contents€¦ · the revolution of 1848 in france (1848–1852) 218 the revolutions of 1848 in...

Contents

List of Illustrations ix

List of Maps and Tables x

Abbreviations xi

Acknowledgements xii

Introduction: Rethinking Post-Revolutionary Europe 1

1. Endings and Beginnings: Europe in 1815 5

1814–1815: the end of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe 5

Problems of post-revolutionary transition 6

‘Redemptive’ and ‘integrationist’ transitions 10

The Congress of Vienna, 1815 12

Europe’s ‘French problem’ 13

Italy, Germany and Central Europe 15

A framework for international co-operation 18

An evaluation of the Congress of Vienna 20

2. Re-Inventing the Monarchy: France, 1814–1830 22

Continuity and rupture 22

The impact of the Hundred Days 24

The White Terror and ultra-royalism 26

The crisis of legitimacy 29

An alternative style of monarchy 34

Conclusion 36

3. Conservatism and Political Repression, 1815–1830 38

Metternich and conservatism 38

Metternich’s policy in Germany 40

Metternich’s policy in Italy 42

The ‘movements’ of 1820–1821 in Italy, Spain and Portugal 45

Threats of revolution in Britain, 1817–1820 48

v

Revolution and repression in Russia 51

Conclusion 54

4. The Underground Republic: Opposition Movements

1815–48 56

The four sergeants of La Rochelle 56

The frustrations of youth 57

Carbonari and secret societies 58

Bonapartism in France 60

Republicanism in France 63

The barricade 66

Utopian socialism and the ‘social question’ 68

Afterword 75

5. The Fragility of Nationalism 76

The fragility of nationalism 76

Imagined communities in the Habsburg Empire 81

Italy – Mazzinianism 84

Germany – the Burschenschaften 85

Germany – the Zollverein 86

The War of Greek Independence, 1821–1829 90

Conclusion 96

6. The Revolutions of 1830 98

Introduction 98

France: the July Revolution 99

Britain: the crisis of parliamentary reform, 1831–1832 103

Germany and Switzerland: the ‘regeneration’ of the cantons 106

Southern Europe: liberalism and clericalism 107

The Netherlands: Belgian Independence 108

Poland: the ‘November Rising’ of 1830 109

Conclusion 111

7. The Rise of Public Opinion 113

The revival of a public sphere 113

The ‘conspiracy in broad daylight’ 114

Forms of political action 118

The gendering of the public sphere 120

Public opinion mobilized in Germany 123

vi CONTENTS

Public opinion mobilized in Britain and France 124

Conclusion 126

8. The ‘Juste Milieu’ and Gathering Unrest, 1830–1848 128

Introduction: threats to the ‘happy medium’ 128

The July Monarchy and the search for legitimacy 129

The juste milieu 129

Italy – the modernization of Piedmont 132

Liberal Spain 133

Britain – Peel and Chartism 135

Pio Nono 138

Conclusion 140

9. The Jews: The Dilemmas of Emancipation 142

Introduction: the Mortara Affair, 1858 142

Before emancipation 143

The process of emancipation in Western Europe 145

The status of Jews in Western and Central Europe 146

Jews in Eastern Europe 150

Jewish assimilation and Jewish identity 153

The case of the Rothschilds 155

Jew-hatred traditional and modern 158

Conclusion 159

10. The City 161

Introduction: what made Dostoevsky nervous 161

Urban demography 162

Urban poverty 165

Was the city sick? 168

Cholera 171

Conclusion: varieties of urban life 173

11. The Peasant World 175

Introduction: a gradual expansion 175

A world of peasants 175

Economic change in the countryside 180

The consequences of agrarian change 183

Russia 185

Conclusion 186

CONTENTS vii

12. The Crisis of the Artisans 188

Industry without factories 188

Threats to artisan production 190

The social basis of popular politics 192

Conclusion 195

13. Bourgeois Culture and the Domestic Ideology 197

In search of the bourgeoisie 197

Bourgeois wealth, bourgeois values, bourgeois leisure 199

The domestic ideology 201

Divorce 207

Challenges to conventional gender expectations 210

Conclusions 212

14. The Revolutions of 1848 214

Introduction: romantic failure or apprenticeship in democracy? 214

The Revolution of 1848 in France (1848–1852) 218

The Revolutions of 1848 in Germany 222

The Revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg Empire 227

The Revolutions of 1848 in Italy 231

Conclusion and interpretations 235

15. The Crimean War and Beyond 238

Politics after 1848 238

The Eastern Question and the Crimean War, 1853–1856 238

Conclusion: 1856 as a turning-point 246

Afterword – Europe overseas 248

Notes 251

Recommended Further Reading 275

Index 287

viii CONTENTS

1 Endings and Beginnings: Europe in 1815

1814–1815: the end of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe

The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 brought peace to a war-weary continent.

For more than 20 years, the European powers had been almost continu-

ously at war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France. To be sure, they

had not always opposed France with a united front – far from it, since for

many years their own ancient quarrels had overshadowed the French

menace. Meanwhile, Bonaparte’s diplomacy had offered powerful

inducements to remain neutral, first to Prussia and then to Russia. Since

1813, however, an invincible coalition had gathered around France’s

two most persistent opponents: the Austrian Empire, ruled by the

Habsburgs and guided by the architect of the coalition, Prince Clemens

von Metternich, and Britain, led by its reserved and depressive Prime

Minister Viscount Castlereagh. The victorious Allies dismantled the

French Empire, restored the Bourbon King Louis XVIII to the French

throne, and packed Napoleon off to the island of Elba, near the coast of

Tuscany.

The peace of 1814 was short-lived. Napoleon escaped from Elba, landed

on the south coast of France, and gathered his forces for another attempt at

power. As Louis XVIII hurriedly repacked his luggage and fled to the safety

of Brussels, Napoleon promised France a liberal constitution. In the

Hundred Days, as this brief period was to be known, he tried to distance

himself from his dictatorial past, in order to rally all anti-monarchical forces

to his cause. Only with Napoleon’s final defeat near the Belgian village of

Waterloo in 1815, at the hands of the Prussians aided by the British, could

Europe look forward to a definitive peace.

The year 1815 did not simply mark the end of a long cycle of general

European warfare. It was a turning-point in two other senses. First, 1815

represented the end of the long Napoleonic hegemony which had

redesigned the map of Europe, and imposed French rule on Italy,

Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, the Croatian

coast and (temporarily) Spain. European strategists now had to organize the

continent along new lines in the aftermath of the French imperial collapse.

This chapter will examine how they went about this task, how they treated

5

the defeated power which had dominated Europe for so long, and what

priorities guided them.

Second, the ultimate defeat of Napoleon and his exile to St Helena in the

Atlantic constitute an ideological turning-point. Conservatism was now

triumphant after two decades of the social, religious and judicial reforms

which followed the French Revolution. French conquests had brought in

their wake an attack on the privileges of the aristocracy, an attack on the

seigneurial system, the nationalization and sale of Church property, the

introduction of the Napoleonic law codes and the new French system of

secondary education. These changes offered a more egalitarian, secular and

rationally administered alternative to the hierarchical structures of Old

Regime Europe. French reforms could not be uniformly applied in every

territory of the Empire. The French had to make compromises with local

elites in order to secure their collaboration. In some parts of Europe, like

Spain, French rule did not endure long enough for reforms to take root. But

in those areas which had a long and continuous experience of French rule,

the impact of the French Revolution was very tangible. In the areas closest

to France, which Michael Broers has called ‘the inner Empire’,1 especially

in Belgium, the Rhineland and northern Italy, the revolutionary and

Napoleonic era had a lasting influence.

The aftermath of 1815 therefore had three important characteristics: the

disappearance of Napoleon inaugurated a long period of peace; it forced

territorial and strategic adjustments in the wake of the collapse of the

French Empire; and it comforted conservatives by neutralizing the threat of

revolutionary change. Europe now had to face up to the realities and prob-

lems of its post-revolutionary condition.

Problems of post-revolutionary transition

How was the legacy of the revolutionary and Napoleonic past to be assim-

ilated or rendered harmless? How were the memories of those revolution-

ary years to be either nurtured or suppressed? These questions remained

fundamental after 1815, both for the conservatives who came to power, and

for their enemies. Later chapters will discuss some of the different responses

they gave. Here it is appropriate to introduce some general themes.

The conservative monarchies of the Restoration period (1815–1830) had

an ambiguous relationship with the revolutionary and Napoleonic past.

Those who had been deposed by Napoleonic conquests needed to reclaim

their legitimate right to rule, and to refashion the royal aura of sacrality

which the execution of Louis XVI had terrifyingly shattered. This could

6 POST-REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1815–1856

only be done by condemning the French Revolution and its awful progeny

– Bonaparte, the usurper of thrones. On the other hand, the Napoleonic

machinery of state presented the Restoration regimes with unprecedented

sources of power, based on a centralized administration, more efficient

policing and tax collection, as well as a system of conscription whose

wartime value had been fully demonstrated. In Turin and Rome, therefore,

the new regimes retained Napoleon’s enviable and efficient police force, the

gendarmerie, renaming it the carabinieri. The French Bourbons, and others like

them, had no wish to surrender such advantages inherited from the

Napoleonic years. For them there was no question of ‘turning the clock

back’ to the kind of political struggles which had embroiled the French

monarchy before 1789. Instead, in the areas which had experienced French

imperial rule, rulers found themselves at the head of a state apparatus

which was now potentially more rational and effective than any Old

Regime bureaucracy had dreamed of. The fall of the French Empire there-

fore produced governments whose rhetoric condemned the Revolution and

all its works, but who in practice maintained a pragmatic view of what

should be preserved from the changes of the recent past. Even in reac-

tionary Spain, King Fernando would not reverse the sales of Church prop-

erty conducted under French rule. Marco Meriggi called this the ‘hidden

legacy’ of Bonapartism.2 Many historians still find the vocabulary of

‘Restoration and Reaction’ useful to describe this period, yet what emerged

was not a replica of the past, but something different, which incorporated

many features of the French reforms.3 Rather than a simple restoration of

the dynastic Old Regime, this was a distinctive period of post-revolutionary

change.

Naturally there were many all over Europe for whom the watchword

was not reconciliation, but revenge on the revolutionary iconoclasts and

Bonapartist sympathizers who had overthrown traditional institutions and

attacked long-established beliefs. The French ‘ultra-royalists’ are an exam-

ple of such a group apparently bent on widespread administrative purges,

and demanding compensation for their sufferings in exile. The past,

however, could not be so easily erased. The reactionaries themselves had no

intention of forgetting it. They regularly observed the sinister anniversary

of the execution of Louis XVI on 21 January 1793 – an anniversary which

for them stood as a permanent warning of the disasters to which revolution

could lead.

