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MANIPON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon,Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery. Petitioner is a deputy sheriff of CFIBaguio City and was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister ofLabor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City orhis deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC toorder Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipalmayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other judgmentcreditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest.

Manipon sent a notice to Commercial Bank and Trust garnishing the

bank accounts of Dominguez but did not inform the labor arbiter ofsuch fact and did not immediately satisfy the judgment. Manipon metwith Dominguez and told the latter that he "can remedy thewithdrawal so they will have something for the New Year."Dominguez confided the offer to the National Intelligence andSecurity Agency (NISA) to entrap Manipon. Manipon contends thatsuch paymeny was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfactionof the execution of judgement.

Ruling: Manipon is guilty of the crime charged. It is very strangeindeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a finaljudgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper.

ALMEDA vs. PEREZ

Facts: Epifanio T. Villegas and Jesus A. Mendoza, filed a complaintwith the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano G. Almeda, Sr. withhaving acquired, during his incumbency as government employee,cash and properties from unknown sources in the total amount ofP121,407.98 which acquisitions, according to the complaint, weremanifestly out of proportion to the salary and other lawful income ofsaid Mariano G. Almeda, Sr., and, therefore, in violation of theprovisions of Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law.

Ruling: In the first place a proceedings under the Act (Rep. Act No.1379) does, not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely inthe forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state.(Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in the law leadingto forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition

(Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. Thepreliminary investigation which is require prior to the filing of thepetition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expresslyto be one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal in acriminal case.

CABAL vs. KAPUNAN

Facts: Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, was charged with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplainedwealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorialtendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". The Committee insistedthat petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to hisright to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. Theissue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before

the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.

Ruling:It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the chargeagainst petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379,as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, whichauthorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer oremployee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as suchpublic officer or employee and his other lawful income and the incomefrom legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held,however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. A forfeiture, as thusdefined, is imposed by way ofpunishment not by the mere conventionof the parties, but by the lawmaking power. As a consequence,proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal,and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from theobligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

MORFE vs. MUTUC

Facts: One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty(30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "andwithin the month of January of every other year thereafter", as wellas upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with thehead of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and swornstatement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of theamounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal andfamily expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the nextpreceding calendar. Plaintiff maintained that the provision on the

"periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets,income and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared hisfinancial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive andunconstitutional."

ExecSec answered saying that when a government official, likeplaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarilyassumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair,not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time hecontinues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employeecannot be segregated from his public life. Whether the periodicalsubmission of SAL for public officers is an oppressive exercise ofpolice power and violative of due process and an unlawful invasionof the right to privacy.

Ruling: Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Actof 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at curtailing andminimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining astandard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to furtherpromote morality in public administration. A public office must indeedbe a public trust. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue ofposition he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only toemphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsoryrevelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of theamounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of incometaxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is nounconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private

sphere.

JAVARATA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) ofRepublic Act No. 3019, as amended, said to have been committedwith the use of his influence as such public official and takingadvantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroomteachers, with deliberate intent did then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand feloniously made demand and actually received payments fromother classroom teachers.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person inconnection with any contract or transaction between the Governmentand any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacityhas to intervene under the law. The legal issue is whether or not,under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the above-quotedprovision of the statute.

Ruling: A simple reading of the provision has to yield a negativeanswer. It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata receivedin excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the conceptof a gift or benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whetherJaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks ofTubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under thelaw. Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whoseofficial intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction.

TRIESTE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of 12separate violations of Section 3 (h) of RA 3019. being then the

Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of theMunicipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrativecontrol of the funds of the municipality and whose approval isrequired in the disbursements of municipal funds, did then and therewilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in abusiness, contract or transaction in connection with which saidaccused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in whichhe is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchasesof construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan fromTrigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which theaccused is the president, incorporator, director and majorstockholder.

Ruling: Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchersafter the materials were delivered, petitioner's signature on thevouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of interventioncontemplated under Section 3(h). What is contemplated in Section3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transactionin which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liabilitymay attach. There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in hiscapacity as Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in havingthe transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neitherTreasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get theconstruction materials from Trigen.

MEJORADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal CasesNos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section3(E) of RA 3019. The accused, being employed in the Office of the

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Highway District Engineer, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring andconfederating together with 2 other John Does whose true Identities,with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, andfacilitate the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the paymentin the removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his landexpropriated by the government. Arturo A. Mejorada is in thedischarge of his official and/or administrative functions and after saidclaim was approved and issued and encashed in the amount ofP7,200.00 given only P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon),appropriating, applying and converting to themselves the amount of

P6,200.00. Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was firstemployed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of PublicWorks on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in theOffice of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig. In said "SwornStatements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of therespective properties of the claimants were made to appear verymuch higher than the actual value claimed by them. WON theessential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e)of RA 3019 have been clearly and convincingly proven.

