tions. In a long statement, largely critical of the spd, the g im said that "on the basis of this analysis, the Central Committee of the g im . . . and the r k j . . . decided that their position on the election cannot be reduced to recommending any specific voteno matter how much this may be regarded as a deficiency." That statement ended, "We must point to the bracing experiences the workers had last April with parliamentarism and its parties and hold up the struggle in the form of mass strikes and demonstrations as a practical alternative to passive trust in the election of the sp d ."26

On several occasions in later years the g i m took a more active electoral role. In 1978 they gave "critical support" to the Green Party in regional elections in Hamburg and Hesse.27 In 1980 they urged their supporters to vote for the Social Democratic Party. Among their slogans on that occasion were "No vote for the bosses' parties c d u / csu or the f d p ! " "Vote s p d to prevent Strauss from winning the elections!"28 (Strauss was the very conservative leader of the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democrats, the csu.)

Factionalism Within the GIM

Almost from the moment of their emergence as a public group once again, the German Trotskyists associated with the United Secretariat suffered severe factional problems. Some of these reflected the struggles going on within the u s e c during the 1970s.

At least two splits occurred in u s e c 's German section in the years immediately following the reestablishment of an open Trotskyist group. In the Spring of 1969 a faction broke away to form the Spartacus group.29 This Spartacusbund continued to exist for a number of years, although itself suffering several splits. It became associated with a dissident u s e c group known as the Necessary International Initiative, headed by an Italian Trotskyist, Roberto Massari.30

Subsequently, another schism took place in the g i m , with a group reestablishing the i k d . According to one hostile observer, "The split was in a leftward direction.. . . Several other splits quickly fragmented the i k d leading to the existence in Germany of unstable and competing left-centrist groupings.

>|31

Further dissension arose as the result of the establishment in the winter 1969-70 by the g i m of another group, the Revolutionar- Kommunistische Jugend ( R K j-R e v o lu t io n - acy Communist Youth). At the time of the merger of the g i m and the r k j several years later, Was Tun (What Is to be Done), the g i m periodical, explained that "the r k j was never a 'youth organization' in the classical sensea group guided by the 'mother organization' and having specific tasks in the field of youth work. The strategic conception of the r k j was rather that it be a 'lever' with which to build an organization capable of intervening in the class struggle under the special conditions of the youth radicaliza- tion. That is, fundamental to the founding of the r k j was the g i m ' s extreme weakness after the end of entrism and the split in the spring of 1969. . . ,"32

The r k j was formally established as a national organization in a convention held in Frankfurt, May 29-31, 1971. It voted to become a "sympathizing organization" of u s e c . Its function was spelled out thus: "In a period of West German capitalism in which a larger part of the worker youth, college students, and high-school students are approaching revolutionary positions, the r k j will intervene among the radicalizing youth to hasten the organization of the vanguard for consistent anticapitalist struggle. In doing this, the r k j will make an essential contribution to the anchoring of the revolutionary organization in the class struggles of the West German proletariat."33

However, the creation of the r k j apparently created confusion among u s e c German Trotskyists rather than strengthening their movement. As a consequence, only

Germany: World War II and After 431

five months after this founding conference a second national convention of the r k j was held October 30-November 1971 in Cologne. Although that meeting allegedly "reflected the rapid growth of the West German Trotskyist movement," its most notable decision was to call for the merger of the rk; a n d the g i m .34

This merger was finally achieved at a "fusion conference" held December 30, 1972- January 1, 1973. Although it was reported that "broad agreement was reached on some key points" at that convention, it was decided to have formal votes on three competing draft political resolutions presented at the meeting "because neither the proposed theses nor the state of the discussion within the organization yet fully meets the objective requirements of the struggles in West Germany. "3S

A resolution dealing with the reasons for unification of the g i m and r k j was passed. Was Tun subsequently reported that "we believe that the conception of the r k j , despite its great practical value in building the section was based on a number of mistakes, which are described in this resolution; an underestimation of the newly arising revolutionary left itself, which generally strove to overcome an outlook restricted to its own sector and to work out a general perspective for the whole society; an underestimation of the practical effects of the upsurge of West German workers struggles, which opened up increasing possibilities for bridging the gap between the working class movement and the movement of radical youth by direct intervention in the proletariat; an underestimation of the concrete significance of the weight of the Fourth International in West Germany, which in the long run, if this development of a 'special West German strategy for building the organization' had been carried further, would have led to a political regression."35

