LRDECLASSIFIED' ro- 11652'Al 3(« af 5(D) or (E) R ECO R D

DEPARTMENT OF STATECSSfÿÿ, OOPWS»»»» •ÿÿ•ÿÿÿÿ

Intelligence Report>

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No» 6146 Datei January 13, 1953,

c.REAPPRAISAL' OF WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

’ ' ON TEE KOREAN WAR•:

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Office of Intelligence Research

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,' No evidence exists that official views of Yifestern European members

ii. the United Nations have changed ori the necessity of prosecuting the, '

Korean War to a successful conclusion on terms agreeable to the WestiPublic opinion also generally favors continuation of the war, despitemuch re-evaluation by the prèés in the last two months of officialattitudes, including extensive discussion of the Indian proposals for ,settlement of the POW issue.

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Five; outstanding opinion; trends, which are by no means new, appearto dominate;Western* European Attitudes j (l) only the Communist , pressand certain neutralist and "peioe” groups remain in outright oppositionto the war*s,(-2) (government officials and opinion leaders agree that thewar must be contained and are searching urgently for alternatives whichmight bring the war to a close; (3) no non-Communist desires a Koreanarmistice at any price, however, although a rigid position by the US ’Vis generajly deprpcated; (4) tKer> is fear that increased US concernabout the Korean: War inay resuit in decreased US assistance to andinterest in NATO; end- (5) both government officials and opinion leadersare deeply concerned lost the East-West' hot war in Korea should beenlarged or allowed to ignite a global conflict.

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Western Europe*s non-Coramunist press reflected a real Interest inthe Iptdian; plan -as a possible solution to, the POW issue and initial USrejection of this plan was widely criticized. The press was evidentlyrelieved that the outcome of UN discussions on the Indian proposal healedthe rift among the Western nations on this issue. In addition* it ...ooncluded that the Soviet action on the: proposal was final proof of theUSSR's intention to Continue the war. But the seardh for- Alternativescontinued with.the re-emergence pf the idea that UN membership for thePeking regime might contribute to a peaceful settlement, : This view issupported in Western Europe, and especially in the UK and Scandinavia,despite the general conclusion as a result of the most recent vote on .

the POW issue that Moscowÿ and not Peking, determined Communist policyon the war.

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THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

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I* BRITISH ATTITUDES

!A. The General View

The UK Government sees no alternative to prosecution of the war inKorea» as long as North Korean and Chinese Communist forces continuetheir aggression and refuse to support the basis for a reasonablesettlement of the POff issue* This attitude is generally shared by theLaborite opposition and by other non-Communist political groups andno economic or political developments within the UK are likely tochange it* But the British do not consider it possible for them toincrease their military commitments in Korea much beyond present forces,

There has, developed an increasing sense of frustration and dis¬appointment over the Korean stalemate, both militarily and at the trucetable* The British are not as impatient as the Americans, however,over the long-drawn-out nature of the conflict* gAs the editor of the

•influential London Economist recently said in Look magazine* "Nor areare the British very worried by the prospect of an unsettled war nnd anundemarcated border. That, in faot, is just what they have always beenused to. There, may not in 1'act be rauch resemblance between the Britishwatch on - the North-West frontier of India., which lasted for the bestpart of a century, and the American watch on the 38th parallel. . But tothe British the similarity is great," At the same time, they agreegenerally that an indefinite prolongation of the conflict would givethe Communists a net advantage

Although the British continue to Oppose a spread of the conflictto the Chinese mainland, there is some official speculation that thedecision to limit the conflict may be taken out of ; UN hands throughwidening acts of Communist aggression. - The ef f ect.-of a- new USadministration on the pace and range of the Korean conflict has alsosbeen a subject of considerable,press Speculation, In most Britishcircles there is an increasing awareness of the fact that the cost tothe US of the Korean struggle will put great pressure on the administra¬tion for some kind of decisive action to end the stalemate,

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B, Opposition Views • j»

Apart from the small and politically insignificant BritishCommunist .Party which opposes UN. action in "Korea on all grounds, theleft-wing Laborites are most concerned: about' the course and duration.of the Korean hostilities. They fear that the US, for reaèons ofprestige and face, will initiate all-out action in Korea, regardless ofthe wishes of its UN allies.. They are the most articulate critics ofthis forward policy in Korea, which they identify with the policies ófMacArthur and, the Pentagon*

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rTo some extent other political groups share the Laborite6 concern

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;t „ ,vlv • •/ • ;.w »* •i“ \over what they regard as /agroMhg'deÿemphasis on the defense of WesternEurope in favor of thé ÜS inspired decision to "cl.ean up" the situationin the Far East* Eden's recent aasqyance to the House of Commons thatPresident-elect Eisenhower will not neglect Western Europe will onlypartly allay British fears, tbpi- may divert US support from NATO.

