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Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association201 SCRA 13

FACTS:Plaintiff- appellee, Bel- Air Village Association Inc.

(BAVA) filed a complaint for specific performance and

damages with preliminary injunction against defendant-

appellant for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel- Air

Subdivision, which provides among others that the house and

lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial

purposes. Plaintiff- appelle was alleged to have violated the

Deed after the latter operated a hot Pan de Sal store in the

house and lot located in the said Subdivision.

The trial court rendered a decision in favour of BAVA which

was affirmed by the respondent CA. Thus, appellant filed an

instant petition before the SC.

ISSUE:W/N the defendant- appellant violated the Deed of

Restrictions of Bel- Air Subdivision.

HELD:No. The SC ruled that the street (Jupiter) where the

house and lot is located is not covered by the restrictive

easements based on the 'deed restrictions' but chiefly

because the National Government itself, through Ordinance

No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had

reclassified it into a 'high density commercial (C-3) zone.

Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the

strength alone of the said deed restrictions.

As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly,

the restrictive easements are valid and enforceable. But they

are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands,

needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may

determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our

jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be

the 'law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it

cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order,

or public policy.' Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent

to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety,

peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of

contractual rights, whenever necessary. Decision of the

respondent court is reversed.

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance

235 SCRA 630

FACTS:These are motions seeking reconsideration of a

decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the

declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise

known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. CREBA asserts

that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)

classifies transactions as covered or exempt without

reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be

uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a

progressive system of taxation."

It is claimed that the application of the tax to existing

contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on

deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases

in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10%

VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something

that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into

the contract.

ISSUE:Whether RA 7716 impairs obligations of contracts and

is therefore unconstitutional.

HELD:No. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in

order to fix obligations as between parties, but the

reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also

read onto contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the

contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the

sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered

into prior to the effecting of the law would violate the

constitutional provision that No law impairing the obligationof contracts shall be passed. It is enough to say that the

parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of

prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing

power of the state. For not only are existing laws read into

contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but

the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is

also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the lega

order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment

presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains

adequate authority to secure peace and good order of

society.

Siska Development v. Office of the President 231 SCRA

674 FACTS:Petitioner, a subdivision owner-developer

entered into a Contract to Sell with Guadalupe Sering,

involving a lot situated at the Mira-Nila Subdivision in Quezon

City. With the consent of the petitioner, Guadalupe

transferred all her rights and interests over the aforesaid lot

in favor of respondent Socorro Sering. Thereafter, private

respondents assumed the transferors obligation by paying

the monthly amortizations for the lot. Private respondents

defaulted in the payment of their monthly amortizations, butpetitioner still accepted the late payments. Petitioner sen

private respondents a notice of rescission of the Contract to

Sell for failure to pay the monthly amortizations on time but

it was cancelled after private respondents updated thei

payments, and imposed the condition that should it be

necessary to rescind the contract for a second time, the

second rescission would be final. Private respondents again

defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations .When

private respondent offered to pay the remaining balance of

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the purchase price, a representative of petitioner refused to

accept the payment, alleging that the contract had already

been cancelled. However, said respondent protested that he

had not received any notice of rescission from petitioner. To

compel the execution by petitioner of the final deed of sale,

private respondents filed an action for specific performance

in the CFI but it was dismissed. When the case was elevated

to the Office of the President, the latter ruled in favor of

private respondents, directing petitioner to execute a final

deed of sale on the lot covered by the Contract to Sell in favor

of private respondents upon payment of the unpaid balance

of P9, 341.24.

Petitioner argues that the relationship between the parties is

governed solely by the Contract to sell because said contract

was entered into long before the passage of the Maceda Law.

Without expressly stating so, petitioners line of argument

invokes the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Art.

III, Sec. 10).

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of non-impairment

clause of the constitution.

HELD: None. The purpose of said clause is to safeguard the

integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by

the State. As a rule, contract should not be tampered with by

subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and

obligations of the parties. As noted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz

The will of the obligor and obligee must be observed; the

obligation of their contract must not be impaired.

Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of thecontract. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes

the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new

conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws

remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.

Miners Association v. Factoran 240 SCRA 100

FACTS: Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive

Order Nos. 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative

powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the

processing and approval of applications for the exploration,

development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section

2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes

the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture,

co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the

exploration, development, and utilization of mineral

resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR

of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all

existing mining leases or agreements which were granted

after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, shall be

converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1)

year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and

Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to

submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing

Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the

Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the

abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel

claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the

Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization

composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim

holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and

constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two Department Administrative

Orders valid.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of

Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing

law on the acceptance and approval of declarations oflocation and all other kinds of applications for the

exploration, development, and utilization of mineral

resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.

Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old

system of exploration, development and utilization of natural

resources through "license, concession or lease" which,

however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the

1987 Constitution.

By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its

implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 whichsuperseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing

on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under

Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing

mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to

operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other

areas of administration and management of mineral lands,

the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,

and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of

Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing

rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not

inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall

continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the

reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by

the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order

No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations

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through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the

State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in

this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional

restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,

modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements

granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,

pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-

extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of

public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The

passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded

Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR

Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII,

Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Juarez v. CA214 SCRA 475

FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a lot located at 502

Quezon Boulevard, Manila. It was leased in the early 1900sto Servillano Ocampo, who built a house thereon where he

lived with his parents and his sister Angela. The lease was

taken over by Angela Ocampo, who continued to stay in the

house together with her children, including herein petitioner

Virginia Ocampo Juarez. In 1976, Angela moved to her

daughter Virginias house in Pasay City. The house on Quezon

Boulevard she leased to Roberto Capuchino, reserving only

one room for her personal belongings. Meantime, the lot had

been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty, Inc., which in

turn sold it in 1985 to Cetus Development Corporation, the

herein private respondent.

Immediately after acquiring the lot, Cetus filed a complaint

for ejectment against the petitioner with the Municipal Court

of Manila on the ground that the lessee had subleased the

property without its consent in violation of BP 877. The case

was dismissed. The court held that the statute was

inapplicable because the sublease was made prior to its

effectivity.

The Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that BP 877 was

applicable because the original contract of lease did not

specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a

monthly basis. The contract was deemed terminated from

month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in July 1985, it

became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on

June 12, 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 877 is violative of the Impairment

Clause.

HELD: No. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate;

in fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism

in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in

protecting the integrity of private agreements from

government meddling, but that was when such agreements

did not affect the community in general. They were indeed

purely private agreements then. Any interference with them

at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could

be properly struck down.

But things are different now. More and more, the interests of

the public have become involved in what are supposed to be

still private agreements, which have as a result been removed

from the protection of the impairment clause. These

agreements have come within the embrace of the police

power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a

ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects

the public welfare one way or another so as to require the

interference of the State, then must the police power be

asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clause.

FPIB v. CA

252 SCRA 259

FACTS: Producers Bank (now called First Philippine

International Bank), which has been under conservatorship

since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an

agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the

two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of

P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by

Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio

Rivera.

Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida

Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it

alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an

agreement; hence there was no valid contract of sale

Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The

regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank

filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with

the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the tria

court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has

been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale.

HELD: Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the

bank manager, Rivera, entered into the agreement with

apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly

proved by the evidence presented which showed that in al

the dealings and transactions, Rivera participated actively

without the opposition of the conservator. In fact, in the

advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was

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designated as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition of

the Banks assets.

CMMA v. POEA243 SCRA 666

FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies,

Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning

agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies

which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of

their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge the Court

to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing

Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No.

05, series of 1994, on one of the grounds that the resolution

and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because

they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of

obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. The said

resolution and memorandum resolved to amend and increasethe compensation and other benefits in cases of death,

disability, and loss or damage to a Filipino seaman working in

ocean-going vessels.

In their, comment the public respondents contend that the

petition is without merit and should be dismissed because

the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum

circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making

authority or power of subordinate legislation.

ISSUE: Whether or not POEA resolution and memorandum is

unconstitutional.

HELD: There is no merit to the claim that the assailed

resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal

protection and contract clauses of the Constitution nor is

there-merit in the claim that the resolution and

memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of

Rights.

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual

obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal

exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect toproperty or some object of value and which confer rights that

maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to

statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the

general legislative powers of the State and involving the

public rights and public welfare of the entire community

affected by it.

It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police

power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to

secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare

of the community, even though contracts may thereby be

affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract

beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them

19

Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts

and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and

not only may regulations which affect them be established by

the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change

from time to time, as the general, well-being of the

community may require, or as the circumstances may change

or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And

under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject

to the police power of the State because they are not

ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being

valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted

under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck

down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. Tohold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutiona

doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract

clause. The Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for

lack of merit with costs against the petitioners.

PNB v. O.P.252 SCRA 5

FACTS: May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale

dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots

therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they

previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision

developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, The Subdivision and

Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is not applicable to

the mortgage contract in question, the same having been

executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the

question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the

Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President

of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the

Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, by authority of the

President.

Private respondents were buyers on installment o

subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding

the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the

subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the

petitioner, PNB. Unaware of this mortgage, private

respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot

buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in

question.Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted

and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the

foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

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Acting on suits brought by private respondents, the HLURB

Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a

decision rendered ruled that PNB -- without prejudice to

seeking relief against Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from

private respondents only the remaining amortizations, in

accordance with the land purchase agreements they had

previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and

cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for

the lots they had already bought from said subdivision

developer. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

affirmed this decision. The Office of the President likewise

concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to

this Court. The petitioner complains that the retroactive

application of the law would violate the impairment clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Bank is a privy to the

contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-

subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President

erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private

respondents remaining amortizations and issue the

corresponding titles after payment thereof.

HELD: Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the

time of its execution may be legally modified or even

completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a

proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the

contract.

Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and,

always, a reservation of the police power as long as the

agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare.Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital

infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the

legislature as a postulate of the legal order.Privity of

contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law

explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the

installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the

mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such

payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the

mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit

being paid for.

Wherefore petitioner Bank was enjoin to focus not only on

the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take

another look at the larger issues including social justice and

the protection of human rights as enshrined in the

Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and

decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing

social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a

brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly,

petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and

purposes an instrument for the implementation of state

policies so cherished in our fundamental law.

