CASE DIGEST OF THE 4TH ASSIGNMENT (or part 2 ass. of article VI) July 10 & 14, 2012)

1. LibanVs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, et al. were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. They filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Richard J. Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator of the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat?

Ruling: The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

2. Liban vs. Gordon JAN. 18, 2011

Facts: in his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.

Issue: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat?

Ruling: No. Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

3. BANAT vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 179271; April 21, 2009

FACTS: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Issue: Do sections 37 & 38 of R.A. 7166 violate Sec. 17, Article VI? When does the jurisdiction of the COMELEC end and when does the jurisdiction of HRET begin?

Held: Yes.WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

SUPPLEMENTARY: YES, it does not violate Sec. 17 Article VI, congress and comelec en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of congress and the comelec en banc, are exercised on different occasions and different purposes.

The Supreme Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives (HOR), the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends. With that, the HRET's own jurisdiciton begins. It follows that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning COMELEC's proclamation should now present his case before the HRET, which is the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives.

4. VILANDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Issue: Can HRET look into the eligibility ...SEE YOUR ASSGNMENT OUTLINE:))

RULING: No. HRET does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. Even though the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET, under Rule 14. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

5. Madrigal v. VillarG.R. 183055July 31, 2009

FACTS On August 2007, the Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents int he Commission on Appointments (CA), with Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal as one of the contingents in the Senate under the PDP-Laban party. Sen. Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters to Senator Manuel Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. With this claim, she requested for the reorganization of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions of the CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional." Sen. Villar answered her letter noting that he intended to have the CA Committee study and deliberate on the matter. However, he also stated that copies of the letters of Madrigal would be transmitted to the Senate Secretary for it had better jurisdiction on the issue, as per Sen. Arroyo's comment which stated that, "if there is a complaint in the election of a member, or members, it shall be addressed to the body that elected them, namely the Senate and/or the House. Thus, it was just appropriate for the case presented by Madrigal to be included in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate to be properly addressed.

However, Sen. Madrigal, by letter, reiterated her request for the actions of the CA to be held in abeyance pending the reorganization of both the Senate and House of Representatives contingents. Thereafter, she filed for a petition (2nd to that of Drilon, G.R. 180055) for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against Sen. Villar in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA, alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction:

in failing to comply with the constitutionally required proportional party representation of the members of the CAin continuously conducting hearings and proceedings on the the appointments despite the abovein failing, despite repeated demands from petitioner, to reorganize the CA members.

ISSUE: Can a Senator challenge before the Supreme Court that she was denied proportional representation with the Commission on Appointments?

HELD: No. The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before Sen. Madrigal may bring her petition to Court. Sen. Villar's invocation of the said doctrine is thus well-taken. Furnishing a copy of the petitioner's letter to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. More to that, the Members of the House who claim that they have been deprived of a seat in the Commission on Appointments must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the CA. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

6. Pimentel v. EnrileG.R. 187714March 8, 2011

FACTS: Sen. Villar and Sen. Lacson, each, delivered a privilege speech (on separate dates). Both of them suggested that Ethics Committee cannot take the floor with regard to accusations against Sen. Villar. More so, Sen. Lacson suggested, that since the Ethics Committee cannot act with fairness on Sen. Villar's case, it should be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with 10 members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. When the respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings, petitioners objected to theapplication of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. Sen. Pimentel raised an issue that there is a need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. But responded proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on PS Resolution 706. The preliminary conference was then scheduled.

Petitioners contested the following: 1) transfer of complaint against Sen. Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Sen. Villar's constitutional right to equal protection; 2) the Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation and complaint filed by Sen. Madrigal against Sen. Villar is violative of Sen. Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement of Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3) The Committee violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision which requires its effectivity upon publication.

Respondents argue that the instant petition must be dismissed for being premature, pointing out that petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort. It is within the power of the Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior. More to that, the internal rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. With regard to the publication of the Rules of Procedure, the Rules of the Ethics Committee have already been duly published and adopted, which allowed the adoption of the supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.

ISSUE:

Is non-publication of the Rules of Procedure governing legislative investigations, fatal?

RULING:

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

7. Garcillano v. HouseG.R. 170338December 23, 2008

FACTS: VirgilioGarcillano filed a petition alleging that he is the person alluded in the "Hello Garci" tapes. He was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. Thus, Garcillano claimed that he was directly injured by the House Committee's actions and charged them of electoral fraud. He prayed to the Court for the petition of prohibition. He filed for the restrain of the House Representative Committees from using the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. Garcillano requested that the said recordings should be stricken off the records of inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the proceedings.

ISSUE: Does the Constitution require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate?

