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Kuwait Aff DDI 20101/43

Kuwait Aff

***Affirmative Cards***........................................................................................................................................2Plan Text..................................................................................................................................................................3Inherency- 1AC.......................................................................................................................................................4Inherency.................................................................................................................................................................5

Terrorism Advantage [1/4]......................................................................................................................................6Terrorism Advantage [2/4]......................................................................................................................................7Terrorism Advantage [3/4]......................................................................................................................................8Terrorism Advantage [4/4]......................................................................................................................................9Risk of Terrorist Attack High................................................................................................................................10Terrorists Oppose US Presence.............................................................................................................................11Kuwait = Terrorist Hotspot....................................................................................................................................13Kuwait Terrorist Attack [Middle East War Module]............................................................................................14

Missile Advantage [1/4]........................................................................................................................................15Missile Advantage [2/4]........................................................................................................................................16Missile Advantage [3/4]........................................................................................................................................17Missile Advantage [4/4]........................................................................................................................................18Israeli Strikes Module............................................................................................................................................19

Democracy Advantage [1/4]..................................................................................................................................20Democracy Advantage [2/4]..................................................................................................................................21Democracy Advantage [3/4]..................................................................................................................................22Democracy Advantage [4/4]..................................................................................................................................23Democracy on Brink..............................................................................................................................................24US Presence Hurts Democratization.....................................................................................................................25US Presence Hurts Democratization- Monarchies................................................................................................27US Withdrawal -> Democratic Spillover..............................................................................................................28Kuwait Democracy Spills Over to Regional Governments...................................................................................30Demo Promo -> Terrorism....................................................................................................................................31US Democracy Promotion Bad.............................................................................................................................32

Reducing Presence Solves.....................................................................................................................................33Withdrawal Solves.................................................................................................................................................34AT: Kuwait Likes US Presence.............................................................................................................................35

***Neg Cards***..................................................................................................................................................38Status Quo Solves..................................................................................................................................................39US- Kuwait Cooperation Good.............................................................................................................................40US-Kuwait Cooperation Good..............................................................................................................................41

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***Affirmative Cards***

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Plan Text

The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military presence in Kuwait by removing all troops.

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Inherency- 1AC

Kuwait bases facilitate Iraqi withdrawal which guarantees usage.AFP, 6/27 (Arthur MacMillan, 6/27/10, " US drawdown from Iraq gathers pace ", http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hirMu7qwFrK3kKfb8r3eqz6G2ClA)

CAMP VICTORY, Iraq — The withdrawal of American combat troops and equipment from Iraq is 60 percent complete two months ahead of a deadline that will serve as a precursor for a complete US military pullout. Camp Victory, a giant sprawling base on the edge of Baghdad airport, is one of eight sites where American soldiers are sorting through the mass of hardware and supplies that must either be taken home, sent to Afghanistan, or destroyed. Although the military is anxious to avoid accusations that it is "cutting and running" from Iraq as operations in Afghanistan take precedence, US troop numbers are steadily falling and just 50,000 will remain beyond August 31. "We are right-sizing the force," Brigadier General Gus Perna, the man in charge of the drawdown, told AFP at Camp Victory in a giant yard filled with 330 vehicles headed for neighbouring Kuwait to be moved out of the country. "Over 32,000 pieces of rolling stock have been retrograded out of Iraq since February 2009," he said, referring to MRAP (Mine-resistant, armour-protected) and Humvee troop carriers used since the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein. The vehicles are being driven south into Kuwait before they are moved to Afghanistan or back to the United States. Around 800,000 other pieces of equipment have so far left Iraq in cargo containers. Camp Victory is the central hub for movement operations and combines with four locations in northern Iraq, one in the west of the country and two in the south where equipment is being processed and tracked for eventual shipping. There are currently 84,000 US troops in Iraq, but President Barack Obama's decision to pull all combat soldiers out means 34,000 are readying themselves to leave while a training and advisory force stays behind after August. It takes one hour for a vehicle to be processed and it will stay there for three to five days before heading south in a convoy. Between 30 and 40 vehicles leave Camp Victory each day, US logistics officers said. When combined with the seven other sites, however, around 3,500 vehicles have left the country in June so far, the highest monthly total this year. An Iraqi military official told AFP that Baghdad is happy with the pace of the pullout of combat troops and stressed that important equipment was being given to local forces. "The withdrawal has reached more than 60 percent of its requirements and there have been no problems so far," said defence ministry spokesman Major General Mohammed al-Askari. Excess US equipment with an estimated worth of 91.4 million dollars has so far been handed over to the Iraqi government, and other supplies such as rifle ammunition will be left because it is uneconomical to ship it to America. This is in addition to hardware and facilities that the United States has refurbished under the two-billion-dollar Iraqi Security Force Fund approved by Washington. Although some equipment is being given to the Iraqis there is also a massive amount of material that the US military machine is destroying because it is deemed "unserviceable". At Camp Victory, clapped-out military trucks were being stripped down and cut up and sold off to local scrap metal dealers, while dozens of computers and printers were being destroyed in a giant shredding machine. Between 50 and 70 40-foot and 20-foot containers filled with equipment are being lifted by giant magnetic cranes onto lorries bound for Kuwait each day. With deaths of Iraqi civilians and security forces still in the hundreds each month, there remains concern that a dangerous security vacuum could ensue when US combat troops pull out in just over two months' time. But Michael O'Hanlon, a national security and defence policy expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the August 31 withdrawal should not be seen as a cause for concern. "I'm generally optimistic," he said. "The end of the 'combat mission' is partly a semantic change and the 50,000 remaining US troops will still be quite capable. "The fact that we have been out of the cities for a year already suggests the drawdown is eminently feasible," O'Hanlon added.

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Inherency

Thousands of troops have been flown to Kuwait during the Iraq drawdownThe World Tribune, 7-14-10(“U.S. military down to 74,000 troops in Iraq” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_iraq0650_07_14.asp)

BAGHDAD — The U.S. military has been approaching its goal to withdraw all combat forces from Iraq. Officials said the U.S. military presence in Iraq has dropped to a total of about 74,000 troops, Middle East Newsline reported. They said most of the troops were flown from bases in Iraq to neighboring Kuwait, and from there either to Europe or the United States. The U.S. withdrawal has accelerated despite political turmoil in Baghdad, without a government since elections in March 2010.

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http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_iraq0650_07_14.asp





Terrorism Advantage [1/4]

US military presence in Kuwait spurs terrorismJanardhan, 05(N. editor of Gulf in the Media at the Gulf Research Center, Dubai, “Kuwait Wakes up to the Face of Militant Islam” http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=159

Al-Enezi reportedly confessed that the group's ultimate aim was to set up an "Islamic Emirate," in Kuwait and he had enough explosives to wire 10 cars and explode them minutes apart to confuse authorities, and the priority was American targets. The group – including Al-Enezi's brother Nasser Al-Enezi, who was killed in a clash on January 30 – trained on wiring cars in Iraq and made explosives in the Kuwaiti desert. Al-Enezi claimed that his group supported bin Laden in "expelling Americans from the (Arabian) peninsula," and resigned from the Ministry of Awqaf (endowment) and Islamic Affairs in June 2004 to protest against the government's objections to his sermon on the U.S.-led operations in Fallujah, Iraq. [7] Nasser Al-Enezi's alleged mission was "to kidnap U.S. soldiers and Western civilians and execute them and film the process." He received instructions from "armed terrorist groups" in Iraq to plan the use of ice-cream trucks packed with explosives to attack U.S. military convoys on their way to Iraq from Kuwait. [8] Mohsen Al-Fahdli – a Kuwaiti al-Qaeda suspect accused of enlisting youths to attack U.S. forces in Iraq – was arrested in January. He was being hunted since August 2004 for allegedly supporting bin Laden. Soon after, at least 10 suspects – whom the Commander of Kuwait's National Guard identified as al-Qaeda members – were arrested. [9] Fahdli and three other Kuwaitis – Maqboul Al-Maqboul, Mohammad Al-Mutairi and Adel Bou Haimed – will reappear before an appeals court to face accusations of belonging to al-Qaeda. They were first convicted for providing funds for jihadist activity in Iraq and undergoing military training in Afghanistan, but were cleared of the charges and their sentences for five-year jail terms overturned in April 2004. [10] The move to appeal followed Fadhli's designation as a supporter of terrorism by the U.S. Treasury Department in February 2005 and the freezing of his assets for providing financial and material support to the Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi network in Iraq and al-Qaeda. Fadhli and Dosari were seen as the leaders of two sleeper cells in the country. Fadhli served as a bodyguard and second in command to an al-Qaeda leader, as well as fighting against Russian forces in Chechnya where he trained in the use of firearms, anti-aircraft guns and explosives. [11] He was instrumental in raising funds in Kuwait to attack the French oil tanker the Limburg off the coast of Yemen in October 2002. Fadhli was also linked to an attack during the same time against U.S. Marines on the Kuwaiti Island of Failaka. [12] Dousari, who is still at large, was a Corporal in the Kuwaiti Air Force. He had applied to join the Kuwaiti Armed Forces in 1991 and participated in the Al-Aghrar training program for three months before graduating and joining the Air Force as Lance Corporal. [13] The Iraq factor The proximity of the war zone has also had a telling impact on the spread of al-Qaeda's influence in Kuwait. While the authorities admit to the death of two Kuwaitis in Iraq, some reports suggest that the number could be as high as 11 dead in suicide missions. When the U.S. launched air strikes on al-Qaeda's infrastructure in Afghanistan, there were about 150 Kuwaitis in the training camps. While about 50 were killed, the remaining Kuwaiti mujahideen melted into the neighboring countries or found their way back into Kuwait. [14] Zarqawi also instructed some Iraqi terrorist cells to move their operations to Kuwait and attack U.S. forces, their supply lines, and Kuwaiti government officials. [15] Repercussions from the attack on the insurgents' stronghold in Fallujah reverberated in Kuwait. Four Islamic groups – the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, the Scientific Salafis, and the pro-Iran Popular Islamic Alliance – issued a communiqué condemning the attack on Fallujah and calling for parliamentary condemnation of it. At the same time, tapes containing Zarqawi's call to fight back were distributed anonymously in car parks during Friday prayers in some areas. [16] Islamic websites were also flooded with reports on the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. guards in Abu Ghraib, with many calling for revenge against the "new Crusaders". A message on www.qal3ah.net by Kuwaiti Salafist leader Sheikh Hamed bin Abdallah al-Ali in May 2004 read: "The new conservatives, and particularly the gang of [U.S. President George W.] Bush, are enjoying the humiliation of the Muslims."

