The Italians on the Land

The Italians on the Land: Changing Perspectives on Republican Italy

Then and Now

Edited by

Arthur Keaveney and Louise Earnshaw-Brown

The Italians on the Land: Changing Perspectives on Republican Italy Then and Now, Edited by Arthur Keaveney and Louise Earnshaw-Brown

This book first published 2009

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2009 by Arthur Keaveney and Louise Earnshaw-Brown and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

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ISBN (10): 1-4438-1129-7, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1129-3

TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables............................................................................................. vii Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements .................................................................................... xi Introduction .............................................................................................. xiii Crisis with Alternative – The Reformers of the Roman Republic Arthur Keaveney ......................................................................................... 1 Ager publicus in the Roman Republic and the Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights Saskia Roselaar.......................................................................................... 11 ‘Agros coemendo et colendo in gloriam’: Villas and Farms in the Agrarian Economy of the Republic Annaliza Marzano ..................................................................................... 31 Grain Laws: An Alternative to Land Distribution? The Case of Caesar’s Policies (64-44 BC) Luca Fezzi ................................................................................................. 47 An Interdisciplinary Approach to Republican Agriculture in Central and Southern Italy Daniel C. Hoyer......................................................................................... 65 ‘Ex Italia convenerunt’ (Cic. Dom. 12.30): Italian Participation in Roman Political Life (133-44 BC) William Rees ............................................................................................. 85 Advice to Farmers: Changing Perspectives Graham Anderson............................................................................................ 107

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The Limits of Knowledge, Demography and the Republic Louise Earnshaw-Brown ......................................................................... 123 Contributors............................................................................................. 137 Index........................................................................................................ 139

LIST OF TABLES Politicians, grain and land laws during Caesar’s career (64-44 BC) ......... 61 The Component Populations of Coale and Demeny’s Model West Life .......................................................................................................... 126 The Component Populations of Coale and Demeney’s Model South Life .......................................................................................................... 126 Abridged Life Tables – Table Abrégée de Mortalité. 1925-1927 Canada .............................................................................................. 133-135

FOREWORD Anybody familiar with the diverse nature of the evidence, both historical and archaeological, for the condition of Italy under the Roman republic will not be surprised that it has stimulated scholarly controversy. Practitioners of both disciplines have not been slow to have their say and a great variety of techniques and approaches to interpreting that evidence have been invoked. This and the general resurgence of interest in the area made it, in our view, both timely and useful to organise a conference entitled, ‘The Italians on the Land: Changing perspectives on Republican Italy then and now’ at Darwin College, the University of Kent on the 11th and 12th of October 2008. The title reflects our belief that the nature of the material at our disposal fosters debate rather than dogmatism. This was a conference where differing viewpoints and methods might be expounded and subjected to informed discussion. It was an occasion to find out what others were doing and to learn from them. With a greater or lesser degree of editing by their authors, seven of the papers presented are reproduced here. An eighth, by Prof. G. Anderson, not delivered then has now been added. Three others, by Jonathan Prag, Jamie Sewell and Kathryn Lomas have been, or will be, published elsewhere. We hold that the topics treated here are of considerable importance and we believe that our speakers made a very real contribution to their understanding. Indeed we were especially delighted to find that many of our participants were at an early point in their careers.

Arthur Keaveney Louise Earnshaw-Brown

University of Kent St. Patrick’s Day 2009

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from three bodies here at Kent, the Classics and Archaeology Section; the School of European Culture and Languages and the Kent Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities. We would like to thank Andy Crane for assistance over the two days of the conference. An especial debt of gratitude, however, is owed to Verity Irvine who, with both patience and despatch, prepared our manuscript for the press.