Communist-inspired peace campaigns in the UK have had little effecton public reactions to the Korean conflict Mad none on official decisions*Only a few people in the UK seamed to have been influenced by Communistcharges of UN use of bacteriological weapons in Korea, though at therecent Trades Union Congress conference a resolution condemning the useof such weapons by either side was passed*

C. The POW Issue

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On the POW issue the government has supported, with public approval,the principle of voluntary repatriation* In the British view thisposition is consonant with humanitarian prinpiplesBand the conventionsgoverning political asylum. Rather i it viewed the Indian proposal as aconstructive step toward preserving the :basic principles while cutting , ...the ground from under Soviet fluid Communist objections to atruce. Initial US opposition to the Indian proposal was interpreted in

some British quarters as impulsive and unfounded* Influential organslike the Economist tended to minimize reports of a serious US-UK splitover the fundamentals of the POW issue* Underlying British support ofthe Indian proposal seems to have been the conviction that it offeredthe UN the opportunity to seize the initiative and it might have beeninstrumental in sowing discord between Peiping and Mosoow if properlypursued. 1

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The British (Government and most of the press viewed the final vote .«on the Indian plan-as a ne't gain for the West because, by opposing whatthe majority of the’ UN countries considered a reasonablé compromise,proposal on the POW: issue, the USSR and its allies exposed the Sovietstrategy in Korea and in the UN as one of supporting aggression andsowing dissension* Moreover, in the British view the Soviet rejectionof the Indian solution will have a bad effeot on the neutralist-mindedAsiatics, who have tended to believe that Soviet peaoe protestationswere genuine and that .the Western powers haye not exerted themselvessufficiently to secure a peace formula in Korea. In the UK it willdamage Communist-sponsored peace congresses and other propaganda efforts*

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)II. FRENCH ATTITUDES

A* The General View

The French officially support, the present Korean War effort, butthey do not want to see it extended. The French view the Korean War,like their struggle in Indochina, as part of the Communist problem in

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the Far East .apd. they hope for a general cessation of hostilities in thisarea. This attitude, in general, is shared by the non-Coninunist oppositionparties.

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At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the French Governmentencouraged that the US had taken strong action in Korea. It hoped thatthe war in Korea would (l) lessen pressure on France in Indochina,(2) bring increased US support, and, above all, (s) lead to a generalsettlement in the Far East, including Indochina. As the war in Koreadragged on, the government came to realize) that a general settlementwas unlikely. Public and press opinion has been generally apathetic.

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B. Opposition Views'I

The Communist Party is the only political group inopposes continuation of the war* The Communists do notdetermination of official pólióy, however nor have their campaignsrelating to wthe war been noticeably effective.® „ •>

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C• The TOW Issue

No proposals for settling the POW issue have received a significantpublic response, The Indian PCW plan was fully reported in the non-Communist press, but remained a secondary point of public interest.The press reaction revealed a desire' to end the war quickly, but noreal hope that it would be. The general reaction was that the Indianplan presented a valid basis for breaking the POW deadlock, but thatthe USSR had chosen to see the fighting continued. The CommunistParty.press practically ignored the Indian Proposal. L(Communist daily) barely mentioned it at first limiting itself to a *.

discussion of the merits of the Vyshinsky plan. Later, it stated thatthea Indian plan had been changed to such an extent to meet US require¬ments that it no longer represented a compromise.

France whicheffect the

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j III* BENELUX ATTITUDES '

The three Benelux countries have consistently and actively -supported the UN, policy.of armed intervention in Korea. They have doneso largely in the. hope that by upholding the principle of. collectivesecurity in Korea, similar acts of aggression elsewhere may be prevented.Their military contribution has been small, however, and consistsmerely of two battalions of volunteers and one naval patrol craft.Some difficulty has arisen in the Netherlands, moreover, in findingvolunteer replacements for these small forces.

