concepts and theories: scientific knowledge and...
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CHAPTER I
Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and Contemporary Sociological Theories
People have seen Science as an integral part of society, which is mainly
concerned with investigation and discovery of new facts about empirical world. The
sociology of science as a part of sociology of knowledge has always been concerned
with defining the nature of scientific ideas and their relations with other kinds of ideas
(i.e. ideological, philosophical, aesthetical and religious) and various institutional and
personality factors. 1 Merton's arguments in Science, Technology and Society in
Seventeenth Century England2 closely followed Weber's essay The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism.3 Prior to 1940, science was always viewed as an entity
simply as a source of information having various consequences for the rest of the
society. Before going into detail of how science is being treated by sociologists it will
be pertinent to define science.
Definition of Science:
Different people have defined science in different ways. The first and foremost
question is how can one distinguish science from that which is not science. Following
Karl Popper's suggestion in, the logic of scientific discovery, this question concerning
the difference between science and non-science is usually called the problem of
demarcation.4 One difficulty with the demarcation is the fact that there are several types
of entities which may be called scientific: men and women, groups and institutions,
concepts, statements, thoughts and inferences, arguments and experiments, methods
and instruments, articles and works, theories and world views.
The term "science" may thus refer to the scientific institution (scientific
workers, organisation of research), the research process, the scientific method, or
scientific knowledge. These four aspects of science are usually defined relative to each
other in a circular way. Science as an institution is that part of the society which
Mannheim, Karl, "The Sociology of Knowledge" in Curtis, James and Petras, John (eds.). The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader, Duckworth, London, 1982, pp.l 09-130.
2 Merton, Robert, K., Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England, H. Footing, New York, 1970.
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (translated by Talcott Parsons), Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.
4 Popper Formulates this problem as that of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical science on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as 'metaphysical' system on the other (Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, p.35).
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produces scientific knowledge by maintaining scientific research, which means
systematic and institutionalised pursuit of new knowledge by using scientific methods.
Scientific methods, in tum, are those tools for producing scientific knowledge, which is
acceptable to the scientific community. To be more clear, scientific knowledge consists
of the results of research which uses scientific methods. 5 An effective way of
comprehending the nature of scientific knowledge is to contrast it with ordinary
knowledge (common-sense knowledge). Ordinary knowledge or common-sense
knowledge is some times equated with pre-scientific knowledge, which is of inferior
"quality. However, Malinowski6 argues that if by science we understand a body of rules
and conception based on experience and logical inference embedded in material
achievement, and that it is a fixed form of tradition carried on by some sort of social
organisation, then there is no doubt that even the lowest savage communities have the
beginning of science, however rudimentary it may be.
According to Norman Campbell, "science is the study of those judgments
concerning which universal agreement can be obtained". 7 Here the emphasis is on the
nature of the matter of study. This nature and subject matter of science are dependent
on the applicability of scientific methods. However, the problem with these kinds of
definitions is the fact that the methods of science are historically developing. Our
understanding of the nature of scientific method is also continuously changing. For
these reasons, the characterisation of science by methods, which are now found to be
acceptable, is questionable. Paul Feyerabend has argued in his book 'Against Method,s
that there are no general methodological rules for science, which we should not
sometimes violate in the name of scientific progress. This statement implies that
scientific methods are not sacrosanct.
Science is a living institution which develops and changes through time. There
are certain general features as identified by Niiniluoto9 that are all associated with the
5 Niiniluoto, Ilkka, Is Science Progressive?, D.Reidel Pub., Boston, 1984, p.3 6 Malinowski, B., Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, Doubleday & Company, London,
1955, p.l7. 7 Campbell, Norman, What is Science?, Dover, London, 1952, p.27. 8 Feyerabend, P.K., Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, New Left Books,
London, 1975, p.ll. 9 Niiniluoto, Ilka, Is Science Progressive? op.cit., p.4.
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self-corrective nature of scientific inquiry. These features include objectivity, critical
attitude, autonomy, and progress. The scientific inquiry has to be objective at least in
two senses. First, the object of investigation has to be real in Peirce's10 sense i.e. its
character should be independent of what anybody may think it to be. Secondly, the
object should be allowed to influence the formation of the result of inquiry, and this
influence should be inter-subjectively recognisable. Science is self-corrective in the
sense that no authority can claim for him a permanent position. As there are claims and
counter claims regarding the nature and scope of science it remains inconclusive to
define science in categorical terms. Therefore, it could be understood only by analysing
its characteristic features.
Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge:
Scientific knowledge is based on connection made at both the theoretical and
observational levels. Connections of ideas in scientific systems are, therefore, both
empirical and rational. These two levels are integrated by the third type of connection
i.e. abstraction. According to Judith Willer 11, all thinking that combines rational,
empirical and abstractive thoughts is scientific. Neither catalogues of empirical facts
nor rational systems such as mathematics are scientific thinking by themselves. In the
absence of a developed science, technology is representative of empirical thinking. In
the scientific system of knowledge, empirical events are measured at the observational
level and are connected through abstraction of concepts at the theoretical level.
According to Jogtenberg 12, science is a professionalised system of theoretical
production and "finite province of meaning". That is to say, science is at the same time
a social system which has definable structures and processes, and a world of meaning
for individual scientists. The world of science, as Schutz and Luckmann 13 define it, is a
"finite province of meaning" characterized by harmony, compatibility of experience
and a particular 'cognitive style'. According to Schutz and Luckmann, cognitive styles
10 C.S. Peirce's Collected Papers, edited by Harthshone, C. and Weiss, P., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1931-55, vol.5, p.575.
11 Willer, Judith, The Social Determination of Knowledge, Print ice Hall, New Delhi, 1971, pp.30-32. 12 Jogtenberg, Tom., Social Construction of Science: A Comparative Study of Global Direction,
Research Evolution and Legitimization, D. Reidel Pub., Dordrecht, 1983, pp.15-16. 13 Schutz, Alfred, and Luclcmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life World, (Translated by Zaner,
Richard M. and Engelhardt, H. Tristram) Heinemann, London, 1974, pp.23-24.
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can be distinguished along with several dimensions, "tension of consciousness (e.g.
wide awakeness)" characteristic "epoche"· (e.g. 'scientific attitude'), form of
spontaneity (e.g. gearing into the external world), form of sociology (e.g.
intersubjectivity), form of self-experience (e.g. "bound" into the role of a chemist and
"free" to experiment with particular, chemicals) and temporal perspective (e.g.
"standard" time). 14 According to these authors, what distinguishes a scientific cognitive
style from an every day (life world) cognitive style is characteristic "epoche" of
"scientific attitude", 15 as contrasted with the 'natural attitude' of every day life.
Richard Boyd's 16 (1981) has argued that reality is prior to thought. Hence,
science deals with that reality which is independent of our perception. It means that
content of science is not amenable to sociological study. Karl Popper 17 has divided the
reality into three domains: Non-organic or organic physical objects and processes
(nature or world 1 ); thoughts, mental states or consciousness of higher animals and of
human beings (world 2); concrete and abstract products or public creations of human
minds (world 3). World 3 interact causally with world 1 via world 2, but it is only more
or less independent ofthe.other two worlds, since it is man-made. Given the division of
reality into three worlds, a corresponding classification of systematic discipline
0
In Schutz's terms "epoche" means "brackating away". In scientific inquiry those items of information which are not relevant for research are brakated away (i.e., kept aside from cognition); earlier Husser) used the term "epoche" to imply suspension of belief in a phenomenon. It means nearly the same thing as above; selective cognition of events, facts and phenomena.
14 Ibid., pp.35-36. 15 'Scientific attitude' is not over clearly defined by authors, but implicitly it is a type of theoretical
attitude, where scientific things are no longer taken for granted as scientific problems are encountered and dealt within a scientific way. The way that things may be dealt with scientifically is obviously subject to huge variation dependent on discipline, individual style etc. At a high level of generality one might speak of scientific rationality, but how successfully one can distinguish scientific rationality from other rationalities in an empirically useful sense is not fully clear. For example, Garfinkel (1975) has provided an inventory of 'rationalities' which distinguish the "attitude of scientific theorizing" from the attitude of daily life. They are (i) the compatibility of ends - means relationship with principles of formal logic (ii) semantic clarity and distinctiveness (iii) clarity and distinctiveness for its own sake, and (iv) compatibility of the definition of a situation with scientific knowledge. These do not occur in the attitude of daily life. But, Garfinkel is careful to point out: "to avoid misunderstanding I want to stress that the concern here is with the attitude of scientific theorizing. The attitude that informs the activities of actual scientific inequity is another matter entirely". In fact, scientists alternate between the attitude of daily life, and the attitude of scientific theorizing. (Garfinkel, Harold, "Scientific and Common Sense Activities", in Giddens, Anthony), (ed.) Positivism and Sociology, Heinemann, London, 1975, p.62-63.
16 Boyd, R. 'Scientific Realism and Natur~listic Epistemology' in Asquith, P.O. and Giere, R.N. (eds.) P.S.A. 1980, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Condon 1981, Vol.2 pp.613-663.
17 Popper, K.R., Objective Knowledge, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1972, pp.78-80.
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studying reality is obtained. World 1 is investigated by the natural sciences, World 2 by
psychology and the world 3 by mathematics, cultural sciences and social sciences.
Husser1 18 believes that ultimate reality is the "transcendental subject" which
constitutes the world. The critical realists also agree with Husser! that our experience is
always influenced by the accepted conceptual and theoretical framework. This means
that in studying the world, the scientists have to conceptualize it by some suitable
chosen framework. The realists also agree with "Proxists" (like later Husser! and
Heideggar) that our experience is influenced by our needs and interests i.e. by our
practical orientation towards the world. George Luckas has consistently stressed the
need to consider practice rather than thought alone, whenever knowledge and
consciousness were under sociological investigation. For him, "men generate
knowledge in the course of practice to further their particular interests" 19•
In consonance with the understanding of Lukas, Habermas20 feels that scientific
knowledge is the product of communities of interacting men and women who operate
upon and perceive reality not idly and contemplatively, but in terms of particular
instrumental, manipulative and predictive interests; in tum those interests are
constituted into the process of knowledge generation and evaluation. Knowledge is
produced through a rigorous process of interaction and convergence of ideas in the
scientific community. The reality emerges from the casual interaction in scientific
community which critically evaluates and deliberates its logic and relevance. When a
definite consensus is achieved in the opinion of scientific community, it becomes
knowledge. Peirce21 has explained this logic through the following model.
18 Husser], E., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, North Western Univ. Press, Evanston, 1970.
19 George, Luckas, Quoted in Interest and the Growth of Knowledge by Barnes, Barry (ed.) Routledge & Paul, London, 1977, p.l2.
20 d Habennas, Jurgen, Knowle ge and Human Interest. Translated by Shapiro, Jeremy J., Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, p.21.
21 C. S. Peirce's Collected Papers, op.cit, p.ll2.
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Causal interaction
Convergence
Flnai Opinion of the Scientific
1--_________ C_o_rr_es_,p'-o_n_d_e_n_c_e __ ~/Community Peirce's Model of Knowledge Formation
The scientific knowledge is distinguished from other forms by its inter-personal
character. This means that scientific knowledge is open to all; it is not personal but
inter-personal. Ziman called scientific knowledge condensable knowledge or public
knowledge.22 By this, he means that the results of science are open to inspection to
anyone who is interested in testing its validity. Its facts and theories must survive a
period of critical study and testing by other competent and disinterested individuals,
and they must have been found so persuasive that they are almost universally accepted.