INTRODUCTION In ‘Crisis with Alternative: The Reformers of the Roman Republic’ Arthur Keaveney argues we can detect an Age of Reform which extended from the Gracchi to Sulla. He sets forth what he believes to be the chief characteristics of these reformers laying emphasis on the fact that they devised laws but not a new constitution. Reform, he further argues, ended with Sulla. Keaveney also pleads for an understanding of the failure of these reformers. They could not reasonably be expected to envisage anything more than remedial legislation or to foresee what was to happen in the next generation when that failed to supply the remedy for public ills. Saskia Roselaar’s ‘Ager publicus in the Roman Republic and the evolutionary theory of land rights’ first discusses the theory, associated with Demsetz, that pressure on limited resources, particularly land, leads from communal to private rights of tenure. She then applies this to the history of the Roman ager publicus. Roselaar outlines the stages by which the Romans first tried to limit the amount of land which could be taken and then the complete privatization of public land. The first law to limit the amount was the Lex Licinia of 367 BC, then in the late third century three new forms of public land were devised: ager quaestorius, ager censorius and ager in trientabulis. By granting security of tenure this marked a step in the direction of privatization. The Gracchi mark the next stage with the creation of ager privatus vectigalisque or private and burdened with a vectigal. Then followed the three laws passed after the death of Caius Gracchus which modified the brothers’ reforms. The author concludes by emphasising that there was a strong connection between a growing competition for land and the privatization of public land in the Roman Republic. With “Agros coemendo et colendo in gloriam”: Villas and Farms in the Republic’ A. Marzano discusses the widely held view that the second century saw the development of a villa system in Italy. She sets out to examine the archaeological evidence which would support the picture of a villa complex run by slaves and the settlement patterns in central Italy which show large villas and farms co-existing from the republic to the middle empire. She examines the evidence from Settefinestre and argues that some of the evidence pointing to slave quarters has been misinterpreted. She also questions the application of the Settefinestre model to the villa of

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the Volusii at Lucus Feroniae. She then examines the settlement pattern around Caere and concludes it does not reflect the emergence of villas run by slaves but rather shows a predominance of free tenantry. In ‘Grain Laws: An Alternative to Land Distributions? The case of Caesar’s Policies (64-44 BC)’ Luca Fezzi examines the twin questions of grain laws and land distributions in the late republic. Starting with the proposals of Rullus and finishing with Caesar’s colonial and grain laws in 46 BC he examines all of the relevant legislation proposed or actually carried and attempts to set them in their historical context. He pays particular attention to Caesar’s attitude in their regard. His conclusion is that Caesar’s political and economic viewpoint was consistent. He favoured land laws rather than corn distribution. Daniel C. Hoyer’s ‘An Interdisciplinary Approach to Republican Agriculture in Central and Southern Italy’ observes how the literary tradition records the deracination of the peasantry and their replacement by slave plantations while archaeology finds small and medium peasant holdings surviving in the late republic. He attempts to marry the two views by using the Ager Cosanus as a case study. After a detailed examination of settlement patterns he points to small and medium sized farms co-existing with large wine producing villas. This is to be explained by difference in function. Villas by the sea exploited markets further afield while smaller farms produced for local consumption. Hence to seek a purely historical or simply archaeological explanation is inadequate and Hoyer suggests a boom experienced in the early to mid second century was curtailed by the second century which may go some way to explaining the crisis of the last century of the republic. W. G. Rees in ‘ “Ex Italia….convenerunt” (Cic. Dom. 12.30), Italian Participation in Roman Political Life 133-44 BC’ challenges the widely held assumption that only the élite of Italy would have participated in Roman political life. He examines the economic standing of those who held a lesser property qualification and suggests they were in a position to go to Rome to make their voices heard. Moreover they would want to make those voices heard since they had a developed political consciousness. With particular, but not exclusive, reference to the Commentariolum Petitionis, he points out that Roman public figures had to listen to those voices. Finally he argues that the nundinae provided a useful forum for exchange of political views and that the promulgation of a law over the course of a trinundinum also fostered debate. Contrary to what is often supposed Rees does not believe either the Lex Hortensia (358 BC) or the Lex Caecilia Didia (95 BC) in any way interfered with Italian participation in politics.

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Graham Anderson ‘Advice to Farmers: Changing Perspectives’ discusses the treatment of agriculture in a series of authors beginning with Cato and ending with Columella. He concerns himself with the relationship of each author with this subject through his choice of literary postures and explores the literary opportunities presented by those who assume the pose of teachers of it. Among his conclusions are that those writers never lose touch with the realities of farming; Virgil has a genuine sympathy with Italian agriculture; even Ovid for instance makes use of its proverbial wisdom and through all our writers there is an awareness of the moral dimension of farming. In ‘The Limits of Knowledge Demography and the Republic’ Louise Earnshaw-Brown discusses the use of Life Tables in studying ancient populations. Ulpian is credited with being the first to compile such a table and Earnshaw-Brown discusses the use modern historians have made of this data. The bulk of the paper is, however, concerned with the use of Model Life Tables, specifically those designated as West and South by Coale and Demeny, by classical historians. The difficulties they pose are considered in detail, what are seen as defects in the method are outlined and the conclusion is reached that results based on these tables are unreliable.

