other agreements thatmay fall under Article 81(1) amarket analysis is necessary.This assessment will befacilitated by the guidelines. Thediscussion by types ofagreements allows takingaccount of specific competitionproblems related to the different



forms of co-operation. It alsoaddresses the most commontypes of combinations, e.g. jointR&D with subsequent jointproduction.

Expected Impact of theProposals

The impact of the proposedchanges on industry should be

positive. The increase in legalsecurity should stimulate co-operation between companieswith little or no market power, inparticular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Thesecompanies will have greatercontractual freedom for their co-operation and will be freed fromthe costs and delays associatedwith unnecessary notifications.

The consumers will also benefitfrom the proposals which willenable the Commission toconcentrate on those cases whichharm consumers by increasingprices or reducing output,innovation or the variety orquality of goods and services.

MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89


Introduction

On 14 March 2000, theCommission decided to declarethe proposed concentrationbetween the two Swedish truckproducers, Volvo and Scania,incompatible with the commonmarket. The prohibition decisionwas based on what may besummarised as a straightforwardcase of classical horizontaloverlaps and high market shares.In particular it was found that theproposed concentration wouldhave created dominant positionson:

• the markets for heavy trucksin Sweden, Norway, Finlandand Ireland;

• the markets for touringcoaches in Finland and theUnited Kingdom;

• the market for inter-citybuses in Sweden, Denmark,Norway and Finland; and

• the market for city buses inSweden, Denmark, Norway,Finland and Ireland.

This purpose of this article is tosummarise the central features ofthe Commission's competitionanalysis. In doing so, it willhighlight two areas in particular,namely the definition of therelevant geographic market andthe presence of unilateral effects.

While the article focuses on theanalysis of the heavy trucksmarkets, largely similar reasoningwas used to analyse the bus andcoach markets.

Subsequent to the adoption of thedecision, some commentatorshave argued that the decisiondemonstrates that companies fromsmaller Member States are at acompetitive disadvantage in theassessment under the MergerRegulation. The article willbriefly respond to these,obviously groundless, allegations.

The proposed concentration

The proposed concentrationinvolved the acquisition byVolvo of a controlling stake inScania. On 6 August 1999,Volvo reached an agreement toacquire all of Investor AB'sshares in Scania, equivalent tojust under 50% of the votingcapital. Concurrently, Volvomade a public offer for all othershares in Scania.

The relevant product markets

Within the industry, trucks areoften divided into three distinctcategories based on the weightof the vehicle (light, medium andheavy trucks). None of theparties are active in light trucksand Scania has only de minimissales of medium trucks.However, both parties are active

on a European or evenworldwide basis in theproduction and supply of heavytrucks. In the decision, theCommission agreed with Volvo'sproposed definition of therelevant product market as thatfor heavy trucks over 16 tonnes.Although heavy trucks aredifferentiated products, it wasfound that any furtherbreakdown of the large varietyof possible configurations ofsuch vehicles would not bemeaningful in terms of assessingthe market power of the mergedcompanies.

The Relevant GeographicMarkets

As far as the above-mentionedareas are concerned, theCommission concluded that thegeographic reference market forheavy trucks is still national inscope. This conclusion waspartly based on observeddifferences in technicalrequirements, purchasing habitsand market shares in variousMember States. However, theexistence of price discriminationconstituted the strongestindication that the effects of themerger should not, as proposedby Volvo, be assessed at theEuropean level. In the course ofthe investigation theCommission found clearindications that truck producersare able to charge significantlydifferent prices (often 10% ormore) for similar products, evenwhen they are sold inneighbouring countries. It wasalso found that the existence ofsuch price differences did not

Case No : COMP/M. 1672 –Volvo/ScaniaBy Dan SJOBLOM, Merger Task Force

➣ MERGERS


lead to any significant cross-border, or parallel, trade. Theexplanation for these phenomenais that heavy truck salesgenerally include a servicepackage, which means that asignificant proportion of the totalprice relates to a local servicecomponent.

Effects of the proposedconcentration on the marketsfor heavy trucks

Even before the proposedconcentration, Volvo and Scaniawere already leadingmanufacturers of heavy trucks inthe EEA. The merged entitywould have become the leadingsupplier in the EEA with 31% ofall sales, followed byDaimlerChrysler with 20%. Atthe level of the relevant nationalmarkets the merged entity wouldhave acquired very high marketshares, ranging from around90% (in the Swedish market) toaround 50% (in the Irishmarket). It was further noted thatthe parties' market positions havebeen both stable and largelysymmetrical in the past and thatthe merged entity, in all of themarkets, would have had aposition several times strongerthan the closest remainingcompetitor.

The existing evidence, thatScania prior to the proposedconcentration had beencompeting strongly with Volvoand was widely regarded as itsclosest competitor, compoundedthe competition concernsresulting from the highcombined market shares. The

reason for this is that the mergedentity in such circumstanceswould have had even betterpossibilities to exploit itsdominant position than indicatedby its market shares alone. Giventhat Volvo's intention was tomaintain the Scania brand andorganisation as an entirelyseparate business unit, Volvocould, for example, have raisedthe prices for Scania trucks by 5-10%, safe in the knowledge thata significant proportion of thosecustomers who would not acceptsuch an increase would be likelyto switch to the closestcompeting brand, i.e. Volvo.Since Volvo would also havecontrolled the closest brand,such a reaction to a priceincrease would have beenrevenue neutral to Volvo. Theeffect of controlling the twoclosest competitors on themarket is therefore tosubstantially reduce the riskassociated (even by a dominantfirm) in imposing a supra-competitive price53. In thiscontext, the Commission hadfound evidence that Volvo andScania had pursued similarstrategies in the relevant marketsand that they had similar brandimages, which were based on,inter alia, excellent quality andreliable service.

Furthermore, the investigationalso showed that the barriers to

53 For further information on the

Unilateral effects doctrine indifferentiated product markets, seee.g. Federal Trade Commission v.Staples, Inc., 970F. Supp. 1066(D.D.C. 1997).

entry or expansion in thesemarkets were high. Anycompetitor who would havewanted to challenge the mergedentity would have had to makelarge investments over asignificant period of time tobuild up the necessary criticalmass of installed vehicles in therelevant markets. In reachingthis conclusion, the Commissionassessed - and dismissed -Volvo's claim that thetransaction would necessarilylead to market share losses forthe new entity, the extent ofwhich, according to Volvo,would have been sufficient topreclude the creation ofdominance.

For these reasons, theCommission concluded that, ifapproved, the concentrationwould have significantlychanged the structure of themarket for heavy trucks inSweden, Norway, Finland andIreland, and created a dominantposition on each of thosemarkets.

Proposed commitments

Volvo submitted a package ofproposed commitments in orderto ensure the approval of theproposed concentration. Eventhough these commitmentscould, if properly implemented,have had some beneficial effecton the competitive situation inthe relevant markets, theinvestigation showed that theywould have been insufficient toresolve all the competitionconcerns resulting from theproposed acquisition of Scania.

➣ MERGERS


The proposed commitmentsincluded certain measuresrelating to a particular, Swedishcab crash test for heavy trucks,and a temporary suspension ofthe Scania brand. Theseproposals were found to havelittle or no potential impact onthe competitive situation. Thecab crash test follows fromSwedish law and can thereforeonly be abolished by theSwedish Government. It wastherefore, despite Volvo'sundertaking to use its best effortsto ensure its abolition, notpossible to conclude that the testwill be abolished. Equally, theproposed suspension of theScania brand was found to be oflimited significance, as itcontained a number ofsignificant limitations (both interms of time and scope).Notably, it would not imply thewithdrawal of the Scania productline, which, according to theproposal, would have continuedto be sold under another brand ofVolvo's choice.

Volvo had also proposed todivest its 37% stake in Bilia AB(a truck, bus and car distributorin the Nordic countries). Thestated purpose would have beento remove one of the existingvertical links into the distributionlevel. However, on closerexamination the Commissionfound that this company, even ifthe ownership link were to beremoved, would remaineconomically dependent onVolvo in the same way as allother (non-integrated) Volvodealers.

Volvo also proposed measures toopen up access to its dealer andservice networks for competingmanufacturers. This proposal,which would basically have leftthe existing structure of theVolvo and Scania organisationsintact, was however not found toprovide either the existingdealers or the competitors withsufficiently strong incentives tohave a real impact on the market.

The undertakings proposed byVolvo for the coach, city- andinter-city bus markets were alsofound to be too limited in scopeto significantly facilitate accessto the relevant markets forcompetitors. They were thereforeconsidered as insufficient toremove the competition concernsin each of the relevant markets.

Conclusion

Given the negative effects oncompetition on at least 15relevant markets, and the failureof Volvo to propose anyundertakings that fully removedthese concerns, the Commissiondecided, on 14 March 2000, todeclare the proposedconcentration incompatible withthe common market.

Although there are no "new"lessons to be learned from thedecision, it confirms theCommission's commitment notto allow the creation of dominantpositions through concentrations.It thereby highlights the need forfirms that have strong andoverlapping market positions tocarefully assess all elements that

are relevant for the assessmentof the scope of the geographicmarket. Caution is clearly calledfor if that assessment providesindications that the geographicmay not be sufficiently wide toexclude competition concerns.This applies in particular if thefirms are close competitors ondifferentiated product markets.

The aftermath

Following the Commission'sdecision in Volvo/Scania, certaincommentators alleged that theCommission's competitionpolicy discriminates againstlarge firms from "smaller"Member States who, it wasalleged, would be undulyhindered from expandingthrough mergers andacquisitions. This allegation is ofcourse completely withoutfoundation.

First, it must be recalled that thepurpose of any competitionbased merger control system isto ascertain the absence ofnegative effects on any relevantmarket. The only way to avoidan arbitrary assessment thatwould reduce merging firms’legal certainty is to apply thistest without having regard towhether such markets are smallor large in absolute or relativeterms.

Second, it should beremembered that the success ofcompanies such as Volvo andScania have largely been due tothe competition between them.This explains, to a large degree,

➣ MERGERS


why they have both becomesuccessful internationalcompanies with more than 80%of their sales outside the Nordicregion. Even from an industrialpoint of view it is not clear whyit would be in anyone’s interestto have competition betweensuch companies eliminatedthrough a merger.

Third, the implied suggestion -to allow mergers that would leadto dominant positions on "smallhome markets" - would, inaddition to being unlawful underthe Merger Regulation, lead todiscrimination against customersand consumers in smallerMember States. These customerswould then become exposed tothe dominance and theCommunity would fail to protectthem in the same way as if theyhad been active in a "largemarket". The suggested approachwould also lead to discrimination

against companies from largerMember States who would,firstly, be barred from enteringthe market(s) of the dominantfirm, whereas the merged entitywould be able to enter the largerand more open markets.Secondly, companies with "largehome markets" would also bediscriminated against by notbeing able to claim this peculiar"small market defence".

Finally, it should be stressedfirms based in smaller countriesand which have high marketshares in their home markets,such as Volvo and Scania, arecertainly not precluded fromexpanding through structuraltransactions. In fact, within someweeks of the Commission'snegative decision both Volvoand Scania have foundalternative strategic partners.Scania has a new large (althoughnot controlling) shareholder,

Volkswagen AG, which was notpreviously active in theproduction of heavy trucks andbuses. This transaction did notfall under the MergerRegulation, as VW's acquisitionof 34% of the voting rights inScania did not confer control inthe meaning of the MergerRegulation.

Just a few weeks later, Volvoannounced its intention toacquire Renault's heavy truckdivision (RVI) in exchange for15% of the shares in AB Volvo.This transaction will fall to beassessed under the MergerRegulation. Without prejudgingthe assessment that will have tobe made of the Volvo/Renaulttransaction, it appears clear thatthose who claimed that theVolvo/Scania merger was a sinequa non have already beenproven mistaken.

I. INTRODUCTION

A substantive number ofnotifications was submitted inthe first four months of 2000 (95compared to 92 in the sameperiod in 1999). Importantworkload was derived by therecord level of cases in phase II,

involving deeper marketinvestigation: no fewer than 9phase II investigations werecarried over from 1999,54 while

54 In six of these cases a final decision

was taken within in the periodcovered by this review, one waswithdrawn and two investigations,namely in cases M. 1671 - DOW

six new ones were opened in theperiod covered by this review.55

Consequently this led to anunprecedented number of sixdecisions under Article 8 of the

CHEMICAL/UNION CARBIDEand M.1693 – ALCOA/REYNOLDS, were still ongoing atthe end of this period.

55 M.1673 – VEBA/VIAG, M.1741 –MCI WORLCOM/SPRINT,M.1813 – INDUSTRI KAPITAL(NORDKEM)/DYNO, M.1806 –ASTRA ZENECA/NOVARTIS,M.1882 – PIRELLI/BICC, JV.27 –MICROSOFT/LIBERTYMEDIA/TELEWEST.

Main developments between 1stJanuary and 30 April 2000

By Anna PAPAIOANNOU, Walter TRETTON and NeilMARSHALL, Merger Task Force

➣ MERGERS


Merger Regulation56, which istwice the number taken duringthe same period in 1999 andthree times that of 1998. Thedeeper phase II investigationsconducted in the period underexamination eventuallyconcluded in one prohibition(VOLVO/SCANIA)57 and fiveapproval decisions subject tocommitments (AIR LIQUIDE/BOC58, LINDE/AGA59, TO-TALFINA/ELF AQUITAINE60,ALCAN/ALUSUISSE61, MMS/DASA/ASTRIUM62). In thiscontext it is interesting tomention that the partiesabandoned the deal in the caseALCAN/PECHINEY a fewhours before an imminentprohibition.

Eleven cases were cleared withcommitments at the end of aphase I investigation. Suchcommitments are intended tosolve competition problems thatare "readily identifiable and caneasily be remedied".63

Commitments at the end of aphase II investigation wereaccepted in five cases. Theexperience on remedies gleanedby the Commission in these and

56 i.e. decisions following the four

months' further investigation.57 M.1672.58 M.1630.59 M.1628.60 M.1628.61 M.1663.62 M.1636.63 Recital 8 of Council Regulation

(EC) 1310/97 amending Councilregulation EEC 4064/89 (the MergerRegulation).

previous cases will be reflectedin a forthcoming Notice onCommitments.

It should be underlined that theCommission has continued towork very closely withcompetition authorities of thirdcountries and of Member Statesconcerning remedies and otherissues on individual cases. Forthe record, GENERALI/INA64

may be mentioned as anexemplary case of co-operationwith competition authorities of aMember State. The parallelaluminium cases ALCAN/ALUSUISSE and ALCAN/PECHINEY gave theopportunity for effectivecollaboration with the UScompetition authorities.65

A situation of increasingworkload faced by the MergerTask Force, received theattention of certain media.66 Theforthcoming Notice onSimplified Treatment of RoutineCases could be viewed in thiscontext.

The issue of workers'participation in mergerprocedures became topical onoccasion of the decisionUNILEVER / AMORA-MAILLE67. The MergerRegulation clearly stipulates in 64 M.1712.65 For an analysis of these aluminium

cases, see comprehensive article inthis issue by Dimitri Giotakos.

66 e.g. FINANCIAL TIMES,14.4.2000, or Neue Zürcher Zeitung,29/30.04.2000.

67 M.1802.

Article 18.4 that employees'representatives should beentitled to be heard, uponapplication, in the context of aphase II examination. It shouldbe underlined that that up to thepresent, the Commission hasnever refused to hear workers'recognised representatives at anystage of the procedure. It shouldbe borne in mind however that,in the context of merger analysis,the Commission will only hearthe aspects being governed bycompetition law. DG Competi-tion firmly believes, that theworkers' right to be heard shouldbe sufficiently publicised.

During the period underexamination, the Court of FirstInstance delivered onejudgement in the joined casesinvolving action by The CocaCola Company (TCCC) andCoca Cola Enterprises (CCE)versus the EuropeanCommission.68

In 1997 TCCC and CCE hadappealed against a Commissiondecision authorising the sale byTCCC and by CadburySchweppes to CCE of theirinterests in AmalgamatedBeverages. The Commission hadconsidered that although CocaCola and Cadbury Schweppeshad held a dominant position inthe British cola market prior tothe operation, the concentration

68 Joined cases T-125/97 and T-127 –

THE COCA COLA COMPANY v.COMMISSION and COCA COLAENTERPRISES v. COMMISSIONof 22.3.2000 .

➣ MERGERS


itself did not strengthen thisdominance.

In its decision the Commissionhad simply ‘taken note of’ anundertaking by CCE to refrainfrom certain commercialpractices, but had not made thedecision conditional upon it. TheCFI, after examining the file andevaluating the statements madein the course of the procedure,held that the inclusion of thisundertaking did not producelegal effects (in the sense that abreach of its terms would entailthe decision’s revocation) andtherefore was not legallychallengeable.69

II. RELEVANT CASES

In the period of time covered bythis review, the Commission hadthe opportunity to examinecloser certain markets which areof immediate interest toconsumers (such as domestic andmotorway fuels, mobiletelecommunications, pay-TV)Furthermore, deeperinvestigation was conducted insectors which are currently

69 The other points of the appeal were

held to be inadmissible on groundsof not producing legal effects. Thesewere a control question, thedefinition of the relevant market(cola-flavoured carbonated softdrinks) and the finding that CocaCola and Schweppes Beverages helda dominant position on the Britishcola market . The CFI considered itwas not the mere finding that acompany held a dominant positionat a given time that might give riseto the risk of fines but its resortingto conduct which constitutes anabuse of that position.

undergoing fundamental restruc-turing leading to a significantlyhigher degree of consolidation(industrial gases, aluminium,pharmaceuticals) or which arealready highly consolidated(chemicals).

The definition of the scope of thegeographic market was thecentral point in theCommission's investigationwhich led to the prohibition ofthe take-over of SCANIA byVOLVO. In its decision, theCommission has made it clearthat the consistent application ofthe dominance test to anyrelevant geographic market,independently of its size, besidesbeing within the letter and spiritof the Merger Regulation,guarantees protection toconsumers from the effects ofdominance, in small and largemarkets alike and especiallywhere the common market ruleshave not been fully effective.70

The take-over of ELF-AQUITAINE by TOTAL-FINA71 was a case of regroupingof first league national playersleading to the creation of"national champions". Thegeneral competition concern insuch cases is that dominantpositions may be created in theparties' traditional national

70 For a comprehensive analysis of the

case, see special article in this issueby Dan Sjöblom.

71 For an analysis of the issues involvedin this case, see article by A.Schaub, Cl. Rakovsky, H. Piffaut,P.Deluyck in Competition PolicyNewsletter, No 1, 2000.

markets which wouldsubsequently lead to apartitioning of the nationalterritory between them withfurther destabilising impact onthe structure of the commonmarket. The Commission's taskwas to identify and eliminate (i)activity overlaps and (ii)bottlenecks that could enable thenew entity to lock the market toits profit by control of importlogistics, of transport anddistribution of refined petroleumproducts. The operation calledfor careful assessment also dueto its expected significant impactupon vital markets forconsumers.

In examining the mergers AIR-LIQUIDE/BOC and LINDE/AGA (all companies ratedbetween first and sixth world-wide in terms of turnover), theCommission was faced with thefirst two cases of globalconsolidation in the industrialgases industry.72

In AIR LIQUIDE/BOC, theCommission identified distinctproduct markets in the industrialgases sector, defined by type ofgas and by method ofdistribution, namely, (i) thetonnage market (large quantitiesof oxygen and nitrogen toindustrial users, sold throughdedicated production plantsinstalled on the customer's site ortransported through pipelines),

72 The AIR LIQUIDE/BOC deal was

eventually abandoned by the partiesfollowing unsuccessful negotiationson remedies with the Federal TradeCommission in the US.

