copenhagan summit outcome

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CLIMATE 08/09 DECEMBER 2009

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IDDRI

emman Grin, Matthi Wmar (IDDRI)

The Copenhagen Accord:

What happened?Is it a good deal?Who wins and who loses?What is next?


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IDes pouR le DbAT 08/2009 3

Th Cnhagn Accrd: What hand? I it a gd da? Wh win and wh ? What i nxt?

IDDRI

emman Grin (IDDRI) [email protected] Wmar (IDDRI) [email protected]

Th Cnhagn Accrd:

What hand? I it a gd da?Wh win and wh ? What i nxt?

What happened?

The two weeks of negotiations have been fullof twists and turns. There has been two maindistinct phases: before and after Heads of Statearrived in Copenhagen.The outcome of the rst phase, when heads ofdelegations and Ministers had the leadership, isa set of draft decisions, heavily bracketed, andnot recognized by all Parties especially theUS as a basis for negotiations. It proves thedifculty if not the impossibility of mak-ing progress towards an agreement throughthe United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Proto-col (KP) process. The lack of clarity of the BaliRoadmap setting a two-track process, one un-der the UNFCCC and one under the KP,w butleaving open the form and legal nature of thenal outcome and the lack of skill of the Dan-ish Presidency, did not help.The outcome of the second phase, when asmall group around 30 heads of State tookthe lead, is a minimalist agreement, disap-pointing in substance, and hectic in process. Itproves that the pileup of countries redlines didnot leave room for an ambitious agreement:

the agreement found is somehow the lowest

common denominator. This is not the deal we

hoped, but given the context, and especiallygiven the perception that States had of theirown national interests, this was probably thebest possible deal.

Before arrival of the Heads of State

The negotiations here in Copenhagen un-folded as follow. There were two negotiatingtracks: one under the UNFCCC, and one underKP. Under each of these tracks, the work wassubdivided into different building blocks:

KP Numbers

MechanismsLand Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)

LCA

Shared vision

Mitigation developed

Mitigation developing

Mitigation other issues

Adaptation

Finance

Technology

The KP track has remained stuck during the whole negotiations. Developing countriesstressed the need for KP Parties to commit to a

second commitment period of the KP. And KP


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4IDes pouR le DbAT 08/20094 IDDRI

Parties underlined the need to reach a single le-gally binding agreement. But the negotiations

under the LCA track have been full of twistsand turns:

Friday 11During a contact group meeting of the AWG-LCA, the Chair, Michael Zammit Cutajar,presents its package of draft decisions. All ofthem are bracketed, and contain several op-tions. The package consists of a core decision(the 1/CP15) and a bunch of satellite decisions.These satellite decisions cover issues such as:adaptation, a mechanism to register and fa-cilitate the matching of nationally appropri-ate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and support,REDD-plus, a mechanism for technology de-velopment and transfer, and the governance ofthe nancial architecture. All of these satellitedecisions contain options, sometimes numer-ous, as in the case for adaptation or technol-ogy, sometimes limited, as far as registry andnance are concerned.The satellite decisions are accepted as a ba-sis for negotiation. But the core decisionis vividly discussed. It is accepted by all,except Japan, as a possible basis for nego-

tiations. Japan says it cannot accept the op-tion chosen in the mitigation for developedcountries section: an unconditional secondcommitment period for KP Parties. Other KPParties have similar concerns, but say theyare ready to accept the text as a basis for ne-gotiation. The US says that the overall struc-ture of the mitigation section is not right,because it uses KP rules and procedures asa reference for all developed countries com-mitments even though it leaves the USoutside the KP and also because it lacks

symmetry between developed and develop-ing countries. But it also says it is ready toaccept the text as a whole as a basis for nego-tiation. The developing countries are gener-ally happy with the text, even though theyhave some specifics remarks.

Saturday 12During informal meeting of the AWG-LCAin the morning, the Chair organizes somediscussions on the mitigation section of thedraft core decision. The turn of events prob-ably surprises and disturbs the US. Parties

make comments paragraph by paragraph,

de facto endorsing the structure of the miti-gation section, which is not suitable for the

US. The US then gets frightened.During an informal Ministerial organised bythe Danish Presidency in the afternoon, theUS complains about the Chairs proposed textand asks Connie Hedegaard, Danish Ministerof Energy and Climate, and President of theCOP15, for immediate political action.