CRISIS WITH ALTERNATIVE: THE REFORMERS OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

ARTHUR KEAVENEY Somebody coming for the first time to the historiography of the later Roman republic will soon observe two things. In the first instance there is a tendency to lay emphasis on the destructive aspects of most of the leading figures of the period even when these men were plainly striving to bring better order on the world they lived in.1 Then, while there is a certain reluctance to address in the widest sense the problem of why the republic failed,2 there is no shortage of studies devoted to single phenomena such as the army, for instance.3 Recognising this state of affairs has led me to my theme today. To join that select group, which has attempted to offer an overall explanation of the republic’s downfall, fits neither my capacities nor my inclinations. But what I do want to do is examine in detail another one of those single factors which contributed to the downfall of the Roman republic. I shall be dealing with individuals but attempting to highlight the positive rather than the negative. I want to look at that body of Roman politicians who recognised that the state faced grave problems and attempted to do something about them. Meier’s formulation of ‘a crisis without alternative’ is well known.4 I will, however, be arguing that some people did recognise there was a crisis to which remedies might then be applied. They failed but I will suggest that this was because they could not reasonably be expected to foresee what the outcome of these troubles might be.5

1 Badian (1970) on Sulla is a typical but by no means unique example of this trend. For Sulla as a lawgiver see Hantos (1988) and Keaveney (2005), 140-155. 2 Notable exceptions are Smith (1955); Meier (1966); Brunt (1988), 1-92. 3 On the army compare the views of Gabba (1975), 1-69 with those of Keaveney (2007). 4 Meier (1966), 201-205. 5 In fairness we may anticipate part of our later discussion here and point out that those who resisted reform also could not foresee that outcome. They, too, cannot be blamed for that even if their resistance contributed to that failure.

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For us a republican reformer is simply somebody who perceived an ill afflicting the state, proposed a solution, attempted to carry it out or actually did so.6 Applying this criterion I would confer the title of reformer on the following: Laelius, Fulvius Flaccus, the Gracchi brothers, Livius Drusus the elder, Saturninus, Livius Drusus the younger, P. Sulpicius and Sulla.7 Our earliest reformers appear to have conceived of only one problem. In the case of C. Laelius and Tib. Gracchus (trib. pleb. 133 BC) it was land.8 For M. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 125 BC) it was the Italian question. But those who follow seem to have recognised that the situation required intervention in other spheres as well. Hence the comprehensive programmes of these men. But before we go on to say something about these large scale programmes, it is worth our while to note that, while we can see that all who wished to play the reformer concerned themselves with land, there is a danger for us if we look at the matter in a superficial fashion. Land reform meant different things to different people. For Laelius and the Gracchi brothers it meant redistribution to remedy the deracination of the peasantry.9 For Caius’ great opponent Livius Drusus (trib. pleb. 122 BC) it

6 In order not to burden the paper with an excess of documentation I only cite ancient sources at those points where it is crucial to the argument. Full information on our ancient authorities may be found in the standard works, Greenidge and Clay, MRR and the relevant RE articles. A similar policy of pertinent minimalism has been followed with modern works. 7 The following have been omitted:

These tribunes who were, at best, agitators and for whom there is no evidence of a serious well thought out reform programme: P. Decius (120 BC); C. Marius (119 BC); C. Memmius (111 BC); C. Mamilius Limetanus (109 BC); T. Manlius Mancinus (107 BC); L. Cassius Longinus (104 BC); P. Furius, Q. Pompeius Rufus, M. Porcius Cato, Sex. Titius (99 BC); C. Appuleius Decianus, Q. Calidius, C. Canuleius (98 BC).

L. Marcius Philippus (trib. pleb. 104? MRR 1.560). His land bill might mean he was some kind of sincere imitator of Tiberius Gracchus (see below) but our scant knowledge does not preclude the possibility that he too might have been simply interested in causing trouble. 8 Plut. Tib. Gracch. 16 does say that Tiberius at the end of his life may have introduced other measures. But I suspect this is an example of Plutarch’s ‘back projection’ or assigning to one period what properly belongs in another. On this characteristic of Plutarch’s approach see Keaveney (2007), 4-7. In this instance it is likely he is attributing to Tiberius what belongs to Caius. See further n.37 below. 9 Plut. Tib. Gracch. 8-9, C. Gracch. 5. On the differences in the two Gracchan land laws, see Greenidge (1904), 209, 224-228.

