Contents1ac..................................................................................................................................................4

FYI on What the Plan Does....................................................................................................................16

Inherency Extensions.............................................................................................................................17

INH: Need to Update the Law in digital age......................................................................................18

Solvency Extensions...............................................................................................................................20

SOLV--AT: Law is Indeterminate.......................................................................................................21

SOLV--Court Should Reconcile Fourth Amendment...........................................................................22

SOLV--AT: Rollback/Won’t Be Enforced............................................................................................23

SOLV—Executive Will Comply............................................................................................................25

SOLV--Solvency: Lower Courts will follow.........................................................................................26

SOLV--Solvency: The Plan will Snowball............................................................................................28

SOLV--Solvency: Supreme Court Decisions are Modeled..................................................................29

Solvency: Court Creates Social Change.............................................................................................30

Democracy Advantage Extensions.........................................................................................................33

DEM--AT: Other invasions of privacy exist........................................................................................35

DEM--Status Quo is a significant intrusion on privacy.......................................................................36

DEM--Fourth Amendment Key to Democracy...................................................................................37

DEM—Democracy Good Extensions..................................................................................................40

DEM—Democracy Good Extensions—Existential Risk.......................................................................43

DEM--Democracy Good Extensions—Poverty Add-On......................................................................44

DEM—AT: People just shouldn’t use the internet............................................................................45

Internet Advantage Extensions..............................................................................................................46

INT: Internet Impact Extensions.......................................................................................................47

INT: Internet is in trouble now..........................................................................................................48

Imperial Presidency Advantage Extensions...........................................................................................49

IMP--Executive Power is Increasing Now...........................................................................................51

IMP—Executive Power = War............................................................................................................53

IMP—Pres Powers = War...................................................................................................................54

IMP--Rights........................................................................................................................................56

IMP—Pres Powers destroy economy.................................................................................................58

IMP—Pres Powers = Biopower..........................................................................................................59

IMP—AT: Impact Cards Don’t Assume Obama.................................................................................60

IMP--Solvency for Imperial Presidency..............................................................................................61

IMP--AT: FISA Courts Solve...............................................................................................................62

IMP—Strong Courts Check Pres Powers............................................................................................63

IMP: Executive Will Comply with the Supreme Court.......................................................................66

Topicality Answers—2ac........................................................................................................................67

T Answers—Surveillance...................................................................................................................68

T Answers--Curtail Doesn’t Mean Abolish AFF Answers....................................................................69

T--Its AFF Answers.............................................................................................................................70

T--Domestic AFF Answers..................................................................................................................71

T--Substantially AFF Answers.............................................................................................................72

T--Federal Government AFF Answers................................................................................................73

Theory Answers—2ac...................................................................................................................74AT: Test Case FIAT (Have to have a test case)...................................................................................75

AT: Effects T—Court Mandates Then Congress Does........................................................................76

AT: Over-spec....................................................................................................................................77

AT: Ground Specification is Extra-Topical.........................................................................................78

Disad Answers..............................................................................................................................79Politics DA Answers...............................................................................................................................80

1ar: Politics: Decisions Announced in May......................................................................................82

1ar: Blame Deflection.......................................................................................................................83

1ar: Individual Decisions Don’t Matter.............................................................................................86

Court Capital Answers—2ac..................................................................................................................87

1ar: Court Capital Answers—No Spillover........................................................................................91

Court Capital Answers--Spokeo Specific Answers..............................................................................92

1ar: Robins will win...........................................................................................................................94

1ar: No Major Settlements...............................................................................................................95

Court Stripping Answers........................................................................................................................96

Hollow Hope DA Answers......................................................................................................................97

1ar: Brown v. Board Proves—Court Creates Social Change..............................................................99

1ar: Court Creates Social Change....................................................................................................100

Legitimacy DA Answers........................................................................................................................101

Legitimacy DA Answers—Extensions: Controversial Decisions Help the Court...............................104

Legitimacy DA Answers—Individual Decisions Don’t Matter...........................................................105

Separation of Powers Answers........................................................................................................107

Activism Answers.............................................................................................................................108

Counterplan Answers.................................................................................................................109Congress CP Answers...........................................................................................................................110

Cong CP--1ar: PERMUTATION SOLVES BEST...................................................................................113

1ar: Courts Better for Rights...........................................................................................................114

Lower Courts CP Answers—2ac...........................................................................................................117

Lower Courts: Links to Legitimacy DA.............................................................................................120

1AR Lower Courts CP—Solvency Extensions....................................................................................121

1ar: Solvency Extensions—No Trickle-Up.......................................................................................122

1ar Extensions: Roll Back................................................................................................................123

1ar: Ext. Rule of Law DA..................................................................................................................124

State Courts CP Answers......................................................................................................................125

CP Competing Off Plan Certainty 2ac...................................................................................................127

1acObservation 1: Inherency: The Court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment is outdated with regard to new technologies:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment is outdated in regards to new technologies . n35 The Court has held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in what they disclose to third parties. n36 In U.S. v. Jones, as Justice Alito opined, "[s]ome people may find the 'tradeoff' of privacy for convenience 'worthwhile,' or come

to accept this 'diminution of privacy' as 'inevitable.'" n37 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, noted that, "this approach is ill-suited to the digital age , in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks." n38 The two differing opinions exemplify the public's standing on surveillance in the 21st century.

Plan:

The United States Supreme Court should recalibrate the Fourth Amendment test in Katz v. United States for domestic internet surveillance to allow what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

Observation 2: SolvencyThe plan text solves and Courts are key to protecting privacy rights over the internet:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The application of the Fourth Amendment to Internet surveillance has expanded the government's ability to conduct unreasonable searches. The government's power is currently unchecked and must be

recalibrated . n173 The Court's interpretation in Katz, that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not

places, and that people have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" has become irrelevant due to the advances in technology. n174 Understanding that the Internet is, in theory, a place where content flows, and renders nearly everything on the Internet

incapable of protection under the Fourth Amendment. n175 Instead of adopting a narrow interpretation, legislatures need to apply the broader rationale behind the Fourth Amendment, which reasons, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his[/her] own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he[/she] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." n176 The Court must better protect what a person seeks to preserve as private. n177

Courts are key to check the executive branch with the Fourth Amendment—self-restraint and Congress fail:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

The courts must be more proactive in their role in limiting the reach of the executive branch. Both the Pen Register Decisions and the NSA Cases presented Fourth Amendment issues in a context that suggest a greater role for the courts . In the traditional conception of the adversarial system, the court plays the role of neutral arbiter, deciding only the

issues framed by the parties, based on the evidence provided by the parties. n276 However, in the constitutional context, and particularly in the context of ex parte proceedings, the courts must protect the unrepresented interests of the People. Courts should assume the additional obligation of assuring that the government does not reach further than permitted by the Fourth Amendment and the relevant statutory structure. If courts are not comfortable accepting this role, and many may not be, then they should freely explore alternative measures to ensure the representation of the interests of the People. The Pen Register Decisions suggest one immediate [*1032] remedial measure. n277 Commendably, a few courts appointed amici to brief the position opposed to the government. n278 The appointment of counsel to represent the interests of the People would identify the separate interests of the collective people and would encourage a more

thorough litigation of the issues before the courts. From an institutional perspective, courts must accept their role of enforcing the Constitution against the executive branch by applying greater scrutiny to executive claims of authority . The NSA Cases present the courts with an opportunity to revisit the difficult issue of the state secrets privilege. As discussed earlier, the application of the state secrets privilege should be subject to a balancing test where the significance of the interests at stake in the lawsuit are fairly weighed in the determination of whether the privilege applies. The privilege itself rests on the proposition that some interests, such as national security, are superior to other types of interests, such as the individual claims in a lawsuit. However, where the interest asserted in the lawsuit is not a claim for breach of contract but a claim for breach of the Constitution, the application of the privilege should not be taken lightly. The difficulty in apportioning proper weight to the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment stems from the use of the language in the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Reclaiming the language of the Fourth Amendment implies a different role for the courts because the original language denotes a right, rather than an expectation. An expression of the interests protected by the Fourth

Amendment as a right rather than as an expectation necessarily entails a higher degree of involvement for the courts. If we expect to restore significance to the promise of the Fourth Amendment, we must encourage courts to abandon the reasonable expectation of privacy test. We cannot reasonably expect the executive branch to limit

itself , nor can we expect the legislative branch to successfully restrain the executive. The Constitution's

original promise to the People of a right to be secure cannot survive without a renewed commitment

and vigilance from the courts.

Advantage 1: Democracy

Government surveillance of the internet risks a police state—the internet is a critical threshold:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

Government spying is not a new phenomenon; it has been an ongoing custom since the earliest forms of government. n12 The NSA's spying program constrains one of humanity's most important inventions, the Internet . n13 The United

States government crossed a threshold that grants access to limitless amounts of information . n14 They are overstepping constitutional boundaries, n15 and raising the possibility of a police state. n16 By advocating that surveillance is necessary for national security, the government provides an incentive for citizens to bypass the surveillance. n17 Anonymity is an important virtue of the Internet, and destroying it causes more harm than good. n18 Legislators must reexamine current legislation,

redefine what constitutes a reasonable search, and balance national security with an individual's right to privacy. Courts must reconcile

[*471] modern technology with the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the judiciary must fulfill their constitutional function by keeping the executive branch in check.

And now is key: several democracies worldwide are backsliding away from democracy:Béla Greskovits, 4/3/2015 (Central European University, Budapest, “The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe,” http://politicalscience.ceu.edu/sites/politicalscience.ceu.hu/files/attachment/event/1113/greskovitshollowingandbackslidingofdemocracy-globalpolicy2015.pdf, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

Focusing on ten East Central European member states of the European Union, this essay explores two

major challenges to the quality and solidity of their democracies. The first of these refers to the general

European problem of declining popular involvement in politics, termed hollowing of democracy ( Mair,

2006). The second challenge is captured by the term backsliding, which suggests destabilization or even a reversal in the direction of democratic development. Backsliding is usually traced to the radicalization of sizeable groups within the remaining active citizenry, and the weakening loyalty of political elites to democratic principles. While the long-term process of

hollowing of democracy is less spectacular, the news on backsliding often make it to the headlines. Today analysts and the general public are alarmed by the frequent disruptive protests against unemployment, poverty and uncertainty stemming from

austerity, and the occasional remarkable showing of radical Right-wing and other anti-system parties at elections. In several countries of the region, especially those hard hit by the global financial crisis and the Great Recession,

governments have also attempted to gain control over free media and other institutions of democratic checks and balances, as well as over the activity of civil society organizations.

Democratization solves multiple existential risks to our survival:Benny Peiser, 11/15/2007 (social anthropologist at Liverpool John Moores University, UK, “Existential risk and democratic peace,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

In recent years, humankind has become aware of a number of global and existential risks that potentially threaten our survival. These natural and man-made risks comprise cosmic disasters, volcanic super-eruptions and climatic disruption on the one hand, and nuclear warfare, technological catastrophes and fully-fledged bioterrorism on the other. In order to secure the future of civilisation, we are challenged to recognise and ward off these low-probability, but potentially destructive hazards. A new debate is gaining momentum about how best to achieve a secure future for our planetary civilisation. The rise of neo-catastrophism The perception that disorder rather than harmony held sway in the solar system gradually began to emerge during the 20th Century. The traditional concept of an essentially benign universe was replaced by that of an unpredictable cosmos punctuated by global catastrophes. The emergence of scientific neo-catastrophism surfaced as a corollary of the space age. Artist's impression of asteroid impact. Image: AFP/Getty There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm Images of impact craters sent back by space missions in the 1960s and 1970s exposed the pock-marked, impact-covered surface of many planets. At the same time, the identification of hyper-velocity impact craters on the Earth and empirical evidence of half a dozen mass extinction events generated a new view of our planet as a fundamentally hazardous and catastrophic place in space. More recently, predictions of large-scale disasters and societal upheaval as a result of catastrophic climate change, as well as growing apprehension about impending bioterrorism and nuclear warfare, have become almost routine issues of international concern. There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm. The existential risk paradox At the core of today's collective anxieties lies what I call the existential risk paradox. As advances in science, medical research, genetics and technology are accelerating, human vulnerability to global hazards such as

cosmic impacts, natural disasters, famine and pandemics has significantly decreased. Simultaneously, the proliferation of democratic liberalism and free market economies around the world has dramatically curtailed the death toll associated with natural disasters and diseases. A recent study confirms that the annual percentage of people killed by natural disasters has decreased tenfold in the last 40 years, in spite of the fact that the average annual number of recorded disasters increased fivefold.

Evidently, open and technological societies are becoming increasingly resilient to the effects of natural disasters. Kari Marie Norgaard Read a view of the psychology of climate scepticism from US scholar Kari Norgaard Inside the climate ostrich Yet the very same technologies that are serving us to analyse, predict and prevent potential disasters have reached such a level of

sophistication and potency that their misuse can transform vital survival tools into destructive forces, thus becoming existential risks in their own right. The nuclear device that may protect us from a devastating asteroid impact can also be employed for belligerent purposes. Genetic engineering that offers the prospect of infinite food supplies for the world's growing population can be turned into weapons of bioterrorism. And without the global utilisation of fossil fuels we would lack all trappings of modern civilisation and social progress. Yet, fossil fuels are regarded as dangerous resources that are widely blamed for economic tensions, wars and catastrophic climate change. Existential risk perception There seems to be some correlation between media exposure and existential risk perception. The more people see, hear or read about the risks of Near Earth Object (NEO) impacts, nuclear terrorism or global climate catastrophes, the more concerned they have become. The mere mention of catastrophic risks, regardless of its low probability, is enough to make the danger more urgent, thus increasing public estimates of danger. Scientists who evaluate risks are often torn between employing level-headed risk communication and the temptation to overstate potential danger. Sunbather (BBC) Media called on 'climate porn' Chaotic world of climate truth The inclination to amplify a possible risk is only too understandable. Personal biases, as well as grants and funding pressures, are considerable motivating factors to hype a probable hazard; ;n many cases, funding is allocated on the basis of intense lobbying. This, in turn, can tempt researchers to aggressively promote their specific "danger warning" via the mass media. Behind many alarms lurk vested interests of research institutions, campaign groups, political parties, charities, businesses or the news media, all of whom vie for attention, influence and funding in a relentless war of words. Professional risk analysts disapprove of such scare tactics, and point out that the detrimental affects of apocalyptic-sounding alarms and the rise of collective anxieties are much costlier than generally presumed. Whether individuals regard existential risks as a serious and pressing threat, or a remote and long-term risk, often depends on their psychological traits. Nobody has appreciated this conundrum perhaps better than Sir Winston Churchill who famously said: "An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity." Doomsday argument In recent years, leading scientists in the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, have advanced the so-called Doomsday Argument, a cosmological theory in which global catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom,

are wrong Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or unavoidable. According to a more optimistic view of the future, all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted by the constraints of human biology. Instead, it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and information-crunching technologies that potentially comprise boundless technological solutions to existential risks. Current advances in developing an effective planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk from the list of contemporary concerns. A technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global democracy as a solution But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-

cut solutions are available for the inherent potential threats posed by super-technologies. After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes. Here, the solution can only be political and cultural. Enola Gay. Image: Getty Effective democracy may prevent

man-made catastrophes Fortunately, there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of democratic

liberalism is directly correlated with a steep reduction of armed conflicts . A recent UN report found that the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War , while

the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically, from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems . As Rudolph J Rummel,

one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: "In democracy we have a cure for war and a way of minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history.

Developing standards for surveillance restores trust in democratic government:Morton H. Halperin, 5/7/2014 (Senior advisor, Open Society Foundations, “I Spy, You Spy: Limiting Government Surveillance of Private Citizens,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morton-h-halperin/i-spy-you-spy-limiting-government-surveillance_b_5269132.html, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

Building on this common understanding, the two governments should agree to initiate a process designed to develop standards and guidelines for surveillance of private persons that each government would commit to incorporating into its own domestic laws. Other democratic governments, both in Europe and across the globe, should be invited to commit to the same goal and join the effort along with other stakeholders, including Internet companies and civil society organizations. The guidelines should require that the rules governing surveillance of private persons be enacted into law and that each

government be required to provide a clear and complete explanation of what surveillance is permitted and under what circumstances. The guidelines should cover direct surveillance, searching large data bases, and minimizing the use of personally identifiable information. The guidelines should provide for effective oversight of the intelligence activity consistent with

each country's traditions and provide for the right of redress for anyone improperly surveilled. The successful negotiation of such standards will go a long way to restore the trust of democratic governments in each other and of their citizens in their governments and intelligence services.

And the Fourth Amendment is key: it is the most vital element of democracy: Iaconeta 13 (Christine, 3/21) Book Review: More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-first Century. American Association of Law Libraries. Professor Iaconeta is a member of the California Bar and an active member of the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL), Law Librarians of New England (LLNE), and NELLCO. She has served on numerous committees and has held leadership positions in these organizations. Currently she is the Chair of the Academic Law Libraries Special Interest Section (ALL-SIS) of AALL, AALL’s largest special interest section with 1200 members. http://www.aallnet.org/Blogs/spectrum-blog/47280.html// LDonn

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring a finding of probable cause before a search can take place. The amendment allows for governmental invasion of privacy but it also requires that it be justified and that the government be held accountable for its actions. Seemingly straightforward when originally drafted by our Founding Fathers, technological advances, changes in police work, and threats to national security have had a profound effect on the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-first Century, author, Stephen J. Schulhofer, takes the reader through a concise retelling of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, hoping to reconcile the historically held belief that governmental intrusions into the public’s private matters cannot be allowed in a free society; even when so doing my lead to the increased risk of danger and harm to the public. Accordingly, Mr. Schulhofer argues that the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment as it was originally conceived

can be, should be and must b e adhered in today’s modern society. A person’s right to privacy and the “right to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ” [1] is that essential to democracy . After an introduction that

outlines the four myths that fuel skepticism about the Fourth Amendment[2], the author begins, in Chapter Two, by discussing the historical tenets of the Fourth Amendment, outlining the Framers strongly held belief that unconstrained governmental discretion cannot be allowed and that judicial oversight is needed to prevent improper governmental actions. In this chapter, Mr. Schulhofer argues that the present day courts should focus on the principles and values laid out by the Court in early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when deciding cases, rather than relying on a strict adherence to the specific rules established by the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The author calls this “adaptive originalism.”[3] This concept is explored further in Chapter 3, as well as in the next chapter where he examines the changing nature of everyday police work. In both of these chapters the author discusses the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that were necessitated by the nature of illegal activity and the need for the police to protect the public from criminal activity while still adhering to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment. The author continues to discuss the need for flexibility in Chapter 5, when he discusses administrative searches, those searches that take place outside the realm of traditional police work. In these special circumstances, for example, searches done to insure public health and safety, the Court has relaxed the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements. Although this allows for flexibility, the author argues that this threatens the traditional notions of privacy requiring the need for governmental accountability and oversight. Again, the author is calling for flexibility while still recognizing the need for actions that promote the Fourth Amendments original ideals.In Chapter 6, the author examines the privacy implications resulting from the development of modern technologies, including the effect wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping and increased access to personal information has had on our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Chapter 7 looks at national security and how the events of 9/11 have affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In this final chapter, Mr. Schulhofer discusses the effect the events of 9/11 had on our Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the assumption that security and prevention of future tragedies outweighs the protections afforded to us by the Fourth Amendment is misconceived. All decisions have risk and to alienate the millions of law abiding Muslims in the U.S. in order to protect us from the few that mean us harm is more damaging. Governmental transparency and checks on governmental power will generate the societal trust needed to better protect our society from the dangers we now face.[4] In conclusion, Mr. Schulhofer argues in the last chapter that despite the many societal advances and changes the Framers couldn’t possibly have anticipated

when the Fourth Amendment was drafted, the notion of individual privacy continues to be the most vital component of

individual freedom and democracy, making the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment are vital in today’s society.

US democratic law is modeled internationally and sets the foundations for other democracies:Krotoszynski, 2009 (Ronald J. John C. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The Perils and the Promise of Comparative Constitutional Law: The New Globalism and the Role of the United States in Shaping Human Rights. Arkansas Law Review 2009. http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy .samford.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/? 06/24/2015. clj)

Only a few years ago, former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, of the Supreme Court of Israel, tied these developments directly to the contribution of

United States constitutional law stating, "United States public law in general, and U nited States Supreme Court decisions in particular , have always been, to me and to many other judges in modern democracies, shining

examples of constitutional thought and constitutional action." n10 He also noted that "the United States is the richest and deepest source of constitutionalism in general and of judicial review in particular ." n11 Further,

he acknowledged, "We foreign jurists all look to developments in the United States as a source of inspiration." n12

Advantage 2: The InternetThe lack of legal protections to check internet surveillance leads to a chilling effect and prevents the development of an open internet:Jeff Jarvis, 6/17/2013 (staff writer, “I fear the chilling effect of NSA surveillance on the open internet,” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/17/chilling-effect-nsa-surveillance-internet, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

I fear the collateral damage the NSA's spying via technology will do to that technology. The essential problem is not the internet or internet companies or even the spies. The real problem is the law and what it does not prevent the American government from doing with technology, and how it does not protect the principles upon which this nation was founded.

The damage to the net and its freedoms will take many forms: users may come to distrust the net for

communication , sharing, and storage because they now fear – with cause – that the government will be spying on them, whether or not they are the object of that surveillance. International users – properly concerned that they are afforded even less protection than Americans – may ditch American platforms. The European Union and other national governments, which already were threatening laws targeting US technology companies, will work harder to keep their citizens' data away from the US. Technologists may find it necessary to build in

so many protections, so much encryption and caution, that the openness that is a key value of the net becomes lost. If we trust the net less, will we use it less? Will it become less of an engine for innovation and economic development? Will it be a diminished tool for speech and assembly among citizens? If governments use this event as an excuse to exercise more oversight and control over the net, will that not then, in turn, reduce citizens' trust in the net and their freedom using it? Governments present themselves as the protector of our privacy, but as the NSA story demonstrates, governments present the greatest threat to our privacy as they have the means both to surveil us and to use our information against us. And note well that governments' relationship with the net is necessarily influenced by the net's disruptive force on government: witness the internet's use in organizing protests against governments in Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, and more nations by the day. Isn't a weakened, controlled, distrusted net in governments' interests? Advertisement So far, much of the negative coverage and emotion in this story have centered on the technology companies alleged by Edward Snowden's leaked PowerPoint slides to have cooperated with the NSA. The Washington Post has yet to correct its contention that the NSA and FBI are "tapping directly" into the servers of internet companies, though that simplistic characterization has been soundly denied by Google, Facebook, and others. The Associated Press has given a more nuanced and sensible interpretation of the slides, explaining that some Prism data is the product of warrants served on those companies, producing data from their servers that is delivered by file transfer, or disc in Google's case, and some is the result of apparent wholesale eavesdropping on internet fibre. That tapping into the net's full flow of communications is far more troubling even than the US government's secret warrants. For a savvy description of how that can occur, listen to security expert Steve Gibson's podcast. I've yet to hear internet bandwidth providers (Level3, Verizon, et al) questioned as internet service companies have been about whether and how they are cooperating with the spies. That is a next phase of this story. What the NSA is doing may be legal, made so by the Patriot Act. But even on Fox News, regular contributor Andrew Napolitano has questioned whether its actions and this law are constitutional. That is the key question Edward Snowden and company now put before us: what principles are being violated or upheld by the government's actions? That is the discussion we must have. I see these core principles at stake. First, privacy: in the United States, first-class letters and parcels are protected from search and seizure except by warrant. That should be the case, but is not, for any private communication using any technology: other classes of mail, email, internet telephony, Twitter direct

message, or means yet to be invented. Second, the balance of powers: the NSA is overseen by a secret court and gagged legislators. Thus, save for Snowden's leaking, we the people are excluded from the information we need and the opportunity we deserve to keep our representatives and agents in check. A third principle riding atop these is transparency: the notion that government should be transparent by default and secret by necessity (and there are necessary secrets). Today, government is secret by default and transparent by force, whether from whistleblowers and journalists. When government threatens to torture the whistleblowers and prosecute the journalists who share information with us, then that puts a chill on speech and a choke on the transparency citizens depend upon to assure their rights and monitor their governments. The first two are principles enshrined in the US constitution: in the fourth amendment that guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and in the structure of American government itself. The third is a principle whose value I have learned from the

net and the power it gives any citizen to speak publicly; to find, organize, or join a public; and ultimately, to choose what is public and what is not. The NSA's actions and the laws that enable them – as well as some occasionally overblown conjecture around this – threaten to diminish the power and freedom of the net . I worry that the damage is done.

The chilling effect is real and spreading: websites are shutting down for fear of NSA surveillance:Mathew Ingram, 8/20/2013 (staff writer, “Through a PRISM darkly: Fear of NSA surveillance is having a chilling effect on the open web,” https://gigaom.com/2013/08/20/through-a-prism-darkly-fear-of-nsa-surveillance-is-having-a-chilling-effect-on-the-open-web/, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

Just a few weeks ago, the secure email service Lavabit — which Edward Snowden used while corresponding with

Guardian writer Glenn Greenwald about NSA leaks, ironically — shut down because of the founder’s concern about government surveillance, as did fellow email provider Silent Circle. Now, the well-respected legal discussion forum Groklaw has done the same, driven by what its founder has called the “forced exposure” of NSA surveillance. How many more web services do we have to lose before NSA chilling effects become a serious drain on the internet we all take for granted? In his note about the closure of his secure email service, Lavabit founder Ladar Levison said that if we knew what he knows about the security of the global email system, we wouldn’t use email at all. Pamela Jones, the founder of Groklaw, said in her own closure notice that this warning started to gnaw away at her, and finally she couldn’t stomach running her web forum and email list any longer, because of a fear that its entire contents were available to the NSA. “The simple truth is, no matter how good the motives might be for collecting and screening everything we say to one another, and no matter how ‘clean’ we all are ourselves from the standpoint of the screeners, I don’t know how to function in such an atmosphere.” Safety in the rule of law? Not so much privacy / spying / eye in computer Not only did Jones say that she couldn’t continue running Groklaw because of the fear of surveillance (especially since she has readers and subscribers around the world, and surveillance of non-U.S. citizens is even easier than it is with U.S. residents) but she said the rise of the security state actually seemed to contradict some of the reasons she started the Groklaw service in the first place, or at least to conflict with them, and that made it even more difficult to continue. As she put it: “I loved doing Groklaw, and I believe we really made a significant contribution. But even that turns out to be less than we thought, or less than I hoped for, anyway. My hope was always to show you that there is beauty and safety in the rule of law, that civilization actually depends on it. How quaint.” Some of those who have been commenting on Jones and her decision seem to feel she is over-reacting. But is she? The PRISM documents and subsequent revelations about how much of our online behavior is being captured — either for immediate surveillance or stored in some database for future analysis — are enough to make even the biggest government supporter think twice, not to mention incidents like the detention of Glenn

Greenwald’s partner at a British airport and the seizure of his belongings. Who will decide to shut down next? How much of what we value about the internet is in jeopardy because of the sheer scale of the surveillance that is going on all around us? It’s one thing to lose a secure email service or a legal discussion forum, but how long until other more mainstream services are affected? And it doesn’t have to be outright shutdowns or closures — just a series of restrictions or the gradual decline in usage by users who are (rightly) concerned about the information they are putting online or the digital cookie crumbs they are leaving behind them. As Jones points

out, the cumulative effect of a multitude of decisions like hers could have substantial repercussions for

internet companies (and in fact have already done so) as well as the digital economy as a whole. How many people will want to use an e commerce solution like Facebook is said to be launching if they know every transaction will be indexed and tracked by the government or the NSA? That’s just one example. As Jones puts it: “My personal decision is to get off of the Internet to the degree it’s possible. I’m just an ordinary person. But I really know, after all my research and some serious thinking things through, that I can’t stay online personally without losing my humanness… if everyone did that, leap off the Internet, the world’s economy would collapse, I suppose. I can’t really hope for that. But for me, the Internet is over.”

