conflict prevention and peacebuilding (2013-2018)...eni,eidhr, icsp, ifs, cfsp, csdp are at the...

International

External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

(2013-2018)

Final report

Volume 3 – Annexes

April 2020

___________

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission

International Cooperation and

Development

© Pictures on the cover page

1) Community-based Peace & Protection Center voluntary monitor, Guindulungan (Mindanao), Philippines, Volker Hauck

2) UNMISS fuel convoy, Juba, South Sudan, Nicole Ball 3) Espacios Territoriales de Capacitacion y Reincorporacion (settlement for former FARC combattants),

Miravalle, Colombia, Susan Soux

Consortium composed by

Particip, Ecorys, ECDPM, Fiscus, Itad and OPM

Leader of the Consortium: Particip GmbH

Contact person for this evaluation: [email protected]

FWC COM 2015

EuropeAid/137211/DH/SER/Multi

Specific Contract N°2018/396862

External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and

Peacebuilding (CPPB) 2013-2018

This evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit

of the DG DEVCO (European Commission)

Implemented by Particip GmbH

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the

authorities of the countries involved.

Lead company Merzhauser Str. 183 D-79100 Freiburg

The evaluation is carried out by: Nicole Ball – Team Leader Evelien Weller – Core Expert Volker Hauck – Core Expert Andrew Sherriff – Core Expert Susan Soux – Core Expert Fernanda Faria – Core Expert Matthias Deneckere – Researcher Sophie Desmidt – Researcher Pauline Veron – Researcher Dominika Socha – Researcher Enzo Caputo – Quality Support Expert Michael Lieckefett – Evaluation Manager The evaluation was implemented by Particip GmbH and managed by the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit. The main authors of the report are Nicole Ball, Volker Hauck, Evelien Weller, Andrew Sherriff and Michael Lieckefett. The authors accept sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Union. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.

External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) 2013-2018

Final report

The report consists of three volumes:

VOLUME I – MAIN REPORT

1. Introduction 2. Policy background and context of EU support for CPPB 3. Evaluation methodology 4. Answers to the evaluation questions 5. Conclusions 6. Recommendations

VOLUME II – COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AT JC LEVEL

Cluster 1: Strategy and implementation 1. EQ 1 on relevance and coherence 2. EQ 2 on the approach to implementation 3. EQ 3 on coordination and complementarity 4. EQ 4 on added value 5. EQ 5 on cross-cutting issues Cluster 2: Effects of EU support for CPPB 6. EQ 6 on short- to mid-term results 7. EQ 7 on broader effects and sustainability

VOLUME III – ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference 2. Detailed evaluation methodology 3. Evaluation matrix 4. Analysis of the spending inventory 5. Mapping of non-spending activities 6. Survey report 7. Side note on DEVCO trainings on conflict sensitivity 8. List of documents consulted 9. List of persons interviewed

i

External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (2013-2018) Final report Vol. 3 – May 2020 – Particip GmbH

Table of contents Annex 1: Terms of Reference ............................................................................................... 1

Annex 2: Detailed evaluation methodology ....................................................................... 30

Annex 3: Evaluation matrix ................................................................................................. 43

Annex 4: Analysis of spending activities .......................................................................... 50

Annex 5: Mapping of non-spending activities ................................................................... 58

Annex 6: Survey report ........................................................................................................ 61

Annex 7: Side note on DEVCO trainings on conflict sensitivity ...................................... 89

Annex 8: List of documents consulted .............................................................................. 95

Annex 9: List of persons interviewed .............................................................................. 119

1


Annex 1: Terms of Reference

30


Annex 2: Detailed evaluation methodology

Reminder of the evaluation scope as presented in the ToR

In line with the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR), the legal and geographic scope of the evaluation includes: 1) all relevant actions (including spending and non-spending activities) and all bilateral partners / regions which fall under the responsibility of DG DEVCO and DG NEAR (neighbourhood region only) and 2) the work/engagement of the EEAS related to them.1 All agreements, cooperation and other official commitments related to EU support to CPPB are taken into consideration. In terms of EU external funding instruments2, the scope covers the:

• Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), • European Development Fund (EDF), • European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), • European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and • Instrument for Stability / Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfS / IcSP) Art 3, 4

and 5 activities.3

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actions, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions / operations, EU MS interventions and activities financed by DG ECHO will be examined only from the point of view of coherence, co-ordination and complementarity with EU CPPB engagement.

In terms of temporal scope, the evaluation focuses on the period 2013-2018, but also takes the period 2011-2012 into consideration in order to assess the evolution of EU support to CPPB since the 2011 CPPB evaluation and, in particular, better identify changes which occurred after the 2013 Joint Communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises.4 In particular, the mapping will cover the period 2011-2018 (see Annex 4 below). The scope thus covers two EU financing cycles (2007-2013 and 2014-2020).

In terms of thematic scope, the EU has no agreed or single definition of either “conflict prevention” or “peacebuilding”. Rather, the ToR employ United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definitions of those two concepts, which are also widely used by other CPPB actors, including for the purposes of evaluation.5 These two definitions are overlapping and cover a wide array of themes and possible

1 European Commission, External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2013-2018). Thematic Evaluation: Terms of Reference, pp. 9-10. 2 Four funding instruments are outside the scope of this evaluation: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Partnership Instrument, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Instrument for Greenland. 3 Interventions financed through Art 3 and Art 4 if the IfS / IcSP were to be examined initially only from the perspective of coherence and complementarity. Following the kick-off meeting for the evaluation, FPI agreed that all IfS / IcSP interventions would be fully included in the evaluation scope. 4 The evaluation portfolio contains interventions and contracts agreed to or underway during the 2011-2018 period. 5 The definitions provided in the ToR are: 1) Conflict Prevention: actions undertaken to reduce tensions and to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Beyond short term actions, it includes the notion of long-term engagement. It consists of operational prevention, i.e. immediate measures applicable in the face of crisis), and structural prevention, i.e. measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place, or, if they do, that they do not recur ((OECD DAC, 2001: 86 and United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2001: para. 8). 2) Peacebuilding: – actions and policies “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict,” encompassing “a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms,” including “short and long term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it” (UN Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2001/5, 4278th meeting, February 2001).

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areas of interventions. As such, they do not provide adequate guidance in terms of delineating the thematic scope of the evaluation. The first task for the evaluation team was accordingly to determine the thematic scope of CPPB for the purpose of this evaluation. This entailed a comprehensive process undertaken during the inception stage and which has been summarised in section 0 below.

Overall approach

The methodology applied for this evaluation is based on the methodological guidelines on strategic evaluations developed by DG DEVCO. Given the purpose and conditions of the evaluation, the most appropriate design for the evaluation was a multiple case study, applying a mixed-methods approach.

The evaluation was managed and supervised by the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit. Evaluation progress was closely followed by a Reference Group (RG) chaired by the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit and consisting of representatives from DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG NEAR, EEAS and FPI.

The evaluation was conducted in three main phases, as summarised in Figure 1, between September 2018 and February 2020. Field missions were carried out to eight countries (Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Lebanon, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan and Zimbabwe) as well as to the African Peace Facility (APF) based in Addis Ababa. Desk-only case studies were carried out for four countries (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Myanmar and Somalia.)

Figure 1 Key steps of the evaluation process

Mapping of EU CPPB support

The mapping and typology of EU support for CPPB6 was essential to understand the breadth and composition of EU support for CPPB, to develop the intervention logic, to select a representative sample of case studies, to structure the data collection and, ultimately, to answer the evaluation questions. For the purpose of this evaluation, “mapping” refers to the process of understanding what

Includes long-term support to, and establishment of, viable political and socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of addressing the proximate and root causes of conflicts, as well as other initiatives aimed at creating the necessary conditions for sustained peace and stability (OECD DAC, 2001: 86). 6 ‘EU support for CPPB’ refers to all financing and non-financing instruments and tools covered by the legal scope of this evaluation: ‘The overall EU support for CPPB EU’s will be taken into consideration including agreements, the cooperation and any other official commitments. Policies and interventions governed by the instruments such as DCI, EDF, ENI,EIDHR, IcSP, IfS, CFSP, CSDP are at the epicentre.’ CSDP missions are to be examined only at case study level and focus on complementarity with other instruments. Where support is provided by the EU and its Member States, the term ‘EU and EU MS’ will be employed.

1. Desk phase 2. Field phase

3. Synthesis phase

Meetings

Major tasks

RG RG RG RG Sem

• First desk review • Fine-tuning of the

methodology

• Preparatory report• Inception report

• Detailed desk review • Interviews

• Desk report

• Country missions• Presentation of

findings

• Field mission notes

• Final synthesis• Dissemination event

in Brussels

• Final report

Legend:RG – Reference Group (ensures quality control by the Commission)Sem – Seminar to discuss the final report with a broader audience

Deliverables

Sep 2018 – May 2019 May – Jul 2019 Jul 2019 – Feb 2019

Inception stage Desk stage

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is and is not part of CPPB (based on a typology) and to identify all relevant EU interventions (spending and non-spending).

As there is no single agreed EU definition of CPPB, the team developed a typology based on a review of key documents and interviews with key informants in Brussels7. In the course of identifying the CPPB thematic areas, it became evident that some categories of EU interventions were more closely linked to CPPB than others. Consequently, three main categories of interventions related to CPPB (both spending and non-spending) have been identified:

• Category 1: Primary CPPB interventions. This category covers actions that by their nature have clear objectives for exerting positive effects on peace and conflict dynamics, and that would not be implemented in a non-conflict prone/crisis environment.

• Category 2: Mixed Objectives interventions. This category covers actions that could be implemented to achieve CPPB objectives, but that could also have other types of objectives – usually depending on the context in which they take place.

• Category 3: Complementary interventions. This category covers actions that usually have objectives other than CPPB (fighting organised crime, development, humanitarian assistance, counter terrorism), but that can be considered as contributing to overall EU CPPB objectives within certain contexts.

The allocation of specific themes to each of the three categories was done through an iterative process undertaken by the evaluation team. This typology led to the development of a spending inventory and to the identification of non-spending activities, the results of which can be found in Annexes 4 and 5 (in Vol. 3) respectively.

Table 1 shows the distribution of identified thematic areas across the three main categories:

Table 1 Typology of CPPB thematic areas (spending and non-spending)

Category 1: Primary CPPB interventions Thematic areas Types of interventions 1.1. High level engagement and support to peace processes

This thematic area includes EU engagement in peace negotiations, conflict/crisis mediation, Track I and Track II diplomacy, conflict resolution efforts, confidence/trust building related to peace negotiations, and relationship-building among conflicting groups. It also includes EU financial support to other actors and institutions, for example the African Union (AU) and the UN’s Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, to carry out similar activities.

1.2. National and local dialogue and reconciliation

This thematic area focuses on interventions at the national and local levels aimed at reducing tensions, resolving conflicts and promoting reconciliation. It includes Track II and Track III mediation, confidence/ trust building related to conflict/crisis resolution, relationship building among conflicting groups and bridge building activities (state-society relations, inter/intra-community, intra/inter-religious); inclusive dialogue seeking the participation of marginalised groups in political processes (e.g. women, peace and security, or WPS); cross-border dialogue/ conflict resolution mechanisms and efforts to strengthen social cohesion and trust between state and society. Early indications are that support is primarily spending but there may be important behind-the-scenes diplomatic activities as well.

1.3. Transitional justice This thematic area covers the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-

7 For more information, please refer to the Inception Report, chapter 4.

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scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecution, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof. It includes the four central elements of transitional justice: 1) criminal justice, 2) truth, 3) reparations, and 4) guarantees of institutional reform to prevent the recurrence of abuses. It incorporates a broad range of processes and mechanisms such as judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, individual prosecution, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, among others.

1.4. CPPB capacity building

This thematic area covers a broad range of activities intended to build capacity for CPPB at the national and local level in bilateral partners, within international and regional partners, and within the EU itself. This includes, for example, strengthening systems and infrastructure for peace, providing technical assistance, developing effective leadership, promoting training and networking, capacitating civil society/grassroots/ non-state actors, empowering women and youth (boys and girls) to participate in political/peace processes. Support is primarily spending.

1.5. Peace support operations, ceasefire monitoring and human rights monitoring (in the framework of CPPB)

This thematic area covers a range of operational activities to support peace processes. EU support is primarily financial, although it includes non-spending activities through specific activities carried out by CSDP missions/operations in this field. It enables partners to contribute to peace support and peacekeeping operations (including those led by regional partners such as the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS or OAS), human rights monitoring missions, cease-fire monitoring missions and the early response capacities of regional partners (such as the AU and the RECs).

1.6. Conflict analysis and early warning

This thematic area includes a range of analyses to assess conditions in bilateral partners (such as conflict/fragility/post-conflict elements, drivers of peace/resilience and needs assessments). Any conflict analysis undertaken by the EU is included, i.e. those conducted in partnership with other international actors or EU Member States, those carried out by EU Delegations and those conducted by EU HQ in support of EUDs. This thematic area also includes conflict early warning systems (EWS) and efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity (such as guidance, training). This category covers both the EU conflict EWS (at a general level, details of its application to EU CPPB recipients are confidential) and financial support to partners (at the community, local, national or regional levels) to enable them to carry out early warning activities.

1.7. Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB

This thematic area covers evaluations, audits, research and grant reviews conducted by the EU specifically for CPPB programming.

Category 2: Mixed Objectives interventions Thematic areas Types of interventions 2.1. Security and Rule of Law / Justice

This thematic area covers all elements of justice and security sector reform as defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, including community security and access to justice/customary law/ traditional justice. Other activities supported include disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) (including child soldiers), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and humanitarian mine action (HMA). This area also includes looking at the broader relationships between security and justice actors/forces and the population. Relevant activities conducted by Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian and military missions/

34


operations are also included. Both spending and non-spending support is provided.

2.2. Democratic governance, elections, civil society, and media

This thematic area covers the political aspects of governance. It includes activities that are crucial for democratic governance such as supporting freedom of the media, legal frameworks for strengthening political parties, strengthening civil society capacities to engage in democratisation processes, fostering a democratic culture, promoting freedom of expression, constitutional reform in a post-conflict setting. It includes supporting electoral processes (transparency of elections bodies, electoral census, election monitoring) and parliamentary strengthening. It includes local governance in the context of federalism/ decentralisation/devolution of powers linked to peacebuilding processes as well as promotion of intercultural dialogue, diversity and women’s participation in civil society and democratisation processes.

2.3. Socio-economic foundations

This thematic area covers socio-economic activities that are specifically conducted to promote CPPB objectives. This can include “peace dividends”, basic life skills for youth and adults in conflict areas, and cross border cooperation in education, business and trade, and other socio-economic areas. It can also include support to education, employment, economic reconstruction and health if specifically designed and implemented for peacebuilding objectives as well as actions to address inequalities (between individuals or groups). Support is primarily spending.

2.4. Natural resources and land rights

This thematic area includes activities intended to reduce conflict over natural resources, for example water resource management, and the use of natural resources to finance conflict and/or the management of the natural resources by authorities. The latter includes EU support for due diligence guidance (international, national and local levels) and responsible mining/natural resources exploitation (Kimberley process, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative-EITI etc.). It also includes addressing land rights and land governance in the context of peacebuilding/peace agreements. This category also includes Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) efforts related to natural resources. Both spending and non-spending support can be provided.

2.5. Countering/ Preventing violent extremism

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism is a broad umbrella term to categorise activities that seek to prevent or mitigate violent extremism through non-coercive measures that are united by the objective of counteracting the factors of violent extremism. P/CVE is widely understood to include, for instance, community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be ‘at risk’ of joining or being attracted to VE groups, such as sports programmes, vocational training and mentorship programmes. It therefore overlaps with efforts to prevent violence and conflict by supporting development, strengthening institutions, and developing appropriate policy frameworks. Category 3: Complementary interventions

Thematic areas Types of interventions 3.1. Organised crime This thematic area includes interventions aimed at curbing the activities of

organised crime in areas such as drug trafficking, illicit financial flows, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons. It includes both spending and non-spending support.

3.2. Counter Terrorism This thematic area includes activities aimed at countering terrorism. Counter-terrorism (CT) includes measures taken to prevent, pursue, protect

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and respond to terrorism. All CT-specific programming – i.e. programmes designed to address CT capacity gaps and deliberately counter terrorist actors and methods – are included here. Examples are protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attack, building the capacity of security services to effectively responding to terrorist attacks, or enhancing international and institutional cooperation to efficiently pursue and/or detain terrorist suspects.

3.3. Non-proliferation This thematic area includes activities aimed at controlling weapons, including CBRN but excluding Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

3.4. Humanitarian assistance and delivery of basic services (e.g.WASH)

This thematic area includes humanitarian assistance, service delivery for water, sanitation and hygiene and efforts to prevent pandemics, the spread of AIDS and other diseases.

3.5. Development, food security, resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

This thematic area covers a wide range of activities related to promoting development and resilience, including rural development, poverty reduction, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, livelihoods and employment creation.

3.6. Economic governance and core state functions (other than security)

This thematic area covers the establishment of core government services in health, education, basic infrastructure (including energy), urban planning and transport. It covers economic governance including anti-corruption and public finance management programmes. It also covers trade for development.

3.7. Macro-economic stability and growth/ support to private sector/ trade

This thematic area covers activities intended to promote macro-economic growth and stability, including economic infrastructure, physical reconstruction, sustainable energy, tourism and regional integration. It also covers various aspects of trade, including trade policies, trade promotion and trade sanctions.

3.8. Migration and displacement

This thematic area covers interventions addressing the repatriation and return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, migration elements of integrated border management and population flows.

3.9. Human rights and indigenous rights

This thematic area covers human rights and indigenous rights related interventions other than those associated with transitional justice (thematic area 1.3) or human rights monitoring (thematic area 1.5). It includes activities such as human/indigenous rights dialogues, human/indigenous rights protection, support to human/indigenous rights defenders and monitoring legal/justice systems from a human rights perspective. It also includes general women’s rights/gender equality, prevention of gender-based violence, business practices and human rights/Corporate Social Responsibility and private sector interests in unstable areas.

3.10. Climate change and environment

This thematic area covers interventions related to climate change, environmental protection and environmental degradation.

This typology led to the development of a spending inventory and to the identification of non-spending activities, the results of which can be found in Annexes 4 and 5 (in Vol. 3) respectively.

Reconstructed intervention logic

The evaluation team reconstructed an Intervention Logic (IL) from reviewing five of the most prominent documents that (broadly) outline the EU’s approach to promoting peace, stability and security and describe the objectives, scope and political/policy framework for support to CPPB.8 The

8 The Treaty on European Union, Art 21, section 2, signed in December 2007; COM (2001), Communication from the Commission on Conflict prevention; European Commission and HR/VP JOIN(2013) 30 final joint Communication to the

36


basic framework that emerged was further refined through the review of additional policy documents, regulations and guidance notes as well as comments from the Evaluation Reference Group.9

The IL summarises the ultimate intended impact of EU support for CPPB, the intermediate impacts, the outcomes, outputs, key activities by thematic areas of CPPB engagement and major inputs. The IL also takes into account the cross-cutting role of conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender in formulating and implementing EU CPPB actions. The IL provides a framework for the evaluation, helping to understand how the EU seeks to support CPPB through a variety of interventions and what the underlying assumptions guiding these interventions are. The IL underpins the evaluation questions and associated judgement criteria and indicators, which are captured in the evaluation matrix (see Annex 3 in Vol. 3). The matrix forms the basis for developing the interview questionnaires and survey and provides the analytical framework for the team’s contribution analysis, conclusion and recommendations.

At output level, the IL presents slightly broader and more general elements than the usual narrower notion of ‘output’ that is often used at intervention level (usually quantitative, e.g. number of trainings, number of people trained). The notion of outputs in the IL for EU support for CPPB spans the continuum from narrow outputs to higher-level qualitative and quantitative outputs (moving towards ‘intermediate’ outcomes). This was done for two reasons: 1) policy documents are not very specific about these outputs, and 2) the list of outputs that can occur as a result of EU support for CPPB is extensive, wide-ranging and difficult to categorise. The team therefore decided to aggregate the outputs (moving towards ‘intermediate’ outcomes) at a slightly higher level.

Figure 2 depicts the IL and highlights the links to the EQs.

European Parliament and the Council on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises; Regulation (EU) No. 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; and 2013 EU guidance note on addressing CPPB and security issues under external cooperation instruments. https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-fragility/minisite/support-and-guidance/addressing-conflict-prevention-peacebuilding-and-security-issues-under. 9 These include: a) The Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 23 June 2000, as amended in November 2010, Art 11; b) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016; c) Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on conflict prevention, 2011; d) COM(2011) 637 final communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an agenda for change; e) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy {SWD(2015) 500 final}, Brussels, 18 November 2015, 2015 JOIN (2015) 50; f) Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action {SWD(2017) 226 final} {SWD(2017) 227 final}, JOIN(2017) 21 final Brussels, 7 June 2017; g) Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument; h) Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020; i) Regulation (EU) No. 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide; j) Council regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund, Article 6; and k) EU guidance note on the use of conflict analysis in support of EU external action, 2013.

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Figure 2 CPPB intervention logic

• EU and partners have sufficient political willingness to engage.

• EU and partners CPPB actions are relevant and appropriate to achieve outcomes and intermediate impacts.

• EU and partners CPPB actions are effectively undertaken in timely and flexible manner.

• CPPB recipients demonstrate ownership.

• Conflict sensitivity is effectively applied and this supports achievements of outcomes and impacts.

• Human rights and gender are promoted and important for effective CPPB action.

• A comprehensive approach is applied and supports EU CPPB engagement.

• The EU support for CPPB adds value.

Primary CPPB interventions• High-level engagement and support to peace

processes• National and local dialogue and reconciliation• Transitional justice• CPPB capacity building• Peace support operations, cease fire monitoring and

human rights monitoring (in the framework of CPPB)• Conflict analysis, early warning, conflict sensitivity • Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB

Mixed objectives interventions on various themes affecting CPPB, such as:• Security and Rule of law / Justice• Democratic governance, civil society,

elections and media• Socio-economic foundations of CPPB• Natural resources and land issues• Countering/Preventing violent extremism

EU CPPB strategies and approaches are defined

and implemented

Effective EU and CPPB partner capacities

(institutional/substantive) for CPPB are enhanced

EU and partners have contributed to addressing

underlying causes of conflict

EU and partners have contributed to preventing and/or addressing violent threats and crisis and

enable rapid restoration of stability.

Violence originating from the nascent conflicts/crises prevented/mitigated and immediate stability restored

Structural stability created / restored / consolidated and conditions for peace strengthened

Preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security

Non-spending:Diplomacy: including good offices, mediation, sanctionsPolitical and policy dialogue: including EU HQ, EUDs / OfficesSituational awareness: including conflict / early warning / risk / fragility / needs assessments

Spending:Funding instruments: geographic & thematic instrumentsFunding modalities / channels: budget support, EU Trust Funds etc.

Cross-cutting issues underpinning CPPB: conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender equality

Inpu

ts

Other (related) funding and non- funding:• CFSP actions (i.e. CSDP; EUSR)• EU MS actions• EU MS contributions to CFSP actions (delegated staff)• Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO)• Contributions by third partners, e.g. to EU Trust Funds

Complementary interventions

• Organised crime• Non-proliferation • Counter terrorism • Humanitarian assistance /

WASH• Development, food security,

linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

• Economic governance and core state functions (other than security / justice)

• Macro-economic growth and trade

• Migration and displacement• Human rights and

indigenous rights• Climate change and

environment

Activ

ities

(by

them

atic

are

a)U

ltim

ate

impa

cts

EU and partners have contributed to creating and/or strengthening long-term

conditions for sustained peace and stability

Local / national / regional partners have taken ownership of CPPB results, mechanisms, tools and

processes

Conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed

Shared EU/EU MS/non-EU partner analysis, common understanding

and long-term vision are developed

Networks, cooperation and coordination mechanisms within EU (including MS) and with non-EU partners are established/strengthened

Assu

mpt

ions

2As

sum

ptio

ns1

• Necessary resources areavailable to the EU

• Commission/EEAS capacities andinstitutional arrangements for CPPB are in place, including institutional capacity, contextual knowledge, availability of instruments etc.

• Other international CPPB actors are committed and engaged.

EQ 2

EQ 4

EQ 3

EQ 1

EQ 5

EQ 6

EQ 7

Out

puts

Inte

r-m

edia

te

impa

cts

Out

-co

mesBr

oade

r ef

fect

sSh

ort-t

o m

id-te

rm

resu

lts

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Evaluation matrix

Table 2 provides an overview of the key elements and structure of the evaluation matrix. The full matrix, including explanations on the rationale and justification of the individual EQs can be found in Annex 1. It benefited from comments from members of the RG and DEVCO QA during the inception phase.

Table 2 Overview of the evaluation matrix

Evaluation question Dimensions covered by the judgement criteria Key analytical elements Strategy and implementation EQ 1 – Relevance and Coherence To what extent has EU support for CPPB been aligned with EU high-level priorities for CPPB, the broader frameworks for EU external action and the priorities and needs of partner countries?

• Consistency between i) strategy/programming and intervention level; and ii) EU high-level policy priorities for CPPB. // Coherence = absence of contradiction within EU support for CPPB.

• Coordination among EU institutions and complementarity among CPPB interventions. • Coherence with other EU external action (development, trade, counter-terrorism, etc.). • EU support for CPPB responsiveness and adaptiveness to context, priorities and needs of

partner countries, including inter-governmental bodies at regional level.

• Relevance (both at start/design and in changing circumstances during implementation)

• Internal coherence (within CPPB and with other EU external action)

EQ 2 – Approach to implementation To what extent have the approaches, tools and mechanisms for implementation been appropriate to achieve the intended objectives in an optimal manner?