Ziman argued that scientific enterprise is corporate. It .is not merely, in Newton's
incomparable phrase, ''that one stands on the shoulders of giants, and hence can see a
little farther". 23 Every scientist sees through his own eyes and also through the eyes of
his predecessors and colleagues. It is never one individual that goes through all the
steps in the logical inductive chain; it is a group of individuals, dividing their labour but
continuously and zealously checking each other's contributions. Thus, scientific
research is a social activity. Like all social activities, scientific endeavour involves a
process of interaction between competing realities. This can be ascertained through the
process of verification and confirmation.
22 Ziman, J.M., Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, f968, p.8.
23 Ibid., p.9.
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Verification and Confirmation of Scientific Theories/Knowledge:
According to Rudolf Carnap,24 there are two kinds of verification: direct and
indirect. If the question is concerned with a statement which asserts something about a
present perception i.e. there is a red square on a blue ground. Then the statement can be
tested directly by our present perception i.e. by directly seeing it. However, a statement
'P' which is not directly verifiable can only be verified from other already verified (J
statements.
According to Rom Harre25, scientists arnve at their laws and theories by
induction from the results of experiments, and to test them by further experiments.
Observation and the results of experiments are data, which provide a sound and solid
base for the scientific thought. However, experiments have limitation because they are
conducted on just a few samples, but laws and theories in different ways go beyond the
results of experiments. Sometimes, random adventurism has worked in science and this
has been called serendipity pattern by a sociologist. 26
In the philosophical debate about the criteria used to certify scientific
knowledge most attention has been given to the principles involved in validating
theoretical claims. According to Davies,27 to be classed as "scientific" a theory must
make predictions that have a logical symmetry. To be scientific a theory must:
(1) relate to a sufficiently wide range of phenomena;
(2) make predictions of what should, and what should not happen in certain
circumstances, however difficult the actual testing of these prediction may be;
(3) make predictions sufficiently precise.
24 Camap, Rudolf, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939, p.17.
25 Harre, Rom, Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty experiments that change our view of the World., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p.9.
26 Merton calls it "serendipity" pattern. It means sudden or unexpected discovery. Example, Fleming discovered pencillin by chance. The word serendipity is derived from chance discovery of the island of Serendip in (Sri Lanka) by Arab traders in the past. (See, Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, New York, 1968.)
27 Davies, J.T., The Scientific Approach, Academic Press, London, 1973, p.66.
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Thus, theory should not be so vague and diffuse that refutation becomes
impossible hence it should be simple and experimentally testable. According to Popper,
"a simple" theory is defined as one with few arbitrary parameters and consequently,
. h h . 1 . 28 A d. D . 29 more eas1ly tested t an a t eory mvo vmg more parameters. ccor mg to av1es ,
scientific theory must have the following five attributes:
( 1) The generality 'g' i.e. unification of existing intellectual concepts which is achieved.
(2) It's simplicity's'
(3) The precision, 'p' i.e. the predictions that can be made from it.
(4) Its 'testedness' 't' i.e. its having been tested repeatedly in various ways over a wide
range of relevant experimental conditions.
(5) Its 'refutedness' 'r' in previous tests, or its inconsistency with established data.
Refutedness here refers to the extent of refutation it has suffered during the testing
't'.
Thus, according the Davies,30 credibility and elegance of a particular theory
depends on the relative importance of each of these five attributes.31 Popper32 has
suggested that the major criteria of theoretical adequacy in science is and should be the
ability of a claim to withstand attempts at falsification. In this context Popper accepted
the role of the scientist who created the refuted theory. He stated:
"Every refutation should be regarded as a great success : not merely as a success
of the scientist who refuted the theory, but also• of the scientist who created the refuted
28 Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific discovery, op cit., p.I76. 29 Davies, J.J. The Scientific Approach, op.cit., p.95. 30 Ibid., p.96. 31 Other Philosophers list the attributes differently: Agassi (I 964) prefers explanatory power, simplicity
and known truth content, which appear to correspond respectively with 'g', 's' and 'p' and a combination of 'p', 't' and 'r'. Popper is primarily concerned with testability in situations of potential refutation: he uses such concepts as empirical content and explanatory power with respect to previous data, simplicity; and verisimilitude and these all contribute to his over all criterion of 'testability'.
32 Popper, Karl R., Conjectures and Refutations: Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.217.
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theory and who thus in the first instance suggested, if only indirectly, the refuting
experiment". 33
Numerol!s criteria-such as agreement with the evidence, simplicity, accuracy,
fruitfulness and elegance etc. cited by logical empiricists for verification of theoretical
knowledge are not adequate. One of the main difficulties with these criteria is that they
deal with quite different dimensions. Hence, it is not possible for scientists to combine
them in a manner, which is not arbitrary. Popper postulated falsifiability as a criterion
of demarcation between science and non-science in place of the earlier logical positivist
criterion of verifiability.
In the light of the discussion of the nature of scientific knowledge in the
philosophy of science, it has become clear that science is not ab~olute knowledge. Now
question arises: How does scientific knowledge grow? This question is related to
dynamics in science. In this context, debates between Popper and Kuhn and Paul
Feyerabend have been discussed.
Dynamics in Science
Karl Popper's Theory of falsifications:
According to Popper it is impossible to arrive at a true universal statement on
the basis of a finite set of true singular statement. For no amount of favourable
observation could ever conclusively verify a statement; on the other hand a single
negative observation could falsify a universal statement. Thus, Popper34 emphasis on
falsifiability implied that science is an open system, which constantly changes the
constellation of theories. Popper introduced the following schema for the growth of
Knowledge
Here P1 is a problem with which we start. The first step in problem solving is
the proposal of an imaginative conjectural solution IT (the tentative theory). The next
33 Ibid., p.243. 34 Poppes, Karl R., Conjectures and Refutations: Growth ofScientific Knowledge, op cit. pp.ll9-l26.
9
step is the attempted 'error elimination'. And finally P2 represents the new 'problem
situation' which emerges from the attempt to solve problem P. However, this process is
not cyclical for P2 is always different from P1.
Popper35 has stated that rational criticism function as an essential engine of
scientific growth. That is, the progress of knowledge takes place in two ways: bold
conjectures are advanced, and they are met by attempted refutations in which critical
and severe tests are proposed and carried out. Thus, Popperian conception of science
acquires a dynamism that has been absent in logical positivism.
Kuhn's theory of Normal and Revolutionary Science:
Kuhn36 argued that instead of considering science as 'the totality of true
propositions there is another way of looking at science, as human activity. The practice
of science, he holds, is not guided by timeless and a historical canons of scientific
method. Instead, science is heavily influenced by what he calls 'paradigms'. By
'paradigms' Kuhn means those, "universally recognised scientific achievements that for
a time,provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. These
are not fully articulated explications of principles, rules or theories, but are generally
unanalysed,taken for granted aspects of scientific practice."37
These rules, Kuhn points out, gain their significance only from the cases and
circumstances in which they are learned and utilised. At any given time in a scientific
discipline there are particular coherent traditions of scientific research', which Kuhn
terms 'normal science' that takes their shape from paradigm. According to Kuhn,
'normal science' means 'research firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledged
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice'.38 'Normal Science' is the
hallmark of science, it allows progress because the legitimate areas and methods of
investigation are clearly spelled out. The concepts of 'normal science' and 'paradigm'
are 'intertwined' and are pre-requisites for calling a field science. It is through doing
35 Ibid., pp.l31-135. 36 Kuhn, Thomas s.
1 The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1962, p.x. 37 Ibid., p.9. 38 Ibid., p.l 0.
10
'normal science' that scientists learn the methodological, metaphysical, theoretical and
instrumental assumptions of their discipline.
According to Kuhn,39 'normal Science' does not seek to produce novelties,
rather it is a puzzle-solving activity - the scientist proceeds according to a well
specified set of rules. Though normal science is a cumulative enterprise, it has
unintentional non-cumulative effects. By its very nature, normal science leads its
practitioners to awareness of anomalies, which are a pre-requisite to new discoveries
that ultimately can produce change in the 'paradigm'. However, small adjustment in a
'paradigm' occurs when new discoveries are able to handle the anomalous situation.
But, discoveries are not the only source of paradigm change. From time to time, a
number of anomalies can emerge within a certain normal science tradition, which
precipitates a crisis. This has profound effects on the scientific community in question.
The extraordinary research sets the stage for the possibility of a scientific
revolution, a gestalt - switch in which a new paradigm emerges. However, scientists
never reject an old 'paradigm' without coming up with a replacement of an alternative
'paradigm'. But, a new 'paradigm' is favoured only, as Kuhn argued: "if it can solve the
anomalies encountered by the older one; if it has more quantitative precision and can
predict new phenomenon, if it has certain aesthetic qualities or is supported by some of
the more well-known members of the profession."40
For example, Copernicus thus claimed that he had solved the long-vexing
problem of the length of the calender year, and Newton said that he had reconciled
terrestrial and celestial mechanics. Lavoiseir stated that he had solved the problems of
gas-identity and of weight - relations, and Einstein argued that he had made
electrodynamics compatible with a revised science of motion.41 Individual scientists
embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons and usually for several at once. Kuhn
observed that "even the nationality or the prior reputation of the innovator and his
teachers can sometimes play significant role". 42
39 Ibid., pp.35-36. 40 Ibid., p.l53. 41 Ibid., p.l55. 42 Ibid., 153. Kuhn refers the case of Lord Rayleigh to illustrate the role of reputation, cf: Lord
Rayleigh, at a time when his reputation was established, submitted to the British Association a paper
11
In learning a 'paradigm' the scientists acquire theory, methods and standard
together, usually in an inextricable mixture. Thus, whole positivist notion of theory
being independent of observation gets collapsed. Kuhn emphasises that what counts as
an observation of this or that is theory dependent. There are, then no raw data, no brute
facts, but only data analysed, modelled, and manufactured according to some theory.
Hence, he questioned the minimal positivist assumption that there is some description
of the fact, which is neutral among competing explanatory theories. Thus, we see that
Kuhn conceives science as a social enterprise, with an organised consensus of scientists
determining what is and is not to be considered scientific, while logical positivists
viewed science as an attempt to establish rule as correspondence between language and
the world.
Karl Popper criticised Kuhn's concept of 'normal science'. Kuhn believed that
'normal science' is the activity of the science student who accepts the ruling dogma of
the day without challenging it and who only accepts a new revolutionary theory if
almost every body else is ready to accept it. According to Karl Popper, this kind of
belief is very dangerous. The normal scientists have been taught badly. He stated: "all
teaching at the university level should be training and encouragement in critical
thinking."43 Hov,:ever, Popper has stressed the need for some dogmatism. He wrote:
"dogmatic scientists have an important role to play. If we give in to criticism too easily,
we shall never find out where the real power of our theories lie."44
Kuhn's thesis is relativistic that is why Popper dubbed it as 'the myth of
framework' and regarded it as a logical and philosophical mistake'. Popper emphasised
that a critical discussion and a comparison of the various frameworks is always
possible. It is true that an intellectual revolution often looks like a religious conversion.
