counterplans - ddi 2013 ss

8/13/2019 Counterplans - DDI 2013 SS

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/counterplans-ddi-2013-ss 1/73

Counterplans



===Cuba===



Press Release CP



NoteSolves perception based advantages…it’s a little shady so don’t keep this as you're a-strat.



1NC

Text: The United States federal government should

Issue a press release that says simply: The President, in consultation with

Congress, and without conceding America's explicit commitment to

promoting democracy and protecting human rights, will begin to

reconsider our policy towards Cuba. To that end, the Administration will

be convening a Cuba Study Group to reevaluate U.S.-Cuban relations.

Create a Cuba Study Group

First step to relations

Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy

Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IINThe White House and State Department should issue a press release that says simply: ¶ ¶ The President, in consultation with

Congress, and without conceding America's explicit commitment to promoting democracy and protecting human rights, will begin to

reconsider our policy towards Cuba. To that end, the Administration will be convening a Cuba Study Group to reevaluate U.S.-Cuban

relations.¶ ¶ This first step is entirely consistent with Secretary of State Clinton's statement to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee during her confirmation hearing, where she promised to review

America's Cuba policy. What this first step lacks in specificity, it makes up in potential: we

would not be committing ourselves to anything but an open mind. From this point forward we can

begin to understand how we can best approach Cuba by creating a "Cuba Study Group" that

can analyze the current situation and begin collecting official and unofficial contacts from

within Cuba. These contacts may prove to be invaluable, since the U.S. government currently lacks serious high-level contacts

or relationships within the Cuban government. Ultimately the Cuba Study Group will seek to answer the key

question that will dominate that reconsideration phase: What next?¶ Cuban exiles and Cuban-Americansshould not dominate this group, although each would bring invaluable insights to the table. The group's membership should

include men and women across America who have experience in academia, agriculture,

business, diplomacy, law, medicine, policymaking, and religion. Each member can then draw upon their

respective expertise, and solicit ideas from their respective communities around the United States. This group can then help

facilitate an incremental dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba.



Economic Liberalization QPQ CP



1NC (Embargo QPQ)

Text: The United States federal government should remove the Cuban embargo

if and only if Cuba accepts a policy of economic liberalization.

Solves relations and political reforms – empirics


Recommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN

The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change . To

that end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage

economic liberalization, rather than focusing on political conditions.¶ (4A) Economic Liberalization

Precedes Political Liberalization¶ ¶ American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing

political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make

economic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track

of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change

necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of

view does not change our objectives - it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives. ¶ The notion of offering a quid

pro quo - easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has always been impossible

because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there

would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and

constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will [*207] feel less

pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the

populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in

his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous

amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthen

Washington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America

to engage the island directly. n53¶ However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on

the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doingan end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and

government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains

the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will

always be stalemate . Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that

economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions

flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union;

n54 in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam,

the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in China, an unmistakably

capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. n57 Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the

Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed

out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58¶ Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political

reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of

austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its

monopolistic grip on politics for as long as [*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the

economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a "listening tour" around the island he also initiated a

series of debates.¶ During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April

2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency

system. n59 Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the



totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed

through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than

focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban

relations.

Conditioning liberalization on embargo solves



(4B) Washington's Policies Should Encourage Economic Liberalization¶ ¶ The importance of this argument

cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least two

things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due

credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For

example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows

its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge

their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing small-

scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised - not belittled - and followed by

positive reinforcement by Washington.¶ Second, since these economic changes will be prerequisites for any significant political

reforms on the island, Washington should focus its short-term diplomatic efforts on an open Cuban

market, rather than an open Cuban polity. This might mean easing or restructuring, though not

necessarily fully eliminating, restrictions on trade, travel, and remittances, in order to encourage more

private economic activity. In these ways, the U.S. can help awaken Cuba's nascent economic society, providing the

necessary impetus for political reform.



1NC (Financial Community QPQ)

Text: The United States federal government should grant Cuba membership

into the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank if and only if Cuba accepts a policy of economic

liberalization.

Solves relations and political reforms – empirics



The United States should recognize that economic change is a precursor to political change . To

that end, the Obama Administration should craft its Cuba policy to emphasize and encourage

economic liberalization, rather than focusing on political conditions.¶ (4A) Economic Liberalization

Precedes Political Liberalization¶ ¶ American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing

political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should makeeconomic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track

of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change

necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of

view does not change our objectives - it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives. ¶ The notion of offering a quid

pro quo - easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has always been impossible

because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there

would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and

constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will [*207] feel less

pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the

populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in

his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous

amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthenWashington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America

to engage the island directly. n53¶ However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on

the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing

an end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and

government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains

the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will

always be stalemate . Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that

economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions

flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union;

n54 in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam,the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in China, an unmistakably

capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. n57 Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the

Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed

out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58¶ Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political

reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of

austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its

monopolistic grip on politics for as long as [*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the

economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a "listening tour" around the island he also initiated a



series of debates.¶ During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April

2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency

system. n59 Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the

totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed

through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than

focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban

relations.

Conditioning liberalization on membership into international financial

community solves



Another method Washington can use to lure Cuba into economic reform is membership into the

international financial community. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the

Inter-American Development Bank each have rules for borrowing money and can encourage

liberalization in Cuba by making their respective funds available as a carrot to incentivize

liberalization. n60 These regional and global economic organizations have [*209] rules and procedures that are

technically independent of the U.S. Congress. By couching these reforms in terms of

obligations to transnational financial organizations, any economic progress can be insulated

from the anti-American rhetoric that would otherwise follow their painful implementation.

Ending the U.S. opposition to the reengagement of the international financial community with

Cuba would go a long way toward promoting economic liberalization. n61



2NC



---AT: Transition = slow

Transition will be slow but net beneficial. Immediate transition alienates the

population – China proves

Perez 10 (David A. – J.D. Yale Law; “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A PolicyRecommendation for the U.S. State Department”; Harvard Latino Law Review; 2010; Lexis) IIN (4C) The Economic Transition Will Be Slow¶ ¶ Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after

Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to

preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as

not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that

choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic

doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing

Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would

forestall any economic recovery . On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market

reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the

population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be

to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually

useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will

not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market

reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban

discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist

Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.¶

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely

implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful

patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can

quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical

economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [*210] state-sector, would be a

far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.¶ China and Vietnam have both introduced market

reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path ofliberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one

might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically - especially at first. The

stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic

turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has

little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make

the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as

a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban

government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be

short-circuited before it takes off the ground.¶ Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while

putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern.

Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban

people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability tofocus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used

as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably

painful transition.¶



XO CP



NoteThis would only work for teams that eased restrictions i.e. Amir and Kyle who substantially

reduce the embargo…



Solvency

XO solves – Clinton, Bush, and Obama prove

Propst 11 (Stephen F. – Partner Hogan Lovells US LLP; “Presidential Authority to Modify

Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba StudyGroup and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings

Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN

Introduction¶ On January 14, 2011, President Obama announced measures to significantly loosen the U.S.

sanctions¶ against Cuba, including broad new authorizations for travel and non-family

remittances to support private economic¶ activity in Cuba. These changes were made without prior

Congressional approval and are only the latest in a string¶ of modifications to the Cuba sanctions that have been

implemented solely under the President’s executive authority.¶ Along with the political and policy debates over the President’s

actions, there will undoubtedly be some who question ¶ whether the President had sufficient legal authority to make these changes.

This paper reviews the sources of the¶ President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions and concludes that executive authority is

broad enough to support¶ not only the changes announced to date, but also a range of additional measures to ease restrictions. 1 ¶ I.

Overview¶ Through a complex series of federal statutes, Congress has codified the comprehensive U.S. economic¶ sanctions

against Cuba and restricted the President’s authority to suspend or terminate those sanctions until

a¶ “transition government” is in power in Cuba. Notwithstanding these statutory requirements, the President

maintains¶ broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba

sanctions regime in support of ¶ particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by

Congress, including the provision of humanitarian support for¶ the Cuban people and the

promotion of democratic reforms. In fact, since Congress codified of the Cuba sanctions¶ in 1996, Presidents

Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease the scope of restrictions¶

applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba

sanctions is¶ grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the

President and the responsible¶ executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions

through executive actions, regulations and licenses.¶ The authority is particularly broad in certain

areas, such as telecommunications-related transactions and¶ humanitarian donations, where

Congress has explicitly granted discretion to the President under existing statutes.

XO solves easing restrictions


Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study

Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings

Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN

Consistent with the relevant statutory authorities and restrictions, as well as statutory statements of ¶ U.S. policy objectives, the

President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following types of additional¶ changes to the

current U.S. sanctions against Cuba:¶ • Establishing “general licenses” for existing categories of travel to

Cuba that are currently authorized¶ only by specific licenses;¶ • Expanding existing categories of

authorized travel to include new travel provisions (along the same¶ lines as the new authorization announcedon January 14, 2011 for travel related to non-academic¶ clinics and workshops in Cuba);¶ • Revising

existing general and specific license provisions to ease or eliminate current limitations and¶ conditions

applicable to travel and remittances to Cuba;¶ • Establishing a new general license for the

provision of services to Cuba (along the same lines as the¶ March 2010 revision that authorized services to

facilitate Internet communications);¶ • Establishing a general license for entry into U.S. ports of

vessels engaged in trade with Cuba;¶ • Permitting payment for authorized transactions with

Cuba (except sales of agricultural commodities¶ or products) to be financed through letters of credit or other



financing arrangements issued,¶ confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions (but subject to

statutory restrictions on the¶ extension of credit for transactions involving “confiscated property”);¶ • Authorizing imports

of certain goods and services from Cuba;¶ • Modifying current export control regulations to

establish more favorable licensing policies for¶ additional categories of items that may be

exported under specific licenses;¶ • Establishing additional license exceptions for exports of

U.S.-origin goods to Cuba; and¶ • Expanding the availability of existing license exceptions to

cover additional categories of exports and¶ easing conditions and limitations on the use of

those exceptions.