The internet solves multiple scenarios for extinction:David Eagleman, 11/9/2010 (Neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, “Six ways the internet will save civilization,” http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: natural

disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease, poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which the net has vastly reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden

Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of

isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The internet will predict natural disasters We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-

phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded

reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated Censorship of ideas was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, China, Iraq and elsewhere. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it directly contributed to the collapse of the nation. Historically, a more successful strategy has been to confront free speech with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by some governments to build firewalls, it’s clear that this benefit of the net requires constant vigilance. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one

per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. The net opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum

of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital will serve us well when we confront existential threats we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reduced Societal collapse can often be understood in terms of an energy budget: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of deforestation or soil erosion; currently, the worry involves fossil-fuel depletion. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers

societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly diseases threatening civilisation . The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

The internet is key to the economy:

Gabriela Gonzalez, 9-4-2014 (“A million reasons why the internet is good for you,”http://blogthinkbig.com/a-million-reasons-why-the-internet-is-good-for-you/, accessed 6-23-2015, Kkb)

The internet contributes an average of 3.4% to gross domestic product ( GDP) in at least 13 countries worldwide, including the US, the UK, Canada and Spain. Money production through the internet is so high that it is the same as the amount in GDP produced by Canada each year and more than that produced by Australia; and the research only covered 13 countries, not the whole world. The internet creates jobs and for each job created in the technology industry , five more are created in other branches, jobs that are needed to support an

entire company. Crowdfunding platforms raised more than $2.7 billion in 2013, providing enough money for over one million campaigns created by ordinary people with big ideas. 95% of the companies in countries belonging to the organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are present online, which increases their sales and improves the customer-seller relationship. The internet has made many things change, and in the search for a formula to reduce piracy, the “Netflix” effect has come about, something so simple whereby if people have a legal place where they can pay to watch movies, view series and listen to music piracy will fall. According to one study, 40% of people download less pirate copies if they can use a service such as Netflix and similar sites.

US economic decline causes global great power warsDuncan ’12 [Richard Duncan, former IMF consultant, financial sector specialist for the World Bank, Chief Economist Blackhorse Asset Management, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, Page 12, Ebooks]

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11

aircraft carriers and 18 nuclear-armed submarines. The country spends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. economy collapses

into a New Great Depression, the United States could not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper. Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned. Priority would be given to those places that were of vital economic interests to the United States. The Middle East oil fields would be at the top of that list.

The United States would have to maintain control over them whatever the price. In this global depression scenario, the price of oil could collapse to $3 per

barrel. Oil consumption would fall by half and there would be no speculators left to manipulate prices higher. Oil at that level would impoverish the oil-producing nations, with extremely destabilizing political consequences. Maintaining control over the Middle East oil fields would become much more difficult for the United States. It would require a much larger military presence than it does now. On the one hand, it might become necessary for the United States to reinstate the draft (which would possibly meet with violent resistance from draftees, as it did during the Vietnam War). On the other hand, America’s all-volunteer army might find it had more than enough volunteers with the national unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent. The army might have to be employed to keep order at home, given that mass unemployment would inevitably lead to a sharp spike in crime. Only after the Middle East oil was secured would the country know how much more of its global military presence it could afford to maintain. If international trade had broken down, would there be any reason for the

United States to keep a military presence in Asia when there was no obvious way to finance that presence? In a global depression, the United States’ allies in Asia would most likely be unwilling or unable to finance America’s military bases there or to pay for the upkeep of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Nor would the United States have the strength to force them to pay for U.S. protection. Retreat from Asia might become unavoidable. And Europe? What would a cost–benefit analysis conclude about the wisdom of the United States maintaining military bases there? What valued added does Europe provide to the United

States? Necessity may mean Europe will have to defend itself. Should a New Great Depression put an end to the Pax Americana, the world would become a much more dangerous place. When the Great Depression began, Japan was the rising industrial power in Asia. It invaded Manchuria in 1931 and conquered much of the rest of Asia in the early 1940s. Would China, Asia’s new rising power, behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state).

However, in this disaster scenario, it is not certain that China would survive in its current configuration. Its economy would be in ruins. Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent. There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart, as it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that China’s provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war with one another. United or divided, China’s nuclear arsenal would make it Asia’s undisputed superpower if the United States were to withdraw

from the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the West, all of Asia would be at China’s mercy. And

hunger among China’s population of 1.3 billion people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right. During the 1930s, the Fascists movement arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism. It is difficult to judge whether Europe’s democratic institutions would hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression. Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country—or, at least London—could become ungovernable. Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into anti-immigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the

one hand, Russia would be impoverished by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On the

other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining internal order through emergency wartime powers. Germany is very nearly demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of sentences. Global

economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion. Not all of the world’s seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread. Food riots would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginable for the current generation, who, at least in the industrialized world, has known only prosperity.

Nor would there be reason to hope that the New Great Depression would end quickly. The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60 million people .

Advantage 3: Imperial PresidencyThe judiciary is currently letting the executive branch run amok in intelligence surveillance, the plan is necessary to restore the check against the president:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

One of the core principles of the United States Constitution is the system of checks and balances. n237 The judicial branch has been extremely hesitant to oppose the government with regard to intelligence

surveillance. n238 In In re Application of F.B.I., the FISA Court approved the collection of telephony metadata on U.S. citizens and interpreted the NSA's surveillance practices as indistinguishable from a pen register. n239 In similar fashion, an Idaho court held, in Smith v. Obama, that a citizen seeking an injunction against NSA telephony metadata collection has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her cellphone data. n240 Other courts dismissed similar actions on the basis that plaintiffs lack standing. n241 For example, a District Court in Washington, D.C. held that the plaintiff lacked standing, because "[h]is generalized fear that his communications are being intercepted 'is insufficient to create standing.'" n242 Opponents of current wiretapping and surveillance legislation have garnered little support from the

courts because national security concerns have prevented revisions to surveillance regulations. n243 At the same time, the executive branch's authority in this area has been greatly expanded following 9/11. n244 The 9/11 attacks resulted in "the single largest loss of life from a foreign attack on American soil," and left the nation in a state of terror. n245 The government

has [*495] an obligation to protect citizens from another attack. n246 Nonetheless, there must be a balance between the constitutional rights of the individual and the government's surveillance practices . n247 The judicial

branch must fulfill its constitutional function by serving as a check on the authority of the executive and legislative branches. n248 The FISA court has failed to restrain the power of intelligence agencies over the past two decades. For example, the FISA court approved 20,909 warrants, approximately thirty-three surveillance warrants per week, from 2001 to 2012. n249 During that span, FISA court judges denied only ten applications and approved over 500 business record warrants, which also include bulk metadata from phone and Internet providers under section 215. n250 Most notably, the FISA court "substantially modified" 376 of the 417 business record warrants for 2011 and 2012. n251 It can be reasonably inferred that the modifications by the court show that the FISA court is doing everything it can to approve warrants for the NSA, because the court does not reject them completely.

The presidency’s powers are massively expanding now and Congress isn’t providing a check on them:F.H. Buckley April 2014 (is Foundation Professor at the George Mason University School of Law and author of The Once and Future

King: The Rise of Crown Government in America THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING. http://spectator.org/articles/58138/ once-and-future-king, 06/23/15 , clj)

Gutzon Borglum knew what he was doing when he picked the site for the future Mount Rushmore. The area’s 1.6 billion-year-old granite is thought to erode only a single inch every ten millennia. Barring a detonation at the hands of our jihadist foes, the faces of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt will still look serenely down at future visitors of South Dakota’s Black Hills when the America of the twentieth century is as remote as we are from the pharaoh whom built the first pyramid. If only our Constitution had been carved out of the same sturdy material. American liberty has not been eroding so much as crumbling away these last five years. Increasingly burdensome and intrusive legislation, persecution (and sometimes prosecution) of political enemies by the executive branch, a swelling national debt: It’s been a bad few years, to say the least. But the biggest threat to the bedrock of our freedom is the presidency itself, the crown government of the almighty chief executive, which is completely at odds with the republican principles of our Founders. Forget what your high-school civics teacher told you: Since our founding, America has actually had three different constitutions. The first, the one that the Framers gave us, established congressional government: The House of Representatives, voting by state, would almost always choose the president, and the executive branch was exceedingly lean—starved, even. Then we had so-called Jacksonian democracy: The president, chosen by the people, enjoyed the legitimacy of the only person elected by the nation as a whole. This was the constitution of separation of powers, in which the legislative and executive branches shared the responsibility for governing, and in which a

strong president might be forced to bend before an implacable Congress. We now live under a third constitution, one that enshrines an all-powerful executive. The president has slipped off the petty, outdated constraints of the past. He makes and unmakes laws and spends trillions of dollars without the consent of Congress. Even the gravest of decisions, whether to commit our country to war, he makes alone. His ability to reward friends and punish enemies exceeds anything we’ve seen before. He is rex quondam, rex futurus—the once and future king. And all of this seems irreversible. The arc of American government has bent from monarch to monarch, from George III to Obama. To be sure, I’m not the first person to detect a whiff of royal perfume amid the effluvium of our executive branch. Liberals such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who drooled over Jack Kennedy but excoriated Richard Nixon, have always been quick to decry executive overreach by Republican presidents, even as they celebrated the assertion of

presidential power when their fellow slept at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. And, indeed, the role of the president has been expanding, and that of Congress receding, for many years now. But we’ve seen a clear move recently toward a new conception of our nation’s highest office, and of government itself. The president now enjoys the power to make law. Never mind that this is inconsistent with the separation of powers, that Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution specifies that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” One might have expected the speaker of the House or the leaders of the Senate to defend their domain. They have not. In fact, Congress has done more than just quietly acquiesce to its own obsolescence. It has aided and abetted the expansion of presidential power by drafting major legislation in the most general terms, allowing the details to be penciled in by federal agencies under executive supervision. This can be seen as a grant to the president of legislative powers, the regal prerogative the Framers so feared.

Unrestrained presidential powers risk nuclear war: FORRESTER, 89 (Ray, professor @ Hastings College of the Law University @ University of California and former Dean of Law School @ Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Cornell, George Washington Law Review, August 1989, l/n)

On the basis of this report, the startling fact is that one man alone has the ability to start a nuclear war. A basic theory--if not the basic theory of our Constitution--is that concentration of power in any one person , or one group,

is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe

with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged in the discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed

Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . .Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war. [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President. Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which such a decision has been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits

might entail. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is difficult to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this most critical issue. The Court has been fearless in deciding other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped that

the Justices will finally do their duty here. But in the meantime the spectre of single-minded power persists, fraught with all of the frailties of human nature that each human possesses, including the President . World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to check the President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry. Congress, of course, can amend the Resolution to state explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces" includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act without prior consultation by renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult. Wisely, Article V requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three-fourths of the states. Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that it arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made aware of the problem. It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare. A constitutional amendment may be, indeed, the appropriate method. But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically? The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to commit the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though he may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the war after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and their children to war. There is a recurring relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into wars which, in hindsight, were foolish, unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences that drive the single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remains that the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective check and balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our

leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human nature, with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own relatively benign society, where

the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here. But the "nuclear football"--the ominous "black bag" --remains in the sole possession of the President. And, most important, his decision to launch a nuclear missile would be, in fact if not in law, a declaration of nuclear war, one which the nation and, indeed, humanity in general, probably would be unable to survive.

FYI on What the Plan DoesIn the status quo, email users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of messages or IP addresses of websites they visit—the plan would change that:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

By nature, the Internet is a public network. n214 Therefore, anytime someone uses it, they are knowingly exposing information to the public. n215 Courts have consistently held that senders and recipients of standard mail have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to information "put on the outside of mail, because that information is voluntarily transmitted to third parties." n216 Similarly, "e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit." n217 A Verizon customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy because they are giving their IP address voluntarily to Verizon. n218

Bulk collection of Internet metadata does not currently constitute a search under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The NSA asserts that the identifiers are limited to identifying persons associated with foreign terrorist organizations and should be allowed because it is vital to NSA's counterterrorism mission. n197 However, evidence has pointed to the contrary. n198 A report to the government in 2009 showed that as of January 15, 2009, a staggering 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers approved by the designated NSA officers were based on a

reasonable, articulable suspicion. n199 Although this appears to be a clear abuse of discretionary authority under § 1861, [*490] the NSA argues that the bulk collection of Internet metadata is similar to a pen register and does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. n200

Inherency Extensions

INH: Need to Update the Law in digital age Fourth Amendment interpretations must be updated to the digital age:Mason C. Clutter, 2014 (National Security and Privacy Counsel to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, “DOGS, DRONES, AND DEFENDANTS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE ,” George Mason Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

As technology evolves and expectations of individual privacy morph, so too must the law. Unfortunately ,

Congress is failing to keep up with technological advances, and the courts are forced to refer to our founding document for guidance on the government's use of new technologies. The Fourth Amendment protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." n1 We know that a man's home is his castle and one of the most private and

protected spaces under the law. But what protection do citizens have from intrusion by electronic devices and other "enhanced searching technologies" that can see, smell, and hear through walls and track one's physical location and electronic communications? Can law enforcement use these technologies against us outside of our homes? The law is always a bit stickier when we step outside of the home and into "public."

Solvency Extensions

SOLV--AT: Law is Indeterminate (--) Extend our solvency evidence—recalibrating the 4th amendment provides better guidance to future courts than the current Katz test.(--) Reclaiming the language of the 4th amendment provides greater clarity and guidance:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

The increased capacity for electronic surveillance and the need to employ new technologies require a critical reassessment of the existing legal structure. In essence, it is time for another paradigm shift. n17 We must abandon Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy and adopt language that accurately reflects the significance of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. The interests that courts since Katz have described in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy should be expressed in terms of personal security and the right to be secure. At first blush it may appear that replacing the reasonable expectation of privacy with the right to

be secure is merely a game of semantics, but the use of specific language is important, and reclaiming the language

of security will provide greater clarity and guidance in our analysis of Fourth Amendment issues. n18

(--) Breaking away from the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in Katz generates legal clarity:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

A clean break from the reasonable expectation of privacy standard will generate clarity by (1) reducing the blurring effect of a reliance on a normative standard, (2) adopting a conception of Fourth Amendment protection from governmental intrusion that comports with the realities of modern technology, and (3) linguistically separating the different notions of privacy in our current legal lexicon.

(--) Courts will follow precedent—they feel an overwhelming obligation to do so:Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis

Throughout constitutional history, Supreme Court Justices have assumed with near unanimity that they

are legally authorized and sometimes bound to follow precedents , sometimes even when prior cases were themselves erroneous at the time of their decision. n149 Indeed, I know of no Justice in the history of the Supreme Court who has persistently questioned [*1822] precedent-based decisionmaking . n150 Even leading constitutional originalists - those who maintain that courts otherwise ought to decide cases in accordance with the

original understanding n151 - have accepted the authority of judicial precedent , including past decisions that could not themselves be justified under originalist principles. n152

SOLV--Court Should Reconcile Fourth Amendment (--) Courts should reconcile the Fourth Amendment with modern technology:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

Modern courts seek a proper application of the Fourth Amendment adapted to modern technology . n294

The next step is for the courts to understand that technology is rapidly evolving, and that they must be flexible to find a proper solution. This is about accountability. The Constitution is something 'we the people' placed on the government. n295 On November 18, 2014, legislators had the ability to curtail the NSA's surveillance program. n296 Senator Patrick Leahy's [*500] bill to limit the NSA's telephony metadata collection program was up for a vote, which needed sixty votes to pass. n297 It was the hope of the American people that our government will respond to the encroachment it has allowed thus far. Unfortunately, Leahy's USA FREEDOM Act of 2014 fell short of the sixty votes needed to pass. n298 The votes were divided among party lines, with the exception of a few votes on each side. n299 Most view the outcome as a major loss for privacy advocates, because the Patriot Act has not been curtailed in any way. n300 However, the rejection of the USA FREEDOM Act has the potential of being a major win for privacy advocates.

(--) Katz should be reformulated to look at the results of the search—otherwise new technologies will overwhelm the Katz test:Ric Simmons, 2002 (Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, Hastings Law Journal, “From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies,” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

This Article argues that courts should apply the Katz test as it was originally intended: a test which considers only the result of the search - the type of information that was acquired; and disregards altogether the method of the search - the action or conduct of the agent conducting the search. Although such a test would directly contradict a few subsequent cases that have interpreted the Katz standard, n10 it is entirely consistent with the paradigm shift that the Court engineered in Katz. This argument is supported by a close textual reading of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz (which set out the "reasonable expectations" test) and is also consistent with much of the reasoning in case law from the hundred years prior to Katz. Furthermore, application of a purely "results-based" test is all the more necessary given the advances in technology that have occurred since that landmark case was decided over thirty years ago. Specifically, in the fields of computer crime (which did not exist at all thirty years ago), sense-enhancing technology (which existed in much cruder form), and binary or content-discriminating searches (which are soon to become a prominent and valuable tool for law enforcement), a continued adherence to a test that considers the method of search used by the government will result in the same inconsistencies that the Court observed in the electronic eavesdropping field, in which the constitutionality

of a surveillance absurdly turned on whether the microphone "trespassed" into the defendant's wall. Perhaps more ominously, using the method of search as a factor in determining constitutionality will inevitably result - indeed, has already resulted -

in a gradual weakening of Fourth Amendment protections as investigative technologies become more sophisticated.

SOLV--AT: Rollback/Won’t Be Enforced (--) No rollback: three reasons:

Schacter, 1995 (Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, “ARTICLE: METADEMOCRACY: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION” Harvard Law Review, JANUARY, lexis, Accessed 2/18/2013, rwg)

Even if some of the strongest cynicism about legislative behavior and motivation is overstated, several aspects of the pluralist process

nevertheless suggest that statutory override cannot cure all that ails the essentialist model. First, legislatures

are frequently too busy, overextended, or inert to respond to an objectionable judicial interpretation . n54 Indeed, there is little reason to believe that legislators systematically monitor judicial interpretations of statutes. n55 Second , [*606] statutory override is an imperfect substitute , and controversial as a normative matter, because the current legislature may have different preferences from the enacting legislature. n56 Third, even when legislators do respond to a particular judicial interpretation, the

process does not necessarily end . The new statute might require interpretation, and the process may simply continue. n57

(--) Strike down efforts in Congress fail—can’t get enough Congressional support to strike down Court decisions:

Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, [“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi /full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe]

It is also worth asking why the Court fares so well in Congress. As noted above, few of the Court's most

controversial interventions in the past half century have been directly reversed . Nor has Congress

enacted any of the numerous bills to remove the Court's jurisdiction over areas in which the Court has aroused congressional anger. A large part of the explanation lies in the difficulty of enacting legislation in a process with so many veto points. That difficulty is especially great in an era like the current one, which lacks a strong or stable law-making majority. In such an era, interventions are likely to have significant support in government regardless of their ideological

direction, and even decisions that strike down federal laws may enjoy majority support . The line of decisions since 1995 that has limited the regulatory power of the federal government (e.g., Alden v. Maine 1999, United States v. Morrison 2000) constitutes the most significant judicial attack on federal policy since the 1930s. But since 1995, Congress has had Republican majorities except for the bare

Democratic Senate majority in 20012002. In that situation, any significant action to counter the Court's policies has been exceedingly unlikely .

(--) Other branches will comply—fear of public backlash guarantees:McFarland, 2008 New York University Annual Survey of American Law editor (Michael, New York University Annual Survey of American Law, "Derivative Citizenship: Its History, Constitutional Foundation, And Constitutional Limitations," 63 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 467, l/n, accessed 2/18/2013, rwg]

The idea that courts should decline review because they do not want their decisions to be ignored by the political branches is misguided. Congress would rarely risk the public backlash that would come with ignoring a Supreme Court directive. n240 President Nixon, for example, would have found it all but impossible to refuse to provide Congress with his Oval Office tapes. n241 Redish even argues that courts gain from challenging the political branches. n242 Courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are viewed as the final arbiters of the Constitution, and public support will frequently be on their side if they

choose to challenge Congress or the executive. n243 Thus, the institutional reasons for granting deference to Congress provide little support for the plenary power doctrine.

(--) Politicians will enforce the counterplan—they’ll act if the statute is gone away for all time:Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the interactive nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of statutes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is

not purely external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations . Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule of law under which a statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute were gone for all time . At the very least, even if political actors realize the potential for reversal , the finding of unconstitutionality alters the way in which they spend their political

capital. As a result, rather than seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a nullity, they devote their political resources to other - more clearly

consequential - matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce a result contrary to what the political process would have produced in the absence of the initial judicial decision.

SOLV—Executive Will Comply (--) Executive will comply with Supreme Court decisions:

TODD S. PURDUM, 2004 6/29/2004 (“THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESIDENT; In Classic Check and Balance, Court Shows Bush It Also Has Wartime Powers,” Accessed 7/26/2012 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/supreme-court-president-classic-check-balance-court-shows-bush-it-also-has.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, rwg)

Some historians were not surprised by the court's decisions. Alonzo Hamby, a scholar of the presidency at Ohio University, noted wryly that

''once upon a time, it was not assumed that presidents necessarily had to pay attention to Supreme Court decisions.'' In the 1830's, when the Supreme Court declared the government's forced removal of Indian tribes from their lands illegal, President Andrew Jackson famously dismissed the ruling by the chief justice by saying: ''John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it.'' Mr. Hamby said, ''But in the world we live in now, it's literally impossible for a president to ignore a Supreme Court decision , no matter how wrong or dangerous he may think it is.''

(--) Obama will comply with Supreme Court decisions:Scott Lemieux, 6/15/2015 (staff writer, “Yes, it's okay for Obama to 'bully' the Supreme Court,” http://theweek.com/articles/560206/yes-okay-obama-bully-supreme-court, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

To state what should be obvious, the idea that Obama is engaged in some kind of illegitimate "bullying" by criticizing the latest anti-ObamaCare

attack cooked up by the law's most fanatical opponents is asinine. Obama is not suggesting that he would refuse to

comply with an unfavorable ruling. He is not following FDR and arguing that Congress should retaliate

by adding additional seats to the court. He has no leverage to force the court to do anything . He's expressing

his views about a case.

SOLV--Solvency: Lower Courts will follow (---) Doesn’t matter if lower courts don’t follow--the plan is modeled and solves for democracies in other nations: that’s the Krotoszynski ’09 evidence.(--) Judges almost always follow the courts lead—multiple reasons:

Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June [“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/ doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe]

Once we know more about the implementation of the Court's decisions in absolute and relative terms, the most important question might well

be why implementation is as successful as it is. The Court's limited concrete powers would seem to aggravate the difficulties faced by all organizational leaders, so why do judges and administrators follow the Court's

lead so frequently? Within the judiciary, part of the answer undoubtedly lies in selection and

socialization processes that enhance agreement about legal policy and acceptance of hierarchical

authority . Even the Court's limited powers may be sufficient to rein in administrators, especially in the era of broad legal mobilization that Epp has described: Groups that undertake litigation campaigns to achieve favorable precedents can also litigate

against organizations that refuse to accept those precedents. Both judges and administrators may reduce their decision costs by using the Court's legal rules as a guide. In any event, the relationship between the Court and policy makers who implement its policies may be an especially good subject for studies to probe the forces that reduce centrifugal tendencies in hierarchies.

(--) Parties almost always adhere to Court rulings:Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis

(b) Authoritative Legitimacy and Its Limits. - Today, nearly all Supreme Court rulings possess a high degree of authoritative legitimacy, whether in the strong or the weak sense, at least with respect to [*1831] the parties before the Court. n195 In plainer terms, the parties almost always obey the Court's

rulings . No logical necessity undergirds this state of affairs. In the past, General Andrew Jackson famously defied a judicial ruling. n196 So did President Abraham Lincoln. n197

SOLV--Solvency: The Plan will Snowball (--) LEGAL PRECEDENTS SNOWBALL:

Tsai, 2005 Assistant Prof. of Law @ University of Oregon School of Law, 2005 (Robert, Iowa Law Review, March 2005; 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1095; Lexis)

It is always risky to attempt predictions based on a reading of signs. The history of law, like human history generally, is a set of contingencies. Unforeseen events can cause a disruption; a series of small interpretive choices and popular reactions can add up to a quiet legal revolution. More important, law's appearance can be deceiving. Still, legal symbols do reveal [*1160] gestalts - the particular interaction between law's manifestations and the beliefs they express.

SOLV--Solvency: Supreme Court Decisions are Modeled (--) Extend our Krotoszynski ’09 evidence—other democracies model the Supreme Court decisions.(--) Supreme Court decisions are modeled:

LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO, 2012 (Professor of Constitutional Law, Rio de Janeiro State University, Spring, 2012, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 35 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 331, L/N, “HERE, THERE, AND EVERYWHERE: HUMAN DIGNITY IN CONTEMPORARY LAW AND IN THE TRANSNATIONAL DISCOURSE,” rwg)

In recent years, constitutional and supreme courts all over the world have begun engaging in a growing constitutional dialogue n88 involving mutual citation and academic interchange n89 in public forums like the Venice Commission. n90 Two factors contribute to the deepening of this dialogue. First, countries that are newcomers to the rule of law often draw

upon the experience of more seasoned democracies. In the past several decades, waves of democratization have spread across the world, including Europe in the 1970s (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), Latin America in the 1980s (Brazil, Chile, and

Argentina), and Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s. n91 The U.S. Supreme Court , the German Constitutional Court, and

other similar national courts serve as significant role models for these new democracies . n92 Even though

the flow of ideas is primarily one directional, it is, as with any other exchange, a two-way street.

(--) Domestic litigation in the US is modeled by other nations:Van Schaack, 2004 Assistant Prof. of Law @ Santa Clara University School of Law, Vanderbilt Law Review, November, (Beth, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2305; Lexis)

Nonetheless, domestic civil litigation in the U.S. plays a part where criminal prosecutions are not feasible or forthcoming and where perpetrators are subject to personal jurisdiction here. By exposing the whereabouts of abusers, civil suits can spur or shame the U.S. government into invoking administrative n133 and/or criminal remedies against identified perpetrators. n134 For example, information gathered in connection with civil lawsuits has assisted the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) in pursuing actions against abusers for visa fraud. n135 Likewise, the commencement of civil litigation in the U.S. can trigger similar judicial responses in the home countries of defendants. n136

Solvency: Court Creates Social Change (--) Plessy and other race based decisions prove: the stamp of approval from the Supreme Court has powerful societal consequences:

Lassiter, 2005 Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1401

Klarman largely substantiates his claim that the Plessy Court's civil rights decisions represented "plausible interpretations of conventional legal sources" and accurate reflections of white public opinion, and therefore the corollary that "these rulings were not blatant nullifications of post-Civil War constitutional amendments designed to secure racial equality" (p. 9). But this does not necessarily confirm his broader thesis about

the minimal effect of the Plessy-era decisions on the path of history. Klarman's belief in judicial minimalism downplays the import of having the institution of the Supreme Court - and not just southern vigilantes or political demagogues or even Progressive-era reformers - extend the federal government's stamp of constitutional approval to a formal legal system that operated on the basis of the systematic racial subordination of African Americans. [*1411] "Jim Crow legislation was generally more symbolic than functional," according to Klarman, because "white supremacy depended less on law than on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and the threat and reality of violence" (p. 82). But surely it is not simply a coincidence that a relatively stable racial order marked the four decades between the turn of the twentieth century and the beginning of World War II, the same era during which the Plessy Court's validation of legal segregation and black disfranchisement remained operative. Nor is it incidental that substantial black activism and corresponding white violence marked the fluid and unsettled racial climate that existed during the decades before the Supreme Court's endorsement of segregation and disfranchisement in the late 1890s, and also during the period after the federal judiciary began to chip away at both policies beginning in the

1940s. n35 The Supreme Court's overt willingness to tolerate state-action subterfuges that enforced anti- black discrimination through race-neutral facades also helped to shape the legal underpinnings of racial inequality and provided a segregationist road map for southern (and northern) policymakers throughout the twentieth century. Between 1910 and 1920, the Court issued a series of rulings that invalidated forced peonage laws, grandfather clauses, separate-and-unequal luxury accommodations in railroad cars, and city ordinances mandating residential segregation. n36 These cases, which Klarman aptly characterizes as "concerned more with form than substance," were therefore "easy to circumvent" as long as legislatures continued to pay lip service to constitutional principles (p. 62). For example, beginning in the 1920s the NAACP mounted an aggressive assault on residential segregation, which emerged as a decidedly national phenomenon as a result of urbanization in the South and the First Great Migration of blacks to the North. But the federal courts upheld restrictive racial covenants under the doctrine of private property rights until the late 1940s, and they have never seriously challenged "racially motivated but facially neutral zoning" (p. 92) and other public policies that offer ample evidence of state action. n37 In the area of criminal law, the [*1412] Supreme Court expanded the scope of due process during the interwar period to rescue black victims of grossly unjust trials, but these individual (rather than class-action) cases did almost nothing to remedy the structural racism that pervaded the southern legal system (pp. 117-35, 152-58). During the New Deal era, the justices did signal a greater willingness to consider the state action dilemma in cases involving the all-white primary in Texas and the failure of Missouri to provide a substantively equal law school for a black applicant in the Gaines litigation brought by the NAACP. n38 The civil rights group ensured that voting discrimination and substantive equality in public education would remain on the judicial agenda during and after World War II, the turning point in Klarman's story.

