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Chapter-III

Biocentrism

Speciesist anthropocentrism has been identified by the majority of environmental

philosophers and other environmentalists as the root-cause of the present day eco-

crisis. And it is often said that contemporary environmental philosophy has set out

its journey by questioning this moral anthropocentrism. It is regarded as a

systematic bias in traditional Western attitude to the non-human world or the

nature in general. There have, however, recently developed some important views

rejecting this attitude, and this development has strongly influenced the ways in

which humans interpret their relationship with other species and with the nature

and ecosystems. One such world-view we find in contemporary environmental

philosophy is Biocentrism that considers all living beings to have moral value and

humans to be one among innumerable species of organisms that live on the earth.

‘Biocentrism’ (from Greek: βίος, bio, ‘life’; and κέντρον, kentron, ‘center’) is a

term that has more than one meaning. In environmental philosophy, however, it

refers to the life-centric nature-view. It means that all living beings on the earth,

including humans, have moral value. It recommends well-being of all life in the

biosphere.

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But it may be noted here that biocentrism also refers to the scientific position

that life and consciousness forms the basis of observable reality, and thereby is the

basis of the universe itself. For example, American scientist Robert Lanza

proposed a theory in 2007, where he upholds this view that life and biology are

central to being, reality, and the cosmos— life creates the universe rather than the

other way around. This biocentrism of Robert Lanza asserts that current theories of

the physical world do not work, and can never be made to work, until they fully

account for life and consciousness. While physics is considered fundamental to the

study of the universe, and chemistry fundamental to the study of life, biocentrism

places biology before the other sciences to produce a ‘theory of everything’.1

Of course, the reception of Lanza's theory has been mixed. Critics have

questioned whether the theory is falsifiable. Lanza has argued that future

experiments, such as scaled-up quantum superposition, will either support or

contradict the theory.2 Anyhow, this is a theory of cosmology, while we are

interested in environmental philosophy and ethics. In environmental philosophy

biocentrism is well-defined as the belief that all forms of life are equally valuable

and humanity is not the center of existence.

Anyhow, biocentrism transcends anthropocentrism. While anthropocentrism

argues in favor of a world-view centering solely on humans and recognizes value

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only in human beings, biocentrism regards every living being in the nature as

having intrinsic value and thus goes beyond speciesist anthropocentricity. This

view asserts that we have an obligation to the whole biotic community. The central

claim of biocentrism is that our moral obligation extends beyond humans to

include all living beings. This obligation is direct, not merely indirect obligation to

the living beings via humans. We are morally obliged, e.g., to preserve endangered

species, not only because present and future humans would find life of diminished

value unless we do that, but also because they are living beings with

intrinsic/inherent value, the fact that demands our moral respect.

Australian philosopher Richard Routley (Sylvan) gives a good example in

favour of biocentrism in his paper ‘Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental

Ethic? (1973) It goes by the name ‘last man argument’, where Routley asks us to

imagine a hypothetical situation in which the ‘last man’, surviving a world

catastrophe, acts to ensure the elimination of all other living beings and the

destruction of all the landscapes after his demise. From the anthropocentric point

of view, the ‘last man’ would do nothing morally wrong, since his destructive act

in question would not cause any damage to the interest and well-being of humans,

who would by then have disappeared. Nevertheless, Routley points out, there is a

moral intuition that the imagined last act would be morally wrong. An explanation

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for this judgement, he gives, is that those non-human objects in the environment

whose destruction is ensured by the ‘last man’ have intrinsic value, a kind of value

independent of their usefulness for humans. From his critique, Routley concluded

that the main approach in traditional western moral thinking was unable to allow

the recognition that natural things have intrinsic value and that the tradition

required overhaul of a significant kind. Anyhow, our common intuition is that it

does matter to destroy the last form of life, and this is taken as evidence that non-

human life has value independent of the existence of conscious valuers—and that

this value is relevant to the assessment of the moral standing of living things.

Classical Biocentrism

Paul Taylor is the champion of this biocentric view of Nature, to whom we owe for

its classical version. But the first life-centered concern in Western ethics is found,

perhaps, in Albert Schweitzer’s Civilization and Ethics published in 1923.

Schweitzer’s biocentric point of view is illustrated in terms of ‘Reverence for

Life’. He sees this as stemming from a fundamental ‘will-to-live’, inherent in all

living beings. In self-conscious beings, like us, this will-to-live establishes a drive

towards both self-realization and empathy with other living beings. He formulates

his world-view in this way: ‘I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of

life which wills to live.’3 (‘Ich bin Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das

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leben will.’) Just in my own will-to-live there is a yearning for more life, the same

obtains in each the will-to-live around me equally, whether it expresses itself or

remains unvoiced. According to Schweitzer, all life is sacred and we should live

accordingly, keeping in mind that each and every living being is inherently

valuable ‘will-to-live’. In nature one form of life falls prey upon another. But,

human consciousness holds an awareness of, and sympathy for, the will of other

beings to live. As a moral human being, he strives to rise above from this predator-

prey relation so far as it is possible. Actually, as living beings with moral

consciousness, we are not only concerned with our own life but also for the lives of

other living beings and the environment in which we live in. According to him, ‘It

is good to maintain and cherish life; it is evil to destroy and check life.’4

We have

to choose to live up to this moral conscience; and our world-view must derive from

this life-view, not vice versa. Respect for life, overcoming coarser impulses and

hollow doctrines, leads the individual to live in the service of other people and of

every living creature. In contemplation of the will-to-life, respect for the life of

others becomes the highest principle and the defining purpose of humanity.