On the other side of the political fence, republicans all over Europe drew

inspiration from the immediate revolutionary past. The surviving actors of

the French revolutionary drama personally incarnated the continuity of the

historical memory of radical egalitarianism. Ex-revolutionaries in exile in

ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: EUROPE IN 1815 7

Brussels and Switzerland, and ageing veterans of the French National

Convention of 1792–3 were a living link with the past, and helped to keep

alive what Alan Spitzer called ‘the underground republic’ in these conserv-

ative years after 1815.4 Napoleon’s belated adoption of constitutional liber-

alism in the Hundred Days provided a platform on which both liberals and

Bonapartists could briefly unite.

Only later in the nineteenth century did the revolutionary tradition

come under more intense scrutiny, as some socialists began to find it confin-

ing, suspecting that constant reference to the great example of 1789 was a

symptom of the immaturity of the radical Left. But there was no doubting

the importance of the revolutionary and Napoleonic decades. As Karl

Marx commented in relation to the 1848 Revolution in France, ‘the dead

traditions of all past generations weigh like a nightmare on the spirit of the

living’.5

The years of revolution and Bonapartist rule in Europe had been cata-

strophic for established regimes. How were these years and their impact to

be confronted, forgotten, or used by the left as a platform for further radi-

cal change? We might envisage Europe’s problem after 1815 as the prob-

lem of managing a post-revolutionary transition. There are perhaps

instructive parallels to be drawn with other twentieth-century regimes

which emerged after decisive historical ruptures. The issues and problems

facing Europe after Napoleon may be compared with issues of change and

continuity in Spain after Franco or Germany after Hitler. The fate of the

Soviet Union and its European Empire after the fall of communism offers

an even more interesting basis for reflection.

The fall of Soviet hegemony in East Central Europe ushered in a

period in which post-communist societies searched for new political forms

and the foundations of a new kind of civil society. Similarly, with the

collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1815, the expansion of the newspa-

per press led to the revival or the creation of a public sphere in which poli-

tics could be debated, after years of strict censorship and control. Just as

in Europe after 1815, there were voices seeking to wipe out entirely the

memory of an odious Soviet regime. There were those clamouring for the

restitution of confiscated property, like the French ultra-royalists after

1814, and residents of the former German Democratic Republic in the

1990s. Just as after 1815, there were other voices ready to accommodate

some aspects of the past, and others still, especially amongst the older

generation, who were increasingly nostalgic for some of the certainties of

life in the former Soviet Union. Both 1815 and 1991 were endings and

beginnings, intending to break decisively with the past but unable to

dismiss it entirely.


Like the Napoleonic Empire, Soviet hegemony had imposed subordi-

nation to the economic needs of the dominant power, and after collapse

both in 1815 and 1991 this economic subservience to imperial interests

was over. A large part of the continent was again opened up to competi-

tion and to the economic powers of the age. In the 1990s, the potential

beneficiaries seemed to be the United States and the European Union. In

1815, British manufactures were once more able to exploit continental

markets which had been partially closed to them under Napoleon’s

Continental Blockade. Great Britain’s new industrial strength and naval

supremacy gave her a global influence which no other power could yet

challenge.

The example of the end of the Soviet Union points to another problem

of transitional politics: the survival of elites with material interests and

power bases firmly embedded in the previous regime. The former Soviet

nomenklatura (the administrative elite of high-ranking privileged functionar-

ies) did not simply dissolve into thin air, but sometimes remained in posi-

tions of regional authority from which they could resist change. Similarly,

former Bonapartist administrators everywhere after 1815 remained a

source of anxiety for the ‘restored’ regimes. The former soldiers of

Napoleon’s Grande Armée posed another problem: when a great Empire

collapses, what happens to its armies? Demobilization was a major political

problem, both for the post-communist east and for post-Napoleonic

Europe. Significantly, former officers of Napoleon’s army were often impli-

cated in revolutionary conspiracies and in nationalist movements after

1815.

To talk in terms of the post-revolutionary politics of transition begs an

obvious question: it is fairly clear what the societies of 1815 and 1989–91

put behind them, but it is far less clear where they were heading.

Transition, then, but transition to what? The political struggles and

Revolutions of 1815–48 were all contests between rival versions of the ideal

destination of this transitional process. Would that end-point be an ordered,

peaceful and authoritarian Europe, as Prince Metternich desired, deferen-

tial to its monarchies and to organized religion? Or was Europe heading, as

the liberals wished, towards some limited form of representative and consti-

tutional government, in which private property would be sacred, and

monarchies would be subject to the rule of law? What were the conse-

quences in all this of the apprenticeship in popular democracy which the

French above all had experienced during the French Revolution? Would

that experience of popular sovereignty be developed and deepened in the

following decades? For as the dominant classes were to discover, liberty and

equality, like the wheel, could not be un-invented.


‘Redemptive’ and ‘integrationist’ transitions

There are no doubt many different models of post-revolutionary transition,

but following Dirk Moses, we might categorize new regimes as either

‘redemptive’ or ‘integrationist’ in the positions they adopt towards a trau-

matic past. A ‘redemptive’ transition is one in which the dominant policy is

to erase and to expiate the sins of the past. A redemptive transition aims at

a spiritual rebirth and a social transformation. The new regime seeks to

distance itself clearly and symbolically from the one it has replaced in order

to establish its moral credentials. To some extent the French revolutionary

regimes of the 1790s fit this model, as they attempted to transcend the

perceived evils of what after 1789 they started to call the ‘Ancien Régime’.

The de-Nazification process in postwar Germany and the purges of

Bonapartist personnel in Europe after 1815 also resemble a redemptive

transition. The French clericals and ultra-royalists aimed to cleanse society

of its subversive elements and to redeem a sinful and violent past.

Redemptive change in this case was compromised by the tainted birth of

the restored Bourbon monarchy, which was established by foreign powers

in the wake of a French national defeat.

An ‘integrationist’ transition, on the other hand, is more pragmatic and

willing to compromise with the previous regime and its followers.

Integrationist regimes accommodate ‘yesterday’s men’, hoping to achieve a

smooth handover of power. Sometimes the expertise and experience of

those who have served a compromised regime are commodities too valu-

able for an incoming administration to discard. In Germany after 1918, the

persistence of old imperial elites in positions of power is one example of this,

although this continuity with the imperial Reich is usually seen as a source

of weakness rather than strength in the new Weimar Republic. To a certain

extent, such an integrationist policy might miss some opportunities for a

radical renewal of the national polity. Similarly, some perpetrators of the

Nazi genocide were notoriously integrated into the German Federal

Republic in the late 1940s and 1950s. In the Spanish model of transition,

too, in the interests of social cohesion there were no trials of human rights

abuses committed under the Franco dictatorship.

Europe after 1815 offers examples of both redemptive and integrationist

transitions, and sometimes characteristics of both appear side by side.

Neither set of protagonists was completely able to impose their particular

vision on the course of events. Some regimes of our period were determined

to repress any move to resurrect the spirit of revolution, and this was

Metternich’s aim above all. In contrast, other regimes (like the July

Monarchy of Louis-Philippe) came to power as integrationist regimes. By


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organizing the return of Napoleon’s ashes from St Helena, Louis-Philippe’s

Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers tried to incorporate the Napoleonic legend,

and at the same time to circumscribe its disruptive potential. The

Revolutions of 1848 were to show, however, that both redemptive and inte-

grationist regimes were vulnerable to the powerful forces of historical

memory, when harnessed for a revolutionary cause or for the personal

dictatorship of Napoleon III.

The Congress of Vienna, 1815

The diplomatic elite of Europe gathered at Vienna in search of an equilib-

rium between the national interests they each represented, and the need for

European security as a whole. The leading protagonists were the ‘big four’:

Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, although France, Spain, Sweden

and Portugal would also be signatories of the final treaty. Metternich, as

Austrian foreign minister since 1809, had most at stake, since Napoleon had

destroyed the role of the Habsburg Empire as a leading force in Germany

and Italy, and threatened to reduce it to the status of a Balkan power. He

set out to re-establish Austria’s dominant position in both Germany and

Italy.

Metternich, like the other European statesmen, had a lingering eigh-

teenth-century notion of the balance of power, whereby territorial gains

made by one major power had to be ‘compensated’ by corresponding terri-

torial gains by the others. This theory still influenced the way in which the

Great Powers managed their own competing claims in East Central

Europe. The ‘balance of power’, however, was always a flexible and

dispensable concept. Thanks to British naval supremacy, it could only apply

on the European continent itself. No-one contemplated trying to ‘balance’

Britain’s awesome sea power.

Britain emerged in a very strong position, holding most of the overseas

possessions which had been seized during the Napoleonic wars. She

retained Gibraltar and Malta and exercised a protectorate over Corfu. In

the West Indies, Britain acquired Tobago and St Lucia. The Cape Colony

was also now a British possession. The creation of the new enlarged king-

dom of the Netherlands made sure that the mouths of the Rhine and the

Scheldt were in friendly hands. Similarly, when Norway passed from

Danish control to Swedish rule, this ensured that no single power could

dominate the vital entrance to the Baltic Sea, which satisfied another

requirement of British maritime commerce.

Apart from the traditional, but very loosely interpreted idea of the


balance of power, there were new forces operating in the field of European

international relations. Ideological issues were important, as Metternich

developed ways of suppressing liberal and national revolts wherever they

might occur. European diplomacy had also to reckon with the new ideas of

Tsar Alexander I, who believed international relations could be recon-

structed on a moral and Christian basis. Alexander imagined himself as a

victorious Messiah, emerging from the fires of Moscow to bring peace to

Europe. The Tsar had experienced a religious conversion during the

trauma of the French invasion. He immersed himself in the Bible and

visited the English Quakers, whose pacifism corresponded with his own

Christian vision of the world.6 Metternich found it easy to ridicule such

fantasies, but less easy to dismiss the presence of Russian troops in the heart

of Europe. A Russian army now occupied Paris itself, signalling to the rest

of Europe that Tsarist power could not be ignored. The Vienna Congress

needed to settle the longstanding conflicts between Prussia, Austria and

Russia in Eastern Europe, and it needed to find a framework for interna-

tional co-operation and security in the future. Balance-of-power theory

would prove a feeble instrument for achieving such grand ambitions. First

of all, the diplomats had to solve Europe’s ‘French problem’.

