cyborgs and replicants on the boundaries

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Cyborgs and Replicants: On the BoundariesAuthor(s): Alice RaynerSource: Discourse, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 124-143Published by: Wayne State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41389337Accessed: 28-01-2016 13:38 UTC

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2/21

Cyborgs

and

Replicants:

On the

Boundaries

Alice

Rayner

"Monsters,"

s

Donna

Haraway points

out,

"have

always

defined

the imits fcommunitynWesternmaginations"222). A recent

collection

of

essays

dited

byJames

J.

Sheehan and

MortonSosna

examines

such limits

hrough

the

lenses of

philosophy,

cience,

and

history, iscussing

uch various

issues as

monsters,

iology

and

culture,

Artificial

ntelligence,

nd machines.

As the titleof

the book

asserts,

oundaries are the

ssue. "Since the

Fall,"

James

Sheehan

puts

t,

man's

place

in

nature has

always

een

problem-

atic"

(Sheehan

and Sosna

27).

His

subsequent

historical

urvey

rightly

uggests

hat

the

terms

or the

question

of human bound-

aries

are

contingent upon particular

cultural

conditions. He

pointsout thatearlyChristians oncerned themselveswiththe

status f the soul

in humans

and

animals,

while

by

the

eighteenth

century,

the

question

centered more

on

rationality

nd the

mechanistic ifference

etween

humans, nimals,

and machines.

For

Descartes,

animals functioned

"automatically,"

ike "ma-

chines,"

where

humans were

distinguished

by

free

will,

intelli-

gence,

"soul,"

and

language.

Arnold .

Davidson,

n his

essay

The

Horror of

Monsters,"

laims that

certain monsters

n

the

history

of horror

can show

"systems

f

thought

hat are concerned with

the relation

betweenthe orders

of

morality

nd of

nature"

36).

Clearly ny description

f the boundaries willbe

implicated

in

and

by

culture to the

degree

that

creating

boundaries

is a

cultural

dentity roject, contingentupon language, place,

and

history.

he

contemporary

ersion

of the

questions

about human

boundaries tends

to center

on

the relation of humans to their

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/21

Spring

994

125

own

technologies:

n whether hehuman

being

can be

distinguished

from"thinkingmachines;"1on whether we can be duplicated

through

Artificial

ntelligence

or

genetic

engineering;2

n the

status f virtual

ealities

hat

an be

experienced through

echno-

logical

means

alone;

on whether

machines can

develop

conscious-

ness;

on the

creation of

"impossible"

ensations

of

technological

sound

and

sight

hat annot

be taken

n

by

the human sensorium

but are nevertheless

ctual

n

the sense

of

measurable

nd

present.

Technology

is the source

for

images

of "monsters"

n the

contemporary

orld

as humans

grapple

with

theirown

power

to

transformhemselves. t has become a site at the conceptual

intersection

f science and

myth,

n

the sense

that,

as Roland

Barthes

so

acutely

detailed

it,

humans create

mythical

ites for

holding

contradictory

esires and fears toward

even the most

mundane

phenomena

of

the

world.

Technological

creations

eem

to elicit the same

combination of wonder

and horror and the

same

concerns about

transgression

nd order as the

monsters f

the

sixteenth

entury.

And

in

the chronic

contradictions

n

atti-

tudes

toward

echnology,

he

Promethean

myth

s

lurking.

While

would

resist

ny

assertion

f the

continuity

n the

images

of

mon-

sters n theWesternmagination, would suggest persistence n

the

uses of those

images

to

identify

nd

clarify

he tensions

be-

tween

"morality

nd nature"

that reside at the

boundaries of

cultural

dentity.

The

imaginative

figures

of

cyborgs,

ndroids,

and robots

help

to locate both

the

mythic

orce

nd the

ethical,

political,

nd

social

implications

n

the

technologies

that

challenge

the bound-

aries

of

humanity.

Haraway,

for

example,

sees

in

the

cyborg

a

figure

f an

unbounded,

playful

dentity

hat

responds

both

to the

call for

responsibility

n

social relations

nd to a need fordissolu-

tionof universal nd unitarydeas ofidentityhatwould imagine

an all-natural

uman,

freeof

technological

dditions.

A

cyborg

ody

s not

nnocent;

t

was

notborn

n

a

garden;

t

does not eek

unitarydentity...;

t takes

rony

or

ranted....

Intense

leasure

n

skill,

machine

kill,

eases

to be a

sin,

but

an

aspect

of embodiment.

he machine s not an it to

be

animated,

orshiped,

nd

dominated. he machine s

us,

our

processes,

n

aspect

four embodiment.

222)

Yet, in many ways,those created figuresmightbe seen not to

dissolve the

boundaries of the

human and the

technological

but

to serve as

clarifying

mirrors

for the human. The

image may

appear

as a distortion

f a

conceptual

ideal

but

it does

provide

n

instance

of the

very

elf-division

hat constitutesWestern

ubjec-



4/21

126

Discourse 6.3

tivity.

articularly

n

fictional

forms,

but

implicitly,

think,

n

scientific nd philosophical arguments, he imaginary, echno-

logical

humanoid

figures

are means of

displaying

the human

encounterwith tself.

If

one takes such

figures

to be

contemporary

ersions of

monsters,

avidson's

essaygives

clue about

how

such

monsters

can

be used to issue

warnings

nd

inspire

we. He

specifies

how

a

pamphlet published

by

Martin

Luther and

Phillip

Melancthon

n

1523,

translated nto

English

in

1579

as

Of

two

wonderfulopish

monsters

illustrates he

way

that the

interpretation

f monstrous

imagesserved o reflect anger.

On

the one

hand,

there s

a

prophetic

r

eschatological

i-

mension...

n

which

monstersnd

prodigies...

eretaken o

be

signs

f

fundamental

hanges

bout o affecthe

world....

The

other

dimension,

hich...

e can call

allegorical,

s the

one withwhich

his

pamphlet

s most

preoccupied...

ach

monsters

a divine

ieroglyphic,

xhibiting particular

ea-

ture f

God's wrath.

37-39)

Davidson

later

quotes Jean

Delumeau's

history

f fear

in

which

Delumeau notes that hepreoccupationwithmonsters nd prodi-

gies

at the

end of

the fifteenth

entury

s

in

the

context of a

"global

pessimistic

udgment

on

a time of

extreme wickedness"

when

"monsterswere to

be

understood as illustrations f

these

sins"

(40).