Arthur Keaveney 3

was a device to be deployed to woo the plebs away from him.10 In the next generation this man’s son, Livius Drusus (trib. pleb. 91 BC) also used it in a similar fashion but with a different aim. He employed it as a bargaining counter in his dealings with the Italians. They would barter land for his colonies in order to procure enfranchisement.11 Before him, however, we find L. Appuleius Saturninus (trib. pleb. 103/100 BC) fulfilling a more traditional role. In previous eras the senate had, from time to time, made land grants as a matter of course to discharged veterans, but was now somewhat reluctant to do so. Here with Saturninus’ legislation we find a tribune acting in concert with a general to revive the practice.12 Sulla too, with his settlements can be taken as wanting to reward his men in this time honoured fashion, but his motives are obviously more complex than just that. He certainly wished to hold Italy to its allegiance with his veterans but he was also anxious not only to punish his enemies but to undo the damage done to the country in the late wars.13 Caius Gracchus, of course, was the first reformer to operate on a grand scale. Not only did he incorporate his brother’s agrarian programme and Flaccus’ Italian proposals into his schemes, but he reached out into virtually every other department of state. Provincial administration, the courts, the army, public works, and what we may loosely term ‘civil rights’, all received his attention. As we have noted, others who came after him also produced a large body of reforms but it is worth observing that not everybody shared all of his preoccupations. We have already noted that Saturninus’ attitude to the land question differed from that of Gracchus and we can now note that he had no interest in the Italian question and may have had a very aggressive provincial policy.14 We also have to remember that Caius left a legacy of controversy to the next generation. Using the word in its strictest sense we can describe the younger Drusus and Sulla as ‘reactionaries’ since part of their legislation, at least, was a response to Caius’ activities and an effort to undo the damage done by his encouragement of the equites and the Italians.15

10 Plut. C. Gracch. 9. 11 Keaveney (2005a), 86-90. 12 Keaveney (2007), 58-62. 13 Keaveney (2005),151-155, (2007), 61. 14 Italians: Keaveney (2005a), 77-80; foreign policy: Giovannini (2008). 15 This, of course, is incidental to the fact that, in order to achieve their aims, Caius and his brother had radicalised the tribunate and it was left to Sulla to attempt to pare it back. Syme’s dictum that ‘Sulla could not abolish his own example’ has acquired the status of a mantra in modern scholarship but I would maintain that it is equally true to claim he could not abolish the example of the Gracchi.

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As the alert will have divined, I do not believe that after Sulla there were any figures who might be styled ‘reformers’. A justification for this view will now be entered. If we look first at the post Sullan tribunes, we find none with the kind of broadness of outlook and vision we detected in those of previous generations. Those who held the tribunate in the seventies were, of course, exercised chiefly by only one issue, the removal of the disabilities Sulla had imposed on their office.16 But those who benefited by their efforts and enjoyed full powers once more, showed themselves unable to exploit properly for wider aims the position they now enjoyed. So Aulus Gabinius (trib. pleb. 67 BC) is remembered as the tool of Pompey who brought in a law to give him the command in the war against the pirates.17 His fellow tribune, L. Cornelius (67 BC), thought in terms of a limited set of laws to deal with some obvious abuses which were now manifesting themselves in public life.18 In the next year (66 BC) L. Manilius saw to it that Pompey received the Mithridatic command but has no further claim on our attention.19 Even the most colourful of these tribunes, P. Clodius (58 BC), had little or nothing of permanent value to offer with his legislative programme.20 Nor is there any man of auctoritas to be found to emulate Sulla in his role of reformer. Pompey, of whom much might be expected, gives nothing. Happy to be the first man in the state and to defend it from attack, he showed no disposition to address its internal ills.21 Cicero’s championship of the republic needs no detailed exposition here. However, his famous remedy for the republic’s ills, concordia ordinum, seems a trifle simplistic and, in any case, he was never to have the opportunity to apply it in any meaningful fashion.22 As it happens the man who had the

16 Gruen (1995), 23-28. 17 Mitchell (1979), 151-152; Seager (2002), 43-45. 18 Mitchell (1979), 159-162. 19 Mitchell (1979), 153-156; Seager (2002), 49-51. 20 Tatum’s analysis and discussion of these laws in (1999), 114-135 convincingly underpins his negative conclusion (244), ‘[Clodius] invoked long-standing values and concepts for ephemeral and limited purposes’. 21 On Pompey see Seager (2002) and note the verdict of Rawson (1983), 38, ‘he seems to have had no conscious desire to subvert the constitution...but [was a man] without profound political views or principles’. 22 For his career see Rawson (1983) and Mitchell (1979), (1991). The latter in (1991), 9-62 provides a useful distillation of Cicero’s political philosophy. I concur with his view (325-326) that Cicero had little impact on the events of his time but disagree when Mitchell claims of Cicero that, ‘none of his contemporaries had any