The sharp differences of opinion reflected in the "fusion conference" continued within the g i m . This was reflected in the

1975 national conference of the organization, when three factions appeared: "These tendencies are the Internationalist Tendency (i t ), which has held the majority on the Central Committee since the 1974 conference and supports the majority leadership of the Fourth International; the Compass Tendency |k t ), the second largest tendency; and a third, small tendency, the Leninist- Trotskyist Tendency (l t t ), which supports the minority tendency in the Fourth International."37

The German u s e c affiliate was thus split along the lines of the controversy then raging generally within the United Secretariat. The largest group was aligned with the "Europeans" (Emest Mandel, Pierre Frank and Livio Maitan) who were then pushing a "guerrilla" approach, particularly for theLat- in American countries. The smallest group within the g i m was aligned with the u s e c faction led by the Socialist Workers Party of the United States. The second largest g i m faction (Compass Tendency) was aligned with the so-called Third Tendency within u s e c , led by the Italian Roberto Massari.34

Was Tun, in reporting on this meeting of g i m , noted that "in the vote on the political resolution at the 1975 National Conference, none of the three tendencies in the g i m was able to win a majority. For a democratic- centralist organization, this is a situation as difficult as it is unusual. It means that no tendency has a mandate to lead the organization on behalf of a majority of the membership." In the face of this situation, it was decided to summon shortly a new national conference. Meanwhile, the 1975 meeting agreed to give the Internationalist Tendency an absolute majority on the new Central Committee and provided that its version of the political resolution be "the public general line of the g i m . " -A sixteen-point program, for work in the labor movement, among immigrants, and on other organizational issues was adopted as an interim directive to the leadership. Of the thirty members of the new Central Committee, the i t

432 Germany: World War II and After

kyist groups arose from factional controversies within the United Secretariat during the 1970s. One was the Lega Comunista. In the u s e c controversies of that period, in addition to the International Majority Tendency led by Ernest Mandel, Livio Maitan, and Pierre Frank and the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency aligned with the Socialist Workers Party of the U.S., there was a Revolutionary Marxist Fraction, which was represented at the 1974 Tenth World Congress of u s e c by an Italian delegate, Roberto Massari. In1975 Massari led a split in the g c r / l c r to form the Lega Comunista. It took the lead in organizing outside of u s e c an "international opposition" to the United Secretariat, the Necessary International Initiative (n i i ), with affiliates in Great Britain and Germany as well as Italy. As late as 1980, the Lega Comunista still existed.58

The second split in Italian Trotskyism resulting from the quarrels of the 1970s within u s e c was the formation of the Lega Socialista Rivoluzionaria (l s r ). It was formed by Italian elements aligned with the International Bolshevik Fraction led by the Argentine Nahuel Moreno, when that group broke with the United Secretariat in 1979-80. However, in a congress in July 1982 the l s r decided to withdraw from the Moreno international faction and to assume an independent position.59

Another Italian group which by the early 1980s was unaffiliated with any of the international Trotskyite tendencies was the Revolutionary Workers Group for the Rebirth of the Fourth International (Gruppo Operaio Rivoluzionario por la rinascita della Quarta Internazionale g o r ). Its origins were in a split from the g c r in 1976 of people opposed to participation in the Proletarian Democracy electoral coalition of that year on the grounds that it was a "popular front."

These dissidents first organized as theBol- shevik-Leninist Group for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International. They soon established contacts with the ex-Lambertist Italian organization, the Bolshevik-Leninist

Group of Italy, but the two organizations found it impossible to agree on unity terms.