Eugenio v. Drilon252 SCRA 106

FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis

from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended

payment of his amortizations because of non-development

on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to

spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name

Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and conveyance of

the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and

Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human

Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to

complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents

purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him

of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold

to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in

applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given

retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify

the non-payment of the amortizations.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse

of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given

retroactive effect.

HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with

grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to give retroactiveeffect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to

its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for

retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred

from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the

statute is the law.

Meralco v. Province of Laguna306 SCRA 750

FACTS: On various dates, certain municipalities of the

Province of Laguna, including, Bian, Sta. Rosa, San Pedro

Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then

in effect, issued resolutions through their respective

municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner

Manila Electric Company ("MERALCO") for the supply of

electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas

On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a

franchise by the National Electrification Administration to

operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality

of Calamba, Laguna.

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On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise

known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," was enacted

to take effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government

units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy

taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed

therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province

enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective 01

January 1993, providing, in part, Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax

which states there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses

enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one

percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include

both cash sales and sales on account realized during the

preceding calendar year within this province, including the

territorial limits on any city located in the province.

Respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to

MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner

MERALCO paid the tax, which then amounted to P19,

520.628.42, under protest. A formal claim for refund was

thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of

Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and

continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to

P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the

Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the

imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna

Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned

MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D.

551 on 28 August 1995, the claim for refund of petitioner was

denied.

On 14 February 1996, petitioner MERALCO filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a complaint for

refund, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or temporary restraining order, against the

Province of Laguna and also Benito R. Balazo in his capacity as

the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. The trial court, in its

assailed decision of 30 September 1997, dismissed the

complaint

ISSUE: W/N the imposition of a franchise tax under Section

2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92 is invalid.

HELD Prefatorily, it might be well to recall that local

governments do not have the inherent power to tax 4 except

to the extent that such power might be delegated to them

either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article

X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that

power has been given in favor of local government units.

While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax

exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the

nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying

on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far

from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax

exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non

impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked

are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such

as those contained in government bonds or debentures

lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which

the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak

of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax

exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without

impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax

exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax

exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes

the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non

impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII

Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor

provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit

that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be

granted except under the condition that such privilege shal

be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as

and when the common good so requires.

XII. Section 12

1. Rights in Custodial InvestigationMiranda v. Arizona384 US 436

Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 162 SCRA 675

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without awarrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner

he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a

robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion

to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up

without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his

constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court

denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners right tocounsel and due

process violated.

HELD: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodia

inquest; hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage

to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a crimina

offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said

investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain

information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the

time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted

by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be

made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

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On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way,

deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he

was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the

opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to

substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and

instead opted to file a Motion to acquit after the prosecution

had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute

lack of opportunity to be heard.

People v. Pinlac165 SCRA 675

FACTS: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal

cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his

conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting

his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by

force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having

appraised of his constitutional rights and without the

assistance of counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed during thecustodial investigation of the accused.

HELD: The court find it meritorious to declare that the

constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure

of the authorities in making the accused understand the

nature of the charges against him without appraising him of

his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial

investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented

the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is

inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided

therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal.

The court acquitted the accused.

People v. Loveria187 SCRA 47

FACTS: The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged

with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated

Homicide. After being convicted by the RTC, accused-

appellant filed an appeal, assailing, among others, assails the

manner in which he was identified by one of the victims at

the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in

Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional

right to counsel.

Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at

the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec. 20.No

person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be

informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,

intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will

shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in

violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence.

ISSUE: W/N accused-appellants constitutional right to

counsel has been violated.

HELD: No, the Court ruled that Loverias constitutional right

to counsel was not violated when he was identified in a police

line-up by one of the victims and neither can he now invoked

that right because a case is already pending in court.

The Court emphasized that the so-called Miranda rightscontained in the above-quoted constitutional provisions may

be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial

investigation. Since the appellant was not being investigated

when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he

cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at

that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional

guarantee invoked. Furthermore, since custodial

investigation is defined as the "questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way", these constitutional rights may no longer beclaimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in

court.

People v. Alegria190 SCRA 122

FACTS: Antonio Corporal, a security guard with multiple stab

wounds was found dead in the premises of the Warebank

Phil., Inc., in Tondo, Manila, where he was working. Among

the four suspects, Trial proceeded only against Labuac and

Buenaflor, who were both eventually convicted and

sentenced to life imprisonment. The lower court found that

on the above-mentioned date, the four accused agreed to

enter the compound of Warebank to steal empty bottles

However, they were seen by Corporal, who was then on duty

After stabbing the guard, the men fled the scene.

These findings were based on the sworn statements taken

from Labuac, Buenaflor and Alegria (one of the four), and the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, principally Alex Sto

Domingo and Perla Balde, who both declared that they saw

Buenaflor carrying Corporal's shotgun. Police officer, who

took the sworn statement of Labuac, and Police officer

Josefino Rey, who took the sworn statements of Buenaflo

and Alegria, both swore that the affiants were informed of

their constitutional rights and freely confessed their

participation in the murder of the guard.