Arthur Keaveney 5

opportunity to act, Julius Caesar, elected not to ameliorate but to destroy and, what is more, he boasted of it.23 The explanation for this state of affairs is not perhaps one that will appeal to those who wish to give analyses with the appearance of depth or fitting complexity. It is Chance. It was simply unfortunate that when Sulla’s reforms were not working there was nobody with the will or means to come forward and try again.24 This assertion naturally leads us to a consideration of why reform as a whole failed, and here we must speak of more than Chance. In the first instance we can agree with those who have in the past laid the blame on the ruling class of Rome as a whole. From the time Laelius took fright and withdrew his modest proposal up until the Roman nobility, in effect, failed to make Sulla’s laws work, the attitude of those in power in Rome was, at best, obstructive and often far worse. Violence marked the resistance from the very start.25 Much as we may deplore the activities of such as Saturninus, we have always to recall the fate of the Gracchi at the hands of their opponents and that it was surely this which led him to do what he did. It was, we may constantly remind ourselves, the opponents of reform who first had recourse to rougher methods. And they, in turn, called out a like response from their opponents. Aside from Saturninus just mentioned, we can cite Sulpicius who formed a kind of private army simply because he suspected – rightly as it turned out – that his opponents would have recourse to force.26 Indeed, the futility of the constitutional approach is underlined for us and, I dare say, for contemporaries in the failure of Caius Gracchus to make any real headway with his bills to establish what we would nowadays call human rights. This lesson was not, I suspect, lost on Sulla.27 Indeed, we can best appreciate the situation facing reformers if we recall that, of those who persisted in the face of opposition, only Sulla died a natural death.28 better understanding of the problems of the Republic or pointed to better solutions’. 23 Suet. Div. Jul. 77. 24 Like most scholars I reject Gruen’s thesis (1995) that the republic was fundamentally sound in these latter years. 25 One wonders if Laelius foresaw that something like this might happen. We might also ask if what happened to the Gracchi led Philippus (n.7) to withdraw his bill. 26 Plut. Sulla 8. It is worth noting that, apart from the street brawls which characterise the period, there is at least one case of personal assault by a reformer on an opponent. The younger Drusus is so accused (de Vir. Ill. 61). 27 Cf. Keaveney (2007), 37-38. 28 Like Laelius and Philippus the elder Drusus seems to have retired gracefully from the fray.

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Reaction of the sort we have just been considering was, I submit, essentially grounded in a desire to preserve vested interest. But that desire takes a number of forms, some less reprehensible than others. The wish to save the state from the kingly ambitions of Tiberius Gracchus is, on the surface at least, more understandable than the consistently mean-spirited attitude adopted towards the Italian question. Again we can understand why Q. Mucius Scaevola and Rutilius Rufus tried to do something about the tax farmers who, as a result of Caius Gracchus’ measures, preyed on Asia Minor.29 Further, if we properly understand the position of the senate, it may very well be that we cannot completely condemn its policy towards land grants for veterans.30 Yet when all pleas for extenuation have been made, it is difficult to evade the conclusion that, while outbreaks of violence were sporadic, there lay behind the resistance to change a consistent heavy dullness. This is best illustrated in Sulla’s case. He had been able to make away with his declared enemies. What he could not do was overcome the innate reluctance of those whom he had put in power to making his laws work.31 If again for a moment we want to plead on behalf of Rome’s rulers, it is commendable perhaps that they should wish, given their temperament, to defer to what they conceive to be the mos maiorum. But yet too often the converse may be true. We are witnessing what is simply a selfish desire which may be summed up as, ‘what we have we hold’, and from that we may legitimately infer that those in power in Rome failed to see the seriousness of the problems they faced and their possible outcome. But it must then be immediately said that this is true also of the reformers themselves. We cannot, I think, charge them with acting in a hasty and ill-considered manner. So far as we can tell, from the fear felt by his enemies, if nothing else, Caius Gracchus had used the interval between his brother’s death and his own entry to office to mature his schemes.32 The younger Drusus’ carefully modulated designs argue an intelligent and cogent response to a growing crisis.33 Above all, Sulla’s two attempts at making change, in 88 and 81 respectively, point to his having long pondered the ills which beset the state and the remedies which needed to be applied.34 What we can point to is haste in execution. Much of the

29 Greenidge and Clay, 122-123. 30 See Keaveney (2007), 58-62. 31 See Keaveney (2005), 185-187. 32 Note what Plut. C. Gracch. 1-3 has to say about his opponents’ fears. 33 Keaveney (2005a), 87-92. 34 Keaveney (2005), 183. Tatum (1999), 114-115 claims careful drafting even for Clodius.