But this does not mean that we cannot evaluate critically and rationally our former
view, in the light of new ones. Thus, the conceptual scheme that Kuhn developed in
"The Structure ofScient(fic Revolution" has been slighted for its inability to handle: (I)
on some paradoxes of electrodynamics. His name was inadvertently omitted when the paper was first sent, and the paper itself was at first rejected as the work of some "paradoxes". Shortly afterwards, with the author's name in place, the paper was accepted with profuse apologies (R.J. Strutt, 41
h Baron Rayleigh, John William Strut/ Third Baron Rayleigh, New York, 1924, p.228.
43 Popper, Karl R.,"Normal Science and its Dangers", in Lakatose, Imre and Musgrave, Allan (eds.), Criticism And The Growth of Knowledge.,Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1978, pp.51-58.
44 Ibid., p.55.
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period of normal science m which more than one paradigm exists; (2) non
revolutionary period in which fruitful debate and criticism rather simple puzzle solving
accompany a dominant research tradition; and (3) the gradual shift in the paradigms
which are common to such period.
Kuhn45 on his part insisted that such period occurs less frequently historically
than his critics might think and that in any case, his framework is fully adequate for
describing and analysing them. Kuhn praises 'normal research' for two reasons. First,
'normal science' is the hallmark of science, as it distinguishes the scientific from non
scientific. Second, normal science leads to revolution and thus, ultimately to scientific
development. This is the mpst controversial point between Kuhn and critics of Popper.
John Watkins, draws the line between the two thinkers in the following ways. "The 0
condition which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a 0
condition which if it is actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of
affairs in which critical science had contracted into defensive metaphysics".46
Paul Feyerabend's theory of multiplicity:
Paul Feyerabend asserted that the meanings of both observational and
theoretical terms are completely dependent on the theory in which they are embedded.
He rejected Kuhn's emphasis on the consistency condition, which demands that new
theories either contain or be consistent with well-established theories in their domain.
He argued that the condition is inherently unreasonable. He wrote: "it eliminates a
theory not because it is in disagreement with the fact; it eliminates it because it is in
disagreement with another theory ..... The only difference between such a measure and
another theory is the age and familiarity. Had the younger theory been there first then
the consistency condition would have worked in its favour". 47
The defence of consistency condition depends crucially on the truth of
assumption of the relative autonomy of facts, which states that facts exist independent
45 Kuhn, Thomas, S.,"'Retlection on my Critics" in Lakatos, lmre & Musgrave, A. (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., pp.249-59.
46 Watkins, John, "Against Normal Science" in Lakatose, lmre, & Musgrare, A. (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., p.28.
47 feyerabend, P. "How to be a good Empericist: A Plea for Tolerance in Epistemological Matters in Brady, Bruce (ed.), Reading in the Philosophy of Science, Printice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp.319-42.
13
of theories. Since Feyerabend adheres to the theory dependent thesis, he denies the
relative autonomy of facts. He argued, if facts are theory dependent, then the best way
to increase the number of facts (and hence the empirical content of scientific
knowledge) is to increase the number of alternative mutually inconsistent theories. The
key to scientific advance is the proliferation of theories. He wrote: "you can be a good
empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many alternative theories rather than
with a single point of view and experience. This plurality of theories must not be
regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will, at some time, in the future be
replaced by the one true theory."48 Theoretical pluralism is assumed to be an essential
feature of all knowledge that claims to be objective- such a plurality allows for a much
sharper criticism of accepted ideas than does the comparison with a domain of facts
which are supposed to sit there independently of theoretical consideration.49
However, one of the most glaring weaknesses of Feyerabend's analysis is his
adamant insistence that, except for trivial cases, any change in a theory will alter the
meanings of all terms- observational and theoretical. Peter Achinstein50 argued: "if we
accept Feyerabend's position then any term used in two different theories will have
different meanings in those theories. If that is true, then two theories can never
contradict each other, even if they seem to imply contradictory consequences". For
example, as Peter Achinstein stated: "if I assert p and you assert not - p, we are not
and can not be disagreeing, because the terms in my assertion are p-laden and so mean
one thing, where as those in not-pare not p laden and so mean another. Not- p, then
is not the negation of p. In short, negation is impossible". 51
48 Feyerabend, Paul, "Consolation for the Specialists" in Lakatose, Imre and Musgrave.,A (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., pp.202-J 0.
49 A significant observation of Feyerabend is that the western science has become monolithic. A pluralistic approach enabled a seeker of truth to recognise the validity of multiple systems in the domain of science or rationality. He argued, for example, that Chinese system of medicine could not be considered less scientific than the westem medicine. The main problem in the field of western medicine was its reliance on samples for testing medicines. These samples could be defective. Feyerabend proposed that only the scientific community could not confirm that a discovery was valid. The common people must confer the validity upon it. This line was reminiscent of pragmatism centered around Pierce, Dewey and C. Wright Mills.
50 Achinstein, Peter, Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p.96.
51 Ibid., p.93.
14
Not only is any disagreement impossible for proponents of two different
theories but, for the same reason, it will be impossible for theorists to agree even on a
description of the data to be explained by their respective theories. For in such a
description all the terms employed will depend for their meanings upon the given
theory. However, if there can be no agreement and no disagreement between two
theories they cannot be called an alternative. An in-depth understanding of sociology of
science from the perspective of non-positive tradition of science reaffirms the belief
that scientific knowledge follows a non-cumulative, non-linear and discontinuous path.
Agreement, conformity, anarchism and conflict are lamp post in scientific research. As
M.G. Narasimhan52 has found that disagreement, conflict and controversy have
provided the basic force for propelling science forward especially in the contemporary
context. Following a lack of general consensus to define the dynamics and dimension
of science multiple approaches have emerged in sociological studies of science.
Review of Literature (Emerging Trends in Social Studies of Science):
The modern roots to theoretical sociological studies of science can be traced to
a variety of intellectual currents in early and mid - twentieth century scholarship: from
the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in the works of Scheler and Mannheim/3
to the Fleck's Social studies of medicine;54 from the emergence of the history and
sociology of science in the works of George Sarton, 55 Robert K. Merton56 and Boris
Hessen, 57 to the works of Ogburn, 58 and others on inventions and technology: fron; the
52 Narasimhan, M.G., Controversy as an explanatory Category in Scientific Metatheory: An Argument and an lllustration. (Unpublished Thesis). Foreign Language Division, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 1994.
53 For a general understanding of sociology of knowledge see, Curtis, J. E. and Petras, J.W. (eds.), The sociology of Knowledge, Pareger, New York, 1970.
54 In 1935, Ludwik Fleck published a marvellous pioneering sociological study of the evaluation of scientific knowledge, which described in detail the historical variation in what counted as scientific fact and the social process through which what was accepted as fact at any time become consensually established (See, Fleck, L. Genesis and Development of scientific fact, (translated into English by Bradley, F. and Trenn, T.J) Chicago Uni. Press, Chicago, 1979);
55 Belgian Historian George Sarton ( 1884-1956) initiated the ISIS journal, which is leading (even today) journal in the history of science, See, Sarton, George, The History of Science and New Humanism, Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 193 7).
56 Merton, Robert. K. Science, Technology and society in Seventeenth century England, op.cit., 1970. 57 Hessen, Boris, "The social and economic roots of Newton's Principia" in Science at the Cross Roads,
London, 1931. 58 Ogburn, William F., Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, Viking, New York,
1950 (originally published 1922).
15
grand theories of Foucault, 59 and Habermas,60 to Marry Douglas',61 anthropology of
knowledge and perception; and from the Popper and Kuhn debates on the critique of
science that emerged in 1960. In course of time various perspectives in sociology of
science have developed. In the following sections some prominent perspectives in
sociology of science like functionalist, Marxian, conflict model, interest model,
constructivist and its sub-approaches will be critically evaluated for evolving suitable
theoretical construct for the present study. In the last section some studies in Indian
context have been evaluated to chalk out the unique character and need of the present
study.
Functionalist Perspective
The Mertonian perspective m sociology laid foundation of the discipline of
sociology of science. Robert K. Merton has strongly influenced research in sociology of
science. Merton contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge began with his
doctoral dissertation, "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century
England."62 His argument in this thesis closely followed Weber's essay, "The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"63 In parallel with Weber thesis on the
relationship between Calvinist doctrines and entrepreneurial activity, Merton argued
that puritan value stimulated development of science.
After this work Merton focused on the social organisation of science rather than
with its relations to the rest of society. Merton wrote two important papers: 64 Science
and the social order (1938) and science and democratic social structure (1942)". These
papers originated from Merton's study of the value of science and their relations to the
larger society in which they developed, and they went beyond this to examine the social
structural characteristics of science that must accompany these values.
59 Foucault M., The Archaeology of Knowledge (Eng. Trans. (ed.) Tavistock, London, 1969. 60 Habennas. J., Knowledge and Human Interests (Trans. By Shapiro, J.J.), Beacon Books, Boston,
1971. 61 Douglas, Marry, Essays in the Sociology of Perception, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986. 62 Merton, Robert K. Science, Technology and society in Seventeenth century England, op.cit., 1970. 63 Weber, Max, Protestant Ethic and spirit of capitalism op.cit., 1930. 64 These papers are included in Merton, Robert K., Social theory and Social Structure, Free press, New
York, 1968, pp.590-615.
16
After Merton, many scholars65 like. Norman Storer, Bernard Barber, Jonathan
and Stephan Cole, Nicholas Mullins, Diana Crane, Harriat Zuckerman and many others
have adopted Mertonian perspective for the study of social institution of science.
In recent years, a body of research has emerged in sociology of scientific
knowledge (SSK) that has undermined the relevance of functionalist perspective.
However, before dwelling on these emerging trends in sociology of scientific
knowledge first we will critically analyse the basic premises of Mertonian perspective
and then we shall go for evaluation of emerging approaches in sociology of scientific
knowledge in order to find suitable theoretical construct to situate the present study. We
shall start with Mertonian perspective because, this perspective deserves attention for
the following three reasons.
(1) The Mertonian paradigm is still the main source of ideas, perspectives and advice
on science policy in developed and developing countries. 66
(2) Many scholars believed that6? 'strong programme' treatment of Merton's sociology
of science has only expanded the topics and explanatory methods of the sociology of
knowledge without radically altering the Mertonian programme.
65 For more detaiJson the Merton ian perspective, see the works of following authors. Storer, Norman, S., The Social system of Science, Holt, New York, 1966; Barber, Bernard, Science and the social order, Free press, New York, 1952; Cole, Jonathan and Cole, Stephen, Social Stratification in Science ,University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973; Mullins, Nicholas. "The Development of a Scientific Specialty: The Phase Group and the Origin of Molecular Biology" Minerva,JO,(l),/972,pp.51-82; Crane, Diana, Invisible colleagues: Diffusion of the knowledge in scientific communities, The University of Chicago press, Chicago, 1972; Zuckerman, Harriott, "Deviant Behaviour and Social Control in Science," in Sagarin, E. (ed) Deviance and Social change, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1971 pp.89-138.