XO solves all the following


Economic Sanctions Against Cuba” ; A legal analysis prepared at the request of the Cuba Study

Group and released in connection with a forum on U.S.-Cuba Relations at The Brookings

Institution, 15 February 2011; Hogan Lovells) IIN¶ III. Statutory and Regulatory Support for Presidential Authority to Modify Cuba Sanctions ¶ Notwithstanding this framework of

successive federal statutes mandating sanctions against Cuba, the¶ President retains broad authority to

significantly modify and even ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions.¶ This conclusion issupported by two separate reports prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”), ¶ following detailed reviews of the

statutory framework and regulatory actions taken by the executive branch since the ¶ enactment of Helms-Burton in 1996.52

Specifically, the reports prepared at the behest of Congress in 1998 and in ¶ 2009 concluded that (i) the President still maintains

“broad discretion” to make additional modifications to the Cuba¶ sanctions; and (ii) prior measures, implemented by the executive

branch that have had the effect of easing specific¶ restrictions of the Cuba sanctions, have been consistent with statutory mandates

and within the discretionary¶ authority of the President.53¶ The statutory and regulatory provisions supporting

the President’s authority to modify the Cuba sanctions¶ include the following:¶ • Article II,

Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which vests broad powers in the President to¶ conduct the

foreign affairs of the United States.54¶ • Section 602(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act and

Section 5(b) of TWEA (under which the CACR was¶ established), which grant broad authority and discretion to the President

to establish and make¶ changes to embargoes established thereunder.55¶ • Paragraph 2 of

Proclamation 3447, which explicitly grants authority to the Secretary of Treasury to¶ make such exceptions by

license or otherwise to the prohibition on imports from Cuba as he¶ determines to beconsistent with the effective operation of the embargo.¶ • Paragraph 3 of Proclamation 3447,

which explicitly authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to¶ “continue, make, modify or revoke” exceptions to

the prohibition on all exports to Cuba.¶ • Section 515.201 of the CACR that was in effect in March 1996,

which prohibits dealings in property¶ in which Cuba or Cuban nationals have an interest, but explicitly references the

authority of the¶ Secretary of Treasury to establish exceptions to the prohibitions by means of

regulations, rulings,¶ instructions, licenses, or otherwise.56¶ • Section 515.533 of the CACR that

was in effect in March 1996, which provides a “general license”¶ authorizing exports to Cuba that have

been specifically licensed or otherwise authorized by the¶ Department of Commerce (but subject

to certain conditions on the financing of such export¶ transactions).57¶ • Section 515.801 of the CACR that was in effect

in March 1996, which sets forth the authority of the ¶ Secretary of Treasury to grant general and specific licenses for

transactions otherwise prohibited¶ under the CACR.58¶ • Section 1703 of the CDA, which states theU.S. Government’s policy of seeking a peaceful transition¶ to democracy and resumption of

economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of ¶ sanctions directed at the Castro

government and support for the Cuban people.59¶ • Section 1705 of the CDA, which further

elaborates upon the policy of providing support for the Cuban¶ people through specific types

of authorized activities.60¶ • Sections 2 and 3 of Helms-Burton, which reaffirm the objective of

providing support for the Cuban¶ people.61¶ • Section 102(h) of Helms-Burton, which codified

the CACR as it existed in March 1996, including the¶ authority of the Secretary of Treasury to exercise licensing



authority.62¶ • Section 109(a) of Helms-Burton, which authorizes the President to “furnish assistance and

provide¶ other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to

support democracy¶ building efforts for Cuba.”63



===Mexico===



ITS CP



NoteThis is for the Points of Entry aff --- make sure in CX you clarify that the aff only modernizes

border tech and express lanes… for, my understanding of the aff is that it only does that much.

The CP could also apply to any cross-border affs as long as you change the CP text!

Sorry for not writing the 1NC



Solvency

ITDS solves

Bochner et al. 2001 (Brian Bochner, Bill Stockton, Dock Burke Texas Transportation Institute

Texas A&M University System; "A prototype southern border facility to expedite NAFTA trucksentering the United States." the Proceeding of the 80th Annual Meeting of the Transportation

Research Board, Paper. No. 01-0406; 2001; http://bordercross.tamu.edu/about/trb_paper_01-

0406.pdf ) IIN

¶ A factor favoring the use of technology at the border is that North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA) truck traffic is dominated by large companies—those that have adopted relatively high

levels of technology adoption in the areas of communications, computers, and software. If

technologies can be selected that reduce border crossing time and costs, it is likely that the

large NAFTA trucking companies will adopt them.¶ This paper is based on a Texas Senate initiative (Senate Bill

913) to examine the possibility of expediting current port of entry processing of commercial vehicles

entering the United States of America (USA) from Mexico. The paper describes the basic prototype plan and

operational concept proposed for northbound commercial border inspection stations with automated processing. The prototype

would use the International Trade Data System (ITDS) currently under development by the U.S.federal inspection agencies. This database would use Intelligent Transportation Technologies

to link ITDS and the inspection process. This combination of a consolidated electronic database and appropriate

Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) technologies can significantly reduce border crossing delays by

most commercial vehicles without compromising the processes required by the federal and

state agencies responsible for interdiction and law enforcement. The paper suggests the desirability of bi-

national links to improve system efficiency, and provides a basis for more effectively accommodating growth in traffic and the

adoption of new technologies to improve agency performance.

ITS solves efficiency and safety of border crossing

Crainic et al. 09 (Crainic T.G., Gendreau M., Potvin J.-Y. “Intelligent freight-transportation

systems: Assessment and the contribution of operations research”; (2009) Transportation

Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 17 (6) , pp. 541-557;

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X08000648) IIN

3. Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO)¶ The Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO) area of ITS has been defined as

“Advanced systems aimed at simplifying and automating freight and fleet management

operations at the institutional level”, Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) programs

targeting, in particular, safety information exchanges, electronic credentials administration, and roadside electronic screening.¶

National or regional authorities, in collaboration with carriers and firms that propose the required technologies, usually initiate CVO

projects. The goal is to increase the performance of the infrastructure (mostly highways) and

customs systems, simplify and automate government control-related freight and fleet

management operations, and, thus, enhance the efficiency of commercial vehicle activities

through seamless operations based on electronic vehicle and cargo identification, location and

tracking, pre-clearance and in-motion verifications. These systems rely heavily on vehicle or cargo positioning

systems (GPS or radio frequency networks), bi-directional communications (DSRC, radio, satellite, or wireless phone), and EDI. The

importance of CVO applications has been acknowledged quite early on in ITS history, and a significant number of CVO projects have

been undertaken or are currently under way.¶ Initial deployment efforts of CVO technologies have been

organised around the so-called “corridors”. A corridor is typically organised around a major

highway, or a system of highways, that cross several regional or national jurisdictions. The

goal is to increase the fluidity of truck traffic and to offer seamless interstate or inter-nation

border crossings, while ensuring adequate levels of control and reporting relative to

regulations on safety, traffic, customs, and so on. Weight-in-motion scales, overweight detectors, EDI, automatic

vehicle (and cargo) identification and classification systems, vision technology (to read license plates), and variable message signs

http://bordercross.tamu.edu/about/trb_paper_01-0406.pdf








are among the main technologies used. Corridor projects usually involve national and local governments and agencies, private

technology providers (who, sometimes, also contribute significantly to the financing of the technology deployment), and, obviously,

carriers.

ITS would be a PPP venture

Crainic et al. 09 (Crainic T.G., Gendreau M., Potvin J.-Y. “Intelligent freight-transportationsystems: Assessment and the contribution of operations research”; (2009) Transportation

Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 17 (6) , pp. 541-557;

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0968090X08000648) IIN

Integration for ITS and e-business alike is not a simple task, however, as it must engage with a large array of

disparate entities covering three broad areas: technical, political, and geographical. At the

technical level, ITS brings together the fields of transportation planning, telecommunications,

computing, vehicle and electronics manufacturing, and infrastructure construction. Many

stakeholders are involved in the development, deployment, and operation of ITS: government agencies at the national, regional, and

municipal levels, highway operators, carriers, equipment manufacturers, system vendors, service operators, etc. They must all

collaborate to implement and run a system that is composed of a mixture of public and

private assets, means and services. A geographical integration must also be achieved at

regional and, in many cases, international levels. An end user, a container carrier for example,

would not like to be forced to buy a different set of equipment for each city or country it

intends to travel to. Intelligent Transportation systems are all about mobility, they are not

meant to infringe on it. The efforts aimed at the development of standards and national architectures attempt to address

these issues.

PPP solve freight

Wisetjindawat 10 (Wisinee – Departmet of Civil Engineering Nagoya Institute of Technology

Gokiso-cho, Showa-ku Nagoya, Aichi; “REVIEW OF GOOD PRACTICES IN URBAN FREIGHT

TRANSPORT A TION”¶ As part of the project¶ ECO-EFFICIENT AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA UNESCAP”; April 30, 2010;

http://www.escap.asia/ttdw/common/TPT/egm_eco_efficiency/dr_wisinee_report.pdf ) IINPublic Private Partnership (PPP) is the most recommended organizational structure for freight

facilities. The Public sector should subsidize and/or organize the facilities together with private sector entities. Initial

funding for research work and pilot studies should be provided by the government sector. It

important to note that the key to success for most schemes is the enthusiasm of the private sector

operators participating in the project. The development of an understanding of the benefits of

sustainable transport among private sector operators is very important since the benefits in

reduced cost are not always obvious, and can cause the private sector to lose interest in the

long run.

Requiring upfront private sector financing avoids politics and spending linksCooper, 12 - Donna Cooper is a Senior Fellow with the Economic Policy team at the Center for

American Progress (“Meeting the Infrastructure Imperative”, 2/16,

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/infrastructure.html)//DH

Private investors have partnered with state or local governments to build roads, expand highway

systems, and build or repair bridges. Typically in this case the private investor pays the public entity upfront an

estimated market value for the transportation asset, and then is required under an agreement

to cover the cost of improving the asset. In addition, these agreements permit the investor to charge tolls or receive

dedicated tax payments while also establishing clear maintenance requirements. Investors enter into these agreements where the

http://www.escap.asia/ttdw/common/TPT/egm_eco_efficiency/dr_wisinee_report.pdf


http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/infrastructure.html)/DH






tolls or dedicated taxes are projected to cover all costs and profits and are most attractive to investors when the level of earnings

has the potential to exceed projections. Federal credit subsidies lower the overall project costs, which in turn reduces the pressure

on tolls and/or dedicated taxes, which then has the positive results of making a project more politically

and financially feasible.