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legislation is found crammed into a single year. Due weight, of course, must be given to the fact that Roman offices were normally held for only a year. The magistracy was ill-equipped for dealing with schemes of a long term nature. The facilities for change that are open to a tyranny or a modern parliamentary democracy were not available to the Roman republic.35 In some instances we may find some kind of justification. The younger Drusus in 91 BC self-evidently had no option but to cram his laws into one year. And Sulla, too, who only held the dictatorship for a year may have wished to defer to republican sensibilities.36 Nevertheless, we know there were those who were conscious of the need for a longer period for legislation and sought it by iteration. The obvious examples here are Caius Gracchus and Saturninus.37 Their anxiety contrasts with the almost casual behaviour of Sulla who, while he was dictator and going about his law-making, also found time to besiege an Italian town.38 This brings me to the final point I wish to consider today. The reformers of whom we speak were not opportunists. I do not believe there can be much dispute about this.39 They clearly saw perils and dangers threatening the state and they attempted to remedy the situation with new legislation or the re-enactment of old. If we look at them from the Aristotelian viewpoint, we may say they gave laws but did not devise a constitution.40 No really radical proposal was ever brought forward. The ‘anti-senate’ of Sulpicius is pure gangster slang and Caius Gracchus’

35 An obvious point of contrast is with Augustus who had forty years to stamp his impress on the Roman world. 36 Keaveney (2005), 164-166. There I expressed agreement with a view originally propounded by Seager that there must have been a lapse of time between Sulla’s relinquishing the dictatorship and assuming the consulship. This is necessary in order to make his offer of accountability meaningful. I now think this can be developed and propose that it is logical to assume the dictatorship ran from November 82 BC to November 81 BC 37 As we saw above (n.8) Tiberius Gracchus might, in the view of some, also he numbered among these men. 38 Keaveney (2005b), 436. Lucullus’ law making for Cyrene falls into the same pattern: Plut. Luc. 2. 39 With the possible exception of the elder Drusus who is, and will probably remain, ambiguous. Was he the tool of Rome’s nobility or did he see in their embarrassment the chance to advance his own designs? We shall probably never know despite the confidence of Greenidge (1904), 238-239. 40 Pol. 1273b. Hence, although it is convenient to speak of Sulla’s ‘constitution’ or ‘Verfassung’ or the like, it is strictly not true. What he produced was a body of laws.

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moment as a great dispenser of patronage was brief.41 In retrospect we know our reformers failed but it is important we know why they failed since piecemeal arrangements could sometimes endure.42 I believe we may claim for them what may be claimed for many other reformers at other times and in other places. At many points in any given in any chain of events, it is not granted to contemporaries to see the eventual outcome.43 That is why our reformers acted as they did. What they saw led them to believe moderate reform, not wholesale dislocation, was what was required. I would also claim that it was only with Caesar’s victory44 that it became apparent something more thorough was required and that was long after the period of reform had come to an end. When dealing with the Romans there is, however, a further factor to be taken into consideration. Thanks to their way of thinking they would not, or rather could not, conceive of a drastic alteration in the manner they ordered their affairs. To them the state and the respublica were synonyms.45 To make too great a change would simply mean that what resulted was no longer Roman.46 There is no greater argument for the validity of this view than that Augustus had to accommodate these sentiments when, according to how we may style it, he embarked on his historic compromise or created his elegant sham. To sum up in a few words. We can in the late republic detect an Age of Reform extending from Tiberius Gracchus to Sulla. These reformers recognised the problems facing the state and applied the remedy of moderate constitutional reform. These efforts failed largely because of the resistance of their contemporaries. We can also claim they might have underestimated the gravity of the situation but here we may end on a note of caution. It was not in their generation that the republic was lost. It is therefore unfair to ask of them to foresee the future with what it might bring later and it is impertinent to speculate on what might have happened had their measures been allowed to work.47 41 Sulpicius: Keaveney (2005), 48; Gracchus: Plut. C. Gracch. 6. 42 Pompey’s arrangements in the East are a case in point. See Freeman (1994); Seager (2002), 176-177. 43 One wonders, for instance, how many of those who took the Tennis Court Oath in 1789 guessed what it would soon lead to. 44 Or was it after Philippi? 45 See Brunt (1988), 299-300. 46 To put it crudely: for these men Rome truly was eternal. 47 A version of this paper was read to a meeting of CASUS in Cloudland New Mexico on 13th September 2008 and I have, I believe, profited by the discussion there as on the present occasion.