(--) Court decisions produce massive societal ripple effects: Brown v. Board of education proves:

Yeazell, 2004 professor of law @ UCLA, 2004 (Stephen, Vanderbilt Law Review, November, 2004, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1975; Lexis)

One doubts that Robert Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Jack Greenberg and the rest of the legal team that argued Brown v. Board of Education n1 spent much time thinking about mass torts. Nonetheless, it is entirely appropriate that a commemoration of their achievements include not only

that topic but also international human rights and health care, as well as the more expected ones of education and social welfare. Brown was part of a revolution, and revolutions often have collateral effects as important as their immediate consequences. The civil rights movement followed the same pattern. [*1976] As an immediate consequence, that movement brought us school desegregation. Follow-on effects included desegregation of public facilities. These were important milestones in U.S. society . They achieved specific changes, but they also made possible the second civil rights revolution - the legislative actions that have, in the last four decades, transformed U.S. society. Beyond race and civil rights, Brown created several ripples , two of which

provide the focus for this Essay. First, Brown and the civil rights litigation movement helped create a renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue for social change. That belief lies open to challenge, and it can leave students and lawyers frustrated at the distance between the aspirations that brought them to law school and the world of practice as they perceive it. But whether or not it is well-founded, this belief, with roots traceable to Brown and civil rights litigation,

has endured for several generations. Thus, Brown reshaped the aspirations of lawyers in ways that are still important.

Democracy Advantage Extensions

DEM--AT: Other invasions of privacy exist (--) Extend our Alhogbani evidence from the 1ac—the internet is a crucial threshold that grants access to limitless amounts of information.(--) Extend our Iaconeta evidence—the Fourth Amendment is key to democracy—meaning their other rights violations don’t matter.

DEM--Status Quo is a significant intrusion on privacy (--) Current balancing test is out of whack—it is a significant intrusion on privacy rights:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The NSA asserts that the current government surveillance scheme is a special case because national security is at stake and the program is part of a counter-terrorism effort. n226 Therefore, the NSA must provide a compelling case and "[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the nation." n227 The government must balance individual rights against the immediacy of the threat and the efficacy of the NSA's surveillance [*493] program. n228 The current level of surveillance constitutes a significant intrusion on privacy rights.

(--) Reliance on warrantless searches in the digital age has massively increased:Mason C. Clutter, 2014 (National Security and Privacy Counsel to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, “DOGS, DRONES, AND DEFENDANTS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE ,” George Mason Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

The public's reliance on technology has reached new heights. Today, one has a difficult time functioning in society without the use of technology, like e-mail, ATMs, and smartphones . At the same time, law enforcement's reliance on technology to conduct criminal investigations is growing at an exponential rate without adequate and standardized safeguards in

place to regulate the government's use of such technology. From dog sniffs to domestic surveillance drones, from your front porch to the open road, warrantless searches are being conducted every day.

DEM--Fourth Amendment Key to Democracy (--) 4th Amendment essential to democracy Crowley 5/2013(Don, “Law and Politics Book Review”). Sponsored by the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science Association. Review: MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. Department of Political Science Professor, University of Idaho with an emphasis in privacy law. http://www.lpbr.net/2013/05/more-essential-than-ever-fourth.html// LDonn

This is a very good and readable book and a very useful addition to Oxford’s Inalienable Rights series. Stephen Schulhofer, the Robert McKay Professor of Law at New York University, skillfully combines an historical overview of the purposes and functions of the Fourth Amendment with a reasonably lively account of how the U.S Supreme Court has steadily abandoned many of the core principles embedded in the Fourth Amendment. This, of course, is not a new story and for those who have followed the Court’s approach to the Fourth Amendment and Schulhofer certainly isn’t advancing an argument that hasn’t been voiced before. Indeed Justice Brennan proclaimed in 1984 that the Court’s “victory over the Fourth Amendment was now complete.” (U.S v. Leon, 1984, Justice Brennan dissenting). Brennan’s comment was perhaps overstated in 1984 but Schulhofer’s account skillfully documents the Court’s continuing assaults on the Fourth Amendment’s core principles. Anyone looking for a short but persuasive argument detailing the Court’s “victory over the Fourth Amendment” should consider this work. Professor Schulhofer begins by advancing the argument that too many people believe that the Fourth Amendment is primarily designed to “protect criminals or to shield information that is at best disreputable” (p.11). Those who see themselves as good law-abiding citizens see little value in the Fourth Amendment because they have nothing to hide. While Schulhofer offers no empirical support suggesting how many people really believe that the Fourth Amendment is of no value to them, he is probably right that too many neglect the larger function that the Fourth

plays in preserving an open society. Schulhofer emphasizes that “ no less than freedom of speech or the press, protection from unwarranted government surveillance ranks among these core liberties that are essential to democracy” (p.13). In the second chapter Schulhofer recounts how the Fourth Amendment grew out of the English common law tradition of resisting “general warrants” carried out by an executive without judicial approval. The opposition to such general warrants carried over to the American colonies as seen in the outcries against “writs of assistance” aimed at enforcing unpopular British laws. This opposition to general searches or fishing expeditions unmoored from evidence linking a particular person to a particular crime ultimately became the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment. Schulhofer argues that the “peculiar structure” of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to part of our modern interpretative problem. While the second part of the Amendment clearly asserts [*233] that warrants can only be issued by a judge (“neutral magistrate”) on the basis of probable cause and must identify the places and things to be searched, the opening clause only speaks to not violating the people’s right against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Thus the possibility arises that a search can be “reasonable” without having first obtained a warrant. The irony here is that if it is not necessary to get a warrant based on probable cause then why would government officials ever get one. It would always be easier to avoid obtaining a warrant and simply argue later that a search was “reasonable.” One answer would be that what makes a search “reasonable” is obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause. While the Court has never firmly adhered to that position the typical answer to this puzzle has been to argue that the general rule is to obtain warrants based upon probable cause while acknowledging that sometimes it isn’t reasonable to insist on a warrant. Or, as Justice Stewart put it in Katz, “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” (Katz v. U.S, 1967). So an important question becomes how varied and how broad are these exceptions? As Schulhofer argues, the Court has generally adhered to the warrant rule in searches inside the home but has increasingly abandoned a concern with warrants in other settings. Some of this is familiar territory and non-problematic. No one expects police to get a warrant in “hot pursuit” of a suspect and certainly no one wants the police to get a warrant to obtain access to a bomb when there is evidence that it is in a car along a parade route. Still, despite the Courts assertion in Katz that the Fourth Amendment protects “people not places”, the Court has found ways to avoid applying the full protection of the Fourth Amendment to a growing number of situations. Some of these exceptions are to the warrant requirement (automobiles), while others are to probable cause or even reasonable suspicion (stop & frisk, drug tests, and other administrative or so called “special needs” searches). The strength of Schulhofer’s book is his ability to provide succinct summaries of Court decisions in a wide variety of search and seizure areas and still maintain a flowing narrative of the Court’s gradual abandonment of key Fourth Amendment principles. Thus, we find nice chapters on the Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment in public places, administrative searches, wiretapping, eavesdropping in the information age, and issues related to national security. Schulhofer’s discussion of all of these issues is timely and persuasive. I would not hesitate to assign any of these chapters, or indeed the entire book, for my civil liberties course. Schulhofer’s account of the manner in which the Court has failed to

respond to issues related to the new information age is particularly compelling. He strongly criticizes the Court’s increasingly narrow and largely undefined notion of what constitutes a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in this technological era. It has been far too easy for the Court to pronounce that one has a “lesser expectation of privacy” in a [*234] particular setting. Schulhoferman notes that in the Court’s view what we turn over to third party actors doesn’t warrant any protection at all since an individual has chosen to reveal this information to others (p.126). He argues that “to treat information conveyed to a trusted intermediary, under promise of confidentiality, as if it had been posted on a public billboard is to make nonsense out of the Fourth Amendment.” (p.127). In a world where participation through communication technologies is virtually required if one is to be a full participant in civil society the Court seems to be saying that the price of admission is to give up any notion of privacy. As Schulhofer notes, the Fourth Amendment should be seen as protecting

these third party transactions – not as irrelevant to them. “The Fourth amendment was designed to nurture and support civic life, not to provide an alternative to it” (p.132).

(--) Fourth Amendment key to democracy:

Morgan Cloud, 2002 (Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory University, “RUBE GOLDBERG MEETS THE CONSTITUTION: THE(- SUPREME COURT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,” Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

Finally, and most importantly, it should enunciate an expansive, value-based theory of the scope of the Fourth Amendment and its role in preserving privacy and liberty-- without which our democracy cannot

survive . Such a theory animated the Court's most important decisions interpreting this part of the constitutional text until it confronted

technological surveillance for the first time in Olmstead. This expansive view of constitutional liberty was the impetus for Katz, although subsequent decisions have obliterated that element of the decision. Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo suggests that the Court might be ready to try to reclaim this essential element of our constitutional heritage by replacing the present "convoluted system of achieving a basic task" with a "technological [*50] trespass" theory. May they succeed in the effort.

(--) All Americans benefit from the 4th Amendment- Absence of the 4th Amendment has a chilling effectSchulhofer 12 (Stephen , “More Essential than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty First Century”). Oxford University Press. page 14. Schulhofer is the Robert B. McKay Professor of Law at New York University.

Any law abiding citizen who feels in any way out of step with the social or political establishment readily understands this need for a buffer- for protection against unrestricted government scrutiny. But those who place themselves squarely in the mainstream benefit personally as well. The great majority of Americans want to live in a vibrant, diverse, society where a wide range of views can be expressed , where new ideas can be explored. Nearly every American , even the most conventional, wants to live in a democracy, after all. So all of us need the 4th Amendment : when unrestricted search and surveillance

powers chill speech and religion , inhibit gossip, and dampen creativity, they undermine politics and impoverish social life for everyone.

DEM—Democracy Good Extensions (--) Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinctionDiamond, 1995 senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, 95

(Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness .

(--) Democracy solves for human survival:Henry Teune, 2002 (member of the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, “Global Democracy,” Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

The outlines of a global democracy can be seen now only through visionary lenses. During the past three decades, social scientists and professional observers described an emerging global political economy, but without democracy. n1 It took most of the 1990s to grasp that

without democracy, globalization could not continue in a peaceful, orderly fashion. Democracy began to become the bedrock

of the prosperity promised by globalization. It may well turn out to be the best invention for human

survival and the betterment of everyday living. Indeed, in time, democracy in large-scale societies may be judged the most important discovery of the twentieth century since vaccines. Governments systematically killing their own peoples and nearly nonstop international wars of scale marked the first half of the twentieth century (Rummel 1996). By that century's end, the beginning of the institutionalization of a second democratic revolution, not only had major international wars ceased, but almost all

governments openly subscribed to the principle that they should improve people's lives and should not

kill , incarcerate, or expel them . As important was the muting of any credible national political challenges to rudimentary human rights. The killing of masses of people by legitimate authorities may be the most important international fact of the first half of the twentieth century. But the most important fact of this era of globalization is that almost all [*24] governments, save one or two, stopped doing that around the century's end, following the spread of democracy.

(--) Democracy solves nuclear warMuravchik 1 - Ph.D., Resident Scholar, AEI, Member of the State Dept. Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion, Adjunct Prof., Institute of World Politics

(Joshua Muravchik, Paper presented before the NPEC/IGCC Summer Faculty Seminar, "Democracy and Nuclear Peace," http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf)

The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy In a

famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states."1 Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was

pointing to two down-to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy … fights in anger … to the bitter end."2 Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan and that

part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed the proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being " as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations ."3 Some of those

who find enthusiasm for democracy offputting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II.4

(--) Democracy solves all scenarios for conflict escalationHalperin 11

Morton, senior advisor to the Open Society Institute and co-author of The Democracy Advantage, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11

For there is one thing the neocons get right: As I argue in The Democracy Advantage, democratic governments are more likely than autocratic regimes to engage in conduct that advances U.S. interests and avoids situations that pose a threat to peace and security. Democratic states are more likely to develop and to avoid famines and economic collaps e. They are also less likely to become failed states or suffer a civil war. Democratic states are also more likely to cooperate in dealing with security issues, such as terrorism and prolif eration of weapons of mass destruction .

(--) Democracy is key to environmental protectionJanicke 96

Martin Janicke, Professor of Comparative Policy and Head of the Research Unit for Environmental Policy at the Free University of Berlin, 1996, Democracy and the Environment, p. 71

That democ racy in general is a better precondition for environmental policy than authoritarian rule is extremely plausible . There seems to be no need for explanation. From comparative research we are aware of the poor record on pollution control in the former communist countries. The previous rightist dictatorships in southern Europe (from Turkey to Portugal) have also shown similar records. It is also easy on theoretical grounds to develop plausible hypotheses about the causal connection between successful (or at least better) environmental policy and democracy. Environmental policy goals are usually in direct opposition to current economic trends. Oppositional rights are , therefore, an important resource for the successful formulation and imple mentation of ‘green’ policy . Critical roles for science and the media can also, in this respect, be as important as civil rights or a competitive party system.(--) Environmental protection key to human survival:Sumudu Atapattu, 2006 (Lecturer, Adjunct Faculty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Law School, William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

The events of December 2004 in South Asia reinforced the proposition that a livable environment is necessary for human survival. A natural disaster of unprecedented proportions, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, killed approximately 280,000 people and displaced millions more in eleven countries stretching from [*277] Indonesia to Somalia. n21 Sri Lanka was among the hardest hit. Although this was a natural disaster, the message is clear-one should not underestimate the importance of the

relationship between human beings and the environment. Human beings depend upon the environment for their daily needs, which include water, food, and shelter. As the recent catastrophe showed, humankind's very survival depends upon environmental factors. Natural disasters also have an adverse impact on the environment, although it is unlikely they can be avoided altogether. While human beings can aggravate natural disasters, humans have created many environmental crises and global environmental problems, such as the greenhouse effect n22 and the depletion of the ozone layer.

(--) Democracy is key to prevent the spread of AIDSHalperin 5

Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 42

A similar pattern is apparently evolving with regards to HIV and AIDS. Although the lack of reliable data makes firm comparisons premature, a snap shot of the spread of this disease suggests a continuation of the pattern of democratic responsiveness to human needs among developing countries (see Table 2.3). In every income category considered, democracies post substan tially lower estimated percentages of adults who are HIV positive . Given the singular importance of public awareness for the slowing of this highly conta gious virus, this result is not surprising . (And these figures do not factor in the presumed greater accuracy of reporting in democracies.) Although certain democracies have been seriously challenged by HIV/AIDS (for example, Botswana), the openness that is encouraged under democratic governments is a distinct advantage for public health efforts

DEM—Democracy Good Extensions—Existential Risk (--) Democracies solve for human survival:Cheema & Maguire, 1/25/13 (Shabbir Cheema Principal Adviser and Programme Director Division for Public Economics and Public Administration United Nations Department of Economic and Linda Maguire Social Affairs and (Evaluation Specialist United Nations Development Programme, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005781.pdf, AP)Democratic governance has three distinct advantages over authoritarian regimes. First, democracies are better able to manage conflicts and avoid violent political change because they provide opportunities for the people to

participate in the political process of the country. Second, democracies are better able to avoid threats to human

survival because the checks by the opposition parties, uncensored criticism of public policies and the fear of being voted out of office. Third, democracies lead to greater awareness of social development concerns including health, primary health care and rights of women and minorities.

DEM--Democracy Good Extensions—Poverty Add-On A) Democracy solves poverty

Cheema & Maguire, 1/25/13 (Shabbir Cheema Principal Adviser and Programme Director Division for Public Economics and Public Administration United Nations Department of Economic and Linda Maguire Social Affairs and (Evaluation Specialist United Nations Development Programme, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan005781.pdf, AP)

Even though democracy is not a “cure all” for human development and poverty alleviation, it ¶ holds more potential for achieving these goals than any other system of government. Democracy ¶ creates opportunities and enhances capabilities of the poor and underprivileged.¶ lv¶ As such, it has ¶ an intrinsic human development value. Moreover, most stable democracies tend to have lower ¶ levels of poverty, and, on the flip side, democracies that let their citizens remain in protracted ¶ poverty tend to be short-lived. ¶

B) Poverty is the equivalent to a thermonuclear war between Russia and the US – this systemic impact is bigger and more probable than any war

James Gilligan, 2000 Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, 2000 edition, Violence: Reflections on Our Deadliest Epidemic, p. 195-196

The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide--or about eight million per year, 1935-1945), the Indonesian

massacre of 1965-1966 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year . In other word, every fifteen years, on

the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232

million deaths; and every single year , two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending , in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world .

DEM—AT: People just shouldn’t use the internet (--) People shouldn’t be forced into outmoded forms of communication—there is no realistic alternative to providing internet freedoms:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

[*491] It should not be said that U.S. citizens assume the risk of government surveillance through the use of third party channels. n210 Yet, for citizens to assume the risk, there must be some notion of choice and unless citizens are willing to go back to outdated ways of communication, they have to accept the risk of surveillance. n211 It is evident that most people in the 21st century rely heavily on cellphones and the Internet in their daily lives. n212 Citizens should not have to give up their privacy when they have no other option . The Fourth Amendment should protect American citizens against NSA practices under section 215 because it violates the reasonable

expectation of privacy, and "[i]t is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative. " n213

Internet Advantage Extensions

INT: Internet Impact Extensions (--) Open access to the internet is key to human survival:Syed Ali Mujtaba, 4/25/2015 (“Net neutrality is essential for human survival,” http://twocircles.net/2015apr25/1429964045.html#.VYsIh1L0968, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

It’s the apocalypse of the Internet that offers democratic promise of the information highway to everyone. So there should be no discrimination in terms of speed, access, cost or any such criteria. Net is basic requirement for human survival like food water and shelter. It can be used to build powerful global vision, it can be used to fight corruption, save lives, and bring people-powered aid to countries in crisis. Any demand that goes against the grain of net neutrality should be outlawed.

(--) Internet key to solving multiple scenarios of human survival:Mayeesha Tahsin, 2/25/2014 (“Is Internet Connectivity a human right?” http://www.quora.com/Is-Internet-Connectivity-a-human-right, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

I think it's like this, let's assume that human rights are the basic rights that would ensure that every human being would survive. Or let's also assume that without making sure that specific human rights are being met, the human in question is likely to die. True that there were several debates in the other generations that do we even need to make sure most, if not all, human being survive,

fortunately we seem to be over that phase right now and going forward as we've been unambiguously convinced that food,shelter,clothing,education,water,the right to live, to express their concerns and emotions are the things that all human being deserve regardless of their gender,race or geographical location . When we are talking about connectivity, the only question is never really related to if internet is the only thing we are concerned about. Internet is a tool. We're merely talking about ensuring that all the human beings be able to make use of this tool to the furthest of their ability and to their appropriate needs. Now let's go into the idea of why and how those rights came to the conclusion when in a dark age we'd have considered that our only basic mode of survival is to hunt down other people. The answer is always technological innovation. Wheels once made sure that more people meet and that forwarded empathy after people learnt to get through language barriers. Innovation ensured that more people can travel to further areas and ensure their survival, then came industrial revolutions that made making products easier, and that made sure we can actually afford to at least try to make sure that most of the people survives and make use of their abilities regardless of our ethical differences. Technology,culture,politics and innovation is fundamentally correlated. Sometimes technological advances comes first and then that changes culture, but sometimes to achieve faster growth we have to change the existing ideologies first to actually redirect technological innovation to a particular direction. Right now internet is the vastest content generation tool which allocates immediate distribution to the people and it promotes openness, and ensures that we are free of secrecy and conspiracy. We should also remember that it's basically a trillion dollar market where companies are practicing delivering goods and earning, from Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, Facebook all of them are basically internet based companies compared to previous generation companies where they were more hardware based such as GM or several other oil or car companies. Starting something which is internet based is easier as it goes, compared to every single other industries, such as technological hurdles are pretty hard to overcome in Biotech based companies. Now let's go to the idea of industrial goods based economy vs knowledge

based economy. Ultimately whole internet is basically a knowledge economy because be it google adwards, or facebook

likes and shares, or Quora posts, we are selling content, or we are directing it to a relevant customer. Knowledge as a commodity has some interesting characteristics such as it can be shared,enhanced, changed, and owned by multiple people at the same time, so innovation for securing human survival becomes easier in later years.

INT: Internet is in trouble now (--) US surveillance threatens the internet:Jonathan Turley, 3/24/2014 (professor of law at The George Washington University Law School, “Yes We Can: United States Declared “Enemy of the Internet” With Iran, North Korea, and Other Bad Actors,” http://jonathanturley.org/2014/03/24/yes-we-can-united-states-declared-enemy-of-the-internet-with-iran-north-korea-and-other-bad-actors/, Accessed 6/24/2015, rwg)

We previously discussed the rapid drop of the United States in the protection of the free press. Now, the respected Reporters Without Borders has produced a separate report on Internet freedoms. In yet another dubious distinction for President Obama, the United States is now listed with such “Enemies of the Internet” as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. This is our first time on the infamous list — a true accomplishment for an Administration that has been denounced for its wholesale attacks on privacy and other core civil

liberties. The Administration (and its Senate allies like Sen. Dianne Feinstein) spent little time in setting itself against the open Internet

forum and has sought a variety limitations and sanctions for Internet speech. Our mass surveillance programs features prominently in our inclusion of this list. The National Security Agency has worked furiously to break down walls on the Internet while the Justice Department has pursued various individuals for web posting. There will come a day when Democrats will seek again to speak in favor of core values of free speech, free press, privacy, and the like. When that day comes, there will be a chorus of howls from civil libertarians who have watched in astonishment as the Democratic Party enabled these assaults on freedom either actively or by acquiescence.

The trading away of the power of principle for the power of personality will, in my view, be judged harshly in history. Obama will leave office in a few years and what he will leave a much larger security system, more extensive surveillance, and a mountain of hypocrisy for his supporters to climb in his wake. I am not sure how the Administration will celebrate its latest distinction, but the First Lady is currently traveling at great public expense in China. That would seem a perfect place to celebrate since the White House told reporters that they would not answer any questions. However, the First Lady (despite announcements that she would avoid discussion of human rights) did call for respect for freedom of speech and other rights.

(--) Government surveillance threatens an open internet now:Paige Brown Jarreau, 4/22/2013 (staff writer, “Internet Freedom vs. Control,” http://www.scilogs.com/from_the_lab_bench/internet-freedom-vs-control/, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

However, with the increased ease of communication provided by the internet have come increased efforts by government to police online content. According to Ryan Gallagher in a 2012 Slate article, “a new era of augmented international cooperation over policing the Internet is on the horizon.”[8] Internet freedom activists have protested attempts to police and

regulate online content on the grounds of individual rights including privacy and freedom of expression. While government surveillance of internet activity in order to protect national security , combat terrorism, protect copyrighted material

and minimize highly offensive content including child pornography seem justifiable, it may be difficult to draw the line between internet surveillance that only targets these areas and surveillance that violates Americans’ constitutional rights. Net-neutrality is another controversial issue with respect to government regulation of the Internet; Adam Thierer recently argued against such regulation as an encroachment on First Amendment rights: “[t]he First Amendment was intended to protect us from tyrannical, coercive government power, not the silly mistakes of private [cable] companies.”[9] Freedom vs. Control: Ryan Gallagher writes in a recent Slate magazine article: The Internet is often seen as a place of chaos and disorder, a borderless world in which anonymous

trolls roam free and vigilante hackers wreak havoc. But […] there are fears governments are secretly maneuvering to restructure and rein in the anarchic Web we have come to know and love, perhaps even ushering in a new era of pervasive surveillance. So just how real is the threat of change and what might it mean?[10]

Imperial Presidency Advantage Extensions

IMP--Executive Power is Increasing Now (--) Executive branch’s power has been greatly expanded:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The U.S. government is not on a mission to abolish American's privacy rights and turn into a repressive regime. n290 Yet, the fear that they might should not be understated. The executive branch's power has been expanded greatly and "all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree." n291 As the legislative and judicial branches reconcile privacy expectations with modern technology, they should be wary of sacrificing liberty for the sake of a fleeting sense of security. n292 Terrorists are already operating under the assumption that the NSA is doing everything in its power to thwart potential attacks, and they are responding by going dark. n293

(--) Obama is guilty of executive overreach throughout his two presidency terms.

Peterson Jun 20, 2015 (Eric is a graduate of Tulane University with a degree in Economics and Political Economy. Half-Baked: Obama Executive Overreach Makes Its Way to Your Dinner Table. http://townhall.com/columnists/ericpete rson/2015/06/20/halfbaked--obama-executive-overreach-makes-its-way-to-your-dinner-table-n2014973/page/full, 06/23/15, clj)

If you had to name a theme for Obama’s second term, it would be regulatory overreach. Despite the repeated rejection of the

President’s most controversial proposals by lawmakers, Mr. Obama has turned to his “pen and his phone” (and the vast government bureaucracy he controls) to enact his extreme and often unpopular agenda . Examples of the kind of executive overreach that have come to define his presidency include unilateral changes to Obamacare, sweeping new rules issued by the FCC designed to impose centuries railroad-style regulations on the internet, and the far-reaching and expensive

red tape he is seeking to impose on our electricity grid including airline emissions, trucking companies, and even humble wood-burning stoves. The latest overreach, however, may quite literally take the cake and comes to us courtesy of the Food and Drug Administration. This sweeping regulation will directly affect what kinds of food we are allowed to purchase at our neighborhood grocery store. The FDA has long taken issue with “trans fat” a type of unsaturated fat found produced from vegetable fats. Products containing trans fat have become more widespread since the 1950’s when they appeared on the scene in the form of margarine and have since made their way into everything from frozen pizzas to Reese’s Pieces. While initially viewed as a healthy alternative to other fats, research indicates that overindulging can contribute to health risks. That conclusion led FDA regulators to require food manufacturers to label all their products containing trans fat. While many health conscious individuals choose to steer clear of products that contain trans fat (consumption has decreased 78 percent between 2003 and 2012), millions of Americans have continued to enjoy many of the delicious foods that contain trans fat, albeit in moderation. Unfortunately that’s a problem for the heavies at Mr. Obama’s FDA. Rather than letting people make their own decisions about whether to indulge in the occasional trans fat-laden snack, the FDA has just ordered a ban on trans fat, which federal regulators say food companies must remove from all of their products by 2018. And while the FDA is patting itself on the back, the ban will – like most everything else cooked up by federal regulators – may have serious unintended consequences. Foremost, the cost to food producers could be enormous. While many producers have moved away from trans fat on their own, the fats remain essential to many popular products due to its taste, texture and ability to preserve shelf life. Finding a replacement may not be easy or cheap, and consumers will ultimately face increased costs as a result. Worse, it’s entirely possible that the eventual “replacement” for trans fat may not be any healthier.

But these are things federal regulators rarely consider when they try to control our behavior and supplant their all-knowing judgment for our own. At its core, this ban represents the worst of Washington. Rather than letting individuals decide what’s best for them, our all-knowing

government overlords want to tell us they know better. These perpetual critics of freedom simply can’t sit idly by while Americans enjoy the occasional slice of frozen pizza, or handful of candy. For them, that kind of freedom is as dangerous as Reese’s Pieces.

Kidding aside, Americans have little recourse when dealing with the alphabet soup of government agencies that continue to intrude into their daily lives regulating everything from light bulbs to groceries. That’s unfortunate. Families deserve to make their own decisions about what’s best for their lives. Congress should push back on ham-handed FDA regulation, and tell Mr. Obama’s bureaucrats to get their greedy hands out of our collective snack bowl.

