complainant’s hearing brief

8/7/2019 COMPLAINANTS HEARING BRIEF

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SLPREME COURT, STATE OP COLORADOORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINEBEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE1550 Broadway, Suite 675 MV 25 2011Denver, Colorado 80202

RESIDIC }SC{FLINRYjUl)CEK C( URT IF COT.( luI Comp]ainant:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADOA COURT USE ONLYRespondent:

-PETER B. ALBANI Case Number: 1OPDJDY5Elizabeth Espinosa Krupa, #26028Adam J. Espinosa, #33937Assistant Regulation CounselAttorney for Complainant I1560 Broadway, Suite 1800Denver, CO 80202Telephone: (303) 866-6400, ext. 6583Fax No.: (303) 893-5302 I!e.krnoacsc.sta teco.us

I COMPLAINANTS_HEAmNG_BRIEF

INTRODUCTIONThis matter involves Respondents misconduct during two in cameraproceedings held in the course of the criminal trial of Respondents client,Patricia Ragusa. In the first in camera proceeding, Respondent, under thepretext of making a Schultheis record, told the judgeoutside Ms. Ragusaspresencethat he disagreed with Ms. Ragusas decision not to accept theprosecutions offer of a plea agreement. Respondent used the second in cameraproceeding, held under the guise of a sequestration of witnesses issue, to revealprivileged client confidences to the court. By such conduct, Respondentviolated Cole. RPC 12(a), 1.4(a), 1.6(a), 1.7(b) (1993), 1.8(b), 3.3(a)(1), S.4(c),and 8.4(d).

Feop(e u. Scftuitfteis, 635 P.2d 8 (Cok,. 1981), 5 a semnat case that deals with a counselsobligation to request to withdraw when a client demands to present perjured testimony. ASchultheis record is made outside of the presence of all parties, even the cuurt, wfth theassistance of the court reporter.


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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThe People filed the complaint in this matter on September 15, 2010.Respondent filed his answer on October 29, 2010. The parties held an at-issueconference on November 24: 2010. Trial is set fo r prH 5-8, 2011 at theDenver District Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1. Respondent has taken and subscribed the oath of admission, wasadmitted to the bar of this Court on October 30, 1984, and is registered uponthe official records of this Court, registration no- 13982. He is subject to thejurisdiction of this Court in these disciplinary proceedings. Respondentsregistered business address is 1901 \Ves Littleton Bouevard. Suite 206,

Littleton, Colorado 80120.2. In 2004, the Jefferson County Distrkt Attorney charged PatriciaRagusa (Ragusa) with 51 counts of theft and attempted theft and 51 counts ofcomputer crime and attempted computer crime for allegedly stealing $1.2million from her employer. State of Colorado v. Patricia Raguso, case no.04CR3101. Respondent represented Ragusa in her defense, along with RobertGrossman (Grossman). Respondent was lead counsel. Ragusa paidRespondent and Grossman $11000000 for their representation.3. The case was tried to a jury from November 7-16, 2005. Ragusawas found guilty of al l counts. In April 2006, she was sentenced to fifteenyears of incarceration, plus five years of mandatory paro!e and restitution.4. In June 2006 the Co}orado State Public Defenders Office on behalfof Ragusa filed a direct appeal requesting the reversal of her conviction andsentence due to violation of her Sixth Amendment rights to (1) have conflict-free counsel, (2) be present at tria], and (3) have counsel of her choice.5. On September 3, 2009, the Court of Appeals issued a mandatereversing Ragusas judgment of conviction in State of Colorado a PatriciaRagusa, Court of Appeals No. 06CM 110. The Court vacated her sentence andhad the case remanded for a new trial. The decision was based upon review oftwo in camera proceedings at which Ragusa was not present.

First in camera proceeding6. Before jury sejection and outside Ragusas presence, the trial courtheld an in camera proceeding on the record. Respondent initiated theproceeding by advising the court that he wanted to make a Schuitheis record.


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7. Respondent did not make a Schultheis record, nor did he have thebasis or ever intend to.