The suspects took the witness stand and denounced thei

supposed confessions as having been taken from them

through threats and violence, were made to sign paper o

which content they did not understand, were not informed of

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their constitutional rights nor were they represented and

assisted by counsel.

HELD: In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly literate, not even

having finished Grade 1, and, like Buenaflor and Alegria, was

not represented by counsel. While there was a lawyer who

was allegedly called to be present at their interrogation, he

did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely to

give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. There is

nothing in the record to show that the lawyer made a single

manifestation or representation on behalf of the person he

was supposed to protect against any possible abuse of the

investigators.

The lawyer who was supposed to have advised the suspects

were the same person who took their oaths and certified that

he was "satisfied" that the statements were freely and

knowingly given.

The lawyer was also a member of the police organizationinvestigating the suspects and, no less remarkably, were not

presented as witnesses to authenticate the confessions. The

police officer who took their confession had admitted to have

prepared in advance the suspects statement to be signed by

the latter.

The court then ruled in favor of the suspects as having found

their confessions inadmissible in evidence due to the evident

non-conformity with the constitutional right to a counsel to

prevent confessions given under coercion. In absence of any

other evidence due to the inadmissibility of the confession,

the charges against the suspects were dismissed. In the

absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it must be

presumed that they did not kill the guard.

People v. De Guzman194 SCRA 191

FACTS: De Guzman was arrested for allegedly selling

marijuana after a buy-bust operation conducted by the

NARCOM District Office in Malolos, Bulacan. The case for the

prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Sgt. Ruben

S. Bazar who stated that the operation was done after

receiving a tip from a confidential informer that the accused

would be selling marijuana at Virgen de los Flores, Baliwag,

Bulacan from six in the evening until midnight. The only other

witness presented by the prosecution was Capt. Marlene

Salangad of the PC Crime Laboratory, who affirmed the

findings in the field test and declared verbally and in her

report that the contents of the plastic bag from De Guzman

were marijuana fruiting tops.

The defense of De Guzman was flat denial stating that the

NARCOM agents simply arrested him without cause and

without warrant and took him to NARCOM headquarters

where they manhandled him. His ring and P2,000 cash

belonging to his sister was confiscated by the agents and then

dumped him in a fishpond where he was left until the

following morning, when he signed the Receipt of Seized

Property because he was afraid of further punishment. Also

two other witnesses testified that in the evening of the arrest

of the accused, they saw three men pointing their guns at De

Guzman and twisted his arm and tied his hands with wire

before taking him away.

The RTC did not believe the testimony of the accused. He was

later convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan

sentencing him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20

000.00.The case was brought to the Supreme Court asking fo

a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence

against him was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of theconstitutional rights of the accused facing custodia

investigation.

HELD: This Court is also not inclined to believe De Guzmans

testimony. It is not because it is incredible but because there

is no evidence to sustain it, especially that such evidence is

not easily come by, given the circumstances of the accused

who is an ordinary individual without convenient connection

with a lawyer or the wherewithal to retain one. Neither can it

be supposed that by himself alone, this chicharon vendor

would be aware of his rights under the Constitution and havethe boldness to assert them against the authorities holding

him captive.

The receipt was in reality an admission which the accused-

appellant was forced to make without the assistance of

counsel and without being first informed of the constitutiona

rights of a person facing custodial investigation. That

evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights and

the consistent rulings of this Court since the case of People v.

Galit.

People v. Lim196 SCRA 809

FACTS: In the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1969, Santiago

Tumaliuan, a 37-yr old businessman, drove his jeep to

Tuguegarao. He was accompanied by his daughter Vilma

whom he dropped off at St Paul College, and Fausto Guiyab,

Juan Malillin and Patrolman Cesar Binag who was his escort in

civilian clothes. They first played mahjong at the house o

one Mallabo. Guiyab remained in the jeep to guard it. A

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noon, they proceeded to the cockpit. Guiyab again watched

the jeep.

At about 4PM, Santiago and Binag left the cockpit. On their

way out, they passed by Antonio Lim and his bodyguard near

the exit. Genaro and Alberto, Lims companions, were

standing at the gate talking to each other. Upon reaching the

jeep, Santiago took the drivers seat. Binag seated himself at

the passengers and Guiyab occupied the back seat. They

first went to the gas station to fill up.

Binag saw Genaro and Alberto on the street 10 meters away

to his right. Genaro shouted in Ibanag dialect translated,

Fire now. 3 successive gunshots were fired in a few

seconds. The 1st show killed Santiago hitting him in the head.

The 2nd shot was fired at Guiyab who also shot in the head,

killing him instantly. The 3rd shot hit Patrolman Binag in the

jaw. He fell on the cement pavement and lost consciousness.

But before that, he saw Lim firing the first 2 shots w/ his .38

caliber nickel-plated Smith & Wesson revolver. Being apatrolman himself and having served in the army, he was

familiar w/ firearms. Lim was then wearing a yellow polo-

jacket. Binag had known him for a long time since they both

came from San Pablo and used to drink liquor together.