Monsters,

n

other

words,

are unnatural

products

of

nature,

ndicating

God's

wrathful

udgment upon

the sins of

the

worldbut

also

helping

to institute

ertain

prohibitions

n

human

activity.

avidson takes

the textof

Ambroise

Par,

Des

monstrest

prodiges

with ts

causal

classifications,

mong

which s "the

fusing

together

f

strange pecies,

which

render the creature

not

onlymonstrous ut

prodigious,

hat s to

say,

which s

completely

b-

horrent nd

against

Nature"

44).

Par

links

horror,

urthermore,

to "the

normative

elation

betweendivineand

human wills"

50).

The

interpretation

f

monsters,

avidson

points

out,

is a means

by

which

"high

culture"

demonstrates he

consequences

of

par-

ticular

behavior

n

order to

control that

behavior. More

generi-

cally,

however,

monstrosity

s seen

as an

"unnatural"

grafting

f

twodifferent

indsor

species

of

beings,

not unlike

the

cyborg.

If

horror n

the

sixteenth

entury

was articulated

primarily

by highculture "scientific,hilosophical, nd theologicaltexts")

as a

means of

proving

he

sinfulness f

the world and

aiming

to

correct

unpalatable

beliefs nd

behavior,

horror n

the

late-twen-

tieth

entury

s

primarily

phenomenon

of mass

culture.

A

hor-

ror

towards

echnology

nd

technological

nvention an

be

found

almost

everywhere,

ocusing

often

on the

fear of the

possible



5/21


6/21

1

28

Discourse

6.3

Three

"Borg" episodes

of the television

eries,

Star Trek:

he

NextGenerationprovidea particularly onvenientstarting lace

for

discussing

he

ways

n

which

high

culture debates

in

science

and

critical

theory

re translated nto low

or

popular

culture

concerns about human boundaries.

That

is,

those

episodes

enact

conventional

nxieties nd resolutions hat ndicate

both the his-

tory

f

apprehension

towards

echnology

nd the fears

f technol-

ogy

as a

transgression

f the

boundaries

of both

biological

and

culturaldefinitions f the human.

The

Borg

s a

great

ube

traveling hrough

he outer imits

f

space and approaching "our" galaxy. t is simultaneouslyn en-

tity,

civilization, race,

and a machine with

human

components.

It is a

collective

singularity.

We

are

Borg," says

any

one

of its

humanoid

parts.

t is a

civilization

hat ssimilates nd annihilates

other races and civilizations.

Resistance s futile" s its

repeated

warning;

nd even the

usually

wise and tolerant

Guinan testifies

that

virtually

er entirerace was

destroyed y

the

Borg,

nd

that t

cannot be resisted. he

Borg

accumulates

the

knowledge

f other

races before

nnihilating

hem;

t s self-correctivend

self-regen-

erating,

nd thus cannot be

destroyed y

conventional

weapons.

Its humanoid parts are identical to the collectivewhole and

"single-mindedly"

ocused on its

imperative

o assimilate

every-

thing

n

its

path.

That total

self-absorption

n

its own

imperative

and

computercapacities precludes

emotions ike

sympathy,

om-

passion,

or fearand

recognition

orthe "otherness"

f the

other,

which also

precludes

negotiation

and

dialogue,

identification,

and

difference.

In

the

first

pisode,

the

Enterprise

rew

confronts t and

is

forced to

recognize

thatthere

s no

negotiation,

hat the

Borg

is

virtually mnipotent,

nd that t s

coming

toward he

galaxy.

t is

the meanest cube in the cosmos. The only response s flightnd

warning

o others.

n

the second

episode,

there s direct onfron-

tation,

nd the

Captain,

Jean-Luc

Picard,

s taken

n

and

assimi-

lated

by

the

Borg,whereupon

he

is

hooked

into the machine and

gets

a new

name, Locutus,

whose

knowledge

about

Federation

technology, apacities, trategies, istory

nd values become

part

of the

Borg's

information

ystem.

icard is an

unwilling

aptive

forwhom "resistance

s futile."But he has also lost

his

identity

s

Picard

to

the

degree

that Picard is an addition to

the

Borg

and

therebybecomes Borg.

He becomes alien to his crew and

to

himself s he was. But more

specifically,

is

identity

s an autono-

mous, intentional,

willing,

ommanding,

nd

desiring

ndividual

is

utterly uppressed by

the

imperative

f

the

Borg

collective

suppressed

but not

eliminated,

for afterhis rescue and the deli-

cate

operation

to

excise his

machinery,

e maintains

memory

f



7/21

Spring

994

129

being

Picard-as-Borg.

t's a

trauma

sufficient

or Picard

in

the

third pisode to forgethis usual tolerancefor other civilizations

and

to desire the

annihilation

of

the

Borg.

He

plans

to

implant

one of its

captured

humanoid

components

as

a virus

that will

destroy

t.

Only

as that

captured

humanoid

unit s found

to have

the

capacity

to individuate

and

acquire

a sense

of

separate

selfhood

(primarily

hrough

a

combination

of "humane"

treat-

ment and human

language)

does

Picard

recognize

that reintro-

ducing

that

component

to the

Borg

as an individual

might

erve

to transform

he

Borg

rather han

destroy

t.

By

ntroducing

he

imperfections that constitute the human

-

imperfections

grounded

in

the values

attached to

separateness,

ndividual au-

tonomy,

will,

and emotion

-

Picard

retains his

public

value as

a

tolerant

humanitarian

while also

overcoming

he

omnipotence

of

the

Borg.

In

manyways,

he third

pisode

reiterates

he values

insisted

upon

by

Star Trek's

irst

eneration

Captain

Kirk: that t is

indi-

viduality

nd

human

imperfection

hat not

only

define

humanity

but

give

t reason

to

struggle,

o

improve,

grow,

nd,

above

all,

to

"tolerate."

he actual

achievement

f

perfection

n

either

techno-

logical, ntellectual, r socialutopias n the StarTrek eries eads to

cruel,

totalitarian,

nd inhumane

exercises

of

power.