• EU support’s timeliness and transaction costs. • Adequacy of the EU institutional set-up: rapid, flexible response; cost-effectiveness; human

resources, knowledge and skills. • Quality of monitoring and learning mechanisms. • Choice of financing instruments and aid modalities.

• Efficiency

EQ 3 – Coordination and Complementarity To what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with EU MS, and international, regional, national and local actors?

• Coordination at operational level with EU MS and non-EU partners (international, regional, national and local actors).

• Synergies with CPPB interventions/policies of EU MS. • Synergies with CPPB interventions of other actors (international, regional, national and local

actors).

• 3Cs (external coherence, coordination, complementarity)

EQ 4 – Added Value What has been the added value resulting from EU support for CPPB compared with what could have been achieved by EU MS and other actors (national/international organisations, national/regional partners) alone?

• Added value in comparison to what could have been achieved by EU MS alone. • Added value in comparison with what could have been achieved by regional and national

partners and/or other international actors alone.

• Added value (1. in sense of added value vs EU MS and 2. in sense of additionality to the ensemble of CPPB efforts)

EQ 5 – Cross-cutting Issues • Adequate mainstreaming and application of conflict sensitivity (in design and implementation) • Relevance

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Evaluation question Dimensions covered by the judgement criteria Key analytical elements To what extent has EU support for CPPB mainstreamed and promoted conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender?

• Adequate mainstreaming and application of human rights (in design and implementation) • Adequate mainstreaming and application of gender equity issues (in design and

implementation)

• Coherence • Effectiveness

Effects of EU support for CPPB EQ 6 – Short- to mid-term results To what extent has EU support for CPPB achieved the expected short- to mid-term results?

• Achievement and EU contribution to expected short- to mid-term results o Evidence of changes and contribution of spending actions o Contribution of non-spending actions, including political support o Interactions between spending and non-spending actions

• Contribution of a comprehensive/integrated approach to results • Identification of and reaction to unintended negative effects

• Effectiveness

EQ 7 – Broader effects and sustainability To what extent has EU support for CPPB contributed to conflict/crisis prevention/mitigation, and structural stability and enhanced conditions for peace in a sustainable way?

• EU contribution to structural stability created / restored/ consolidated and conditions for peace strengthened o Evolutions of structural stability and conditions for peace (in case study countries) o Evidence that EU and partners have pursued and supported structural stability and

conditions for long-term peace o Evidence that underlying causes of conflict and crises have been addressed o Contribution of complementary interventions o Other (non-EU related) contributing factors

• EU contribution to mitigating/preventing violence from nascent conflicts & crises o Evidence of timely actions o Contribution of complementary interventions o Other (non-EU related) contributing factors

• Sustainability o Capacities o Ownership o Financial sustainability

• Impact • Sustainability

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Case study selection

Case studies were selected based on the selection process outlined in chapter 5.5 of the Inception Report, including consultations with the RG and within DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and

EEAS. Recipient countries of EU support for CPPB were examined against eight primary

selection criteria. To distinguish between cases that ranked more or less the same after applying the primary analysis, a set of subsidiary criteria were applied. Table 3 below presents

the criteria used and Table 4 lists the 12 approved case studies by region.

Table 3 Primary and subsidiary criteria for the case study selection

Primary selection criteria Subsidiary criteria 1. Geographic coverage; 2. Eu CPPB spending; 3. Thematic diversity; 4. Diversity of EU financial

support; 5. Eu non-spending activities; 6. Complementarity10; 7. Nature of conflict/crisis; 8. Evaluability

1. Bilateral partners on the EU crisis declaration list; 2. Joint peacebuilding assessments with other internat.

partners; 3. Formal collaboration with the UN has taken place

between 2013 and 2018; 4. Inclusion in the 2011 EU CPPB evaluation; 5. Presence of a regional EU Special Representative

(EUSR); 6. Recommendations from EU interlocutors; 7. Support channelled through Emergency Trust Fund for

Africa, the Madad Trust Fund and/or the CAR Trust Fund; 8. Recipients of General Budget Support and/or State and

Resilience Building Contracts.

Table 4 Approved case studies

Region Proposed case studies Africa • APF/South Sudan/CAR/Somalia (field visits to South Sudan

and the AU/IGAD in Addis) • Somalia (desk) • Central African Republic (desk) • Niger • Ivory Coast • Zimbabwe

Asia • Afghanistan (desk) • Philippines • Myanmar (desk)

Latin America • Colombia Neighbourhood East • Georgia Neighbourhood South • Lebanon

While data have been collected for all cases during the desk phase, only eight will be subject to further in-depth analysis via field visits. Evaluability and the added value of an additional

field study were the main criteria that informed the team’s decision for not visiting four cases. For Somalia, Afghanistan and Central African Republic, the team determined that security

concerns will not allow for a meaningful visit (e.g. possible interactions with a variety of

10 This covers four types of complementary support: 1) whether a CSDP mission/operation is present; 2) whether DG ECHO support is provided; 3) whether a joint programming exercise has been undertaken or is underway; and 4) whether the APF has provided support.

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stakeholders outside the capital/government districts/green zones). The EUD in Myanmar was

unable to host a field mission until September which is too late to keep the deadlines agreed with the evaluation management and RG. Work on the four desk-only cases will not end with

the desk report and the team will seek to carry out additional interviews and document review

during the field and synthesis phase to complement the desk work. Finally, the survey provides an additional tool for collecting country-related information from the relevant EUDs at distance.

Data collection and analysis

The evaluation matrix, including the Judgement Criteria (JC) and indicators which structured each EQ, provided the overall framework for data collection and analysis. Data collection

activities were carried out mainly during the desk phase and the field phase. These activities included the Commission’s external relations data ‘CRIS’ extraction, document collection and

review, case studies, email queries, phone and face-to-face interviews and an online survey

which targeted over 40 EU Delegations worldwide. The combination of data collection methods and techniques varied according to the different JCs, but multiple sources were used

systematically to triangulate the information collected. Where possible, the evaluation team combined the use of qualitative and quantitative data, and relied both on primary and

secondary data sources, while taking into account resource and time constraints. During all

phases, the evaluation team verified that the set of methods and techniques was sufficiently broad to ensure a high level of data reliability and validity of conclusions, and identified gaps

to be filled and hypothesis to be tested (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 Data collection process

Source: Particip.

Main challenges and limitations

This evaluation did not face major or unusual challenges that would not be encountered in any other EU global thematic evaluation. However, like other evaluations, it faced a few external

challenges over which the evaluation team had limited control. The most important challenges and limitations, together with steps taken in mitigation, are presented in Table 5.

Statistics Financial data

Intervention-specific

information

General information Data is missing

Data is to be cross-checked

and/or complemented

Data is reliable and

comprehensive

Information gap

Hypotheses

Preliminary findings

To be collected & tested during

further phases

To be tested during

subsequent phases

To be confirmed during

subsequent phases

Identifying and gathering information at indicator level

Feeds the level of the indicators

Ensuring data quality

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Table 5 Main challenges and limitations

Challenge Situation encountered and mitigation response Related to the evidence base Thematic scope

The EU has no agreed or single definition of either “conflict prevention” or “peacebuilding”. Definitions employed by others (UN, OECD-DAC) are widely used by CPPB actors, yet did not provide adequate guidance in terms of delineating the thematic scope of the evaluation as they were relatively broad. As a consequence, determining the thematic scope of CPPB for the purpose of this evaluation was challenging. A number of issues with the evaluation’s scope manifested as early as in the first RG meeting, notably the inclusion of IcSP/IfS articles 3 and 4 or the identification of complementary interventions. Close consultation with the RG during the drafting of the Inception Report allowed all these issues to be resolved.

Project and programme documentation

Relevant information was not always easily retrievable, as only limited progress reporting was available in CRIS. Therefore, the team combined data extracted from CRIS with information found online and documentation shared by EU Delegations (EUDs), geographical desks and stakeholders met during the field phase. This process proved to be very time-consuming, with documents still being retrieved well into the field phase. The availability of M&E documents continued to be problematic throughout the evaluation.

Political and policy dialogue

Political and policy dialogue is complex, with a multitude of cause and effect linkages that the evaluation team was required to test. While documented effects were often not available in project and programming documents, the team conducted interviews at Headquarters (HQ) and in partner countries, with a particular focus on questions related to policy and political dialogue. With the exception of Georgia, the team met with Heads of Delegation (HoD) and/or members of the political sections at EUDs during the field missions.

The highly sensitive nature of CPPB

The root causes of conflicts, violence, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are highly sensitive and heavily politicised topics in many (if not all) partner countries benefitting from EU support to CPPB. The evaluation team had to work carefully in such instances, triangulating official government interviews, EUD interviews, discussions with conflict parties, civil society groups and so on to avoid replicating biased or one-sided views.

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Annex 3: Evaluation matrix

Cluster 1: Strategy and implementation

EQ 1 on relevance and coherence

To what extent has EU support for CPPB11 been aligned with EU high-level priorities for CPPB, the broader frameworks for EU external action and the priorities and needs of partner countries?

JC 1.1 EU support for CPPB at strategy/programming and intervention level has been aligned with EU high-level priorities and objectives for CPPB

I-1.1.1 Evidence that high-level CPPB political priorities and policy objectives are reflected and mainstreamed in EU strategy/programming.

I-1.1.2 Evidence that high-level CPPB political priorities and policy objectives are reflected and mainstreamed in EU CPPB interventions as well as complementary interventions.

JC 1.2 EU support for CPPB at strategy/programming and intervention level has been coherent and complementary across EU institutions

I-1.2.1 Evidence that the policies relating to EU support for CPPB were shared and coordinated within the EU institutions at headquarters level and between headquarters and EU Delegations.

I-1.2.2 Evidence that EU support for CPPB was coordinated operationally within and between EU institutions and between EU headquarters and EU Delegations.

I-1.2.3 Extent to which cooperation between the Council, EEAS and the Commission has promoted complementarity across EU CPPB action.

I-1.2.4 Evidence that different EU CPPB interventions (covering both spending and non-spending interventions) have been implemented in a complementary and synergistic manner.

JC 1.3 EU support for CPPB at strategy/programming and intervention level has been coherent with other EU external actions in areas such as development, trade, counter-terrorism etc.

I-1.3.1 Evidence that EU support for CPPB does not contradict other high-level policies of EU external action

I-1.3.2 Evidence that the objectives of other EU external actions do not conflict with CPPB objectives.

11 ‘EU support for CPPB’ refers to all financing and non-financing instruments and tools covered by the legal scope of this evaluation: ‘The overall EU support for CPPB EU’s will be taken into consideration including agreements, the cooperation and any other official commitments. Policies and interventions governed by the instruments such as DCI, EDF, ENI,EIDHR, IcSP, IfS, CFSP, CSDP are at the epicentre.’ CSDP missions are to be examined only at case study level and focus on complementarity with other instruments. Where support is provided by the EU and its Member States, the term ‘EU and EU MS’ will be employed. Additionally, ‘EU support for CPPB’ refers to Category 1 and 2 interventions in the typology. Where Category 3 interventions are relevant, they are specified in EQs, JCs and indicators.

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I-1.3.3 Evidence that complementary interventions (Category 3) are aligned with /not contradicting EU support for CPPB.

JC 1.4 EU support for CPPB has shown responsiveness and adaptiveness to priorities and needs of partner countries as well as inter-governmental bodies at regional level

I-1.4.1 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has adopted an inclusive and multi-stakeholder approach in identifying needs and preference on the ground and in intervention design and during implementation.

I-1.4.2 Extent to which EU CPPB interventions have been sufficiently tailored to the region/local policy and political-security-cultural context in which they take place and whether they have been grounded in up-to-date conflict/context analysis.

I-1.4.3 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has remained relevant over time by responding to changing circumstances in national/regional security situations and/or political context or to changes of implementing partner capacities.

EQ 2 on the approach to implementation

To what extent have the approaches, tools and mechanisms for implementation been appropriate to achieve the intended objectives in an optimal manner?

JC 2.1 EU support for CPPB has been delivered in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost

I-2.1.1 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has been implemented within the intended timeframes without significant delays.

I-2.1.2 Extent to which the costs involved are justified in light of the effects that have been achieved through CPPB support.

I-2.1.3 Evidence that the transaction costs for steering, consultation, coordination and participation of stakeholders have been reasonable, compared to the complexity of the situations and other comparable actions.

I-2.1.4 Extent to which the institutional set-up of EU support for CPPB (incl. communication channels and decision-making processes) has promoted flexibility, timeliness and cost-effectiveness.

JC 2.2 The EU institutions (EUD and HQ level) providing support for CPPB have sufficient and appropriate human resources

I-2.2.1 Evidence of sufficient CPPB expertise, knowledge and technical skills to support CPPB strategy/programming, design and implementation, among and within EU institutions (at HQ, regional offices and EUD levels).

I-2.2.2 Evidence of sufficient and appropriate experience-sharing and lessons-learning mechanisms within the EU institutions and with EU MS and other actors and that the findings of these mechanisms inform EU support for CPPB

I-2.2.3 Extent to which staff numbers have been sufficient and appropriate to support CPPB programming, among and within EU institutions (at HQ, regional offices and EUD levels).

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JC 2.3 EU support for CPPB has been monitored on a regular basis to report on results, identify blockages and resolve problems in a timely fashion at EUD and HQ levels

I-2.3.1 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has been underpinned by baseline studies and employed appropriate indicators to measure progress in relation to the baseline situation at output, outcome and impact levels and to ensure conflict sensitivity.

I-2.3.2 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has set realistic targets for achieving the objectives identified at programming and project/programme design stage.

I-2.3.3 Evidence that EU CPPB interventions have sound monitoring systems (SMART indicators, data collection system with responsible stakeholders identified) in place at the start and that these are actively used it during implementation of CPPB interventions (i.e. indicators monitored on a regular basis, proper reporting carried out regularly).

I-2.3.4 Extent to which qualitative improvements/positive change have been adequately documented in programming reports, monitoring reports and evaluations.

I-2.3.5 Evidence that the overall direction of EU support for CPPB has been monitored and that this information is available to relevant actors (e.g. EU institutions, EU MS, non-EU partners).

JC 2.4 The choice of EU financing instruments and different aid modalities has been appropriate to the context, beneficiary needs, capacities and expected results

I-2.4.1 Evidence that the mix of instruments (geographic instruments, IfS/IcSP, thematic instruments/programmes) used has been appropriate to the context and expected results.

I-2.4.2 Evidence that the right aid modalities (project, budget support, Twinning) and delivery channels (e.g. Trust Funds, ERM, bilateral vs regional support) were available and fit for purpose.

EQ 3 on coordination and complementarity

To what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with EU Member States, and international, regional, national and local actors?

JC 3.1 EU support for CPPB has been coordinated and complementary with efforts by EU MS and international actors, at operational and policy levels

I-3.1.1 Evidence of shared analysis and common vision and understanding with EU MS and international actors (including UN, NATO) that has informed programming/interactions.

I-3.1.2 Evidence of factors that either contributed to or undermined coordination and extent to which and how such factors were integrated into the formulation and implementation of EU support for CPPB.

I-3.1.3 Evidence that synergies have been sought and exploited and that duplication has been avoided at intervention level.

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JC 3.2 EU support for CPPB has been coordinated and complementary with efforts by regional, national and local actors, at operational and policy levels

I-3.2.1 Evidence of shared analysis and common vision and understanding with national and local actors that has informed programming/interactions.

I-3.2.2 Evidence of factors that either contributed to or undermined coordination and extent to which and how such factors were integrated into the formulation and implementation of EU support for CPPB

I-3.2.3 Evidence that synergies have been sought and exploited and that duplication has been avoided at intervention level.

EQ 4 on added value

What has been the added value resulting from EU support for CPPB compared with what could have been achieved by EU Member States and other actors (national/international organisations, national/regional partners) alone?

JC 4.1 EU support for CPPB has had added value in comparison to what could have been achieved by EU Member States alone

I-4.1.1 Evidence that the amounts and duration of funding enable the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for EU Member States.

I-4.1.2 Evidence that the EU’s political weight, its supranational nature and its commitment to remain engaged over the long term have enabled the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for EU Member States.

I-4.1.3 Evidence that the EU’s convening power and its ability to forge partnerships have enabled the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for EU Member States.

I-4.1.4 Evidence that the EU’s expertise and knowledge of country and CPPB relevant issues have enabled the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for EU Member States.

JC 4.2 EU support for CPPB has had added value in comparison with what could have been achieved by other actors (international, regional, national or local) alone

I-4.2.1 Evidence that the EU’s political weight and its supranational nature have enabled the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for other actors.

I-4.2.2 Evidence that the EU’s convening power and its ability to forge partnerships have enabled the EU to support CPPB in ways that would not be possible for other actors.

EQ 5 on cross-cutting issues

To what extent has EU support for CPPB mainstreamed and promoted conflict sensitivity, human rights and gender?

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JC 5.1 Conflict sensitivity (including particular attention to diversity) has been mainstreamed and applied appropriately in the design, implementation and M&E of EU support for CPPB, as well as in complementary interventions

I-5.1.1 Evidence that conflict sensitivity guidance and principles have been taken into account and mainstreamed in strategy/programming documents as well as intervention-level documents.

I-5.1.2 Evidence that EU support for CPPB has been guided by conflict sensitivity principles during implementation and M&E.

I-5.1.3 Evidence that EU-supported complementary interventions (Category 3) have been guided by conflict sensitivity principles.

JC 5.2 Human rights have been addressed and mainstreamed in design, implementation and M&E of EU support for CPPB

I-5.2.1 Evidence that human rights guidance and principles have been taken into account and mainstreamed in strategy/programming documents as well as intervention-level documents.

I-5.2.2 Extent to which EU support for CPPB has addressed the protection and promotion of human rights during implementation and M&E.

JC 5.3 Gender has been addressed and mainstreamed in design, implementation and M&E of EU support for CPPB

I-5.3.1 Evidence that guidance on gender sensitivity have been taken into account and mainstreamed in strategy/programming documents as well as intervention-level documents.

I-5.3.2 Extent to which EU support for CPPB has addressed gender issues during implementation and M&E.

I-5.3.3 Evidence that any observed changes / effects of EU support for CPPB are fairly distributed across different gender groups.

Cluster 2: Effects of EU support for CPPB

EQ 6 on short- to mid-term results

To what extent has EU support for CPPB achieved the expected short- to mid-term results?

JC 6.1 EU support for CPPB (incl. spending and non-spending actions and their interactions) contributed to achieving the expected short- to mid-term results

I-6.1.1 Evidence that expected short- to mid-term results have been achieved and degree of contribution of EU support for CPPB through spending actions to these results.

I-6.1.2 Evidence that non-spending actions, including for example policy dialogue and high-level political support, have contributed to these results.

I-6.1.3 Evidence that the combined use and interactions between spending and non-spending activities have contributed to these results.

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JC 6.2 EU support for CPPB has been underpinned by a comprehensive/integrated approach which has contributed towards achieving results

I-6.2.1 Extent to which and how the comprehensive/integrated approach has been applied to EU support for CPPB (either explicitly or implicitly).

I-6.2.2 Evidence that the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach contributed to mitigating/preventing violence originated by nascent conflicts and crises and to restore immediate stability and/or creating/restoring/consolidating structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace.

JC 6.3 Potential unintended negative effects of EU support for CPPB have been identified and addressed by EU and partners

I-6.3.1 Evidence of unintended negative effects I-6.3.2 Evidence that unintended negative effects of EU support for CPPB (including

effects on the political environment of partner countries) have been adequately identified and dealt with by EU and partners.

EQ 7 on broader effects and sustainability

To what extent has EU support for CPPB contributed to conflict/crisis prevention/mitigation, and structural stability and enhanced conditions for peace in a sustainable way?

JC 7.1 EU support for CPPB has contributed to creating/restoring/consolidating structural stability and strengthened conditions for peace

I-7.1.1 Evidence of changes in the context in terms of structural stability and improved conditions for peace (e.g. a more peaceful, equitable and democratic society) during the evaluation period.

I-7.1.2 Evidence that EU and partners (through EU support for CPPB) have pursued and effectively supported structural stability and long-term conditions for sustained peace.

I-7.1.3 Evidence that underlying causes of conflict and crises have been effectively addressed through EU support for CPPB by EU and partners.

I-7.1.4 Evidence that complementary interventions (Category 3) have had a contributing role in strengthening structural stability and conditions for peace.

I-7.1.5 Extent to which other (non-EU related) factors have contributed to strengthening structural stability and conditions for peace.

JC 7.2 EU support for CPPB has contributed to mitigating/preventing violence originated by nascent conflicts and crises and to restore immediate stability

I-7.2.1 Evidence of timely and adequate actions by EU and partners (through EU support for CPPB) that have contributed to preventing and/or addressing violent conflict and enabling rapid restoration of stability.

I-7.2.2 Evidence that complementary interventions (Category 3) have had a contributing role in preventing and/or addressing violent conflict and enabling rapid restoration of stability.

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I-7.2.3 Extent to which other (non-EU related) factors have contributed to mitigating/preventing violence originated by nascent conflicts and crises.

JC 7.3 Effects of EU support for CPPB are sustained

I-7.3.1 Evidence that CPPB capacities of regional, national and local actors have been sustained.

I-7.3.2 Evidence that ownership of CPPB actions and results by regional, national and local actors has been strengthened.

I-7.3.3 Evidence that effects of EU support for CPPB have been financially sustained (for example by EU follow up actions, by donors, or by resources of recipients).

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Annex 4: Analysis of spending activities The evaluation team has identified a portfolio of spending activities totalling at 5,6 billion EUR

of contracted amounts. More than two thirds are funded through the two largest geographical

instruments, the European Development Fund (EDF, 48%) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, 20%). Thematic instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability

and Peace (IcSP) and its predecessors (IfS-RRM), 18%) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, 0,1%) as well as the geographical instruments in

support of the European Neighbourhood Region (ENI / ENPI, 14%) share the remaining third

(see Figure 4).

Figure 4 Breakdown of the CPPB portfolio by funding instruments

Instrument Contracted, EUR m.

EDF 2.733,35 DCI 1.112,47 IcSP/IfS/IfS-RRM 1.043,83 ENI/ENPI 768,91 EIDHR 5,40 Total 5.663,96

As shown in Figure 5 below, the majority of support is provided bilaterally (i.e. through partner level interventions). Regional level interventions make up for roughly 40% of the total volume.

A smaller percentage of the total is intended for multi-recipient interventions (e.g. thematic interventions at a global level or involving several specifically selected partners).

Figure 5 Breakdown of the CPPB portfolio by type of intervention

Support Contracted, EUR m.

Bilateral interventions

3.128,10

Regional interventions

2.307,18

Multi-recipient interventions12

228,68

Total 5.663,96

Looking at the geographical distribution of the portfolio, the predominant role of Africa as a

recipient of CPPB related support becomes immediately apparent (Table 6). As a

12 Multi-recipient interventions are either interventions providing support at a global scale or to a selected number of bilateral partners.

48,3%

19,6%

18,4%

13,6%

0,1%

EDF DCI IcSP/IFS(-RRM) ENI/ENPI EIDHR

55,2%40,7%

4,0%

Bilateral interventions Regional interventions

Multi-recipient interventions

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consequence, the team has chosen to include a further regional breakdown within the African

continent. A total of approximately 3,1 billion EUR (more than half of the total volume) is contracted to either bilateral or regional level interventions in Africa, the majority of which is

dedicated to regional level interventions targeting Africa as a whole. This regional funding

primarily reflects funds made available for the African Peace Facility (APF).13 The remaining funding is spread rather evenly across the sub-regions with the exception of Southern Africa

which receives significantly less than the other sub-regions. The findings from the bilateral

partner mapping exercise suggest this reflects the relatively lower incidence of conflicts in Southern Africa during the 2011-2018 period.

Whereas the ratio between bilateral and regional level interventions is similar across most regions14 (ranging from approximately one sixth to one fifth of the total amounts), support in

Asia and Latin America seems to be almost entirely bilateral. There are also significant

differences between African sub-regions, with Western Africa presenting the largest share of regional support. This is possibly related to the special conflict environment in Western Africa

which has a broad regional dimension.

Table 6 Overview of CPPB spending by region

Region Total contracted EUR m. % bilateral % regional

Africa 3.107,05 33,6% 66,4% Africa (Central) 308,15 94,8% 5,2% Africa (East) 332,67 96,5% 3,5% Africa (South) 75,31 99,9% 0,1% Africa (West) 414,63 85,8% 14,2% Africa (whole) 1.976,29 0,0% 100,0%

Asia (incl. Central Asia) 1.030,91 98,4% 1,6% Asia (Central) 44,35 92,4% 7,6% Asia (Middle East) 25,87 100,0% 0,0% Asia (South) 643,26 99,3% 0,7% Asia (Southeast) 317,44 97,2% 2,8%

European Neighbourhood 1.030,63 78,3% 21,7% Neighbourhood (South) 367,33 79,5% 20,5% Neighbourhood (East) 621,48 82,9% 17,1% Neighbourhood (whole) 41,83 0,0% 100,0%

Latin America 253,26 99,5% 0,5% Caribbean & Pacific 13,42 80,7% 19,3% Total15 5.435,28

A further breakdown of the bilateral support by bilateral partner shows that over 90% of the

total support is shared among 30 recipients (Table 7). The 15 largest recipients received almost

13 The CRIS database displays these funds as benefitting the “Pan-African region” and the team has adopted this categorisation to reflect the portfolio as faithfully to the EU-internal databases as possible. 14 Africa (in its entirety) is an obvious exception due to the large amounts allocated to the APF which bias this statistic in favour of the regional-level interventions. The sub-regions however follow the general trend of having more than 80% of their funding contracted through bilateral support. 15 Additional 228 million EUR are tied to multi-recipient interventions without a clear geographical focus and thus do not appear in this table.