Sunday 13sDuring an informal meeting organised bythe Danish Presidency and gathering 48 Min-isters, it is decided that the Presidency shouldextract the main political elements of theChairs proposed text and organize Ministe-rial consultations on these points. The list ofissues is the following:

Aspects of developed country mitigationmHow to increase aggregate and individualmtargetsHow to ensure comparability of effortsmamong developed countries

Aspects of developing country mitigationmHow to register planned actionsmHow to measure report and verify imple-mmented mitigation actions

Aspects of nancemHow to set a long term quantied goal onmclimate nanceHow to create new sources for climate -mnanceHow to measure report and verify climatemnance

Other issuesmBunkersmTradem

Monday 14

Ministerial consultations co Chaired by twoMinisters, one of a developed country, oneof a developing country, on each of the is-sues (UK and Ghana on finance etc) are or-ganised throughout the day. However, theseinformal do not provide the change of gearshoped, mainly because even if they are coChaired by Ministers, the usual group of ne-gotiators is intervening from the floor. It isof particular concern for some Parties thatconsultations are not launched on 1bi butare launched on KP, finance and NAMAs,raising questions about the favourable

treatment of the US.


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Tuesday 15During the closing plenary of the AWG-LCA,

developing countries, driven by the big emerg-ing countries (China, India, Brazil and SouthAfrica) ask for the FULL Chairs proposed textto be included in the report of the Chair to theCOP, not the text MINUS the main politicalelements. It is a long night, with the US tryingto introduce brackets everywhere in the miti-gation section. It is not sufcient for the USto put some brackets at the beginning and atthe end of each section. It is willing to under-line areas of particular concern. This exerciseeventually stops at 6.30 AM on Wednesdaymorning leaving everybody exhausted.

Wednesday 16During a COP/MOP plenary, Connie Hede-gaard announces that the Presidency will puttwo negotiating texts on the table, one underthe LCA and one under the KP. She does soeven before the Chair of the AWG-LCA has achance to report its nal proposed text dur-ing the COP plenary. She probably does thatbecause she considers that the Chair proposedtext is not suitable for the US.This move provokes very strong reactions by

a very large group of countries, especially alldeveloping countries. Connie Hedegaard thenquits the Presidency as planned, and leavesthe Presidency to Lars Rasmussen, her PrimeMinister. Lars Rasmussen nds himself in a very difcult position during the high levelsegment that comes next. He has to face sevenconsecutive angry points of order by the repre-sentatives of the four big emerging countries(China, India, Brazil and South Africa) thatdo not accept that the Presidency ignores thenegotiating texts produced by both working

groups, the AWG-KP and LCA, and introducessome Presidency texts instead, probably be-cause it estimates that the LCA proposed textis not adequate for the US, and will thereforeprevent from reaching an agreement. Theprocess is stuck. It will remain stuck until theHeads of State arrive on Thursday.

After arrival of the Heads of State

Thursday 17Heads of State met as a small group at 11PMto try to unblock the situation. Unfortunately,

the rst two attempts at nding a compro-

mise failed. Heads of State attempted to reachagreement on a substantial political declara-

tion that would lead to decisions on four es-sential points: the future of the Kyoto Protocol,means of engagement by the U.S., vericationof action by developing countries, and longterm nancing. If Heads of State had come toterms on these overriding issues, the negotia-tions would have succeeded. But no consensusemerged. The Sherpas were thus back in playin the early morning, trying to nd a way tomove ahead.

Friday 18Heads of State returned late morning to presenttheir speeches at the plenary session. Despite aconciliatory tone, there were indications thatthe outcome might not be satisfactory.Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister, indi-cated some slight opening. Remaining rm onquestions of verication, he seemed to thinkthat some compromise was possible, provid-ed that certain limits were respected. He alsospecied that Chinas position was uncondi-tional, meaning that whatever happened in Co-penhagen, China would fulll its commitment,irrespective of nancial or technical support.