Binag sustained a gunshot wound above the left jaw, near the

mouth, injuring his tongue. If not for blood transfusion, he

would have died. In the hospital, on the night following the

shooting, the chief of police interviewed him and asked him

who had fired at him and his companions. As Binag could not

talk, he wrote on a piece of paper the name of his assailant:Antonio Lim with his bodyguard.

Prior to the shooting, Santiagos brother, Vice-Mayor Carlos

Tumaliuan was charged w/ the murder of Antionio Lims

mother and sister. Moreover, in another case, the brothers

of Lim were charged w/ murder and Binag was a prosecution

witness there. Santiago was known to be financier of his

brother, the vice-mayor, while Guiyab was a buyer of tobacco

for Santiago and was responsible for obtaining bail bonds for

the vice-mayor.

ISSUE:

HELD: The guilt of Lim was proven beyond reasonable

doubt. The shooting was indubitably treacherous for Lim

employed a form of assault w/c directly and specially insured

its execution w/o risk to himself arising from the defense w/c

the victims might have made (Art 14 RPC). The surprise

assault precluded them from making any defense at all.

Premeditation was not proven. The prosecution failed to

establish (a) the time when Lim determined to commit the

crimes, (b) the act showing that he had clung to his

determination, and (c) a sufficient interval between the

determination and the execution that would have afforded

him full opportunity for meditation and reflection and

allowed his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.

There being no generic circumstances, the penalty of

reclusion perpetua for each of the 2 murders was properly

imposed (Art 64 & 248 RPC). An indeterminate sentence of 6

yrs. of prision correctional, as minimum, to 12 yrs. & 1 day of

reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, is imposed for

the frustrated murder. Judgment affirmed.

People v. Arceo202 SCRA 170

FACTS: Accused- appellants, Arceo and Zapanta were charged

and convicted for conspiring and confederating together, and

mutually aiding and abetting one another in the sale and or

deliver of dried marijuana fruit tops. Accused Arceo was

arrested in a buy bust operation conducted by a compositeteam of Filipino and American Drug Enforcement officers

Upon interrogation, he confessed without the assistance of

counsel that the marijuana leaves came from co- accused

Zapanta, his marijuana supplier who was thereafter arrested

in his apartment. The accused appellants were convicted by

the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N the unwritten confession made by accused

appellant Arceo against Zapanta without the assistance of

counsel valid.

HELD: No. The accused-appellant Zapanta's guilt was based

haphazardly on the strength of Librado's unwritten extra

judicial confession that he (Zapanta) was the supplier o

marijuana. Librado's confession was thus not only unfounded

but obtained in gross violation of his fundamental right to

counsel. He was never provided with a counsel at the

preliminary stage of the investigation in which incriminatory

questions were asked him. Hence, the confession is

inadmissible as evidence of Pancho's guilt, or for any purpose

The decision appealed from is MODIFIED, AFFIRMING Librado

Arceo's penalty of life imprisonment, and ACQUITTING the

other accused-appellant, Pancho A. Zapanta, whose

immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered.

rroyo v. CA203 SCRA 750

FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery

before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet against his wife

Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on

November 2, 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants

pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted

petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.

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Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also

moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a

pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain

ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later con

traded marriage with another woman with whom he is

presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court

of Appeals.

Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the

dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming

as basis for their motions Dr. Neri's manifestation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his

constitutional rights on custodial investigation.

HELD: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an

investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask

questions to elicit information and/or confession or

admissions from respondent-accused. In the present case, Dr.Neri was not a peace officer or an investigating officer

conducting a custodial interrogation; hence petitioner cannot

now claim that Mrs. Neris admission should have been

rejected.In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did

not err in admitting Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a

competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered

inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to

remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under

investigation for the commission of an offense."

People v. Parojinog 203 SCRA 673

FACTS: On March 31, 1984, a group of police and PC soldiers

were ambushed by the members of the Communist Party of

the Philippines and the New People's Army. On August 1,

1987, appellant was investigated at the INP station in Ozamiz

City. During which investigation, he confessed that he

surrendered to Governor Fortunato Sagrado of Misamis

Occidental in connection with the ambush of a group of

police and PC soldiers.

Before the start of the investigation, Pcpl. Santos apprised

appellant of his constitutional rights to counsel of his own

choice and if he did not have one a certain Atty. Fernando

Fuentes III of the CLAO will be his lawyer who will help him.

He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes as his lawyer thereafter; he

was informed of his right to remain silent or not to answer

any questions if he did not like to answer or if he had nothing

to answer. Finally, he was warned that his statement may be

used as evidence against him before the court. Atty. Fuentes

III assisted appellant during the entire investigation which

lasted for about an hour. After the investigation, appellant

signed his extra-judicial investigation. Atty. Fuentes III also

signed the document. Thereafter, two policemen escorted

appellant to the Office of City Fiscal Luzminda Uy for him to

swear to his written confession. Before swearing in appellant,

Fiscal Uy verified whether the statements therein were

indeed his.

At the trial, the prosecution presented some witnesses.

Appellant imputes involuntariness to said confession because

he was allegedly denied his constitutional right to counsel

during his custodial investigation by the police. He claims that

the lawyer assigned to him did not actually attend the

investigation as the latter went out and that said lawyer was

not his choice and was only forced on him.

