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Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

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Page 1: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Critical Legal Studies

January 23, 2013

Leah GardnerCaroline Bélair

Rachel DavidsonMolly Churchill

Page 2: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Assigned ReadingsJonathan Turley, « The Hitchhiker’s Guide to CLS, Unger and

Deep Thought », (1987) 81 Northwestern University Law Review 593.

Jennifer Nedelsky, « Reconceiving Rights as Relationship » dans Jonathan Hart & Richard W. Bauman (dir.), Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture, and Politics, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996.

Pour aller plus loin:

Patricia J. Williams, « Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights » (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 401.

Page 3: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Critical Legal Studies (CLS)

Page 4: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Historical Context

- Vietnam War (1955-1975)- Civil Rights Movement

- 1977: official start of the CLS movement

- Foundations:- Critical Marxism- Legal Realism (1900-1960s)

- Holmes (late 19th century)- Recognize "real" way in which judges make

decisions

Rosa Parks

Page 5: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS Critique of Blackstone's Commentaries by Kennedy (1979)

A Treatise on the common law of England, 18th century

Page 6: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Key elements of CLS

- Legal language and institutions that appear neutral actually mask relationships of power

- Law = a tool used by the powerful to maintain the status quo

- There is no single truth: multitude of alternatives

- "It has been said that if Kennedy is the Pope of CLS, then Unger is the Christ figure" Turley, p. 14

Page 7: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS critique of major legal theories or approaches

- Formalism- Positivism- Rationality- Liberalism

Page 8: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS rejects Formalism

- Formalism: - Legal reasoning = science- Use of formal rules to resolve dispute- Legal autonomy

- CLS + realists highlight role of other factors in adjudication: effects of rules, values, morals and social, political and economic context, personal factors...

Page 9: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS rejects Positivism

- Think back to the Hart-Fuller debate

- Positivism:- Morality plays no part in defining law- Scientific or empirical approach to

law

Page 10: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS rejects Rationality

- Rationality:- Belief that there is a rational foundation

for legal doctrine and development

- CLS: - rejects pure reason as foundation for law - questions use of reason to legitimize law - recognizes role of passion, will, etc.

Page 11: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS rejects Liberalism

- Liberalism: - "precisely what liberalism is has been a

source of disagreement" Turley, p. 9- Freedom to pursue own interest

- 2 particular aspects critiqued by CLS:- Rights talk- Neutral adjudication

Page 12: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS rejects Liberalism: Critique of Rights

- CLS Critique of Rights:1) Rights are individualistic2) Rights conceal political issues3) Rights distance individuals4) Rights serve political and economic requirements of liberalism (ex. Right to K)

- Critiques are revisited in the Nedelsky and Williams articles

Page 13: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Trashing

Think expose, expose, expose!- the political, nonneutral nature of law- illegitimate power structures- the ideological underpinnings of legal system

“One must start by knowing what is going on, by freeing oneself from the mystified delusions embedded in our consciousness by the liberal worldview” A. Freeman, in Turley, p. 11

Page 14: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS Tools - Deconstructionism

- no text has an objective meaning- language is inherently non neutral

- De-Reification- Reification: Concept is taken out of context,

distorted/co-opted

- Contextuality- Recognize context in which law

takes place

Page 15: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Summary

Foundations of CLS

Views criticized by CLS Tools used by CLS

Legal RealismCritical Marxism

Liberalism (rights and neutral adjudication)

Positivism (scientific approach to law)

Formalism (legal autonomy)

Rationality (pure reason legal foundation)

ContextualityDe-Reification

Trashing!Deconstructionism

Page 16: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Trashing Exercise: It's Fun! "[T]he principal aim of society is to protect individuals in

the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals." Blackstone on the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1753)

Page 17: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill
Page 18: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Roberto Mangabeira Unger

The "Christ of CLS"

Philosopher, Social Theorist, Politician

Page 19: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Core Concepts

• duality• neutrality• contextuality• context-breaking• plasticity• anti-necessetarianism (false-

necessity)• the super-liberal society

Page 20: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Critiques of Unger

-Stability is not all that bad: Sunstein

-Not pragmatic enough to achieve change: West, Cornell

-Too focused on individual: Cornell

- Omission of plight of oppressed people: West

-Too optimistic: Van Zandt

Page 21: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

CLS critiques of rights

- Too individualistic- Obfuscate real political issues- Alienate and distance people from

one another- Serve the political and economic

requirements of liberalism

Page 22: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Patricia Williams"Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" - Critique of CLS

