Lp,ISHINGTHEDocsoF'WtRCoxFLICT M,tx,tcEMENT

TNADtvtDEDWonLD

Edited by Cltester A. Crocker,

Fen Osler Hampson,and PamelaAall

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Washington, D.C.

SrnrpMnKrNG,Srnrp BnBnKrNG,

AND SrnrnEmLURE

MohammedAyoob

TATE BREAKING AND STATE MILURE,both unavoidable accompaniments ofthe state-making process, lie at the root

of most conflicts that the international systemhas witnessed since the end of World War II.The veracity of this assertion is demonstratedby two generally accepted facts. The first is theincontestable reality that the overwhelmingmajority of conflicts since the end ofWorldWar II have been located in the postcolonialcountries that constitute the Third World. Thesecond is the equally incontrovertible fact thatmost such conflicts either have been primarilyintrastate in character or have possessed a sub-stantial intrastate dimension, even if they ap-pear to the outside observer to be interstateconflicts.l This means that problems of in-ternational and domestic order have becomeclosely intertwined during the current era andare likely to remain so well into the foresee-able future.

The validity of both these assertions, thatis to say, the concentration of conflicts in theThird World and the primacy of domestic

sources of conflict, is confirmed by the latestdata presented in the ,S/PRI Yearbook 2005.These data demonstrate that all nineteen ma-jor armed conflicts thatwere recorded rn2004were classified as intrastate in character. How-ever, the report makes clear that "[i]n a reversal

of the classic spill-over of conflict from intra-to inter-state, developments in Iraq during2004 raised the prospect ofan internationalconflict creating a firlly fledged civil war.'z lraq,therefore, stands out as the exception thatproves the rule. In the previous year,2003,SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute) had identified nineteenmajor armed conflicts as well, but had notedthat two of them, the conflict between Indiaand Pakistan over Kashmir and the invasionof Iraq by the United States and the UnitedKingdom, were interstate in character.3 Whileboth Kashmir and Iraq continued to figure inthe 2004list, the basic character of these con-flicts was perceived as having been changedby the amelioration of the India-Pakistan di-mension of the Kashmir conflict on the one

95

96 MoHelauBo Ayoos

hand and the "success" of the U.S. invasion onthe other.

Almost all of the conflicts in 2003 and2004were located in the old or newThird World,as had been the case in previous years. The newThird World refers to states in Central Asia,the Caucasus, and the Balkans that emergedout of the disintegration of the Soviet Unionand the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. Interms of their colonial background, the arbi-trary construction oftheir boundaries by ex-temal powers, the lack of societal cohesion, theirrecent emergence into juridical statehood, andtheir stage of economic and political develop-ment, the states of the Caucasus and CentralAsia and of the Balkans demonstrate oolitical.economic, and social characteristics that are inmanyways akin to those of the Asian, African,and Latin American states that have tradition-ally been considered as constituting the ThirdWorld. There are abundant data, therefore, tosupport the conclusion that the overwhelmingmajority of conflicts in the international system

since 1945 have been "a ubiquitous corollaryof the birth, formation, and fracturing ofThird World states."4

SrerB MaruNG rN THE THrRD WoRLD

The events since the eady 1990s, by removingthe SecondWorld from the intemational equa-tion, have helped present the dichotomy be-tween the global core and the global periphery

-the First World and the Third World-invery stark terms. By eliminating the Cold Waroverlay from Third World conflicts and thusexposing their fundamental local dynamics,the end ofbipolarityhas also demonsffated theclose linkage between these conflicts and thedlnamics ofstate making (and its obverse, state

breaking and state failure) currendyunderwayin the global periphery. The proliferation ofconflicts in the periphery, when comparedwith the image of relative tranquillitywithinand amity among the industrialized countriesofWestern Europe and North America, has

augmented the impression that there are ac-tually two distinct zones in the internationalsystem-the zone of peace in the North andthe zone of turmoil in the South-and thatthe two work according to different logics, a

Lockean one in the former and a Hobbesianone in the latter.s

However, this dichotomous representationofthe First andThirdWorlds hides the essen-

tial similarity in their process of state making,which has been (and is) crucial in determin-ing the political trajectories of states. Thispoint becomes clear if one compares the cur-rent situation in the Third World, not withthat prevailing within and among the indus-trial democracies today, but with the situationfrom the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuryin Western Europe, when the eadiest of themodern sovereign states were at a stage ofstate making that corresponded with the stage

where most Third World states find them-selves today.b

Youssef Cohen and colleagues have mostsuccincdy defined the process of state makingas "primitive central state power accumula-tion."7 Thus defined, state making must in-clude the following:

r The expansion and consolidation of theterritorial and demographic domain undera political authority, including the imposi-tion oforder on contested territorial and de-mographic space (war)

o The maintenance of order in the territorywhere, and over the population on whom,such order has already been imposed (po-iicing)

o The extraction of resources from the terri-tory and the population under the controlofthe state, resources essential not only tosupport the war-making and policing ac-tivities undertaken by the state but also tomaintain the apparatuses of state necessary

to carry on routine administration, deepenthe state's penetration ofsociety, and serve

symbolic purposes (taxation)8

SrerB MarrNc. Srem BnpexrNc. eNo SretB Ferlunr 97

All three broad categories of activities out-lined here, however, depend on the state's suc-

cess in monopolizing and concentrating themeans of coercion in its own hands in the ter-ritory and among the population it controls.That is why the accumulation of power be-comes so crucial to the state-making enterpriselthe more primitive the stage of state building,the more coercive the strategies employed toaccumulate and concenffate power in the hands

ofthe agents ofthe state. Cohen and colleagues

stated in a seminal article published in 1981,

"The extent to which an expansion of state

power will generate collective violence depends

on the level of state power prior to that expan-

sion. . . . The lower the initial level of state

power, the stronger the relationship betweenthe rate of state expansion and collective vio-lence."e One needs to be reminded that theviolence generated during the process ofstatemaking is the result of actions undertakenboth by the state and by recalcitrant elements

within the population that forcefi.rlly resist thestate's attempt to impose order.

The inherent similarity in the logic of thestate-building process provides us explana-tions for the current replication by ThirdWorld states of several dimensions of the early

modern European experience of state making.Simultaneously, the difference in the pace at

which state building has to be undertaken and

completed in theThirdWorld and the dramat-ically changed international environment inwhich Third World state making has to pro-ceed explain the divergence in other dimen-sions from the earlier European model of state

building. The similarities and the differencesare equally important, as is the bearing theyhave on problems of authority and governance

within Third World states.

It should be noted that in most of Europe,state making usually antedated the emergence

of nations and nation-states by a couple ofcenturies. This is why it is essential not to con-fuse the building of modern sovereign states

with the emergence of nation-states in the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries.lo So'ter-

eign and relatively centrahzed states that have

performed successfully over a long period oftime-and have therefore knit their people

together in terms of historical memories,legal

codes, language, religion, and so forth-mayevolve into nation-states or at least providethe necessary conditions for the emergence ofnation-states, but they are not synonymous

with the latter. Historical evidence has con-vincingly demonstrated that in almost allcases in Europe, with the exception of theBalkans (an exception that may provide theclue to the current violence and strife in thatregion), the emergence of the modern sover-

eign state was the precondition for the for-mation of the nation.11

This generalization applied as much to late-

comers such as Germany as it did to the ear-

liest examples of modern states, such as En-gland and France. Without the central roleperformed by the Prussian state, Germanywould probably have remained nothing more

than a geographic or cultural expression. Thesimilarity betvveen the German experience on

the one hand and the French experience on the

other has been summed up well by CorneliaNavari: "When Hegel insisted that it was the

state that created the nation, he was lookingbackurards to the history ofFrance, not for-ward to the history of Germany. When Ger-many was unified'from above'in 1870 and

the Reich was formed, this way of proceed-

ing did not appear to most Germans to be at

variance with the experience of their Western

neighbors-a substitution of Union'by force'

for the brganic growtti of France and England.