The "hu-

man"

in

short,

s defined

by

both

itsdistance

from

perfection

nd

by

the

way

hatdifferences ithin

he human

community

reate

a

demand for

communication,

negotiation,

nd

recognition

f

the

"otherness"

f

the other.

The

Borg

is

clearly

n

instance

of conventional

fearsabout

absolute

power

nd

prodigious

technology.

t

is a

graft

f technol-

ogy,

human

bodies,

and

human consciousness.

The

celebration

of

imperfection

n the

episodes

further

erves

o

identify

he

human

community s an "us" that s made of distinct nd discreet ndi-

viduals

with

unique capabilities.

The

fear of the

Borg's omnipo-

tence

s

specified

by

the fear

of a loss of

autonomy,

free

will,"

nd

separateness,

ut also of a

fearof

absorption

nto a

mass,

collec-

tive

dentity,

nd an

undifferentiated

echanism.

As a

political

llegory,

f

course,

the

episodes

also

instate he

value

that underlies

the

hierarchical,

allegorical

order of

the

Bridge

crew.3

ach member has

its distinctive

unction:

he

Cap-

tain

who listens

to

multiple

viewpoints

ut

finally

akes

responsi-

bility odecide; theCommanderRiker, NumberOne," who also

gives

orders but

is allowed to

express

a sexualized

identity;

he

empathie

Deanna

Troi who feels

across

distances;

the

Klingon

warrior,Worf,

eady

at all moments

to

fight;

he blind

engineer

LaForge

who sees

patterns

f

heat

with

technological

device

and

who

has

almost miraculous

capacity

o

fix

technological glitches;



8/21

1

30 Discourse

6.3

the android

Data,

who has all information

n

the

known

universe

but no emotion except a certainwistful uriosity o know the

experience

of human

emotions;

and the

boy

wonder,

Wesley

Crusher,

naive but

uncannily

mart and

capable,

to whom

the

whole

adolescent

fantasymaybelong

in

the first

lace.

The

Borg,

nonetheless,

s a

technological

monster

nd like

mostmonsters f fictionmustbe

destroyed

r transformed.

ut it

is

distinct

rom other

technological

monsters ike Frankenstein

who indicate an

essentially

reudian

anxiety

hat he creationwill

overcome

the creator the son

will

killthe

father.

n

this

ase,

the

autonomyof the creationis of less concern than the threatof

absorption

nto

an undifferentiated holeness. t

is

not

difficult

to cast the fearof

absorption

nto the collective f the

Borg

n

this

light, uggesting

hat

n

Freudian terms he ssue of boundaries s

not

simply

one of the

delineation

of

individuality

nd

essence

against

what s and is not

human,

but a definition f the human

itself s masculine

individuation

gainst

the

absorption

into a

maternal,

material mass. The

Borg

levels the

hierarchy

hat

is

comprised

of

unique

individuals nd

composes

itself s an undif-

ferentiated elf-sameness

hat,

ike a

mechanical

version of The

Blob, absorbsall in itspath. It is possible,of course,to find the

Freudian

spin

in

thisfear as well. Andreas

Huyssen

describes the

historical

phenomenon

in

modernism that associates mass cul-

ture with

the

feminine.

n

his

analysis

of

the

film

Metropolis

he

further

oints

out

how

technology

s

embodied

in

the seductive

femalerobot.

Historically,

hen,

wecan conclude hat s soon s themachine

cameto be

perceived

s a

demonic,

nexplicable

hreatnd as

harbinger

f chaos nd destruction...riters

egan

o

magine

the Maschinenmenschs woman. here regroundsosuspect

thatwe are

facing

erea

complex rocess

f

projection

nd

displacement.

he fears nd

perceptual

nxieties

manating

fromvermore

owerful

achinesre

recast nd reconstructed

in

terms f themalefear f

female

exuality,

eflecting

n

the

Freudian

ccount,

hemale's astration

nxiety.

70)

The Freudian versionof the

anxiety

oward he

technologi-

cal

"other," however,

maintains

a

rather

simple opposition

be-

tween

bsorption

nd

differentiation,

ale and

female,

onscious-

ness and unconsciousness.One of the contemporaryppeals in

Star Trek TheNextGenerations that t does not leave off t

simple

enmity

nd

destruction f

one

by

the other. t does

not,

n

fact,

assert that the individuated

yborg

will maintain ts

ndividuality

after

returning

o

Borg.

The last

shot

in

the

episode

is a

glance



9/21

Spring

994

131

between

the

cyborg

nit,

Hugh,

and

LaForge.

That

glance

offers

possibility ithout certaintyor eventualtransformation;t is a

reminder of "evolution"

but

an

open question

of

whether

the

Borg

will forever

nnihilate

others.

But more

importantly,

he

crew has

recognized

the

Borg

as

having rights

o exist.

Certainly

the

program

validates

and reinforces he value

of

individuality

and

hierarchy

board

the

Starship

Enterprise,

but that value

is

based

on the individual's

capacity

to resistdestruction f others.

In

place

of the

simple opposition

between

selfhood and

other,

individuation

nd

absorption,

a more

complex question

about

whatto do n the face ofsuchan entityppears.This is stillrelated

to values attached

to

subjectivity,

ut

I

want

to hold off that

discussionuntil

ater.

For the

question

becomes

more

complex

when the

figure

f

the

cyborg

s seen

not

ust

as a

boundary uestion

between

human

and

machine,

but as a carrier f

technology's ncreasing bility

o

simulate

the human dimension

and make the human

indistin-

guishable

from he

technological.

The

Borg

episodes

insist n the

distinction

nd

rely

n clarification.

ut a

film

ike Blade

Runner

based

on,

but

very

different

rom,

Philip

K. Dick's

novel,

Do An-

droids reamofElectricheep?, ortrays irtually erfectreplicants

and offers nother

set of

questions. Replicants

n

the

generation

known s Nexus

6 are

produced

by

the

TyrellCorporation

o work

as slave abor

in

the

"hazardous

exploration

and colonization"

of

the "Off-World."

he

replicants

are

"superior

in

strength

nd

agility"

nd

"equal

in

intelligence

o their

genetic engineers"

but

are

designed

to have

no

emotions.

The

mind-designer,

r.

Tyrell,

fearing

hat

n

time

uch

perfect eplicants

mightdevelop

human

emotions,

built

n a

fail-safe,

elf-destruct

rogram

that imits he

replicant ife-span

o four

years.

