cs 194-1 (cs 161) computer security midterm 1 reviewcs161/fa06/notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. ·...

12
CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Review Part 1

Upload: others

Post on 27-Feb-2021

3 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security

Midterm 1 Review

Part 1

Page 2: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.2Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Threat Assessment

• Some questions:– What kind of threats might we face?– What kind of capabilities might we expect adversaries to have?

– What are the limits on what the adversary might be able to do to us?

• Result is a threat model, a characterization of the threats the system must deal with– Think: Who? What? Why?

Page 3: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.3Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Security Basics

• Authentication: prove identity– Who are you?

• Authorization– Granting access

• Access control: enforcing authorization–Access Control Matrix–ACL– Capabilities

Page 4: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.4Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

MAC and DAC Mandatory Access Control (MAC)

» We also use the abbreviation MAC for “message authentication code”

» Policy determines access» Rules that the system enforces» Users can’t break rules» RULES CAN BE FLEXIBLE

• Discretionary Access Control (DAC)– Users set their own rules

» (for their own files)

Page 5: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.5Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Symmetric crypto• Definition• Advantages

– Fast– Reasonably well-understood– Standardized– Can be implemented in hardware easily– Exhaustive search attack hard (with large key

size)

• Disadvantages– Key distribution– Single target– Still needs to be implemented in protocols

Page 6: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.6Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Symmetric Crypto: DES , AES

• AES (Rijndael)• 128-256 bit key, 128

bit block cipher• Attacks

– Brute Force Exhaustive Search

– Known Plaintext– Chosen Plaintext

» Differential cryptanalysis

Page 7: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.7Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Asymmetric: “public keys”• Encryption key public, decryption key private

– Easy way to send secret messages– Decryption only by intended recipient– Perfect for distributing symmetric keys

• Encryption key private, decryption key public– Only I can send messages, anyone can verify (and

read)– A type of “digital signature”– We will develop this idea in detail

Page 8: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.8Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Asymmetric: pros and cons• Advantages

– Doesn’t require advance set up– Strongest forms are as hard as factoring– Perfect for solving key distribution problem– Good for building protocols

• Disadvantages– Slow, slow, slow (& takes space too)– Secrecy & source authentication takes two

encryptions– Need to find a way to prove “public keys” are

honest» Solution: public key hierarchy

Page 9: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.9Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

RSA

• Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (1978 – published 1979)• Idea:

– Given e and d– Encryption: c = E(m) = me mod pq– Decryption: D(c) = cd mod pq

• Issues:– Given e, how can we find d?

» Answer: use EGCD (extended greatest common divisor)• Euclidean algorithm

Page 10: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.10Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Signatures• Signing vs. Encrypting• Encryption is a TOOL

– Can help in signing– Does not trivially solve the signature problem!

• Asymmetric Signing– Pretty Secure– Slow!

• Symmetric Encryption As Signature?– Faster… but We need non-repudiation

• Message Authentication Code– Sign a hash!

» FAST, also ensures integrity

Page 11: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

PKI: Public Key Infrastructure

Tygar’s public key is …Love, Arnold S.

Digitally signed by AS

Arnold Schwartzenegger’s key is …Love, George Bush Jr.

Digitally signed by W

George Bush Jr.’s public key is …Love, Kofi Annan

Digitally signed by Kofi

• Problem: Whose public key is it?

• Solution: Have a trustworthy person sign it to vouch.

• Problem: Very few people are trusted by the WHOLE WORLD– Too much work on them!

• Solution: Delegation– Kofi delegates to

presidents/kings.– President delegates to

governors.

Page 12: CS 194-1 (CS 161) Computer Security Midterm 1 Reviewcs161/fa06/Notes/midterm... · 2006. 10. 4. · Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006 Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.11

Midterm Review, Part 1, Slide.12Wednesday Morning Kosloff CS161 ©UCB Fall 2006

Revocation• What?

– Declare a public key to be invalid

• Why?– Private key stolen– Failed PKI

• How?– Explicit Revocation (lists)

» As Needed– Automatic Expiration

» Expiration date