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three quarters of the overall bilateral portfolio. The total CPPB portfolio consists of more than

70 recipients, which means that over 40 EU partners received less than 10% of EU CPPB related support. Almost half of the recipients in the CPPB spending inventory received less

than 10 million EUR between 2011 and 2018. Spending is clearly concentrated in a few

selected partners, 11 of which received more than 100 million EUR during the same period. These recipients are distributed relatively evenly across the globe: four can be found in the

European Neighbourhood, three respectively in Africa and Asia and one recipient in Latin

America. The biggest recipient by far is Afghanistan (467 million EUR), which received almost as much as the three next largest recipients – Somalia, Myanmar and Colombia – combined.

These large recipients receive the vast majority of EU CPPB financing allocated to their respective regions. Colombia alone accounts for two thirds of EU financial support to CPPB in

Latin America. Afghanistan and Myanmar together receive more than 60% of the funding going

to Asia and Somalia receives almost 60% of the support to Eastern Africa.

Table 7 Overview of the 30 largest recipients of bilateral CPPB support

Zone Contracted, EUR m.Afghanistan 467,51 gggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggg

Somalia 204,35 gggggggggggggggggggg

Myanmar 172,24 ggggggggggggggggg

Colombia 165,15 gggggggggggggggg

DR Congo 161,97 gggggggggggggggg

Jordan 134,27 ggggggggggggg

Lebanon 128,63 gggggggggggg

Moldova 122,89 gggggggggggg

Nigeria 120,50 gggggggggggg

Palestine 120,15 gggggggggggg

Pakistan 102,91 gggggggggg

Georgia 88,97 gggggggg

Niger 82,30 gggggggg

Ukraine 80,19 gggggggg

Central African Republic 79,61 ggggggg

South Sudan 57,81 ggggg

El Salvador 54,81 ggggg

Libya 53,10 ggggg

Cambodia 50,59 ggggg

Philippines 50,42 ggggg

Syria 48,46 gggg

Chad 48,29 gggg

Mali 39,92 ggg

Côte d'Ivoire 49,91 gggg

Angola 31,93 ggg

Zimbabwe 30,43 ggg

Kyrgyzstan 30,05 ggg

Bangladesh 24,91 gg

Sri Lanka 22,16 gg

Nepal 20,66 gg

Total (30 largest) 2.845,11% of total bilateral support 91,0%

% of top 15 recipients 71,3%

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In terms of delivery channels, the largest share of EU support to CPPB (over 1,8 billion EUR)

is channelled through regional actors, such as the African Union (AU), the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Large

volumes of support are also channelled through UN agencies (983 million EUR) and

(international) NGOs (739 million EUR). (International) NGOs also represent the largest group in terms of absolute numbers of contracts implemented through them (640), only comparable

to private sector companies (534 contracts). In contrast, the average contract volume for both

groups is relatively small compared to regional actors and development banks (average volume 32 million EUR resp. 17 million EUR). Table 8 provides an overview of the delivery

channels.

Table 8 Overview of delivery channels

Delivery channel Planned amount N° of contracts Av. volume / contract Regional actors 1.802.467.975 57 31.622.245 UN Agency 983.696.792 196 5.018.861 (I)NGO 739.186.627 640 1.154.979 National authority 472.054.143 78 6.051.976 Private sector 411.416.757 534 770.443 EU MS 383.054.173 94 4.075.044 Intergovernmental organisation

243.703.491 53 4.598.179

Development bank 220.015.291 13 16.924.253 EU entity 126.750.874 24 5.281.286 Local authority 3.991.367 18 221.743 Not specified/Other 277.618.738 124 2.238.861

The team has identified different categories of EU interventions based on how closely they are

linked to CPPB. Only the first two categories, i.e. “Primary CPPB interventions” and “Mixed

Objectives interventions”, are included in the spending portfolio. Funding is distributed almost equally between the two categories, with funding for Category 1 Primary CPPB interventions

being slightly larger as illustrated by Figure 6.

Figure 6 Breakdown of the CPPB portfolio by categories of interventions, EUR m.

When looking at the development of the portfolio over time, it becomes apparent that EU

support to CPPB peaked in 2014 with just over 1 billion EUR contracted and has decreased

slowly since the (currently standing at 515 million EUR in 2018). This is shown in Figure 7. The

3.100

2.564

Category 1: Primary CPPB Category 2: Mixed Objectives

54


2018 spending is still almost one and a half times the amount that was contracted in 2011.

This increase could be an indicator of a recent surge of violent conflicts over the past few years, a renewed momentum on CPPB both at the EU and global level16 and/or a result of the

EU funding cycles.

This increase is further substantiated by the fact that the amount contracted to interventions with Primary CPPB objectives remains relatively stable at a high level whereas interventions

with Mixed Objectives are decreasing in volume. The turning point can be observed between

2014 and 2015. Since then, the share of funding contracted in Category 1 has always been higher than in Category 2. As an analysis of the portfolio by thematic area underscores,

Category 1 (Primary CPPB) is dominated by peace support operations in Africa which account for roughly two thirds of the overall volume and this accounts for a large share of the

divergence.

Figure 7 Contracted CPPB funding over time

The following tables and figures show the breakdown of contracted amounts by thematic area

and also identify the largest (bilateral) recipient for every thematic area. While support to peace operations dominates Category 1, Category 2 (Mixed Objectives interventions) is mainly

composed of interventions supporting security/rule of law or democratic governance. Other thematic areas play a less significant role (in terms of financial volume).

Table 9 Thematic areas of Category 1 (Primary CPPB interventions)

Thematic area Total

planned, EUR m.

Largest bilateral

recipients

Largest bilateral recipient, planned,

EUR m. 1 High level engagement and support to

peace processes 211,21 Somalia 89,04

2 National and local dialogue and reconciliation

714,67 Colombia 152,98

3 Transitional justice 42,70 Lebanon 37,90

16 For information on changes in ODA allocated to CPPB over the 2011-2018 period, see: Sherriff, A., Veron, P. Deneckere, M. and Hauck, V. September 2018. Supporting peacebuilding in times of change. A synthesis of 4 case studies. Maastricht: ECDPM.

349,64

1.002,58

789,96

0

200

400

600

800

1.000

1.200

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Cont

ract

ed am

ount

, EUR

m

Category 1: Primary CPPB

Category 2: Mixed Objectives

Total

55


Thematic area Total

planned, EUR m.

Largest bilateral

recipients

Largest bilateral recipient, planned,

EUR m. 4 CPPB capacity building 146,08 Niger 15,54 5 Peace support operations, ceasefire

monitoring and human rights monitoring (in the framework of CPPB)

1.967,74 Ukraine 41,94

6 Conflict analysis and early warning 14,25 Ethiopia 1,50 7 Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB 3,18 N/A N/A Total 3.099,83

Figure 8 Thematic areas of Category 1 (Primary CPPB interventions)

Table 10 Thematic areas of Category 2 (Mixed Objectives interventions)

Thematic area Total planned EUR m.

Largest bilateral

recipients

Largest bilateral recipient, planned

EUR m. 1 Security and Rule of Law / Justice 1.355,17 Afghanistan 270,47 2 Democratic governance, elections, civil

society, and media 1.069,69 Afghanistan 183,14

3 Socio-economic foundations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding

74,40 Palestine 24,36

4 Natural resources and land rights 11,36 Côte d'Ivoire 1,00 5 Countering / Preventing violent

extremism 53,51 Jordan 11,00

Total 2.564,13

63,5%

23,1%

6,8%

4,7%

1,4%0,5% 0,1%

Peace support operations, ceasefiremonitoring and human rightsmonitoring (in the framework of CPPB)National and local dialogue andreconciliation

High level engagement and support topeace processes

CPPB capacity building

Transitional justice

Conflict analysis and early warning

Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB

56


Figure 9 Thematic areas of Category 2 (Mixed Objectives interventions)

Most interventions follow a project-based approach. However, budget support operations also contribute to CPPB objectives, even if this contribution is at times more indirect in nature. The

evaluation team has identified a list of 26 general budget support operations with a total volume

of just above 2 billion EUR (see Table 11) that are potentially relevant to this evaluation. They have not been included into the statistical analysis above (in order to prevent the distortion of

results) but were taken into account for the case study selection and further analysis.

Table 11 Overview of potentially relevant budget support operations

Recipient Decision Reference Intervention title Contracted,

EUR m. Mali FED/2015/038-388 SBC MLI 2015 - Appui à la Consolidation de

l'Etat 181,93

FED/2018/040-072 SBC MLI 2018 - SBC III 130,00 Burkina Faso FED/2015/037-936 SBC BFA 2015 120,00

FED/2016/038-574 GGDC Burkina Faso 135,00 Niger FED/2013/024-422 GGDC Niger 140,78

FED/2016/038-436 SBC NER 2016 - Contrat relatif à la Construction de l'Appareil de l'Etat

78,77

Côte d'Ivoire FED/2016/037-942 GGDC Côte d'Ivoire 57,15 FED/2012/023-813 SBC CIV 2012 143,72

Afghanistan ACA/2016/038-207 SBC AFG 2016 100,00 ACA/2017/040-631 SBC AFG 2017 100,59

Ukraine ENI/2014/037-370 SBC UKR 2014 182,13 Benin FED/2012/022-715 GGDC Benin 43,66

FED/2016/037-882 GGDC Benin 104,44 Chad FED/2015/038-489 SBC 2015 - ACET Programme d'appui à la

consolidation de l'Etat 22,00

FED/2016/039-310 SBC 2016 - ACET II Programme d'appui à la consolidation de l'Etat

92,45

Sierra Leone FED/2012/024-389 SBC SLE 2012 34,71 Togo FED/2012/023-306 ABPP - Programme d'Appui Budgétaire aux

Politiques Publiques 32,03

52,9%41,7%

2,9%2,1%

0,4% Security and Rule of Law / Justice

Democratic governance, elections, civilsociety, and media

Socio-economic foundations of conflictprevention and peacebuilding

Countering / Preventing violent extremism

Natural resources and land rights

57


Recipient Decision Reference Intervention title Contracted,

EUR m. FED/2016/038-540 SBC TGO 2016 - Contrat de Consolidation

de l'Etat 2 (SBCT) 61,00

Liberia FED/2017/040-045 SBC LBR 2017 - Moving Liberia forward Improving service delivery and public investment

6,00

Cape Verde FED/2016/038-219 GGDC Cape Verde 62,06 Central African Republic

FED/2017/040-192 SBC CAR 2017 60,08

Malawi FED/2012/022-685 GGDC Malawi 40,00 Mauritania FED/2012/022-576 SBC MRT 2012 - CSLP III - Programme

d'AB à la mise en place du Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté

38,71

Burundi FED/2012/022-696 FABRICE - Facilité d'Appui Budgétaire et de Renforcement Institutionnel pour la Croissance Economique

35,85

Gambia FED/2017/040-255 SBC GMB 2017 29,34 Guinea-Bissau

FED/2014/037-674 SBC GNB 2014 19,93

Total 2.052,33

58


Annex 5: Mapping of non-spending activities The extent to which the EU engages in non-spending activities is difficult to determine with

precision as they can comprise, for example, activities executed during the day-to-day

business of an EU Head of Delegation’s (HoD) diplomatic contacts as well as confidential negotiations; and/or activities for which only limited information is generally documented and/

or available to evaluators. The effectiveness of non-spending activities will be assessed primarily through an investigation of the 12 case studies.

The principal criterion for identifying non-spending activities is whether the activities have been

carried out directly by EU institutional actors, i.e. EU functionaries and other EU staff, to promote the EU’s CPPB goals. A smaller number of non-spending activities are carried out by

third parties, complementary to the work of these institutional actors. The evaluation team has adopted the following working definition for non-spending activities:

"EU institutional non-spending activities are carried out by EU institutional actors (EU officials

and contracted staff as well as staff of EU member states delegated to EU institutions) in

support of CPPB promoted and facilitated by the EU and its partners. These activities are paid

from the administrative budget.”

EU institutional non-spending activities can take place at very different institutional levels, ranging from limited engagements at the level of EU Delegations (such as the support to

mediation between factions within society in a partner), up to international peace negotiations – as with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme – where

the High Representative (HR) is the EU lead. Such engagements can be accompanied by

spending activities that may comprise the low-level exchange of civil society organisations in partner X or a workshop with EU policymakers in Brussels (funded through IcSP) or the

accompaniment of high-level diplomatic activities of the HR’s international political engagement by the EUSR in region Y.17

There are also activities carried out by EU Member States or other international partners or

NGOs which the EU institutions make use of, or which the EU relates to, but which are not funded by the EU, such as diplomatic activities by EU Member States which are coordinated

with EU action. Table 12 below shows the division between EU institutional non-spending activities and related/coordinated non-spending activities for both Category 1 Primary CPPB

interventions and Category 2 Mixed Objectives interventions. No non-spending activities have

been identified for complementary interventions.

17 The EUSR falls under the “other / related funding” category according to the working definition. The EUSR is not an EU official and is appointed by the Council. She/He operates administratively through a project approach funded under the CSDP budget with contributions from EU member states (mostly delegated staff). The EUSR website describes EUSRs as follows: “The EUSRs support the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), in the regions concerned. They play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective EU Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the Union's efforts to become a more effective, more coherent and more capable actor on the world stage. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key bilateral partners and regions, acting as a “voice” and “face” for the EU and its policies.” [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives ]

59


Table 12 Non-spending activities

EU institutional non-spending activities

Related / coordinated non-spending activities

Category 1: Primary CPPB interventions High level engagement and support to peace processes

Good offices/diplomatic initiatives: HR activities Diplomatic initiatives and political dialogue by senior staff, at headquarters as well as HoD level Support by PRISM (and its predecessors18) and other EEAS senior staff for high level engagement

(Coordinated) diplomacy/diplomatic initiatives undertaken by EU Member States

Transitional justice

Political roles, policy dialogue and/or diplomatic and mediation initiatives by EU HoDs and other senior staff, such as Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Political Section

Collaboration by EU MS and other international actors with non-governmental actors or groups/ organisations, through unofficial and informal channels

National and local dialogue and reconciliation

Political roles, policy dialogue and/or diplomatic and mediation initiatives by EU HoDs and other senior staff, such as Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Political Section MEPs’ personal mediation initiatives EEAS supported mediation (through PRISM staff) Support to peace building conferences and/or international pledging conferences, e.g. on Somalia (New Deal process)

(Coordinated) diplomacy/diplomatic initiatives undertaken by EU Member States) Political dialogue (including Friends’ Groups, e.g. in Colombia in the framework of the implementation of the peace process between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) Collaboration by EU MS and other international actors with non-governmental actors or groups/ organisations, through unofficial and informal channels

National and local capacity building for CPPB


Coordinated activities (dialogue, mediation) with EU Member States and other international partners

Peace support operations, ceasefire monitoring and human rights monitoring (in the framework of CPPB)


Executed by EU Member States: training by CSDP missions/operations (capacity building/training/ curricula/ definition of training standards, and so on) for people deployed to EU, AU, UN missions

Conflict analysis and early warning

Conflict early warning system tools and process: Global Conflict Risk Index, Conflict Prevention Reports

Fragility assessments and/or risk assessments carried out by other international organisations or bi-lateral partners (e.g. in context of New Deal)

18 PRISM predecessors comprise the specific EEAS Divisions and personnel that existed during the evaluation period prior to the creation of PRISM that had a related conflict prevention or peacebuilding focus.

60


EU institutional non-spending activities

Related / coordinated non-spending activities

Risk assessments Conflict Analysis EU conflict Early Warning Systems All carried out with broad engagement from EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG ECHO Conflict sensitivity guidance, training and quality assurance by DEVCO

Oversight and lessons learning for CPPB

Internal evaluations, studies, reviews, research Participation in international audits, e.g. OECD peer reviews PB assessments, executed jointly with UN and WB Joint monitoring with other likeminded actors, participation in joint missions

External evaluations, studies, research conducted by international organisations or bilateral partners

Category 2: Mixed Objectives interventions Security and Rule of Law/ Justice

Political roles, policy dialogue and/ or diplomatic and mediation initiatives by EU HoDs and other senior staff, such as Heads of Cooperation and Heads of Political Section

Coordinated activities (dialogue, diplomatic initiatives, mediation) with EU Member States and other international actors

Democratic governance, elections, civil society and media



Socio-economic foundations of CPPB

Trade-related initiatives, conducted in a conflict-sensitive manner (e.g. on sensitive products / natural resources or on dual use materials under non-proliferation agreements)

Externally supported trade-related initiatives, conducted in a conflict-sensitive manner (e.g. on sensitive products/natural resources or on dual use materials under non-proliferation agreements)

Natural resources

Due diligence guidance at the international, national and local levels Political support to responsible mining / natural resources exploitation initiatives – e.g. Kimberley process, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) efforts related to natural resources

Countering / Preventing violent extremism



61


Annex 6: Survey report

Design and implementation of an online survey addressed to 40 EUDs

Purpose and objectives

Online surveys have turned out in the past to be useful tools for quickly gathering considerable

amounts of information, reaching a large number of respondents and obtaining structured and directly comparable data on topics of interest to enhance the generalisability of findings.

Through this tool, it was possible to collect primary information from a range of different

countries and thus to yield further insights into outcomes of EU support to CPPB on a global scale, rather than simply relying on information from desk and field case studies only.

General survey methodology

The questionnaire used for the online survey consisted both of closed and open questions.

Closed questions had a rating scale from 1 to 4 (or 5, when including the “don’t know” answer).

Additionally, respondents had the possibility to comment on the question in an optional text box below to clarify their answer or to introduce additional elements. Open questions allowed

for further contextualisation and the collection of any additional qualitative elements deemed relevant by the respondents.

While each survey question related to different aspects tackled by the EQs and was directly

linked to specific indicators or JCs, the questionnaire as a whole did not mirror the complete spectrum of the evaluation matrix. Rather the objective was to provide the team with additional

views on the main issues being addressed by the evaluation. Priority was given to subjects that are difficult to capture through document review, such as aspects related to policy dialogue

and other non-spending activities (for example, mediation), added value or effects of support.

The survey allowed to fill gaps regarding non-case study countries and to check findings gathered through desk research and interviews.

Target group and response rate

The survey was sent to the Evaluation focal points/Heads of Cooperation of EUDs in a selected sample of countries. This included the 33 partner countries initially identified during the case

study selection process and 7 additional relevant countries that had been recipients of CPPB support. This selection accounted for over 90% of EU CPPB financial assistance. It also

represented a very diverse portfolio in terms of geographic coverage, thematic diversity,

funding instruments, non-spending activities, complementarity and country/conflict context. The obvious overlap with the 11 case study countries allowed for cross-fertilization between

the survey and interviews and helped us fine-tune the questionnaires for the field missions.

A single unified response per EUD was the preferred result of our survey request. In order to

collect exhaustive responses to our questions, we encouraged the respondents to share and

discuss the questionnaire with their colleagues (preferably Heads/Team Leaders of relevant sections) for a more comprehensive view.

In total we have received responses from 29 out of 40 addressed EU Delegations in conflict or conflict-prone countries, distributed across all continents as shown in Figure 10.

62


Figure 10 Overview of responses

In most cases, the co-operation section responded to the questionnaire. The political section

was less frequently involved. Other contributions came from the Heads of Delegation as well

as from the relevant regional FPI/IcSP hubs. In approximately one third of the responses, multiple sections have been involved in answering the survey.

Summary of the survey analysis

Relevance

Q319: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU support for CPPB addressed the country’s priorities/needs in the time period 2011-2018?

Answers to this question have been largely positive with the vast majority of EUDs stating that

EU support for CPPB has addressed the priorities/needs in their countries (17 to a great extent,

9 to some extent).

Figure 11 Addressed country priorities/needs (Q1)

Q3_text: Please highlight the most important priorities/needs addressed and any particular feature(s) on how they were addressed.

The respondents highlighted the significant role that the EU played during the peace building

processes in their countries (i.e. Nepal, Ukraine, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, and Côte d’Ivoire). Confidence building initiatives (i.e. Moldova) or support to elections (i.e. Zimbabwe)

were identified as contributing factors to successful processes. The use of dialogue, various channels and modalities (EU Trust Funds, Multi-donor trust funds, appointments of an EU

19 The first two questions covered the respondents country of operations and their positions within the EUDs.

11

9

4

32

Asia

Africa

Neighbourhood South

Neighbourhood East

Latin America

4%0% 32% 61% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

1

Not at all Little extent Some extent Great extent Don't know

63


Special Envoy, support to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission) and their combination with

various instruments (i.e. IfS/IcSP, DCI, EDF) were highlighted as strengths of EU support.

Q4: Based on your experience, to what extent have the following tools and approaches been used to inform EU support for CPPB in the country?

Conflict or context analysis (both undertaken by EU entities or by other partners) were used

regularly by the EUDs that responded to this question (23 responses “to some or great extent”). Risk assessments and conflict sensitivity assessments were also used across the sample, but

a larger share of EUDs used these tools only to a little extent or not at all.

Figure 12 Conflict analysis / context analysis with a peacebuilding focus/conflict

sensitivity assessments undertaken by EUDs, EEAS, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR,

FPI, ECHO, EU Member States (Q4_1)20

Figure 13 Conflict analysis / context analysis with a peacebuilding focus/ conflict

sensitivity assessments undertaken by other partners, including UN, etc.

(Q4_2)

Figure 14 Use of risk assessments linked to conflict risks and/or to promote conflict

prevention (Q4_3)

20 Context analysis is a specific step of programme design. It is not necessarily conflict-informed or conflict sensitive or, indeed, informed by conflict analysis. Some context analyses do, however, include elements of conflict analysis and therefore the term “conflict/context analyses” is employed in some places in this report.

4% 14% 57% 25% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 4% 56% 30% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


0% 22% 52% 19% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


64


Figure 15 Conflict sensitivity assessments and/or monitoring, including use of conflict

advisors, helpdesks, etc. (Q4_4)

Q4_specify: Based on your knowledge, please specify which actors have conducted the conflict and/or context analysis in the country:

13 out of 24 respondents indicated that conflict and/or context analysis were conducted by various EU entities (EUD, DEVCO B2, EEAS PRISM, EEAS geographic divisions, FPI, EUSR

or EU external experts and/or PSDC experts).

10 additional respondents indicated that UN agencies (i.e. UNDP) and the EU conducted assessments jointly. Finally, CSOs contributed to the preparation of conflict and/or context

analyses in six countries and were even entirely responsible in one country.

In a smaller number of cases, EU Member States (UK/DFID, Germany), USAID and the World Bank contributed to conflict and/or context analysis.

Q4_specify2: Based on your knowledge, indicate when the conflict and/or context analysis has been produced:

The responses to the survey suggest that the conflict and/or context analysis were produced

rather recently with most EUDs indicating that they had conducted these analyses after 2015.

Only a small number of EUDs indicated that the analyses had been produced prior to the evaluation period.

Figure 16 Produced conflict and/or context analysis by time period (Q4_specify2)

7% 18% 61% 7% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


3

5

12

7

during and before 2011

between 2012-2014

between 2015-2017

during and after 2018

65


Q5: Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU been able to adjust its support for CPPB to respond to changes in the political, security and socio-economic situation/context in the partner country between 2011 and 2018?

Most respondents indicated that EU was flexible in adjusting its support for CPPB to changes in the political, security and socio-economic situation/context in the partner countries to some

extent (11 responses) or even to great extent (12 responses). Only five EUDs reported difficulties to adapt (capable to adapt “to a little extent”) and no respondent indicated that

adaption was not possible at all.

Figure 17 EU support for CPPB to respond to changes in the political, security and socio-

economic situation (Q5)

Q5_text: Please explain your assessment.

IcSP was most frequently cited as a positive example contributing to EU’s responsiveness by its relative quickness and flexibility. Other positive elements cited were trust funds and

increased efforts to analyse and monitor context, e.g. through PRISM conflict assessment.

However, programmes were found to adjust slowly to changing circumstances and mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in existing programmes was also described as challenging.

In addition, the design and funding of new programmes should have proceeded faster to better seize windows of opportunities.

Approach to implementation (instruments and modalities)

Q6: Based on your experience, to what extent has the mix of actions financed under the various EU financing instruments (e.g. geographic: DCI, EDF, ENI, and thematic instruments: IfS/IcSP, EIDHR) been appropriate to respond to EU CPPB objectives in the country?

A majority of EUDs stated that the mix of actions financed under various financing instruments was appropriate to respond to CPPB objectives in their respective countries to a great extent.

Figure 18 Appropriate mix of actions to respond to EU CPPB objectives in the country

(Q6)

Q6_text: Please explain your assessment

In general, EUDs agreed that combining different instruments in a strategic and coherent way

enabled them to better respond to CPPB objectives and allowed for increased flexibility. By combining CSDP missions with various financing instruments (i.e. in Somalia and Niger),

0% 18% 39% 43% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


0% 11% 25% 61% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


66


EIDHR with geographic instruments (i.e. in Niger and Nepal) as well as EU Trust Funds with a

range of thematic and geographic instruments (i.e. in Lebanon and the Philippines), some EUDs applied an integrated/comprehensive approach.

In multiple cases, IcSP was the most significant financing instrument and respondents stressed

that it was critical and complementary to other instruments in terms of “testing the ground for intervention”, preparing a long-term intervention, providing quick responses, performing short

term activities and contributing to more political elements (e.g. Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia).

To allow for more structural and long-term interventions, IcSP activities were complemented and/or followed up by activities financed under geographic instruments.

Combining bilateral interventions with regional programmes, however, was judged less useful by the respondents.

Q7: Based on your experience, to what extent has the mix of actions financed under the various EU financing instruments (e.g. geographic and thematic instruments) been complementary with CSDP missions?

The question on complementarity between EU actions and CSDP missions yielded mixed

results. There is a slight majority of EUDs which stated that there was indeed complementarity

to some or even to a great extent, but at the same time 26% of the respondents expressed more negative views.