ISSUE: WON there was a denial of constitutional right to

counsel on the part of the appellant.

HELD: None. Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987

Constitution provides: Sec. 12 (l). Any person underinvestigation for the commission of an offense shall have the

right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have

competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he

must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived

except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person

under investigation for the commission of an offense may

choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of

counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial

choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in

the police investigators, the accused really has the final

choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask

for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no

objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire

proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he

subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V.

Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the

investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty.

Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus, it was too

late.

People v. Nicolas204 SCRA 191

FACTS: The accused-appellant, in two separate information,

was charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and

arson allegedly committed with two other co-accuseds,

namely, Rodolfo Nicolas y. delos Reyes and Roque Dilao y.

Adayo.

At the arraignment, the accused-appellant and his co-accused

entered separate pleas of not guilty in both cases.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants admissions

are not admissible in evidence.

HELD: No.The admissions made by the accused-appellant

during custodial investigation as reflected in his sworn

statement dated October 8, 1983 cannot be admissible in

evidence for his statement before Patrolman Bataller was

given in gross violation of his constitutional rights as

guaranteed under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973

Constitution (now Article III, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution).

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant gave an

uncounselled confession before the investigating officer who

simply asked as one of the preliminary questions before the

accused-appellant made his declarations relating to the

crime.

Inasmuch as the records are bereft of any proof that the

accused-appellant knowingly rejected having a lawyer assisthim during the taking of the extrajudicial confession in

question, our ruling in the case of People v. Jara, bears

reiteration. Thus;

Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived

by the person entitled to that protection the presumption is

always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution

must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the

satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly

and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and

deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having

a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That

proof is missing in this case.

The ban against uncounselled confessions is even more

pronounced under the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.

Hence, after 1987 regardless of whether or not the

confession of the accused is true, as long as it was given

without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in

evidence although it was a product of the accuseds own free

will and volition in view of the current policy with respect to

extrajudicial confessions based on the Bill of Rights.

People v. Marra236 SCRA 565

FACTS: In information filed before the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe,

Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the

crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc

on March 7, 1992. On June 4, 1992, amended information

was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated

as an accused instead of John Doe. A warrant of arrest was

thereafter issued against Allan Tan but the same was

returned un served; hence trial proceeded with regard to

herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.

Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon

arraignment on May 15, 1992. After trial on the merits

judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8

1992 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of

nighttime, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs

of Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity

P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as mora

damages, and the costs.

After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective

evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not disposed to

reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the

latter being amply supported by the established facts and

fully sustained by the applicable law. Marra contended that

he was under custodial investigation when he admitted thekilling but invoked self-defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marra was under custodia

investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-

defense.

HELD: Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution

provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed

of his right to remain silent and to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Custodia

investigation involves any questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a

general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on

a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and

the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends

itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins

to operate.

In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodia

investigation when he made the admission. There was no

coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a

statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answe

questions from the very start when the policemen requested

that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not

yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a

particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of

possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect

was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we

held in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to

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Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited

through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No

written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as

a result of formal custodial investigation. The trial Court,

therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that

compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial

investigation is not applicable in the instant case.

In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an

accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of

any offense necessarily included therein may be given in

evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this

admission may be considered as part of the res gestae.

The Court affirmed the judgment of the court a quo finding

accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime

of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil

liabilities therein stated.

Navallo v. Sandiganbayan

234 SCRA 175

FACTS: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of

Numancia National Vocational School found to have

misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA

audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA

demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner

pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial

investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash

count he was made to sign the certification on the fund

shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends

that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of

certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance

and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during

the COA audit.

HELD: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during

the COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit of

custodial investigation. A person may be subject to

malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of

misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund

shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with

convincing justification.

People v. Frago232 SCRA 653

FACTS: Orlando Frago was charged with rape and attempted

rape docketed as criminal cases nos. 9144 and 9145

respectively. Frago was acquitted on criminal case no 9145

and conviction on criminal case no 9144 undergone review.

Frago stated on his appeal that he was not assisted by a

counsel on any part of proceedings to include during his

identification by the victim on a police lineup.

ISSUE: W/N respondent was denied with the right to counsel.

HELD: Right to counsel attaches upon the start of

investigation, any person under investigation must among

other things be assisted by a counsel however during police

lineup accused was not yet entitled to such stage, to counselsince he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal

offense because police lineup is not yet a part of custodial

inquest. There is nothing in the record which shows that in

the course of identification from police line up the police

investigator sought to extract admission or confession from

appellant.

People v. Ruelan231 SCRA 650

FACTS:

Fordito Ruelan is the store helper of Ricardo & Rosa Jardiel

He stayed in the Jardiels residence but he had sep arate

quarters for sleeping. One day, Ricardo awoke to Rosa leaving

his room. He saw Rosa meet with Ruelan at the gate of the

house as they were about to open the store. Rosa ordered

Ruelan to get an axe to be used in repairing some fixtures and

a sack. Then Rosas house dog got loose & went out towards

the street. Rosa scolded Ruelan while the latter pleaded that

she stops berating him. Rosa didnt heed to his request &

Ruelan got fed up & using his axe, he struck Rosa behind her

right ear causing her to fall face down. Then, appellant

dragged her to a grassy portion at the side of the street &

immediately left the place. Ruelan was thus charged by the

RTC of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty

of life imprisonment.