- Little minority and grassroots membership and input- Message not accessible or applicable to those who

need it most- Belief that rights are counterproductive to social

change ignores the degree to which rights-assertion has achieved social change

- For African Americans, rights are powerful symbolic tool

- Instead of abandoning rights, we need to give them away as gifts

Page 23: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship

Nedelsky's outline:

•Justifying Constitutional Rightso Rights as Collective Choiceso Beyond the "Pure Democracy" Critique

•Critiques of "Rights Talk"

•Applying "Rights as Relationship"

Page 24: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipMove away from...

Page 25: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship

By...

For example...

...understanding rights as collective choices, with mutable definitions/meanings.

Page 26: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipCanadian Charter, s. 15

And...

Page 27: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship...By...

"Democracy has never been the sole or even primary value of either the U.S. or Canada, and it could never be the sole basis for a good society" (p. 6)

For example...

...recognizing democracy is not our sole societal value.

Page 28: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipAutonomy

understanding it in terms of relationship helps us "begin to rethink what it means conceptually and institutionally for autonomy to serve as a measure of democratic outcomes" (p. 7)

Page 29: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipImplication:

Focus on relationships to foster autonomy.

By...

Page 30: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship...Understanding that rights serve to structure

relationships - and then making this understanding central to discussions about rights.

"What rights in fact do and always have done is construct relationships - of power, of responsibility, of trust, of obligation" (p. 13).

Page 31: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship

Keeping relationship central to our discussion of rights allows us to address 3 main concerns CLS scholars (and others) have raised about "rights talk"...

Page 32: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipCritiques of "Rights Talks"

1. "rights" are too individualistic

"It is my hope that the notion of rights can be rescued from its historical association with individualistic theory and practice."

Page 33: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipCritiques of "Rights Talks"

2. Rights obfuscate whatis really at stake

Nedelsky:A focus on relationship helps "loosen up the existing reification" (p.17)

Page 34: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipCritiques of "Rights Talks"

3. Rights are alienating and distancing; they act as barriers between people

Nedelsky: A focus on relationship helps us see "that our 'private rights' always have social consequences" (p. 17).

Page 35: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as RelationshipImplication: change our understanding of

constitutionalism

"My idea of Constitutionalism is to make democracy accountable to basic values, to have mechanisms of ongoing dialogue about whether the collective choices people make through their democratic assemblies are consistent with their deepest values" (p. 20).

Page 36: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Rights as Relationship

Major point of agreement with CLS:•the "rights bearing individual" at the heart of

liberal political thought does a disservice to all and dehumanizes us

Major points of agreement with Patricia Williams:•discarding the idea of rights is not the solution•recognition of (inter)dependence (Williams,

p.429)•widening understanding of impact of private

rights (Nedelsky, p. 17; Williams, p. 432)/

Page 37: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Nedelsky - Applications/questions1. Torrito c. Fondation Lise T.: How can we

imagine the discussion in this case about right to privacy being different if it were conceded that rights are primarily about structuring relationship?

2. Does Nedelsky's reconceptualization of rights address concerns raised by people such as Andrew Petter in the lead-up to 1982 about Charter rights hiding the problems of wealth and power disparities?

Page 38: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Discussion Questions

1. Critics have said that Unger is too optimistic and theory-based. In a recent op-ed in The Globe and Mail, Jeffery Simpson criticized the Idle No More movement, stating that "too many first nations people live in a dream palace." Does 'dreaming' have a role to play in creating a more just legal system or is it counter-productive?

1. How useful is the concept of "rights"? What are its pros and cons?

Page 39: Critical Legal Studies January 23, 2013 Leah Gardner Caroline Bélair Rachel Davidson Molly Churchill

Discussion Questions3. Patricia Williams starts out her piece contrasting her

experience as a Black female lawyer and academic searching for an apartment to that of her White male colleague. Both were looking "to establish enduring relationships with the people in whose house we would be living; [they] both wanted to enhance trust of ourselves and to allow whatever closeness, whatever friendship, was possible." Williams explains, however, that because of their respective social locations, the way they sought to establish such a relationship was polar opposite. What implications (if any) does such a realization have for Nedelsky's proposal to reconceive rights as relationship?