criteriology: a minimally theoretical method

METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1979

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD

JAMES AUSTIN

It is difficult to overestimate the impact on Western philosophy brought about by the twentieth century British thinkers who turned their energies from Hegelian systems and Kantian subjects to language and language users. Whether the resulting contemporary linguistic analysis is another Copernican revol- tion or just the logical outcome of Kant’s original revolution I am not prepared to argue. Either way it is incontestable that a great deal of what goes on under the label “contemporary philosophy” is a far cry from what most laymen would normally associate with the term “philosophy”. Indeed, it is probably a far cry from what Plato would have associated with that term, in spite of the fact that in his Purmenides and Sophist he raised at least one of the key issues which much later proved to be a major impetus behind the linguistic turn; viz., the question of the relation between meaning and reference. I t is largely by way of attempting to answer this question that the current emphasis on the method of “criteriology” has developed. But as yet neither the brief history nor the theory of this revolutionary way of conducting philosophical investigations has been sufficiently sorted out. This essay is offered as a small step in that direction,

Bertrand Russell is clearly the dominant figure in the genesis of the new philosophy. Although it was Frege who first identified many of the new problems, it was Russell who brought the issues of logicism, logical atomism, meaning and reference, concept and object, propositions and sentences, and proper names and definite descriptions, into the forefront of philosophic discussion. Russell’s style of writing was so deceptively lucid and matter of fact that it must have seemed to the average student of his day that a solid link had at last been forged between logic and language. Traditional philosophical problems could now, with a little obvious analyzing here and there, be reduced to functions of rather simple formulae, themselves derived from strictly deductive and rigorous principles. Thus, reductivism held sway as the first stage of the linguistic turn.

At first the success of the reductive theory was encouraging. 1

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Fregean and Meinongian issues were cleared .up or dispensed with out of hand. Paradoxes of meaning and paradoxes of reference were dissolved in the respective solvents known as the theory of definite descriptions and the theory of types. The principles of arithmetic were derived from those of logic plus set theory, thus welding the method of logical analysis firmly to the pursuit of answering traditional philosophical puzzles. Russell, Wittgenstein, and Moore it appeared were suddenly beginning to solve some of these lingering puzzles. But it was the way they reached solutions, not the solutions themselves, which was revolutionary. According to the new breed, no longer need philosophers concern themselves over ontological questions: the world is made of simple facts, not things. No longer need we search for a convincing proof of the existence of an external world: most of us have two such proofs dangling from our wrists.

The success of this first stage proved illusory however. For soon the star pupil of reductivism became its star opponent- a phenomenon not uncommon in philosophy. Elements of dis- content with a Russellian atomism were obvious even in the Tractarian Wittgenstein. By the time of the circulation of The Blue and Brown Books the referential theory of meaning, and the theory of proper names in which it was grounded, was depicted as only one language game among many. Even the truth functionality thesis of extensionalism was repudiated in favor of the dictum, meaning is use. Ordinary language was now seen as the vehicle for philosophical solutions rather than some ideal, artificial, logical language.

With the advent of this second stage of the linguistic turn, British philosophers began to feel the need for intellectual therapy, to cure themselves of philosophical paradoxes, not to solve them. And their pharmacist, if not the actual doctor, was seen by many to be the ordinary man in the street. It is amusing to conjecture about how the intellectual historians of future centuries might write about this stage: “It was a period of travail for the common working man and chamber maid. They were continually having to duck into alleyways to avoid the hordes of philosophers who, at the suggestion of their leader, besieged the layman to explain how to use expressions such as ‘absolute’, ‘intentional’, ‘I know’, etc.”

This approach at philosophizing was not to last very long. At best, i t developed into a sort of lexicography of select terms common to philosophical literature. J. L. Austin was the exemp

CRITERIOLOGY: A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 3 lar of this trend. At worst, it became a sort of linguistic psychology intent upon showing how all philosophical puzzles are really psychological aberrations founded on misuses of words-misuses to be cleared up only by appeal to the great unwashed.

But there is only minimal evidence that Wittgenstein himself ever subscribed to such a myopic view as represented by this second stage. To disparage the attempt at constructing an adequate ideal language in favor of the recognition of the primacy of ordinary language is not necessarily the same as recognizing the reports of ordinary users of everyday language as veracious or insightful. Neither does it entail that the proper task of a philosopher should be that of a chronicler of the associations which the man on the street is able to conjure up when certain troublesome philosophically puzzling terms are mentioned to him.

