~-r~

Critical &Creative %inking:

the· fllustrafasian JoumaCof P/iitiJsopliy for C/iiUren

'l!oC 7 9W 2 October 1999

II,II

Gareth Matthews

Tim Sprod

Stephan Millet

Winifred W H Lamb

Greg Smith

Rass Phillips

Tim Sprod

FAPCA Conference Issue I

CONTENTS

'Philosophy as Child's Play'A keynote address to. the FAPCA Conference

Philosophy and Childhood

Reports from the Field

Philosophy across the curriculum:the W~sley College Experience

TOK at Narrabundah

Using non-Lipman materials with Year 9

Book ReviewReview of Places for Thinking

Report

FAPCA Chair Report

Critica{ &Creative %in/(fng 7(2) October1999

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for ChildrenandThe Federation of Australian Philosophy for Children Associations (FAPCA)

ExecutiveChair:

Secretary:

Treasurer:

Ex-officio:

Ross Phillips, School of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Vie 3083Tel: 03-9479-2141 Fax: 03-9479-3693 E-mail: ross.phillips@latrobe.edu.auCaroline Morrison, St Pidelis Primary School, 52 Saunders St, Moreland, Vie 3058Tel: 03-9383-3600 Fax: 03-9386-0076 E-mail:Dan Vine, 194 Darebin Rd, Thornbury, Vie 3071Tel: 03-9484-2230 E-mail: vitis@primus.com.auLaurance Splitter, ACER, Camberwell, Vie 3124. E-mail: splitter@acer.edu.au

AssociationsThe Centre of Philosophy for Children - Director: Laurance Splitter

ACER, Private Bag 55, Camberwell, Vic 3124. Tel (03) 9277 5555 Fax (03) 92775500The NSW Philosophy for Children Association - 1 [amberoo Lane, Double Bay, NSW 2028

President: Sandy Lynch, School of Philosophy, UNSW. E-mail LMccutcheon@msn.com.auThe Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools - Chair: [anette Poulton.. "-68-Sastings St,·Northc-ote, \lic.3Q70 ...Tel (03) 94813386. e-mail: GKKing@ausom.net.auThe South Australian Philosophy for Children Association - Sue Knight, Uni of South Australia.

97 Gover St, North Adelaide. Tel: 08-267-1854 Fax: 08- 302-5153The Western Australian Philosophy for Children Association - Contact: Felicity Haynes,

Uni Western Australia, Crawley WA 6009. Tel (09) 380 2431 Fax (09) 380 1956Tasmanian Philosophy for Children Association - Tin Sprod, Friends School, North Hobart Tas7002. Tel: (03) 6210 2288 Fax: (03) 6234 8209 e-mail: T.Sprod@postoffice.friends.tas.edu.au

Regional CoordinatorsAustralian Capital Territory (ACT) - Denise Boettcher, 44 Vasey Cres. Campbell, ACT 2612Armidale, NSW - John Mumford, Dept Social, Cultural & Curriculum Studies, Uni New England,

Armidale, NSW 2351. Tel (067) 81 300 Fax (067) 733350Northern Territory - Alan Day, Curriculum & Assessment, NT Department of Education,

GPO Box 4821,Darwin, NT 0801. Tel: (089) 89 5511South-West Victoria - Clive Lindop, School of Social Inquiry, Deakin University-Warmambool,

Warmambool, Vic 3280. Tel (0355) 633 512 Fax (0355)633 534 e-mail: CLIVEL@deakin.edu.au

Journal EditorClive Lindop - School of Social Inquiry, Deakin UnL,Warrnambool, Vie 3280

TeI03-5563-3512 Fax 03-5563-3534 E-mail CLIVEL@deakin.edu.au

Editorial BoardPhil Cam - University of New South WalesPeter Davson-Calle - University of TasmaniaFelicity Haynes University of Western AustraliaLaurance Splitter - ACER, Melbourne, VistoriaRoss Phillips Latrobe University, VictoriaTim Sprod - University of Hobart

ISSN - 1325-7730

-Critical & Creative %in/dng: t6e !JLusttafasian 70urna[ of PliiCosopfiy for cfiilifren

Aim and scope

To provide a vehicle for the communication ofideas and a forum for discussion and debate ofissues concerning the practice of philosophicalinquiry with children.

To foster continuing development of the theoryand practice of engaging children in philo­sophical inquiry;

more specifically»(1) to promote better teaching and curric

ular design for the development of criti­cal and creative thinking amongstchildren through increased under­standing and use of philosophicalinquiry in the classroom

(2) to enrich the understanding of phil­osophy and philosophical inquiry as

well as its role in the development ofgood thinking and good judgment.

(3) to increase interaction and collaborationbetween the academic community ofscholars in universities and teachers inschools on matters of logic, epistemology,creativity, metaphysics, aesthetics,ethics, inquiry, philosophy of science,mind, person-hood, community,understanding, learning, thinking,dialogue, discussion

(4) to promote discussion of the place ofphilosophy in the national and schoolcurriculum and its infusion into thepresent curriculum; the place andcontribution of philosophy to the in­tellectual, creative, moral and socialdevelopment of individuals.

Structure

The journal will carry a range of articlesreporting on all aspects of the practice ofengaging in philosophical inquiry anddeveloping critical and creative thinking. Tothis end it will be organised into four mainSections or Departments as follows:-

(1) Theory and Applied Researcha. Contributions concerning the moretheoretical aspects of philosophyand inquiry such as.-the nature and purpose, of philosophy,inquiry, community, conversation,dialogue, critical thinking, creativethinking, reasoning, etc.the nature of childhood, adolescence,mind; the philosophy of childhoodand development, etc.epistemological, social, political andethical dimensions of the practice of en­gaging children in philosophical inquiry.policy and planning, future studies anddirections; implications of recentGovernment Reports

b.Research studies of classroom practice:the impact of philosophy for children onclassroom interaction, classroom discourseand dialogue; pupil participation,thinking and learning; teacher thinkingand behaviour; classroom climate, etc.

ii

(2) Philosophical studiesdiscussion and clarification of key phil­osophical concepts, topics and issuesembedded in and raised by classroomreaders and other materials;exegeses of the philosophical literature onsuch matters.

(3) Reports from the field:a.Reports from practising teachers on

their experience of engaging children inphilosophical inquiry; discussion of prac­tical problems and possible solutions; in­novative ways of using classroommaterials, arranging classrooms, grouping,interacting with pupils.Children's reactions and views newmaterials or exercises.This section may well stimulate otherresearch projects.

b.Children's work - writings, illustrations, etc

(4) Resources & Reviews (R&R)Reports from inservice or workshopexperiences and challenges. News andreports from national and internationalconferences. Discussion of differentapproaches, new materials, exercises andsuch. New philosophical stories, teachermanuals and other materials. Reviews ofbooks and other materials.

Welcome to Critical & Creative Thinking

Welcome to the seventh volume of Critical and Creative Thinking - the Journal for the Federationof Australian Philosophy for Children Associations. This Journal is dedicated to improving theteaching and research of critical and creative thinking by providing a forum for discussion anddebate on all aspects, theoretical and practical, of the practice of engaging children in activitiesintended to develop and improve their thinking. We encourage classroom teachers as well asacademics to send in their contributions for publication. Critical & Creative Thinking is intended tobe a teachers' professional journal featuring a combination of theoretical and research articles witharticles from teachers on their clasroom experience and practical strategies for engaging children incritical and creative thinking activities. Whatever program you are trying with your class, pleasewrite in and let us know about it and its impact on your students as well as its influence on your ownteaching practice. There are many others who are interested in what you are doing, together we canhelp each other become even better teachers and educators.

Clive LindopDeakin University-Warrnambool

Notes for contributors

All contributions are welcome. Manuscripts should be typed and doubled spaced on A4 letter or USletter paper and accompanied with a disc copy, preferably 3.5 in Macintosh disc in Word 5 format(though IBM MS DOS is acceptable). Alternatively, to save time and avoid damage or loss in themail, contributors may send their articles by E-mail (ASCII text) to:-

CLIVEL@deakin.edu.au

Please use the Author - Date system with endnotes and bibliography for your articles

NB: to maintain academic credibility, contributions to sections (1) Theory and Research and (2)Philosophical Studies, are subject to those processes of peer review normal for scholarly refereedjournals.

Letters to the Editor

If often happens that one reads an article and wants to respond, but not in the form of a lengthyarticle. Such responses, which might simply add to a point made by the author either in agreementor disagreement, or offer an alternative view, etc. could appear as a 'Letter to the Editor.' The ideahere is to encourage dialogue between readers and authors- in effect using the Journal to create acommunity of inquiry!

Send all postal contributions to Clive LindopEditorCritical & Creative ThinkingDeakin University-WarrnamboolWarrnambool, Vic 3280Australia.

E-mail: CLIVEL@deakin.edu.au

Subscriptions

Subscriptions accepted now at the rate of $A25 and paid by certified cheque, Master or Visa CardAuthorisation made out to Critical & Creative Thinking and sent toThe Editor, Critical & Creative ThinkingClive Lindop, Deakin University-Warrnambool, Vie 3280, Australia.

Hi

Critical & Creative lJiiinl(jng

CONTENTS

Volume!Number 1 March 1993Mat Lipman:Ann SharpRon ReedFelicity HaynesChristina SladeRobert LairdTimSprodAnthony ImbroscianoLaurance Splitter

Number 2 October 1993Phil Guin:Mat Lipman:RonReed:Helmut Schreier:Klaus Doderer:jen Glaser:Martyn Maher:Lyn English:

David Inverarity:Laurance Splitter:

Number 1 March 1994Ann SharpRoss PhillipsSandy YuleAnthony BrookerLawrence ParkerCairns & WilksAnthony ImbroscianoMakolm MillerTimSprod

Number 2 October 1994Ann SharpPhil CamRoger Creswell &Peter HosbsonIrene de PuigSue Wilks

Christine DurhamGreg SmithTock Keng Lim

The Educational value of Philosophy for ChildrenThe Ethics of TranslationReconstructing Linguistic ExperienceTeaching Children to Think for ThemselvesPixie's Anti-realistic view of AnalogyPhilosophy for Children in Aboriginal ClassroomsPhilosophy for children and Literacy ..Logic in SchoolsSimon Chapter 1

a story about being the same and being different

Reflections on Karl Popper & Philosophy for ChildrenUnreasonable People and inappropriate JudgmentsCritical Theory, Post-modernism & Communicative RationalityThe Role of Stories in Philosophising with ChildrenChildren as Little Philosophers in Children's BooksIs Pixie Reasonable? Social and Ethical Themes in 'Pixie'Reflections on Philosophic Practice in the ClassroomUsing Philosophical Inquiry to enhance Mathematical

CommunicationPaint me some ThinkingSimon Chapter 1: Classroom Discussion Plans and Exercises

Volume 2

The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children IA sincere word for the Devil's AdvocatePhilosopher culture and teacher culturePunishmentStrategies for infusing critical thinking into a cultureA PMI on philosophyTeaching logic wellPhilosophy in New Brunswick schoolsAn attempt at evaluating Philosophy for Children

The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children IIA philosophical approach to moral educationContested values and Philosophy for Children in a pluralistic,

democratic stateBeyond knowledge: moral and political educationEncouraging pupil participation: practical ways of establishing

a community of inquiryA philosophical fortune huntAn experience of introducing Lisa to secondary school teachersEvaluation of the Philosophy for Children project in Singapore

Critical & Creative rrhinl(jngVolume 3

Number 1 March 1995Chris de HaanTerri FieldNina IulinaSandy YulePeter Davson-GallePhi CamCresswell & HobsonPeter Davson-CalleAnn SharpYim PyoungkapManuel Meglas RosaClive LindopLindop,Delany et al,Ann SharpPeter Davson-Galle

Deweyan aesthetics in the philosophy classroomPhilosophy for Children and the feminist critique of reasonPhilosophy abroad - a Russian perspectiveOn trusting teachers with philosophyAdvocatus Diabli or Advocatus Dei? a reply to Cam, Cresswell & HobsonAgainst indoctrination - response to Davson-GalleThe moral dimension - response to Davson-GalleRejoiners to Cam, Resswell & HobsonHabit in the thought of CS PeirceA graceful error corrects the caveIs Philosophy for Children useful for the ESL teacher?Philosophy for Children and ESLPhilosophy comes to SchoolWho owns the flowers?More doggeral verse

Number 2 October 1995 ICPIC CONFERENCE ISSUE IPeter Singer Coping with global changeAnn Sharp Educating for global ethical consciousnessSusan Gardner Inquiry is no mere conversationChristina Slade Reflective reasoning and the selfMike Pritchard On becoming reasonableRichard Moorhouse Research in Philosophy for ChildrenVicki Mackrill Philosophy for Children in Kinder and PrepKathleen Davson-Calle Bare Brains[ames Battye A puzzle for [essicaLaurance Splitter Philosophy for Children Strategic Plan

Voulme4

Number 1 March 1996Robert FisherGil BurghShariPopenPhils GuinMike RossGrreg SmithUrn & KaliannanMargarete Wenzel[in Whan ParkFr Stan AnihTimSprodCresswell et al

Number 2 Oct 1996Carol SteinerChristina SladeDavid KennedyRoss PhillipsDina MendocaSteve WiIliamsRoger Creswell

Peter Davson-Galle

ICPIC CONFERENCE ISSUE IISocratic education: a new paradigm for philosophical inquiryTranslating democracy into practice: a case for demarchyRethinking teaching and teachers within communities of inquiryEducation for global citizenshipA child's belief system and securityFostering community in the community of inquiryReflections of teachers on the community of inquiry in their classroomStorytelling as embodied philosophyDemocratic citizenship education in a global community: the case of KoreaSchooling without thinking: the educational curricular crisis in our timeBouncing BallsBook Review of 'Thinking Stories' I & II

Learning opportunities, communication and mass educationConversing across communitiesYoung children's movesSelf esteem and ownership of ideasThe religious dimension of Philosophy for ChildrenLearning sequences and inquiry in small groupsDemons, devils, dragons and flames: harnessing sporting interests

in the philosophy classroomMatters of degree and kind

Critical & Creative %ink:ingVolumeS

Number 1 March 1997Mat LipmanWinifred Wing-LambClive LindopDina MendocaAnthony ImbroscianoTimSprodKathleen & PeterDavson-Galle

Number 2 Oct 1997Freddy MortierChristine GehrettMarie-France Daniel

TimSprodClive Lindop

No 1 March 1998Susan GardnerRichard MorehouseTock Keng LimTerry AllenMary BarrettPeter Davson-Calle'Winifred WH LambLilly Hawkins

No 2 Oct1998Clive LindopWendy TurgeonTimSprodLeanne ParfittJohn ColbeckFAPCA Report

No1 Mar 1999[im BurdettPeter Davson-GalleDavid Kennedy

Lola HillLeanne ParfittMichel Sasseville

Philosophical discussion plans and exercises'A good dinner and a game of backgammon'Truth, hunches and our form of lifeReading VygotskyPhilosophy and student academic performanceAn historical community of inquiry

Eyes lies

Competence in children: psychological, legal, moralThe power of narrative in a philosophical community of inquiryAn interactionist-constructivist mode for the practical education of

preservice teachers in physical educationBook review: Reasonable Children by Michael PritchardBook review: Thinking Stories III by Phillip Cam

Volume 6

Philosophy for Children realluy works! A report on a two year studyThe use of student argument skill: a report on a two year studyHow to evaluate Philosophy for childrenBeing an individual in the community of inquiryHumourSchools and FoolsReview: The philosophy of ChildhoodReview: Thinking and Talking Through Literature

Self identity: explorations in philosophic methodReluctant philosophers: casues and curesThinking for oneselfEducation and ThinkingCourage to think, to be, and to become different

Volume 7

The conununity of inquiry as a means of reducing youth suicideDemocracy, philosophy and schoolsThe politics of objectivity, the philosophy of childhood

and dialogical educationPreservice teachers' experience of the conununity of inquiryDynamics of a classroom dialogueICPIC Report to UNESCO;-

International co-operation in Philosophy for Children

Critical &Creative Thinking: the Australasian Journal

. of Philosophy for Children

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FAPCA Chair report

TimSprodUnder the structure of the FAPCA Constitution, the Tasmanian Association has provided theFAPCA executive (together with Laurance Splitter as an ex-officio member) since 1997. TheSecretary has been Peter Davson-Galle, the Treasurer Vicki Mackrill, and I have been the Chair.

As a major focus of our term, we have tried to keep contact with Associates around Australia andNew Zealand, and to encourage their founding or revitalisation where that was necessary. Thishas been successful in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, although it would onlybe fair to say that the vast majority of this work was done by people on the ground. The Queenslandnetwork was assisted by FAPCA financially in its set-up costs. I feel that FAPCA needs to continuethis sort of support.

There seems to be a trend amongst many of our associates towards widening the meaning ofPhilosophy for Children - I would like to encourage this. We need to be able to attract the interestof all those who work with young people, both in school and out, from the earliest years to the mostsenior. We also need to consider that the methods of Philosophy for Children are valuable inengaging people of all ages in philosophy. We have also been considering a widening of the role ofour journal, Critical & Creative Thinking, ably edited by Clive Lindop, to build on its internationaldistribution.

FAPCA also held a successful Level II Teacher Educator workshop in Melbourne in January 1999.This resulted in certification for 3 Full Teacher Educators, 4 Philosopher Teacher Educators and 5Classroom Practice Teacher Educators, with one Certificate of Attendance. After much anxiety, wealso managed to fund it, with help from an anonymous donor ($3000), AAP ($1000) and VPCA (nowVAPS: $1000 towards the attendance of Victorians) and even to turn a profit in the end.

Much of our energy over the past year has been expended on organising the 1999 FAPCA Conferencein Hobart. This was seen as a chance to make connections - to Tasmanian teachers, to othersinterested in philosophy in schools but not directly involved in P4C, to those interested inphilosophy and childhood. I think that we achieved success in each of these aims. Certainly, theconference committee were delighted that over twice as many people attended as we anticipatedwhen we first started planning. I must pay tribute to the planning committee members: JennyMorgan, [udy Keen, Rosie Kosmeyer, Moira Nichols, Mary Fearnley-Sander and jeff Malpas.

Mures Conventions handled registration and accommodation bookings at no cost to us and wereextremely helpful. The conference received assistance from Tasmanian Department of Education($3060 for bursaries for teachers), and from the Education Faculty ($1130 for bursaries to studentteachers and for the use of Professor Gareth Matthews in teacher training following the conference)and School of Philosophy ($1280 for student and faculty attendance and assistance with GarethMatthews' accommodation, plus infrastructure support) at the University of Tasmania. ATasmanian Government conference subsidy of $25 per person from interstate staying at least twonights in Tasmania also added $1025 to the budget. Ansett, as the official conference airline,provided $200 to assist with brochure costs. We received valuable organisational help fromTasmanian Conventions Bureau. FAPCA has spent $2309.40 on assisting the attendance ofrepresentatives of a number of regional P4C associations.