Congress wants greater P3’s because of opposition to spendingMarks, 11 - guest editor of Infrastructure Journal and partner in Milbank Tweed Hadley and

McCloy’s Global Project Finance¶ (Allan, “U.S. Infrastructure: Challenges, Politics and

Opportunities,” 4/11, http://www.milbank.com/images/content/6/6/6634/MARKS-US-

Infrastructure-Infrastructure-Journal-04-11-2011-.pd.pdf)//DH

¶ Despite ongoing reports from analysts about the ailing state of infrastructure in the United ¶ States, the US Congress

continues to focus more on the federal budget deficit than the ¶ infrastructure deficit.¶ Although

securing financing for new infrastructure projects can be a challenge, the recession ¶ has created an excellent opportunity to take

advantage of historically low interest rates and ¶ underutilized construction capacity to invest in critically needed infrastructure

upgrades. ¶ Because there has been less and less money available from traditional funding sources

to ¶ meet the ever-growing need, both for new capacity and to repair and upgrade aging

facilities, ¶ governments at federal, state, and local levels have been reluctant to invest in many

new ¶ projects and have stalled existing projects. Fortunately, public-private partnerships (PPPs) ¶ offer an attractivetool to bridge this gap.¶



Commissions CP 1NC Shells



CP 1NC (Energy Policy Specific)The United States Congress should establish an independent bipartisan commission

empowered to submit to Congress recommendations for energy policy. Congress and the

executive will delegate authority to the commission to create recommendations and allow 90

days to pass legislation maintaining existing legislative baselines. If Congress does not passlegislation revising the Commission’s recommendations within the specified period, those

recommendations will enter into legal force. The Commission should recommend to Congress

that the United States federal government should (do the plan).

Competes---the CP’s policy statement is not legally binding---it doesn’t enact

the plan, it simply recommends its mandates

Koch 5(Charles H. Koch 5, the Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law, Spring 2005, “Policymaking by the

Administrative Judiciary,” Alabama Law Review, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 693, p. lexis n110 E.g., Consol Edison Co of New York v. FERC, 315

F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir 2003))

"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry the "force of law," because

they lack "present binding effect " on the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established policy

statement, it may decide the case using that policy statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Id. n111 One

brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements of policy," may not have a binding effect on the agency ,

resulting in even more ambiguous application to administrative judges Several courts distinguish statements of

policy from other nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which

control the agency For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these terms An agency policy

statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm. It merely

represents an agency position with respect to how it will treat--typically enforce--the governing legal norm By

issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its current enforcement

or adjudicatory approach . . . Policy statements are binding on neither the public, nor the

agency Syncor Int'l Corp v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A statement might not be binding

because it serves the dual purpose of "informing the public of the agency's future plans

and priorities for exercising its discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to

agency personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its discretionary powers in specific cases.

Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a

"binding norm." Id. at 1014 Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny

the statement some effect. Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same effect Ronald in

Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L J 1497, 1503 (1992).

And, it solves the entirety of the case and avoids politicsRothkopf 11

(David Rothkopf, Prof @ Columbia and Georgetown and CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign

Policy, he also taught international affairs and national security studies at Columbia University's

School of International and Public Affairs and Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, The time

for a White House-led national energy policy is right now, October 26, 2011

http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/26/

the_time_for_a_white_house_led_national _energy_policy_is_right_now)



It is currently conventional wisdom in Washington that the president will have a difficult time advancing any major new policy

initiatives between now and the election. It would be a mistake for the president and unfortunate for the country were that to prove

to be an accurate forecast. Fortunately, nothing is more suspect than Washington's conventional wisdom. Further, it is fully in the

president's power to challenge the low expectations of political professionals and average citizens everywhere by building his

campaign around not only a rehash of what he has accomplished and a wish list of things for the future, but by enlivening it with

meaningful, major new efforts that he is undertaking immediately due to the urgency of the challenges the United States faces. One

area in which such an effort is not just needed but is effectively several generations overdue is energy policy. To date, the

administration's efforts in the area of energy have concentrated on greening the U.S. energy mix and the jobs that green energy

might bring. While worthy, the efforts have been bogged down and undercut for a variety of reasons: ranging from the tacticaldecision to put health care ahead of energy among policy priorities, the inflated and dubious nature of many green job provisions,

the success of climate skeptics in impeding the cap-and-trade debate, and the recent kerfuffle over Solyndra (and, by extension,

government energy loan programs, alternative energy programs in general, and the whole idea of "picking winners" associated with

some elements of green energy policy). The Energy Department even initiated a worthy Quadrennial

Technology Review that mimicked the Quadrennial Defense Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and the

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review processes at Defense, Homeland Security, and State respectively. But it was

not a broad-gauge energy policy and the U nited S tates has been in need of such a policy for

decades. There have been abortive efforts in that direction but they have been compromised or stopped short

of becoming a regular element of U.S. government policy making . One reason for the problem is that

despite the fact that the D epartment O f E nergy was created to help ensure the creation of such

policies during the 1970s, it is simply incapable of overseeing the development of the kind of

comprehensive policy that is needed. Unlike defense policy or diplomacy policy, critical components of a

true energy policy are managed not in one agency but across the entirety of the U.S.

government. It is a domestic and an international issue, a security and an economic issue, a regulatory,

financial, diplomatic, and environmental issue. Furthermore, for better or for worse, energy issues have tended

to become too politicized by different special interests. Recognizing the need for a "whole of government"

approach to the issue, the Bush administration put Vice President Dick Cheney in charge of its effort in this

direction. But because of his perceived closeness to certain segments of the energy community (which is far more diverse than

typically understood), the process was sidetracked. Similarly, Obama's efforts to date have been impeded because, as one senior

official said to me, they have been "too tied up in the climate issue." But of course, the reason an energy policy is so essential is

because real energy policy is not just about green jobs, it is about every single job in the United States . Every business

depends on access to energy. So do individual citizens and the economy as a whole. Energy, the largest industrialsector in the world, touches every other sector in profound ways. Interruptions in supply, spikes in prices,

changes in regulation, shifts in demand, and innovations in technology have ripple effects that go from border to border, from the

top to the bottom of the economy. Indeed, part of the problem with the Obama administration's framing

of energy issues is that it has been too narrowly focused on new technology and regulation. Not only

does energy require a "whole of government" approach, it demands a "whole of economy"

approach and above and beyond that a "whole of U.S. national interests" vision. The president could initiate a

regular, institutionalized, interagency, economy-wide, holistic energy policy development

process without congressional approval -- though he should do it with active bipartisan consultation.

He contemplated this during his transition when the idea of an Energy Policy Council or Energy Security Council was contemplated,

advocated by at the time by folks like campaign honcho and thoughtful energy-policy thinker, former White House Chief of Staff

John Podesta. Because the approach needs to be interagency, it should be directed out of theWhite House. And because energy security and economic security need to drive it, it should be quarterbacked by

National Security Advisor Tom Donilon with the support of National Economic Advisor Gene Sperling.

The NSC has more staff, so it should probably lead on this. The D epartment O f E nergy could serve as a kind of

secretariat and coordinate key components. But vital issues go well beyond their scope of work and capabilities

and pertain to questions like regional stability, access to sea lanes, resource competition, currency policy, etc. While there is a

fondness and precedent for quadrennial reviews in the federal government at the moment, it might make



sense for this to be more frequent, possibly biennial , especially given the speed of

developments in this area. If a congressional mandate for the approach can be won, terrific. If it can

be done by executive order, terrific. Who could possibly rationally oppose the development of

such a policy?¶ In an election year, of course, such an effort would seem timely and be widely

supported -- especially with all eyes on the economy , with so many tens of millions of jobs

supported directly and indirectly by the energy sector, and with so many watershed developments

possible in areas like supply (shale gas, offshore gas, oil sands, the Arctic) and technology (efficiency tops the list),

even revenue generation (the tax policy implications are great and reform opportunities, even those fueled by some kind

of market-driven energy or carbon mechanism would be well worth considering). We are on the verge of real transformation at

home and around the world in this area -- in traditional as well as new forms of energy, with the vastly increased possibilities of U.S.

domestic supply one of the few clear potential game changers for the U.S. economy. (China's domestic energy development policy

focuses on "energy under foot." I'm not for slavishly following Chinese policies ... but "under foot" would be a good place to look for

our security and growth, too.)¶ Developing the policy would take us into 2013 and either the second term of the Obama

administration or the first term of a new administration. But America should not wait until then to address this

vital set of concerns ... and much can be done during the year ahead to send a strong message

that a time of critical national and economic security we are not sitting on our hands. President

Obama can launch such an effort,

get credit for it,

and address a long overdue need withinthe

U.S. policy apparatus.



CP 1NC (Generic)

The United States Congress should establish an independent bipartisan commission

empowered to submit to Congress recommendations for international economic policy.

Congress and the executive will delegate authority to the commission to createrecommendations and allow 90 days to pass legislation maintaining existing legislative

baselines. If Congress does not pass legislation revising the Commission’s recommendations

within the specified period, those recommendations will enter into legal force. The

Commission should recommend to Congress that the United States federal government

should (do the plan).

Competes---the CP’s policy statement is not legally binding---it doesn’t enact

the plan, it simply recommends its mandates

Koch 5(Charles H. Koch 5, the Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law, Spring 2005, “Policymaking by the

Administrative Judiciary,” Alabama Law Review, 56 Ala. L. Rev . 693, p. lexis n110 E.g., Consol Edison Co of New York v. FERC, 315

F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir 2003))

"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry the "force of law," because

they lack "present binding effect " on the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established policy

statement, it may decide the case using that policy statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Id. n111 One

brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements of policy," may not have a binding effect on the agency,

resulting in even more ambiguous application to administrative judges Several courts distinguish statements of

policy from other nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which

control the agency For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these terms An agency policy

statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or interpret a legal norm. It merely

represents an agency position with respect to how it will treat--typically enforce--the governing legal norm By

issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its current enforcement

or adjudicatory approach . . . Policy statements are binding on neither the public, nor the

agency Syncor Int'l Corp v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A statement might not be binding

because it serves the dual purpose of "informing the public of the agency's future plans

and priorities for exercising its discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to

agency personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its discretionary powers in specific cases.

Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a

"binding norm." Id. at 1014 Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny

the statement some effect. Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same effect Ronald in

Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 DUKE L J 1497, 1503 (1992).

CP solve--commissions can be tasked with any issue

Campbell 2



(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,

visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:

Government by Commission)

The creation of temporary, independent bodies that give advice to Congress, develop

common-sense recommendations on complex policy issues, and find broadly acceptable

solutions to contentious problems, is an important yet under-investigated area of

congressional delegation. The term “commission” is a prevalent catch-phrase, but

these entities have taken several names. Whether designated as blue-ribbon

commissions, committees, councils, boards, or task forces, they consist mostly of

nonelected officials, deal with major social crises and policy issues, and perform

technical studies. With variations to fit the circumstances, Congress creates

commissions to accomplish diverse goals: to cope with increases in the scope and

complexity of legislation, forge consensus, draft bills, finesse institutional obstacles,

involve noncommittee and junior members in issues, coordinate strategy, and

promote interparty communication. Commissions deal with issues as disparate as pay

raises, obsolete military bases, the budget deficit, Medicare, flue-cured tobacco, wartime

relocation and internment of civilians, amateur boxing, telemedicine, government

reform, and the regulation of professional baseball.