Rather, the common man’s particular uses of a term under scrutiny-not his reports on his uses-are what is of paramount importance in the later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ordinary language analysis. The philosopher is expected to “read off’ from specific occurrences of a term or expression and the accom- panying relevant circumstances of those occurrences, the common employment (which is to say the common meaning) of that term or expression. That by virtue of which the meaning (or use) is “read off’ are the criteria and symptoms. Thus to understand a concept is to understand the criteria for the employment of that concept-term. It is this, the third stage of the linguistic turn at which one is tempted to view the philosopher’s sole task as the search for criteria.

Upon publication of the Philosophical Investigations, the philosophical community was presented with an avalanche of criteriological investigations. Indeed, almost the entire book can be viewed as a series of searches for the criteria associated with certain inner and outer phenomena. Just notice a few of the discussions (chosen randomly) that are exclusively criteriological searches in the Znvestigations :

(I, 154) for one’s having raised his (own) arm,’ (I, 354) for rain,

1Throughout this essay reference to the Philosophical Investigations will be specifically to the 2nd edition of that work and will be indicated as follows: Section I will be noted simply as “I” and followed by the section number; and section I1 will be noted as “II” and followed by page number. The Blue and Brown Books will be noted as “BB” and followed by page number. On Certainty and Zeftel will be noted by “OC” and “2” respectively and followed by section number.

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(I, 344) for saying something to one’s self, (I, 376) for saying the ABC’s silently, (I, 377) for identity claims, (I, 404) for personal identity, (I, 509) for meaning something, (I, 572) for being in a state of expectation, (I, 625) for judging whether someone really meant such and

(11, p. 185) for my learning the state and color of an object

(11, p. 198) for “seeing as” as a case of recognizing, (11, p. 203) for seeing a drawing as three dimensional, (11, p. 212) for the difference between interpreting some seen

thing differently and seeing something different.

such,

from a sense impression,

Furthermore, a similar list could be constructed from the Zettel. And On Certainty for the most part is a criteriological investigation of one locution, “I know . . .”. The Blue and Brown Books written before the Investigations, contains a great many criteria1 searches plus the famous discussion of the differences between criteria and symptoms, possibly the only truly theoretical comments Wittgenstein ever delivered on the subject.

Yet with all this emphasis which Wittgenstein placed on the concept of a criterion, his early post-Tractus followers mentioned the notion only infrequently. Rather, they directed their attention upon the related and, I think, subordinate ideas of “uses” and “family resemblance.” One reason for this is fairly obvious. With the resounding failure of positivism ringing in their ears, they wanted to avoid at all costs the stigma of the rubric apparently entailed by Wittgenstein’s new turn, “Ask not for the meaning of a term, but for its criteria”. They sensed that a theory which merely substituted the term “criteria” for “modes of verification” in this slogan could not sufficiently avoid the traps which ensnared verificationism. So the second stage in the linguistic turn became recognizable by the refusal to take seriously the apparent Wittgensteinian identification of meaning with criteria of application; and instead focussed upon the safer thesis which identified meaning with use.

Why was the identification of meaning with use safer than that of meaning with criteria? Because the former seemed to have absolutely no theory supporting it and therefore no shaky grounds standing in need of an elaborate defense by way of philosophical argument. That meaning and use are identical

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 5 seemed, at one level at least, so obviously true that it was unchallengeable. Suppose English language users got together and decided to use the term “gobbledegook” where they had heretofore used only “oak tree”. Is there anyone proficient at using the substituted “gobbledegook” who would not be said to know its meaning? The doctrine “meaning is use” seemed to be tied to just this sort of psychological obviousness.

Wittgenstein saw a deeper problem here. True, meaning is use. But when one wants to dicuss the meaning of a term, or consider the meaning, or philosophize about it, or do anything with the meaning, it cannot be the use he discusses, considers, etc. For the use is no more than all the particular uses in particular circumstances; and there is after all no way of corralling all these actual instances in one discussion. Instead, Wittgenstein seems to be claiming, one “reads off from these particular uses, or a certain set of uses of a term or expression and its surround- ings, the sense of that employment of the term or expression. That by which one goes, or is guided when he “reads off’ the meaning, are of course the criteria of the employment of the term or expression.