FAPCA will pretty well break even on the conference, which was acclaimed by those who attendedas a big success. Gareth Matthews proved to be an excellent choice as the Keynote Speaker, and seta relaxed yet intellectually challenging tone for the event. We aimed for a mix between presenta­tions aimed squarely at practicalities within the classroom, and more theoretical and discursivepapers: many commented that they had found this mix to be well balanced and stimulating. Quite afew of the papers presented have been placed on the FAPCA website and many will be published inCritical & Creative Thinking. Unfortunately, the clash with the ICPIC Conference in Brazilprevented a number of our more senior members from attending.

Finally, as I pass the baton on to the Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools (VAPS), Imust wish all the best to the next executive.

Critical & Creative %inRin,g

Preveiw

%{7 ;No 2 OctoVer 1999

This issue features some of the reports of what is going on in the field, in schools around Australia.The issue uses a keynote address from our guest speaker, Gareth Matthews and another by theimmediate past Chair of FAPCA, Tim Sprod, as a platform from which to view some of thepractical applications of philosophy reported to the Conference from different parts of Australia.The next issue will feature more of the theoretical and research papers presented to the Conference

Professor Gareth B Matthews of Massachusetts University delighted the Conference with a coupleof addresses about children and philosophy, one of which, 'Philosophy as Child's Play; isreproduced here for the readers. He observations show that children have a talent for philosophy,for making astute observations of their own and puzzling over the same features of experience thatpreoccupy professional academic philosophers. Moreover, as he illustrates, 'we must be prepared tolet even a small child make it clear that we ourselves don't understand fully the phenomenon underdiscussion. And we must also be open to the possibility that the child may have a surprisinglyworthwhile suggestion for analysing the phenomenon - or if not, for actually analysing it, at leastfor appreciating its subtle complexity. '

Tim Sprod, the immediate past Chair of FAPCA, builds on Matthews work to argue that we can dobetter philosophy if we take children and childhood into consideration. Philosophy has beenimpoverished by not paying sufficient attention to childhood. This claim parallels the one madeby feminist philosophers that, by ignoring gender, philosophy has not been able to come to soundconclusions. Proper philosophical consideration of childhood and the moral development ofchildren, enjoins us to engage children in philosophical inquiry. Not only should philosophy takemore notice of childhood, but also children should be helped to take more notice of philosophy.

Stephan Millett reports on his experience at Wesley College in Perth where he was asked tointroduce philosophy into the curriculum. After the initial attempts proved disappointing, hesuggested a change of approach within the school which met with more success and positive results.So much so that he is able to conclude that although the Philosophy and Ethics program is still verymuch in its infancy, "there are encouraging signs that it - in conjunction with other college initiatives - isbeginning to makea positive difference and moveus toward beingan 'ethical school'."

Winifred Wing Han Lamb outlines the Theory of Knowledge course at Narrabundah College, whichlike philosophy for children promotes the education of the 'whole person' because of the sense ofcontinuity that is respected throughout in content, approach and rationale. In this article shedescribes this continuity and illustrates the program with sample documents of course description,lesson plan, and student work.

Greg Smith offers a brief preview of his nine hour course on moral issues given over three mornings toa combined group of Yr 9 students from three schools in Brisbane. He has gathered various texts"that work" and includes the web-site address to access lesson plans and materials.

The next issue, Vol 8 No 1 March 2000 will feature more of the theoretical and research papersoffered at the Conference. If you have not already done so, I urge you renew your subscription so thatyou don't miss out on these valuable and informative reports.

Clive LindopEditor

Philosophy as Child's PlayGareth B. Matthews: University of Massachusetts/Amherst

Keynote Address, FAPCA Conference, Hobart July 1999

Several years ago Raymond Briggs, the iconoclastic cartoonist andauthor of When the Wind Blows and Father Christmas, granted aninterview to a reporter for one of the London Sunday newspapers. Thearticle that resulted from that interview was full of provocativelyirreverent and often dispeptic remarks (e.g., "I don't travel; it narrowsthe mind"). But one of those rather cranky observations struck me then,as it does now, as especially profound. Briggs said he didn't know whypeople got so excited at the news that a child had been born. "That babyis just going to grow up into a 41-year-old insurance clerk,' he said. "Nowcan you imagine going excitedly down the street, saying, 'Guess what?My wife just gave birth to a 41-year-old insurance clerk'?"

Why is it that we are so excited about the birth of a baby, even when werealize that that infant will probably grow up into a boring adult?Surely one thing that excites us about small babies is the wonderfulsense of possibility they represent for us. We can imagine innumerablepossibilities for the child, but far fewer for the adult.

There is, however, an assumption in Briggs's sour comment that I want tocall into question. It is the assumption made by all of us some of thetime, and by some of us all of the time, that what counts about a child ishow she or he turns out. As parents and teachers we are all concernedwith how the children we are responsible for will turn out. My mother,who lived to be 91, asked me regularly until just a few months before shedied how I thought my younger brother would turn out! (Toward the endof my mother's live, I should add, my younger brother was himself over50 years old and a flight captain for American Airlines.) "Mom," I kepttrying to tell her, "he's already turned out." But she never got themessage.

I suggest to you that there is something really perverse, even offensive,about our preoccupation with how our children will turn out. It isn'toffensive to worry about how the cake will turn out. The cake batter, inand of itself, is not worth much. It's value lies primarily in itspotentiality. But children are not batter. They are not just a bag ofpotentialities on its way to becoming something real and actual, on itsway to becoming something worthwhile. Children are alreadysomething worthwhile. In some ways they are more wonderfullyworthwhile than they will probably be as adults. I suggest that weought to evaluate the time we spend with them as their parents andteachers, not just, or even primarily, in terms of how they eventuallyturn out, but also, perhaps even primarily, with respect to the quality ofour common life together.

"That's hopelessly romantic," you may protest, Or even worse: "That'ssimply irresponsible." As parents and teachers we have a grave respon­sibility for our children. We must do what we can to see that theydevelop emotionally, morally, socially, and intellectually into well­functioning adults. To do anything less constitutes a moral failure of thefirst magnitude.

All that is, of course, true. But I suggest that valuing children now, fortheir own sakes, and valuing the time we spend with them for its

CriticaC & Creative '11ii.nlCin,g 'VaC 7 910 2 Qct06er 1999

Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play 2

intrinsic nature, and not just for its instrumental worth, will in fact notretard their development or limit their futures. In fact, the veryopposite is true. Thinking of our time together as intrinsically valuableis even more likely to make it extrinsically valuable, that is, valuablefor later on, than focusing so heavily, as most all of us do, on how thesewonderful beings will later turn out.

When I reach for examples of how wonderful children can be I naturallyturn to their philosophical comments, questions, and reasoning. Thereare two explanations for why I do this. The first and most obvious isthat I am myself a professional philosopher. If I were an artist or poetor physical education teacher, my list of gifts from the children I spendmy time with would, no doubt, be rather different. What I treasureespecially in children is their ability to do, often spectacularly well,what I most like to spend my time doing. The second explanation isperhaps more interesting. It is that young children are much more likelythan adults to raise philosophically interesting questions, makephilosophically interesting observations, and engage, on their own, inphilosophically interesting reasoning. Moreover, when then areencouraged a bit, they are much more likely to respond to myphilosophical questions with freshness and imagination than are, say,my undergraduate university students. They are much more likely to dothese things, especially the spontaneous things, until they get fullysocialized into school life, when reflectively imaginative comments,questions, and bits of reasoning largely disappear. But before childrenget the message that philosophical thinking is not rewarded, whatthey have to say is philosophically more interesting that what, onaverage, the 20-year-olds in my university classroom, or the 40-year­olds in the working world have to say.

I have spent a fair amount of my life trying to convince adults that ifthey would only listen to what their children say and would engagethem directly in philosophical exploration, the adult, the child, andthe relationship between adult and child would all be greatly enriched.1 myself was first made aware of philosophical thinking in youngchildren when our older daughter, Sarah, now almost 40 years old and alawyer on Martha's Vineyard, was just four years old. (I threw in the bitabout Sarah as an adult in case you were wondering how she had turnedout!) This is a story 1 begin my book, The Philosophy of Childhood,with. The family cat, Fluffy, had contracted fleas. 1 announced that Iwas taking Fluffy down into the basement for flea fumigation. Sarahasked if she could watch. 1 agreed that she could, as long as she stayedon the basement steps, well away from the cloud of flea powder I wasabout to produce.

As she watched the primitive ritual of flea fumigation Sarah asked,"Daddy, how did Fluffy get fleas?""Oh," 1 replied, somewhat off-handedly, "she was probably playing

with another cat and they jumped off that cat onto Fluffy."Sarah reflected a moment. "And how did that cat get fleas? She

asked."Oh," I said, warming to the regress in my explanations, "it was

probably playing with another cat and they jumped onto it fromthat other cat."

Sarah reflected a bit more. "But Daddy," she said, flit can't go on andon like that forever; the only thing that goes on and on like thatforever is numbers."

Criticar & Creative 'Ifiinkins Wor 7 210 1 Qct06er 1999

Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play .3

I was immediately struck by Sarah's confidence that a certain kind ofinfinite regress can be ruled out a priori. The connection between Sarah'sreasoning and various forms of the Cosmological Argument for theexistence of God -each of which includes a move ruling out an infiniteregress of causes - could hardly have escaped me, since I earned myliving discussing those very arguments in my philosophy lectures at theUniversity of Minnesota, where I then taught. "My God," I thought,here I am teaching my university students about arguments for a FirstCause and my four-year-old daughter comes up, on her own, with anargument for a First Flea.

I should perhaps add that, not only have I discussed philosophicalquestions with Sarah for the last 35 years or so, she is now havingphilosophical conversations with her daughter, Pearl, who is not yetfour years old. In fact, I recently began a review of Michael Pritchard'sbook, Reasonable Children, with this story about Pearl. About a yearago, when Pearl was not yet three, she and her mother developed thefollowing routine. Whenever Pearl was attracted to something hermother didn't want her to have, her mother would say, "That's not foryou, Pearl." Pearl would reply, "When I'm older," and nod her headknowingly. "Yes," her mother would say, in reinforcement, "when you'reolder, Pearl."

In a store with her mother one day Pearl headed for an open box ofcandy, which was enticingly placed just at her level. "That's not foryou," said her mother.Pearl withdrew her hand. "When I'm older," she responded,according to the little routine she and her mother had developedtogether."Yes," said her mother, approvingly, "when you're older, Pearl."Pearl thought for a moment. "I'm a little bit older," she said, "can Ihave a little bit.?"

Like many interestingly philosophical exchanges - whether betweenadults and children or among adults, even professional philosophers ­this one was motivated by considerations of self-interest. Adultphilosophers sometimes make clever points to establish theirphilosophical prowess. Pearl, how-ever, didn't want to show off herreasoning ability; she wanted some candy.

Of course philosophically interesting comments and questions aresometimes born of a purely philosophical motivation. I think this wastrue of Sarah's flea question. But self-interest, when it plays a role inmotivating philo-sophically interesting exchanges, need not tarnishthe quality of the reason-ing, or diminish its philosophical interest.Consider an exchange between Steve, still two years old, and his father.Steve's father was eating a banana. Steve looked on.

"You don't like bananas, do you, Steve," said the father."No," agreed Steve, and paused. "If you was me, you wouldn't like

them either," he said.He paused, furrowed his brow, and then added, "But then who would

be the daddy?"

No doubt Steve's original comment, 'If you were [or was] me, youwouldn't like them either,' was intended to legitimize his own refusalto eat bananas. It was a settled feature of his natural taste preferences,he wanted to suggest, that he didn't like bananas. If his father were he,his father would have those same natural taste preferences. But havingonce made the counterfactual leap, even if for self-justificatory reasons,

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Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play

he became ensnared in philosophical perplexity about how to interpretwhat philosophers call a statement of "counterfactual identity."

As you may know, questions about how to interpret counterfactualidentity statements are notoriously problematic. If Mahatma Gandhihad been Adolf Hitler, would Gandhi have been an anti-Semite orwould Hitler have been a pacifist? Most of us have only very fuzzyintuitions on how to handle such questions. It is a challenge to come upwith a way of under-standing them that respects whatever intuitionswe have and gives us a way to answer the questions that seem to gobeyond our intuitions.

The message of my first book on philosophy and children, Philosophyand the Young Child, is that many children do, on their own, askquestions, make comments, and even engage in reasoning that profess­ional philosophers can recognize as philosophical. Unfortunately veryfew adults respond to such child philosophising by reflecting with thechild on the issue or issues raised. In my second book, Dialogues withChildren, I did what, I take it, most of you are engaged in. I went into aschool - it was a music school in Edinburgh - and deliberately raisedphilosophical questions with the children in my class. Let me say alittle about what 1 do when 1 do that sort of thing.

Like Mat Lipman, I tend to use stories when 1 do philosophy withchildren in the early grades. I don't think my use of stories is at allcondescending to the children. For one thing, the stories often presentthought experiments. And thought experiments are, in my view,essential to good philosophical pedagogy, whether one is doingphilosophy with young children, with post-graduate students, or withother philosophy professionals.

Second, I'm a strong believer in texts. Having a common text helps givesome discipline and order to a philosophical discussion. The text may bea discursively philosophical one. Or it may be a story. If it is a story, itmay be a story that occurs in a philosophical text. Or it might be onewritten or told without a specifically philosophical purpose in mind.

As some of you may know, this passage from Chapter 4 of Frank Baum'sOzma of Oz is one of my favorites:

... standing within the narrow chamber of rock, was the form of aman - or, at least, it seemed like a man, in the dim light. He wasonly about as tall as Dorothy herself, and his body was round as aball and made out of burnished copper. Also his head and limbs werecopper, and these were jointed or hinged to his body in a peculiarway, with metal caps over the joints, like the armour worn byknights in days of old. He stood perfectly stilt and where the lightstruck upon his form it glittered as if made of pure gold.

'Don't be frightened,' called [her companion, the hen,] Billina r •••

'It isn't alive.''I see it isn't,' replied [Dorothy], drawing a long breath.'It is only made out of copper, like the old kettle in the barn-yard at

home,' continued the hen, turning her head first to one side andthen to the other, so that both her little round eyes could examinethe object.

'Once,' said Dorothy,'I knew a man made out of tin, who was awoodman named Nick Chopper. But he was as alive as we are,'cause he was born a real man, and got his tin body a little at a

.4

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Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play .5

time - for the reason that he had so many accidents with his axe,and cut himself up in a very careless manner:

'Oh,' said [Billina], with a sniff, as if she did not believe the story.'But this copper man,' continued Dorothy, looking at it with big eyes,

'is not alive at all, and I wonder what it was made for, and why itwas locked up in this queer place.'

'That is a mystery,' remarked Billina, ...Dorothy stepped inside the little room to get a back view of thecopper man, and in this way discovered a printed card that hungbetween his shoulders, it being suspended from a small copper peg atthe back of his neck. She unfastened this card and returned to thepath, where the light was better, and sat herself down upon a slab ofrock to read the printing.'What does it say?' asked [Billina], curiously.Dorothy read the card aloud, spelling out the big words with somedifficulty; and this is what she read:

SMITH & TINKER'SPatent Double-Action, Extra-Responsive, Thought-Creating,

Perfect-Talking

MECHANICAL MAN

Fitted with our Special Clock-Work AttachmentThinks, Speaks, Acts, and Does Everything but Live

'How queer!' said Billina. 'Do you think that is all true, my dear?'I don't know,' answered Dorothy, who had more to read. 'Listen tothis, Billina':

DIRECTIONS FOR USING:For THINKING: - Wind the Clock-work Man under his left arm,

(marked No. 1.)For SPEAKING: - Wind the Clock-work Man under his right arm,

(marked No. 2)For WALKING and ACTION: - Wind Clock-work in the middle of

his back, (marked No. 3.)

"Welt I declare!" gasped [Bellina], in amazement: 'if the copperman can do half of these things he is a very wonderful machine. ButI suppose it is all humbug, like so many other patented articles.''We might wind him up,' suggested Dorothy, 'and see what he'll do:Dorothy had already taken the clock key from the peg.'Which shall I wind up first?' she asked, looking again at the

directions on the card.'Number One, I should think,' returned Billina. 'That makes him

think, doesn't it?''Yes,' said Dorothy, and wound up Number One, under the left arm.'He doesn't seem any different,' remarked [Billina], critically.'Why of course not; he is only thinking, now,' said Dorothy.'I wonder what he is thinking about.'"1'11 wind up his talk, and then perhaps he can tell us,' said the girl.So she wound up Number Two, and immediately the clockwork mansaid, without moving any part of his body except his lips:'Good morn-ing, lit-tle girl. Good morn-ing, Mrs Hen.'

I have discussed this passage with children of different ages and inmany different countries. One of the most memorable discussions I havehad took place in an elementary school in Newton, Massachusetts, about165 km. from my hometown. The children were third and fourth-graders

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Gareth Matthews; PhilQsophy as child's play 6

who had volunteered to join my discussion grQUp. I asked these kidswhether a robot could think.

"There's no proof," said both RQSS and Sam, "that a robot cannotthink."

Rachel suggested that a real brain could be put into a robot and thenthe robot could think.

Nick was unimpressed. "If it had a real brain," he objected, nitwouldn't be a machine."

More discussion revealed that, of the dozen children in this discussiongrQUP (ages nine to ten and a half) only Matt thought that a robot couldbe constructed that would actually have real thoughts. I urged theothers to produce an argument that might convince Matt he was wrQng.And I suggested to Matt that he might think of an argument to win overthe others,

RQSS and Sam remained pessimistic about settling this question with anargument. There is nQ proof one way or the other, they kept saying.They were inclined to agree with Nick that a robot with a living brain,if such a thing were possible, wouldn't really be a robot anyway. ButSam was skeptical that such a thing could be put together, He seemed tobe concerned about whether one could make all the needed connections SQthat the living brain could tell the robot body what tQdo.

I persisted in my request for an argument. "Can anyone think Qf anargument to prQve that something like Tiktok, that isn't alive, cannothave real thoughts?" I asked.Finally Paul obliged. .

"A way of proving it," he said, is this. The only thing that can thinkis a brain. And the only things that have brains are people andanimals. And even if we did put a brain inside a computer, like Nicksaid, it wouldn't be a computer anymQre, or a robot.