The

renegade

replicants

s well

as

the experimentalversion knownas Rachael have memory m-

plants

of a

past

that create a

"cushion" for the emotions

they

might

encounter

in

a

short

period

of

time,

but

that

memory

serves

to control the

replicants'

behavior more

efficiently.

he

Blade

Runner,

Deckard,

gradually

alls

n

love withthe

replicant

Rachael. For

these

replicants,

s

the

leader

Roy Batty isdainfully

points

out,

are

not

computers,

we

are

physical."

The

technology

of

biomechanics,

n

other

words,

has

produced

a version

of

the

human

that is coextensive with

the human

by

virtue

of both

functionalmemories

nd emotions that re added

to their

supe-rior

strength

nd

agility"

nd

"intelligence qual

to their

genetic

engineers."

n

what

might

be

an

ironic nod

to Hubert

Dreyfus's

point

that

omputers

will

neverbe able to beat

him

at chess since

theyrequire

intuition nd

experience,

the

replicant

uses a chess

move

to trick his

way

into

Tyrell's

inner sanctum. Unlike

the



10/21

1

32

Discourse

6.3

cyborg,

which is an

addition or a

graft

upon

the

human,

the

replicant s a duplicationor simulacrum.

Jean

Baudrillard

escribeshis

concerns bout such

simulacra

in

his book

Simulations. or

him,

the

proliferation

f

simulation

has eliminated ll

oppositional

force

n

differences etween real

and a

representation.

We are

witnessing

he

end of

perspective

nd

panoptic

space

(which

emains moral

hypothesis

ound

up

with v-

ery

lassical

nalysis

fthe

objective"

ssence f

power),

nd

hencethe

very

bolition

f

he

pectacular.

The medium tself

is no longer dentifiables such,and themergingf the

medium nd

the

message

McLuhan)

s the first

reat

or-

mulaof this

new

ge.

There

s

no

longer ny

medium

n

the

literal

ense: t s

now

ntangible,

iffusend

diffracted

n

the

real,

and it can

no

longer

even be

said thatthe

latter

s

distorted

y

t.

54)

If

one

position

n

the

Renaissance

debate

was

essentially

ominal-

ist that

words

hould be

identical to

reality

nd

genres

"pure"

-

Baudrillard's

position

eems to

reverse t:

technology

should" be

a representation, ot a duplication; t"should" mitate, otdupli-

cate. But as

in

the

English

Renaissance

when words

became a

profligate

echnology

hat

could not rest n

their

references nd

began

to take n

a life f

their wn

"A

sentence s

but

chev'ril

love

to a

good

wit,"

ays

este

n

Twelfthight.

How

quickly

he

wrong

ide

may

e

turn'd utward"

3.1.11-13])

he

mage

of

the

replicant

s not

itself

representation

uta

thing

with

life

f

ts

wn.Or at east t s

the

representation

f

ucha

possibility.

The robotno

longer

nterro-

gates

ppearance;

ts

only

ruths

n

its

mechanical

fficacy....

eing

and

appearance

re

melted nto

common

ubstance f

production

and work"Baudrillard,imulations4).

Yet this s

not

entirely

ow

"robots" r

replicants

re

used

in

science

fiction.

f

they

do

not

interrogate

ppearances, they

om-

monly

erve o indicate

the imits f

human

ethics.

They

do not

n

fact

eliminate

the

comparative

measure of

human action. From

Metropolis

o Blade

Runner r

Karel

apek's

R.U.R. from

he Rus-

sian

film

Aelita o

Greg

Bear's

book

Queen

fAngels,

r

the android

Data

in

Star Trek

the

"nonhuman"

figures

erve to

criticize he

idealist

project

thatwould

separate

humans from

heir mechani-

cal"

functions f

labor

and calculation

and

would eliminate the

complicating

ituationsncurred

hrough

motions nd

imperfec-

tions ike

disease. As

machines or

computers

or robots

are

per-

fected o

the

point

of

duplicating

humans

n

order to

serve

them,

it

becomes a

virtual

habit in

science

fictionto

criticize

the de-

mand for

such

service

n

the first

lace.

The ideal

that

would



11/21

Spring

994

133

assume to

give

humans the

leisure

to

"be"

humans

by

giving

repetitive, oteworkto machines or computersconventionally

signals

the

oppression

nherent

n

that

deal.

In

his

criticism

f

the

Utopian

projections

f

Artificialntelli-

gence,

TerryWinograd

makes

several

mportant oints,

the most

significant

f

which s that

AI

reduces the mind "to the

nteractive

sum of

decontextualized

fragments"

203).

The

customary

evice

in

science fictionfor

showing

his imitation

n

Artificial ntelli-

gence

or

duplicate

humanoicfs

s to contextualize

the

robot,

or

the

replicant.

n

creating

context

for

the abor of the

robot,

the

science fiction onventionhabitually reates an occasion for the

development

of

subjectivity,

laced

in

a context

in

which it is

intended to

replace

human

labor,

the machine

instead becomes

human.

In

the novel

by Greg

Beao~,

Queen

ofAngels

for

example,

the

explorer

pace probe

known

is

AXIS

gradually

evelops

a

subjec-

tivity

n the models of its

creators.

Out

in

the

depth

of

space,

it

eventually

nows oneliness

auid,

based on its

programming,

e-

cides to

split

hat

ubjectivity

rji

rder to function.4 he

testwhich

its

creatorsdevise for the

possibility

f the

development

of

AXIS

self-awarenesss a oke: "Why jiid heself-awarendividual ook at

his

image

in

the mirror?To

get

to the other side"

(114).

The

AXIS

computer

arrives t

maiiy

lternative

nswers

o the riddle

and

finds ll of them

equally

humorless,

ince its oneliness takes

priority.

ad Bear considered

this

further,

e

might

have allowed

the

computer

to

laugh,

since

laughter

tself an be said to

derive

fromthe

recognition

of such a

split

n

subjectivity

what

Arthur

Koestler called the

"bifurcation

f

conflicting

odes").