2NC Solvency



Overview

CP solves 100% of the case plus the net benefit- an independent agency

submitting a recommendation to do the plan would build consensus in order to

pass the plan- that’s Rothkopf

It’s competitive because its recommendation doesn’t carry the force of law, but

rather it’s an establishment of an agency position on an issue- that’s Koch

The result of the CP is indistinguishable from the plan--- it leads to the

consensus of doing the plan---nobody will perceive a difference between the

plan and the CP for the purpose of solvency and if they do, they’ll comply with

the CP as though it were binding.

View any solvency deficits through a lens of optimal vs. sufficient



Generic 2nc Solvency

CP is competitive and solves the case - Guidance documents have the power of

law but are not binding – agencies voluntarily comply with rules

Hunnicutt 99 (James JD – Boston College Law School “NOTE: Another Reason to Reform theFederal Regulatory System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law” Boston

College Law Review December, 41 B.C. L. Rev 153)

Rules created without process--interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of

agency organization and other nonlegislative rules--generally cannot have legally binding

effects. 117 In administrative and judicial proceedings, nonlegislative rules are not treated as law, but as influential agency

thought that may factor into a proceeding's outcome. 118 According to the courts, nonlegislative rules cannot be the decisive factor

in a court proceeding or enforcement action. 119 For example, in 1986, in Thomas v. New York, the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit held that a letter written by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency could not have binding

legal effects because it had not been subjected to notice-and-comment process. 120 Several eastern states--including New York,

national environmental groups, American citizens owning property in Canada and a Congressman brought suit against Lee Thomas,

Administrator of the EPA under President Reagan in the early 1980s, for not revising certain air pollution standards. 121 Prior to

Thomas taking the helm of the EPA, Douglas Costle had been the EPA's Administrator under President Carter. 122 Days before

Reagan took office, Costle wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Edmund Muskie indicating that based on the findings of an

official joint American-Canadian commission, he believed pollution emitted by the United States was responsible for causing acid

rain in Canada. 123 According to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, if the Administrator of the EPA determines that

American air pollution is causing significant harm in Canada, the EPA must order the states causing the acid rain to reduce [*172] air

pollution. 124 Then, those states would be obligated to intensify the regulation of the private parties contributing to air pollution

within the states' jurisdictions. 125 The new Administrator, Thomas, chose to ignore the letter. 126 Intent on reducing acid rain in

Canada, the plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the letter obliged the EPA to force the generating states to revise their air pollution

controls. 127 The court found that the letter constituted a rule within the meaning of the APA and that it had not been created as a

result of any rulemaking process. 128 The court reasoned that the rule did not fall within any of the § 553(b)(A) exceptions because

it affected individual rights and obligations by causing the states to heighten their regulations, which would result in the termination

or restriction of numerous utilities and manufacturers. 129 Because the EPA had not followed the notice-and-comment process to

create the rule, the EPA was not required to constrain its discretion by abiding by the letter. 130 The holding in Thomas evidences

the principle that nonlegislative rules cannot have binding legal effects. 131 Reality, however, may differ from this principle. 132 B.

Agencies May Try to Apply Nonlegislative Rules as Law Against Private Parties When agencies treat a nonlegislative

rule as law, those rules will have the practical effect of binding law because people tend to

acquiesce to that which the government informs them constitutes the law. 133 Mostmembers of the public assume all agency rules constitute legitimate law, so they simply

conform to all rules. 134 By treating nonlegislative [*173] rules as law, agencies can convince the public into following

nonlegislative rules. 135 Occasionally, agencies rely upon nonlegislative rules for enforcement actions. 136 For example, in 1989 in

United States v. Picciotto, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed a conviction based upon a nonlegislative rule

because, by virtue of prescribing unlawful conduct, the rule imposed binding obligations on the public. 137 In 1981, Concepcion

Picciotto began a six year, twenty-four-hour-per-day protest against nuclear war across the street from the White House in

LaFayette Park. 138 In 1988 the Park Service issued an "additional condition" without performing any notice-and-comment

procedures. 139 The additional condition prohibited the storage of property in LaFayette Park beyond that which is reasonably

necessary to stage a twenty-four hour protest. 140 A Park Service police officer arrested Picciotto for violating the additional

condition. 141 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found her guilty and gave her a ten-day suspended prison

sentence and six months unsupervised probation. 142 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the additional

condition was substantive because it imposed obligations enforceable by criminal penalty, even though the Park Service had created

it without notice-and-comment. 143 Although Picciotto won her appeal, this case demonstrates how agencies may create rules

without notice-and-comment and treat them as binding law. 144 Besides initiating or threatening enforcement actions based on

nonlegislative rules, agencies often rely on them to grant or deny applications and permits. 145 Similarly, federal [*174] agencies canutilize nonlegislative rules to influence programs administered by the states. 146 As the trial court did in Picciotto, courts sometimes

agree with the agencies and treat nonlegislative rules as binding law. 147 For instance, in 1993, in United States v. American

National Red Cross, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued an injunction against the Red Cross, as part of a settlement,

ordering the Red Cross to conform with all of the FDA's nonlegislative rules regarding blood. 148 Concerned with the integrity of the

blood supply, the FDA passed numerous legislative and nonlegislative rules regarding how blood was to be handled. 149 Finding that

the Red Cross had failed to meet the standards imposed by the FDA, the court specifically differentiated between the FDA's

legislative rules and nonlegislative rules, and ordered the Red Cross to abide by both. 150 Therefore, rules created without notice-

and-comment became binding law for the Red Cross. 151 [*175] C. Analysis of the Legal Effects of Nonlegislative Rules The situation

in Red Cross must be avoided because it robs the public of the opportunity to offer input on nonlegislative rules. 152 Because the

Red Cross, the FDA and the court agreed to this settlement, the FDA's nonlegislative rules regarding blood bind the Red Cross, even



though the rules create new law, impose legal obligations, have immediate effects, are not necessarily published in the Federal

Register and may have significant effects on the public. 153 Moreover, the public lost the opportunity to participate in the creation

of laws that will affect many people, including patients in need of blood transfusions. 154 When courts allow nonlegislative rules to

have substantive effects on the public, they undermine the foundation underlying the APA and the notice-and-comment procedures

therein. 155 Nonlegislative rules should not impose obligations or immediate effects on the public, and courts and agencies should

strive to avoid using them in such a manner. Too often, nonlegislative rules have a practical binding legal

effect because people do not realize those rules are not binding. The parties affected by the

rules choose to acquiesce to the rules rather than attract agency attention, they lack theresources to challenge the rules, or they have already fought the rule in court and have given

up on the appeals process. 156

Regulations are established by congress – agencies can make internal

modifications that avoid political blame

Schillaci 07 (William C. author of the book Most Misunderstood Regs March 27, “Reining in

Guidance Documents” http://enviro.blr.com/whitepapers/ehs-management/epa-

environmental-protection-agency/reining-in-guidance-documents/)

"The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The Agency

follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguousstandards and the like. Then as years pass, the Agency issues circulars or guidance or

memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in regulations.

One guidance document may yield another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages

of text as the Agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law is made,

without notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the Code

of Federal Regulations."



Recommendations Solve

Recommendations assure the passage of the CP

Mayer 7(Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Base Realignment and Closure

Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” December 2007,

http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf )

The binding character of the recommended closures was key. Once the ¶ president had

approved the commission recommendations, Congress had 45 ¶ days to reject the list by a

Joint Resolution, under expedited procedures ¶ designed to minimize obstructionist tactics

(Davis 2005). In practice, the process ¶ was unstoppable after this stage, since it would take

2/3 majorities in both the ¶ House and Senate to actually block the closures from going into

effect ¶ (assuming that resolution of disapproval would have to overcome a presidential ¶

veto).

Commission recommendations are perceived as coming from outside so meanspoliticians agree—aren’t linked with Washington

Campbell 2(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,



Policymaking has changed over the past several decades with the shifting American political

landscape. Public approval of Congress and its members has declined since the 1970s.38 Public

discontent about the legislative branch in the 1990s grew to unprecedented levels.39 Such

dissatisfaction not only reflects a generalized distrust of politicians but also a feeling that

government is not working well.40 The manifest result of this is a growing proportion of new

members who lack prior political experience and who echo this same critical sentiment.¶ With

incumbency a seeming curse, politicians often campaign against the government.41

Congressional leaders heed this populist reaction. They build agreement from the bottom up

with the inclusion of practitioners—experts in the field from across the political spectrum who

are involved in implementation. In doing so, Congress looks for ways to involve people back

home in two-way communication so that constituents can express their reaction to what is

going on in Congress. The ad hoc commission has become a device for achieving this goal,

allowing individuals who have diverse knowledge and experience to share information and

thus reach better results. The Commission on Service Members and Veterans Transition

Assistance set up by Congress in 1996 to the review benefits and services available to active

duty members and veterans visited over forty military installations around the world during itstwo-year existence, talking to thousands of service members and family members.42 “The real

beauty of a commission,” proclaimed one Senate staff aide whose boss proposed the

Commission on Executive Organization, 43 “is the political weight you get from having

something put together by ‘common people’ as opposed to ‘politicians.’”

http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf





Lack of Time solvency

Congress won’t even want to debate about the recommendations---they’ll

approve it due to lack of time




The increased use and development of ad hoc commissions by Congress reveals a growing

pattern: the use of alternative mechanisms in formulating policy. For the most part,

commissions have been set up in response to the extraordinary growth in the complexity and

size of the federal government’s responsibility since the New Deal, and especially during the

“Great Society” years of the 1960s.7 When the first Congress convened, the United States had a

tiny population, mostly rural and uneducated; its social and industrial structure was simple.

Changes occurred slowly, and the government’s tasks were few.8 The contemporary situation isradically different. “Today,” reflected former Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.),

“there’s an almost information overload, a bombardment by news, by faxes. Everything is

instantaneous with too little time for thoughtful reflection.”9 In the Capitol, elevator operators

still greet members and visitors, and paintings of powder-wigged Founding Fathers still gaze

down from their gilded frames. But now they share the corridors of power with fiber-optic cable

links, PCs, cell phones, and wireless modems. Staffers can even order lunch from the House food

system over the Internet at www.specialordersdeli.com.¶ A longtime watcher of Congress

summed up the hectic, new-age legislative life:¶ Legislators have very little time for reflection.