The commitment of Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva,the Brazilian President, was evident. He force-fully reafrmed his desire to reach agreement,not just any agreement but agreement of a sub-stantial nature, ruling out a mere political dec-laration to save face. He also widened the dis-cussion and surprisingly announced that Brazilwas ready to provide nancial and technologi-cal support to poor countries. He also stressedthat Brazils commitment was absolute.Barack Obama, the American President, couldgo only so far. His speech was more addressed

to his domestic audience than to other coun-tries. He is closely watched by his Congress,and is thus faced with considerable constraints.The rst part of his speech was reminiscent ofthe political process under way in the US. Thesecond was more directly linked to the negotia-tions. Barack Obama recalled the US two mainrequirements: set emission reduction targetsby large emitters and internationally veriableactions. At no point did he indicate even slightconcession, notably on the issue of differentia-tion, which could help move toward a compro-mise solution. On nance, he spoke of Hilary

Clintons proposal the previous day: that de-


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veloped countries mobilize 100 billion dollarsannually up to 2020 to support mitigation and

adaptation action by developing countries.Manmohan Singh, the Indian President, seemedpessimistic. He declared that we might well bedisappointed by the outcome at Copenhagen,but that this venue should be seen as a steppingstone towards an agreement in 2010. Thus heintended to limit his efforts at Copenhagen.Heads of State meet once again in a smallgroup. They continue working on the politicaldeclaration. The US and emerging countriesare in the centre of the negotiating process,even if the EU tries to keep them on track foran ambitious deal. The group produces differ-ent versions of the text. A small number of is-sues are subject to negotiations, and go backand forth in the consecutive versions:

Issue End game

Translation of this poli tical declaration

into a legally binding instrument next year

Disappears

50% reduction of global emissions in 2050

and date of the peak

Disappears

International verification of developing

countries actions

Stays

This table of pros and cons is based on a top

down analysis. It uses as a benchmark, not autopian deal, but the necessary deal to reachthe 2C target, which is the target set by thepolitical declaration. Based on that, the dealis a minimalist agreement, disappointing insubstance. But this is not the only way to lookat things. One should also look at the context.The pileup of countries redlines did not leaveroom for an ambitious agreement: the agree-ment found is somehow the lowest commondenominator:

The US did not give up anything. The tim-m

ing for the US was very bad, as its domesticlegislation is not yet passed.Emerging countries made a concession onmthe verication of their actions. The formulaused international consultations and analy-sis might sound like nothing. But it meansthat they get hooked into the internationalregime, which is a big step forward. Thisconcession allows them to show that theyact and that they will report in a transparentmanner.The EU tried to put pressure on the US andmemerging countries for a higher level of am-

bition, although quite unsuccessfully.

This is not the deal we hoped, but given the

context, and especially given the perceptionthat States had of their own national interests,this was probably the best possible deal. Thisis a deal that makes the best of a terrible situ-ation in which we were, but which should beaggressively and urgently strengthened.

This table represents winners and losers basedon the substance of the agreement. But some ofthe players that we put here as losers have en-dorsed the declaration, notably the EU and theAfrican group. Why? Because such an agree-ment is not only about substance but also, andperhaps mainly in this case, about process.States are rational players. And the rationalehere is twofold: interests and power.

Some European leaders Sarkozy, Merkel,mBrown backed by Lars Rasmussen took theinitiative of a political declaration, way be-fore Copenhagen. Plus, the EU pictures itselfas a climate leader, so it is difcult to be outof the deal. Some might argue that no dealwould have been better than a bad deal. Butthe deal is rst and foremost a deal between

the US and big emerging countries. And theUS has sold the deal as the deal of the mo-dernity, a deal which launches a new process.So it was difcult for the old Europe to beexcluded from this motion.The African countries endorsed the declara-mtion probably due to the prospect of receiv-ing money for adaptation.

What is next?The status of the Copenhagen Accord is highly

uncertain from both a political and legal per-spective.From a political perspective, it must be pointedout that the Copenhagen Accord was reached within a very diverse group of around 30Heads of States and Governments, represen-tatives from all UN regional groups, Least De- veloped Countries and the alliance of SmallIsland States, with a majority from develop-ing countries, whereas the UNFCCC appliesto its 193 Contracting Parties. Although these30 countries represent more than 80 % of theglobal CO2 emissions (keeping in mind that