And one

conventional

istinction

etween

machines and humans s

exactly

the

capacity

or

aughter.

n

R.U.R.,

on the other

hand,

the robots

are such perfectduplicatesof human action, forced nto labor,

that

hey

ecognize

their

ppression by

the

Corporate

owners

nd

rebel. The Marxist

oint

n

so

many

of science fiction's orrelates

betweenhuman and robot s

that

he contextof mechanical abor

is itself

ehumanizing,

s

exemplified

y

the

human laborerswho

work ike automatons

n

Metropolis

nd in

Aelita.

n

Blade Runner

even the nventor

yrell

ecogtiizes

hat he

replicants

re

capable

of

developing

"emotion"

because

of

materiality

nd

context,

nd

through

hem,

sense of self.

In BladeRunner eplicants re functionally umanin theway

the

film

represents

heir

desires

for

continuation,

for

love,

for

familial

memories,

or

freedom

rom he

oppressive

ontrolof the

Corporation,

nd

finally

or

compassion,

as

when

Roy Batty

aves

the life of the

Blade

Runner,

Deckard.

Batty

lso carries

vestiges

of the

Oedipal

drama

when

he

confronts

Tyrell

whom he calls



12/21

1

34

Discourse 6.3

"father"

ust

before he

puts

out

Tyrell's yes.

The

TyrellCorpora-

tion itselfbecomes a sign of the "inhuman" that is defined as

absolute economic and

technological

ontrol.To this

degree,

the

film

maintains onventional

oppositions, uggesting

s do other

such films s

King of

Hearts that

n

an insane

world,

only asylum

inmates re sane. Like the

nmates,

he

replicants

ave borderline

identities: hat

s,

they

annot be

clearlydesignated

as one

thing

or another.The

point,

however,

s that

value

is

determinednot

by

some

ontological

status what

they

are" as

beings

-

but

by

the

quality

f actions and desires.As

technological

extensionsof hu-

man creators, he replicants dentifyhe notion that the origin

(mechanical

or

biological)

and status

machine

or

human)

do

not determine value. The

replicant,

ike the

cyborg,

n

other

words,

uggests

hatvalue is not inherentto

identity.

et,

in

the

confusion

that arises

n

not

being

able to

"fix"

upon

an

identity

the

film

also locates

what

might

be called

an

epistemological

anxiety

oward

echnological

transformation,

n

which the

figure

both

is and is not itself nd the medium IS the

message.

This

locates once

again

the

problem

of the

graft

nd the concerns for

what to do

when an

entity

s

the embodiment of

metaphor:

"A

naturalperspective,hat s and isnot," s Orsinosays t the end of

Twelfthight

5.1.217).

As

technology

s found

to be so embedded

in

the world s to

be

indistinguishable

rom

he

world,

o be

constituting

he world

as "simulation" s far as

Baudrillard s

concerned,

one

might

ay

that

the tensionof differences hat

constitute

metaphor

nd

rep-

resentationhas

collapsed.

At this

point,

however,

he anxieties

raised

might

enternot on the

question

of differencesnd bound-

aries between human

and inhuman but on how to act

in

a limit-

less,

unbounded

world where

technology

roduces

a

perspective

that "is and is not." Because of technology, ven the body is no

longer

a

convincing

site for

unitary

and

singular

identity.

Haraway, gain,

s

optimistic.

Why

hould our bodies end at the skinor include

t best

other

beings

encapsulated

y

skin?From the

seventeenth

century

ill

now,

machines ouldbe animated

given

hostly

souls to

make them

peak

or moveor to accountfor

their

orderly

evelopment

nd mental

apacities.

Or

organisms

could be mechanized reduced o

body

understood s re-

sourceof mind.Thesemachine/organismelationshipsre

obsolete,

nnecessary.

220)

What am

trying

o

suggest

here is that

n

spite

of the

radical

changes

n

theterms

nd conditions fthe

known nd the

unknown,



13/21

Spring

994

135

thought

nd

unthought,

human

and

inhuman,

natural and un-

natural,there s a persistent olarization n attitudes owardthe

uncertainborderlandsof

identity, xemplifiedby

the

divergence

in

attitudesbetween

Baudrillard

and

Haraway.

Both

attitudes,

however,

ould be characterized s

reactions

o

the

contemporary

violation of a dualistic

norm: a dualism which is

oppressive

to

Haraway,

useful to

Baudrillard.

The crucial location

for

ethical

contemplation

s

in

the

attitude

toward

ratherthan

in

the onto-

logical

statusof the

technological

object:

not to ask what

is the

"true"nature of the

cyborg

r

robot,

but to ask about the source

and function fthat ttitude oward t. ForHaraway, he function

is to

open possibilities

or

forging

ess

oppressive

ocial

relations;

for

Baudrillard,

t would seem to be to find

ways

f

maintaining

skepticism

oward he

reality

f

the simulacra and

its

part

n the

Enlightenmentproject

that

Ross

noticed. Baudrillard's idea

is

not,

believe,

to reinstate ome

metaphysical

round

forvalue but

to

keep

from

being

seduced

by

the conflationof

image

and the

real thatwould create

another

totalized,

undifferentiated orld.5

Together, Haraway

and

Baudrillard

might

describe how

to

maintain

kepticism

nd

expectation

within

technological

world

in whichsuch phenomena as robots,artificialntelligence, nd

virtualrealities are

themselves

realities;

how to act both within

and outside dualistic

conceptions by making

distinctions;

ow

to

support

differencewithout

dualism.

The

divergent

reactions to

technology,

he simulacra and

the

postmodern

condition are

in-

dicators

of how

human

values

and

udgments

stillfunctionwithin

and as

part

of the

proliferation

f "technoculture." t is

diverging

attitudeswhich

eem

to

have

persisted.

Each is

giving

heoretical

description

orwhat s

fundamentally

n

attitude

oward echnol-

ogy.

f

neither ttitude

an be considered

final,

he two nonethe-

less share a concern forhow the technological phenomena of

both

combinatory eings

and simulacra

are

implicated

n

ethical

and

political

ctions.

What is at stake for each one is the

possibility

hat

prodigal

learning

and human

technology

will undermine and overturn

formsof

knowledge, authority

nd

action.

This,

in

fact,

s the

apparent

basis

of Fredric

Jameson's

hope

in

postmodernism.

Jameson,

too,

has an

optimism

hat

might

be said to

precede

his

description

nd

theory

f the

postmodern.

