Criminal Law II. Criminal LawA body of rules and statutes that defines conduct prohibited by the government because it threatens and harms public safety and welfare and that establishes punishment to be imposed for the commission of such acts.A. Classical Theory of Criminal Law - this theory suggests that people think before they proceed with criminal actions; that when one commits a crime, it is because the individual decided that it was advantageous to commit the crime. The individual commits the crime from his own free will being well aware of the punishment. This theory, derived its basis from what John Locke penned The Social Contract. Locke proposed that all citizens are equal, and that there is an unwritten but voluntary contract between the state and its citizens, giving power to those in government and defining a framework of mutual rights and duties. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes wrote, the right of all sovereigns is derived from the consent of every one of those who are to be governed.This way of thinking enforces the idea that we, as citizens, agree to follow the laws of the government in return for our protection and sustenance which is very different from early European authoritarianism.B. Positivist Theory of Criminal Law - On the other side of the spectrum, the positivist rejects the idea that each individual makes a conscious, rational choice to commit a crime but rather, some individuals are low in intelligence, social acceptance, or some other way, and that causes them to commit crime. This theory acts on the proposition that one who commits a crime cannot morally comprehend the wrongfulness of his actions in the same way individuals of average intelligence or who are socially accepted, etc are able to do so. The mind of these individuals has been affected in a particular way and therefore does not have the capability to make a conscious, rational choice to obey the law. Unfortunately a case can be made based on this theory regarding shootings on school campuses where students have murdered fellow students usually because of some type of bullying involved.II. Crime noun: crime; plural noun: crimes1. an action or omission that constitutes an offense that may be prosecuted by the state and is punishable by law

III. Sources of Criminal Lawa) Revised Penal Code -contains the general penal laws of the Philippines. First enacted in 1930, it remains in effect today, despite several amendments thereto. It does not comprise a comprehensive compendium of all Philippine penal laws. b) Special Penal Laws - violations of Special Penal Laws are generally referred to as malum prohibitum or an act that is wrong because it is prohibited. Thus, no criminal intent is needed in order to find a person liable for crimes punished under Special Penal Laws. As long as the act is committed, then it is punishable as a crime under law.c) Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law - Defining The Conditions Under Which The President may Issue Orders Of Arrest Or Commitment Orders During Martial Law Or When The Privilege Of The Writ Of Habeas Corpus Is Suspended

d) Are there Common Law Crimes in Philippines? - There is no crime unless the act is defined and penalized by the Criminal Code of the Philippines or other laws at the time of commission. Criminal laws are prospective in application unless favorable to the accused. IV. Police Power police power is the capacity of the states to regulate behavior and enforce order within their territory for the betterment of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants.December 8, 1914G.R. No. L-9726THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.C. W. O'Brien for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.JOHNSON, J.:This was an action for criminal libel.The complaint alleged: That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish languages, and known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, and having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper's issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows: OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOWS CIVIL SUIT. 'Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O'Donnell fire solved and papers served.'Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.''The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.''The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.''The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.''The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O'Donnell on April 4.''The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause why they should not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.''On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'donnell was destroyed by fire. The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.''The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the paid by the agents of the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the records.''Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the property had been an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. The there was an investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.''Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause.''The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in line the house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners.''Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts.''The present action came before the court on motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the judgment, which, in the original case, given the owners of the property judgment for the amount of the insurance.''Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house being in the hands of the sheriff.''It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the West o Sctoland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.''It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit brought against Ex-Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home.'That in this article is contained the following paragraph. To wit: ". . . Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners," by which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law.Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From the sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error: First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the alleged libel. Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous articles was libelous per se. Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was no malice. Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney Ramon Sotelo. Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published.After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of error.In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries."It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for a punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held liable.In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that - "No person is represented to be either the 'author, editor, or proprietor.'" That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. We might, by series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may nominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the "manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the "manager" of a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word "manager." Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his power and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be defendant upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution is a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling the "manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title he has assumed, which is important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author of editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than that they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination.For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.V. Constitutional Sources1. Article II Section 5 The maintenance of peace and order, the proection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.2. Article IV Section 1The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.3. Article II Section 1The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all governtment authority emanates from them.VI. Limitations on the enactment of penal legislationa. Article III (Bill of Rights) Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspiration(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the part y shall have been duly convicted. Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishmentinflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Section 22. NO ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted Ex post Facto Laws - is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law.-A law that makes illegal an act that was legal when committed, increases the penalties for an infraction after it has been committed, or changes the rules of evidence to make conviction easier. The Constitution prohibits the making of ex post facto law.G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.AQUINO, J.:This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months and one day to two years and four months.The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks which was committed or after October 22, 1975.That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both."As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of First Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531).It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary investigation of the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal presupposes that he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed to try the case. No costs.SO ORDERED.In RE: Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132. KayVillegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970]First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 reserves vote, 2 maintain opinions in Imbong vs. Comelec andGonzales vs. Comelec, 1 concurs partly, 1 on leave, 1 files separate dissenting opinionFacts:Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Section 8 of RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, "Kay Villegas Kami" avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, it intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. "Kay Villegas kami" actually impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

Issue: Whether Section 8 of RA 6132 is in the nature of an ex-post facto law.