➣ MERGERS


(ii) the bulk market (lowerquantities of liquid gases usuallyto be transported by rail or roadto the customer's site) and (iii)the cylinders market (storage incylinders of smaller quantitiesgases still in gaseous form). TheCommission took account of theinter-relation between thesemarkets, implying for instance,that a strong position on thetonnage market will often confercompetitive advantages on thebulk market and vice-versa.

The tonnage market wasconsidered to be EEA-wide. Onthis market the parties wouldhave obtained dominant position.The parties, however, offeredcommitments which were foundto remove the Commission'scompetition concerns

The geographic market for bulkand cylinder gases (with theexception of certain high purityand high value gases) was foundto be national in scope mainlydue to different prices, marketstructures and distributionsystems in Member States. Theoperation would havestrengthened the dominantposition in certain bulk andcylinder markets of Air-Liquidein France and of BOC in the UKand Ireland. Furthermore, bycombining existing dominantpositions in neighbouringcountries in these markets, theoperation raised the concern thatan extended area would beperpetually dominated by onesingle entity. The remediesproposed aimed at ensuring theeffective opening of the formerhome markets to competition,

through divestment of plantsmainly in the UK and France.The annual sales of the divestedplants were in the range of abouthalf of the market share that AirLiquide would have otherwiseacquired.

In the helium and electronicspecialty gases, which werefound to be wider than nationalin scope, the operation wouldthreaten to create a jointdominant position between thenew entity and Air Products (ajoined bidder with Air Liquide inthe acquisition of BOC, subjectto the division between them ofBOC's assets after completion ofthe deal). In helium, where theoperation would have reducedthe vertically integratedsuppliers from four to three,remedies consisted in thedivestiture of contracts for liquidhelium supply from Russia andPoland, access (via back-to-backagreements) to Air Liquide/BOC's purchasing agreements inthe USA, plus a freezing of AirLiquide's joint control (togetherwith Air Products and ultimatelywith the Algerian Government)on the important Algeriansupply. Remedies vis-à-vis thejoint dominant position that theoperation would create inelectronic specialty gases,consisted in the divestment ofthe transfill facility owned byAir Liquide in France (togetherwith the necessary technologylicences, customer informationand purchase orders to keep it aviable business), as well as of acommitment to grant third partyaccess to licences to BOC'spatented technology, a process to

be managed by an independentpatent attorney.

The Commission's findings inthe Air-LIQUIDE/BOC case, asregards the product andgeographic market definition oftonnage, bulk and cylinder gaseswere confirmed in the parallelcase LINDE/AGA. Commit-ments in that case covereddivestments in the bulk andcylinder gas markets in theNetherlands and Austria.

The Commission's investigationin the VODAFONE AIR-TOUCH / MANNESMANN 73

case showed that there is anemerging demand for advancedseamless pan-European servicesfrom internationally mobilecustomers. In particular largecorporations with substantialamounts of European cross-border businesses have a greaterdemand for such advancedservices than other types ofsubscribers. These new servicesessentially include pan-Europeanofferings of Internet mobileservices and wireless locationservices and will, to a substantialdegree, be accessed throughInternet mobile portals.

The advanced pan-Europeanservices are heavily dependenton the ability of operators toprecisely locate their customerswhen the latter are outside thereach of their own network. Withexisting GSM networks this isnot possible, but through new

73 M.1795.

➣ MERGERS


technologies such as GPRS,74

EDGE75 and CAMEL, 76

operators will be able tointegrate each others networks toprovide these services seamless-ly. These technologies also allowa significant improvement withregard to the speed informationand data (including content) canbe transferred through thedifferent networks. However, inorder to provide seamlessservices, operators have to agreeon the modifications on theexisting network configurations,centralised management solu-tions and cost and profitallocation.

Following the merger, the newentity has a unique footprint inthe common market, with solecontrol of mobile operators ineight Member States and jointcontrol in three. In addition, ithas an unrivalled customer base(almost double the amount of itsnearest competitor only inEurope). Through the largefootprint, it appeared that themerged entity would be in aunique position to build anintegrated network which would 74 General Packet Radio Service, a

technology developed for GSMnetworks to allow enhanced rates ofdata transfer.

75 Enhanced Data GSM Environment orEnhanced Data Rates for GlobalEvolution, represents the finalevolution of data communicationswithin the GSM standard (secondgeneration+).

76 Customised Application of MobileEnhanced Logic, a GSM featurename for including IntelligentNetwork functions into the GSMsystem. The technology will bebecome available after 2002.

enable a quick implementationof the provision of advancedseamless pan-European services,at least in those Member Stateswhere it has sole control. On theother hand, the merged entity'scompetitors, because of theirsegmented footprints and thedifficulties in integrating theirnetworks into a seamless one,would not be able to duplicatethis in the short to medium term(on average 3-5 years). Thisraised serious doubts as to thecompatibility of the merger withthe common market.

The remedies accepted consistedin, (i) the de-merger of OrangePlc, as a stand-alone businessincluding all its subsidiaries, inorder to face competitionconcerns in the UK and Belgianmobile telephony market, (ii) thegranting to other mobileoperators of the possibility toprovide pan-European advancedseamless services to theircustomers by using theintegrated network of the mergedentity. Due to fast developmentsin the sector, to the award of 3rd

generation UMTS licences andto the fact that competitors willin all likelihood try to build upalternative infrastructure, theundertakings have been limitedto a period of three years.

In the course of the investigationin the BT/ESAT77 case, theCommission found evidence ofthe existence of a market for thedistribution in Ireland of pan-European or global end-to-end

77 M.1838.

network services, whichencompass managed datanetworks, frame relay services,voice virtual private networksincluding call centre services.While the production of globalservices has a global dimension,their distribution may have anarrower/national dimension.Indeed, global service providersrequire a national presence andoften appoint independent localdistributors with their ownnetwork for handling traffic inthat market. Due to the alreadyestablished position of ESAT inthe distribution of such servicesin Ireland, the merged entitywould have controlled between50% and 60% of the Irishmarket. As a remedy BTundertook to grant the globalservices provider Global One,the right to terminate thedistribution agreement withESAT or, alternatively, todisclaim any exclusivitydistribution rights. Moreover theparties undertook not to renewanother provider's (Infonet)distribution agreement. All theseremedies were aimed at openingup the Irish market for thedistribution of global telecom-munications services.

In the ASTRIUM case (jointventure between MMS andDASA), the Commissionanalysed the satellite productionmarket both as regards primecontracting and equipmentproducing activities. As itemerged from the Commission'senquiry, each of the sub-systemsand equipment products whichconstitute the platform andpayload of a satellite might

➣ MERGERS


constitute a distinct productmarket. In particular, thereappeared to be a distinct marketfor mechanical wheels (used forthe stabilisation of the satelliteattitude). The geographic marketfor such equipment forobservation and scientificsatellites appears to beEuropean-wide. This is due tothe fact that such satellites arecommissioned by spaceagencies, such as the EuropeanSpace Agency (ESA). ESA inspecific, takes care that contractallocation at certain productionlevels within a project takesplace on the basis of thegeographic "juste retour" (fairreturn) principle which requiresit to (i ) grant preference to thefullest extent possible to industryin all ESA Member States (ii) toensure that all ESA MemberStates participate in projects inan equitable manner, havingregard to their financialcontribution to ESA.

The Commission also identifieda distinct market for militarycommunication satellites inFrance. In that market, whereprocurement is based on opencompetition between MMS andjust one another competitor(Alcatel Space), there was riskthat the operation would create adominant position. Since DASAwere the only supplier to AlcatelSpace for a series of sub-systemsand equipment, the operationwould result in Astriumbecoming both a competitor andkey supplier to Alcatel Space. Itwould therefore be in a positionto foreclose the market toAlcatel Space.

MMS undertook to divest itsbusiness in mechanical wheels,as a remedy to the fact thatfollowing the operation the onlyother supplier of this product inEurope would have depended onsales to Astrium. A secondundertaking concerned thegranting of DASA's licences forthe manufacturing and sale ofother equipment products(chemical propulsion systems,chemical thrusters and on-boardmanagement systems) to preventforeclosure of the market toAlcatel Space.

The acquisition by GENERALI,a company active in theinsurance sector both in Italy andabroad, of INA, one of thelargest Italian insurers wascleared by the Commissionsubject to a number ofcommitments. Accordingly,Generali undertook to divest itscontrolling stakes in threesubsidiaries active in the lifeinsurance sector and itsshareholding in the insurancecompany Fondiaria. INAundertook to divest itscontrolling interests in the bankinsurance company Bnl Vita andin Banco di Napoli. Thecompetition concerns raised bythe transaction were aggravatedby the existence of significantinterlocking directorships,whereby directors of Generaliand INA were also member ofthe boards and/or Executivecommittees of some oftheircompetitors in the life insurancesector. Both Generali and INAundertook to eliminate suchinterlocking directorships inorder to prevent co-ordination of

the competitive behaviour of theinterlocked companies.

The case SHELL/BASF78

(project Nicole) concerned ajoint venture in which the partiesproposed to combine all of theirworldwide polypropylene (“PP”)and polyethylene interests heldby Montell, Targor and Elenac.The joint venture was clearedafter a Phase 1 investigationsubject to a package ofcommitments offered by theparties.

The combination of the twocompanies’ businesses raisedhorizontal competition issues inthe markets for PP technologylicensing, PP resins and PPcompounds that were remediedby commitments to divestsignificant amounts of resins andcompounds production capacityas well as BASF’s PPtechnology licensing business(Novolen).

In addition, BASF holds a suiteof patents for the next generationof PP catalysts (metallocenes)that would have been strongenough to block others bringingany metallocene catalysts to themarket. The Commissionconsidered that the combinationof this strong patent positionwith the position that the jointventure would have held in thetraditional (Ziegler-Natta)catalysts and technology wouldhave further strengthened theparties’ dominance. To remedythese concerns, the parties

78 M.1751.

➣ MERGERS


committed to a package ofmeasures involving licensingand non-assertion of these patentrights, as a result of which thejoint venture’s ability to preventthe development of metallocenecatalysts will be removed.

The parties proposed a form of“pendulum” arbitration that hadnot previously been seen by theMerger Task Force. In thenegotiations for theconsideration for the patentlicenses can be reached thenboth negotiating parties wouldsubmit a single proposal to thearbitration panel. This panel canonly decide in favour of one ofthe two submitted proposals – inits entirety. The Commissionbelieves that this processtherefore creates incentives forthe parties to submit fair andreasonable offers and provides aroute to solving complexnegotiation issues fairly andwithout burdening theCommission’s resources.

III. REFERRALS TOMEMBER STATES

In the first four months of 2000,the Commission referred all orpart of the deal to MemberStates’ competition authorities inthree cases. Of these, two werereferred in full to the UK(ANGLO AMERICAN/TARMAC79 and HANSON/PIONEER80). The other(CARREFOUR/PROMODES81)

79 M. 177980 M. 182781 M. 1684

was the subject of two partialreferral decisions, one to Franceand one to Spain, as well as aconditional clearance decisionby the Commission.

While neither of the two casesthat were referred in full raisednew issues, they were closelyrelated and the analysis appliedin the ANGLO AMERICAN/TARMAC case was directlyapplicable in the subsequentanalysis of the acquisition ofPioneer by Hanson. Bothconcentrations involved thesupply of aggregates - sand,gravel, etc - and relateddownstream products such asready-mixed concrete andasphalt in the UK. Due to thecosts involved in transport ofthese products, theCommission’s investigationsreaffirmed its conclusions inprevious decisions that thegeographic markets for theseproducts are local and distinct,thereby fulfilling the conditionsfor referral. Neither case raisedcompetition issues in otherMember States, and so it waspossible to refer the cases in full.

The jurisdictional fallout of theconcentration between Carrefourand Promodès was rather morecomplex. In relation to thedownstream, retailing activities,the deal would have createdcompetitive problems onlocalised retail markets in Franceand Spain. The relevantauthorities in these two countriesrequested the referral of all thesemarkets on the basis that thesewere not a substantial part of thecommon market and they were

subsequently referred. However,the Commission retainedjurisdiction over the remainingparts of the deal, where thegeographic dimensions ofcompetition were considerablywider.

LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION

Application of Article 90 ECMain developments between 1st February and 31st May 2000


Introduction

On 27 March 2000 theCommission announced itsdecision to close its investigationconcerning the long-term gassupply agreement entered into bythe Spanish gas company GASNATURAL, belonging to theREPSOL-YPF group ofcompanies, and the Spanishelectricity generator ENDESAafter both parties modified theterms of their agreement in linewith the competition concernsexpressed by the Commission ina warning letter82.

The original transaction, the firstof this kind in Spain, providedGAS NATURAL with animportant gas contract in termsof quantities sold and of longduration in the fastest growingsegment of the Spanish gasmarket: gas for electricitygeneration.

The context of the agreement:the liberalisation of the gasmarket.

The transaction between GASNATURAL, the dominantsupplier in the Spanish gas

82 See IP/00/297 of 27.03.2000

market, and ENDESA, themarket leader in the electricitybusiness in Spain, took place at aparticularly crucial moment inthe liberalisation of the Spanishand European gas markets.

The interest of the Commissionin this case was to ensure thatthe gas supply contract did notallow the dominant gas supplierto prolong its de facto monopolyfor many years and thus impedenew entry in the Spanish gasmarket which had started to beliberalised.

GAS NATURAL used to hold amonopoly on all Spanish gasmarkets (except for somedistribution licences in a fewareas). Liberalisation started in1996 in Spain when themonopoly rights of GASNATURAL were partly lifted forlarge industrial consumers aswell as for power generators.The latter are of particularinterest to new entrants in themarket because of theirrequirement to purchase largequantities over longer periods oftime. Power generators are alsopotential entrants into thewholesale gas market themselves(ENDESA is, for example,already present in the gas

distribution market). Gas is a keyfuel for power generators notonly as a substitute for coal butalso as a product to be offered tofinal consumers (“multi utility”).

Ensuring the openness of theSpanish market (and of othernational markets) was (and stillis) of paramount importance atthe time given that the EU GasDirective enters into force inAugust 2000, providing for theinitial stages of the liberalisationof the European market.

The issues at stake

The more importantinfringements of competitionarising as a result of theagreement between ENDESAand GAS NATURAL were:

– the creation of barriers toentry into the liberalisedSpanish gas market as a resultof a long-term supplyagreement having a de factoexclusive character andleading to a foreclosure effectin the market; and

– the own use requirementestablished in the contractamounting to a restriction onthe resale of gas which led toan artificial segmentation ofSpanish gas markets.

However, before analysing theexistence of the infringements tocompetition, the first step was toestablish the relevant marketaffected, both in terms ofproduct and geographicalmarket, as well as the questionof the existence of a dominantposition in that market.

Long-term supply agreements in thecontext of gas market liberalisation:Commission closes investigation ofGas NaturalBy Mariano FERNÁNDEZ SALAS, DG COMP-E-3

➣ LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION


1. The product marketaffected.

The approach of the Commissionin previous decisions, notably inthe context of the mergerregulation83, can also befollowed in this case. Firstly, gasis considered to be a separateproduct from other sources ofenergy like electricity or petrol.Secondly, different customergroups can constitute separaterelevant gas markets. Thus thebulk supply of gas to eligibleindustrial customers or towholesalers can be a differentmarket (free market) from theregulated market of distributionin which customers are captive.It was the first of these twomarkets which was affected bythe transaction. In this context,one could argue that electricitygenerators constitute a specialgroup of customers within thefree market as a result of theirown special demand conditions.However the reply to thisquestion can also be left opensince the conclusions drawn asto the geographical dimension ofthe market and as to the positionof GAS NATURAL on therelevant market would remainunchanged.

83 See in particular Decision of

01.09.1994, case n° M.493,Tractebel/Distrigaz; Decision of02.06.1998, case n° M.931,Neste/Ivo and Decision of29.09.1999, case n° M.1383,Exxon/Mobil.

2. The geographical marketaffected.

In previous cases, such as theExxon/Mobil merger, theCommission found thatwholesale markets were stillnational at this stage. The marketconditions are determined by thepast monopolistic structure withone company holding a de factomonopoly on import, transport(pipelines and LNG terminals),storage and resale of gas. Whilethe Spanish legislation allowseligible customers to import gasdirectly, some services can onlybe provided almost exclusivelyby wholesale companiesestablished at national level(balancing, back-up, securitystorage, diversification etc.).This makes it difficult foreligible customers (and gasproducers) to by-pass theservices of wholesaletransmission companies. It istrue that the geographicalrelevant market may acquire awider dimension with the entryinto force of the Gas Directiveand the general introduction ofTPA on the gas networks in allMember States. However, theseregulatory changes will bringabout merging markets in thelonger run only and marketsremain essentially national atpresent. These conclusions canalso be applied to this case.

3. The dominant position.

The market position of GN isstill very strong even after 3years of the liberalisationprocess. GN supplies around90% of the requirements of

industrial customers andelectricity generators in the freemarket. This militates in favourof a presumption of dominance,in accordance with past case-law(Hoffmann-La Roche and Akzo).This presumption is alsosupported by the strong positionof GN in the regulated marketwhere it supplies (and willlegally continue to supply until2008) around 90% of thecustomers.

One could argue that the supplyof gas for electricity generationwas an emerging market inSpain since this contract was thefirst of its kind to supply newgeneration (CCGT) plants(though gas was already suppliedfor electricity generation toexisting thermal plants also ableto burn fuel). In emergingmarkets high market shares donot necessarily indicatedominance. However, this viewcannot be followed: theelectricity generation market iscertainly a growing market butnot an emerging market. It is notan ex-novo market created, forinstance, by new technologicaldevelopments, but rather asegment of a wider market thatcould become a separate marketas a result of a different demandstructure, assuming thatelectricity generators havespecial characteristics thatdistinguish them from otherlarge industrial consumers.However, from the point of viewof supply, the differencebetween supplying an electricitygenerator and an interruptibleindustrial consumer that uses gasto produce electricity in a co-



generation unit is small, exceptperhaps with regard to thevolumes supplied.

If the argument of the existenceof an emerging market was,nevertheless, accepted, one hasto consider whether high marketshares indeed indicate adominant position. Suchassumption presupposes that theemerging market in questionremains open to new entrantsand that the quasi-monopolymarket position is consequentlyonly temporary84. During theinvestigation, however, therewere some indications that GASNATURAL, even under adynamic perspective, does enjoya dominant position in thegrowing market segment of gassales to electricity generators andwill maintain its dominantposition on a lasting basis. Thestrong position of GASNATURAL as an importer intoSpain (only true importer) andits gate-keeper function foraccess to the infrastructuremilitated in favour ofconsidering GAS NATURAL adominant company.

Thus, the dominant positionresulted from the considerablemarket shares held by GASNATURAL in the relevant andneighbouring markets, its controlof the gas infrastructure in Spainas well as from the commercialadvantages it enjoys vis-à-vis itspotential competitors.

84 See Decision of 09.11.1994, case n°

M.469, MSG Media Service.

4. The alleged abuses of GasNatural dominant posi-tion.

The Commission’s claims werebasically the following:

• Creation of barriers to entryinto the liberalised Spanishgas market: de factoexclusivity and long durationof supply contract. ENDESA,through the contract inquestion, was basicallycovering all its gasrequirements for theforeseeable future and a largeproportion thereafter inaccordance with its perceivedshare of Spanish powerproduction. At the same time,potential entrants were losingan attractive client in terms ofvolumes, as electricitygenerators are among thelarger customers of gas. Entryof new competitors wasrendered more difficult andthus less likely. Thesubsequent foreclosure effectin the Spanish marketsubstantially hindered the on-going liberalisation of theEuropean gas market.Consequently, the dominantposition of GAS NATURALwas reinforced.