The 1976 dissidents from the g c r then decided in April 1978 to reorganize as the Lega Trotskista d'ltalia (l t i ). By that time they had entered into contact with the international Spartacist tendency [sic] and the l t i had fraternal delegates at the August1979 conference of the ist in London. However, controversies resulting from that encounter led first to the formation within the Lega Trotskista d'ltalia of the Internationalist Proletarian Opposition, which in April1980 broke away from the Lega to establish the Grupo Operaio Rivoluzionario por la rinascita della Quarta Internazionale.60 Although thereafter unaffiliated with any international alignment, the g o r did issue a call for a "genuine" international Trotskyist tendency.61

The Spartacist tendency originated in Italy in 1975. At a "European encampment" of the ist in July 1975, a group of Italian participants who had recently broken with Roberto Massari's Revolutionary Marxist Fraction announced the establishment of the Spartacist Nucleus of Italy.62 It apparently became part of the Lega Trotskista d'ltalia when that was established in 1976, and gained control of that group. In August 1980, it was formally announced that the l t i was becoming the Italian Sympathizing Section of the ist.63

The Italian Spartacists were centered principally in Milan. From there they issued a monthly periodical, Spartaco, which consisted principally of translations of articles from the New York Spartacist newspaper Workers Vanguard. From time to time they organized "debate assemblies" on subjects of current interest.

Still another international Trotskyist tendency to be represented in Italy at least for a time was the International Trotskyist Liaison Committee, the so-called Thornett group. The Gruppo Bolscevico Leninista (g b l ) had originally been part of the Lambertist c o r q i but broke with that group in

t

iItaly 597

However, the l t f draft claimed that the i m t document "revises the Trotskyist position. It reaffirms the guerrilla orientation adopted at the 1969 congress. At the same time it seeks to make that orientation more palatable.. . . What is referred to in the resolution . . . is not armed struggle as initiated and carried out by the majority of the population but violent actions initiated and carried out by small groups. Such actions are supposed to serve as examples to the masses." The i m t proposal put "emphasis on the action of miniscule groups. In reality that is all the resolution deals withthe action of miniscule groups isolated from the masses."

The l t f draft also argued that the blanket endorsement of guerrilla war for Latin America by the majority, if valid for that region, ought logically to be expanded throughout the world. It argued that "if it is true that the bourgeoisie will grant concessions in face of small mobilizations, as the resolution states elsewhere, but will seek to smash big mobilizations, doesn't that hold for Western Europe and for the United States?"38

Finally, the l t f document claimed that the acceptance of the guerrilla line by the Fourth International had been due largely to the influx of young people into the Fourth International who were inspired by the Chinese, Vietnam, and Cuban revolutions, but not by the Russian one. Furthermore, it said, a number of old-timers who should have known better had acquiesced to the youngsters.

Denouement of the Factional Conflict of 1970s

Hansen noted after the Tenth Congress that there had been extensive negotiations between the i m t and l t f before the meeting to assure its orderly procedure, and that there had also been accord between the two groups concerning the policy to be followed after the congress. It had been agreed to sus

pend further discussion on the issues voted on at the congress for one year, to maintain discussion in a monthly international discussion bulletin on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, youth radicalization, the women's movement, the Middle East, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe. It was also agreed to hold the next congress within two years.

Another part of the agreement between the two factions introduced an innovation in the Fourth International. It gave recognition to the fact that rival "sections" representing the two factions had come into existence. Although it instructed the i e c to use all its influence to bring about a merger of these groups, it also provided that "at the congress, Fourth Internationalist groups already existing separately were recognized regardless of their size as sympathizing groups; but this exceptional measure was not to be regarded as a precedent."39

The Eleventh Congress did not in fact take place until November 1979. During the intervening period a number of events transpired which ultimately brought the conflict between the i m t and l t f to an end, but which also resulted in a substantial split in the United Secretariat.

One relatively minor development following the 1974 World Congress was the breaking away from u s e c of the Third Tendency, which had stood apart from both the i m t and l t f at the congress, and had been led by an Italian Roberto Massari. Soon after the Tenth Congress Massari split the Italian affiliate to form the Lega Comunista. He then took the lead in establishing the Necessary International Initiative (n ii), a kind of "opposition" to u s e c conceived of as having a role similar to that of the Left Opposition to the Comintern in the early 1930s. A Third Tendency faction in Great Britain, and the Spartacusbund, which had earlier broken away from the German u s e c affiliate, were among the groups participating in the n i i .40 We have no information concerning how long the n ii continued in existence.