The fundamental principles of morality which we seek as a necessity for

thought is not, according to Schweitzer, a matter of galvanizing the traditional

moral views and norms, but also of expanding and extending the moral horizon.

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Morality, accordingly, is, in its unqualified form, extended responsibility with

regard to anything living. He writes: “A man is really ethical only when he obeys

the constraint laid on him to help all life which he is able to succour, and when he

goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living. He does not ask for how far

this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself, nor does he ask how far it

is capable of feeling. To him life as such is sacred.”3

It may be mentioned here that Schweitzer received the 1952 Nobel Peace

Prize for his philosophy of ‘Reverence for Life’. Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life’

philosophy upholds that all living beings have intrinsic or inherent value. The

intrinsic value of nature can and should be appealed to as the basis for human

ethics. And the attitude of reverence for life would establish the connections

between ethics and nature. According to Schweitzer, ethics begins when we

recognize these connections, we feel awe and respect in the fact of living beings

that commands our reverence and that compels us to strive to promote and preserve

life in all its forms.

Anyhow, Schweitzer’s assertion ‘I am will-to-live’ reminds us of

Schopenhauer as his forerunner in the philosophy of ‘willing’ and ‘will’ in general.

Of course, Schweitzer somehow individualizes this ‘will to live’, and this is

something like this: I am life which wants to live amidst of lives which want to

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live! According to Schweitzer, I first of all experience the will to live and living in

my own feeling and organism and I come to rationally respect this will also in

other living beings, if I respect this will to live in myself. I am therefore forced or

driven to acknowledge some such will to living also in other living beings around

me and have to appreciate and respect this in the same way as in my own case. The

transfer from the respect for my own will to living to the reverence for life of the

other beings is grounded by certain methodological or meta-ethical principle of

equality or equalitarianism, being a certain kind of inference by analogy, which

Schweitzer however emphasizes as being ‘denknotwendig’ (necessary in

thinking).6 This kind of necessity and equalitarianism would and should lead me to

respect and revere any other life and living being independently from any

constraints or perspectives of speciesism, egotism or other partisan view-points.

Ethics should not be constrained by speciesist, racial, nationalistic or whatever

restricted points of view. Thus, the reverence for the will of life in other beings

should be a universal requirement.

Anyhow, as already stated, Paul Taylor is the best proponent of contemporary

biocentric view of nature. Taylor’s is, perhaps, the most comprehensive attempt to

articulate and defend a biocentric position in environmental discourse. His

biocentric world-view first comes to the fore with the publication of the article,

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‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’ in Environmental Ethics in 1981. It was then

followed by a full-fledged book titled Respect for Nature: A Theory of

Environmental Ethics, which he published in the year 1986. The core of Taylor’s

position is the claim that all living things and beings have inherent value and so

merit moral respect. According to him, to say that an entity has a good of its own is

simply to say that, without reference to any other entity, it can be benefited or

harmed. This good is ‘objective’, in the sense that it is independent of what any

conscious being happens to think about it. Anyhow, to say that each living being

has a good of their own or something has inherent worth is, according to Taylor, to

invoke two principles: the principle of moral consideration and the principle of

intrinsic value.7

The principle of moral consideration means that every living being that has a

good of its own merits moral consideration. And the principle of intrinsic value

states that the realization of the good of an individual is intrinsically valuable. This

means that its good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end

in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. The combination of these

two principles constitutes the fundamental moral attitude which Taylor calls

‘respect for Nature’.

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The first principle of moral consideration states that all living things deserve

the concern and attention of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being

members of the earth’s community of life. From the moral point of view, their

good must be taken into account whenever it is affected for better or worse by the

behaviour of some agents. This provision stands for all, no matter what species the

creature belongs to. The good of each entity is accorded some value and so

acknowledged as having some weight in the deliberations of all rational agents.

However, it may be necessary for such an agent to act in ways contrary to the good

of this or that particular organism in order to further other’s good, including human

good. But the principle of moral consideration prescribes that, with respect to each

being an entity having its own good, every individual deserves moral

consideration.

On the other hand, the principle of intrinsic value asserts that, irrespective of

what kind of entity it is in other respects, if it is a member of the earth’s biotic

community, the realization of its good is something intrinsically valuable. This

signifies that the good of the entity concerned is worthy of being preserved or

attended to, and this intrinsic/inherent value is an end in itself and for the sake of

the entity concerned. While we consider an entity as having intrinsic or inherent

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value, we deny that it can be treated as a mere object, or as an entity whose value

completely depends on being instrumental in promoting another’s good.8

Though these two principles seem nearer to each other, they are not identical.