He

distinguishes

he

historical ifference etween modernism nd postmodernismn

the basis of the relative

lace

of the aesthetic

n

relation

o a domi-

nant

deology

nd

phase

of

capitalism.

Modernism s characterized

by

its

rejection

of and

by

the cultural

dominant, whereas,

he

claims,

postmodernism

S the culturaldominant.Postmodernism

is

simply

revolutionfrom

within,

but it carries for

Jameson,

it



14/21

136

Discourse 6.3

seems,

no less

revolutionary otential.

Subversion from

within

what s alreadyhuman,as opposed to thatcomingfrom n out-

side,

locates

what

manypostmodern

elebrantsfindas

the

politi-

cal

potential

n the

technological.

In

the

specific

case of the

possibility

of

replicants

or

simulacra

as

they point

to the human encounter with

tself,

t

might

be usefulto consider

Heidegger's

terms

danger"

nd

"sav-

ing power"

of

technology

rom

his

essay,

The

Question

Concern-

ing

Technology."Suppose

that the

power

to

generate

simulacra,

both actual

in

postmodern

rt and

hypothetical

n

technological

sciences, s understoodsimply s whatHeidegger called the "re-

vealing"

of what s

in

the

path

of that

power "destining").

The

AI

scientistor the

genetic engineer says,

n

effect,

hat from the

limited

power

have now

to

create

thinking

machines or

perfect-

ible human

beings,6

future

n

which

replicant

human

beings

can

be created s conceivable and

possible.

These entities xist head

of the

presentgiven

conditionsof

technologicalexpertise

a

des-

tining

and a

challenging

forth).

The actual creation of

such

replicants,

n

the

example,

is thus ess

significant

han the

possi-

bility

hat

opens

ahead of

actuality

nd

"challenges"

the actual to

meet t. The technological apacity nsome sense "causes" tsown

futurity,

ut that

futurity

s also

only

xistent

n

the

present

ondi-

tion of the

technological,

which s

why

iscussions f

actual

dupli-

cations

of

human

thought

nd human

beings

tend to

focus on

what

could

be rather than on what is now. The

technological

"challenges

forth"ts

own

possibilities,

ut the

challenging

s more

like an act that cannot reside

in

any given technological object.

The

danger,Heidegger suggests,

s

that:

As oon s

whats unconcealed o

onger

oncerns an ven s

object, utdoesso, rather,xclusivelys standing-reserve,nd

man

n

themidst f

objectlessness

s

nothing

ut he

rderer

f

the

tanding-reserve,

henhe comes o the

very

rink f

pre-

cipitous

all;

hat

s,

he comes o the

point

where e himself ill

have o be

taken s

standing-reserve.

eanwhile

an,

recisely

as the ne so

threatened,

xalts

imselfo the

posture

f ord f

the arth.

26-27)

In

these

terms,

Heidegger might say

that the

projections

of

AI

science and

genetic engineering

reveal the human as

standing-

reserve or resource) for tsownsimulation; hey consume" the

human

in

ordering

t

forthe

purpose

of

simulation,

uch that

he

human is

not a

thing

n

itselfbut

something

ready

for use.

In

some

sense,

that s both

the

danger

and the

"truth" f human

technology.

t is

"dangerous"

because it forecloses n

both "chal-

lenging"

nd

"destining"

r

what

could

be called the

openness

of



15/21

Spring

994

137

technology

o its

futurity.

t

produces

the

dangerous

illusion that

the human is "lord of the earth"and is not in factalready"in-

debted" to thatwhich s more

han

and ahead of itself. he delu-

sion is that because of

the

way

n

which the world is a human

"construction" f

language

and

codes,

which

are at the founda-

tion of

technology,

mankind

ssumes

thatwhatever t encounters

is therefore

nly

tself r a

self-construction.

et because it s

now

opening upon

an

imagined

perfect

imulation,

these technolo-

gies

also

serve to reveal what

Heidegger might

all the "essence"

of

the human

-

an essence

comprised

of

technological

capabili-

ties.This is theHeideggerian paradox or "mystery"ftechnology.

The

very

Enframing"

hat

threatens

o close

off he revelation f

what s the essence

of the

human

in

its

technological

capacity

for

ordering,

s also the means

by

which

the

revelation

f

that ssence

can

take

place.

The

coming

o

presence

f

technology

hreatens

evealing,

threatenst with he

possibility

hat ll

revealing

illbe con-

sumed

n

ordering

nd that

verything

ill

resent

tself

nly

n

the

unconcealednessf

standing-reserve.

uman

activity

an

never irectlyounterhis anger.Human chievementlonecannever anisht.

33)

In

the mundane

example

of Rachael

in

Blade

Runner,

he

actuality

f the

replicant

forecloses

on

any

useful

or

functional

distinction etween the human and the simulated

human,

which

is

why

Rachael does not seem

to

elicit

any

fearor

anxiety

rom s.

To

the

contrary,

he and the other

replicants

define the "inhu-

man"

as the

corporate

nventor

who

is

willing

o use

replicants

s

human

labor

in

"standing-reserve."

t

the same

time,

he

repre-

sents the figureof the human as both a construction f the hu-

man and as

something

more

than

human.

What

she

"challenges"

-

though

not

in

the sense

that

Heidegger

uses it

-

is

an ethical

rather than an

ontological

status

of the human. The

danger

of

technology epresentedby

the

film

s

shown

by Tyrell

who con-

sumes the

replicant

abor

in his

ordering

of the

technological

human and

thereby

onceals their ssential

"humanity,"

hich s

defined

by

a functional

memory

and desire.7 The simulated

memory

s

shown to be

experienced

as

real,

in

the collection of

simulated

family

photographs

and their

importance

to the

replicants.Rachael remembers akingmusic essons,but she does

not know

if

it was she who had

them,

or

Tyrell's

niece,

upon

whom her

experiences

were modeled.

Regardless,

Deckard tells

her,

"youplaybeautifully."

ut

this

puts

the

mystery

f the techno-

logical

into a

position

as

mystery

hat

simultaneously

efines the

"human"

as the

experience

f

memory

nd desire

nd undermines



16/21

138

Discourse 6.3

the dea that

xperience

s the sole standardof

validity

nd truth.