Figure 19 EU actions (e.g. geographic and thematic instruments) complementary with

CSDP missions (Q7)


EUDs that saw complementarity “to a great extent” with CSDP missions underlined a high degree of cooperation, very good management and significant time-investments to ensure

complementarity, avoid duplications and allow for flexibility as the main contributing factors

(i.e. Niger, Somalia, CAR).

Other EUDs hinted at the very specific / limited mandate of the CSDP in their country (i.e. in

Ukraine, where the CSDP “had little to do with the conflict in the East, as its role [was] mainly

to provide advice to various law enforcement agencies on the rule of law”). In Georgia, the loosely defined scope of the CSDP mission left room for duplications.

Q8: Based on your experience, what have been the main aid delivery methods for EU support for CPPB in the country?

Project approach is the dominant aid modality across the portfolio and was mentioned by all

but one respondent. Budget support was mentioned in25%, trust funds in roughly 50%.

Twinning or other modalities were hardly mentioned at all.

15% 11% 30% 26% 19%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Not at all Little extent Some extent Great extent Not applicable

67


Figure 20 Main aid delivery methods for EU support for CPPB (Q8)

Q8_text: In your view, are these modalities/delivery channels fit for purpose?

Most EUDs responded positively to the question, albeit with very diverging explanations.

Consequently, the answers seemed to suggest that the usefulness of modalities and delivery channels depended highly on context and targeted objectives. Therefore, many EUDs also

expressed that the variety of available modalities was important to adapt to different situations

or tackle different problems.

In general, the project approach was mentioned for its flexibility and for allowing the EU to tailor

interventions to the identified needs both in terms of focus and amount of funding (e.g. Ukraine, Lebanon, Nepal, Burkina Faso). Trust funds were found to contribute, but at least in the case

of Ukraine the EU’s preference of local interventions was seen as a burden to the installed

multi-partner trust fund which potentially discouraged other donors and ultimately led to a more negative perception of this particular modality. Indirect management was cited as being

“practical means to mobilise actors who are equipped to operate in conflict theaters” but with the downside of reduced EU visibility (Georgia).

Rigid and slow processes as well as lack of partner government ownership were identified as

undermining factors, not just to a particular modality, but in general.

EU Delegation capacity

Q9: Based on your experience, to what extent has the knowledge on CPPB and on conflict sensitivity of the EUD staff been adequate in view of the CPPB needs in the country between 2011-2018?

Respondents replied mostly positively with regards to their staff’s knowledge on CPPB and

conflict sensitivity in general with a majority indicating adequacy of knowledge to some or even to great extent. However, a significant number of respondents (33%) saw only little adequacy

or no adequacy at all (the figures are better for conflict sensitivity, at only 14%).

With regards to country-specific CPPB and conflict sensitivity, EUD respondents seemed globally satisfied with their staff’s knowledge.

27

7

1

12

2

Project approach Budget support Twinning

Trust fund Other

68


Figure 21 Knowledge on CPPB generally (Q9_1)

Figure 22 Knowledge on conflict sensitivity generally (Q9_2)

Figure 23 Knowledge on CPPB and conflict sensitivity as it applies to your country

specifically (Q9_3)


A vast majority of answers highlighted the fact that CPPB expertise and knowledge on conflict

sensitivity was restricted to very few staff members, most often the FPI staff. Only a few EUDs (Lebanon, Myanmar, Sri Lanka) reported that all staff was highly aware of the need for conflict

sensitivity and that, in the case of Myanmar, coordination with other donors increased

knowledge of context considerably. Nepal and Palestine explicitly deplored the lack of CPPB training provided to staff, while others highlighted a disconnect between HQ

priorities/programmes and the awareness and situation on the ground (Bangladesh,

Guatemala).

Q10: Based on your experience, has there been training provided on CPPB and/or conflict sensitivity between 2011 and 2018?

The majority of EUDs indicated that there was training of some kind provided to them on CPPB and/or conflict sensitivity during the evaluation period. Among the EUDs that reported training,

individual training (incl. online courses) was the most frequently used form. Only a minority

received training directed at the whole Delegation.

7% 26% 48% 15% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


7% 7% 57% 25% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 11% 43% 39% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


69


Figure 24 Training provided on CPPB and/or conflict sensitivity (Q10)

Q10_specify: Please explain your assessment and if you were trained provide an insight on how useful / applicable the training has been.

Only few answers actually reported on the usefulness of the training provided and those who

did conveyed mixed opinions. The overall consensus was that training was partially useful, but

clearly not sufficient. In line with the above figure, the majority of responses highlighted very few training opportunities in particular for the whole Delegation.

Q11: Based on your experience, to what extent has the institutional set up (cooperation between EUD and Headquarter, management of CPPB interventions, etc.) facilitated the provision of EU support for CPPB in the country?

For 75% of the respondents, the institutional setup (related to the cooperation between EUD

and HQ or the overall management of CPPB interventions) facilitated the provision of EU support for CPPB in their respective countries.

Figure 25 Institutional set up (cooperation between EUD and Headquarter, management

of CPPB interventions, etc.) facilitating the provision of EU support for CPPB

(Q11)

3

10

3

7

5

Training for the whole Delegation Individual training (incl. online courses)

Other training: (please specify) No training

Don't know

7% 11% 54% 21% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


70



Most open answers reported on the coordination and cooperation in place between

Headquarters and EUDs. Views on the quality of this cooperation were mixed, with several

countries expressing a positive perspective (CAR, Guatemala, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Ukraine) while others voiced concerns over limited or difficult cooperation (Burkina Faso,

Iraq/Yemen, Palestine, Zimbabwe). Most frequent among the negative arguments expressed was the impression that EU Headquarters lacked internal coordination between the different

entities (EEAS, NEAR, DEVCO and FPI) which made cooperation between Headquarters and

EUDs even more difficult. Furthermore, the regionalisation of FPI officers was mostly assessed as a negative change to the institutional setup (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan).

Coordination, complementarity and EU added value

Q12: Level of coordination: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with efforts made by EU Member States and other international actors?

The level of coordination with EU MS and other international actors was generally assessed very positively by the respondents. Across all queried topics, 75% of answers (or more) were

positive and reported coordination and complementarity to some or even great extent.

Coordination in the forms of sharing analysis (Q12_1) and avoiding duplications (Q12_4) was assessed more positively. As regards sharing common visions (Q12_2) and increasing

synergies (Q12_3), roughly 25% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the coordination efforts.

Figure 26 Sharing analysis (Q12_1)

Q12_1_specify: please specify actors involved

Burkina Faso FR, DK, BE, US, UN

Central African Republic

All MS

Côte d'Ivoire MS having cooperation in CI (FR/GER) DR Congo Belgium, UK, France

Georgia between EUD, EUSR and likeminded states

Kyrgyzstan UK, DFID and the UN Peace Building Fund Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is all about this and the Del is member to all the coordination that are in

place in country Nepal Regularly updated through the HOMs; regularly communicated the relevant activities carried

out, and any monitoring and evaluation done as and whn happens. Niger Quelques actions complémentaires financées par la coopération des EM Nigeria specifically through RPBA and CPR

Pakistan MS (CT WG), dipl missions, UN agencies Somalia The Netherlands, UK, DK, US, NO, UN, WB

Sri Lanka Missions report shared with EUMS

7% 7% 43% 39% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


71


Syria Mostly DE

Ukraine UK embassy, USAID Zimbabwe EU, EU MS, like-minded bilateral, multilateral

Figure 27 Sharing a common vision on the response required (Q12_2)


Burkina Faso FR, DK, BE, US, UN Central African Republic All MS Colombia Member States, UN, Government Georgia between EUD, EUSR and like minded states Lebanon The international community shares a common vison on CPPB

Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is all about this and the Del is member to all the coordination that are in place in country

Nepal regularly updated through the HOMs; regularly communicated the relevant activities carried out, and any monitoring and evaluation done as and whn happens.

Niger Essentiellement certains EM représentés au Niger Nigeria Same as above Pakistan MS (CT WG and HoMS level pre-programming missions), dipl missions, UN agencies

Palestine there have some attempts to coordinate the EU donors in this sector. Efforts are in an early stage

Philippines ES, SE (in the past in the Trust Fund) etc. Somalia All EU MS, US, NO, UN, WB Sri Lanka EUMS Syria Amongst like-minded donors at local but also HQs level Ukraine USAID, UN, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands Zimbabwe EU, EU MS

Figure 28 Increasing synergies between supported actions (Q12_3)


Burkina Faso FR, DK, BE, US, UN

4% 19% 37% 41% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


7% 15% 37% 37% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


72


Central African Republic All MS Georgia between EUD, EUSR and like minded states Lebanon UN reform offers a good opportunity to strengthen synergies at all levels


Nepal Regularly updated through the HOMs; regularly communicated the relevant activities carried out, and any monitoring and evaluation done as and when happens.

Niger Mainly with Member States Nigeria Same as above plus implementaiton of nexus Pakistan MS, diplomatic missions, UN agencies

Palestine there have some attempts to coordinate the EU donors in this sector. Efforts are in an early stage

Somalia DK, UK, SE, NO, US, UN, WB Sri Lanka UN, GIZ

Syria In some ad hoc cases through co-funded actions (with DE, FR, UK, SW, etc.) but definitely not to the extent that one would expect in another context

Ukraine USAID, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Japan Zimbabwe EU, EU MS, like-minded

Figure 29 Avoiding duplications (Q12_4)

Q12_specify: please specify actors involved

Burkina Faso FR, DK, BE, US, UN Central African Republic All MS DR Congo UK, France Georgia between EUD, EUSR and likeminded states Guatemala EU is the only actor in the buffer zone Lebanon due to overall funding gaps there is hardly any overlap in interventions


Nepal Regularly updated through the HOMs; regularly communicated the relevant activities carried out, and any monitoring and evaluation done as and whn happens.

Niger Essentiellement avec EM. De façon moindre avec NU Pakistan MS, dipl missions, UN agencies

Philippines It remains to be seen as things are currently evolving after the establishment of the BARMM

Somalia UK, DK

4% 7% 37% 48% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


73


Sri Lanka UN, GIZ Ukraine Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands Zimbabwe EU, EU MS, like-minded

Q13: Level of coordination: Based on your experience, to what extent has EU support for CPPB been coordinated and complementary with efforts made by regional, national and local actors.

The picture painted by respondents was less positive regarding the level of coordination with

regional, national and local actors in comparison to the coordination with EU MS. While a majority of EUDs still reported positively on all different forms of coordination, a significantly

higher number of respondents indicated that the efforts made in coordinating with these actors

were not sufficient. In particular, more than 40% of EUDs stated that there had been only little efforts (at best) to share common visions in their respective countries.

Figure 30 Sharing analysis (Q13_1)

Q13_1_specify: If answer is positive: please specify actors involved

Burkina Faso

Ministère sécurité

Georgia With Switzerland and the US Kyrgyzstan For BOMCA and Internews, OK

Lebanon Through UN coordination analysis is shared Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is aligned with the National Ceasefire Agreement provisions

Nepal All the development actors contributing to the Peace Building programme have contributed to the NPTF and coordinated in all processes of managing the programme. EU Delegation has chaired and coordinated the groups.

Niger Partage d'information en général, mais pas systématique Nigeria RPBA had participation of regional, national and local actors

Pakistan Federal government, provincial governments, UN agencies Somalia UN and WB trust funds, EU Trust fund

Syria Due to the high-sensitivity of the analysis produced, although quite a lot could be shared

Ukraine Local and national actors Zimbabwe Local and regional CSOs

Figure 31 Sharing a common vision on the response required (Q13_2)

Q13_2_specify: If answer is positive please specify actors involved

Burkina Faso


15% 15% 44% 19% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


8% 35% 27% 23% 8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


74


Georgia With Switzerland and the US

Lebanon In the context of Lebanon's Crisis Response Plan and its related working groups work national and local actors are coordinating

Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is aligned with the National Ceasefire Agreement provisions

Nepal All the development actors contributing to the Peace Buildign programme have contributed to the NPTF and coordinated in all processes of managing the programme. EU Delegation has chaired and coordinated the groups.

Niger Ministère de l'intérieur et ministère du plan, services déconcentrés de l'Etat, partenaires techniques et financiers aux différents niveaux

Nigeria RPBA, discussions with ECOWAS Pakistan federal government, provincial governments, UN agencies

Palestine The main coordination in Palestine is with the body set up by the Palestinian leadership to coordinate with Israeli society. The coordination focuses on exchange of information on EU funded activities and in planning joint events particularly in the context of the international peace day

Philippines

Close coordination with the Philippine government and in the past also with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of which representatives have become members of the BARMM administration.

Somalia UN and WB trust funds, EU Trust fund

Syria Political positions have often prevented open discussions aimed at this

Ukraine Local actors

Figure 32 Increasing synergies between supported actions (Q13_3)


Burkina Faso

Ministère sécuriité


Georgia With Switzerland and the US

Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is aligned with the National Ceasefire Agreement provisions Nepal All the development actors contributing to the Peace Building programme have contributed to

the NPTF and coordinated in all processes of managing the programme. EU Delegation has chaired and coordinated the groups.

Niger See previous

Pakistan federal government, provincial governments, UN agencies Somalia UN and WB trust funds, EU Trust fund

Sri Lanka National and local governments Ukraine Local actors, national actors to a lesser extent

Figure 33 Avoiding duplications (Q13_4)

12% 15% 42% 23% 8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


8% 19% 42% 23% 8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


75



Burkina Faso


Central African Republic Georgia With Switzerland and the US

Kyrgyzstan trying Myanmar The Joint Peace Fund is aligned with the National Ceasefire Agreement provisions

Nepal All the development actors contributing to the Peace Building programme have contributed to the NPTF and coordinated in all processes of managing the programme. EU Delegation has chaired and coordinated the groups.

Niger See previous Nigeria Coordination with national government is limited and complex

Pakistan federal government, provincial governments, UN agencies

Philippines Philippine government (OPAPP) as a coordinating body Somalia UN and WB trust funds, EU Trust fund

Sri Lanka National and local governments Ukraine Local actors, national actors

Q14: Based on your experience, to what extent has the EU support for CPPB added value as compared to EU Member States acting bilaterally or to other actors’ action?

Most of the EUDs saw significant added value (expressed by a significant high number of answers “to a great extent”) in EU support for CPPB compared to EU MS or other actors’

actions.

Figure 34 Compared to EU Member States acting bilaterally (Q14_1)

Figure 35 Compared to other international, national and local actors (Q14_2)

Q15: Based on your experience, to what extent have the factors specified below created an added value of EU support for CPPB as compared to EU Member States acting bilaterally?

EUDs reported most positively on factors pertaining to the funding (amounts and duration) of

EU support. Here, a majority of responses indicated that these factors contributed to creating added value to a great extent (67% for amounts, 56% for duration of funding). EU’s nature as

a supranational organization – its political weight and its relative neutrality which helped forging

partnerships – were also assessed positively. Only a few respondents (around 20%) stated that these above-mentioned factors contributed little (or not at all) to EU’s added value.

4% 11% 25% 50% 11%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 7% 37% 44% 7%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Not at all Little extent Some extent

76


EU’s expertise in CPPB issues was discussed controversially: while still assessed positively

overall, respondents showed less conviction with the majority of answers (56%) only attributing importance “to some extent”. More than 30% of respondents found that expertise contributed

only little to added value – if at all.

Figure 36 Amounts of funding (Q15_1)

Figure 37 Duration of funding (Q15_2)

Figure 38 Political weight (Q15_3)

Figure 39 Ability to forge partnerships (Q15_4)

Figure 40 Expertise in CPPB issues (Q15_5)

4% 15% 15% 67% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 15% 22% 56% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 15% 41% 41% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


0% 19% 31% 46% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 30% 56% 11% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


77


Figure 41 Knowledge of country (Q15_6)


Several EUDs underlined the view that the EU’s funding in terms of its size, duration, predictability and comprehensiveness (i.e. covering a broad range of areas) was a key

contributing factor to added value (e.g. Georgia, Myanmar, Nepal and Nigeria). The political weight was highlighted by some as another key factor distinguishing EU’s efforts from what

individual MS could achieve (Colombia, Myanmar). Others stated that the EU did not use its

weight to full potential (DRC, Nigeria). To a certain degree, both political and financial support were linked to the EU’s willingness to take risks (a finding that emerged from the case studies)

and the answer provided by the EUD in Guatemala supported this.

Cross-cutting issues

Q16: Based on your experience, to what extent and how has EU support for CPPB been implemented in a conflict sensitive manner (i.e. avoid harm, build on awareness of the context, minimize negative impacts and risks, build “positive” peace) in the country between 2011 and 2018?

Responses to this question clearly corroborated the EUD’s conviction that EU support to CPPB

was implemented in a conflict sensitive manner in their respective countries, with close to 90% positive answers.

Figure 42 Implementation of EU support for CPPB in a conflict sensitive manner (Q16)

Q16_text: Please explain your assessment and mention methodology used (e.g. conflict analysis or other; and whether it has been used to inform programming, action documents, policy dialogue, political dialogue, etc.)

A few EUDs reported the use of conflict analysis (or similar situation/political analysis) to

increase conflict sensitivity of their activities (e.g. Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia, Ukraine) while

others mentioned compliance with the “do-no-harm” principle as an indicator for conflict sensitivity (e.g. CAR, Palestine). The majority of respondents named close political dialogue

with relevant national entities as one of the key drivers for conflict sensitivity in their activities. In two cases, Georgia and Niger, this dialogue took place within a wider framework of action

(EaP respectively an SBC) which was considered an advantage for mainstreaming conflict

sensitivity as opposed to more ad-hoc efforts to dialogue. Only a small number of EUDs openly admitted that conflict sensitivity was (at first) not given sufficient attention and that re-

adjustments had to be made during implementation (e.g. Nigeria, Syria).

0% 15% 35% 50% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


4% 7% 50% 39% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


78


Q17: Based on your experience, to what extent and how have complementary interventions been implemented in conflict sensitive manner (i.e. to avoid harm and contribute to peacebuilding) in the country between 2011 and 2018?

Respondents largely conveyed the opinion that complementary interventions were implemented in a conflict sensitive manner. Responses were very positive in stating that non-

CPPB related activities followed principles such as “do-no-harm” or tried to actively contribute to broader peacebuilding efforts.

Figure 43 Complementary interventions implemented in conflict sensitive manner (i.e. to

avoid harm and contribute to peacebuilding) (Q17)

Q17_text: Please explain your assessment and mention methodology used (e.g. conflict analysis or other; and whether it has been used to inform programming, action documents, policy dialogue, political dialogue, etc.)

EUD responses to this question echoed the responses given for the previous one – “do-no-

harm” and political dialogue were most frequently mentioned. The consideration or inclusion of minorities, IDPs and other vulnerable groups in non-CPPB interventions was seen by some

as evidence for their conflict sensitivity (e.g. Georgia, Philippines, Sri Lanka). The EUD in

Nepal reported frequent interactions and cooperation between Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) and other, complementary interventions such as technical assistance. Bangladesh

voiced concerns that conflict analysis (or similar assessments) had little influence on the actual implementation and was mostly used to “tick the box”.

Q18: Based on your experience, to what extent have gender (including Women, Peace and Security) and human rights been promoted and mainstreamed through EU support for CPPB?

According to survey respondents, there was extensive promotion and mainstreaming of human

rights through EU support for CPPB (a combined 96% of respondents answered “to some

extent” and “to great extent”). Responses with regards to the mainstreaming of gender were largely positive as well, but a significant number of respondents (21%) provided a more

reserved statement.

Figure 44 Human rights (Q18_1)

7% 4% 39% 39% 11%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


0%4% 50% 46% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


79


Figure 45 Gender (Q18_2)


EUDs reported mostly positively on the mainstreaming of gender and human rights, highlighting several best practice examples (most notably within the framework of the Peace

Funds in Myanmar and Nepal) and overall reporting a functional level of mainstreaming. Others noted room for improvement (CAR, Georgia, Pakistan) while the EUD in Guatemala reported

that neither gender nor human rights were particularly considered in the design of the current

actions.

Effects of EU support

Q19: What have been the most important achievements of EU support for CPPB in the country between 2011 and 2018?

EUD Achievement 1 Achievement 2 Achievement 3 Achievement 4 Afghanistan in the SSR-related

projects, CPPB good engagement with CSOs over the past years also in CPPB-sensitive areas

support to elections also with a view to CPPB

not yet a great achievement, but the EUD is going towards a very CPPB sensitive direction with the new mechanism for peace instrument.

Bangladesh Nothing throughout

Burkina Faso

EU is a credible interlocutor for categories 1, 2 and 3 CPPB interventions as it has the capacity to address and deliver on a very large variety of relevant interventions

EU achieved objectives regarding conflict prevention, including on prevention of violent extremism

EU is delivering on the capacity of the anti-terrorist security forces particularly on the mobility and the training of the security forces

EU has been able to finance a SSr forum and various studies


Stabilisation Support of peace process

Recovery

Colombia Confidence building between parties before signing peace agreement

Support to Govt' rapid action plan

Support to reincorporation of former combatants

Influence to keep process alive after change of government. Ability to talk to both parties

Côte d'Ivoire restore Security/Police services

Contribute to rehabilitate basic services normally provided by the State

Prevent ethnic and local conflict

Restore justice services and Human rights in the country

DR Congo The fight against impunity of international crimes (transitional justice)

Reinforcement of the accountability of security forces

The support to human rights defenders

Support to dialogue at local and central level

0% 21% 36% 43% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


80


EUD Achievement 1 Achievement 2 Achievement 3 Achievement 4 Georgia Grassroots

empowerment including multi-ethnic local action groups for rural development

Quick response to major emerging opportunities for dialogue e.g. agriculture pest challenges, electricity, healthcare

Vibrant civil society supported in breakaway Abkhazia, conducive to diverse viewpoints and thus essential to peace efforts

Established EU credibility as a support to recovery without going into recognition and at the same time without antagonising the de facto authorities

Guatemala Support to the OAS office in the buffer zone

Conflict mitigated Both countries passing referenda to move their conflict to an international court

Iraq,Yemen Restoring confidence in institutions

Creating interlinkages EU EUMS and GoI

Working on stability

Kyrgyzstan Responded to the post-conflict rehabilitation needs of communities affected by 2010 riots

rights of ethnic minorities are more respected at national and local level

Strengthened the capacities of youth organizations, of state organizations, of women organization with the aim to enhance their role in PVE at national and community level.

Lebanon Inter (security) agency approach

Targeted CT/PVE approach

Specific internal security approach

complementary measures in education, social support, health, water and livelihood

Libya contribute to fostering political consensus

Stabilisation at local level (addressing overstretched basic public services)

demining/clearance of ERW

mediation at T2 level

Moldova EU is a important actor of stability with confidence and trust from both sides

EU can appear as EU in a territory where the EU was not welcomed as such and had in the past to act only toward UNDP

EU is the driver of International donors in the CBM area in Moldova

Myanmar The set up of the Joint Peace Fund I wasn't there at that time so I can't comment on other aspects

Nepal Policy dialogue Projects implementation

Communication and visibility

Leading to sustained peace building through the successful election of the Constituent Assembly election

Nigeria Support to dialogue in the Niger Delta

peace accord during elections 2019

support to DDR process and interventions

Support to government in response to farmers/herders conflict

Palestine give a life line to the peace camp which is increasingly marginalised on both sides of the conflicts

Philippines Effective monitoring of the peace agreements and enhanced protection of civilians in conflict affected areas

Support to the Third Party Monitoring Team

2 joint missions of the MILF and the Philippine government administration of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to EU institutions and

Support to the political dialogue between the MILF and the Philippine government

81


EUD Achievement 1 Achievement 2 Achievement 3 Achievement 4 related entities in Brussels

Sri Lanka Strengthening Human Rights Commission

Capacity building of CSO dealing with Human Rights

Livelihood of displaced people

Syria Promoting a vision for a truly Whole of Syria approach to CPPB, in terms or working towards preparing the country for a post-conflict future in which the different parts of the country will have to come together again.

Bringing conflict-sensitivity to the forefront of donor discussions and calling attention on the negative consequences of donor support when driven blindly only by humanitarian or only by political considerations.

The analyses being produced highly contribute to donors' discussions and internal reflection on the way forward

Reaching out to local partners directly, instead of treating them as sub-contractors of international organisations or INGOs. To date we are the donor that does it more prominently.

Ukraine Support to the stabilisation of the security situation in eastern Ukraine

Support for a credible and respected human rights monitoring mission

Contributing to large scale early recovery actions and social cohesion through UN structures in eastern Ukraine

Zimbabwe electoral process human rights commission

justice system land governance

Q20: What have been the most important achievements of EU support for CPPB in the country between 2011 and 2018?

EUD responses indicated that EU support for CPPB achieved to mitigate/prevent violence and

to create/restore/consolidate structural stability (70% positive responses each).

However, respondents appeared less certain with regards to addressing the underlying causes

of conflict, where more than 40% of EUDs expressed skeptical views. A combined 52% of respondents even stated that EU achieved to restore immediate stability only to a small extent

or not at all.

Figure 46 Mitigating/preventing violence (Q20_1)

Figure 47 Restoring immediate stability: (Q20_2)

7% 19% 59% 11% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


15% 37% 33% 11% 4%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


82


Figure 48 Creating/ restoring/ consolidating structural stability and strengthening

conditions for peace (Q20_3)

Figure 49 Addressing underlying causes of conflict (Q20_4)

Q21: Based on your experience, what factors have contributed to the sustainability of the results achieved by EU support for CPPB between 2011 and 2018?

EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Afghanistan close cooperation with civil society close cooperation and coordination with the

Government, including capacity building within the Government

Bangladesh Not all. You cannot substitute a bureaucratic exercise for deep political engagement and a result-oriented Political dialogue

Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Burkina Faso

clear alignment with national priorities

attention to domestic funding of recurrent costs (conditions)

use of budget support, implying domestic management of security actions and investments


Approach Emergency - Recovery - Development

Colombia I believe sustainability of the process is still under question in Colombia

Côte d'Ivoire Real willingness to end up the conflict by all parties

Media and press Strong political dialogue with Gouv RCO and member states

Adaptability to needs and quick delivery of what was planned with soft procedures

DR Congo Involvement of key national actors (ownership)

Sector dialogue with all the partners

Georgia engagement with grass root organisations

Win-win of ENI interventions for both sides of the conflict

Relevance of chosen sectors of ENI intervention in terms of buy-in by the local stakeholders, interest for Tbilisi, and link to living conditions of population

Guatemala The continuation of the support with DCI funds Iraq,Yemen Coordination between EU

and EUMS Long preparatory work Culture of participation

Kyrgyzstan work with local and national authorities responsiveness of beneficiaries

7% 22% 37% 33% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


11% 33% 44% 11% 0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%


83


EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Lebanon Ongoing support by EU and international community Libya level of funds presence of EUDEL on the

ground capacity to work with CSOs

Moldova to avoid a top-down approach + to have both parties fully-engaged in the design and implementation

to make sure projects are practical rather than theoretical with creative implementation scenarios

to focuses on non-politically sensitive topics and ensure that the project/programme is not "politicized" by one another

to ensure that the assistance is demand-driven

Nepal Ownership by the government on NPTF

Coordination of DPs, joint monitoring visits

Creation of Local Peace committees and their operationalisation

provision of immediate support to conflict affected families/victims

Nigeria Anchored in solid analysis Based on consultations/local ownership/leadership

Palestine predictability of funding

Philippines Conclusion of the CAB 2014 Adoption of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) 2018

High priority given by the Government to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB)

Somalia EU long-term partnership with Somalia

Complementarity of instruments used in the country

political dialogue

Sri Lanka Capacity building of CSO as actors in conflict transformation

Gender and inclusion Alignment with national policies

Flexibility of strategies

Syria Being in the lead of donors' dialogue fora, including with inputs from third-party analysis

A reasonable coordination between the different EU services involved in the Syria response

The organisations of the Brussels conferences on Syria that have managed to keep the public focus on these issues

Understanding that in Syria any results needs to be achieved by going smaller in terms of actions funded through partners, even at the risk of fragmenting the response and making it more cumbersome to manage

Ukraine Political weight Long term support enabled by continued support for specific actions across different instruments

Complementarity and synergy between different actions

Zimbabwe institutional strengthening dialogue and support to CSOs


Bangladesh None

Georgia see description

Iraq,Yemen CPPB is integral part of EU interventions in the country Moldova Trust and confidence are the most important element. EU should not force but accompany.

Inclusive approach is important. Myanmar It is a difficult question to ask to someone so new to the country, and the Joint Peace Fund is so

new that it is not yet possible to have a talk on results: it's only 2 years old... Niger Une évaluation externe est entreprise au Niger.

84


Nigeria Those interventions that have delivered sustainable results have been based on proper analysis and designed in support to local initiatives

Palestine In the absence of a political process and with the deteriorating political environment, the impact of the EU funds supporting peacebuilding can only be confined to supporting the existence of a peace camp

Philippines created more stability in Mindanao

Ukraine Sustainability would be difficult to achieve in projects funded under IcSP as these are typically no more than 18 months long. A number of projects have been extended beyond this time frame, while other activities have been continued either under IcSP Interim response Programmes or through programmes funded under the ENI. In addition, some projects, such as the dialogue projects, or projects aimed at HR monitoring and civilian protection have established very good synergies, which has increased their impact and hence, the sustainability of results.

Q22: How well does your Delegation combine funded activities with non-funded diplomatic, security and policy actions?

Most of the EUDs (19 out of 27) stated that they implemented the integrated approach as much

as possible and were looking at complementarity from all activities.

This was especially the case where the political section had played a coordination role and where there was an effective cooperation with the development cooperation section (i.e.

Afghanistan, Libya, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Zimbabwe). Besides, political and policy dialogue were enhanced by State Building Contract / Budget support interventions (i.e.

Afghanistan, Niger) but also through EUSR and EU CSDP missions (i.e. Georgia, Niger).

Finally, in a few cases (7 out of 27 responses), respondents indicated that there was a limited focus on the way EUD’s activities were combined with diplomatic and policy outreach.

Lessons learnt

Q23: Based on your experience, what have been the main success factors for EU’s support for CPPB in the country? (factors could be both external/contextual as well as internal EU/operational)

EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Afghanistan dedication of the staff better coordination with EU Member-States

and other international partners to often be on the same page

Bangladesh None throughout

Burkina Faso

Analysis Reactivity and speed

Partnership with EU MS security institutions

Variety of cooperation tools 1, 2 and 3 mobilised


Flexibility Targeted use of all available instruments

Cooperation among services

Colombia High level political engagement

Strong cooperation Ability to adapt and respond quickly to changing circumstances

Ability to quickly translate political agreements into action on the ground

Côte d'Ivoire Narrow donors coordination

Strong involvement and commitment of Staff

Soften procedures Close follow up of field realities

DR Congo Ownership by Congolese key actors

EU concrete added value compared to the MONUSCO

Complementarity of the sectors covered by the EU

Georgia Clear commitment to engagement

Realism of interventions in

Relevance of interventions

Link diplomatic and assistance strands

85


EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 through sizeable programmes

sectors less exposed to over politicisation

Guatemala The EUDEL engagement

Iraq,Yemen EU and EUMS have a clear agenda

EU and EUMS have shared objectives

EU and EUMD shared the hgh value of CPPB

Kyrgyzstan better understanding between people, less hatred among communities

more awareness of conflict factors among youth and media

better link between theory, reports, research and practice

improved regional cooperation, with neighbour countries

Lebanon Sustained policy dialogue, on EU and MS levels

Comprehensive cooperation support to the security sector

Comprehensive support to the Syrian refugees, the host communities and vulnerable people in Lebanon and the Government of Lebanon to strengthen its systems to cope with the crisis

Libya knowledge of staff Understanding of conflict

level of funds reactivity/flexibility (IcSP)

Moldova to avoid a top-down approach and ensure that the decision makers on both banks continue to be fully-engaged in the design and implementation of the assistance

ensure that the assistance is demand-driven

to make sure projects' needs are practical, rather than theoretical

to follow a "step by step" approach by ensuring that the assistance focuses primarily on non-politically sensitive topics, while progressively opening new fields for cooperation, including through EU major mainstream programmes for which the Republic of Moldova is eligible

Myanmar same as above

Nepal Urgency of the NPTF to implement peace and stability in the country

Ownership of the NPTF by the government

Good coordination amongst DPs

Combination of different components and the flexibility to address the diverse needs.

Niger Dialogue politique avec gouvernement

Mission EUCAP Complémentarité instruments

Nigeria integrated approach risk taking in some interventions

strong coordination with other international actors

Palestine predictability and size of funds

Philippines Neutrality Knowledge of the situation on the ground

Good and permanent contacts to the actors on the ground

Somalia EU Partnership with Somalia

Sustainable approach and work for structural changes and peace

work with civil society importance of funding; flexibility and innovative approaches

Sri Lanka A mix of political dialogue and projects the latter also used ad leverage for the former.

Syria At this stage in the Syrian conflict, it is difficult to speak of "success" factors as

Despite the above, the EU has been able to nurture the basis of peace-

The EU's internal divisions on Syria allowed for the creation of some operational room of

Syrian project partners have always had a much clearer vision on

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EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 the militarisation of the Syrian conflict after the uprising was not prevented (but rather encouraged by some MS), nor, at the later stages of the conflict, have any of the predictable violent geographic take-overs by the regime been prevented or at least mitigated, at the cost of many lives. Today, EU programming is still not using the term peace-building in its special measures for Syria because of political restrictions linked to a probably outdated EU strategy for Syria.

building by not only consistently applying a Whole-of-Syria approach for many years, but also by moving that approach forward by actively connecting actors across different conflict lines. Such activities were promoted mostly by the inside Syria work funded by DG-NEAR and managed by the EUD, but also in some cases by the FPI/IcSP.

action by the EUD Syria to encourage Syrian actors to engage in cross-line (whether geographical or within community fault lines) collaborations which are stepping stones for future peace-building. Similarly, the EUD Syria OPS team ensured that media support took a de-conflicting shape, and is working hard that accountability and justice initiatives on Syria do not remain disconnected from public debates and general life inside Syria

ensuring how the Syrian social fabric could be protected or maintained (despite the adverse evolution of the conflict) than iNGOs and donors and by developing projects jointly with Syrian partners seeds for future successes have been planted

Ukraine Good country knowledge Flexibility and complementarity of instruments

Zimbabwe funds availability EU added value Delegation's commitment

Q24: Based on your experience, what have been the main factors hindering EU’s support for CPPB in the country? (factors could be both external/contextual as well as internal EU/operational)

EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Afghanistan not enough expertise

in the delegation directly on CPPB

too few training/learning possibilities

portfolios of programme managers too big

deteriorating security situation and corruption in the country

Bangladesh Lack of basic political analysis training for staff joining EU Delegations

Burkina Faso

Poor HQ coordination

Poor HQ diplomatic and political leadership (if not fragmented)

Little access to intelligence

EU MS diplomatic sensitivity


Volatility of the security situation Structural fragilities of the country

Colombia Continued violence beyond FARC guerrilla

Weak institutional presence in our areas of action

Political polarization around the peace process

Peace institutional setting in Colombia

Côte d'Ivoire after the crisis the number of stakeholders is too high with small amounts this is very much time consuming and not so efficient for the action

possibility of double funding. The fact the local administration si acting as a mercenary and not a service provider

DR Congo The political situation between 2016 and 2018 The absence of dialogue at high level Georgia Lack of conflict-sensitive set-

up for regional ENI/EaP fora variety of EU entities/stations of duty involved

EU's position not fully equidistant from all sides to the conflict

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EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Guatemala The choice of OAS as partner. They have very little capacity absorption and management skills Iraq,Yemen GoI instability GoI high level of corruption

Kyrgyzstan lack of donor coordination/ possible duplication

Need for a dedicated HR for increasing capacity in the PVE/CVE sector

evolution from PVE to CVE

State concept on PVE/CVE understood as security/militarised issue

Lebanon Fragmented political landscape in Lebanon

Syrian crisis and burden of hosting 1.5 million refugees

Political narrative towards Syrian refugees

Libya Difficulties for EU to weight in the conflict (no teeth) even in its direct neighbourhood

Difficulty for the EUMS to share a common vision and speak with one voice

Moldova Central authorities non/willingness to negotiate

non/willingness of both partners to accept EU as partner

political context

Myanmar our support is not hindered by the context: we adapt it to the changing and challenging context. But globally, having a large amount of stakeholders involved, having a peace process led by a party to the conflict and having a "double headed" government (Civilian government and Army), with the latter still ruling the country and the former being quite unexperienced is making the whole process very complex.

Nepal Cumbersome financial process

Slow implementation of projects due to bureaucracy

Diverse priorities/focus of the development partners hindering to come up with a consolidated voice

Political interest/ uninterest to pursue some of the initiatives

Niger Some partners not playing the game Dégradation des conditions sécuritaires dans plusieurs régions frontalières

Nigeria limited knowledge/experience of CPPB

slow and rigid instruments and processes

difficult relations with some of key national counterparts

Palestine external extremely degraded political context

absence of an ongoing peace process

Implementation modalities and their too rigid application

Philippines Perceived as an actor far from the area Political hostility of the 2016 elected Philippine President towards the EU

Somalia Complex country situation mix of interests (traditional/non-traditional actors)

Sri Lanka Poor government political will to implement relevant issues of transitional justice and reconciliation

Lack of effective coordination among Government ministries

Perception of foreign driven process of peacebuilding

Syria Political restrictions imposed by EUMS that were co-funding EU projects with the (unfortunately unused) potential to engage in conflict prevention and peace-building, in particular cross-border stabilisation and resilience-type projects under UK, DE, and FR co-funding. The EU has not been able to be an independent (political) actor in promoting peace-building on Syria.

Disconnect between EU's operational work inside Syria (from Beirut and all the hubs from where the response is provided - Gaziantep, Amman and of course Damascus) and the EU's political services: while at the operational level EUD Syria (OPS team) worked at the maximum to bring together diverse Syrian partners and engage them in cross-line dialogue, this was not picked

A decision in 2015/2016 at EU level not to support, neither politically nor operationally, local ceasefires/local negotiations in Syria (at the time pioneered by UNSE) had detrimental effects on all following regime-take-overs in Syria and has multiplied the cost of lives (no conflict prevention and no peace-building possible in EU-funded stabilisation and

Imperfect understanding across EU services (political or operational) of Syrian conflict dynamics, socio-economic profiles of locations and geographies, real perceptions and interests by Syrian and other conflict parties – as well as a lack of regular adjustment of positions to real-time evolutions on the ground - and therefore programming and

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EUD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Disconnect also between EUMS diplomatic demarches (RU, TK, FR, DE summit without EU, and similar instances) and EU support to the Geneva process

up nor complemented by political/diplomatic capital at the local, regional or Geneva level, while on the contrary precious examples of work could have been put on the table to push t5he conversation forward

resilience projects directed at populations in areas that were taken over by the regime), making less-violent, negotiated solutions much rarer and resulting in local negotiations without any EU or UN monitoring or presence.

political positions that tended to be obsolete by the time any EU programming hit the ground

Ukraine Lack of involvement of the EU (not its MS) in the peace process

Poor coordination and competing visions on the side of the UA authorities

Insufficient human resources on the side of the EU

Zimbabwe inflexibility of instruments inconsistent programming of instruments

lack of expertise/intelligence

Q25: Looking ahead, please indicate the priority areas for improving EU support for CPPB in the country in the coming years.

Respondents indicated two main priority areas for improving EU support for CPPB: 1) greater training, incl. for CSDP staff (i.e. Libya, Bangladesh, Nigeria), and 2) the revision of different

aid instruments and modalities to increase more tailored and flexible support (i.e. DR Congo, Nigeria, Nepal, Zimbabwe).

In addition, some EUDs highlighted the need for better coordination mechanisms, more

complementarity of EU support to government efforts, a better-defined strategy on the objectives of EU support to CPPB and the recruitment of CPPB specialists at EUD level.

In terms of priority intervention areas, responses clearly varied by country context. In addition to highlighting the importance of Primary CPPB interventions (i.e. transitional justice and

reconciliation), EUDs expressed the need to focus or improve their focus on women and youth

in conflict prevention and resolution; 2) new sources of conflict (incl. climate change, natural resources, in particular water, environment), and finally 3) creating an enabling environment

of economic resilience with special focus on the private sector.

Q26: Please use this box to record anything you would like to comment on to justify answers above or to add nuance or guide the evaluation team.

A few additional highlights were provided by the respondents:

• A more thorough reflection on instruments that are used to provide support to CPPB is needed (i.e. advantage of using IcSP instead of geographic instruments);

• More flexibility and sensitivity are needed given highly volatile post-conflict situations;

• Additional workload in the EUDs due to the FPI regionalisation should be recognized and addressed;

• Staff training on CPPB in Brussels before deployment to the Delegations should be

provided by senior diplomats who have been exposed to CPPB throughout their careers and not by consultants.

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Annex 7: Side note on DEVCO trainings on conflict sensitivity

To what extent has the EU managed to train staff on conflict sensitivity?

Introduction

In 2012 and 2013, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) first designed online

courses aimed at training staff on understanding the concept of conflict sensitivity and learning how to apply it in a practical sense. These courses included ‘Conflict Sensitive Approaches’

and ‘Land, Natural Resources, and Conflict’ and are now available to staff through two key EU

platforms, DEVCO Academy and EU Learn.

DEVCO Academy is one of the EU’s main platforms for training staff on CPPB-related topics.

Founded in April 2018, DEVCO Academy is an online public learning platform openly accessible to the entire development community including the UN, for example. The Academy

also exchanges learning material with external institutions, and some of the courses the

Academy offers are received from external partners. DEVCO Academy therefore distinguishes itself from other platforms such as EU Learn which is used solely within European institutions.

EU Learn is a management system used within European institutions and by almost all EU staff as of 2016. This platform also offers courses and training to staff on CPPB-related streams

but does not have the ability to share information and training courses with external partners.

Since the development of the UNDP’s training courses on conflict sensitivity in 2012/2013, the UN has also designed (co-financed by the EU) the ‘EU Conflict Sensitivity’ course. Established

in 2017, the course utilises elements of the UNDP course on conflict sensitive approaches and is available through both the EU Learn and DEVCO Academy platforms.

The information provided below has been obtained from a number of sources including

information from the DEVCO Academy and the EU Learn Platform, as well as correspondence with DG DEVCO.

Description of the types of courses available which incorporate conflict sensitivity training

Staff benefit from four types of conflict sensitivity training through the DEVCO Academy. These

include (1) direct face-to-face training, (2) complementary face-to-face courses which include modules, (3) direct online courses, (4) and complementary online courses. None of the courses

relating to conflict sensitivity are obligatory for EC staff. Both platforms use tools such as e-

learning, webinars, videos, documentation, and podcasts. Until 2016, EU staff had an internal training-newsletter to announce different courses. Now, trainings are announced via the news

section of the intranet homepage and via colleague announcements over email.

DEVCO – EU Conflict Sensitivity (2017)

The EU Conflict Sensitivity course was developed approximately two years ago by the EU in

cooperation with an international NGO and is available for internal EU staff (including EUDs) through the EU Learn platform, as well as for external colleagues via the newly established

DEVCO Academy. By the end of this 2-and-a-half-hour course, learners will have a greater level of awareness and understanding of conflict sensitivity, including what the definition entails

(key terms, concepts, and principles), why it is important, where and when it should be applied

within EU action and who it is relevant for. The course has been designed to be relevant to a wide range of staff working in EU institutions engaged in external action. The primary target

audience for the course are EU technical level staff, specifically project officers, programme

managers, and technical advisors from across DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, and EU Delegations

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staff. Secondary audiences include staff from EEAS, DG ECHO, EIB, FPI, and other relevant

institutions and partners.

The EU Conflict Sensitivity course aims to teach staff to apply a ‘conflict sensitivity lens’ when

designing and implementing EU projects and interventions, understanding of what integration

of conflict sensitivity across the Programme and Project Cycle Management might look like, and knowledge of where to access additional resources and support to successfully transform

conflict sensitivity into action. Content-wise, the 2-and-a-half-hour course is made up of two

parts. Part 1 (duration 1.5 hours) introduces core concepts, approaches, and tools for integration conflict sensitivity into the work of EU initiatives. Part 2 (duration 1 hour) provides

learners with an opportunity to practice the concepts and tools identified in part 1 of the course in a series of practical case studies. Learners will have the opportunity to choose one or more

of 3 interactive case studies.

DEVCO – On-line training programme on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict

The online training programme on Land, Natural Resources, and Conflict is 3 hours long and

aims at strengthening the capacities of stakeholders for the sustainable management of land and natural resources. The course is particularly relevant for staff assigned to fragile or conflict-

affected countries where the conflict has been exacerbated by issues over natural resources.

Although not solely focussed on conflict sensitivity, the concept is incorporated into certain sections of the training course. For example, when discussing special considerations that need

to be taken into account for ‘Conflict Prevention Strategies’, the course discusses the importance of considering conflict sensitivity across all programming and how to ‘integrate

conflict sensitivity for natural resources across all programming.’ The cross-cutting issues

section contains an entire part on conflict sensitivity, including what it means (e.g. understanding the context in which an organisation is operating), understanding the interaction

between intervention and context, and being able to act upon that understanding in order to maximise positive impacts and avoid negative impacts on conflict. The activity also discusses

strategies that can be used to ensure interventions are conflict sensitive, including regular

conflict analysis and monitoring to assess the impact of the intervention on three main drivers of conflict.

DEVCO – Conflict Sensitive Approaches - Online Course (UN)

The Conflict Sensitive Approaches course was developed by the United Nations Inter-Agency Framework Team on Preventive Action with support from a consultant from the Swisspeace

Foundation. Unlike face-to-face training courses, the conflict sensitivity course is an online, interactive learning tool structure along different levels of acquiring knowledge. A fictitious

context is presented throughout the different course levels to provide multiple learning

opportunities. The course is recommended for all staff and practitioners and provides the learner with an overview of conflict sensitivity, what it is, and how to apply it in work using

suitables examples and case studies. Module 1 is approximately 3 hours long and focuses on the introduction to the theoretical concept of conflict sensitivity. Its main objectives are to define

conflict sensitivity/rationale/goals/implications, describe the relevance of conflict sensitivity at

the individual/organisational/project level, and describe the key principles that underlie conflict sensitivity. The module is made up of 3 introductory sections, with the last part containing an

assessment of what has been learnt.

After becoming familiar with the basic concepts and principles of conflict sensitivity in module

1, module 2 focuses on the application of these principles in different situations. Module 2 is

approximately 1 hour 30 minutes long and made up of 3 parts which include 3 different case study situations. It allows the learner to apply conflict sensitive approaches to the fictitious

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environment of Globalia, and allows the learner to choose a scenario which is most relevant

to their work context eg. pre-conflict, ongoing conflict, or post-conflict phase. The main objectives of this module are to teach and test the learner’s ability to apply the three conflict

sensitivity steps of module 1. This module is for practitioners and non-practitioners who have

completed module 1.

DEVCO – The Role of Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management Approaches

This webinar examines the linkages between natural resource management, investment in

resilient agricultural livelihoods and contributions to peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Furthermore, this webinar explores how conflict-sensitive approaches to natural resource

access and use can make a contribution to sustaining peace, and how investments in building resilience can help reduce specific conflict drivers.

Face-to-Face courses

There are also face to face courses held as part of other trainings such as DEVCO’s Context for Development. The conflict sensitivity training, such as ‘Context for Development - Fragility

and Conflict Sensitivity’ is held on the last day of the course on ‘Land, Natural Resources, and Conflict’. Other face-to-face courses on conflict sensitivity training may also exist, but the

contents of these courses is unknown as they are not available to view online.

Summary of statistics demonstrating the number of staff that have undertaken CPPB-related courses between 2013 and 2017

Table 13 Number of staff that took CPPB-related training courses between 2013-2017

by organisation

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total number

of staff per organisation

DEVCO DEL 75 53 76 26 25 255

DEVCO HQ 56 43 51 26 16 192

EEAS HQ 12 5 0 0 1 18

EEAS DEL 0 3 6 4 2 15

FPI HQ 8 0 4 2 0 14

FPI DEL 3 5 20 3 1 32

NEAR HQ 0 0 3 1 0 4

NEAR DEL 0 1 23 7 10 41

Other DG 15 25 13 5 3 61

Other DG DEL 4 0 3 0 0 7

Member state 0 0 23 0 0 23

University 0 0 2 0 0 2

Int. organisation 0 0 0 3 0 3

Total number of staff per year 173 135 224 77 58 667

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Staff from DEVCO DEL, followed by DEVCO HQ, are consistently the highest number of

participants in CPPB-related training courses between 2013-2017. Participation in such courses also increased considerably from organisations such as FPI DEL, NEAR DEL, and

the member states in 2015 only. There was quite a stable number of participants each year

between 2013 and 2015, whereas 2016 and 2017 saw a significant drop in participants. This may be due to a reduced number of resilience courses on offer during these years.

Table 14 Number of staff that undertook face-to-face (HQ) CPPB-related courses

between 2013 and 2017*

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Total number of staff per course

Devco - Better Articulating Humanitarian & Devel. Interventions 24 0 0 0 0 24

Devco - Core Course on Fragility, Security and Development 32 0 0 0 0 32

Devco - Delivering EU development assistance in fragile / crisis situations 37 26 0 0 0 63

Devco - Justice, Democracy and the Rule of Law 22 0 0 0 0 22

Devco - Training Course on Fragility, Security and Development in the context of EU External Action 15 0 0 0 0 15

Supporting staff from EU Delegations in implementing the new EU approach to fragility 20 0 0 0 0 20

DEVCO - EU External Action: Fragility, Security and Development in a Changing World 0 30 17 12 0 59

Devco - Resilience in practice 0 56 0 0 0 56

DEVCO- On-line training programme on land, natural resources and conflict (HQ) 0 16 0 0 0 16

Relationship between state fragility and development challenges/deficits in rural areas 0 1 0 0 0 1

Atelier inter-agence pour l'amélioration de l'engagement dans les situations de fragilité (Africa) 0 0 34 0 0 34

CODELAOC - Crise, Sécurité, Justice (Africa) 0 0 15 0 0 15

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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


DEVCO - Context for development - Fragility and conflict sensitivity 0 0 53 0 41 94

Devco - Delivering EU humanitarian and development assistance in fragile/crisis situations 0 0 28 0 0 28

DEVCO - Governance and rule of law 0 0 44 0 0 44

DEVCO - Context for development - Part 3 : Fragility and conflict sensitivity 0 0 0 34 0 34

Number of staff in total per year 150 129 191 46 41 557

* Orange highlighted columns indicate courses which contain training on conflict sensitivity.

As most of these courses are face-to-face only and their course content is not available online,

it is unclear as to which courses include training on conflict sensitivity/CPPB-related activities and which do not. The highlighted columns in the table show the courses which certainly train

on conflict sensitivity. The most popular face-to-face course to undertake by staff is the

'DEVCO - Context for Development - Fragility and Conflict Sensitivity', including its 'Part 3' evolutionary course. Further knowledge is needed as to whether any other face-to-face CPPB-

related courses contain conflict sensitivity training. One clear trend is that face-to-face CPPB

courses have received less participants in recent years, particularly 2016 and 2017 which saw a dramatic drop in staff participation. This may be due to a reduced number of “resilience”

courses on offer. If we compare courses that were organised in both periods (eg Context for development or EU External Action) we can see that there is no big difference in participation

(53 vs 41 or 17 vs 12). We can assume that face-to-face courses are available to all staff as

you do not need to register online for them, and some are also provided in the field such as in Africa (CODELAOC - Crise, Sécurité, Justice, and Atelier inter-agence pour l'amélioration de

l'engagement dans les situations de fragilité).