Ruling: The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayanestablished the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his positionas a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign theaforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statementswhich contained falsified declarations of the value of theimprovements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the

petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when hedivested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. Theevidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation ofSection 3(e).

SEGOVIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Petitioners: Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and WinifredoSM Pangilinan all hold regular executive positions in the NationalPower Corporation (NPC). They -- together with two other officerswho have since resigned from the NPC, namely: Gilberto A. Pastoraland Cecilia D. Vales -- were designated by the NPC Board tocompose the Contracts Committee for said NPCs Mindanao Grid.The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted theprequalification and bidding procedures for the project. The lowestand second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of INPHASE and

T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc., respectively.However, the CC disqualified both of the bidders. The project waseventually cancelled. Bidders filed a petition in the Sandiganbayansec 3(e) of RA 3019, hence, petitioners were preventivelysuspended. Petitioners allege the suspension for it is violative of theConstitution.

Ruling: As suspension was not penal in character but merely apreventive measure before final judgement; hence, the suspensionof a public officer charged with one of the crimes listed in theamending law, committed before said amendment, does not violatethe constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purposeof suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustratingor hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnessesor tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing furtheracts of malfeasance while in office. Substantially to the same effect

was the Courts holding in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, thatpreventive suspension is not violative suspension remains entitled tothe constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability muststill be established. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandatesthe suspension of a public official from office pending a criminalprosecution against him.

AMBIL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: The present controversy arose from a letterof Atty. David B.Loste praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of thenMayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case for murder,from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner,then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R.Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.3019. Ambil being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar,

and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden ofEastern Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected,appointed and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation tooffice, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping didthen and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause therelease from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor FranciscoAdalim, accused in Criminal Case by allowing said Mayor Adalim tostay at accused Ambils residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85)days, more or less which act was done without any court order. Theyreason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering theimminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by hisdetention. WON Section 3 of RA 3019 applies to herein petitioners.

Ruling: In order to hold a person liable under this provision, thefollowing elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a publicofficer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) hemust have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or grossinexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injuryto any party, including the government, or gave any private partyunwarranted benefits. In this case, we find that petitioners displayedmanifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detentionof Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. The power to orderthe release or transfer of a person under detention by legal processis vested in the court, not in the provincial government. In the present

case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincialjail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, theyaccorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as amayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes ofapplying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was aprivate party. We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. andAlexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofviolating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GARCHITORENA

Facts: Petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of theSandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, asamended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with thebenefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Petitioner filed with us a

petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin theSandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 onthe ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as shewas then a presidential candidate. Petitioner next claims that theAmended Informations did not charge any offense punishable underSection 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complainedof therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and thatthe Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adoptedthe policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses andunmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they hadarrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. Whether or notSandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senatewithout violating the Constitution.

Ruling: Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage

the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan didnot err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID

commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator? Section 13

of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officerconcerned must be suspended only in the office where he is allegedto have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus,it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate thatit applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding.Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she

still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the

accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding beforetrial on the merits proceeds.

LUSPO vs. PEOPLE

Facts: Consolidated petition of the accused seeking the reversal ofthe decision of the Sandiganbayan finding them guilty beyondreasonable doubt of violating Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. Acting on a reportof the Commission on Audit (COA) regarding disbursementirregularities for combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) inRegions VII and VIII, North Capital Command (CAPCOM), the Officeof the Inspector General (OIG), conducted an investigation of severalofficers of the PNP and of a private individual. Upon a f inding that theabovementioned PNP officials and the private individual conspired toswiftly and surreptitiously execute the ghost purchase of the CCIE,the OMB-AFP recommended the filing of the criminal information for100 counts of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of theRevised Penal Code against them.

Ruling: Petitioners were found by the Sandiganbayan to haveviolated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioners are public officers.

Evident bad faith and manifest partiality are imputed to Luspo, Duran,and Montano when they caused the preparation, issuance, release,and payment of P10M without supporting documents. The lastessential element of the offense, damage or injury to the government,is amply substantiated by the certification executed by RomuloTuscano of the PNP Logistic Support Service, indicating that there isno available record regarding the delivery of P10 million worth.WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the conviction of SalvadorDuran, Sr., Arturo Montano, and Margarita Tugaoen inSandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 20192 is hereby AFFIRMED. Theconviction of Van Luspo in Criminal Case No. 20192 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE, and he is hereby ACQUITTED.