Paul's statement of the case wowed me. Elegant reasoning like that iswhat I hope to get from my university students, but seldom do. It waspresented with the confidence of a professional,

Of course, Paul didn't formulate his argument unaided. He developed itout of the preceding discussion. But that is part Qf what made theargument impressive. It puts together succinctly and perspicuously allthe main considerations the grQup discussion had turned up. I waspleased with it on two levels. On the most basic level, I was glad for theconfirmation that Paul and some of the others in the grQUP had come tounderstand the value in trying to find premises from which one could puttogether a logically compelling argument for the conclusion one isinterested in defending. People in our society certainly have the idea ofan argument as a outspoken disagreement. If YQU say that badmintonrequires more skill that table tennis and I insist, perhaps vociferously,that the reverse is true, we have an argument, but not in the sense Qf'argument' that a philosopher is most likely to be interested in. Paul,though not yet ten years old, showed that he knew exactly what Iwanted when I asked for an argument. Moreover, he was able to use thegeneral discussion to provide him with the materials he needed for hisargument. Furthermore, the argument he was able to come up with,drawing on the discussion of those nine and ten-year-olds fits right inwith what many professional philosophers are saying these days. AsJohn Searle puts it in his book, The Mystery of Consciousness (New York:The New York Review of BQQks, 1997(170),

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Gareth Matthews: PhilOSQphy as child's play z

We know that human and some animal brains are conscious, Thoseliving systems with certain sorts of nervous systems are the onlysystems in the world that we know for a fact are conscious. We alsoknow that conscious-ness in those systems is caused by quite specificneurobiological processes.

Of course there are philosophers, good philosophers, who disagreewith Searle. But the point I want to make is that Paul and the otherchildren in that grQUP are fully able to [oin the contemporary discussionof consciousness, what it is and which entities might have it. They donot have to wait until they become university students to take part inthat conversation, And a classic children's story, like the one aboutTiktok can be the stimulus for awakening their intuitions andstimulating their reasoning generators,

A natural stimulus to philosophical reflection is the topic of timetravel. It is, of course, also a favorite theme of children's literature. Icould have used a chapter from Madeline L'Engle's A Wrinkle in Timeor anyone of a number of other time-travel stories for kids to stimulate adiscussion of time by those kids in Newton, Massachusetts. Instead, Itried to get them to help me write a story about time travel.

As things worked out, we never completed our story on time travel. Butthe effort produced wonderful philosophical discussion, excerpts fromwhich I shall share with YQu:

Me: Alice says there couldn't be any such thing as a time machine.Nick: The past is already past and the future hasn't happened yet.

And YQU can't change something that yQU already did. It's liketaking something you did and saying, "Oh, I didn't do that."

Mark: Say I broke my arm in the second grade. I can't gQ back and say,"Oh, I don't want to do on that swing set because I know I'm goingto break my arm."

Rachel: YQU just gQ back as someone else.Mark: YQU could see everybody else but they couldn't see YQu.Rachel: YQU might gQ back as yourself before YQU were born.Me: What would that be like - going back as yourself before YQU

were born? HQW old would YQU be?Someone: Minus five years.Ursula: You'd be the same age as YQU were when YQU started going

back. You'd have the same clothes.Me: Then YQU wouldn't take any part in what was happening.Ursula: You'd just see it.Sam: If YQU went into the future, YQU could change the future. Like, if

YQU saw YQU were in a car accident, then YQU could never ever drivein a car, and SQ you'd just change the future.

Me: SQ would that have been the future YQU saw?Nick (firmly and forcefully): That would have been the future and

YQU can't change it.

Two weeks later I returned to that school and read out to the kidssomething I had put together from our discussion on time travel.

Me: Do YQU recognizesome bits from the discussion two weeks ago?Ursula: Yeah, the time line and about the yr 1 and things like that.Sam: And that you couldn't change the past.Me: DQ YQU think there could be any such think as the beginning oftime.

[Here, I should say, I include material I also used in my book,The Philosophy of Childhood.]

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Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play

Several children: No.Nick: The universe is everything and everywhere. But then if there

was a big bang or something, what was the big bang in? ... Howdid the universe start?

Sam: It was just there!Nick: There has to be a beginning to the universe. Otherwise it

wouldn't be there.Nick's claim tripped off a cacophony of responses. I tried to bring thediscussion back to order.

Me: Let's see if we can deal with Nick's reasoning. Nick says therehas to be a beginning to the universe or else there wouldn't beanything there

Sam: There had to have been something for the universe to appearon. The universe is what everything appeared on. It's not reallyanything. It's just what other things started on.

Me: So there always has to be a universe.Sam: Yeah, there always has to be a universe.Me: How many people think that there always was a universe - no

beginning to the universe? [All hands go up except Nick's andmaybe two others.] How many people think there was abeginning to the universe? [Nick's handgoes up, but no others.]So Nick is the only one who thinks that there was a beginning tothe universe. And Jeff and, I'm not sure about Daniel- a couple ofyou - are not sure. The rest of you think there was always auniverse.

Sam: Yeah, that's what everything started on.Me: So if there was always a universe, there was no first time,

either.Sam: There was a first time for certain things, but not for the

universe. There was a first time for the earth, there was a firsttime for the stars. There was a first time for the sun. But therewas no first time for the universe.

Me: Can you convince Nick that the universe had to always be there?Sam: What would other things appear on? What would the universe

[itself] have appeared on?Nick: That's what I don't understand. But the universe has to have

started out. If something doesn't start out, that thing isn't there.Sam: If the universe started [out], what would it start on?Nick: That's what I don't get.Ross: If it started on vast blackness, then that's just the universe

then. The universe is vast blackness.Sam: It's space.

The transcript ends there. I think the bell rang. We never got back totrying to complete our story on time travel. I think I didn't want to goback to time travel because the kids had come up with such a wonderfuldiscussion of the beginning of the universe. I wanted to celebrate it andreflect on it, which I have done ever since.

Most of the philosophy I have done with children has beenimprovisatory. I have read them stories, provoked discussion a bit, andthen simply followed up their own comments with other questions. Or Ihave written the beginnings of stories myself in such a way as to raisesome philosophical issue and then asked the kids how they the storyought to go on. Might there be a more organized way of proceeding, away that could be taught to teachers, even to teachers who havethemselves had little or no philosophical training?

8

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Gareth Matthews: PhilOSQphy as child's play 2

Of course, there could be. Perhaps some of you have developed suchorganised ways of proceeding. Matthew Lipman and his associates atthe Institute for the Advancement for Children have developedworkbooks to gQ with his novels, But Mat, at least, has resisted the ideaof developing such materials to gQ with conventional children'sliterature. Some colleagues of mine in Massachusetts and I have triedthat, though only on a very small scale. I want to conclude by giving youan example of what we came up with and a sample of our experience inusing it.

We produced a very brief teacher's guide for treating children's storiesphilosophically in schools and then, for each story we selected, wedeveloped a series of questions to stimulate philosophical discussion.I'd like now to give you a sample of what we came up with and whatresults we got in trying it out.

One of the stories we selected was The Real Thief by William Steig. Togive you a story summary, in case you are not familiar with this storyand a brief indication of some of the philosophical issues that it mightbe used to discuss, I'll quote now from the "Thinking in Stories" column Iwrote on The Real Thief:

First it is rubies that disappear from the Royal Treasury, then goldducats, then the famous Kalikak diamond. King Basil, the bear, isdriven, quite against his inclinations, to suspect Gawain, the goose,who is the Chief Guard of the Royal Treasury and the only one,besides the King, with a key to it.Gawain is brought to trial, found guilty, and sentenced to prison.Before he can be taken off to serve his term, though, he flies away,across Lake Superb, and hides in the forest on the other side.

The mouse, Derek, is the real thief. It had all started so innocently,He had stumbled into the Royal Treasury and had beenoverwhelmed by the beauty of the royal jewels. He had taken, firstone, then more, and then even more, until finally he had taken theKalikak diamond itself. He has transported all those jewels to hissmall, underground home among the oak roots.Upon learning that his friend, Gawain, had been charged with thetheft, Derek had resolved that, if Gawain were actually foundguilty, he, Derek, would come forward and confess. But then, whenGawain had escaped, he had decided not to confess after all,

What should Derek do now? To clear Gawain's name he steals evenmore jewels. Everyone soon realizes that Gawain must not have beenthe real thief. Then Derek returns all the jewels and goes in search ofGawain tQ confess and apologize.Cleverly, Derek finds Gawain in his forest hideout, and, in a movingscene, tells him all. Gawain forgives Derek and Derek manages,with some difficulty, to get Gawain to say he will forgive the Kingas well. Then Gawain asks Derek, almost nonchalantly, whether heis going to confess to the others.

[Thecolumn continues:]When I read this story aloud to others, as I often do, I stop atGawain's almost nonchalant question and ask my hearers what theythink Derek should dQ and why. Should he go back and admit hismisdeeds, and why, or why not? Before we finish reading the storytogether we have a discussion as to how we would want it to end.

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The jewels, we remind ourselves, have all been returned. The Kingand his subjects realize that Gawain was falsely accused andmistakenly found guilty. No doubt the King is prepared to try tomake amends to Gawain. No one suspects Derek. Moreover, Derekhas already suffered great remorse and taken important steps to undohis misdeeds.

Those of my hearers who suppose that the morality or immorality ofan action depends essentially on the nature of that action'sconsequences, are likely to conclude that Derek should not confess.Who would be made better off by such a confession? Not Derek, itseems, for he would be made to suffer even more. Not the King, itseems, for he likes Derek and would be disappointed to learn of histhievery. Not Gawain, who has already forgiven Derek and wouldnot want him to be punished more than his remorse has alreadypunished him.

Those of my hearers who suppose that the morality or immorality ofan action is quite independent of its consequences are likely toconclude that Derek must confess. Doesn't simple honesty demand asmuch?

The point of the discussion is not to dramatize the relativity ofmorals. The point is rather to make clear how difficult it is toresolve serious moral dilemmas, and to show how closely intertwinedquestions of conscience may be with theoretical issues about whatkind of consideration shows that an action is right, or wrong.

The philosophical value of Steig's story, however, extends evenbeyond the fine opportunity it affords for discussion what is right,and what makes something right. Since much of the story is written,and written very sensitively. From the thief's point of view, readingit is an exercise in the moral imagination. For Steig's story is thatrarity among children's books-an exploration of moral questionsthat manages to be exciting and serious, without ever beingmoralistic.

[That's the end of the column.]

For this and the other stories we worked on, my colleagues and I decidedto produce ten cards, on each of which there would be a set of relatedquestions. The procedure we recommended for using them was this.Someone in the group of children discussing this story would volunteer topull a card and read at least the first part of the question on the card outloud. Or, if the children were too young to read the question, the teacherwould read it aloud. If the group found that question interesting, it couldgo on to consider the related questions on the same card. If they didn'tfind that question interesting, someone could volunteer to draw anothercard. There should be no sense that they had to cover all the questions orreach agreement on anyone. They should pursue a given question as longas they found it interesting.

Here are the first three sets of questions we came up with for The RealThief:1. Gawain agrees to be Chief Guard at the Royal Treasury, even though

the job bores him. He accepts the position because of his affection forKing Basil.B. Have you ever done something that you really didn't want to do

simply to please someone that you like? Give examples.

ID

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Gareth Matthews: PhilosQphy as child's play 11

C. Is there a limit to what you might do to please other people?Explain YQur answer.

D. DQYQU ask other people to do things that they might not want todo? If so, why?

E. Is there a limit to what you might ask other to do for YQu? Do YQUthere should be a limit? If SQ, why?

6. After the Kalikak diamond is stolen, Gawain feels that the Kingsuspects that he is the thief.G. Has someone YQU like or admire ever accused YQU of doing

something that YQU did not do? If SQ, how did YQU respond?H. Have YQU ever suspected that someone did something wrQng and

later YQU found out the persQn was innocent? What happened?I. If YQU don't know anything about a person, is it better to be trusting

or suspicious of his or her actions? Explain YQur answer.J. HQW do YQU know when to be trusting and when to be suspicious of

others.11. King Basil tells his court that Gawain has deceived them and stolen

royal treasures.L. What evidence suggests that Gawain is a thief?M. Has anyone ever accused you of doing something wrong? Was

there any evidence?N. Have you ever accused someone of doing something that they

really did not do? Did YQU have any evidence?O. What kind of evidence should the King see before accusing

Gawain of stealing from the Royal Treasury?

I want to give YQU nQW the transcript of a discussion my colleague, LenoreCarlisle, had with a group of fourth-graders in an elementary school inmy hometown. They were responding to the very first part of the firstquestion,

Lenore, reading out from the card: "DQYQU sometimes do somethingyQU don't really want to do because YQU want to please someoneYQU like? Ethan, hQW about that? DQ YQU sometimes do somethingYQU don't really want to do because YQU want to please someoneYQU like?"

Ethen: "Mrs. Carlisle, you know me better than that."[The children in the grQup Iaugh.]

Lenore: "Come on, Ethan, I want you to really think about this one."Ethan: "NQ, I really don't think I do. I'm not that nice. But my

mother does that sort of thing all the time. It drives me crazy. Ithink it drives her crazy, tOQ."

Lenore: "Can you give me an example without selling your poormother down the river?"

Ethan: "Oh sure, I can give YQU lots of examples. Like with my grand­mother. My mother will say anything my grandmother wants tohear because she wants to please her."

Mark: "1 do that all the time."Laura: "Yeah, I dQ that, tQO, with my grandmother, and you know,

sometimes even with my friends."Lenore: "Tell us about how that happens with friends."Laura: "Well, it can be, if, say YQur friend really likes New Kids on

the Block [a rock grQUP popular at the time] and you really don'tlike them, but your friend wants to listen to a tape or something. Alot of times I just say, 'Oh, yeah, they're neat!' Just to be friends,to be nice or something."

Ethan: "That's not being nice."

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Gareth Matthews: Philosophy as child's play .12

Laura: "Yes it is. If I want her to feel okay about listening to thattape, then I say that so she'll enjoy herself ... enjoy relaxing tomusic. It's nice."

Ethan: "It's also lying."Laura: "It is not!"Ethan: "If you say, 'Oh boy, neato! New Kids on the Block! Goody,

goody, goody!' [mocking] And you really hate New Kids on theBlock, then that is a lie."

Mark: "Well, it's not really a lie."Sarah: "It's a certain kind of lie."Ethan: "0, what kind, Sarah? Is it a chocolate lie? Or a strawberry

swirl lie? What flavor of a lie is it?"Sarah: "It's not hurting anybody."Mark: "That is a time when the truth would hurt and a lie, but it's

not really a lie, that's the thing that doesn't hurt somebody'sfeelings."

Laura: "That's what I think, too."Ethan: "Look, either it's a lie or it isn't a lie. And if it isn't the truth,

it's a lie. Is it the truth?"Laura: "No, but just because it isn't the truth doesn't mean it's a lie."Mark: "It's a lie that's better than the truth because it has part of

the truth in it. Cause if the truth is you don't want to hurt yourfriend's feelings, then the thing that would be a lie is really atruth, in a way."

Ethan: "Nice try, Mark. But a lie is still a lie."Lenore: "So why you'd say it, is what makes the difference?"Laura: "Of course."

[That's the end of the transcript]

Many people thing that what makes something count as a lie is a prettystraightforward matter. The only difficult question for them is whetherit is ever permissible, or perhaps even obligatory, to tell a lie. Manypeople think that, even though it is wrong, prima facie, to tell a lie, totell one for some high moral purpose, for example, to save someone'slife, may be, not only permissible, but perhaps even one's duty.

In Lenore's discussion, Ethan seems pretty confident about what counts asa lie, as well as about the principle that lying is simply wrong. Ofcourse no one, in this part of the group's discussion, anyway, hadactually tried to define 'lie,' and the group had not considered manycases in which it might be thought plausible that lying would bemorally okay.

Ethan's brash confidence is a wonderful foil for the more tentative andopenly reflective comments of Laura and Mark. There is a nice mix oftemperaments here, yet enough respect for others and confidence inoneself to make the discussion both lively and probing.

One reason it is important to discuss lying with children is that,although they are often admonished not to tell lies, as if the onlyproblem were a behavioral one, the concept of a lie is, in fact, deeplyproblematic. Mark's wonderfully sensitive comment in the transcriptabout how "if the truth is you don't want to hurt your friend's feelings,then the thing that would be a lie is really a truth, in a way" brings outsome of what is problematic about the concept.

When I say that the concept of a lie is deeply problematic I don't justmean that it is problematic whether one should ever tell lies. I mean it

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Gareth Mattbews: PhilOSQphy as child's play

is problematic just what counts as a lie. Many thoughtful peoplesuppQse that to tell a lie is just to say that p when

(1) it is , in fact, false that p;(2) one also believes it to be false that p; and(3) in saying that p one intends to deceive someone.

In fact, although that analysis is pretty good, there are significantproblems with it.

la

First, as Sartre points out eloquently in the "Bad Faith" section of Beingand Nothingness, there is a serious problem about hQW to understandself-deception, lying tQoneself. Can one say something false to oneself inthe belief that it is false and also with the intention of deceivingoneself? It is hard to understand hQW this can be a real possibility. Butif it is not, what then is the phenomenon we call "self-deception"?

Second, there is the problem about using an expectation that one will belying as a means of deceiving someone by saying, unexpectedly, what is,in fact, true. This possibility is the basis for the old joke about the twocompeting traveling salesmen in Czarist Russia who meet, unexpectedly,at the train station, Warily, the one asks the other where he is goingand is told, "to Minsk." Purious, the first one replies, "You're just tellingme that YQU are going to Minsk SQ that I'll think YQU are going to Pinskwhen YQU really are going to Minsk, you dirty liar."

Finally, there is the problem of the protective witness. If the teachercannot punish my friend, [ames, unless I, the only one who actually saw[ames trash the small maple tree in the playground, tell on [ames, then Imay deny that [ames did it to protect [ames. (He is, after all, myfriend.) But I may not be fooling the teacher. She may know that [amesdid it, perhaps from some indirect evidence, and I may realize that sheknQWS it. Still, without may first-hand testimony, she may not be ableto punish [ames. I lie when I say [ames didn't do it, even though I haveno intention of actually deceiving the teacher. I'm just protecting myfriend. SQ there is a lie without the third condition being satisfied,namely, that I say that [ames didn't do it with the intention ofdeceiving someone,

In the discussion Qf lying from Lenore's classroom, we can recognize anessential condition for doing philosophy well with kids. We must beprepared to recognize that we may not be able, after all, to give asatisfactory account of something even so basic as what it is to tell a lie.Moreover, we must be prepared to let even a small child make it clearthat we ourselves don't understand fully the phenomenon underdiscussion. And we must also be open to the possibility that the childmay have a surprisingly worthwhile suggestion for analyzing thephenomenon - or if not, for actually analyzing it, at least forappreciating its subtle complexity.