There are demands upon their attention literally every minute of the day—and these demands

would be made every minute of the night too if not for unlisted telephone numbers. They are

utterly dependent upon typed cards which they receive from their press secretaries the

moment they arrive in the office. These cards, broken down almost minute by minute, list everyengagement of the day and every committee and subcommittee meeting, with a brief

addendum of the agenda. They are dependent upon hasty briefings from aides who scurry

alongside as they dash about the Capitol. Too often, their only time for studying a complex

legislative problem is when they are driven to and from their offices by aides, wives, or

chauffeurs.10¶ If Congress did not delegate certain tasks to commissions, it would cede a

good portion of its responsibilities to other decision makers. The ad hoc commission enables

Congress to maintain its autonomy. It shows some of Congress’s aggressiveness in seeking out

new areas of endeavor. In certain areas of policymaking Congress has, in the past two

decades, usually been peripheral or reluctant to assert itself. Delegating to a temporary

commission may prove to be a source of influence in negotiations with other decision makers.

Most commission recommendations, in fact, are eventually accepted and implemented.11



Politicians get shielded solvency

Congressional action hinges on voters—getting shielded by the commission

means they’ll take action




Arnold demonstrates that while the decisions that Congress makes are partially dependent on

legislators’ own personal policy preferences or their need to trade favors, the quest for

reelection is legislators’ dominant goal. Thus, members of Congress tend to pursue the

preferences of the public on any issue that is salient to the public. Whenever lawmakers must

choose among alternative policies they will most likely select the one that will contribute

most to their reelection. Legislators’ decisions also depend on whether they are dealing with

policy effects that are directly traceable to their own individual actions or whether the

electoral connection involves only policy positions.8 Following this logic, delegation to the

Quadrennial Pay Raise Commission in 1967 was instituted to distance Congress from a delicate

decision—going on record in favor of raising its own pay. The “commission” label provided a

shield against public outcry and a way to explain a difficult vote.9 It also broke the chain of

traceability for individual legislators

Commissions enable action on issues that aren’t politically beneficial

Campbell 2

(Colton C. Campbell, Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University,visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:


Others treat Congress as a firm that makes policy and has the option of internal production

through direct legislation or outsourcing to the executive. Accordingly policy is made in the

politically most efficient manner, be it through legislation or through delegation. As with

actual firms, each alternative has both advantages and disadvantages, so the boundary

between legislative and executive policymaking lies where these net benefits “just balance at

the margin from legislators’ point of view.”19¶ In some cases, then, delegation may offer

legislators an attractive alternative to making policy themselves. The issue of airline safety is

an example. This policy area requires technical expertise but lacks potential political benefits.Lawmakers will gain little credit if things go well and no airline disasters occur, but they will

have to withstand intense scrutiny if things go wrong—airline regulation is an issue with only a

political downside, and failures tend to be spectacular and well-publicized.20 The set of

individuals receiving benefits, the flying public, is diffuse and ill-organized, while those paying

the costs of regulation, the airline companies, are well-organized and politically active.

Delegated power is relatively easy to monitor when one keeps in mind the easy observation



of deficiencies in the system. Thus, even if legislators had unlimited time and resources,

delegation would be the preferred mode of policymaking.21



Delagation Solvency

Delegation to a commission overcomes partisanship and gridlock




Fingers are repeatedly pointed at Congress as contributor to or creator of many

problems in the policymaking process. A major objective of this study is to sort out

situations in which Congress, with sufficient information at hand or with a definite

interest in a policy matter, voluntarily delegates to a commission as part of the

policymaking process. The use of ad hoc commissions does not always represent a

dereliction of legislative duty. Such congressional action often reflects periodic

responsibility and curiosity about alternative, different means for Congress to intervene

directly and indirectly in policy development and implementation.¶ In the face of

challenging governing circumstances, lawmakers find creative ways to make policy.17This has been especially apparent in the period since World War II. In this time

period, the trend has been toward tougher governing circumstances, including the rise

of divided government, mounting partisanship, increasingly fragmented committees, and

a more complex issue agenda. In response to these types of pressures, congressional

members seek ways to keep the lawmaking process going.



A2 Delay

No delay

Campbell 2



There are a number of ways in which Congress performs its policymaking

functions. Ad hoc commissions are one device at its disposal. Despite criticisms that

these entities are inefficient and frequently evade the issues, commissions provide a

flexible option, the variation in their composition and organization reflecting the specific

mandates that establish them.79 Commissions can provide expert advice in matters of

public policy within a definite time frame. By virtue of their ad hoc status, they can

bypass normal bureaucratic channels. Commissions are a public relations device

designed to draw attention to certain issues, to elicit public support, and to achieve

consensus in a fragmented Congress. Commissions also allow for the directrepresentation of functional consistencies in the advisory process by seeking the

advice of holders of diverse points of view.80 It is this list of advantages that has

encouraged the recent use of commissions and led to their becoming a stable feature of

public policies.



A2 can’t do new issues

No precedent has to exist---commissions can be tasked with any problems

Campbell 2



Congressional delegation to a commission might be designed to investigate social crises;

to gain public or political consensus; to bring exposure and prestige to new policies and

problems and arouse and focus public concern for them; to reformulate a federal

program or commitment or to develop a new approach to a problem; to respond to

national crises; to foster a winning coalition; to convey a message to executive

agencies; to respond to initiatives from presidents who either desire support from

Congress or want to fund commissions through the regular appropriations

process; to satisfy constituents or interest groups from the member’s district or

state; because of precedent; for congressional involvement into or oversight ofpresidential business; or as an option of last resort when Congress has no institutional

precedent for dealing with a novel problem.

The commission makes the groundwork for legislation




Ad hoc commissions as instruments of government have a long history. They areused by almost all units and levels of government for almost every conceivable

task. Ironically, the use which Congress makes of commissions— preparing the

groundwork for legislation, bringing public issues into the spotlight, whipping legislation

into shape, and giving priority to the consideration of complex, technical, and critical

developments—receives relatively little attention from political scientists. As noted in

earlier chapters, following the logic of rational choice theory, individual decisions

to delegate are occasioned by imperfect information; legislators who want to

develop effective policies, but who lack the necessary expertise, often delegate

fact-finding and policy development. Others contend that some commissions are

set up to shift blame in order to maximize benefits and minimize losses.



A2 Congress can’t make a Commission

Commissions can be established by Congress or the President or both

Campbell 2



Federal commissions are by no means limited to the legislative process. They may be

creatures of Congress or the presidency, some created informally by the mutual

consent of Congress and the president, others administered by an executive agency.

Many federal commissions cover multiple jurisdictions, making it difficult to decide

whether a commission is strictly congressional, executive, or judicial. Normally, all three

branches of government are willing to support commissions, but the commissions’

tasks, purposes, and composition can determine whether they belong to one

particular branch or have more diverse origins. “I was a member of the Federal

Courts Study Commission, a legislative study group to conduct a study of the jurisdictionof the U.S. courts and report to Congress,” recounted one commissioner regarding the

inter-branch morphing of his commission. “But it became clear as the commission

progressed that the commission was a judicial creature serving the purposes of the

judiciary, not Congress, recommending ways for the Court to manage its case

workload as opposed to realigning parts of the judiciary.”



A2 Certainty

Certainty is nonsense --- the Aff can’t solve it

Posner 8 (Eric A., Professor of Law – University of Chicago, and Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law – University of Chicago, “Soft Law:

Lessons from Congressional Practice”, Stanford Law Review, December, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, Lexis)

Congress seeks to influence public behavior, and enactment of statutes is the normal method

for doing so. As we argued above, a statute can be analyzed as a type of communication that

affects people's beliefs about the legal consequences of their actions - in the form of sanctions

(or rewards). If a legislature enacts a statute at time 1 that governs behavior at time 2, people

will update their beliefs about the probability that a sanction will be applied to that

behavior. Enactment of a hard statute, however, only affects probabilities; it does not create

certainty. If no statute exists, people might still believe that at [*600] time 2 a sanction will be

applied to the behavior in question with probability p. For example, Congress might enact a later

statute that applies retroactively. If instead a statute is enacted at time 1, people will raise

their probability estimate to p*, but p* need not equal 1. Congress might subsequently repealthe statute before it has any effect or enact additional statutes that offset the sanction of the

first statute. And even if the hard statute remains in force, officials who administer the statute

will have discretion about how stringently to enforce it. The enactment of a hard statute, then,

should only cause individuals to update their beliefs that the relevant behavior will be

sanctioned in the future from p (prior to the statute) to p*, where p < p* < 1. Now consider a

soft statute of equivalent content. By revealing information about Congress's intentions, the soft

statute will cause people, in most cases, to update their beliefs about the probability that a

sanction will be applied to the relevant behavior at time 2. The new probability, p', in general

will be less than p*. A congressional resolution that disapproves of the relevant conduct makes

it more likely that a subsequent statute will prohibit that conduct, but tends to increase the

probability of that prohibition being in effect by less than a hard statute would. In the case of a

hard statute, the behavior will not be regulated at time 2 only if the hard statute is repealed; in

the case of a soft statute, the behavior will not be regulated at time 2 unless a hard statute is

enacted. Nonetheless, it is important to see that we are dealing only with probabilities.



AT: Links to ptx



No link--perception

Commissions are key to policy popularity and solve perception

Glassman & Strauss 11

(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional

Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations”, http://www.wise-

intern.org/orientation/documents/CRS%20commissions.pdf , February 2, 2011)

By establishing a commission, Congress can often provide a highly visible forum for

important issues that might otherwise receive scant attention from the public.38 Commissions often are

composed of notable public figures, allowing personal prestige to be transferred to policy

solutions.39 Meetings and press releases from a commission may receive significantly

more attention in the media than corresponding information coming directly from

members of congressional committees. Upon completion of a commission’s work

product, public attention may be temporarily focused on a topic that otherwise would

receive scant attention, thus increasing the probability of congressional action within the

policy area.40

Congress perceives commission recommendations as more publicly popular




The progression toward congressionally created ad hoc commissions offers members of

Congress a way to separate politics from policy issues. The carefully crafted “independence” of

a commission helps legitimize congressional decisions and make them palatable to an

otherwise ambivalent public. Lawmakers and their staffs indicate that many contemporary

situations upon which legislative action must be predicated are so complicated that a politicalbody cannot hope to find the real facts. Certain modern-day problems call for analysis by more

than one mind with more than one approach by individuals who can access a difficult problem

without prejudice and with controlled emotions. A commission set up by Congress, according

to one congressional staff aide, “might have the credibility that normal legislative channels

such as a committee and that committee’s hearings would not have as well as provide

credibility to the rest of Congress in dealing with the particular question the commission is

handling.” Too often, congressional hearings become adversarial proceedings. In the spirit of

the regulatory commission a temporary, independent ad hoc commission provides advice

from people who are not beholden to public pressure.