While the principle of moral consideration affirms that all living beings deserve the

concern and consideration of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being

members of the earth’s community of life, the principle of intrinsic value states

that if some entity is a member of the earth’s biotic community, the realization of

its good is something intrinsically valuable, its good is worthy of being respected,

and this intrinsic value is an end in itself, and as such, it is for the sake of the entity

concerned. According to Taylor, when rational, autonomous agents regard such

entities as possessing inherent worth, they place intrinsic value on the realization of

their good and so hold themselves responsible for performing actions that will have

this effect and for refraining from actions having the contrary effect. Not only that,

then they subscribe to the principles of moral consideration and of intrinsic value

and so conceive of wild living beings as having that kind of worth. On Taylor’s

judgment, “[S]uch agents are adopting a certain ultimate moral attitude toward the

natural world. This is the attitude I call “respect for Nature”. 9

Respect for nature thus signifies a life-centered world-view of environmental

philosophy. This ethics of respect for nature has three basic elements: a belief

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system, an ultimate moral outlook, and a set of rules of duty and standards of

character. These elements are connected with each other in the following manner.

The belief system underlying this attitude of respect for nature is called ‘the

biocentric outlook on Nature’. As Taylor explains, the belief system provides a

certain outlook on nature which supports and makes intelligible an autonomous

agent’s adopting, as an ultimate moral attitude, the attitude of respect for nature.

Living things and beings are viewed as the appropriate objects of the attitude of

respect, and are, accordingly, regarded as entities possessing inherent/intrinsic

worth. One then places intrinsic value on the promotion and protection of their

good. As a consequence of this, one makes a moral commitment to abide by a set

of rules of duty and to fulfill certain standards of good character.

This ethics of respect for nature is symmetrical with a system of human ethics

grounded on ‘respect for person’. This has three aspects: The first is a conception

of oneself and others as persons, as centers of autonomous choice. Second, there is

an attitude of respect for person as person. It is adopted as an ultimate moral

attitude in which every person is regarded as having inherent worth or human

dignity. Third, there is an ethical system of duties which are acknowledged to be

owed by everyone to everyone. These duties are forms of conduct in which public

recognition is given to each individual’s inherent worth as a person.

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Accordingly, the bio-centric outlook on nature implies all these four

things:10

(1) Humans are members of the earth’s community of life on the same terms

as all the non-human members are.

(2) The earth’s natural ecosystems are seen as a complex web of

interconnected and interdependent elements.

(3) Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological centre of life,

pursuing its own good in its own way.

(4) Humans are not superior to any other living thing.

While thus formulating the biocentric outlook, Taylor takes cognizance of

the fact of our being an animal species to be a fundamental feature of our

existence. He and his supporters do not deny the significant differences between

ourselves and other species, but they wish to keep in the forefront of our

consciousness the fact that, in relation to our planet’s natural ecosystems, we are

but one species population among many others. Our origin lies in the same process

of evolution that gives rise to all other species and that we are confronted with

similar environmental conditions that confront the members of other species. The

so-called laws of natural selection, of adaptation and of genetics apply

simultaneously with all of us as members of the biological community.

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If we have a deep watch on the happenings in the nature, we would see that

each animal and plant is like us in having a good, a telos of its own. Although our

human good (e.g., of value and significance of human life, including the exercise

of individual autonomy in choosing our own particular value-system) is not exactly

similar to the good of a non-human animal or plant, it cannot be maintained that

their good can go without the biological necessities for survival and physical

health.

Again, the possibility of the extinction of the human species makes us aware

of another aspect in which we should not consider ourselves in better position than

other species. Our well-being and survival is dependent upon the ecological health

and wellbeing of various animals and plants communities, while their survival and

health does not depend on human wellbeing. Rather, many wild animals and plants

would be greatly benefited if all human beings disappear from the earth. The

depletion of their habitats by human beings in the name of ‘development’ would

then cease. The anthropogenic pollution of the land, air and water would come to

an end. Ecosystems could gradually return to their balance, suffering only some

natural disruptions. All these imply that our presence is not so much needed from

the community standpoint.

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Let us come to the second component of biocentric worldview, which sees the

natural world as an organic system. To accept the biocentric outlook and regard

ourselves and our place in the world from its perspective is to see the whole natural

order of the earth’s biosphere as a complex but unified web of interconnected

organisms, objects, and events. The ecological relationship between any

community of living things and their environment forms an organic whole of

functionally interdependent parts. Such dynamic, but at the same time, relatively

stable structures such as food-chains, predator-prey relations, plant succession in a

forest, are self-regulating energy-recycling mechanisms that preserve the

equilibrium of the whole.11

And for this, while we think of the well-being of the biotic communities—of

humans, animals and plants, we should be careful for the ecological equilibrium.