I have chosen a strange way of expressing that last point. Being open tothe wisdom and subtlety of what a child can say may sound like beingopen to being shown up by a child. But what it really is, is being open tothe gift of an insight from a quite different point of view. Listen to Markagain on whether you would be lying if you told your friend that YQUliked the rock group, New Kids on the Block, when really you don't:

"It's a lie that's better than the truth because it has a part of thetruth in it. Cause if the truth is you don't want to hurt YQur friend's

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Gareth Mattbews: Philosophy as child's pla.y M

feelings, then the thing that would be a lie is really a truth, in away. "

That's a remark you can turn over in your mind for the rest of the day,and perhaps for the following day as well.

Now I certainly don't know how Mark is going to turn out. But I do knowthat he has already given Lenore, and you, and me, somethingpreciously important to think about. And that's worth celebrating, justin itself. But I would say that the very fad that his reflections on adifficult, puzzling, and important matter have been encouraged andappreciated make it at least a little bit more likely that he will also bea reflective adult, maybe that rare reflective insurance clerk that one isdelighted to be presenting one's claim to, or maybe something very, verydifferent. In the meantime, let's celebrate Mark, the philosopher, andEthan, and Laura, and Sarah, and all the rest. Let's listen out for themin our own families and classrooms and give them, as well as theirphilosophical play, the respect and encouragement these young philos­ophers need and deserve.

Critical& Creative lJ'fU,ging. j!ol7 910 1 Octo6er 1999

Philosophy and ChildhoodTim Sprod: The Friends' School, North Hobart, TasmaniaEmail: T.5prod@postoffice.friends.tas.edu.au

Wisdom comes with age. Especially philosophical wisdom. Or so thecommon stereotype would have us believe. According to many philos­ophers across the ages, this means that the best philosophy is donethrough introspective analysis of what our experience and life hastaught us - but only after we have lived a fair bit of it. Probably themost famous example is Rene Descartes, sitting in his armchair andpondering what it is impossible to doubt.

The problem with this approach to philosophy has been pointed outover recent decades by many feminist philosophers. If you start from theexperience of well-off, highly educated white males, you end up withphilosophical positions that are biased by this limited experience.

A great deal of interesting philosophy has been done by these samefeminist philosophers drawing on their experience as women. Indeed,recent feminist philosophy has turned the same point in upon itself: iffeminist philosophy is done solely by white, middle-class females, thenthe riches that could arise from differing experiences will be lost. Thephilosophies of difference that have arisen have opened up some richphilosophical ground.

It is not my intent in this paper to explore these new grounds, nor tocomment on any of the many versions of third wave feminism that havearisen. Rather, I want to explore the case that the same idea needs to beapplied to the relationship between childhood and philosophy.

Of course, there is a distinct disanalogy between the idea of feministphilosophy and "childhood philosophy". Much (but not all) feministphilosophy is done by females who have had a good grounding in phi­losophy through a university education. Such philosophers have accessto the communication means available for cutting edge philosophy.Almost by definition, a philosophy of childhood cannot be done by uni­versity educated child philosophers, utilising the. usual means of ad­vancing philosophical positions.

This really leaves two alternatives: childhood philosophy can be doneby children using different means, including possibly collaboration withsympathetic adult philosophers; or childhood philosophy must be atask for the philosopher who pays extra attention to the philosophicalimplications of childhood.

Both of my alternatives have been explored in his writings by ourKeynote Speaker, Gareth Matthews. I think it would be fair to say,however, that he has not gone down the first path very far. He doesexplore philosophical views that children have expressed, for the mostpart finding that they echo, without foreknowledge, the views of onegreat philosopher or another. Iwould venture to say that any of us whohave done philosophy with children for any length of time have hadthe experience of some child advancing a view that we know from ourphilosophical training.

Yet Gareth has made a stronger claim: that children do, occasionally,come up with a philosophical view that is genuinely inventive, in thatit does not appear in the existing literature. For example, he makes this

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claim for a comment by a student called Sam, who is discussing "whatthe universe appeared on". He claims that Sam's conception is reminis­cent Qt but superior to, a thesis of Plato's. Yet, although the thought isnovel, it is Gareth who has developed it and commented on its impor­tance. Sam did not know enough Qf the history of philosophy to see thata fuss ought to be made of it, nor, I venture to hazard, would he havehad the philosophical skills to have been able to write a paper to makethe right sort of fuss. We have to rely on a philosopher of Gareth'sknowledge and standing to do this.

This raises some intriguing possibilities. Perhaps academically trainedphilosophers should set up child "think tanks", where children discussphilosophical problems, while adults listen in and identify premisingpoints for later development, HQW would the children for such grQuPS bechosen? WQuld they be made up of those who have displayed 'academicpromise', as indeed, the ranks of the academic philosophers have been?Or are we after the fresh views of children who are not only philosoph­ically naive, but also think "outside the square", for they are the mostlikely to produce the striking view?

Intriguing though these questions are, I would like to leave them asidefor the moment, and concentrate on the second alternative I identifiedabove: that philosophy has to take notice of childhood, just as feministphilosophy has alerted us to the need to take notice of gender. Hereagain, as I indicated, Gareth has led the way. His book Philosophy ofChildhood has explored a number of philosophical areas in the light ofwhat we know about childhood. I will refer only to one at the moment,to illustrate the point. Gareth claims that we can explore the philoso­phy of art better by considering what it would be to say that childrenproduce real art. A philosophical consideration of children in relationto art he claims, gives us insight not (only) into children, but into amainstream sub-species of philosophy.

This is the sort of claim that I wish to explore further. Can we do betterphilosophy if we take children and childhood into consideration? Myclaim is that we can, and that we ought. I wish to explore this claimfurther from my own work. Before I do, however, I need to acknowledgethat not the first philosopher to recognise this. I have already high­lighted Gareth Matthews' own work, and my own ideas have drawnparticularly on Chapter 5 of The Philosophy of Childhood. Further, Ihave also drawn on a number of feminist philosophers who have takenchildhood seriously. In this regard, I must mention Annette Baler'sinfluential essay, Cartesian Persons, tQ be found in her book Postures ofthe Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals, and Seyla Benhabib's work inSituating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism inContemporary Ethics. Finally, Charles Taylor, has also extensivelyconsidered the implications of childhood in his Sources of the Self: TheMaking of the Modern Identity.

Yet these philosophical works (Matthews apart) have not contributedto the creation of a sub-specialisation of philosophy called thePhilosophy of Childhood, and it would be a rare philosopher whoidentified this as their field. This stands in stark contrast to, say,feminist philosophy. Indeed, it is not certain that these philosopherseven recognise their contributions. When I wrote to Annette Baier, forexample, inviting her to attend this conference, she politely declined,saying that she had not really done very much work in the area of ourtheme.

..

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Childhood and reasonReason, or rationality, has been a central concern of philosophy sincebefore the days of Socrates. It is, according to many philosophers fromPlato and Aristotle onwards, the faculty that sets us apart from theanimals. There has been a strong tradition of considering Reason (and itis often capitalised in these sorts of accounts) as some thing that humans(read: adults, probably males) possess - a unitary and consistent methodfor reaching sound conclusions. It is a universal trait of humans.

Strong in this tradition is an opposition between Reason and emotion.Such an opposition is needed to account for the fact that not everyonewho considers a particular problem comes to the same conclusion. IfReason and emotions are opposed, then it is easy for the reasoning man todismiss the thinking of his opposition as being clouded by emotion.Indeed, since women and children are (in this account) notoriouslyemotional, and hence unable to impose the rule of Reason on theiremotions, they can be dismissed as less than human.

One of the most striking formulations of this view is Immanuel Kant's,It is well known, for example, that Kantian metaethics is based on theMoral Law, a law that the rational being imposes onitself through theuse of Reason. Indeed, this account leads to the assertion that it is moremoral to be emotionally driven to evil deeds, but to just overcome thesedesires through the use of Reason, than it is to be emotionally inclined tocaring behaviour. David Hume famously opposed this view, claimingthat "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions". Yet wecan see that Hume's view still posits a sharp divide between reason andemotion - he just inverts the hierarchy.

What does a consideration of childhood have to offer to philosophicalinvestigations of reason? My view is that a good look at how it is thatwe come to be reasoning beings tells us a lot about how we should charac­terise reason itself. Babies are not reasoning beings in the same sensethat adults are. Certainly, they do exhibit behaviour that reflects acertain level of reasoning, but this level is more like the level seen inanimals than in adult humans. Yet, over time, babies develop intoadults. We call that time childhood.

Attention to the development of reasoning in childhood requires thatwe, as philosophers, become interested in empirical studies of children.Child development studies tell us that children do not merely have aninherent reason which unfolds over time. Certainly, there are featuresconnected with reasoning that are 'hardwired' into all humans.Nevertheless, social interaction is essential to the development ofreasoning. The work of Lev Vygotsky is very important in this regard:we learn the skills of reasoning by immersion in social situations wherethe reasoning is carried out by the community jointly. Only when thechild starts to internalise those skills can we say that the child isdeveloping reason in this regard.

The implications of such studies for an account of reasoning are profound.Reason is not something we have, which merely requires maturation tounfold. It is a social construction, which we pick up piecemeal, fromothers, in particular social situations. It is little wonder, then, that rea­son is always contextualised. The systems of reason - logic, for example ­are attempts to widen the contexts of reason, rather than descriptions ofa totally decontextualised system. Modem work shows that there arecompeting systems of logic, and that people do not conform to anyone

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system in all their reasoning in any case. The fact that reasoning isalways contextualised has, of course, many implications for teaching,which I will not expand on here.

Attention to childhood also throws light on the question of the relationof reason and the emotions. Firstly, since we participate in socialsituations through an emotional engagement with others, emotions areinextricably part of the context of reasonableness. They provide theimpetus to care about our thoughts, and hence, far from being opposed toreasoning, are an essential aspect of reason.

Secondly, attention to the development of emotions in children shows usthat the emotions cannot be merely some sort of raw, unreasoningreaction to events. While they do have a basis in such biologicalreactions, any display of any emotion is inextricably tied up with socialreasoning about its appropriateness, its reasonableness. So the emotionsthemselves are but a type of reasoning.

None of this is to say that we do not sometimes reason poorly because weallow the emotional aspect of thinking to overwhelm other aspects.This certainly happens. But then, we can also reason poorly because weinsist on following an allegedly logical chain of reasoning and ignore theemotional thinking that could set us right. All I am saying is that theappropriate, the reasonable, mix of logic and emotion will depend inlarge degree on the context within which the thinking is taking place.

The upshot of these, admittedly sketchy, considerations is that reasonis a more complex entity than the traditional view would have usbelieve. Elsewhere I have developed the view that reasonablenessshould be considered as having five aspects: the critical, the creative,the committed, the contextual and the embodied. Attention tochildhood changes our view of reason.

Childhood and autonomyAutonomy is a concept introduced to moral philosophy by Kant. ForKant, autonomy is following the dictates of Reason, rather than beingdriven by inclinations and desires, or by the machinations of others. Wecan immediately see that the concept of autonomy is closely tied upwith that of reason. Since I have suggested that we need a concept ofreason that differs markedly from Kant's, then it is not surprising thatwe also need to look again at autonomy.

The Kantian notion of autonomy, as we have seen, stresses the indepen­dence of people. It has been attacked vigorously in recent times becauseof this, most notably by feminist philosophers who characterise thisdisconnectedness from others as arising from a peculiarly male point ofview. Some feminists have suggested that we should give away auton­omy as a moral ideal for these reasons. Yet there do seem to be good rea­sons for retaining a notion of autonomy: we do wish to claim thatmorally good people do not merely follow the orders of others, but maketheir moral decisions in a way that springs from their moral being.

Here, I suggest that consideration of how it is that children develop intomorally autonomous adults can help us. It is clear that young childrencannot be said to be morally autonomous. We do not hold them legallyaccountable for their actions for this reason. Yet we do see that they be­come, in a way similar to that which I have outlined above for reason­ableness, more able to make decisions for themselves as they grow and

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learn. This suggests several things: that autonomy is not an all-or-noth­ing characteristic; that as adults we should be supporting the develop­ment of autonomy; and that developing the capacity to 'think for one­self' depends critically on interaction with, and attachment to, others.

Good autonomous decisions are not made by those who do not think likeothers, for good decisions follow good decision making processes - that is,good reasoning - and we have seen that children learn to think byinvolving themselves in situations where others reason jointly and pub­licly. As children become more capable reasoners, they can become moreautonomous. Autonomy cannot, then, involve the cutting of oneself offfrom others, but must rather be the increasing ability to involve oneselfin public reasoning on one's own behalf, without having to lean on theabilities of others. Thus, we can reconceive of autonomy ina way thatavoids the feminist charge that it ignores connectedness, while retain­ing the sense that autonomous persons are in control of their own actions.

Again, the reconceptualisation of autonomy has direct implications forteachers. We cannot use the need to respect children's autonomy as arationale for not taking on the responsibility to teach them, as is some­times done. Nor, though, can we treat children as if they lack all auton­omy, thus denying them the respect they deserve as becoming­autonomous beings. We cannot neglect to give them the opportunities topractice their developing independence-through-interdependence. Herewe see the importance of the notion of scaffolding, drawn fromVygotsky's and jerome Bruner's work.

Childhood and communicative actionLet's turn our attention away from philosophical positions developed inthe past to a more modem system - [urgen Habermas' theory of commu­nicative action. Can consideration of childhood enable us to recogniseand rectify weaknesses in this system?

First, let me briefly outline the Theory of Communicative Action.Habermas has developed his theory to explain how modem humanrationality and action arise through the medium of language. Hesketches in three types of action through language: success-orientedaction, communicative action and critical discourse. All humaninteractions can be described in terms of one of these categories.

Success-oriented action (often also called strategic action) refers to caseswhere people act as individuals aiming for the success of their ownactions, without attempting to coordinate their purposes and ends withothers. Actors here are using language to manipulate others to achievetheir own (often, but not always, hidden) ends.

In communicative action, the parties seek to exchange information,convey experiences and!or clarify meaning through discussion, coming toa common understanding against a background of assumed facts andvalues. Communicative action is thus not solely about individualsseeking the means to their ends, but aims at reaching an intersubjectiveunderstanding and a joint agreement on actions.

Actors switch to critical discourse in an attempt to reach consensus oncontentious claims about values or truth. This occurs when someone callsinto question the truth of one of the facts or values previously taken forgranted.

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Tim Sprod: Pbilosophy and childhood

Habermas claims that all social interactions take place in one of thesethree ways. He does not claim (although he seems sometimes to beinterpreted in this way) that actions ought not to be success-oriented, forin certain contexts, success-oriented action is acceptable. He does, how­ever, claim that in modem societies, much that ought to be carried outthrough communicative action in fact takes place through strategicaction. Further, even communicative action does not always take placeafter a sufficiently rigorous discussion about the meanings of the termswe use.

Habermas' theory has wide ranging implications, such as his account ofboth truth and moral correctness as being whatever issues from idealcritical discourse. It has been used in analyses of the institutions ofsociety, one of which is education. It is my belief that attempts to applyit suffer because the theory itself is flawed, and that some of the flawscan be corrected by considering that social actors can be children, as wellas adults. How does this work?

The roots of Habermas' theory are Kantian, and he assumes somethingvery like the Kantian account of autonomy, together with a modified,but still recognisably Kantian, account of rationality. In this, he seemsalso to consider only social actors who are already adults, in possessionof autonomy and rationality. It is from this assumption of equality inthese respects that he disapproves of strategic action in contexts whereall actors ought to be consulted. Hence there is a strict demarcationbetween strategic and communicative action.

But we have seen that children cannot be said to be fully autonomous andrational; nor can they be said to completely lack these characteristics.Further, children can only increase their autonomy and reasonableness ifthey interact with other members of society, some of whom are furtheradvanced in these respects. Indeed, in order to maximise these increases,some of these more advanced persons will be entrusted with the task ofdeveloping them in children: they are teachers.

Yet teaching cannot be analysed in terms of either strategic action orcommunicative action. Teachers cannot always negotiate their goalswith children, for the children have not yet developed the capabilitiesto do so. However, the goals themselves include developing the capaci­ties to engage in communicative action and critical discourse, and wehave seen that the Vygotskian argument means that teachers have toengage in communicative action and critical discourse with theirstudents in order to do so.

Hence, there must be a type of interaction that mixes, inextricably,strategic action and communicative action. This I have labelled"pedagogic action": pedagogic action consists in a more experienced per­son interacting with a less experienced person with the specific aim ofdeveloping the latter's abilities. The aim is not negotiated, so theaction has something of the character of strategic action, but theinteraction must be communicative action (or critical discourse)otherwise the aim could not be achieved.

Let's look at an example of what I mean. In a community of inquiry, aquestion that asks a student to give reasons for their assertion simulta­neously advances the inquiry at hand (communicative action) and assistsin bringing about in the student a realisation that reason-giving is avaluable move in discussion (success-oriented action).

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Tim Sprod: Philosophy and childhood a

The concept of pedagogic action seems not to be limited just to teaching.Obviously, parents will also engage in it. But pedagogic action is notconfined to interactions with children. As we have seen, attention tochildhood reminds us that neither rationality nor autonomy are all-or­nothing characteristics: persons can always improve in either respect.Hence, situations where a more competent person is assisting a lesscompetent to improve are restricted neither to the classroom nor tochildren.

Childhood and virtue ethicsFinally I will turn to a very ancient doctrine which is undergoing aremarkable resurgence at present: Aristotle's virtue ethics. Whilebasing their work very much on Aristotle's remarkable NicomacheanEthics, modem virtue ethicists have made a number of changes, as wemight expect. It is notable, however, that by far the greatest proportionof the virtue ethics accounts, from Aristotle on, concentrate on adults,and what it is for a human adult to be a virtuous person. Childhood isnot ignored, but in Aristotle it is merely commented on, as a state to becontrasted with adulthood.

For Aristotle, childhood is a time of habituation into the virtues, whileadulthood is a time for using practical wisdom. A person who has beenhabituated into the virtues will habitually act in accordance with thevirtues, but to decide what particular actions are actually in accordwith the virtues requires a type of wisdom: practical wisdom.

However, there are problems with taking this account to rely on a sharpdivide between childhood and adulthood, as it has commonly beentaken. This common view has it that children should be subjected, byparents, teachers and other adults, to a regime of unquestioned obedienceas they are ordered to act in virtuous ways. Only when their practicalwisdom flowers, in adulthood, are they to be permitted to wieldpractical wisdom for themselves. At this stage they can, if they judgethemselves to be less than virtuous in some way, actively choose forthemselves to become more virtuous by (as Aristotle puts it) exercising "acertain kind of study and care".