S. While in chambers, outside the presence of Ragusa and theprospective jury panel, Respondent told the judge he and co-counsel Grossmanhad advised Ragusa to accept the prosecutions plea bargain offers: thedistrict attorneys office, throughout this proceeding - have made us anumber of plea bargain offers that we have advised our client to takeunconditionally ... The district attorneys office has made us an cifer, whicnwould have netted her a range of between four to twelve years]. And Mr.Grossman and I have met with her repeatedly and were very adamanL that wefelt she should take that deal.9. Respondent continued, W e think that its fo lly for her to not havetaker: the deal . . And we just fee l it appropriate that we make a record. Healso stated we believe her decision is flat out wrong, and in good faith, webelieve that her choice is just a very, very poor one.10 . Respondent concluded the in camera proceeding by stating, Andwe will not advise her of this should she ask us what this was about. We dontthink it was appropriate. It would only throw a monkey wrench thinking thatwere against her.

Second in camera proceedingii. Following a recess during the prosecutions case-in-chief, the courtheld another in camera proceeding, again in Ragusas absence.12. This in camera proceeding was called to discuss a potentia] witnesssequestration violation. However, Respondent started the discussion by statingJudge, a most fortuitous situation happened that under the guise of callingback to talk to us about a question, a sequestration potential violation, thatgave us an opportunity to come into chambers so M r. Grossman and I canreport what just happened during the break13. Respondent then revealed that he and Grossman had beensubjected to perhaps the most vicious attack they had] ever had to get from aclient According to Respondent, Ragisa tod Respondent and Grossman thatthey d Dnt give a s---, dont give a 1---, and larel putting on a patsy defense.14. Respondent stated And I just think we need to put in on therecord, because, as [ anticipated prior to this trial, Patricia rRagusa seems tobe trying to make us a target fo r what and I think the Court has a pretty goodidea of why Rob and I said she ought to consider taking this deal and what webelieve the evidence was going to be .

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15 . Respondent continued, were not trying to be babies Ro b and 1are certainiy not going to quit. \V ere not going to le t her llre us, if that everwere to come.16 . Ragusa did not learn about the substance of the two in cameraproceedings until the attorney appointed to represent her on appeal discoveredthe statements while reviewing trial transcripts.17. After the Court of Appeals remard, a motions hearing on the newtrial was held in Jefferson County District Court before Judge Taniara Russell,who presided over the original criminal trial. In response to a motion todisqualify her, she said the following:THE COURT: But Iv e taken a lot of time over the last two days to look atthis and I have to tell you that the most distressing part of it is, and Ihope that people who read the case will note the fact that both timesthat counsel came back to see me, it was under pretext , they lied tome, then I would have never allowed them to come back had theytold me the truth. And that I did in fact ask for the defendant to bepresent, and they said no. (Emphasis added)18 . When asked by Ragusa what happened in the two in cameraproceedings conducted without her present, Respondent told her that things

were going well for her or that they were winning.RULE VIOLATIONS

A. Respondent Failed to Abide by his Clients Decision as to PleaEntered in Violation of Cob. RPC 1.2(a)Cob. RPC 1.2(a) provides that a lawyer shall abide by a clients decision,after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waiveju y trial and whether the client wifl testify.Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) when he stated to the judge and theprosecutors that he disagreed with his clients decision to decline the pL eaagreement. He failed to abide by his clients decision when he madestatements regarding what a poor choice it as after his tireless efforts toconvince her to the contrary. Respondent did not abide by his ciients choicebut made statements without her present in order to preserve his own selfinteres ts. Specifically, Respondent told the court and the prosecutor that hisclients decision as to the plea agreement was fo lly . By such conduct, therespondent violated Cob. RPC 12(a).


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B. Responden t Fa iled to Communicate with his Client in Violation ofCob. RPC 1.4(a)

Cob. RPC I .4(a)in effect in 2005) states that a awyer shall keep a clientreasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply withreasonable requests for information.Respondent failed to comply with this duty of communication when hepurposefully failed to inform his diem of the statements he made to theprosecutor and the judge in her absence. Respondent made statements toadvance his own self-intercst and against his clients best interest, Respondentstated on the record that he was not going to tell his client about thestatements he made in camera without her present. Respondent fafled to

communicate to his client the true nature of the in camera proceedings bothbefore the proceedings and afterward, when he told her things were going veilor that she was winning. By such conduct, the respondent violated Cob. RPC1.4(a).C. Responden t Failed to Maintain Confiden tial ity of Information inViolation of Cob. RPC 1.6(a)

Cob. R.P.C. l.6(a) stales that a lawyer sha]l not reveal informationrelating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informedconsent.