It appeared to be a repetition ofit, differingonly in that it was less bloody. Here, as there,

the state was moving outwards into diverse

feudal remnants of the old order, dissolving

them, making all obedient to the same law."72

The chronological sequence of the estab-

lishment of the sovereign state and the evo-

lution of nationalism in theThirdWorld bears

very close resemblance to that of modern

98 MoHewro Ayooe

Europe, with the state taking clear historicalprecedence over the nation. As AnthonySmith has put it very succincdy, "[T]he west-ern model is essentially a'state system'ratherthan a'nation system'; and this has been itsfatefirl legacy to Africa and Asia." Smith goeson to point out that despite the differences ingeopolitical and cultural terms between Eu-rope and the Third World, "the central point. . . of the western experience for contemporaryAfrican and Asian social and political changehas been the primacy and dominance of thespecialized, territorially defined, and coercivelymonopolistic state, operating within a broadersystem of similar states bent on fulfilling theirdual functions of internal regulation and ex-ternal defence (or aggression)."13

In this context, it is instructive to noteCharles Tilly's point that "the building ofstates in Western Europe cost tremendouslyin death, suffering,loss of rights, and unwill-ing surrender of land, goods, or labor. . . . Thefundamental reason for the high cost of Eu-ropean state building was its beginning in themidst of a decentralized, largely peasant socialstructure. Building differentiated, autono-mous, centralized or ganizations with effectivecontrol of territories entailed eliminating orsubordinating thousands of semiautonomousauthorities. . . . Most of the European popu-lation resisted each phase ofthe creation ofstrong states."l4 Tilly's description of condi-tions in Europe at the birth of modern sover-eign states has an uncanny resemblance topresent conditions in manyThird World so-cieties. It thus helps to explain why, if onearranges the current state-building strategiesemployed in the Third World on a contin-uum ranging from coercion to persuasion(with the two ends representing ideal types),even those states like India that fall relativelvclose to the persuasive end of the continuumrely on significant amounts of coercion-aswitnessed over the past several decades in Pun-jab, Kashmir, and the northeastern states-toentrench and consolidate the authority of the

state in regions where it faces, or has faced,major challenges.

In order to replicate the process by whichrelatively centralized modern states are cre-ated, Third World state makers need above alltwo things: lots of time and a relatively freehand to persuade, cajole, and coerce the dis-par^te populations under their nominal nrle toaccept the legitimacy of state boundaries andinstitutions; to accept the right of the state toextract resources from them: and to let thestate regulate the more important public as-pects of their lives. Unfortunately for ThirdWorld state elites, neither of these tvyo com-modities is available to them in adequate mea-sure. This is because, unlike European states,

postcolonial states have to build states and na-tions within limited time spans, thus forcingthem to collapse sequential phases ofstate andnation construction into one mammoth phase.They have no alternative because their failureto accomplish in decades what European states

took centuries to do is likely to hold them upto international ridicule and consign them topermanent peripherality in the internationalsystem. Simultaneously, contemporary inter-national norms demand that postcolonial stateelites treat their populations humanely andaccording to codes of civilized behavior, thusrestraining their capacity to use force in thepursuit of state making and nation building.The lack of adequate time and normative con-straints imposed on state makers make theirtask very difficult and encourage the emer-gence of secessionist movements that chal-lenge the state's authority and lay the basis forintrastate conflict.i5

The point regarding the availability of timebecomes clear if one examines the amount oftime it took for the states ofWestern Europeto emerge as firll-fledged sovereign states, en-jon"g the habitual obedience of their popula-tions, basically secure in the legitimacy of theirborders and institutions, and, therefore, in a

position where they could respond positivelyto societal demands, since these demands no

Srern MAxrNG, SrATn BRnATNG, RNo Statn FRrluns 99

longer ran counter to the logic of state buildingand the accumulation of power in the handsof the state. It was not until the beginning ofthe twentieth century that the states of West-em Europe and their offshoots in North Amer-ica emerged as the responsive and representa-tive modern states that we know them to betoday-the end products of the state-makingprocess that had unfolded for at least three orfour hundred years. It is instmctive to remem-ber that the survival of the American state inits present form hung in the balance in the1860s, only 150 years ago, and it managed tosurvive only after a bloody civil war that leftmillions dead. Although leading historians ofstate building in Europe differ about the exactdating of the origins, in the sense of begin-nings, of the modern sovereign state, there islitde argument about the fact that "it took fourto five centuries for European states to over-come theirweaknesses, to remedytheir admin-istrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarmloyalty up to the white heat of nationalism."16

Unfortunately forThird World state mak-ers, their states cannot afford the luxury ofprolonging the traumatic and costly experi-ence of state making over hundreds of years ila Europe. The demands of competition withestablished modern states and the demonstra-tion effect ofsocially cohesive, politically re-sponsive, and administratively effective states

in the industrialized world make it almostobligatory for Third World states to reachtheir goal within the shortest possible time.The pioneers of European state making (al-though not the latecomers like Germany andItaly) were remarkably free from systemicDressures and demonstration effects. because

"[ th. leading contenders for statehood-England, France, Spain, Holland-were basi-cally in the same boat, trying to navigate thesame uncharted sea. Where European states

did not have this luxury and had to compresssome of the sequential phases that togetherconstituted the process of state building, theysuffered from a "cumulation of crises."17 This

applied particularly to the states of Germanyandltaly,which emerged as unified sovereign

entities only in the closing decades ofthe nine-teenth century and were immediately faced

with the pressures of mass politics. In fact, itcan be argued that the emergence of ItalianFascism and German Nazism was a result ofthe Italian and German state elites'inability inthe first two decades of the twentieth centuryto respond successfully, in a context of mass

politics, to the accumulated crises threateningtheir respective states.l8

If this was the case with Germany, whichhad the well-established Prussian state at itscore, one can well imagine the enormity of the

challenge faced by the postcolonial states ofthe Third World. The latter's problems have

been compounded by the fact that they are

under pressure to demonstrate adequate state-

hood quickl/i to perform the task of state

making in a humane, civilized, and consensual

fashion; and to do all this in an era of mass

politics. The inadequacy of the time elementand the consequent fact that several sequential

phases involved in the state-making process

have had to be telescoped together into one

mammoth state-building enterprise go a longway toward explaining the problems of author-ity and governance faced by the Third Worldstates today.le Given the short time at thedisposal of state makers in the Third Worldand the consequent acceleration in their state-

making efforts necessary to demonstrate thatthey are moving speedily toward effectivestatehood, crises erupt simultaneously and be-come unmanageable as the load they put on

the political system outruns the political andmilitary capabilities of the state, thus furthereroding the legitimacy of the already fragilepostcolonial state.

INtBnNettoNALNoRMS oFSretBHooo AND HUMAN Rrcnrs

In addition to these internal factors, the work-ings of the international system, especially the

MoHevuBo Avooe

policies adopted by the superpowers duringthe Cold War era, have complicated the pro-cess of state making in the Third World. Withthe export of superpower rivalry to the ThirdWorld in the form of proxywars, both inter-state and intrastate, and the transfer ofweaponsto governments and insurgents in fragile poli-ties in volatile regional environments, thebipolar global balance during the Cold Warera gready accentuated the insecurities and in-stabilities in theThird World. Numerous cases

in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East attest tothe veracity of this statement.2o

Equally important, certain internationalnorms that have crystalJtzed relatively recendyhave also had mixed effects on the securityand stability of Third World states. The firstof these norms relates to the inalienability ofjuridical sovereignty or statehood once con-fered by international law and symbolized bymembership in the United Nations.The sanc-tity of the borders ofpostcolonial states formsthe logical corollary to this norm. While thisinternational norm has done much to preservethe existence of several Third World states

that may have otherwise been unviable, it has

also, paradoxically, added to the security pre-dicament of theThirdWorld state.This pointcan best be understood by recalling that theelimination of states considered unviable, ei-ther because oftheir internal contradictions orbecause their existence did not suit great-porveraspirations, was perfectly acceptable to theEuropean international community virtuallythrough the end of World War I. The Prus-sian annexation of several Germanic princi-palities in the 1860s and the periodic disap-pearance and reappearance ofPoland in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries are primeexamples of this phenomenon.

The international consensus on the alien-ability ofjuridical statehood began to changeduring the interwar period and crystallizedafter World War II in the context of the de-colonization ofAsia and Africa. Colonies, oncegranted independence, acquired the right to

exist as sovereign entities, even if many ofthem (especially in Africa) did not possess"much in the way of empirical statehood, dis-closed by acapacity for effective and civil gov-ernment.'21 This change has meant that, whilethis international norm has protected the legalexistence of postcolonial states without regardto their internal cohesiveness or the eflective-ness of their domestic control, it has been un-able to solve the security problems that suchstates face as a result of the contradictionspresent within their boundaries and inherentin their statemaking process.