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And, Terrorists breed in Kuwait – the country doesn’t have the resources to deter themUnited States Department of State, 09(“Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 – Kuwait” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49fac6a29.html)

The Government of Kuwait exerted measured effort but made little progress in combating terrorism; it did not enact stronger counterterrorism and money laundering legislation, and it continued to have difficulty prosecuting terrorists and terrorism financiers and facilitators. Kuwait was an effective and reliable partner in providing security for U.S. military installations and convoys in Kuwait. The risk of a terrorist attack in Kuwait remained high, however, because of the government-welcomed presence of U.S. forces in the country. Kuwait lacked legal provisions to deal with conspiracies to commit terrorist acts, a problem exacerbated by the contentious relationship between the executive branch (headed by Kuwait's ruling family) and the elected legislative body, the National Assembly, which must approve such legislation. In general, the Kuwaiti government was more likely to take action against non-Kuwaiti residents involved in terrorist facilitation, but showed reluctance to take legal or preventative action against key local Sunni extremists unless there was a perception of clear and direct danger to Kuwaiti or U.S. interests. The Kuwait's Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) and Islamic Affairs' World Moderation Center offered a 45-day moderation course, which over 700 imams have completed thus far. The Center also began offering this course to high school Islamic studies teachers. During the year, Kuwaiti officials visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation center with the intent to establish a similar center in Kuwait; the Kuwaiti Prime Minister announced this initiative in a September meeting with the President. However, at year's end, the Rehabilitation Center had not yet been established reportedly due to legal constraints. The Amir of Kuwait made a call for tolerance and dialogue at the November UN General Assembly-sponsored Interfaith Dialogue in New York. The Government of Kuwait increased its cooperation with NATO by conducting a six-day joint exercise in November that focused on combating terrorist attacks and piracy. Kuwait Army Commandos, Kuwait National Guards, and a Jordanian Special Forces Unit also participated in a November joint exercise on combating terrorism in residential areas. Kuwait experienced a dramatic increase in dialogue on counterterrorism; the government engaged in numerous high-level counterterrorism talks with U.S. officials including the President, and senior civilian and military officials on issues ranging from border security, cyber security, and recidivism of terrorists. In March, Kuwait participated in an Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) workshop designed to improve its interagency counterterrorism coordination. The Kuwaiti government lacked sufficient enforcement mechanisms for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, thus hindering its effectiveness. The government implemented no cash reporting requirements for individuals leaving the country, and this was a significant vulnerability. While money laundering was a criminal offense, terrorist financing was not specifically prohibited. Kuwait had established an Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing Committee, with representation from a wide range of government ministries and domestic financial institutions. Kuwait was also an active member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Although Kuwait had a Financial Intelligence Unit, it did not exercise independent authority in accordance with current international standards. A revised anti-money laundering draft law, which would criminalize terrorist financing, has been pending Council of Ministers' approval and subsequent referral to the National Assembly for passage since August. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor regulates charities; transfers of donated funds abroad must be approved by the ministry. The Kuwaiti government made several arrests on terrorism-related charges, but was unable to successfully prosecute or detain for a lengthy period because of the lack of evidence and/or the lack of a clear definition of terrorism under its constitutional framework . Significant acquittals took place during the year:In October, the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers published an Action Plan which included and allocated $2.7 billion for counterterrorism initiatives to be implemented by the Ministry of Interior by 2012

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Stopping terrorism in Kuwait is critical- key to prevent spillover to other Middle Eastern countries.Raman, additional secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, government of India, and currently director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and distinguished fellow and convenor, Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapte, 05(B. Online Asia Times, “Jihadi terrorism, from Iraq to Kuwait” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GB24Ak02.html)

Next to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, a country of growing concern in the so-called "war against terrorism" is Kuwait. Just as sections of Pakistani society became radicalized as a result of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, there are indications of a creeping radicalization of sections of Kuwaiti society as result of the jihad in Iraq, and there is every possibility of this spreading to Jordan. Reports from reliable sources speak of dozens of Kuwaitis joining al-Qaeda in Iraq and fighting the US troops and the local security forces there. According to these sources, at least 11 Kuwaitis have died in suicide missions in Iraq, though the Kuwaiti authorities admit to the deaths of only two. The growing concern of the Kuwaiti authorities over the emergence of religious and anti-American extremism in their society became evident last August when they set up a government committee to counter the spread of what they described as "deviant ideas". The Islamic Affairs minister, Abdullah al-Maatouk, announced the formation of the committee following the reported unearthing of a network that was recruiting volunteers to join al-Qaeda in Iraq. He stated at that time that extremist and deviant activities in Kuwait had reached a dangerous level. On February 6, he formed a panel of religious scholars and academics under the earlier committee to "strengthen moderate [Islamic] ideology and confront extremism". The Islamic news site Mufakkirat al-Islam reported on January 31 that about 17 religious clerics had been arrested for objectionable activities inside their mosques. The formation of this panel followed a series of clashes and other incidents (at least five of them) between suspected terrorists and the local security forces in different parts of Kuwait since the beginning of this year. In these incidents, at least eight alleged terrorists were killed and 40 Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian and other suspects arrested. Four police officers lost their lives. It has been reported that among those arrested three are women - two Kuwaitis and one non-Kuwaiti. One of the Kuwaitis is the wife of a cell leader and she was allegedly helping him prepare improvised explosive devices and the non-Kuwaiti was allegedly hiding a machine gun under her abaya, the traditional cloak for women. Kuwaiti security forces killed five suspected al-Qaeda militants and captured three, including the group's leader, on January 31 following a gun battle, the fourth in January. A police officer died of injuries sustained in the clash. The terrorists were identified on the basis of information gathered during the interrogation of the captured terrorists, including Amer Khalef al-Enezi, the cell's suspected spiritual leader, who subsequently died in police custody allegedly due to a heart attack. The authorities were searching for two others - Kuwaitis Khaled al-Dosari and Mohsen al-Fadli. Among others arrested for questioning was Osama al-Munawer, a Kuwaiti lawyer who represents Islamists in courts. On February 1, Kuwaiti parliament unanimously passed a law giving police wide powers to search and seize illegal weapons. The Interior Ministry banned veiled women from driving, to prevent terrorists from masquerading as women. According to Agence France Press, the French news agency, Enezi had been a preacher at a mosque in Jahra, 40 kilometers northwest of Kuwait City, until he was dismissed a few months ago by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs because of his "extremist views". His younger brother and alleged right-hand man, Nasser, was reportedly killed on January 30 during another gun battle with security forces. According to Kuwaiti media reports, Enezi confessed during interrogation that his group had links with al- Qaeda and had planned to kidnap US soldiers and other Westerners and film their murders, and to attack US military convoys on their way to Iraq. On February 5, the security forces blasted their way into a concrete block home at Sulaibiyah, about 18 kilometers west of Kuwait city, and captured five suspected terrorists who had taken shelter inside and were resisting arrest. According to police, two of the arrested men are Saudi citizens and the remaining three are Jordanians. However, the newspaper al-Rai al-Aam, quoting informed sources, said the men were stateless Arabs who recently obtained Saudi and Jordanian citizenship. There are about 100,000 stateless Arabs living in Kuwait, down from 250,000 before the 1990 Iraqi invasion. The government has introduced a series of tough measures to force them to reveal their original identity. The newspaper al-Qabas reported on February 7 that the interrogation of the arrested persons indicated that they

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Continued from Previous Page

had contacts with Zarqawi, who had asked them to attack US military convoys in Kuwait. The local media quoted an Interior Ministry official as saying that the arrested suspects had confessed that they had planned to use ice-cream trucks packed with explosives to attack US military convoys traveling to Iraq. What has been of great concern to the Kuwaiti authorities is the fact that some of the arrested terrorists had accomplices inside the Kuwaiti security forces and the civilian departments of the government, thereby indicating an as of yet unquantifiable penetration of the security forces and these departments by the terrorists. Some of the arrested suspects reportedly had fought against the Americans in Fallujah in Iraq. It has been reported in the media that not all of the arrested suspects belonged to a single organization. During the interrogation, the names of a number of cells emerged, which were apparently operating independently of each other as has been happening in Iraq. Among these are: the Mujahideen of Kuwait, The Brigade of the Two Shrines, the Sharia Falcons Squadron, the Peninsula Lion Brigade and the Martyr Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin Brigade, apparently named after a leader of al-Qaeda in Peninsula's group, who was killed by Saudi security forces last June. However, according to Kuwaiti authorities, three cells of al-Qaeda operated in Kuwait. The first cell called itself the Peninsula Lions and was led by Nasser Khalif al-Enezi (killed on January 30 ) and his brother Amer (died in police custody). The second was named the Kuwaiti Mujahideen and was headed by Mohsen al-Fahdli. The third, which did not have any name, was commanded by Khaled al-Dousari and Ahmad al-Mutairi. Apparently helped by intelligence from the Americans, the Kuwaiti authorities acted promptly and ruthlessly neutralized the groups and individuals planning attacks on US military convoys to Iraq. However, it is by no means certain that the Americans and the Kuwaiti authorities have been able to establish the full extent of the inroads made by pro-al Qaeda elements in the local civil society and their penetration into the government, including the security forces. Talking to senior newspaper editors on February 7 on the recent incidents involving terrorists in Kuwait, Kuwait's Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah warned that the Islamist violence, which had rocked the emirate since the beginning of the year, could spread to other oil-rich Gulf Arab states. "The government and the security forces have planned for a worst-case scenario," he said. The previous day, the al-Rai al-Aam daily quoted a Kuwaiti Islamic Affairs Ministry official as saying that copies of an unlicensed book about jihad had been confiscated from mosques. The official did not say how many copies were found. Kuwaitis and Pakistanis with Kuwaiti links have long played an important role in bin Laden's al-Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF) formed by him in February 1998. Pakistanis Ramzi Yousef, who played an active role in the New York World Trade Center explosion of February, 1993, and is presently in jail in the US, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged brain behind the September 11 terrorist strikes in the US, both had a Kuwaiti connection and had played a role in the recruitment of Kuwaitis for al-Qaeda and the IIF. On October 7, 2001, when the US started its air strikes on al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, there were about 150 Kuwaitis in the training camps of al-Qaeda and the IIF. While about 50 reportedly died in the air strikes, the remaining fled into either Pakistan or Iran. Some of them went to Iraq after March 2003, while others managed to sneak back into Kuwait. The spread of the jihad to Kuwait comes in the wake of repeated calls from bin Laden and his No 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri during the past two years for the spread of the jihad to the states in the region allegedly cooperating with the US in Iraq and for the use of the oil weapon.

Terrorism widespread in the Middle East would kill hundreds of millions and lead to nuclear retaliation. Easterbrook, Fellow at the Brookings Institute, 01(Greg, November 2, CNN, l/n)

EASTERBROOK: Well, what held through the Cold War, when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other, what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were rational. They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn. Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries. And that -- it is very much in the interest the Muslim peoples of the world that atomic weapons be kept out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, in addition to being in our interests.