Europe’s ‘French problem’

The European powers sought guarantees for their own security. They

needed protection against French aggression, fearing that any future revo-

lutionary regime in France would launch another war of liberation against

the conservative monarchies, as the French Revolution had done in

1792–3. At the same time as restraining France, Europe needed to rehabil-

itate her. The welcome presence of France’s veteran diplomat Talleyrand

at Vienna testified to this desire to reintegrate France as quickly as possible

into the so-called ‘Concert of Europe’. Nothing in the treatment of France

at Vienna, therefore, prefigured the treatment of Germany in the Treaty of

Versailles a century later. There was no war-guilt clause, no enforced disar-

mament, and a relatively light burden of reparations was imposed. At

Vienna, the victors were magnanimous. France’s frontiers were pegged

back to their limits in 1790. She suffered an army of occupation and was

forced to pay the allies an ‘indemnity’ – we might call this ‘reparations’ – of

700 million francs. Within three years, however, the occupying forces

departed, and by 1820 the indemnity was paid.

The Treaty of Vienna established a ring of reinforced ‘buffer states’

which would stand between French expansionism and the rest of Europe.


On France’s northern frontier, Belgium (formerly part of the Napoleonic

Empire) and the Netherlands were united in a single kingdom, ruled by the

Dutch House of Orange. This artificial unification of French and Flemish

speakers, and of Catholics and Calvinists, endured only until 1830.

On France’s eastern frontier, the Rhineland now became a part of

Prussia, with enormous consequences for the future. The absorption of the

Rhineland was both an asset and a problem for Prussia. The Rhineland

cities had an advanced economy, French-influenced social and legal insti-

tutions, and a substantial Catholic population. They also had strong tradi-

tions of municipal independence, all of which made the culture of the

Rhineland quite different from that of Prussia’s Protestant agrarian elite.

The Köln banker Schaaffhausen shrugged his shoulders in 1815 and

lamented: ‘Well! We have married into a poor family here.’7 The Prussian

annexation of the Rhineland also made it inevitable that any future French

aggression would instantly bring France into direct conflict with north

Germany’s leading military power.

Switzerland, or to be more accurate the federated Swiss cantons, formed

another link in the protective chain of states encircling France. In 1815, the

general principle of Swiss neutrality was first advanced and accepted by all

the powers. It has been a ‘given’ of international relations ever since.

Finally, Vittorio Emanuele of Savoy returned to Turin from his refuge in

Sardinia to reassume the throne of Piedmont, his small Alpine kingdom in

northwestern Italy, which had been absorbed into the Napoleonic Empire.

He profited from some territorial reinforcement, as his kingdom was now

to include the old Ligurian Republic, based on the important commercial

port of Genoa. The Piedmontese now had a Mediterranean outlet.

These arrangements were inherently fragile in at least two respects. First,

the union of Belgium and the Netherlands would not endure. Second, the

system depended on the compliance of the Piedmontese monarchy with

Great Power strategy. As the Austrians were later to discover, this compli-

ance would be reluctant at the best of times, and Piedmontese policy could

as easily take an anti-Austrian as an anti-French turn.

More generally, however, the notion of the ring of states encircling

France was predicated on a false assumption and accompanied by an

impossible contradiction. The assumption that France was Europe’s most

likely disturber of the peace turned out to be alarmist. France after

Napoleon did not have an expansionist agenda in Europe. In 1830 and

1848, the revolutionary regimes which came to power in Paris carefully

reassured the European powers of their peaceful objectives. Europe,

however, remained fearful of French intentions. In 1815, the diplomats fell

into the habit, common to their species, of trying to prevent the last war,


rather than forestalling the next one. The impossible contradiction of

neutralizing France was exposed in 1823. Then Metternich, far from want-

ing to restrain France’s military action, actually invited armed French inter-

vention in order to crush the liberal movement in Spain.

Italy, Germany and Central Europe

The reorganization of Italy and Germany incorporated much of

Napoleon’s rationalization of the political map, but it put Austria firmly in

control. Austrian domination in the Italian peninsula was based on her

direct rule of Venetia and Lombardy. The port city of Trieste and the

Dalmatian coastline were also annexed by the Habsburg Empire.

Habsburg princes or their acolytes returned to power in the Duchies of

Tuscany, Modena and Parma, which was handed to Napoleon’s second

wife, Marie-Louise of Austria. Pius VII returned to govern the Papal States,

which included Umbria, the Marches and the Romagna (the papal enclave

of Avignon had been definitively lost to France in the Revolution). Within

the Papal States, the Austrians maintained military bases at Ferrara,

Piacenza and Comacchio in the ‘Legations’, the Papal provinces of the

Romagna, so named because they were delegated to cardinals to adminis-

ter. The Neapolitan Bourbons ruled the sprawling Kingdom of Naples and

Sicily in alliance with Austria. All these rulers depended on Vienna to

protect them from threats of revolution.

Austria assumed a similar controlling position within the new German

Confederation, which comprised 34 states, including Prussia, and four free

cities. The member states renounced war with each other, and agreed to

establish a German Federal Diet, or council. The Diet, however, was not

an elected representative assembly, but a body made up of delegates

appointed by the governments of the various German states. Luxembourg

was included, represented by the King of the Netherlands, while Holstein

was represented by the King of Denmark. The final power structure of the

Confederation was the outcome of considerable wrangling between Prussia,

Austria and other German states. Eleven major states each had a single

vote, and the smaller states were to share their votes in units of six. Austria

presided over the Confederation, and many small German states looked to

Vienna for protection against Prussian expansion, as well as against domes-

tic upheavals. This, then, was a body of German princes held together by

its opposition to German nationalism. Metternich was soon to enlist the

German rulers in his crusade against liberalism and nationalism.

In post-revolutionary Germany, however, the enduring legacy of


Napoleon was clearly apparent. The independent cities, bishoprics and

micro-states which had dotted the map of Germany before the French

conquests were not revived. The Napoleonic secularization of Germany

was permanent. The main beneficiaries of this process, alongside Prussia

itself, had been the middle-sized kingdoms of southern Germany. Under

Napoleon’s territorial reorganization, for example, the territory of Baden


Map 1.2 The Italian States in 1815

Source: David Laven and Lucy Riall, eds, Napoleons Legacy: Problems of Government in RestorationEurope, Oxford (Berg Publishers), 2000.

had grown by 750 per cent, and its population almost doubled.8 Together

with Württemberg and Bavaria, Baden therefore had strong material

reasons to align itself with France. In Metternich’s vision, however, such

sovereign Mittelstaaten (middle states) were a useful barrier against the devel-

opment of German nationalism. Chapter 3 will examine how Metternich

was able to enlist the German Confederation in the counter-revolutionary

cause.

The territorial settlement in Eastern Europe posed difficult problems,

and threatened to resurrect ancient antagonisms between Prussia, Austria

and Russia. Prussia wanted control of Saxony, while Russia demanded

Poland, and these conflicts brought the powers to the brink of another war.

The compromise solutions which emerged reflected Russia’s impressive

military strength. The Russians took control of Finland, and it was they too

who essentially determined the fate of the Poles. The Napoleonic Duchy of

Warsaw was now reduced to a smaller Polish state, known as ‘Congress

Poland’, with a population of 3.3 million, which was effectively dependent

on Tsarist Russia. Between 1815 and 1830, therefore, Poles found them-

selves dispersed among several different territories. About 850,000 lived

under Prussian rule in Poznàn (Posen), and approximately 4 million lived

under Austrian rule in Galicia, the poorest of all these Polish regions.

Others were subordinated to Russia, in the Ukraine, Bielorussia or

Lithuania, or inhabited Congress Poland itself, which had its own army and

its own Polish schools.9 Only in Cracow, which was declared an indepen-

dent city, were Poles temporarily free of foreign rule.

Throughout the eighteenth century, French support had sustained

Polish aspirations for independence from the Eastern powers. Deprived of

this source of assistance, the fractious Polish gentry faced limited options.

For the time being, Prince Czartoryski’s policy of accommodation with the

Russians seemed the only one possible. This strategy was vindicated by a

bizarre turn of events, in which Tsar Alexander granted the Poles a limited

constitution – something which would have been unthinkable in Russia

itself. Although only the Tsar could initiate legislation, Poland had a

Parliament, for which over 100,000 electors, mainly members of the gentry

or szlachta, had voting rights. Paradoxically, the exiled Polish revolutionary

Kosciusko wrote a letter of gratitude to Tsar Alexander, thanking him for

‘protecting’ Poland. Even before the death of Alexander I in 1825, the

future of this relatively liberal arrangement was in doubt and, as discussed

in Chapter 6, a Polish revolution was brewing, which would have fatal

consequences for the existence of a Polish state.

Since Russia dominated Poland, Prussia looked for territorial ‘compen-

sation’ elsewhere for this increase in Russian power. Prussian and Russian


greed for territory threatened to impede the progress of the Vienna negoti-

ations. In the past, the powers might have solved the problem simply by

partitioning Poland between them. This time, however, the Tsar insisted on

a nominally independent Polish state, which was a far more advantageous

solution from Russia’s point of view. The situation was rescued by handing

most of Saxony (except for its capital Dresden), as well as the Rhineland

and the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia, to Prussia. Austria, as we have

seen, annexed Lombardy and dominated the German Confederation.

A framework for international co-operation

Designing a blueprint for European stability was one thing; making it work

in practice was another. At Chaumont in 1814, the allies had already

declared their plans for continuing postwar co-operation when they opti-

mistically announced that their alliance would last for 20 years. In a series

of conferences after 1815, European leaders continued to meet in order to

regulate the security arrangements they had put in place, and to deal with

crises as they occurred. This so-called ‘Congress System’ simply consisted

of a series of summit meetings of the five major powers – France, Britain,

Austria, Russia and Prussia. It worked for as long as it did because all the

powers were in fundamental agreement about maintaining the interna-

tional order which had been established at the end of the Napoleonic wars,

and because they found it useful to tackle problems within a collective

framework.

This consensus was underpinned by two treaties of alliance. The

Quadruple Alliance united Austria, Britain, Russia and Prussia. Tsar

Alexander’s Holy Alliance of the three eastern Empires – one Catholic, one

Protestant and the other Orthodox – was another element of conservative

solidarity, but it also reflected Alexander’s own Christian and ecumenical

objectives. Castlereagh dismissed the Holy Alliance as ‘a piece of sublime

mysticism and nonsense’ but, as far as Metternich was concerned, if

Christian humanitarianism united reactionary rulers against revolutionary

contagion, then he could use it to advantage. In any case, enclosing Russia

within a system of alliances seemed the best way to restrain her expansion-

ist tendencies.