One of the most significant events of the

USEC: Trajectory 755

TRASCRIZIONE:

Factionalism Within the GI

Almost from the moment of their emergence as a public group once again, the German Trotskyists

associated with the United Secretariat suffered severe factional problems. Some of these reflected

the struggles going on within the USEC during the 1970s.

At least two splits occurred in USECs German section in the years immediately following the reestablishment of an open Trotskyist group. In the Spring of 1969 a faction broke away to form the

Spartacus group29. This Spartacusbund continued to exist for a number of years, although itself

suffering several splits. It became associated with a dissident USEC group known as the Necessary

International Inititiv, headed by an Italian Trotskyist, Roberto Massari30. Subsequently, another schism took place in the GIM, with a group reestablishing the IKD.

According to one hostile observer, The split was in a leftward direction Several other splits quickly fragmented the IKD leading to the existence in Germany of unstable and competing left-

centrist groupings31. Further dissension arose as the result of the establishment in the winter 1969-70 by the GIM of

another group, the Revolutionar-Kommunistische Jugend (RKJ-Revolutionary Communist Youth).

At the time of the merger of the GIM and the RKJ several years later, Was Tun (What Is to be

Done), the GIM periodical, explained that the RKJ was never a youth organization in the classical sensea group guided by the mother organization and having specific tasks in the field of youth work. The strategic conception of the RKJ was rather that it be a lever with which to build an organization capable of intervening in the class struggle under the special conditions of the

youth radicalization. That is, fundamental to the founding of the RKJ was the GIMs extreme weakness after the end of entrism and the split in the spring of 196932. The RKJ was formally established as a national organization in a convention held in Frankfurt, May

29-31, 1971. It voted to become a sympathizing organization of USEC. Its function was spelled out thus: In a period of West German capitalism in which a larger part of the worker youth, college students, and high-school students are approaching revolutionary positions, the RKJ will intervene

among the radicalizing youth to hasten the organization of the vanguard for consistent anticapitalist

struggle. In doing this, the RKJ will make an essential contribution to the anchoring of the

revolutionary organization in the class struggles of the West German proletariat33. However, the creation of the RKJ apparently created confusion among USEC German Trotskyists

rather than strengthening their movement. As a consequence, only five months after this founding

conference a second national convention of the RKJ was held October 30-November 1971 in

Cologne. Although that meeting allegedly reflected the rapid growth of the West German Trotskyist movement, its most notable decision was to call for the merger of the RKJ and the GIM34.

This merger was finally achieved at a fusion conference held December 30, 1972-January 1, 1973. Although it was reported that broad agreement was reached on some key points at that convention, it was decided to have formal votes on three competing draft political resolutions

presented at the meeting because neither the proposed theses nor the state of the discussion within the organization yet fully meets the objective requirements of the struggles in West Germany35. A resolution dealing with the reasons for unification of the GIM and RKJ was passed. Was Tun

subsequently reported that we believe that the conception of the RKJ, despite its great practical value in building the section was based on a number of mistakes, which are described in this

resolution; an underestimation of the newly arising revolutionary left itself, which generally strove

to overcome an outlook restricted to its own sector and to work out a general perspective for the

whole society; an underestimation of the practical effects of the upsurge of West German workers

struggles, which opened up increasing possibilities for bridging the gap between the working class

movement and the movement of radical youth by direct intervention in the proletariat; an

underestimation of the concrete significance of the weight of the Fourth International in West

Germany, which in the long run, if this development of a special West German strategy for building the organization had been carried further, would have led to a political regression36. The sharp differences of opinion reflected in the fusion conference continued within the GIM. This was reflected in the 1975 national conference of the organization, when three factions

appeared: These tendencies are the Internationalist Tendency (IT), which has held the majority on the Central Committee since the 1974 conference and supports the majority leadership of the Fourth

International; the Compass Tendency (KT), the second largest tendency; and a third, small

tendency, the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency (LTT), which supports the minority tendency in the

Fourth International37. The German USEC affiliate was thus split along the lines of the controversy then raging generally

within the United Secretariat. The largest group was aligned with the Europeans (Ernest Mandel, Pierre Frank and Livio Maitan) who were then pushing a guerrilla approach, particularly for the Latin American countries. The smallest group within the GIM was aligned with the USEC faction

led by the Socialist Workers Party of the United States. The second largest GIM faction (Compass

Tendency) was aligned with the so-called Third Tendency within USEC, led by the Italian Roberto

Massari38.