• Own use requirement:restriction on the resale ofgas and segmentation ofSpanish gas markets. Theoriginal agreement also hadthe effect of limiting thecompetitive position ofENDESA in the gas market,where at present it is a smallplayer, since it was notallowed to resell the

competitive gas purchasedfrom GAS NATURAL forelectricity generation, whileGAS NATURAL undertook,in a separate agreement, tosupply gas for resale at adifferent price. Pricedifferentiation according tofinal use and resaleprohibition is the classicbehaviour of dominant firms.Lowering the prices tocustomers that are likely toattract new entrants, whilemaintaining a higher level ofprice in other segments of themarket (market segmen-tation), certainly helps tomaintain the market positionof dominant firms (such asGAS NATURAL).

• Discrimination of otherSpanish gas purchasers.Other clauses of the originalagreement had the effect ofproviding ENDESA bettertreatment than other futurebuyers from GASNATURAL without any validjustification.

THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSEDBY THE PARTIES.

Following its investigation,during which the SpanishCompetition Authorities wereduly informed in application ofthe Commission’s cooperationnotice of 199785, theCommission informed the 85 The Spanish authorities dealt with

other parts of the agreementsbetween ENDESA and GASNATURAL. In particular, theyprohibited the merger of part of thegas distribution network of bothcompanies in two Spanish regions.



companies concerned that theoriginal supply agreement couldconstitute an infringement ofArticle 82 of the Treaty as it hadthe effect of reinforcing thealready existing dominantposition of GAS NATURAL inthe Spanish gas market.

GAS NATURAL and ENDESA,replying to the concerns of theCommission, proposed someamendments to the gas supplycontract. Their proposals werebasically the following:

• Substantial reduction (around25%) of gas volumes coveredby the contract in order tofree part of ENDESA’spurchasing capacity ensuringits continued existence as acustomer in the gas marketwhich could attract newmarket entry. Thus, theexclusivity ratio diminishedand reached a point where itwas no longer possible toclaim the existence of defacto exclusivity in thecontract.

• Reduction of the long-termduration of the supplycontract by one third in orderto avoid the excessive long-term dependence of thecustomer on the supplier.Thus, the contract will notexceed 12 years in the plateauperiod.

• GAS NATURAL will notrequire ENDESA (or anyother electricity generator infuture contracts) to use thegas for electricity generationpurposes only once suppliesreach the plateau level. Thus

ENDESA becomes free toresell the gas86.

• Modification of other clausesof the agreement that couldhave the effect ofdiscriminating in favour ofENDESA compared to othergas customers.

CLOSING OF THE PROCEDUREAND EFFECTS ON THELIBERALISATION OF THE GASMARKET.

In view of the commitmentsmade by the parties, theCommission decided not topursue its ex-officio case againstGAS NATURAL:

• As a result of the reduction ofthe volumes to be suppliedand of the duration of thecontract, not all ofENDESA’s requirements are

86 Except for the build-up period.

During this period, GASNATURAL increases the gasdeliveries to ENDESAprogressively. Because of theflexibility conditions, it wasaccepted that, during the build-upperiod, GAS NATURAL couldrequire an own use requirementfrom ENDESA. However, theflexibility argument cannot play arole anymore once deliveries in theagreement reach the plateau level.Asking GAS NATURAL for acomplete removal of the resaleprohibition would not have apractical impact, since during thebuild-up period, it would be difficultfor ENDESA to resale any gas inSpain. In the past, the Commissionalso accepted that a (limited in time)resale prohibition could be imposedon an electricity generator ( See caseTRANSGAS-TURBOGAS, 1996Commission Report on CompetitionPolicy, p. 48 and p.135.).

satisfied. Accordingly,ENDESA will need topurchase more gas in thefuture, thus attracting newsuppliers and bringing morecompetition to the Spanishmarket. In this case, theCommission considered thatthe volumes concerned arelarge enough to attract newentrants. Indeed, it appearsthat quite substantialminimum quantities need tobe involved before entry intodiscussions with gasproducers/traders, not yetselling in the geographicalmarket concerned, can beenvisaged, in particular whenthe purchases relate toLiquefied Natural Gas.

• Allowing ENDESA (or othergas buyers) to resell the gaswill completely change thepattern of trade in the market.GAS NATURAL will nolonger be in a position tosegment the market, and mayface sales from ENDESA (orother large gas buyers) in thegas market.

• Access by power generatorsto competitive natural gas asa substitute for coal is crucialfor the development of acompetitive electricitymarket. In addition, naturalgas is also a product thatelectricity producers can offerto final consumers (“multienergy”). Under the terms ofthe agreement as amended,ENDESA will be able tooffer gas at spot marketconditions in the gas market,while developing at the sametime its new powergeneration park.

STATE AID


Eight Survey on State Aid inthe EU

In April 2000 the Commissionapproved the Eighth Survey onState Aid in the EU, COM(2000)205. As with previouseditions, the coverage of theSurvey was extended furtherand, for the first time, data onemployment and training aidwere included. Moreoverseparate analyses were carriedout on CO2 emission taxschemes that contain elements ofState aid and certain categoriesof horizontal aid.

Results of the Survey

Overall results presented inTable 1 show that during thethree year period 1996 to 1998,the Member States of the EUspent an average of € 93 billion ayear in aid in the manufacturing,agriculture, fisheries, coalmining, transport, financial andother service sectors. This is an11% decrease on the previousreporting period 1994 to 1996.

The manufacturing sectorreceived an average of € 33billion a year during the currentperiod, a decrease of some 15%when compared with theprevious reporting period. Thegradually decreasing EU-widetrend in the award of aidobserved in the Sixth and

Seventh Surveys has thereforebeen maintained.

However, as can be seen fromTable 2, these overall figuresconceal wide variations in aidlevels and trends betweencountries.

When considering aid levels inrelation to value added, they arecurrently highest in Greece andItaly and lowest in the UnitedKingdom and Sweden. Thespread is remarkable: in Greece,aid is seven times higher than inthe UK. In regard to cohesion, acomparison between three of thefour largest economies and thefour Cohesion countries –Greece, Ireland, Portugal andSpain – also illustrates importantdifferences. Manufacturing aidin Germany, France and Italy,although having dropped slightlyfrom the 80 percent share duringthe previous period, stillaccounts for 76 per cent of allmanufacturing aid. At the sametime the share of aid that isgranted in the Cohesioncountries increased, albeitmarginally from 8 to 9 percent ofmanufacturing aid.

Remarkable differences betweenMember States are also to beseen when the differentobjectives and forms of aid areconsidered. At the EU levelregional aid represents almost

60% of total aid tomanufacturing. However itsshare at Member State levelvaries from one to 96%depending upon the country.Overall, the amount of aidgranted to manufacturing forone-off ad-hoc measures to assistindividual firms has continued todecrease and now amounts to4% of all manufacturing aid inthe Union. At the same timeaccompanying changes in thedistribution of manufacturing aidbetween horizontal and regionalobjectives have been observed. Itappears that with the exceptionof Germany, Italy and Greece,all Member States are graduallyshifting resources away fromsectorial, ad-hoc aid, towardshorizontal objectives. There isalso a perceptible shift ofresources towards regional aidwith absolute increases beingseen in ten Member States.

Conclusions drawn by theCommission

Clearly in view of the still veryhigh levels of State aid, the strictand rigorous control of State aidwill be maintained. Howevergiven the very different patternsin the award of aid that are foundacross the EU, the Commission’sresponse will be suitablynuanced.

- Increasing transparencyUser-friendly access toinformation on theCommission's state aid policywill be reinforced by a stateaid register. It is also beingconsidered whether a

Main developments between1st January and 31st May 2000

➣ STATE AID


scoreboard could furtherimprove transparency;

- Modernising the state aidcontrol rulesThe frameworks forenvironmental aid andemployment aid are underrevision. Legislation is beingprepared to exempt certaincategories of State aid - likeaid for small and mediumenterprises or training aidfrom notificationrequirements. Such groupexemptions should ensure a

reduced level ofadministrative effort on thepart of Member States andthe Commission, therebyallowing a greater focus onmore complex areas of stateaid control;

- Enforcing state aid controleffectively outside theEuropean Union Enforcementof the strict state aid controlprovisions contained in theEurope Agreements signedwith the candidate countrieswill be increased through the

finalising of implementingrules for these provisions.

- Faster recovery of illegal aidParticular importance will beattached to a more speedyrecovery of aid which theCommission has declaredincompatible with the ECTreaty.

The Survey may be consulted onDG COMP’s homepage at :http ://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg4/lawaid/en/rap8.htm.

Table 1Overall national aid in the European Union 1994-1996 and 1996-1998in billion euro

1994–1996 1996–1998

Overall national aid 104,2 93.0

Of which:Manufacturing sector 38,5 32.6Agriculture 14,5 13.3Fisheries 0,3 0.3Coal mining 9,1 7.2Transport 36,7 32.1Financial Services 2,0 3.3Tourism 0,3 0.2Media and Culture 0,6 0.7Employment* 1,1 1.4Training* 0,8 0.9Other Services 0,3 0.9

*Data incomplete for 1994-1996

➣ STATE AID


Table 2State aid to the manufacturing sectorAnnual averages 1994-1996 and 1996-1998

In per cent of valueadded

In euro per personemployed In million euro

1994-1996 1996-1998 1994-1996 1996-1998 1994-1996 1996-1998 Austria 1,3 1,4 654 719 455 495 Belgium 2,5 1,9 1376 1093 931 732 Denmark 2,6 2,9 1252 1433 607 712 Germany 3,8 2,6 1941 1434 16201 11463 -Old Länder : : 451 435 3080 2856 -New Länder : : 8783 6021 13121 8607 Greece 4,8 4,9 925 997 592 616 Spain 2,3 2,1 769 691 1883 1800 Finland 1,6 1,6 928 959 366 391 France 1,7 2,0 895 1131 3607 4481 Ireland 1,3 1,9 909 1458 240 416 Italy 5,5 4,4 2419 1955 11040 8864 Luxembourg 2,2 2,3 1400 1476 46 48 Netherlands 1,1 1,2 702 735 602 629 Portugal 1,4 1,0 263 188 272 195 Sweden 0,8 0,8 421 441 330 344 UnitedKingdom

0,6 0,7 317 334 1358 1454

EUR 15 2,8 2,3 1292 1113 38531 32639

Averages in 1997 prices

➣ STATE AID


Germany - The Commissionauthorizes the special taxtreatment of certain sectors ofthe economy in connectionwith the continuation of theecological tax reform

On 15 February 2000, theCommission decided toauthorise the continuedecological tax reform inGermany under state aid rules.The Commission has concludedthat the special tax treatment ofcertain sectors of the economy,notified by the GermanGovernment under the state aidrules in connection with thecontinuation of the ecologicaltax reform, is compatible withthe EC Treaty. It has decided toauthorise the special rules up tothe year 2002 under theCommunity guidelines on stateaid for environmental protectionand on the basis of its existingpractice and the Community'senvironmental policy.

The Commission approved theintroduction of the ecotax inGermany in April 1999, in so faras it was covered by the state aidrules. It should be borne in mindthat a general increase in, or theintroduction of, energy taxes isnot in itself an aid measurerequiring authorisation.However, exemptions from anysuch general tax in the form ofreduced tax rates or refunds mayhave to be regarded as aid if theyfavour certain undertakings or theproduction of certain goods. TheCommission took the view inApril 1999 that this was inprinciple the case as regards the

reductions of up to 20% in taxrates provided for under theecotax law for firms inmanufacturing industry,agriculture and forestry and forrail transport services.

This decision covers the secondstage of the ecological tax reform.The main features of theextension are the gradual annualincrease in electricity tax and infuel tax. The reduced tax rates arebeing maintained under theincreased electricity tax. Thismeans that the relevant firms willreceive a higher tax exemption;however, they will also payhigher taxes than before.Furthermore, as part of theincrease in electricity tax, agrowing number of firms will paythe reduced rates and thus becovered by the partial taxexemption. For this reason, theincrease in electricity tax alsorequires authorisation under thestate aid rules. The same appliesto the tax refund proposal formanufacturing industry.

The increase in fuel tax will inprinciple have to be borne by allfirms; however, public transportwill be subject to only half of theadditional levy. This too, in theCommission's view, amounts toaid.

The reduction in mineral oil taxfor low-sulphur fuels and theexemption granted on electricitygenerated for their ownconsumption by plants of up to 2MW are, in the Commission'sview, not aid.

As in April 1999, theCommission has, however,decided not to raise anyobjections to the aid provisions,because they are in line with theCommunity guidelines on stateaid for environmental protection,its previous practice on similarschemes in other Member Statesand the Community's environ-mental policy.

The Commission is thusessentially maintaining theposition it took in its April 1999decision: the 1994 Communityguidelines on state aid forenvironmental protection (OJ C72/03 of 10 March 1994)recognise that the introduction ofenvironmental taxes and chargescan involve state aid becausesome firms may not be able tostand the extra financial burdenimmediately and requiretemporary relief. Such aid in theform of relief from environmentaltaxes may under certainconditions, and taking each caseon its merits, be approved inexceptional cases. Havingconsidered all the circumstancesof the case, and taking intoaccount its previous practice andthe Community's environmentalpolicy, the Commission hasdecided that the conditions forapproval are met. In so deciding,it has taken account of the factthat at present not all MemberStates of the Community ornon-Community countriesimpose such energy taxes andthat the introduction ofenvironmental taxes thereforeaffects the competitive position ofthe relevant firms.

➣ STATE AID


The Commission has also basedits decision on the fact that theauthorisation period remainsunchanged as compared with theoriginal authorisation period.The Federal Government hasrenewed its commitment tore-notify the measures forapproval no later than three yearsafter the entry into force of theecotax, i.e. before 1 April 2002,and, in the Electricity Tax Law,has set a similar limit to theperiod of applicability of the aidmeasures.

The Commission has also notedthat the Federal Governmentassumes that German industrywill stick to the voluntaryagreements entered intopreviously and will in the yearsahead continue its efforts toreduce energy consumption andincrease energy efficiency.Lastly, the Commission has takenaccount of the fact that theGerman scheme is in line withthe Commission's 1997 proposalfor a Council Directiverestructuring the Communityframework for the taxation ofenergy products.

This decision does not cover theproposed exemption of certain gasand steam turbine power stationsfrom mineral oil tax. Thismeasure will be dealt with later ina separate Commission decision

Denmark – Commissionapproves tradable CO2emission permits for theelectricity sector in Denmarkfor the period 2001-2003

On 29 March the Commissiondecided not to object to a schemeconcerning tradable CO2emission permits for theelectricity sector in Denmark.The Commission welcomes theDanish emissions trading scheme,since it is important for the EU togather experience ahead of theInternational Emissions Tradingto be introduced under the KyotoProtocol in 2008. However, theCommission considers that givingproducers emission permitswithout compensation constitutesState aid under Article 87(1) ofthe EC Treaty. It can approve theState aid on the basis of Article87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, sincethe scheme will contribute to thedevelopment of environmentalprotection. The Commissionmakes clear that this decision iswithout prejudice to futuredecisions on methods forallocating tradable emissionpermits. This applies for apossible revised version of theDanish scheme allowing trade inpermits between differentcountries, for a new scheme toapply after 2003 and for schemessubsequently developed in otherMember States.

The system is based on an annual,national ceiling for the allowableemissions from electricityproduction. It is limited to theelectricity sector, since it alone isresponsible for about 40% of thetotal emissions of CO2 in

Denmark. The ceiling is reducedeach year, going from 22 milliontonnes in 2001 to 21 milliontonnes in 2002 and 20 milliontonnes in 2003, when the schemeends. The national quota isallocated to existing electricityproducers for free, based on theirhistorical emissions in the period1994–1998 (grandfathering). Thebasic quotas allocated will onlycover about 70% of the historicalemissions of each electricityproducer.

The idea behind a system withtradable emission permits is thatthe incentive to reduce emissionsshould be strongest where thecost of doing so is the lowest. Intheory, a producer able to reduceemissions at a cost per tonnewhich is lower than the amountof the fine due for exceeding thequota, i.e. DKK 40/tonne (about€ 5.40), will do so. The excesspermits can then be sold toanother producer, for whom it ischeaper to buy permits than topay the fine. A producer can alsosave permits that are not used inone year for use the next year(banking). Each year, the quota ofeach producer is adjusted takingaccount of the national quota forthe particular year, thetransactions made and whetheremission permits have beensaved.

In its assessment, theCommission has emphasised theimportance of safeguarding thefreedom of establishment. Thus,the Danish authorities will ensurethat if there are new entrants onthe Danish electricity marketduring the operation of the

➣ STATE AID


scheme, these will receive quotasbased on criteria that areobjective and non-discriminatoryin relation to those applied toincumbent producers. The criteriaare subject to approval by theCommission.

The Danish scheme should beseen against the background ofthe Kyoto Protocol to the UNFramework Convention onClimate Change from December1997. Under the Kyoto Protocol,the European Communitycommitted itself to reducing itsemissions of greenhouse gasesby 8% during the period 2008–2012 in comparison with theirlevels in 1990. A burden-sharinghas been agreed internally in theEU, which for Denmark impliesa reduction by 21% in the period2008-2012 compared with 1990.

France et Pays-Bas - LaCommission autorise des aidesen faveur du programme derecherche ITEA.

Le 11 avril, la Commission aautorisé les aides notifiées par laFrance et les Pays-Bas en faveurdu programme de rechercheITEA (« Information Technologyfor European Advancement »).

ITEA est un programme Eurekade recherche et développementdans le domaine destechnologies logicielles. Il vise àacquérir des connaissances dansdifférents domaines (composantslogiciels, architectures,spécifications de standards,spécifications des interfaces,etc.) et concerne toutparticulièrement le dévelop-

pement de technologies pour les« briques logicielles »(« middleware »).

Douze pays, dont onze del’Union Européenne, ontmanifesté leur intérêt pour ceprogramme. Conformément auxrègles Eureka, ITEA sera menéen collaboration transfrontalièreau niveau européen, etimpliquera une collaborationeffective entre industriels etcentres publics de recherche.

Les autorités françaises etnéerlandaises soutiendront lesprojets de R&D menés dans lecadre d’ITEA en apportant desaides dont l’intensité maximalesera de 50%. Le programmeITEA durera jusqu’en juin 2007et aura un budget total d’environ3200 millions d’Euros. Les aidesapportées par les autoritésfrançaises et néerlandaises autitre des régimes approuvés parla Commission s’élèveront aumaximum à 274 millionsd’Euros et 95 millions d’Eurosrespectivement.

La Commission a analysé lesrégimes d’aides notifiés par laFrance et les Pays-Bas dans lecadre du programme ITEAconformément à l’Encadrementcommunautaire des aides d’Etatà la Recherche et audéveloppement87.

Les travaux financés dans lecadre d’ITEA sont de larecherche industrielle ou desdéveloppements pré-concurren-

87 JO C 45, 17.2.1996, p.5

tiels au sens de l’Encadrement.ITEA s’inscrit dans les objectifsdu Cinquième Programme Cadrede Recherche et Développement,et plus particulièrement dans lesobjectifs du programmespécifique «Société del’information conviviale88». Lesrégimes notifiés par la France etles Pays-Bas pouvaient parconséquent bénéficier du bonusd’intensité de 25% prévu aupoint 5.10.3 de l’Encadrementpour les projets s’inscrivant dansle Programme-cadre communau-taire avec collaborationtransfrontalière et diffusion desrésultats : une intensité d’aide de50% pouvait donc être autorisée.

La Commission, qui a souligné àde nombreuses reprises quel’industrie des technologies del’information et descommunications jouerait un rôlecrucial pour la société del’information au 21ème siècle,considère qu’un programme derecherche comme ITEAcontribue à l’intérêt commun.Elle a conclu que les dispositifsd’aide français et néerlandaisétaient en tout point conformes àl’Encadrement communautairedes aides d’Etat à la Rechercheet au Développement etpouvaient par conséquent êtreautorisés.