Rifts naturally occurred amongst the victorious allies of 1815, and the

system of congresses did not survive beyond 1823. It had marshalled its

forces to suppress revolutionary movements in Italy in 1821 and Spain in

1823. Tsar Alexander I and his Greek-born foreign minister Capodistria

saw these repressive projects in terms which prefigured the rhetoric of


George W. Bush. In 1820, the Tsar had faced a mutiny of the Semenovsky

Guards in his own capital, and he now attributed all the revolutionary

movements of the early 1820s to ‘the empire of evil’. Paris was the sinister

epicentre of subversion, propagated by ‘the synagogues of Satan’.10 The

outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1822, however, introduced

tensions of a new kind between the major powers, confronting Metternich

and the British with the disturbing reality of Russian military power in the

Mediterranean. As we shall see in a later chapter, Metternich’s system of

congresses could not survive this.

Castlereagh’s untimely suicide in 1822 further altered the pattern of

international relationships. Even before his death, Britain had been rela-

tively unmoved by Metternich’s attempts to organize armed intervention in

Europe’s revolutionary trouble spots. Britain’s principal interests lay outside

continental Europe, and were increasingly focused on protecting her global

commercial connections. For Austria, on the other hand, the stakes were

very different. The Habsburg Empire was a multi-ethnic dynastic state,

which had been thoroughly bankrupted by the Napoleonic wars. At the

heart of Europe, Austria felt uniquely vulnerable to revolutionary threats.

Austria had had no English Channel to protect it from the Napoleonic

onslaught at Wagram, Ulm and Austerlitz. Moreover, the very idea of

national independence threatened its cohesion; it would set Germans

against Czechs, against Poles, against Italians and against Magyars, it

would set Magyars against Slavs, and everyone against Jews. Nationalism

was potentially a centrifugal force which could destroy the Habsburg


Table 1.1 The ‘Congress System’

1814 Treaty of Chaumont: the coalition against Napoleon pledged a 20-yearalliance

1815 Quadruple Alliance: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia offered mutualsupport against French aggression, and agreed on regular conferences

1815 Holy Alliance: Russia, Prussia, Austria announced a new counter-revolutionary order based on Christian morality

1818 Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen): Allies decided to withdraw troops from France,and renewed Quadruple Alliance

1820 Troppau (in Galicia): Austria, Russia and Prussia (but not Britain)supported principle of armed intervention to forestall revolutions

1821 Ljubljana (Laibach): Austrian intervention in Naples and Piedmontapproved

1822 Verona: French intervention in support of Ferdinand VII of Spainapproved

1822 Suicide of Castlereagh1825 Death of Tsar Alexander I

Empire. In this sense, Metternich’s struggle against the spread of revolu-

tionary ideologies was a struggle for the survival of the Austrian Empire

itself. Although their priorities were very different, Castlereagh and

Metternich had nevertheless co-operated closely, and Metternich was

shaken by the British Prime Minister’s violent demise. Castlereagh was, he

said, my second self. In his place, the brilliant George Canning gave British

world policy a more independent direction. For Metternich, Britain soon

became ‘gangrenous to the bones with the revolutionary spirit’.11

An evaluation of the Congress of Vienna

The settlement of 1815 gave Europe a century of peace. This is not to deny

that wars broke out, but the Crimean War, the wars of German and Italian

unification, and the Balkan wars were all localized wars, and most of them

were short. Between Waterloo and Sarajevo, Europe was spared a general-

ized conflict, and this makes the Treaty of Vienna one of history’s outstand-

ing diplomatic triumphs. Territorial changes proved necessary, like the

creation of independent Belgium in 1830, but they did not spark off any

widespread conflagration. The Vienna Settlement sought a lasting settle-

ment in which hegemony would be shared, conflicts could be managed, and

the rights of all states collectively recognized. As Paul Schroeder, the most

incisive recent historian of the Vienna Congress, concluded: ‘No other

general peace settlement in European history comes anywhere close to this

record.’12

It was a settlement drawn up by reactionaries keen to crush any revival

of liberalism or Bonapartism in Europe. Yet under Metternich’s influence

they maintained a pragmatic view of the recent past. They were not vindic-

tive towards the defeated power, and after all they wanted to strengthen the

position of the Bourbon monarchy in France. When it suited them, they

believed in the doctrine of the balance of power, and at other times they

ignored it. They believed in principle in defending the legitimate rights of

monarchs, but in practice many petty princes, swept away by the

Napoleonic conquests, were not restored to their miniature thrones. In the

interests of stability, the settlement of 1815 recognized and incorporated

much of the Napoleonic legacy in Germany.

The European statesmen who negotiated the Vienna settlement are

often accused of ignoring popular aspirations for self-determination.

Indeed, they saw no need for democratic consultations. ‘Peoples?’, asked

the Austrian Emperor Francis I, ‘What does that mean? I know only

subjects.’13 The French people were not asked whether they wanted the


Bourbon monarchy back or not. When the Austrians took control of

Lombardy, no-one thought to consult the disgruntled bourgeoisie of Milan.

Nor did the Genoese have any say in the liquidation of their Republic, or

in suddenly becoming subjects of Turin. The rights of nations did not come

into consideration.

One reason for this was that in 1815 most nationalist movements were

merely whispers in the wind. The Vienna statesmen were inclined to view

conspiracies and uprisings as the inevitable aftershocks of the revolutionary

earthquake, which would eventually die away. The idea of national self-

determination was still the obsession of a handful of intellectuals without a

mass following. We should not read the enormous power of nationalism in

the twentieth century back too far into the early nineteenth. The idea that

there had been a German ‘War of Liberation’ against the French oppres-

sor in 1813 was largely a myth elaborated retrospectively for nationalist

purposes. When, in Livorno in March 1814, the British Admiral Bentinck

invited the Italians to rise up in defence of their liberties, his appeal fell on

deaf ears. In Poland, the French military presence in the country had not

aroused the gentry, although the de facto Russian protectorate produced a

revolution in 1830. To say that the 1815 settlement ignored nationalism is

therefore an anachronistic criticism, for nationalism had not yet emerged as

a serious political force.

With hindsight, we might level another criticism at the Vienna states-

men, and one that they would perhaps have recognized on their own terms:

they had not found an answer to the ‘Eastern Question’. Europe’s so-called

‘Eastern Question’ stemmed from the weakness and long-term decline of

the Ottoman Empire. This posed a serious problem for the Great Powers:

when the Ottoman Empire did eventually collapse, how would the spoils be

divided? Russia’s ambitions for a Mediterranean foothold dated back at

least to Catherine II’s so-called ‘Greek project’. Containing Russian expan-

sion in south Eastern Europe was thus a priority for all the other powers.

Yet international antagonisms in this region were too thorny to disentangle,

and the Treaty of Vienna largely left them conveniently alone. As a result,

the Balkans soon became the source of serious threats to European peace,

from the Greek struggle for independence to the Crimean War and

beyond. Like many of their successors, the statesmen of Vienna found the

problems of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean too baffling to

resolve.


Abd el-Kader, E. 249–50Adelfi (secret society) 58Agulhon, Maurice 65–6, 119, 217,

278–9, 283Alexander I, Tsar 13, 17, 18–19, 47,

51, 92, 95, 150–1, 185Alexander II, Tsar 243Alexander, Sally 286Algeria 30, 222, 249Alsace 102, 149, 154, 158Alvarez Junco, José 281Amann, P. 219Amsterdam 147, 167, 169Anderson, Benedict 77, 80, 277Anderson, Matthew S. 276Angoulême, Duke of 27Anti-Corn Law League 113, 124anti-semitism 86, 143, 148, 151,

158–9Anti-Slavery Society 125anticlericalism 33, 65, 100, 108,

109Antwerp 109, 162, 164, 166, 167apprenticeship system 125Ariège peasants, revolt of 102–3Arndt, M. 223artisans 54, 64–5, 70, 101, 188–96,

198, 216, 225and 1848 revolutions 214, 220,

226alliances with liberals and

nationalists 112industry without factories 188–90and mechanization 99, 123and politics 192–5, 217production, threats to 190–2in Warsaw 111

Athens 96Attwood (leader of Birmingham

Political Union) 104Austerlitz 19Australia 237, 248Austria 4, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20

bourgeois culture and domesticideology 200–1

and the Church 140Congress of Vienna 12, 13, 21Eastern Question and Crimean

War 239, 241, 242, 245, 246international co-operation

framework 19Jews and emancipation 147, 148Juste Milieu 141Kremsier Constitution (1849) 238liberalism and clericalism 107,

108Metternich and conservatism 39Metternich’s policy in Germany

42Metternich’s policy in Italy 44, 45‘movements’ in Italy, Spain and

Portugal 46, 48Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 85peasants and agriculture 176, 180political action, forms of 119revolutions of 1830 112revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

224–5, 230–1, 232, 233, 234,235

urbanization 169Zollverein 87, 90see also specific towns

Austro-Slavism 229

287

Index

Note: the notes section has not been indexed.

Avignon 149Azeglio, M. d’ 38, 114, 120

Babeuf, G. 60Baden 16–17, 41, 87, 124, 146, 148,

223, 224Archbishop of 123

Bakunin, M. 229Baldwin, Peter 284Balkan Wars 20Balkans 21, 39, 90, 178, 179, 239,

246Baltic 181Balzac, H. de 31Bank Charter Act (1844) 135Bank of England 105, 135Barcelona 134barricades 66–8, 100–1, 216, 220,

223, 232Basle 106, 107Basque provinces 135Baumgart, Winfried 243, 286Bavaria 17, 41, 87Beecher, Jonathan 276Belgium 4, 14, 90, 133

artisans and urban economy 188Catholics 77cholera 172and the Church 139Congress of Vienna 20divorce 210Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5and the Netherlands 108–9revolutions of 1830 98, 111–12urbanization 162–3, 164, 166, 167see also specific towns

Bentham, J. 105Bentinck, Admiral 21Béranger, P.J. de 61, 102, 120Berend, I.T. 275Berlin 214, 223Bern 106, 107Berry, Duchesse de, Marie-Caroline

34–5Berry, Duke of 36Bertier de Sauvigny, Guillaume de

278

Bezucha, Robert, J. 65, 278Biedermeier style 201, 202Bielorussia 17biens nationaux 30Birmingham 105, 137Birmingham, David 281Birmingham Political Union 104–5Bismarck, O. von 225, 227, 235,

236Bissette, C. 126Black Sea 240Blackbourn, David 226, 279‘Blacks, the’ 86Blanc, Louis 74, 101, 193, 219, 221Blanqui, Auguste 59–60, 70, 219blood libel 159‘blue horizon’ chamber 29Blum, Jerome 281Bohemia 97, 147, 148, 158, 188,

195, 227Bolivar, Simon 248Bologna 108, 142, 190Bolshevism 52Bonapartism 26, 56, 60–3, 102, 108,

120, 129book-burnings 32–3Bordeaux 149Born, S. 193Bouches-du-Rhône 178Boulogne conspiracy 62Bourbon regime 15, 20, 26, 36–7,