Was Tun, in reporting on this meeting of GIM, noted that in the vote on the political resolution at the 1975 National Conference, none of the three tendencies in the GIM was able to win a majority.

For a democratic-centralist organization, this is a situation as difficult as it is unusual. It means that

no tendency has a mandate to lead the organization on behalf of a majority of the membership. In the face of this situation, it was decided to summon shortly a new national conference. Meanwhile,

the 1975 meeting agreed to give the Internationalist Tendency an absolute majority on the new

Central Committee and provided that its version of the political resolution be the public general line of the GIM. A sixteen-point program, for work in the labor movement, among immigrants, and on other organizational issues was adopted as an interim directive to the leadership. Of the

thirty members of the new Central Committee, the IT was given sixteen, the KT twelve and the

LTT two; with the IT getting seven alternate members, the KT six and the LTT two39.

Factionalism continued. On July 9, 1978, the Central Committee of the GIM adopted a resolution

which indicated that the internecine struggles were threatening the very existence of the

organization. This resolution started out by proclaiming that despite at times violent political conflicts, the GIM has not yet fallen apart. While this fragile unity may rest on the realization that

left to their own resources splinter groupings cannot arrive at any political perspective for the long

run, nonetheless the fundamental common basis that still exists must be underlined. It claimed that the extant differences of opinion are of a tactical and not of a principled nature40. The resolution went on to note that a widespread criticism of the national leadership appeared at the June National Conference. In all probability the critics will be able to find support only from a

minority in the future as well. But on the other hand, no other grouping, coalition or political

conception has appeared from which an alternative leadership could emerge. Hence it is as good as

certain that the present up-in-the-air situation will continue, and the collapse of the organization will

be hastened. The Central Committee therefore resolved that extraordinary efforts to unify the organization had to be taken. These were the establishment of a Working Group, with representatives of all factions,

even those not represented in the Central Committee, and the request that the United Secretariat

name someone to preside over that organization. The Central Committee prescribed that The task of the Group will be to produce a detailed program for the GIMs work in the coming year, which as far as possible will not be open to interpretation, and it appealed to parts of the GIM to take part in this attempt at unifying our practice, to work out suggestions for it, name representative

delegates to the Working Group, and to work with it in a spirit of compromise41.

29 Intercontinental Press, New York, February 26, 1973, page 211

30 Workers Vanguard, New York, January 23, 1977, page 3

31 Spartacist, New York, Winter 1979, page 10

32 Reprinted in Intercontinental Press, New York, February 26, 1983, page 211

33 Intercontinental Press, New York, July 19, 1971, page 695

34 Intercontinental Press, New York, December 6, 1971, page 1063

35 Intercontinental Press, New York, February 26, 1972, page 210

36 Reprinted in Intercontinental Press, New York, February 26, 1973, page 211

37 Intercontinental Press, New York, June 23, 1975, page 894

38 Spartacist, New York, Winter 1979, page 1

39 Reprinted in Intercontinental Press, New York, June 23, 1975, page 894, page 895

40 Spartacist, New York, winter 1979, page 11

41 Ibid., page 17

[]

Latter-day GCR and Lega Comunista Rivoluzionaria

The end of the entrist experience brought about a major crisis within the ranks of the Italian

Trotskyists. It is Maitans opinion that the crisis arose because the decision to end the entrist policy came at least two years too late. As a consequence of this controversy an important part of the leadership and the cadres quit to join the formations of the extreme left, particularly Avanguardia

Operaia48. Elsewhere, Maitan has written about the gravity of the 1968-69 crisis in Italian Trotskyism. In 1972

he wrote that the active intervention of Trotskyism as an organized political force in the Italian situation was very seriously hampered by the extremely grave crisis the organization suffered in the

second half of 1968 and the beginning of 1969. During crucial months the organization was

paralyzed, and later it was enormously restricted, not only in relation to the big mass movements,

but also within the vanguard49. During the 1970s, the GCR rebuilt its ranks substantially. However, the basis on which it was

reconstructed was largely via recruits brought into their ranks by the student revolt of the late 1960s

and early 1970s50. Although there was penetration of some segments of the labor movement, the

membership and leadership of the group came principally from the ranks of student activists.