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Risk of Terrorist Attack High

Risk of terrorist attack high in Kuwait- US Presence.The UN Refugee Agency, 07(Refworld, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 – Kuwait” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USDOS,,KWT,48196cbe28,0.html)

In 2007, the Government of Kuwait did not enact stronger antiterrorism and money laundering legislation, and it continued to have difficulty prosecuting terrorists and terrorism financiers and facilitators. The risk of a terrorist attack in Kuwait remained high because of U.S. forces in the country, regional tensions, and the Kuwaiti government's reluctance to confront domestic extremists. Kuwait lacked legal provisions to deal with conspiracies to commit terrorist acts, a problem complicated by domestic politics. In the past, the Kuwaiti government took action against non-Kuwaiti residents involved in terror facilitation but was reluctant to take action against key local Sunni extremists unless there was a perception of clear and direct danger to Kuwaiti or U.S. interests. The Kuwaiti government was reluctant to support the designation of its nationals as terrorists or terrorism supporters under UNSCR 1267.In April, the Kuwaiti government froze all financial accounts of terrorism financier Mubarak Al-Bathali and forbade him to open any further accounts in Kuwait. In July, Kuwaiti authorities arrested Jabir Al-Jalahmah for his role in facilitating the travel of jihadists to Iraq, but a Kuwaiti court later released him on bail.2 The Kuwaiti government had not prepared a case against Al-Jalahmah. Mohsen al-Fadhli, a U.S.-designated Kuwaiti terrorist, was believed to be in Jordan and remained at large. The Court of Cassation, Kuwait's highest court, ruled in March 2005 that it did not have jurisdiction over al-Fadhli's alleged financing of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.The Kuwaiti government continued the prosecutions of the 36 members of the "Peninsula Lions" terrorist cell involved in January 2005 confrontations with police. In May, the Court of First Instance overturned the convictions of three defendants. In June, the Court of Cassation commuted the death sentences of four defendants to life sentences (equal to 25 years of imprisonment under Kuwaiti law). The Court of Cassation is reviewing the verdicts of the remaining 32 defendants in the Peninsula Lions case.In 2002, twelve armed Kuwaitis attacked two U.S. service members outside a military base near Failaka Island. The Appeals Court acquitted five of the twelve defendants. In February 2007, the Court of Cassation reduced the fines of two of these defendants from 700,000 USD to 7,000 USD. Separately, in 2005, the Criminal Court convicted 18 Kuwaitis in absentia to three years in prison for recruiting jihadists to fight in Iraq. In October, the Appeals Court attempted to review the cases of seven of these individuals, but was unsuccessful since they remained at large.In April and May, Kuwaiti courts upheld the not guilty verdicts of seven former Guantanamo detainees on terror-related charges. The Kuwaiti government had been appealing decisions previously rendered by lower Kuwaiti courts.Nevertheless, Kuwait was an effective and reliable partner in providing security for U.S. military installations and convoys in Kuwait. In 2006, Kuwaiti police arrested three bidoons (stateless residents) for planning to attack U.S. military personnel. The Criminal Court convicted the bidoons in January 2007, and sentenced them each to ten years in prison, to be followed by deportation. The Court of Appeals was scheduled to review their case on December 31. Kuwait's reluctance to address the social and economic conditions of its bidoon residents has resulted in this segment of the population becoming vulnerable to radical ideologies and terrorist recruiters.In response to AQ threats to attack oil facilities in the Gulf, Kuwait took some steps to improve security at its petroleum installations and export terminals. In March, a multi-agency U.S. Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection team visited and provided the Kuwaiti government with a number of recommendations to improve its energy infrastructure security. Kuwait responded by taking initial steps to enhance physical security at several locations.

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Terrorists Oppose US Presence

Terrorists oppose US bases in Kuwait.Reuters, 5-10-10(“Kuwaiti court acquits 8 of plot to bomb U.S. base” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6492U620100510)

Most of the defendants were detained in August and charged of planning to bomb Camp Arifjan, a vast logistics base for the U.S. military in the desert south of the capital. Authorities had previously said the plot was linked to al Qaeda. "They were all acquitted. I believe justice was done," attorney Adel al-Abdul Hadi said, adding that five of the men could be released later in the day. Of the eight, two were tried in absentia and one was serving time for another crime, he said. The prosecution can still appeal the verdict, and generally does appeal in cases linked to Islamist militancy. The ruling by a criminal court was issued without immediate explanation. "This is good news, there was no evidence against them," liberal analyst Shamlan al-Eissa said. He said the government should concentrate more on fighting the culture of religious extremism in Kuwait, which he said was at the root of militancy. "Fighting terrorism should be by spreading freedoms, encouraging arts and artists, the theater and music," he said. Kuwait, the world's fourth largest oil exporter, waged a largely successful campaign to stamp out violence by Islamist militants after the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. cities and the Iraq war. Camp Arifjan serves as a staging ground for troops serving in Iraq. Kuwait's position as a key U.S. ally in the region was cemented after the 1991 Gulf War that liberated it from a seven-month Iraqi occupation under Saddam Hussein. Kuwait was later the launch pad of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam in 2003. Some Islamists oppose the American military presence in Kuwait, and the U.S. military has occasionally been the target of al Qaeda-inspired attacks, including a raid that killed one U.S. Marine and wounded another in October 2002. When Kuwaiti authorities announced the arrests in August, a security official told Reuters the group also planned to attack the country's Shuaiba oil refinery. However, the court did not charge them on any counts related to that facility. In a separate case, Kuwait said earlier this month that authorities had detained several people in a security probe, following media reports that a number of Kuwaitis and foreigners were being held on suspicion of spying on military installations for Iran. That case was unrelated to the bomb plot case.

Terrorists view Kuwait as a major target- Western presence and proximity to Iraq.UK Trade and Investment, 5-6-10(“Overseas Security Information For Business – Terrorism Threat” http://www.ukti.gov.uk/uktihome/localisation/106432.html#Kuwait)

Al Qaeda (AQ) poses the main threat to western interests in Kuwait. Since 2002, the US military have been the target in a number of small arms attacks in Kuwait and Islamic extremists continue to oppose their presence in the country. Kuwait is a financial hub for extremists as well as a significant facilitation route. We judge that Kuwait’s proximity to Iraq represents a significant factor in the terrorist threat to the country and western interests remain priority targets.

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http://www.ukti.gov.uk/uktihome/localisation/106432.html#Kuwait

http://www.reuters.com/places/iran

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6492U620100510


Terrorists Oppose US Presence

Terrorists target US bases in KuwaitReuters, 09(“Americans in Kuwait at risk from attacks, U.S. says” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57H1K320090818)

Kuwait announced on August 11 that it had arrested all six members of an al Qaeda-linked network who planned to bomb the U.S. Army camp of Arifjan, state security headquarters, and "important facilities," during the Muslim month of Ramadan. Ramadan is expected to start around August 21. The members of the network who had confessed after their arrest, also planned to attack the OPEC member's 200,000 barrels per day Shuaiba oil refinery, a security official said. "The Department of State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks and other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas," the U.S. embassy in Kuwait said in a communique on Tuesday. It advised U.S. citizens in Kuwait to register with the embassy, and "maintain a high level of vigilance" to avoid being targets of any possible attacks by terrorist groups. "Potential targets may include U.S. contractors, particularly those related to military interests," the message said. Kuwait, the world's fourth-largest oil exporter, was the launch pad for the 2003 U.S.-led war on Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. cities, there were a number of al Qaeda-inspired attacks in Kuwait, including a raid that killed one U.S. Marine and wounded another in October 2002. The government has since waged a largely successful campaign to stamp out violence by Islamist militants.

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http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57H1K320090818


Kuwait = Terrorist Hotspot

Terrorists Groups opposition in Kuwait lead to terrorist attacks in the region. Fox News, 09(“Kuwait Nabs Al Qaeda Group Planning Attack on U.S. Base” http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,538914,00.html)

The Interior Ministry said in a brief statement that State Security detained a "terrorist network" of six Kuwaitis who gave "detailed confessions" about plans to bomb Camp Arifjan, the main U.S. base in the country, as well as the headquarters of the country's security agency, in addition to other facilities it did not name. The statement did not provide any details. However, Kuwait's Alrai daily quoted anonymous security sources on Tuesday that the group had confessed to buying a truck which it intended to load with fertilizer, chemicals and gas cylinders and ram into the camp. It was unlikely the attack on the vast American logistics and supply facility in the desert south of Kuwait City would have been successful due to high security. Kuwait has been a close U.S. ally since the Washington-led 1991 Gulf War that liberated it from a seven-month Iraqi occupation under Saddam Hussein. But militants in the country oppose the U.S. military presence and have attacked American troops and civilians working for them in the past. In October 2002, two Kuwaiti extremists opened fire on U.S. Marines training on Failaka island, killing one and injuring another. In January 2003, a fundamentalist civil servant killed an American contractor and severely wounded another when he ambushed their car near a U.S. army camp. Six Kuwaitis and stateless Arabs are serving life sentences after being convicted in 2007 of planning attacks on U.S. troops and Kuwaiti security personnel. They were part of a group arrested after unprecedented street clashes with militants in 2005.

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Kuwait Terrorist Attack [Middle East War Module]

Terrorist Attack in Kuwait would lead to oil shocks. Luft and Korin, The Journal of International Security Affairs, 03(Gal and Anne, December, Institute for Analysis of Global Security, “Terror’s Next Target” http://www.iags.org/n0111041.htm)

Over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are contained in just eight fields, among them the world's largest onshore oil field -- Ghawar, which alone accounts for about half of the country's total oil production capacity -- and Safaniya, the world's largest offshore oilfield. About two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's crude oil is processed in a single enormous facility called Abqaiq, 25 miles inland from the Gulf of Bahrain. On the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has just two primary oil export terminals: Ras Tanura - the world's largest offshore oil loading facility, through which a tenth of global oil supply flows daily - and Ras al-Ju'aymah. On the Red Sea, a terminal called Yanbu is connected to Abqaiq via the 750-mile East–West pipeline. A terrorist attack on each one of these hubs of the Saudi oil complex or a simultaneous attack on few of them is not a fictional scenario . A single terrorist cell hijacking an airplane in Kuwait or Dubai and crashing it into Abqaiq or Ras Tanura, could turn the complex into an inferno. This could take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it most of the world’s spare capacity, sending oil prices through the ceiling. "Such an attack would be more economically damaging than a dirty nuclear bomb set off in midtown Manhattan or across from the White House in Lafayette Square," wrote former CIA Middle East field officer Robert Baer. This "would be enough to bring the world's oil-addicted economies to their knees, America's along with them."

Disruption in oil production tanks the global economy and leads to wars in the Middle East. Perry, Senior Fellow of Economic Studies, 01(George L. Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/perry/20011024.pdf.)

This outlook would change dramatically if a crisis disrupted an important part of the world oil supply. Past crises are a guide. The two largest recessions of the postwar period were associated with disruptions in the world oil market. In late 1973, in the context of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, Arab oil producing nations announced major cuts in production, and an embargo of shipments to the United States and other nations supporting Israel. In December, the OPEC cartel raised the posted price of crude oil, which had been near $3 a barrel at the start of the year, to near $12.