No link—makes policies popular

Commissions make unpopular policies bipartisan

Glassman & Strauss 1(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional



Solutions to policy problems produced within the normal legislative process may also suffer polit ically from charges of

partisanship.30 Similar charges may be made against investigations conducted by Congress.31 The non-partisan or

bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and

recommendations less susceptible to such charges and more politically acceptable to a

diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can potentially give their

recommendations strong credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when

dealing with divisive issues of public policy.32 Commissions may also give political

factions space to negotiate compromises in good faith, bypassing the short-term tactical

political maneuvers that accompany public negotiations.33 Similarly, because

commission members are not elected, they may be better suited to suggesting unpopular,but necessary, policy solutions.34

Commissions are bipartisan – make unpopular issues bipartisan

Glassman & Strauss 11

(Matthew Eric Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, Analysts on the Congress at the Congressional Research Services, “Congressional



Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful entities in the

legislative process. By establishing a commission, Congress can potentially provide a

highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may bereadily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in

greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most

congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more

politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public.

Commissions are bipartisan – Congressional Oversight

Schwinn 10

(Steven D. Schwinn, Associate Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School, “Obama Establishes Bi-Partisan Commission on Fiscal

Responsibility and Reform”, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/02/obama-establishes-bipartisan-commission-on-

fiscal-responsibility-and-reform.html . February 19, 2010)

President Obama signed an executive order yesterday establishing a bi-partisan commission to

address federal spending and the federal debt. The move comes after the Senate rejected bi-partisan legislation to create a similar

commission. Under the EO, President Obama will appoint the chairs (one from each party) and six members (no four of which

may be from one party). The Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, the Minority Leader of the House, and the

Minority Leader in the Senate will each appoint three members (who must be sitting members of their respective houses).

President Obama appointed Erskine Bowles, President Clinton's Chief of Staff, and former Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY), the

former Republican Senate Leader, as co-chairs. Minority Leaders Senator Mitch McConnell and Representative John Boehner

said they'll cooperate and appoint members next week. President Obama gave the Commission the following

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/02/obama-establishes-bipartisan-commission-on-fiscal-responsibility-and-reform.html








task: Identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve fiscal

sustainability over the long run. Specifically, the Commission shall propose recommendations designed

to balance the budget, excluding interest payments on the debt, by 2015. . . . In addition, the Commission shall

propose recommendations that meaningfully improve the long-run fiscal outlook , including

changes to address the growth of entitlement spending and the gap between the projected revenues and expenditures of the

Federal Government.

The Commission obviously cannot have authority to bind Congress.Instead, it operates as an attempt to help solve a collective action problem--that every

single member of Congress has an incentive to push for disproportionate spending in his

or her home district, and therefore together the institution is ill-equipped to deal with a

fiscal crisis. The Commission's recommendations can provide political pressure on

Congress, even if they do not legally bind Congress. A model is the Defense Base Closure

and Realignment Commission, the BRAC, which helps to solve a similar collective action

problem by studying and making recommendations about military base closures and

moves. Unlike President Obama's Commission, however, the BRAC was created by Congress through legislation. This

difference is unlikely to diminish the influence of the Commission, however: If both parties participate, its

recommendations will or won't be politicized, whether it was established by statute or by

EO.



No link—blame shifting

The counterplan avoids politics-shifts the blame onto the commission

Campbell 2



The third major reason for Congress to delegate to a commission is the strategy of distancing

itself from a politically risky decision. These instances generally occur when Congress faces

redistributive policy problems, such as Social Security, military base closures, Medicare, and

welfare. Such problems are the most difficult because legislators must take a clear policy

position on something that has greater costs to their districts than benefits, or that shifts

resources visibly from one group to another. Institutionally, Congress has to make national

policy that has a collective benefit, but the self-interest of lawmakers often gets in the way.

Members realize that their individual interests, based on constituents’ demands, may be at

odds with the national interest, and this can lead to possible electoral repercussions.55 Even

when pursuing policies that are in the interests of the country as a whole, legislators do not

want to be blamed for causing losses to their constituents. In such an event, the split

characteristics of the institution come into direct conflict.¶ Many on Capitol Hill endorse a

commission for effectively resolving a policy problem rather than the other machinery

available to Congress. A commission finds remedies when the normal decision making process

has stalled. A long-time Senate staff director said of the proposed Second National Blue Ribbon

Commission to Eliminate Waste in Government: “At their most effective, these panels allow

Congress to realize purposes most members cannot find the confidence to do unless

otherwise done behind the words of the commission.”56¶ When an issue imposes

concentrated costs on individual districts yet provides dispersed benefits to the nation,

Congress responds by masking legislators’ individual contributions and delegatesresponsibility to a commission for making unpleasant decisions.57 Members avoid blame and

promote good policy by saying something is out of their hands. This method allows

legislators— especially those aiming for reelection—to vote for the general benefit of

something without ever having to support a plan that directly imposes large and traceable

geographic costs on their constituents. The avoidance or share-the-blame route was much of

the way Congress and the president finally dealt with the problem of financially shoring up

Social Security in the late 1980s. One senior staff assistant to a western Republican

representative observed that the creation of the Social Security Commission was largely for

avoidance: “There are sacred cows and then there is Social Security. Neither party or any

politician wants to cut this. Regardless of what you say or do about it, in the end, you defer.

Everyone backs away from this.” Similarly, a legislative director to a southern Democraticrepresentative summarized: “So many people are getting older and when you take a look at who

turns out, who registers, people over sixty-five have the highest turnout and they vote like

clockwork.”



Any backlash gets blamed on the commission




The ties between Congress and ad hoc commissions are now complex and symbiotic: elected

officials (and their aides) are in a position to construct public policy, in exchange for which

commissions can work for members whose roles are comprehensive and highly variable. They

also provide the expertise necessary for writing legislation. Of course,some of these

relationships are arrangements of blame avoidance. Commissions can allow members of

Congress to manipulate voters’ perceptions, because routine government action usually

eludes the sustained attention of the general public. Consequently, lawmakers use an element

of delegation to escape blame for politically sensitive decisions. In practice, most commissions

serve more than one purpose. Many provide a basis for informed legislative action and help

manage a growing legislative workload; they enable legislators to cope with burgeoning

demands—to follow more issues and process more bills.¶ It is now possible to consider what

motivates individual lawmakers to delegate authority to these organizations. One should review

the benefits and drawbacks with regard to the use of ad hoc commissions and their applicability

to the case at hand. While the disputes over the desirable extent of delegation are numerous,

there is no widely accepted explanation of why Congress delegates some of its policymaking

authority. In the next chapter a decision tree of legislative decision making will show the

conditions that encourage lawmakers to learn from others, to enlist help from others, and to

push responsibility onto others.



No link—depersonalizes the issue

Delegating power detaches congressional responsibility from a policy

Campbell 2



Chapter 6 is a case study of blame avoidance. On occasion, Congress will establish a

commission to shift blame for any negative side effects connected with sensitive issues.

Because most lawmakers see themselves as agents of their constituents, they are unwilling to

sacrifice district prosperity for the collective good. So when members evaluate the costs and

benefits of a politically sensitive issue and find that it translates into electoral losses rather

than gains, they will create a commission to avoid the unwanted task of making a difficult

decision. No fights on Capitol Hill are as contested as the ones over whose districts lose

defense dollars. Lobbying for military projects comes naturally to members who are expected to

champion local interests. Liberals and conservatives, hawks and doves, Democrats and

Republicans all join the fray. The Base Closure Commission enabled lawmakers to turn away

from the dilemma of choosing which bases to close, thereby providing a political heat shield.

Legislators became advocates for their constituents rather than bearers of bad news,

passionately pleading the case for their constituents, thereby doing the job they were elected

to do but also confronting a national policy need.

Legislators only backlash when they believe it’ll involve them—CP

depersonalizes issues

Campbell 2



Modern theories of legislative behavior begin with David R. Mayhew’s book, Congress: The

Electoral Connection, which suggests that congressional action has a direct electoral

connection, in which legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection, motivated primarily

by self-interest.1 Individuals may enter Congress with altruistic intentions, but their behavior

in office is best explained by the “electoral connection”: the need for reelection. As a

consequence lawmakers consider the preferences of their voters, especially on issues of

potentially high salience, that is, issues visible to the public.2 Congress is thus organized to

promote the goal of reelection. Members follow conservative strategies to capitalize uponparticularized benefits, to respond to organized groups, to claim as much credit as possible,

and to mobilize only when they can claim credit.3 The incentive to delegate, therefore, must

have some sort of electoral connection.¶ Follow Mayhew’s line of thought, others have

developed what has come to be known as the distributive theory of legislative organization.4

According to this view, the decision to delegate is a function of the political costs and benefits

for which elected officials will be held electorally accountable. Legislative action reflects a

desire to maximize net benefits to districts in order to increase the chances for reelection.



Delegation enables individual legislators to protect favored constituents5 or to shift blame for

political costs6 onto other organizations, but makes them unable to claim full credit for any

perceived benefits. Delegation is a function of this trade-off. Thus, congressional decisions to

delegate occur when the decrease in attributable costs is greater than the decrease in

attributable benefits.¶ R. Douglas Arnold notes that legislators are ever mindful of the direct

correlation between their individual performance and the voting booth. According to what he

calls the “incumbent performance rule,” voters tend to punish legislators for undesirable

effects only if there are both identifiable governmental actions and visible individual

contributions. Responsibility for unpleasant decisions is therefore frequently delegated to the

president, bureaucrats, regulatory commissions, judges, state and local officials, or temporary

commissions as a procedural strategy for “masking” legislators’ individual contributions.7

Such delegation is especially prevalent when there is a desire to shed policymaking tasks that

are too onerous or when dealing with issues that are likely to provoke disputes with voters.

Challengers will take full advantage of reminding citizens about issues as traceable as legislative

salaries, for example.



No link—politicians maintain their ideology

Neither side looks like they’re giving in—gives the counterplan bipartisan

support




A main institutional function of commissions, therefore, is to foster collective action.