ISSUE:

WON he can be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged based on the established facts, without the

alleged written extrajudicial confession

HELD:

Ruelan contends that his extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible as he was never apprised of his constitutiona

rights to remain silent, to counsel, & to be informed of such

rights. But a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the

contrary is proved & the burden of proof is upon the person

making the confession. In this case, the presumption hasnt

been overcome. Not only is the appellants confession replete

with details only he couldve supplied, but the circumstances

surrounding its execution belie his claim. By voluntarily

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executing his extrajudicial confession after having been

informed by Atty. Luz Cortez of his constitutional rights, and

in the presence of and with the assistance of said counsel,

appellant Ruelan effectively waived his right to remain silent.

People v. Barasina - 229 SCRA 450

FACTS: The accused was charged of robbery with homicide.

During investigation he was investigated and made anextrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the

absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was

provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena, a municipality

attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement

admitting the shooting of the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due

process of custodial investigation.

HELD: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly

violated since the authorities failed to provide him counsel

during the interrogation and he was not informed of his right

to remain silent and right to a counsel. Furthermore, the

counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is

impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused

cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be

provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused

with municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial

because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of

duty of said counsel. The court held the evidence

inadmissible to court for failure to meet the requisites of due

process for conducting custodial investigation.

People v. Barlis231 SCRA 426

FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of

Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo gr(o)ve, she

heard two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of

the bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they

were brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of

the suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the

trial of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused

Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder so that he

could become a witness for the Government. The two

accused denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such

was dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand

testimony of the Galvante who has no motive to kill the

victim.

The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the

Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in

accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a

state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement

wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the

assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante

made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty.

Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two

brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another

person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons

surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on

Galvante.

ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante without

counsel may be questioned by his co-accused

HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the

confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the

confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is

personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had

stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected

to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his

confession and the revelations therein. Appellants

imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby.Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted

it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the

trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel

which is required in extrajudicial confessions.

People v. Bandula232 SCRA 566

FACTS: On 5 May 1989, the trial court rendered judgment

finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime of robbery

with homicide. However, his three (3) co-accused were

acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence." Among the evidence

admitted to the lower court were the alleged extrajudicial

confessions of accused Bandula and Teofio Dionanao.

According to the trial court, these extrajudicial confessions

which were executed during custodial investigation, "have all

the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of

an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession

itself that accused were informed of their rights under the

law regarding custodial investigation and were duly

represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)."

Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions

he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional

infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that

they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were

merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by

the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent

counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without

the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without

sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.

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ISSUE: W/N the constitutional rights of the accused to

counsel was violated?

HELD: Yes, the Court ruled that the constitutional rights of

the accused was violated and acquitted him of the crime

charged.

From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-

appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigatedimmediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If

at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial

investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two

weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel

who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben

Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.

People v. Balisteros237 SCRA 499

FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of

Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo grove, she heard

two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of the

bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they were

brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of the

suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the trial

of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto

Galvante from the information for murder so that he could

become a witness for the Government. The two accused

denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such was

dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand testimony of

the Galvante who has no motive to kill the victim.

The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the

Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in

accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a

state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement

wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the

assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante

made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty.

Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two

brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another

person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons

surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on

Galvante.

ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante

without counsel may be questioned by his co-accused.

HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the

confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the

confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is

personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had

stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected

to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his

confession and the revelations therein. Appellants

imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby.

Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted

it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the

trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel

which is required in extrajudicial confessions.

People v. Maqueda

242 SCRA 565

FACTS: Horace William Barker, a British consultant of the

World Bank, was brutally slain while his wife Teresita

Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion

of a robbery in their country home at Tuba, Benguet.

Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante,

the victims former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of

the ghastly crime. One Richard Malig was arrested but was

later on released after his motion, to drop him from the case

as there was no sufficient evidence against him and that

Hector Maqueda (also known as Putol) is impleaded as co-accused in the said case, was granted by the court. The court

issued warrants for the arrest of Maqueda and Salvamante.

However, only Maqueda was arrested, leaving Salvamante at

large.

Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th

PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, and

Quezon where SPO3 Molleno got Maquedas statement.

According to him, he informed the accused of his rights under

the Constitution. The accused thereafter signed a

Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) wherein he narratedhis participation in the crime at the Barker house. Shortly

after his arrest, Maqueda filed an application for bail stating

that he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the

said case since he is the least guilty among the accused. This

was opposed by the prosecutor after receiving an affirmative

answer from the accused to his question if he was in the

company of Salvamante in entering the house of the Barkers.

During his detention, the accused also narrated to Ray Dean

Salvosa, a civilian, that Salvamante brought him to Baguio

City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante

then brought him to the Barker house and it was only thenwhen they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante

revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City

was to rob the Barkers. The trial proceeded against him only,

after he entered a plea of not guilty and put up the defense

of denial and alibi.