When one views the realm of nature from this biocentric perspective, one should

never forget that in the long run the integrity of the entire biosphere of our planet is

essential to the realization of the good of its constituent communities of life, both

human and non-human. This holistic view of the earth’s ecological systems,

according to Taylor, does not by itself constitute a moral norm. These are facts of

biological reality, rather a set of causal connections put forth in empirical terms. Its

ethical implications for our treatment of the natural environmental lie entirely in

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the fact that our knowledge of these casual connections is an essential means to

fulfilling the ends we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for

Nature.

In order to explain the third component of the biocentric outlook Taylor

reiterates that each individual organism is to be conceived of as a teleological

center of life. The organism comes to mean something to be one as a unique,

irreplaceable individual. The final culmination of this process is the achievement

of a genuine understanding of the biocentric point of view and with that

understanding, an ability would crop up to take that point of view. Conceiving of a

living being as a center of life, one is able to look at the world from its perspective.

Understanding living beings as teleological centers of life does not necessitate

associating them with human characteristics. We need not consider all of them as

having consciousness like us. Some of them may be aware of the world around

them and others may not. Nor need we deny that different kinds and levels of

awareness are exemplified when high level consciousness in some form or other is

present. But be they conscious or not, all are equal teleological centers of life in the

sense that each is a unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their

preservation and well-being.

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The denial of human superiority as the fourth component of the biocentric

outlook on nature is perhaps the most important idea in establishing the

justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. The concept of human superiority

is strictly human point of view, that is, from a point of view in which the good of

humans is taken as the standard of judgment. Because of that, all we need to do is

to look as the capacities of non-human animals from the standpoint of their good to

find a contrary judgment of superiority. In each case, the claim to human

superiority would be rejected from a non-human standpoint.

As Taylor explains, it is true that we are different from non-human animals in

respect of some specific capabilities. But these facts do not by themselves establish

human superiority. If we think a little, we would find that it is only from human

standpoint that looks like this. On the other hand, many non-human animals have

some capacities that we humans lack. The cheetah can run faster than men; an

eagle can see things from a far distance; so on and so forth. Why would these not

be considered as signs of their superiority over humans? From a neutral

perspective, the claim to human superiority does not carry weight, rather it could

be regarded as ‘an irrational bias in our own favor’.12

According to Taylor, this becomes clear as and when we conceive our relation

to other species in terms of the three components of the biocentric outlook. These

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components together give us an overall view of the natural world and of the place

of humans in it. As we take this point of view, we come to realise ‘other living

things, their environmental conditions and their ecological relationships in such a

way as to awake in us a deep sense of our kinship with them as fellow members of

the Earth’s community of life’.13

We then understand that humans and non-humans

together constitute an unified whole in which all living beings are functionally

interrelated. Each is then seen to share with us the same characteristic of being a

teleological centre of life. When this entire outlook becomes a part of the

conceptual framework, we come to look onto ourselves as bearing a certain moral

relation to non-human forms of life.

Another key exponent of biocentrism is Robin Attfield. He takes trees as an

example of non-sentient life and seeks to establish whether and why they might

also be morally considerable. He likewise maintains trees have a good of their

own, but, for him, it is not sufficient to show that trees merit moral consideration.

There are further differences between his position and that of Taylor. Taylor

appeals to the rational and scientific merits of biocentricism in support of the moral

status of trees, while Attfield appeals to analogy with morally significant human

interests, such as the interests that derive from their capacities for nutrition,

growth, and respiration.14

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Again, as to how the good of a non-human can be the ground of an obligation

for moral agents, the answer turns on its good having intrinsic/inherent value. It is

worth distinguishing between approaches which are qualified and unqualified in

their commitment to the intrinsic/inherent value of the good of non-rational beings.

A representative of the qualified view is Robin Attfield. For Attfield, whatever has

a good of its own has moral standing, i.e., merits moral consideration. His position

is that if we grant consideration to humans then we cannot consistently deny it to

other living beings, and the onus is on a would-be opponent of this view to name

some morally relevant differences between humans and other living beings which

would justify considering humans as moral patients and non-humans not. He

believes that this will prove hard to do. Anyhow, Attfield’s qualified view does not

deny that there might well be a preponderant need most of the time to treat plants,

and, perhaps, some other creatures, as resources, valuable though their lives are in

themselves. For Attfield, the moral standing of a being is established separately

and prior to any judgements as to its moral significance. All beings which have

moral standing have intrinsic/inherent value, but some of them will have very little

of it—indeed, too little to be a determinant of any obligation of a moral agent. It,

therefore, appears that a qualified approach may not necessarily lay the ground for

claiming anything more than a frankly anthropocentric one.

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Robin Attfield does not think that we owe moral respect to all living beings,

as not all lives are worthwhile. He also is not egalitarian even with regard to those

lives that are owed moral respect. The most compelling reason for preserving trees

refers first to the interests of humans, and then to those of other sentient animals.