However, this characterisation of virtue ethics leaves it totally obscurehow children turn into adults. Nancy Sherman has pointed out thathabituation itself cannot be a merely passive process on the part of thechild being habituated. For each application of a virtue requires ajudgement that the situation has certain characteristics, that make itappropriate to act in this way rather than that. These judgementsrequire reasoning. In a case when an adult is present, the child can bemerely told what to do. But in order to be truly habituate into the rightsort of action, the child must be able to act in the appropriate waywithout the adult being present. Hence, habituation requires the activeimprovement of the child's moral judgement.

I assert that we must go further. It is not only that habituation into thevirtues needs to engage the child's reasoning, but that the child'sability to reason well itself needs to be developed through the sort ofVygotskian scaffolding that I have referred to earlier. This, we haveseen, means that the child needs to be engaged in dialogue concerning notjust the right thing to do now, but also an investigation of the reasonswhy it might be the right thing, and what makes actions right in thefirst place.

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TimSprod: Philosophy and childhood

In other words, proper attention to childhood subverts the commoninterpretation of Aristotle's virtue ethics completely. Far from licensinga "children should be seen and not heard" upbringing, virtue ethics asconstrued through a proper philosophical consideration of childhoodenjoins us to engage children in philosophical inquiry. This is aconclusion that I trust will be welcome to delegates to this conference.

A final wordThe thrust of my talk has been to claim that Philosophy has beenimpoverished by not paying sufficient attention to childhood. Thisclaim parallels the one made by feminist philosophers that, by ignoringgender, philosophy has not been able to come to sound conclusions. Ihave attempted to illustrate my claim with a number of examples.Interestingly, the cumulative effect of these investigations is that we .are warranted in drawing the conclusion that, not only shouldphilosophy take more notice of childhood, but also that children shouldbe helped to take more notice of philosophy.

Further reading

Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford, Oxford Uni Press.Baier, A. (1985). Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals.

London, Methuen.Bruner, J. S. (1986). Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA,

Harvard University Press.Caygill, H. (1995). A Kant Dictionary. Oxford, Blackwell.Cherniak, C. (1986). Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.Habermas, J. (1981). The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston,

Beacon Press.Hume, D. (1740/1972). A Treatise of Human Nature: Books Two and

Three. London, Fontana.Lloyd, G. (1984). The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western

Philosophy. London, Methuen.Matthews, G. (1980). Philosophy and the Young Child. Cambridge,

Harvard University Press.Matthews, G. (1994). The Philosophy of Childhood. Cambridge, MA,

Harvard University Press.Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of

Virtue. Oxford, Clarendon Press.Sprod, T. (1998). A Philosophical Justification for the Community of

Inquiry Approach to Moral Education. Unpublished PhD thesis,University of Tasmania.

Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self: The Making of the ModernIdentity. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and Language. Cambridge, MIT Press.

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Philosophy across the curriculum: the Wesley experienceStephan Millett, Director of Philosophy and Ethical Inquiry, WesleyCollege, South Perth, WA. E-mail: smillett@Wesley.wa.edu.au

IntroductionI was invited last year to set up a philosophy and values curriculumwhich eventually would cater for all years K-12 at Wesley College inPerth. Wesley is a college of the Uniting Church in Australia. It hasthree sub-schools: a co-educational preparatory school for Kindergartento Year 4; a boys-only Middle School for years 5-8 and; a boys-onlySenior School for years 9-12.There is a total of nearly 1200 students

OverviewThe program began last year with stand-alone classes in Philosophy forYears 10, 11 and 12, but this model encountered significant resistancefrom the boys involved. The program in Years 10 and 11, for example,was introduced in the second semester and replaced in one case a careersinformation session and in the other it replaced a private study period.There was anger among the boys that they were required to do some­thing they had not heard of before, which they saw as having norelevance to their education and which they believed would not helpthem get a job. They were also suspicious of the new teacher. After aterm and a half of battling this resistance, I proposed - and the collegeagreed - that things should be set up differently.

The revised Philosophy program for 1999 has included work withclasses in Year 5, Year 9 Science, Year 10 SOSE, as well as specificclasses in Philosophy and Ethical Inquiry for Years 11 and 12. The mainfocus of the revised program in the Senior School has been on devisingcurriculum materials that fit into the Key Learning Areas of theCurriculum Framework prescribed by the Curriculum Council. That is,the emphasis has been on dealing with philosophical thinking andvalues across the curriculum. In all cases it has involved a philosopherworking with teachers in their classrooms, in effect providing an on-sitephilosophy consultancy with a variety of briefs, but with the majortask of helping the class teachers introduce philosophical thinking,particularly thinking related to values, into their existing programs.

The major project in the senior school in the first half of 1999 involveddeveloping curriculum materials for the Year 9 Science program - mate­rials that raised philosophical and/or moral issues related to the sub­ject matter already being dealt with in the Year 9 curriculum. For Year9, Science is taught as a series of nine-week modules, with most of theteachers involved teaching the same module to each class group. Forfirst semester, an extra period a week was allocated to Year 9 Science. Inthat extra period I worked with each of the teachers who took Year 9Science, with each teacher giving me a slightly different brief. In onecase I was asked to provide supplementary questions for a group explo­ration based on the biological sciences. Another teacher asked me to sitin on his classes and offer suggestions as to how the classwork could besupplemented from a philosophical perspective. This resulted in mate­rials being developed that dealt with inductive and deductive logic andlogical fallacies as well as a distinction between philosophical and sci­entific thinking. A third teacher worked with me to develop scenariosin which scientific values clashed with economic, political and socialvalues. The boys worked in groups to try to resolve the conflicts set up inthe scenarios. The fourth of the science teachers involved asked me todevelop materials related to the topics he was covering: blood and ma-

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nipulation of genes. These were dealt with using predominantly thecommunity of inquiry model pioneered by Mathew Lipman et a1. Thesetopics were preceded by some work with de Bono's Six Hats} An impor­tant element of most sessions across all years has been a short medita­tion, quiet time or guided visualisation - which I discuss later in thispaper. The meditation makes a remarkable difference to the receptive­ness of the classes and helps promote a better level of discussion of theissues raised.

I began discussions with the Science department with regard to becominginvolved in the Science curriculum because I believed that boys, in gen­eral, were more comfortable with the styles of thinking required to doscience well and that science was a learning area that was in some wayvalorised by boys. It has struck me in the past that ethical and social is­sues are too easily overlooked in science on the basis that science dealswith getting basic information, and that it is not the role of scientists toquestion what is done with the information. I thought that if I could getboys to engage, during science classes, with ways of thinking not com­monly found in the classroom, I believed there would be a greater chanceof them using such thinking skills more widely. And, because science is acompulsory subject with a common curriculum for all students in years 8, 9and 10, all of the students in anyone year group could be targeted. Thescience teachers were generally receptive to the idea of having aphilosopher on board. The same model as employed for Year 9 this yearwill be employed to introduce values and philosophical thinking intothe Year 10 curriculum. The response from the boys has generally beenpositive - although I suspect that some of this is of the "a change is asgood as a holiday" variety - because classes with me are simply differ­ent from those with their usual class teacher. The teaching materialsdeveloped for and with these classes are available to science staff viathe college intranet. It is important to note, also, that that members ofthe Science department are actively engaged in a number of other re­search projects designed to facilitate transition to the outcomes focusmandated for all schools in Western Australia by the CurriculumCounciL

In the Senior School, I also worked with the Social Science department(the learning area of Studies of Society and Environment - SOSE), thistime with a specific project-based activity in a Year 10 class. My briefhere was to introduce the classes to forms of moral argument and moralquestioning related to work they were doing on the topic of air pollution.This required me to work intensively with one teacher and her two Year10 classes over a period of just more than two weeks. Our work togetherculminated in classroom-sized "summits" modelled on the EarthSummits. Our summits were video-recorded in the school studio by Year12 Media Studies students. There were many beneficial outcomes fromthe process of organising the summits and of getting them recorded. Theprimary outcome in terms of the Social Science curriculum was that theboys in the class demonstrated that they had understood key elementsof, in this case, "air pollution". But there were other outcomes: - theboys learnt how to work in teams; the boys learnt how to work witholder peers; and there was a clear assimilation of moral concepts intotheir understanding of a problem that might otherwise be construedmore simply as a problem with a technical definition capable of a tech­nical solution.

Getting the boys to assimilate moral concepts into their SOSE projectswas managed by working through several case studies unrelated to their

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S. Millett: the Wesler experience 25

pollution projects. These case studies were supported by teaching mate­rials that introduced the boys to a distinction between hurt and harm(one can be harmed without knowing, but one always knows when one ishurt) and got them to ask what sorts of things could be harmed. Theywere thus introduced to the question of moral considerability and wereasked to suggest criteria for this. This broadened the scope of their ques­tioning and caused them to re-think what sorts of entities (from humansto algae to ecosystems themselves) might be considered to be stakehold­ers in the issues they were investigating. The main tool developed forthis was a worksheet for ethical decision-making coupled with a varia­tion on what has become known as the Potter Box - devised by RalphPotter at Harvard University. The worksheet asks students to definethe problem and ascertain the relevant facts for each case study or sce­nario. It then asks students to identify the stakeholders or claimantsand suggest what actions each stakeholder would want to be taken.Following from this the worksheet gets students to develop three or fouralternative courses of action and with each of these, discuss the best andworst results for each stakeholder. The final section of the worksheetasks if there are any ethical principles that might support or preventany of the actions. The Potter Box, at its simplest, is a device to ensurethat certain key elements are considered when making judgments on is­sues of ethics. The version I use is reproduced on A4 or A3 paper roughlydivided into four quadrants. In the first quadrant students write whatempirical information or facts they have; in the second they must statethe values supported by the decision-makers; in the third they choosean ethical principle by which to operate; and in the fourth they state towhom or to what the decision-makers owe a loyalty. The 'box" is a dy­namic model that helps ensure adequate attention is given to each of thefour designated areas that may influence judgment on an ethical issue. Itis a useful device to show both that different outcomes may be morallydefensible and that the values, loyalties and principles by which weoperate may influence our understanding of the facts in any givensituation.

Devices such as ethical worksheets and graphical models such as thePotter Box can work well with senior students - where they can acteither as a framework for an ethics syllabus or as a guide to student­driven inquiry for well-motivated students. Different approaches workbetter for younger children.

In the Middle School, which at Wesley takes in Years 5-8, I have so farworked for a semester with the two Year 5 classes, in collaboration withthe class teacher, who sat in on the sessions. The curriculum for theseclasses was developed during the previous year in consultation withMiddle School teachers, and is designed to introduce the classes to ques­tions of value. The classes are entered in the timetable as Religion andValues Education (RAVE) - a name increasingly being adopted in inde­pendent schools following a series of seminars this year and last by DrPeter Vardy.2 At Wesley, we have chosen a curriculum largely based onthe community of inquiry model developed by Lipman and others, butwith some variations - including some use of de Bono's ideas, some work­sheets and some collaborative group work. The latter has been inspiredby professional development work at the college with Dr [ulia Atkin.

In the first semester the primary texts were "The Knife" and "The EchoSisters" from Philip Cam's Thinking Stories 1 anthology.3 These workvery well at this level. In "The Knife" there are questions of ethicalbehaviour to do with crime and punishment with which boys of this age

Critical & Creative 'Iliinkin,g Vo{ 7 No 2 Qcto6er 1999

S. MilleU: the Wester Experience

group readily associate and the discussions were focussed and lively.When we moved on to "The Echo Sisters" the class found the textslightly more difficult. Despite this, there was a vigorous discussion ofissues related to environmental ethics and politics. One set of questionsof particular note related to an illustration accompanying, but not men­tioned in, the text. The fact that it was not referred to in the writtentext seemed to unsettle some of the class - but also provoked somethoughtful questioning. This illustration of an owl perched in a tree andcarrying a severed electrical cord in its mouth became the source mate­rial for two complete sessions in each of the two classes. In one class inone week all the boys insisted that the picture referred to an actual owlactually carrying a severed electrical cord. In the other class, therewere three boys who each could see that in some way there might be an­other dimension to the meaning available in the picture. They suggestedthat the owl "stands for" the forest and that the cord "stands for" thehydro-electric scheme that threatened to destroy the river, the wilder­ness and animals homes with it. Another boy said tithe cord representsthe hydro scheme" while another said that the picture was a "protestsign". This was an interesting development, philosophically and psy­chologically.

When the idea of a metaphorical meaning came into the classroomcommunity there were some boys who were obviously bemused by this,and others who appeared to be wondering what it was that the threeboys could see that they could not. In the week between that class andthe next there was an apparent change in the boys' understanding. Thereappeared to have been what might be called a cognitive shift. In eachclass the next week, there was a strong call to discuss the owl pictureagain. In one class, an increased number of boys recognised the possibil­ity of the picture acting as a visual metaphor with multiple meanings.In the other class (where previously none had recognised this level ofmeaning) there were several boys who had been thinking about the pic­ture in the intervening week and who had come to understand that theremight be something other than a literal interpretation of the picture.Some of the boys in each class remained apparently unaware that therewas something other than a literal interpretation available for the pic­ture, but in each class there were also numbers of boys who seemed ac­tively to wonder what it was that some boys could see that they couldnot. The cognitive shift from literal to metaphorical meaning did notapply to the whole group, but the idea definitely seemed to be spread­ing through the group after having been identified by one or twomembers.

It is also worth noting that for the Easter-time lessons in these classes,the boys were presented with paintings of the Crucifixion by, respec­tively, Tintoretto, Fra Angelica, Bellini and William Blake. Theirtask, in groups of six, was to generate a series of questions about the pic­tures. On another occasion a Calvin and Hobbes cartoon was used assource material, so the groups were accustomed in some degree, to work­ing with pictures within the context of Religion and Values Education.

One of the key elements of philosophy classes at this level is that thediscussions integrate what the students have learned in a number of keylearning areas. In the discussions surrounding "The Echo Sisters", for ex­ample, the boys brought in what they knew of the carbon cycle and thewater cycle from their geography and ecology work, and were able tocome up with dear descriptions of what "system" was from their under­standing of the Internet and from their use of Lego. One boy said that "a

2Q

Criticae & Creative 'IFtinf.;irw. roe 7 9/0 2 OctoPer 1999

S. Millett: the Wesler experience z:system is one thing that joins to lots of things". Another said "a systemis like a main thing with little things coming off it - these join back tothe main thingO.like the Internet". These are not unsophisticatedresponses.

The work in Year 5 is the subject of a research project funded by theUniversity of Sydney, which will publish some of the details of theproject later this year. As part of the study, the boys have filled in aquestionnaire devised by Lovat and Schofield from the University ofNewcastle.4 The questionnaire seeks to determine whether there havebeen changes in the boys' moral values and to what extent any changecan be attributed to the specific curriculum intervention.

The Year 5 classes use the community of inquiry model to address issuesraised by the boys. In some class time, however, the large group is di­vided into smaller groups to deal with particular issues. It is apparentthat some of the boys engage better with the discussion when it occurs insmall groups (of six or less) than when the whole group (of 24) operates.The smaller groups are probably less intimidating for quieter boys thanis the whole group which, if the teacher/ facilitator is not careful, canbecome dominated by small number of boys loudly proclaiming theirpoints of view. There are, of course, other techniques available to elicitresponses from quieter students, but the small groups appear to offer anenvironment in which most boys in the two classes feel comfortable tospeak. The boys in the study had already been accustomed to working insmaller groups and formed them readily when required.

The Middle School, which formally comes into existence next year whena new building is opened, has adopted as one of its core values that theschool as a whole should be a community of inquiry.

Climate in the college that has allowed the program to be establishedThe introduction of Philosophy across the curriculum at Wesley Collegecould not have happened if there that had not been a climate in theCollege that allowed the program to be established. There are a numberof facets to this climate of change:

There has been a concerted push to change the "culture" of the College tomake it more friendly and tolerant of differences, with many individualchanges contributing to this. Perhaps the main impetus for this has comevia the Press and continuing references in it to the alienation experi­enced by students (especially boys) in their middle years of schooling,and to the health problems of young men. The values program is a con­scious attempt to address alienation early in a boyfs school experiencewith a view to lessening its impact in later years. It is a fact that ratesof suicide, self-harm and injury to peers in young Australian men areamong the highest in the developed world. We believe that one way toaddress this is to address the sense of alienation and disengagement ex­perienced by boys - by helping them to think in ways other than thegoal-oriented reason dominant among boys (more of this later).

The changes include the establishment of a teaching and learning pro­ject, the creation of a student representative council and, most signifi­cantly, the formation of a Middle School. The teaching and learningproject encompasses classroom-based research projects in most years andacross most of the key learning areas. There are, for example, researchprojects looking at: portfolios in Year 5; electronic portfolios in Year 9and 10 Science; literature circles in Year 11; Information Technology

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S, MilIeu: the Wesley Experience

across the curriculum; and low-achieving maths students. The teachingand learning project itself promotes collaborative learning and the ideathat there are multiple intelligences and multiple learning styles evi­dent in any group of students.

The creation of a student representative council through which boys inthe college may raise issues of concern to them is part of a college-wideattempt to get students responsibly engaged in the running of theirschool - to become engaged with honour and responsibility. This is partof an overall strategy to create an "ethical school".

Related to the desire to change the culture of the College has been thecreation of a Middle School for boys in Years 5 to 8 inclusive (boys ofages 10-13). The year groupings of the Middle School pays conscious at­tention to the physical and psychological developmental stagesthrough which boys progress and allows boys of similar physical devel­opment to study and play together. In effect, the College has been di­

.vided into three sub-schools, thus allowing smaller, and potentiallyfriendlier environments to be established. In the Middle - as in theSenior - School there is a conscious policy of fostering responsibility andhonour among the boys.

Of course, the philosophy program could not have been initiated in itspresent form without the appointment of a Director of Philosophicaland Ethical Inquiry, with a brief to develop curricula for years 5-12 and,eventually, K-12. It is noteworthy that the College has employed aphilosopher for this position, rather than someone with a specificbackground in secondary education. .

A further key element of the climate of change in the college has beenthe explicit acknowledgment of core values in the K-12curriculum man­dated to be implemented progressively in Western Australian schoolsfrom 1999 to 2004.5 These shared values include: a commitment to thepursuit of knowledge and achievement of potential; self-acceptance andrespect for self; respect and concern for others and their rights; social,civic and environmental responsibility.v While the choice of the actualvalues to be emphasised within the state-wide curriculum may not beunproblematic, the fact that values are given a central and prominentposition is itself significant.

Common key elements across the programThere are a number of elements common to the program across all years.Meditation. Most sessions in most classes start with a relaxation or med­itation session. This is one of the most influential elements. If nothingelse, getting a class to be able to sit quietly changes the dynamic in theclassroom and allows many other things to be done more efficiently. Avariety of techniques is used, including quiet contemplation, guided vi­sualisation, breathing focus. The younger boys initially have a greatdeal of difficulty sitting still, with the Year 5s able to manage initiallyless than a minute. After two terms the Year 5s can sustain, on most days,upwards of 10 minutes of quiet in which they are invited to contemplateor pray. Older boys initially resist these quiet times, but come to enjoysome "time out" from their busy lives, even if it is only a few minutes.The senior boys have come to request guided visualisations and mostseem to enjoy it. The discussions that follow such meditation sessions ­whether the groups are young or old -- are always more focused and en­gage a higher proportion of the class than discussions held in the ab­sence of meditation.