46, 138, 246alternative style of monarchy 35continuity and rupture 23, 24divorce 208Jews and emancipation 149July Revolution 99, 101juste milieu 129legitimacy, crisis of 29, 30, 32, 33Napoleonic hegemony, end of 7republicanism 63White Terror and ultra-royalism

27bourgeois culture and domestic

ideology 65, 100, 197–213, 219,221, 226, 229

divorce 207–10

288 INDEX

gender expectations, challenges to210–12

public and private sphere 201–7wealth, values and leisure

199–201Bradford 162Brandreth, J. 49Brazil 248–9Bremen 90, 147Breuilly, John 279Briggs, Asa 104, 280, 284Bright, John 170Bristol, riots in 104Britain 3, 4, 38–9, 47, 114, 115,

116, 118, 237agriculture 176, 178, 181, 182–4artisans and urban economy 189,

190, 191–2, 194, 196bourgeois culture and domestic

ideology 197, 198, 199, 212–13Chartism 135–8cholera 172, 173commercial treaty with Italy 133Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political

repression 54divorce 208, 209, 210domestic ideology 204, 205, 207Eastern Question and Crimean

War 239, 241, 242, 243, 247,249

international co-operationframework 18, 19, 20

Jews and emancipation 146, 147,148–9, 155

juste milieu 128, 141liberal bourgeoisie 226liberalism 107Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5, 9Netherlands and Belgian

independence 109parliamentary reform (1831–1832)

103–6Peel, Sir John 135–8Peterloo massacre 49–51public opinion, rise of 113, 124–6republicanism 64

revolutions of 1830 98, 99, 111,112

Revolutions of 1848 236–7threats of revolution (1817–1820)

48–51urbanization 161, 162, 163, 164,

170and War of Greek Independence

93, 95youth opposition movements 57see also Ireland; Scotland; Wales

and specific townsBritish Empire 248British and Foreign Anti-Slavery

Society 125Brittany 179Brock, Michael 277Broglie, Duc de 126Brune, General 26Brunswick 87, 106Brussels 8, 24, 108, 109, 172Buchez, P.B.J. 71Budapest 214Bunsen, G. 86Buonarroti (Tuscan revolutionary)

60Burgundy 102Burschenschaften 41–2, 85–6Bury, J.P.T. 277Byron, Alfred Lord 93, 95

Cabet, Etienne 59, 68, 73–4Cadbury family 206Caine, Barbara 286Calvinism 14, 27, 108, 123, 167Camphausen ministry 223Canada 248Candeloro, Giorgio 43Canepa, Andrew M. 146, 147, 285Canning, George 20, 248Cape Colony 12, 237, 248Capodistria 18–19, 92, 95, 96Captain Swing riots 105–6carabinieri 7Carbonari 44, 45, 46, 50, 56, 58–60,

61, 108Cardigan, Lord 243

INDEX 289

Carlist War/Carlists 47, 107, 134Carlo Alberto, King 46, 132, 147,

231–2, 233–4Carlo Felice, Prince 46Carlsbad Decrees (1819) 42, 86Carr, Raymond 47, 281Carrel, Armand 115–16Castlereagh, Viscount R.S. 5, 18,

19, 20, 39, 95Catalonia 134, 135Catherine II, Empress of Russia 21,

151Catholic Association 124Catholicism 14, 18, 26, 36, 47,

138–9, 140, 167Belgium 77divorce 208domestic ideology 203, 205emancipation in Britain 103,

124France 241Germany and the Burschenschaften

85Italy 77Jews and emancipation 143, 147,

154July Revolution 100legitimacy, crisis of 32, 33liberalism and clericalism 107Netherlands and Belgian

independence 108, 109peasants 187Revolutions of 1848 221, 225Switzerland 106

Cato Street Conspiracy 50Cattaneo, Carlo 77, 234Cavaignac, General 219, 220Cavour, Count C.B. di 128, 132–3,

140, 235censorship 30, 42, 44–5, 51, 54, 55,

113, 114, 141, 229Central Negro Emancipation

Committee 125Ceylon 237Chaloner, W.H. 283chambrées 65Champagnat, M. 138

Charles X, King of France 23, 36,37

Algeria 30Eastern Question and Crimean

War 249July Revolution 99, 102legitimacy, crisis of 29, 30, 33–4republicanism 63

Charpentier (publisher) 118Charter of 1814 28, 29–31, 36,

99–100Chartist movement 49, 105, 113,

127, 128, 135–8, 188, 237Chaumont 18Chevalier, Louis 168, 284Child Custody Bill (1839) 210Chile 248China 249Chios 93cholera 171–3, 231Church, Clive 98, 277Church of England 104Church/religion 3, 22, 27, 46, 48,

134, 167, 176, 203–4and the 1812 Constitution 63see also Calvinism; Catholicism;

Greek Orthodox; Jesuits; Jews;Lutheranism; Protestantism;Russian Orthodox

Civil Code (Napoleonic) 207Clark, Timothy 68, 283clericalism 46, 107–8

see also anti-clericalismClermont-Tonnerre (legislator) 145club movement (Paris) 193, 219co-operative organizations 64, 70–1Cobban, Alfred 198, 285Cobbett, W. 115Codrington, Admiral 95Comacchio 15common land, enclosure or

privatization of 181–2Communist League 75Communist Party Manifesto 75compagnonnages (fraternal association

of workers) 191‘Concert of Europe’ 13, 246

290 INDEX

Congress Poland 17, 18, 19, 51, 150Congress of Vienna (1815) 12–13,

20–1, 147, 249Consalvi, Cardinal E. 44conservatism and political repression

(1815–1830) 38–55Britain, threats of revolution in

(1817–1820) 48–51Italy, Spain and Portugal 45–8Metternich 38–40Metternich’s policy in Germany

40–2Metternich’s policy in italy 42–5Russia, revolution and repression

in 51–4Considérant, Victor 74‘conspiracy in broad daylight’

114–18Conspiracy of the Equals 60Constant, Benjamin 24, 126Constantine, Russian Grand Duke

Nikolaevitch 51–2Constantinople 91, 93, 241Constitution 1812 (Spain) 45, 46, 63Constitution 1831 (Switzerland) 107Constitution 1837 (Spain) 47, 133Constitution 1848 (Italy) 47, 132Constitution 1849 (Austria) 238constitutionalism 47, 98

liberal 216–17, 236Consulta (Roman State Council)

139Cooper, Thomas 194Coppa, Frank J. 281Corfu 12Cortes of Cadiz 63cottage industries 189–90Cracow 17, 150craftsmen 193, 223, 229Crémieux, A. and family 150, 154,

155, 160crime 169Crimean War and beyond 20,

238–501856 as turning-point 246–8Eastern Question 238–46Europe overseas 248–50

politics post 1848 238crisis of 1816–17 38Croatia 5, 82, 83–4, 230, 231Crouzet, F. 283Cubitt, Geoffrey 278Customs Union 42, 85

see also ZollvereinCustozza 234Czartoryski, Prince A. 17, 51, 111Czechs 82–3, 224, 231, 235

Dalmatian coastline 15Danubian Principalities 91, 92, 95,

180, 241–2, 243, 246Daumard, Adeline 200Daumier, H. 1 16, 117, 118, 121,

122Davidoff, Leonore 206, 286Davies, Norman 280Davis, John A. 281de Broglie (liberal aristocrat) 130De Musset (writer) 116De Vigny (writer) 116Deak, Istvan 283Decembrist revolt/Decembrism

51–3, 55Delacroix, Eugene 68, 70, 93, 94,

100, 101Denmark 80, 181, 191, 226Dennis, Richard 284Derby, riots in 104Derry, T.K. 280Dickens, Charles 171diet and nutrition 178–9Dinwiddy, J.R. 277Disraeli, B. 155, 160, 174Dissenters 125divorce 207–10Divorce Act (1857) (in Britain) 208,

209Dom Miguel 47, 107Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil 47,

107domestic service 204–5domesticity 210–11Don Carlos (brother of King

Fernando) 47

INDEX 291

Dona Maria, Infanta (daughter ofKing Joao VI) 47

Dordogne 31Dowe, Dieter 283Dresden 222Droz, Jacques 1Dubbelt (Director of Third

Department) 54Duisburg 163, 164Dukes, Paul 280Dusseldorf 227Dwyer, Philip G. 277

East Anglia 182Eastern Europe 3, 4

cholera 173Congress of Vienna 13, 21imagined communities 82Jews and process of emancipation

144, 145, 150–3, 159nationalism 76, 78peasants and agriculture 176, 180public opinion, rise of 126

Eastern Question 21, 238–46economic modernization 182Egypt 239, 241Eisenbach, Artur 285Eley, Geoff 226émigrés 2–3, 23, 27, 28, 30, 34Endelman, Todd M. 155, 285Enfantin, P. 71, 211Engels, F. 2, 68, 75, 170, 174, 217,

223, 224Enlightenment 32–3, 45, 121Epidauros 93Esdaile, Charles 281Essen 170Evangelical Protestantism 125,

205–6Evans, Richard J. 282–3, 284

Factory Acts (1844 and 1847) 135,138

Falloux Law of 1850 221family limitation 178fatherland associations 123Fay, General 119

February Revolution (1848) 218,219

fédéré movement 60feminism 211–12Fenton, R. 244Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria 40Ferdinand III, Grand Duke of

Tuscany and Archduke ofAustria 44

Ferdinand, King of Naples 231, 232Ferguson, Niall 156, 157, 158, 285Fernando VII, King of Spain 7, 45,

46Ferrara 15Finland 17, 79, 243First Republic (France) 218Five Days of Milan 232–3Flanders 108Florence 116, 166–7Forest Code (1827) 102, 182, 184Four Ordinances of 1830 36, 99‘four sergeants of La Rochelle’ 56–7Fourier, Charles 71–3, 74, 210Fraisse, Geneviève 286France 1, 2–3, 4, 17, 47, 49, 109,

114, 115, 1161814–1830 22–37, 98, 111, 112

continuity and rupture 22–4Hundred Days 24–6legitimacy, crisis of 29–34monarchy, alternative style of

34–5White Terror and ultra-royalism

26–8artisans and urban economy 188,

189, 190, 191, 192–3, 196bourgeois culture and domestic

ideology 198, 199, 200Catholicism 241Chamber of Deputies 99, 101,

102, 131, 220, 221cholera 172, 173and the Church 138, 139Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political

repression 54divorce 208, 209

292 INDEX

domestic ideology 204, 206–7Eastern Question and Crimean

War 239, 241, 242, 246, 247,250

gender expectations, challenges to211

imagined communities 82international co-operation

framework 18invasion of Algeria 249Jewish assimiliation and identity

154Jews and emancipation 146, 147,

149–50July Revolution 99–103juste milieu 128, 141liberal bourgeoisie 226liberalism 107Metternich and conservatism 38,