Meanwhile, the GCR had changed its name to Lega Comunista Rivoluzionaria (LCR).

During the 1970s and early 1980s the GCR-LCR considered themselves as part of what they

frequently referred to as the vanguard. This consisted not only of their own organization, but a variety of other far left parties and groups, including Maoists, ex-Maoists, and some others not

easily catalogued. The Trotskyists tended to picture the vanguard as an alternative to the Socialists and Communists on the Left, to measure their own performance particularly in relation to

that of other vanguard elements, and from time to time to seek various kinds of cooperation with those elements.

One can cite various examples of such cooperation. In January 1975 an anti-Vietnam War

demonstration was held in Rome with the support of the GCR, Avanguardia Operaia, Potere

Operaio, Viva il Comunismo, Il Comunista, Gruppo Gramsci, and the Communist Party of Italy

(Marxist-Leninist)51. In the 1976 election the GCR collaborated with Proletarian Democracy, a

coalition including Avanguardia Operaia, Partito dUnit Proletaria per il Comunismo, Lotta Continua, and various other far left elements. The GCR ran three candidates on the Proletarian

Democracy ticket52.

In an interview published in 1977 Maitan sketched the importance which the Trotskyists gave to

their particular vanguard orientation: Beginning with the 1970 and 1971 national congresses, we worked out a strategy for building the revolutionary party as the outcome of a three-part

movement: gathering together the vanguard groups around coherent platforms based on a common

experience in struggle; attracting the worker and student vanguards around this pole; and

developing the antibureaucratic and antireformist consciousness of those working class sectors that

are under the influence of the traditional parties53. There are no membership statistics available for the GCR/LCR. However, its strength is said to

have been centered in the north, including the cities of Turin, Milan, Genoa, and Brescia. Its

principal center in central Italy was Rome, and in the south it had some membership in Taranto54.

It was not until 1973 that the GCR decided to orient its activities towards the organized labor

movement55. It certainly did not become a major element in the trade unions. However, it has been

reported that the LCR had good influence in several factories, including the Fiat plant in Turin, the Alfa Romeo, Imperial, and Face Standard factories in Milan, and the Italsider plant in Taranto.

At one time, in 1969-70, it also had considerable influence in the labor movement in the southern

port of Bari. This did not result in any long-term strength for the Trotskyist movement in that

region, and after 1973 a number of the Trotskyist trade union cadres from Bari were sent to work in

Milan, Florence, and other cities56.

Other Trotskyist Groups in Italy

Although the GCR-LCR has been the longest-lived and probably largest group in Italy proclaiming

loyalty to Trotskyism, it has by no means been the only one. Most other major elements in the

world movement have had some representation in the country.

The oldest non-USEC Trotskyist group in Italy was the Partito Comunista Rivoluzionario

(Trotskyista), affiliated with the Posadas version of the Fourth International. At least in its early

years, the Italian group was less prone than most of the Posadas parties to devote its time

exclusively to the writings of J. Posadas. For example, the August 10, 1964, issue of its newspaper,

Lotta Operaia, although containing one two-page article of Posadas on contemporary Brazilian

events, was taken up largely with analysis of contemporary Italian political developments, including

the Communist Partys betrayal of a supposed workers movement to occupy key factories, and the evolution of the left-wing Socialist party, the PSIUP, with which the Posadas people apparently

had substantial contact. As late as 1975, the Posadas Fourth International still reported that Lotta

Operaia was appearing as the organ of its Italian affiliate57. We have no further information about

the evolution of the group.