Respondent violated Rule 1.6(a) by revealing confidential clientinformation in the two in camera proceedings, incluthng his disagreement withhis clients decision to decline the plea offer and his strained relationship withher. Respondent revealed not only his advice to his client but her responses,reactions and his belief that she was manipulating the judicial system or wouldattempt to manipulate the judicial system. Respondent revealed confidentialinformation that his client provided to him in the course of his representationof her. Ragusa did not provide informed consent for Respondent to disclosetheir attorney-client confidences. By such conduct, Respondent violated Cob.RPC 1.5(a).D. Respondent had a Prohibited Conflict of Interest in Violation ofCob. RPC 1.7(b)

Cola. RPC 1.7(b) (in effect during the relevant time period in 2005) statesin part that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of thatclient may be materially limited by the lawyers own interests. The !asyersown interests should no: be perniftted to have adverse effect on representationof a client.

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Respondents own interest in preserving his reputation material]y limitedhis responsibilities to Ragusa. 1-us self-interest caused him to disclose clientconfidences regarding the plea agreement, comment on his cLients decision-making ability and to accuse her of manipulation to the presiding udge andopposing counsel.Respondent admits that his intent during both in camera proceedingswas to make a record to protect himself in We event that Ragusa made anineffective assistance of counsel claim against him at a future date.Respondent did not consider how that impacted his duties owed to his client.As attorney for Ragusa, Respondent had a duty of lovatyto her,individually. In making records regarding Ragusa outside her presence andspecifically excluding her to protect hims&i, Respondent represented Ragusa

under circumstances in which his representation was materially limited by hisown interests.Respondents conflicted representation adversely affected Ra2usa byactually or potentia]ly adversely affecting the courts view of her case. By suchconduct, Respondent violated Cob . RPC 1.7(b).

E. Respondent had a Prohibited Conflict of Interes t in Violation ofCob. RPC 1.8(b)Cob. RPC 1.8kb states th at a lawyer shall not use information relating tothe representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the clientgives informed consenLRespondenL violated Rule 1.8(b) when he made a record usinginformation relating to his rep resentation of Ragusa to protect his own self-interest and to the disadvantage of his client without her consen t. Respondentwas so concerned about a potential claim against him based on hisrepresentation of Ragusa that he used information gained during the course ofrepresenting her that cou!d be used in his lavor and against his client in any

proceeding regarding his effective assistance of counsel.The conflict was so apparent that the respondent felt obliged to concealhis reasons for meeting with the court in cameraand thus, the duty to advisehis ciient about the nature of Ihe confict arose. By using inforrna:Ion reatingto his representation of Ragusa to her dfsadvantage without her consent,Respondent vo!ated Rue :.a().

F. Respondent Knowingly Made a False Statement of Material Fact orLaw to a Tribunal in Violation of Cola. RPC 3.3(a)(1J

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Cob. RPC 3.3(afll) provides that a Iayer shall rot knowinglymake a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct afalse sta tement of materiul fact or law previously made to the tribunal by thelawyer.Respondent staled on the record that he needed to make a Schu/theisrecord in the first in carncra proceeding. However, Respondents statements inthe in camera proceeding had nothing to do vi1h his client offering perjuredtestimony. The only reason Respofldent usec the Schuitheis case was toexclude his client from the record he intended to create.The above statements made by Respondent were not true. Respondentmade no attempt to clarify that he was not going to make a Schultheis record,and never went back to clarify for the court what the record he intended to

make or did make. Respondent knew that the above statements were not trueat the time that he made the statements.Respondents sta tements were an attempt to deceive the court about thetrue purpose for a proceeding in camera and to deceive the court about hisclients lack of knowledge of the status of the roceedings .Similarly, the second in camera proceeding was held to address apotential sequestration violation. Respondents intent in the second in cameraproceeding was to tattle to the court about his clients statements and

behavior.Respondents false statements were of a material fact because the courtpermitted each in camera proceeding to occur without Ragusa present based onRespondents representations as to the reason why the proceedings were beingconducted. By such conduct, the respondent violated Cob. RPC 3.3(a)(l).