88 JO L64 du 12 mars 1999, p.20

➣ STATE AID


Germany - The Commissiondecides that the aid grantedfrom 1993 to 1997 in favour ofSystem MicroelectronicInnovation GmbH (SMI) isincompatible with the Treatyand has to be recovered. Inorder to ensure its effectiverecovery, it decides that the aidwill have to be recovered notonly from the present owner ofthe assets of SMI(Microelectronic Design &Development GmbH - MD&D)but also from any othercompanies to which SMI'sassets have been or will betransferred.

The European Commission hasdecided to close the formalinvestigation procedure inrespect of State aid measuresamounting to DEM 140,100,000awarded to SystemMicroelectronic InnovationGmbH (SMI), Frankfurt/Oder/Brandenburg (Germany) with afinal negative decision. As thesemeasures are incompatible withthe Treaty, the aid has to berecovered.

On 5 August 1997, theCommission initiated a formalinvestigation procedure againstunnotified aid measures infavour of SMI. The companyfiled for bankruptcy already inApril 1997. The main activity ofSMI was the production ofcustomer specific microchips.The bankruptcy administratordecided to continue thecompany’s operation. A newcompany, named SiliciumMicroelektronik IntegrationGmbH Frankfurt/Oder (SIMI),

was founded on 30 June 1997 tosecure the going-concern ofSMI. All shares of SIMI wereowned by the company inbankruptcy SMI. On 1 July 1997the administrator also founded a100 % subsidiary of SIMI,named Microelectronic Design& Development GmbH(MD&D), whose intendedactivities were in the field ofconsulting, marketing,development and design ofmicroelectronic products andservices. After several fruitlessattempts of the LandBrandenburg to sell MD&D to aprivate investor, the negotiationswith MEGAXESS Inc from theUSA, were finally successful. InJuly 1999 MD&D bought theshares of SIMI and the assets ofSMI.

Grants of a total DEM64,800,000 for investmentpurposes by the Treuhandanstaltand a loan of DEM 70,300,000of the Land Brandenburg for losscoverage from 1993 until 1997were awarded in favour of SMI.A further DEM 4,000,000 of theLand and DEM 1,000,000 of theTHA was awarded in favour ofSIMI, the subsidiary of SMI.

As the aid measures were neithercovered by approved regimesnor exemptable on the basis ofthe provisions of the Treaty, theaid measures had to beconsidered as beingincompatible and therefore haveto be recovered from thebeneficiaries.

The Commission further decidedthat the aid measures in favour

of SMI and SIMI have to berecovered from MD&D. Thiscompany still benefits from theaid because it still uses the assetsof the bankrupt company, SMI,thus taking advantage from theaid formally granted to SMI andSIMI.

Furthermore, Germany should beprevented from evading theconsequences of the recoverydecision by setting up a systemof successive subsidiaries like itdid in this case. Therefore, theCommission decided also toextend its decision to aidmeasures in favour of any otherundertaking to which SMI's,SIMI's or MD&D's assets havebeen or will be transferred.

Nouvelles Décisions sur lescartes des aides d'Etat à finalitérégionale pour la période 2000-2006

The mapping exercise that theCommission started some 2years ago is now more than halfway. At the end of May theCommission approved the fullmap of areas where nationalregional aid may be granted fornine Member States. These areDenmark, France, Germany,Greece, Ireland, Finland,Sweden, Spain and Austria. TheCommission also approved theArticle 87(3)(a) areas of Italyand Portugal.

Although good progress wasmade during the last months, theproposals submitted by someMember States have not allowedthe Commission to approve allmaps. Procedures according to

➣ STATE AID


Article 88(2) of the Treaty arepending on the Belgium and onthe Dutch map, and on theItalian and Portuguese Article87(3)(c) areas. The assessmentfor Luxembourg and the UnitedKingdom is not yet finalised.

Germany

On 14 March the Commissionapproved the remaining part ofthe German regional aid map forthe period 1 January 2000 until31 December 2003. The decisiondeclares the City of Berlin andseveral regions in West-Germany eligible under Article87(3)(c) EC-Treaty and laysdown the respective maximumaid intensities relevant forregional aid. Thus, the city ofBerlin may receive 20% (in netgrant equivalent), the region ofHameln-Pyrmont, the city ofPassau and the city of Hof 10%(in net grant equivalent) and theremaining proposed labourmarket regions in West-Germany 18% (in net grantequivalent). However, Germanydeclared not to exceed 20 %gross in the city of Berlin and18 % gross for the relevantlabour market regions in WestGermany.

In July last year, theCommission had already decidedthat the five new Länder areeligible under Article 87(3)(a)EC-Treaty and their respectiveaid intensities were laid downfor the period 1 January 2000until 31 December 2003.

Austria

On 30 May, the Commissionapproved the Austrian regionalaid map for the period 1 January2000 until 31 December 2006.Burgenland is the only region toqualify under Article 87(3)(a)EC-Treaty. Therefore, in sameparts of this region a maximumaid intensity of 35% (in net grantequivalent) is permitted. Regionsfalling under Article 87(3)(c)EC-Treaty have either beenselected on a NUTS III basis orcorrespond to areas eligibleunder the Structural Funds. Theirrespective maximum aidintensities have been chosen inorder to reflect the seriousnessand intensity of the regionalproblem and vary between12,5% and 20% (in net grantequivalent).

Sweden

On 29 March, the Commissionapproved the Swedish regionalaid map for the period 2000 to2006. The Swedish Article87(3)(c) EC region is one single,compact zone located in theNorth of the country. It has apopulation of 1.4 million (15.9%of the total population ofSweden). In the most remote partof the (c)-area, the maximum aidintensity ceiling is set at 30%nge. This area has a populationdensity of 1.9 inhabitants persquare kilometre and qualifies asa low population density areaunder paragraph 3.10.4 of theGuidelines on national regionalaid 89 . In the rest of the (c)- 89 OJ C 74, 10.3.1998, p. 9

region, the aid ceiling is set at17.5% nge for large enterprisesand 17.5% nge + 10% gge forSMEs.

On 3 May, the Commission alsoapproved the Swedish regionaldevelopment aid scheme. Thisscheme establishes acomprehensive package of aidmeasures to support thedevelopment of enterpriseslocated in the Swedish Article87(3)(c) regions. Under thescheme, the Swedish authoritieswill provide aid for generalbusiness investment as well asfor advisory services for SMEs,research and developmentprojects and training actions.

France

The Commission approved theFrench regional aid map on 1March. 36.7% of the Frenchpopulation live in assisted areas.2.7% live in the French"Département d'Outre-mer", theonly French Article 87(3)(a)regions, where regional aid canamount to 65% net for largecompanies and 75% net forSMEs.

The Article 87(3)(c) areas wereselected according to a methodwhich was based on the FrenchTravel-to-Work-Areas but alsotook account of the designatedObjective 2 areas. Regional aidto large companies in theassisted areas may not exceed20% net and 15% in those areaswhich were limited to 15% in1999. In the Doubs and Upper-Rhin, the aid intensity is limitedto 10% net. Aid for SMEs can

➣ STATE AID


benefit from a majoration of 10gross percentage points.

Spain

La Commission européenne aapprouvé la carte espagnole desaides à finalité régionale dont letaux de population couverte quine dépasse pas les 79,2% dutotal de la population espagnole.Parmi la population couverte,58,4% se situe dans les régionsrelevant de l'article 87.3.a) car lePIB/habitant y est inférieur à75 % de celui correspondant à lamoyenne communautaire et20,8% se situe dans des régionsen meilleure situation relativequi tombent sous le coup del'article 87.3.c).

Les plafonds régionaux desintensités des aides régionalesseront (en termes d'équivalentsubvention net) de 50% dans les

régions de l'Andalucía, lesCanarias et l'Extremadura; de40% dans les régions de Galicia,Asturias, Castilla y León (saufles provinces de Palencia etSegovia où le plafond sera de37% et les provinces de Burgoset de Valladolid où il sera de35%), Castilla - La Mancha (saufla province de Guadalajara où ilsera de 30%), ComunidadValenciana (sauf les provincesde Valencia où il sera de 37% etde où il sera de 35%), Murcia,Ceuta et Melilla. Aux plafondsindiqués, s’ajoutera, dans le casdes PME un supplément de 15points bruts de pourcentage.

Quant aux régions en meilleuresituation relative et relevant doncde l'article 87.3.c), les intensitésseront de 20% sauf dans lescommunes proposées de laprovince de Lleida où elles’élèvera à 10%, dans la

province de Teruel où elles’élèvera à 30% ESN en raisonde la faible densité de populationet dans la région de Cantabria oùelle commencera à 40% pourdiminuer jusqu'à 20% sur unepériode de quatre ans en raisondu fait qu'il s'agit d'une région entransition du statut de région87.3.a) au statut de région87.3.c). Aux plafonds indiqués,s’ajoutera, dans le cas des PMEun supplément de 10 point brutsde pourcentage.

Finland

By letter dated March 16, theCommission informed Finlandof its approval of the increase(compared to the ones approvedin October 1999) of the intensityrates for large firms in theArticle 87(3)(c) regions outsidethe Aland islands (now 20%NGE and 16% NGE).

INFORMATION SECTION


COMPETITION DG staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2958819

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et DDirecteur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2967819plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et FDirecteur général adjointplus particulièrement chargé des Directions G et H

Conseiller pour les réformes Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2955894

Conseiller auditeur Roger DAOÜT 2965383/2960090Conseiller auditeur John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2994036

Assistants du Directeur général Henrik MØRCH 2950766/2992132Bernhard FRIESS 2956038/2950006

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29502102. Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 1959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2952871Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georgios ROUNIS 2953404

1. Politique générale de la concurrence,aspects économiques et juridiques Bernd LANGEHEINE 2991855/2965019Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

2. Projets législatifs et règlementaires ;relations avec les Etats membres Emil PAULIS 2965033/2995470Chef adjoint d'unité Paolo CESARINI 2951286

3. Affaires internationales Yves DEVELENNES 2951590/2995406Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2996728de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/2967244Conseiller Giacomo GIACOMELLO 29512681. Unité opérationnelle I Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/29623682. Unité opérationnelle II Francisco Enrique GONZALEZ DIAZ a.i. 29650443. Unité opérationnelle III Wolfgang MEDERER 29535844. Unité opérationnelle IV Paul MALRIC SMITH 2959765

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER ff 2953895/2963904

Conseiller Herbert UNGERER 29666231. Télécommunications et Postes,

Coordination Société d'information Pierre BUIGUES 2994387- Cas relevant de l'Article 81/82 Suzanna SCHIFF 2957657/2995365- Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 Christian HOCEPIED 2960427/2958316

2. Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/2963904Chef adjoint d’unité Georg Klaus DE BRONETT 2959268

3. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2965303

➣ INFORMATION SECTION


DIRECTION DServices Enzo MOAVERO MILANESI 2953427/2969481

1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) Serge DURANDE 2957243/29518022. Transports et infrastructures des transports Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2995894

Chef adjoint d’unité Joos STRAGIER 2952482/29958943. Commerce et autres services Lowri EVANS 2965029/2965036

DIRECTION ECartels, industries de base et énergie Angel TRADACETE COCERA 2952462/2950900

1. Cartels Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816Chef adjoint d'unité Julian JOSHUA 2955519/2951816

2. Industries de base, Nicola ANNECCHINO 2961870/29564223. Energie, eau et acier Michael ALBERS 2961874/2960614

DIRECTION FIndustries des biens d'équipementet de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2965550

1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2957439Chef adjoint d'unité Carmelo MORELLO 2955132

2. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 2954427/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2963781

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat I Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2958603/2992627Conseiller . . .

1. Politique des aides d'Etat Robert HANKIN 2959773/2956689Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Aides horizontales Jean-Louis COLSON 2960995/29625263. Aides à finalité régionale Wouter PIEKE 2959824/2967267

Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376/29650714. Analyses, inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2956661

DIRECTION HAides d’Etat II Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, constructionnavale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques Maria REHBINDER 2990007/2963603Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, Jorma PIHLATIE 2953607/2955900électronique, construction mécanique et autressecteurs manufacturiersChef adjoint d'unité . . .

3. Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2960009

Task Force ‘Aides dans les nouveaux Länder’ Conrado TROMP 2960286



SPEECHES AND ARTICLES

"Who will be in the driver's seat?" -Mario MONTI - Forum EuropeConference - Brussels - 11.05.2000

Presentation of the XXIXth reporton competition policy - MarioMONTI - European Parliament -Committee on Economic andMonetary Affairs - 08.05.2000

The Role of EC Competition Policyin the Liberalisation of EU EnergyMarkets - Angel TRADACETECOCERA - European EnergyMillenium Forum - Brussels -27.04.2000

Sport and Competition - MarioMONTI - Excerpts of a speechgiven at a Commission-organisedconference on sports - Brussels -17.04.2000

The Community's State Aid Policy -Mario MONTI - Conference of the16 Ministers of Economic Affairs ofthe German Länder - Brussels -30.03.2000

Liberalizzazioni e Concorrenza -Mario MONTI - CommissioniCongiunte Bilancio, Industria eAffari Costituzionali del Senato -Roma - 28.03.2000

La politique européenne deconcurrence et la société del’information : Bilan et perspectivesaprès le Sommet de Lisbonne -Jean-François PONS - ConférenceEuro CPR 2000 - Venise -27.03.2000 - Shipping: Examiningthe development and impact ofEuropean legislation - JürgenMENSCHING - ContainerisationInternational - 3rd AnnualConference "Global 2000" - London- 22.03.2000

I servizi pubblici locali nel quadrodella politica di concorrenzacomunitaria - Mario MONTI -Convegno organizzato dallaFondazione Montedison su « Leliberalizzazioni e le privatizzazionidei servizi pubblici locali » - Milano- 20.03.2000

Modernisation of EU CompetitionRules - Launch of the CompetitionAct 1998 - Mario MONTI - London

Documentation…This section contains details of recent speeches or articles givenby Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of theseare available from Competition DG’s home page on the WorldWide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details ofconferences on competition policy which have been brought to ourattention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of thisfacility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG’sInformation Officer.



- 02.03.2000

Speech given at the formalintroduction ceremony of the newPresident of the Bundeskartellamt -Mario MONTI - FestveranstaltungPräsidentenwechsel Bundes-kartellamt Bonn - Bonn -13.01.2000

Modernising CommunityCompetition policy : State Aids andAntitrust - Mario MONTI - Meetingof the Committee on Economic andMonetary Affairs of the European

Parliament - Brussels - 11.01.2000

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION

Except if otherwise indicated, thesepublications are available throughthe Office for Official Publicationsof the European Communities or itssales offices (see last page).Use Catalogue number to order.Publications marked with as asterisk(*) are also available on DGCompetition web site:http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakingsSituation at 30 june 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles85, 86 and 90.Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A01-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum toVolume IA-Rules applicable toundertakingsSituation at 1 March 1995.

Catalogue No: CM-88-95-436-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aidSituation at 30 June 1998; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles42, 77, 90, 92 to 94.Catalogue No: PD-15-98-875-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE;EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI)

Competition law in the EC-Volume II B-Explanation of rulesapplicable to state aidSituation at December 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-296-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIIA-Rulesin the international field-Situation at 31 December 1996(Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Merger control law in theEuropean Union-Situation inMarch 1998Catalogue No: CV-15-98-899-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Brochure concerning thecompetition rules applicable toundertakings as contained in theEEA agreement and theirimplementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority.Catalogue No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS



Competition policy in Europe andthe citizenCatalogue No: KD-28-00-397-xx-C(xx=language code: FR et PT; theother versions will be availablelater).

Application of EC State aid lawby the member state courtsCatalogue No: CM-20-99-365-EN-C

Dealing with the Commission(Edition 1997)-Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding, powers under Articles 85and 86 of the EEC TreatyCatalogue No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI,SV)

Green paper on vertical restraintsin EC competition policy -COM(96) 721- (Ed. 1997)Catalogue No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NLPT SV FI)

Final report of the multimodalgroup - Presented toCommissioner Van Miert by SirBryan Carsberg, Chairman of theGroup (Ed. 1997).Catalogue No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C

The institutional framework forthe regulation oftelecommunications and theapplication of EC competitionrules - Final Report (ForresterNorall & Sutton).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommissionDecember 1995 (M. Cave, P.Crowther, L. Hancher).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Community Competition Policy inthe Telecommunications Sector(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March1997)-volume II B a compediumprepared by DG IV-C-1; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17and under the Merger Regulationas well as relevant Judgements ofthe Court of Justice. - Copies available through DGCOMP-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623,2968622, fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur lesmodalités d'application duRèglement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de laCommission concernant certainescatégories d'accords dedistribution et de service de venteet d'après vente de véhiculesautomobiles - Copies availablethrough DG COMP-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax. +322-2969800) EN, FR, DE

COMPETITION DECISIONS

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matière d'aidesd'Etat -Article 93, paragraphe 2(Décisions finales négatives)-1964-1995Catalogue No: CM-96-96-465-xx-C[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964-1995);EN et DA (73-95); EL (81-95); (ESet PT (86-95); FI et SV (95)]

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-94/98Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-93/94

Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-90/92Catalogue No: CV-84-94-387-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-89/90Catalogue No: CV-73-92-772-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-86/88Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-81/85Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-73/80Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matièrre deconcurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90du traité CEE-64/72Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.)



COMPETITION REPORTS

European Communitycompetition policy 1999(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV ). Copies availablethrough Cellule Information DGCOMP.

XXVIII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-785-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

European Community onCompetition Policy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-301-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI SV

XXVII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1997Catalogue No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C

European Community onCompetition Policy 1997Catalogue No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT,SV, DA, FI)

XXVI Report on CompetitionPolicy 1996Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*,FI*, SV*)

XXV Report on CompetitionPolicy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)

XXIV Report on competitionpolicy 1994

Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

XXIIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1993Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1992Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PTXXIe Report on competitionpolicy 1991Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Fifth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectorsCatalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV )

Sixt survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectorsCatalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C

Septième rapport sur les aidesd'Etat dans le secteur desproduits manufacturés et certainsautres secteurs de l'Unioneuropéenne [COM (1999) 148final]Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, SV, FI )

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

Buyer power and its impact oncompetition in the food retaildistribution sector of theEuropean Union

Cat. No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C

The application of articles 85 &86 of the EC Treaty by nationalcourts in the Member StatesCat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx=FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT)

Examination of current andfuture excess capacity in theEuropean automobyle industry -Ed. 1997Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C

Video: Fair Competition inEurope-Examination of currentCat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI, SV)

Communication de laCommission: Les servicesd'intérêt général en Europe (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx=DE, NL, GR, SV

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements andtreaties between the US andMember States of EU in areas ofsecurities, criminal, tax andcustoms (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Survey of the Member StateNational Laws governing verticaldistribution agreements (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Services de télécomunication enEurope: statistiques en bref,Commerce, services et transports,1/1996Cat. No: CA-NP-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Report by the group of experts oncompetition policy in the newtrade order [COM(96)284 fin.]Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C



New industrial economics andexperiences from Europeanmerger control: New lessonsabout collective dominance ? (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coéditionwith J. Wiley) -Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements inthe Telecommunications Sector(Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C.