He concludes that while some degree of respect is due to almost all life, the interest

of other non-sentient life will always have a relatively low priority. Even then,

Attfield and Taylor agree on the point that things and beings without good of their

own cannot merit moral consideration in their own right, and that only living

beings have goods of their own.15

Christopher Stone, a professor of law at the University of Southern California,

supports Attfield’s contention, but in different way. Stone proposes in his article

‘Should Trees have Standing?’ that trees and other natural objects should have at

least the same standing in law as corporations. Stone argues that if trees, forests

and mountains could be given standing in law then they could be represented in

their own right in the courts. Moreover, like any other legal person, these natural

things could become beneficiaries of compensation if it could be shown that they

had suffered compensatable injury through human activity.

Biocentric view-point is also present in John Rodman’s environmental

thought. He places the position of biocentricity in ‘ecological sensibility’ category.

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In his famous paper ‘The Liberation of Nature?’ he comes out to organize

environmental thought into four categories: resource conservation (contending the

reckless exploitation of forest, wildlife, soil, etc), wilderness preservation (arguing

for certain natural areas as sacred places), moral extensionism (supporting the view

that we have duties directly to some non-human natural entities), and ecological

sensibility (a complex pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgment to the

nature).16

Rodman speaks of three components of this ecological sensibility, and these

are: (i) a theory of value that recognizes intrinsic/inherent value in nature without

engaging in mere extensionism; (ii) a metaphysics that takes account of the reality

and importance of relationships and systems as well as of individuals; (iii) an

ethics that ‘includes such duties as non-interference with natural processes,

resistance to human acts and policies that violate the non-interference

principle….and a style of co-inhabitation that involves the knowledgeable,

respectful, and restrained use of nature’,17

for one ought not to treat with disrespect

or use as a mere means anything that has a telos or end of its own.

Most biocentric positions are presented within the framework of conventional

ethical theories. Attfield, for example, takes a consequentialist position. Taylor’s

position draws extensively on both Kant and Aristotle. Anyhow, biocentrism is

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individualistic in that their various moral concerns are directed towards individuals

only, not ecological wholes, such as species, populations, biotic communities, and

ecosystems. None of these is sentient, a subject-of-a-life, or a teleological-center-

of-life, but the preservation of these collective entities is a major concern for many

environmentalists. Moreover, the goals of animal liberationists, such as the

reduction of animal suffering and death, may conflict with the goals of the

environmentalists. For example, the preservation of the integrity of an ecosystem

may require the culling of feral animals or of some indigenous populations that

threaten to destroy fragile habitats. So there are disputes about whether the ethics

of animal liberation is a proper branch of environmental ethics.18

As we have seen above, Rodman and other critics have suggested that it is not

possible to generate an adequate environmental ethics by extending the range of

contemporary theories to this biocentric way, because these theories have evolved

to articulate moral claims that arise on an analogy to human cases, and are

inherently anthropocentric and individualistic. They are thus less than well-suited

to articulate the moral claims of non-humans, particularly those who are extremely

unlike human individuals.

According to Rodman, all the first three categories of environmental thought

will be rendered obsolete with the realization of ecological sensibility. But even

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then, the position of ecological sensibility derives primarily from the category of

moral extensionism, in which he places Singer’s Animal Liberation: Towards an

End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals to be an example. The basis of the extension

thought from the third to fourth category is the idea of equality that involved with

non-human beings.

Anyhow, it is now time to turn onto the issue of animal liberation, which is

related with biocentrism. This discussion may be made in the name of Sentientism.

Sentientism

The term ‘sentience’ comes from Latin word ‘sentire’, that means ‘to feel’ or to

‘perceive’. ‘Sentience’ thus means ‘the capacity of feeling pleasure and suffering

pain’. Sentientism is the moral theory that all sentient beings, be they human or

non-human, have intrinsic moral value. Therefore, we are obligated to treat all

sentient beings with kindness and compassion, regardless of their external form or

level of intelligence. It is also said that no ethical system can be valid if it fails to

acknowledge all sentient beings. As early as in 18th century, Jeremy Bentham

raised the issue of non-human suffering and sadism in his An Introduction to the

Principles of Morals and Legislation:

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If we study a little we can see that the French have already discovered that

the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be

abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor... What else is it that

should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the

faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a

more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day,

or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what

would it avail? The question is not, "Can they reason?" nor "Can they talk?"

but, "Can they suffer?”19

Following Bentham, the advocates of ethical sentientism propose in the

second half of 20th century that the most appropriate criterion of moral

considerability is that of sentience, that is, the capacity for experiening pleasure

and pain. If an entity is sentient, they argue, it seeks pleasurable states of being and

seeks to avoid painful states of being, and this is its interests. And since interests

are interests, irrespective of the species to which they belong, it is arbitrary to

respect only human interests. Rather beings, that have interests, ought to have their

interests taken into account in the context of actions regarding them. If an entity,

on the other hand, is not sentient or is incapable of having any interests of its own,

it does not owe any consideration to us. After all, what does it matter how we treat

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an entity if that entity cannot matter to itself? Peter Singer, the most prominent

exponent of this approach in contemporary times, summarizes this line of

argument as follows: “A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.

Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A

mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road,

because it will suffer if it is.”20

He goes on saying: “If a being suffers, there can be

no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No

matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its

suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough

comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of

suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken

into account. That is why the limit of sentience… is the only defensible boundary

of concern for the interests of others.”21

The idea of equality towards non-human beings, to the sentient beings was

also widely discussed at the end of the 1970’s. Bentham was well aware of the fact

that the logic of the demand for racial equality should not stop at the equality of

humans. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take

that suffering into consideration, and, indeed, to count it equally with like suffering

of any other being. Rather than regarding them as inferior to human beings because

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of their inability to reason, Bentham applied the moral principle of utilitarianism to

sentient animals. He said that because animals suffer, their happiness is indeed

relevant. The ethical theory of utilitarianism states that an action is right if its

results are superior to those of any other action. The basic idea is to generate the

greatest possible amount of happiness among the greatest number.

Indeed, utilitarianism is a powerful force in support of many environmental

philosophies. Rather than believing in the absolute ‘rights’ of animals and nature,

many environmentalists contend instead that their programme maximizes utility.

They say that because animals can suffer, they should be taken into account when

judging the morality of an action.8

The classical utilitarians shaped much of

philosophical debates in the nineteenth century, but they did not take animals’

moral standing seriously. It is in the second half of 20th

century moral

philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Jöel Feinberg, and Tom Regan who took up the

issue.

John Rodman appears to have first used the term ‘sentientism’ to refer to that

mode of ethics which restricts moral standing only to the living beings who can

feel pain and pleasure. But it is Peter Singer who can be regarded as the champion

of sentientism. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation based on utilitarianism has

become ‘the holy book’ of animal liberation movement, and for this reason, the

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term ‘animal liberation’ has become closely associated with Singer’s views. He

claims that all animals are equal as they all have interests. He wonders, how could

this go unnoticed that this applies also to non-human animals, who also have lives

that can go well or badly, can suffer and hence have interest that we can affect!22

Some moral philosophers applied the idea of rights to animals. They argue

that animals, like humans, have certain basic rights, like the right to live and

flourish freely. This means that there are human actions which are simply

unacceptable, and that humans must respect animal rights. The equality claim does

not, however, imply equality in all respects, e.g., in intelligence and abilities,

capacity for leadership, rationality, etc. that are applicable to humans.

As already hinted, Singer has two key ideas of justification for equality of

consideration: First, he adopted Bentham’s pleasure and pain principle, argued for

sentience and in particular, the capacity to suffer. Animals feel pain, and this fact

makes them moral subjects. Animals who can suffer have an interest in avoiding

pain. And pain in a non-human animal is no different in moral significance to pain

in a human. Secondly, he evokes the principle of equality: the principle of equal

consideration of like interests. All entities which have a capacity to suffer have an

interest in avoiding suffering—of equal moral standing in each case—each such

entity has a claim to equally. But this does not, of course, mean equal treatment in

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all respects. Interests are not identical across living beings. Still then we could

admit that animals are entitled to equal considerations. But equal consideration for

different beings may, however, lead to different treatment.23

The grounds for inferring that animals can feel pain are nearly as good as the

ground for inferring other humans’ pain. Only nearly, for there is at least

behavioural sign that humans have, and no non-human have, and that is

sophisticated language. This has long been regarded as an important distinction

between man and other animals. But this distinction is not relevant to the question

of how animals ought to be treated, unless it is linked to the issue of whether

animals suffer. The link, according to Singer, has been attempted in two ways.

First, stemming from philosophical thought associated with Wittgenstein, who

maintains that we cannot meaningfully attribute states of consciousness to beings

without language. This position seems to us implausible one. States, like pain, are

more primitive, and seem nothing to do with language. Singer refers to Michael

Peters’ Animal, Men and Morals, where it is argued that the basic signals we use to

convey pain, fear, sexual arousal, and so on, are not specific to our species.24

So

there is no reason to believe that a creature without language cannot suffer. The

second link is the best evidence that we can have that another creature is in pain is

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when he tells us that he is. But, according to Singer, ‘I am in pain’ is not really the

best possible evidence that the speaker is in pain because he or she might be lying.

Anyhow, let us now see how do we know that animals can feel pain? We can

never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or

non-human. Animals in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and

their overt behavior is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain. We

also can point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and especially

of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar. This anatomical parallel makes

it likely that the capacity of animals to feel pain and pleasure is similar to our

own.25

Thus Singer claims that the capacity for consciousness of pleasure and pain

would, all by itself, suffice to give an animal moral standing. In Animal Liberation

Singer writes: “The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for

having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of

interests in a meaningful way.”26

Anyhow, in his essay ‘All Animals are Equals’

Singer makes his form of sentientism even more explicit: If a being is not capable

of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing in it to be

taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience is the only defensible

boundary of concern for the interests of other. Given Singer’s understanding of

what it is to be sentient, we have the following criterion of morality:

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A thing has interests or well-being only if it is capable of suffering or

experiencing enjoyment.