G. Respondent Engaged In Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud,Deceit or Misrepresentation in Violation of Cob. RPC 8.4(c)Cola. RPC 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyerto engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.Respondent violated Ru!e 8.4(c) when he made the Schuliheis hearingrequest by misrepresenting the need and use of the hearing to the court andhis client. Respondents statement tc the Court, to the prosecutors and for therecord was false because a Sdui!theis hearing is conducted when an attorneybelieves a client intends to provide perjured testimony to the court and theattorney has an obligation to make a record regarding this belief and not assis tthe client in offering per jured testimony. Respondent never corrected this falsestatement.

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Respondent knew the sta tements about We need to make a Schuliheishearing Mere not true when lie made them, or was reckless in failing todetermine whether or not the statements were true prior to making them.Respondents recklessness is demonstrated by his stating to the court thereason to make an in camera proceeding and then making a record regardingthe plea offer and his clients decision not to take the plea oiler, which hasnothing to do with his client intending to offer perjured testimony.Respondent intentionally or knowingly or reck lessly failed to tell hisclient that he made statements, without her present, to the court and theprosecution regarding her decision-making ability, his distaste for her and hisdistrust in her. When Ragusa asked Respondent what had occurred in thehearings, he simply told her things were going well fo r them or that they werewinning. These statements constitute conduct involving dishones ty, deceitand/or misrepresentation. By such conduct, Respondent violated Cob. RPC8.4(c).

H. Respondent Engaged in Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration ofJu stice in Violation of Cola. RPC 8.4(d)Cob. RPC 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyerto engage in conduct that is prejudic ial to the administration of justice.Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by repeatedly using faise pretenses to getthe court and the prosecutor to be present when he made statements that wereharmful to his client and disclosing her confidences on the record without herpresent. Respondern directly delayed anti altered the course of the Lria);Ragusa won on appeal, her conviction was vacated, and her case wasremanded to the trial court for a new trial due to Respondents actions.Respondent thereby caused substantial prejudice to the administration ofjustice. By such conduct, the respondent violated Colofl RPC 8.4d).

SANCTIONSWhen imposing sanctions for violations of the Colorado Rules ofProfessional Conduct, ABA Standard 3.0 directs the Presiding DisciplinaryJudge to consider the following four factors:

a. the duty violated;b. the lawyers mental state:c. the actuai or potential injury caused by the lawyers misconduct;andd. the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

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Duties ViolatedRespondent had a duty to dca professionally, honestly, and openy with

the court and his client. Attorney misconduct perpetuates the publicsmisperception of the legal profession and breaches the public and professionaltrust. In re DeRose, 55 P3d 126, 131 (Cob. 2002). By lying to his clientabout the nature of the in camera proceedings, Respondent breached theseduties to his client. By lying to the court about the purpose of the in cameraproceedings, Respondent breached those duties to the court. By creating aconflict of inte rest between himself and his client, Respondent viotated the duoto provide conflict-free representation to his client.

Respondent owed a duty of loyaky to his client. Respondent breachedthat duty when he vio]ated the attorney-client privHege. The attorney-clientprivilege applies to confidential matters communicated by or to the client inthe course of obtaining counsel, advice, or direction with respec t to the clientsrights or obligations. People v. Madero, 112 P,3d 688, 690 (Cob. 2005).Only the client may waive the privilege. Id. The information Respondentrevealed in both in camera proceedingsincluding Ms. Ragusas conversationswith Respondent about potential plea agreementswas protected by theattorney-client privilege. See Commonwealth t Downey, 842 N.E.2d 955, 962(Mass. App. 2005) (The pubished conversation involved one trial attorneysadvice during the course of tria directed to the prospect of the defendantentering a plea of guilty. Such privileged and confidential communication !iesat the heart of confidential and strategic decisions between the accused clientand defense counselwhich is precisely why the law for centuries hasprotected privileged attorney-client communication.) (internal citationsomitted). Ms. Ragusa did not give Respondent the authority to disclose thatconfidential information.