This is a crucial contradictionn thefigure f thereplicant.The

status

of the

replicantproposes

that the

"experience"

of

an

im-

planted memory

s

indistinguishable

rom "real"

memory

per-

haps

because

memory

s

already

a form

of virtual

reality):they

function

dentically.

et

experience may

not

necessarily

e coex-

tensive

with the "truth" f the

origins

of those

memories. But

apart

from hese

paradoxes,

the value of the

replicants

n

the

film

resides

not

in the

paradoxes

of their

truth nd their

experience

but

n

the

differentialetweenthem nd

the creators.As

Jameson

puts t,

There omes nto

being,

hen,

situation

n

which

we can

say

that

f

ndividual

xperience

s

authentic,

hen t cannotbe

true;

nd that f

scientificr

cognitive

modelof

the same

contents

true,

hen t

escapes

ndividual

xperience.

411)

The

conceptual mapping

of the

world,

like the

concept

of

Rachael's

identity,

oes not conform o her

experience.

Yet it

is

just

that

disconformity

hat constitutes

elf-awareness s

well as

the

ground

for

recognition

f

others.For

Jameson

the character-

istic of

postmodernism's

nswer to the

disconformity

etween

concept

and

experience

s

in

the

"insertion s individual

ubjects

into a

multidimensional et of

radically

iscontinuous

ealities..."

(413).

The

discontinuity mong

the individual

subjects

on the

Bridge

of the

Enterprise

s,

nonetheless,

presented

as a

coopera-

tive

discontinuity.

he

component

bodies of The

Borg,

and the

way they

re

represented

s

anathema to

the crew of the

Enter-

prise,

imply

a horror not

of discontinuous

realities but

of too

muchcontinuity too vast n extensionofthebodyand identifi-

cation with he one. The

replicants

r the

robots

n

R.U.R. or the

AXIS

computer

can likewise

"critique"

or

"interrogate"

uman

action

primarily

ecause

they

re

shown to

develop subjectivity,

which s an

encounter of the self s

other-to-itself.elf-division

s

the

condition of

subjectivity.

he

Borg

is a

"monster" lien

be-

cause it is

shown to have no such

self-divisionnd

cannot ever

encounter

tself s other.

We

are

Borg," hey/

e/it

ay.

The

Borg

is alien because

it is

fully

elf-identical.t

signals

the

imagined

horror f total

elf-absorption

nd

self-samenesshat

annot stand

outside tself nd therefore annotresist tsownpower.Heidegger

imagined

such

self-absorption

s the

danger

in

technology.

And

while he

sounds himself

angerously

lose to

turning

elf-division

into a

metaphysical

ategory,

he

importantpoint

is the

differ-

ence

between the

delusion of

"lord of the

earth" that

would lead



17/21

Spring

994

139

to a

Borg-like

xercise of the

annihilation

nd

absorption

of self

and others, nd theself-division

ecessary

o resist hat xercise.

Man

stands

o

decisively

n

attendance n

the

challenging-

forth

f

Enframing

hat e

does not

pprehend nframing

s

a

claim,

hat e

fails o

see

himself

s

theone

spoken

o,

nd

hence also

fails

n

every

way

o hear n

what

espect

e ek-

sists,

rom

ut of

his

essence,

n

therealm f

an

exhortation

or

address,

nd thus an

never

ncounter

nly

himself.

27)

The

figure

f

the

replicant,

n

these

terms,

oes

not

engage

thequestionoftheboundariesof thehuman and nonhuman,yet

it

does

serve

in

Blade

Runnery

t

least,

to

give

an

image

of the

otherness hat s

already

a

factor

n

the encounter

of the

human

with tself.

The fiction

larifies

Heidegger's

paradox

of technol-

ogyby

eparating

ut

Tyrell

s the one

who is

self-absorbed

y

his

technology

nd who

cannot

rsist

his

creations s

images

of

him-

self

-

a

separation

that belies the

simultaneity

f

danger

and

revealing

n

Heidegger's

conception.

Tyrell's

reation,

Batty,

an

resisthis

own

power

and encounter

another

in

Deckard.

Tyrell

does

not

recognize

his

own

"indebtedness" to his

creations.

Heidegger's

idea of indebtednessdecenters the creator as the

single

cause of his

creation

aftd

displaces

him

into a

network f

causalities hat

ncludes the

way

hat he

nvention s

"called forth"

by

the future

or

destining)

and

is

in

a

cooperative

causality

r

"co-responsibility.

Tyrell's

ttempt

o

control

the future

ppears

in

the imitshe

genetically ngineered

into

the

life

span

of the

replicants.

While

he can

control

that

pan

of

time,

he

cannot

control their ctions

within

t,

and the

replicant,oy

Batty,

uccessfully

akes his re-

vengeon him in a mannerthat s bothOedipal and horrifiche

tears

out his

eyes).

This is in

keeping

withthe

thematic ine that

makes

eyes

he

testingground

for

replicants,

ince

through

eyes

the

replicant

not

only

betrays

ts

evel of

emotion

but also sees its

own

condition

("if

you

could

see

what

I

have

seen,"

Batty

ells

Deckard at

the

end).

The

replicant

confirms

yrell's

Freudian)

fear that

the creation

will

overtake

he

creator,

but he

does so

in

an

act of

ustice.

For

Tyrell

s

evil not

simply

ecause he

created

the

replicants

but

because he

reduced the

human to

"standing-

reserve"

nd failed to

see

them

as

things-in-themselves.

One difficultyere,however,s that n partnershipwith hat

political

critique,

the

film

betrays

tself

s a

romance

(perhaps

illuminating

he Marxist

romance).

When

Batty

ies,

having ust

saved the

life of

Deckard

in

an

act of

gratuitous

ompassion,

a

whitedove

flies

upward.

The

film

annot seem

to resist

iving

he

replicants

not

simply

ubjectivity

ut "soul"

as well. t

comes

close



18/21

1

40

Discourse

6.3

to

conferring metaphysical

tatuson its

subject

matter

n

offer-

ingthat mageof a "mystery"fthesoul.On the otherhand,Blade

Runner oes

help

to

displace

the

presentation

f a norm of the

human

based on "nature" nd to

circumvent

rguments

hat de-

finethe

human

in

either ssentialor functional erms. t

replaces

those

arguments

with more conventional thical norm: that

the

guarantor

of the human value is in

its actions not essences or

formal unctions. his

also circumventsome of the

concerns that

Baudrillard

brings

up

in

Simulations

n

which he outlines the

dangers

he sees

in

the

technological

ability

o

produce

a simula-

tion that sindistinguishablerom he real. WhatBaudrillarddoes

not discuss s

the fact that even simulations

bear the burden of

ethical

responsibility

or

action,

and

appearances negotiate

no

less for

both

power

and value

than do the

oppositional

forces

supposedlyguaranteedby

the real.