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S. Millett: the Wesley experience 22

Community of inquiry. In each class there is an attempt to cultivate acommunity of inquiry, although this has proved more difficult withboys in the senior school than those in earlier years. It appears the boysin the senior school (especially Years 11 and 12) are unaccustomed toasking questions and are unaccustomed to the relative lack of structurewithin sessions using the community of inquiry. It has been suggested bya colleague ( and I have some sympathy for this) that the older boyshave been brought up in a media-dominated environment where theyare simply required to be passive consumers. This passive consumptionincludes consumption of education: in Ivan Illich's terms/, wherebyschool for these senior boys is a place where they come to get an educa­tion rather than as a place where they come to learn. That is, educationitself is a commodity for which they pay and teachers are considered tobe servants paid to deliver a product to students-as-consumers. We hopethat as the philosophy program is incorporated into all years, the re­sistance to it in the senior years will lessen and that we will be able tooffer a curriculum that is more overtly philosophical and at greaterdepth than is currently possible.

Group and collaborative learning techniques are a significant part of theestablishment of communities of inquiry. In many cases the group consistsof the whole class, although students in the compulsory years (8,9 and10) are more accustomed to group work through the efforts of teachersinvolved in the Teaching and Learning Project and so small group workin philosophy is easier to manage with these students. Senior studentscurrently working toward the TEE (HSC-equivalent) are less accustomedto group work, so in most cases they are asked to work through case stud­ies individually before the class is brought together for plenary discus­sions of the issues raised. Completing the case studies (using the work­sheet for ethical decision-making and/or the Potter Box) individuallytakes on a "gatekeeper" role: those who complete the work are invitedinto further group discussions.

Discussion of issues raised by the boys. This is of more importance in theSenior School where boys are increasingly questioning the validity ofrules, the validity of decisions made that affect them and where theyare increasingly "pushing the boundaries" of what is acceptable be­haviour. This is in a context of a college policy to include boys in the de­cision-making process. In most Philosophy groups in the senior schoolthere is an opportunity for the boys to raise and discuss issues of concernto them, including issues related to the running of the school and to theirschool life generally (e.g. consistency of decision-making, school rules,violence, respect).

Discussion of issues raised by the boys applies increasingly as the boysmove through the year groups. These sessions operate as an effectivepressure release valve in that they allow boys to raise issues that arebothering them, and to discuss these issues in the presence of a(generally) disinterested mediator. Some of the issues raised in seniorclasses this year include: school policy on a range of issues; violence;stress; anger; religion and god; guilt. These issues are a valuable way into philosophical discussions which have the added benefit of improv­ing the boys' knowledge of themselves. A word of caution, though; Ittakes time to build an environment of trust in which the boys feel thatthey can raise and discuss issues without their words being repeated out­side the classroom. I am careful to seek class permission to take up issuesthat are raised by them within the class. Discussing issues raised by theboys addresses directly the question of alienation.

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S. Millett: the Wesler Experience

The objectives of the program.The Philosophy program in all levels of the college aims to bring aboutoutcomes related to the following:Thinking well, including the ability to frame and ask questions and torecognise the roles played by different question types. From my experi­ence, learning to ask questions and differentiating between differentquestion types is a new experience for boys in the senior school. Juniorboys - those of 10 years or younger - have no problem wanting to ask ques­tions, but their questioning is more often simple and aimed at gettingapproval from a teacher for their willingness to be involved in a class­room question exercise. The nature of their questioning during philoso­phy sessions has changed over the past two terms. As noted earlier,there has also been a change in their ability to interpret meaning intexts.Values. There is clear evidence that pre- and early adolescents willbenefit from a specific teaching intervention with an explicit values.orientation,8 and most sessions relate in some way to moral values.Issues relating to moral values are discussed in light of a college policyto operate in a climate of "committed impartialitytl9 The College is acollege of the Uniting Church and has a Christian ethos to which it iscommitted, but it encourages a dialogue on religious and values issues inwhich other views are also put and discussed. That is, as long as theviews to which the Uniting Church and the College are committed areput to the group, other views may be canvassed in a spirit of impartialinquiry. One of the challenges of the Philosophy program (and theCollege generally) is to find ways to assess whether there is a change invalues over time.Spirituality. Many of the class sessions involve discussions of spiritual­ity. Within the meditation/relaxation sessions boys are invited to prayif they wish. There is no compulsion. My objective is to help boys realisethat a spiritual life is a fuller life, whilst recognising that each indi­vidual must come to their own understanding of what spirituality is andthat there may be multiple pathways toward spirituality. This is aninclusive activity for all faiths and denominations. My intention is thatthe boys involved will know that they can be moral individuals even ifthey do not find a faith and that they can be tolerant of others' beliefsor lack thereof.Engagement. Alienation. Self-knowledge. We hope that by offering anenvironment and a space in the timetable where issues of concern can beraised, the boys will be encouraged to engage with their learning in amore thoroughgoing fashion than might otherwise be the case. We an­ticipate that boys who participate in this program over a number ofyears will be less likely to suffer alienation because they will have theskills to think through situations and will have come to a degree of self­understanding and self-knowledge that they might otherwise havemissed out on.Reflection. Boys are encouraged to reflect on problems and not simply toseek a solution. They are encouraged to reflect on their own actions andthrough reflection also to come to know themselves better. There hasbeen an emphasis on goal-oriented reasoning in the past that needs to becounterbalanced with forms of communicative reason 10_ the use of rea­son to come to an understanding rather than to win an argument orachieve a set goal. I suggest that the predominance of goal-orientedthinking among boys (and males generally) sets them up to either win orto lose. Boys who too-often lose may choose not to engage in activities inwhich they see only the possibility of winning or losing. Other boysmay find that the pressure of having to win may become too great - andstop engaging. Boys who see only the possibility of winning or of losing

eo

Critica{ & Creative 'TfiinRin,g 1l0{ 7 9io 2 Octo6er 1999

erienceS. Millett: the Wesley exp m.

in any exchange - whether it is in argument, in sport, or in academic en­deavour - may choose to opt out all together, to choose to die or to engagein risk-taking activity in which the choice of living or dying is to anextent taken out of their hands. .

This is not to say that we need to dispense completely with goal-ori­ented thinking, with the sort of strategic thinking in which action ori­ented to success is sufficient.U Strategic thinking is necessary, but it isnot sufficient. Boys need to practise other forms of thinking other thanthe merely strategic. They need forms of communicative rationality inwhich they are encouraged to explore questions in a bid to understandthem, not simply to solve this or that problem. They need also to be ableto share with each other rather than always to compete. Providing aspace, both literal and mental, for boys to communicate with the aim ofunderstanding may well be one of the most important things we can dofor them. It will at least help produce men who are not blinkered intonarrow forms of strategic thinking in which winning is the only object.However, trying to do this in an environment where competitive sport isone of the most potent symbols in boys' lives is seriously difficult. Buttry we must.Civics and citizenship. The Middle School has in place a separate syl­labus dealing with civics and citizenship. The philosophy (RAVE) pro­gram highlights the importance of choice, one of the key elements in­herent in a democratic model.Literacy, cognitive development and the development of a criticalmoral faculty. There is evidence from the work in early Middle Schoolthat the community of inquiry model influences the development of"critical literacy" Le. the ability not only to read, but to interpret andcontextualise what is read.

The Philosophy and Ethics program at Wesley is still very much in itsinfancy, but there are encouraging signs that it - in conjunction withother college initiatives - is beginning to make a positive difference andmove us toward being an "ethical school".

Endnotes

lEdward DeBono. Six Thinking Hats fro Schools (Books 1-6)Highett, Vie: Hawker Brownlow, 1992

2 Heythrop College, University of London .3 Philip Cam. Thinking Stories I: Philosophical Inquiry forChildren.

Alexandris, NSW: Hale & Inremonger, 19934Lovat, Terence & Schofield, "Values formation in citizenship educa­

tion: a proposition and an emoirical study." Unicorn 24,1 April 1998.5 Curricular Framework for Kindergarten to Yr 12 Education in Western

Australia Curriculum Council 19986 Ibid P 16.7 Ivan Illich. Tools for Conviviality New York: Harper & Row, 19738 Lovat & Schofield, op cit.9 A concept adopted from Prof Brian Hill, Murdoch University, WA.

10 This is adistinction borrowed from Jurgen Habermas, MoralConciousness and Communicative Action. Transl Christian Lenhardt& Shierry Weber Nicholson. Oxford: Polity, 1990

11 [bid, P 134.

Critica{ & Creative 71iinRing 'JIg! 7 9fo2 Octo6er 1999

'TOK' at Narrabundah College - content, approach andrationaleWinifred Wing Han Lamb: Philosophy, The Faculties, AND

e-mail: Winifred.Lamb@anu.edu.au

IntroductionTheory of knowledge (TOK) is a year long course accredited by theAustralian Capital Territory Board of Senior Secondary Studies. It istaught at Narrabundah College in Canberra and is worth a tertiaryminor. In the course of the last few years, since TOK has been taught atthe college, the course has evolved in an organic way, out of changingrequirements of the International Baccalaureate but more importantly,out of the experience of teaching and learning within the course. Thereis a framework and syllabus, but there is also enough scope within thatfor us to define its nature through experience, discovery and developingunderstanding of what philosophy means. (a contentious issue evenamongst philosophers today.)

TOK is not academic philosophy. While academic philosophicalunderstanding is valued, TOK aims to promote more, both for the sake ofchildren and for the sake of philosophy. TOK is philosophy 'with oneeye out on the human condition' (David Cooper, 1995,61)With referenceto lesson material that illustrates approaches taken in this course, Iwill show how TOK is governed by what I would call 'the principle ofcontinuity' as manifested in terms of content, approach and rationale.My argument in this short paper for this conference, entitled, 'Growinginto Philosophy', is that TOK, like philosophy for children promotesthe education of the 'whole person' because of the sense of continuitythat is respected throughout in content, approach and rationale. Such anapproach is based on a fundamental respect for children and youngpersons, seeing them, not as proto-type adults but as adequate peoplewho can be our partners in learning. This approach to children is verymuch the spirit of Gareth Matthews' work which affirms the continuitybetween childhood wisdom and adult philosophical endeavour. (see egoMatthews, 1996)

The 'Principle of Continuity' in TOKIn this section, I will show how 'continuity' operates in the following 3ways -

1. TOK and 'epistemological homebuilding'TOK seeks to promote an understanding that is continuous with theform-ation of the learner's worldview and personal development. Itseeks to graft philosophical development onto the learner's search fortruth and the process of becoming a self. TOK seeks to promote asynoptic understanding that is not fragmented into incommensurableknowledges.

2. TOK and lived experienceIn relation to the above aim, TOK seeks to advance philosophicalunderstanding that bridges pre-theoretical or 'common' understandingand academic understanding. This kind of 'bridging' is of course integralto any attempt to introduce philosophy to children as is amplydemonstrated in the work of Gareth Matthews, and indeed, in the workof all teachers engaged in this activity.

CriticaC & Creative fJfUnkin,g. VaC 7 9Yo 2 Octo6er 1999

Winifred W H Lamb: TOK at Narrabundah 3.2

3. TOK and pedagogy - the idea of 'seamless philosophy'The above features have obvious pedagogical implications which I willillustrate with a brief course description, two samples lesson and asample of student writing (see Appendix). In my eight years of teachingand developing TOK, I have mostly written my own material on whichour discussions are based. The emphasis is on a dialogical,conversational style of content which invites engagement in genuinelyhuman questions. Students learn early in the course about theimpossibility of neutrality, the inescapability of responsibility in ourknowledge, the need to substantiate their positions and knowledgeclaims, and the vital importance of dialogue in their learning andformation.

The outworking of such approaches is a kind of 'seamless' philosophy sothat the philosophical emerges in the course of the conversational.Indeed, the best times of TOK is this experienced 'seamlessness'.

In what follows, I will address each of the senses of 'continuity' in thatorder and attach the illustrations mentioned above.

1. TOK and 'epistemological homebuilding'It is patently clear that college students such as we find atNarrabundah College live in the midst of life experiences that often

, involve them in struggles with large questions of ultimate andpenultimate concern - the experience of tragedy, of loss, the fact ofinjustice and of human frailty and the reality of death. While thedifficulty of their circumstances will vary, all teenage students areinvolved in processes of personal development and discovery. Inaddition to what adolescents contend with by virtue of theirmaturational development, our students also live at a time ofunprecedented change. We are told by social theorists that we live in 'aworld of multiple options' (Giddens, p. 142) dominated by consumerismand choice, a 'mall culture', in which young people face 'a plethora ofselves', and a 'chorus of invitations'. (Middleton and Walsh, p. 55)

While personal autonomy remains an important goat educators aresurely conscious of the difficulty that young people experience innegotiating such a world of change, and how this threatens somethingas basic as the 'ontological security' (Giddens p. 142), the intactness and'boundedness' (for a discussion of 'bounded selfhood', see Mouw andGriffioen, p. 115) of their persons. Writing from the context ofpostmodern culture and of the assaults on human beings from the radicalplurality and fragmentation that threatens, Middleton and Walshspeak of the importance of 'epistemological homebuilding' (Middletonand Walsh, p. 169) in the task of education so that young people, inparticular, will not be overwhelmed or feel dislocated. This kind ofadvocacy is particularly pertinent in our times, and particularlypertinent in the teenage years of development.

We seek in TOK to tap both the challenge and the nurturing potential ofphilosophy. Far from being merely a mind-sharpening exercise, werecognise the liberating effects of philosophy. In David Cooper's words,good philosophy addresses the sense of alienation that we allexperience, the tension between 'that intuition of ourselves as one withthe whole ... and that {of ourselves} as separate beings....'.(Cooper, 61)In the light of this, as teachers of philosophy, we feel unable to endorseany narrow idea of our task, as being merely the 'piecemealclarification of puzzling terms.' (Cooper, 4) Rather, the value of

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Winifred W H Lamb: TOK at Narrabundah .3i

philosophy must be seen in relation to human being. (Elliott, 1975) It isour hope that students will be centred by philosophy and will find a'home' within the subject.

2. TOK and lived experienceEpistemological homebuilding occurs when knowledge is seen to bepalpably relevant to life questions and to lived experience. Philosophyneeds to promote the synoptic view which provides a way of seeing andforms a basis for judgement and understanding of experiences. Forstudents to be able to appropriate philosophical understanding for theirown deliberations, TOK seeks to promote an understanding that is notfragmented into incommensurable know ledges. It is for this reason thatTOK seeks to advance philosophical understanding and that bridgespro-theoretical or 'common' understanding and academic understandingthat helps to 'bind' experiences. The nurturing potential of philosophyis also bound up with its survivability. I will discuss this point underthe following headings.*TOK and 'human being'* TOK and 'caring for philosophy'

2a. TOK and human beingThe philosopher Ray Elliott reminds us that education that is for'human being' will not automatically view academic understanding asan unremittingly good thing. In fact, such an education is based on therealisation that introducing children to academic modes ofunderstanding could mean the loss of 'natural understanding' and therisk of losing a rich and synoptic understanding, 'the sense of beingwithin the whole', (Elliott, 1975, 69) Common understanding iscontrasted with academic understanding which comes from study of theacademic disciplines. These are more specialist and technical andwhile more rigorous and disciplined, are also shaped by developmentsand trends within the particular disciplines themselves. Graduation tothese modes of understanding incur a cost in terms of wisdom and in termsof risks to personal development that comes from being totally immersedin them.

Mary Midgley advances a similar idea when she says that educationshould seek to promote the kind of understanding that forms the'background map' of the whole range of our knowledge. (8) and thatspecialist knowledge should be related to everyday thinking and madeanswerable to it. Such pleas from Elliott and Midgley should be heededand have a particular pertinence to our postmodem times which ismarked by the sense of fragmentation that comes from the loss of anybinding narrative to unify our diverse discourses.

2b. TOK and 'caring for philosophy'I made the point earlier that TOK is 'philosophy with one eye out onthe human condition' for the sake of children and for the sake ofphilosophy. While we care for children, we care also for philosophy.While in education, we seek to promote a love of truth, as Ray Elliottsays, love of truth includes a love and care for one's subject (Elliott,1974). One way of ensuring that philosophy thrives and has a future isto guard against its loss of a soul. Elliott speaks of an 'art of tendance'in relation to the subject that one loves. Part of the survivability ofphilosophy lies in its capacity to speak to the human condition.

With reference to our political and intellectual climate which shapesthe direction of educational planning and funding and determines the

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Winifred W H Lamb: TOK at Narrabundab 3.i

future of academic inquiry itself, the philosopher, Raimond Gaita saysthat we are experiencing a conceptual loss as a result of which we arenow unable to articulate the treasure that philosophy is. The 'form ofspeaking' that we need to advance the worth of philosophy 'has gonedead on us'. (Gaita, 1997, 14) Rather than capitulate to arguments forphilosophy that appeal to its many external benefits, we need perhapsto revisit the classical insight that part of the value of philosophy isits capacity to nourish the life of the mind for it could be said that thelucidity and reflection that are valued in philosophy are intrinsic to itand without it our lives will suffer. In other words, the relationshipbetween being reflective and personal authenticity is not an extrinsic onesince such notions as authenticity and integrity characterise the verynature of a rich inner life. (Gaita, 1997) It could be argued that 'truth isthe need of the soul' because an indifference to truth in one's life,including one's emotional life, results in superficiality and loss of self­knowledge. As we encourage the young to engage with philosophy andto interrogate philosophical intuitions, we are also keepingphilosophy alive and in touch with human life. (see Gaita, 1997 &Lamb, forthcoming).

Questions of Neutrality and AutonomyI am aware that such claims as I have made raises questions about'thick' values and about the role of the teacher especially in the publicsystem, also about the role of the expression of conviction and/or themaintenance of neutrality in one's teaching. The broad claims that Ihave made for TOK in the role of 'epistemological homebuilding' andtowards the formation of the self could similarly incur criticisms ofcontroversial assumptions. They are reminiscent of the debate over theadvocacy for the education of the 'whole child' (see eg., Standish, 1995,McLaughlin, 1996) Indeed, what I have advanced regarding TOK, itscontent, approach and rationale, amounts to such an advocacy. This isnot the place to take on that debate except to remark that it is by nomeans clear that neutrality is the proper role of the teacher in theteaching of value-loaded content. (see ego Warnock, 1973). With respectto the personal autonomy which remains an important goal of education,it is essential to realise that autonomy is not 'something to be tapped'as something to be nurtured and supported.