Middle East wars result in preemptive nuclear strikes and escalation.Burrows, Director of the Analysis and Production Staff in the National Intelligence Council, 09(Mathew J. “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” The Washington Quarterly)

The most dangerous casualty of any 3 is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

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http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/perry/20011024.pdf


Missile Advantage [1/4]

The United States is planning to deploy Patriot Missiles in KuwaitAFP 10/12/07, “Kuwait to buy Patriot missiles,” http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gOYJ8nUArmnwuRYr9hYJIyts0AFA

KUWAIT CITY (AFP) — Kuwait is to buy an unspecified number of Patriot missiles from the United States, Defence Minister Jaber al-Mubarak al-Sabah told the state news agency KUNA on Friday. Sheikh Jaber, responding to questions about Washington's sale of arms to Gulf allies, said "Kuwait has signed deals, not for airplanes, but for materiel such as ships and Patriot missiles." He did not give any further details. In July, the United States announced plans for a series of arms deals worth at least 20 billion dollars (14.6 billion euros) with Saudi Arabia and five other oil-rich Gulf states. The deals are aimed at shoring up US allies in the Middle East and countering "a more aggressive Iran", as one administration official put it.

They’ve started testingPR Newswire, 1/11/10, “Kuwait Air Defense Forces Conduct Successful Patriot Test Firings,” http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kuwait-air-defense-forces-conduct-successful-patriot-test-firings-81131462.html

TEWKSBURY, Mass., Jan. 11 /PRNewswire/ -- The Kuwait Air Defense Forces successfully test fired Raytheon Company's (NYSE: RTN) Patriot Air and Missile Defense System against tactical ballistic missiles. The test firings were held last month at the Udairi Range in Kuwait in conjunction with other Kuwait Air Defense and Land Forces elements during a joint exercise. The test firings used a Kuwait Patriot Configuration-2 Plus fire unit with Guidance Enhanced Missiles as the interceptors, which are operated and maintained by Kuwait Air Defense brigade troops. The Patriot system successfully engaged and destroyed two Patriot-as-a-Target missiles, as well as three foreign Multiple Launch Rocket System-type targets, both configurations emulating tactical ballistic missiles. The exercise was observed by senior officials from the Kuwaiti and U.S. governments, including Kuwait Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sheikh Ahmad Al-Khaled Al-Sabah. "This test firing showcased the lethal capabilities of the combat-proven Patriot Air and Missile Defense System against tactical ballistic missiles, as well as the strong alliance among the Kuwait Air Defense Forces, the U.S. government and Raytheon in maintaining the readiness and effectiveness of Patriot in Kuwait," said Skip Garrett, vice president and deputy for Patriot Programs, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS).

This reverses Obama’s previous softlining stance towards Iran – causes a unique point of tensionThe Guardian, 1/31/10, James Sturcke, “US raises stakes on Iran by sending in ships and missiles,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/31/iran-nuclear-us-missiles-gulf/print

Tension between the US and Iran heightened dramatically today with the disclosure that Barack Obama is deploying a missile shield to protect American allies in the Gulf from attack by Tehran. The US is dispatching Patriot defensive missiles to four countries – Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait – and keeping two ships in the Gulf capable of shooting down Iranian missiles. Washington is also helping Saudi Arabia develop a force to protect its oil installations. American officials said the move is aimed at deterring an attack by Iran and reassuring Gulf states fearful that Tehran might react to sanctions by striking at US allies in the region. Washington is also seeking to discourage Israel from a strike against Iran by demonstrating that the US is prepared to contain any threat. The deployment comes after Obama's attempts to emphasise diplomacy over confrontation in dealing with Iran – a contrast to the Bush administration's approach – have failed to persuade Tehran to open its nuclear installations to international controls. The White House is now trying to engineer agreement for sanctions focused on Iran's Revolutionary Guard, believed to be in charge of the atomic programme. Washington has not formally announced the deployment of the Patriots and other anti-missile systems, but by leaking it to American newspapers the administration is evidently seeking to alert Tehran to a hardening of its position. The administration is deploying two Patriot batteries, capable of shooting down incoming missiles, in each of the four Gulf countries. Kuwait already has an older version of the missile, deployed after Iraq's invasion. Saudi Arabia has long had the missiles, as has Israel.

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A withdrawal relieves stress on the Kuwaiti-Iranian relationship and allows Kuwait to work with IranW. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D in IR from Claremont Graduate University, September 07, “Kuwaiti National Security And The U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf

Kuwait remains unwilling to accept an ongoing Iranian effort to establish a new regional security pact in which Iran replaces the United States as the chief protector of the Gulf Arab states. Iranian leaders have stated that the Gulf Arabs have more in common with the interests advocated by Tehran than those advocated by the United States. The proposed Iranian pact includes a provision whereby the Gulf states would require the United States to leave bases within their territory. It is consequently difficult for Kuwaiti-Iranian relations to become cordial because of the U.S.- Kuwaiti relationship. The Iranians are extremely interested in ensuring that Kuwait refuses to cooperate with any potential U.S. plan to bomb or otherwise attack Iran. On an April 2006 visit to Kuwait, former Iranian president Rafsanjani stated, “We are certain the Gulf countries will not back the United States in waging an attack on Iran.” Various other Iranian leaders have also reassured the public that the position of the Kuwaiti government is that it will not allow its bases to be used against Tehran for a military strike again their nuclear facilities. Kuwaiti officials let these public statements pass without direct comment, although they have publicly stated their opposition to a U.S. attack on Iran. It is not clear what they would do to try to prevent it or to distance themselves from the United States if such an attack occurs. Mostly, Kuwait spokesmen such as Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem al Khorafi have stressed that “[t]he region cannot bear the serious consequences of military action.” Kuwait and the other Gulf Arab states are known to be deeply apprehensive about the Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear technology, although they are also worried about appearing too confrontational with Tehran. The concern about an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not surprising given that such a system could increase Iranian self-confidence and strongly embolden Tehran in its desire to play a more assertive regional role with conventional and unconventional forces. While Kuwaitis probably do not fear being attacked with nuclear weapons, they are aware that the large and powerful Iranian army is a serious threat that may be employed more readily if Tehran has a nuclear option to protect itself from “regime change” by the United States. Moreover, the Iranian danger could be amplified if the United States is seen to be faltering in its commitment to Kuwaiti security due to isolationism that could result from Iraq war setbacks and traumas. The Kuwaitis and other Gulf Arabs have sought techniques to express their concern about an Iranian nuclear capability without implying a threat of Iranian aggression. One of the central ways in which they have done this is to treat the Iranian program as an environmental issue rather than a security issue in their overt diplomacy. In particular, they suggest that a nuclear accident in Iran would have dramatic implications for their own countries if massive amounts of radiation were released into the atmosphere as a result of such an occurrence. The Kuwaitis also stress dangers to their desalination plants which are their primary source of fresh water. This approach to the problem also allows Kuwaiti diplomacy and that of the other Gulf states to sidestep the issue of whether or not the Iranian nuclear energy program is also a nuclear weapons program.

Only Kuwait can effectively engage Iran and stop proliferationAriel Farrar-Wellman, B.A. from Bucknell University, 2/23/10, “Kuwait-Iran Foreign Relations,” http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/kuwait-iran-foreign-relations

Kuwaiti and Iranian memberships in OPEC and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have provided a forum to enhance political cooperation between the two countries. Kuwaiti-Iranian international relations have been difficult since Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, a situation further exacerbated by Kuwait’s support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. Since the end of the war more than two decades ago, however, Kuwait and Iran have been working to better their political relationship. In 2005, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki met with Kuwait’s Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad As-Sabah, conveying “Iran’s message of peace, friendship and willingness to expand friendly ties with all regional countries, particularly with Kuwait.” The Kuwaiti Prime Minister responded that “blossoming Iran-Kuwait ties would definitely have positive effects on regional peace and stability, particularly between Iran and the other Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) member-states.”[11] Since this friendly encounter, greater bilateral economic cooperation has helped improve the political atmosphere between the two countries, even as Kuwait has complied with the UN Security Council against Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

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Iranian prolif causes Middle East instability and escalationMathew J. Burrows, Director of the National Intelligence Council, 09, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” The Washington Quarterly

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

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That ends in global warHarlan Ullman, senior associate at Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6/25/07 “July 1914 redux?,” The Washington Times

Just a few years earlier, conventional wisdom argued that full-scale war in Europe was no longer conceivable. The restraints of closely linked economies made war too expensive to wage and the intermingled ruling royal families aligned by marriage and blood had no grounds for fighting one another. That case was famously and wrongly made in British Nobel Prize-winning economist Sir Norman Angell's The Grand Illusion that captivated fancy European salons in 1910. The causes of World War I are thankfully dead and gone. No secret treaties bind great powers to come to the aid of lesser states. Indeed, far fewer armies exist today than existed nearly a century ago, and a major enemy - jihadist extremism - does not even possess one. Yet, with real and potential crises looming from the west coast of Africa to the east coast of Indonesia, the possibility of at least one or more of these danger spots exploding is real. And many leaders could become a 21st-century equivalent of the archduke, ranging from Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Ali al-Sistani to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Despite U.S. generals claiming to have achieved "real progress" on the ground in Iraq, the situation is close to if not in extremis. Political reconciliation, a hydrocarbon law and de-Ba'athification remain distant goals. Power and oil production, unemployment, potable water, sewerage, medical and educational facilities and other metrics crucial to societal well-being remain unsatisfactory. A political act as powerful as the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra a year and a half ago could rip the fragile state asunder. Palestine and Lebanon are also in or close to civil war, with Fatah and Hamas in a life-and-death power struggle and the Siniora government facing a similar test against Hezbollah. Unconfirmed reports filtering out of the Middle East predict an Israeli strike against Syria, possibly in the Bekaa Valley to take on Hezbollah, at a time when the popularity of its Prime Minister Ehud Olmert makes President Bush look like a rock star. Last week, Britain's Guardian wrote that Vice President Dick Cheney was winning the political battle in Washington over taking out Iran's budding nuclear power capacity with a military strike, a rumor that has been circulating for some time. Weekend elections have not clarified what Turkey might do should Kurdistan move closer to independence or if a major conflict and violence erupt there, as in much of Iraq. The recent suicide bombings that killed nearly 100 in Kirkuk raise the stakes that such violence could spill over. Afghanistan very much remains the invisible war - out of sight and out of mind. However, conditions continue to deteriorate. Reform of the civil sector has not advanced. Poppy production and corruption continue to swell. And as more Afghan civilians die in friendly-fire or collateral-damage incidents, hearts and minds migrate away from our side to the Taliban and local tribal chiefs. Although not in the greater Middle East, Nigeria is vulnerable to an Islamic or jihadist-led revolution. Possessing huge quantities of oil and natural gas, led by a new and untested president and a state where corruption is more than rampant, Nigeria's stability cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the opposite thinking should be driving contingency planning, especially as the new U.S. Africa Command stands up. And then there is Pakistan, potentially the most dangerous place in the world. Gen. Musharraf holds on and does his best to support the United States in battling terror and al Qaeda. But make no mistake, the realities of Pakistan reveal cross-cutting loyalties, national interests that often diverge from America's and a frightening influence of jihadist extremists and fundamentalists. These include thousands of madrassas teaching the most perverted views of Islam, all of which exist in the shadow of dozens of nuclear weapons. Of course, there is no certainty (and perhaps not even a chance) that any or even one of these hot spots will detonate a regional explosion with potentially catastrophic consequences. Still, one can be concerned, if not worried. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff was worried by what his "gut" told him about possible terrorist attacks against America this summer and was promptly derided on the basis of his analysis. My mind - not my gut - asks in a broader context if what we are seeing today may be eerily reminiscent of July 1914 but in slow motion.