It is worth noting here that this guaranteeencompassing juridical statehood and territo-rial integrity has begun to weaken in the post-Cold War era. This has been witnessed in awhole host of cases, ranging from northernIraq to Kosovo, where the international com-munity, led by the major Western powers, has

intervened in contravention of the principlesofstate sovereignty and the territorial integrityof established states. However, this change inintemational norms, if consolidated, is unlikelyto alleviate the Third World's security predica-ment. In fact, it is likely to worsen that situa-tion considerably and to add to the prevalentinstability and disorder in the Third World,because it has become linked to the issue oftheright of ethnic groups to sel-f:determination. Itappears, therefore, that the Third World is

caught in a no-win situation as far as this set

of international norms is concerned.A second set of international norms that

has affected the security of theThirdWorld isrelated to the issue of human rights, with pri-mary emphasis on civil and political rights.While the modem conception of human rightscan be traced to the natural law approach de-veloped in eighteenth-century Europe, the re-cent normative force that human rights haveacquired in the international arena is the resultof the acceptance by the vast majority of statesof the existence and validity of such rights forall human beings, regardless of their status as

citizens of particular states.22

Srero MerrNc. Srarn BneerrNc. eNo SrerB Farunp

The changing attitude toward human rightsas a legitimate concern of the internationalcommunity meant that they needed to be

brought within the ambit of international lawand rescued from their status as the exclusive

preserve ofsovereign states in relation to theirown citizens. This led to their inclusion in thePreamble and Article 1 of the United NationsCharter and to their codification in the Uni-versal Declaration of Human Rights, adoptedin7948,and the two International Covenants

on Human Rights, which were opened forsignature and ratification in 1966 and became

operative in7976,This was a major develop-ment in the evolution of norms that governthe international system, for it acknowledgedmore clearly than ever before that individuals,as well as states, could now be considered sub-jects of international law. It also signified theinternational acceptance of the principle thatindividuals and groups have rights that are in-dependent of their membership in individualstates and that derive not from their nationalstatus but from their status as members of thehuman species.

The major problem with the implementa-tion of human rights in the Third World is

that the concept of human rights owes its em-pirical validity to the existence and successfi.rl

functioning of the indus trialized, representa-

tive, and responsive states ofWestern Europeand North America. These states set the stan-

dards for effective statehood. as well as for thehumane and civilized treatment of their citi-zens.They do so by their demonstrated success

in simultaneously meeting the basic needs ofthe large majority of their populations, pro-tecting their human rights, and promotingand guaranteeing political participation. Butthese states have, by and large, successfully

completed their state-building process, are

politically satiated and economically affluent,and possess unconditional legitimacy in theeyes of the overwhelming majority of theirpopulations.They can therefore afford to adoptliberal standards ofstate behavior in relation

to their populations, because they are reason-

ably secure in the knowledge that societal de-

mands will not run counter to state interests

and will not put state structures and institu-tions in any gravejeopardy.

While norms regarding human rights have

been a touchstone of civilized behavior on the

part of states for almost half a century, a simi-lar status has begun to be accorded to demo-

cratic governance since the 1990s. The rheto-ric emanating from Washington and otherWestern capitals and the political conditional-ities attached to International Monetary FundandWorld Bankloans to developing counffies

since the 1990s have privileged political par-ticipation and encouraged democratic transi-ti.on in postcolonial countries. One cannot deny

that the policy of promoting democratic gov-

ernance has innate merits. However, in theshort run such a policy has the capacity to im-pede state- and nation-building activities by

putting constraints on state elites'pursuit ofthese goals.This is especially the case in multi-ethnic societies,where the transition to democ-

racy often accentuates ethnic cleavages and

sharpens competition for access to the privi-leges of power.The danger of systemic break-

down becomes particularly acute when de-

mocratizatton becomes equated merely withprocedural or electoral democracy and notmuch attention is paid to putting in place con-

stitutional and judicial constraints that wouldprevent majorities from riding roughshod over

minority opinions and interests. In dividedsocieties. such as those in the Third Worli,democracies can easily turn into majoritarianpolities where parties engage in competitivechauvinism thatwidens societal fissures to such

an extent that divisions become irreversible.

Sri Lanka is the classic case in point, but Iraqseems to be moving in the same direction.23

What are currently considered in theWest to be norms of civilized state behavior-including those pertaining to the humanrights of individuals and groups as well as

democratic governance-are, in the Third

r02 MoHavuBo Ayoos

World, not infrequently in contradiction withthe imperatives of state making.These imper-atives, as has been pointed out more than once,not only sanction but also frequently requirethe use of violent means against recalcitrantdomestic groups and individual citizens. Fur-thermore, the international norm upholdinghuman rights runs direcdy counter to the normthat prescribes the inalienability of luridicalstatehood for Third World states.24 While thelatter is uncompromising in upholding the le-gality of the existence of Third World stateswithin their colonially constructed boundaries,the former undermines the political legitimacyof these same states by prescribing standardsand yardsticks in terms that mostThird Worldstates, struggling to perform the minimumtasks of maintaining political order, will be in-capable of meeting for many decades to come.

Moreover, the simultaneous but contradic-tory operation of the two norms contributes tothe creation and augmentation ofinternal dis-content within Third World states. It does so

by, on the one hand, forcing all the diverse anddissatisfied elements within Third World states

to remain within their postcolonial bound-aries and, on the other, encouraglng these veryelements to make political, administrative, andeconomic demands on the states that thesestates cannot respond to successfirlly. The states

cannot respond either because they lack thecapabilities to do so or because doing so couldseriously jeo pardize their territorial integrity.

One can make the argument on behalf ofThirdWorld states, sti1l struggling to translatetheir juridical statehood into empirical state-hood, that the case for human rights (whetherof individuals or of groups) and against thestate's use ofviolent means to impose order isnot as morally unassailable as it may appe^r atfirst sight. This point can be made most ef-fectively in the context of the failed-statesphenomenon,where state structures have com-pletely collapsed.2s In these cases, it can bedemonstrated that in the absence of evenrudimentarily effective states to provide a min-

imum degree ofpolitical order-as in Lebanonfor the fifteen years of civil war, or as currendyin Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, above

all,Iraq,where dozens ofpeople are killed everyday-the concept of human rights remainsnothing more than a pure abstraction. In sucha context, the human rights ideal is impossibleto implement even minimally, because in theabsence of an effective sovereign a trulyHobbe-sian state ofnature prevails, and the very sur-vival of large segments of the population can-not be assured.

These comments should not be taken as anapologia for authoritarian regimes in theThirdWorld that ostensibly emphasize order at theexpense ofbothjustice and political partici-pation. Authoritarian regimes quite often con-tribute a great deal to the creation and aug-mentation of disorder in Third World statesdespite paying lip service to the objective ofmaintaining and promoting order. Iran underthe shah, the Philippines under Marcos,Zureunder Mobutu, Nicaragua under Somoza, andZimbabwe under Mugabe-to cite but a fewinstances-all provide good examples of thistendency.

It is also tme that most regimes in theThirdWorld attempt to portray threats to theirregimes as threats to the state. Discerning an-alysts must, therefore, carefirlly distinguish be-tween issues of regime security and those ofstate security. However, in many cases, giventhe lack of unconditional legitimacy bothof the regime and of the state structure in theThirdWorld and the close perceptual connec-tion between regime and state as far as themajority of the state's population is concerned,the line between regime security and state secu-ritybecomes so thin, and the intelplaybetweenthe two so dense, that it is virtually impossibleto disentangle one from the other. As oneperceptive scholar pointed out in connectionwith the Middle East, "[T]hose who rulemust attempt to encourage loy"lty to the state,ofwhich they hope themselves to be the chiefbeneficiaries, while at the same time seeking

Srerp MexrNc. SrerB BReerrNc. eNo SrerB Ferluno 103

to disguise the fact that their system ofpower,and thus the identity of the political structureitsel{, frequendy owes more to the old ties ofsectarian and tribal loyalty."26In many such

countries the fall of the regime is likely tosignal the failure of the state as well; any stu-dent ofTudor England or Bourbon Francewill find this phenomenon very familiar. Iraqprovides the latest testimony to the veracity ofthis proposition.