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Table 15 Number of staff that took online CPPB-related courses between 2013 and

2017

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


Land, Natural Resources, and Conflict 20 0 0 6 2 28

Resilience in Food Security Analysis 3 6 2 0 0 11

Conflict Sensitive Approaches 0 0 33 21 1 55

Social Protection and Resilience 0 0 0 4 0 4

EU Conflict Sensitivity 0 0 0 0 10 10

Responsible Governance of Tenure 0 0 0 0 1 1

Webinar on Resilience 0 0 0 0 3 3

Number of Staff in total per year 23 6 35 31 17 112

* Orange highlighted columns indicate courses which contain training on conflict sensitivity.

Although recent years have seen lower participation in CPPB-related courses in general, these

statistics show a general increase in participation in online CPPB training courses. Because DEVCO Academy was not established until 2018, we can assume that the online courses in

the above table were only available via the EU Learn platform, and so only available to EU

staff and not available to external partners.

From the online CPPB-related training courses, ‘Conflict Sensitive Approaches’ and ‘Land,

Natural Resources, and Conflict’ remain the most popular courses to undertake by staff. EU Conflict Sensitivity was only released in 2017, and so may take some time before participation

increases. We must also keep in mind that online courses are sometimes not fully completed

and staff are not obligated to fill out course evaluation forms, indicating that the participation may in fact be more or less. Most online courses, including those related to conflict sensitivity,

are predominantly undertaken by staff from DEVCO DEL and DEVCO HQ. It could only be fully determined that these highlighted courses in the table contain training related to conflict

sensitivity. The other courses are either no longer available online (and therefore unable to

determine their course content), have evolved into a different course, or do not include references to conflict sensitivity at all throughout their course programme.

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Annex 8: List of documents consulted

EU key reference documents

EFI Regulations

• European Union (2015): 11th EDF Regulation on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund. Reg(2015)323.

• European Union (2014): DCI Regulation establishing a financing instrument for

development cooperation for the period 2014-2020. Reg(2014)233.

• European Union (2014): EIDHR Regulation establishing a financing instrument for

democracy and human rights worldwide. Reg(2014)235.

• European Union (2014): ENI Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument. Reg(2014)232.

• European Union (2014): IcSP Regulation establishing an instrument contributing to

stability and peace. Reg(2014)230.

• European Union (2014): IPA II Regulation establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession

Assistance (IPA II). Reg(2014)231.

• European Union (2014): PI Regulation establishing a Partnership Instrument for

cooperation with third countries. Reg(2014)234.

• European Union (2011): 10th EDF Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 215/2008 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund, as

regards the European External Action Service. Reg(2011)370.

• European Union (2011): ICI Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1934/2006 establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised and

other high-income countries and territories. Reg(2011)1338.

• European Union (2010): IPA I Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 718/2007 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 establishing an instrument for

pre-accession assistance (IPA). Reg(2010)80.

• European Union (2008): 10th EDF Regulation on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund. Reg(2008)215.

• "European Union (2007): IPA I Regulation implementing Council Regulation (EC) No

1085/2006 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA). Reg(2007)718."

• European Union (2006): DCI Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation. Reg(2006)1905.

• European Union (2006): EIDHR Regulation on establishing a financing instrument for

the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide. Reg(2006)1889.

• European Union (2006): ENPI Regulation laying down general provisions establishing

a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Reg(2006)1638.

• European Union (2006): ICI Regulation establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised and other high-income countries and territories.

Reg(2006)1934.

• European Union (2006): IfS Regulation establishing an Instrument for Stability. Reg(2006)1717.

Overarching policy documents

• European Union (2017): A Global Strategy for the European Union. Fact sheet .

• European Union (2017): The new European Consensus on Development "Our World,

our dignity, our future".

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• European Union (2016): Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global

Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.

• European Union (2012): Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union.

• European Union (2011): Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda

for Change. COM(2011) 637 final.

• European Union (2010): Revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement ACP-EU.

• European Union (2006): European Consensus on Development.

• European Union (2005): EDF Cotonou Agreement. Partnership Agreement ACP-EC.

Geographical and thematic policy documents

• Council of the European Union (2018): Council Conclusions on the Integrated

Approach to External Conflicts and Crises. CC(5413/18)

• Council of the European Union (2014): Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting.

• Council of the European Union (2011): Council conclusions on conflict prevention,

3101st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 20 June 2011.

• Council of the European Union (2007): Council Conclusions on a EU response to

situations of fragility. 2831st External Relations Council meeting, 19-20 November

2007.

• Council of the European Union (2018): Women, Peace and Security, Council

Conclusions, 15086/18, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37412/st15086-en18.pdf.

• European Union (2017): A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's external action.

JOIN(2017)21.

• European Union (2017): EU conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and

Guidance for Implementation. SWD(2017)282.

• European Union (2017): EU resilience policy framework for cooperation with partner countries and evaluation of related implementation actions. SWD(2017)227.

• European Union (2017): Implementation of ENP Review. JOIN(2017)18.

• European Union (2016): Revised indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women,

peace and security.

• European Union (2016): Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform. JOIN(2016)31.

• European Union (2016): EU Conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and

Guidance for Implementation. SWD(2016)3.

• European Union (2016): Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the

European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace. COM(2016)447.

• European Union (2016): Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

• European Union (2015): Capacity building in support of security and development -

Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises. JOIN(2015)17.

• European Union (2015): Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

SWD(2015)50.

• European Union (2015): Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy.

SWD(2015)500.

• European Union (2013): Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020. SWD(2013)227.

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• European Union (2013): The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and

crises. JOIN(2013)30.

• European Union (2011): Impact assessment. Accompanying the regulation establishing an Instrument for Stability. SEC(2011)1481.

• European Union (2008): Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the

United Nations Security Council Resolution ion 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security.

• European Union (2007): Towards an EU response to situations of fragility. Engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace.

COM(2007)643.

• European Union (2006): A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform. COM(2006) 253.

• European Union (2005): EU concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform

(SSR). 12566/4/05.

• European Union (2005): A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin

America. COM(2005)636.

• European Union (2001): Communication on Conflict Prevention. COM(2001)211.

• European Union (2001): Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent

Conflicts. 9537/1/01.

• European Union (1996): The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond, Communication from the Commission

to the Council on 6th March.

Guidelines

• EEAS (2015): Handbook on CSDP. Volume I. 3rd edition.

• European Union (2013): Guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peace-

building and security issues under external cooperation instruments.

• European Union: Integrated Approach - Action table.

• European Union (2015): Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. An EU Staff

Handbook. Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No 17.

• European Union (2013): Guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peace-

building and security issues under external cooperation instruments.

• European Union (2008): Programming guide for strategy papers. Conflict prevention.

• European Union/ EEAS (2013): Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in

Support of EU External Action.

• European Union: Integrated Approach - Action table.

Other strategic documents

• Council of the European Union (2009): Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. 15779/09.

• EEAS: Issues Paper on stabilisation as part of the Integrated Approach.

• EEAS (2018): The EU as a Global Player on Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention

paper for Member States. Zero draft as of 26 March 2018. Later WK 5955/2018.

• EEAS (2017): EU conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and Guidance

for Implementation. Decide Archive.

• EEAS (2017): Inter-Service Consultation on the 2017 revised Joint Staff Working

Document "EU conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and Guidance for

Implementation".

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• EEAS (2017): Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments together with UN and World

Bank. EEAS/COM(2017)8.

• EEAS (2017): The EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises. EEAS/COM(2017)8. 10054/17.

• EU (2018): From Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European

Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Implementation Report Year 2.

• European Union: EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises - Action

Plans. SWD(2015)85, SWD(2016)254.

• European Union (2016): Progress Report on EU's Comprehensive Approach to

external conflict and crises - Action Plan 2015. SWD(2016)253

• European Union (2008): Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World. S407/08.

• European Union (2003): European Security Strategy. A secure Europe in a better

world.

• Von der Leyen, Ursula (2020): Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the

World Economic Forum, 22nd of January, European Commission.

• Von der Leyen, Ursula (2019): Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019-2024.

EU support (thematic)

• Council of the European Union and European External Action Service (2015): Communication to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Annual CSDP Lessons

Report 2014.

• Council of the European Union (2012): EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. Luxembourg, 25 June 2012.

• European Union (2017): 2017 Annual report on the implementation of the European

Union’s instruments for financing external actions in 2016 + staff working document.

• European Union (2016): Annual Activity Report. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.

• European Union (2016): IcSP - Foreign policy instrument. Outcome indicators for the

IcSP.

• European Union (2016): Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).

Outcome Indicators for the IcSP.

• European Union (2016): 2016 Annual report on the implementation of the European

Union’s instruments for financing external actions in 2015 + staff working document.

• European Union (2015): 2015 Annual report on the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2014 + staff working

document.

• European Union (2014): 2014 Annual report on the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2013 + staff working

document.

• European Union (2014): IcSP EU in Action - Infographic.

• European Union (2014): Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 and accompanying

Multiannual indicative Programme 2014-2017 of the Instrument contributing to Stability

and Peace.

• European Union (2013): 2013 Annual report on the European Union’s development

and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2012.

• European Union (2012): 2012 Annual report on the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 2011.

99


• European Commission. Annual Action Programmes for the Instrument contributing to

Stability and Peace - Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness

component (Article 4) to be financed from the general budget of the European Union 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

• European Commission: Instrument for Stability – Thematic strategic papers. 2007-2011, 2012-2013.

• European Commission: Annual action programme for the Instrument for Stability –

Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace-building Partnership) 2011, 2012. European Commission (2014): action programmes of the African Peace Facility 2014-

2016, 2017-2018.

• European Commission: African Peace Facility annual reports 2012-2017.

CPPB related evaluations and studies

Evaluations

• ADE & PEM (2017): Evaluation of the EU’s Cooperation with the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region (2008-2015).

• ADE & IBF (2013) African Peace Facility evaluation – Part 2: reviewing the overall

implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to maange conflicts on the continent. Final report + annexes.

• ADE-Particip (2011): Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building.

• ECDPM, Cardno and Particip (2017): Evaluation of the implementation of the African

Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent – Main report + annex.

• EU, UN and WB (2015): Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment. Analysis of Crisis

Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine. Volume 1: Synthesis Report.

• EU, UN and WB (2015): Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment. North-East Nigeria.

Volume 1: Synthesis Report.

• Italtrend et al. (2014): Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability – Crisis Preparedness Component (2007-2013) Final report.

• Landell Mills et al. (2018): Evaluation of EU Support for Security Sector Reform in

Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries (2010-2016).

• Landell Mills et al. (2017) External evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability

and Peace (2014-mid 2017).

• Landell Mills et al. (2017): Confidential. Evaluation of EU Support for Security Sector Reform in Enlargement and Neighbourhood Countries (2010-2016). Approved

inception report.

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Netherlands (2011): Budget support: Conditional

Results. Review of an instrument (2000-2011). IOB Evaluation No 369.

• Particip & ECDPM (2016): Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability – Crisis Response Component (2007-2013).

• Particip et al. (2011): Thematic evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice

and Security System Reform.

• Particip et al. (2011): Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to

respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity with victims

of repression).

• Rusi and ICCT (2018): Global evaluation of the European Union engagement on

counter-terrorism.

100


Studies

• Benraïs, Linda and Simon, Julie (2016): Strengthening the EU multi-stakeholder

coherence in peacebuilding and conflict prevention: examples of good practices.

• Benraïs, Linda and Simon, Julie (2017): Review of EU policy towards conflict

prevention and peacebuilding.

• Berglund, Jenny and Bruckert, Denis (2017): Report on Technological Shortcomings in

Early Warning and Conflict Analysis. EU-CIVCAP Report DL 3.1.

• Davis, Habbida and Penfrat (2017): The EU’s Capabilities for Conflict Prevention. EU-CIVCAP Report DL 3.2.

• Davis, Habbida and Penfrat (2017): The EU’s Capabilities for Conflict Prevention. EU-

CIVCAP Report DL 3.2 updated.

• ECDPM (2017): Promoting Conflict Prevention Approaches in Africa. Note prepared by

ECDPM for a briefing to DEVCO & the EEAS.

• ECDPM (2016): The future of EU support to peace and security in Africa: What implications for the African Peace Facility beyond 2020?

• ECDPM (2014): The Growing Role of Conflict Prevention in Support of the EU’s Efforts

in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Great insights Magazine.

• ECDPM (2013): The EU’s State Building Contracts. Courageous assistance to fragile

states, but how effective in the end?. Briefing note No 60.

• EEAS (2012): EEAS Mediation Support Pilot Project. Evaluatory Review.

• EPLO (2018): The Integrated Approach: what next after the Council Conclusions?

Letter to the Political and Security Commitee.

• EU (2018): Ad hoc study on "definitions/understanding of CPPB, conflict sensitivity and analysis.

• EU (2018): Peace and Security in 2018. European Parliament Research Service..

• EU (2018): The African Peace and Security Architecture: need to refocus EU support. Court of Auditors. Special report No 20/2018.

• Foreign Policy Magazine (2018): Women are the key to peace.

• Göldner-Ebenthal, Karin and Dudouet, Véronique (2017): From power mediation to dialogue support? Assessing the European Union’s capabilities for multi-track

diplomacy.

• Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2017): Conflict Barometer 2017.

• IECEU (2015): Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict

prevention. Review: from short-term stabilisation to long-term peacebuilding.

• IECEU (2015): Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict

prevention. Analysis of the current preventive activities in EU.

• Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2017): Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.

A performance review. Approach paper.

• Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2017): Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.

Facts. Infographic.

• Initiative for Peacebuilding (2012): EU External Action: Towards Conflict Sensitivity.

Saferworld Briefing.

• Jayasundara-Smits, Shyamika and Schirch, Lisa (2016): EU and security sector

reform: tilting at windmills? WOSCAP DL 2.6.

• Juncos, Ana and Algar-Faria, Gilberto (2017): EU capabilities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding: a capabilities-based assessment. EU-CICAP Report DL 2.6.

101


• Juncos, Ana and Blockmans, Steven (2018): The EU’s role in conflict prevention and

peacebuilding: four key challenges. Global affairs, DOI.

• Koenig, Sybille & Brusset, Emery (2019): Joint Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States. https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/joint-programming/documents/report-

joint-programming-conflict-affected-and-fragile-states

• Lundström, Stina and Dressler, Matteo (2016): Assessing EU support to governance

reform. WOSCAP DL 2.7.

• Mayne, John (2008): Addressing Cause and Effect in Simple and Complex Settings through Contribution Analysis. Discussion draft.

• Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (2016): European defence:

from strategy to delivery.

• Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004): Towards a Strategic Framework for

Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study

of Peacebuilding.

• Overseas Development Institute (2015): EU State Building Contracts. Early lessons

from the EU’s new budget support instrument for fragile states.

• Pantuliano, Sara (2017): Why is peacebuilding so difficult to achieve?. Peace and Politics.

• Sherriff, A. & Deneckere, M. (2018): Supporting peacebuilding in times of change. A

synthesis of 4 case studies. ECDPM.

• Sherriff, A., Hauck, V. & Rocca, C. (2013): Glass half full: Study on EU lessons learnt

in mediation and dialogue.

• SIPRI (2018): Arms transfer and SALW controls in the Middle East and North Africa: Mapping capacity-building efforts.

• Stewart, Emma (2008): Capabilities and Coherence? The Evolution of European Union

Conflict Prevention. European Foreign Affairs Review 13: 229–253.

• SWP (2018): Vom Notfall zum Regelfall (EUTF for Africa).

• UN Security Council (2018): The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth

and peace and security.

• Van der Borgh, Chris, Martin, Mary and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna (eds.) (2017). EU

capabilities in conflict prevention and peace building: challenges, strengths and opportunities of a whole-of-society approach. WOSCAP DL 4.16.

• World Bank Group (2017): Pathways for peace. Inclusive approaches to preventing

violent conflict.

• WOSCAP (2017): Policy recommendations from a Whole of Society perspective for the

EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities.

Other

General EU topics

• Council of the European Union (2012): Council Conclusions on The future approach to

EU Budget Support to third countries.

• EEAS (2018): Organisational Chart as of 180416.

• European Union (2018): DG ECHO Organigramme.

• European Union (2017): Gender Action Plan II - Annual Report 2016. SWD(2017) 288.

• European Union: EU Financing Instruments. DG DEVCO. PowerPoint.

• European Union: Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. Instrument for

Development Cooperation.

• European Union: Post disaster needs assessment. PowerPoint.

102


• European Union: State of Play of Joint Programming.

• European Union (2018): Evaluation with Gender as a cross-cutting dimension.

• European Union (2018): Joint Programming Guidelines.

• European Union (2017): Budget Support Guidelines.

• European Union (2017): DG DEVCO. Organisational Chart as of 170501.

• European Union (2016): Better Regulation Guidelines. COM(2015)215.

• European Union (2016): Budget Support. Annual Report 2016.

• European Union (2012): Budget Support Guidelines. Executive Guide. A modern

approach to Budget support.

• European Union (2012): Budget Support Guidelines. Part I-III.

• European Union (2012): Instructions for the programming of the 11th European

Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 2014-2020.

• European Union (2012): Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. Conceptual

Clarification. DG DEVCO and DG ECHO. PowerPoint.

• European Union (2011): The future approach to EU Budget Support to thrid countries.

COM(2011)638.

• European Union (2010): Engaging and Supporting Parliaments Worldwide."

• European Union (2007): Guidelines on Support to Sector Programmes.

• European Union (2007): Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Management of

General Budget Support.

Topics related to CPPB in EU and EU MS

• Bostyn (2012): Addressing the root causes of conflict. Some thoughts on

mainstreaming the prevention of radicalisation into development assistance. PowerPoint.

• CONCORD (2015): position paper ahead of the 22 October 2015 consultation meeting

on the IcSP art. 4: conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building.

• Crisis Group & EU (2018): Early Warning Early Action Project (16-19).

• Crisis Group & EU (2018): Qs for applying gender-sensitive conflict analysis.

• EEAS (2018): Factsheet. EU-NATO cooperation.

• EEAS: Conflict Sensitivity of EU External Action. PowerPoint.

• EEAS (2014): EU Conflict Early Warning System. Fact sheet .

• EEAS (2014): The European Union and Conflict Prevention.

• EEAS (2012): Fragility and Conflict. The Comprehensive approach. DG DEVCO

Training. PowerPoint.

• EEAS, European Commission & EPLO (2016): Civil Society Dialogue Network Funding Instruments meeting. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Consultation on 2017 programming. Minutes.

• EEAS, European Commission & EPLO (2015): Civil Society Dialogue Network Funding Instruments meeting. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Consultation on 2016 programming. Minutes.

• European Commission (2012): Development responses after the Arab Spring. DG DEVCO Fragility Training. PowerPoint.

• European Union (2018): Reinforcing the EU-UN strategic partnership on crisis

management.

• European Parliament Research Service (2017): The EU's approach to funding peace

and security . Briefing EU Legislation in Progress.

103


• European Union / GCRI (2017): EWS Conflict risk indicators with sources.

• European Union: Global Democracy Support - Before Elections. Intro.

• European Union: Global Democracy Support - Mediation and Dialogue. Intro.

• European Union: Global Democracy Support - Mediation and Dialogue. MEPs as

Mediators.

• European Union: Global Democracy Support - Mediation and Dialogue. Young Political Leaders.

• European Union: Priorities in Fragile States. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals.

DG DEVCO. PowerPoint.

• European Union: What is Political Economy Analysis?. PowerPoint.

• European Union (2018): EWS simple cycle Diagram.

• European Union (2018): Workplan of Peacebuilding consultancy at DEVCO B2.

• European Union (2017): Conflict prevention report template.

• European Union (2017): EWS Assessment of Structural Risks of Conflict

(INTERNAL).pdf.

• European Union (2017): Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence.

COM(2017)315.

• European Union (2017): The budgetary tools for financing the EU external policy.

• European Union (2016): Lessons drawn from past interventions and stakeholders’

views. Accompanying the document Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to

support security sector reform. SWD(2016) 221.

• European Union (2012): Crisis and Emergency and Post-Emergency Situations. The

Guidelines. DG DEVCO Fragility Training. PowerPoint.

• European Union (2012): The security and development nexus. DG DEVCO. PowerPoint.

• European Union: EU development aid to fragile and crisis countries. 2011 facts and

figures . EDF and Europeaid Powerpoint.

• Foreign & Commonwealth Office UK (2013): Conflict Pool Strategic Guidance.

• Government of Sweden (2018): Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022.

• National Audit Office UK (2012): Review of the Conflict Pool.

• N.N.: Jean Monnet Dialogue for peace and democracy.

• N.N. (2014): Annex F: The UK Conflict Pool and Conflict Security and Stability Fund.

• YouthPower (2018): EU Conference on Youth, Peace and Security - Promoting Youth in Peacebuilding. https://www.youthpower.org/events/eu-conference-youth-peace-

and-security-promoting-youth-peacebuilding.

Other

• European Commission (2018). EU Gender Action Plan II - Gender Equality and

Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU

External Relations 2016-2020 – Annual Implementation Report 2017. SWD(2018) 451 final.

• European Union (2013): The "New Deal" for engagement in fragile states. Library Briefing. Library of the European Parliament.

• Federal Government of Germany (2017): Guidelines on preventing crises, resolving

conflicts, building peace.

• G7+ Secretariat (2016): New Deal Innovations. Aid instruments for peace- and state-

building: Putting the New Deal into practice. Case study 1-6.

104


• International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2011): A New Deal for

engagement in fragile states.

• International Dialogue Working Group on New Deal Implementation (2014): New Deal Monitoring Report 2014.

• OECD (2018): The DAC’s main findings and recommendations. Extract from: OECD

Development Cooperation Peer Reviews European Union 2018.

• OECD (2016): States of Fragility 2016. Understanding Violence.

• OECD (2011): Investing in Security. A global assessment of armed violence reduction

initiative.

• OECD DAC (2014): Development Assistance and Approaches to Risk in Fragile and

Conflict Affected States.

• United Nations (2016): Resolution 2282. Review of the United Nations peacebuilding

architecture. Adopted by the Security Council at its 7680th meeting and General

Assembly on 27 April 2016.

• United Nations (2018): Factsheet on Standby Team.

• United Nations (2018): Peacebuilding and sustaining peace resolution. Resolution

adopted by the Security Council at its 8245th meeting, on 26 April 2018. RES2413(2018).

• UNDP (2018): DPA Key Facts.

• ACP Group (2018): ACP Negotiation Mandate for a Post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement with the European Union.

• Médecins sans frontières (2017): Forced to flee Central America's Northern Triangle:

A Neglected Humanitarian Crisis.

• EU, UN and WB (2018): Learning from experiences with implementation and financing

of recovery and peacebuilding assessments. 1999-2017.

• European Union (informal): Examples of CPPB indicators.

• GoP-UN ACT for Peace Programme (2009): Managing Performance in Peacebuilding:

Framework for Conflict-sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation.

• IFP Mediation Cluster (2008): Evaluating Peace Mediation.

• OECD DAC (2012): Building blocks to prosperity: The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

Goals (PSGs). DAC High Level Meeting 2012. One pager.

• OECD DAC (2012): Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series.

• OECD DAC: Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

Working draft for application period.

• Transtec (2015): Study of Evaluations: Lessons and recommendations for monitoring

and evaluation of IfS/IcSP. Final Report.

Case studies

~ In addition to the detailed references below, MIPs/NIPs, SSFs, strategy/programming

documents, as well as intervention level documents for interventions related to case studies

were consulted ~

African Peace Facility/South Sudan

• African Peace Facility Expert Pool, Evaluation of the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) under the African Peace Facility, Revised Final Report, Contract no. 335-871,

June 2015.

• CTSAMM (2017): Report 051 – Sexual and Gender Based Violence in the Yei Area.

105


• CTSAMM (2018): Report 03 – SGVB in Central Equatoria.

• Early Response Mechanism (ERM) II, ROM report, C-365457, 25/06/2018.

• ERM Phase I – Final Consolidated Report (November 2009 to July 2015)

• EU (2014): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), Period: 01/01/2013 –

31/12/3013.

• EU (2015): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), Period: 01/01/2015 – 31/12/3015. South Sudan.

• IGAD (2014): Narrative Completion Report of the South Sudan Peace Process under

Early Response Mechanism (ERM), Submitted to the AUC.

• IGAD South Sudan Office (2016): Narrative report of the IGAD-CTSAMM under EU

grant (1 May 2016-30 September 2016).

• IGAD-SSO (2018): Final Narrative Report. ERM Support to the Revitalization of the Implementation of the ARCSS (01 August 2017 to 30 June 2018).

• IGAD-SSO (2018): Interim Narrative Report and a Request for “No Cost Extension”,

ERM Support to the Revitalization of the Implementation of the ARCSS (01 August 2017 to 31 December 2017).

• IGAD-SSO (2018): Narrative progress report of the IGAD-CTSAMM under EU Grant

(May 1, 2016-January 31, 2018).

• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (2014): Plan to Facilitate

mediation processes in South Sudan, Submitted to the AUC.

• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (2015): Seven month plan to

Facilitate mediation processes in South Sudan, Period covering September, 2014 – to

January 2015.

• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (n.d.): Early Response

Mechanism – Support to the Revitalization of the Agreement for the Resolution of the

Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, revised narrative proposal.

• International Crisis Group (2017): Instruments of Pain (II): Conflict and Famine in South

Sudan, Briefing 124, Nairobi/Brussels.

• International Crisis Group (n.d.). South Sudan. Available at: , https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan (last accessed on

19.04.2019)

• Letter from Francesca Mosca to El Ghassim Wane (2014): Early Response Mechanism

(ERM) – African Peace Facility Support to facilitate mediation processes in South

Sudan, Ares(2014)88624.