Bierlieferungsverträge in denneuen EU-MitgliedstaatenÖsterreich, Schweden undFinnland - Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE

Surveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport1995Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C

Information exchanges amongfirms and their impact oncompetition (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long termcompetitiveness (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C

Competition policy in the newtrade order: strengthening

international cooperation andrules (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de lacomptabilité: subventionspubliques (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Rapport surl'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C

Study on the impact ofliberalization of inward crossborder mail on the provision ofthe universal postal service andthe options for progressiveliberalization (Ed. 1995) Finalreport,Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Meeting universal serviceobligations in a competitivetelecommunications sector (Ed.1994)Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy(Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2Part CCat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the Europeansingle market (Ed. 1993)

Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C

International transport by air,1993Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Enquête 1992(Ed. 1993) - 9 languagesCat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992)Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Green Paper on the developmentof the single market for postalservices, 9 languagesCat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL1st February 2000 to31st May 2000

ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONSAND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIOBY UNDERTAKINGS)

27.05.2000C 149 2000/C 149-0029Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 30 March 2000 inCase T-65/96: Kish Glass & Co.Ltd v Commission of theEuropean Communities[Competition - Float glass -Rights of defence andprocedural rights of thecomplainant - Product marketand geographical market -Article 86 of the EC Treaty(now Article 82 EC)]C 149 2000/C 149-0003Judgment of the Court (FifthChamber) of 16 March 2000 inJoined Cases C-395/96 P and C-



396/96 P: Compagnie MaritimeBelge Transports SA (C-395/96P), Compagnie Maritime BelgeSA (C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -International maritime transport- Liner conferences - Regulation(EEC) No 4056/86 - Article 86of the EC Treaty (now Article82 EC) - Collective dominantposition - Exclusivity agreementbetween national authorities andliner conferences - Linerconference insisting onapplication of the agreement -Fighting ships - Loyalty rebates- Rights of defence - Fines -Assessment criteria)C 149 2000/C 149-0043 Case T-78/00: Action brought on 3 April2000 by Sumitomo MetalIndustries Limited against theCommission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0029Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 30 March 2000 inCase T-513/93: ConsiglioNazionale degli SpedizionieriDoganali v Commission of theEuropean Communities[(Competition - Customs agents- Meaning of "undertaking" and"an association of undertakings"- Decisions adopted byassociations of undertakings -Setting of tariffs - Governed bypublic law - Applicability ofArticle 85(1) of the EC Treaty(now Article 81 EC)]C 149 2000/C 149-0033 Case T-5/00: Action brought on 17January 2000 by NederlandseFederatieve Vereniging voor deGroothandel op ElektrotechnischGebied against the Commissionof the European CommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0034 Case T-6/00: Action brought on 17January 2000 by TechnischeUnie BV against the

Commission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0035 Case T-50/00: Action brought on 8March 2000 by Dalmine SpAagainst the Commission of theEuropean CommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0037 Case T-58/00: Action brought on 12March 2000 by Bond van deFegarbel-Beroepsverenigingenagainst the Commission of theEuropean CommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0038 Case T-59/00: Action brought on 17March 2000 by CompagniaPortuale Pietro Chiesa vCommission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0041 Case T-71/00: Action brought on 24March 2000 by Kawasaki SteelCorporation against theCommission of the EuropeanCommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0043 Case T-77/00: Action brought on 3 April2000 by EsatTelecommunications Ltd.,against the Commission of theEuropean CommunitiesC 149 2000/C 149-0024 Case C-94/00: Reference for apreliminary ruling from the Courde Cassation (French Court ofAppeal) by judgment of thatcourt of 7 March 2000 in thecase of Roquette Frères SA vDirecteur-Général de laConcurrence, de laConsommation et de laRépression des Fraudes(Director-General forCompetition, Consumer Affairsand the Elimination of Fraud)

23.05.2000C 143 2000/C 143-0003Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/37.866)

13.05.2000C 135 2000/C 135-0020 Case T-45/00: Action brought on 29February 2000 by the Conseil

National des Professions del'Automobile (C.N.P.A.) andOthers against the Commissionof the European Communities

29.04.2000C 122 2000/C 122-0018Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 15 March 2000 inJoined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95,T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95:Cimenteries CBR and Others vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty(now Article 81(1) EC) Cementmarket - Rights of the defence -Access to the file - Single andcontinuous infringement -General agreement and measuresof implementation - Liability foran infringement - Evidence ofparticipation in the generalagreement and measures ofimplementation - Links betweenthe general agreement and themeasures of implementation asregards objects and participants -Fine - Determination of theamount)C 121 2000/C 121-0014 Noticepublished pursuant to Article19(3) of Council Regulation No17 concerning case COMP/C.2 -37.576 - UEFA's broadcastingrules [Text with EEA relevance]

27.04.2000C 118 2000/C 118-0003Competition rules relating tohorizontal cooperationagreements - Communicationpursuant to Article 5 of Council



Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71of 20 December 1971 on theapplication of Article 81(3) ofthe Treaty to categories ofagreements, decisions andconcerted practices modified byRegulation (EEC) No 2743/72[Text with EEA relevance]

26.04.2000C 117 2000/C 117-0019Opinion of the Economic andSocial Committee on theCommission preliminary draftRegulation on the application ofArticle 81(3) of the EC Treaty tocertain categories of agreements,decisions and concertedpractices between liner shippingcompanies (consortia) pursuantto Council Regulation (EEC) No479/92

20.04.2000L 100 2000/L 100-0024Commission Regulation (EC)No 823/2000 of 19 April 2000on the application of Article81(3) of the Treaty to certaincategories of agreements,decisions and concertedpractices between liner shippingcompanies (consortia) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 114 2000/C 114-0003Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/F-1/37.846 -Neles/VIB) [Text with EEArelevance]

19.04.2000C 112 2000/C 112-0007Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/37.854/E-2) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0007Notification of agreements to setup a joint venture (CaseCOMP/E-2/37.841) [Text withEEA relevance]

08.04.2000C 102 2000/C 102-0018Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 13 December 1999in Joined Cases T-190/95 and T-45/96, Société de Distribution de

Mécaniques et d'Automobiles(Sodima) v Commission of theEuropean Communities(Competition - Distribution ofmotor-vehicles - Examination ofcomplaints - Action fordeclaration for failure to act, forannulment and for compensation- Inadmissibility)C 102 2000/C 102-0026 Orderof the President of the Court ofFirst Instance of 15 December1999 in Case T-191/98 R II, ChoYang Shipping Co. Ltd vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Payment of a fine - Bankguarantee - Proceedings forinterim relief - Urgency -Interim measures)C 102 2000/C 102-0024Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 16 December 1999in Case T-198/98: Micro LeaderBusiness v Commission of theEuropean Communities(Competition - Complaint -Rejection - Articles 85 and 86 ofthe EC Treaty (now Articles 81and 82 EC)- Prohibition onimporting software marketed ina third country - Exhaustion ofcopyright - Directive91/250/EEC)C 102 2000/C 102-0020Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 17 February 2000 inCase T-241/97: StorkAmsterdam BV v Commissionof the European Communities(Competition - Administrativeprocedure - Examination ofcomplaints - Infringement ofArticle 85 of the EC Treaty(now Article 81 EC)- Comfortletters - Reopening theprocedure - Statement of reasons- Duty to provide - Extent -Cooperation agreement -Exclusive mutual supply clause -No-compete clause)C 102 2000/C 102-0018Judgment of the Court of First

Instance of 13 December 1999in Joined Cases T-9/96 and T-211/96, Européenne AutomobileSARL v Commission of theEuropean Communities(Competition - Distribution ofmotor-vehicles - Examination ofcomplaints - Action for adeclaration of failure to act, forannulment and forcompensation)

15.03.2000C 74 2000/C 074-0005Notification of CooperationAgreements (Case COMP/F1-37.775 - CEMEP)Text withEEA relevance

14.03.2000C 73 2000/C 073-0006Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/F-1/37.802 -Dynamit Nobel - Orica)Textwith EEA relevanceC 73 2000/C 073-0006Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/37.741)Text withEEA relevance

03.03.2000L 58 2000/L 058-0016Commission Decision of 14September 1999 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article81 of the EC Treaty (CaseIV/36.213/F2 - GEAE/P &W)Text with EEA relevance(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 2901)

22.02.2000L 49 2000/L 049-0037Commission Decision of 14December 1999 relating to aproceeding pursuant to Article15(1)(b) of Council RegulationNo 17 (Case No IV/34.237/F3 -Anheuser-Busch Incorporated -Scottish & Newcastle) (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 4499)

19.02.2000C 47 2000/C 047-0027Judgment of the Court of First



Instance of 13 December 1999in Joined Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 and T-123/96: Servicepour le Groupementd'Acquisitions (SGA) vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (Competition -Distribution of motor vehicles -Examination of complaints -Action for a declaration offailure to act, for annulment andfor compensation)

17.02.2000C 44 2000/C 044-0004Notification of an agreement(Case COMP/37.752 - Day-certain Cross-borderParcels)Text with EEArelevance

14.02.2000L 39 2000/L 039-0001Commission Decision of 26October 1999 concerning aproceeding pursuant to Article81 of the EC Treaty CaseIV/33.884 - NederlandseFederative Vereniging voor deGroothandel op ElektrotechnischGebied and Technische Unie(FEG and TU) (notified underdocument number C(1999)3439)

04.02.2000L 30 2000/L 030-0001Commission Decision of 14 July1999 relating to a proceedingunder Article 82 of the ECTreaty (IV/D-2/34.780 -Virgin/British Airways)Textwith EEA relevance. (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 1973)

03.02.2000C 31 2000/C 031-0003Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-2/37.779 -BASF-Sonatrach)Text with EEArelevance

CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS /MERGER PROCEDURE

30.05.2000C 150 2000/C 150-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1966 -Phillips/Chevron/JV)

27.05.2000C 149 2000/C 149-0030Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 22 March 2000 inJoined Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97: The Coca-ColaCompany and Coca-ColaEnterprises Inc. v Commissionof the European Communities(Competition - Regulation(EEC) No 4064/89 - Decisiondeclaring a concentrationcompatible with the commonmarket - Action for annulment -Statement of reasons -Admissibility)C 148 2000/C 148-0020 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1910 -Meritanordbanken/Unidanmark)C 148 2000/C 148-0021 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.2004 -Investcorp/Chase CapitalInvestments/GerresheimerGroup)

26.05.2000C 147 2000/C 147-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1974 -Compagnie de Saint-Gobain/Raab Karcher)C 147 2000/C 147-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1963 - IndustriKapital/Perstorp)C 147 2000/C 147-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1687 -Adecco/Olsten)

25.05.2000C 145 2000/C 145-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case

COMP/M.1842 -Vattenfall/Hew)C 145 2000/C 145-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.40 -Lagardère/Canal+ andCOMP/JV.47 -Lagardère/Canal+/LibertyMedia)

24.05.2000C 144 2000/C 144-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1800 - Marconi/BoschPublic Network)C 144 2000/C 144-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1938 -BT/Telfort)C 144 2000/C 144-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1932 -BASF/American Cyanamid)

23.05.2000C 143 2000/C 143-0005Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1882 - Pirelli/BICC)C 143 2000/C 143-0004Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1741 - MCIWorldcom/Sprint)C 143 2000/C 143-0005Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1806 - AstraZeneca/Novartis)C 143 2000/C 143-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1835 -Monsanto/Pharmacia & Upjohn)

20.05.2000C 142 2000/C 142-0040 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1916 - RTLNEWMEDIA/Primus-Online)C 142 2000/C 142-0039 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1950 - ToyodaAutomatic Loom Works/BTIndustries)C 142 2000/C 142-0038Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case



COMP/JV.46 - CallahanInvest/Kabel Nordrhein-Westfalen)C 142 2000/C 142-0037 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1947 - ABNAMRO Lease Holding/DialGroup)C 142 2000/C 142-0036 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1796 -Bayer/Lyondell)C 142 2000/C 142-0036 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1866 - Preussag/Hebel)C 142 2000/C 142-0035 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1751 - Shell/BASF/JV - Project Nicole)

19.05.2000C 141 2000/C 141-0019 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1795 - Vodafone Air-touch/Mannesmann)C 141 2000/C 141-0018 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1933 -Citigroup/Flender)C 141 2000/C 141-0017 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1858 -Thomson-CSF/Racal (II))

18.05.2000C 139 2000/C 139-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1989 -Winterthur/Colonial)C 139 2000/C 139-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1760 -Mannesmann/Orange)

17.05.2000C 138 2000/C 138-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1975 -Deutsche

Bank/Eurobank/LamdaDevelopment/JV)C 138 2000/C 138-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1876 - KohlbergKravis &Roberts/Wassall/Zumtobel)C 138 2000/C 138-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1911 - Dow/BSL)

16.05.2000C 136 2000/C 136-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1646 -CGD/Partest/BCP/SAirGroup/PGA)C 136 2000/C 136-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1970 - Johnson& Johnson/Mercury AssetManagement/Agora HealthcareServices JV)C 136 2000/C 136-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1852 - TimeWarner/EMI)

13.05.2000C 134 2000/C 134-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1886 - CGU/NorwichUnion)C 134 2000/C 134-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1904 -Carrefour/Gruppo GS)C 134 2000/C 134-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1957 - TelenorMedia/VIAG Interkom)C 134 2000/C 134-0013 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1793 -Voith/Siemens/JV)C 134 2000/C 134-0013 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case

COMP/M.1889 - CLT-UFA/Canal+/VOX)

11.05.2000C 130 2000/C 130-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1871 - ArrowElectronics/Tekelec)C 130 2000/C 130-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1845 -AOL/Time Warner)C 130 2000/C 130-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1898 - TUIGroup/GTT Holding)C 130 2000/C 130-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1968 -Solectron/Nortel)C 130 2000/C 130-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1571 - NewHolland/Case)C 130 2000/C 130-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1959 -Meritor/Arvin)

04.05.2000C 125 2000/C 125-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.39 -Bertelsmann/Planeta/NEB)C 125 2000/C 125-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1944 -HSBC/CCF)C 125 2000/C 125-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1946 -Bellsouth/SBC)C 125 2000/C 125-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1929 - MagnetiMarelli/Seima)C 125 2000/C 125-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1780 -LVMH/Prada/Fendi)

03.05.2000



C 123 2000/C 123-0043 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1819 andCOMP/ECSC.1320 -Rheinbraun/OMV/Cokowi)[Text with EEA relevance]C 123 2000/C 123-0042 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1960 -Carrefour/Marinopoulos) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 123 2000/C 123-0044 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1930 -Ahlström/Andritz) [Text withEEA relevance]C 123 2000/C 123-0045 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1948 -Techpack International/Valois)[Text with EEA relevance]C 123 2000/C 123-0041 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1879 -Boeing/Hughes) [Text with EEArelevance]

29.04.2000C 121 2000/C 121-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1961 -NHS/MWCR) [Text with EEArelevance]

26.04.2000C 116 2000/C 116-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.25 - Sony/TimeWarner/CDNow) - Text withEEA relevanceC 116 2000/C 116-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1956 -Ford/Autonova) - Text withEEA relevance

20.04.2000C 114 2000/C 114-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.46 - CallahanInvest/Kabel Nordrhein-Westfalen) [Text with EEArelevance]

19.04.2000

C 112 2000/C 112-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1891 - BPAmoco/Castrol) [Text with EEArelevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1919 -Alcoa/Cordant) [Text with EEArelevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1822 - Mobil/JVDissolution) [Text with EEArelevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1901 - CapGemini/Ernst & Young) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1908 -Alcatel/Newbridge Networks)[Text with EEA relevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0005Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1895 - OceanGroup/Exel (NFC)) [Text withEEA relevance]C 112 2000/C 112-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1887 - CréditSuisse First Boston/Gala Group)[Text with EEA relevance]

15.04.2000L 95 2000/L 095-0034Commission Decision of 28 July1999 imposing fines for havingsupplied incorrect information ina notification submitted pursuantto Article 4 of CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89(Case No IV/M.1543 -Sanofi/Synthélabo) [Text withEEA relevance] (notified underdocument number C(1999)2290)C 110 2000/C 110-0045 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case

COMP/JV.37 -BSkyB/KirchPayTV) [Text withEEA relevance]

14.04.2000C 108 2000/C 108-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1909 -Alstom/ABB Alstom Power)[Text with EEA relevance]C 108 2000/C 108-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1831 - DeutscheBank/Ciba)C 108 2000/C 108-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1747 - TelekomAustria/Libro) [Text with EEArelevance]C 108 2000/C 108-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1937 - SkandiaLife/Diligentia) [Text with EEArelevance]C 108 2000/C 108-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.45 -Bertelsmann AG/KooperativaFörbundet (KF)/Bokus AB(BOL Nordic)) [Text with EEArelevance]

13.04.2000L 93 2000/L 093-0001Commission Decision of 22September 1999 declaring aconcentration to be incompatiblewith the common market and theEEA Agreement (CaseIV/M.1524 - Airtours/FirstChoice) [Text with EEArelevance] . (notified underdocument number C(1999)3022)C 105 2000/C 105-0003Opinion of the AdvisoryCommittee on Concentrationsgiven at the 67th meeting on 9September 1999 concerning apreliminary draft decisionrelating to Case IV/M.1524 -Airtours/First Choice

12.04.2000



C 104 2000/C 104-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1878 -Pfizer/Warner-Lambert) [Textwith EEA relevance]

08.04.2000C 101 2000/C 101-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1935 -Rabobank/Gilde/Norit) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 101 2000/C 101-0013 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1803 -Electrabel/Epon) [Text withEEA relevance]

06.04.2000C 98 2000/C 098-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1820 - BP/JVDissolution) [Text with EEArelevance]

05.04.2000C 96 2000/C 096-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1911 -Dow/BSL) [Text with EEArelevance]C 96 2000/C 096-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.42 - AsahiGlass/Mitsubishi/F2 Chemicals)[Text with EEA relevance]C 96 2000/C 096-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.19 - KLM/Alitalia)[Text with EEA relevance]C 96 2000/C 096-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.44 -Hitachi/NEC - DRAM/JV) [Textwith EEA relevance]C 96 2000/C 096-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1328 -HSP/Salzgitter) [Text with EEArelevance]

04.04.2000

C 95 2000/C 095-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1907 -Woco/Michelin)Text with EEArelevanceC 95 2000/C 095-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.30 - BVI Television(Europe)/SPE EuromoviesInvestments/Europe MoviecoPartners)Text with EEArelevance

01.04.2000C 94 2000/C 094-0006 Initiationof proceedings (CaseCOMP/JV.27 -Microsoft/LibertyMedia/Telewest)Text with EEArelevance

31.03.2000C 93 2000/C 093-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1816 - ChurchillInsurance Group/NIGHoldings)Text with EEArelevanceC 93 2000/C 093-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1902 -Telia/Commerzbank/FNH)Textwith EEA relevanceC 93 2000/C 093-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1772 - ContinentalTeves/ADC AutomotiveDistance Control)Text with EEArelevance

30.03.2000C 91 2000/C 091-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1836 -Siemens/Bosch/GSMAcquisition)Text with EEArelevanceC 91 2000/C 091-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1739 -

IVECO/Fraikin)Text with EEArelevanceC 91 2000/C 091-0004Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1745 - EADS)Textwith EEA relevance

29.03.2000C 90 2000/C 090-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1846 - GlaxoWellcome/SmithKlineBeecham)Text with EEArelevanceC 90 2000/C 090-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1920 -Nabisco/United Biscuits)Textwith EEA relevance

28.03.2000C 89 2000/C 089-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1801 -Neusiedler/American IsraeliPaper Mills/JV) - Text with EEArelevanceC 89 2000/C 089-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1814 -Bayer/Röhm/Makroform) - Textwith EEA relevanceC 89 2000/C 089-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1892 - SaraLee/Courtaulds) - Text withEEA relevance

25.03.2000C 88 2000/C 088-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1914 -TXU/Hidroeléctrica)Text withEEA relevance

24.03.2000C 86 2000/C 086-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1887 - CréditSuisse First Boston/Gala Group)- Text with EEA relevance

23.03.2000C 84 2000/C 084-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1882 -



Pirelli/BICC General)Text withEEA relevanceC 84 2000/C 084-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1875 -Reuters/Equant - ProjectProton)Text with EEA relevanceC 84 2000/C 084-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1886 -CGU/Norwich Union)Text withEEA relevance