(--) The Presidents rise to control came due to a weak Congress and media.F.H. Buckley April 2014 (is Foundation Professor at the George Mason University School of Law and author of The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING. http://spectator.org/articles/58138/once-and-future-king, 06/23/15 , clj)

How did this happen? No great mystery there. Power has been centralized around the heads of government in all modern democracies. Authority naturally gravitates from disorganized groups—Congress—to a single person. The group must struggle to get its act together; not so the single person. Recall the recent stand-offs between Obama and the House over the debt ceiling. On one side was Obama, claiming that he alone spoke for the entire country as a whole; on the other was John Boehner of West

Chester, Ohio, and a fractious bunch of congressmen. It wasn’t much of a contest. Second, the regulatory state cannot exist without a large bureaucracy, which answers primarily to the president. The legislative branch must delegate rule-making

authority to regulators whose codes are so various and extensive that oversight is nigh impossible. This leaves matters to the executive,

which hires the regulators, promotes and demotes them, and generally tells them what to do. Third, political campaigns have been transformed by the media, which makes rock stars of presidents. At one time it was thought that the rise of new media would prevent a president from amassing excessive personal power. That hasn’t happened. Instead, the White House is now a news outfit in its own right, complete with photographers and videographers. It need not rely on print newspapers or the television networks to get its message out. It need no longer put the president at the mercy of probing reporters, preferring instead teleprompters and softball questions from People magazine. The fawning reporter is rewarded with access; hostile would-be

newshounds are frozen out. And so we are on the verge of what George Mason once called an “elective monarchy.”

(--) Presidential regimes are created as a result of executive overreach. F.H. Buckley April 2014 (is Foundation Professor at the George Mason University School of Law and author of The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING. http://spectator.org/articles/58138/once-and-future-king, 06/23/15 , clj)

Such concentrations of power often surround prime ministers in parliamentary governments, but they are much more dangerous in presidential regimes. For one thing, the American president is head of state as well as head of government. He is the symbol of the entire country, the figure with whom every patriot identifies, at least theoretically. A person who moves to America, as I did, must learn to suppress his gag reflex when reading a Peggy Noonan op-ed on the sublimity of a State of the Union Address, or listening to an MSNBC talking head bloviate about our godlike president. In parliamentary regimes, politicians are comical figures. If there’s a national tragedy, we don’t wait for a speech from the prime minister. Oh sure, we get misty-eyed over jug-eared princes, but they haven’t been able to hurt us since 1832.

They’re not going to spend us into bankruptcy or audit us. Further, presidential regimes lack the means to discipline an overreaching head of government. In America, scandals are transitory. Benghazi? “What difference at this point does it make?” asked an angry Hillary Clinton. She had a point. After all, eight months had elapsed. In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is expected to meet the House on a daily basis. And the decision of what is to be debated lies, crucially, with the Opposition, which can, and frequently does, decide to prolong argument just where the government is weakest. “No better method,” observed Harold Laski, “has ever been devised for keeping administration up to the mark.” Thus, in a parliamentary government, a successful politician must be informed, quick on his feet, and, perhaps especially, witty. In Canada he must be all of these things in both English and French. The grandiose (Obama), the verbally clumsy (George W. Bush and Obama again), and the thin-skinned (Nixon and Obama again) find themselves either excluded or laughed at. When Obama addressed the Indian parliament, its MPs did double-takes on seeing his teleprompter. Then there are non-confidence motions, which can turf out a parliamentary government on a simple majority in the House of Commons, and party leadership votes like the one that ended

Margaret Thatcher’s career. All we have here in the United States is the Big Bertha of impeachment and removal from office—which never rears its head unless the president is from one party and the House and two-thirds of the Senate from another. Here’s a piece of trivia: Only one president in American history, Andrew Johnson in 1868, has ever faced impeachment by such a Congress. (Republicans only controlled 55 votes—not two-thirds—in the Senate in 1998, and the 45 Democrats voted in lockset to acquit Bill Clinton.) Yet even then, the ruling party could not muster the votes in the Senate to toss Johnson out of office. The requirement of a two-thirds supermajority in that chamber was snuck in at the last moment at the 1787 constitutional convention, elicited no

discussion, and transformed the shape of American politics. It should not be so hard to give a president the boot. I’d like to see it done often, for high crimes and misdemeanors, for stupidity, for arrogance, or just for the spirit of the thing.

IMP—Executive Power = War A) Expanded presidential powers risk war & undermine US leadership:

Neal Kumar Katyal, 2013 (Paul and Patricia Saunders Professor of Law, Georgetown University, “STOCHASTIC CONSTRAINT,” Harvard Law Review, Feb. 2013, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

Given these expanded powers, there is a deep risk that Presidents may , in the interim between the exercise of

power and the ex post check, work grave harm - to peace, to civil liberties, and to the image of the U nited

S tates abroad . Goldsmith argues that the existence of ex post checks places all modern Presidents in a "synopticon" that produces a

deterrent effect (p. 207). "Officials are much more careful merely by virtue of being watched," Goldsmith notes (p. 207). However, a crucial check on presidential adventurism - reelection - has been nonexistent for second-term Presidents since 1951. n38 This structural change may hide the Executive from the synopticon's watchful eyes, making presidential decisionmaking freer of checks and balances than it otherwise might be in a system that properly relies on Madisonian power sharing. And, as Goldsmith himself acknowledges, presidential popularity can often blunt the power of the synopticon - particularly when national security is pitted against civil liberties (p. 47). The popular willingness to err on the side of national security, and the consequent weakness of the synopticon, will be at its apex when the issue involves the rights of foreigners - who altogether lack the ability [*1001] to vote. n39 Yet the rights of foreigners are a crucial part of the post-9/11 debate.

B) US leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange.Zalmay Khalilzad, 1995 RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995 Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end

in itself, but because a world in which the U nited S tates exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the

rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major

problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the

United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system

IMP—Pres Powers = War (--) Overstepping presidential powers causes war— Iraq proves Formisano ’15 (Matt Scott Formisano, Utah State University graduate with a masters degree in Political Science, “Presidential War

Powers”, http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=gradreports, Published 15 April 2015, Accessed June 25 2015, CMT)

One of the greatest controversies during the Bush presidency involved the U.S. invasion of Iraq . When it became evident after the

invasion that hostilities in Iraq were not ceasing, Congress accused the President of overstepping his executive authority , bypassing Congress, and 56 invading Iraq solely on Presidential prerogative. After the first Gulf War, many politicians in Washington regretted not taking Saddam Hussein out of power when they had the chance. “Because of recent intelligence reports that Iraq had evaded UN resolutions requiring it to destroy all stocks of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons…There were also reports that Iraq had not abandoned its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, another violation of UN resolutions” (Irons 222). The George W. Bush administration knew that Hussein posed a threat to national security and to the lives of his fellow Iraqis whom he was testing his biological weapons on. Through several attempts by the UN, the Bush administration warned Hussein that denying UN inspectors into the country to search for chemical and biological weapons would have serious repercussions. “In October 2002, Congress passed the Iraq Resolution to empower President Bush to use military force against Iraq. The administration told lawmakers and the public that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had the capacity to inflict even greater damage on the United states than the 9/11 terrorist attacks” (Fisher 2011, 262). Louis Fisher in Defending Congress and the Constitution argues that the claims the Bush administration made to the public and Congress were far-fetched and driven by the administration preying upon

the fears of the public (Fisher 2011, 223). Contained in the Iraq Resolution were assertions that the President’s constitutional power was to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States. Once again, Congress was being asked to authorize the president to begin a war, without a formal declaration. Whether such an authorization met the constitutional standard had become a moot point, since Congress had

long ago abdicated its war- declaring power to the executive branch (Irons 234). Irons correctly states that the war-declaring power belongs to the executive.

(--) Strong presidents lead to war. Bandow, 2002  October 01, 2002 (Doug is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author of a number of books on economics and politics. Only Congress Can Declare War. http://fee.org/freeman/detail/only-congress-can-declare-war. 06/23/2015. clj)

The Bush administration has been looking at other potential military targets almost since the war in Afghanistan started. But should the President decide he wants to expand the war, he should get legislative approval. After September 11 Congress authorized President Bush to retaliate against any “nations, organization, or persons” he determined to be involved in the atrocity . But there is no evidence linking even that ugliest of regimes, Iraq, to the September attacks. So the administration has spent months developing an alternative justification for attacking: the refusal to accept United Nations inspections aimed at deterring development of weapons of mass destruction. Nonproliferation is a worthy concern, but not one obviously warranting war. Indeed, Baghdad has been out of compliance with the U.N.’s inspection regime since 1998. Moreover, the President has no authority to act for this reason. Congress authorized him to retaliate against terrorism, not to commence war to enforce U.N. inspections-or overthrow a nasty dictator. After the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the prospect of war with Iraq last August, President Bush promised “to consult with Congress.” But consultation is not nearly enough. Article 1, Sec. 8 (11) states, “Congress shall have the power . . . to declare war.” The president is commander-in-chief, but he must fulfill his responsibilities within the framework established by the Constitution and subject to the control of Congress. Today , of course, presidents prefer to make the decision for war themselves. In effect, American presidents claim to possess power comparable to, if not greater than, that of the onetime head of the Soviet communist party. As then-Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger rightly criticized the Evil Empire: “Now who among the Soviets voted that they should invade Afghanistan? Maybe one, maybe five men in the Kremlin. Who has the ability to change that and bring them home? Maybe one, maybe five men in the Kremlin. Nobody else. And that is, I think, the height of immorality.” Now who among Americans has voted to attack, say, Iraq? Should one man in the White House make that decision, it would also be the height of immorality. One of the founders’ criticisms of the British king was that he could unilaterally drag

his nation into war. President Abraham Lincoln, a “strong” president apt to act on his own authority, nevertheless reflected: “Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object.” The Constitution’s framers consciously rejected such a system. Still, some Americans opposed the proposed Constitution because they feared that it gave the president too much authority. Don’t worry, explained that great friend of executive power Alexander Hamilton. The president’s power “would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the land and naval forces . . . while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war.” The founders wrote the Constitution as they did because they feared that presidents would act as they do now. Explained James Madison in 1793, it is necessary to adhere to the “fundamental doctrine of the Constitution that the power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature.” Constitutional convention delegates did change Congress’s power from “make” to “declare” war, but the intent was to give the president authority to respond to a sudden attack, not initiate a conflict. The Founders wanted to make war less likely. The president “is not safely to be entrusted with” the power to decide on war, said Virginia’s George Mason. James Wilson advocated a strong presidency, but was pleased that the proposed constitution “will not hurry us into war.” Instead, “It is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress.” The founders were prescient. Presidents have routinely deceived the public, lied to Congress, and manipulated the political system when taking America into war.

IMP--Rights (--) An increase in presidential power causes tyranny Turley ’14 (Jonathan Turley, is the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University and frequently appears before Congress as a witness on constitutional issues He is the host of www.jonathanturley.org, an award-winning legal and policy blog, “A

Question of Power: The Imperial Presidency”, http://www.legion.org/magazine/222394/question-power-imperial-presidency, Published 1 June 2014, Accessed 25 June 2015, CMT)

They [ the framers of the Constitution] wanted to divide power between three branches and create lines of separation that prevented the concentration of power in any single branch . The framers based their ideas on an

understanding of human nature – and human weakness. They tried to create a system in which ambition would check ambition. However, they knew that citizens can be distracted or deceived into giving up their very freedom . Madison warned future

generations that “if Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy.” The framers knew how effective fear can be to induce citizens to give up their liberties. Recent years have proven them once again

prophetic in their warnings. To this day, many Americans misunderstand the separation of powers as simply a division of authority

between three branches of government. In fact, it was intended as a protection not of institutional but of individual rights, by preventing any branch from assuming enough power to become tyrannical . No branch is supposed to have enough power to govern alone. Once power becomes concentrated in the hands of a president, citizens are left only with the assurance that such unchecked power will be used wisely – a Faustian bargain the framers repeatedly warned us never to accept. Benjamin Franklin said it best when he warned that “they who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”

(--) More presidential power would destroy our civil libertiesLittle ’14 (Jackie Little, staff writer for BruceFeinLaw.com, “King Obama Betters the Tyranny of King George”,

http://www.brucefeinlaw.com/2014/11/25/king-obama-betters-tyranny-king-george/, Published 25 November 2014, Accessed 25 June 2015, CMT)

President Barack Obama currently exercises more unchecked, tyrannical power than King George III, whose tyrannies

provoked the Declaration of Independence and Revolutionary War won by General Washington. Mr. Obama has exterminated American citizens not accused of crime without due process of law on his secret say-so alone . He has initiated wars against Libya, Syria, and the Islamic State without congressional authorization . He has imprisoned persons indefinitely without accusation or trial at Guantanamo Bay — even detainees whom the

military has found to be innocent of international terrorism. He has used military tribunals in lieu of independent courts for the prosecution of civilian offenses. He has substituted executive agreements for treaties to extend United States troop and combat commitments in Afghanistan and to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. He has issued presidential signing statements to unilaterally de

facto void provisions of duly enacted laws. He has refused to enforce deportation laws and prohibitions on torture and warrantless surveillance of American citizens in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He has expended money contrary to the limits set by Congress in appropriation measures. He has placed the entire United States population under dragnet surveillance in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s right to be let alone — the most cherished right among civilized peoples. He has frustrated legislative or judicial oversight by improper invocations of state secrets or executive privilege. He has issued executive orders regulating government contactors which usurp the legislative powers of Congress.

(--) Expansion of presidential powers destroys existing laws and rightsKashan 10 (Sunya, “The USA Patriot Act: Impact on Freedoms and Civil Liberties”). http://dc.cod.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=essai

One of the hidden consequences of the Patriot Act is the unprecedented and dangerous¶ expansion of the presidential powers. According to attorney Joseph Margulies, who successfully led¶ Rasul vs Bush¶ in the Supreme Court, “The

president has treated the war on terror as an armed conflict¶ and has invoked his constitutional power as commander in chief. The precise scope of president’s¶ war power is ill defined and subject of endless constitutional debate” (11). In¶ How Would A Patriot¶ Act¶ ?, Glenn Greenwald argues that it was through President Bush’s authorization that the National¶ Security Agency started eavesdropping on Americans without court approved warrants, in violation¶ of the constitutional laws (14). Similarly, President Bush also created a controversy when his¶ administration kept an American born citizen, Jose Padilla, accused of making a bomb plot, locked¶ away in

solitary confinement for more than three years as an enemy combatant, without right to trial¶ (47). These presidential actions only show us a glimpse of the absolute authority at the disposal of¶ the president and a complete disregard to the existing laws,¶ habeas corpus ¶ , and constitutional rights ¶ of all residents of this country ¶

IMP—Pres Powers destroy economy (--) Increase in presidential powers destroys the economy Posner 10 (Richard, “Abuse of Presidential Power ”). http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2010/07/abuse-of-presidential-power-posner.html Posner is the former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He was the chief judge of the court from 1993 to 2000.

President Obama has used this device of extra-legal presidential intimidation more frequently, probably, than any President. In the spring of last year he told General Motors to fire its chief executive officer, Rick Waggoner. He had no authority to do that, and didn’t pretend that he did. Waggoner went. Last month the President ordered British Petroleum to put billions of dollars into an escrow account for payment of claims for losses caused by the BP oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. He did not pretend to have any legal authority to order this, but BP quickly complied—as it did with the President’s insistence that it cut its dividend in order to be sure of having enough money to pay all the claims that might be made against it and the fines that might be imposed on it. And the President’s criticisms of Wall Street bonuses may have been decisive in the decision of Goldman Sachs to scale down the bonuses it was intending to award for the firm’s highly profitable 2009. Should a President use the prestige (one might even call it the “moral authority”) of the office, and his ability to command public attention, to obtain compliance with demands made by him on the business community that are not backed by law? I think not, apart from any distaste one may have for bullying. It makes business subject to two regulatory regimes. One is a legal regime, created by Congress and by the regulatory agencies to which Congress delegates a portion of its own constitutional regulatory power. The other is a kind of “people’s democracy” regime, in which government stirs up public anger to force businesses to comply with extra-legal government demands. This second regulatory regime operates without rules, and so subjects business to potentially debilitating uncertainty in the sense of a risk that cannot be quantified. We know from Keynes and other students of uncertainty that a common and often the sensible response to uncertainty is to freeze, in the hope that the uncertainty will dissipate over time, or to take active steps to reduce the uncertainty. Both are options for business faced with the threat of presidential wrath. A business can hire less, invest less, and build up its cash balances as a hedge against adversity. It can also redouble its lobbying and other influence activities in an effort to neutralize or deflect threats of extra-legal regulation. Neither is a healthy response; the first is downright pernicious, especially in a depression or recession, or the early stages of economic recovery. Both are responses that the threat of presidential bullying encourages. Many of the President’s legislative initiatives , in particular the health reform law, the just- enacted financial regulatory reform law, and the credit card law of last year, have increased the uncertainty of the economic environment for business. These laws really haven’t settled anything; it will take years of regulatory implementation before their full impact can be determined. But in addition business has to deal with the unpredictable exercise by the President of an uncanalized extra-legal authority to bend business to his wishes.It is no wonder that the economic recovery appears to be progressing so slowly .

IMP—Pres Powers = Biopower (--) Overstepping presidential powers manifests itself in a state that can kill anyone at any time Wilson ’13 (Scott Wilson, Scott Wilson is the chief White House correspondent for the Washington Post Previously, he was the paper’s deputy Assistant Managing Editor/Foreign News after serving as a correspondent in Latin America and in the Middle East, “Obama on civil liberties: Saying One Thing, Doing Another”,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/14/obama-on-civil-liberties-saying-one-thing-doing-another/, Published 14 May 2013, Accessed 25 May 2015, CMT) “The decisions that were made over the last eight years established an ad hoc legal approach for fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable,” Obama said, calling it a “framework that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to

use our values as a compass.” Obama did ban harsh methods in interrogation – which the International Committee of the Red Cross has called “torture” – immediately after taking office. And he has advocated strongly for gay rights, ending the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in the military and coming out in support of gay marriage. But he has failed to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the face of Congressional resistance, even though he recently pledged to try again . Moreover, Obama has greatly expanded the Bush-era counter-terrorism tactic of drone warfare, becoming the first president to use an unmanned aircraft to kill an American citizen abroad without formal charge or trial. The target, Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American-Yemeni cleric

IMP—AT: Impact Cards Don’t Assume Obama (--) Obama is massively expanding presidential powers—he’s channeling Cheney:

Steven Thomma and William Douglas, 2012 6/21/2012 (staff writer, “Obama asserts presidential powers he once spoke critically of,” http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/06/21/153365/obama-asserts-presidential-powers.html, Accessed 7/26/2012, rwg)

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama is starting to channel his inner Cheney.¶ For years, Obama talked about the limits on presidential power. Now, driven either by principle or political expediency, he’s working to build and maintain a powerful presidency that pushes the edge of what it can do, while often telling Congress and the courts to mind their own business.¶ In the last week alone, he refused a subpoena to share Justice Department emails with Congress, told courts he doesn’t have to justify his claimed power to assassinate suspected terrorists and decided to stop deporting certain illegal immigrants even though Congress has refused to enact a law to do that.¶ Those moves cap a slow buildup of executive branch power since Obama took office in January 2009. Some actions build on war powers seized by the administration of

President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Some assert new domestic authority.¶ Taken together, they reinforce the strengthening presidential power that Cheney pursued ever since he served as White House chief of staff to Gerald Ford and watched Congress take power away from a presidency weakened by Vietnam and Watergate.¶ “Particularly with regard to national security powers, Obama is as vigorous in exercising those powers, and expanding some of them, as his predecessor,” said Gene Healy, the author of the book “The Cult of the Presidency: America’s Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power.”

(--) Obama has made expansive use of war powers—even more than Bush:Meghan Foley, 12/11/2014 (staff writer, “Has Obama’s Expansion of War Powers Set a Dangerous Precedent?” http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/obamas-legacy-eschewing-congress-when-using-military-force.html/?a=viewall, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

While the dividing line between congressional and presidential powers has long been debated, and much of what the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended has become obscured, it is clear that the authors of the Constitution divided war powers between the president and Congress. No one questions that those men believed vesting in the president the unilateral authority to wage war was dangerous. Of course, since the beginning of United States history, presidents have used force to protect Americans abroad, and that is because James Madison had the wording of the congressional right to “declare war” changed from “make war,” giving the president power to defend the country in the case of an immediate threat. And for now, there is little disagreement in Washington that the president has the constitutional authority to repel an attack on the country or its residents without congressional approval in extreme circumstances. But when self-defense is not an issue and no treaty obligations need to be fulfilled, the words of Elbridge Gerry should be considered. During the Constitutional Convention, Gerry — a signer of the Declaration of Independence, an eventual congressman, and a proponent of the Bill of Rights — noted that he “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to

empower the Executive alone to declare war.” And so future historians will “puzzle over how Barack Obama the prudent war-powers constitutionalist transformed into a matchless war-powers unilateralist ,” Goldsmith wrote for Time.

“And they will wonder why he claimed to “welcome congressional support” for his new military initiative against the Islamic State, but did not insist on it in order to ensure clear political and legal legitimacy for the tough battle that promised to consume his last two years in office and define his presidency .” Past presidents — Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan — were not opposed to taking military action without congressional authorization. So what makes Obama different? At the surface, his administration may not seem so different. But many political experts believe Obama has moved beyond the accepted loopholes, and done so while

maintaining the facade of the reluctant warrior. A speech Goldsmith gave before the Hoover Institute in early November gave a close analysis of three specific ways that Obama — who was a constitutional lawyer — has expanded the war power beyond any measure taken by previous administrations, including that of Bush.

IMP--Solvency for Imperial Presidency (--) Reclaiming the Fourth Amendment allows the courts to limit governmental authority:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

Once the reasonable expectation of privacy language is removed from our Fourth Amendment discourse, we can rely on the original language

and intent of the Constitution to provide useful language to describe and fortify the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. By reclaiming the original language of the Fourth Amendment, courts [*1030] can revive the original purpose of the Amendment as a limitation on governmental authority .

IMP--AT: FISA Courts Solve (--) The FISA courts are a rubber stamp and don’t place a check on the executive:Abdulmajeed Alhogbani, 2014 (J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, 2016, CommLaw Conspectus, “GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,” Accessed 6/23/2015, rwg)

The FISA court's warrant approval rate has led many to believe they are a rubber stamp for the executive branch and are failing to perform their judicial duty. n257 Furthermore, FISA court proceedings are ex

parte, which means they [*496] only hear from one party. n258 The government justifies an ex parte proceeding because adversarial proceedings are time-consuming, costly, and can obstruct investigations. n259 However, there is a reasonable concern that without someone to argue the other side, the FISA court is turning into "an administrative, rather than a judicial, body." n260 James Robertson, a former FISA judge, explains, a judge must hear both sides of a case to remain unbiased and impartial. n261

(--) Executive branch currently has the authority to monitor every communication without the check of judicial review:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

At the heart of both the NSA Cases and the Pen Register Decisions lies the struggle to reconcile the use of expanding technological [*982]

capabilities with a labyrinth of statutes and a problematic standard of constitutional review. The NSA Cases alert us to the very real possibility that the executive branch has the capacity to monitor every transaction and communication of any individual without the check of judicial review . The Pen Register Decisions involve requests for judicial orders permitting real time tracking of individuals by the government based on a mere certification that the information is relevant to an investigation. Both sets of cases provide an impetus to reexamine the increasingly complicated intersection of law, advancing technology, and our conceptions of personal and national security.

IMP—Strong Courts Check Pres Powers (--) Strong courts are key to check presidential powers:

Michael P. Allen, 2007 (Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, Brooklyn Law Review, Spring 2007, 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871; Lexis/Nexis, rwg)

Rather, the Article explores the serious question of the role of courts in a time of actual or potential constitutional change. The change we face in our time happens to concern the actions of the federal executive branch under the leadership of a Republican President. But the theoretical underpinning of the approach I describe would apply equally to an attempt by Congress to broaden its powers, or to the actions of a President Hillary Rodham Clinton or a President Barack Obama. I ask, then, that the reader put aside questions of my partisanship -- at least for the moment -- and judge the theory on its merits. If those of us in the world of legal academia are unable to do so, the nation may be in greater difficulty than is imagined. What is needed instead is a longer-term focus not on this President, [*876] but on the presidency as one of many institutions in the constitutional structure.¶ The jury is still out on the administration's ultimate success in redefining the scope of executive

power. In some cases, the courts effectively have supported the administration. n23 In others, the administration has been rebuked. n24 In the great majority of situations, a debate still rages over the propriety of unilateral presidential

authority . n25 I will not join the debate about the constitutionality of any of the specific actions taken by the current administration. For

present purposes, I assume merely that the administration's positions are pushing the constitutional envelope in terms of presidential power

under the Constitution.¶ My aim is to explore the role of courts in response to such a broad-based and coordinated assertion of envelope-pushing executive power. Of course, one obvious response to such an inquiry is that the judiciary should follow Chief Justice Roberts's comment during his confirmation hearings: judges are umpires who should call balls and strikes. n26 Thus, the judiciary's role is to take each case challenging a given executive action on its own and use standard principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation to resolve the narrow issue presented. As I explain further below, however, such a narrow approach provides insufficient protection for the structural underpinnings of American democracy.¶ I begin in Part II by laying out a constitutional theory that should guide courts when faced with a broad, constitutionally envelope-pushing assertion of power by one structural part of the American

constitutional system. In brief, courts must serve as agents of systemic structural equilibrium. [*877] The judiciary must ensure that the fundamental structural safeguards built into the fabric of the Constitution are maintained even if a constitutional change in the balance of power is implemented. The way in which equilibrium is re-established will vary depending upon the particular change at issue, but the goal of maintaining the boundaries of the structural safeguards embedded in the Constitution remains constant.¶ Part II also identifies the fundamental structural principles that should guide courts. The Constitution and the documents surrounding its drafting and ratification reveal three foundational principles: (1) The Constitution is based on maintaining multiple and meaningful centers of political authority situated horizontally and vertically from one another. These power centers -- the three coordinate branches of the federal government and the states -- must be capable of meaningfully playing their roles in maintaining a separation of governing authority; (2) the People must be allowed to have meaningful participation in the governing process; and (3) whatever power relationships are implemented, the resulting governmental structure must be functional. The goal of Part II is to prepare specifically to address how courts should respond to the Bush administration's assertion of executive authority.¶ Before one is able to do so, one must get a better understanding of the Bush administration's specific conception of executive authority. Part III is a descriptive exercise devoted to distilling the single dominant theme and three distinct but related sub-attributes of President Bush's constitutional Chief Executive. The dominant and overarching theme of the Bush administration's stance is a strongly unilateral executive who is constitutionally empowered to take a wide array of actions without "interference" from any other power center in American government. The three distinct sub-attributes associated with unilateralism are: (1) the unilateral authority is often exercised in secret, greatly reducing transparency in government (such lack of transparency applies to citizens as well as to other institutions of government); (2) the administration is highly intolerant of criticism and questioning associated with its exercise of power; and (3) the administration is disciplinarian and retributive with respect to those people and entities that do challenge its exercise of authority. [*878] ¶ Part IV of the Article turns to the specific question of the courts and President Bush by applying the theory set out in Part II to the description of the Bushian constitutional executive laid out in Part III. In order to do so, I use cases considered by the United States Supreme Court during its October 2005 Term. I consider cases in such divergent areas as the legality of military commissions, n27 federal attempts to interfere with state laws providing a limited right to physician-assisted suicide, n28 partisan redistricting, n29 campaign finance reform, n30 and First Amendment protections for public employees and citizens alike. n31 I explain how these cases, as well as some others, fit into the structural equilibrium approach. In some instances the theory produces the same results as those actually reached, while in other important respects I argue that the Court should have approached matters quite differently in order to act as an agent of structural equilibrium. Finally, Part V concludes by considering issues on the horizon in which courts will again have the opportunity to

respond to the Bush vision of Article II. It is not hyperbole to suggest that what happens in the next few years will decide in many respects the type of government enjoyed by our children and grandchildren. The stakes are unquestionably high.