39Metternich’s policy in Italy 43Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 80opposition movements 56peasants and agriculture 175,

176, 178–9, 181, 182, 183, 184,187

political action, forms of 118, 119,120

public opinion, rise of 113, 124–6revolutions of 1848 214, 217,

218–22, 235, 236secret societies 59urbanization 161, 163, 164,

168–9, 170and War of Greek Independence

93, 95youth opposition movements 57

Francis I, Emperor 20Frankel, Jonathan 285Frankfurt 87, 146, 147, 214, 223,

224Franz Josef I, Emperor of Austria

229Frayssinous, Cardinal 32Frederick William III, King of

Prussia 41

Frederick William IV of Prussia 23,214, 223, 224

French Alps 178French Charter (1814) 63French National Constituent

Assembly 145French National Convention

(1792–3) 8French Revolution 2, 9, 22, 28, 30,

32–3artisans and urban economy 191,

193continuity and rupture 23divorce 207Jews and emancipation 142, 145,

146peasants and agriculture 176, 177

Frevert, Ute 286Fribourg 107Friends of Light movement 123Fulbrook, Mary 279Fundamental Rights of the German

People 223–4funeral processions 119

Galicia 17, 128, 135, 147, 181, 184,186

Gard 27Garibaldi, G. 232, 234–5Gavroche (street urchin) 68Geary, Dick 282Gellner, Ernest 77, 277Gemie, Sharif 283gender expectations, challenges to

210–12General German Workers’ Fraternity

123, 193Geneva 106, 204Genoa, port of 14, 44, 132, 171Gentz, F. von 42German Confederation 15, 17, 18,

40, 85, 86, 223, 224, 238Germany 2, 14, 15–18, 114, 141

artisans and urban economy 188,189, 191, 192, 193

bourgeois culture and domesticideology 201, 213

INDEX 293

Germany (cont.):and Burschenschaften 85–6Catholic movement 123cholera 172Congress of Vienna 12, 20conservatism and political

repression 54, 55domestic ideology 203, 204, 205Eastern Question and Crimean

War 246Federal Diet 15Frankfurt Monday Circle 123Frankfurt Parliament 124, 148,

223, 224, 225, 226, 227gender expectations, challenges to

211gendering of public sphere 121Greater Germany (Grossdeutsch)

225imagined communities 81jew-hatred 158Jews and emancipation 142, 144,

146, 147, 148, 149, 154legitimacy, crisis of 30Little Germany (Kleindeutsch) 225Metternich’s policy in 39, 40–2Middle German Union 87Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 78peasants and agriculture 181, 182,

183public opinion, rise of 123–4, 126revolutions of 1830 98Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

217, 222–7, 235, 236South German Union 87unification 90urbanization 173and War of Greek Independence

93youth opposition movements 57and Zollverein 86–90see also Prussia; Rhineland and

specific townsGhent 109Gibraltar 12Gildea, Robert 275

Ginsborg, Paul 233, 283Gioberti, V. 139, 140Girardin, E. de 115–16Glasgow 137Goldfrank, David M. 246, 286Goldsmid, F.H. 149Goldstein, Robert J. 276Gorchakov, Prince 243Goudchaux family 150Graetz, Michael 285Grande Armée 9Greece 4, 39, 55, 96, 124Greek Orthodox Church 77, 92Greek War of Independence

(1821–1829) 19, 55, 90–6, 239Grégoire, Abbé 146Gregory XVI, Pope 139Grey, Lord 104, 105Grimm brothers (J. and W.) 42, 81Grochow, battle of 111Grogan, Susan 276Grossick, Geoffrey 282Grundrechte declaration 223–4Guelphs (secret society) 58guerre des demoiselles (Ladies War)

102–3, 184guilds 190–1Guizot, Prime Minister 101, 126,

130–1, 140, 218, 227, 229

Habermas, Jürgen 113, 114Habsburg Empire 12, 15–18

artisans and urban economy 188,191, 195

Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political

repression 54Eastern Question and Crimean

War 242imagined communities in 81–4international co-operation

framework 19Jews and emancipation 144,

146–50, 154Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5, 8nationalism 80peasants and agriculture 180, 181

294 INDEX

public opinion, rise of 126Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

225, 227–31, 235see also Austria; Eastern Europe

Hales, E.E.Y. 281Halévy, E. 103Hall, Catherine 206, 286Hambach festival 124Hamburg 90, 146, 147, 172Hamm, Michael F. 284Hanover 89

King of 42Hardenberg, K.A. 41Hardy, T. 209Harsin, Jill 286Hartley, Janet M. 280Haupt, H.-G. 282Hearder, Harry 281Hegel, G.W.F. 222Heidelberg university (Germany)

85Heine, H. 147, 156Hellenism 92Hep-Hep riots 158Herder, J.G. 78, 158Herzen, Alexander 238Herzog, Dagmar 123, 279Hesse 148Hesse-Cassel 87, 106Hesse-Darmstadt 87Hetherington, H. 115Higgs, David 28, 278Hobsbawm, E.J. 77, 103, 275, 277Hohenzollern dynasty 222Holstein 15Holt, P. 280Holy Alliance 18Hong Kong 249House of Commons 104, 105, 136,

138House of Lords 104House of Orange 14Hroch, Miroslav 76, 83, 86, 92, 97,

277Hugo, V. 66, 67, 118, 168, 222Hundred Days 5, 8, 24–6, 36, 60Hungary 79

Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 246

imagined communities 81, 82Jews and emancipation 147peasants and agriculture 176, 180,

183, 185political action, forms of 119Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

229–30, 231, 235see also specific towns

‘Hungry Forties’ 128, 175, 183Hyman, Paula E. 285

Illyrism 83, 230India 171, 248, 249Industrial Revolution 190industrialization 78, 175, 196Infamous Decree 149inheritance 177Inquisition 46, 134, 138, 143, 147intelligentsia 53international co-operation

framework 18–20Ireland 77, 138, 139, 183–4

potato famine 164Isabella, Queen of Spain 47, 128,

134Isle, Rouget de l’ 31Italy 2, 4, 15–18

artisans and urban economy 190Carbonari and secret societies 58,

59Catholicism 77cholera 171, 172and the Church 139, 140Congress of Vienna 12, 20, 21conservatism and political

repression 54‘conspiracy in broad daylight’ 114divorce 208Eastern Question and Crimean

War 246international co-operation

framework 18Jews and emancipation 143, 146,

147, 149juste milieu 128, 141

INDEX 295

Italy (cont.):liberalism and clericalism 108and Mazzinianism 84–5Metternich and conservatism 38,

39Metternich’s policy in 42–5modernization of Piedmont 132–3‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 79opposition movements 56peasants and agriculture 176, 179,

182, 183, 184political action, forms of 119–20public opinion, rise of 126revolutions of 1830 98, 111, 112Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

217, 218, 231–5unification 90urbanization 166–7youth opposition movements 57see also specific towns

Jardin, André 1, 278JelacicV, J. 230Jelavich, Barbara 281, 286

Charles 281Jena University (Germany) 41–2, 85,

86, 158Jennings, Lawrence C. 284Jerusalem 241Jesuits 43, 46, 139Jewish Learning movement 154Jews and process of emancipation

142–60, 167Ashkenazi Jews 144, 149, 159assimilation and identity 153–5conversions from Judaism to

Christianity 154–5, 160Eastern Europe 150–3endogamous marriage 155, 157–8ghettos 143–4Hebrew 154jew-hatred, traditional and

modern 143, 158–9Mortara Affair (1858) 142–3pre-emancipation 143–5

progroms 151re-ghettoization 142Rothschild family 155–8Sephardic Jews 144, 149, 155,

159shops as targets of workers’

protests 195status in Western and Central

Europe 145–50Yiddish language 154

João VI, King of Portugal 23, 47John of Austria, Archduke 225Johnson, Christopher H. 276Johnson, Douglas 278Jones, Gareth Stedman 280Jones, Peter 187journeymen 54, 64, 123, 193, 223July Monarchy 62, 63–4, 65, 116,

118bourgeois culture and domestic

ideology 198, 200Eastern Question and Crimean

War 249juste milieu 128, 131and legitimacy, search for 129Revolutions of 1848 218urbanization 163

July Revolution (1830) 30, 57–8, 98,99–103, 115

June Days (1848) 219–20

Kennington Common march 138Kertzer, David I. 285Kielstra, Paul M. 284Kiev 151, 163, 169, 171Kieval, Hillel J. 285Kingsley, Charles 161Kollar, J. 82Köln 123, 124, 163, 166Kolokotrones, T. 92Kolowrat (politician) 40Kosciusko, T.A.B. 17Kossmann, E.H. 280Kossuth, L. 119, 230, 231Kotzebue, A.F.F. von 42, 86Kremsier Constitution (1849) 238Kroen, Sheryl T. 33, 37, 278

296 INDEX

Krupp 170Kudlick, Catherine 173, 284

Labrousse, Ernest 283Ladies’ Society for the Relief of

Negro Slaves 125Lafayette (revolutionary) 59, 63, 98,

100, 103Lafitte, Jacques 101Lamarque, General 119Lamartine, A. de 219Lamennais, abbé 71, 139Lancashire 49, 137, 192Landwehr 41language 78–80, 81–2, 83Las Cases, E.D., Comte de 62Laslett, Peter 178Latin America 248Lausanne 106, 107Laven, David 43, 276, 281Le Creusot 170Ledru-Rollin, A.A. 220Lee, W.R. 279Leeds 162Legal Reading Club 119Legations 15legitimists 23Leicester 49Leipzig 85

Schillerfest 123Lenin, V.I. 31, 52, 60Leopold, Grand Duke of Habsburg

44Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 109Leplay, F. 182Leslie, R.F. 277liberal constitutionalism 216–17, 236liberalism 15, 47–8, 54, 56, 98,

107–8, 133–5, 216and 1848 revolutions 214Italy 132

libraries 194Liège 109Limoges 172Linda, Josef 81linguistic politics 81–2Linz 227

Lis, Catharina 284literary salons 121, 123Lithuania 17, 78, 111Little Germany (Kleindeutsch) 225Livermore, H.V. 281Liverpool 162, 164Livorno, port of 21, 44, 45, 147, 171Lofland, L. 201–2Lombardy 15, 18, 21, 43, 44, 45, 97,

232economic change 183Jewish communities 147revoutions of 1848 233, 234

London 114, 147, 161, 162, 172,174, 204

London Working Men’s Association136

Louis XVI, King 7, 22, 24, 29, 31,33–4

Louis XVII, King 29Louis XVIII, King 5, 37

continuity and rupture 23, 24death of 29Hundred Days 25, 26legitimacy, crisis of 30, 34White Terror and ultra-royalism