22.03.2000C 82 2000/C 082-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1650 -ACEA/Telefónica)Text withEEA relevance

21.03.2000C 80 2000/C 080-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1895 - OceanGroup/Exel)Text with EEArelevanceC 80 2000/C 080-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1904 -Carrefour/Gruppo GS)Text withEEA relevance

18.03.2000C 78 2000/C 078-0018 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1325 -EMR/MPRH)Text with EEArelevanceC 78 2000/C 078-0017 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1871 - ArrowElectronics/Tekelec)Text withEEA relevanceC 78 2000/C 078-0016 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1876 -Kohlberg KravisRoberts/Wassall/Zurntobel)Textwith EEA relevance

17.03.2000C 77 2000/C 077-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case

COMP/M.1716 -Gehe/Herba)Text with EEArelevanceC 77 2000/C 077-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1910 -MeritaNordbanken/UniDanmark)Text with EEA relevance

16.03.2000C 76 2000/C 076-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1660 - Bank of NewYork/Royal Bank ofScotland/RBSI SecurityServices)Text with EEArelevanceC 76 2000/C 076-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1774 - DeutscheBP/DaimlerChrysler AG/Union-Tank Eckstein)Text with EEArelevanceC 76 2000/C 076-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1618 - Bank of NewYork/Royal Bank of ScotlandTrust Bank)Text with EEArelevanceC 76 2000/C 076-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1812 -Telefónica/Terra/Amadeus)Textwith EEA relevanceC 76 2000/C 076-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1893 - ButlerCapital/CDC/AXA/Finauto/Autodistribution/Finelist)Text withEEA relevance

15.03.2000C 74 2000/C 074-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1659 - PreussenElektra/EZH)Text with EEArelevance

14.03.2000C 73 2000/C 073-0005Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (Case

COMP/M.1862 -Lafarge/Titan/Amereyah)Textwith EEA relevanceC 73 2000/C 073-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1849 -Solectron/EricssonSwitches)Text with EEArelevanceC 73 2000/C 073-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1825 - SuzukiMotor/Suzuki KG/Fafin)Textwith EEA relevance

10.03.2000C 69 2000/C 069-0008Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1829)Text with EEArelevanceC 69 2000/C 069-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1865 - FranceTélécom/Global One)Text withEEA relevanceC 69 2000/C 069-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1826 -KBC/KBC Petercam DerivativesNV)Text with EEA relevance

09.03.2000C 67 2000/C 067-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.24 -Bertelsmann/Planeta/bolSpain)Text with EEA relevanceC 67 2000/C 067-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1759 -RMC/Rugby)Text with EEArelevanceC 67 2000/C 067-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1793 -Voith/Siemens/JV)Text withEEA relevanceC 67 2000/C 067-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1885 - Babcock



Borsig/VA Technologie/Pipe-Tec)Text with EEA relevanceC 67 2000/C 067-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1832 -Ahold/ICA-förbundet/Canica)Text withEEA relevanceC 67 2000/C 067-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1883 -NEC/Mitsubishi)Text with EEArelevance

08.03.2000C 66 2000/C 066-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1795 -VodafoneAirtouch/Mannesmann)Textwith EEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1745 -EADS)Text with EEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1874 -Lafarge/Blue Circle)Text withEEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1856 -Citigroup/Schroders)Text withEEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1880 -Minnesota Mining andManufacturing/Quante)Textwith EEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1867 -Volvo/Telia/Ericsson/WirelessCar)Text with EEA relevanceC 66 2000/C 066-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1855 -Singapore Airlines/VirginAtlantic)Text with EEArelevance

07.03.2000

C 65 2000/C 0065-0022 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1777 -CGU/Hibernian)Text with EEArelevanceC 65 2000/C 0065-0022 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1754 - MorganGrenfell/Piaggio)Text with EEArelevanceC 65 2000/C 0065-0021 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1866 -Preussag/Hebel)Text with EEArelevanceC 65 2000/C 0065-0020 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1842 -Vattenfall/HEW)Text with EEArelevance

03.03.2000C 61 2000/C 061-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1786 - GeneralElectric/Thomson CSF/JV)Textwith EEA relevance

01.03.2000C 58 2000/C 058-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1873 -Compagnie de Saint-Gobain/MeyerInternational)Text with EEArelevanceC 58 2000/C 058-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1712 -Generali/INA)Text with EEArelevance

29.02.2000C 56 2000/C 056-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1720 -Fortum/ElektrizitätswerkWesertal)Text with EEArelevanceC 56 2000/C 056-0008 Priornotification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.1889 - CLT-UFA/Canal+/VOX)Text withEEA relevanceC 56 2000/C 056-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1829 -HMTF/Nabisco GroupHoldings/BurlingtonBiscuits/United Biscuits)Textwith EEA relevanceC 56 2000/C 056-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.42 - AsahiGlass/Mitsubishi/F2Chemicals)Text with EEArelevanceC 56 2000/C 056-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.35 - Beiselen/BayWa/MG Chemag)Text with EEArelevance

25.02.2000C 53 2000/C 053-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1675 - Ducros/HeroFrance)Text with EEA relevanceC 53 2000/C 053-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1806 - AstraZeneca/Novartis)Text with EEArelevance

24.02.2000C 52 2000/C 052-0026 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1835 -Monsanto/Pharmacia &Upjohn)Text with EEArelevanceC 52 2000/C 052-0027 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1590 -HSBC/RNYC/Safra)Text withEEA relevanceC 52 2000/C 052-0025 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1751 -Shell/BASF/JV - ProjectNicole)Text with EEA relevance

23.02.2000



C 50 2000/C 050-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1789 - INA/LUK)[Text with EEA relevance]

22.02.2000C 49 2000/C 049-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.36 - TXUEurope/EDF-LondonInvestments)Text with EEArelevanceC 49 2000/C 049-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1807 - FNAC/COIN/JV)Text with EEArelevanceC 49 2000/C 049-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.36 - TXUEurope/EDF-LondonInvestments)Text with EEArelevanceC 49 2000/C 049-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1838 -BT/Esat)Text with EEArelevance

19.02.2000C 46 2000/C 046-0025 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1794 - DeutschePost/Air ExpressInternational)Text with EEArelevanceC 46 2000/C 046-0026 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1854 - EmersonElectric/Ericsson EnergySystems)Text with EEArelevanceC 46 2000/C 046-0025 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1797 -SAAB/Celsius)Text with EEArelevance

18.02.2000

C 45 2000/C 045-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1827 -Hanson/Pioneer)Text with EEArelevanceC 45 2000/C 045-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1862 -Lafarge/Titan/Amereyah)Textwith EEA relevanceC 45 2000/C 045-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1674 -Maersk/Ect)Text with EEArelevanceC 45 2000/C 045-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1698 -RWA/Nordsee/Cerny)Text withEEA relevanceC 45 2000/C 045-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1763 - Solutia/VikingResins)Text with EEA relevanceC 45 2000/C 045-0004Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/JV.37 -BSkyB/KirchPayTV)Text withEEA relevance

17.02.2000C 44 2000/C 044-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1700 -AVNET/Eurotronics)Text withEEA relevanceC 44 2000/C 044-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1778 -Freudenberg/Phoenix/JV)Textwith EEA relevanceC 44 2000/C 044-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1709 -Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Textwith EEA relevance

C 44 2000/C 044-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1742 - SunChemical/Totalfina/ Coates)Textwith EEA relevance

16.02.2000C 43 2000/C 043-0029Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/JV.27 -Microsoft/LibertyMedia/Telewest)Text with EEArelevanceC 43 2000/C 043-0030 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1870 -ZF/Brembo/DFI)Text with EEArelevanceC 43 2000/C 043-0031 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1848 -Schroders Ventures EuropeanFund/Takko ModeMarkt)Textwith EEA relevance

15.02.2000C 42 2000/C 042-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1831 -Deutsche Bank/CIBA)Text withEEA relevance

12.02.2000C 40 2000/C 040-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1869 -CVC/BTR-Siebe AutomotiveSealing Systems)Text with EEArelevance

11.02.2000C 39 2000/C 039-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1775 - Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser-Rand/Ingersoll-Dresser Pump)Text with EEArelevanceC 39 2000/C 039-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1784 - DelphiAutomotive Systems/LucasDiesel)Text with EEA relevance

10.02.2000



C 38 2000/C 038-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1723 - Illinois ToolWorks/Premark)Text with EEArelevanceC 38 2000/C 038-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1861 -MAN/ERF)Text with EEArelevanceC 38 2000/C 038-0010 Initiationof proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1673 -VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEArelevance

09.02.2000C 37 2000/C 037-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1781 -Electrolux/Ericsson)Text withEEA relevance

08.02.2000C 35 2000/C035-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1849 -Solectron/Ericsson)Text withEEA relevanceC 35 2000/C035-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.39 -Bertelsmann AG/PlanetaCorporación SRL/NuevasEdiciones de Bolsillo(NEB))Text with EEA relevance

05.02.2000C 33 2000/C033-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1841 -Celestica/IBM)Text with EEArelevanceC 33 2000/C033-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1802 -Unilever/Amora-Maille)Textwith EEA relevanceC 33 2000/C033-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1840 -KKR/Bosch Telecom Private

Networks)Text with EEArelevanceC 33 2000/C033-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1813 - IndustriKapital (Nordkem)/DynoASA)Text with EEA relevance

04.02.2000C 32 2000/C 032-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1735 -Seita/Tabacalera)Text with EEArelevance (C 32 2000/C 032-0002Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/JV.32 -Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/MayHolding)Text with EEArelevanceC 32 2000/C 032-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1773 - NordicCapital/Trelleborg)Text withEEA relevanceC 32 2000/C 032-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1847 -GM/SAAB)Text with EEArelevance

02.02.2000C 30 2000/C 030-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1686 -DaimlerChrysler Services/MB-Automobilvertriebsgesellschaft)Text with EEA relevanceC 30 2000/C 030-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1755 -CVC/Acordis)Text with EEArelevanceC 30 2000/C 030-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1453 -AXA/GRE)Text with EEArelevance

C 30 2000/C 030-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1764 - SkandinaviskaEnskilda Banken/BFGBank)Text with EEA relevance

STATE AID

30.05.2000L 129 2000/L 129-0026Commission Decision of 15February 2000 on the State aidwhich Belgium is planning to grantto NV Sidmar (notified underdocument number C(2000) 517)27.05.2000

C 149 2000/C 149-0031Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 16 March 2000 inCase T-72/98: AstillerosZamacona SA v Commission ofthe European Communities(State aid - Shipbuilding -Article 4(3) of Council Directive90/684/EEC - Determination ofthe ceiling for production aid)C 148 2000/C 148-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 7/2000 (exNN 155/99 and ex N 490/98) -Italy - Law No 290 of 17 August1999: "Extension of time limitsin the agricultural sector"C 148 2000/C 148-0014 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C.12/2000 (ex N532/99) - Netherlands:development aid for China(shipbuilding)C 148 2000/C 148-0016Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 148 2000/C 148-0019Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of



the EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 148 2000/C 148-0010 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article6(5) of the CommissionDecision No 2496/96/ECSC of18 December 1996 establishingCommunity rules for State aid tothe steel industry (hereinafterreferred to as the Steel AidCode), concerning aid C13/2000 (ex N 585-589/99) -environmental aid to ECSC steelcompanies

20.05.2000L 120 2000/L 120-0001Commission Decision of 25November 1998 on State aidgranted by Italy to EnirisorseSpA (notified under documentnumber C(1998) 3866)L 120 2000/L 120-0012Commission Decision of 15February 2000 on State aidimplemented by Germany infavour of Kvaerner WarnowWerft GmbH (notified underdocument number C(2000) 516)C 142 2000/C 142-0020 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 11/2000 (ex N166/99) - Italy: investment aid toRivit SpA, non-ECSC steelC 142 2000/C 142-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 142 2000/C 142-0011 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid/measure C17/2000 (ex N 736/99) - Aid toSolar Tech srl - ItalyC 142 2000/C 142-0023 StateAid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 8/2000 (ex N

548/98) - Aid for education offarmers in Allgäu, GermanyC 142 2000/C 142-0026 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 9/2000 (ex NN5/99) - Second privatisation ofKataLeuna GmbH CatalystsC 142 2000/C 142-0003 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 73/99 (ex NN90/97) - Germany -Restructuring measuresconcerning a milk processingundertaking; Rhöngold Molkerei

18.05.2000L 117 2000/L 117-0026Commission Decision of 15February 2000 on the State aidwhich Italy plans to grant to FiatAuto SpA for its plant in Rivalta(Turin) (notified underdocument number C(2000) 487)

13.05.2000C 134 2000/C 134-0005 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 6/2000 (ex NN93/99) - Kvaerner WarnowWerft - Excess payment ofrestructuring aidC 134 2000/C 134-0004 Stateaid-C 59/99 (ex N 352/99)-FranceC 134 2000/C 134-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 134 2000/C 134-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 134 2000/C 134-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

11.05.2000L 112 2000/L 112-0075 EFTASurveillance Authority DecisionNo 112/99/COL of 4 June 1999introducing new guidelines onState aid to the motor vehicleindustry and amending for theseventeenth time the Proceduraland Substantive Rules in theField of State AidC 130 2000/C 130-0013Authorisation of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of theEEA Agreement and Article1(3) of Protocol 3 to theSurveillance and CourtAgreement - EFTA SurveillanceAuthority decision not to raiseobjections

06.05.2000L 110 2000/L 110-0017Commission Decision of 22December1999 on the State aidscheme implemented by Italy forthe production, processing andmarketing of products listed inAnnex I to the EC Treaty(Sicilian Regional Law No 68 of27 September 1995) (Notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 5202)L 110 2000/L 110-0001Commission Decision of 8 July1999 on State aid which Italyplans to grant to Fiat Auto SpAfor its plant at Piedimonte SanGermano, Cassino (Notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 2267)L 110 2000/L 110-0009Commission Decision of 28 July1999 on State aid which Italyplans to grant to Fiat Auto SpAfor its plant at Pomiglianod'Arco (Naples) (Notified underdocument number C(1999)2916)

05.05.2000C 127 2000/C 127-0011Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections



03.05.2000L 105 2000/L 105-0015Commission Regulation (EC)No 908/2000 of 2 May 2000laying down detailed rules forcalculating aid granted byMember States to producerorganisations in the fisheries andaquaculture sector

29.04.2000C 121 2000/C 121-0029Corrigendum to the Communityguidelines on State aid forrescuing and restructuring firmsin difficulty (Notice to MemberStates including proposals forappropriate measures) (OJ C288, 9 October 1999)C 121 2000/C 121-0019Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 121 2000/C 121-0018Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88 ofthe EC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections[Text with EEA relevance]C 121 2000/C 121-0016Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections[Text with EEA relevance]

19.04.2000L 98 2000/L 098-0001Commission Decision of 10November 1999 concerning aidwhich the Region of Tuscany(Italy) intends to grant in thelivestock sector in favour of theChianina cattle breed (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 3866)

15.04.2000C 110 2000/C 110-0040Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where the

Commission raises no objections[Text with EEA relevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning measures C 1/2000(ex N 769/99) - Restructuringaid in favour of PhilippHolzmann AG [Text with EEArelevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0009 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning measure C 2/2000(ex N 718/99) - Sweden -Measures to improve the indoorenvironment in buildings [Textwith EEA relevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0012 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty, andArticle 6(5) of CommissionDecision 2496/96/ECSCconcerning aid C 9/95 (formerlyNN 121/94) - Spain - Tubacex(ECSC and non-ECSC steel)[Text with EEA relevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0017 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid measure C 10/00(ex NN 112/99 - N 141/99) - Aidin favour of Stamag Stahl- undMaschinenbau AG - Germany[Text with EEA relevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0033 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 5/2000 (ex C68/97 (ex NN 118/97)) - SniaceSA - Spain [Text with EEArelevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0041Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

C 110 2000/C 110-0044Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections[Text with EEA relevance]C 110 2000/C 110-0027 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 75/99 (ex N167/99) - Regional aid to begranted to Fiat - SATA for aninvestment project in Melfi

08.04.2000C 102 2000/C 102-0028 Case T-354/99: Action brought on 10December 1999 by KuwaitPetroleum (Nederland) B.V.against the Commission of theEuropean CommunitiesC 102 2000/C 102-0019Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 16 December 1999in Case T-158/96: Acciaierie diBolzano SpA v Commission ofthe European Communities(ECSC Treaty - Action forannulment - State aid - Decisionfinding aid incompatible andordering its repayment -Unnotified aid - Steel Aid Codeapplicable - Rights of thedefence - Protection oflegitimate expectations - Interestrate applicable - Statement ofreasons)C 101 2000/C 101-0011 Stateaids - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 3/2000 (exN 233/99 and N 234/99) -Netherlands - Development aidto Indonesia (Shipbuilding)[Text with EEA relevance]C 101 2000/C 101-0003 Stateaid - Germany [Text with EEArelevance]



C 101 2000/C 101-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

06.04.2000L 85 2000/L 085-0027Commission Decision of 30September 1998 on aid grantedby Germany to SKETVerseilmaschinenbau GmbH[Text with EEA relevance](notified under documentnumber C(1998) 3022)

04.04.2000L 83 2000/L 083-0021Commission Decision of 20 July1999 on State aid granted byItaly to the Inma shipyardthrough the public holdingcompany Itainvest (formerlyGEPI) [Text with EEArelevance] (notified underdocument number C(1999)2532)C 95 2000/C 095-0023Corrigendum to theauthorisation for State aidpusuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections(OJ C 88, 25 March 20000)

01.04.2000C 94 2000/C 094-0009Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 94 2000/C 094-0007Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance e

30.03.2000C 91 2000/C 091-0006Authorisation of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of the

EEA Agreement and Article1(3) of Protocol 3 to theSurveillance and CourtAgreement - EFTA SurveillanceAuthority decision not to raiseobjections

29.03.2000L 78 2000/L 078-0023Commission Decision of 16November 1999 on the State aidwhich Italy plans to grant for thecreation of new shipyards atOristano (Sardinia) andBelvedere Marittimo(Calabria)Text with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)4839)

28.03.2000C 89 2000/C 089-0008 DraftCommission Regulation on theapplication of Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty to training aidC 89 2000/C 089-0015 DraftCommission Regulation on theapplication of Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty to State aid tosmall and medium-sizedenterprisesC 89 2000/C 089-0006 DraftCommission Regulation on theapplication of Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty to de minimisaid

25.03.2000C 88 2000/C 088-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 88 2000/C 088-0008 State aid- Invitation to submit commentspursuant to Article 6(5) ofCommission Decision No2496/96/ECSC of 18 December1996 establishing Communityrules for State aid to the steelindustry concerning aid C 76/99(ex NN 153/98) - Employmentaid for Cockerill Sambre SA,ECSC steelText with EEArelevance

C 88 2000/C 088-0005Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 88 2000/C 088-0003Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance

18.03.2000C 79 2000/C 079-0022Judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of 15 December 1999in Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96: Freistaat Sachsen andOthers v Commission of theEuropean Communities (Stateaids - Compensation foreconomic disadvantages causedby the division of Germany -Serious disturbance in theeconomy of a Member State -Regional economic development- Community Framework onState Aid to the Motor VehicleIndustry)C 79 2000/C 079-0025 Order ofthe Court of First Instance of 27January 2000 in Case T-49/97:TAT European Airlines SA vCommission of the EuropeanCommunities (State aid - Airtransport - Authorisation of aidpayable in three tranches -Action brought against thedecision authorising payment ofthe third tranche - Adoption of afresh decision authorising theaid in implementation of anannulling judgment - No need toadjudicate - Conditions)C 78 2000/C 078-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88