EtrrNoNeuoNAL SELF-D Btnwnqetlou

The human rights issue raises a further prob-lem. Given the multiethnic nature of mostThird World states, if human rights are in-terpreted as group rights and, therefore, are

seen to include the right to ethnonational self-determination, they are likely to pose gravethreats to the territorial integrity andjuridi-cal statehood of postcolonial states, onceagain pitting one set of international normsagainst another. The legitimation of the notionof ethnonational self-determination, how-ever partial and selective, following the end ofthe Cold War-symbolized by the promptrecognition accorded to the successor states tothe Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the sep-

aration of Slovakia from the Czech Republic

-is likely to have encouraged demands forethnic separatism in the Third World. Giventhe latent tensions between ethnicity andstate-defined nationalism even in functioningfederal polities like India and the clear contra-diction between ethnonationalism and state-

defined nationalism in much of the ThirdWorld, any development anywhere in the in-ternational arena that may encourage ethnicseparatist demands in the context of state and

regime fragilities prevalent in the Third Worldis bound to add to the great strains already ex-

istingwithin these polities.The effects of such

a contagion spreading have been summed upin a Council on Foreign Relations study thatconcluded that "while the creation of some

new states may be necessary or inevitable, the

fragmentation of international society intohundreds of independent territorial entities is

a recipe for an even more dangerous and anar-

chic wodd."27A major problem with ethnonational self-

determination relates to the definition of the

ethnic self that is seeking to determine its fu-ture. The self:perception and selFdefinition ofethnicity is usually subject to change, depend-

ing on the context in which it operates at any

point in time. This is what Crawford Young

has referred to as "the dynamic and changing

character of contemporary ethnicity: Far fromrepresenting a fixed and immutable set ofstatic social facts, cultural pluralism is itselfevolving in crucial ways and is in major re-

spects contextual, situational, and circumstan-

tial.'28 Therefore, to link such a potent ideology

as that of self-determination to a malleable

idea like that of ethnicity-and then to legit-imize this combination by reference to the

principle of human rights ofgroups-is bound

to inffoduce even greater disorder in the ThirdWorld than is akeady present, because it en-

dows the demands of everydisgrunded ethnic

group with the legitimacy of the ideal of na-

tional self-determination. The danger is thatthis is exacdy what the renewed popularity ofthe idea of ethnonational self-determinationmay end up achieving, to the great detriment ofboth order and justice in the Third World.

The problem is fi.rther confounded by the

fact that, given the ethnic mixtures of popula-

tions in most countries, hardly any pure ethnic

homelands still exist. This fact contradicts the

ethnonationalists' assumption that "the earth's

entire population, or most of it, divides intoa finite number of distinct, homogeneous

peoples.It follows that the world's ideal con-dition consists of that finite number of nation-states."29 Attempts at ethnonational self-determination are, therefore, bound to run intoresistance from ethnic minorities in presumed

ethnic homelands. As William Pfaff has suc-

cincdy put it, "The ethnic state is a product ofthe political imagination; it does not exist in

reality. . . . The idea of the ethnic nation thus isa permanent provocation to war."30 Such con-flict is expected to result either in virulent formsof ethnic cleansing or in the carving out ofmicrostates from the ministates established onthe basis of ethnic nationalism. or both.

Quesr Srerns,qNo ERlno Srerns

Related to the issue of ethnonational self-determination is the failed-states phenome-non. Jack Snyder has described the link be-tween the two bydescribing ethnic nationalismas "the default option." According to Snyder,ethnic nationalism "predominates when insti-tutions collapse, when existing institutions are

not firlfilling people's basic needs, and whensatisfactory alternative structures are not read-ily avai1ab1e."31 While this may not providethe total explanation for the revival of ethno-nationalism, it does capture avery major in-gredient that has contributed to the recentpopularity of the ethnonationalist ideology,namely, the lack of effective statehood. This istrue not only in the case of the components ofthe former Soviet Union and of the FormerYugoslavia but also in many parts of the ThirdWorld. The lack of effective statehood was re-sponsible for the emergence of what RobertJackson has termed "quasi-states" in the ThirdWorld.32 These quasi states can now clearlybe seen as precursors of failed states in theglobal South.

The end of the Cold War has had an im-portant impact on the transformation of someof these quasi states into failed states. This isespecially true in the case ofthose states thathad witnessed high levels of superpower in-volvement in the military sphere, includingthe arena of arms transfers, during the ColdWar era. At the height of the Cold War, thesuperpowers attempted to strengthen clientgovernments in internally fragmented states,each often seeking to maintain a semblanceof stability within countries that were alliedwith itself. One maior instrument of such

support was the transfer of large quantitiesof relatively sophisticated arms to friendlyregimes. In several instances, such arms trans-fers led to countervailing transfers ofweaponryby the rival superpower to forces opposed tothe central authorities. Afghanistan during the1980s came to epitomize this action-reactionphenomenon.33

Past superpower policies of pouring armsinto fragmented polities have, however, be-come a major source of instability and disor-der in the post-Cold War period. The presenceof large quantities of relatively sophisticatedweaponry (ranging from AK-47s to Stingermissiles) and the withdrawal of superpowersupport to weak and vulnerable regimes-support that was essential to prevent the cen-tral authorities from being overwhelmed bydomestic rivals who, in turn, were dividedamong themselves-created near-total anar-chy in countries like Afghanistan and Soma-lia, where central authority completely col-lapsed, thereby turning these quasi states intofailed states.

Furthermore, the failure of the internationalcommunity, principally the major powers andinternational organrzations, to prevent andcontrol the flow of small arms, which are re-sponsible for the majority of deaths in currentconflicts, is exploited by private arms dealersand transnational criminal cartels as well as

states interested in making fast money in themurky area of arms trade. This unregulatedarmsbazaar not only adds to the misery of thepopulace but also undermines state authorityin countries and regions most vulnerable tointernal conflicts.34

The relationship between state failure andinternal conflict is, however, not a one-waystreet, with the former inevitably leading tothe latter. The relationship is in many cases

circular, as the two phenomena feed on eachother, with state weakness providing the polit-ical space for the intensification of conflictsamong political factions and/or ethnic groups,and the conflicts in turn further eroding the

Srero MeruNc. Srere Bnoerrxc. eNo SrerB Ferlune 105

capacity of the state to maintain order andprovide security to its citizens. Suffering fromacute insecurity, individuals often turn to po-litical factions, ethnic groups, and even criminalgangs (and sometimes it is difficult to distin-guish among the three categories) to providethem with protection in exchange for theirloyalty and contribution-financial, physical,or both-to the "war effort."

There is another dimension of state failurethat has amalor impact on the level of conflictwithin societies. Alex de Waal has pointed thisout with great clarity in relation to Africa. Hehas argued that economic crisis in Africa has

meant that "governments find it more dfficultto sustain and control armies,which then turnto local sources of provisioning.These includerequisitioning, looting and taxing populations,involvement in commerce, and diverting hu-manitarian aid. Though the causes of war inAfrica and the aims of the combatants are stillalmost exclusively phrased in terms of achiev-ing state power and affecting constitutionalchange, the realities on the ground reflect more

intense predatory behaviour by soldiers."3s

This search for "survival" on the part of un-paid or poorly paid soldiers, who commandgreat coercive power in relation to the rest ofthe population, contributes to the reality and

perception of state failure while serving a "ra-

tional" purpose for those engaged in it.Finally, state failure,like state making, must

be viewed as a process, not an event. In I.William Zattmadswords, it is akin to "a long-term degenerative disease"36 rather thansomething that occurs at a particular point intime. Such an understanding of state failure*illh.lp one comprehend the fact that, as theLebanese example demonstrates, the process

is not irreversible. Furthermore, it will assist

one to understand why this process is usuallyaccompanied by long-drawn-out "civil" wars

duringwhich political factions fight overwhatthey presume to be the state's carcass and thestate attempts to revive itself drawing on itsresidual capacity and legitimacy. If and when

one faction succeeds in by and large subjugat-

ing the others, it usually dons the mantle ofthe state in order to legitimize the concentra-

tion of coercive power in its hands.