Arthur Keaveney 9

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Oxford Freeman, P. A. (1994), ‘Pompey’s eastern settlement: a matter of

presentation?’, in C. Deroux (ed.) Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History VII, Brussels, 143-179

Gabba, E. (1975), Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies, trad. P.J. Cuff, Oxford

Giovannini, A. (2008), ‘Date et objectifs de la Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis (Roman Statutes no.12)’, Historia 57, 92-107

Greenidge, A.H.J. (1904), A History of Rome, London, vol. 1 Gruen, E. (1995), The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, California Hantos, Th. (1988), Respublica Constituta, Stuttgart Keaveney, A. (2005), Sulla: The Last Republican, London, 2nd ed. —. (2005a), Rome and the Unification of Italy, Bristol, 2nd ed. —. (2005b), ‘The Terminal Date of Sulla’s Dictatorship’, Athenaeum 93, 423-439 —. (2007), The Army in the Roman Revolution, London Meier, Ch. (1966), Respublica Amissa, Wiesbaden Mitchell, T.N. (1979), Cicero: The Ascending Years, New Haven —. (1991), Cicero: the Senior Statesman, New Haven Rawson, E. (1983), Cicero: A Portrait, Bristol Seager, R. (2002), Pompey, London, 2nd ed. Smith, R.E. (1955), The Failure of the Roman Republic, Cambridge Tatum, W.J. (1999), The Patrician Tribune, Chapel Hill

AGER PUBLICUS IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

OF LAND RIGHTS

SASKIA T. ROSELAAR

1. Introduction It is an often stated maxim that as pressure on limited resources – the most famous example is of course land –increases, there will be a gradual transition from predominantly communal to mostly private rights of tenure. A particularly influential theory on this issue has been the ‘evolutionary theory of land rights’ first formulated by Demsetz. His classic example involves the creation of private land rights among Native American tribes in the modern Quebec area. The land in this area was mainly forested, and the local population used it for small-scale hunting. Property rights were not strictly defined; the land was held in communal ownership by the tribes.1 In the seventeenth century the value of animal furs increased, because demand in Europe rose. This led to remarkable changes in landholding structures. First the hunting grounds were allotted seasonally; the land to be used each season was marked off, so that the hunters could no longer freely choose where to hunt. Eventually the land was split up into private plots held by individual hunters. In this way the creation of private ownership of land was the direct result of the demand for more furs.2

Many other examples of similar developments could be cited: the gradual privatization of most common lands in early modern Britain and Europe immediately springs to mind. In this article I wish to review the

1 In fact, Demsetz does not clearly define the property regime pertaining to the lands before the seventeenth century; it is unlikely that the boundaries between each tribe’s lands were strictly defined, and much land may have been under the control of no particular tribe. 2 Demsetz (1967); see North and Thomas (1973), 23; Libecap (1986), 230. Elements of this theory were already formulated by Boserup (1965), 80-1.

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validity of the evolutionary theory of land rights for the Roman Republic. In this period a particular kind of public land, state-owned ager publicus, existed, and this seems to have been subjected to a similar process of privatization as the Republic progressed. I shall first set out the evolutionary theory of land rights in more detail, and then try to establish whether it provides a valid method of analyzing the developments in the Roman Republic.

2. The evolutionary theory of land rights and incentives for privatization

A number of important issues emerge from the example above; the creation of private land rights seems to develop in roughly the same way in most cases. The first step in the theory is the danger of overexploitation which may occur when pressure on the land grows. In the case of communally owned land, every user is free to take as much land or resources from it as he wants. With a large pool of users, it may be difficult to notice that overexploitation is taking place; once it does emerge that this is occurring, it is difficult to limit. No one authority exists which can limit the amount of that land which can be worked by one person and the number of animals which can be hunted in communal forests or grazed on common pastures. Such decisions may be made by a group of people together, but this involves lengthy negotiation and it is difficult to define rules with which all involved will agree. If there is no central authority which oversees adherence to the rules, some people may ignore them altogether.3 Therefore an increase in pressure on land will often lead to more conflicts, for example about how much land one person is allowed to use and about boundaries between common and private holdings.4

Furthermore, it is usually assumed that the existence of communal ownership limits possibilities to maximize economic profit from the land. The prime reason for this is the uncertainty of tenure of communal holdings: the rewards of land improvement will have to be shared with all users of the land, and it is therefore not certain that the person who invests the most will also receive the largest part of the increased revenues which accrue from investment. There is even the risk that people who have not 3 Demsetz (1967), 355; Alchian and Demsetz (1973), 19-20; Libecap (1986), 230; Merrill (2002), 332. Platteau (1996), 36 points out that pressure on the land can also lead to under-exploitation, e.g. when someone cannot work his holdings for the moment, but is afraid to lease them out because he fears that he will be unable to get them back later. 4 Boserup (1965), 91-2.