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Israeli Strikes Module

Specifically, Iranian prolif causes Israeli strikesHana Levi Julian, 2/13/08, “Kuwait: Gulf States Assuming Israel Will Destroy Iran's Nukes,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/125240

A senior government official in Kuwait hinted Tuesday that Gulf States are expecting and waiting for Israel to destroy Iran’s nuclear reactor before the security situation reaches critical mass. Sami Alfaraj, advisor to the Kuwaiti government and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), said Kuwait and the other Gulf States might ask both the Jewish State and the United States to guarantee their security if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear power station. “I believe in something on the same Iraqi model… We are assuming in the Gulf that Israel will take it out,” Alfaraj told the Reuters news agency. Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility in a daring raid June 7, 1981 that neutralized its ability to function before the reactor went “hot” – thereby protecting the surrounding countries as well. Israeli intelligence had confirmed that the Iraqi government planned to produce nuclear weapons at the site. Then, as now, Israeli officials were convinced that nuclear power in the hands of the enemy constituted an existential threat to Israel. In his briefing to IAF fighter pilots prior to the operation, then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Rafael Eitan said, “The alternative is our destruction.

Extinction Leonid Ivashov, Analyst at the Strategic Culture Foundation, 5/21/07, “Iran: The Threat of Nuclear War” The AP, Lexis

What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine , a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.

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Democracy Advantage [1/4]

Democracy on the brink now- Kuwait faces issues with establishing a stable democratic government The International News, 09(“Kuwait’s democracy troubles Arab rulers” http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=184768)

DUBAI: The ups and downs of parliamentary democracy in Kuwait are being used by Gulf Arab rulers to discredit the idea of representative government that dilutes their immense powers, analysts say. A new episode in the soap opera of Kuwait’s system began this week with an attempt by parliamentarians to force out the interior minister, who is a member of the ruling family. The Sabah family that dominates the cabinet is expected to remove him rather than see one of its own face a public thumbs-down in a no-confidence vote set for July 1. Last month the former British protectorate of 3.2 million — one of the world’s largest oil exporters — held its third elections in three years, part of a protracted tussle for power between the ruling-family and elected parliamentarians. But the trend in the Gulf, from commentary in state-dominated media to official statements, has been to cite Kuwait — unique in its wide, free vote for a parliament with teeth — as an argument for more dynastic and autocratic rule. The violence following Iran’s recent elections has also raised Gulf fears of instability, giving another reason for no change. Islamist and tribal deputies stand accused of holding back government development plans by voting down legislation proposed by cabinet and seeking no-confidence votes in Kuwaiti ministers. “In recent months there was a lot of glee and schadenfreude about Kuwait’s political problems. Many articles were written about the mess that Kuwait’s democracy had got them into,” said British academic Christopher Davidson, a Gulf specialist. Gulf countries often cite “khususiyya”, or special characteristics, to justify limiting popular participation in government and prefer to avoid the word “democracy”. In 2006 elections to the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates, for example, less than one percent of the country’s native population was eligible to vote. “Our leadership does not import ready-made models that may be valid for other societies but are certainly not suitable for our society,” Dubai ruler and UAE vice-president Sheikh Mohammed said in an interview in April this year.

US presence in Kuwait undermines democratization in the region.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku- wait has also shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this monarchy and the history of democratic expression are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity. Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned about maintaining their democratic image abroad because of their continuing need for international support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves as an important if still incomplete example to the region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular vitality over the last year, and the United States needs to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain aware that democracy and moderation are not the same thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic to U.S. goals for the region.

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http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf



US withdrawal from an autocracy could create a democracy that would serve as a model for the Arab regionDiamond 10(Larry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University and director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law., Why are there no Arab democracies?, http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-21-1.pdf, January)

The unfavorable geopolitical situation confronting Arab democracy extends well beyond the overwhelming factor of oil, though oil drives much of the major powers’ interest in the region. External support for Arab regimes, historically coming in part from the Soviet Union but now mainly from Europe and the United States, confers on Arab autocracies crucial economic resources, security assistance, and political legitimacy. In these circumstances, for non-oil regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, foreign aid is like oil. Like oil, aid flows into the central coffers of the state and helps to give it the means both to coopt and to repress. Since 1975, U.S. “development” assistance to Egypt has totaled more than $28 billion, not including the nearly $50 billion that has flowed to that country in unconditional military aid since the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords.20 Less well known is the huge flow of U.S. economic and military aid to the much less populous state of Jordan, which has taken in an average of $650 million per year since 2001. “Western aid makes possible the regime’s key political strategy of spending massively on public jobs without imposing steep taxes. From 2001 through 2006, the foreign assistance that Jordan raked in accounted for 27 percent of all domestic revenues.”21 Two other external factors further reinforce the internal hegemony of Arab autocracies. One is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which hangs like a toxic miasma over Middle Eastern political life. It provides a ready and convenient means of diverting public frustration away from the corruption and human-rights abuses of Arab regimes, turning citizen anger outward to focus on what Arab private and state-run media alike depict emotively as Israeli oppression of the Palestinians—and by symbolic extension, the entire Arab people. Protests over the failings of Arab regimes themselves—the poor quality of education and social services, the lack of jobs, transparency, accountability, and freedom—are banned, but Arab publics can vent their anger in the press and on the streets in the one realm where it is safe: condemnation of Israel. The second external factor is the other Arab states themselves, who reinforce one another in their authoritarianism and their techniques of monitoring, rigging, and repression, and who over the decades have turned the 22-member Arab League into an unapologetic autocrats’ club. Of all the major regional organizations, the Arab League is the most be reft of democratic norms and means for promoting or encouraging them. In fact, its charter, which has not been amended in half a century, lacks any mention of democracy or individual rights. Beyond all this is the lack of even a single clear example of Arab democracy, which means that there is no source of democratic diffusion or emulation anywhere inside the Arab world. Even in a globalized era, this matters: Throughout the third wave, demonstration effects have been “strongest among countries that were geographically proximate and culturally similar.”22 Will Anything Change? Is the Arab world simply condemned to an indefinite future of authoritarian rule? I do not think so. Even the beginnings of a change in U.S. foreign policy during the years from 2003 to 2005 encouraged political opening and at least gave space for popular democratic mobilization in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco, as well as the Palestinian Authority. Although most of these openings have partly or fully closed for the time being, at least Arab oppositions and civil societies had some taste of what democratic politics might look like. Opinion surveys suggest that they clearly want more, and new social-media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, the blogosphere, and the mobile-phone revolution are giving Arabs new opportunities to express themselves and to mobilize. Three factors could precipitate democratic change across the region. One would be the emergence of a single democratic polity in the region, particularly in a country that might be seen as a model. That role would be difficult for Lebanon to play, given its extremely complicated factions and consociational fragmentation of power, as well as the continuing heavy involvement of Syria in its politics. But were Iraq to progress politically, first by democratically electing a new government this year and then by having it function decently and peacefully as U.S. forces withdraw, that could gradually change perceptions in the region. Egypt also bears watching, as the sun slowly sets on the 81-year-old Hosni Mubarak’s three decades of personal rule. Whether or not his 46-year-old son Gamal succeeds him, the regime will experience new stresses and needs for adaptation when this modern-day pharaoh passes from the scene. Second would be a change in U.S. policy to resume principled engagement and more extensive practical assistance to encourage and press for democratic reforms, not just in the electoral realm but with respect to enhancing judicial independence and governmental transparency as well as expanding freedom of the press and civil society. If this were pursued in a more modest tone, and reinforced to some degree by European pressure, it could help to rejuvenate and protect domestic political forces that are now dispirited and in disarray. But to proceed along this path, the United States and its European allies would have to overcome their undifferentiated view of

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http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-21-1.pdf


Islamist parties and engage those Islamist actors who would be willing to commit more clearly to liberal-democratic norms

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Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East stems from instability and lack of democratic processesElBardei and Weiner, 05(Mohamed, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Allen S. associate professor of law and Warren Christopher Proffesor of the Practive of International Law and Diplomacy. “A discussion with the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency”. 2005)

Weiner: Many people perceive that the retention of substantial nuclear arsenals by countries that already had them when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was signed, and the development of new technologies in some countries, is one of the causes for the persistent proliferation efforts. But aren't regional conflicts , like those in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan, a more prominent cause of proliferation? And if those are the primary causes, do we really think that accelerating nuclear disarmament efforts among the permanent five states would help?ElBaradei: It would help, but I agree with you, that it is not the primary reason for proliferation efforts. The primary reasons for proliferation efforts are regional insecurity and instability. If you look around, where do you see [the] most proliferation efforts? It's the Middle East, it's northeast Asia, [the] Korean peninsula, and the Indian subcontinent—areas where you have chronic disputes that have been festering for decades. Not in Scandinavia. We're not worried about proliferation efforts in Scandinavia, but ask yourself why. It's not that the Swedes are inherently superior. The Swedes are not threatened by the Finns, while Israel probably feels threatened by its neighbors. Iran feels maybe threatened by its neighbors . North Korea feels threatened by its neighbors. Whether you agree or disagree with the sense of insecurity, there is a sense of insecurity you have to address. Whydo you have a sense of insecurity? Again, it could be some of these conflicts. It could be the oppressive government you have. It could be the denial of human rights. It could be the schism between the rich and the poor. In all these parts of the world, people are not able to express their views through the ballot box. They have governments that are repressive, and they feel a sense of global injustice because of the conflict that does not want to go away. These are really the drivers for proliferation efforts. . . . But we live in an environment, still, where nuclear power is perceived to be a source of power, a source of prestige, and ultimately a source of deterrence. It is not without notice that the five permanent members of the Security Council are the five nuclear weapon states. . There is an environment that, if you have a nuclear weapon, you are treated differently. North Korea has, whether we like it or not, been treated differently from Iraq. I hope that's not because they have a nuclear deterrent, but that's part of it, let us face it.