I1

It is clear that the search for criteria was intended to be the new tool of philosophy replacing reductivism and (non-criterial) ordinary language analysis. But it was odd that such a revolutionary instrument had no real logical theory behind it. It appeared that “criteriology” was fashioned ex nihilo without proper grounds for support or theoretic foundation.

In order to supply this conceptual backing for criteria many writers have turned their attention back towards the Wittgen- steinian corpus.’ But their results have not been unanimous. Some have insisted that Wittgenstein had a substantial theory of criteria. They usually fasten upon one of the theoretic statements in The BZue Book as proof of their contention. Some of these try to show how this alleged theory is sustained and supported throughout the later works, while others argue that by the time of the Znvestigations Wittgenstein had radically revamped his initial Blue Book theory. Still others tend to lament that Witt-

zFor a very thorough, if not particularly recent, bibliography on the issues center- ing around Wittgenstein’s conception of a criterion, see W. G. Lycan’s “Non- inductive Evidence : Recent work on Wittgenstein’s ‘Criteria’ ”, American Philo- sophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, April, 1971.

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genstein had no real theory of criteria; these either abandon the idea of constructing a coherent notion of criteria altogether or merely express wonderment at what Wittgenstein really meant by a criterion. And then of course there are many others who, noticing the efficacy of the method of “criteriology”, could not care less whether or not Wittgenstein had a theory to back the method; so they construct their own theories.

There is something worthwhile in all these “solutions”, but at heart they are misdirected. A better approach to the question of a coherent theoretical backing for “criteriology” is to ask the crucial question “Why did Wittgenstein himself not supply such a theory?” Surely it was not an oversight on his part. The answer, I feel, is that the very nature of the role played by the concept of criteria in the quest for meanings debars the poss- ibility of a coherent theoretic account of criteria. Wittgenstein offered no full-fledged theory of criteria because he realized none was possible.

This fits in nicely with Wittgenstein’s view of what philosophy is, or should be. Consider this passage from the Investigations, I, 109:

And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Others have cited this passage in order to draw attention to

Wittgenstein’s non-theorizing tendency; and have then argued that the absence of a full-blown logical theory of criteria is just a typical aspect of his penchant for description over explanation with regard to philosophical matters. However, a much stronger conclusion can and, I think, should be reached. It is not simply that it would have been uncharacteristic of Wittgenstein to offer such a theory; rather the offering of such a theory would have violated the very nature of the philosophical enterprise as he saw it. (Back to this theme in a moment.)

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 7 Nevertheless, some theoretical discussion was necessary in

order to fix the topic of conversation, if for no other reason. And in fact some such discussion was given. I am referring to the now famous passages on pages 24 and 25 of The Blue Book in which Wittgenstein seems to be describing the difference between “criterion” and “symptom” by means of defining or explaining the use of each concept. Not surprisingly all of the published discussions of Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria have taken these passages as the key points-and some as the only point of departure. I suggest this approach harbors a serious error and is, furthermore, the main obstacle in the way of a clear understanding of what goes under the heading of Wittgen- stein’s theory of criteria. It is also the reason that even today there is very little agreement among Wittgensteinians as to the role of the concept of criteria in his later works.

I believe that this universal tendency to take these Blue Book passages as the logical theory of criteria is fundamentally in error. I propose, on the other hand, to read these passages not as exhaustively definitive of criteria and symptoms, but as a sort of cursory introduction to the contrary notions of a symptom and a defining criterion. In these pages, Wittgenstein is attempting to “avoid certain elementary confusions” by “introducing two antithetical terms”, symptom and (defining) criterion. He asks us to imagine that medical science adopts the convention of calling “angina” an “inflamation caused by a particular bacillus”. It follows that having that particular bacillus is the-assuming there is only one-defining criterion for angina. Therefore, “to say ‘a man has angina if this bacillus is found in him’ is a tautology”. Symptoms of angina are, and defining criteria are not, probablistic, experiential evidence for the disease.

I call “symptom” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion (BB, p. 25).

And assuming that having an inflamed throat is a symptom of angina, Wittgenstein says

But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis (BB, p. 25).

If we were to stop with this passage, there are several hasty conclusions we might reach about criteria :

JAMES AUSTIN

All meaningful concepts have defining criteria, either explicit or implicit; criteria are necessary and sufficient conditions for their phenomena; the assertion of the presence of a criterion entails the assertion of the presence of the phenomenon for which it is the criterion; criteria never offer merely inductive evidence for their phenomena; criteria for a concept are static, such that a change of criteria entails a change of meaning; it is not possible that the criteria be present and the phenomenon not; all symptoms are discoverable by experience, none by grammar or convention which is the contrary of the way criteria are discovered; and criteria and symptoms cannot in practice ever be con- fused.