Kyoto Parties cover only 30 % of emissions),


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IDDRI

the legitimacy of the Copenhagen Accord forpaving the way to the adoption of a compre-

hensive post 2012 global regime on climatechange depends on the context through whichcountries can be all represented to endorse itscontent.From a legal perspective, Decision CP.1/15 onlytakes note of the Copenhagen Accord, it doesneither decide upon nor agree with its content.As a matter of international law, the Copenha-gen Accord does not bind the Contracting Par-ties to the UNFCCC. In effect, the ContractingParties are only bound by the decisions theymake within the COP pursuant to the rules ofprocedure (applying on a provisional basis) in

accordance with Article 8 of the UNFCCC. Be-

cause it was informally reached in the marginsof the COP to the UNFCCC, the CopenhagenAccord can be just regarded as a political dec-laration which only expresses an intention toact from a number of well identied countries(who are listed before the preamble part of theAccord) with respect to the way they believethe UNFCCC should be implemented in orderto achieve its ultimate objective. Following the

compromise found in the COP Plenary on tak-

Who wins and who loses?

Winners Losers

US

The declaration sets no

additional obligations to

the US compared to what

it plans to do domestically;

its international target for

reducing emissions will

be the mere mirror of its

domestic legislation

It obtains the verification of

developing countries actions,

esp. those of China, through

international consultations

and analysis

It contributes much less(1/3) than other developed

countries (esp. EU and

Japan) to fast start finance

Big emerging countries,esp. China

They are not named and

shamed as the ones who are

responsible for the failure

of Copenhagen. They had to

make a concession on the

verification of their actions.

But it allows them to show

that they act and that they

will report in a transparent

manner.

KP Parties, esp. the EU

The declaration makes no

reference to a future legally

binding instrument at any

point in time.

It does not take a decision

on the future of the Kyoto

Protocol. So hypothetically

KP Parties find themselves

stuck within the KP whereas

the US is not there and

there will not be any other

legally binding instrument.

And there are no provisions

to ensure the comparabilitybetween the US and KP

Parties.

It contributes much more

than the US to fast start

finance

Small Island States

The declaration makes no

reference to a future legally

binding instrument at any

point in time.

The bottom up approach to

setting targets results in a

great inconsistency between

the long term goal andshort term targets. There

are no figures yet in the

declaration, but the addition

of current pledges is likely

to lead towards a 3 or even

3.5C increase, putting

there mere existence at a

very high risk. The Maldives

nevertheless endorsed the

declaration

African countries

African countries, like small island states, would suffer

enormously from a 3 or 3.5C increase that translates into a

more than 5C increase for Africa. Nevertheless, almost allAfrican countries endorsed the declaration, probably due to

the prospect of receiving money for adaptation.

Is it a good deal?

+ -

2C target

Quantified and economy

wide emission targets for all

developed countries

Increased frequency and

improved methodology

for the communication

of developing countries

mitigation actions

Verification of developing

countries mitigation

actions trough international

consultations and analysis

Fast start finance amounting

to 30 billion dollars for the

period 2010 2012

Developed countries set a

goal of mobilizing jointly

100 billion dollars a year by

2020 to address the needs of

developing countries

Creation of a High Level

Panel to study how to tap

alternatives sources of

finance

No reference to a future

legally binding instrument at

any point in time

Bottom up approach to

setting targets resulting in a

great inconsistency between

the long term goal and short

term targets

Not translated into a 50%

reduction of global emission

in 2050

Weak section on adaptation,

where response measures

are put on an equal foot

with the impacts of climatechange

No figures for developed

country targets before the 1st

of February 2010

No decision taken on the

future of the Kyoto Protocol

No comparability between

the US and KP Parties

No quantified goal for the

reduction of emissions from

deforestation and forest

degradation

Only 25.2 billion dollars

have been pledged, withan unfair burden sharing

(US contribution = 1/3 of

Europes), and no guarantee

on the fact that these

are new and additional

resources

No alternative sources of

finance tapped


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ing note of the Accord, many questions wereraised on what this Accord actually means

with regard to the work under the UNFCCCand the Kyoto Protocol. Actually, taking noteof should be understood as giving the pos-sibility to Contracting Parties to the UNFCCCto refer to the content of the Copenhagen Ac-cord, but within the work programme that hasbeen effectively decided by consensus amongall 193 Contracting Parties at the COP 15 andCOP/MOP5. In that respect, it must be notedthat Contracting Parties have agreed in Copen-hagen to extend both the mandate of the Con- vention Track (AWG LCA) and of the KyotoTrack (AWG KP) to COP16 that will take placein Mexico City, in November 2010.Therefore, the question is to know if and howthe Copenhagen Accord can help reach a con-sensus in both LCA and KP tracks in the com-ing months, on the road to Mexico.Because the Copenhagen Accord does not bindContracting Parties for the work to be contin-ued under the AWGs, some Parties may opposeto the establishment of a number of institu-tions that are foreseen in the Accord, such asthe Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. The es-tablishment of any such body would require