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Middle Eastern proliferation draws in major states and causes nuclear warKroenig, 8(Matthew, Assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University., Beyond Optimism and Pessimism:The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, 6/17)

As such, power-projecting states worry about the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. U.S. officials feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel could embolden Israel against its Arab enemies, or entice Arab states to launch a preventive military strike on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. In a 1963 NIE on Israel’s nascent nuclear program, the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community was that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, “Israel’s policy toward its neighbors would become more rather than less tough…it would seek to exploit the psychological advantage of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs.”41 President Kennedy concurred. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Kennedy wrote that Israel should abandon its nuclear program because Israel’s “development of such (nuclear) weapons would dangerously threaten the stability of the area.”42 Similarly, in the case of China’s nuclear program, U.S. officials believed that a nuclear-armed China would “be more willing to take risks in military probing operations because of an overoptimistic assessment of its psychologicaladvantage.”43 In recent years, U.S. officials have continued to fear the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. In a 1986 Top Secret CIA Assessment, U.S. intelligence analysts predicted that a nuclear North Korea would have “a free hand to conduct paramilitary operations without provoking a response.”44 Similarly, a U.S. expert recently testified before Congress, “A nuclear arsenal in the hands of Iran’s current theocratic regime will be a source of both regional and global instability.”45 U.S. officials assessed that regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could compel them to intervene directly in regional conflicts. In the early 1960s, U.S. officials speculated that Israel could potentially leverage its nuclear arsenal to compel the United States to intervene on its behalf in Middle Eastern crises.46 Similarly, in 1965, Henry Rowen, an official in the Department of Defense, assessed that if India acquired nuclear weapons, it could lead to aconflict in South Asia “with a fair chance of spreading and involving the United States.”47 Today, U.S. defense strategists plan for the possibility that the United States may be compelled to intervene in regional conflicts involving a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea and their neighbors. The empirical record has justified fears that nuclear proliferation could entangle powerprojecting states in nuclear disputes. The United States has intervened in conflicts that it might have avoided had nuclear weapons been absent. For example, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to aid Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War until Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir threatened that, without U.S. assistance, she would be forced to use nuclear weapons against the Arab armies.48 In response, Kissinger reversed his decision and provided emergency aid to the Israeli Defense Forces.49 Similarly, in 1999 and 2002, the United States became caught in diplomatic initiatives to prevent nuclear war in crises between the nuclear-armed countries of India and Pakistan.50 Indeed, the expectation that powerful states will intervene in conflicts involving a nuclear-armed state is so firmly ingrained in the strategic thinking of national leaders that small nuclear powers actually incorporate it into their strategic doctrines. South Africa’s nuclear doctrine envisioned, in the event of an imminent security threat, the detonation of a nuclear weapon, not against the threatening party, but over the Atlantic Ocean in an attempt to jolt the United States into intervening on South Africa’s behalf.51 Similarly, the surprise Pakistani raid on Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999 was motivated partly by the expectation that Pakistan would be able to retain any territory it was able to seize quickly, because Pakistani officials calculated that the United States would never allow an extended conflict in nuclear South Asia.52Regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could also entrap power-projecting states in a great power war. Other power-projecting states, facing a mirror-image situation, may feel compelled to intervene in a crisis to secure their own interests, entangling multiple great powers in a regional conflict. In a 1963 NIE, U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that “the impactof (nuclear proliferation in the Middle East) will be the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a confrontation involving the major powers.”53 President Johnson believed that a nuclear Israel meant increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East and perhaps superpower war.54 If historical experience provides a guide, U.S.strategists today are concerned by the possibility that China may feel compelled to intervene in any conflict involving a nuclear-armed North Korea, making the Korean Peninsula another dangerous flash-point in the uncertain Sino-American strategic relationship. Power-projecting states, other than the United States, are also threatened by the possibility that nuclear proliferation

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Democracy on Brink

Kuwaiti democracy is on the brink now – long transition is decreasing excitementBrown 9(Nathan J, nonresident Senior Associate Middle east Program Carnegie endowment for International Peace, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, Kuwaiti Democracy in Crisis, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23127, 5/16)

Residents of the Arab world have been denied this set of experiences. But in a sense, Kuwaitis have been living through a very drawn out version of a democratic transition. And they have experienced some of the emotions described above, but in an odd sequence. Kuwaitis have seen their parliament grow from a debating society to a powerful political structure; they have seen matters formerly whispered of in private gradually work their way into daily newspapers; they have seen the franchise be granted to new groups and elections become more competitive. But because the changes have been gradual and remain incomplete, Kuwaitis have missed the drama and the elation of a democratic breakthrough. Their country today is not fully democratic; their transition has already taken more than a generation; and the outcome is still very much in doubt.

Democracy on the brink now- Kuwait faces issues with establishing a stable democratic government The International News, 09(“Kuwait’s democracy troubles Arab rulers” http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=184768)

DUBAI: The ups and downs of parliamentary democracy in Kuwait are being used by Gulf Arab rulers to discredit the idea of representative government that dilutes their immense powers, analysts say. A new episode in the soap opera of Kuwait’s system began this week with an attempt by parliamentarians to force out the interior minister, who is a member of the ruling family. The Sabah family that dominates the cabinet is expected to remove him rather than see one of its own face a public thumbs-down in a no-confidence vote set for July 1. Last month the former British protectorate of 3.2 million — one of the world’s largest oil exporters — held its third elections in three years, part of a protracted tussle for power between the ruling-family and elected parliamentarians. But the trend in the Gulf, from commentary in state-dominated media to official statements, has been to cite Kuwait — unique in its wide, free vote for a parliament with teeth — as an argument for more dynastic and autocratic rule. The violence following Iran’s recent elections has also raised Gulf fears of instability, giving another reason for no change. Islamist and tribal deputies stand accused of holding back government development plans by voting down legislation proposed by cabinet and seeking no-confidence votes in Kuwaiti ministers. “In recent months there was a lot of glee and schadenfreude about Kuwait’s political problems. Many articles were written about the mess that Kuwait’s democracy had got them into,” said British academic Christopher Davidson, a Gulf specialist. Gulf countries often cite “khususiyya”, or special characteristics, to justify limiting popular participation in government and prefer to avoid the word “democracy”. In 2006 elections to the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates, for example, less than one percent of the country’s native population was eligible to vote. “Our leadership does not import ready-made models that may be valid for other societies but are certainly not suitable for our society,” Dubai ruler and UAE vice-president Sheikh Mohammed said in an interview in April this year.

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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23127


US Presence Hurts Democratization

US presence in Kuwait undermines democratization in the region.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

The United States also has a vested interest in regional political reform and ongoing democratization in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku- wait has also shown a commitment to expanding democracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspirations for both stability and more inclusive government within the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standing democratic tradition that they have attempted to blend with the continued authority of a ruling monarchy that has been in power since the 1750s. The existence of this monarchy and the history of democratic expression are key components of the Kuwaiti national identity. Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concerned about maintaining their democratic image abroad because of their continuing need for international support against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearly the most democratic country among the Gulf Arab states, and the Kuwait democratization effort serves as an important if still incomplete example to the region. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particular vitality over the last year, and the United States needs to continue supporting such efforts to ensure that they are not ephemeral. The United States must also remain aware that democracy and moderation are not the same thing, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered a number of Islamists who appear deeply unsympathetic to U.S. goals for the region.

The US’s reliance on Kuwait for its military presence has undermined democracy because it put its security interests firstBrown 9(Nathan J, nonresident Senior Associate Middle east Program Carnegie endowment for International Peace, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, Kuwaiti Democracy in Crisis , http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23127, 5/16)

Kuwaiti democracy is threatened not directly by the gradual erosion of political certainty—democracy is all about uncertainty, after all—but by the disillusionment this has caused. And perhaps mot notable is the declining democratic determination of two critical supporters of Kuwaiti democracy—the business community and the United States. The traditional business elite, the backbone of the constitutional order in a previous generation, has watched as the parliament has paralyzed decision making and become the preserve of tribal and neighborhood deputies more interested in securing benefits for their constituents than in transforming Kuwait into an international economic powerhouse. And the traditional business elite’s economic position in Kuwait has also declined in relative terms, as new economic actors have entered the scene. The United States has followed a stranger pattern. In the 1990s, at a time when it payed only lip service to the idea of democracy elsewhere in the Arab world, American support for Kuwaiti democracy was critical. But under the leadership of George W. Bush, when the United States elevated democracy to the defining element of its declared policy, American priorities in Kuwait turned sharply in the opposite direction. The American relationship with Kuwait was important—but primarily as a means for moving equipment and troops into and out of Iraq. Internal Kuwaiti developments were of secondary interest. As the parliament seemed to become a place where Islamists of various stripes operated freely, it was viewed as a less friendly institution in official American eyes. To be sure, the fact that Kuwaiti women were granted full political rights attracted American attention—but the fact that all Kuwaitis, male and female alike, were in danger of losing all of their political rights excited no mention. There may be a slight shift under the Obama administration—the current US ambassador did express her hope that Kuwaitis would resolve their problems thorough constitutional means—but the United States is both weaker and more distracted than it was a decade ago.

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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23127



US Presence Hurts Democratization

US interests trump calls for democracy in KuwaitKhan 3(Muqtedar, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Adrian College in Michigan. He earned his Ph.D. in International Relations, Political Philosophy, and Islamic Political Thought, from Georgetown University in May 2000., Visiting Fellow at Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for MiddleEast Policy, Chair of the Political Science Department and Director of InternationalStudies at Adrian College, PROSPECTS FOR MUSLIM DEMOCRACY: The Role of U.S. Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/khan20031001.pdf, 9/1)

In Algeria in 1992, France, with tacit support from the United States, financed and legitimized a military coup that prevented Islamists from coming to power after winning an election.8 This singular episode has become for many Muslims a vindication of the claim of radical Islamists that the United States seeks to undermine the Muslim world out of malice against Islam.9 They also reached the conclusion that the United States, which had no vital interests at stake in Algeria, would not allow democracy in the Middle East. Even today, many Islamists snigger when they hear the call for democracy in the Middle East because they see that the United States remains a close ally and even defender of nearly all the monarchies in the region. The kings of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan and the Emirs of Qatar, and Kuwait are crucial to U.S . interests. It seems unlikely to Muslims that the United States will undermine its allies . Abidullah Jan, a Pakistani Islamists writes: Pakistan is an example that shows democracy and dictatorships are irrelevant as long as the U.S. objectives are served. Interestingly, th ere is neither talk of democracy nor a progressive state for countries already under American occupation, such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc.10

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http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/khan20031001.pdf


US Presence Hurts Democratization- Monarchies

The US’s agreements with Kuwait are supportive of the Kuwaiti monarchy – these undermine democratic progress in the countryKhan 1(Muqtedar, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Adrian College in Michigan. He earned his Ph.D. in International Relations, Political Philosophy, and Islamic Political Thought, from Georgetown University in May 2000., Visiting Fellow at Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for MiddleEast Policy, Chair of the Political Science Department and Director of InternationalStudies at Adrian College. US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: A BARRIER TO DEMOCRACY?, http://www.glocaleye.org/forpoldem.htm 11/1)

As Islamic awareness increases in postcolonial Muslim societies and Islamic activists try to rebuild their civilization they find that an economically motivated alliance between secular authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world and the West, in particular the US, is the biggest barrier to freedom, democracy and self determination. Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait are just a few examples of states were non-democratic regimes thrive and repress popular movements with US support. The US government finds it more convenient to dominate the region by negotiating terms with a handful of elite rather than coming to terms with the region’s public opinion, if democracy were to take root in the Middle East.In 1953 a CIA coup replaced the democratic government of Mossadeq Hussain in Iran with a monarchy so that Iran could become a client serving US interests in the Middle East. In Algeria the west financed and legitimized a military coup that prevented Islamists from coming to power after winning an election. The US remains a close ally and even defender of nearly all the monarchies in the region. The Kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan are crucial to US interests in the region.