ReferencesDavid Cooper (1996) World Philosophies - an Historical Introduction

(Oxford, Blackwell)Elliott, R.K. (1975) Education and Human Being, in S.c. Brown (ed.)

Philosophers Discuss Education (London, Macmillan)(1974) 'Education, Love of One's Subject and Love of Truth'

Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of GreatBritain. VII, [an, 1974

Gaita Raimond (1997) 'Truth and the Idea of the University',Australian Universities Review, vol 40, # 2

Gallagher , Shaun (1992) Hermeneutics and Education (New York,State University of New York Press).

Giddens, Anthony (1991) Modernity and Self Identity in the LateModern Age (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press)

Heaton, J.M. (1978) Ontology and Play, in B. Curtis & Wolfe Mays(eds). Phenomenology and Education. (London,Metheun).

Lamb, Winifred Wing Han "'Philosophising on Saturday": Faith andthe Philosophical Life', in M. Bower & R. Groenhoet (eds) AmongSophia's Daughters - Faith, Feminism and Philosophy, IndianaUniversity Press, forthcoming

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Matthews, Gareth (1996) The Philosophy of Childhood (Cambridge,Massachusettes, Harvard University Press).

McLaughlin, T.H. (1996) 'Education of the Whole Child?' in Ron Best(ed.) Education, Spirituality and the Whole Child (London,Cassell).

Middleton, J. Richard & Walsh, Brian J. (1995) Truth is Stranger ThanIt Used to Be - Biblical Faith in a Postmodern Age (DownersGrove, Illinois, IVP)

Moltmann, Jurgen (1967) Theology andJoy (London, SCM Press).Mouw, R. J. & Griffioen, S. (1993) Puralisms and Horizons. (Grand

Rapids, Michigan,Eerdmans).Peter Standish, (1995) Postmodernism and the education of the whole

person, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 29 (1), pp. 121-35Mary Wamock, (1973) 'Towards a Definition of Quality in Education' in

RS Peters (ed.) The Philosophy of Education (London, OxfordUniversity Press)

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3. TOK and pedagogy - the idea of 'seamless philosophy'

Document it 1 HANDOUT TO STUDENTS-Introduction to TOK

'The only thing we require to be good philosophers is the faculty ofwonder,'

What is TOK?Theory of Knowledge is a way of thinking that explores the nature ofknowledge and truth. It does this by a variety of approaches and withreference to a variety of contexts.

Throughout the 3 units, our concern will be the question of what and howwe know, and the question of what is truth (!). Not surprisingly, theseare important questions in philosophy, but they are also vital questionsin the living of our lives, both publicly and privately. TOK respects thepervasiveness of these questions and encourages the posing and addressof them in a wide variety of contexts. In the 3 TOK units, we willconsider the question of truth and knowledge within the different areasof knowledge and of human concern - art, religion, politics, morality,scientific enquiry, mathematics, literature, history and the business ofliving together in society, and of 'the everyday'.

Organisation of the Units - a Brief Description

Unit 1 - In this unit, you will be introduced to the problem of knowledgeas it is expressed in aspects of the history of philosophy. We will startwith perhaps the most well-known philosopher of all, Plato (428-347B.e.) We will look at his famous Allegory of the Cave to get an idea ofthe difference between appearance and reality, knowledge and belief.We will trace how in the west, philosophers have required knowledgeto give us certainty. We will in particular see this in the philosophicalwork of Descartes (1596-1650) and Hume (1711-1776) and in how theytried to overcome uncertainty, or the problem of scepticism.

From around week 4 of the unit, we will look at language and itsrelationship to knowledge and truth.

What did the philosopher Wittgenstein (1889-1915) mean when hesaid 'The limits of my language are the limits of my world' ? Can wehave thoughts outside language? What is the relationship between thelanguage I use and what I think? Is 'reality' captured in language? Isthere anything 'unsayable' that is just as important as what is sayable?How much does a culture's language reflect the views and values of thatculture? Does our language then lock us into a particular culturalperspective? How much is power tied up in all this? Does our languagereflect the power structures that exist? Is politically correct language astep in the right direction?

Many such questions will be addressed and with the growing confusionthat may arise from these big questions, (do not worry too much aboutbeing confused.... it's not necessarily a bad thing and will occur if you'rebeing adventurous in your thinking) we will spend a couple of lessons onclear thinking and informal logic. Just to set you right for the rest of thecourse, perhaps.

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Unit 2 - In this unit, we will turn to the question of knowledge byencouraging you to look at the curriculum, at the various fields or formsof knowledge that are represented there. For example, we will considerthe nature of scientific knowledge, for example, and examine thedistinctiveness of the different areas of knowledge with respect tomethodolology, concepts, approaches and tests for truth? How arescientific truths differently established from truth in poetry, forexample? What does 'objectivity' mean in these various areas?

As you reflect on areas of knowledge in your curriculum, you will also"reflect on the nature of education, and your own education, in particular.We will for example, raise such questions as the role ofreason/emotion/imagination in knowledge, the difference betweeneducation, training and indoctrination, the relationship (if any)between education and the meaning of life!! etc. (We don't shy awayfrom the big questions in TOK!)

Unit 3 - This unit is the most ambitious of all in which we will (eventhough we will hardly have enough time to do this properly...) tacklethe BIG questions. As a former student of TOK has observed, theapproach taken in TOK is an audacious one! (see Document #4).

While in Unit 1, we discussed the question of language and culture andthe way in which language shapes our view of the world, in this unit weconsider some implications of this for morality and values and for truth.To what extent is morality culturally determined? If society A treatsthe elderly in a way that is appalling from the point of view of societyB, is there a way of judging whose is the morally better position? Wheredo we find such criteria for judgement? What about artistic judgement?Are there independent criteria for judging such a thing as aestheticbeauty, or is beauty in the eye of the beholder?

Given the obvious diversity and plurality of Australian society, how dowe live in a way that respects this diversity? How far should respectfor difference extend? Are there limits to tolerance and freedom ofexpression?

While we audaciously attempt these questions, we return, hopefully,more equipped to consider the question of Whatis truth?

So, TOK is quite an adventure... there aren't right or wrong answers asthere are in some other subjects. But there are qualities that help to getyou further ...

Important Qualities for TOKListening is essential and it is something that we hope we could all helpto do better through our discussions and through journalling. It ispossible to hear but not really take in what others are saying. We needto cultivate attentiveness. Sometimes, the views of others are difficultto understand. We should ask for clarification. At other times, theirviews are unexciting or downright unappealing. But it is also possiblethat their views are challenging. It is natural to resist views that fallinto those categories but sometimes, it is neither fair nor wise to do that.All in the class should be given an opportunity to have a say.

The journal also provides you with an informal way to record and reflecton the material that is presented and to explore and take issues further.The best journals are those that engage with these questions and issues

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(The subject is

in a tenacious way by re-visiting both the questions you have raisedearlier and the positions that you have proposed. Consistency is goodbut is not necessarily a virtue if it is based on a lack of openness to therevision of one's views.

Respect, attention, tenacity, engagement and of course, a sense ofadventure and fun all help to make TOK a rewarding experience.

Document# 2 Sample Session in TOK 1- Lesson Plan Notes

Language, Society and the Construction of the Self - Who am 11'The crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogicalcharacter. We become full human agents, capable of understandingourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisitionof rich human languages of expression..... I want to take language ina broad sense, covering not only the words we speak, but also othermodes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the"languages" of art, of gesture, of love, and the like. But we learnthese modes of expression through exchanges with others. People donot acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own.Rather we are introduced to them through interaction with otherswho matter to us - what George Herbert Mead called 'significantothers'. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense notmonological, not something that each person accomplishes on his orher own, but dialogical.... We define our identity always in dialoguewith, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant otherswant to see in us. Even after we outgrow some of these others - ourparents, for instance - and they disappear from our lives, theconversation with them continues within us as long as we live'(Charles Taylor, 1994)

'In the beginning is the relation.' (Martin Buber)not a thing, but a relation)

' ..... our own selfhood is a gift from others....' (Mikhail Bakhtin )

'The self is -- one might say -- what the past is doing now. It iscontinuity and so it is necessary memory -- continuity seen as theshape of a unique story, my story, which lawn, acknowledge as mine.To be a self is to own such a story; to act as a self is to act out of theawareness of this resource of a particular past.' (Rowan Williams)

'The exercise of creative thought requires the presence of some lovedone ... so that there may follow the sharing of it with another. Insolitude, the springs of my soul dries up' (Schleiermacher 1768­1834))

1. IntroductionAs a teacher, I have sometimes (even often) come across a view of theself that is prevalent these days, especially amongst younger people. Itgoes like this - once a child was a pure and pristine self but as a/hegrows up, learns a language, is socialised and schooled, she becomes'contaminated' in some way by culture and loses what she once had - herinnocence, her essence, her 'true' self, her originality. Socialisation,learning and education, growing up in a social situation are for thisreason something to be regretted. We will call this the 'Rousseau viewof the self' because it is close to what the philosopher Rousseau (1712­1778)said about the self and about personal development.

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2. The view of the Pre-social SelfThis view is not uncommon perhaps because it is compatible with the

individualism that is part of our cultural climate. However, it is basedon some misconceptions about the self and about personal development.Firstly, it is based on the idea that there is a 'self at birth that is'ready made'.

However, it is hard to make sense of a 'pure' presocial self since we areall born into social situations in which we learn language (at least one)which gives us concepts that shapes our understanding, perceptions andvalues. What a child learns is always in a social context. That contextreflects a way of seeing the world that cannot be neutral. For example,the mere fact that the child does not learn to recognise pure sounds butalways the sound of something, of singing, the train, the television,means that all that (s)he learns is in some sense shaped and interpretedand seen in a certain light. In Wittgenstein's words, all that the childlearns is part of a 'form of life' (or forms of life). In other words, a childdevelops in a social context or (s)he does not develop at all.

3. The 'Dialogical Self' &; the 'Monological Self 'As the philosopher Charles Taylor said, the self does not develop as amonologue - Le. in privacy, but as a dialogue because all that we are andhave become is the result of 'conversations' /relationships withcountless others who shape the way we are. These 'conversations'('conversation' in the widest sense of the word, in which e.g. we can besaid to be in conversation with Plato who we meet through texts) aredependent on the language(s) that we learn. Without language and'conversation' there is no developed self at all.

The view that I described in paragraph 1, what I called the 'Rousseauview of the self' is also based on the idea that somehow the young childcomes into the world with ready-made thoughts and looking forlanguage and words to express these thoughts. Here, the young child iscompared to something like a newly arrived immigrant who hasthoughts and experiences in his head but can't express these in a foreignlanguage. This is the picture that Augustine (354-430) presents in hisConfessions and it is a view that Wittgenstein (1889-1951) disputed.Augustine's view is based on the assumption that thought comes beforelanguage and language merely expresses thoughts that people have intheir heads, that thinking is a separate process from speaking. Such aview is based on a sharp separation of thought from language, and itassumes that words are secondary to ideas and thought. Wittgensteinsaid that this view is mistaken because the relationship betweenlanguage and thought is more integral and complex than that. Heshowed how words and language cannot stand on their own but areembedded in the different ways in which we live. These different'forms of life' as Wittgenstein called them, arise because human beingsmake sense of reality in diverse ways and it is out of these 'forms of life'that language has meaning and actual use. With Wittgenstein, wemight say that the meaning of a word lies in its use in the language.

This embedded view of the self - the dialogical self - may be contrastedwith the way the philosopher Hume thought of the self. You willremember how he represented himself as distanced from hisexperiences, examining himself from the outside like a neutral onlooker.You may remember that he imagined himself looking within himselfand finding not a self, but a 'bundle of sensations'. According to thedialogical view of the self, this kind of pure detachment from oneself is

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not possible for while we do look at ourselves, and this is verybeneficial in self-reflection, we do so with all the baggage of values andbeliefs that we carry, and it is through these that we do our reflection.There is no neutral seeing, not even of ourselves. This is not to say thatself-understanding is impossible, but it is to say that such understandingcomes dialogically with others who in their othemess to us, show uswho/what we are. (Wow!} In a very real sense, we need others to tell uswho we are.

4. The relationship between Language and ThoughtAs for trying to give an account of how meaning and use arise, we findthat we always end up in deep waters. There is something very basic,even mysterious in the way language works with thought. To understandwhat words mean, we must set those words in the proper context, in the'stream of life' in which they have acquired meaning. For thephilosopher Wittgenstein, thought and language are inseparablewithin forms of life that we often so take for granted that the assumedvalues and beliefs within them are invisible to us. However, it iswithin these forms of life that language has meaning and within thesethat our thoughts are expressed and developed.

5. Becoming a Self - & 'Ways of Escape'If indeed our self development depends upon our 'dialogue' andconversation with others and 'the other' (that which is different fromus) then there is a sense in which the process of growth and developmentwill involve challenge and will require courage. To encounter differenceis to risk transformation, yet in a very real sense, we do not really knowwho we are without encounter and dialogue with others. However,there are ways of escaping othemess in this encounter. We can deny andnot see difference by closing ourselves off or by making others in ourlikeness. We do this when we are not listening. (We all haveexperiences of one-way conversations....!)

Fundamentalism is an example of a closed position like this. Thefundamentalist by definition has possession of truth and does not needany new truths, certainly not from strange and unexpected directions.Fundamentalists have been described as people who 'freeze' truth sothat there is certainty and control. There are no surprises. In encounterwith difference, fundamentalists tend to subsume what is new anddifferent within their own preconceived frameworks so that their beliefframeworks remain unchallenged and unchanged. It is not hard to seethat this shuts out development and growth. It is a way of 'escaping theself.' We may not be fundamentalists as such but we adopt a similarmentality when we will talk only to those who are like us, those whoagree with us and not challenge us.

However, just how far do we go in opening ourselves up to difference?When Penny (another TOK teacher) and I were talking over thisquestion, she suggested that it is possible to 'escape' in an oppositedirection - Le.by opening oneself up to all options and by saying that allpositions are worth a try and are equally valid. Such an approach alsoinvolves the risk of the loss of self. (see Kenneth Gergen later) Ahealthy self is in a sense a person who is able to order their conflictingdesires and priorities and act in a way consistent with this order. Thismay be contrasted with the person who has no such hierarchicalstructure and no conception 'of where it is within him that he reallyresides'. (Feinberg, 1973, 149) The philosopher [oel Feinberg provides agraphic description of such a person who is 'a battlefield for all his

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constituent elements, tugged this way and that and fragmentedhopelessly.' ( Feinberg, 149) Such a person is incapable of exercisingautonomous choice for he is 'tied in knots by the strands of his ownwants.' (149) We may recognise this description in our experiences ofconfusion and of a 'traffic jam' of desires which we find difficult to sortout. However, in order to achieve anything at all, especially our long­term goals, we do manage to order our wants and priorities.

Social theorists note that in our postmodern age, the self faces anidentity crisis because of the options and choices available (whetherreal or virtual). The sociologist Kenneth Gergen calls it the process of'social saturation' in which we are inundated by a multiplicity ofclamouring voices proffering alternative identities. He writes, r ....

social saturation provides us with a multiplicity of incoherent andunrelated languages of the self' with which we are perpetuallybombarded, but between which it is impossible to choose. The mediaproduces images and change them at a regular rate in order to provide uswith styles to consume and identities to try out. As someone said, 'All oflife has now been commodified, including identities.' Gergen describesthe condition resulting from social saturation as a state of'multiphrenia' in wich the individual is split 'into a multiplicity ofself-investments'. A multiphrenic person is populated by a plethora ofselves. 'In place of an enduring core of deep and indelible character,there is a chorus of invitations.' The result is that 'the fully saturatedself becomes no self at all' . The condition that Gergen describes is notunlike multi-personality disorder.

Clearly, a healthy self is neither closed - minded nor totally openeither. Sometimes people refer to the need to listen to an 'inner voice'through the changes of life. How is this developed through time, doyou think?

ICE (in class essay) - about 600 words

1. 'The crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogicalcharacter........ The genesis of the human mind is in this sense notmonological, not something that each person accomplishes on his orher own, but dialogical' (Charles Taylor 1994, 'The Politics ofRecognition' in A.Gutman (ed) Multiculturalism Princeton Uni Press)

How do we become selves? Discuss with reference to Charles Taylor'sview and to your own experience.

2. Read again what [oel Feinberg and Kenneth Gergen say and explainwhat they say about the stable self. Do you agree?(K. Gergen The saturated self: dilemmas of identity in contemporarylife. NY: Basic Books 1991)a. Feinberg, 'The idea of the free man' in JF Doyle (ed) Educationaljudgments: papers in the Philosophy of Education. London: RKP)

3. Is the self born or made?

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Document# 3 SampleStudent Essay - a dicussion on the self

Is the Self Born or Made?by Rob Oayton

The question of whether the self is monological or dialogical is amanifestation of one of the most important divisions in civilisation: theobjective and the subjective. This division is reflected by our language inwhich the subject/object/verb division is one of the most basicgrammatical divisions, and in which a subject exists only in relation toan object. The relationship is necessary for a statement to have meaning.

I began thinking about these divisions of self recently while reading[anet Frame's To the Island, the first part of her autobiography. Awriter's conception of the self is naturally at the heart of theautobiographical genre, as the self is the subject of the narrative. Frameexplores the tension between these divisions of self but never takes afinal position. She acknowledges that memory is an act ofinterpretation, but her preoccupation with clothing seems to emphasisethe idea of her memory being a kind of stage on which characters act outroles, denying the existence of a coherent self that can be faithfullyrepresented. But she also rejects the Romantic ideal of art transcendingthe personal, instead insisting on "bringing it home". She seeks toimmerse herself in her everyday existence, to find the profound in theprosaic.

Defined in terms of its relationships to others, the subjective self fulfilsone of the most basic human needs: the need to belong. While everyperson is undeniably unique in their language and values, certainconventions are necessary for people to communicate and engagecoherently with one another. Conventions, therefore, are a prerequisiteto society, and so people instinctively seek out identities to assume inorder to participate. The subjective self is never fixed, but constantlyreinterpret itself through memory. Personal growth is possible for thesubjective self through experience and the challenging of its ideas.People have a multitude of different selves to use in differentcircumstances. I can remember my sense of confusion when I saw peoplefrom my high school in the School of Music foyer. I didn't know how toact when people crossed the boundaries of the separate spheres of mylife.

All people assume identities. Sub-cultures of our society are anidentifiable example, members assuming a group-specific identity bydressing and acting in a certain manner, but consciously or not, we allengage in this to an extent. Children learn about human relationships byimitation, for example, when they play 'house' or 'dress ups', and allpeople imitate those they admire or idolise. The power to assume anidentity is perhaps part of the attraction of such cultural activities astheatre and Internet chat.