The reader will recognize these points as the ones around which most of the contemporary discussions of Wittgenstein’s concept of criteria revolve. And, I believe, each of these points stands contravened in the later works.

Even a weak familiarity with the characteristic slipperiness of the concept-terms which Wittgenstein investigates is reason enough to be suspicious of the claim that his angina discussion is meant to be exhaustively descriptive of the concept of criteria. But there is more powerful reason for rejecting this claim. The picture which the angina discussion gives of language is that of a fixed calculus proceeding by means of rigorously applied, incontrovertible rules of meaning (criteria). But in this very section of The Blue Book he tells us that for philosophers, “the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language” (BB, p. 25). The trouble with philosophy is that “we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules” (BB, p. 25).

True, Wittgenstein has just asked us to imagine the presence of a certain kind of bacillus as an exact rule so to speak for the ascription of cases of angina; but this is so only by way of introducing a set of terminology by means of a clear-cut, if rarely instantiated, dichotomy between inductive symptoms and defining criteria. These defining criteria are clearly “strict rules”. And Wittgenstein immediately warns us

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 9 For remember that in general we don’t use language according to strict rules-it hasn’t been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discusions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules (BB, p. 25).

and “this is a very one-sided way of looking at language”. I prefer the strong interpretation of this passage. That is,

Wittgenstein is not merely admonishing us to look very carefully at the use and the deep structure in order to find the defining criteria. Rather he is stating that very few terms actually have conventionally backed defining criteria.’ That is, substituting the concept of “meaning” for that of “use” in the last passage quoted, and “defining criteria” for “strict rules”, I paraphrase “we don’t use language according to strict rules” as “most expressions have meanings not expressible by means of defining criteria”. This fits in nicely with another passage from these pages.

We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don’t know their real definition, but because there is no real “definition” to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules (BB,

I hesitate to conclude from all this that Wittgenstein has absolutely no logical theory of criteria. After all, the notion of a defining criterion, which he has delineated to some extent, is meant to tell us something about criteria in general. So, one is forced to conclude, there is at least minimal theoretic content to The Blue Book discussion of symptoms and criteria.

There are also other sources of theoretic support for the concept of criteria, viz., the Investigations, On Certainty, Zettel, and numerous other passages in The Blue and Brown Books. In these works Wittgenstein is busy searching for the criteria for different concepts. Usually these concepts relate to inner phenomena; and usually these discussions are valuable in their own right. However, one can also view these discussions as various displays of the method of searching for criteria rather than as actually concerned exclusively with the particular con-

p. 25).

3Kotice that, in the sciences much more frequently than in everyday conversation, we encounter terms backed by defining criteria. Typically, a scientific term will have its definition stipulated at the outset. Notice too that Wittgenstein’s choice of a term possessing a defining criterion, angina, is such a term drawn from the medical sciences (BB, p. 25).

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cepts at hand. From these displays one is able to “read off” a certain amount of “theory” about the tool used in these investigations; that tool of course is “criteriology”. Notice, this process of “reading off’ is the same as that applied to many of the particular investigations of the specific phenomena. Wittgen- stein doesn’t list the criteria for the concept of, say, expectation; he discusses different occasions for the employment of the associated terms until the reader is able to “go on” for himself. It is then that the reader can be said to understand fully the meaning of the concept, or understand the criteria of application of the concept. Similarly, when the reader is able to “go on” to other concepts, to continue that is, the method of investigation used by Wittgenstein, then he can be said to understand what a criterion is. The subtle move which Wittgenstein makes from any explicit mention of the use or the criteria is towards the insistence that we know the meaning of a concept when “we can go on”, that is when we know how to look for use and criteria. In this way, meaning, in the final stage of the linguistic turn, becomes wedded to method.

I contend that Wittgenstein in his later works was much more interested in demonstrating a new method of doing philosophy than in developing a theory of criteria or theories of the particular phenomena to be investigated. In these works he never tires of insisting that one should not expect explanations from philosophizing, but descriptions instead. New theories would offer no help whatsoever in this endeavor because philosophical problems “are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known” (I, 109).