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US Withdrawal -> Democratic Spillover

US withdrawal from an autocracy could create a democracy that would serve as a model for the Arab regionDiamond 10(Larry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University and director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law., Why are there no Arab democracies?, http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Diamond-21-1.pdf, January)

The unfavorable geopolitical situation confronting Arab democracy extends well beyond the overwhelming factor of oil, though oil drives much of the major powers’ interest in the region. External support for Arab regimes, historically coming in part from the Soviet Union but now mainly from Europe and the United States, confers on Arab autocracies crucial economic resources, security assistance, and political legitimacy. In these circumstances, for non-oil regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, foreign aid is like oil: another source of rents that regimes use for survival. Like oil, aid flows into the central coffers of the state and helps to give it the means both to coopt and to repress. Since 1975, U.S. “development” assistance to Egypt has totaled more than $28 billion, not including the nearly $50 billion that has flowed to that country in unconditional military aid since the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords.20 Less well known is the huge flow of U.S. economic and military aid to the much less populous state of Jordan, which has taken in an average of $650 million per year since 2001. “Western aid makes possible the regime’s key political strategy of spending massively on public jobs without imposing steep taxes. From 2001 through 2006, the foreign assistance that Jordan raked in accounted for 27 percent of all domestic revenues.”21 Two other external factors further reinforce the internal hegemony of Arab autocracies. One is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which hangs like a toxic miasma over Middle Eastern political life. It provides a ready and convenient means of diverting public frustration away from the corruption and human-rights abuses of Arab regimes, turning citizen anger outward to focus on what Arab private and state-run media alike depict emotively as Israeli oppression of the Palestinians—and by symbolic extension, the entire Arab people. Protests over the failings of Arab regimes themselves—the poor quality of education and social services, the lack of jobs, transparency, accountability, and freedom—are banned, but Arab publics can vent their anger in the press and on the streets in the one realm where it is safe: condemnation of Israel. The second external factor is the other Arab states themselves, who reinforce one another in their authoritarianism and their techniques of monitoring, rigging, and repression, and who over the decades have turned the 22-member Arab League into an unapologetic autocrats’ club. Of all the major regional organizations, the Arab League is the most be reft of democratic norms and means for promoting or encouraging them. In fact, its charter, which has not been amended in half a century, lacks any mention of democracy or individual rights. Beyond all this is the lack of even a single clear example of Arab democracy, which means that there is no source of democratic diffusion or emulation anywhere inside the Arab world. Even in a globalized era, this matters: Throughout the third wave, demonstration effects have been “strongest among countries that were geographically proximate and culturally similar.”22 Will Anything Change? Is the Arab world simply condemned to an indefinite future of authoritarian rule? I do not think so. Even the beginnings of a change in U.S. foreign policy during the years from 2003 to 2005 encouraged political opening and at least gave space for popular democratic mobilization in countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco, as well as the Palestinian Authority. Although most of these openings have partly or fully closed for the time being, at least Arab oppositions and civil societies had some taste of what democratic politics might look like. Opinion surveys suggest that they clearly want more, and new social-media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, the blogosphere, and the mobile-phone revolution are giving Arabs new opportunities to express themselves and to mobilize. Three factors could precipitate democratic change across the region. One would be the emergence of a single democratic polity in the region, particularly in a country that might be seen as a model. That role would be difficult for Lebanon to play, given its extremely complicated factions and consociational fragmentation of power, as well as the continuing heavy involvement of Syria in its politics. But were Iraq to progress politically, first by democratically electing a new government this year and then by having it function decently and peacefully as U.S. forces withdraw, that could gradually change perceptions in the region. Egypt also bears watching, as the sun slowly sets on the 81-year-old Hosni Mubarak’s three decades of personal rule. Whether or not his 46-year-old son Gamal succeeds him, the regime will experience new stresses and needs for adaptation when this modern-day pharaoh passes from the scene. Second would be a change in U.S. policy to resume principled engagement and more extensive practical assistance to encourage and press for democratic reforms, not just in the electoral realm but with respect to

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US Withdrawal -> Democratic Spillover

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enhancing judicial independence and governmental transparency as well as expanding freedom of the press and civil society. If this were pursued in a more modest tone, and reinforced to some degree by European pressure, it could help to rejuvenate and protect domestic political forces that are now dispirited and in disarray. But to proceed along this path, the United States and its European allies would have to overcome their undifferentiated view of Islamist parties and engage those Islamist actors who would be willing to commit more clearly to liberal-democratic norms.

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Kuwait Democracy Spills Over to Regional Governments

Kuwait democracy solves for failed governments throughout the Middle EastBrown, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and a Carnegie Scholar, 09(Nathan J, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “Moving Out of Kuwait’s Political Impasse” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23320)

A successful attempt to sustain the Kuwaiti democratic experiment would have mildly positive regional effects for the cause of political reform. In earlier decades, Kuwait served as a positive model for some Gulf states. The Bahraini constitution of 1973, for example, was modeled on the Kuwaiti document. Kuwait no longer seems like such a positive model―in fact, the political stalemate in the country now serves as a negative model. A revival of Kuwaiti democracy will not lead to a “Gulf spring” much less an Arab one. But it will prevent elections and parliaments from becoming symbols of stagnation and paralysis.

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Demo Promo -> Terrorism

US hypocrisy regarding democratic rhetoric creates anti-Americanism which incites terrorismKhan 1(Muqtedar, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Adrian College in Michigan. He earned his Ph.D. in International Relations, Political Philosophy, and Islamic Political Thought, from Georgetown University in May 2000., Visiting Fellow at Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Chair of the Political Science Department and Director of International Studies at Adrian College. US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: A BARRIER TO DEMOCRACY?, http://www.glocaleye.org/forpoldem.htm11/1)

It is not a hatred of democracy and freedom but the desire for one that has made many Muslims hate the US whom they blame for the perpetuation of undemocratic polities in their world. Surely there are some Muslims who argue that democracy like everything Western is UnIslamic and evil. Fortunately such misguided people are few and have very little influence in the Muslim World. The utter lack of peaceful channels for protest and dissent in the entire Arab world has slowly radicalized most moderate Islamic oppositions . The use of brutal force by secular regimes has further incited reactionary violence from Islamic militias. Many Muslims from this part of the world believe that the US is hypocritical about its claim that it values democracy. They also think that it is inherently opposed to democracy in the Muslim world and must share the blame for the repression and authoritarianism perpetrated by its allies. The mounting frustration at their inability to bring change in their own world has led many Muslims to take the militant route and now they are zeroing in on the US, who in their opinion is the biggest barrier to political freedom.

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http://www.glocaleye.org/forpoldem.htm


US Democracy Promotion Bad

US democracy promotion spurs backlash and anti- AmericanismJamal, assistant professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Tessler, Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor of Political Science, 08(Amaney, Mark, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Has the United States Poisoned Democracy in the Arab World? http://carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=22230)

Has the association of democracy promotion with U.S. foreign policy, and especially with the occupation of Iraq, spawned a backlash and led ordinary Arab citizens to question whether democracy is appropriate for their countries? Certainly the United States’ lack of even-handedness in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been a major Arab complaint, and more recently the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq have given rise to widespread anti-American sentiment in the Arab world. Associated with this is U.S. government insistence that its actions in Iraq are part of an effort to promote democracy in the Arab world.

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Reducing Presence Solves

Dramatically reducing military presence solvesKenneth M. Pollack 2003, Pollack is an expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf. He was Director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council. He also spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2003) “Securing the Gulf” JSTOR

In this approach, the United States would dramatically reduce its military footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the current arrangements in place. The headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain (where a U.S. Navy flag has been welcome for 50 years), but fewer American warships would ply the waters of the Gulf. The air force would retain its huge new base at Udeid in Qatar, again because the Qataris seem pleased to have it there. The army, might keep some prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and and might regularly rotate in battalions to train on it—if those states were comfortable with such guests. In addition, if a future Iraqi government were amenable, the United States might retain an air base and some ground presence there. Alternately, army bases in the region might be dispensed with altogether, and instead the United States could simply rely on equipment stored on container ships stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. On the political level, the United States would preserve its informal relationships with the gcc states and possibly add a similar association with a friendly new Iraqi government. It would continue to contain Iran by making clear that any Iranian aggression would be met by an American military response. And it would continue its efforts to secure European, Japanese, and Russian support in pressuring Tehran both economically and diplomatically so as to end Iran's support for terror and its unconventional weapons programs. This smaller military footprint would go a long way toward alle viating the internal problems caused by the presence of U.S. combat forces in the Persian Gulf region—so not surprisingly, this is the strategy that the Gulf Arabs themselves favor. With Saddam gone, their overriding goal now is to minimize domestic discontent, and they believe that the United States can keep peace in the region with a minimal presence. This approach would also be popular in certain quarters of the American military which would be glad to shed the burdens of policing an inhospitable and less than luxurious region far from home.

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Withdrawal Solves

US military withdrawal fixes Kuwait- Iraq relations.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

At the time of this writing, Kuwait is clearly safe from an Iraqi conventional military attack even without the U.S. alliance. The Bagdad government is currently unable to control its own capital and is certainly not in a position to undertake foreign military adventures. The Iraqi Army is weak and divided, and the Iraqi Air Force has very little offensive capability (beyond a few helicopters).158 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis are psychologically unable to rule out a future threat from Iraq. The current Iraqi political system is widely viewed in Kuwait and the world as transitional, and it is not impossible that a strong and dictatorial government will once again emerge. This may occur only after a prolonged civil war in which a victor emerges and consolidates power. While Iraq is in turmoil now, it may eventually become much stronger. Moreover, if the future of Iraq is defined by intense and protracted civil war, the parties left standing are likely to be radical, militarized, and inclined to violent confrontation. Radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, for example, is a strong Iraqi nationalist who could conceivably threaten Kuwait in the future, although he would almost certainly be deterred from a direct conventional invasion. Sadr has called upon Kuwait to end its relationship with the United States and evict the U.S. troops currently in that country on the grounds that they are no longer necessary to protect the emirate from Saddam.159

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AT: Kuwait Likes US Presence

Kuwait wants democracy without US presence involved.Meyer, Professor of Sociology at Ohio State, 03(Katherine, Research News, “KUWAITI CITIZENS WANT DEMOCRACY, BUT DON’T DESIRE CLOSER TIES WITH THE WEST, STUDY FINDS” http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/kuwait.htm)