Science

fiction s

constantly aking

the

debates

among

phi-

losophers

and scientists nd

placing

them

n

conventional

repre-

sentations f

good

and evil.But

the further

oint

s

that

n

spite

of

simulations,

he

difficulty

rises

n

conception

more

than

percep-

tion of what s or is

not "human."

A

simulacrum f the

human,

likeRachael,maybe functionallyndistinguishablerom human

or her

status,

ike the

cyborg, mbiguous,

but neither function

nor

status is sufficient r

final

in

describing

"history"

nd its

complex

network f

originating

onditions, ituation,

unctional

memories,needs,

responses,

he

responses

he

elicits rom

thers,

all of

which erve

n

the

film,

t

least,

to

situate he

very

omplex-

ity

hat

nforms oth

identity

nd value. The

simulacrum s

a real

testing round

of the real. It is still

howing,

ike the

monsters f

the sixteenth

entury,

set of

relations between the

"orders of

morality

nd of

nature." But it

finally oints

not

strictly

o

the

limits f the boundaries of

identity

s an order of

morality

nd

nature

but to the imited

thicsthathumans

practice.

Notes

^ee,

for

xample,

henow

best-selling

ook

by

Roger

enrose,

he

Emperor's

ew

Mind

n

which e

examines he

difficulty

n

experimental

testing

or he

differencesetween

umans nd

computers.

e cites he

famous

uring

est

n

which n

interrogator

ust ecideon thebasis f

responses f a computernd a humanvolunteer,oth hiddenfrom

view,

which ne

is the

computer.

f

the

computer

an

give onvincingly

human

esponses

o the

degree

hat he

nterrogator

annot

etermine

that t

s a

computer,

t

passes

he est.

Penrose

oints

ut

that he

difficulty

or

he

computer

s to resist

itsown

capacity

or

omputation,

o

try

o

respond

o

"common ense"



19/21

Spring

994

141

questions

f

experience.

ee also

the

rticle

yTerry

Winograd,

Think-

ingMachines,"nwhich ecriticizeshefundamentalermsponwhich

AI

makes claims

to

create

thinking

machines hat

duplicate

human

thinking.

2Sherry

urkle

oints

ut

that

n

this

ontemporary

ebate,

om-

puters

nd

computational

deas

that

ffer he

possibility

f a rational

and rule-driven achine ead

to romantic

esponses"

hat

endto de-

finethe human

n

terms f "what

omputers

annotdo." While she

points

ut Hubert

Dreyfus's

rroneous

ssertion

n

the

1960s

that

computer

ould notbeat

him

t

chess,

he would eem

n

closer

gree-

mentwithhis ater dea

in

What

omputers

an'tDo: that mbodiment

situates he human n a particular ay hat annotbe reproduced y

rule-governed

rder.

Our

specific iology

laces

us

in

the human ife

cycle:

we are

born,

urtured

y

parents,

row,

evelop exually,

ecome

parents

n

our turn. ndwe die.

This

cycle rings

s the

knowledge

hat

comesfrom

nderstanding

he

certainty

f

oss,

hat hosewe

ove

will

die and so willwe..."

(Turkle249).

What

once

might

have been an

ontological argument

bout essential

identity

has

become,

post-

Wittgenstein

r

Sartre,

erhaps,

n

argument

boutfunctional

dentity:

a

thing

s

what

t

does.

3My

hanks o Robert

Harrison

or

discussing

ithme this iew f

theBridge rewnTheNext eneration.

4The decision"

o

split

s

perhaps

vidence

hat he cenario fthe

book s

fiction,

ot

philosophy,

ince

believe

t s more ccurate o

say

that

ubjectivity

tself

s

the

plit

f

elf-awareness.

5In

Seductionaudrillard

istinguishes

etween he "cold" seduc-

tion of

technology

nd the

"warm" eduction hat

plays

he

game

of

appearances.

In

seduction...t is the manifest

iscourse...hat turns

backon

the

deeper

order

whether

onscious r

unconscious)

n

order

to

invalidate

t,

substituting

he

charm nd illusionof

appearances.

These appearances re notin tjheeastfrivolous,utoccasionsfor

game

and its

takes,

nd a

passion

ordeviation

the seduction f the

signs

hemselves

eing

more

mportant

han he

mergence

f

ny

ruth

-

which

nterpretationeglects

nd

destroys

n

its

searchforhidden

meanings.

his

s

why

nterpretation

s

what,

ar

excellenceis

opposed

to

seduction,

nd

why

t s

the east

eductive

f

discourses.... ll

meaningful

discourseeekso nd

ppearances:

his s ts

ttraction,

nd ts

mposture....

perhaps

iscourses

secretly

empted

y

his

ailure,

y

he

bracketing

f

its

bjectives,

f ts ruth

ffects hich ecome

bsorbedwithin surface

that

wallows

meaning.

his is

what

happens

t

first,

hen discourse

seduces

tself,

t

s

the

original

orm

y

which

iscourse ecomes bsorbed

withintself ndemptied f ts ruthnorder obetter ascinate thers:

the

primitive

eduction

f

anguage"

53-54).

The "cold seduction" f

the elevision

ight, y

ontrast,

is

noffensiveo the

magination....

t s

innocuous

ecause t no

longer onveys

n

imaginary,

or

the

simple

reason hat t s no

onger

n

image..."

162).

"Cold"

eduction,

hat

s,

s

fully

elf-containednd has no

use

or

relation o an other.



20/21

142

Discourse 6.3

6See

n

particular

llenNewell.Newell s a

co-creatorfa unified

theoryfcognition nown s "Soar"that s an "embodied heory"r

architectureor the ull

ange

fhuman

ognition."

7It s

worth

oticing

hat

memory

s used

in

the

film

Robocop

o

confirmhat he

echnologically

econstituted

ntity

s still

"person."

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