And one method of arranging what we have always known, Wittgenstein’s favored method, is that of investigating the criteria or occasions for use of concept-terms. He is speaking of the writing of the Investigations when he says “we now demon- strate a method, by examples” (I, 133, my emphasis). That is, the Philosophical Znvestigations is a series of examples which, though important in themselves, are primarily intended as a demonstration of a new method of doing philosophy, “criteri-

It is important to remember that Wittgenstein did not offer “criteriology” as the method of philosophy. “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies” (I, 133). We all have the same goal perhaps, namely steering our way clear of the puzzles generated by our bewitchment by language; but there are different ways of reach-

ology”.

CRITERIOLOGY: A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 11

ing this goal. One could for example choose to deal only with inductive or symptomatic features of an expression’s usage; or perhaps statistical analysis or some similar method. Wittgenstein on the other hand uses the notion of a defining criterion as a limiting concept to which only few non-scientific concept-terms approach. But most terms simply are not used in such a way as to become susceptible to analysis by way of defining criteria.

Nevertheless, whenever we are attempting to find our way about with regard to a philosophical puzzle, we are in the habit of asking for the directions; that is, we always ask the limiting question “What are the criteria for use of the term . . .?” A few times, as with the terms “bachelor” or “3 fathoms deep”, we may actually arrive at a generally accepted set of criteria that approaches the status of definition. But more frequently, as with “painful” or “intelligent”, we wind up with something resembling “symptoms” as characterized in the Blue Book discussions.“ But this is to say nothing more than that some family resem- blances are stronger and more easily discernable than others.

Before moving forward to show how my interpretation of Wittgensteinian “criteriology” as a minimally theoretic method is able to handle some of the most troublesome questions currently being posed about criteria, let us take up an obvious objection. Perhaps Wittgenstein’s development of the concept of criteria is only minimally theoretic; but this is all the more reason to devote our energies to a further development of the theory rather than to plunge ahead, using the method without proper substantiation. We should first develop the theory, define the theoretic concepts we are using, list as far as possible all the logical properties of the “C-relation”; after this base is firmly set we can then legitimately turn our attention to applying the theory in the world just as Wittgenstein applied the theory (albeit prematurely) in his later works.

This line of argument has been at the heart of some of the current discussions of Wittgenstein’s concept of criteria. But I think it contains a fundamental error. It depicts the modicum of theory which he did set out, as the initial stages of a theoretic development; it is as if he became bored with theory develop ment and decided to abandon the proper task of theory explanation and to turn instead to theory implementation. But this is

41 realize this line of reasoning commits me to the position that criteria and symptoms shade off into one another whereas Wittgenstein spoke only of a bit of evidence “fluctuating” between the status of criterion and symptom. But I believe this more rigid distinction is untenable and that Wittgenstein himself abandoned it after the early discussions on the topic.

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absurd. As has already been mentioned Wittgenstein viewed the philosopher’s task as one of describing or arranging what we have always known and explicitly not one of issuing logical or theoretical explanation.

Furthermore, the very notion of “fleshing out” the initial theory of criteria stands in direct contradiction to the spirit of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In the first place I fail to see what a “fleshing out” of a concept would be if it were not some form of criterial specification, that is to say, an investigation of the criteria of employment of an attenuated concept-term. Thus a “fleshing out” of the concept of criteria would amount to a circular, criteriological search for the concept of criteria itself. This in itself would not be viciously circular unless it were to be offered as the theoretic backing for “criterio1ogy”-which of course is the issue at hand. I would only remind the imaginary objector at this point of Wittgenstein’s lesson that “the real [philosophical] discovery” is the “one that gives philosophy peace, so that i t is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question” (I, 133).

I11

I have argued that Wittgenstein’s position on these matters is best characterized by the label “minimally theoretic method”. Now let me simply list a few propositions that constitute at least a partial description of the theoretic content of this method. Most of these features have been developed, argued for and textually supported in the literature previously, so I will not bother with more than a cursory examination here:

(1) A defining criterion is the limiting condition of criteria. Not all criteria are defining. Neither do all expressions have criteria in this strong sense.

(2) Criteria are always evidential, i.e., if X is a criterion for Y, then the presence of X necessarily counts as evidence with some degree of binding, for the presence of Y.

(3) Criteria are always criterial for linguistic expressions fit- ting their circumstances or objects.‘ It follows that they are human instruments.