The Respondents Mental StateRespondents mental state fo r was knowing. In an attempt to gain access

to the court, the respondent knowingly deceived the court and misrepresentedhis purpose for the in camera hearings in order to exclude his client andprotect himself.

Injury Caused by the Respondents MisconductRespondents misconduct caused actual and potential injury to his

client, the profession, and the People of the State of Colorado by causing justiceto be delayed and by requiring additional resources to he expended to resolvethe clients case. Additionally. Respondent harmed the client and theprofession by voiating a fundamental tenet of the attorney-client relationship,confidentiality, in an ef!ort to benefit him self.

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Through his conflicts of interest and disclosure of client confidences,Respondent caused in juy to Ragusa by denying her the ability to berepresented by counsel in any meaningful way. The right to counsel plays acrucial role in the adversa ra system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, sinceaccess to counsels skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants theample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to which they areentitled. Stricicland u. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (quoting AdamsUnited States ex rd. McCann, 317 CS. 269. 275 {1942fl. The right to beheard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the rightto be heard by counsel jA defendant] lacks both the skill and knowledgeadequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect one. Herequires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings againsthim Gideon a Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (W63) (internal citationsomitted).The Colorado Supreme Court has held that rtlhe right to conflict-freecounsel is encompassed within the right to effective assistance of counselThat counsel must be conflict-free ensures that a defendant will receive thezeaious advocacy to which he is entit!ed, People HarLan, 54 P.3d 871, 879(Cob. 2002) (interna] citations omitted). By revea!ing confidenti& clientinformation to the court and prosecution in an attempt to proteci himself,Respondent created an imperrnissible conflict of interest and deprived hisclient of the right to effective counsel.Perhaps most importanUy, Respondent harmed the client by creatingactua or potential prejudice in the mind of the trial judge. The ColoradoSupreme Court in Schultheis, 638 P.2d at 13 , held that the defendant isalways entitled to an impartial trial judge, untainted by accusations that thedefendant had insisted upon presenting fabricated testimony. Also, CR5. 16-7-302(1) provides that a judge shall not participate in plea discussions. Thepurpose of that rule is to preserve judicial irnpartiality . People a Crumb, 203P.3d 587 (Cob. App. 2008), cert. granted, Crumb v. People. No. 08SC884, 2009WL 663958 (Cob. Mar. 16, 2009), reud on other grounds, Crumb v. People, 230

P.3d 726 (Cob. 2010). Respondents misconduct harmed Ragusa bypotentially destroying the trial judges impartiality.Aggravating and Mitigating FactorsThe following aggravating factors are established under ABA Standard9.22:922(b) dishonest or selfish motive: Respondents words and conduct inthe two in camera hearings demonstrate an effort by Respondem to protect

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himself from his client and demonstrtc a dishonest and selfish motive in thiscase.9.22(d) multiple offenses: The respondent violated several rules ofprofessiona! conduct in these matters, including Cob. RPC 1.2 (authoritybetween client and lawyer), 1.4(a) (communication), 1.6(a) (conlidentialitv),1.7(b) (conflict of interest), :8(b) (conflict ci interesq, 3.3(a)(1) false stawmentto a tribunal), 8.4(c) (dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation), and 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).9.22(g) Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct: Respondenthas failed to acknowledge the wrongfui nature of his conduct with respect tothe allegations in the complaint.9.22(h) Vulnerability of the victim: The victim was in a particularlyvulnerable situation in that she was charged with over one hundred felonycriminal counts and was facing thousands of years in prison and was relyingon Respondent to zealously defend her and protect her [egal interests.9.22(11 Substantia l experience in the practice of law: Respondent wasadmitred to the practice of law on October 30, 1984, and he has over twentyyears experience in the practice of law.The following mitigating factors are established under ABA Standard932:9.32(& Absence of a prior discinlinarv record: Respondent has no priordisciplinary history.App ropriate Level of Disc iplineConsidering the nature and seriousness of Respondents misconduct, asuspension of two years is appropriate. The ABA Standards and relevant caselaw support a two-year suspension.Relevant ABA StandardsABA Standard 4.22 provides that suspension is generally appropriatewhen a bawver knowkngly reveals information relating to the rep resentation of aclient not otherwise lawfu:ly permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosurecauses injury or potentia: w a Chent.ABA Standard 4.32 provides that suspension is generally appropriatewhen a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a

client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury toa client.