Similarly, if one views conflict and war as

process and not merely in terms of final out-comes, one can conclude that there are usually

groups, factions, and individuals that benefiteconomically, as well as politically, from the

prolongation of such wars. They come to ac-

quire a vested interest in perpetuating such

conflicts. This is why "fc]onflict entrepreneurs,

as well as conflict victims, must be part of any

anallxrcal frameworld' devised to study whathas been termed "complex political emergen-

cies."37 Such a perspective can help unravel

the rationality behind what appear to the out-

side observer to be totally irrational conflicts.

DBnaocnetlZArIoNINTHETHIRDWORLD

It may seem obvious to the lay observer thatthe principal method to prevent state makingfrom being transformed into state failure is to

grant greater political participation to those

sectors of society-whether ethnic or socio-

economic-that have heretofore been er<cluded

from the exercise of political power. It wouldbe too naive to believe, however, that democ-

ratization-defined in terms of increasing

guarantees for the exercise ofcivil and polit-ical liberties and in terms of political partici-pation through the medium of competitiveelectoral politics-by itself, and in all contexts,

will succeed tn neutraliitng ethnic separa-

tism.38 The success of the democratic experi-

ment in defusing ethnic tensions will, there-fore, depend on a number offactors, identifiedby Ren6e de Nevers as including "the speed

with which ethnic issues are recognized; thelevel of ethnic tension when the democtatiza-

tion process begins; the size and power of dif-ferent ethnic groups within the statel the ethnic

composition ofthe previous regime and its op-

position; the political positions of the leaders

r06 MouevnrBo Ayoos

of the main ethnic groups; the presence or ab-sence ofexternal ethnic allies; and the ethniccomposition of the military."39

There is, however, another side to the de-mocratizatton coin. The demands of statebuilding and democratization can be recon-ciled only if the demo $atizing state in theThird World is credibly able to monopolizethe instruments of violence within its territo-ries, thus preventing dissident groups from at-tempting to change the state's boundaries whenpolitical controls are relaxed. This monopolyover instruments of violence is essential be-cause "often the first act offorces liberated bythe introduction of democracy is to seek somepermanent escape from the state they see as

having oppressed them."4oThis is where the most severe problems are

likely to arise, even if democratic political sys-tems become the norm rather than the excep-tion in theThirdWorld. Democratic and (even

more important) democ raiirngregimes can-not afford to be seen as weakwhen confrontedby separatist challenges and cannot, in the finalanalysis, give up their right to lay down andenforce the rules (even if some of these havebeen negotiated with the opponents of thestate) by which the game of politics is to beplayed within the boundaries of states overwhich they preside. Otherwise, the "demo-cratic center may be questioned for its ineffi-ciency in creating or its weakness in handlingthe secessionist crisis, opening the way formilitary intervention."4l

This point is inadequately understood bymany proponents of democratization in theThird World, who tend to equate democraticstates with weak states on the assumption thatstrong states are bound to be autocratic bynature. By making this assumption they failto learn from the European experience thatdemocracy emerged as the final stage of thestate-building process and not at the expenseof state building. Even in todays context, whendemocratyzation cannot wait until state build-ing is completed, it cannot tfuive in the absence

of the political order that only a strongly en-trenched state can provide. Democratization,therefore, must complement rather than con-tradict the process of state making; withoutthe political order that can be provided only byeffective states, the gains of democratizationcannot be sustained. Anarchies-as the exam-ples of Somali a, LTberia,Afghanistan, and Iraqclearly demonsffate-are no respecters of dem-ocratic values and human rights.

However, the reconciliation of the two im-peratives of the consolidation of state powerand democrainationis not, and will not be, aneasy task even if tremendous goodwill is pres-ent on all sides. Major tensions are bound toarise between state elites and their ethnic andpolitical opponents who would like to put sig-nificant curbs on the power ofthe central state.In addition, where separatist insurgencies arealready under way, major problems betweenseparatists and democrattzng central govern-ments are likely to revolve around two basicquestions: What is the guarantee that groupsespousing separatism will indeed surrender allarms and reconcile themselves to autonomousor semiautonomous status that will continueto be essentially dependent on the good faithand the continuing political sagacity of thecentral government? What is the guaranteethat central authorities, after persuading sepa-ratist ethnic groups to lay down their armsand thus having overcome immediate internalsecurity crises, will continue to abide by theircommitment to popular political participa-tion, the constitutional protection of minorityrights, and regional autonomy?

The answers provided by theThirdWorld'shistorical record to these questions do not leavemuch room for optimism. Furthermore, if onegoes by the eadier European experience, oneis likely to conclude that the historical junc-ture at which most Third World states findthemselves today is unlikely to permit a greatdeal of ethnic accommodation and politicalparticipation. These two processes usuallyrun counter to the overriding imperative of

Srnrn MexrNc. SrarB BnBer<rNc. eNo SrerB Ferlunp 107

consolidating state power and fashioning a

state that is sovereign, not merely juridicallybut also empirically. However, one can makean effective argument that the early-twenty-first-century context is so dramatically differ-ent from the late-eighteenth- or even the late-nineteenth-century context that radically newsolutions must be found for this dilemma.

In other words, the problem of reconcilingthe demands of state making with those ofdemocratization and human rights-as wellas with demands for regional autonomy, devo-lution of powers, and protection of minoritygroup rights-will have to be addressed muchmore creatively, and mutually acceptable solu-tions will have to be found, if the twin specters

of failed states and destructive ethnonational-ism are to be kept atbay.Above all, this meansthat the trajectories of democratization (in-cluding the preservation ofgroup rights andlocal autonomy for substate units), on the onehand, and of the consolidation of coercivepower and concentration oflegitimate author-ity in the hands of the state, on the other, mustnot diverge radically. In fact, they should ide-ally become mutually legitimizing agents, withdemocratnation legitimizing the greater con-centration of authorityin the hands ofthe state

and the concentration of centralized power le-gitimizing and facilitating the loosening ofpolitical controls and the guaranteeing ofpo-litical and civil rights to the citizenry.

Most important, the two processes shouldnot be allowed to become the polar opposites ofeach other. Faced with a stark choice betweenthe territorial integrity of the state and de-mocraizafon, state elites are invariably boundto opt for territorial integrity over democrati-zation. Where the processes of territorial in-tegrity and democracy collide, democratiza-tion cannot prevail without the disintegrationof the state.Therefore, in order for the strateg'y

of democratization to work successfrrllywith-out threatening the disintegration ofstates,the state elites'decision to democratize mustbe firmlylinked to the negotiated surender of

separatist groups where they exist. The dis-arming of such groups should proceed in tan-dem with the implementation of any plans forautonomy or devolution of powers that mayhave been negotiated between the parties.

TnB RorB oFTHE INtBnNeTIoNALConavnnurv rN DEMocRATIZATIoN

The intemational community, working throughthe United Nations, can play a constructiverole in encouraging reconciliation betweenstate building and democratizationby adopt-ing a very restrictive approach toward recog-nizing new political entities that attempt tobreak away from established states in the ThirdWorld. A too-permissive approach to state

breaking, as witnessed in the early 1990s inthe case of the formerYugoslavia,will add toconflict and anarchy rather than preservinginternational order. Colonially imposed state

boundaries may be an iniquitous way of de-lineating the borders of ThirdWorld states,

but every other alternative appears to be infi-nitely worse.

The United Nations must not fall into thetrap of giving legitimacy to demands for se-

cession from member states, unless the termshave been peacefi.rlly negotiated with the par-ent state. Exceptions like Eritrea, EastTimor,and Kosovo must not influence, let alone de-termine, the norms of international behavior.

Eritrea was a special case because its separa-

tion was negotiated with the post-Mengisturegime in Ethiopia. Furthermore, Eritrea re-gained the colonially crafted political identitywithin the colonial boundaries that had been

compromise d in 1952 by the internationallysponsored merger of the former Italian colonywith the Ethiopian empire and the subsequent

flagrant violation by Addis Ababa of Eritreanautonomy that had formed an integral partof the merger agreement. However, despiteEritrea's peaceful separation from Ethiopia inthe early 1990s, by the late 1990s its relationswith Ethiopia had deteriorated once again to

108 MoHeunoo Avoos

such an extent that the two countries fought abloody border war that has had tremendousadverse consequences for the economies ofboth states.