The trial court found the accused Hector Maqueda guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with

homicide and serious physical injuries and sentenced him to

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the

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victim for damages. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang

Salaysay of the accused although it was taken without the

assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since

an information had already been filed in court against him

and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by

the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken

during custodial investigation. Maqueda seasonably appealed

to the Supreme Court his conviction, highlighting the lone

error of the trial court that he was found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the

accused was admissible in court although it was taken

without the assistance of a counsel.

HELD: While we commend the efforts of the trial court to

distinguish between the rights of a person under Section

12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a

criminal complaint or information had been filed against him,

we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filingan accused no longer, *has+ the right to remain silent and to

counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and

not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such

refusal. If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the

criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his

constitutional rights remain silent and to counsel and to be

informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a

very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also

diminish the said accuseds rights under Section 14(2), Article

III of the Constitution. The exercise of the rights to remain

silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under

Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined

to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or

information but are available at the stage when a person is

under investigation for the commission of an offense.

The provision also has the following safeguards: (a) the

council must be competent and independent, preferably of

his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of

such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the

rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the

presence of counsel.It was therefore, wrong for the trial courtto hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is

strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not

apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or

information has already been filed because after its filing he

loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the

theory of the trial court, then the police authorities and other

law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting

confessions or admissions from accused persons after they

had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at

such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled

to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to

counsel.

People v. Morico246 SCRA 214

FACTS: Appellant in this case was caught in a buy-bust

operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics Command

(NARCOM) upon an information from their confidentialinformant that a certain "Sixto," a resident of Barangay

Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, was engaged in the sale of marijuana

leaves.

The three hand-rolled sticks of marijuana leaves confiscated

from appellant were found positive for marijuana by the

National Bureau of Investigation.

Appellant claimed that he was working as a mason at

Barangay Sabutan when he was arrested. When appellant

asked why he was arrested, he was told that he was peddling

marijuana. Appellant was then brought to the municipal

building in Silang, Cavite. From Silang, appellant was brought

to Imus. He related that he saw the sticks of marijuana

presented in evidence against him for the first time in Imus.

On the third day of his detention, he was manhandled and

ordered to sign the "Receipt of Seized property" without the

assistance of counsel. He was threatened with bodily harm if

he failed to sign the document.

Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking

Sheet and Arrest Report the same was never explained to himnor was he assisted by counsel.

On the fourth day of his detention, the policemen demanded

money from him for his release. He refused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erroneously convicted

the appellant of an offense which is not charged in the

information

HELD: An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not

charged in the information. To do so would constitute a

violation of his constitutional rights to be informed of the

charges against him and his right to due process. The

inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses refer to minor or trivial matters and incidents

which do not detract us from the fact that appellant was

caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust

operation.

Moreover, as long as the testimonies of the witnesses

corroborate each other on material points, the minor

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inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such

inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance their

truthfulness as they wipe out any suspicion of a counseled

testimony.

This Court has laid down the rule, in a long line of cases that

the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for

the appellant or for the trial court to decide as it is the

prerogative of the prosecutor. Apparently, the prosecution

deemed it unnecessary to present their informant poseur-

buyer as there was already sufficient evidence to pin down

appellant. Besides, if appellant believed that the testimony of

the poseur-buyer could have exculpated him, he could have

availed of the compulsory process to have the latter

produced as his witness.

People v. Cabintoy247 SCRA 442

FACTS: Herein accused-Appellants were charged with the

crime of robbery with homicide. In the course of the trial, thefacts revealed that the accused were not informed of their

rights while under custodial investigation and executed

waiver of the right to counsel and extrajudicial confessions

without the assistance of counsel. It was further revealed that

the waiver and extrajudicial confessions were signed by the

counsel the day after it was executed by the accused-

appellants.

The trial court finds the accused- appellants guilty.

ISSUE: W/N confessions executed by appellants during their

custodial investigation admissible.

HELD: No. From the foregoing, one is led to the inevitable

conclusion that at the time the questioned confessions were

executed, there were no prior valid waivers of their

constitutional rights by accused appellants. This defect alone

is sufficient to render the confessions inadmissible in

evidence against accused-appellants. Moreover, the

confessions do not indicate that both accused were

represented by counsel during the investigation. The settled

rule is that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a

valid waiver of the right to counsel in writing and in the

presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Agustin240 SCRA 541

FACTS: Dr. Bayquen, together with his son, Anthony;

Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic;

and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their

Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio

City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and

nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right

side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man

approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its

window, and fired at the passengers. All those in the car were

hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.

Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had

been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during

the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo

Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He

implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen

for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain

"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was

assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of

the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with

the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the

assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal

Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and

was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of

Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to

admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He

further declared that although he was given a lawyer,

Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he

nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that

Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in

English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he

understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a

witness did not push through since Quijano escaped.

However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was

established.

ISSUE: Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial

statements are admissible as evidence.

HELD: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial

confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of

guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct

or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on

inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not

just confessions.

The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in

twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty.Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the

transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not

signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or

decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that

appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth

grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant

therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1),

Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and

properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not

explicitly told of his right to have a competent and

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independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had

in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford

to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would

agree to be assisted