(--) Supreme Court is a key check on executive power:Michael P. Allen, 2007 (Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, Brooklyn Law Review, Spring 2007, 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 871; Lexis/Nexis, rwg)

V. Conclusion and a Glimpse of the Road Ahead¶ Times change and so does the Constitution. When constitutional change is formalized through an Article V amendment, courts have a constitutional duty to enforce the new constitutional structure or other rule in

conformity with the amendment. When the change is an extra-constitutional one, however, courts must ensure that they protect the three foundational principles on which the original constitutional architecture is based.¶ I have explained the central attributes of the potential constitutional change advocated by the Bush administration. It is wide-ranging and potentially quite dangerous to American fundamental constitutional values. My goal has been to develop the operation of the structural equilibrium theory with the Bushian model as an example. I did so using the Supreme Court's October 2005 Term. As discussed above, with the structural equilibrium model as a baseline, the Court did well as to some matters but was deficient with respect to others.¶ This effort addressing how the structural equilibrium approach would have operated is important in its own right. Without doing so, one would not be in as good a position to evaluate the merits of the approach I advocate. However, the true significance of the approach is forward-looking. I hope that the Court consciously acts on the approach I have suggested here, because the challenges most certainly continue in the future. How will the Court rule on cases raising the continued viability of the "state secrets" privilege? n298 What will [*938] the Court decide concerning executive preemption in a case it heard during the October 2006 Term? n299 And what will the Court do when it next confronts the applicability of the Chevron doctrine in the context of aggressive administrative agency actions? n300 Each of these issues implicates core elements of the proposed new constitutional order. In each case, the Court will need to decide how to synthesize the new with the old. When it does so, it should consciously act as an agent of constitutional structural equilibrium to preserve the foundational principles in the most

effective way possible.¶ In sum, as Professor Ackerman recently wrote considering executive power and

terrorism, "our great constitutional tradition of checks and balances provides the material we need to withstand the tragic attacks and predictable panics of the twenty-first century ." n301 They also provide the material to weather the more general storm of extra-constitutional change , whether it is instigated

by Democrats or by Republicans. Now, the Court needs to act on that constitutional tradition.

(--) Court puts checks on executive power:TODD S. PURDUM, 2004 6/29/2004 (“THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESIDENT; In Classic Check and Balance, Court Shows Bush It Also Has Wartime Powers,” Accessed 7/26/2012 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/supreme-court-president-classic-check-balance-court-shows-bush-it-also-has.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, rwg)

In the fall of 2001, President Bush justified his decision to treat some captured terrorist suspects as ''enemy combatants'' without access to lawyers, courts or other long-established legal rights on the grounds that he could not let the

United States' ''enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty itself.'' On Monday morning, the Supreme Court upended a good-sized chunk of that logic, and offered a powerful reminder that in the United States, even in wartime, no prisoner is ever beneath the law's regard, and no president above its limits . It was Justice Robert H. Jackson who first noted 52 years ago this month, in another wartime election summer, that a president is not commander in chief of the country, only of the military. Justice Jackson wrote that in his concurring opinion overturning Harry S. Truman's seizure of the

American steel industry during the Korean war, and Justice David H. Souter cited those words approvingly in his concurrence on Monday. The effect of the current court's rulings in two related cases was to place a classic institutional and political

check on Mr. Bush's effort to keep some citizens and aliens held as the most dangerous ''enemy combatants'' from ever having their day in any court. It is precisely the right to some such hearing, the court held, that defines the constitutional separation of powers and by extension the American governing creed.

(--) Court will check the executive:TODD S. PURDUM, 2004 6/29/2004 (“THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESIDENT; In Classic Check and Balance, Court Shows Bush It Also Has Wartime Powers,” Accessed 7/26/2012 at

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/supreme-court-president-classic-check-balance-court-shows-bush-it-also-has.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, rwg)

''It is a clear demonstration of how much our system of checks and balances , of separation of powers,

continues to be an effective brake on any one branch ,'' said the historian Robert Dallek. ''After all, this is not a left-leaning court, or one dominated by justices who are left of center. But ultimately the court has a unique degree of independence from the executive and legislative branches, that even in times of great difficulty it does not lightly give up.''

IMP: Executive Will Comply with the Supreme Court (--) Executive will comply with Supreme Court decisions:

TODD S. PURDUM, 2004 6/29/2004 (“THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESIDENT; In Classic Check and Balance, Court Shows Bush It Also Has Wartime Powers,” Accessed 7/26/2012 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/supreme-court-president-classic-check-balance-court-shows-bush-it-also-has.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, rwg)

Some historians were not surprised by the court's decisions. Alonzo Hamby, a scholar of the presidency at Ohio University, noted wryly that

''once upon a time, it was not assumed that presidents necessarily had to pay attention to Supreme Court decisions.'' In the 1830's, when the Supreme Court declared the government's forced removal of Indian tribes from their lands illegal, President Andrew Jackson famously dismissed the ruling by the chief justice by saying: ''John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it.'' Mr. Hamby said, ''But in the world we live in now, it's literally impossible for a president to ignore a Supreme Court decision , no matter how wrong or dangerous he may think it is.''

Topicality Answers—2ac

T Answers—Surveillance 1) We meet: Alhogbani evidence says the government is spying on citizens with

the internet.2) We meet: NSA uses the internet to conduct surveillance activities:

Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015 (“NSA Spying on America,” https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

News reports in December 2005 first revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been intercepting Americans’ phone calls and Internet communications. Those news reports, combined with a USA Today story in May 2006 and the statements of several members of Congress, revealed that the NSA is also receiving wholesale copies of American's telephone and other communications records. All of these surveillance activities are in violation of the privacy safeguards established by Congress and the US Constitution.

3) Counter-interpretation: surveillance means to watch over:John Gilliom, (Prof., Political Science, Ohio U.), SUPERVISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY, 2013, 18.

In the introduction, we wrote that surveillance could be thought of as monitoring people in order to regulate or govern their behavior. Surveillance, in other words, is an exercise of power through watching. In the social sciences, “power” has been classically (and too simply) defined as the ability to get people to do something they would not otherwise do. We’ve all had the experience of changing our behavior when we realize someone is watching us; if observation can make people do (or not do) something, then it can be understood as a form of power. When we note that the term surveillance comes from the French word meaning “to watch from above,” the emphasis on “above” implies that power relationship.

4) Negative interpretation is over-limiting: limits out cases where modern technology is used, like the internet.

5) Reasonability: good is good enough on Topicality.6) Literature checks abuse: Literature defines the number of cases on the topic.

T Answers--Curtail Doesn’t Mean Abolish AFF Answers 1) We meet: we don’t abolish all domestic surveillance, we only eliminate it for

internet surveillance.2) Curtail can mean to stop entirely:

Vocabulary.com, 2015 (http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail)

Curtail is an official-sounding word for stopping or slowing things down . The police try to curtail crime — they want there to be less crime in the world. A company may want to curtail their employees' computer time, so they spend more time working and less

time goofing around. Teachers try to curtail whispering and note-passing in class. When something is curtailed, it's either

stopped entirely or stopped quite a bit — it's cut short.

3) Prefer the counter-interpretation: their interpretation forces the AFF into contrived plan texts that don’t match the literature base.

4) Reasonability: good is good enough on topicality.5) Literature checks abuse.6) Plan text in a vacuum is topical—plan text says curtail so whatever that means

we do.

T--Its AFF Answers 1) We meet “its” we only curtail US federal government enforcement—they

can win state and local circumvention arguments against the AFF.2) We meet: the US government is using the internet to conduct surveillance:

Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015 (“NSA Spying on America,” https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

The US government, with assistance from major telecommunications carriers including AT&T, has engaged in massive, illegal dragnet surveillance of the domestic communications and communications records of millions of ordinary Americans since at least 2001. Since this was first reported on by the press and discovered by the public in late 2005, EFF has been at the forefront of the effort to stop it and bring government surveillance programs back within the law and the Constitution. History of NSA Spying Information since 2005

(See EFF’s full timeline of events here) News reports in December 2005 first revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been intercepting Americans’ phone calls and Internet communications. Those news reports, combined with a USA Today story in May 2006 and the statements of several members of Congress, revealed that the NSA is also receiving wholesale copies of American's telephone and

other communications records. All of these surveillance activities are in violation of the privacy safeguards established by Congress and the US Constitution.

3) Reasonability: Good is good enough on topicality.4) Literature checks abuse: we need federal government warrants for the

plan.

T--Domestic AFF Answers 1) We meet: we only curtail surveillance of people living in the United States.2) We meet: surveillance over the internet is domestic:

Jonathan Stray, 8/5/2013 (http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa-data-collection-faq, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Yes, assuming the NSA adheres to the restrictions set out in recently leaked court orders. By definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Court decides what it is legal for the NSA to do. But this level of domestic surveillance wasn’t always legal, and the NSA's domestic

surveillance program has been found to violate legal standards on more than one occasion. The NSA was

gradually granted the authority to collect domestic information on a massive scale through a series of legislative changes and court decisions over the decade following September 11, 2001. See this timeline of loosening laws. The Director of National Intelligence says that authority for PRISM programs comes from section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Verizon metadata collection order cites section 215 of the Patriot Act. The author of the Patriot Act disagrees that the act justifies the Verizon metadata collection program. The NSA's broad data collection programs were originally authorized by President Bush on October 4, 2001. The program operated that way for several years,

but in March 2004 a Justice Department review declared the bulk Internet metadata program was illegal . President Bush signed an order re-authorizing it anyway. In response, several top Justice Department officials threatened to resign, including acting Attorney General James Comey and FBI director Robert Mueller. Bush backed down, and the Internet metadata

program was suspended for several months. By 2007, all aspects of the program were re-authorized by court orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

3) Counter-interpretation: surveillance means spying on people—the people are in the US.

William Staples, 2014 (Prof., Sociology, U. Kansas), EVERYDAY SURVEILLANCE: VIGILANCE AND VISIBILITY IN POSTMODERN LIFE, 2014, xiii.

The word surveillance, in the most general sense, refers to the act of keeping a close watch on people .

4) Counter-interpretation: domestic means in the US:Andrew Sparks, (Editor), WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 5TH Ed., 2014, 433. Domestic: Of one’s own country or the country referred to.

5) Reasonability: good is good enough on T.6) Literature checks abuse: Need literature on domestic surveillance.

T--Substantially AFF Answers 1) Counter-interpretation: substantially means 20%:

Words & Phrases, 67, 758. “‘Substantial’ number of tenants engaged in production of goods for commerce means that at least 20 per cent of the building be occupied by tenants so engaged. Ullo vs. Smith, D.C.N.Y., 62 F. Supp. 757, 760.”

2) We meet the counter-interpretation: 74.4% of people use the internet in the United StatesRyan and File 14 (Thomas and Camille, “Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2013”). http://www.census.gov/history/pdf/2013computeruse.pdf

In 2013, 83.8 percent of U.S. households reported ¶ computer ownership, with 78.5 percent of all ¶ households having a desktop

or laptop computer, ¶ and 63.6 percent having a handheld computer ¶ (Table 1).¶ • ¶ In 2013, 74.4 percent of all households reported ¶ Internet use, with 73.4 percent reporting a high- ¶ speed connection (Table 1). ¶ • ¶ Household computer ownership and Internet use ¶ were most common in homes with relatively young ¶ householders, in households with Asian or White ¶ householders, in households with high incomes, in ¶ metropolitan areas, and in homes where house-¶ holders reported relatively high levels of educa¶ -¶ tional attainment (Table 1).¶ 9¶ • ¶ Patterns for individuals were similar to those ¶ observed for households with computer owner¶ -¶ ship and Internet use tending to be highest among ¶ the young, Whites or Asians, the affluent, and the ¶ highly educated (Table 2). ¶ • ¶ The most common household connection type was ¶ via a cable modem (42.8 percent), followed by ¶ mobile broadband (33.1 percent), and DSL con¶ -¶ nections (21.2 percent). About one-quarter of all ¶ households had no paid Internet subscription (25.6 ¶ percent), while only 1.0 percent of all households ¶ reported connecting to the Internet using a dial-up ¶ connection alone (Table 3)¶

3) Prefer the counter-interpretation: even if it is somewhat arbitrary, it is better than their overlimiting definition.

4) Reasonability: good is good enough on T.5) Literature checks abuse: need specific lit to defend why to decrease

surveillance.

T--Federal Government AFF Answers 1) We meet: we only curtail US federal government enforcement—they can

win state and local circumvention arguments against the AFF.2) We meet: The federal government conducts internet surveillance:

Richard Wolf, 11/18/2013 (staff writer, “NSA surveillance programs face challenges in court,” http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/11/16/supreme-federal-court-surveillance-verizon/3581325/, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

WASHINGTON — The federal government's once-secret telephone and Internet surveillance programs face crucial court hearings in Washington and New York this coming week, but the Supreme Court won't reconsider the decisions of a secret federal court. The challenges, brought by liberal, conservative and privacy watchdog groups, raise the prospect that a federal judge could order at least a temporary halt to the National Security Agency's snooping on millions of Americans. U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon on Monday will hear former Reagan administration lawyer Larry Klayman's request for preliminary injunctions against both of the government's major surveillance programs. One sweeps up telephone companies' data from domestic call records, even though the targets are foreign terrorists. The other goes after cellphone and computer data from major wireless companies and Internet service providers.

3) Reasonability: Good is good enough on topicality.4) Literature checks abuse: we need federal government warrants for the

plan.

Theory Answers—2ac

AT: Test Case FIAT (Have to have a test case) 1) We Meet: The Supreme Court can always find an excuse to decide a case:Tracy Bach, 3/11/2009 (CLI BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 6, “The Recognition of Intergenerational Ecological Rights and Duties in U.S. Law,” http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/CLI%20Policy %20Paper/BP_06%20-%20%28Bach%29.pdf)

While Article III does not explicitly set out any specific standing requirements, the Supreme Court has formulated the doctrine over time and established requirements that a plaintiff must show in order to bring a case. Some commentators have described this evolution as always in flux, even asserting that courts "can always find an excuse for giving standing” if they want to get to the merits of the case .8 Many argue that the Court has restricted standing—particularly in environmental cases—to too narrow a set of individuals.9

2) Counter-interpretation: FIAT allows us to assume a test case exists.3) Prefer the counter-interpretation: Their interpretation would require Congress

AFF’s to prove a bill exists in a committee before it could be FIAT’ed.4) They risk locking out Supreme Court AFF’s—denying education about a third of

the federal government and how it operates.5) Solvency advocate checks abuse: our Alhogbani and Casey evidence says the

Court should recalibrate the fourth amendment for internet surveillance.6) Good is good enough: Reasonability should be your standard on theory.

AT: Effects T—Court Mandates Then Congress Does 1) We meet: we take one action—the Court eliminates the surveillance by striking

it down.2) No different than Congress: Court decisions have the power and permanency

of law:This Nation.com, 2008 (“Supreme Court Decision Making,” http://www.thisnation.com/textbook/judiciary-decision.html, Accessed 7/25/2012, rwg)

Interpretation as law A prominent attorney who had argued hundreds of cases before the Supreme Court once remarked that the Supreme Court is not final because it's right, it is right because it is final. The Court's position as the court of last appeal and as the highest court in the land means that its decisions are binding and largely unchangeable. Once the Court has ruled, its decisions have all the effect and permanency of law .

3) Plan is a mandate—Executive and Legislative have to bow to the judiciary:Steve Kellmeyer, 2005 The Illinois Leader, 2005 [The coming paradigm shift from the judiciary to the corporation, July 7, http://www.illinoisleader.com/opinion/opinionview.asp?c=27040, rwg]

The executive and legislative branches bow to the authority of the judicial branch. They do not exercise authority on their own, except as the judicial branch gives them leave. Since the federal judiciary is a creation of the

legislative branch, we now have a Frankenstein government, a government in which the creator has lost control of his creation. Since the judiciary is the only real source of power in America , the indirect election of judges through a republican system should be a source of comfort to all concerned. True, the term is for life, not four or six years, the government is by nine people, not thousands, and there remains not even a semblance of the idea that the judges represent the interests of any of the electorate but the forms are observed. We have maintained the idea of the republic - sort of.

4) They limit out all AFF’s: all AFF’s require multiple steps—they create a bill, put it through a committee, Congress passes it, and then Obama signs it.5) Their interp limits out all Courts AFF’s

A) Bad for education: we learn more about the Courts and their unique role in surveillance policy.

B) Not real world: the Court decides all kinds of issues related to Fourth Amendment Law.6) We spike out of zero topic specific da’s: we claim to massively curtail surveillance. 7) Good is good enough: Reasonability should be the standard on T.

AT: Over-spec 1) Counter-interpretation: AFF gets any agent of the USFG: The federal

government refers to any entity of the federal government—The Chicago Manual of Style 2010 16th edition text © (http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles32.html)

Q. When I refer to the government of the United States in text, should it be US Federal Government or US federal government? A. The government of the U nited S tates is not a single official entity . Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the US government or the US federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of governmen t:

the Congress , the Senate, the D epartment o f S tate, etc .

2) Prefer the counter-interpretation:A) Real world: No real world plan wouldn’t specify their agent.B) Makes the AFF a fixed target: prevents shadiness on politics links and

counterplan competitionC) Preserves topic specific education: we learn about surveillance policy in the

context of real world actors3) No abuse: we act through an agent of the USFG.4) They have plenty of ground: we claim to massively curtail domestic

surveillance. 5) Not a violation: We violate no words in the resolution by specifying the

judiciary.6) Reasonability: good is good enough.

AT: Ground Specification is Extra-Topical 1) Counter-interpretation: The AFF is required to specify the grounds for their

decision.2) Most real world: No Supreme Court decision would ever not explain the

rationale for their decision:Wiki Answers, 2012 (Accessed 7/25/2012, “Written Opinions,”

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_types_of_written_opinions_may_the_US_Supreme_Court_issue, rwg)

The Court's Opinion (usually also the majority opinion) is synonymous with the Court's decision. The "Opinion of the Court" gives the verdict and explains the reasoning behind the decision reached . The privilege of writing the official opinion falls to the most senior justice in the majority group, or to the Chief Justice if he voted with the majority; this person may choose to write the opinion, or may assign the task to another member of the majority. If the justices who voted against the majority wish to issue a unified opinion, they simply decide amongst themselves who will write it.

3) We have a solvency advocate: Our Alhogbani and Casey evidence specifies the rationale for the plan.

4) Disads and counterplans check abuse: they can run disads off the reason for decision or counterplan out of grounds to solve advantages.

5) Reject argument not team—if you find it illegitimate for us to specify our grounds, then we can just defend the curtailment of power.

6) Reasonability: good is good enough on T and theory.

Disad Answers

Politics DA Answers (--) Supreme Court announces decisions in May & June

Supreme Court of the United States, 7/25/2012 (“The Court and Its Procedures,”http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx, Accessed 7/25/2012, rwg)

The Court maintains this schedule each Term until all cases ready for submission have been heard and decided. In May and June the Court sits only to announce orders and opinions . The Court recesses at the end of June, but the work of the Justices is unceasing. During the summer they continue to analyze new petitions for review, consider motions and applications, and must make preparations for cases scheduled for fall argument.

(--) ZERO LINK AT ALL: The Supreme Court does the plan—Obama doesn’t use any capital to push the plan.(--) Courts preserve president’s political capital

Tushnet, 2008 (law professor at Harvard, Mark, “THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY AND THE ROBERTS COURT: SOME HINTS FROM POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREM-ACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY”, Summer, 25 Const. Commentary 343, lexis, Accessed 2/18/2013, rwg)

What can the courts do for a resilient regime? Presidents and Congress have limited time and political energy. They will spend them on what they regard as central issues. But at any time there will be "outliers" - geographic regions as yet uncommitted to the regime's constitutional understandings, or substantive areas that plainly require change if those understandings are to become deeply implanted in society, yet politically too touchy [*347] or relatively unimportant to Congress. "For the affiliated leader, enhancing judicial authority to define and enforce constitutional meaning provides an efficient mechanism for supervising and correcting those who might fail to adhere to the politically preferred constitutional vision" (pp. 105-06). The courts can serve as a convenient but essentially administrative mechanism for bringing these outliers into the constitutional order. n16¶ In addition, the courts may have rhetorical resources unavailable to presidents. Their obligation to explain their decisions, and the fact that they make decision after decision, means that they have an opportunity to develop a reasonably general account of the resilient regime's constitutional understandings. In Whittington's words, "It is the classic task of judges within the Anglo-American tradition ... to render new decisions and lay down new rules that can be explicated as a mere working out of previously established legal principles" (p. 84). Presidents, in contrast, only sporadically make speeches illuminating those understandings.¶ More boldly, affiliated presidents may try to use the courts to "overcomee gridlock" (p. 124) caused by the strategic positions

recalcitrant opponents of the new constitutional regime may occupy. And, if not "use the courts," at least rely on the courts to take the initiative, because "the Court can sometimes move forward on the constitutional agenda where other political officials cannot" (p. 125). "Coalition leaders might be constrained by the needs of coalition maintenance," but "judges have a relatively free hand" (p. 125). This "use" of the courts, though, poses risks. The courts may push the regime's constitutional principles further and faster than is politically wise, and the regime's political leaders may find themselves on the defensive. Indeed, in this way the courts can contribute to making a resilient regime vulnerable, which may be part of the story about the Warren Court and the demise of the New Deal/Great Society regime. n17¶ [*348] Preemptive presidents face a special strategic problem. Sometimes they take office because they manage to persuade the public that they remain committed to a resilient regime's constitutional vision even if in their hearts they want to transform the regime. n18 At other times they take office as a regime becomes vulnerable, but do not themselves have the program, vision, or charisma to be reconstructive presidents themselves. n19 They are likely to face opposition in Congress and to some degree in the courts. But they can turn divided government to their advantage by seeking judicial confirmation of executive prerogative. The judges in place might be sympathetic to such claims for doctrinal and political reasons. They will have "inherited from affiliated administrations" (p. 169) doctrines supporting executive authority. And, though Whittington doesn't make this point explicitly, they may see the preemptive president as an accident, soon to be replaced by an affiliated one whose exercises of presidential power they will want to endorse. Finally, preemptive presidents need to get their authority from somewhere when they face congressional opposition, as they will. They don't have much of their own, but they can try "to borrow from the authority of the courts in order to hold off their political adversaries" (p. 195).¶ One final point before I move to some speculations about the future of judicial supremacy. Whittington emphasizes the growth of judicial supremacy during the twentieth century, both in terms of the judges' self-understanding and, perhaps more importantly, in terms of the degree of political

commitment to judicial supremacy (p. 25). He suggests that politicians have had increasingly strong reasons to support the Supreme Court. The reconstructive presidency of Ronald Reagan was less ambitious than that of Franklin Roosevelt (p. 232), assuring the American people that Reagan's policies would strengthen rather than destroy the social safety nets that Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson's regimes had created. Even a reconstructive president could hope that the Supreme Court would assist in articulating regime

principles in the way the Court ordinarily does for affiliated presidents. Further, drawing again on Skowronek's account of the [*349] ways in which regimes leave a residue even after they have been displaced, Whittington describes the doctrinal thickening that occurred during the twentieth century with respect to essentially every possible ideological and political commitment a President could have (p. 283). Doctrinal thickening means that every member of a ruling coalition will have some basis in constitutional law for its assertions that the Constitution requires satisfaction of its policy preferences, and that the Court cannot possibly satisfy all the demands on it. n20 So, for the future, we might

expect Presidents to have increasingly ambivalent views about the Supreme Court. In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court will be useful and annoying to every President - useful because the Court can do some policy work that Presidents would rather not expend time and political capital on , and annoying because the Court's failure to satisfy all the demands emanating from a President's political supporters will put pressure on the President to do something about the Court.

(--) Turn: the plan bolsters political capital by allowing politicians to blame the court: Keith E. Whittington, 2007 politics at Princeton University, (Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, p. 137-39)

Independent and active judicial review generates position-taking opportunities by reducing the policy responsibility of the elected official s. They may vote in favor of a bill that they personally dislike secure in the knowledge that it will never be implemented . State statutes regulating abortion after the Roe decision, for example, were often pure symbolism, though they could also play a more productive role in pressing the Court to refine its

doctrine or in filling in the lacuna left by judicial decisions. More subtly, the judicial backstop allows legislators to focus on some dimensions of the proposed policy (the most optimistic and politically popular) while downplaying others (the constitutionally subversive and treacherous). Legislators even gain a political windfall when the courts actually act to strike down the popular law . The visibility of the exercise of judicial review creates another opportunity for legislators to publicize their position on the issue, this time by bewailing the Court’s actions .

(--) Court action doesn’t link to politics- individual rulings don’t draw attention Gregory Caldeira, 1986 Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, [The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., pp. 1209-1226; “Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court”; Jstor]

In previous work on support for institutions and leaders, scholars have demonstrated the crucial effects of discrete political events and circumstances on the rise and decline of public confidence . For example, Mueller (1973) persuasively argues that crises in foreign affairs result in "rallying-around-the-flag" and a

subsequent increase in the popularity of the incumbent chief executive (cf. Parker, 1977). Unfortunately for the purposes of analysis,

events normally associated with the Court seldom cause a splash of the dimensions of the Mayaguez

incident or the Cuban missile crisis, Particular decisions sometimes do gain a fair amount of attention in the elite media of communications, but few single cases -with the exception of a bombshell such as Dred Scott-

have sufficient weight to shift public attitudes one way or the other . Even if we could isolate a number of crises or landmark decisions, the polling organizations have not gathered data on support for the Court often enough to permit a precise reading on the influence of salient events.

[Insert Scenario Specific Answers]

1ar: Politics: Decisions Announced in May (--) The plan wouldn’t be announced until May at the earliest—after their politics scenario—this isn’t FIAT gimmickry—this is normal means for the courts.(--) You should prefer normal means to immediacy:A) Most real world: teaches real world decision making skillsB) Rewards topic specific education specific to the branch of governmentC) Least distortion of the lit base—both sides can debate it.(--) Decisions never leak before they are announced:

Sam Baker, 7/4/2012 (staff writer, “Supreme Court healthcare ruling leaks have DC buzzing: Who is the culprit?” http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/236197-supreme-court-talk-has-dc-buzzing-who-is-the-leaker, rwg)

The justices themselves were implicated in the speculation because clerks would have more to lose by talking to the press. A decision has never leaked before the court announced it publicly ; the explanation

for that fact is that justices have nothing to gain and clerks would be throwing away promising careers by leaking.

1ar: Blame Deflection (--) They don’t have a link and we only have a risk of a turn—extend our Tushnet evidence—politicians can use the court to prevent themselves from expending political capital, extend our Wittington evidence, politicians can look good by posturing in opposition to the court.(--) Court gives political cover for Congress: Perine 08 (Katherine, Staff – CQ Politics, “Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling”, 6-12, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees, gives Democrats further cover against GOP sniping. “This is

something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives political cover to Congress,” said Ross K. Baker, a

Rutgers Universitiy political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘The devil made me do it.’ ”

(--) Court decisions provide legislators political cover:Natasha Korecki, 5/8/2015 (staff writer, “State Supreme Court pension ruling provides political cover to cut more, tax more,” http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/7/71/590030/state-supreme-court-pension-ruling-provides-political-cover-cut-tax, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

An Illinois Supreme Court ruling that struck down a pension reform law on Friday could have just opened the door even wider to the prospect of deep cuts to services and new taxes for Illinois residents. With only three weeks left until lawmakers have to pass

a balanced budget, legislators now have even more political cover to raise taxes and cut spending following the high court’s decision that it was unconstitutional for the state to pare back promised pension benefits for state employees.

(--) Courts provide political cover for politicians:ROBERT T. GARRETT, 8/19/2005 (“Educational Equity, Politics & Policy in Texas,” http://texasedequity.blogspot.com/2005/08/legislature-adjourns-special-session.html, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers , who have tended to put off

dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant

law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."

(--) Court decisions give politicians political cover:Texas Classroom Teachers Association, 2013 (“2013 Texas school finance litigation update” https://tcta.org/node/13360-2013_texas_school_finance_litigation_update, Accessed 7/10/2015, rwg)

Wealthier districts tend to be located in suburban areas that are represented by powerful, typically fiscally conservative legislators, so there is

political pressure against leveling down. The question would be whether this political pressure and the excuse of a

court decision would give legislators the political cover to raise taxes in order to level poor schools up.

(--) Blame deflection: Democrats will blame Bush’s Court

Katherine Perine, 2008 staff at CQ Politics, 6/12/2008, Congress Unlikely to Try to Counter Supreme Court Detainee Ruling, CQ Politics, p. http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002896528&cpage=2)

Thursday’s decision, from a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees , gives Democrats further

cover against GOP sniping. “This is something that the court has decided, and very often the court gives

political cover to Congress ,” said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers University political science professor. “You can simply point to a Supreme Court decision and say, ‘ The devil made me do it .’