EastTimor was also not a oart of the Indo-nesian postcolonial state. Unlike the rest ofIndonesia, which had been a Dutch colony,East Timor was a Portuguese colony that wasforcibly annexed by Indonesiain 7975 whenPornrgal withdrew from the territory. Althoughit took twenty-five years for EastTimor to re-gain its independence within its erstwhile colo-nial borders, the episode demonstrated thedeep impact of colonial structures on shapingpostcolonial national identities.

Kosovo is unfinished business from thedisintegration of Yugoslavia. The division ofYugoslavia into ethnically defined states led onthe one hand to major civil conflict in Bosniaand on the other to the assertion of Kosovo'sethnic nationalism. The latter assertion, legit-tmized by the ethnic division of Yugoslavia,became particulady intense in the context ofthe Serbian attempt to marginalize politicallyand economically the large Kosovar Albanianmajority by reneging on the province's au-tonomous status. This forced the Albanians,who formed 90 percent of the population, tolive in subordination both to the Serb minorityin Kosovo and to the Serbian government inBelgrade. Had the multiethnic Yugoslav fed-eration not been dismanded. the world wouldnot have been faced with the ethnic cleansingin Bosnia, the Serb atrocities on the KosovarAlbanians, and the international interventionto prevent the repetition ofethnic cleansingin Kosovo.

The international community must be es-

pecially wary of allowing these precedents togovern its reactions to the situation in Iraq,however dire it may appear in the short term.Encouraging, or even passively acquiescing in,Kurdish demands for secession will oDen ahornet's nest in the Middle East, reopeningquestions regarding state borders that havebeen considered setded and leading to highly

negative reactions, not only from the Arabworld but from Turkey and Iran as well. Do-mestic tensions within Iraq, already exacer-bated by the U.S. invasion, will be transformedinto a regional conflict of major proportionspulling many oflraqs neighbors into its vortex.

EnpnNerry INoucBo Srnrn Eerrunn

The case of Iraq, and that of Afghanistan be-fore it, highlights a major cause of and catalystfor, state failure that has so far been neglected inthe analysis of the subject. It has been demon-strated conclusively that great-power involve-ment in the domestic and regional conflictsafflicting postcolonial states have often haddeleterious consequences for state-buildingefforts in the Third World. Superpower com-petition during the Cold War era for the loy-alties of states, regimes, and factions in devel-oping countries particularly contributed to theintensification of the security predicamentfaced by Third World states.42 But Iraq andA-fghanistan are unique in the sense that theyhave clearly shown that external great-powerintervention does not merely contribute tostate failure but can be its principal cause bysetting up the targeted countries for state col-lapse. They have also thrown into sharper re-lief earlier cases of great-power interventionthat led to state debilitation bordering on state

failure. These latter cases include Angola andMozambique from the mid-1970s until the1990s. Covert U.S. support to insurgent groupsand tribal factions in these sub-Saharan coun-tries played a key role in undermining the ef-fectiveness of postcolonial regimes that weresupported by the Soviet Union. This deliber-ate policy of state debilitation seriously de-tracted from the capacity of governmentsin the two countries to maintain order withirrtheir domains and provide security to theirpopulations. Mahmood Mamdani argues quiteconvincingly that the United States appliedwith great effect the lessons it had learnedin Angola and Mozambique, as well as in

SrerB MarrNc, SrarB BReerrNc, eNo Srarr Farluno 109

Nicaragua, where it armed and equipped theContras against the socialist Sandinista gov-ernment, to its venture in Afghanistan, whereit once again aimed at destabilizing and inca-pacitating a regime that was a Soviet ally.a3 Inthe process, it set up Afghanistan for statefailure but this time of a much more dire sortand with enoffnous unforeseen and unintendedconsequences.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghan-istan began in earnest in December 7979,tosave a tottering client regime that had come topower in April 7978but was riven with dis-cord and was at the same time reeling underthe pressure ofan insurgency supported by theUnited States and Pakistan.The United States

responded to the direct Soviet intervention byratcheting up its support to the insurgents and

launching what amounted to a full-fledgedproxy war in Afghanistan billed as a jihadagainst godless communism. This jihad notonly facilitated the ingathering of transna-tional jihadi elements in Afghanistan but also

launched that country on the slippery slope ofstate failure. Following the Soviet withdrawalfrom Afghanistan rn 1989, U.S.-armed jihadifactions fought each other brutally, destroyingwhatwas left of the state infrastructure.Thus,they succeeded in creating a political vacuumthat facilitated the creation by transnationaljihadis of a safe haven from which they couldlaunch their global campaign of terror.aa Itis indeed ironic that the terrorist attacks of9/77were in large part the direct consequence

of the externally induced collapse of the state

in Afghanistan, for which the United States

bore much of the responsibility. It was the ab-sence of political order in Afghanistan thatprovided al Qgeda with the opportunity andthe space to plan and execute the attacks onthe United States.

These terrorist attacks triggered a U.S. re-sponse that targeted not onlyAfghanistan butalso Iraq as part of the Bush administration's"war on terror." Iraq was targeted despite thefact that there was little evidence connectins

al Qeda to the Saddam regime.as The U.S.

invasion oflraq created the conditions for the

debilitation and potential dismemberment ofthe Iraqi state by destroying the Iraqi state ap-

paratus and failing to put in place an alterna-

tive structure that would be both effective and

legitimate. Equally important, according toRobert Malley and Peter Harling, "Washing-ton's conviction that the Bdathist regime was

essentially Sunni (it was not) and that large

numbers of Sunni Arabs therefore were inher-endy opposed to its overthrow (theywere not)became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearing re-sistance in Sunni Arab areas before it actually

materialised, US forces treated them harshly.

This helped heighten hostility from SunniArabs who increasingly, albeit reluctantly,identified themselves as such."46 The con-sequent alienation of Sunni Arabs from theemerging post-Saddam structure helped cre-

ate a hospitable environment for the transna-

tional jihadis to operate in.It would be wrong to equate the Iraqi

insurgency merely with transnational jihadiactivities.aT However, faulty U.S. policies pro-vided crucial momentum and operating space

to shadowy organizations, such as the al-Zarqawi-led al Qgeda in Iraq, to prepare forand conduct acts of terror both within lraq and

in neighboring countries.a8 The U.S. invasion

thus created conditions that not only seemed tobe pushing lraq toward disintegration but also

helped provide transnational jihadi terorists,who had lost their safe haven in Afghanistanfollowing the U.S.{ed invasion of that country

in2007-2,with a new base from which they

could operate.It is no wonder that President

George W. Bush's repeated declaration thatIraq had become the center for internationalterorism became a self-firlfilling prophecy.

The blowback for the United States fromthe Iraq invasion is likely to be far greater than

that from the U.S.-supported war against theSoviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This willbe the case because, as Peter Bergen and AlecReynolds have pointed out, "Fighters in Iraq

110 MoHelruBo Ayoos

are more battle hardened than the AfghanArabs, who fought demoralized Soviet armyconscripts. They are testing themselves againstarguably the best army in history, acquiringskills in their battles against coalition forcesthat will be far more useful for future terroristoperations than those their countelparts leamedduring the 1980s."aeJust as many of the lead-ing lights of the current generation of Islamistmilitants are veterans of the Afghan war, theinsurgency in Iraq is likely to produce the lead-ership for the third generation ofjihadis, whoare likely to pose major threats to Muslimregimes allied to the United States. Accordingto Bergen and Reynolds, "fT]he blowbackfrom Iraq is likely to be as painful for SaudiArabia as the blowback from Afghanistan wasfor Eglpt and Algeria during the 1990s."s0

Afghanistan and Iraq provide grave warn-ings to major powers and international insti-tutions that they should desist from undue in-terference, especially of the military kind, inthe domestic affairs of developing countriescurrently in the early stages of state making.Given the fragile and contingent nature ofthestate-building exercise, such intervention hasimmense potential to become the proverbiallast straw that may break the camel's back, thusleading to state evaporation. Both Afghanistanand Iraq demonstrate that the disintegrationor collapse of states, even those initially notconsidered important actors in the interna-tional system, often possesses the capacity toaffect the strategic interests of great powers indirect and indirect ways, thus turning suchstates into major issues of global concern andprimary sources of systemic destabilization.