COLUMBUS, Ohio -- The citizens of Kuwait became more supportive of democracy during the mid- to late-1990s, but that did not include a desire for closer ties with the United States and other Western countries, a new study found. A survey of 1,500 Kuwaiti citizens conducted in 1994, 1996, and 1998 found that the citizens became less interested in trade alliances with the West and less likely to pay attention to Western media over that time period. The long-term survey is one of the first in the Arab world to examine how typical citizens feel about political issues in their country and their relationships with other countries. The results suggest that Western military intervention and other forces may have helped shape an interest in modernized, democratic government in Kuwait, said Katherine Meyer, co-author of the study and professor of sociology at Ohio State University. However, the findings also show that Kuwaiti citizens want democracy on their own terms. “They don’t want to completely identify with the West. They want individual rights, personal liberties and control over government, but in their own way. They are not interested in being a satellite of another political power,” she said. Moreover, the results suggest that the strong role of the Islamic faith in Kuwait was no hindrance to the growing support for more participative government. Meyer conducted the study with two former graduate students at Ohio State who are now in the Middle East: Helen Rizzo of The American University in Cairo and Yousef Ali of Kuwait University. They presented their results recently at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association. The researchers randomly selected 1,500 citizens from throughout Kuwait, representing various groups within society. The study was designed to examine changes in citizens’ attitudes about democracy and other issues following Western military intervention in the Middle East during the Gulf War of 1990-91. In that war, the United States and its allies helped stopped an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Results showed that support for democracy in Kuwait grew substantially during the four years covered in the study. About 60 percent of those surveyed supported democracy in 1998, compared to only 40 percent in 1994. “Worldwide, there is a trend toward more support for citizen’s rights,” Meyer said. “Kuwait has an educated population and its citizens are attuned to what is going on in the world. They want to have more rights and liberties within their own country.” Changes in attitudes toward the West were mixed. Kuwaitis felt increasingly friendly toward Western countries, including Britain, France and the United States, but they were significantly less supportive of trading with these countries or forming military or economic alliances. In addition, those surveyed paid little attention to the Western media in 1994 and followed it significantly less in 1998 – even though the government attempted to make the latest communications technologies more available. At the same time, Kuwaitis grew more interested in strengthening their ties with the rest of the Arab world. They felt a special affinity to other Gulf Coast countries – Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Support for military and economic alliances with these countries was high in 1994 and grew even stronger by 1998. Kuwaitis’ desire for stronger relationships with the larger Arab world also grew significantly between 1994 and 1998, although it remained moderate to low, Meyer said. There was a thawing of the hard feelings against countries and political organizations such as Yemen, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization that had aligned with Iraq during the first Gulf War. “Kuwaitis still felt unfriendly toward these countries in 1998, but there was a movement away from hostility,” she said. The researchers also investigated the theory that the strong role of Islamic beliefs might impede the process of democratization in the Middle East. Findings showed that citizens’ beliefs about their Islamic faith did not change between 1994 and 1998. “If Islam were impeding democracy, increasing support for democratic principles and practices would correspond to declining adherence to Islamic beliefs,” Meyer said. “Since that was not the case, there is not clear evidence that Islam and democratization are incompatible.” The findings that Kuwaitis felt friendly toward the West – but more interested in developing relationships with their Arab neighbors – should not be surprising, Meyer said. “Some Americans may assume that military assistance to a country like Kuwait overwhelms its citizens with gratitude, that it makes them want to identify with the U.S. But that’s not the case,” she said. “It is not analogous to a child-to-adult relationship. It is more like an adult-to-adult relationship in which the recipients of aid are grateful for the help of the West, but still want to maintain their own uniqueness. They think that their ultimate strength resides within their Arab cultural and historical traditions and geographical location.” Meyer said she believes the most recent Gulf War probably only intensified these feelings. “Kuwaitis were pleased to see Saddam Hussein removed and grateful for the military intervention. But this is an anxious time for them and they are nervous about the continuing Western military presence.” The study examined how attitudes and opinions differed among some disadvantaged sub-groups within Kuwait, such as the minority Shia Islamic

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sect, and second-class citizens, who did not have the right to run for national parliamentary office in the 1990s. The findings showed that the attitudes of disadvantaged groups often showed greater intensity or fluctuated more than did the overall population. However, Meyer said these groups generally followed the overall trends. Meyer said these results can not be summarily generalized to the current situation in Iraq, since the data were collected several years ago and Iraq and Kuwait remain antagonistic to each other. However, the same general processes seem to be at work in Iraq: citizens are interested in becoming more democratic but lack increased desire for ties to the West. “Iraq and Kuwait are two very different settings, but there is a shared sense of identity that is rooted in their own Arab traditions and their own culture and history,” Meyer said.

US presence in Kuwait causes tension between the two countries.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

Another problem that has sometimes bothered Kuwaitis is the perception that the United States does not make a serious effort to consult them or their Gulf neighbors on regional issues. Pique over this issue was apparent in a remark by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammad Sabah stating, “Yes we are allies of the U.S. but we are not its puppies . . . . Our interests compel transparency in delivering our concerns . . . and to cooperate with the U.S. only where this is needed.”189 This demand for respect is especially compelling since it comes from one of Kuwait’s most pro-American political figures. The Kuwaitis have also made it clear that they do not like to be harshly scolded by the United States over such issues as the price of fuel for the U.S. military. The Kuwaitis supplied free fuel to the military during the 2003 war against Saddam, but did request payment for some fuel at a preferential rate of $21 per barrel as the conflict in Iraq continued. The U.S. leadership agreed to pay $7 per barrel, but they did so only after the Kuwaiti leadership received a letter from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) scolding them for their ingratitude for the 1991 liberation.190 This matter could have been settled satisfactorily without such harshness which is often more painful when a powerful state addresses a weaker ally, since it implies a subordinate status relationship. Other problems exist as well, including a past tendency of some policymakers to stop in Kuwait on the way to Iraq without spending any time there. This approach has sometimes caused the Kuwaitis to feel their views are not appreciated. Recently, significant progress was made in reversing this perception when the United States helped to organize a January 2007 conference with America’s Gulf allies (and Egypt and Jordan) to discuss Iraq and Iraq-related problems. The U.S. Secretary of State attended this conference to present President Bush’s priorities and to listen to the concerns of the attending Arab states. While some disagreement occurred on the issue of Iran (discussed later), all parties considered the discussions important, and the value of these sorts of activities should not be underestimated.191 Additionally, congressional delegations are showing a much increased interest in Kuwaiti opinions on regional security, probably as a result of ongoing problems in Iraq. Previously, Kuwaitis would at times become irritated at U.S. political leaders who would call for a strategic redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq to Kuwait without any hint that the Kuwaitis might seek input into such a matter.

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Kuwaitis blame the US for mismanaged occupation sparking public opposition Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

The Iraqi insurgency, which began in 2003, introduced a major new element into the U.S.-Kuwaiti strategic relationship in which both parties retain a stake. Despite overwhelming Kuwaiti enthusiasm for Saddam’s ouster, some Kuwaitis for a considerable time have blamed the United States for what they describe as a mismanaged occupation.160 This blame is often private, and some Kuwaitis also temper it with a belief that Iraq is an inherently violent society that is almost impossible to rehabilitate. Additionally, the Kuwaiti leadership has been especially reluctant to criticize the United States in public on this issue. In 2004, for example, Speaker of the Parliament Jasem al Kharafi responded to Kuwaiti public criticisms of U.S. actions in Falluja by calling upon citizens “to stay out of other states’ business to spare [Kuwait] unwarranted and uncalled for tensions and confrontations.”161 Kuwaiti leaders did, however, feel compelled to speak out in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal.162 Saddam had previously held a number of Kuwaitis at the prison, leaving Kuwaitis especially sensitive about human rights abuses there.

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***Neg Cards***

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Status Quo Solves

Withdrawal from Iraq means troops will inevitably withdraw from Kuwait. The World Tribune, 4-22-10(“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait” http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in Kuwait. Officials said the Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They said the U.S. military would thin its huge logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq concludes in September 2010. "We could have a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is no longer a need to support a combat presence in Iraq," an official said. On March 31, the Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support Associates, based in Fort Worth, Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of U.S. troops and equipment from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to the U.S. military. "This procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for supplies and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and tenant units moving into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait," the Pentagon said on April 6. Officials said the U.S. military has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal from Iraq. They said this has marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikdom in an effort to enhance security and other functions. "Base operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides operational support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security commitments and theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Kuwait," the Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been copying elements of its command and control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan. They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14 million contract to FedTech Services to develop an information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater Network Management Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat Support would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was solicited and received. The Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would support the transition of the military's command, control, communications and computer capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S. embassy, and other enduring forward operating bases. "The majority of the services involve project management, program planning and analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems and network engineering and integration, and communications infrastructure installation to include inside and outside plant architecture," DRS said on April 7

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http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp





US- Kuwait Cooperation Good

US- Kuwait relations important- security concerns, and economic interdependenceTerril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

Kuwait has been a close military partner of the United States since a U.S.-led military coalition liberated it from the iron grip of Iraqi occupation in 1991. The U.S.-Kuwait relationship since that time has been consolidated as an important alliance for both countries. Although Kuwait is a small country, it is also strategically located and supports ongoing security relations with the United States. The importance of Kuwait’s strategic position can be expected to increase as the United States reduces its presence in post- Saddam Iraq but still seeks to influence events there and throughout the Gulf region. Kuwait’s strategic importance also increased following the U.S. decision to remove its combat forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003.3 Additionally, Kuwait rests upon approximately 10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and is expanding its efforts to explore for natural gas, making it a vital economic ally. More recently, and also of interest to the United States, the Kuwaiti experience is emerging as an especially important ongoing experiment in democratic institution-building and the expansion of democratic practices. This approach to governance is being implemented in ways that support U.S. goals for increased democratization of the region, although elections have also helped to empower some extremely conservative Islamists, such as members of the Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement, which is the political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood.4

US-Kuwait relations are important- terrorism, Iraqi instability, civil war.Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

This monograph notes that the United States can, if insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationship and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take Kuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have the potential to become more jaded and less cooperative in their relations with the United States if they view themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as subordinates. The United States has a long history of resentful allies carefully measuring the degree of cooperation they will give in return for security guarantees. There is no need for this to occur with Kuwait. Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relations thus become important and may become especially vital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S. withdrawal under less than optimal conditions. Strong efforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare in Iraq from spreading to Kuwait under such scenarios. Such efforts may require a great deal of new and creative thinking by both Kuwaitis and Americans as the threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now been overshadowed by the dangers of spillover from an Iraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and large- scale subversion.

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US-Kuwait Cooperation Good

Cooperation key to check back Iraqi civil warTerril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGICRELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)

Furthermore, both Kuwait and the United States fear a rise in region-wide terrorism and sectarian violence resulting from the current civil strife in Iraq, as well as other factors. Should Iraqi’s sectarian strife reach new levels of intensity, it is important that it does not spread to other nations such as Kuwait. Kuwaiti diplomacy and security planning must seek ways to minimize the impact of the Iraq civil war in ways that do not cause the vast majority of loyal Kuwaiti Shi’ites to become alienated from their government. Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empowered Iran which has at least partially filled the Gulf power vacuum created by Iraq’s political crisis. Kuwait, as a small country, has little desire to offend a major regional power such as Iran, and has occasionally sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. Good Kuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favor by significant elements of Kuwait’s Shi’ite community and therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaiti national unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership fears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf and is especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel the United States to withdraw its military forces from the region. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will never fully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, like other Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, although they also oppose U.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they will be placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regional violence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomatic and economic options for dealing with the crisis were thoroughly explored and exhausted first.

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