(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 78 2000/C 078-0008 State aid- Invitation to submit commentspursuant to Article 88(2) of theEC Treaty concerning aid C77/99 (ex NN 97/99) - Regionalaid to VW-AMD for aninvestment project inSaxonyText with EEA relevanceC 78 2000/C 078-0006Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance

14.03.2000L 66 2000/L 066-0001Commission Decision of 17March 1999 on State aid givenby Greece to Heracles GeneralCement CompanyText withEEA relevance. (notified underdocument number C(1999) 716)L 62 2000/L 062-0026Commission Decision of 28 July1999 on State aid granted by theFederal Republic of Germany toPittler/TornosWerkzeugmaschinen GmbHTextwith EEA relevance (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 3025)

11.03.2000C 71 2000/C 071-0014Commission Notice on theapplication of Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty to State aid inthe form of guaranteesC 71 2000/C 071-0008 State aid- Invitation to submit commentspursuant to Article 88(2) of theEC Treaty, concerning aid C48/99 (ex NN 129/98) - Spain(Province of Álava) - Tax aid inform of a 45 % tax creditTextwith EEA relevanceC 71 2000/C 071-0007Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88

(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 71 2000/C 071-0006Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

08.03.2000L 61 2000/L 061-0004Commission Decision of 14 July1999 on aid granted by Germanyto Weida Leder GmbH (Weida),ThuringiaText with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)3441)

04.03.2000C 62 2000/C 0062-00018Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 62 2000/C 0062-00016Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 62 2000/C 0062-0007 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid insert C 79/99(ex N 481/99) - RoverLongbridgeText with EEArelevanceC 62 2000/C 0062-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning measure C 78/99 (exNN 305/99) - Portugueseregional aid map for the periodfrom 2000 to 2006Text withEEA relevance

26.02.2000

C 55 2000/C 055-0008Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 55 2000/C 055-0002 State aid- Invitation to submit commentspursuant to Article 88(2) of theEC Treaty concerning three taxaid schemes: C 49/99 (ex NN29/99) - Tax aid in the form of areduction in the tax base fornewly established firms in theprovince of Álava (Spain); C50/99 (ex NN 30/99) - Tax aid inthe form of a reduction in the taxbase for newly established firmsin the province of Guipúzcoa(Spain); C 52/99 (ex NN 32/99)- Tax aid in the form of areduction in the tax base fornewly established firms in theprovince of Vizcaya (Spain)Textwith EEA relevanceC 55 2000/C 055-0011Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 55 2000/C 055-0010Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

24.02.2000C 52 2000/C 052-0030Authorisation of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of theEEA Agreement and Articles3(5) and 3(1) of the Act referredto in point 1b of Annex XV tothe EEA Agreement - EFTASurveillance Authority decisionnot to raise objections

23.02.2000



L 50 2000/L 050-0019Commission Decision of 11February 2000 on Finnish Stateaid for seeds (notified underdocument number C(2000) 358)

19.02.2000C 46 2000/C 046-0006Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 46 2000/C 046-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 46 2000/C 046-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objections

15.02.2000L 42 2000/L 042-0019Commission Decision of 20 July1999 on State aid implementedby the Federal Republic ofGermany for Lautex GmbHWeberei und VeredlungTextwith EEA relevance. (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 3026)L 42 2000/L 042-0001Commission Decision of 11May 1999 concerning aidgranted by Italy to promoteemploymentText with EEArelevance. (Notified underdocument number C(1999)1364)

12.02.2000L 37 2000/L 037-0022Commission Decision of 26October 1999 on the State aidimplemented by Spain in favourof the publicly owned shipyards[Text with EEA relevance](notified under documentnumber C(1999) 3864)

C 40 2000/C 040-0004Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises no objectionsC 40 2000/C 040-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance

10.02.2000L 35 2000/L 035-0043 Decisionof the EEA Joint Committee No12/1999 of 29 January 1999amending Annex XV (State aid)to the EEA Agreement

05.02.2000C 33 2000/C033-0009Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevanceC 33 2000/C033-0006 State aids- Invitation to submit commentspursuant to Article 88(2) of theEC Treaty, concerning aid C74/99 (ex NN 65/99) - France -Development aid to Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (Shipbuilding)Textwith EEA relevance

04.02.2000L 30 2000/L 030-0025Commission Decision of 20 July1999 on State Aid granted byGermany to SKET Maschinen-und Anlagenbau GmbHTextwith EEA relevance. (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 2538)

PRESS RELEASES1.2.2000 - 31.5.2000

All texts are available from theCommission's press release

database RAPID at:http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start.Enter reference (e.g.: IP/00/544)in the "Reference" input box onthe research form to retrieve textof a press release. Press releaseson competition matters can beconsulted daily from DGCompetition's website at:http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pressre.htm

Note: languages available vary fordifferent press releases.

ANTITRUST

Reference: IP/00/544 Date: 2000-05-29 : European Commissionappoints new Hearing Officer

Reference: IP/00/520 Date: 2000-05-24 : Commission finalises newcompetition rules for distribution

Reference: IP/00/508 Date: 2000-05-23 : Commission clearsEuropean manufacturers' agreementto improve energy efficiency ofelectric motors

Reference: IP/00/495 Date: 2000-05-19 : Commission seeks amandate for negotiations with Japanon a co-operation agreement in thecompetition field

Reference: IP/00/472 Date: 2000-05-12 : Commission approves theEBU-Eurovision system

Reference: IP/00/419 Date: 2000-04-28 : Commission opensproceedings against Nintendodistribution practices

Reference: IP/00/411 Date: 2000-04-27 : Commission starts publicconsultation on the proposed reform



of competition rules applicable tohorizontal co-operation agreements

Reference: IP/00/409 Date: 2000-04-27 : Telecommunications:Commission takes France to courtover universal service

Reference: IP/00/404 Date: 2000-04-25 : Commission renews blockexemption for consortiumagreements in shipping

Reference: IP/00/372 Date: 2000-04-12 : Commission ready to liftimmunity from fines to TelefónicaMedia and Sogecable in Spanishfootball rights case

Reference: IP/00/297 Date: 2000-03-27 : Commission closesinvestigation on Spanish companyGAS NATURAL

Reference: IP/00/296 Date: 2000-03-27 : Financial services:Commission closes infringementcases against Portugal concerningBSCH/Champalimaud

Reference: IP/00/183 Date: 2000-02-23 : Reaction by CommissionerMario Monti to the Agreement OnThe Fixed Book Price (Germanyand Austria)

Reference: IP/00/154 Date: 2000-02-15 : Commission assesses theupdated Stability Programme ofItaly

Reference: IP/00/148 Date: 2000-02-11 : Commission approves anagreement to improve energyefficiency of washing machines.

Reference: IP/00/141 Date: 2000-02-10 : Commission examines theimpact of Windows 2000 oncompetition

Reference: IP/00/121 Date: 2000-02-07 : Car prices in the European

Union: differentials betweenMember states of the euro zonenarrow slightly

Reference: IP/00/111 Date: 2000-02-04 : Commission launchessecond phase of telecommunicationssector inquiry under the competitionrules: mobile roaming

MERGERS

Reference: IP/00/570 Date: 2000-05-31 : Commission clears spin-offof Nortel Networks manufacturingassets to Solectron.

Reference: IP/00/568 Date: 2000-05-31 : Commission authorisestakeover of tour operator GTT byTUI

Reference: IP/00/561 Date: 2000-05-31 : Commission approvesestablishment of packaging jointventure by Techpack Internationaland Aptar/Valois

Reference: IP/00/560 Date: 2000-05-31 : Commission clearsacquisition of French bank CCF byHSBC Holdings

Reference: IP/00/559 Date: 2000-05-31 : Commission approves jointventure between AhlströmMachinery and Andritz in the fieldof pulp and paper equipment

Reference: IP/00/548 Date: 2000-05-30 : Commission clearsacquisition of Seima by MagnetiMarelli

Reference: IP/00/543 Date: 2000-05-29 : Commission authorisesCarrefour and Marinopoulos to setup a joint venture in Greece

Reference: IP/00/542 Date: 2000-05-29 : Commission gives greenlight to a US joint venture between

BellSouth and SBCCommunications

Reference: IP/00/539 Date: 2000-05-29 : Commission opens fullprobe into Boeing's acquisition ofthe satellite business of HughesElectronics

Reference: IP/00/535 Date: 2000-05-26 : Commission approves jointacquisition of Fendi by LVMH andPRADA

Reference: IP/00/528 Date: 2000-05-25 : Commission clears Ford'sacquisition of full control ofAutonovaReference: IP/00/509 Date: 2000-05-23 : Commission approvesmerger between Pfizer and Warner-Lambert subject to commitments

Reference: IP/00/500 Date: 2000-05-22 : Commission clears Alcatelacquisition of Newbridge Networks

Reference: IP/00/499 Date: 2000-05-22 : Commission approvesacquisition of MWCR by SanPaoloIMI and Schroders Groups

Reference: IP/00/496 Date: 2000-05-19 : European Commissionclears purchase of CordantTechnologies by Alcoa

Reference: IP/00/494 Date: 2000-05-19 : Commission clearsacquisition of Burmah Castrol byBP Amoco.

Reference: IP/00/492 Date: 2000-05-18 : Commission approvespurchase by Cap Gemini of Ernst &Young's global consulting and ITactivities

Reference: IP/00/478 Date: 2000-05-15 : Commission authorisesBertelsmann to acquire stake inNordic Internet bookshop Bokus



Reference: IP/00/473 Date: 2000-05-12 : Commission clearsacquisition of Diligentia by SkandiaLife Insurance

Reference: IP/00/453 Date: 2000-05-10 : Commission clears purchaseof Courtaulds Textiles by Sara Leesubject to the sale of the Well brand

Reference: IP/00/452 Date: 2000-05-10 : Commission grantsconditional clearance to mergerbetween Glaxo Wellcome andSmithKline Beecham

Reference: IP/00/447 Date: 2000-05-08 : Commission approves jointventure between Dynamit NobelGmbH Explosivstoff- undSystemtechnik and Orica EuropeLtd.

Reference: IP/00/446 Date: 2000-05-08 : Commission clears Nabiscoacquisition of United Biscuits

Reference: IP/00/439 Date: 2000-05-04 : Commission authorisescreation of joint venture betweenHitachi and NEC to produceDRAMs

Reference: IP/00/438 Date: 2000-05-04 : Commission clears mergerbetween Ocean and Exel in thesector for logistics services

Reference: IP/00/425 Date: 2000-05-04 : Commission clears DowChemical's acquisition of UnionCarbide subject to commitments

Reference: IP/00/424 Date: 2000-05-04 : Commission clears mergerbetween Alcoa and ReynoldsMetals, under conditions

Reference: IP/00/421 Date: 2000-05-02 : Commission authorisesacquisition of Hoesch Spundwandund Profil GmbH (Germany) bySalzgitter AG (Germany)

Reference: IP/00/420 Date: 2000-05-02 : Commission approvestakeover of Robert Bosch GmbH'smobile telephony operations bySiemens AG

Reference: IP/00/417 Date: 2000-04-28 : Commission clears DowChemical's acquisition of fullcontrol in Germany's BSL

Reference: IP/00/416 Date: 2000-04-28 : Commission clears jointcontrol by Telia and Commerzbankof investment companies FNH andTCI

Reference: IP/00/415 Date: 2000-04-28 : Commission clears Internettravel agency joint venture betweenTelefonica's TERRA and Amadeus

Reference: IP/00/396 Date: 2000-04-18 : Commission gives go-aheadto joint venture between Reuters andEquant

Reference: IP/00/395 Date: 2000-04-18 : Commission approvesPolycarbonate plates joint ventureof Bayer and Röhm

Reference: IP/00/394 Date: 2000-04-18 : Commission opens in-depthinvestigation into proposed take-over of BICC by Pirelli

Reference: IP/00/390 Date: 2000-04-14 : Commission notifies VEBAand VIAG of its objections againstproposed merger

Reference: IP/00/386 Date: 2000-04-14 : Commission clearsacquisition of sole control by ArrowElectronics, Inc. over TekelecEurope, S.A.

Reference: IP/00/385 Date: 2000-04-14 : Commission clears mergerbetween CGU and Norwich Union

Reference: IP/00/373 Date: 2000-04-12 : Commission clears mergerbetween Vodafone Airtouch andMannesmann AG with conditions

Reference: IP/00/354 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission clears theproposed acquisition by EuropeanMetal Recycling Limited of MayerParry

Reference: IP/00/352 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission clears mergerbetween MeritaNordbanken andUniDanmark

Reference: IP/00/346 Date: 2000-04-10 : Commission clearsacquisition of Blue Circle byLafarge

Reference: IP/00/343 Date: 2000-04-07 : Commission approves jointventure between Ahold, ICAFörbundet and Canica

Reference: IP/00/342 Date: 2000-04-07 : The Commission authorisesthe acquisition of sole control byCarrefour over the Italian retailerGruppo GS.

Reference: IP/00/328 Date: 2000-04-04 : Commission approveshydraulic power joint venturebetween Voith and Siemens

Reference: IP/00/327 Date: 2000-04-04 : Commission authorisesNEC and Mitsubishi to set up a JVcompany in the field of PCmonitors.

Reference: IP/00/325 Date: 2000-04-03 : Commission approves jointventure between Preussag and VATechnologie

Reference: IP/00/324 Date: 2000-04-03 : Commission clears theacquisition by 3M of Quante'stelecom components business.



Reference: IP/00/323 Date: 2000-04-03 : Commission approvesmerger in the financial servicessector

Reference: IP/00/315 Date: 2000-03-30 : Commission clears mergerbetween Monsanto (USA) andPharmacia & Upjohn (USA) subjectto conditions

Reference: IP/00/313 Date: 2000-03-30 : Commission clears jointventure between Shell and BASFsubject to commitments

Reference: IP/00/308 Date: 2000-03-30 : Commission clears theacquisition by Citigroup (US) ofpart of Schroders (UK)

Reference: IP/00/302 Date: 2000-03-28 : Commission clears theacquisition by BT of Esat

Reference: IP/00/293 Date: 2000-03-24 : Commission approves take-over of Meyer International plc byCompagnie de Saint-Gobain

Reference: IP/00/283 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission gives go-aheadto joint venture between AsahiGlass and Mitsubishi

Reference: IP/00/282 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission clears theacquisition by CLT-UFA of News'stake in the German TV channelVOX.

Reference: IP/00/281 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission opens in-depthinvestigation into the merger of thecrop protection businesses ofNovartis and AstraZeneca.

Reference: IP/00/280 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission clears thecreation of ASTRIUM, subject toconditions

Reference: IP/00/279 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission authorises theparticipation of BSkyB inKirchPayTV

Reference: IP/00/275 Date: 2000-03-21 : Commission approvesacquisition of joint control of HEWby Vattenfall and the Freie undHansestadt Hamburg

Reference: IP/00/267 Date: 2000-03-16 : Commission clearsacquisition of Ericsson EnergySystems by Emerson Electric

Reference: IP/00/259 Date: 2000-03-14 : Commission authorisesunder conditions the mergerbetween aluminium producersAlcan and Alusuisse

Reference: IP/00/258 Date: 2000-03-14 : Alcan abandons its plans toacquire Pechiney to avoid theprospect of a decision by theEuropean Commission to block themerger

Reference: IP/00/257 Date: 2000-03-14 : The Commission prohibitsVolvo's acquisition of its maincompetitor Scania

Reference: IP/00/241 Date: 2000-03-09 : Commission clears theacquisition by Unilever France ofAmora-Maille subject to conditions

Reference: IP/00/214 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission approves theacquisition of ERF (Holdings) plc(UK) by MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG(Germany)

Reference: IP/00/212 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission clearsacquisition by KKR Group of BoschTelekom Private Networks

Reference: IP/00/205 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission clears theacquisition by Solectron of the

telecom switching hardwareactivities of Ericsson in Swedenand France.

Reference: IP/00/200 Date: 2000-02-29 : Commission approvesestablishment of Nuevas Edicionesde Bolsillo (NEB) joint venture byBertelsmann and Planeta.

Reference: IP/00/199 Date: 2000-02-29 : Commission clears jointventure between Granaria, Ültje andFelix Snack in the nut snack sector

Reference: IP/00/197 Date: 2000-02-28 : Commission approves theparticipation of Telekom Austria inLibroReference: IP/00/194 Date: 2000-02-28 : Commission clearsCelestica's acquisition of IBM'selectronic manufacturing services(EMS) businesses in Italy and theUS.

Reference: IP/00/188 Date: 2000-02-25 : Commission opens in-depthinvestigation into the acquisition ofDyno ASA by Industri Kapital inthe chemicals market

Reference: IP/00/177 Date: 2000-02-22 : Commission clearsacquisition by Bayer AG of thepolyether polyols activities ofLyondell Chemical Company

Reference: IP/00/174 Date: 2000-02-21 : Commission opens fullinvestigation into the MCIWorldCom / Sprint merger

Reference: IP/00/173 Date: 2000-02-21 : Commission approvesacquisition of joint control of E-Plusby KPN and BellSouth

Reference: IP/00/172 Date: 2000-02-21 : Commission approvestakeover of Europcar InternationalS.A. by Volkswagen AG



Reference: IP/00/150 Date: 2000-02-14 : Commission approves jointventure in paper sector

Reference: IP/00/135 Date: 2000-02-09 : Commission authorisesTotalFina to take control of ElfAquitaine subject to substantialchanges to the plan originallynotified

Reference: IP/00/134 Date: 2000-02-09 : Commission approves theacquisition of AGA (Sweden) byLinde (Germany) subject toconditions

Reference: IP/00/129 Date: 2000-02-08 : Commission clears Mergerbetween Hellenic Bottling Companyand Coca-Cola Beverages plc,subject to undertakings

Reference: IP/00/128 Date: 2000-02-08 : Commission approves theacquisition of Air ExpressInternational by Deutsche Post AG

Reference: IP/00/126 Date: 2000-02-08 : Commission authorises theacquisition by Electrabel (Belgium)of the Dutch electricity producerEPON

Reference: IP/00/125 Date: 2000-02-08 : Commission authorises jointventure between Eastern Electricityand London ElectricityReference: IP/00/118 Date: 2000-02-07 : Commission clears themerger between Swedish defencecompanies Saab and Celsius

Reference: IP/00/114 Date: 2000-02-05 : Commission opens in-depthinvestigation into merger betweenVEBA and VIAG

Reference: IP/00/110 Date: 2000-02-04 : Commission clearsacquisitions by Suzuki MotorCorporation

Reference: IP/00/109 Date: 2000-02-04 : Commission clearsFinalrealm's acquisition of UnitedBiscuits

Reference: IP/00/106 Date: 2000-02-03 : Commission agrees todissolution of BP/Mobil JointVenture, a European fuel andlubricants producer and retailer; thedissolution was a condition of theExxonMobil merger clearancedecision

Reference: IP/00/105 Date: 2000-02-03 : Commission approves jointventure between General ElectricCompany (USA) and Thomson-CSF(France) in the field of flightsimulator training.