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other European nations, the Benelux countries are thoroughlyopposed to any extension of the Korean conflict and are anxious toterminate hostilities at the earliest opportunity, though not at thecost of sacrificing principle to expediency. The statements by

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Presidant-elact Eisenhower. opposing an extension of the war in Koreawere, therefore, generally:well received,

Although the Benelux coyntries have joined in UN resolutionscondemning Chinese Communist' aggression.jot*.Apposing an embargo on theexport of strategic commodities to Communist China, the opinion isoften unofficially expressed ! in. the Netherlands that admission ofCommunist China to the ON woul& bp a small price to pay for peace inKorea,

J On the question of the foroible repatriation of prisoners of war,the Benelux countries have consistently supported the US position. Theinitial negative reaction of the US .to the Vidian proposal was widelydeplored both in tiie press and in official circles, not so much froman expectation that the proposal would provide a Solution, but ratherfrom a desire that the blague for the expected failure of, the Indianplan should rest squarely upon the USSR, Press cojnment on Vyshinsky’srejection of the Indian proposal was unequivocal .and .unanimous inexposing Moscow policy as designed to obstruct all efforts to break thePOT stalemate. There was a wide difference of .opinion, howeverfas tothe reasons for the Soviet rejection, even among papers with the samepolitical affiliation. Whereas one Dutch,paper believed the USSR’saim was to create division i® the. UN and to goad the West into wholesalewarfare, others explained the Soviet maneuver as designed to forestallChinese acceptance or to tie down US troops in Korea.

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I With the exception of the Communists and, in the Netherlands, of avery few extreme right-wing elements, the people and the press of theBenelux countries have generally supported their governments* Koreanpolicy. According to an opinion poll conducted in the Netherlands tduring the summer of 1951, „47 percent of those interviewe'd favoredcontinuation of the fighting in preference to a UN withdrawal, 28 „percent advocated withdrawal, and 25 percent were undecided. Seventy-five percent opposed the use of the atom bomb by UN farces in orderto bring the Korean War to an end,

Communist propaganda relating to the war has been generallyineffective® Failure of the bacteriological warfare propagandacampaign in the Netherlands is indicated by the shift of Communistpropaganda in the fall of 1952 from germ warfare charges to condemnationof "terrorist bombardment," It is even reported that the DutchCommunists assigned the task of spreading the BW charges were themselvestoo skeptical to put on a convincing act.

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IV. ITALIAN ATTITUDES3

A, The General View

J. The Italian Government has consistently supported UN policy in

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Korea. It immediately declared its solidarity with the dècision ofthe Security';Council to intervene in Korea and, although not a memberof the UN, sent a hospital unit- to Korea. After the Soviet denunciationof the Indian, proposal' in NordèltóÿÉSi; government’s view —inferred from editorial comment* in &«wÿftpers generally reflectingofficial attitudes — was that the proposal had been worth backing butthat, since the Soviet, Union had no desire to end the war, there wasno> OdUrSe open but tp continue it within its present geographic andstrategic: limits.

The democratic parties which support the government- also supportits- position on Korea1. When the war".was going badly for the UN andthe threat of .its extension seemed great, two deputies of governmentparties -presented proposals f1or ending it* 'As the war hAs dragged onwithin its present limitsi however, outbursts of neutralist sentimentHave not been repeated on the part of government supporters and generalinterest in the war has dedined*

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Among the opposition parties,-, thé Monarchists support officialpolicy. The neo-Fascist MSI has hot suggested that USL.intervention wasunwarranted or unnecessary or that the UN should end the war at all costs,but it opposed the Italian Governments* gratuitous identification withthe UN cause and is reluctant tó consider the Korean 'War 'as' directlyconcerning Italy.

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B. Opposition Views ,

*• - " .Only the CtaaDmusist and NennlJiodalist parties do. not share,the

otherwise general, conviction that the Communists, and specifically the* Soviet Union,.,do' not want peace. While the’Communists. and fellow- -

- travelling Nenni Socialists have no voice, in the determination ofOfficial policy,- their propaganda has Some .influence upon publifeopinion. The Communist npeace campaign" and Nenni*s pleas fof Italianneutrality and a treaty with the Soviet Union have probably been moreimportant, in affecting public attitudes, on Korea than have suohspecifically Korean-oriented programs as the charge of US bacteriologicalwarfare. Public, (pinion polls 1 indicate that perhaps 22 percent of thepopulation actually believed the charges and 23 percent were uncertain.These figures oompare tb the 85 percent of. the vote gained by theextreme left in 1951-52 local elections* Although the BW campaignnot an outstanding sucoess, its -plafee in the .Over-all strategy of theCommunists’ and Nenni Socialists’ propaganda was undoubtedly importantin intensifying fear of'war and desire for peace at all costs.