66 See, Shapin, Steven, "Mertomian Concessions", Science, Vol. 259, 1993, pp.839-841. 67 R.J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock argue that the strong programme's mode of
explanation is little different from "old. Fashioned functionalism" and that it is open to many of the same criticism. Anderson and his colleagues point out that the demonstration of causality is typically made by showing homologies between particular scientific theories and others beliefs to the extant in the social milieu in which the theories originated. In a functionalist explanation, abstract homologies (e.g between basic dimensions of Puritan belief and the ethos of science)are used to demonstrate that the milieu support or motivate the promulgation and acceptance of theory. The 'strong programme' re-writes the congruence arguments in functionalism into stronger causal idioms, but the task of demonstrating and defending connections between particular abstract formulation of ''belief and knowledge" faces many of the same intractable problems. (See, Anderson, R.S., Hughes, J.A., and Sharrock, W.W. "Some Initial Difficulties with the Sociology of Knowledge: A preliminary examination of the strong programme" Manchester Polytechnic Occasional Papers, no. I., 1987). See also, Lynch, Machael, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action, Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science, Cambridge Univ. Press Cambridge 1993, pp.55-59.
17
(3) The Mertonian perspective is still relevant in Sociology of Scientific Knowledge for
development of a sociology of mind, thinking, and consciousness, which are reflected
in the contemporary social studies of artificial intelligence, and in self-organisation
theories of science. 68
In his most recent defence of the Mertonian paradigm, Merton examines the
thesis at three levels of theoretical abstraction.69 At socio-historical level, he stated that
ascetic Protestantism helped to motivate and channalised the activities of men in the
direction of experimental science. At middle level hypothesis he argued that the
development of science like the development of any institution had to be supported by
group values. At third or abstract level, the hypothesis is that the interests, motivations
and behaviours in any given institutional sphere - such as religion or economy - are
interdependent with the interests, motivations, and behaviour in other institutional
spheres such as science.
The third formulation of the Merton thesis tends to undermine the simple,
"reciprocal influence" assumption that has generated decades of controversy over the
relative validity of the Puritanism -science sequences versus the science -Puritanism
sequence. That formulation gives greater priority to a structural and systematic
argument as opposed to utilitarian hypotheses and hypotheses about the values and
roles of individuals in evolving science.
Merton is unusually sensitive to possible dysfunctions in the social structure of
science. For example, Merton claims that "joy in discovery and the quest for
recognition by scientific peers are stamped out of the same psychological coin". 70 This
allows him to argue that departure from the norms of science can be 'normal' and not at
all detrimental to science. Merton also recognised that "the reward system could get out
of hand and defeat its original purposes of reinforcing and perpetuating the emphasis on
68 Collin, H.M., Artificial £rperts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990; See also. Restivo, Sal ,"Zen and the art of science studies" Science Technology & Human Values. 17, 1992, pp. 402-406.
69 This defence was prompted by a rather lame criticism by G. Becker of Merton's claim concerning Gennan Pietism and Science which Becker tried unsuccessfully to extend to general Merton thesis. See, Beker, G. "Pietism and Science: A Critique of Robert K. Merton's Hypothesis", American Journal of Sociology, 89, 1984,pp.l 065-90. (See also, Merton, Robert K, "The Fallacy of the latest Word: The case of Pietism and Science", American Journal of sociology, 89, 1984, pp. 1091-1121)
70 Merton, R.K. Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, in Storer, Nonnan W (ed) University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973., p. 340.
18
originality"71 But he has steadfastly held to the claim that only a few scientists "try to
gain reputation by means that will loose them repute" 72• Profound changes in science
are allowed in principle by the Mertonian paradigm but not changes in the ethos of
science. In general, Merton tends to assume that the social system of science works as a
systems that deviance is idiosyncratic,· and that the social structure of science is
(although dynamic and mutable in principle) fundamentally stable. This wide spread
tendency reflects the pervasiveness of and commitment to the hegemonic ideology of
modern science.
The main dogma of the Mertonian perspective is that the autonomy of science
somehow makes "scientific knowledge independent of social influence" 73. But Merton
suggestion for autonomy of science is related mainly to internal functioning of science
instead of total immunity from the society. He has conceded that external factors
facilitate or retard the pace and direction of scientific development. Hence, it seems
Merton is not a rigorous intemalist, he asserts; "society has to have a certain shape or
form to nourish the immanent development of science"74 This idea of a sociology of
immanent development becomes the great promise for the Post-Mertonian science
studies.
Merton, like Mannheim, was careful to distinguish the social and historical
conditions that gave rise to scientific innovation from the process of innovation within
the specialised disciplines. Contrary to the belief, Merton and his followers did not
ignore the 'estoric content' of scientific activity, nor did they define the natural sciences
as asocial enterprise. 75 Merton's main concern was to investigate what institutional
conditions are necessary to produce and certify knowledge claims. Merton recognised
that science has often been pressed into the service of political economic, and religious
interests but he claimed that the conflict and ethical dilemmas that arise under such
condition testify to the normative expectation that science should be an unencumbered
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Merton did not overtly make an ontological or
71 Ibid., pp. 300-304. 72 Ibid., p.321. 73 Ibid., p. 209. 74 Ibid., p. 204. 7! For an example of Mertonian research that, in its fashion deals with the "content" of science. See
Barber, B. and Fox, Rene, "The Case of the floppy -eared rabbits: an instance of serendipity gained and serendipity lost", American journal of sociology, 64, 1958, 128-36.
19
epistemological claim about what distinguishes science from other institutions; instead,
he presented a functional argument regarding how "standardised social sentiment about
science" gives rise to and support the historically distinctive ethos of science. Merton
was also concerned about the more immediate situation in Nazi Germany.76 By
utilising the Parsonian conceptual frame work to define a distinctive constellation of
four "institutional imperatives" for modern science, Merton avoided some of the
concrete difficulties associated with Mannheim's proposal. He formulated four norms:
universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticisms. These norms
give a coherent picture of science. To an extent, this constellation of norms is modelled
after a Parsonial reading of Weber's ideal, ideal-typical account of bureaucracy with its
emphasis on universalism, specialised competency, the impersonality and communal
property /of the office, and the institutionalisation of meritocratic standards for
adjudicating competition.77 So, like Weber, Merton is also criticised for his idealised
version of norms that over look the actual practice in life. Although Merton was careful
to identify the norms as ideal standards rather than description of actual behaviour, he
nevertheless was criticised by Barry Barnes and R.G.A Dolby as follows:
Scientists have from time to time, professed these norms. The sociologists musts distinguish professed norms from the pattern of positively sanctioned behaviour; these professed norms are in themselves incapable of providing real guidance for action. Merton can point out to examples of his norms in what scientists say, but he does not produce any evidence of behaviour modified by these norms.78
Merton in his later writing made some modification regarding the normative
structure of science. He argued that he never claimed that the norms acted as
unequivocal standards guiding all scientific conduct. Instead, he contended that priority
races and related competitions among scientists create dilemmas about the enactment of
normatively appropriate conduct. 79
76 Merton, R.K., Social theory and Social Strucrture, 1968, op.cit., p.595; Barnard Barber also mentioned that Merton was also responding, to a paper" The Social Roots of Newton's Principia by Borris Hessen presented in the second International Congress held in London, 1931. Hessen argued that even pure science had social origin (see. Barber, B., Science and Social Order, George Allen, Unwin, London, 1952.
77 Weber, Max, Economy and society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, vol.2. 78 Barner, B. Dolby, R.G.A.,; "The Scientific ethos: A deviant Viewpoint". European Journal of
sociology, vo1.11, 1970, pp.3-25. 79 Merton, R.K., Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays, The Free Press, New York, 1976.
pp.32-55.
20
I
The norm of universalism which enjoins upon the scientists that truth claims
whatever their sources are, to be subjected to pre-established, impersonal criteria:
consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge. 80 Thus, norm
does not guarantee objectivity; rather it fosters a pre-objective commitment to
meritocratic institutional procedures for sharing and evaluating research results. As
Norman Storer argued: "it is the norm of universalism, which makes science an
international community; what a Russian discovers about the atom will be valid in
America and his work can be appreciated by scientists every where".81 Storer also
suggested that this norm is orientational rather than directives in its intents". Stephen
Hill also added utilitarian dimension to Mertonian norm ofuniversalism.82 He writes:
~
''we would suggest that the assumption of Mertonian universalism embodies an assumption of usefulness of science knowledge: the pure normative statement of universalism by Merton, is that because natural phenomena are every where the same, hence, social, cultural and political contexts are irrelevant to objective evaluation of the truth of scientific statements. But such 'truth' has more than philosophic value as it can form explanation of everyday experience and can become embodied in objects of our every day experience. Thus, 'truth' can be recognised outside a science circle of adherents. As a norm, universalism, as other posited norms of science, assumes a social system. There is no basis for science as a social system supported by society unless scientific truth is perceived as of value to society. Thus, within the normative scientist's world-view of science, usefulness is not the goal of scientific inquiry; but usefulness is seen to follow certification of knowledge and operation of other internal norms that ensure its validity. Without this assumption science as a social system has no contemporary basis. When science is turned towards developing countries (either by scientists or analysts of science), the utilitarianism which often remains implicit within the scientific community's meaning system while in advanced countries becomes explicit. Thus, the assumption reads, valid knowledge must result from universalistic science practice, and this knowledge must be useful in LDCs. My base of universalism' is similar to Merton's, but not coincident with it" .83
Dedijer is also agreed with the notion that Mertonian norm of universalism
embodies the idea of usefulness. He argued: "Every aspect of national development
policy depends on research conducted within the country, although it must, of course,
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cuI l..fb~~ '~-··I! ~ !i ~ IL;.ir!t I ·r:-: ,lji :--, /.·~··· 80 Merton, Robert K, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p. 607. ~(.;\ .'.-;/
81 Storer, Nonnan, W., The Social System ofScience, 1966, op.cit., p.78. \, -~--J(:<:/ 82 Still, Stephen, C., "Contrary Meanings of Science - Interaction between cultural and p~>"
Meanings of Research in a Developing Country Scientific Research Institution" in Blume, Stuart S. (ed.) Perspective in the Sociology of Science, John, Wiley and Sons, New York, 1997. pp.l95-230.
83 Ibid., p. 224. THESIS
305.5530954 G7471 No
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be used on the achievements of, and conform with the standards of international
science". 84 Thus, he accepted the universality of science.
Communism - this norm suggests that the "substantive findings of science are a
product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community".85 Norman Storer,
who is an adherent of Mertonian perspective, argued: "the communality directs the
scientist to share his findings with other scientists freely and without favour, for
knowledge that is not in the public domain can not be part of the legitimate body of
knowledge against which creativity is measured and to which other scientists refer in
their works". 86
However, in actual practice, followers of Mertonian perspective have accepted
the fact that scientists some times accept restriction on publication of their research
findings, on the ground of national security, economic value or on the ground of
incompleteness of the research. As Bernard Barber stated that scientists do accept
temporary restriction on publication of their research findings. However, there is no
restriction on sharing of information within a research groups or between two or more
reliable research institutions. Merton himself entered the first qualification on the
community rights to all discovered knowledge, noting the individual's credit for
discovery upon publication. Property rights in science are whittled down to a bare
minimum ... of recognition and esteem ... Commensurate with the significance of the
increments". 87
The norm of communality is directly related to the norm of disinterestedness.