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invested anything may still profit from others’ investments, an issue known as the free-rider problem.5 The fact that the rewards of their efforts may have to be shared with others may deter holders of public land from making investments. This is an important reason for the fact that wealth redistribution by the state weakens the incentives to create private ownership: awareness that part of one’s income will be taken by the state and distributed to others will diminish the urge to create private ownership to maximize profits.6

These are the reasons for postulating that a system of private ownership is likely to appear in a situation of growing pressure on the land. This has the advantage of ‘internalizing the externalities’. Externalities are effects which are the result of actions taken by someone who does not bear the direct consequences of these actions. In other words, they are external factors which have direct consequences on a person’s landholdings, without the user of the land being able to influence them. For example, in a situation of communal ownership, one user may decide to create a dam to prevent excess water running over his lands. However, as a result another user of the same common land may find himself without a water supply. The creation of the dam is an externality for the second user, since he suffers the consequences from an action which he did not himself undertake. By the act of the privatization of common land, the users of the land achieve greater control over their land: from that juncture they decide over their own lands, instead of having to suffer as a result of someone else’s actions.7

The exact moment of the creation of private ownership depends mostly on the (perceived) transaction costs. These can be defined as all costs, both in monetary terms and in time and effort, which are incurred in governing the land, and the costs of the transition from public to private. When land is communal, such costs may include the amount of discussion necessary to assure every user a fair share of the land. If land is abundant it will be easy to assign each user some land without incurring conflicts. As pressure on the land mounts, transaction costs will rise in the form of increased conflicts over access to it.

The actual creation of private ownership itself will also entail considerable costs, again both in monetary terms (the fencing and policing of the new private land) and in terms of time and effort. For example, if a great deal of public land existed before the creation of private ownership, the legal status of claims to such land may be obscure, and the creation of 5 Johnson (1972), 262; North and Thomas (1973), 5; Platteau (1996), 36. 6 Demsetz (2002), 670. 7 See Demsetz (1967), 348 for a basic discussion of the concept of externalities.

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private ownership therefore requires time and effort on the part of the state (or other authority) to sort out the status of the land. When it is envisaged that such costs will be too large, privatization may be delayed, even though its creation would have unequivocal economic advantages.8

The eventual benefits of private ownership must therefore be expected to outweigh the cost, before any authority will decide to create it. If public ownership is considered to be a limiting factor on the amount of goods produced, the decision to privatize may be taken when demand for these goods reaches a certain level.9 However, even though privatization is expected to lead to more investment in the land and a higher productivity, it is difficult to calculate when exactly such advantages will outweigh the costs of privatization.10 Therefore privatization often takes place considerably later than might be expected if purely economic factors are taken into consideration.

In some cases it is clear that the costs of dividing common land into private plots, or of policing the plots created, would be too high, and therefore communal ownership is maintained. For example, transhumant herders need large amounts of pasture land; giving each person the whole amount of land required as private property would greatly reduce the number of people able to use common pastures, and therefore cause a large reduction in overall profitability. Moreover, the costs of fencing off large tracts of land and of policing such large plots are very high. Therefore public pasture lands are usually not privatized.11

The creation of private property often leads to considerable social costs, because some users of previously communal land cannot prove their rights to the land, and therefore do not receive a share of the newly created private land. Simply ignoring such claims reduces the monetary costs of transition from one property regime to the next, because it saves time and effort if not all claims have to be investigated; however, this means that some individuals, especially the poorer and less powerful members of

8 Boserup (1965), 92-3; North and Thomas (1973), 6; Libecap (1986), 232, 240; Banner (2002), 365. 9 Alchian and Demsetz (1973), 24; Banner (2002), 362-4; Levmore (2002), 423-4. 10 Libecap (1986), 232-4; Levmore (2002), 427-31. 11 Baland and Platteau (1998), 646-7. In some cases the costs of maintaining private property turn out to be too high after all, and private land returns to public status. This may be the result of either a conscious decision of the state and/or the private owners, or by simple neglect of maintaining exclusive access to the land; see Levmore (2002), 441; Merrill (2002), 335.