5True Wittgenstein frequently spoke as if there could be criteria for non-linguistic entities, e.g., the bacillus as criterion for angina rather than for the ascription of angina. But I feel this to be merely a loose way of speaking and that his insistence upon the conventional nature of criteria proves this.

CRITERIOLOGY: A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 13 Criteria are always grammatically not factually tied to their objects. Reasons can be advanced for an expression’s occurrence only so far; ultimately it comes down to a matter of convention. This is a corollary to the doctrine, meaning is use. Thus, to give the criteria for the employment of a certain expression is to offer an explanation of the sense or meaning of that expression (BB, p. 24). Criteria are always intersubjective or publicly observable. This follows from the fact that they are linguistic, human instruments and not, therefore, amenable to private, ostensive definition (I, 580). Criteria are extremely helpful in alleviating ambiguity arising from the encountering of conflicting symptoms, but this is not their only function. To cite correctly the criteria for a certain phenomenon is to assuage successfully all reasonable doubt as to the existence of that phenomenon. Symptomatic support on the other hand never more than “probablifies” its phenomena.‘ In general we are all taught the meaning of a concept by being presented with the commonly accepted criteria for the employment of that concept-term. Though symptoms may also be used in the teaching of expressions. Criteria1 support is almost always defeasible. But this feature does not conflict with the assertion that criteria are grounds for certainty with regard to their phenomena. Certainty in this sense reflects grounds for belief beyond all reasonable doubt, not beyond all possible conflicting, imaginable scenarios.

But the most important point to realize is that “criteriology” is a method of solving philosophical disputes, a method whose character is entailed by the notion that meaning is use or that “essence is expressed by grammar” (I, 371). If a dispute is resolvable by getting straight about the meaning of the expressions employed-as all philosophical disputes are in fact resolvable according to Wittgenstein-then it makes sense to ask how

6Notice that this feature accounts for the major shift in Wittgenstein’s attitude towards the worth of epistemology from his earlier Tractaus’ ignoring of the endeavor altogether. For the best discussion around on the matter of Wittgenstein and epistemology see P. M. S. Hacker’s Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), esp. Ch. I1 and passim.

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we should go about this getting straight about meanings. There are several possible ways. One, perhaps unfruitful, way would be to list all actual historical occurrences of the expression in question and attempt to “read off’ the appropriate use from the list. Another way would be to examine a (pragmatically chosen) representative sampling from among those historical occurrences. But Wittgenstein’s method is to search for the criteria of the employment of the expression. One particularly useful way of testing the rigidity of a proffered criterion is to invent language games where that criterion is apparently dispensable and where the alleged hair line boundaries become vast, open plains -a method which the later Wittgenstein pursues ingeniously and endlessly. Another very helpful way of discovering a criteria-set is to examine the learning process associated with the expression. If we know, to take a limiting-condition example, that all language users are taught to utter “Y” in and only in the presence of condition X, then we have in a firm sense the definition of “Y”. With cases at greater removes from this paradigm we nevertheless are still able to determine the sense of an expression. Certain difficulties arise due to the obvious fact that not all language users are taught every expression with which they are familiar by means of the same set of criteria. Nor is it the case that every expression has even in its most carefully delineated usage only one criterion. Furthermore it is a notorious fact that symptoms and criteria may “fluctuate”. But none of these considerations in any way detracts from the efficacy of the method of “criteriology” as a determination of the sense of expressions employed in philosophical puzzles. Neither do they detract from the truth of the nine theoretical theses set out above. They would only be damaging to a theory which made the dual claims that all utterances are criterially dependent (i.e., even first person pain statements, performative utterances, exclamations, and greetings such as “hello”, and so forth), and that all criteria are defining criteria. And, if I am right, Wittgen- stein never held either of these theses.

IV There are several unresolved questions concerning Wittgen-

stein’s notion of criteria which become manageable from the viewpoint taken in this essay, namely the viewpoint that “criteriology” is a minimally theoretic method. In conclusion I will briefly consider a few of these issues.

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 15 The evidential problem. What is the logical nature of criterio-

logical evidence? Does a statement asserting the existence of a set of criteria entail that which asserts the existence of the phenomenon for which it is the criteria1 set? Are criteria both necessary and sufficient conditions for their related phenomena?

From the standpoint of the “criterio1ogy”-as-a-minimally- theoretic-method thesis, the answer to the evidential problem is not difficult. In so far as “criteriology” is a method as opposed to a theory, all criteria are paradigmatically defining criteria. That is, one searches for criteria as if one is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions. But of course such conditions are seldom found, simply because few expressions are used according to fixed rules.