(--) Courts provide political cover to politicians:Dallas Morning News 8/19/05 http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/legislature/schoolfinance/stories/082005dntexsession.8bd31b4a.html

That could foreshadow the court's response to a chief argument by state attorneys – that the court should butt out and leave school finance to the Legislature. A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities

until state or federal judges forced them to act. " It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."

(--) Politicians will use the counterplan to deflect blameAlison M. Martens, 2007 political science at University of Louisville, 2007 (Perspectives on Politics 5.3)

The outline of this revised research agenda, begins by looking at a 1993 article written by Mark Graber challenging the countermajoritarian difficulty paradigm. Graber's observations point to the importance of studying systemic transformations, such as the evolution of judicial supremacy. Using historical case studies on abortion, the Dred Scott controversy, and anti-trust issues to study perceived incidents of judicial independence, he contends that scholars who seek to justify independent judicial policymaking, even in the face of believed democratic deficiencies, misunderstand and inaccurately represent the relationships between justices and elected officials. By looking at the dialogues between these parties it becomes apparent that judicial independence , when it actually occurs, is often exercised at the invitation of elected officials , and in the absence of any expressed majoritarian choice, in order to resolve political controversies that elected officials cannot or do not want to resolve themselves. Hence the counter-majoritarian difficulty can be more appropriately characterized as the “non-majoritarian difficulty.” 33 According to Graber, where crosscutting issues divide a lawmaking majority an invitation is often tacitly but

consciously issued to the Court by political elites to resolve the political controversy that they themselves are unwilling or unable to address, thereby “ foisting disruptive political debates off on the Supreme Court .” 34 Graber writes that “elected officials encourage or tacitly support judicial policy making both as a means of avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions and as a means of pursuing controversial policy goals that they cannot publicly advance through open legislative and electoral

politics.” 35 Furthermore, political and electoral advantages can accrue by ducking these tough questions and sending them on to be settled by the Court. Graber explains that elites (including the executive) can benefit from passing the political buck to the Court in multiple ways. Party activists can be redirected to focus on legal action in the courts, thereby reducing pressure on mainstream politicians who wish to maintain

a more politically viable moderate stance. Voters can be redirected to focus any ire they might have over policy

outcomes on the Court. Politicians can take responsive positions on judicial decisions that may make for a good sound bite but really require no politically accountable action on their part. Finally, political compromise between the legislature and the executive might be had under the table of Court policymaking. 36 This is an impressive set of political benefits that can stem from a practice of judicial supremacy that creates a Court equipped with the interpretive authority and legitimacy to make controversial public policies. Graber's article, then, highlights the perversion of political accountability that can possibly occur where everyone in the system, the public included, accepts and expects interpretive authority to reside with the courts.

1ar: Individual Decisions Don’t Matter (--) Extend our Caldeira evidence: individual decisions rarely make a splash—there’s no way a decision about surveillance will turn everyone away from the courts if decisions like abortion and gun control haven’t… (--) Popular respect for the Court shields it from partisan politics on individual issues:

Gregory Caldeira, 1998 Prof of Political Science at The Ohio State University, [Co-written by Vanessa A. Baird, James L. Gibson; “On the Legitimacy of National High Courts” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (Jun., ), pp. 343-358; Jstor]

The purpose of this research is to examine theories of diffuse support and institutional legitimacy by testing hypotheses about the interrelationships among the salience of courts, satisfaction with court outputs, and diffuse support for national high courts. Like our predecessors, we are constrained by essentially cross-sectional data; unlike them, we analyze mass attitudes toward high courts in eighteen countries. Because our sample includes many countries with newly formed high courts, our cross-sectional data support several longitudinal inferences, using the age of the judicial institution as an independent variable. We discover that the U.S. Supreme Court is not unique in the esteem in which it is held and, like other courts, it profits from a tendency of people to credit it for pleasing decisions but not to penalize it for displeasing ones. Generally, older courts more successfully link specific and diffuse support, most likely due to satisfying successive, nonoverlapping constituencies.

Court Capital Answers—2ac (--) Non-unique: Obamacare decision has angered conservatives:Carol E. Lee, 6/25/2015 (staff writer, “Obama Has a Good Week,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-has-a-good-week-1435253458, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

Tensions will continue between the two parties over health care. Whit Ayres, a GOP pollster, said Thursday’s ruling wouldn't alter the Republicans’ dim view of the Affordable Care Act, but rather may strengthen their resolve to repeal the law. “This will simply increase the interest among Republicans in finding a preferable alternative to Obamacare,” he said. “It doesn’t change the fundamental Republican argument.”

(--) No spillover to specific cases—even if capital theory is true it doesn’t apply to individual decisions.(--) Turn: Activism:

A) Third-party doctrine is an example of judicial activismMark Fitzgibbons, 5/28/2015 (“FED’s Mass Data Collecting ‘Third-Party Doctrine’: A Judicial Fiction Unsupported by the Constitution,” http://cnsnews.com/commentary/mark-fitzgibbons/feds-mass-data-collecting-third-party-doctrine-judicial-fiction, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

The third-party doctrine, which is a judicial fiction unsupported by the Fourth Amendment’s text, and has been rejected in I believe seven states, was initially more limited to the bank records of one targeted crook at a time. It was not created to let government grab the records of all people held by all businesses all of the time. Lowry writes, “If the National Security Agency’s bulk-data program expires, the coroner should conclude that it was ‘death by bumper sticker.’” Well, better that than death to the Fourth Amendment by bumper-sticker application of the third-party doctrine. Proponents of mass, random harvesting of business-owned records have adopted the un-conservative position that this judicial doctrine construing the Fourth Amendment should forever trump public opinion and even the separation of powers. The people’s elected officials can overturn the court when the court is wrong. We are still, after all, a republic. That does not mean, of course, that the Constitution isn’t paramount law over even our elected representatives, who may not violate the Constitution with legislation. But it is also true that when judicial opinions favor government acts in violation of the constitutionally protected rights of the

people, the black-robed ones are not the last word. The judicially created Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine is the product of judicial activism in favor of government power. Because it is not supported by the text, purpose or history of the Fourth Amendment, it may be overturned through our republican process, which involves the will of the people, bumper stickers and all.

B) Activism threatens the courts legitimacy:ABDULLAH BOZKURT, 4/13/2008 (“Judicial activism’s quarrel with legitimacy and democracy,” http://www.todayszaman.com/national_judicial-activisms-quarrel-with-legitimacy-and-democracy_139067.html, Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

“This is judicial activism if not a judicial coup,” says Professor Ergun Özbudun, a teacher of constitutional law at Ankara’s Bilkent University.

“There is no smoking gun in the indictment filed by the chief prosecutor with the Constitutional Court,” he adds. Judicial activism is a term adopted in the US to describe zealous judges who overstep their authority and conflict with the legislature’s power by making new law rather than interpreting existing legislation. The issue was constantly debated at the republic’s foundation, spearheaded by Alexander Hamilton in his famous “Federalist Papers” and Republican Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton argued that the judiciary would be least dangerous to political rights because it had no influence over the “sword or purse.” Jefferson,

however, challenged the proposition, saying that exalting the judiciary over the executive and legislature would disgrace the judiciary and lead to its eventual degradation . The Jeffersonian prediction did not happen,

thanks to the US Supreme Court mostly steering clear of politics and respecting the power of the

legislative and executive branches.

(--) Non-unique: gay marriage ruling has angered conservatives:Fox News, 6/26/2015 (“Supreme Court: Same-sex couples can marry in all 50 states,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/06/26/supreme-court-same-sex-couples-can-marry-in-all-50-states/, Accessed 6/26/2015, rwg)

Roberts wrote: "If you are among the many Americans -- of whatever sexual orientation -- who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today's decision. ... But do not celebrate the Constitution. It

had nothing to do with it." Each of the four dissenting justices also wrote a separate dissent. Prominent social conservatives, meanwhile, blasted the decision. Tony Perkins, head of the Family Research Council, said it puts the government on a "collision course with America's cherished religious freedoms."

(--) Katz precedent has already been undermined:Orin S. Kerr, 2004 (Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School, Michigan Law Review, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, Accessed 7/7/2015, rwg)

Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 Ind. L.J. 549, 554 (1990) ("The Katz standard has been twisted to allow the government access to many intimate details about our lives."); Jonathan Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business: Thermal Imaging, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1437, 1454 (1996) (arguing that

although post-Katz cases claimed to be applying the Katz test, "this show of loyalty to Katz has proven specious, for subsequent cases have undermined the promise of Katz"); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583, 587 (1989) (arguing that "the entire course of recent Supreme Court fourth amendment precedent, which has narrowed significantly the scope of individual activities that are protected constitutionally, is misguided and inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth amendment."); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 Duke L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (arguing that some Supreme Court cases "do not reflect societal understandings" of when an expectation of privacy is "reasonable," and that "some of the Court's conclusions [about what expectations of privacy are reasonable] may be well off the mark"); Tomkovicz, supra note 99, at 647 (explaining that post-Katz cases "neither fulfilled the promises of Katz nor been consonant with an appropriately conceived fourth amendment core.").

(--) Turn: Winners win for the Courts—controversial decisions enhance the court’s legitimacy:

David Law, 2009 (Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Georgetown Law Journal, March 2009, 97 Geo. L.J. 723; “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” Lexis, rwg)

Part IV of this Article discusses a counterintuitive implication of a coordination-based account of judicial power. Conventional wisdom suggests that courts secure compliance with their decisions by drawing upon their store of legitimacy, which is undermined by decisions that are unpopular, controversial, or lack intellectual integrity. n25 Part IV argues that precisely the opposite is true : an unpopular or unpersuasive decision can, in fact, enhance a court's power in future cases , as long as it is obeyed. Widespread compliance with a decision that is controversial, unpopular, or unpersuasive serves only to strengthen the widely held expectation that others comply with judicial decisions. This expectation, in turn, is self-fulfilling : those who expect others to comply with a court's decisions will find it strategically prudent to comply themselves, and the aggregate result will, in fact, be widespread compliance. Part IV illustrates these strategic insights--and the Supreme Court's apparent grasp of them--by contrasting [*734] Bush v. Gore n26 with Brown v. Board of Education n27 and Cooper v. Aaron. n28

(--) No internal link: Capital doesn’t tradeoff between issues--Redish and Cisar, 1991 prof law @ Northwestern and Law clerk to US Court of Appeals, 1991

(MARTIN H. REDISH, prof law and public policy @ Northwestern; ELIZABETH J. CISAR, Law Clerk to Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Dec 1991, “CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES: ARTICLE: "IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERN" *: THE NEED

FOR PRAGMATIC FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY.” 41 Duke L.J. 449)

Choper's assumption that the judiciary's institutional capital is transferable from structural cases to individual rights cases is no more credible. Common sense should tell us that the public's reaction to con- troversial individual rights cases-for example, cases concerning abor- tion,240 school prayer,241 busing,242 or criminal defendants' rights243- will be based largely, if not exclusively, on the basis of its feelings con- cerning those particular issues. It is unreasonable to assume that the public's acceptance or rejection of these individual rights rulings would somehow be affected by anything the Court says about wholly unrelated structural issues .

(--) Theory of institutional capital is wrong—votes are based on ideology and not institutional capital:

Cross and Nelson, 2001 Biz Law @ UT and PoliSci @ Penn State, (Frank B. Cross, Biz Law @ UT, Blake J. Nelson, Assis prof PoliSci @ Penn State, 2001, “STRATEGIC INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING” 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1437)

The normative political model, sometimes called the attitudinal model, contends that judges make decisions so as to advance their political or ideological [*1444] policy ends, without regard to either the demands of the

normative legal model or the concerns of other institutions. n39 It is normative in that it assumes that judges are unconstrained and have single-peaked utility functions. In this model, judges decide so as to advance their ideological policy ends , without regard for the formal requirements of law (e.g., constraining precedents and text) and without

concern for the reaction of external entities. The political model may find support in legal sources beyond the legal realists and the contemporary critical legal theorists . n40 Supreme Court Justices are commonly characterized as "liberal" or "conservative" - political terms describing the ideological import of their

decisions. Significantly, this model of decisionmaking does not necessitate an extremely cynical view of judges, as the political model may reflect subconscious psychology and cognitive dissonance. n41 With the growth of clerk populations, it is easy for "the appellate judge to determine a result based on personal notions of fairness and right, and then to leave to the staff attorney the task of constructing reasons to support that result." n42 The political model can be descriptively accurate, even absent conscious judicial policymaking . In contrast to the normative legal model,

considerable empirical data supports the claims of the political model of judicial decisionmaking. Many studies have already been described in the legal literature. n43 Some prominent judges have taken issue with these studies and raised some

methodological challenges, n44 though the challenges are readily answered. n45 Perhaps [*1445] the most persuasive

evidence can be found in a meta-analysis of studies on judicial decisionmaking conducted by Dan Pinello. n46 He identified 140 research papers that empirically analyzed judicial decisionmaking by party affiliation. A majority of these papers reported data in a manner that could be incorporated in his meta-analysis, and he found that virtually every study showed a positive association between judicial voting and judicial ideology. n47 The studies together contained over 222,000 judicial votes , and the judges' political party explained thirty-eight percent of the variance in their voting.

(--) No link: no one pays attention to the court:Noah Feldman, 6/17/2012 ( professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard, “Supreme Court’s Super Mondays Don’t Serve Justice,”

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-17/supreme-court-s-super-mondays-don-t-serve-justice.html, Accessed 7/28/2012, rwg)

The club of Supreme Court devotees (OK, junkies) likes to think of the first Monday in October as opening day, and the last Monday in June as game seven of the World Series. But many years, the series is a dud. Most of the cases are technical and unexciting, they enter the casebooks

with little fanfare , and the public barely notices. This year will be the exception that proves the rule.

(--) Individual decisions don’t affect capital.Gibson et al., 2003 PoliSci @ Wash U in St. Louis and Ohio State, 2003

James L. Gibson, PoliSci @ Wash U in St. Louis, Gregory A. Caldeira, PoliSci @ Ohio State, Lester Kenyatta Spence, Poli Sci @ Wash U in St. Louis, Apr. 2003, “Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 354-367

Perhaps more important is the rather limited rela- tionship between performance evaluations and loyalty to the Supreme Court . These two types of attitudes are of course not entirely unrelated, but commitments to the Supreme Court are not largely a function of whether one is pleased with how it is doing its job. Even less influential are perceptions of decisions in individual cases . When people have developed a "running

tally" about an institution-a sort of historical summary of the good and bad things an institution has done- it is difficult for any given decision to have much incremental influence on that tally. Insti- tutional loyalty is valuable to the Court precisely because it is so weakly related to actions the Court takes at the moment.(--) Judicial capital is resilient – one controversial decision won’t destroy it.

Grosskopf and Mondak, 1998 (Anke Grosskopf, Assistant Prof of Political Science @ Long Island University, & Jeffrey Mondak, Professor of Political Science @ U of Illinois, 1998, “Do attitudes toward specific supreme court decisions matter? The impact of Webster and Texas v Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 51 no 3 633-54 September1998)

Opinion about the Supreme Court may influence opinion about the Court's decisions, but is the opposite true? Viewed from the perspective of the Court's justices, it would be preferable if public reaction to rulings did not shape subsequent levels of support for the Court. If opinion about the Court were fully determined by early political socialization and deeply rooted attachments to democratic values, then justices would be free to intervene in controversial policy

questions without risk that doing so would expend political capital. Consistent with this perspective, a long tradition of scholarship argues that the Supreme Court is esteemed partly because it commands a bedrock of public support, or a reservoir of goodwill, which helps it to remain legitimate despite occasional critical reaction to unpopular rulings (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968; Easton 1965, 1975; Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and

Gibson 1992). The sources of this diffuse support are usually seen as rather stable and immune from short-term influences, implying that evaluations of specific decisions are of little or no broad importance. For instance, Caldeira and Gibson (1992) find that basic democratic values, not reactions to decisions, act as the strongest determinants of institutional support.

1ar: Court Capital Answers—No Spillover (--) Extend our Redish and Cisar evidence—the assumption that institutional capital affects unrelated issues is false—justices decide based on their feelings on individual issues—not the overall reservoir of support it has.(--) Capital doesn’t spill over to other decisions.

Redish, 1997 Law @ Northwestern U, 1997Martin Redish, Law @ Northwestern U, Summer 1997, “Federalist Society Symposium: Washington, D.C.: November 14 - November 16, 1996: Panel Three: Disciplining Congress: The Boundaries of Legislative Power”, 13 J. L. & Politics 585

The limited pie theory, associated with Professor Choper, n39 is that the Supreme Court has a limited pie of institutional capital, of institutional goodwill, and if it spends some of that on constitutional federalism, it will be deprived of its opportunity to use that for where it really is needed - individual rights. The reason institutional capital is really needed in individual rights is [*604] primarily that the states can protect themselves in the jungles of the political process, while individuals cannot. To that, my colleague Michael Perry and others have added what implicitly underlies this: that individual rights are simply more important than constitutional federalism. n40 I like to take the position that a true constitutional liberal should strongly believe in adherence to constitutional, not just political, limits on federalism, because federalism serves an important function as a buffer between the government and the individual. The whole idea, the genius of the structure set up by the Framers, was that the system of separation of powers, the system of federalism, and the system of individual rights would all interlock as different fail-safe mechanisms. If federalism and separation of powers are working properly as divisions of government power, tyranny would be prevented, and presumably the number of instances where individuals and government conflict over their rights would be reduced. The story that best illustrates how constitutional federalism can protect against tyranny is the story that I gather is true about Mussolini when he was given a copy of the National Recovery Act, which ultimately was held unconstitutional, and he looks at it and he says in Italian, "Ah, now there's a dictator." And I think that illustrates

how dangerous it is in terms of the values of our constitutional system to vest full power within the federal government. The limited pie theory, as a justification, makes no sense because it assumes a kind of fungibility of institutional capital that just doesn't comport with reality . How people feel about individual rights decisions will not be determined by whether the Supreme Court has said anything about constitutional federalism. Reactions to Roe v. Wade n41 or Miranda v. Arizona n42 are based on people's concerns about those decisions . What the Supreme Court says or doesn't say about constitutional federalism will have little, if

any, effect on reactions to those decisions. [*605]

(--) Even if their overall theory is true, you can’t apply it to specific decisions—prefer our evidence for drawing this distinction:

Grosskopf and Mondak, 1998 Profs of Poli Sci Long Island U and U of Illinois, (Anke Grosskopf, Assistant Prof of Political Science @ Long Island University, & Jeffrey Mondak, Professor of Political Science @ U of Illinois, 1998, “Do attitudes toward specific supreme court decisions matter? The impact of Webster and Texas v Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 51 no 3 633-54 September1998)

Some evidence supports our political capital perspective, but the empirical record remains unsatisfying. Tanenhaus and Murphy (1981) found that approval of Supreme Court rulings accounted for roughly 15 percent of the little variance in diffuse support they detected. However, due to the nine-year gap between the waves of their panel survey, the authors could not attribute change in

support to any specific court rulings. Caldeira (1986) showed that aggregate confidence in the Court varies in response to judicial actions such as support for defendants' rights, but Caldeira also could not trace this effect to specific decisions .

Court Capital Answers--Spokeo Specific Answers (--) Spokeo won’t win—the conservative court will decide in a way that helps plaintiffs: Ross Todd, 5/29/2015 (staff writer, “Wave of Privacy Suits Peters Out,” http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202727906735/Wave-of-Privacy-Suits-Peters-Out, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

While the case has been read by lawyers such as Cooley's Rhodes as ripe for reversal by the Supreme Court, some caution that it could be decided in a narrow way that punts on the standing issue that Silicon Valley finds so vital, or that it could be decided in a way that actually helps plaintiffs . The Supreme Court has reviewed the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or FCRA, multiple times since it was passed in 1970, noted Georgetown's Vladeck. The harm that comes from incorrect

revelations such as the ones at issue in the case are baked into the law, not something that must be separately proven, he said. The Ninth Circuit's unanimous ruling was authored by Diarmuid O'Scannlain, one of the court's more conservative judges. Moreover, the Supreme Court might be disinclined to rule in a way that plaintiffs lawyers predict would result in more privacy actions being

filed in state court. "This court has at least four self-identified conservative jurists," said Kamber, the New York plaintiffs

lawyer. "I'd be surprised if those jurists would abdicate the express intentions of Congress" in passing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which allowed defendants to remove state court class actions with more than $5 million at stake to federal court.

Even Cooley's Rhodes has come to a more cautious view of Spokeo. Rhodes said he could see some of the conservative justices on the court applying a separation of powers analysis to the case. Congress did, after all, pass the FCRA with a

private right to sue and statutory damages embedded within it. "It's a conservative principle to defer to the legislature," Rhodes said.

(--) Defense attorneys can successfully defend their clients vs. class action lawsuits:Ross Todd, 5/29/2015 (staff writer, “Wave of Privacy Suits Peters Out,” http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202727906735/Wave-of-Privacy-Suits-Peters-Out, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

SAN FRANCISCO — Michael Rhodes, the charismatic chair of Cooley's privacy and data protection practice, took the stage at an awards dinner in late April with an extra bounce in his step—and a blunt prediction for his colleagues in the plaintiffs privacy bar. "I suspect a lot of people, perhaps on the plaintiffs side, will be out of work within the year," he said. Rhodes was referring mainly to the Supreme Court's decision earlier that same day to grant review in Spokeo v. Robins, a case that has the potential to radically reshape privacy litigation. But his remarks also

reflected growing confidence among defense lawyers that they have a grip on the legal threat posed by suits that seek to hold companies accountable for improperly collecting, selling off, rifling through or failing to protect customers' data. The Recorder first used the phrase "privacy class action" 15 years ago to describe a new class of

suits aimed at dot-com companies. There have been plenty of ambitious predictions since. But though the legal theories have evolved, there have been few big pay days and some signs that mainstream plaintiffs firms are losing interest . After three

boom years, privacy litigation filed in the Northern District of California against Silicon Valley giants Apple Inc., Facebook

Inc. and Google Inc. fell off dramatically in 2013, according to a Recorder review of cases invoking the statutes most frequently used

in privacy cases. The search turned up just a single privacy suit against Apple, Facebook or Google filed in 2015.

(--) Plaintiffs rarely win major settlements in privacy claim cases:Ross Todd, 5/29/2015 (staff writer, “Wave of Privacy Suits Peters Out,” http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202727906735/Wave-of-Privacy-Suits-Peters-Out, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

NO POT OF GOLD When plaintiffs firms first started pressing privacy claims in class actions in the early 2000s, it was traditional powerhouse firms such as Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann and now-defunct Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes

& Lerach that were testing the waters. But since the practice has failed to yield the hefty damages awards more common in securities and mass torts litigation—and the attorney fees that come with them—the practice has largely fallen into the purview of specialty shops such as Chicago's Edelson PC and New York-based KamberLaw. With the exception of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, few big plaintiffs shops have planted a flag in the area of

privacy, and some lawyers in smaller shops say privately that the cases have yet to generate much income for their firms. So far, plaintiffs have won only a few eight-digit settlements, let alone the nine- and 10-digit blockbusters hinted at in their complaints. In August 2013 U.S. District Judge Richard Seeborg of the Northern District of California approved a $20 million deal that Facebook Inc. reached with users whose images appeared without consent in its sponsored stories. Plaintiffs counsel, who asked for $7.5 million in fees, were awarded about $4.7 million, which was less than the team said it would have collected billing at hourly rates. In January 2014, comScore Inc. agreed to pay $14 million to Internet users who claimed the analytics company installed data tracking software on their computers without consent. Plaintiffs counsel at Edelson were awarded $4.7 million. On the data breach front, Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC agreed last June to give $14.5 million in games, online currency and identity theft reimbursement as a

result of a massive hack of credit and debit card information from its PlayStation Network. "There's never going to come to a day where you're going to see a privacy case worth as much as a mass tort case or a large antitrust case ," said Edelson name partner Jay Edelson, who was the subject of a New York Times profile in April.

(--) Tech sector is resilient:Robert Holmes, 9/22/2011 (“4 Resilient Tech Stocks for a Tough Economy,” http://www.thestreet.com/story/11255985/1/4-resilient-tech-stocks-for-a-tough-economy.html, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

In addition, the 2008 stock-market crash showed that tech stocks are resilient. "There is a lot more recurring revenue from companies, and tech companies are managed much more conservatively than in the past," he says. "What speaks to the conservatism is that tech is the only sector of the S&P 500 with positive net cash on the balance sheets."

(--) Spokeo isn’t key to privacy class action suits:Ross Todd, 5/29/2015 (staff writer, “Wave of Privacy Suits Peters Out,” http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202727906735/Wave-of-Privacy-Suits-Peters-Out, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

Still, defense firms that invested in privacy practices believe they have done so wisely, given the growing interest in privacy from Congress, state

legislatures and regulators, and the rise in data breach incidents, which are fueling their own strain of litigation. "Spokeo may have an impact on certain class actions," said Keith Eggleton of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, who has represented companies including

Netflix in privacy cases, "but it won't fundamentally change the importance of privacy as a practice."

1ar: Robins will win (--) Robins will win now:Richard M. Re, 5/19/2015 (UCLA law faculty as Assistant Professor of Law, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/05/talking-about-standing-in-zivotofsky-and-spokeo.html, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

One straightforward possibility would be to read the Ninth Circuit as saying that the violation of any statutory right creates standing. The Ninth Circuit opinion is so capacious that it might well be read that way--indeed, you seem to read it precisely that way in the first paragraph of your last comment--and that broad reading seems to have been the one advanced in the

petition. I think it is quite plausible that the Court could adopt that reading , agree with the petitioner that CA9's broad ruling was wrong, and remand. All in a good day's work. I do not see why you think that such a conventional way of proceeding "would itself violate article III."

(--) Robins will win—Court will follow precedent:Allison Grande, 4/28/2015 (“High Court Poised To Set Pace Of Privacy Class Actions,” http://www.law360.com/articles/648832/high-court-poised-to-set-pace-of-privacy-class-actions, Accessed 7/7/2015, rwg)

But while the defense bar is optimistic the high court will at least ease the barrage of class action claims currently facing businesses, the plaintiffs’ bar remains confident the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was the right one. “My prediction is that Spokeo is going to end up backfiring on the industry groups behind the cert effort ,” said plaintiffs attorney Jim

Francis of Francis & Mailman PC, who specializes in FCRA class actions. According to Francis, case law already allows for plaintiffs to sue for informational and privacy injuries such as reputational damage and invasion of privacy that are protected

by the FCRA and similar statutes, and there is no reason for the court to go against that precedent now. “I do not see the high court undoing years of clear and consistent precedent,” he said.

1ar: No Major Settlements (--) Judges will dismiss major cases—they don’t want Facebook to go bankrupt:Ross Todd, 5/29/2015 (staff writer, “Wave of Privacy Suits Peters Out,” http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202727906735/Wave-of-Privacy-Suits-Peters-Out, Accessed 6/29/2015, rwg)

Still, Edelson, who said high-profile data breaches and the Edward Snowden leaks have "had a profound effect on the judiciary," predicts a

future where settlements routinely top $50 million. The staggering statutory damages at stake in some privacy cases has actually worked against plaintiffs, he said. "Judges were looking for ways to dismiss them," Edelson said,

"because no one wants Facebook to go bankrupt because of a privacy violation."

Court Stripping Answers (--) Congress won’t strip the Courts—bills to limit the Court’s jurisdiction don’t pass even when Congress is angry:

Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June 2003[“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe, rwg]

For Dahl, of course, the challenge stems partly from the sheer volume of intervention in the current era. Just as important, the Court's active participation in policy making has continued for a long period. Dahl suggested that significant interventions occur chiefly in transitional periods, similar to what other scholars have labeled realignments.The several decades since 1960 are too long to be labeled a transitional period. On the other hand, this is an era in which partisan control of House, Senate, and presidency has been divided most of the time. In such an era, it is difficult even to identify a law-making majority, let alone characterize the Court's interventions in relation to

that majority. Congress can do more damage when it attacks the Court itself. But Congress seldom uses its institutional powers against the Court in significant ways. For example, the Court's size has not been changed since the 1860s. Over that period, its jurisdiction has never been cut back as a negative

response to its policies despite a long list of bills with that purpose .