Delegation of authority to a commission to examine an issue helps overcome seemingly

unmanageable and intractable problems. Such coordination may be essential in light of the disjointed nature of

policymaking in Congress and the fragmentation of institutional power.57 “A commission such as the National Commission on Hea lth Care Fraud and Abuse58 facilitated action by others in Congress to find ways to [reduce] health care fraud and abuse,” according to a legislative director to amidwestern Democratic representative. “In that sense, the commission built support to encourage action. In the case of entitl ements, however, the idea

that a commission will produce collective action is wrong. It is an idealistic anticipation to bring people together for something that j ust will not

happen.”¶ Base closing illustrates a problem in which a policy in the collective, common good, but fragmented by the parochial interests of lawmakers,

is derived from delegation to a commission. Members knew that the military base structure bordered on the preposterous, and i t was equally difficult

for anyone to argue that every base was essential to national security, especially when the Pentagon acknowledged nearly a billion dollars in excess

base capacity. The lack of coordination stemmed from the discomfort in Congress about closing b ases in a fair manner and from fear of retaliation by

the administration (and constituents).59 The 1989 Defense Base Closure and R ealignment Commission, with its relatively neutral membership, was aneffective policyforging mechanism. Employing discretion-limiting procedures with carefully defined delegation secured congressional agreement and

maintained unity. The commision did this by requiring lawmakers to give up any meaningful power of review over its list of base closures. In this way

the commission decided the distribution of costs—an arrangement gaining the prior

agreement of a majority of members, with an eye toward the benefit of base closings before individual costs could be tallied.¶

Similarly a proposed bipartisan measure in the 105th Congress (1997– 1999) to establish an independent campaign finance

reform commission designed to study the issue and propose reform legislation to

Congress was offered to foster consensus. Supporters from both parties argued that the

partisan and contentious process of reform was not likely to result in the enactment of

new campaign finance laws. They believed that a commission that operated outside of

the political arena stood a better chance of suggesting reforms likely to garner significant

bipartisan support in both chambers.60 Moreover, the bill sponsoring the commission

offered a way for many Republican lawmakers to cast a vote for reform without supporting the more partisan measure offered by Representatives

Christopher H. Shays (R-Conn.) and Martin T. Meehan (D-Mass.). This would allow them to claim to support reform,

thus avoiding criticism back home as well as escaping the wrath of their party leaders.61



Prefer our ev

Prefer our ev---political science proves Congress won’t backlash if delegation

occurs




There is no easy answer to why Congress creates ad hoc commissions, because the

circumstances of their creation are quite complex and vary widely. Many variables go into the

decision to entrust those bodies to render nonpartisan recommendations: to pacify, to

promote incremental decision making, to build support for proposals, or to obtain consensus

among different interests. Commissions are often hybrids that result from a multitude of

congressional incentives.¶ While disputes over the desirable or proper extent of delegation are

commonplace, our understanding of such congressional action is arguable. The literaturecontains several variations on the theme that policymaking is sometimes so costly—both in

terms of expertise and for political reasons—that it must be delegated to others. A number of

political scientists and economists share the assumption that people’s motives in the political

arena are essentially the same as their motives in the marketplace, resting on rational

calculations of self-interest.8 The problem of delegation is frequently derived from economic

models,9 portraying delegation as an advantageous way for lawmakers to favor

constituents,10 to minimize political losses,11 or to shift blame.12 Also considered important

are the relationships that are assumed to exist between means and ends, which enable the

lawmaker to choose the most rational means to the specified end, as well as the relationships

between the costs and benefits involved, in the interest of efficiency.



No link—interparty communication

Commissions ensure interparty communication and which make the

recommendation acceptable




The creation of temporary, independent bodies that give advice to Congress, develop

common-sense recommendations on complex policy issues, and find broadly acceptable

solutions to contentious problems, is an important yet under-investigated area of

congressional delegation. The term “commission” is a prevalent catch-phrase, but

these entities have taken several names. Whether designated as blue-ribbon

commissions, committees, councils, boards, or task forces, they consist mostly of

nonelected officials, deal with major social crises and policy issues, and perform

technical studies. With variations to fit the circumstances, Congress createscommissions to accomplish diverse goals: to cope with increases in the scope and

complexity of legislation, forge consensus, draft bills, finesse institutional obstacles,

involve noncommittee and junior members in issues, coordinate strategy, and

promote interparty communication. Commissions deal with issues as disparate as

pay raises, obsolete military bases, the budget deficit, Medicare, flue-cured

tobacco, wartime relocation and internment of civilians, amateur boxing,

telemedicine, government reform, and the regulation of professional baseball.



A2 SOP Turn/plenary powers/legislative veto



I/L turn SOP

Commission policymaking’s key to democracy

Campbell 2



In short, the commission fits with the incremental style of policymaking common in the

United States, and it infuses a degree of direct democracy with its bottom-up approach to

policymaking and its nonpartisan membership. The commission is a flexible device for

developing political support on controversial legislation, and for sidestepping legislative gridlock.

By delegating to a commission, Congress can resolve intractable problems because lawmakers

mitigate the side effects commonly associated with transferring responsibility and authority.

At times it may be useful to move out of conventional channels of investigation and

communication toward individuals of independent mind and stature—a strategy commonly

used to overcome the pathologies of hierarchy and specialization to which the House of

Representatives is particularly prone. Whatever its political risks, as a means to counter the

expanding influence of unchecked experts, to preserve open discussion of complex issues, and

to mobilize elite support for innovations, the independent commission often has no peer.26

Commissions key to strong SOP




Those on Capitol Hill value commissions for removing from an issue the political dynamics that

pervade the institution, such as parochialism and partisan gridlock, as well as for evading the

rigidities of institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose that frequently

plagues other institutions in government with more restrictive bureaucratic practices. “A

commission such as the Federal Workforce Reduction and Realignment Commission44 is a

prevention of too many political interests,” noted a congressional aide. Because commissions

typically meet for a year or two, they are able to hear from and accommodate many different

interests and points of view, and they have the capacity to focus congressional as well as

public attention.¶ Commissions conform to the public’s ideal of how decisions should be

made by government. Enlisting the help of commissioners with national prominence and

competence who are also representative of diverse interests and points of view adds to publicsupport and confidence, something not always given to other institutions in government with

their more restrictive bureaucratic practices. This is because Congress limits a commission’s

operation to a defined purview: commissioners collect and analyze data, arrive at conclusions,

submit their recommendations, and terminate shortly there after. Commissions keep out the

politics, giving them the freedom to make impartial judgments. They help to forge policy and

agreement with the inclusion and empowerment of the practitioners who are involved in the

day-today implementation of policy and who can express their feelings and reactions in two-



way communication with lawmakers. “We were very mindful to allow for community

involvement,” declared a congressional aide in response to the proposed Hudson and Mohawk

Rivers National Heritage Corridor Commission.45 This method of formulating policy differs from

the often-criticized backroom methods of normal congressional procedures or the rigidities of

institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose exhibited by bureaucratic

agencies. In essence, advisory commissions provide an additional check in our separated

powers system.¶ Congressional policymaking is a process driven by the transactional politics

needed to sustain coalitions. While it is often a straightforward process to attract a coalition

in favor of general statements of principle, forming actual language and detailed policies can

divide previously unified interests and splinter coalitions.46 Commissions can be helpful in

overcoming this obstacle. Leadership uses them to cultivate consensus or facilitate a

preexisting consensus, to enact or shun policy change, particularly noteworthy when

controversial legislation is at stake or when bipartisan deals on major public policy issues are

being brokered.47 Leadership can design commissions to fit issues that do not fall neatly within

committees’ jurisdictional boundaries. As one staff aide to a Northeastern Democratic senator

noted, “There is compelling reason to create a commission on something like national

educational readiness when there is an action that Congress needs to take and there clearly is

no consensus around how to do that. It may not be perfect, but it’s the best we can do underthe circumstances.”¶



Heg won’t lead to war

Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony

Fettweis 10 (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The

International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be

exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline

of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence , international and

domestic political institutions , evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist

America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained,

nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor ; the process

of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic

interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would

not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way

to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is

typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.



CP parameters check

Delegation doesn’t violate SOP, plenary power, or lead to legislative veto---the

CP defines clear parameters for the commission




A frequently encountered argument against Congress’s use of ad hoc commissions is thatthis form of delegation perniciously influences American government by breaking up the

democratic process, further fragmenting a system in which power is divided among

three branches of government and in which Congress is less and less subject to party discipline.62 Vocal

critics charge that commissions represent improper delegation. Representatives and senators charged with a

duty of representation abdicate their constitutional responsibility by entrusting others, who make decisions

behind closed doors, with their legislative tasks.63 If commission members had preferences identical to those of

legislators, Congress could assure itself of favorable outcomes simply by delegating to commissions with

unfettered discretion.¶ According to the political philosophy of John Locke, as exemplified by the U.S.constitutional system of separate powers, it is thought that a power originally given cannot be delegated away.

This non-delegation doctrine would appear to limit Congress’s authority to transfer power. How much lawmaking

authority, then, can Congress delegate to another body and still stay within the realm of public law? One scholarcomments that Article I, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution endows Congress not with “all legislative power,” but

only with the “legislative powers herein granted.”64 Congress, theoretically, is thus a “legislative body possessing

only limited powers—that is, those granted to it by the Constitution.”65¶ Congressional delegation is

constitutionally acceptable so long as Congress establishes clear directives and limits.

These limits include standards in charters and mission statements, specific criteria or

formulas for the delegated entity’s deliberations, and procedures for mandatory reviewby the legislative body. If these criteria meet adequate standards given by Congress for

conducting general policy and purpose, entities to which responsibilities are delegated may be

given the discretion to make judgments from their analyses. 66 As the Supreme Court

noted in Yakus v. United States, “Congress is not confined to that method of executing itspolicy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative

officers.”67

Congress gets the final say---that solves because Congress is the one ultimately

deciding



SOP wrong--emprics

Zero chance of power balance shift---even if the CP is perceived as

transparently political blame-shifting—it empirically works

Mayer 7(Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Base Realignment and Closure

Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” December 2007,

http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf )

Legislative delegation – the creation of external agents vested with the authority to make

decisions on Congress’ behalf – is a longstanding feature of American national government. 9

Despite a constitutional principle against delegation of legislative power (Fisher 1990, 226),

federal courts have generally allowed broad delegations of legislative power as long as

Congress articulates coherent principles as to how that power should be exercised.10

Legislators may choose to delegate because they lack technical expertise, wish to transfer

political blame, recognize that formal administrative processes may result in better policy, or

because they are politically unable to make policy decisions themselves (Epstein and

O’Halloran 1999; Becker 2005).






A2 perm do both

CP leads to coalition-building which is key to solve politics--the perm destroys

this




Congressional policymaking is a process driven by the transactional politics needed to

sustain coalitions. While it is often a straightforward process to attract a coalition in

favor of general statements of principle, forming actual language and detailed policies

can divide previously unified interests and splinter coalitions.46 Commissions can be

helpful in overcoming this obstacle. Leadership uses them to cultivate consensus or

facilitate a preexisting consensus, to enact or shun policy change, particularly

noteworthy when controversial legislation is at stak e or when bipartisan deals on major public policy

issues are being brokered.47 Leadership can design commissions to fit issues that do not fall neatly within committees’

jurisdictional boundaries. As one staff aide to a Northeastern Democratic senator noted, “There is compelling reason

to create a commission on something like national educational readiness when there is

an action that Congress needs to take and there clearly is no consensus around how to do that. It

may not be perfect, but it’s the best we can do under the circumstances.”