However, Bernard Barber has conceded for patent right even for pure research. He
stated: for "pure" scientists, patents are accepted like secrecy in research as necessary
evil under certain special conditions, for example, when some scientific discovery
should be protected in the immediate public interests and should not be published for
possible exploitation by commercial enterprises. This is the case typically with
biological and chemical discoveries, which have medical applications that are
84 Dedijer, Steven, "Underdeveloped Science in Underdeveloped countries", Minerva, 2, 1963, pp.61-81.
85 Merton, R.K. Social theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p. 611. 86 Storer, Norman. W. The Social System of Science, 1966, op.cit., p.79. 87 Merton, R.K. Social theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p.612.
22
immediat<?lY apparent to the research scientists. In such circumstance, the morals of
science hold that a scientist may permit his discovery to be patented in the public
interest, but only on the condition that he himself receives no direct financial benefit
from such a patent". 88
According to Merton, the norm of disinterestedness is enforced through a
distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives which
characterise the behaviour of scientists. "Scientists conform to strict standards of
conduct not because they are superior individuals but because, it is in their interests to
avoid fraud, cultism, trivial and spurious claims. The enforcement mechanism in this
instance is "the public and testable character of science ..... [which] it may be supposed,
has contributed to the integrity of men of science". 89 As a social norm,
disinterestedness functions primarily to protect the production of scientific knowledge
from personal bias and other 'subjective' influence. There is no denying that scientific
facts and theories are produced by human beings, whose minds can not be completely
cleansed of individual interests. As Ziman argued, "scientists can not be imagined as
bloodless, robots, indifferent to the reception of their research claims. They have the
strongest possible interests in gaining public recognition. for their discoveries".90
Merton cautioned that "disinterestedness is not to be equated with altruism nor
interested action with egoism".91 However, the trick is to nullify these individual
interests by setting them against one another. In effect, as Merton argued, the scientific
ethos delineates an agonistic arena, where a hidden melodrama of clashing egos 1s
transformed into apparently dispassionate intellectual debate.
Besides this, Merton was careful to reiterate "that all of this is epistemologically
quite irrelevant but sociologically and psychologically crucial. He asserted: "Scientific
knowledge is not the richer or the poorer for having credit given where credit is due; it
88 Barber, Bernard, Science and the Social Order, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1952, p.93. 89
Merton, Robert K., The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 1973, op.cit., p.276.
90 Ziman, John, Real Science what it is, and what it means, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp.158-159.
91 Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968, op.cit., p. 612.
23
is the social institution of science and individual men of science that would suffer from
repeated failures to allocate credit justly". 92
In Mertonian perspective, Norman Storer has accepted the fact that: "people
will be interested for applied research because the desire to create may be less strong in
some individuals or some 'people may wish to be concretely creative to produce 'things
that work' rather than abstract ideas on papers, or it may be sheer economic pressure or
necessity for employment"93 Norman Storer further pointed out that "one can see
tendency of basic scientists to look down upon applied scientists because they don't get
competent response. Therefore, even in applied research also scientists try to find and
often get chance to 'bootleg' some pure research into their works, so that they will ftave
material of general interest to the scientific community as well as to the employer. 94
Merton himself has appreciated the role of applied research. He argued: every
new technology bears witness, not only, "to the integrity of scientist', but also to the
objectivity of his knowledge and to his freedom from social influences" .95 However, in
generating and selecting questions for research, Storer argued: "Scientist must seek
continually for a balance between too much dependence on an inbred universe of
theoretical discourse on the one hand and too much dependence upon external sources
on the other. In the former case there is the danger of ignoring problems that might lead
to important advances in theory and knowledge, whereas in the latter the maintenance
of the entire social system of science would be jeopardised".96
It seems that Sklair's argument that "biggest limitation of Mertonian sociology
of science is that it refers only to pure science or academic science"97 is not justifiable.
In fact, Mertonian perspective on sociology of science emphasised on right balance
92 Merton, Robet K., "The Sociology of Science" in Barber, 8 and Hirsth, W. (eds). The Sociology of Science: Free Press. New York, 1962, p.468.
93 Storer, Norman. W. The Social System of Science, 1966, op.cit., p.lll. 94 Ibid., p.ll2 .. 95 Merton, Robert K, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1957, op.cit., p.560. 9
" Storer, Norman W., The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.ll3. 91 Sklair, L. Organised knowledge:· A Sociological view of Science and Technology. Hart-Davvis
MacGibbon, London 1973, p.l73.
24
between applied and ba-;ic science. Even Norman Storer has gone to the extent of
calling "distinction between applied and basic science as invidious".98
According to Merton, the norm of 'organised scepticism IS "both a
methodological and an institutional mandate for the temporary suspension of judgement
and detached scrutiny of belief in terms of empirical and logical criteria".99 The main
intention of this norm is to ensure appropriate response to the contribution of others and
proper attention to others' responses to one's own contribution. Norman Storer
suggested pre-emptory rejection of criticism as a violation of organised scepticism. 100
In fact, the norm of organised scepticism worked as filtering process in
production and accumulation of scientific knowledge. Criticism is an essential
ingredient of creativity. This norm makes scientist to be accountable for his claim. So,
he cannot make claim for spurious or distorted truth, as it will be detected by other
people. However, it does not mean that his claim must be absolute and permanent;
rather, as Storer argued: "scientific truth is, for the moment, what is accepted by the
majority of scientists in a given area and that its acceptance is based upon its relation to
other truths rather than upon its absolute, independent merit". 101
However, Merton's proposition that: "the scientific investigator does not
preserve the cleavage between the sacred and the profane, between that which requires
uncritical respect and that which can be objectively analysed", 102 requires modification
in the light of new discoveries in physical and biological sciences. Merton might have
conceived the idea of this dichotomy for 18th to early 20th century science, the period,
which is marked by conflict between science and religion.
In twentieth century, development of quantum mechanics in physics and
challenges posed to Darwinism created space for theologians in the fold of science. The
majority of scientists have accepted the fact that science and religion are not
98 For detail discussion on this issue see, Storer, Norman S. "Basic versus Applied Research: The Conflict between Means and Ends in Science", Indian Sociological Bulletin, vol.5, no. I, 1964, pp.34-42.
99 M erton, Robert K, The Sociology of Science, 1973, op.cit., p.277. 100
Storer, Norman W, The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.ll7. 101
Storer, Norman, W., The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.l21. 102
Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968, op.cit., p.614.
25
contradictory rather religion provides meaning to science. 103 Hence, Mertonian
perspective needs to incorporate these changes. Although Mertonian perspective has
become more flexible and explicit to incorporate the emerging changes in the realm of
science and society it has to learn a lot from other emerging trends in social studies of
science. In the following sections, Marxian perspective, conflict model, interest model
and constructivist and its subsidiary approaches will be examined.
Marxian Perspective on Science
Marxist theory treats ideas as product of material and social conditions, because
the means of production include the means of mental production, and the ruling class
controls the production of ideas. Marx himself conceived modern "science as a
bourgeois, alienated mode of inquiry". 104 He associated the social transformation from
capitalism to communism with a correlated transformation of science - the negation of
science-as it is and the emergence of 'human science', dealienated, unitary, (not
unified) holistic, and global.
From a Marxian perspective science or knowledge of nature is a social
knowledge, "a tool which man progressively perfects to enhance his own material
development" .1 05 In this approach there is no place for a reified conception of science
as abstract 'pure knowledge'. Scientific and mathematical knowledge is not things 'out
there' in an eternal, universal, platonic realm that can be 'discovered' in one revelatory
way or another. Neither are they products of 'pure' mental activity or of' geniuses' who
create them out of thin air. In any given social formation, the prevailing mode of
knowing grows out of practical activities and corresponds to the prevailing mode (s) of
production and dominant social interests.
The premise that the only value of knowledge is that it can be applied for
human benefits makes a rigid distinction between pure and applied science unnecessary
103 For Detail discussion on relationship between science and religion, see,Brook, John Hedley "Science and Religion" in Obly, R .... et al (eds) Companion to the History of Modern Science, Kegan Paul & Routledge, London, 1990, pp.763-782.
104 Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Language Publication House, Moscow, 1956,pp.IIO-Jl.
105 Marx, Karl. Grundrises: Foundation of critique of Political Economy, Vintage, New York, 1973, p.l43.
26
in Marxian approach. Nonetheless, Marxian approach accepted the link between
applied and pure research. As a prominent Marxian scholar Bukharin wrote:
"Under the cover of the difficulty of the exact demarcation of the applied and theoretical sciences beats the dialectics of the relationship between theory and practice, the passing of one into the other. In reality, we have a whole chain of various theoretical sciences, linked up by internal connections... These sciences are born out of practice, which first sets itself technical task: the latter require in their turn the solution of theoretical problems ... a special (relative), logic and motion being thereby created. Practice in this way grows into theory; the sought for rule of action is transformed into the search for the law of objective relationship". 106
Bukharin included scientific theories with the superstructure. He stated: "the
mode of production determines also the mode of conception". 107 He considered
"scientific cognition, though the highest forms of theoretical cognition, as the practice
of material labour continued in particular forms (natural science)" .108
Antonio Gramsci, another prominent Marxist scholar, expressing his view on
objectivity and relation between science and nature denied the existence of any
independent reality. He wrote:
When one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc". 109
He further writes:
Natural science should be seen correspondingly as essentially an historical category, a human relation ------ Might it not be said in a sense, and up to a certain point, that what nature provides the opportunity for are not discoveries and inventions of preexisting forces - of pre-existing qualities of matter - but creations which are closely linked to the interests of society and to the development and further necessities of development ofthe forces ofproduction". 110
Thus, Marxian notion of constructed reality and socially contingent nature of
science gave rise to different approaches in sociology of science like conflict model,
106 Bukharin, N., 'Theory and Practice from the stand point of dialectical materialism" in Science at the Cross Rood, Kniga, London, 1931, p.26,
107 Ibid., p. 22. 108 Ibid., p. 24. 109 Gramsci, A. Selections from the prison note books of Antonio Gramsci, (I 929-35), London 1971,
p.446. 110 Ibid., p.4 65-66.
27
interest model and constructivist approach etc. In fact,Marxism is at the root of most of
what is innovative about science studies in relationship to traditional history,
philosophy, and sociology of science.
Conflict Theory:
Conflict theory builds an explanation of science on the established foundation
of stratification and organisation theory in general sociology. According to Collins,
from the perspective of conflict theory, scientific activity is analysed in terms of four
basic types of social roles: political, practical, leisure - entertainment, and teaching.
The main activity of scientists in political role is, "defending the legitimacy of their
organisation and attacking the legitimacy of con{petitors" 111• In practical roles,
scientists "work to achieve some practical result for a customer client, or boss. There
are two main types of leisure - entertainment roles. In one, scientists who belong to a
leisure class carry out scientific work for their own amusement; in the other, they are
paid for entertaining patrons or a mass market. Teachers, finally, are involved in
communicating scientific knowledge to specialised full time students. This always
involves some degree of accumulating, assessing, and reorganising the contributions of
their predecessors.
According to Joseph Ben - David, teaching institutions have played a crucial
role in the development of science. Scientific activity based on practical, political, or
leisure- entertainment roles is relatively ephemeral. Ben-David argued: "The Europear1
scientific revolution was concretised and sustained by the rise of autonomous teaching
institutions, notably in France and Germar~y during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries". ll2 The conditions for the development of a relatively autonomous and
generationally continuous science include a sizeable arid relatively autonomous
educational system. Thus, the size, autonomy, and additionally the degree of internal
differentiation of educational systems are key factors in the emergence of scientific
golden ages and traditions.