27, 28Louis-Philippe, King 100–1, 116,

117, 128, 129, 218Lovett, William 194Lübeck 147Lucca 120Ludwig I of Bavaria 123Lutheranism 123, 167Luxembourg 15, 89

Commission 219Lyon 64, 74, 128, 191

uprising (1834) 64–5, 102, 188,189

Macartney, C.A. 279McBride, Theresa 286McPhee, Peter 65–6, 278, 282Madrid 134Magraw, Roger 222, 278Mahmud, Sultan 241Mainz 195

INDEX 297

Malta 12Malthus, T. 165Manchester 49, 137, 162, 164, 170,

174Manin, Daniele 233, 234Margadant, Jo Burr 278Margadant, Ted 282Marie-Louise of Austria 15, 44Mario, Jesse White 172Marist brothers 138Marrinan, Michael 278Marseilles 26, 192Marx, Karl 2, 8, 75, 101, 154, 197,

198, 217, 283revolutions of 1848 219–20, 222,

224, 225–6utopian socialism and the ‘social

question’ 68, 70, 71Marxism 151Masonic lodges 51, 119, 150, 154Mastai-Ferretti, Cardinal (bishop of

Imola) see Pius IX, PopeMaza, Sarah 197, 285Mazowiecki, T. 3Mazzini, G. 84–5, 96, 114

Carbonari and secret societies 58,59

Revolutions of 1848 232, 233, 234Mazzinianism 84–5Mechanics’ Institutes 194medical care 179Mediterranean 92Meissonnier, E. 68, 69Mendizábal government 134Meriggi, Marco 7Merriman, John M. 283, 284Merthyr Tydfil, riots in 104Mesta (sheep grazier corporation)

133–4Metternich, Prince C.L.W. 5, 15,

17, 511820 uprisings 55Concert of Europe 246Congress of Vienna 12, 13and conservatism 3 8–40‘conspiracy in broad daylight’

114

Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 242, 247

Germany and the Burschenschaften85, 86

Germany and Switzerland andregeneration of the cantons 106

Germany and the Zollverein 87international co-operation

framework 18, 19, 20‘movements’ in Italy, Spain and

Portugal 45, 46–7, 48Napoleonic hegemony, end of 9nationalism 76Netherlands and Belgian

independence 109policy in Germany 40–2policy in Italy 42–5politics post 1848 238public opinion, rise of 124, 126revolutions of 1830 112Revolutions of 1848 227, 229,

230, 232and Third Department 54utopian socialism and the ‘social

question’ 73views on Popes 140War of Greek Independence 95

Mexico 248Midgley, Clare 284Mignet, F.A.M. 101migration 163–4, 168, 177–8Miguelists 39, 47Milan 43, 45, 66, 68, 116, 120, 214

revolutions of 1848 232, 234Millet, J.F. 180milliard des émigrés 30Milward, Alan S. 275Mines Act (1842) 135Mitchell, B.R. 275Modena 15, 44, 108, 147, 234moderados (Spain) 133–4Moldavia 91, 243Montefiore, Sir M. 142, 149Montenegro 242Moon, David 281–2Mortara Affair (1858) 142–3, 158,

160

298 INDEX

Moscow 13, 53, 62, 162, 186Moulin, Annie 282Münchengratz, Convention of 112Munich 222mutual aid societies 64

Nada, Narciso 234Nadaud, M. 163–4, 194Namier, Sir Lewis 217, 282Naples 15, 40, 44, 45–6, 48, 119,

120agrarian change 184cholera 171, 172economic change 182Revolutions of 1848 218, 231

Napoleon I (Bonaparte) 2, 60, 242Civil Code 207constitutional liberalism 8Continental Blockade 9continuity and rupture 23defeat of 246exiled 5Hundred Days 26July Monarchy and search for

legitimacy 129legitimacy, crisis of 31Metternich and conservatism 39,

43, 45Peninsular War 46return of ashes from St Helena 12sale of Church property 44settlement with Catholic Church 36slavery 126

Napoleon III, Emperor (CharlesLouis Napoléon Bonaparte) 59,60, 62

Eastern Question and CrimeanWar 2 41, 246

election of 238Revolutions of 1848 214, 216,

220–2, 232, 235, 236seizure of power 2

Napoleonic Codes 29–30, 41, 208Napoleonic hegemony, end of

(1814–15) 5–12Napoleonic Wars 19, 40Naquet Law (1884) 208

Narváez, General 134Nassau 41, 87National Convention (1793) 24, 63National Guard (France) 102, 229National Union of the Working

Classes 105National Workshops 219nationalism 3, 15, 17, 19, 54, 76–97,

216–17, 236fragility of 76–81Germany and Burschenschaften 85–6Germany and Zollverein 86–90Habsburg Empire, imagined

communities in 81–4Italy and Mazzinianism 84–5War of Greek Independence

(1821–1829) 90–6Navarino, battle of 95Nesselrode, Count K.R. 40Netherlands 14

Belgian independence 108–9Congress of Vienna 12divorce 208Jews and emancipation 146, 147,

149Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5peasants and agriculture 183–4potato famine 183–4revolutions of 1830 98urbanization 167, 169see also specific towns

New Zealand 237, 248Newman, Edgar Leon 100, 277newspapers 114–16, 193, 219, 224Ney, Marshal 24, 26Nicholas I, Tsar 53, 95, 111, 151,

238, 242Nightingale, Florence 243Nipperdey, Thomas 279Normandy 183Northern Society 52Norway 12, 79, 80, 82, 98notables 131Nottingham 49, 104Novara 234Nuisances Removal and Disease

Protection Act (1855) 173

INDEX 299

O’Boyle, Lenore 57, 197, 276, 285O’Connell, D. 124O’Connor, Fergus 137Odessa 92, 151, 153O’Higgins, B. 248Okey, Robin 279Old Regime 2, 22, 23, 27, 73, 103,

108, 115bureaucracy 7Cobban’s views on 198discriminatory legislation in Italian

states 147hospitals 166Jews in Frankfurt 144pageantry 34and resacralization 31social structures 41values in decline 40

Oldham 174Opium War (1839–42) 249Oporto (Portugal) 47Orleanists 101, 102, 129–30Orthodox Patriarch 90–1Orton, Lawrence D. 283Otto of Bavaria, Prince (King of

Greece) 96Otto, Louise 211–12Ottoman Empire 21, 90, 239, 241,

242Oudinot, General 232Owen, Robert 68, 72Ozanam, F. 138, 208

Palacky, F. 82, 229Pale of Settlement 151–2Palermo 45–6, 67, 218, 234Palestine 241Palmerston, Lord H.J.T. 39, 109,

209, 242pamphlets 219Papal States 15, 44, 98, 107, 114,

142, 147revolutions of 1848 231, 234

Paris:and 1848 revolutions 217, 219,

220anticlericalism 100

barricades 66, 68bombing (1835) 128bourgeoisie 199, 200cholera 172, 173club movement 193diet and nutrition 178–9economic change 183Education Ministry 38Jewish communities 149July Revolution 100, 102newspapers 116overthrow of July monarchy 214pamphlet literature 113public sphere 114threats to artisan production 191urbanization 161, 164, 168–9women’s involvement in politics

211youth movements 57–8

Parma 15, 44, 108, 147, 234Pasha of Egypt (Mohammed Ali) 93,

239, 241Peace of Paris (1856) 243Peace of Vienna 246peasants 216, 217, 225, 226, 230

emancipation 231protests 99radicalism 65republicanism 66in Switzerland 107

peasants and agriculture 175–87consequences of agrarian change

183–4economic change 180–3Russia 185–6

Pech, Stanley Z. 277Peel, Sir R. 105, 128, 135–8, 140Pellerin (engraver) 61–2Pellico, Silvio 132Peloponnese 92, 93, 95, 96, 250Peninsular War 46Pentridge Rising 49Péreires family 150, 154Périer, Casimir 101–2periodicals 193Perkin, Harold 280Perrot, Michelle 285–6

300 INDEX

Pestel, P.I. 52, 53Peterloo massacre 49–51petitions 49, 224Petrashevsky conspiracy 54Phanariots 91–2Philhellenic movement 93, 95, 124Philipon, C. 116, 118, 120Piacenza 15, 44Picardy 176Piedmont 14, 38, 44, 45, 46, 48,

84–5, 128, 246and constitution 238Jewish communities 147modernization 132–3Revolutions of 1848 231, 233,

234Piedmont-Sardinia 43, 233Pilbeam, Pamela 73, 198, 199, 276,

277, 285Pinkney, David 277Pius IX, Pope (Cardinal Mastai-

Ferretti, bishop of Imola) (‘PioNono’) 15, 44, 128, 138–40,142, 231

Plug Plot 137Po valley 184Poland 2, 4, 18, 54, 128

cholera 173Congress of Vienna 21Diet or Sejm 51Eastern Question and Crimean

War 243Jews and emancipation 146, 149,

150–1Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5nationalism 77‘November Rising’ 109–11Partitions 148, 151peasants and agriculture 176, 185revolutions of 1830 98, 111, 112,

151Revolutions of 1848 224, 229, 235see also Congress Poland and

specific townspolice repression 42Polignac, Prime Minister 28, 36, 99political banquet 118–19

political caricature 116–18political clubs 224, 225political repression see conservatism

and political repressionpolitics of forgetting 30–1Poor Law reform 136, 138, 167poor relief 166–8popular politics 4population expansion 98–9, 181,

196Portugal 4, 22–3, 248, 249

clericalism 107Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political

repression 54divorce 208Eastern Question and Crimean

War 248, 249Jews and emancipation 144liberalism 107, 134Metternich and conservatism 39‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8revolutions of 1830 98

potato famine (1846) 183–4Pouthas, C. 163Poznàn (Posen) 17, 146, 148, 224Prague 68, 195, 214‘Pre-March’ (Vormarz) 85press freedom 99Price, Roger 283print nationalism 55, 80producers’ co-operatives 194progresistas (Spain) 133, 135proletariat 219–20pronunciamento (revolutionary

manifesto) 46Prothero, Iorwerth 282Protestantism 18, 27, 85, 108, 123,

126, 176, 182, 225Dissent 213and divorce 208, 210Evangelical 107, 125, 205–6Nonconformists 103in Switzerland 106, 218

proto-industrialization 189Proudhon, P.J. 70–1, 74Provence 26, 178

INDEX 301

Provisional Government of 1848(France) 218–19

Prussia 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 182artisans and urban economy 192bourgeois culture and domestic

ideology 197, 199cholera 173Congress of Vienna 12, 13Customs Union 42divorce 208, 209, 210Eastern Question and Crimean