TsB INrnnNnrroNAL ColanatDqrTyAND HT]MANITARIAN INTBRVCNTTON

These warnings are particularly relevant todaysince humanitarian interventions have comeinto vogue since the 1990s. The U.S. invasionof Iraq has also been justified post facto as

humanitarian. The normative chanqes re-

garding human rights mentioned earlier have

led from the early 1990s to a dramatic increase

in cases of humanitarian intervention under-taken by major powers in the name of the in-ternational community. Some of these, such as

in Haiti, Bosnia, and EastTimor, were author-izedby the UN Security Council; others, suchas the one in Kosovo, did not receive UN Se-curity Council authorization but were under-taken nonetheless under the aegis ofregionalorganizations such as NAIO. Yet others, suchas the invasion of Iraq in 2003, were under-taken unilaterally by the lone superpower, theUnited States, with the token help of alliesand camp followers in the teeth of oppositionby most states, including the majority of thepermanent members of the Security Council.

These multifarious types of interventionshave raised critical questions about who hasthe right to act on behalf of the "internationalcommunity."Sl The sidelining of the SecurityCouncil, as in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq,has detracted enormously from the authorityof the United Nations as well as from the le-gitimacy of the interventions themselves. Theselatter interventions have also raised the sDecterof externally assisted state breaking: Kosorro,virtually independent of Yugoslavia, and Iraq,in the throes ofa brutal insurgency, are candi-dates for state failure or dismemberment orboth. Such military interventions, even if un-dertaken for humanitarian reasons,which mostpeople doubt, especially in the case of Iraq, are

likely to be counterproductive and end up cre-ating greater disorder in the international sys-tem.52 The invasion of Iraq should, therefore,act as a dire waming that the intemational com-munity, acting through the Security Council,should prevent the recurrence ofunilateral in-terventionism even if contemplated by thelone superpower.

CoNcrusroN

It is in order to conclude with some policyprescriptions. International norms and the

SrerB MarrNc. SrarB BnrexrNc. eNo Srerp FerlunB 111

policies of international actors-lrimarily greatpowers and international institutions-canplay a crucial role in preserving internationalorder ifthey are used sagaciously to persuadedomestic protagonists to make deals with oneanother without violating the sovereignty of ex-isting states. Above all, the international com-munitymust strengthen the juridical status andbolster the political authority of Third Worldstates by refusing to countenance secessionist

demands while trying to persuade all partiesto accept the notion that self-determinationmust be delinked from secession and shouldbe defined in terms of empowering those seg-ments of the population that have been de-nied access to political and economic power.In other words. self-determination should beperceived as synonymous with democratiza-tion (and its attendant power-sharing arrange-ments), rather than with the breakup of exist-ing states.

Such an attitude, ifadopted by the interna-tional community, will send clear signals to allconcerned that the sovereign existence ofpost-colonial states is an essential prerequisite forthe creation and maintenance ofboth domes-tic and international order. It will also signalthat regimes that do not demonstrate a will-ingness to democratize must be ready to faceinternational opprobrium, pariah status, andeven sanctions. Such a stance on the part ofthe international community is necessary toprevent the Third World from sliding intogreater anarchy. For, above all, it must be recog-nized that the oroblem of order in the ThirdWorld can be iackled, not by trying to tran-scend the Westphalian model (a world made

up of sovereign states), but by attempting tostrengthen it. The root cause of disorder in theThird World is linked to the inadequacy ofstate authority and not to the excessive use ofstate power. The augmentation of authorityusually leads to a decrease in the reliance onforce by the state because, as Robert Jackmanhas argued, power without force is the truemeasure of the political capaciry of states.53

Finally, major powers, but especially theUnited States, must desist from intervening inthe domestic affairs of even those states thatmay have unsavory or hostile regimes unless

the latter directly threaten them militarily.The doctrine of preventive assault, as distinctfrom the preemption of imminent attack,espoused by the current U.S. administration,derogates from international order not merely

because it provides a strong justification formany future interventions by many states inmany locales. It is very deleterious from theperspective of both politicai order and politi-cal development of targeted states because itends up creating greater disorder and under-mining the legitimacy of established states.

Furthermore, it can also be extremely counter-

productive and end up creating real threats tothe security of the intervenor rather than ame-

liorating any presumed threats. Iraq providesan eminent example of all these outcomes oc-

curring simultaneously.The Iraqi state today is in a shambles, and

the United States is widely blamed for turningit into a failed state where life is "poor, nasry

brutish, and short." The severe deteriorationin state cap^crty resulting from the U.S. inva-sion has transformed Iraq into the largest and

safest haven for international terrorists whose

principal aim is to target the United States

and its allies. It has also led to a precipitate in-crease in hostility in the Muslim world toward

the United States, thus helping create a reser-

voir ofpotential terrorists that is likely to pose

an increasing threat to U.S. interests world-wide if not to the U.S. homeland itself. Themajor lesson one should draw from Iraq isthat, while it is easy to destroy state capacity by

the use of overwhelming force, it is next toimpossible to resurrect such capacity except

over a long period and after great travails.Moreover, there is no assurance that such a re-

vived state will not turn revanchist and revi-sionist once it has attained appropriate capa-

bilities. State making has to be an indigenous

process in order for the final product to be at

tt2 MoHeuupo Avoon

peace with itself. External intervention, evenwhen undertaken with the best of intentions

-and usually it is not-has the distinct po-tential to lead to state disintegration or statefailure with highly negative consequences forboth domestic and international order.

No:rBs

This chapter is adapted from the author's chapter inBetueen De,uelopment and Destruction: An Enguiryinto the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, ed.Lucvan de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul Scia-rone (London: Macmillan, 1996).

1. Kalevi J. H olsti, Th e S tate, Wat; and the State ofWar (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

22, table 2.1..The table provides data on armed con-flicts by qpe and region from 7945 to !995. Accord-ing to Holsti's tabulation, which does not includeanticolonial wars ofnational liberation, 77 percent ofthe wars during the fifty-year study were internal incharacter. If one includes anticolonial wars, the pro-portion is likely to be considerably higher, probablysomewhere around 90 percent.

2. Renata Dwan and Caroline Holmqvist, "MajorArmed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (NewYork Oxford University Press,2005), chap.2.

3. Renata Dwan and Micaela Gustalsson, "MajorArmed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (NewYork Oxford University Press,2004), chap. 3.

4. Kalevi J. Holsti, "International Theory andWar in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma:National Securit! of Third World States, ed. Brian L.

Job (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 7992),38.

5. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The RealWorld Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Conflict (NewYork Chatham House, 1993). See also James M.Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of TwoWodds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold WarEra," International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring7992):467-49I.

6. For greater detail on this argument, see Mo-hammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of theThird World State: Reflections on State Making in aComparative Perspective," in Holsti, The InsecurityDilemrna,63-80.

7. Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K.Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making:The Violent Creation of Order," American PoliticalScience Reztieus 7 5, no. 4 (7981): 902.

8. For expanded discussions of the process ofstate making and its relationship to organized vio-lence, see KeithJaggers, "War and the Three Faces ofPower: War Making and State Making in Europeand the Americas," Cornparatirte Political Studies 25,no. 1 (April 1992):26-62; and Charles Tilly, "WarMaking and State Making as Organized Crime," inBringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Die-trich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1985), 769-191.

9. Cohen et a1., "The Paradoxical Nature ofState Making," 905 (emphasis in the original).

10. The distinction between modern sovereign(or, as Charles Tilly would call them, 'hational") states

and nation-states has been highlighted byTilly, whohas defined the former as "relatively centralized, dif-ferentiated, and autonomous organizati on s success-

fi.rlly claiming priority in the use of force within large,

contiguous, and clearly bounded territories." Nation-states, on the other hand, are those "whose peoplesshare a strong linguistic, religious, and symboJic iden-tity." Charles Trlly, Coercion, Capital, and EuropeanStates,AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Black-well, 1990),43.

11. For details of this argument and the data onwhich it is based, see CharlesTilly, ed., The Formation

of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ.:Princeton University Press, 1975). See also CorneliaNavari, "The Origins of the Nation-State," in The

Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics, ed.Leonard Tivey (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981),13-38.