A potentially more stringent sentientist position is proposed by moral and

political philosopher Jöel Feinberg. In his famous essay ‘The Rights of Animals

and Unborn Generations’ argues that while it make sense to attribute rights to some

non-human animals and to future generations of humans, neither plants, species,

nor ecosystems are plausible candidates for right. According to Feinberg, in order

to have right, an entity must be capable of consciously aiming at – thinking about –

things in its future. In his own words, “…an interest…presupposes at least

rudimentary cognitive equipment cognitive equipment. Interests are compounded

somehow out of desires and aims—both of which presuppose something like

beliefs, or cognitive awareness…Mere brute longings unmediated by beliefs—

longings for one knows not what—might be a primitive form of

consciousness…but they are altogether different from the sort of thing we mean by

‘desire’, especially when we speak of human beings.” 27

Beside Singer and Feinberg, a third proponent of animal liberation is Tom

Regan. He characterized a truly environmental ethics in an article entitled ‘The

Nature and Possibility of Environmental Ethics’ in the celebrated journal

Environmental Ethics (1981), as one in which ‘all conscious beings and some non-

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conscious beings held to have moral standing’. Although he, like Singer and

Feinberg, takes sentience to be of moral significance, he does not refer his case to

utilitarianism as source. He embraces a sentientist but deontological rights view,

labeling Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ as ‘environmental fascism’.28

Regan argued

for the need for a more rights-based focus than could be found within Singer’s

Animal Liberation. According to Regan, it is not be possible to argue convincingly

the case for animal rights unless they are held to possess a right to life. Regan

accords moral standing to those animals who are ‘subjects of life’. Beings that

meet the criterion, however, are ends in themselves and possess inherent worth,

and on this ground, they can be said to possess rights.

In the book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) Regan says that ‘having moral

right’ is an all or nothing thing; to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not

to be significantly harmed in any way. His argument for extending to animals a

blanket right not to be harmed has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this

blanket right in human is the essence of respecting them as individuals. Second, he

argues that any non-speciesist explanation of why very nearly all human beings

deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that many

animals deserve the same. In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the

‘subject of a life criterion’ best explains the scope of moral rights among humans,

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and implies that at least all normal adult mammals, and probably all normal adult

birds, deserve similar respect. To be a subject of a life, in Regan’s sense, is to have

a conscious well-being which is tied to having one’s conscious desire for one’s

future.

Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (1983) is a rigorous exploration of the

implications of extending a common conception of moral rights from humans to

animals which have the kind of cognitive capacities that Feinberg took to be

necessary for having interests. Regan’s account of the tie between interests and

rights can be paraphrased in this way. If an entity A ‘has moral rights’, then it

would be wrong to set back significant way on purely utilitarian grounds—it would

be wrong to set back significant interests of A unless a certain kind of non-

utilitarian justification for doing so was available. Although appeals to rights in

day-to-day speech are significantly more nuanced than this simple account, it does

capture a core meaning of rights claims as used in daily arguments about ethics.

For instance, when opponents of abortion invoke a fetus’s right to life, they are in

effect saying that the costs of carrying it to term cannot suffice to justify aborting it

—that only be invoking a similar right to life on the mother’s side could abortion

be justified.

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It is important to note that, for Regan, ‘having moral rights’ is an all-or-

nothing: to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not to be significantly

harmed in any way (at least not for the sake of purely utilitarian goals). In daily life

when we talk about rights we typically invoke various specific rights not to be

harmed in fairly specific ways. For instance, to have a right to free speech is to

have the right not to be harmed in the specific way we would be harmed by having

our speech limited, to have a right to a public education is to have to have the right

not to be harmed in the way we would be harmed by not being provided with an

education, etc.

Regan’s argument for extending to animals a blanket right not to be harmed

has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this blanket right in humans is the

essence of respecting them as individuals. To think that aggregate benefits to

others can suffice to justify us in harming an individual is to think of that

individual as a mere ‘utility receptacle’. Regan claims that the classic objections to

utilitarianism—that it could justify punishing the innocent, slavery, etc., if only the

aggregate benefits are large enough to outweigh the costs to the harmed individuals

—arise because utilitarianism fails to respect individuals in this way. Second,

Regan argues that any non-speciesist explanation why very nearly all human

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beings deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that

many animals deserve the same.

In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the ‘subject of a life’ criterion

best explains the scope of moral rights among humans and implies that at least all

normal adult mammals, probably all normal adult birds, deserve similar respect. To

be a ‘subject of a life’ in Regan’s sense is (roughly) to have a conscious well-being

which is tied to having one’s conscious desires for one’s future satisfaction. On

this criterion, a permanently comatose human no longer has moral rights, because

he no longer has any conscious desires for his future in terms of which we can

conceive of him as being harmed in the relevant sense; but even very profoundly

retarded humans would be harmed in this sense, and so, too, animals with at least

rudimentary conscious desires for their future would have that right.