a formal decision under the COP if it is to beagreed upon within the UNFCCC. Some Partiesmay also argue that elements being discussedunder the Bali Road Map constitute a negotia-tion package from which elements should notbe picked and chosen for the purpose of animmediate implementation, all the more sinceif it is outside the UNFCCC context. However,the continuation of the two negotiating tracksmeans that the main controversial question ofthe continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and thelegally binding nature of the outcome under

the Convention track remains unresolved.Conversely, the implementation of the Copen-hagen Accord will depend upon the willing-ness of its signatory countries to make it hap-pen. Interestingly, the Copenhagen Accordhave endorsed Decision 1/CP.15 on the Ad hocWorking Group on Long-term Cooperative Ac-tion and decision 1/CMP.5 that requests the Adhoc Working Group on Further Commitmentsof Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol tocontinue its work. However, at the same time,the same countries have expressively agreedthat the Copenhagen Accord shall be opera-

tional immediately. One may consider that the

immediate implementation of the CopenhagenAccord is a mean to facilitate an agreement in

Mexico, in both LCA and KP tracks, notwith-standing the possibility to merge the two inthe end. Others may regard the immediateimplementation as a way to start now think-ing whether it can become a nucleus of a newinternational climate policy initiative, whichmay be used as an argument to promote thecreation of a World Environment Organization,or a UN Climate Change Security Council.In any case, how could the Copenhagen Accordbe immediately applicable? Firstly, February 1,2010 is a key date in the Accord, as it is thedeadline for countries to inscribe their targets,policies and measures into the Appendix of theAccord. If all 193 countries that are Parties tothe UNFCCC would be ready to do so, the Co-penhagen Accord could become the nucleus. Itcould trigger further support from the manydeveloping countries that were favourable toits adoption within the UNFCCC, and one couldstart thinking of how to set up the CopenhagenGreen Climate Fund. If this is not the case, onemay think that those pledges that will be madeby a limited number of countries could well twith the provisions of Article 7(2)(c) of the UN-

FCCC, which allow the COP to facilitate, at therequest of two or more Parties, the coordina-tion of measures adopted by them to addressclimate change and its effects. If that wouldbe the case, it may derail the UNFCCC processin as far as the facilitation of coordination ofmeasures among a limited number of coun-tries would lead to acknowledge the progres-sive fragmentation of the climate regime.Indeed, one may think twice before killing theCopenhagen Accord, because this would facili-tate the game of some radical countries who

play games within the UNFCCC, and who haveall means to continue such games until and af-ter Mexico. Most importantly is to know wheth-er the Copenhagen Accord can facilitate thediscussions in the US towards the adoption ofan ambitious domestic legislation. Indeed, thefurther developments of the US legislative pro-cess will be also key to the developments at theinternational level. Such development remainshighly uncertain all if one listens to the com-ments made by Congressmen in the US pressright after the end of the Copenhagen Confer-ence. The problem is also that the legal form

and nature of Copenhagen Accord does not


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provide the assurance to the USA that the fu-ture international climate regime will be based

on a bottom up approach where industrializedcountries only inscribe targets adopted at do-mestic level. However, the continuation of theMajor Economies Forum needs to be reectedon. Particular, if it would not be possible to setsomething meaningful up under the Copenha-gen Accord, the MEF could play an importantrole in the necessary international reectionprocess over the coming months with the USAon board within the UNFCCC or, the latter de-rails, within another international forum.

In the end, the Copenhagen Accord providedfor an open space to be lled in. It can be either

under the UNFCCC or another for a. The mainstumbling block to make it under the UNFCCCis the fact that Parties have decided to continueworking under the two track approach with nochange of working practices. Under these cir-cumstances, it will give an strong argument tosome countries that the Copenhagen Accordshould be further specied and operational-ized in a new context. Then comes the nalquestion: was it done on purpose to get out ofthe UNFCCC?n


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emman Grin, Matthi Wmar (IDDRI)

The Copenhagen Accord:

What happened?Is it a good deal?Who wins and wholoses? What is next?

copenhagan summit outcome

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