All people have identities imposed upon them. There are an enormousnumber of ways in which people are conventionally categorised,including gender, race, nationality, age, occupation, sexuality, socialclass..... Language is deeply embedded with ideals that influence us.We are greatly affected by what others tell us we are like, for example,there is a tremendous sense of significance attached to my memory ofbeing described as a "gentle giant" by a friend. Sometimes we assumethese imposed interpretations of ourselves. Names are also fundamentalto our bestowed sense of self, especially pet names and nicknames. It is

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interesting to note that many surnames originally indicated belonging toa place or profession. My family used to call me "Ronald" when I hadtantrums, and when I get angry I still think of myself as "Ronald", Mybrother has called me "Henry" for as long as I can remember - to thepoint where it is no longer self-conscious for either of us.

All of these practices of identification are an active processing ofinformation, not passive. We choose, at least to an extent, who we areand who we want to become, and even who we want to have become. Torecognise difference in others as a means of discovering the self impliesthe existence of a stable, coherent, inner self. The subjective self, bydefinition, exists only in relation to an objective self, which is the coreself that is the agent of such interpretation and appropriation.

I come from both a monological and a dialogical position on the self. Theexistence of a subjective self comprising identities either assumed orimposed necessary for participation in society is reliant on the existenceof an objective self; the selves are in exquisite harmony.

Document# 4What is Theory of Knowledge? - a student's point of view

by Fiona Brideoake

In 13 years of formal schooling, only one course of study not only required,but specifically asked me to consider the value judgments implicit in theknowledge I was acquiring; to consider abstractions such as beauty andtruth, but also contemporary issues of multiculturalism, gender relationsand socialisation. This course, known as Theory of Knowledge.challenges college students to examine the nature of knowledge, toconsider the assumptions through which they perceive the world andthrough which their studies also filter. TOK seeks not to underminestudents' beliefs, but to lead them to think actively about conceptswhich once they may have accepted without question. Learning istransformed from the passive acquisition of facts to a consideration ofcompeting truth claims, of different 'ways' of knowing, from the naturalsciences to religion, and an examination of how abstract notions of justiceand equality are manifest in society.

TOK thus addresses many of the questions of the philosopher, yet in amanner fundamentally different to most beginner's philosophy courses.Students are not given the theories - the answers! - of philosophy'sfamous names, but rather presented with the questions such thinkershave considered. While a text may provide a starting point in theconsideration of an issue, TOK classes are fundamentally discursive,with student's differing experiences providing rich material to drawupon. An audacity characterises such an approach, in which no topic isdeemed too Significant or trivial for consideration. Questions of truthand morality need not be considered only by experts, but are shown to belegitimate, indeed essential, concerns of all members of society.Students completely new to to the study of philosophy are asked todefine knowledge, to consider language from the perspectives of bothlinguist and poet, and, in one notable exercise, define'Art' within a fourminute speech! While discussions are, at times, intense, the TOKclassroom is a space in which views can be aired and questions asked.While discussions may challenge one's beliefs, they also allow criticalreflection on the reasoning underpinning such convictions, often leading

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to a more authentic, informed position, as well as an awareness ofalternative views.

As questions, not previously defined answers, form the basis of study,student's thinking is in no way limited by what a textbook alreadystates to be true. A beginner may feel distinctly uneasy contradictingDescartes, and thus the writings of such thinkers are introduced onlyafter students have been impelled to seek their own answers. Furtherreading may confirm a student's scrawled conjecture or expose the flaw ina carefully reasoned critique, yet such processes confirm the fact thatphilosophy need not be confined to the academies - that young peoplenot only possess the abilities necessary to engage in philosophicaldiscourse, but need do so if rapid social change is to be matched by theability to reflect upon such progress. TOK classes ran for two hours aweek, and yet the learning process was in no way limited to this a timeframe. Debate would spill from the classroom to the bus ride into Civic,while acquired skills in critical thinking would inform one's reading ofcurrent affairs and issues such as euthanasia and multiculturalism.Consideration of different 'ways' of knowing allowed students to reflecton the learning process in other subjects, while the keeping of a TOKjournal recorded the burgeoning process of philosophical thought.Theory of Knowledge demonstrated that questions need be asked of theworld around us, and thoughtful strategies used in approaching bothsocial issues and abstract dilemmas. TOK offered, most importantly,intellectual engagement with the notion of knowledge itself, beginning aphilosophical journey its students shall continue throughout their lives.

Critical & Creative rniinkiqg roe 7 :No 2 QCto6er 1999

Using Selected Non-Lipman Materials with Year 9Greg Smith: St [oseph's College, Brisbane.

AbstractI will share and review texts from a variety of sources outside theLipman corpus which I have used as starters for philosophicaldiscussion in coeducational settings with more able Year 9 students overthree years. They can be grouped under the headings: rights andresponsibilities, ownership, and intelligence. Moral and ethical issuesremain pivotal in this age group's thinking.Lesson plans for them appear at the website:

www.thehub.com.aul-greglphilosophy.html

IntroductionWe have a cluster group arrangement between three adjacent schools inmetropolitan Brisbane wherein invited and nominated students gatherwith experienced teachers on a variety of topics either once or for aseries of sessions. I take the Philosophy cluster for nine hours over threemornings in a semester. I will also offer this same programme in theannual interschool AlSQ Days of Excellence on 3rd September 1999.

By experimentation, experience and some insight, I have gathered texts"that work" and found, like in Lisa, that they focus on ethical andmoral issues. The are gathered in themes on the website merely forconvenience and to provide a major theme for the morning; they are notmeant to limit community inquiries which must range far and wide to beauthentic.

At the outset, it needs to be noted that the following notes have beendevised £.mm discussions; they are NOT some kind of blueprint furdiscussion. I use them as lap sheets for supporting discussion, forintroducing questions if discussion dries up, or for proposing topics todiscuss. Being prepared like this orients me to the material at moredepth than at a cold start. Notes can also help continuity if we want totake up the topic again after the lapse of a fortnight or more. It hasoften happened too that we do not deal with all three texts on the onemorning of two hours. One per hour is quite often enough.

Day OneThe theme of the first day is Ownership where we take up threeresources: Sharon's Dilemma, the Madagascan fossil egg, and theDervish. We open with the moral dilemma faced by the friend of ashoplifter. We critically read the text; we explore the idea of adilemma; we explore options and possibilities for Sharon; we take otherparties' viewpoints; we have moved at times to a discussion offriendship and the limits of loyalty; we try to weigh up social andpersonal responsibilities. For most boys the outcomes are clear but forthe girls the loyalty to the friend emerges as a real value. They try tofind a third way. We could move to the relative value of compromise. Ibelieve some philosophical skills we develop are the attempt to define,attempts to weigh options and anticipate outcomes. Dealing with thewhat ifs' outside the text can get in the way here such as what ifSharon's friend was a regular offender, etc. but learning to focus on whatwe have is effective in itself too.

A second text is a press cutting dealing with the Andrich family's findof a fossilised Madagascan bird egg on a West Australian beach. Youremember the family reburied the egg when the government looked like

Critical & Creative 11iinRi11JJ 't!o{ 7 ;No 2 Qcw6er1999

GregSmith: Using non-Lipman materials .4Z

it would compulsorily hike the fossil. Here we could deal with a'finders' keepers' ethic, our duties to Science and to the wholecommunity in matters of archaeological interest the right to gain profitfrom ownership, the limits of ownership. This story also demandsinteractive discussion about the concept of ownership and rights. Itbroadens general knowledge and we attempt to reach someunderstandings about our responsibilities as citizens. It is alwaysprovocative and stimulating.

The third text for this topic is The Dervish and the King. This Arabianfable offers sharply different interpretations about ownership. TheDervish makes his claim from long-held conventions of hospitality inthe culture and the King from his legitimacy of lineage and rank. Theymeet and two world views clash. We learrr to admire the dervish'scourage to stand up the guards and the King at great personal danger; wenote that some one has to uphold a principle to give it validity. Wediscuss the nature of a mistake; the role of etiquette and customs in life;the nature and origin of a truth; and the power of an exception. Thisstory offers rich taking-off points if the issues in it can be brought out.Depending on the maturity of the group, there is the risk that the issuesare rated as irrelevant because they are from another culture.

Day TwoThe second day is about Rights and Responsibilities: Mate's Plea, TheMake a Wish Foundation, and Fairness is ... This second topic followson by picking up issues raised on the first day. 'Mate's plea' relates thefirst prosecution in the NSW Industrial Court for neglect in Health andSafety at the workplace. We explore various interpretations of anaccident at work, possible motives for reactions, the role of a court andthe differences between written and unwritten laws. We explore theassumptions behind humane and humanitarian thinking. I find thisaccount challenges and divides groups over unions' and employers'concerns, and reveals to the group our own presuppositions abouteveryday actions. Again I push the attempt to offer variousexplanations behind appearances. This always offers at least a feelingof having done some deeper critical reading of the text.

The US 'Make a Wish Foundation' got into some trouble with ErikNess's wish to shoot a kodiak bear even after he was declared notterminally ill. This is an example of good will and a good idea turningbad in practice. This exercise offers many more grey areas to explore: thelimits of the law, exceptions to laws, the overlap between civil andmoral laws, and the limits of 'politically correct' thinking are some. Wetry to deal with 'the lesser evil' principle. We might ask what is theguide to correct behaviour and the origins for our civilised behaviournorms. A whole discussion on social norms can arise here with clashesbetween peer conformity and individual conscience, and role of personalchoice within wider personal freedom apparently available in societytoday. Local experiences of categorisations and blind thinking alwaysarise. Recently cultural differences between American and Australiancultural norms (aka attitudes to guns and shooting) reminded us thatsuch norms are so often relative to times and places. The old(theological) distinction between animals and humans is seldomobserved in this generation.

Finally to sum up and if we have time, we move to an exercise from theLisa Manual exploring "What is Fairness?" The short story about theteacher being fair by distributing candy equally offers opportunities for

Critical& Creatille 'IliinK.,in,g %[7 Wo 2 QctoDer 1999

GregSmith: Using noo-Lipman materials .48

more refined definitions. The community of inquiry is challenged todeal with its members' various definitions such as saying that fairnessis:

giving the same to everyoneeach one getting what he or she wantseach one getting what he or she needs (even though it's not asked for)sharing what you have in common; no one owns it all or any singlesharefairness is only an ideal; greed always wins - it is impossible toachieveit's relative; it's what a judge or referee does: balances needs againstwants.

This is necessarily an open-ended discussion.

Day ThreeThe third day uses texts grouped broadly under the theme ofIntelligence: Can Computers Think? Knowing our Ignorance, and ThreeWishes. First, Bill Gates' views on artificial intelligence always offerrich discussion on an area that many students feel they have someexperience. Defining and differentiating functions through redefinition,and learning to deal with a metaphor in the term 'thinking' arechallenges. Issues about the power of computers, the power ofprogrammers over the rest of us, the rate of change, and the loss ofhumane decision-making readily arise. It does focus on what future wecan envisage and our need to vision a future so that we don't slide intoone we don't want or need.

Secondly, we have used Anne Kerwin's Grid of Ignorance. This tablehighlights what we can and cannot know and what we do know whatwe refuse to know as a society. It is very useful. It reminds us that wehave limits we cannot set, that it takes human intelligence to 'know',that we lose knowledge, that we can rediscover knowledge, thatknowledge is always tentative, that new knowledge can revealmistakes, and that everyone especially philosophers can benefit froman open attitude towards knowledge. This material is a bit rarefied butafter two sessions (5 hours together) I think it is appropriate to attemptit. Even a somewhat shorter discussion is valuable nonetheless.

Thirdly, I use the 'Legend of the Three Waterfalls of Kiyomizu Temple'(Coil 1994) to take up the issue of Intelligence in making critical choicesin life. The text offers a scenario where we must choose one of health,wisdom or love as a life orientation. It forces students to weigh upoptions and the relative worth of these treasures. The relative benefitsof each is explored in discussion and individuals usually get to explaintheir choices. It reveals to the individual what's valuable in theirview of the world. We may then move to critical choices and theirreversibility of some choices. I believe this exercise is valuable forclarifying personal priorities, enhancing individual worth andrevealing maturity in the community of inquiry by allowing a variety ofdifferent views to stand as equally valid.

As stopgaps along the way, I have found that Aesop's Fables areresources new to these students and in the time available, they offerexcellent starters for useful discussion. They also raise the issues oftrust, relationships, thinking clearly, fairness and ownership. Beingone dimensional texts, they help focus on the moral while at the sametime we are establishing protocoIs in our emerging community of inquiry.

Critical& Creative 'lfiinkjn,g '1lol7 tj{o 2 Octo6er 1999

Greg Smith: Using non-Lipman materials ~

I offer this paper just to report my successes. I do not infer that theLipman materials be neglected; only that I have had some success usingthe same methods outside them. I wish you similar success too.

Greg Smithgreg@thehub.com.au

Greg's publications and presentations can be found atwww.thehub.com.au/-greg/presentations.html#published

BibliographyAesop's Fables. http://www.pacificnet.net/-johnr/aesop/

Carolyn Coil, Creative Teaching Strategies Workshop 17/9/94,'Legend of the Three Waterfalls of Kiyomizu Temple' Pieces oflearning Melbourne: Hawker Brownlow Curriculum Services.

John Ellicott, 'Guilty of ignorning a mate's plea.'The Weekend Australian 11 July 1998.

Bill Gates, 'Will computers be able to think?'Computer Age 11 July 1995.

Duncan Graham (1993?) 'Metal spade nearly foils fortune hunt.'Perth press cutting.'

Berrie Heeson (1999) 'Dorredy's Suitcase.'100 journal www.xs4all.nl/-krantlOO1engelslno7.html

Berrie Heeson (1999) 'Runny runs to tomorrow.'100 journal www.xs4all.nl/-krantlOO1engelslno7.html

Anne Kerwin (1983) The Grid of Ignorance

Matthew Lipman, 'What is fairness?' Lesson plan 20, Lisa Manual.

Smith, Gregory (1999). 'Lesson plans for the philosophy clusters'http://www.thehub.com.au/-greg/philosophy.html

Guidance Associates (1975), 'Sharon's Dilemma.'Teacher Training in Values Education: A Workshop.

Robert Lusetich. 'Make-a-wish charity sates sick boy's bloodlust to hunta bear.' The Weekend Australian 18/19 May 1996.

Victorian Readcer Book 5 (reprinted 1994?), 'The Story of a Dervish.'

Critical & Creative rzfiinkiW %{ 7 9'10 2 OcOOPer 1999

Ross Phillips: Book review

Review of Places for Thinkinga package of two booksi-

Partridge, Francesca and Franck Dubuc, In a Field; Ona Path; On aPlain; In a Tree, Melbourne, ACER Press, 1998.

Splitter, Laurance and Tim Sprod, Places for Thinking: ResourceManual, Melbourne, ACER Press, 1999.

by Ross Phillips: School of Philosophy, Latrobe University

In a field, a cow ponders the colour of grass in the dark. On a path, asnail muses about its own nature. In a tree, some starlings consider theirplace in society. On a plain, a giraffe speculates about other points ofview. And flying around them all, a duck makes some very sharpobservations. There is a lot of thinking going on.

These charming little books one each for the cow and the snail andthe starlings and the giraffe were not written with an eye to whatmost readers of this journal will think of as Philosophy for Children.But by a happy chance their author, Francesca Partridge, andillustrator, Franck Dubuc, took them to ACER Press where theirsuitability for classroom philosophy was immediately recognised.Laurance Splitter and Tim Sprod set to work to provide a manual, andthe result - although the picture books are available individuallylike any other children's picture books - is a set of classroom materialsthat makes a fine contribution to the growing body of work for classroomteachers who want to do philosophy with their young students. Placesfor Thinking is aimed at the first few years of school.

Nobody who knows about the development of philosophy for childrencould possibly doubt the importance of Matthew Lipman: yet inAustralia, at least, it is not uncommon for teachers to express scepticismabout the classroom materials developed by Lipman and his principalcollaborator, Ann Sharp. The sources of scepticism vary. Sometimes it isa simple reluctance to adopt Ita foreign package" - especially one fromthe United States, whose influence on our children, through televisionand popular culture generally, many think excessive. For others it is theconviction that the stories wear their pedagogic purpose too openly ontheir sleeves, and so turn children off. Whatever the reason, there aremany teachers who, though convinced of the benefit of doingphilosophy with their classes, are on the lookout for fresh materials.But the use of materials other than those from the IAPC usually placesan extra burden on teachers: either they must draw upon their ownbackground in academic philosophy - something that relatively fewprimary school teachers are in a position to do - or they must find waysto adapt the Lipman/Sharp manuals to new purposes. Certainly themanuals for Pixie, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, Kio and Gus, etc.have been without peer in the extent of the support they give toteachers who lack a background in academic philosophy.

Tim Sprod was an early contributor to the approach of writing manualsto support teachers in the use of existing story books. In 1993 hepublished Books into Ideas. It adopted some of the terminology andstyle of the Lipman/Sharp manuals, but now applied to books withwhich teachers were likely to be familiar. The present case is nodifferent in principle, but here the books and manual are appearingtogether as a handsomely produced and unified set. The Places forThinking manual also cleaves closely to "orthodox" Lipman/Sharppractice: there are the now familiar leading ideas for the benefit of the

50

Criticar & Creative %inKing '1Ior 7 :Np 2 Oct06er 1999

Ross Phillips: Book review .51

teacher, together with discussion plans, exercises and activities to beused with the students.

Philosophers are picky: so concerning the exercises and activities I couldraise a doubt here, a quibble there. But on the whole I found themexcellent. It so happened that I read the sections of the manualconcerned with thinking and consciousness - What do cows think about?Being conscious - immediately after holding a seminar with cognitivescience students discussing the concept of thinking and its relation toconsciousness. I could have done a lot worse than ask these advanceduniversity students to read In a Field and then tackle the variousexercises concerned with thinking and consciousness.

One does not expect to enthuse about a teachers' manual in quite thesame terms as those one might use in talking about the story books itaccompanies, but this manual is an exception. Partridge and Dubuc arecredited with its design and formatting, and they have done a job fullyup to the standard of their beautiful story books. And apart from a fewof the now regrettably usual word-processing-induced errors, the editingis excellent. ACER Press is to be congratulated on this production: toomany "educationally serious" books for children look pretty drab, butthese most certainly do not. If you teach philosophy to children in thefirst few years of school, or if you are curious about how you might dipyour toe into the philosophical waters on behalf of your young charges,this new series is worth serious consideration.

Ross PhillipsSchool of PhilosophyLa Trobe University

Critical & Creative %inKi'W %{ 7 No 2 Octo6er 1999

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