Reference: IP/00/104 Date: 2000-02-02 : Commission gives go-aheadto planned joint venture betweenChemag, Beiselen and BayWa

Reference: IP/00/92 Date: 2000-02-01 : Commission concludes thatBellSouth acquisition of VRTelecommunications' stake in E-Plus falls outside Eu rules

STATE AID

Reference: IP/00/550 Date: 2000-05-30 : Commission approvesAustria regional aid map for 2000-2006

Reference: IP/00/549 Date: 2000-05-30 : Commission closesinvestigation procedure against oforiginal Dutch proposal for regionalaid map

Reference: IP/00/483 Date: 2000-05-16 : Commission decides thatItalian law on the extraordinaryadministration of large enterprisesin difficulty contained incompatibleState aid

Reference: IP/00/430 Date: 2000-05-03 : Commission questionsBelgian plan to grant aid to Ford'sfactory in Genk

Reference: IP/00/429 Date: 2000-05-03 : Commission says Swedishincome tax relief for foreign expertsdoes not constitute State aid

Reference: IP/00/428 Date: 2000-05-03 : Commission says Danishlow income tax rate for expertsrecruited abroad is not State aid

Reference: IP/00/427 Date: 2000-05-03 : European Commissionapproves regional aid package forSweden

Reference: IP/00/426 Date: 2000-05-03 : Commission adopts 13thMonitoring Report on the Article 95ECSC steel aid cases

Reference: IP/00/370 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission declares thatEDF rebates to firms in the paperindustry do not constitute State aid

Reference: IP/00/367 Date: 2000-04-11 : State aid still too highdespite decrease, says annual survey

Reference: IP/00/363 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission turns to theCourt because of Germany's failureto recover WestLB state aid

Reference: IP/00/362 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission approvesSpain's regional aid map for 2000-2006

Reference: IP/00/361 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission gives greenlight to French and Dutch aid forITEA research programme

Reference: IP/00/360 Date: 2000-04-11 : European Commissionapproves regional aid package forDenmark



Reference: IP/00/359 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission approvesincrease in emergency aid for twoearthquake-hit regions in ItalyMarche and Umbria

Reference: IP/00/358 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission approves aloan and equity fund in Ireland -Western Investment Fund.

Reference: IP/00/357 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission approvesshipbuilding aid schemes inNetherlands.

Reference: IP/00/356 Date: 2000-04-11 : Commission closes formalinvestigation procedure intounnotified state aid to SystemMicroelectronic Innovation GmbH

Reference: SPEECH/00/113 Date:2000-03-30 : Mario Monti EuropeanCommissioner for CompetitionPolicy The Community's State AidPolicy Conference of the 16Ministers of Economic Affairs ofthe German Länder Brussels, 30March 2000

Reference: IP/00/305 Date: 2000-03-29 : Commission approvesregional aid map for Sweden

Reference: IP/00/304 Date: 2000-03-29 : Commission approves CO2quotas for the electricity sector inDenmark for the period 20012003

Reference: IP/00/303 Date: 2000-03-29 : Commission finds thatKvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH hasrespected its capacity limitation in1999.

Reference: IP/00/254 Date: 2000-03-14 : Commission approves taxbreaks for investment in Madeira(Portugal)

Reference: IP/00/253 Date: 2000-03-14 : Commission to scrutiniseplan to aid Solar Tech srl (Italy)

Reference: IP/00/252 Date: 2000-03-14 : Commission approvesregional aid map for West Germanregions and Berlin for 1 January2000 to December 2003.

Reference: IP/00/251 Date: 2000-03-14 : Commission opensproceedings into aid for TechnischeGlaswerke Ilmenau

Reference: IP/00/211 Date: 2000-03-01 :European Commissionlaunches formal investigation intoreduced social contributions inSweden

Reference: IP/00/210 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission opensproceedings against aid to fiveItalian steel companies for energyconservation

Reference: IP/00/209 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission clears capitalinjection into Italian leisure park

Reference: IP/00/208 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission approves partof the regional state aid map forItaly for 2000-2006 and opensscrutiny procedure regardingproposed regions in Centre-North

Reference: IP/00/207 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission approvesFrance's regional planning grantmap (PAT) for 2000-2006

Reference: IP/00/206 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission approves aid toDelon Filament GmbH (Germany)

Reference: IP/00/203 Date: 2000-03-01 : Commission closesinvestigation into proposed Belgianregional aid map

Reference: IP/00/182 Date: 2000-02-23 : Statement by CommissionerMonti concerning the control offiscal state aids

Reference: IP/00/161 Date: 2000-02-15 :Commission authorises R&Daid in motor vehicle sector in Spain

Reference: IP/00/160 Date: 2000-02-15 : Commission decides thatKvaerner Warnow Werft GmbHwill have to reimburse DM 12.6Mio ( 6.3 Mio) of aid due toexceeding of capacity limitation in1997.

Reference: IP/00/159 Date: 2000-02-15 : The Commission bansregional aid of LIT 46 billion (24million) for Fiat Rivalta (Italy)

Reference: IP/00/158 Date: 2000-02-15 : Commission approves aid toSIDMAR for five environmentalprojects One negative decision

Reference: IP/00/157 Date: 2000-02-15 : Commission authorisescontinued ecological tax reform inGermany under state aid rules

Reference: IP/00/103 Date: 2000-02-02 : Commission opens formalinvestigation into State aid toKvaerner Warnow Werft

Reference: IP/00/102 Date: 2000-02-02 : Commission approvessettlement between Elf Aquitaineand German authorities in the Leunacase Decision regarding initial Stateaid still suspended.

Reference: IP/00/101 Date: 2000-2-02 : Commission investigatesState aid Dutch manure processingcompanies

Reference: IP/00/100 Date: 2000-02-02 : Commission approvesrestructuring aid for ArmaturenTechnik Magdeburg (Germany).



COURT OF JUSTICE / COURTOF FIRST INSTANCE

DEVANT LE TRIBUNAL

Aff. T-318/99Avia Nederland CoöperatieUA/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C(1999)2539 def, du20 juillet 1999, relative aux aidesaccordées par les Pays-Bas à 633stations-services situées dans larégion frontalière entre les Pays-Baset l'AllemagneAff. T-319/99Federación Nacional deEmpresas, InstrumentaciónCientífica, Médica, Técnica yDental (FENIN) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG(99) D/7.040), du26 août 1999, rejetant la plaintedéposée par la partie requérantecontre «Entes Gestores del SistemaNacional de Salud» espagnols sur lefondement de l'article 82 CE,concernant les conditions depaiement imposées par les «EntesGestores del sistema Nacional deSalud» (organismes gestionnairesdu système public de santé)espagnols à leurs fournisseurs deproduits sanitaires ainsi que d'autrespratiques prétendument anti-concurrentielles desdits organismes

Aff. T-320/99W.F. Milder/CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-321/99Garage en TankstationMilder/CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-323/99Industrie Navali MeccanicheAffini SpA Società in

Liquidazione (INMA) et ItaliaInvestimenti SpA (Itainvest) /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C(1999)2532 def, du20 juillet 1999, déclarantincompatible avec le marchécommun l'aide accordée par l'Italie,par l'intermédiaire du holding publicItainvest (ex GEPI) au chantiernaval Industrie Navali MeccanicheAffini (INMA)

Aff. T-328/99Anthony Goldstein/CommissionUne demande en indemnité visant àobtenir la réparation du préjudiceprétendument subi par le requérantsuite au refus de la Commissiond'adopter les mesures provisoiresdemandées par celui-ci dans le cadrede la procédure administrativerelative à une plainte tendant à faireconstater l'infraction aux articles 81et 82 du traité CE par le «BarCouncil»

Aff. T-339/99Achten vof / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-342/99Airtours plc / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 22 septembre 1999,relative à une procédured'application du règlement (CEE) n.4064/89 du Conseil (affaire n.IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice)déclarant incompatible avec lemarché commun et lefonctionnement de l'Accord EEEl'opération de concentration visant àl'acquisition du contrôle total deFirst Choice plc par Airtours plc

Aff. T-346/99Diputación Foral deAlava/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29septembre 1999, d'engager laprocédure prévue au paragraphe 2

de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerneles aides fiscales à l'investissementoctroyées par la «Diputación Foralde Alava» sous forme d'uneréduction de l'assiette imposable del'impôt des sociétés applicable auxentreprises nouvellement créées

Aff. T-347/99Diputación Foral deGipuzkoa/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29septembre 1999, d'engager laprocédure prévue au paragraphe 2de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerneles aides fiscales à l'investissementoctroyées par la «Diputación Foralde Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'uneréduction de l'assiette imposable del'impôt des sociétés applicables auxentreprises nouvellement créées

Aff. T-348/99Diputación Foral deBizkaia/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29septembre 1999, d'engager laprocédure prévue au paragraphe 2de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerneles aides fiscales à l'investissementoctroyées par la «Diputación Foralde Bizkaia» sous forme d'uneréduction de l'assiette imposable del'impôt des sociétés applicables auxentreprises nouvellement créées

Aff. T-354/99Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland)BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-5/00Nederlandse FederatieveVereniging voor de Groothandelop Elektrotechnisch Gebied /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 26 octobre 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 81 du traitéCE (Affaire n. IV/33.884 -



Nederlandse Federatieve Verenigingvoor de Groothandel opElektrotechnisch Gebied enTechnische Unie) concernant lemarché de l'électrotechnique auxPays-Bas

Aff. T-13/00S.W.M. Baltussen e.a. /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-14/00CAV Ulestraten-Schimmert-Hulsberg e.a. / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-15/00Auto- en Carosserie bedrijfAmbting BV e.a. / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-318/99

Aff. T-29/00Deutsche Post AG/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 14 décembre 1999,infligeant à la requérante,conformément à l'article 14,paragraphe 1, b) et c) du règlementCEE n. 4064/89 du Conseil, du 21décembre 1989, relatif au contrôledes opérations de concentrationentre entreprises, une amende d'unmontant de 100.000 Euros, pouravoir donné des indicationsinexactes et dénaturées à l'occasiond'une notification présentée enapplication de l'article 4 duditrèglement et, pour avoir fourni desrenseignement inexacts en réponse àune demande de renseignement faiteen application de l'article 11 (affaireIV/1610 - Deutsche Post/trans-o-flex)

Aff. T-35/00Anthony Goldstein / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 21 janvier 2000,concernant une demande derenseignements adressée à la

Commission par les représentantsdu requérant suite à la décision de lajuridiction nationale saisie par celui-ci de demander certainesinformations en application del'article 10 du traité CE (ex article 5)et conformément à lacommunication relative à lacoopération entre la Commission etles juridictions nationales pourl'application des articles 81 et 82 dutraité CEE

Aff. T-40/00Consorzio industrie fiammiferi(CIF) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 29 mars 1999,refusant de communiquer aurequérant certains documentstransmis à l' «Autorità Garante dellaConcorrenza» aux fins d'uneenquête relative à l'application desarticles 81 et 82 du traité CE menéepar ladite autorité

Aff. T-44/00Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG/ConseilAnnulation de la décision C(1999)4154 final de la Commission, du 8décembre 1999, relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'article81 du traité CE (IV/E-1/35.860-Btubes et tuyaux en acier sanssoudure)

Aff. T-45/00Conseil national des professionsde l'automobile (CNPA) e.a. /CommissionAnnulation du règlement de laCommission (CE) n. 2790/1999, du22 décembre 1999, concernantl'application de l'article 81,paragraphe 3, à des catégoriesd'accords verticaux et de pratiquesconcertées

Aff. T-48/00British Steel Ltd, anciennementBritish Steel plc / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-44/00

Aff. T-50/00Dalmine SpA / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-44/00

Aff. T-52/00Coe Clerici Logistics SpA/CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 20 décembre 1999,de classer la plainte de la requéranterelative à un prêtendu abus deposition dominante de la part de lasociété concessionnaire d'un desquais du port d'Ancona, en ce quiconcerne les activités dedéchargement de charbon sur cequai

Aff. T-58/00Bond Van De Fegarbel-Beroepsverenigingen e.a. /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-45/00

Aff. T-59/00Compagnia Portuale PietroChiesa scarl / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 22 décembre 1999,de ne pas donner suite à la plaintede la requérante visant à faireconstater la violation desdispositions combinées des articles86 et 82 du traité CE de la part de laCompagnia Unica Lavoratori MerciVarie (CULMV) en sa position defournisseur privilégié de servicesportuaires et de main-d'oeuvre auport de Gênes

Aff. T-67/00NKK Corporation / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)4154 final de laCommission, du 8 décembre 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 81 du traitéCE (IV/E-1/35.860-B tubes ettuyaux en acier sans soudure) ou, àtitre subsidiaire, la réduction del'amende infligée à la requérante



Aff. T-68/00Nippon Steel Corporation /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-67/00

Aff. T-71/00Kawasaki Steel Corporation /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-67/00

Aff. T-77/00Esat Telecommunications Ltd /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission SG(2000) D/100598,du 18 janvier 2000, portant rejet dela plainte de la requérante relative àun prétendu abus de positiondominante de la part de TelecomÉireann, l'opérateur titulaire detélécommunications en Irlande,visant à empêcher ou retarderl'accès de la requérante au marchéirlandais de services detélécommunications (COMP/35.979Esat Telecom/Telecom Éireann)

Aff. T-78/00Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-67/00

DEVANT LA COUR

Aff. C-462/99Connect Austria Gesellschaft fürTelekommunikation GmbH etTelekom-Control-Kommission -Mobilkom Austria AGPréjudicielle - Verwaltungs-gerichtshof - Interprétation de l'art.5 bis, par. 3, de la directive90/387/CEE du Conseil, du 28 juin1990, relative à l'établissement dumarché intérieur des services detélécommunication par la mise enoeuvre de la fourniture d'un réseauouvert de télécommunication, telleque modifiée par la directive97/51/CE du Parlement européen etdu Conseil du 6 octobre 1997 -Pourvoi devant une instance

indépendante contre les décisions del'autorité réglementaire - Effet direct- Interprétation de l'art. 86 du traitéCE (devenu article 82 CE), de l'art.90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 CE),de l'art. 2 de la directive 96/2/CE dela Commission, du 16 janvier 1996,modifiant la directive 90/388/CEEen ce qui concerne lescommunications mobiles etpersonnelles, et des art. 9 et 11 de ladirective 97/13/CE du Parlementeuropéen et du Conseil du 10 avril1997 relative à un cadre communpour les autorisations générales etles licences individuelles dans lesecteur des services detélécommunications - Législationnationale en matière d'attribution defréquences dans la bande 1800MHZ

Aff. C-475/99Firma Ambulanz Glöckner etLandkreis SüdwestpfalzPréjudicielle - Oberverwaltungs-gericht Rheinland-Pfalz -Interprétation des art. 90, par. 1, dutraité CE (devenu art. 86 CE) et 85du traité CE (devenu art. 81 CE) -Législation nationale qui restreintl'accès à l'activité du transport demalades en fonction de la demandeobjective et crée, de fait, desmonopoles locaux

Aff. C-480/99 PGerry Plant e.a. / Commission -South Wales Small MinesAssociationPourvoi formé contre l'ordonnancedu Tribunal de première instance(deuxième chambre) du 29septembre 1999, J.G. Evans e.a. /Commission (T-148/98 et T-162/98), par laquelle le Tribunal arejeté comme irrecevables desrecours visant à l'annulation d'unedécision de la Commission, du 30juillet 1998 (affaire IV/E-3/SWSMA), rejetant les plaintesdéposées par les requérants contre leCentral Electricity Generating

Board (CEGB) et British Coal,relatives à une prétendue ententeconcernant les prix de vente ducharbon destiné à la productiond'électricité

Aff. C-482/99France / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)3148 final de laCommission concernant les aidesaccordées par la France àl'entreprise Stardust Marine

Aff. C-497/99 PIrish Sugar plc / CommissionPourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal de première instance(troisième chambre) du 7 octobre1999, Irish Sugar plc / Commission(T-228/97) - Annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 14mai 1997, relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE(devenu art. 82 CE) (IV/34.621,35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc)

Aff. C-499/99Commission / EspagneManquement d'Etat - Défaut des'être conformé aux décisions91/1/CEE de la Commission, du 20décembre 1989, concernant les aidesaccordées en Espagne par legouvernement central et plusieursgouvernements automomes àMAGEFESA, producteurd'ustensiles de cuisine en acierinoxydable et de petits appareilsélectriques et C(1998)3211 final dela Commission, du 14 octobre 1998,relative à une aide accordée auxentreprises du groupe MAGEFESA

Aff. C-509/99Portugal / CommissionAnnulation de la décision C (1999)3370 final de la Commission, du 20octobre 1999, relative à uneprocédure au titre de l'art. 21 durèglement (CEE) n. 4064/89 duConseil, du 21 décembre 1989,relatif au contrôle des opérations de



concentration entre entreprises(Proc. IV/M. 1616 - A.Champalimaud/BSCH)

Aff. C-36/00Espagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décision2000/131/CE de la Commission, du26 octobre 1999, concernant l'aided'Etat octroyée par l'Espagne auxchantiers navals publics (notifiéesous le numéro C(1999)3864) -Conformité d'aides derestructuration avec l'art. 1, par. 4,deuxième tiret, du règlement (CE) n.1013/97 du Conseil, du 2 juin 1997,concernant les aides en faveur decertains chantiers navals en cours dereconstructionAff. C-43/00Andersen og Jensen ApS etSkatteministerietPréjudicielle - Vestre Landsret -Interprétation de l'art. 2, sous c) etsous i), de la directive 90/434/CEEdu Conseil, du 23 juillet 1990,concernant le régime fiscal communapplicable aux fusions, scissions,apports d'actifs et échanges d'actionsintéressant des sociétés d'Etatsmembres différents - Notiond'«apport d'actifs» et de «branched'activité» - Possibilité de dissocierune somme empruntée et lesobligations de l'emprunteur

Aff. C-57/00 PFreistaat Sachsen / CommissionPourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal de première instance(deuxième chambre élargie) du 15

décembre 1999, Freistaat Sachsen etVolkswagen / Commission (T-132/96 et T-143/96) - Aidesoctroyées au développementéconomique de certaines régions dela République fédérale d'Allemagneaffectées par la division del'Allemagne (art. 87, par. 2, lit. cCE) - Aides destinées à remédier àune perturbation grave del'économie d'un Etat membre (art.87, par. 3, lit. b CE) - Aidesapprouvées par la Commission souscondition de respecter par ailleursdes règles en vigueur dans unsecteur déterminé - Règlesd'encadrement décidéespostérieurement à l'approbationd'une aide

Aff. C-61/00 PVolkswagen AG et VolkswagenSachsen GmbH / Commission e.a.Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal de première instance(deuxième chambre élargie) du 15décembre 1999, Volkswagen etVolkswagen Sachsen / Commissione.a. (T-132/96 et T-143/96) - Aidesoctroyées au développementéconomique de certaines régions dela République fédérale d'Allemagneaffectées par la division del'Allemagne (art. 87, par. 2, lit. cCE) - Aides destinées à remédier àune perturbation grave del'économie d'un Etat membre (art.87, par. 3, lit. b CE) - Aidesapprouvées par la Commission souscondition de respecter par ailleursdes règles en vigueur dans un

secteur déterminé - Règlesd'encadrement décidéespostérieurement à l'approbationd'une aide

Aff.jtes C-74/00 P et C-75/00 PFalck SpA / Acciaierie di BolzanoSpA (ACB) Italie / Commission -Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA (ACB)/ Falck SpA Italie / CommissionPourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal de première instance(cinquième chambre élargie) du 16décembre 1999, Acciaierie diBolzano / Commission (T-158/96) -Refus d'annuler la décision de laCommission 96/617/CECA, du 17juillet 1996, concernant des aidesoctroyées par la province autonomede Bolzano (Italie) à la sociétéAcciaierie di Bolzano

COMPETITION DG'S ADDRESSON THE WORLD WIDE WEB

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/index_en.htm

COMING UP

Competition Policy Newsletter 2000Number 3 - October

XXIX Report on CompetitionPolicy 1999



Cases covered in this issueAnti-Trust Rules

41 Horizontal co-operation agreements

Mergers

45 Volvo/Scania48 Main developments

Liberalisation & State Intervention

55 Gas market

State Aid

59 Eight Survey on State Aid in the EU62 Germany - special tax treatment63 Denmark - electricity sector64 France et Pays-Bas - programme de recherche ITEA65 Germany - SMI65 Nouvelles décisions sur les cartes des aides d'Etat à finalité régionale pour la période 200-2006

competition policy number 2 newsletter · articles 2 competition policy newsletter 2000 number 2...

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