So Regan’s view, like Feinberg’s, may be even more restrictive than

Singer’s. For Singer, the bare capacity to feel pleasure or pain gives an entity

moral standing. According to Regan and Feinberg, however, something more is

required: the capacity to consciously desire things in one’s future—it is in terms of

one’s desires for the future, rather than bare consciousness of pain. But evolution

may have produced consciousness of pain in some organisms without coupling it

with the ability to consciously plan for the future. Pain combines vital information

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about tissue damage in the present with strong negative effect, and these might aid

organisms in simple conditioned learning where thinking about how to achieve

things in the future is unnecessary.

Even then, when Regan distinguished between ‘an ethic for the use of the

environment’ and ‘an ethic of the environment’, it is argued, he seems to embrace

some form of holism. Gary Varner said that if ‘environmental philosophy’ were

defined as that discipline that attributes moral standing to non-conscious entities,

then it would be an analytic truth that no form of sentientism could be an

‘environmental ethic’. Varner concludes that any version of holism claims that no

version of sentientism would be ‘adequate’ as an environmental ethics. Three kinds

of reason for this conclusion may be given:29

First, the range of policy goals for

preserving the health or integrity of ecosystems, sentientist ethics cannot support

these goals as fully as holistic ethics could. Second, in certain hypothetical

situations (like the ‘last man’ case) a sentientist ethic conflicts with the intuitions

of a holistic environmental philosopher. Third, it is that because environmental

philosophers are directly concerned with preserving holistic entities, such as

species and ecosystems, the conceptual machinery of traditional ethical theory is

ill-suited in capturing the general value framework of environmental philosopher.

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The most widely discussed in this connection is J. Baird Callicott’s 1980-

paper ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs’ contributing to the widespread

impression that sentient ethics must be an inadequate basis for an environmental

ethics. Callicott draws between the implications of sentientist ethics and the Land

Ethic of Aldo Leopold on practical issues in very stark terms. He says that the

Land Ethic would permit or even require hunting of animals to protect the local

environment, implying that animal liberationists should oppose hunting even in

such situations. The Land Ethic sees that predators as critically important members

of the biotic community, but sentientist condemn them as merciless, wanton, and

incorrigible murderers. Animal liberationists advocate vegetarianism, but Callicott

argues that universal vegetarianism probably would produce an environmentally

catastrophic population increase.30

Anyhow, in none of the sentientist views surveyed here can include entities

such as species or ecosystems (as opposed to some to their individual members)

plausible candidates for moral standing, and this basic feature of sentientist views

has played a major role in their rejection by many prominent environmental

ethicists. This leads us to search for a more comprehensive environmental theory,

like ecocentrism.

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Notes and References:

1. “Biocentrism (Cosmology).” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 01 June 2012

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biocentrism_ (cosmology)>.

2. Ibid.

3. Albert Schweitzer. “Reverence for Life.” Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and

Application. Louis P. Pojman & Paul Pojman, eds. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008.

p. 132.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 133.

6. Hans Lenk. Global Technoscience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to Human

Values, Technology, Creativity and Globalization. Auslieferung/Verlagskontakt,

Fresnostr: Lit Verlag, 2007. p. 296.

7. Paul Taylor. “Biocentric Egalitarianism.” (Originally published in Environmental Ethics.

vol. 3, 1981. in the name of ‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’). Environmental Ethics:

Readings in Theory and Application. op. cit., p. 141.

8. Ibid., p. 142.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 145.

11. Ibid., p. 147.

12. Ibid., p. 152.

13. Ibid.

14. Kate Rawles. “Biocentrism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Ruth Chadwick et al. vol.

1, San Diago: Academic Press, 1993. p. 278.

15. Ibid.

16. John Rodman. “The Liberation of Nature.” Inquiry 20. 1977. pp. 94-101.

17. Peter Hay. “Ecophilosophy.” A Companion to Environmental Thought. Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press, 2002. p. 31.

18. “Environmental Ethics.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 02 June 2012

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_Ethics >.

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19. Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ch. XVII.

London: Russell, 1962. Sec. 1. Footnote to paragraph 4.

20. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd

ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. p.

57.

21. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

22. Peter Hay. “Animal Liberations/Animal Rights.” A Companion to Environmental

Thought. op. cit., p. 37.

23. Ibid.

24. Peter Singer. “Animal Liberation.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to

Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 25.

25. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd

ed. op. cit., p. 70.

26. Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals.

Wellingborough: Thorsons Publishers, 1975. p. 9.

27. Gary Varner. “Sentientism.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Dale Jamieson,

ed. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001. p. 194.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 196.

30. J. Baird Callicott. “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs.” Environmental Ethics.

Robert Elliot, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 55.

Special acknowledgement: In preparing this chapter I have also taken some help of I Gede

Suwantana’s unpublished thesis From Ecology to Ecosophy: A Study of Arne Naess’s

Environmental Philosophy. Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 2010.