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ABA Siandard 7.2 provides that suspension is generally appropriatewhen a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owedto the profession and causes injury to a client, the public, or legal system.Case Law [nvolvin Disclosure of Client ConfidencesThe court in People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 655 (Cob. 19S9 suspended therespondent for two years for engaging in conduct prejudicial to theadministration of justice and breaching client confidences among othermisconduct including criminal activity. That respondent represented a clientcharged with possession of cocaine. Id. at 686. As part of his service as anundercover informant, the respondent purchased cocaine from his client,resulting in the clients arrest. Id. Like the respondent in Smith, Respondentin this case placed his own personal interest above his clients trust. TheSmith court noted that absent the respondents significant mitigating factors,disbarment may have been appropriate. Id. at 688.The court in In re Conduct of Lackey, 37 P.3d 172 (Dr. 2002), suspendedthe respondent, an attorney for the Oregon National Guard, for one year fordisclosing client confidences by reeasing a memo to t:ie Oregon governorslegal couns& and the media. However, the respondent in Lackey disclosedclient confidences on only one occasion, while Respondent in this case did sotwice. Also, Respondents m:sconacct is more serious because it also

constitu tes dishonesty to a client and to the court.The court in In re Conduct of Huffman, 983 P.2d 534 (Or. 1999),suspended the respondent for two years for revealing client confidences in aletter to the clients new counsel, among other misconduct. The letter wasmeant to embarrass the client and induce the new counsel not to representthe client. Respondents misconduct in the present case was more egregiousthan Huffmans because Respondent engaged in dishonesty and conductprejudicial to the administration of justice, claims which were not proven inJ-Juffman.Case Law Involving Conflicts of [nterestThe court in Florida Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So.2d 241 (Fia. 2002),suspended the respondent for one year for a confict of interes:, among otherrule violations, where the respondent filed motions to enforce settlementagainst his clients interest. Again, Respondents misconduct in the presentmatter Es more serious given the elements of dishonesty and discosure of cNentconfidences.

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The court in Florida Bar v. Lange, 711 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1998), suspendedthe respondent for one year for a conflict between the respondents ownfinancial interest and his clients interest, among other misconduct. Therespondent Iai!ed to object to the jurys requesL to view the crime scenebecause his fee as a court-appointed public defender was limited, and if thecase resulted in a hung juiy, he would have to retry the case for free Id. at521.Case Law Involving Dishonesty to Courts and ClientsThe court in Florida Bar u. Sega?, 663 So.2d 618, 622 (Fla.1995),suspended the respondent for three years for knowingly making amisrepresentation to a tribuna stating it is a serious ethical breach.As discussed above, Respondents conduct is particularly egregious giventhe fact that he acted with a sellish motive. See People t. Lopez, 845 P.2d1253 (Cob. 1993) (Court weighed whether attorney had selfish motive as keyto whether attorney received censure or suspension.)

CONCLUSIONThe ABA Standards and relevant case law support a suspension from thepractice of jaw for two years in this case. A two-year suspension is appropriatebased on the na ture and LLe seriousness of the misconduct and based on theinjury or potential injury to the client.Dated this 25b day of March, 2011.

Respectfully submitted,

Elizabeth Espinosa Krupa, #26028Assistant Regulation CounselAttorney for Complainant

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI hereby certify that one copy of the foregoing COMPLAINANTSHEARING BRIEF was hand-delivered, this 25th day of March 2011, andaddressed to:

Leonard Berenato, Esq.David Worstell, Escj.1626 Washington StreetDenver, Colorado 80203 /

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complainant’s hearing brief

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