The same effects may be said to result from the propaganda (lessfrequent Bince the passage of an anti-Fascist law in June 1952) byextremist groups of the MSI against an allegedly imperialistic, immoral,and incompetent United States.

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C« The POW Issue

The independent and non-Coramunist party press revealed high hopesfor an agreement on the Indiar* POW plan, and there was obvious* although

subdued* delight at the eventual abandonment of a rigid position on itby the United States. Vyshinsky's denunciation of the proposal led tostatements that the USSR did not want peaoe, denunciations of Sovietpolicy, and arguments in favor of the US refusal to yield further onthe prisoner of war issue.

-The reactions of the Communist and Nenni Socialist press differedsignificantly, with the former taking sides with the Soviet Union inthe cold war and the latter attempting to pass as neutral and peace-loving. Unita (Communist), which can and does wait for Soviet reactionsbefore committing itself, never gave full support to the Indianproposal, Avanti (Nenni Socialist) gave warm initial support to theplan, however, a»jd had to do a complete about face after Vyshinsky*sdenunciation of it. Avanti’s lack of consistency in such a oase is farless damaging to the cause of the~Nanni Socialists thana similar error would have, been for the Communiste*

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Vi SCANDINAVIAN ATTITUDES

To most Scandinavians* and particularly to their governments, theEast-West hot war in Korea must be contained and* if at all possible,ended. Although the Scandinavian countries have no troops in Korea,they are deeply concerned over the Korean conflict, principally because

of its threat to world peace, bdt also. because it is feared that afurther diversion of US interest from Europe will result. There is ®

no desire to accomplish a Korean armistice at any- price, however,although a rigid position by the US is generally deprecated. -

The US position in favor of voluntary prisoner repatriation hasreceived strong support both in official and press ciroles. NeutralSweden, as well as the Scandinavian NATO members, have sided withthe US on this issue* At the same time, tha three major Scandinavianstates, all of which have diplomatic relations with Communist China,have opposed the US on its position against Communist Chineserepresentation in the UN, Prior to the entry of Communist China intothe Korean conflict there was general support for replacing theChinese Nationalist representatives in the. UN with representatives ofthe Chinese. Communist Government in the UN. Later much of the press,and official, opinion as well, contended that the Chinese should notbe permitted to shoot their way into international society. Morerecently, however, particularly since the opening of the 7th Sessionof the UN General Assembly* the opinion has again been expressed inpress organs that Communist Chinese representation in the UN would bea small price, to pay for an end to the Korean war. When this specificquestion was up for vota in the UN, Sweden voted in favor of seatingCommunist China whereas the other Scandinavian states abstained.

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In keeping with the Scandinavian view that the UN, and thereforethe US, must constantly strive for a peaceful end to the Koreanconflict, was the favorable reaction to the Indian proposal for ending

the prisoner of war deadlock. owoern that- the plan be workable, wasappreciated; had US opposition continued’it would have met with consider¬able criticism, however. Skepticism was early evident over prospects foradoption of the Indian plan, given the Soviet position. All but Communistcircles condemned the Soviet and Satellite negative votes. That theSoviets really wanted no armistice became a general conviction. Thisview was expressed by the Norwegian Labor Party in an appeal to the SovietUnion which pointed out that, in the light of the UN vote on the Indianproposal, the question of an armistice now rested in Soviet hands.

Aside from the Communists, fellow travellers, some "peace” workersand neutralists, there has been general support for the announcedprinciples tack of the UN effort in Korea. Extensive changes by the

Ccpmunist-sponsored "peace" movement accusing,,the US of using bacterio¬logical warfare and of engaging in indiscriminate bombings, apparentlyhave been unsuccessful. On a number of details, the Scandinavian non-Communist press, particularly the labor and left-auing organs, has been

critical of 0>UN strategy in Korea. The people of Scandinavia would havepreferred if the UN forces initially had not crossed the 38th paralleland certain bombing raids carried out by the US forces have been criticizedas not conducive to peace moves. But the government*s approval of theinitial UN action to halt the Communist invasion has continued to besupported by the non-Communist parties and press.

VI. IBERIAN ATTITUDES

Official- and public'opinion in both Spain and Portugal applauded; the

initial US reaction to aggression in Korea and continues to be sympathetictoward UN objectives, although public interest has greatly diminished asthe truce negotiations have dragged on.