111 Collins, Randall, Conflict Sociology, Academic Press, New York, 1975, p.482. 112 Ben-David, Joseph, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study, Printice-Hall, New Jersey,
1971, pp.71-87.
28
According to Collins, "information, validation, and recognition and material
resources are the bases of power in the division of labour in science. The validation of
scientist contributions and peer recognition integrate the individual scientist with his or
her community and simultaneously give the community power over individual
scientists. Material resources that sustain the community are provided, in general, by
the wider social system". 113 Collins and Restivo have added new dimension to the
conflict theory of science. They have focussed on the scandals in the history of
mathematics and have suggested that major scandals indicate shift in the social
organisation of competition and production in science. 114
Interest Model
Modern approach beginnings in the late 1960, and early 1970 included efforts to
show that scientific knowledge is fueled by social interests. The 'interest model' is
widely associated with the writings of Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and their Edinburgh
colleagues. Barnes argued that behaviour must be understood "in terms of its point, i.e.
by the use of such notions as 'goal' or 'interest' and that in general, the dynamics of
institutions must be understood by reference to interests".' :s
•.. Knorr-Cetina, who favours a 'constructionist' approach as opposed to an
"interest" model, nonetheless, notes "that knowledge of the interests that inform
scientists' theoretical preferences can supplement a constructionist analysis by showing
why it is likely that particular individuals hold particular beliefs" .116 The interest theory
is viewed as a process of imputation of interests. However, Latour had denied the
possibility of imputing interests to social groups, because "there is no independent
source of knowledge about the groups, society or even human beings". 117 But Latour
distanced himself from this dispute and argued that interests are a consequence and not
a cause of the scientists' efforts to translate what others want or what the scientist
113 Collins, Randall, Conflict Sociology op.cit., p.491. 114 Collins, Randall & Retivo, Sal. "Robber barons and politicians in mathematics: A conflict model of
science" The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 8, 1983, pp. 199-227. 115 Barnes, Barry, About Science, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985. p. 31. 116 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The Manufacture of Knowledge: A Essay on the constructivist and Contextual
nature of science, Pergamon, Oxford, 1981, p.II7. 117 Latour, Bruno, "Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world" in Knorr-Cetina, K. and Mulkay,
M.( eds ), Science Observed, Sage, London, 1983, pp. 141-170.
29
makes them want. This concept of 'capturing' interest means that "by pushing the
explicit interest' of audiences and allies, the scientist furthers his or her own
interest". 118 Social interests are expressed in the claims individuals make on cultural
resources on behalf of the groups they represent, are members of or aspire to
membership in or association with. Other prominent theory in social studies of science
is constructivist.
Social Constructivist Perspective
This idea of Social construction is fundamental to sociological analysis. Its
application in modern science studies has drawn attention to the moment to moment
activities of scientists as they go about producing and reproducing scientific culture.
Constructivist holds reality not to be given but constructed; it sees the whole as
assembled, the uniform as heterogeneous, the smooth and even surfaced as covering an
internal structure. Constructivists emphasise on the relativity of scientific truth and
advocate for a sociological analysis of technical content and thereby attempt to open
the black box of scientific knowledge construction. David Bloor challenged the
exclusion of sociologists from studying how 'true' scientific knowledge is produced.
Bloor formulated four key requirements for a 'strong programme' which would take
sociological study beyond the rationalist view of how scientific knowledge is
generated: 119
(a) Causality- The aim of the sociology of scientific knowledge is to discern which
conditions bring about beliefs or states of knowledge. Bloor noted that these
condition could be psychological, economic, political or historical as well as social.
(b) Impartiality- The sociology of scientific knowledge should not select instances for
study with respect to their perceived truth or falsity, rationality or irrationality,
success or failures. These determinations are the upshot of social process and
therefore part of phenomenon to be studied.
118 Latour, Bruno, Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineer through Society, Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 110.
119 Bloor, D. Knowledge and Socia/ Imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976, pp.4-5.
30
(c) Symmetry- Similarly, once instances of scientific knowledge have been chosen for
study, the sociologist should use the same types of cause in explaining instances of
scientific knowledge, whether they are classified as false or true, etc.
(d) Reflexivity - In principle, the patterns of explanation of sociology of scientific
knowledge have to be applicable to sociology itself.
According to these tenants, even mathematical statement such as 2+ 2 =4 could
be subjected to sociological inquiry. In this context the inquiry would be related to what
kinds of historical conditions gave this expression currency and, in particular what
established (and now sustains) it as a belief? However, many authors have expressed
doubt over the application of these principles in actual practices. 120 As a consequence
many sub approaches within constructivist perspective developed.
Andrew Pickering continued the tradition of 'strong programme'. In his study
entitled: "Constructing Quarks: A sociological history of particle physics", 121 he argued
that the relation between theory and experimental data is one of 'tuning' or 'symbiosis'
rather than the independent verification of theory by means of fact:
The empirical relativist programme, a version of constructive programme has
developed in close association with 'strong programme'. It is also known as the Bath
School because H.M. Collins and his students at the University of Bath are the major
contributors. 122 Their studies tend to focus on contemporary scientific controversies,
and they attempt to give symmetrical descriptions of the incommensurable positions,
theory- laden experimental practices, and non-rational (or extra-rational) methods for
reaching closure on the disputed matters.
120 Larry Laudan argues that on some points the relationship between the principles and the research is very doubtful, (See, Laudan, Larry, "The Pseudo - Science of Science?", Philosophy of Social Sciences, vol.ll, 1981, pp.173-98). To an extent Bloor himself agrees that the principles are not intended to provide the basis for the "strength' of the program. (See, Bloor, David, 'The strength of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge'. Philosophy of the social sciences, II, 1986, p.206).
121 Pickering, Andrew, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics, Uni. of Chicago, Press Chicago, 1984.
i27 for the Bath perspective See, Collins, H.M. Changing order: Replication and lndu;tion in Scientific
Practice, Sage Pub., London, 1985; Pinch, Trevor, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Solar Neutrino Detection, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
31
Constructionist ideas were re-invented in studies of laboratories. There are five
major works on laboratory studies displaying many view-points and approaches in
science studies. Latour's and Woolgar's Laboratory life123 has evolved, in Latour's
collaboration with Michael Callon124 into a semiotically inspired 'actor network'
approach. Knorr-Cetina presents, in The Manufacture of Knowledge 125 a constructivist
approach oriented toward the sociology of knowledge that is extended into a model of
'epistemic culture'. Michael Lynch's work on Art and Artefact in Laboratory Science 126
can stand for the ethno-methodological orientation and Traweek's study of Beamtimes
and life times 127 represents the analysis of a symbolic anthropologist who enters the
world of high energy physicist.
These laboratory studies focus to observe the creation of knowledge at the
work-bench, in notebooks, in scientific shop talks and in the writings of scientific
papers. One of their main conclusions is that nothing epistemologically special is
happening in the process of scientific research. However, constructivist approaches
have been severally criticised. As Latour and Woolgar claimed that scientific reality is
constituted by " the process of inquiry, that, it is a consequence rather than a cause of
scientific description" .128 These claims are frequently objected to on the ground that
they suggest that material objects are snapped into existence through the accounts
produced by science. Many authors find this view "widely implausible". 129
According to Trevor Pinch, "laboratory studies or (social constructivism) are
well suited for the micro-study of scientists', day-to-day practices, but are limited when
it comes to the study of consensus formation" .130 Many other scholars like Chubin has
123 Latour, Bruno, & Woolgar, Steve, Laboratory life: The Social Construction of Social Facts, Sage, Beverly Hill, 1979.
124 Calion, Michel, "The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle" in Calion, M., Law, John & Rip, Arie (eds). Mapping the dynamics of Science and Technology. Macmillan, U.K., 1986, pp. I 9-34.
125 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Pergamon, Oxford, 198 I.
126 Lynch, Machael, Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985.
127 Traweek, Sharon, Beamtimes and lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1988.
128 Latour, B & Woolgar's I 979, op.cit., pp. I80-81. 129 Giere, Ron, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago Univ. Press, Chicago, 1988, p.55. 130 Pinch, Trevor, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino detection, 1986, op.cit., p.30.
32
found that these studies have focussed "only on the intra-mural life world encountered
in laboratories but have ignored the societal context in which laboratories operate as
well as political aspects of science" .131
New developments in cognitive science openly challenge the 'strong
programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Slezak argued: "The
computer programme being developed within cognitive science which can be used to
discover laws from raw data are examples of socially uncontaminated influences that
comprise a large class of counter examples of strong programme" .132 He further
suggested that strong programme is inconsistent with much of the current cognitive
science and it has many affinities with the much-discredited doctrine of behaviourism.
He writes: "Just as behaviourism tries to establish connection between external stimuli
and human behaviour so the 'strong programme' tries to establish connections with
social contexts and the complex human behaviour that is involved in science (behaviour
involved in scientific belief)". 133
Besides these criticisms, according to Sismondo, 134 the term 'social ..
construction' has been used in different meanings by various authors. These multiple
meanings create confusions and complexities to understand the real focus of this
perspective. Gad Freudenthal 135 strongly criticises the constructivist programme in
sociology of science. Freudenthal examines the text of Knorr-Cetina and found that she
has failed to recognise the role of "shared knowledge" which are very much prevalent
at core of any scientific research. He critically examines the basic premise of
contructivism as follows.
Knorr-Cetina holds that scientific knowledge is the outcome of negotiation
between interested parties, the contingent product of a social process of construction.
She suggested that every social agent interprets the situation in which she/he finds
herself/himself. This interpretation which is idiosyncratic and contingents for the
131 Chubin, Dry!, 'The Elusive Second "S" in "STS": Who's Who?", Technoscince, 1992, pp.l2-13. 132 Slezak, Peter, "Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme",
Social Studies ofScience, vol. 21, 1991, pp. 107-129. 133 Ibid., p.l12. 134 Sismondo, Sergio "Some Social construction", Social Studies ofScience, vol.23, 1993, pp.514-53. 135 Freudenthal, Gad, "The Role of Shared Knowledge in Science: The failure of the constructivist
programme in the sociology of science", Social Studies ofScience vol./4, 1985, pp.285-95 .
. 33
'same' situation will have different meanmgs to different agents who will,
consequently, act differently. Similarly, a scientific action will depend on how the
scientist interprets the research context in the laboratory so that strictly speaking, there o
can not be two scientists working in an identical situation. According to the
constructivist thesis, the itinerary from the initial open situation to the final scientific
product (a material object, a scientific paper), is plastered with a series of selection, or
choices, which the scientist constantly requires to make. Will s/he use substance 'A' or
'B', measuring method 'C' or '0', and so on. These selections depend on an opportunistic
logic, the logic of a tinkerer', a scientists' next step will depend on the resources
accessible to her/him. S/he may choose to use substance 'A' not because it is better
adopted to some pre-determined purpose, but because 'B' is out of stock or too
expensive. S/he may use apparatus 'C' because access to 'D' is monopolised by
colleagues who set a high price (for example consigning a paper), for its use. The idea
for an experiment might come from a metaphor or an analogy casually uttered by
someone at lunch. The final product thus grows out of a series of contingent, often
accidental, selection of which depends on the material ·and social context of the
labourer.