Held: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on 24 August 1970.

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every six (6 ) months for the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zurich, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front organization established for economic advancement purposes with secret foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211 925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the Philippines without first complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering requirements.CONTRARY TO LAW.The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by the accused.On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were similarly worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where these accounts were maintained.All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court.On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of further liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1353, which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking system.Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Banks reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with the government.On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the two cases.On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in denying petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant petition, attributing the following errors to the appellate court:THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:(A)LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION(B)EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 1353; 2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 7653(C)PRESCRIPTION(D)EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT(E)GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:(1)Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid preliminary investigation?(2)Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners?(3)Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?(4)Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?(5)Were petitioners' alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606. Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are, therefore, cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-salting cases.Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, filed separate cases involving virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Here, we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied independently.[endnoteRef:1][14] Hence, no fault lies at the prosecutions door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same subject matter. [1: ]

With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from the same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses charged, and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no forum shopping.Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993on the condition that he face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigationUpon denial of their demands for preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but immediately caused the withdrawal thereofin view of the prosecutions willingness to go to pre-trial wherein petitioners would be allowed access to the records of preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a motion to quash if warranted.3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justicerespondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of the prosecution5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera moved for the quashing of the informations/casesThe foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, contend that repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old laws.As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.] This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation.Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section 34, by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the application of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be prosecuted criminally.A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter repealing the former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law to maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the international value of the peso, both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a penal clause which sought to penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was expanded to include violations of other pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral. In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter is simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect neutralizes the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption. The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will neither preclude the accuseds prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case. As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation?An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him?The crucial words in the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty. We find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the States right to prosecute them for said offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since the remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted from these dates.In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the court a quo quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in 1986 when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the offense, therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991.The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more than five years. Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years. The period shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the instant case, the indictments against petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960. Petitioners contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged violations were known and prescription should be counted from these dates must be viewed in the context of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected from investigation by their influence and connections, but also by the power and authority of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions. In the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from the dates of the commission of the offenses charged, for the obvious reason that the commission of those offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became a highly prioritized state policy, pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional Constitution.[endnoteRef:2][45] To ascertain the relevant facts to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime various government agencies were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, we are more inclined to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only during the post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period should be counted from the dates of discovery of their commission. The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year prescriptive period counted from February 1986. [2: Bills of Attainder - an act of legislature finding a person guilty of treason or felony without trial. People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972]First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate opinionFacts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines Constitutional Law II, 2005 (3) or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.VI. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115RIGHTS OF ACCUSED Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.RIGHTS OF ACCUSED Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.VII. Civil Code, Article 2Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.VIII. Characteristics of Criminal LawCASESU.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901) FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases forwhich a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in the line of duty.

ISSUES:1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greaterthan $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failedto prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.

2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the penal code?

Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.

3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, whether or not the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?

No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A.No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.

Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. Per Cooper, J., concurringG.R. No. L-246SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner, vs.ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO JIMENEZ, Provincial Warden of Ilocos Sur, respondents.Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.Respondent judge in his own behalf.No appearance for respondent Warden.JARANILLA, J.:The above-entitled case came up to be regularly heard in this court by virtue of a petition filed by Silverio Valdez praying that the judgment be rendered "(a) annulling the proceedings of the lower court, (b) declaring the respondent judge without jurisdiction of the case, (c) commanding the respondent judge to desist from further proceeding in the cause, (d) ordering the provincial warden, Celestino Jimenez, to discharge the defendant, Silverio Valdez, from jail, (e) granting preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent judge from hearing the case on the merits pending proceedings in the case, (f) assessing costs against the respondents, and (g) granting such other or further relief or reliefs as may be just or equitable."The undisputed facts are:That Silverio Valdez was prosecuted for murder under an information filed by the provincial fiscal in the justice of the peace court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, which information, in part, reads as follows:That on or about the 17th day of January, 1945, in the barrio of San Julian, municipality of Bantay, province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named defendant, Silverio Valdez, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger and other weapons and died instantly.That said Silverio Valdez moved for the dismissal of the foregoing information in the justice of the peace court, alleging that the fiscal had no authority to file it and that the court acquired no jurisdiction of the defendant, which motion was denied by the justice of the peace on September 5, 1945; and that since that date accused has been detained as a provincial prisoner in the provincial jail in Vigan, Ilocos Sur;That on September 13, 1945, the provincial fiscal reproduced the said information in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur; and that the defendant filed a motion to quash it on December 18, 1945, which motion was denied by the court on December 20, 1945;That on December 29, 1945, a petition for the reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash was filed but was also denied on January 7, 1946.The main issue here is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the case for murder filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez, as above stated, because, he alleges, he was not only a member of a recognized guerrilla and hence a member of the United States armed forces in the Philippines, in North Luzon, but was also later on absorbed into the Philippine Army and therefore, he claims, he should be tried by a general court martial, which has jurisdiction over the crime charged and the person of the accused pursuant to article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).Petitioner also contends that the whole of Ilocos Sur was at the time imputed in the information overrun by the enemy and that any place of hiding of the guerrillas in the province was a military reservation for the safety of the Philippine and American armed forces within the purview of the Articles of War.During the oral argument of this case, we understood from counsel appearing for petitioner that neither the United States Army nor the Philippine Army was claming precedence or priority in the trial of the herein petitioner, nor that either was demanding that he be tried by a court martial. In fact, no allegation to that effect may be found in this petition.The petitioner relies mainly on the provision of article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408) which reads:1. ART. 93. Murder. Any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct.He argues that pursuant to said article 93 of the Articles of War only a court martial can have jurisdiction to try his case for murder, he being a person subject to military law and the crime having been committed in time of war.Granting all the facts alleged by the petitioner and that he was a regular member of the guerrilla duly recognized by the United States Army and granting further that his unit was incorporated into the United States Army, thus giving him the standing of a regular member of the United States armed forces, and that he was subsequently incorporated into the Philippine Army, we are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the civil courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines are not deprived of their jurisdiction over the petitioner herein, but have concurrent jurisdiction with the military courts or general courts martial to try and take cognizance of the case of murder against the petitioner herein, for the reason that said article 93 of the Articles of War is almost identical with the 92d Article of War of the United States Army, and the latter has been interpreted by the courts to mean that even in time of war the civil courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons subject to military law. Such was the holding in Cadwell vs.. Parker (Ala., 1920; 40 Sup. Ct., 388; 252 U. S., 376; 64 Law. ed., 621):That section 1564 of this Article (Art. 92), providing for punishment of murder or rape as the court-martial may direct, but prohibiting trial by courts-martial in time of peace, section 1565 of this Article (Art. 93), providing for the punishment of various other offenses as a court-martial may direct, and this section (Art. 74), requiring military authorities to deliver accused persons to the civil authorities, except in time of war, do not give military courts exclusive jurisdiction in time of war over offenses committed in violation of state laws by person in the military service, and a state court has jurisdiction over such offenses. (Emphasis added.)Identical doctrines holding that the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases of murder committed by persons subject to military law were laid down in the following cases:Articles of War enacted August 29, 1916, do not deprive the civil courts, either in time of peace or war, of the concurrent jurisdiction previously vested in them over crimes against either federal or state law, committed within the United States, by persons subject to military law. (United States vs. Hirsch [D.C., N.Y., 1918], 254 F., 109; emphasis added.)Prisoners of war are amenable for offenses malum in se and may be tried by the ordinary tribunals in the country in which the crime is committed; and this though they may also be triable by courts-martial. (Govt. vs. McGregory [1780], 14 Mass., 499.)A court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to try all cases of murder committed within the country, and that a murder committed by a soldier in the military service of the United States, in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, forms no exception. (People vs.. Gardiner [N.Y., 1865], 6 Parker Cr. R., 143; emphasis added.).Any changes in Articles of War in years 1913 and 1916 did not alter rule that courts-martial do not have exclusive jurisdiction for trial of a soldier for murder committed in time of war, but that the state courts have jurisdiction until it is assumed by military authorities. (People vs.. Denman [1918], 177 P., 461; 179 Cal., 497.)In the instant case it also appears that when the information for murder was filed the Philippines had already been liberated and the actual hostilities had already ceased. It is claimed, however, that up to the present time a status of war still exists for the reason that the treaty of peace has not yet been signed. But this contention cannot be upheld because, although the formal termination of war by means of the