Official and press reaction in Spain was overwhelmingly favorable toUS intervention in Korea. The general concensus of opinion among cabinetoff icers "reportedly was completely in accord with the US action, and a ?high official of the Spanish General Staff .stated that a proposed troopoffer had not been transmitted only because Spain is not a UN member.Of the most important dailies, Monarchist ABC stated the move would

avert a "new humiliation," Falangist Arriba thought it would rouse theUS after five years of "vacillation," aqd Catholic Ya forecast that a"new situation of strength" would be created in the Pacific. \ The Embassy

received numerous expressions of sympathy and offers to volunteer fromindividual Spaniards.

'ÿ•'. '.I'Public interest diminished dmstically in the course of the drawn-out

negotiations at Panraunjon. Spanish opinion would have welcomed theconclusion of an armistice as a means of ending a military stalemate,

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although ajiumber of papers warned against Communist trickery in thisconnection» • At present, while no change of government polioy apparentlyhas taken place, the press largely limits itself to summaries ofmilitary action and accounts of diplomatic developments withouteditorial comment*

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Portuguese reactions were similar to those of its Iberian neighbor*although Portuguese membership in NATO and possession of Far Easterncolonies imposed on its officials a somewhat more cautious attitude»The Foreign Minister at once volunteered oomÿlete agreement with thePresident's order and added his opinion that only such prompt andpositive US reaction provides a hope for continued peace» A monthlater, however, after conversations with Prime Minister Salazar, hetempered his approval somewhat by pointing out that Korea was probablya diversionary move intended to tast US moral and military strengthand that the West must be prepared for the mein Soviet drive somewherealong the frontier from the Adriatic to Afghanistan. Public interesthas also lagged recently in Portugal, Public information media»continue to publish accounts of the negotiations, military developments,and UN discussions without significant editorial comment* *

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iVII., WEST GERMAN, AUSTRIAN AND SWISS ATTITUDESto»

Neither West Germany, Austria nor Switzerland is a member of the UN?Austria and Germany are not sovereign nations;, and the Swiss Governmentfollows a policy of neutrality in East-West- controversies* None of thesegovernments, therefore, have developed official positions on the KoreanWar* Nevertheless, the parties which form the governments of Germany ®

and Austria létve indicated' that they favor the UN position in Korea» Theopposition parties, except for the Communists, have also supported theUN Eftand. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, which opposes bothEDC and neutralism, published a pamphlet in 1950 which said "In thesummer of 1950, the North Korean army, which was set up and trained bythe Soviets during the time they occupied North Korea, invaded SouthKorea, All those who in the face of these facts claim that the SovietUnion stands for peace and that the Western Powers are warmongers whenthey take measures to defend themselves against the Soviet menace areliars serving the Soviet policy of brutal force," The West German,Austrian, and' Swiss non-Communist press also supports the UN positionin Korea, but does not emphasize Korean developments in reporting oreditorials»

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The only organized groups which oppose continued pursuance of UNobjectives in Korea are the Communist Parties, Communist-frontorganizations, and certain neutralist groups in these countries.Communist propaganda has not succeeded in convincing any sizeabla partof the population of the val idity of the Communist position on Korea,

A public opinion survey oonduoted in August 1952 showed that 70 percent 'I

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of the West German population believes that the Communists are stallingin the truce negotiations, while only 6 percent bélieve the Communiststo be sinceré. likewise, whilwy*ÿ pero/wt Aft the population is awarethat the UN is charged with conducting germ warfare, only 5 percentbelieve that the accusations are true* The POVT controversy is notwell known; only 22 percent of the population have much understandingof it, although about half claim to have heard about it,

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The failure of Communist propaganda is shown by the fact thatthe percentage accepting the Communist position is at most two points

_higher than the electoral strength of the Communist Party in Wést ,Germany, These figures are probably typical for Switzerland andAustria as well; it i's a -safe assumption that the Communist positionon Korean issues is rarely accepted outside Communist circles. Atthe some time, the UN position is not widely understood or approved intest Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, *Wheh askedi "If the peacetalks ashould break down, which of these threes courses do you thinkthe UN should follow?" 34 peroent of the W*Bt Germans pickedthe"withdraw from Korea" choice, 28 percent picjcedj»continue the waronly in Korea," and 12 peroent favoredÿcarrying the war beyond KoreaiWtcr China,

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