(--) Supreme Court decisions are almost impossible to reverse:Baxter, 2005 7/12/2005 (Tom, staff writer, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Lexis)

"Wars come and go, and the economy goes up and down, but a Supreme Court justice serves, on average, 20 years," she said. "And once the court has made a decision, getting it reversed is practically impossible . "(--) Justices will modify their behavior to avoid backlash from other branches:

Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June 2003[“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/ full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe]

Another possibility is that the justices ordinarily give little attention to their political environment but take protective action when their decisions have aroused negative reactions from other policy makers. Justices might reason that it is a poor strategy to depart from their most preferred positions to avoid the possibility of an unfavorable response from the other branches. But when conflicts actually occur, the justices retreat as a means to limit the damage . What might be called crisis-driven strategy is analogous to the "fire alarm" form of congressional oversight over the executive branch. Compared with routine strategy, it would lead to more interventions and more confrontations, but some periods of intervention would end abruptly as the justices responded to conflicts provoked by their decisions.

Hollow Hope DA Answers (--) Non-unique: Housing decision was a big victory for civil rights:Lawrence Hurley, 6/25/2015 (staff writer, “Supreme Court upholds broad housing discrimination claims,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/us-usa-court-discrimination-idUSKBN0P51UO20150625, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

A divided U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday embraced a broad interpretation of discrimination claims allowed under the landmark Fair Housing Act, a blow to lenders and insurers that face such lawsuits and had urged the court to curb them. In a 5-4 decision in a major civil rights case out of Texas, the court preserved a legal tool that has been used for decades to bring

bias lawsuits over actions that have a discriminatory effect even with no evidence of discriminatory intent. The unexpected ruling was a triumph for civil rights activists , who had feared the justices would rein in these lawsuits, and the administration of President

Barack Obama, which had asked the justices to allow such claims to continue.

(--) NO LINK: Courts aren’t flypaper for social movements: movements have a realistic understanding of the power of the Court:

Idit Kostiner, 2003 Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, University of California, 2003[“Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change”, June, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/1540-5893.3702006]

Thus, a central finding in both McCann's and Silverstein's studies one crucial for supporting their model is that contrary to Scheingold's argument, activists for social change are not caught up within a mythic perception of rights and legal institutions. Activists interviewed in these studies instead express a sophisticated and disillusioned understanding of the role of law . McCann and Silverstein suggest that activists use law not out of a mythic belief in its power, but rather as an optimal strategy among "highly limited options available to them". This view of law enables activists to use legal

tactics strategically to promote their goals without falling into a falsely conscious perception of law and without perpetuating the hegemonic nature of legal institutions . Relying on Gramsci's theory of counterhegemony (1971) and on Hunt's interpretation of this theory (1990), McCann argues that movement activists who struggle to promote social change often have no other choice but to use existing institutions, since "all struggles commence on old ground"

(--) TURN: The Court creates social change by balancing legal and policy considerations

Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June 2003[“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe]

Among students of judicial behavior, there is a lively debate over the justices' hierarchies of goals. The most contentious issue is whether justices act almost exclusively on their interest in making good public policy or whether they balance that interest against the goal of interpreting the law well. Most students of judicial behavior explicitly or implicitly take the first position. The work of some political scientists challenges this position, explicitly or implicitly, in part by examining the legal frameworks in which decisions are made But policy considerations certainly play a powerful part in shaping the justices' choices. Moreover, their impact is likely to be especially strong in cases involving possible interventions, cases that have high stakes for public policy. If justices balance legal and policy considerations, their policy goals can be expected to have the greatest impact when justices care most about the policy issues they face . In any event, adopting the premise of policy-oriented behavior helps to illuminate the issues that I consider in this section.

(--) Brown proves: the law bolsters social change:Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg

Equally as important as Brown's moral victory was its impact on the Civil Rights Movement and race relations in the United States. Indeed, two camps of scholars have explored and articulated the importance of the decision on

effecting social change. For some, such as Professor Mark Tushnet, Brown had a direct and forceful impact on the success of the Civil Rights Movement and landmark civil rights legislation enacted during the 1960s. n116 According

to these scholars, Brown gave Blacks hope that racial equality would be achieved and that the rights of Blacks would be recognized, thereby shaping and helping to forge a more aggressive Civil Rights Movement , a movement that would result in strong anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. n117

(--) Rosenberg is wrong: multiple reasons:Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg

n199. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 (1992) (book review) (asserting that Rosenberg's book "deserves harsh criticism because ... it endorses inconsistent measures of effective judicial action, focuses on the Court in isolation rather than as part of a larger political culture, uses presumptions hostile to the recognition of a broad judicial role , and employs inadequate data and questionable portrayals of existing research"); Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 Yale L.J. 1763, 1771-72 (1993) (book review) (criticizing Rosenberg's theory for being "radically indeterminate," for neglecting certain " dynamic effects unleashed by many Court decisions ," and for failing "to differentiate between constitutional and statutory interpretation decisions").

(--) Judicial victories empower social movements: Idit Kostiner, 2003 Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, University of California, [“Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change”, June, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/1540-5893.3702006]

Based on these findings, McCann argues that sociolegal scholars should rethink their critical view of the role of law in social change. He suggests that this critical view is based on scholars' tendency to overdetermine legal norms and to identify them too narrowly with formal legal institutions . He calls for a reconceptualization of law in more relational, context-specific terms that would alter the ways of assessing the value of law in social reform. Accordingly, he argues that judicial victories may be seen as more empowering for social movements than critics often recognize. Moreover, McCann maintains that the focus on winning judicial remedies is highly misleading. He suggests that movements may benefit from the use of legal tactics regardless of actual success in courts due to the empowering effects of participation in legal campaigns.

1ar: Brown v. Board Proves—Court Creates Social Change (--) Brown fundamentally altered race relations in the country:

Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg

Regardless of which camp one falls in, the direct or indirect Brown effect camp, the undeniable truth is that Brown certainly helped to transform race relations in this country. n120 Whether it ignited racial change because of a stronger belief that Blacks' rights and interests would be acknowledged and protected or whether it effected change in a more perverse manner by creating southern resistance that [*1533] invoked the sympathies of northern Whites and politicians, Brown helped to change a nation . In sum, the Brown decision was and is more than a symbol of racial equality. It was the impetus of a movement that worked to change how Americans viewed and thought about race and resulted in important legislation that helped to protect the civil liberties of Blacks and other minorities, even though, as Bell points out, with dwindling force today.

(--) Brown fundamentally altered social attitudes toward social change:Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg

As Zelma Henderson, one of the Topeka parents, proclaimed about the moral victory of Brown, "When you get right down to it, the message of the Brown decision ... is really that all human beings of all races are created equal... . We went to the Supreme Court of the United States to affirm that fact, and we won." n128 Regardless of the status of minorities today, that moral victory was significant. As Professor Dennis Hutchinson recently asserted, "[Brown] de-legitimized Jim Crow . It said that the social attitude ... . this insulting, [*1535] demeaning, humiliating attitude that ... white people have about black people - does not have the official imprimatur of the law." n129

(--) Brown fundamentally mobilized racial change in the United States:Onwuachi-Willig, 2005 Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Michigan Law Review, May, 2005, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1507, Lexis, rwg

Furthermore, there was a practical effect to Brown that was equally significant. As I suggested earlier, had there not been Brown, would segregation have tumbled so easily in other areas, such as with busing and other public accommodations? n130 Moreover, what would have happened if Whites, in their efforts to equalize schools under Bell's "separate but equal" plan, had simply decided that their social interests in preventing race-mixing were much higher than their economic interests in funding only one school? n131 Is this not what Bell astutely points out that many poor and working-class Whites have

consistently done throughout history? The fact is that Brown gave society a goal to strive for and set the stage for a movement that created racial change. Brown was more than a legal decision; it was "a statement about the fundamental moral basis of democracy." n132 In other words, what is important here is not whether "separate but equal" could have been achieved (which I do not believe was possible), but rather, as Ted Shaw proclaimed, whether we would have been "satisfied with that as a nation." n133 The answer for many of us is a clear, resounding "No." Our ability to interact across racial lines allows us to learn about the differences in each other's culture and history, and more importantly, about what we have in common, what are our shared experiences, and what are our shared interests. It is only through this form of integration that true racial equality can be achieved. n134 Indeed, the most recent debates regarding the Ten Percent Plan in the state of Texas reveal the ways in which integration and the discovery of once concealed, common interests can lead to the unearthing of race and class inequality.

1ar: Court Creates Social Change (--) Studies arguing that the Court can’t produce social change ignore the effects of how participation in the process itself activates leaders and bolsters movements:

Idit Kostiner, 2003 Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, University of California, [“Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change”, June, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/1540-5893.3702006]

However, recent work on law and social change tempers this generalized assault on rights and provides a more complex and nuanced description of the interplay between rights, political mobilization, and social change. Following Scheingold's "politics of rights" (1974),

McCann's study of the pay equity movement (1994) finds that legal norms and tactics have had a rather positive effect on the movement. To understand this positive effect of law, McCann proposes that scholars re-envision law as including more than formal legal norms or institutions. Drawing on legal consciousness literature, he suggests that law should be understood as including the meanings that movement activists who use legal tactics assign to legal norms while participating in legal processes. Thus, while actual court decisions may have minimal effect on progressive social reform, McCann's model to which he refers as the "legal mobilization model "suggests that participation in legal processes may have positive effects on social movement mobilization. Based on this model, McCann finds that the use of legal tactics by the pay equity movement has been valuable for elevating rights claims and thus for mobilizing the movement. In particular, he finds that: Movement leaders effectively used successful legal actions despite their doctrinal limitations to organize women workers in hundreds of workplaces around the nation . A massive publicity campaign focusing on court victories initially put the issue on the national agenda and alerted leaders that wage equity was "the working woman's issue of the 1980s." Lawsuits were then filed on behalf of working women as the centerpiece of a successful union and movement organizing strategy in scores of local venues around the nation Sustained legal action over time worked to render employers vulnerable to challenge, to expand the resources available to working women, to provide them a unifying claim of egalitarian rights, and to increase both their confidence and sophistication in advancing those claims.

(--) Animal rights movements prove: the use of legal tactics bolsters social movements:

Idit Kostiner,2003 Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, University of California, [“Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of Law and Social Change”, June, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/1540-5893.3702006]

Silverstein (1996) has joined McCann in reacting against the critique of rights and litigation. Her study of the animal rights movement is

symbolically titled Unleashing Rights. She finds that the use of legal tactics and of rights rhetoric by the animal rights movement has been useful in many ways. For example, she suggests that litigation has been used to dramatize abuses of animals, to embarrass particular institutional actors, and to win favorable media attention . Silverstein concludes that despite their many constraints, both rights talk and litigation are powerful resources for those who seek widespread and subtle change, especially when used by strategically minded activists .

Legitimacy DA Answers (--) No link: we don’t overrule any prior precedent—we just clarify the Katz decision. (--) Non-unique: gay marriage ruling has angered conservatives:Fox News, 6/26/2015 (“Supreme Court: Same-sex couples can marry in all 50 states,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/06/26/supreme-court-same-sex-couples-can-marry-in-all-50-states/, Accessed 6/26/2015, rwg)

Roberts wrote: "If you are among the many Americans -- of whatever sexual orientation -- who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today's decision. ... But do not celebrate the Constitution. It

had nothing to do with it." Each of the four dissenting justices also wrote a separate dissent. Prominent social conservatives, meanwhile, blasted the decision. Tony Perkins, head of the Family Research Council, said it puts the government on a "collision course with America's cherished religious freedoms."

(--) Non-unique: Supreme Court legitimacy low now:Cathy Burke, 6/17/2015 (staff writer, “Ginsburg Tops Survey of Favorite SCOTUS Justices,” http://www.newsmax.com/US/supreme-court-SCOTUS-ruther-bader-ginsburg-clarence-thomas/2015/06/17/id/651056/, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

"Taken together, these findings show the Supreme Court — both collectively and most members individually — is just about as polarizing along party lines as anything else in Americans politics these days ," the PPP concludes. Other survey

findings show: — America overall has a dim view of the Supreme Court , with 35 percent favorability and its unfavorability at 41 percent

(--) Non-unique: King v. Burwell ruling shattered legitimacy:Sutherland Institute, 6/25/2015 (U.S. Supreme Court’s Obamacare decision will have a big impact on Healthy Utah negotiations, http://fox13now.com/2015/06/25/u-s-supreme-courts-obamacare-decision-will-have-a-big-impact-on-healthy-utah-negotiations/, Accessed 6/26/2015, rwg)

Sutherland Institute: The U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity today to reinforce that America is a nation governed by laws, not by powerful

men and women. Sadly, it chose to abdicate that principle in favor of legal sophistry. In the court’s other major ruling on the ACA, NFIB v. Sebelius, the court stated clearly it does not have the expertise to make judgments regarding public policy – but the King v. Burwell ruling relies wholly on judgments regarding public policy to justify its conclusion that the plain language of Obamacare cannot mean what plaintiffs argued it meant. Such clear contradictions in reasoning undermine the credibility of the court for the average, commonsense

people it relies upon for legitimacy.

(--) Decisions don’t affect legitimacy:Harold Maass, 7/22/2013 (staff writer, “How the Supreme Court got on the bad side of everybody,”http://theweek.com/article/index/247206/how-the-supreme-court-got-on-the-bad-side-of-everybody, Accessed 7/25/2013, rwg)

The real cause for the loss of public confidence in what remains the least political branch of the federal government has less to do with specific decisions and more to do with a general decline in trust for

public institutions . ..¶ The broader point that a poll like this stands for becomes apparent when you take into account other polling that

shows that Congress, the Presidency and, indeed, almost any other public institution outside of the military and police seem to have lost the trust of the public. In the long term, that's simply not healthy. [Outside the Beltway]¶ Furthermore, the Supreme Court is in the unique position of having the last word on so many issues that divide us. It's hardly a surprise that the justices take some of the blame when they take sides on issues the public is still fiercely debating.

(--) Turn: Winners win for the Courts—controversial decisions enhance the court’s legitimacy:

David Law, 2009 (Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Georgetown Law Journal, March 2009, 97 Geo. L.J. 723; “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” Lexis, rwg)

Part IV of this Article discusses a counterintuitive implication of a coordination-based account of judicial power. Conventional wisdom suggests that courts secure compliance with their decisions by drawing upon their store of legitimacy, which is undermined by decisions that are unpopular, controversial, or lack intellectual integrity . n25 Part IV argues that precisely the opposite is true : an unpopular or unpersuasive decision can, in fact, enhance a court's power in future cases , as long as it is obeyed. Widespread compliance with a decision that is controversial , unpopular, or unpersuasive serves only to strengthen the widely held expectation that others comply with judicial decisions. This expectation, in turn, is self-fulfilling : those who expect others to comply with a court's decisions will find it strategically prudent to comply themselves, and the aggregate result will, in fact, be widespread compliance. Part IV illustrates these strategic insights--and the Supreme Court's apparent grasp of them--by contrasting [*734] Bush v. Gore n26 with Brown v. Board of Education n27 and Cooper v. Aaron. n28

(---) NO LINK: Court legitimacy is resilient: individual decisions are largely irrelevant:Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg

The Relationship Between Institutional Legitimacy and the Substantive Sociological Legitimacy of Judicial Decisions. - Recent scholarship supports two interesting conclusions about the relationship between the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the substantive

sociological legitimacy of particular decisions. First, although the Court's institutional legitimacy varies with public responses to particular rulings, it does so less sharply than earlier, less sophisticated studies had indicated. n183 For example, recent surveys show that Bush v. Gore has had almost no impact on "diffuse support" for the Court, notwithstanding critics' predictions. n184 The Court apparently possesses a reservoir of trust that is not easily dissipated . n185

(---) NO LINK: Public doesn’t pay enough attention to constitutional interpretations to influence Court legitimacy:

Fallon, 2005 prof. of Constitutional Law @ Harvard, Harvard Law Review, April 2005, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787; Lexis, rwg

Perhaps even more significant than what the recent studies establish, however, is something that poll-based measures of diffuse support

cannot capture. As I have suggested already, the public's relative lack of attentiveness makes it impossible to gauge the substantive sociological legitimacy - in the strong sense of active endorsement - of controversial methods of constitutional interpretation. If we focus on this concern, we will remain chronically uncertain about judicial legitimacy in the sociological sense - even though other measures, including that of institutional legitimacy (or diffuse support), would often support more affirmative judgments about the Court's sociological legitimacy.

(--) Individual decisions don’t undermine legitimacy:Lawrence Baum, 2003 Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, June 2003[“The Supreme Court in American Politics,” http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085526;jsessionid=n1HzQqZJALRe, rwg]

Unpopular decisions may cost the Court a degree of public support in the short run, but in the long run

the Court's standing tends to hold up well . Thus, justices have reason to think that even under relatively difficult conditions, they can engage in policy interventions that they find appropriate without fear of serious consequences

Legitimacy DA Answers—Extensions: Controversial Decisions Help the Court

(--) Controversial decisions enhance the court’s power:David Law, 2009 (Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Georgetown Law Journal, March 2009, 97 Geo. L.J. 723; “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” Lexis, rwg)

Indeed, the reflexive avoidance of politically divisive or controversial cases--via the political question doctrine, the acte de government doctrine, and the like n233 --might actually prove a counterproductive choice of strategy for a court keen to consolidate its power. This Article has argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, controversial decisions have a tendency to enhance, rather than diminish, a court's power, as long as they are obeyed . n234 Accordingly, a court that already commands obedience and expects more of the same, such as the United States Supreme Court or the German

Bundesverfassungsgericht, has little to fear and perhaps even something to gain from embracing controversy . By contrast, a court that lacks a similarly developed track record, such as a newly established constitutional court in an emerging democracy, faces greater risk that its decisions will be disobeyed and its reputation for obedience stillborn. Should it succeed in deciding such a case, however, it will engender expectations of future obedience that boost its power in subsequent cases. If those gains seem more than commensurate with the risks involved, adjudication becomes a prudent gamble. A truly strategic court, as opposed to a merely timid one, will recognize that its political environment is characterized not merely by risks, but also by rewards: nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Legitimacy DA Answers—Individual Decisions Don’t Matter (--) Court’s legitimacy is resilient: Unpopular decisions don’t undermine Court legitimacy:

John C. Yoo, 2001 Professor of law at the University of California, 2001, [The University of Chicago Law Review, “In defense of the court’s legitimacy,” rwg]

One way, then, to judge whether Bush v Gore has undermined the Court's institutional legitimacy in American society would be to examine

public attitudes toward the Court. Studies have shown that public support for the Court and its role in society run high, even though many have little knowledge about the Court's day-to-day activities . 14 While this is not the place to conduct a detailed study,15 we may perhaps draw some initial conclusions from recent Gallup polling data. Over the last decade, poll respondents have usually held more confidence in the Supreme Court than in the other two branches of government.16 In June 2000, 47 percent of those polled said that they held either a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Supreme Court, versus 42 percent for the

presidency and 24 percent for Congress.17 Even in light of the usual caveats surrounding the use of polling data, the resiliency in the Court's public support has been relatively deep and wide ,18 even as it has rendered a series of controversial decisions ranging from affirmative action to abortion to civil rights to religion.

(--) Overruling doesn’t cost capital – overruling bad decisions boosts capital.Linton, 1993 assoc general counsel Americans United for Life, 1993

(Paul Benjamin Linton, Associate General Counsel for Litigation, Americans United for Life, 1993, “PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY: THE FLIGHT FROM REASON IN THE SUPREME COURT” 13 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 15)

The Court describes this first circumstance as "hypothetical." n272 The distinct impression left by this passage is that decisions of the Supreme Court overruling earlier decisions on matters of constitutional interpretation are rare and thus should not be too readily emulated, lest the "legitimacy" of the Court be called into question. But this impression is wrong. On more than 200 occasions, the Court has overturned previous decisions, and in nearly three-fourths of those cases, the Court overruled because the earlier decision had wrongly interpreted the Constitution. n273 What does this remarkable track re [*75] cord of "judicial correction" mean? At the very least, that the "legitimacy" of the Court is not affected by its acknowledgement of prior error, even when that error involved an intepretation of the Constitution. Indeed , as in Brown and West Coast Hotel, the Court has often enhanced its credibility by overruling decisions that were wrong when originally decided. One more overruling decision, if otherwise appropriate, could not reasonably be expected to damage that credibility.

(--) Even after controversial decisions, public opinion will always swing back in favor of the Court.

John C. Yoo, 2001 Professor of law at the University of California, 2001, [The University of Chicago Law Review, “In defense of the court’s legitimacy,” p. 75, rwg]

A second way to approach the question of legitimacy would be to compare Bush v Gore to other historical periods in which the Court's authority has come into question. If the Court's actions today were similar in significant ways to earlier moments of challenge to judicial legitimacy, then we might predict that the changes in the immediate polling data

may augur a more sustained attack on the Court. Evaluating Bush v Gore in light of earlier historical periods, however, suggests that any sustained assault on the Court's legitimacy is unlikely to arise .

(--) Individual decisions won’t undermine Court legitimacy: Uhlmann, 2003 professor of government at Claremont Graduate University, October ( Michael M., “The Supreme Court Rules ww.orthodoxytoday.org/ articles2/UhlmannSupremeCourt.shtm)

The Court has acquired substantial power over our political culture. The public, which knows little about the technical details or philosophical implications of constitutional doctrine, knows that much. And so do the Justices. The remarkable thing about Roe v. Wade is not only the substance of the rule it announced, but the fact that the Court felt so little

compunction about imposing a new and radical rule upon the entire nation. But for all the controversy generated by the abortion decisions, the public is generally not disposed to chasten the Court for its excesses on that or any other subject. The modern Court has tutored the public well on how it ought to think about judicial power and the Constitution. And its central teaching, as I say, is not about the permanent principles that justify representative government but about the inevitability of, indeed the duty to, change.

Separation of Powers Answers (--) No Separation of Powers link to court action:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Further, the tripartite nature of government addresses the Legal Process Model's fear that a judiciary unaccountable to the electorate is

incompetent to make new law with broad social policy consequences. But courts are always ultimately accountable to the electorate because anything they do is subject to legislative reconsideration or veto . n216 Accordingly, one must view "judicial creativity ... not [as] a usurpation of legislative power; [but] rather ... an entirely appropriate part of a joint lawmaking responsibility." n217

(--) Courts are authorized to make law:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

[*985] Some commentators have advocated taking these urgings one step farther and having courts officially adopt an expanded, activist role when considering novel legal issues: n229 Expansion of the role of the courts beyond that permitted by notions of legislative primacy and myopic concentration on the factual matrix of a particular litigation can conform the legal system (legislative, executive, and judicial) more

nearly to the needs of those who are governed by it... Courts [should] be authorized, when appropriate, to look beyond the particular litigants and to make substantive law of equal effect with, or in modification of, statute and to change court-made rules that could have been, but were not, changed by the legislature , subject,

however, as to either, to legislative veto or recall. n230 Courts as institutions should not be uncomfortable adopting a lawmaking function. "The plain and simple fact is that judges, of necessity, must from time to time make, rather than interpret, law and that they are perfectly justified in so doing . Indeed, no clear line actually can be drawn between making and interpreting law and the distinction is therefore illusory." n231 That courts in fact do accept this role is borne out in practice. "Every day ... state courts delineate the limits of tort liability, thereby defining socially acceptable conduct." n232

Activism Answers (--) Plan isn’t activist—Courts have the right to extend privacy in personal information:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Further, in light of legislative problems detailed above, n337 courts should adopt the Reform Model of jurisprudence and extend the

common law to protect individuals rights in personal information . In so doing, these courts should not fear that

they are acting excessively activist ; rather they should realize that they will be acting in accordance with the line of cases in which courts have adopted and developed the right to privacy . The next section presents a number of these cases as examples of the steps that courts can and have taken to move forward to protect individuals against privacy violations. n338

(--) Courts are institutionally competent to protect individuals’ privacy:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

The common law is a flexible mechanism that can and has adapted to technological and cultural change; accordingly, it can adapt to the technological growth that has spawned increases in the collection and dissemination of personal information. n339 As the right to privacy developed throughout the century, many courts adopted a Reform Model jurisprudential posture and moved to adopt the right to privacy through bold judicial moves that were termed by many as activist. This section sets forth some of these courts arguments, from the persuasive arguments set out in Judge Gray's dissent in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., n340 to a number of subsequent privacy cases adopting the

right to privacy. As this section demonstrates, courts which would today expand privacy doctrine to personal information sales would not be acting beyond their competence, but rather would join in a well-reasoned line of decisions extending privacy to protect individuals' privacy against encroachments created by advancing technology.

Counterplan Answers

Congress CP Answers 1) Agent counterplans are bad:A) They steal the entire AFF—they get back 8 minutes of arguments with a 10

second plan text.B) Creates a strategy skew can’t argue against ourselves.C) Voting issue for fairness & education.2) Doesn’t solve the Fourth Amendment: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is on

the brink of collapse—only the courts can solve:Timothy Casey, 2008 (Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, “RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure,” UC Davis Law Review, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 6/25/2015, rwg)

Recent cases demonstrate that our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is on the verge of collapse and

will only survive if courts reclaim the original meaning and language of the Constitution. The next paradigm shift must include a departure from Katz's use of privacy language, and focus instead on the right of the People to be secure. Fundamental to the modern conception of personal security, and indeed one of the basic precepts of the Founding Fathers, is the idea that the government does not ensure the security of the People, but rather that the government embodies the interest against which the People must be protected. Reclaiming the original language of the Constitution by substituting a right to personal security for a reasonable expectation of privacy will simultaneously dispel the false notion that the Fourth Amendment protects individual interests in opposition to collective interests, and reaffirm the idea that only by protecting individual security will we increase our collective personal and national security.

3) Doesn’t solve the presidential powers advantage—extend our Casey evidence that the courts are key—Congressional legislation will fail.

4) Doesn’t solve democracy advantage because it isn’t modeled—extend our Krotoszynski evidence that the US Supreme Court is uniquely modeled.

5) PERMUTE: DO BOTH—CONGRESSIONAL AND COURT LED SOCIAL CHANGE IS THE BEST OPTION:

Araiza, 2005 Professor of Law @ Loyola Law School, 2005 (William, Tulane Law Review, February 2005, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 519; Lexis)

Still, it is worth considering Brown's at best partial success and wondering whether integration would have been more successful if Congress had more aggressively assisted the Court . n110 Indeed, the steps Congress did take - most notably the conditioning of federal education funds on desegregation - helped quicken the pace of change . n111 This is not to say that integration would have occurred

immediately, peacefully, and comprehensively had the effort been led by Congress . The anti-Brown rhetoric of segregationists , criticizing Brown as a judicial usurpation, n112 was largely opportunistic - that is, much, if not most, of that opposition was based on the rejection of integration itself, not the fact that integration was being "illegitimately" imposed by courts.

(--) Legislatures need for re-election makes the courts better for the rights of the accused:Donald A. Dripps, 1993 (Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Syracuse Law Review, “ESSAYS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FOOTNOTE FOUR, AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE; OR, WHY DON'T LEGISLATURES GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

For many years, commentators have decried the failure of American legislatures to promulgate statutory rules of criminal procedure. n1 With few exceptions, however, legislatures have done little by way of limiting the discretion of police and prosecutors, or requiring the criminal courts to observe procedural safeguards against

unjust conviction. By default, the judiciary has become the principal guardian of the rights of the accused . This long-standing situation invites two questions, one positive and the other normative. The positive question is why are legislatures indifferent or

hostile to the rights of the accused? Why should a democratically-elected legislature be in favor of unreasonable searches, coerced confessions, unreliable identification evidence, or biased juries? As we shall see, legislatures in fact favor all of these things, and for compelling reasons of electoral survival.

(---) Court will check the Congress—blocks solvency:Araiza, 2005 Professor of Law @ Loyola Law School, 2005 (William, Tulane Law Review, February 2005, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 519; Lexis)

Yet congressional action is impeded by the very text that it could potentially rejuvenate. The fact that Congress's power is limited to "enforcing" the Equal Protection Clause means that that power is necessarily tied to the meaning of that provision. By itself this requirement is unremarkable: all it means is that when

Congress seeks [*524] to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, its action must have some link to the meaning of equal protection. But because the Fourteenth Amendment also includes a judicially enforceable component , questions about the acceptable range of congressional action inevitably require consideration of how the courts have understood that guarantee. In turn, if the meaning of the Amendment is thought to depend solely and completely on what the Court

says the Clause means - in other words, if we adopt a juricentric model - then lack of clarity in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence necessarily infects, and thus impedes, congressional attempts to breathe new life into it .