• Letter from Francoise Moreau to El Ghassim Wane (30.10.2014): Early Response

Mechanism (ERM) – African Peace Facility Second support to facilitate mediation

processes in South Sudan, Ares(2014)3606852.

• Letter from Koen Doens to Dr Admore Kambudzi (2017): IGAD revised request to use

the Early Response Mechanism of the APF to support the High Level Forum for the

revitalization (HLFR) of the Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), AUC Note Verbale PSD/255/44990-17 dated 7th September 2017, Brussels,

devco.d.3.dir(2017)4654181, Ref. Ares(2017)4661184 - 25/09/2017.

• Letter from Koen Doens to El Ghassim Wane (2014): Early Response Mechanism

(ERM) – African Peace Facility Second support to facilitate mediation processes in

South Sudan, Brussels.

• Letter from Koen Doens to El Ghassim Wane (2015): Early Response Mechanism

(ERM) – African Peace Facility Scond support to facilitate mediation processes in South

Sudan, Brussels, 26 February 2015, devco.d.4.dir(2015)701477.

106


• Letter from Koen Doens to El Ghassim Wane (30.04.2015): Early Response

Mechanism (ERM) – African Peace Facility Second no cost extension of support to

facilitate mediation processes in South Sudan, Brussels, devco.d.4.dir(2015)868586, Ares(2015)1840725 – 30/04/2015..

• Mackie, J., Hauck, V. et al (2017): Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an ,instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the

Continent, April – December 2017, Final Report, Volume 1: Main Report.

• Prendergast, J. (2017): How the World’s Newest Country Went Awry: South Sudan’s war, famine, and potential genocide, Enough Project. Available at:

https://enoughproject.org/files/SouthSudanAwry_March2017_EnoughProject.pdf

• ROM Monitoring Questions (2017): APF Support to the Implementation of the Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South

Sudan, C-376450, 21/08-2017 – 30/08/2017.

• ROM Report (2017): APF Support to the Implementation of the Cease-fire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan,

C-376450, 21/08-2017 – 30/08/2017.

Afghanistan

• Afghan Female Peace Negotiators – Peace training, Specific Contract Nr 2016/375378

• EC (2016): Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: main results. Council of the EU Press Release. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-

releases/2016/10/05/bca-main-results/

• EEAS (2018): European Union and Afghanistan strengthen dialogue on Human Rights, Good Governance and Migration; Kabul 06/05/2018, Press Release. Available at:

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/44052/european-

union-and-afghanistan-strengthen-dialogue-human-rights-good-governance-and-migration_en

• EUPOL Afghanistan (2007): Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on Establishment of

the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan.

• European Court of Auditors (2015): The EU police mission in Afghanistan: mixed

results. Special Report. Available at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR15_07/SR_EUPOL_AFGHANIST

AN_EN.pdf

• European Union (2013): Annex VI – Interim Narrative Report, October 14, 2012- September 30, 2013; EIDHR/2012/303-519.

• European Union (2014): Annex VI – Final Narrative Report, 14 October 2012 - 14

August 2014; EIDHR/2012/303-519.

• European Union (2016): Action Document - Supporting Legitimate, effective and

accountable Governance in Afghanistan, ACA/2016/039-255 (2017-2019).

• European Union (2016): Afghanistan-EU Human Rights Dialogue, Kabul, Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Afghanistan-

EU%20HR%20Dialogue.pdf • European Union (2017): European Union and Afghanistan sign Cooperation

Agreement on Partnership and Development, Press Release. Available at:

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20834/european-union-and-afghanistan-sign-cooperation-agreement-partnership-and-

development_en.

107


• European Union (2018): “Support to Police Reform” strategic advisors in Afghanistan.

Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/43736/european-union-

deploys-support-police-reform-strategic-advisers-afghanistan_en

• European Union (2018): Inception Report: EU Police Team Project (ICSP/2017/393-

712).

• European Union: Afghanistan MIP 2014-2020

• Garret Johnston, Casey (2018): The Political Deal with Hezbe-e-Islami. Available at:

• Habibi Sarabi (2018): Habibi Sarabi’s address to the United Nations. Available at:

http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/files/UNSC_Briefing_Afghanistan_Sarabi_03-2018.pdf

• https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/07/political-deal-hezb-e-islami

• Hughes, Michelle (n.d.): The Afghan National Police in 2015 and Beyond. USIP,

Special Report 346. Available at:

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR346_The_Afghan_National_Police_in_2015

_and_Beyond.pdf

• Kakar, Palwasha (2019): How can we negotiate with the Taliban? Afghan women

Know. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/how-can-we-negotiate-taliban-afghan-women-know

• Lattanzio et al. (2018): Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with

Afghanistan (2007 – 2016). Final Report Afghanistan Volume 1.

• Pajhwok (2017): “Outgoing EU envoy conferred with Wazir Akbar Khan medal”,

Pajhwok Afghan News. Available at:

https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/08/25/outgoing-eu-envoy-conferred-wazir-akbar-khan-medal

• Tardy, Thierry (2017): Mission Impossible? EUPOL Afghanistan 2007-2016; Brief Issue 22.

• UNSCR (2015): Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace

and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

• World Bank (2016): Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project. Available at:

http://projects.worldbank.org/P160567?lang=en

• World Bank (2017): Procurement Notices – Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project. Available at:

http://projects.worldbank.org/procurement/noticeoverview?id=OP00041989&lang=en

&print=Y


• Council of the European Unio (2016): Council conclusions on the Central African

Republic.

• Council of the European Union (2014): European council Conclusions on the Central

African Republic.

• Council of the European Union (2015): Council conclusions on the Central African

Republic.

• Council of the European Union (2018): Council conclusions on the Central African Republic.

• Crisis Group (2017): Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic, Crisis Group report

253. • Crisis Group Africa Commentary (2019): Central African Republic: Getting from Talks

to Peace.

108


• Décision d'exécution de la Commission (2013): l'adoption d'une mesure d'aide

exceptionnelle relevant de l'Instrument de Stabilité en faveur d'un «Programme de

stabilisation en réponse à la crise suivant le coup d’Etat en République Centrafricaine».

• Enrica Picco (2017): ‘The world has put its faith in CAR’s leadership. It should think

again.

• Enrica Picco et Thierry Vircoulon, Mercy Corps & Comité de Coordination des ONGI

en RCA (2017): État des lieux du système d’action humanitaire en Centrafrique: Le

temps des défis,.

• EU (2017): Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2014-2020 pour la République

Centrafricaine.

• European Commission (2011): Instrument for Stability - Crisis Preparedness Component (Peace Building Partnership), IfS/2011/01, Implementing Decision.

• European Commission (2014): Central African Republic - Instrument contributing to

Stability and Peace (IcSP) 'Support to communities at risk', financed as an IcSP Exceptional Assistance Measure, Financing Decision C(2014) 3011.

• European Commission DG DEVCO (2019): Bêkou Trust Fund – Introduction. Available

at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/bekou-trust-fund-introduction_en

• European Union (2014): Action d’extrême urgence pour la création d’une force

d’intervention rapide et de maintien de l’ordre à Bangui, Final Technical Report, IFS –

RRM/2014/342-825.

• European Union (2014): Non-State actors & Local Authorities in Development in-

country interventions, Action fiche 1, Annex 1 to AAP 2013, DCI-NSPVD/2014/344-096.

• European Union (2015): Mission de revue ex-post du programme d'appui budgétaire

délivré en RCA sous la forme d'un SBC 2014, Final Consolidation Report, IFS 2015/355-950.

• European Union (2015): Soutenir les médias centrafricains et contribuer à la

construction d’une société démocratique, pacifique, juste et responsable en RCA, Annex VI: Final Narrative Report, IFS-RRM/2012/297-497.

• European Union (2016): Programme de renforcement des capacités des organisations

des femmes et des jeunes pour la promotion de la paix et le relèvement communautaire (RCAP), Rapport Narratif Final, 2014-2016, Mercy Corps, DCI-NSPVD/2014/344-096.

• European Union (2017): Advancing Reconciliation and Accountability through Forensic

Investigations in the Central African Republic, Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, Human Rights Clinic, IcSP/2016/392-689.

• European Union (2017): Programme de renforcement des capacités des organisations des femmes et des jeunes pour la promotion de la paix et le relèvement communautaire

(RCAP), Evaluation Final du RCAP, Période d’évaluation: du 18 Janvier au 05 Février

2017, DCI-NSPVD/2014/344-096.

• European Union (2018): Common Security and Defence Policy, Factsheet: European

Union Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTMRCA).

• European Union Commission, DG DEVCO (2011): External Assistance Management Report, Delegation: Republique Centrafricaine, Période: 01/01/2011-31/12/2011.

• European Union Commission, DG DEVCO (2013): External Assistance Management

Report, Delegation: Republique Centrafricaine, Période: 01/01/2012 to 31/12/2012.

• European Union Commission, DG DEVCO (2014): External Assistance Management

Report, Delegation: Republique Centrafricaine, Période: 01/01/2013 to 31/12/2013.

• European Union Commission, DG DEVCO (2015): Rapport de Gestion de l’Aide Extérieure (EARM) République Centrafricaine, Période 01/01/2014 to 31/12/2014.

109


• European Union Commission, DG DEVCO (2016): Rapport de Gestion de l’Aide

Extérieure (EARM) République Centrafricaine, Période 01/01/2015 to 31/12/2015.

• European Union, United Nations and World Bank (2016): Central African Republic National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–2021.

• Fondation Hirondelle, Media for peace and human dignity, Financial Audit Report,

2017, ISCP/2015/371-738.

• Gitte Højstrup Christensen, Elisa Norvanto, Thomas Mandrup (2018): Union’s Military

Operation in the Central African Republic: Successes, Shortcomings and Lessons Identified.

Colombia

• Dag Nylander, Rita Sandberg and Idun Tvedt (2018): Designing peace: the Colombian peace process, NOREF.

• EPRS (2018): EU Trade Agreement with Colombia: European Implementation

Assessment.

• European Union (2015): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR),

01/01/2015-31/12/2015, Colombia.

• European Union (2017): EU Trust Fund for Colombia 2017: First Annual/AOSD Report to the Management Board.

• European Union (2017): Statement – United Nations 5th Committee: Special Political

Missions-UN Verification Mission in Colombia.

• European Union (2018): Econometría – Evaluación Final del Programa Nuevos

Territorios de Paz.

• European Union (2018): FACTSHEETS - Relaciones entre la UE y Colombia.

• European Union (n.d.): Agreement Establishing the European Union Trust Fund for

Colombia and its Internal Rules. Available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/agreement-establishing-european-union-trust-fund-colombia-and-its-internal-rules_en https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/agreement-

establishing-european-union-trust-fund-colombia-and-its-internal-rules_en

• European Union (n.d.): Andean Community: The EU has a comprehensive trade

agreement with Colombia and Peru. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/andean-community/

• European Union (n.d.): EU and Colombia – Key partners for peace. Available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-colombia-key-partners-peace_en

• European Union (n.d.): Operational Criteria for the Submission of Proposals to the EU Trust Fund for Colombia. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-

criteria-submission-proposals-eu-trust-fund-colombia_en • European Union (n.d.): Trust Fund for Colombia. Available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-trust-fund-colombia_en

• European Union: Colombia MIP 2014-2017

• Ioannides, Isabelle (2019): Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating EU efforts to support peace in Colombia. Study EPRS / European Parliamentary Research Service.

• N.d. (2016): Final agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting

peace.

• N.d. (2017): Making Colombia Safe Again – Demining Mountain Communities.

• OAS (2016): The Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS).

Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=S-017/16

110


• The Department of Social Prosperity, Colombia (n.d.): Overview. Available at:

http://reports.weforum.org/social-innovation-2013/the-department-for-social-

prosperity-colombia/

• UN (2017): Security Council Report S/2017/1117.

Côte d’Ivoire

• Côte d'Ivoire, EU Roadmap for Commitment to Civil Society 2016-2020.

• Country Strategy Documents et national indicative programmes in the period 2008 –

2013

• European Union (2011): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), Ivory

Coast.

• European Union (2012): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR), Ivory Coast.

• European Union (2012): Programme d’appui budgétaire à la restauration des services

de l’Etat en Côte d’Ivoire – CRIS n° FED/2012/23813, Annex.

• European Union (2012): relative à une mesure spéciale d’appui budgétaire à la

restauration des services de l'Etat pour l'année 2012 en faveur de la Côte d'Ivoire à

financer sur les ressources du 10e FED, 7197 final

• European Union (2013): Decision of the Commission: relative à l'adoption d'une

mesure d'aide exceptionnelle relevant de l'instrument de stabilité en faveur de la Côte

d'Ivoire concernant un «appui à la mise en œuvre du programme de DDR» à financer sur le budget général de l’Union européenne, C(2013) 6300 final.


Coast.

• European Union (2013): Final narrative report, Appui au processus de réconciliation en

Côte d’Ivoire (EIDHR) , Contract 330881.


Coast.

• European Union (2014): Intermediate narrative report, January – December 2014: Triangle PACIFIC'' (CSO-LA), Contract DCI-NSAPVD/2013/307282.


Coast.

• European Union (2015): Second intermediate narrative report, January – December

2015: Triangle PACIFIC'' (CSO-LA), Contract DCI-NSAPVD/2013/307282.

• European Union (2016). Annex to Decision, c6989 final.

• European Union (2016): Sécurité Nationale (IcSP). Commission Implementing

Decision of 31 October 2016 on the adoption of the exceptional assistance measure

for a "National Security and Peacebuilding Support Program in Côte d'Ivoire" to finance from the general budget of the European Union, C (2016) 6989 final.

• European Union (2017): External Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with

the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (2007-2015), Final Report, Volume I, II, III and summaries in English and French.

• European Union (n.d.): Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development PRADD

I and II (IfS/IcSP Art 4). Commission Decision, on the 2015 Annual Action Programme for Côte d'Ivoire to be financed from the 11th European Development Fund, C(2015)

8418 final.

• National indicative programmes in the period 2014.2020.

• UNICEF (2018): Rapport de progrès narrative et financier, 1er août 2017 au 31 juillet

2018, 385-777.

111


Georgia

• Council of the European Union (2012): Council conclusions on the South Caucasus,

3149th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels.

• Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Georgia 2007-2013

• European Commission (2017): Report on the Implementation of the European

Neighbourhood Policy Review, JOIN(2017) 18 final

• European Commission (2011): Annual Action Programme 2011, C(2011) 4966 final.

• European Union (2004): European Neighbourhood Policy.

• European Union (2011): Annex II to Financing Agreement N° 2011/22568 (TAP), ENPI 022568.

• European Union (2012): Commission Decions adopting an Interim Response

Programme in favour of Georgia under the Instrument for Stability in favour of Georgia' – support for stabilization in conflict-affected areas.

• European Union (2013): Mid-Year Progress Reports, IfS Programme in Georgia.

• European Union (2014). Final Report, Contract 299602.

• European Union (2014): Association Agenda between the European Union and

Georgia.

• European Union (2014): Commission Decision, Special measure 2014 in favour of Georgia and Moldova to be financed from the general budget of the European Union,

C(2014) 2988 final.

• European Union (2014): Dialogue Coordination Mechanism, second narrative report,

13 May 2012-30, Contract 301431.

• European Union (2014): Final evaluation report, External Evaluation of the EU-funded OSCE-implemented project “Support to confidence-building through rehabilitation of

water-related infrastructure”, IFS-RRM/2012/299-602.

• European Union (2014): Mid year progress report, IfS/IcSP in Georgia.

• European Union (2014): Mid-Year Progress Reports, IfS Programme in Georgia.

• European Union (2014): Neutral Platform for Discussions, Final Narrative report,

12/2013-12/2014, Contract 333208.

• European Union (2015): ENP Progress report for Georgia, Implementation of the

European Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia Progress in 2014 and recommendations

for actions, SWD(2015) 66 final.

• European Union (2015): Evaluation of the European Union's co-operation with Georgia

(2007-2013), Final Report.

• European Union (2015): Final narrative report COBERM II, Contract 301426.

• European Union (2015): Mid-Year Progress Reports, IfS IV Programme in Georgia,

August 2015

• European Union (2015): Mid-Year Progress Reports, IfS Programme in Georgia, January 2015

• European Union (2015): Mid-Year Progress Reports, PAMF Programme in Georgia.

• European Union (2017): Confidence Building and Conflict Prevention through the Promotion of Mother Tongue Based Multilingual Education in Abkhazia, Progress

report, 1 February 2016 – 31 January 2017, Contract 373694.

• European Union (2017): Joint Approach to Programming.

• European Union (n.d.): ANNEX 2 of the Commission Implementing Decision on Annual

Action Programme 2015 in favour of Georgia Action Document for the European

Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development in Georgia, phase II (ENPARD Georgia II).

112


• European Union (n.d.): Contract 330663 (Education).

• European Union (n.d:): Contract 330663 (Healthcare).

• Fernanda (2015): End year progress IcSP. (not yet cleared)

• Georgia-EU+ Joint programming (2014): Draft Interim Programme.

• National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 (also referred to as CSP-NIP 2011-2013)

• Seamus Cleary and Tinatin Tkeshelashvili (2012): Final evaluation COBERM I, Contract 301426.

• Seamus Cleary and Tinatin Tkeshelashvili (2015): Final Evaluation of Confidence

Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM) 2, Contract 301426.

• Single Support Framework 2014-2017

• Single Support Framework 2017-2020

• View From Berlin (2017): (In)Effectiveness of the Eu Conflict Management and Mediation in Georgia and Moldova. Makhashvili, Journal of International Relations.

• WOSCAP (2017): Strengthening Conflict Prevention: Recommendations for the EU-

Georgia Roundtable Georgia.

Lebanon

• Berghof Foundation (2016): Strengthening the Capacities of Sunni Institutions to

Enhance Stability and Regional Tolerance, Brief Project Update (April – May 2016).

• Berghof Foundation (2017): Strengthening the Capacities of Sunni Institutions to

Enhance Stability and Regional Tolerance, Brief Project Update (November 2016 –

January 2017).

• EEAS and European Commission/DEVCO: Programming of the European

Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014-2020, Single Support Framework for EU

support to Lebanon (2014-2016).

• European Commission (2014): External Assistance Management Report (EAMR),

Period: 01/01/2014-31/12/2014, Lebanon.

• European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign

Affairs and Securtiy Policy (2015): Joint Staff Working Document: Implementation of

the European Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon. Progress in 2014 and recommendations for action, Accompanying the document: Joint Communication to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and

the Committee of the Regions, Implementation ot the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, Brussels, 25.3.2015, SWD(2015) 68 final.

• European Union (2013): Mid-year Progress Report, Support to non-State Actors for the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of civil peace in Lebanon.

• European Union (2015): Annex V: Final Narrative Report, ENPI/2015/296-488.

• European Union (2015): Annex V: Interim Narrative Report, ENPI/2015/296-488.

• European Union (2015): Mercy Corps, Building Community Capacity for Dispute

Resolution and Reconciliation in Lebanon, Final Report, contract IFS-RRM/2012/305-

478.

• European Union (2015): Narrative Project Progress Report, 15 December 2014-30

June 2015, ENPI/2014/349-836.

• European Union (2016): Final Narrative Report, 15 December 2014-14 December 2015, ENPI/2014/349-836.

• Evelien Weller and Dr. Ms Vida Hamad (2017): Evaluation of IcSP actions on Counter-

Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. Mission Report: Lebanon, 2017/383/991.

113


• Lebanese Center for Civic Education (2016): Grassroots in Action for Peace Building,

Grant number IFS-RRM/2012/305-331, Final Report.

• Mercy Corps, Maharat Foundation and Peace Labs (2016): Governance and Community Action Programme, Interim Report, 1 November 2015-31 October 2016.

• Mercy Corps, Maharat Foundation and Peace Labs (2017): Governance and

Community Action Programme (GCAP), Monthly Progress Report, 1-31.

• Weller, E. et al (2017): Evaluation of IcSP Actions on Counter-Terrorism and

Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, Final Report, IcSP/2017/383-991.

Myanmar

• Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (2017): Evaluation report: Confidence Building Towards Robust Ceasefires and Peace Process in Myanmar, first phase (2015 -2017).

• Council of the European Union (2016): Council Conclusions on EU strategy with

Myanmar/Burma. Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10482-2016-INIT/en/pdf

• Crisis Group (2018): Myanmar’s Stalled Transition- Briefing 151, Asia.

• Crisis Group (2019): Myanmar: Humanitarian Crisis and Armed Escalation, Commentary, Asia.

• European Court of Auditors (2018): EU Assistance to Myanmar/Burma, Special Report.

• European Union (2013): Commission Implementing Decisions, adopting an Exceptional Assistance Measure under the Instrument for Stability – Comprehensive

support to the peace process in Burma/Myanmar, financial decision.

• European Union (2013): EU-Myanmar Task Force, Brussels, 11 November 2013, press release available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1062_en.htm

• European Union (2013): European Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive

Framework for the European Union’s policy and support to Myanmar/Burma.

• European Union (2014): Mid-Term Support to the Myanmar Peace Centre, First Annual

Report, 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014, IfS-RRM/2013/315-564.

• European Union (2014): Shan State: peace, reconciliation and development through

community empowerment, Description of Activities, DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766.

• European Union (2015): Evaluation: Mid-term support to the Myanmar Peace Centre, IFS-2013-315364-IMG-MPC.

• European Union (2015): Myanmar Media Lab project, Final Evaluation Report, IFS-

RRM/2013/327651.

• European Union (2015): Myanmar Media Lab, Internews, Annex VI: Final Narrative

Report, IFS-RRM/2013/327651, Reporting period November 2013-Februrary 2015.

• European Union (2016): Joint Communication to the European Parliament, Elements for an EU strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: A Special Partnership for Democracy,

Peace and Prosperity. Available at:

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/myanmar/docs/join_2016_24_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_849592.pdf

• European Union (2016): Promoting Durable Peace and Development in Kachin, Oxfam

Novib, Results-based Monitoring Report, DCI-ASIE/353 929.

• European Union (2016): Report of the Mid-Term External Evaluation; Education

Assistance to Children in Rakhine State, DCI-ASIE/2014/353-601.

• European Union (2017): Midterm Evaluation of ILO/Myanmar’s “Shan State: Peace,

Reconciliation, and Development through Community Empowerment” Programme,

DCI-ASIE 2014/353-766.

114


• European Union (2017): Mid-Term Evaluation, ‘Promoting Sustainable Peace and

Resiliency (PROSPER) Paung Si Lett Programme, Kayah State - Myanmar, Mercy

Corp Scotland”, DCI-ASIE 2014/353-917.

• European Union (2018): European Union, Factsheets EU-Myanmar relations.

Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4004/EU-Myanmar%20relations

• European Union (2018): Final narrative report January 2015 to 31 March 2018:

Confidence Building Towards Robust Ceasefires and Peace Process in Myanmar (Final reporting period: 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2018) Contract Number DCI-ASIE

2014/352-437.

• European Union (n.d.): Development Cooperation Instrument, Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020) Myanmar/Burma

• European Union Delegation to Myanmar (2016): Operations Sections: Mission Report:

Joint Education Mission to Rakhine State.

• NIS & UNOPS (2016): Joint Peace Fund: Quarterly Programme Report July –

September 2016.

• Particip GmbH, Hannah Tigerschiold February (2018): Final Report, Technical Assistance to Nyein (Shalom) Foundation in Myanmar January 2017 – February 2018,

c-2016/380861.

• People in Need (PIN) (2017): Interreligious Respect and Reconciliation Through civil

Society in Myanmar (funded by the European Union) and Bridging Religious and Ethnic

Divides in Burma: support civil society in Promoting Tolerance, Conflict Resolution (funded by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) of the US

Department of State). Final Evaluation Report.

• Swisspeace (2016): Final Evaluation Report Civilian Ceasefire Monitoring Project, IFS/2013/332 001.

Niger

• Association Nigérienne de Lutte Contre la Corruption/Section Transparency International – NIGER and OXFARM (2014) : Rapport de l’Enquête sur la Corruption

dans le Cadre de la Distribution de l’Aide Humanitaire, Niamey

• CARE (2018) : Evaluation finale du projet RESPECT : « Réduire la souffrance des per-

sonnes affectées par le conflit transfrontalier dans la région de Diffa » Juillet 2017 -

Juillet 2018. Rapport final, https://www.careevaluations.org/evaluation/evaluation-finale-du-projet-respect/

• CARE Niger et SOS Civisme Niger (2015): Projet REVE: Revalorisation du Vivre

Ensemble, Rapport d’évaluation finale, C-335897.

• EC/DG DEVCO (2013): Rapport de Gestion de l’Aide extérieure (EAMR), periode

1/1/2013-31/12/2013, Niger.

• EC/DG DEVCO (2015): Rapport de Gestion de l’Aide extérieure (EAMR), periode 1/1/2015-31/12/2015, Niger.

• EC/FPI (2017): Mid-Term External Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability

and Peace (2014 - mid 2017), Final Report and Annex.

• Eirene, ONG Karkara, Radio Baarou (2015): Exploitation de l’or et développement

durable au Niger, EXOR-2, Rapport intermédiaire janvier-décembre 2014, C-333981.

• European Union (2007): Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).

• European Union (2014): Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel.

• European Union (2015): Projet d’Appui à Stabilité et la Consolidation de de la paix dans

la région de Diffa (PASCP), Rapport final d’activités, C-367852.

115


• European Union (2018): Factsheets: The European Union's partnership with the G5

Sahel countries.

• European Union (n.d.): Évaluation finale et capitalisation du projet d’appui à la préservation de la paix et de la sécurité à travers la création d’opportunités d’emploi

pour les jeunes et femmes urbains et ruraux, Rapport final, C-331458.

• European Union (n.d.): Niger-Communauté européenne, Document de Stratégie Pays

et Programme Indicatif National 2008-2013

• European Union (n.d.): République du Niger-Union européenne, Programme Indicatif National 2014 – 2020.