War 246Jews and emancipation 146–8,

150, 154Metternich’s policy in Germany

40–1, 42Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5National Assembly (1848) 227nationalism 85peasants and agriculture 176,

180–1, 182politics post-1848 238Revolutions of 1848 217, 222–3,

225, 226, 235urbanization 163Zollverein 87, 90

Public Health Act (1848) 173public opinion, rise of 113–27

Britain and France 124–6‘conspiracy in broad daylight’

114–18Germany 123–4political action, forms of 118–20public sphere, gendering of 120–3public sphere, revival of 113

Quadruple Alliance 18, 39Quakers 125

Radetsky, Marshal 231, 232, 233,234, 235

Raeff, Marc 53, 280Raglan, Lord 243Ramel, General 27Ranger, Terence 277Raspail, F.V. 59Rath, R. John 276, 283

re-sacralization 29, 31–2Redcliffe, ambassador 242Reform Act (1832) 103, 104, 105,

112, 135, 136, 236Reign of Terror (1793–4) 63religion see Church/religionRepeal of the Corn Laws (1846)

124, 135–6, 138, 183, 236republicanism 56, 63–6, 77, 101Resnick, Daniel 27, 278Restoration 7, 27–8, 32, 34, 36, 38,

138, 246revolutionary songs 120revolutions of 1830 28, 35, 98–112,

188Britain: parliamentary reform

(1831–1832) 103–6France: July Revolution 99–103Germany and Switzerland:

‘regeneration’ of the cantons106–7

liberalism and clericalism 107–8Netherlands: Belgian

independence 108–9Poland: ‘November Rising’

109–11Revolutions of 1848 1, 4, 8, 100,

101, 214–37France (1848–1852) 218–22Germany 222–7Habsburg Empire 227–31Italy 231–5romantic failure and

apprenticeship in democracy214–17

Rhine-Hesse 223Rhine-Main region 123Rhineland 14, 18, 57, 89, 124, 148,

163, 188, 195agitation in wake of bad harvest

(1831) 106political agitation 123revolutions of 1848 224urbanization 163

Riall, Lucy 276Riasonovsky, Nicholas 280Rich, Norman 286

302 INDEX

Riego, Major 47Rochdale 174Romagna 15, 44, 108Romania 82, 91, 93, 230, 246Rome 7, 44, 139, 146, 147, 214, 221

revolutions of 1848 234, 235Rosanvallon, P. 36Rothschild family 143, 148, 149,

155–8, 159, 160Rouen 206royalists 24, 26Royle, Edward 280Rudé, George 277Ruge, A. 148rule of law 114Russell, Lord J. 104Russia 4, 17, 18

artisans and urban economy 196cholera 173Congress of Vienna 12, 13, 21conservatism and political

repression 54divorce 208, 210Eastern Question and Crimean

War 239, 241, 242, 243, 245,246, 247

Jews and emancipation 150, 151,153

legitimacy, crisis of 31Metternich and conservatism 38,

39Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5,

8, 9nationalism 80peasants and agriculture 176, 177,

178, 179, 180, 181, 185–6Poland and the November Rising

111political action, forms of 119politics post 1848 238public opinion, rise of 126revolution and repression in 51–4revolutions of 1830 112Revolutions of 1848 214, 226,

230, 231, 235, 236–7and War of Greek Independence

92, 95, 96

Russian Orthodox Church 210, 241Russification 81, 151, 153

Sahlins, Peter 282Saint-Simon, C.H. de R., Comte de

71, 72, 73Saint-Simonian movement 154, 210,

211San Martin, J. de 248Sand, George 121, 212Sand, K. 86sans-culottes 193Santarosa, Count 46Saul, S.B. 275Savoyard monarchy 43

see also PiedmontSaxe-Coburg-Gotha 87Saxony 17, 18, 87, 106, 123, 188,

193, 223, 224Scandinavia 80, 81

see also particular countriesSchaaffhausen (Köln banker) 14Schleswig war 226Schlieffen Plan 56Schneider 1670 170Schoelcher, V. 126Schroeder, Paul 20, 242, 276Schwarzenburg, Prince 238Scotland 137, 176Scott, Joan 286Second Republic (France) 218, 220,

246secret societies 58–60Seditious Meetings Act 48–50Segalen, Martine 282Semenovsky Guards 19Serbia 95Serbo-Croat language 83serfdom and emancipation 52,

176–7, 180–1, 183, 185, 235Sewell, William 192, 193, 282share-cropping 176Sheehan, James J. 279Sheffield 191Sheremetev, Count 185Shubert, Adrian 281Siccardi Laws 133

INDEX 303

Sicily 15, 44, 45–6, 48, 231Siemann, Wolfram 123, 124, 223,

283Sigmann, Jean 282Silesia 89, 148, 183, 188, 192Simms, Brendan 279Simonton, Deborah 286Six Acts 49–50Sked, Alan 230, 276, 279, 283Slav Congress (1848) 229slavery abolition 114, 124–6, 235,

249Slovakia 78–9, 82–3, 229, 231Slovenia 79Sluga, Glenda 286Smith, Anthony D. 77, 277Smith, Bonnie, G. 204, 285Smith, Denis Mack 84, 132, 278,

281‘social question’ 68–74socialism 56, 210–11, 217

utopian 68–74Société de la Morale Chrétienne 126Société des Familles 59Société des Saisons 59–60Society of Friends (Philike Etaireia)

92Society for Human Rights 64Society of Jesus 34Society of St Vincent de Paul 138Solingen 191, 195Sonnenberg-Stern, Karina 285Sorel, Julien 27, 32Soult, Marshal 130Southern Society 52Spain 2, 4, 15, 63

clericalism 107Congress of Vienna 12conservatism and political

repression 54Constitution 1812 45, 46Constitution 1837 47divorce 208international co-operation

framework 18Jews and emancipation 144juste milieu 128

legitimacy, crisis of 30liberalism 107, 133–5Metternich and conservatism 38‘movements of 1820–1821’ 45–8Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5,

7nationalism 80revolutions of 1830 98

Sperber, Jonathan 2, 195, 225, 227,236, 275, 282, 283

Spitzer, Alan B. 8, 57, 278Squire, P.S. 280St Petersburg 51, 52, 54Stadion (Habsburg governor) 184Staël, G. de 120Stark, G.D. 279Statuto 231–2, 234Stearns, Peter N. 282Stedman Jones, G. 136–7, 280Stein, H. 41Stendhal 27, 57, 118Stern, W.M. 283Stone, Lawrence 205, 286Straits Convention (1841) 241Strasbourg conspiracy 62student guilds 158student leagues see BurschenschaftenStuttgart 211subsistence crisis 38Sue, Eugene 171suicide 169Sweden 12, 80, 191Switzerland 4, 8, 14, 133

divorce 208Metternich’s policy in Italy 45Napoleonic hegemony, end of 5‘regeneration’ of the cantons

106–7revolutions of 1830 98, 111Revolutions of 1848 218, 235see also particular towns

Syria 239Szechenyi, Count 82

Talleyrand Périgord, C.M. de,Prince of Benevento 13, 23–4,39

304 INDEX

Tamworth Manifesto 135tariff barriers 87Taylor, A.J.P. 90, 226, 279, 283Taylor, M. 236–7Thiers, Adolphe 12, 62, 100, 101,

118, 130, 221Third Department 53–4Thistlewood, A. 50Thomis, M.I. 280Thompson, Dorothy 280Thompson, E.P. 136, 194, 198,

280Thuringian states 87Tilly, Louise 286Tocqueville, A. de 60Tolpuddle Martyrs 136Tolstoy, L. 53Tombs, Robert 277Tory party 103–4Toulouse 27Toussenel (author) 159Townsend, L. 125Trade Unionism 105–6Treaty of Adrianople 95Treaty of London (1827) 95Treaty of Vienna 13–14, 20, 21, 38,

246Trevelyan, G.M. 281Trieste 15Tristan, Flora 210–11Trubetskoi, Prince 52Tsarism 81Tudesq, André-Jean 1, 278Turin 7, 14, 132Turkey 95, 239, 241, 242Turley, David 284Tuscany 15, 44, 45, 147, 182, 234

Ukraine 17, 79, 185, 229Ulm 19ultra-royalists 7, 8, 26–8, 35, 36, 37,

65Umbria 15Union of the Fatherland

(Vaterlandsverein) 86United States 3, 4, 9, 247, 249Universal Jewish Alliance 160

universal male suffrage 45, 105, 193,216–17, 219–20, 222–4,229–30, 233, 235–6

urbanization 161–74cholera 171–3social and material problems

168–71urban demography 162–4urban poverty 165–8varieties of urban life 173–4

utopian socialism 68–74Uvarov (minister to Tsar Nicholas)

153

van Leeuwen, Marco H.D. 167, 284Varnhagen, Rahel 121, 123Vaud canton 107Vendée revolt (1793) 28Venetia/Venice 15, 43, 44, 45, 146,

147, 171, 214revolutions of 1848 232–3, 234

Vernet, Horace 129, 130Versailles 204Vick, Brian 78, 225, 283Vienna 147, 148, 169, 200–1, 214,

227, 229Vienna Congress 13Vieusseux (Swiss wine merchant)

116Villèle, Count J. 28, 30, 34Vilna 153Vincent, David 282Vital, David 150, 285Vitebsk province 151Vittorio Emanuele, King of

Piedmont 14, 22, 43, 46Voilquin, Suzanne 210, 211von Gagern government 223von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge

226, 282–3

Wagram 19Wales 137Walker, Mack 284Walkowitz, Judith R. 286Wallachia (now Romania) 91Walton, John K. 280

INDEX 305

War of German Liberation 85‘war of the unstamped press’ 115Ward, J.T. 280Warsaw 17, 111, 146, 150–1Wartburg Festival 85–6Waterloo 5Webb, R.K. 138, 280Weber, W. 201Weill, G. 2Wellington, Duke of 103, 104, 105West Indies 12Westphalia 18, 146, 182Whigs 103, 104, 105White Terror 26–8, 36Wilberforce, W. 125William, King (of Netherlands) 108,

109Williams, Gwyn A. 277Williamson, George S. 279Windischgrätz, General 229, 231

Wooler (author) 51, 115Woolf, Stuart 281workers’ associations 194World Anti-Slavery Convention

125Württemberg 17, 41, 87, 223

Yorkshire 49, 105, 137Young Germany 58Young Italy 58, 84Young Poland 84Young Switzerland 58, 84youth movements 57–8Ypsilantes, Major-General 92–3

Zabreb (previously Agram) 83Zawadski, W.H. 278zelanti 44Zollverein 86–90, 133Zurich 106, 107

306 INDEX

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