signing of the treaty has not yet been effected, at the time when the petitioner was prosecuted for murder in the civil courts the actual fighting or hostilities were no longer going on; in other words, the actual fighting had already ceased and the Philippines had already been liberated. Thus it was held in the following decision:Notwithstanding this section (Art. 74), requiring a soldier to be delivered to civil authorities for trial for an alleged crime except in time of war, the jurisdiction of the military courts over a soldier is not exclusive of the civil court even during time of war, if the soldier was stationed within one of the states where the civil courts were functioning and where no actual hostilities were in progress. (Ex parte Koester [1922], 206 P., 166; 56 Cal. App., 621; emphasis added.)It clearly appears also in the present case as aforesaid that the military authorities are not claiming priority to try the petitioner herein as provided in the Articles of War. Such being the case, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot raise and invoke the right to be tried by a court martial without the military authorities' claiming to try him in accordance with the military law or the Articles of War. To this effect was the ruling in People vs.. Denman (supra):Conceding paramount right of military authorities in the time of war to custody of soldier notwithstanding criminal charges against him in the courts of a state, the right inures solely to military authorities and cannot be raised by the offender. (Emphasis added.).In Funk vs.. State ([1919], 208 S.W., 509; 84 Tex. Cr. R., 402), the following doctrines were also laid down:A soldier of the United States who murders a citizen of the state offends against both the military and the state laws and may be tried in the state courts.Although under this section (Art. 92), military authorities have the prior right to try soldier who has murdered a citizen, the soldier who has committed the crime cannot object to being tried by a state court, where the military authorities have not asserted any right. (Emphasis added.)In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur has jurisdiction over the murder case against the petitioner and cannot be deprived of such jurisdiction. This being our conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other questions of law raised by the petition.Being without any merit whatsoever, the petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.Marcos/Concordia vs. AFPGR No. L-4663GR No. L-4671FACTS:Alleged that the AFP Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded MARCOS and CONDORDIA from their right to appear as counsel on the ground that they are DISQUALIFIED/EXEMPTED/INHIBITED from SEC 17, Article 17 of the Constitution: SEC. 17: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his officeISSUE:WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners in the two cases. YES.HELD:MARCOS AND CONCONDIA DISQUALIFIED TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED IN COURT-MARTIALS. AFP DID NOT UNLAWFULLY EXCLUDED THEIR RIGHTS. HENCE, PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS ARE DENIED WITH COSTS. MARCOS/CONCORDIA: applicable, because the words "any court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.Words any court, used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, refers not only to civil, but also to military courts. i. General meaning must prevail over restricted meaning UNLESS the nature of the subject matter clearly indicates that limited sense is intended.It would be a bar to another prosecution for the same case which would result to DOUBLE JEOPARDY.If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance.Restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, the plaintiff in error, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.In Sec 17, it is obvious that the reason of prohibiting appearance of members of the Senate/House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martials, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil courts judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ratio ibi eadem lexiA court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt or award damages in favor of an individual.Judgment is a criminal sentence, not a civil verdict.Proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt.Court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by same authority that any other exists by, and the military law is a branch of law as valid as the others. It differs from other laws only because- it applies to officers and soldiers but not to other members of the body politic, it is limited to beaches of military duty.G.R. No. L-492TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI), petitioner, vs.WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.Capt. John J. Greer, 1st Lt. John J. Berry, jr., 1st Lt. Everett W. Thode, and 2d Lt. John McCullough for petitioner.MORAN, C.J.:This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner Teodoro Cantos (Teodoro Tatishi) against Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Syer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, upon the ground that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, residing in Ilang, Davao City, and is now confined by order of the respondent at the residence of the High Commissioner in Manila, Philippines, with no legal cause whatsoever.Petitioner was born in Davao on December 7, 1913, his father beingJapanese and his mother, Filipino. At the age of 27 he elected to become a Filipino citizen under the name of Teodoro Cantos, and was given Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Davao on September 17, 1939. On March 25, 1946, he was indicted for war crimes before the military commission duly constituted by order of General Styer, respondent. The charges are as follows:SPECIFICATIONS1. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Tibungko, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 28 December 1941, during a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully and unlawfully kill Sixto Babao, Dalmacio Babao, Francisco Cobling and Martin Marquez, unarmed, non-combatant Filipino civilians, by striking them with a saber, and by shooting them, in violation of the laws of war.2. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Ilang, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 7 January 1942, during a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully, unlawfully and forcibly take and loot personal property of Justina Larracoecha Babao, in violation of the laws of war.Dated: 25 March 1946The military commission, after hearing, found petitioner guilty of the charges and sentenced him to death by hanging.There seems to be no question that petitioner is charged with war crimes before a military commission duly constituted. It is maintained, however, that the petitioner being a Filipino civilian when he allegedly committed the crimes charged and the Philippine courts being open and capable to administer justice, the military commission has no jurisdiction to try him. It is well settled that war crimes may be committed not only by lawful belligerents but by any "men and bodies of men, who, without being lawful belligerents" "nevertheless commit hostile acts of any kind." (Par. 351, Rules of Land Warfare.) "Persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines of hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, etc." are also war criminals subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions. (Par. 352, id., id.) And in the preamble to the Hague Convention it is declared that "until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."All this goes to show that war crimes may be committed by any person regardless of his nationality. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex parte Quirin (317 U.S., No. 1 [Off. Rep. Sup. Ct.], pp. 37, 38), s