(--) Courts clarification of Katz necessary as technology continues to advance:Ric Simmons, 2002 (Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, Hastings Law Journal, “From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies,” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

In deciding Katz, the Supreme Court took a dramatic step towards adopting a results-based test for applying the Fourth Amendment to new

technologies. However, the language in Katz was sufficiently vague to muddle the distance that was traveled in that step. This ambiguity has created a troubling dissonance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is now time for courts to clarify the mandate in Katz and confirm that the landmark case rendered irrelevant any consideration of the methods used in government surveillance. This clarification is becoming only more critical as technology continues to advance , allowing law enforcement officials access to more and more intimate information without any physical intrusion - and indeed without the target's knowledge. We must learn from the absurdity in the case law before Katz, and at the same time consider the implications of the surveillance technologies which will become more ubiquitous as time progresses. In this way both the [*1358] past and the future lead us to a better understanding of Katz - one which looks beyond the method of the search.

(--) Courts are better than the legislative branch at protecting personal information:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

In addition to these judicial attempts, many commentators have advocated legislation that would grant individuals legal rights in their personal information. n44 These commentators argue that the legislature is better equipped than a court to establish such a right, which would require that any person or institution must obtain the affirmative consent of a data-subject before disseminating to third-parties that data-subject's name, address, and/or telephone number. n45 Actual legislative proposals have been introduced in a number of state legis- [*958] latures over

the past year. n46 Again, not one, however, has been successful. This Note argues that despite the theoretical appeal of a legislative solution to the issue of unauthorized dissemination of personal information , individuals

should not wait for legislative action but rather should continue to litigate the issue in state courts. Courts are well suited to address the issue for two distinct but related reasons. First, when appropriate, state courts can extend and modify the common law to keep pace with technological and societal changes. Second, legislatures often are too beholden to special interests to thoughtfully and rationally consider certain questions. Courts, which possess greater independence than legislatures, must consider whether individuals should have legally enforceable rights in their names and personality profiles.

Cong CP--1ar: PERMUTATION SOLVES BEST (--) Permutation is the best option: best preserves constitutionalism and rights:

Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegal, June 8, 2003 [The Yale Law Journal, “Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act,” p. 112]

As this history demonstrates, Congress’s political responsiveness makes it the object of social movement mobilization and a unique register of the nation’s evolving constitutional understandings. The policentric model of Section 5 power holds that Congress and the Court may each consider and incorporate the

other’s views, while retaining autonomy in judgment , so that the Court remains free to strike down any law that it believes

threatens individual liberties or impairs structural values such as separation of powers or federalism. The policentric model thus preserves both the nation’s rich legacy of legislative constitutionalism and the judicially enforced rights on which we have come to depend.

(--) Permute: Do Both--Courts catalyze legislative action:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Noting the deference to the legislature exercised by at least one court that considered application of state tort law to personal information

sales, part III examines the threshold question of institutional competence, i.e., whether the court or the legislature is more competent to analyze potential legal responses to unauthorized dissemination of personal information. Part III focuses particularly on courts' roles in light of the legislative process. It endorses a "Reform Model" of judicial activity that urges courts to embrace their lawmaking function when interest group pressure distorts legislative processes. Part III finally

demonstrates that courts can and must consider the personal information issue on its merits, and thereby

serve as catalysts for legislative action to overcome interest groups' power to force on dispersed individuals the burden of inducing legislative action. [*959]

(--) Permutation solves best—courts are a significant part of social change:Douglas NeJaime, 2013 (Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Michigan Law Review, “2013 SURVEY OF BOOKS RELATED TO THE LAW: BOOK REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, COURTS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,” Accessed 7/10/2015, Lexis/Nexis)

Balkin's account of courts in the process of constitutional change maps onto the empirical reality of social movements. As socio-legal scholars in

the legal mobilization and cause-lawyering fields have demonstrated, contemporary social movement advocates neither put all their hope in courts nor look to courts to single-handedly produce change . n48 Instead, advocates view litigation as a significant but partial tactic - one that works in conjunction with other tactics , and aids rather than displaces other forms of mobilization. They see courts as opportunities, often providing the first official venue in which to articulate and hone the group's claims. In courts, [*889] subordinated groups can announce their grievances, craft their visions, and force state actors to listen. n49 Such groups might also convert constitutional claims into legal entitlements.

1ar: Courts Better for Rights (--) Extend our Dripps evidence—legislatures ignore the rights of people because they need to get re-elected—rights for the minority will get out-voted by the majority.(--) Legislatures undervalue rights—courts are needed to intervene:Donald A. Dripps, 1993 (Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Syracuse Law Review, “ESSAYS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FOOTNOTE FOUR, AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE; OR, WHY DON'T LEGISLATURES GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

My argument then runs as follows. Legislatures undervalue the rights of the accused at both the investigatory and adjudicatory stages of the criminal process. This is not an historical accident but a predictable consequence of political incentives that appear to be of indefinite duration. It follows that the active judicial development of constitutional rules governing police, prosecutors, and the criminal trial process is a legitimate exercise of judicial review. The rules promulgated by the Supreme Court may fairly be criticized for being the wrong rules, but

they may not fairly be criticized for usurping a legislative prerogative. [*1082]

(--) Legislators undervalue the rights of the accused:Donald A. Dripps, 1993 (Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Syracuse Law Review, “ESSAYS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FOOTNOTE FOUR, AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE; OR, WHY DON'T LEGISLATURES GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

I suggest that legislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister , and no more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant. The explanation for the legislative record on criminal procedure has more to do with age, sex, and interest groups than it has to do with race. Public choice theory directs that we model criminal procedure legislation as a good that can only be supplied by the legislature. Its members will be motivated by what consumers of this legislation are willing to pay for it, in such political currency as votes, volunteer time, and campaign contributions, either provided to the legislator or withheld from an opponent.

Who will be willing to bid, in this currency, for favorable rules of criminal procedure? Those demanding criminal procedure rules favorable to the government are potential crime victims and members of the law enforcement bureaucracy. Those willing to bid for anti-government criminal procedure rules are criminals and apparent criminals - individuals who, although in some

sense not guilty, are mistakenly treated as guilty by the system. You don't need a calculator to figure out that more will be bid on behalf of the government than will be bid against it.

(--) Criminal law requires an active role for the Supreme Court:Donald A. Dripps, 1993 (Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Syracuse Law Review, “ESSAYS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FOOTNOTE FOUR, AND THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE; OR, WHY DON'T LEGISLATURES GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?” Accessed 7/8/2015, rwg)

Certainly the lobbying of the commission would parallel the lobbying of legislatures. Who would testify before the commission? Who would bombard the commissioners with policy papers and lecture invitations? My guess is that it would be the Director of the FBI, the head of the OLP, and the National Association of State Attorney Generals. And I am quite certain that neither Terrance Bostick nor Larry Youngblood would

put in an appearance. So it seems to me that even minimal respect for the rights of the accused depends on a

continuing role for the courts, especially for the Supreme Court , to formulate and modify rules of criminal procedure on constitutional grounds.

(--) Greater accessibility and responsiveness makes the courts the better agent:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

In contrast to the Legal Process Model, the Reform Model n188 is not concerned with an overreaching judiciary but rather fears that the

common law will not be responsive enough to social change. n189 Imperfections in legislative processes lead to the belief that "the judiciary's responsibility when exercising its lawmaking function may be greater than that of the other branches because of its greater accessibility and its responsiveness ." n190 Accordingly, the Reform Model [*979] views courts as completely competent to make law, and demands that courts embrace this role.

(--) Judicial intervention is warranted to cure legislative defects:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Political and social scientists have made great efforts to study the underlying forces that may drive this legislative operation. n194 The results

suggest that pure representative democracy does not consistently flourish in state houses and that judicial intervention is often warranted to cure legislative defects. n195 Even despite the difficulty of empirically testing or proving

the theory, n196 many scholars agree that "special interest groups undoubtedly wield too much collective influence in the legislative process." n197

(--) Courts are necessary to overcome interest group bias and inertia in the status quo:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

[*982] From the Reform Model viewpoint, the judicial independence from political pressure allows courts to make necessary reforms to the law "when the political processes are unresponsive." n211 This is vital because "the beneficiaries of ... judicial creativity are persons who are

unlikely to have lobbied for legislation that would solve the problem." n212 Courts can play a vital role in advancing principled consideration of novel issues, by shifting the burden of "overcoming legislative inertia ... from

those who are unlikely and unable to act, to those who are organized and capable of acting." n213 In fact, justifications for "judicial creativity" - judicial exercise of the lawmaking functions - are strongest when legislative failure precludes meaningful consideration of legislative proposals. n214 Courts must be allowed to act creatively in order to overcome the deadening force of special interest groups, the "impotence" of potential tort plaintiffs

with regard to obtaining legislative activity, and the legislative inertia that tilts the initial balance in favor of the status quo. n215

(--) Courts, not Congress should advance the right to privacy in personal information:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

Recent evidence indicates that individuals have mounting concerns over unauthorized dissemination of personal information. In light of these concerns, commentators have suggested legislative solutions to this problem, and

seek legislative enactments that would vest individuals with protectable rights in personal information. Despite the theoretical appeal of such solutions, however, this Note has suggested that because of weaknesses in legislative processes, courts can,

and in fact should , advance tort-based consideration of the issue, to grant individuals privacy rights in personal information. Disproportionate interest-group pressure distorts the legislative process and gives courts the responsibility to address the personal information issue on its merits, so as to weaken the legislative inertia amassed

against meaningful consideration of proposals to grant individuals rights in personal information. This jurisprudential model can liberate the lawmaking capabilities of our republican government without providing judges with unrestrained power, because any court-created rule is always subject to review, and even veto, by the legislature.

(--) Legislature bad at protecting privacy—will yield to business concerns:William J. Fenrich, 1996 (Fordham Law Review, “NOTE: COMMON LAW PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS' RIGHTS IN PERSONAL INFORMATION,” Accessed 7/9/2015, rwg)

n43. See infra notes 157-59 (discussing tort); infra part IV.B (discussing Shibley v. Time Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), and Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Rep., Inc., No. 96-203, (Cir. Ct. Arlington County June 13, 1996)). At least one other commentator has argued that courts should remedy unauthorized sales of personal information, but through recognition of a new tort-based cause of action. See Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1434-38 (advocating creation of tort of commercial dissemination of personal

information). Graham suggests that the greatest impediment to legislative privacy protection is the legislature's lack of a coherent understanding of privacy, although he also acknowledges that legislatures, "faced with the task of balancing the uncertain interests of business against the undefined interests of individuals, might yield to business concerns and undervalue personal privacy ." Id. at 1424-25. This Note argues that interest group pressure has, in fact, distorted legislative consideration of proposals to vest individuals with rights in personal information, and further suggests that adequate protection can be achieved through extension of already-existing common law tort doctrine.

Lower Courts CP Answers—2ac (--) Doesn’t capture our Supreme Court solvency: Doesn’t solve our modeling advantage—only the Supreme Court is modeled—extend 1ac evidence.(--) Supreme Court is more visible and outweighsRosenberg 91 (Gerald N., Associate Professor in Political Science @ U of Chicago, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?)

In order to proceed, while not ignoring state and lower federal courts, I will concentrate on the US Supreme Court/ Like the Congress and the presidency, the supreme court, while not the only institution of its kind in the American Political system, is the most visible and important one . It sits atop a hierachal structure, and decisions of lower courts involving significant social reform seldom escape its scrutiny . Also, because it is the most authoritative US court, it is the most concerned with public policy. Hypotheses that concern the courts and social reform must first deal with the Supreme court and then turn to the ramifications of its decisions elsewhere in the judiciary(--) FIAT Abuse: all the district courts wouldn’t take the same action at the same time

A) Utopian: all 13 district courts wouldn’t take the same action at the same time

B) Distorts the literature base: makes it impossible to generate offense vs. the CP

C) Voting issue: Fairness & Education—debate has been fundamentally altered by introduction of the illegitimate Counterplan.

(--) Lack of federal court uniformity dooms non-judicial enforcementCaminker 94

Evan H., Professor of Law @ UCLA, April, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817

Administration of public law. The executive branch enforces public law. If the judiciary does not interpret and implement federal laws uniformly , the executive branch may have a difficult time determining its enforcement options and obligations. As a result, administrators of federal law confront the problems of unpredictability discussed above. And even if administrators could foresee each particular rule applicable in each divergent case, the disuniformity would still hamper the executive branch's ability to plan and implement effective enforcement strategies in many contexts. 144 Thus rational and efficient administration of public law often requires federal courts to interpret federal law uniformly .

(--) Permute: Have the Supreme Court do the plan and all the lower courts follow—guarantees double-solvency, shields the link to the DA.(--) Turn: Rule of Law

A) Lower court underruling devastates rule of lawBhagwat 2000

Ashutosh, Professor of Law @ University of California, Hastings College of Law; J.D. from UChicago; 80 B.U.L. Rev. 967

Second, a lower court might engage in purely predictive reasoning and refuse to follow a precedent that the court believes the Supreme Court would not follow today based on the court's assessment of the views of individual justices, even if the decision has not been undermined by what Michael Dorf describes as "impersonal sources of law" - i.e., subsequent opinions. 28 Such an approach is defensible, and

indeed has been ably advocated by Evan Caminker; n29but Michael Dorf has presented a convincing, if not definitive argumet for why such purely predictive reasoning

undermines values associated with the rule of law . 30 It is therefore also not surprising or problematic that the Supreme Court should reject such purely predictive "underruling."

B) Commitment to the rule of law is vital in preventing global nuclear conflict Rhyne 58 (Charles, fmr president @ American Bar Association, "Law Day Speech for Voice of America," 5/1/1958, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/rhyne58.html)

The tremendous yearning of all peoples for peace can only be answered by the use of law to replace weapons in resolving international disputes . We in our country sincerely believe that man kind's best hope for preventing the tragic consequences of nuclear-satellite-missile warfare is to persuade the nations of the entire world to submit all disputes to tribunals of justice for all adjudication under the rule of law. We lawyers of America would like to join lawyers from every nation in the world in fashioning an international code of law so appealing that sentiment will compel its general acceptance. Man's relation to man is the most neglected field of study, exploration and development in the world community. It is also the most critical. The most important basic fact of our generation is that the rapid advance of knowledge in science and technology has forced increased international relationships in a shrunken and indivisible world. Men must either live together in peace or in modern war we will surely die together. History teaches that the rule of law has enabled man kind to live together peacefully within nations and it is clear that this same rule of law offers our best hope as a mechanism to achieve and maintain peace between nations.

(--) The Supreme Court will overrule the counterplanBhagwat 2000

Ashutosh, Professor of Law @ University of California, Hastings College of Law; J.D. from UChicago; 80 B.U.L. Rev. 967

In cases like Rodriguez de Quijas, Agostini, and State Oil v. Kahn, the Court indicates an unwillingness to share its power to make new law, which is an aspect of the judicial power, with other courts within the federal judiciary. Instead,

the Court is seeking to concentrate the authority to make and change the law into its own hands . 59 This is not surprising; it is after all a basic assumption of our Constitution, as noted by Madison in Federalist No. 51, that [*978] government officials will seek to expand their own power. 60 The accumulation of power in the hands of the Court, at the expense of the lower federal judiciary, is also not a new phenomenon. Edward Purcell recently explained that, as early as 1928, Felix Frankfurter predicted, described, and extolled this development, in part because of Frankfurter's explicit hostility (common among progressives at that time) to the lower federal judiciary. 61 In recent years, however, this process appears to have escalated and changed in nature. Instead of viewing the exercise of the judicial power as a cooperative venture in reasoned decision-making and precedent-building, where there is value to be gained from participation by all levels of the judiciary , the Court increasingly seems to see it as an exercise of raw power , so that any sharing of that power is necessarily at the expense of the Court's own authority.

(--) Turn: Court ClogA) Breaking the judicial chain of command floods the courts Martin Shapiro 2003 James W. and Isobel Coffroth Professor of Law University of California, Berkeley 03 https://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/events/archives/ShapiroTalk.pdf.

What judges do do is arrive at incremental, highly reiterative policy guesses. Stare decisis or precedential reasoning and explanation is central to the economies of all judiciaries organized hier-archically and even most of those that are not. If lower courts did not follow the previous decisions of higher courts, the certainty of law, which is one reason we choose to live by rules in the first place, would be undermined. Even more importantly the failure of lower courts to practice vertical stare decisis would result in far more cases being pushed on to the highest court than any highest court could handle. Thus even in legal systems in which the highest court is vested with the sole jurisdiction over certain legal issues, as with the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice and the Kelsenian jurisdictional arrangements of continental constitutional courts, decision making under the constraints of vertical stare decisis tends to migrate downward to lower courts. For otherwise the highest court would have to take case after case after case after case deciding exactly the same thing in exactly the same way rather than issuing commanding precedents. Whatever its virtues or vices vertical stare decisis is a necessity of judicial economy.

B) Court clog undermines the ability to fight terrorismGoldman 8 Russell, What's Clogging the Courts? Ask America's Busiest Judge, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5429227

The number of immigration trials have spiked since 2005, a result of a federal program called Operation Streamline that puts illegal immigrants on a fast track to prosecution, detention and deportation. In the first seven months of 2008, the government reported 38,443 new immigration prosecutions. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, a data research organization at Syracuse University, estimates there will be 65,902 immigration cases this year, a 65 percent increase over last year and a 216 percent increase over 2003. For the Department of Homeland Security, Operation Streamline is an indispensable tool needed to secure the border. In the past year, the government says, the deterrent of prison

time has dramatically decreased the number of the people trying to cross the border from Mexico. Critics, however, contend that the increased number of cases strain an already burdened judicial system, depriving lawyers and judges of ample time to hear cases and denying defendants the right to a fair trial. They also contend that resources have been diverted from pursuing offenders more dangerous than the typical migrant worker and that prosecutors cannot use their own discretion in choosing which violators to go after. "I'm all for national security and border security," said Brack, who was appointed to the bench in 2003 by President Bush. "The people I generally see are humble people who have no criminal offenses other than coming back and forth to pick chili. We're spending a lot of time catching these folks when we could concentrate on those penetrating our border to do us harm."

C) Terrorism Causes ExtinctionSid-Ahmed, 2004 political analyst 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Lower Courts: Links to Legitimacy DA (--) Lower court diversion undermines legitimacy

Caminker 94Evan H., Professor of Law @ UCLA, April, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817

Uniformity of federal law interpretation across the nation ought to be considered equally important in preserving courts' perceived legitimacy. If federal law means one thing to one court but something else to another, the public might think either or both courts unprincipled or incompetent, or that the process of interpretation necessarily is indeterminate . Each of these alternatives subverts the courts' efforts to make their legal rulings appear objective and principled. 152 Of course, perceived legitimacy is not measurable and is likely affected by a number of variables besides divergent interpretations by autonomous courts. 153 But at the margin, respect for judicial authority would likely suffer if persistent interpretive conflicts among the federal courts led the public [*854] to believe that interpretation is inherently arbitrary and unprincipled. Put succinctly, internal consistency strengthens external credibility.

1AR Lower Courts CP—Solvency Extensions (_) We’ll win a solvency deficit here1. The Supreme Court will overrule the CP—that’s Bhagwat2. Lack of federal court uniformity dooms non-judicial enforcement—even if they FIAT uniformity—it won’t be perceived as uniform—dooming the solvency of the counterplan.3. They can’t solve any of case—Lower courts can’t strike down federal surveillance—the executive will ignore the lower courts.

1ar: Solvency Extensions—No Trickle-Up (--) Lower Courts wont cause a Supreme Court Decision

Bhagwat 2000Ashutosh, Professor of Law @ University of California, Hastings College of Law; J.D. from UChicago; 80 B.U.L. Rev. 967

In recent years, however, no less a figure than Chief Justice Rehnquist has questioned the value of percolation , n68ad a number of academic commentators have agreed, suggesting implicitly (or explicitly) that the lower courts have little to contribute to the Supreme Court's decision-making . 69 Furthermore, Evan Caminker has made the argument, with which I agree, that Supreme Court

Justices rarely even read lower court opinions anymore (if they ever did), thereby reducing the value of any percolation . 70 [*980] And even after the Court has resolved a problem, and adopted a doctrinal rule, the Justices also seem to completely lack the institutional capacity to observe the actual operation of various doctrinal formulations in the lower courts ,

and so to make practical assessments of their "workability and desirability." 71 There are many complex reasons for these developments, including growing caseloads in the lower courts, which limit the Court's ability to keep track of lower court decisions, and the explosion in the filing of amicus briefs that makes lower court opinions a less important source of data and legal arguments. 72

The results are nevertheless clear - a growing isolation of the Supreme Court from the rest of the judiciary.

1ar Extensions: Roll Back (--) Empirically, when lower courts overstep Supreme Court precedent there is a sharp rebuke

Alford 2006Roger, Professor of Law @ Pepperdine, Lower Courts and Reliance on Foreign Authority, http://lawofnations.blogspot.com/2006/01/lower-courts-and-reliance-on-foreign.html

One of the issues rarely addressed in the debate on reliance on foreign authority to interpret constitutional guarantees is what attitude lower courts should take with respect to the question. As most scholars know, the Missouri Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons relied on foreign authority in flagrantly departing from Supreme Court precedent in Stanford to hold that the juvenile death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. That approach led to a "no comment" from the Supreme Court in Roper, but a sharp rebuke from Justice Scalia. In dissent Justice Scalia noted: "To add insult to injury, the Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even admonishing that court for its flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford. Until today, we have always held that 'it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.'... Today, however, the Court silently approves a state-court decision that blatantly rejected controlling precedent." Last week the Ninth Circuit in Allen v. Ornoski was faced with a death penalty claim by Clarence Ray Allen, an inmate in his seventies who has been on death row for over twenty years. He argued, among other things, "that execution of an elderly person does not comport with 'evolving standards of decency,' in that the execution 'offends humanity,' provides no deterrence value, does not serve any retributive purpose, and violates the norms of domestic and international law." The Ninth Circuit, per Clinton-appointee Judge Wardlaw, rejected the international argument out of hand: "While international norms may also be instructive in this analysis, in light of the nonexistence of domestic authority supporting Allen's claim, and the lack of definitive international authority provided by Allen, we, as an intermediate court, decline to consider the asserted practices of foreign jurisdictions." Allen suggests that lower courts should be more cautious than the Supreme Court in relying on foreign authority, particularly where that authority is not clear and definitive. I am not aware of any empirical studies analyzing how lower courts have handled the question of reliance on foreign authority in constitutional adjudication. It would be worth the time to make such inquiries. Nor am I aware of other lower courts that have expressed the need for greater caution on this question. But I can appreciate the concern because obviously adherence to and departure from precedent is of greater moment for lower courts than the Supreme Court.

1ar: Ext. Rule of Law DA (--) Extend our Bhagwat evidence—lower court refusal to follow Supreme Court precedent undermines the rule of law.(--) Unique link. Lower courts shouldn’t overturn higher courts. Any deviation immediately destroys judicial legitimacy and the rule of law.

Mortimer Sellers, Fall 2006 (Student note, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, LEGAL HISTORY AND LEGAL THEORY: The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America)

The use of precedent by courts in the United States of America should be viewed as a tradition or a practice, rather than a legal doctrine in the strictest sense of the word, because it is so deeply embedded in the culture of the legal profession and the judiciary that it takes place without much reflection by judges. In its simplest and

most important sense, the doctrine of stare decisis requires all tribunals of inferior jurisdiction to follow the precedents of courts of superior jurisdiction, to accept the law as declared by superior courts, and not to attempt to overrule their decisions. n159 American lawyers have come to believe that "the slightest deviation from this rigid rule would destroy the sanctity of the judicial practice. There would be no finality or stability in the law and the court system would be chaotic in its operation and unstable and inconsistent in its decisions ." n160 This strict rule of stare decisis, which governs lower courts in all common-law, statutory and constitutional cases, does not clarify the circumstances in which courts may overrule their own previous decisions, or deviate from their own precedents. Americans have never wandered very far down the Benthamite road of extreme stare decisis, which once bound English common-law courts to respect their own erroneous or unreasonable precedents. n161 Perhaps this distinction between English and American practice arose in part from amorphousness  [*87]  of the English Constitution, which leaves Parliament free to correct any perceived errors of the judiciary, n162 but the more fundamental difference follows from the American view of law as intimately connected to reason, not a command, but truth as revealed by experience. "It is more important that the Court should be right upon later and more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience." n163

State Courts CP Answers (--) No jurisidiction over federal surveillance policy—means they solve none of the AFF.(--) Doesn’t capture our Supreme Court solvency(--) Doesn’t solve modeling: that’s the 1ac evidence. (--) State courts can’t solve the AFF—judicial and political hostility at the local level:

Michelle Wilde Anderson, 2010 (Assistant Professor of Law @ UC Berkeley Law School, “MAPPED OUT OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY,” Stanford Law Review, April 2010, Lexis/Nexis, rwg)

What to do with today's lost neighborhoods? It is the late dawn of the twenty-first century, when integration is stronger and civil rights laws are weaker, when local government budgets are dwarfed by demands. Suing local governments or lobbying them, two of the most important strategies of twentieth-century advocacy for social justice, have been weakened by judicial and political hostility to redistributive claims. Yet state and local government law retains malleability and promise. Laws governing the allocation of power among local agencies exert significant influence over unincorporated urban areas in particular and spatial polarization by race and class more generally.

(--) FIAT Abuse: all 50 state courts wouldn’t take the same action at the same timeA) Utopian: all 50 state courts wouldn’t take the same action at the same timeB) Distorts the literature base: makes it impossible to generate offense vs. the CPC) Voting issue: debate has already been irreparably altered.

(--) Supreme Court is necessary to solve for the states—states will interpret their constitutions the way the Supreme Court does:

Bill Swinford, 1994 (Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, Temple Law Review, “SHEDDING THE DOCTRINAL SECURITY BLANKET: HOW STATE SUPREME COURTS INTERPRET THEIR STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF RODRIGUEZ,” 67 Temp. L. Rev. 981; Lexis, rwg)

State courts often interpret language in state constitutions in order to grant protection to rights and privileges that is broader than that afforded by the Supreme Court under the United States Constitution. n1 However, state courts tend to be guided (if not controlled) by United States Supreme Court interpretations of analogous language in the United States Constitution . n2 In other words, state courts have traditionally used Supreme Court precedents as "doctrinal security blankets," looking to Court precedent for legal support for decisions on state constitutional questions, even when there is no legal

necessity for doing so.

(--) States won’t depart from federal standards—the counterplan can’t solve on its own:

Bill Swinford, 1994 (Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, Temple Law Review, “SHEDDING THE DOCTRINAL SECURITY BLANKET: HOW STATE SUPREME COURTS

INTERPRET THEIR STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF RODRIGUEZ,” 67 Temp. L. Rev. 981; Lexis, rwg)

The adjudication of claims under state constitutions involving equal protection of the law provides a prominent example of the growing pains faced by state courts. n7 As in other areas, state courts in the 1970s and 1980s began hearing more equal protection claims on the basis of state constitutional language alone. But the lack of independent state-level doctrine in this area, combined with the legal tradition of deference to the United States Supreme Court, made it difficult, for those state courts who desired to do so, to depart from federal standards for equal protection . n8

CP Competing Off Plan Certainty 2ac (--) Perm- do the CP--“Should” means “ought to”

Sudison, 7/18/2006 (http://sudison.blogspot.com/2006_07_01_archive.html)

Shall 'shall' describes something that is mandatory . If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is

a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. Should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.

(--) None of their evidence assumes the court—no reason to believe the court conditions rulings or consults on issues before it rules.(--) Any condition means it’s try or die for the AFF: any risk of not solving triggers the democracy impact for extinction, the internet impact of extinction, and the nuclear war off pres powers.(--) CP that compete on the certainty of the plan are bad-

A) Infinite possible conditions- kills predictability and competitive equityB) Kills aff ground- no literature for the aff in the context of the CP- kills competitive equityC. Hurts plan focus- trades off with specifics about the policy- kills topic education which can only happen this yearD. Literature doesn’t check- we can’t be prepared to find nonexistent literature on all their conditions