RULING: According to Sect. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, "The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." Hence, the respondent Committee could not, in violation of the constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry until the procedures are so published.

But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been

overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.

Non-publication of the Rules of Procedure governing legislative investigations is fatal.

8. NERI VS SENATE

Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

FACTS: On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrsand during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Case Digest: Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al., G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, in particular, he refused to answer the questions on1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt. Neri filed this present petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim toexecutive privilegein accordance with the ruling in the landmark case ofSenate vs. Ermita(G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006)

ISSUE:

What is the difference between Sec 21 and 22, Art VI? Can a cabinet member invoke executive privilege?

RULING:

In determining whether Congress correctly ordered Neri's arrest for his refusal to answer the three questions, a distinction must be first laid down between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of thePhilippine Constitution. Sec. 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for the enactment of laws. On the other hand, Sec. 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function over the executive department. Compulsory process is available in Congress' exercise of its powers under Sec. 21. In Sec. 22, it is NOT.TheSupreme Courtconfirmed the legitimacy of this doctrine, but only to the extent of confirming that there is a qualified privilege. Once invoked, a presumption of privilege is established, requiring the Prosecutor to make a "sufficient showing" that the "Presidential material" is "essential to the justice of the case. Executive privilege would most effectively apply when the oversight of the executive would impair that branch's national security concerns.The Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri's claim toexecutive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the peoples right to public information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal thecriminal actofbriberyin the highest levels of government.Additional info: (might be helpful info for study purposes)EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE Court laid out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim toexecutive privilegeto be valid. These are: 1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence, and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Senate vs. Ermita is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, asChief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory.

The dividedSupreme Court(voting 9-6)was convinced that the three questions are covered bypresidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not answering such questions.9. PHILCOMSAT VS. SenateG.R. No. 180308June 19, 2012

Facts: Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) which the government holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) is a private corporation whose main operation is collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT. The government, through the PCGG, regularly received cash dividends from 1986 to 1996. However, POTC started to incur losses in 1998 and ballooned tremendously in 2005.In view of the losses being incurred by the government and to protect its interest in POTC, Sen. Miriam Santiago introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to the anomalous losses by POTC, PHILCOMSAT AND PHC. PSR No. 455 was referred to Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises. The committee found overwhelming mismanagement over the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC.

Issue: Is the power to conduct legislative inquiries vested only on the Senate or also on its committees?

Ruling: Section 21, Article VI clearly states that the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. A Senate or a House of Representatives committee has aconstitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.

10. David et al. vsMacapagal-Arroyo"

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

FACTS: Pres. Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, with which she commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This issuance was with regard to the Philippines's celebration of the 20th anniversary of EDSA. With PP 1017, programs and activities related to EDSA People Power I celebration were cancelled. More so, rally permits were revoked and most arrests were without warrants. Facilities, including the media, were also taken over. Thus, assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. With the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP 1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency.

ISSUES: Is congressional authority needed for the President to declare "a state of national emergency" and "to exercise emergency powers"?

HELD: Congressional authority is NOT needed for the President to declare "a state of national emergency". However, it is NECESSARY for the President "to exercise emergency powers". The petitioner was found to have legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved and qualified under the direct injury test. But the Court does not declare PP 1017 totally invalid. It might have been abused and misused, but its validity is to be determined from its general purpose. Thus, the Court partially granted the petition. PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. But, commanding AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. More to that, the warrant-less arrest of the petitioner and other warrant-less arrest of other rallyists in the absence of proof were also declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

11. Ampatuan vs. Puno, G.R. no. 190259, June 7, 2011

Facts: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers.

Issue: was the presidents exercise of emergency powers pp 1946 violative of sec. 23, art. 6 of the constitution?

Ruling: exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

2002 Bar (Question and Suggested Answer)

In an election case, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal rendered a decision upholding the election protest of protestant A, a member of the Freedom Party, against protestee B, a member of the Federal Party. The deciding vote in favor of A was cast by Representative X, a member of the Federal Party .For having voted against his party mate, Representative X was removed by Resolution of the House of Representatives, at the instance of his party (the Federal Party), from membership in the HRET. Representative X protested his removal on the ground that he voted on the basis of the evidence presented and contended that he had security of tenure as a HRET Member and that he cannot be removed except for a valid cause. With whose contention do you agree, that of the Federal Party or that of Representative X? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:I agree with the contention of Representative X. As held In Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792(1991), the members of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are entitled to security of tenure like members of the judiciary. Membership in it may not be terminated except for a just cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its members must discharge their functions with impartiality and independence from the political party to which they belong.Page 5 of 5