But we must proceed with caution in taking criteria as our paradigm. Wittgenstein repeatedly warns us not to “think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to fixed rules” (I, 81). Avoiding such a conclusion is precisely the advantage of viewing “criteriology” as, primarily, a method. For it is not a thesis of the method that language operates according to fixed rules or that language users do; on the contrary, such a thesis is a t the heart of innumerable metaphysical muddles (BB, pp. 25-26). However, as a method “criteriology” may find it beneficial to proceed in the direction of necessary and sufficient conditions as a limiting case of criteria. Those criteria which are turned up in the investigation-those criteria logically and grammatically tied to the use of the controversial expressions-will prove to be sufficient at resolving the submerged linguistic paradoxes even though they may not fit the mold of a defining criterion as exemplified by the angina example.

The verificationism trap. Does “criteriology” commit the same excesses that verificationism did? How do the two methods differ?

The answer is that “criteriology” does not commit the same mistakes since it is up to a fundamentally different business. It is a method of uncovering the meanings of terms by observing the conditions of the terms’ uses. Verificationism on the other hand-at least in its most erring form-was not a method at all, but a theory of meaning. The meaning of an expression, as the verificationist would have it, is identical with its method of verification. But the term “method” is used quite differently in describing “criteriology”. For there the meaning of an expres-

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sion is its use in particular circumstances. The way one investigates that meaning, or teaches that meaning, or justifies his knowledge claim of that meaning, is the method of criteriological investigation. This is a methodology concerned with uncovering particular meanings where verificationism is a theory about the nature of “meaning”. No equally theoretical commitments are to be found in the later works of Wittgenstein.

The univocity of criteria. There seems to be no univocal notion of a criterion. In The Blue and Brown Books, criteria are clearly necessary and sufficient conditions for their phenomena. But later there is talk of criteria and symptoms “fluctuating”. On the other hand, when we in this essay attempt to give a con- sistent notion of criteria aren’t we specifically violating the Wittgensteinian command to refrain from delivering specious explanations and rely instead only on descriptions?

The answer to this, of course, is more or less explicit in the second section of this essay. Wittgenstein offered only a minimal theoretic backing for what he considered to be the only viable method of dealing with philosophical puzzles. He had no full- blown theory and no attempt at developing one has been offered here. Indeed, it has been argued that none is possible. But this is not a disadvantage of “criteriology”. Quite the opposite. This feature reflects the facet of ordinary language use that certain expressions are more or less rigidly applied; while others fluctuate in their respective distances from these rigidly applied terms. Any “theory” violating this feature of ordinary language usage would be at best misleading.

The method of “criteriology” so far described is perhaps clear enough but nevertheless still somewhat problematic. If an arbi- trator wishes to solve a dispute which turns on the meaning of the word “auger”, he could send the disputants to a dictionary. But another way to reach a solution-perhaps a better one- would be to send the disputants to observe a carpenter using an auger. But when the dispute centers on the veracity of a third person pain report, rarely will a dictionary help. In such a case the background conditions need to be specified and the criteria for the employment of the key expressions investigated. Suppose all the criteria1 evidence points to the sincerity of the pain report. The skeptic can always envision a hitch-usually decep tion or feigning-which would annul the sincerity claim. Criteria are admittedly defeasible. But to call such an imagination game “doubting” is a mirage, If a skeptic could realistically doubt

CRITERIOLOGY : A MINIMALLY THEORETICAL METHOD 17 under normal circumstances, a pain report from a trustworthy source, then we would simply fail to understand him “for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not” (OC, 231). One cannot doubt at will (OC, 221). “The reasonable man does not have certain doubts” (OC, 220). “Doubt gradually loses its sense” (OC, 56).

These last few statements describe a solid state of certainty, a state in which the questioning game has reached rock bottom. Perhaps it is only infrequently that this state will be accom- panied by the discovery of a set of genuinely defining criteria. But no matter. The important point is that here the stage has been reached at which further skeptical doubt has been fore- stalled. The sense of the perplexing expression is clear; the meaning is finally understood; the puzzle has suddenly evapor- ated. This is the goal of the method of “criteriology”, a goal only wistfully admired by the early ordinary language analysts, and only artifically approximated by the earlier reductivists.

JESUS COLLEGE OXFORD

B MPH

criteriology: a minimally theoretical method

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