12. Navari, "The Origins of the Nation-State," 34.

13. Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation intbeThird World (NewYork St. Martin's Press, 1983),1.1.,77 .

14. Ttlly, "Reflections on the History of Euro-pean State Making," in The Forrnation of NationalStates in Western Europe, TL

15. For details of this argument, see MohammedAyoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State

Making, Regional Conflict, and the International Sys-

tern (Bo'ider,Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), especially

chap.2.

SrerB MexrNc. Srerp BnnerrNc, RNo Sr:ern Farlune 113

16. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins ofthe Modern State (Prilceton, NJ.: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 7970),57.

17. Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Forma-

tion and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm forResearch on Variations within Europe," in The For-mation ofNational States in Western Europe,586.

18. For theoretically informed accounts of the"cumulation of crises" in Italy and Germany, see the

chapters on Italy and Germany by Raymond Grewand John R. Gillis, respectively, in Crises of Political

Development in Europe and the United States, ed. Ray-

mond Grew (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1978).

19. The earliest modern states of Western Eu-rope were able to complete their state-making pro-cess in three near-distinct phases: (1) establishing the

cenffalized, "absolutist" state at the expense of a feu-

dal order that had begun to lose much of its economic

and political utiliry (2) welding together the subjects

ofthe centralized monarchy into a people with a com-

mon history legal system, language, and, quite often,

religion (in the sense of Christian schisms), thus lead-

ing to the evolution of a national identity and the

transformation of the centralized monarchical state

into a nation-state, and (3) gradually extending rep-

resentative institutions (dictated by the necessity toco-opt into the power structure new and powerfirl so-

cial forces that emerged as a result of the industrial

revolution), over decades, ifnot centuries. Above all,

as Stein Rokkan has pointed out, "what is importantis that the western nation-states were given a chance

to solve some of the worst problems of state buildingbefore they had to face the ordeals of mass politics."

Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation

Building," 598.

20. For details of this argument, see Ayoob, The

Third World Security Predicarnent, chap.5.

21. Robert H. Jackson, "Qrasi-States, DualRegimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International

Jurisprudence and the Third World," InternationalOrganization 4t, no. 4 (Autumn 7987): 529.

22. R. J. Vinc ent, Human Rights and International

Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

7986),19-36.

23. For Sri Lanka, see Neil Devotta, Blottsback:

Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic

Conflict in Sri Lanka (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Uni-

versity Press, 2004); for lraq, see Larry Diamond,

Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the

Bungted Efort to Bring Dernocrac1 to lraq (New York:

Times Books,2005).

24. As Seyom Brov'm has pointed out, the intel-

lectual position that "servicing . . . basic human rights

is the principal task of human polities-and that the

worth of any polity is a function of how well it per-

forms this task-has put the legitimacy of all extant

polities up for grabs, so to speak. Whether particular

nation-states, and the prevailing territorial demarca-

tions, do indeed merit the badge of political legitimacy is, according to this view, subject to continuing

assessment; accordingly, neither today's govemments

nor todayt borders are sacrosanct." Seyom Brown,

International Relations in a Changing Global Slstem:

Tousard a Theory of the World Polity (Boulder, Colo.:

Weswiew Pre ss, 7992), 726.

25. For a discussion of failed states, see I. WilliamZartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and

Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder' Colo.:

Lynne Rienner,L995).

26. Charles Tripp, "Near East," in Suferpozuer

Competition and Security in tbe Third World, ed.

Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr' (Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988)' 113.

27. Gideon Gotdieb, Nation against State:A Ness

Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sooer-

eignty (New York Council on Foreign Relations,

7993),2.

28. Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity"'

World Politics 35,no.4 (July 1983): 659.

29. Charles Tilly, "National Self-Determination

as a Problem for A11 of Us," Daedalus 122, no. 3

(Summer 7993):30.

30. William Pfaff, "Invitation to \Mar," Foreign

Afairs72, no. 3 (Summer 1993):99,107.

31. Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis

ofthe Post-Soviet State," Suroiaal35, no.1 (Spring

7993):72.

32. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty,

International Relations and the Third World (Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

33. For details of the situation in Afghanistan inthe 1980s during the height ofsuperpower involve-

ment in that country's civil war, see Ohiet Roy, Islam

and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2r,d ed. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1990).

rt4 MonelruBo Ayoos

34. Michael Renner, Snall Arms, Big Impax: TheMxt Challenge of Disarmamenr (Washington, D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, 7997).See also British Amer-ican Security Information Council, Stopping theSpread of Small Arms: International Initiatioes, rcportof a seminar held at the United Nations, New York,September 25, 1998.

35. Alex de Waal, "Contemporary Warfare inAfrica: Changing Context, Changing Strategies,"IDS Bulletin27,no.3 (7996), 6.

36. L William Zartman, "Introduction: Posingthe Problem of State Collapse," in Collapsed States,8.

37. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, "FromWars to Complex PoJitical Emergencies: Understand-ing Conflict and Peace-Building in the NewWorldDisorder," Third World Quarteily 20, no. 1 (February

1999):19.The authors provide examples from Sudan,Liberia, and Afghanistan to demonstrate that conflictentrepreneurs benefit from intemal war and thus pos-sess a vested interest in their indefinite continuation.

38. Democratization is used in the sense of move-ment toward democracy; the latter is perceived as thedesired goal, while the former is the process throughwhich this goal is achieved or at least approximated.

39. Ren6e de Nevers, "Democratization andEthnic Conflict," Surztioal 35, no.2 (Summer 1993):J I-JZ.

40. John Chipman, "Managing the Politics ofParochialism," Survival 35,no. 1 (Spring 7993): 168.

41. Larry Diamond,JuanJ.Linz, and SeymourMartin Lipset, "Introduction: Comparing Experi-ences with Democracy," in Politics in Dneloping Coun-tries: Comparing Experiences taith Democracy, ed.Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour MartinLipset (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,7990), 29.

42. Mohammed Ayoob, "Security Problematic ofthe Third World," World Politics 43, no.2 (Jantary7997):257-283.

43. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim. Bad Mus-lim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror(New York Pantheon, 2004).

44. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oiland Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

45. Richard A . Clarke,Against All Enemies: InsideAmerica's War on Terror (NewYork: Free Press, 2004);and Scott Ritter,Iraq Confidential:The Untold Story ofthe Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN andOverthroro Saddam Hussein (NewYork Nation Books,2oos).

46. Robert Malley and Peter Harling,'A Counter-intuitive Strategy for Iraq," Financial Times,Novem-ber 22,2005.

47. For the complex nature ofthe Iraqi insurgency,

see Ahmed S. Hashim, "Iraq: From Insurgency toCivil War?" Current History 704, no. 678 (January2005): 10-18; and Ahmed S. Hashim, "Iraqt Chaos:Why the Insurgency Wont Go Awayl' Boston Re-vieu, O ctoberNovember 2004.

48. A number of stringent critiques of the U.S.invasion oflraq, the subsequent failure in putting to-gether a viable system in the country and the impactof both these factors on the war against terrorismhave been published recendy. The following are amongthe best: George Packer, The Assassini Gate:Americain Irag (NewYork Farrar, Straus and Girorx,2005);Larry Diamond, Squandered lictory: Tlte AmericanOccupation and tbe Bungled Efort to Bring Democracy

to Irag (NewYork: Times Books,2005); and DanielBenjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: TheFailure of the War on Terror and the Strategy of GettingIt Right (New York Times Books, 2005).

49. Peter Bergen and AIec Reynolds, "BlowbackRevisited: Today's Insurgents in Iraq Are TomorrowtTerrorists," Foreign Afairs 84, no. 6 (NovemberDecember 2005): 4.

50. Ibid.,6.

51. Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Inter-vention and International Society," Global Gooernance

7, no. 3 ( July-September 2001) : 225-230; and Mo-hammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention andState Sovereignty," International Journal of HumanRights 6,no. 1 (Spring 2002):87-702.

52. Mohammed Ayoob, "The War against Irag:Normative and Strategic Implications," Middle EastPolicy 70, no.2 (Summer 2003): 27-19.

53. Robert W. J ackman, Pozoer ut i th o u t Forc e : Th e

Political Capacity of Nation-States (Ann Arbor: Uni-versity of Michigan Press, 1993).