Freudenthal finds contradiction at many points m her theory. For example
Knorr-Cetina writes: "scientific products are unlikely to be reproduced in the same way
under different circumstances. It seems highly improbable that the process (of
selection) could be repeated unless most of the selection are either fixed or made m
similar fashion". 136
However, the acceptance of the fact that, 'the selections are either fixed or made
in similar fashion' by different scientists in different contexts, would mean: first, that
these contexts are standards and not unique, and, second that they are then identically
interpreted by different actors. It seems that Knorr-Cetina has accepted the fact of
scientific consensus at behaviour level. She writes: "Given that scientists working on a
problem are related through communication, competition and co-operation, and often
share similar education, instrument, and interest structures, the later situation is not
really unusual". 137
136 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The manufacture of knowledge, op.cit., p. 16.
137 lb'd I ., p.J7.
34
According to Freudenthal, the main inadequacies of constructivism stem from
one fundamental conception. That is "the disregard of the systematic, trans-local and
inter-subjective aspects of scientific knowledge. The fact that Knorr- Cetina over looks
the role of shared information in her own model of science in which the existence of
such information is an essential premise· ". 138 This theory does not satisfactorily explain
the phenomena of recurrence of simultaneous discoveries and frequent rejection of
knowledge claims.
Many studies 139 made within the framework of social constructivism have tried
to show that scientific knowledge is socially constructed through the social actions of
scientists. However, if the contention of the constructivist scholars is to show that all
science is constructed, through the social actions of scientists, surely, the same criticism
can be applied to their own sociological reports. According to Chris Doran, 140 this
problem of reflexivity has polarized those working within the framework of
constructivism. The 'strong programme' in the sociology of science still adheres to the
beliefs that causal explanations are possible within this new field. 141 However, the
'reflexive' faction strongly decries such an approach, claiming that such causal
explanations are impossible. Explanations in terms of 'interests' are mere analytical
constructions, which create a certain order out of an otherwise disorderly array of
phenomena. 142 Thus, there are paradoxes on the 'reflexive programme' versus the
'strong programme'. Doran has shown that Mulkay and Woolgar argument for the
primacy of the 'reflexive programme' is paradoxical in ways similar to the 'strong
programme's paradoxes. 143
138 Freudenthal, Gad, "The Role of Shared Knowledge in Science: The failure of the Constructivist Programme in the Sociology of Science", op.cit., p.293.
139 See, Gilbert G, and Mulkay M, Opening Pandoras Box, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1984; Brannigan, A. The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1981; Mackenzie, D. "Statistical Theory and Social Interests: A Case Study", Social studies of Science, vol.8, 1978, pp.35-83.
140 Doran, Chris, "Jumping Frames: Reflexivity and Recursion in the Sociology of Science", Social Studies of Science, vol.l5, 1985, 515-31.
141 See, Barnes, B. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974: See also, Bloor, D. Knowledge and Social imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.
142 For a discussion of these issues from the standpoint of the 'reflexive programme' See, Woolgar, S. "Interest and Explanation in the Social Study of Science" Social Studies of Science, vol. II, 1981, pp.365-94. • --
143 Doran, Chris. "Jumping Frames: Reflexivity and Recursion in the Sociology of Science", 1985, op.cit., p.257.
35
Social constructive perspective seems less promising m the sense that
sociologists and scientists come from different background and experience, and hence
there can not be, what Gadamer called, the 'fusion of horizon'. Constructivist failed to
recognise that scientific research is not an atomised, and isolated activity, but is
inserted in and structured by a variety of non-local elements (universal).
Hagendijk144 has directed his criticism to a version of constructivism that he 0
attributed to Latour. His criticism is based on a view of science as part of a culturally
created ways of establishing facts that he believes constructivisim has undermined. He
draws on Anthony Giddens, structuration theory 145 as an alternative to constructivism.
Accordingly, science is considered to be generated by norms and rules. Science as an
institution is theorised to be dependent for its reproduction on configurations of various
types of rules and resources. Hagendijk criticises Merton for his normative bias but
ends up defending a quasi-Mertonian view of science in which traditional dichotomies
of cognitive-social, thoughts -institution, and natural-social are resurrected.
In fac~Anthony Giddens introduced the theory of structuration as an alternative
to functionalism, Marxism, structuralism, phenomenology, portion of traditional
symbolic interactionism. He tried to eliminate the shortcomings of these perspectives.
Giddens argued: "functional analysis tends to ignore the active processes of agents in
interaction and over emphasise~ social structure as constraints. The process of
structuration is intended to emphasise that the individual-society, subject -object and
micro-macro dichotomies do not constitute a dualism, but a 'duality'. That is people in
interaction use the rules and resources that constitute social structure in their day-to-day
routines in the context of co-presence, and in so doing, they reproduce these rules and
resources of structures. Thus, individual action, interaction, and social structure are all
implicated in each other. They do not constitute separate realities, but a 'duality' within
the same reality. 'The structural properties of social system are both the medium and
the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" .146
144 Hagendijk, Rob, "Structuration Theory, Constructivism and Scientific Change". In Cozzens, S and Gieryn, T (eds.), Theories ofScience in Society, Indiana Uni. press, Blomington, I990, pp. 43-45.
145 For detail analysis see, Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, Oxford, I 984: See also, Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory, Macmillan, Press, London, 1979.
146 Gidden, Anthony, Central Problem in Social Theory, 1979, p.69.
36
Hence, one can not understand action and interaction among scientists without
reference to the rules and resources of social structure (normative dimension of
science). Similarly one cannot fully understand large-scale, long-term institutional
structures (science) without knowledge of how actors use the rules and resources of
these institutional structures in concrete action. The actor-network approach, associated
with Calion, 147 Latour, 148 and Law149 is a novel and innovative supplement in sociology
to symbolic interactions and, to a lesser extent, functionalist approach. This is used to
describe socio-technical ensembles as heterogeneous networks of human and non
human actors. This approach is used to analyse how an ordering of society is brought
about by reshuffling and transforming machines, institutions, and actors. The power of
actors (such as industrialists, elite scientists, or politicians) does not consist of some
thing inherently special in those individuals or institutions but originates from the
network they control. Elite scientists networks have both an "inside", which looks like
'pure science' and an 'outside' where these other actors appear on actor networks. By
"following the actors" we see interactive adjustments among scientists and government
officials leading to the very formulation of scientific knowledge.
Constructivist theory poses its strongest challenge to the naturalistic view of
science by raising the basic question whether scientific knowledge is 'found' or 'made'.
However, This question could not be tackled in isolation because scientific knowledge
have both the characters. According to Ziman, scientific knowledge is 'found' in the
sense "that 'naturalist' gives great weight to the empirical findings of research and very
elaborate technical and social procedures are used to check, counter-check, replicate or
otherwise authenticate these before they are accepted as facts". 150 Scientific knowledge
thus contains much that has been found. However, scientific knowledge is also made.
Roth and Barrett argued: "Science in its striving for universality requires the
formulation of theories. For this, very elaborate technical and social practices are
147 Calion, Michel, "The Sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle". In Calion, M, Law, John & Rip, Arie (eds). Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology, Macmillan, UK, 1986, pp. 19-34.
148 Latour, Bruno., Science in Action: How to follow scientist and Engineers through society, op.cit., 1987.
149 Law, John (ed.), Power. Action and Belief A new Sociology of knowledge? Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986.
150 Ziman, John, Real Science what it is, and what it means, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.235.
37
employed in testing and criticising these before they are accepted communally as
reliable law. Scientific knowledge thus contain much that has been made" .151 Thus, it
can be assumed that scientific knowledge is both found and made. Having analysed
various theoretical prospectivesin sociology of science, a brief analysis of some relevant
studies in Indian con,text have been undertaken in order to make the problem of present
study more clear and relevant.
Studies in Indian Context
In the Indian context as observed by Aurora and Kumar, 152 sociologists have so
far paid scant attention to the sociology of science, which holds true to a large extent
even today. There are very few systematic studies on Indian scientific community
linking them with the internal normative dimensions and cultural context of science.
Indian culture has been shown to be incompatible with the values of modern science. 153
Ashok Parthasarthy 154 (1969a) observed the effect that interaction between local
Indian culture and International science had on science organisation and research
behaivour. He claims that this saps local scientists' self-confidence negatively and
affects their capacity for independent thought, and injects a 'caste system' in science
(based on overseas versus local education) into the local community. In another paper
Parthasarthy ( 1969b) argued: "traditional cultural forms have subsumed international
science. The value system and culture of science have proved to be inadequately robust
while the 'archaic' social structure has proved maddeningly resilient. Indeed, Indian
society has demonstrated time and again its inexhaustible capacity to dilute and devour
the most potent of injected culture" .155
151 Roth, P & Barrett, R. "Deconstructing Quarks", Social Studies ofScience, vol. 20, 1990, pp. 579-646. 152 Aurora, G.S. and Kumar, N. "Sociology of Science" in Survey of Research in Sociology and Social
Anthropology, 1969-79, ICSSR. Satvahan Pub, New Delhi, Voi.II, 1985, pp.169-208. 153 See, Rahman, A. "Scientist in India: The impact of Economic Policies and Social Perspective",
International Social Science Journal. Vol.22, 1970, pp.54-74. 154 Parthasarthy, Ashok, "Sociology of Science in Developing Countries: The Indian Experience",
Economic and Political Weekly, IV, (31), 2 August, 1969, pp.1277-80. 155 Parthasarthy, Ashok, "Sociology of Science in Developing Countries- Indian Experience- a Sequel",
Economic and Political Weekly, IV, 31, 23 August, 1969, pp.1387-1389.
38
The study conducted by Professor Haribabu, 156 reveals valuable insight into the
internal dynamics of scientific community. He focuses on 'the system of peer (•
evaluation' in Indian science within the socio-cultural context of science in the country
and its historical interaction with international (Western) science. Prof. Haribabu's
study is located in the interactional approach which was one of the earliest attempts at
theorising in the western sociology of science, which for long constituted a dominant
'paradigm', as distinct from the Marxist 'paradigm' which was the most influential
among 'extemalist' approaches.
He explored evaluation pattern among a group of scientists working in I.I.Sc.
Bangalore. He found that 'peer review' system in Indian science is very weak. He
identified four main factors affecting 'peer review' system prominently: 157 (i) "scarcity
of peers in research areas, (ii) lack of professionalism and rigour; (iii) a preference for
seniors as status judges; and (iv) scientists' association with governmental works". This
study is a very important study as it reveals serious lacuna in the functioning of
scientific community in India. These factors need to be explored in different
organisational contexts like in a national governmental laboratory and in an academic
autonomous institution located in different regions. Moreover, difference should be also
made between evaluation of a research project for grant and evaluation of a scientific
claim made in a research paper. In this context the role of normative dimensions of
science could be examined. However, in the modem time economic importance of
scientific research is increasing, as a consequence the nature of scientific research is
undergoing drastic changes. It is a very important issue in sociology of science. In fact,
professor Haribabu in his latest study has focussed on this issue. His study is very much
in line with the emerging trend in social studies of science, particularly which focuses
on 'new mode of knowledge production'. 158 On the basis of his research on the
community of researcher in modem biology and bio-technology he has shown
that the context of production of scientific knowledge, its organisation and associated
156 Haribabu, E., 'A Large Community But Few Peers: A Study of the Scientific Community in India", Sociological Bulletin, 40(1&2), March-September 1991, pp.77-88.