• European Union, State of the Union (2018): Towards a new 'Africa - Europe Alliance'

to deepen economic relations and boost investment and jobs, Press release.

• European Union: Projet de Renforcement de la Sécurisation Foncière dans la

Commune Rurale de Dargol (PRSF/CRD), Rapport final, C-332262.

• EUTF (n.d.): Website. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/niger

• GdN (2011): Stratégie de Développement et de Sécurité dans les zones Sahélo-

Sahariennes.

• GdN (2015): Plan de Développement Économique et Social (PDES) 2012-2015.

• HACP (2015): Vision et plan d’actions de la HACP (2014- 2018).

• Helly, D., Galeazzi, G. (2014): Planting seeds and breaking eggs. EU Delegations dealing with peace and security - the Sahel case and beyond. Briefing Note 70.

• N.d.: Rapport de la mission d’évaluation a mi-parcours de l’IdS CT dans la region

d’Agadez et les dix communes des régions de Tahoua et Tillabéry, Rapport final.

• Oxfam et ONG Karkara (2016): Projet de construction de la paix dans la zone

transfrontaliere du Niger et Mali, rapport narratif final, décembre 2013- Aout 2016, C-

331593.

• The Defense Post (2019): Seven Niger soldiers, dozens of militants killed in Boko

Haram attack in Diffa region. Available at:

https://thedefensepost.com/2019/03/10/niger-boko-haram-attack-gueskerou-diffa/

• Tubiana, J. and Gramizzi C. (2018): Lost in Trans-Nation: Tubu and Other Armed

Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s Southern Border by Jérôme, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

• United Nations (2013): Integrated strategy for the Sahel, S/2013/354.

• United Nations (2018): Support Plan for the Sahel.

• United Nations (n.d.): Peacebuilding webpage. Available at: https://un-

peacebuilding.tumblr.com/post/173296390605/the-pbf-in-niger

• UNPBF (2018): Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix (PBF) et Gouvernement du Niger (GdN), Plan de priorités pour la consolidation de la paix 2015-2018. Available at:

http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Niger-Plan-Prioritaire-20072015.pdf

Philippines

• Conciliation Resources (2019): Referendum myth-busting: supporting an informed vote

in Mindanao. Available at: https://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/news/referendum-

myth-busting-supporting-informed-vote-mindanao?mc_cid=5933631418&mc_eid=acb8fd5176

• Council of the EU (2011): EU-Philippines Framework Agreement on Partnership and

Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part. Brussels.

116


• European Union (2012): TA Enhancing the capacity of Civilian Protection Component

of the International Monitoring Team (funded under intervention 24319 - PEACE),

Interim Report, Contract 303304.

• European Union (2014): EU/MIP Philippines (2014-2020) – Multiannual Indicative

Programme (MIP) for the Philippines.

• European Union (2015): Progress Report – Justice for All – Enhancing Accessibility,

Fighting Impunity in Philippines (funded under intervention 22704 - Justice for All),

Contract 308147.

• European Union (2015): Project Document (UNDP) - Description of Action – Supporting

an Enabling Environment for Sustainable Peace in the Bangsamoro - (funded under

intervention 38682 – Comprehensive Agreement), Contract 371400.

• European Union (2015): Supporting the Mindanao Peace and Transition Process

(content-wise, follow-up to Contract 303304) - (funded under intervention 38682 –

Comprehensive Agreement), Final Report, Contract 365621.

• European Union (2018): Foster sustainable peace and human security (content-wise,

follow-up to Contract 303304), 1 Feb. 2017 – 31 Jan. 2018. (funded under intervention

40068 – New Peace Roadmap for Mindanao), Interim Narrative Report, Contract 383403.

• European Union (2018): FSD Mine Action Support to the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (content-wise, follow-up to Contract

365622) (funded under intervention 40068 - New Peace Roadmap for Mindanao),

Independent Final Evaluation, Contract 383944.

• European Union (n.d.): Mine Action Support to the Peace Process - (funded under

intervention 38682 – Comprehensive Agreement), Final narrative report, Contract

365622.

• ICG (2016): The Philippines: Renewing Prospects for Peace in Mindanao. Asia Report

No 281.

• Mindanao Trust Fund (2015): Annual Report 2015. Available at https://www.mtf.ph/reports/annual-report-2015

• National Economic and Development Authority (2011): GoP/PDP (2011-2016) -

Philippine Development Plan (PDP), Manila.

• National Economic and Development Authority (2017). GoP/PDP (2017-2022) -

Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011-2016, Manila.

• The Guardian (25 Jan. 2019). Southern Philippines backs Muslim self-rule in landslide

result.

Somalia

• Al-Marani, Suad et al. (2017): Insight into research findings on EU peacebuilding

interventions from case studies and thematic reports. WOSCAP.

• Axiom & Danish Refugee Council (2018): End of project evaluation: Civic engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia. Final Report.

• Conflict Dynamics International & SOYDEN (2015): Logical Framework for the Action:

Political Accommodation and Reconciliation in Somalia.

• Council of the European Union (2011): Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa +

Annex: A Strategic framework for the Horn of Africa.

• Danish Demining Group & WOCCA (2017): Civic engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia (SCERF) Project. Final narrative report. 1st

January 2016 – 31.

117


• European Commission (2014): Support to state building and peace building sectors,

Annual Action Programme, FED/2014/037-616.

• European Commission (2014): Support to state building and peace building sectors, Action Document, FED/2014/037-616.

• European Commission (2016): ECHO Factsheet – Somalia.

• European Union (2013): Good governance. 3rd Interim Narrative Report. Dec number 2269, Contract 290587.

• European Union (n.d.): Good governance, Add 3. Dec nr 22691, Contract 376163.

• European Union (n.d.): Good governance. Annex 1 – NSA Programme – Mid Term Evaluation. Dec number 2269, Contract 290587.

• European Union (n.d.): Good governance. Pillars of Peace – Phase I, 4th Interim

Report. Dec number 22692, Contract 314721.

• Life and Peace Institute & Zamzam Foundation (2017): CRM Phase II – Community-

led local peacebuilding to strengthen state-building in Somalia. 6 Month Interim Report. 1 January – 30 June 2017, DCI-NSAPVD/2015/369-537.

• MPTF (2016): UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia Quarterly Report 1 January –

21 March 2016.

• MPTF (2016): UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia Quarterly Report 1 April – 30

June 2016.

• N.N. (2017): Development partners assessment and suggestions of the WB MPF and the 4th progress report.

• UNOPS (2017): Somali Federal Police Stipends Payments Project (96357) – Final

payment and narrative report.

• World Bank (2014): World Bank – Multi-partner fund. Supporting the Somali Compact.

Annual Progress Report. August 2014 – October 2014.

• World Bank (2017): Multi-Partner fund. Progress report 1st July 2017 – 31st December 2017.

• World Bank (n.d.): Description of the MPF.

Zimbabwe

• CONCORD (2017): EU Delegations Report 2017 - Towards a more effective

partnership with civil society. Available at: https://concordeurope.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/02/CONCORD_EUD_report_2017_Survey_FullData.pdf?86d384&86d384>

• Council of European Union - Foreign Affairs (2018): Council Conclusions on Zimbabwe - 5471/18. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32419/st05471-

en18.pdf

• ECDPM (2013): Glass half full: Study on EU lessons learnt in mediation and dialogue. (Zimbabwe Case). Available at: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-Glass-

Half-Full-Study-EU-Lessons-Learnt-Mediation-Dialogue.pdf

• European Commission (2012): Commission implementing decision adopting an Exceptional Assistance Measure under the Instrument for Stability for support to

sustained democratic reform and peaceful transition in Zimbabwe, FPl.2

Ares(2012)968824.

• European Commission (n.d.): Strengthening Democratic Dialogue in Zimbabwe

ANNEX A.2 – Full application form - Olof Palme International Center. D.O.A. - Decision – 40385 – 393207 -

• European Parliament (2018): Zimbabwe's post-electoral challenges, EPRS - European

Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing - PE 625.183. Available at:

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<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2

018)625183>

• European Union (2011): Towards a framework on National Healing, Reconciliation,

Integration and Prevention of Violence in Zimbabwe - National Association of NGOs -

01/12/2011 to 30/11/2015 -Final narrative report, DCI-NSAPVD/2011/265-469 .

• European Union (2011): Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe, DCI-NSA-PVD-

2011/266-99-5.

• European Union (2012): Towards a framework on National Healing, Reconciliation, Integration and Prevention of Violence in Zimbabwe - 05/12/2012 - Monitoring Report

(ROM) MR-145404.01 CRIS - C-265469, DCI-NSAPVD/2011/265-2012.

• European Union (2015): Zimbabwe – European Union – Country Strategy Paper.

• European Union and Government of Zimbabwe (2015): 11th European Development

Fund - National Indicative Programme (2014 - 2020) For co-operation between the

European Union and the Republic of Zimbabwe.

• European Union Delegation, Heads of Mission of EU Member States present in Harare*

and the Heads of Mission of Australia, Canada, and the United States of America

(2018): Joint Local Statement on the targeting of opposition in Zimbabwe. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe_en/49277/Joint%20Local%20Statemen

t%20on%20the%20targeting%20of%20opposition%20in%20Zimbabwe>

• International Crisis Group (2018): Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform? Available at:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-opportunity-

reform

• Sachikonye, Lloyd and Rudo Chitiga (2014): An Evaluation of the Joint Monitoring and

Implementation Committee (JOMIC) Project - A Report for the Zimbabwe Institute, June

2014. related to Decision – 24377 Democracy & Peace - 303994 - JOMIC Decentralisation.

• Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (2016): Building Civil Society and

Community Capacity to promote Corporate and Government Responsibility and Accountability in the Diamond Mining Sector and Compliance with the Kimberley

Process Certification Scheme Standards - Final Report. IFS-RRM/2013/024-798 - Decision - 24798 Civil Society and Community Capacity -328813.

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Annex 9: List of persons interviewed

Persons interviewed outside of the case studies

Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position DG DEVCO AL-UTAIBI Janet DG DEVCO Regional Office for

East and Southern Africa

IGAD Focal Point

BETTI Ilaria DG DEVCO D – EU-Africa Relations, East and Southern Africa 3. EU-Africa, African Peace Facility

Programme Manager - Panafrican Organizations and Initiatives

BOUTILLIER Clément DG DEVCO B - People and Peace 2. Resilience, Fragility

Policy Officer

BRASSEUR Charles DG DEVCO E2 - Central and Southern Africa, Indian Ocean - Southern Africa, Indian Ocean

International Aid / Cooperation Officer

BRETEA Laura DG DEVCO B1 Gender Equality, Human Rights and Democratic Governance

Policy Officer

CORDINO Giuditta DG DEVCO B - People and Peace 2. Resilience, Fragility

Consultant

GIRARD Charles DG DEVCO EUD in Côte d’Ivoire project manager on peace and security

GUIBBAUD Pauline DG DEVCO Geo Desk in Niger GUIGNARD Aude DG DEVCO D1 - EU-AU

relations, West and East Africa - Western Africa

International Aid/Cooperation Officer

LAUTURE Jean-Jacques

DG DEVCO B - People and Peace 2. Resilience, Fragility

Policy Officer

MINERVINO Stefania DG DEVCO B - People and Peace 2. Resilience, Fragility

Policy Officer

MONTALBAN-CARRASCO

Alejandro DG DEVCO Dir F - Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific

International Aid / Cooperation Officer

MORETTI Elisa DG DEVCO B1 Gender Equality, Human Rights and

Justice Expert

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Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position Democratic Governance

OPPIZZI Matteo DG DEVCO Geo Desk South Sudan

PEDERSEN Jesper DG DEVCO B5 IcSP, art. 5

Head of Sector, IcSP art 5 areas on "Fight against global and trans-regional threats"

PEREIRO PINON

Jorge DG DEVCO D - EU-Africa Relations, East and Southern Africa 3. EU-Africa, African Peace Facility

Team Leader African Peace facility

RAMSEY Fiona DG DEVCO A2 - Development Financing Effectiveness, Relations with Member States Joint - Programming Fragility Study

Team Leader Working Better Together

SCHOUTENS Griet DG DEVCO Columbia Desk - G1 International Aid/Cooperation Assistant

SCHULLER Simone DG DEVCO D – EU-Africa Relations, East and Southern Africa 3. EU-Africa, African Peace Facility

SCORDINO Giuditta DG DEVCO B - People and Peace 2. Resilience, Fragility

External consultant

STALMANS Marc DG DEVCO Sector Wester Africa Sahel

Head of Sector

DG NEAR BERDACH Anna DG NEAR B – Neighbourhood

South International Aid / Cooperation Assistant (Lebanon)

CANEA Ana-Sorina DG NEAR A -Strategy and Turkey 4. MFF, Programming & Evaluation

Evaluation Officer

CENDROWICZ Nicolas DG NEAR C.1 Georgia, Moldova & Neighbourhood Cross-Border Cooperation

Deputy Head of Unit

DAGAND Sophie DG NEAR B - Neighbourhood South

Policy Assistant - Centre of Thematic

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Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position 2. Regional Programmes Neighbourhood South

Expertise Crisis reaction and Security Sector reform

GHERMAN Catalin DG NEAR EUD in Georgia Deputy Head of Cooperation

HALGAND Stéphane DG NEAR B - Neighbourhood South 2. Regional Programmes Neighbourhood South

Head, Centre of Thematic Expertise Crisis reaction and Security Sector reform

HAUF Michaela DG NEAR C.1 Georgia, Moldova & Neighbourhood Cross-Border Cooperation

Team Leader Georgia

HUDSON David DG NEAR Senior Expert HUNDHAMMER Elisabeth DG NEAR C.1 Georgia,

Moldova & Neighbourhood Cross-Border Cooperation

Programme officer

MARQUES DE ATHAYDE

Angela DG NEAR B – Neighbourhood South

Policy Officer (Lebanon)

EEAS ALGUADIS Melis EEAS Policies and thematic

support (ISP.1) Policy officer

ANDERSEN Kai Holst EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

Deputy Head of Operations

BARBOTTE Daphné EEAS Conflict Prevention and Mediation Support (ISP.2)

Policy officer – Conflict Prevention

BOU Jean-Pierre EEAS Division South America

Deputy Head of Division

CONSTANTINI Silvia EEAS PRISM TL/Head of Sector for EWS

COSTELLO Patrick EEAS Global 3 : Democracy and Electoral Observation

Head of Division

DEMAN Jacques EEAS Pan-African affairs (AFRICA.5)

Policy officer

GROSZ Anna EEAS West Africa (AFRICA.3)

Political officer

HAGGEBORG Anna-Karin EEAS Policies and thematic support (ISP.1)

Policy officer

HALL-ALLEN Oliver EEAS Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP


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Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position and Stabilisation (ISP.3)

HEATH Timothy EEAS PRISM Peace & Conflict Adviser

KNOOP Saré EEAS PRISM Policy Officer MADSEN Ann Maria EEAS Service of DSG

CSDP and crisis response PRISM — Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation

Peace and Conflict Advisor

MAJORENKO Madeleine EEAS Policies and thematic support (ISP.1)

Head of Division

MARTINS Ana Beatriz EEAS Horn of Africa, East Africa and Indian Ocean Division


REINDER ROSING

Jan EEAS PRISM Policy Officer

TORTA Isabella EEAS Geo desk with focus on region Georgia and Moldova

Team Leader

VAN DAMME Philippe EEAS Service of Deputy Secretary General for economic and global issues AFRICA

Adviser

VAN NES René EEAS Service of DSG CSDP and crisis response PRISM — Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation


VASIU Mihaela EEAS MENA 5. Strategy and instruments of the ENP - ENP Security dimension coordinator

Policy Coordinator

FPI BABAUD Sebastian FPI FPI 2 IcSP BARTHOLOMÉ Philippe FPI BOJSEN-MøLLER

Simon FPI FPI 2 IcSP Deputy Head of Unit

FIEDRICH Marc FPI FPI 2 IcSP Head of Unit

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Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position FLOREN Aive FPI FPI 1 Evaluations

GENTILE Roberta FPI FPI 2 IcSP Evaluation and Liaison Officer

HADRA Peter FPI Regional IcSP Project Manager

LUKIC Ana FPI FPI 2 IcSP Focal point for conflict prevention

SQUADRITO Giovanni FPI FPI 2 IcSP Team Leader - Peacebuilding Partnership and Crisis Response Planner

VALENTE CORREIA

Paula FPI FPI 2 IcSP Evaluation and Liaison Officer

DG ECHO BELLERS Roger DG ECHO C - Africa, Asia, Latin

America, Caribbean & Pacific 1. Policy Development and Regional Strategy II

Policy Officer - Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience

MATTIATO Alessandro DG ECHO D1 Policy Coordination, International and Multilateral Relations, Legal Affairs

Policy officer

Other EU AMORIM Luís European Council

Secretariat Former Head of Security Unit in RELEX Directorate General

Head of Unit

QUILLE Gerrard European Parliament

European Parliamentary Mediation Support

Head of Service

Multilateral HIENSCH Annick UN United Nations

Peace and Security Liaison Office

Political Affairs Officer

KEANE Rory UN United Nations Peace and Security Liaison Office

Head of Office

NGO / Research BOSSUYT Jean ECDPM Senior Expert CHIGAS Diana Tufts University Fletcher School of

Law and Diplomacy Professor

FAMÀ Giuseppe ICG EPLO member Head of EU advocacy team

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Last name First name Organisation Unit/Sub-Entity Position FLEMMING Matilda Search for

Common Ground European Affairs and

Partnerships Manager

HERRBERG Antje MediatEUr former co-founder and CEO

KLINGENBERG Lisa ICG EPLO member EU Analyst, Research and Advocacy

MIDGLEY Tim Saferworld Conflict Sensitivity Helpdesk for EIB

MONTANARO Lucia Safer World EPLO Member Head of Office in Brussels

MOORE Ben EPLO

Assistant Director PENFRAT Anna EPLO

Senior Policy Officer

REINES-DJIVANIDES

Sonya EPLO

Director

WILLIAMS Paul George Washington University

Elliot School of International Affairs

Associate Professor

List of institutions consulted per case study

The table below presents the list of organisations consulted for each case study in order to

ensure anonymity of the individual resource persons interviewed.

Case study Institutions consulted AFRICA APF / South Sudan (desk and field)

• Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism

• Embassy of France • Embassy of Norway • Embassy of the United Kingdom • Embassy of the United States • EUD South Sudan • FPI regional office (Nairobi) • Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission • Mahad IDP collective • South Sudan Council of Churches • Swedish Embassy Office in Juba, South Sudan • UNHCR

APF / Addis Ababa (desk and field)

• African Union • Embassy of Denmark • Embassy of Japan • Embassy of Norway • Embassy of The Netherlands • EUD African Union • EUD Ethiopia • EUSR • IGAD

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• Institute for Peace and Security Studies Central African Republic (desk) • African Union

• DG DEVCO • EEAS • FPI

Côte d’Ivoire (desk and field) • Centre d’Appui à la Société Civile (CRASC) de Man • Centre de recherche et d'action pour la paix (CERAP) -

Abidjan • Centre des pompiers civils Man • CERAP/CRASC Bouaké • CNS/ Groupe consultatif • Collectif des ex-combattants de la cellule 39 • Comité de paix de Gueupleu • Conseil Superieur Des Imams (Cosim)-Bouaké • Convention de la société civile ivoirienne (CSCI) • Direction de la Police Nationale • DUE Dakar/FPI • EUD • Expertise France • France • Germany • GIZ • INTERPEACE • Ministere de l’Interieur et de la Securité • ONG IDE-Afrique/ Man • ONG INDIGO- Bouaké • ONG INDIGO CI (GUIGLO) • ONUDI • Préfecture de police Bouaké • Préfecture de police de Man • Secrétariat du Conseil national de sécurité (groupe

consultatif) • Secrétariat du Conseil national de sécurité (Sec-CNS) • Sécurité intérieure • UNDP • UNICEF • Union Africaine • Verbatims-Bouaké

Niger (desk and field) • Ambassade de France • ANDD Garkua • Cellule d’appui à l’Ordonnateur National/Ministère des

Finances • CHD • ECHO • EUCAP Sahel Niger • EUD • EUSR Sahel • FPI

126


• GIZ – ProGem/EUTF • Groupement des jeunes filles "Kla Kil" de Diffa Koura • Groupes de collaborateurs et bénéficiaires du project de

SfCG (IcSP) à Diffa • HACP • KARKARA • LUXDEV - Luxembourg • Ministère de la Justice • Ministère de l'Intérieur, de la Sécurité Publique, la

Décentralisation et des Affaires Coutumières et Religieuses • Ministère du Plan • Mouvement patriotique pour une citoyenneté responsable

(MPCR) • ORCONI (Organisation des Consommateurs du Niger), • OXFAM / Niger • PNUD • Search for Common Ground (SfCG) • SOS Civisme • UNHCR • Université de Diffa

Somalia (desk) • DG DEVCO • EUSR • FPI

Zimbabwe (desk and field) • Arda Transau • BMZ/GIZ - Germany • DFID • Dutch Embassy • EUD • External Evaluator for EU Electoral Support • Formerly Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee

(JOMIC) and MDC (political party) • Habakkuk Trust • Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance of Africa

University • Marange Development Trust (MDT) • Mass Public Opinion Institute (implementing partner) • Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs • National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations

(NANGO) • National Youth Development Trust • Parliament of Zimbabwe • Save Odzi Community Network Trust (SOCNET) • SIDA • Swedish Embassy • Swiss Embassy • UN Women • UNDP • USAID • Zanu PF (political party of the government)

127


• ZIDAWU (Zimbabwe Diamonds and Allied minerals Workers Union)

• Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) • Zimbabwe Christian Alliance • Zimbabwe Council of Chiefs • Zimbabwe Election Support Network (implementing partner) • Zimbabwe Electoral Commission • Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA) (EU

implementing partner) • Zimbabwe Gender Commission (ZGC) • Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) • Zimbabwe Institute (ZI) (EU implementing partner) • Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) (implementing

partner) • Zimbabwe National Peace and Reconciliation Commission

(NPRC) • Zimbabwe Open University & Zimbabwe Peace and Security

Education and Training Network • Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme (ZPSP) (former

EU implementing partner) / Masakhaneni Project Trust • Zimbabwe Peace Project • Zimbabwe Women Lawyer's Association (ZWLA)

ASIA Afghanistan (desk) • DG Devco

• EEAS Myanmar (desk) • DG DEVCO

• EEAS • FPI

Philippines (desk and field) • Association FSD France • Bangsamoro Transition Authority • British Council • Catholic Church • Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue • Community-based civil protection • Conciliation Resources • Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities • ECHO Office, Philippines • Embassy of Australia to The Philippines • Embassy of Sweden to The Philippines • Embassy of the Netherlands • Embassy of the UK to the Philippines • EUD, Philippines • EUD, Thailand • GIZ Office Manila • Institute for Autonomy and Governance • International Alert • International Monitoring Team • Konrad Adenauer Stiftung • Magungaya Mindanao Inc

128


• Moro Women Development and Cultural Center (MWDECC) • Nonviolent Peaceforce • North Cotabato Composite Team • Office of the President of the Philippines • Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process in

Mindanao • Organization of T'eduray and Lambangian Conference

(OTLAC) • Spanish Cooperation AECID • T'eduray-Lambangian Women's Organisation (TLWO) • Tiakap Kalilintad • UNDP Resilience and Peacebuilding Office • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), incl. the

Resilience and Peacebuilding Office • United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs • UNYPAD Development Managament Centre • World Bank • YEKEY Constructions

LATIN AMERICA Colombia (desk and field) • Academia

• AECID • CINEP • Colombian Peace Fund • Consejo Noruego • Corpomanigua • DESCONTAMINA • ECHO • ECOMUN • ETRC Agua Bonita • ETRC Miravalle • EUD • Humanecemos • RedAdelco • Sweden • UN Verification Mission • UNDP • UNMAS • Vicariato de San Vicente de Caguan

NEIGHBOURHOOD EAST Georgia (desk and field) • Academia

• Action Against Hunger • Action Against Hunger (Abkhazia) • Association Peaceful and Business Caucasus • Austrian Development Agency • Caucasus House of Civil Hearings • Coalition for IDP Rights • Conciliation Resources

129


• Consultant IcSP monitoring 2014-2015 • CSO “Association of Women of Abkhazia” (Abkhazia) • CSO “Center for Humanitarian Programmes (CHP)

(Abkhazia) • CSO ALERT (Abkhazia) • CSO Center for children with disabilities Samurzakan (Gali,

Abkhazia) • Danish Refugee Council • Danish Refugee Council (Abkhazia) • Df Cabinet of Ministers, State Committee on Ecology and

Nature Protection • Df Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abkhazia • Ecological CSO “ABSABARA” (Sukhumi, Abkhazia) • EUD • EUMM • EUSR • Expert • FAO • Former Minister of Reconciliation • Gogroup Media / JAM news • Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflict • International Crisis Group • Journalist (Abkhazia) • Ministry of Foreign Affairs Georgia • Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and

Civic Equality • Swedish Government • Switzerland Foreign Affairs • TV-Studio “Asarkya” (Abkhazia) • UN • UNDP • UNICEF • Union of Teachers “Education and Universe” - UTEU • United Kingdom • United States • USAID

NEIGHBOURHOOD SOUTH Lebanon (desk and field) • Berghof Foundation

• Carnegie Middle East Center • Civil Defense Force • Customs • Dannieh Union of Municipalities • DG NEAR • EEAS • Embassy of France • Embassy of The Netherlands • Embassy of UK • Embassy of US • EUD

130


• FPI Headquarters • FPI Regional Office • General Security Force • ICMPD • Internal Security Force • Lebanese Armed Forces • Mercy Corps • Participants in the Mercy Corps-implemented Governance

and Community Action Programme • Supreme Council for Defence • UNDP • UNODC