Perm links to politics—involving Congress makes independent and neutral

compromises of congress fail which doesn’t resolve the politics link




“As the world is changing,” wrote former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, “we need to be flexible and find ways to

get people with competence in a room together to solve problems.”15 When used astutely , ad hoc

commissions foster bargaining, consensus, and compromise in relation to policy

proposals, mitigating conflict within Congress that might incapacitate the institution. Such

commissions help elected officials make necessary but unpopular decisions and deal

with complex social crises, policy issues, and studies. This is largely because

commissions are usually in a better position to perform in a visibly fair and politically

neutral manner that increases the perceived caliber and efficacy of their eventual

product . People on Capitol Hill acknowledge that Congress lacks the time to legislate every detail of

every issue, and that some actions necessary in the public interest are so sensitive that they

can be taken only if they are not subjected to an up-or-down rollcall vote. At their most

productive, commissions provide Congress with a flexible option for policymaking. They

are especially valuable tools when controversial and elaborate legislation is at stake. When Congress faces a huge problem such as health care, rather than looking at the entire solution, it acts

sequentially, approaching the solution in small steps, building policy and agreement from the bottom up.

Commissions work well for this process because they are an incremental step toward a

policy end. Through commissions, Congress acquires an informed and timely baseline for decision making that

may otherwise be subject to uncoordinated or political criteria. Appointing a commission can shift responsibility

from lawmakers for a year or so while the commision deliberates. Further, commissions avoid the

rigidities of institutionalization and the loss of an originally intended purpose, both of



which frequently plague other institutions in government. This is because their

operation is limited to a defined purview: they collect and analyze data, arrive at

conclusions, submit their recommendations, and terminate shortly thereafter—an

attractive feature to a Congress that is increasingly made up of relatively conservative

members who express skepticism about many federal agencies.16 Finally, commissions

fit a pluralistic decision making process that conforms to the public’s ideal of how

decisions should be made by government —from the bottom up. A plebiscitary quality has seeped into

legislative life.17 And the ad hoc commission can be a more direct avenue of communication between

constituents and lawmakers than the committee rooms and chamber floors of Capitol Hill, for commissions

enable all the major political interests affected by a given situation to be represented by appointment.



A2 perm do the CP

‘Resolved’ means the plan has to be certain to pass

Kernerman Dictionary 6 - Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary, 2006, “Resolve,”online: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/resolution1 to make a firm decision (to do something) I've resolved to stop smoking. 2 to pass (a

resolution) It was resolved that women should be allowed to join the society.

It severs the requirement that the plan should happen:

“Should” means immediate

Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:

http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18

order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 ¶ ***TO FOOTNOTES¶ In

praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990).

In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as

opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct.

336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).¶ ***END FOOTNOTES¶ The answer to this query is not to be divined

from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal

professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the

critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or

would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four

corners of the entire record. Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to

carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning

intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to beinterpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my

conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of

Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on theface of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor

bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly

followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualisticformalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandonedby the statutory policy of this State.

It also means mandatory---introducing uncertainty severs

Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:

http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating

preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors

"should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory

negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory);

Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the

Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to

the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an



obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958)

("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury

which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony").

The CP is a non-binding recommendation




With official status recognized by Congress, ad hoc commissions have a policy

formulation responsibility limited to an issue or group of related questions (bodies that are set up to

investigate wrongdoing, to assign responsibility for disasters, or to make explicit and detailed studies of internal

management are not considered a part of this grouping). But because they are largely advisory and

rarely have power to implement their findings or recommendations, they are

infrequently mandated with administrative authority, except for the powers conferred on them to

assist them in collecting and gathering information. Because these entities consist in whole or in part of persons

from private life, they can be distinguished from congressional select or special committees, which may be

confused with commissions.3 In most instances advisory commissions hold hearings and request written

submissions from interested persons and organizations, secure information from federal departments or

agencies, conclude with the publication of a report, and close down. The report may include findings uncovered

during testimony, staff studies, background papers, preliminary reports, legal analyses, final reports, and

statistical surveys.

“The” means whole

Webster’s 5

(Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary) 4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to

a group as a whole <the elite>

“Government” means all three branches Black’s Law 90

(Dictionary, p. 695) “[Government ] In the U nited S tates, government consists of the executive, legislative, and

judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its

agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.”

The CP’s fundamentally distinct from the normal legislative process---it’s not

USFG or normal means

Campbell 2



So why and when does Congress formulate policy by commissions rather than by the

normal legislative process? Lawmakers have historically delegated authority to others

who could accomplish ends they could not. Does this form of congressional

delegation thus reflect the particularities of an issue area? Or does it mirror

deeper structural reasons such as legislative organization, time, or manageability?



In the end, what is the impact on representation versus the effectiveness of

delegating discretionary authority to temporary entities composed largely of

unelected officials, or are both attainable together?

The commission can’t enact the plan on its own




There is some basis for these arguments against commissions. Congressional

leadership may design a commission to allow friendly groups more points of

access to members of Congress. For example, special interests could come before

the temporary body to plead their case, out of the public view. But as so many onCapitol Hill will say, it is the elected officials who must decide whether to adopt

commission recommendations. Legislators accept ultimate responsibility, Congress still

determines the basic outlines of national policy, lawmakers remain the paramount

representatives of constituents, and the legislative branch is the central agency for

legitimizing the decisions of government. In addition, commission

recommendations are only advisory. No changes in public policy occur on the

authority of a commission. Commissions do not make policy, for their actions do not

have the force of law. The implementation of a commission’s recommendations is

left to the determination of specific authorization by Congress. But as a legislative

director to a mid-Atlantic Democratic representative observed, a commission is

similar to a jury: “If you don’t give them [commissioners] firm marching orders,

they may not address the problem you want them to address.”



A2 Theory



Predictable

The CP’s predictable---it’s a consistent alternative to the normal legislative

process




Ad hoc commissions as instruments of government have a long history. They are used by

almost all units and levels of government for almost every conceivable task . Ironically,

the use which Congress makes of commissions— preparing the groundwork for

legislation, bringing public issues into the spotlight, whipping legislation into

shape, and giving priority to the consideration of complex, technical, and critical

developments—receives relatively little attention from political scientists. As

noted in earlier chapters, following the logic of rational choice theory, individual

decisions to delegate are occasioned by imperfect information; legislators whowant to develop effective policies, but who lack the necessary expertise, often

delegate fact-finding and policy development. Others contend that some

commissions are set up to shift blame in order to maximize benefits and minimize

losses.

The process for commissions is standardized—CP follows the normal rules for a

commission


visiting Professor of Political Science at American University, 2002, Discharging Congress:Government by Commission)

Until recently there was little standardization of the features, organization, or

procedures of commissions. A degree of continuity emerged with the enactment in 1972

of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which created requirements for the

management and oversight of Federal advisory entities.4 While the statute concentrated

on advisory committees established by mission agencies, its jurisdiction also covered

national commissions created by legislative statute and presidential decree. Under

Section 3 of the statute, advisory bodies are any committee, board, commission,

council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee

or other subgroup thereof, which is established¶ • by statute or reorganization

plan;¶ • by the president by executive order;¶ • by one or more agencies;¶ • by lawwhere the Congress specifically directs the president or an agency to establish it;¶ •by law where the Congress authorizes but does not direct the president or an

agency to establish it;¶ • by an agency under general agency authority in Title 5 of

the U.S. Code or other general agency-authorizing law.¶ At the heart of FACA is a

series of provisions that maximize the public and broadly representative nature of the

panels; the provisions also minimize presidential dominance—at least in the eyes

of a Congress resentful of an imperial presidency.5



A2 Private Actor Fiat

The commission members are no longer private actors once it’s established

Campbell 2



Sometimes referred to as the “fifth arm of government,”1 commissions are formal groups

established by statute or decree. They have multiple members, with each commissioner sharing

equally the responsibility for findings and recommendations. They are sunsetted, limited more

or less to a definite time frame to complete work, usually one to two years from the time of creation to the

final report to Congress. In some cases, however, Congress may propose a commission to extend over se veral years. The Commiss ion on a North

American Economic Alliance, for example, was designed in 1979 to study the development and u tilization of the resources of the United States, Mexico,

and Canada, submitting annual reports to Congress until its termination in 1985. Generally speaking, a commission’s mandate includes a termination

date more than three years after the date of creation or at a s pecified date upon submittal of its recommendations or alternatives, which is anywhere

from thirty to ninety days after its final report to Congress. Commissions come in vario us sizes and shapes, with membership ranging anywhere from

nine to twenty commissioners, twelve to fifteen being the normal number of members. The finalnumber of commissioners will generally accommodate equal appointments by the majority and

minority in both the House and Senate as well as by the president.2 With official status

recognized by Congress, ad hoc commissions have a policy formulation responsibility limited

to an issue or group of related questions (bodies that are set up to investigate wrongdoing, to

assign responsibility for disasters, or to make explicit and detailed studies of internal management are not considered a part

of this grouping). But because they are largely advisory and rarely have power to implement their findings or recommendations , they are infrequently

mandated with administrative authority, except for the powers conferred on t hem to assist them in collecting and gathering information. Because

these entities consist in whole or in part of persons from private life, they can be distinguished from congressional select or special committees, which

may be confused with commissions.3 In most instances advisory commissions hold hearings and request written submissions from interested persons

and organizations, secure information from federal departments or agencies, conclude with the publication of a report, and close

down. The report may include findings uncovered during testimony, staff studies, background

papers, preliminary reports, legal analyses, final reports, and statistical surveys.

Theory, and answers to the politics of the creation of the commission



Process Good

1. Our interpretation is 1 process Counterplan that substantially differs from

the normal legislative process

2. Process counterplans are key to test the immediacy and certainty of the plan

– that’s necessary to current events disadvantages and logical problem-solving

which is a portable impact to debate.

3. There’s resolutional basis – “resolved” and “should” imply immediacy and

certainty of plan action which makes the counterplan predictable.

4. DAs to the CP check

5. We don’t mandate the plan’s passage—say no args and defense of the

normal legislative process checks abuse

6. Functional competition is more real world- Congressmen fight over

implementation, not how the bill is specifically worded

7. Evaluate theory in terms of reasonability – competing interpretations

encourages debaters to go for theory over substance which makes their

education impacts inevitable. Also just a reason to reject the argument not the

team.