157 Ibid., p.82. 158 Gibbons ... et. al., have suggested that 'new mode of knowledge production' have arisen 'in the
context of application' that is, in the course of research on technological, environmental, medical or :;ocietal problems. See Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H .... et.al., The Production of Knowledge, The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies, Sage Pub., London, 1994.
39
values are changing. His study 159 shows that "in India a shift in cognitive value from
'knowing for its own sake' to 'knowing with an eye on patent' is discernible. Prof.
Haribabu has highlighted on a very significant pattern of change in the nature of
scientific research. He has indicated that two distinct cultures of science-academic
research and applied research - have begun to merge. He stated: "Economic interests
are increasingly influencing research so much so that basic research in molecular
biology is shaped by potential applications". 160 He further writes: "In strategic research
both basic researchers and applied researchers net work to find out solution to
problem" .161 This is a good study showing the anxiety and apprehensions of individual
scientist in the process of production of scientific knowledge. However there is need to
study how this new trend will affect normative structure of science and community of
scientists.
Radhika Ramasubhan in her study 162 has suggested that a Marxian sociology of
science is most relevant for the study of science in India and vehemently criticised the
functionalist sociology of science. She asserted: "It is not hard to understand why the
functionalist sociology of Science is an unreal analytical framework within which to
analyse Indian science. It is only the Marxian sociology of science with its historical
perspective and relating science to its economic basis, which provides the necessary
insights into the functioning of science as a social activity". 163
Many scholars have shown that social and economic factors shape the
production of scientific knowledge. However, the analysis of science, as Pro~. Haribabu
argued, in "Marxist tradition does not provide concepts to understand the practice of
science at the micro level, meanings underlying, motivations of scientists, local
contingencies and culture in the process of production of scientific knowledge". 164
159 Haribabu, E. "Scientific Knowledge in India: From Public Resource to Intellectual Property", Sociological Bulletin, 48( I &2) March- Sept. 1999, pp.217-233. (The study is based on Research. Project entitled: Community of Rice Researchers in India; A study of National Rice Biotechnology Network, funded by the Rockfeller Foundation, New York, 1998-99 (no. Rf. 9700/95 dt. 15.12.97).
160 Ibid .. p.221. 161 Ibid., p.227. 162 Ramasubhan, Radhika, "Towards a Relevant Sociology of Science for India", in Blume, Stuart S.
(ed) Perspectives in the Sociology of Science, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1977, pp.155- I 93.
:~1 Ibid., p.l88.
164 Haribabu, E. "Scientific knowledge in India: From Public Resources to Intellectual Property", 1999, op.cit., p. 220.
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JPS Uberai's165 work on science and culture is a very important work (although
philosophical in orientation) in the theoretical sociology of science. Uberai advocates
for semiological method for science in place of positivist method of science. He argued:
"the foundation of positivist method is based on mutually exclusive division between
the truth and the reality. It rejects all relations of a higher transcendental, immanent or
dialectical unity, of mutual participations or of reciprocal dependence between the truth
and the reality". 166
Whereas, "semiological science deals with the truth, order and sense of the
universe or of some select segment of it, viewed as a system of signs and relations; an
individual sign is being treated as both a fact and a value, objective and subjective at
one and the same time. Semiological method will seek to understand things and events
in terms of the whole and the part rather than in terms of the cause and the effect or in
terms of factors and correlation, or in terms of the ends and the means". 167 However,
Uberai accepted the fact that recognition of the value of the subject in scientific
epistemology will be questionable. He writes:
"It is true that recognition of the value of the subject in scientific epistemology
would ent;il an answer to the question as to whether or individual human beings
inhabit distinct world, and if so then what is the relation between them? We can only
give the answer, that although all human beings are in some way equal, unique and
incommensurable, yet their respective world views and life-worlds, both individual
and collective, are somehow also inter-communicable and interconvertible and
together make up the universe of human discourse that we call life and
knowledge" .168
If we accept the views of JPS Uerai then public character of science becomes
very clear. There is a consensus among scientists (researchers) over existence of some
sort of order and uniformity. An idea may come to mind of an individual scientist,
however until it is being inter-communicated with other scientists and agreed by them,
165 Uberai, J.P.S., Science and Culture, Oxford. Uni. Press, Delhi, 1988. 166 Ibid., p.l9. 167 Ibid., p.20. 168 Ibid., p.38.
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it is not scientific. Thus science IS, as Ziman argued, 169 consensus and public
knowledge.
According to Uberai, a semiological logic adoptsthe sacraments as a model to
apply to and among all fields and so have come to view the entire universe as the
meaningful and effective sign of God. The symbols always mediated between the fact
and the value in human life and thought, in just the same way that one says the word
mediates and brings in relation the thought and deeds. 170 Thus, God, man and the world
could be still united in theoretical belief and faith. Uberai says that "once God is
disappeared as a symbol of mediator between man and nature (world), the nature
became a fatherless child to be discovered, protected or exploited by man for his own
ends". 171 For this Goethe, called the positivist science as the 'empirico-mechanico
dogmatic torture chamber of nature '. 172 Hence, Uberai emphasised that new approach
towards science should emphasise the mutual participation of such apparently different
things according to the principle of unity of variety, whether in cosmology, ontology or
. l " 173 episterna ogy .
Shiv Visvanathan's 174 study of scientists in National Physical Laboratory, New
Delhi is a basic study of scientists and their laboratory life. However, his study is
confined to the debate between basic research versus applied research and he traced the
history of how the nature of research in NPL has undergone changes from academic
science to industrial science. He seems to be emphasising the role of basic science over
applied science, but did not explain the reasons for such a feeling among scientists. He
studied political, economic factors and individual charismatic leadership but did not
correlate it with the normative structure of science. Moreover, while talking about
applied research he did not take into account the community life of scientists and their
cultural orientation that guide the basic world view of the scientists.
169 Ziman, J., Public Knowledge, op.cit., p.5. 170 Uberai, JPS, Science and Culture, op.cit., p.41. 171 Ibid., p.41. 172 Ibid., p.69. 173 Ibid., 85. 174 Vishvanathan, Shiv. Organisation for Science: The Making of an Industrial Research Laboratory,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, I 985.
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V.V. Krishna's 175 work on scientists in laboratories is an important study in
sociology of science delving into the dynamics of cultural and social context of science
from a cross-cultural perspective. He studied two laboratories - Central Food
Technology Research Institute (CSIR. India) and Food Research Laboratory (CSIRO,
Australia). Both these laboratories have similar historical origin and organisational
structures besides being involved in similar research area i.e. Food Technology
Research. Though it was a bold attempt in linking the goal orientation of scientists to
their political and social context it has overlooked the distinction between ideal and
practical aspects. That is, normative structure of science that determines the goal
orientation of scientists and their application in actual practice. Another obvious
limitation of this study is that it has not taken into account the contextual differences
which exist between a bureaucratic government laboratory and autonomous academic
organisation.
Another study by Robert Anderson176 ofTata Institute of Fundamental Research
(TIFR), Bombay and Saha Institute of Nuclear Science (SINS), Calcutta deals only
with the role of leadership for effective research. Anderson has highlighted on how
charismatic leadership of Homi J. Bhaba of TIFR and Meghnad Saha of SINS and their
friendly connection with the political elite of the country helped to grow these
institutions. His sole emphasis has been on exploring the role of effective leadership
and their style of working on scientific research.
The Present Study:
The present study is concerned with the normative dimensions, community life
and cultural orientation of scientists in two scientific institutions. It has become clear
from the above discussion that many theoretical approaches (developed in sociology of
science - like functionalist, Marxian, conflict modd, interest model, and constructivism
etc) treated science segmentally. Functionalist perspective focused only on internal
normative structure of science, Marxian and its subsidiaries, conflict and interest model
175 Krishna, V.V. Scientists in Laboratories: A Comparative Study on the Organization of Science and Goal Orientation of Scientist in CSJRO, (Australia) and CSIR (India) Institution (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis) Deptt of Sociology, The University ofWollongong, Australia, 1987.
m Anderson, Robert S. The Life of Scientists in India: A Comparative Ethnography of Two Research Institutes. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Microfilmed), Deptt. of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1971.
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have concentrated on 'external factors' shaping the course of development of science.
However they failed to recognize that science as a social institution has its own internal
rules and dynamics. Similarly constructivist framework (which encompasses many sub
approaches like strong programme, empirical relativist approach, lab studies, and
ethno-fnethodological studies etc.) failed to recognise that scientific research is not
atomised, segmented and isolated activity but is an integrated, holistic activity
structured by a variety of universal elements. Nonetheless these studies provide very
valuable insight into the functioning of science as a social institution. These approaches
explored into the content of scientific knowledge and did not grant any special/distinct
epistemological status to science. However, this attempt of de-mythologizing of science
need to be cautioned. Nonetheless, post Mertonian studies have come as a positive
challenge to one side vision of science. Although Mertonian perspective has anticipated
virtually all the criticism and empirical alternative to its programme that emerged from
several ethnographic and ethno-methodological studies, it required to incorporate new
elements in its framework as indicated by these studies.
Since no single approach is adequate to fully understand the complex nature of
science and its relation with society, some kind of hybrid theoretical construct is needed
to understand the normative dimensions of science and community life of scientists and
their cultural orientations. Moreover, the goal orientations of scientists are determined
by the organisational and socio-political and cultural context in which they are situated.
These 'external factors' influence the community of scientists in formulation and
construction of scientific problems. However, science as a social system has it own
internal rules and dynamics. Hence, 'functionalist-constructionist.! 77 hybrid theoretical
model could be subscribed to integrate communities of scientists with internal
noq:native dimensionsof science as well as with the external domain of culture. (- used
in a broad sense including social, economic and political contexts). It is assumed that
177 Some recent studies have developed 'functionalist- constructionist hybrid' model that have retained many aspects of mertonian approach to the study of science. This perspective preserves the functionalist form of argument without a positivistic commitment to verification, replication through crucial tests and the like. The arguments are concerned with the way that funding, state imperatives, and other "broadly social" agendas influence the local sites of scientific practice. See Gieryn, Thoman, "Boundary work and demarcation of science from non-science" ISIS, 79, 1988, pp.582-93; See, also Cozzens, Susan and Gieryn, Thoman (eds), Theories of Science in Society, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990; Mukherji, Chanda, A Fragil Power: Scientists and the State, Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton, 1989.
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the border between these two domains is porous in order to facilitate continuous
interactions. The present study is located in the space defined by these two major
perspectives in sociology of science.
Conclusion:
In this chapter the theories and concepts related to scientific knowledge have
been explained with the help of contemporary sociological theories. An attempt has
been made to study the nature of scientific knowledge and its internal dynamics by
highlighting the debate between Kuhn, & Popper and other thinkers. As part of
literature review in sociology of science different perspectives like, functionalist
Marxian perspective, conflict model, interest model, and constructivist approaches have
been critically evaluated for selecting a suitable theoretical construct for the present
study. In Indian context-important works, like the work of Ashok Parthasharthy, E.
Haribabu, Shiv Visvanathan, V.V. Krishna, Robert Anderson, Radhika Ramasubhan
and J.P.S. Uberai have been examined in order to chalk out the unique character and
need for the present study. The next chapter deals with the methodology.
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