At least two of the dissident Italian Trotskyist groups arose from factional controversies within the

United Secretariat during the 1970s. One was the Lega Comunista. In the USEC controversies of

that period, in addition to the International Majority Tendency led by Ernest Mandel, Livio Maitan,

and Pierre Frank and the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency aligned with the Socialist Workers Party of

the U.S., there was a Revolutionary Marxist Fraction, which was represented at the 1974 Tenth

World Congress of USEC by an Italian delegate, Roberto Massari. In 1975 Massari led a split in the

GCR/LCR to form the Lega Comunista. It took the lead in organizing outside of USEC an

international opposition to the United Secretariat, the Necessary International Initiative (NII), with affiliates in Great Britain and Germany as well as Italy. As late as 1980, the Lega Comunista

still existed58.

The second split in Italian Trotskyism resulting from the quarrels of the 1970s within USEC was

the formation of the Lega Socialista Rivoluzionaria (LSR). It was formed by Italian elements

aligned with the International Bolshevik Fraction led by the Argentine Nahuel Moreno, when that

group broke with the United Secretariat in 1979-80. However, in a congress in July 1982 the LSR

decided to withdraw from the Moreno international faction and to assume an independent

position59.

Another Italian group which by the early 1980s was unaffiliated with any of the international

Trotskyist tendencies was the Revolutionary Workers Group for the Rebirth of the Fourth

International (Gruppo Operaio Rivoluzionario per la Rinascita della Quarta InternazionaleGOR).

Its origins were in a split from the GCR in 1976 of people opposed to participation in the

Proletarian Democracy electoral coalition of that year on the grounds that it was a popular front. These dissidents first organized as the Bolshevik-Leninist Group for the Reconstruction of the

Fourth International. They soon established contacts with the ex-Lambertist Italian organization, the

Bolshevik-Leninist Group of Italy, but the two organizations found it impossible to agree on unity

terms.

The 1976 dissidents from the GCR then decided in April 1978 to reorganize as the Lega Trotskista

dltalia (LTI). By that time they had entered into contact with the international Spartacist tendency [sic] and the LTI had fraternal delegates at the August 1979 conference of the ist in London.

However, controversies resulting from that encounter led first to the formation within the Lega

Trotskista dltalia of the Internationalist Proletarian Opposition, which in April 1980 broke away from the Lega to establish the Gruppo Operaio Rivoluzionario per la Rinascita della Quarta

Internazionale60. Although thereafter unaffiliated with any international alignment, the GOR did

issue a call for a genuine international Trotskyist tendency61. The Spartacist tendency originated in Italy in 1975. At a European encampment of the ist in July 1975, a group of Italian participants who had recently broken with Roberto Massaris Revolutionary Marxist Fraction announced the establishment of the Spartacist Nucleus of Italy62. It apparently

became part of the Lega Trotskista dltalia when that was established in 1976, and gained control of that group. In August 1980, it was formally announced that the LTI was becoming the Italian

Sympathizing Section of the ist63.

The Italian Spartacists were centered principally in Milan. From there they issued a monthly

periodical, Spartaco, which consisted principally of translations of articles from the New York

Spartacist newspaper Workers Vanguard. From time to time they organized debate assemblies on subjects of current interest.

Still another international Trotskyist tendency to be represented in Italy at least for a time was the

International Trotskyist Liaison Committee, the so-called Thornett group. The Gruppo Bolscevico

Leninista (GBL) had originally been part of the Lambertist CORQI but broke with that group in

1975 over the issue of the Lambertists violent denunciations of Varga and his followers at the time they broke with CORQI. Although for a while indicating some attraction to the Spartacists, the

Gruppo Bolscevico Leninista finally ended up in 1980 joining with the Workers Socialist League of

Great Britain and a few other groups to establish the Liaison Committee64.

The GBL changed its name to Lega Operaia Rivoluzionaria, and by the early 1980s was working

more or less closely with the United Secretariats Lega Comunista Rivoluzionaria. There were some discussions between the two groups of the possibility of unity, but by the end of 1983 these

discussions did not seem likely to result in their proximate unification65.

Conclusion

Trotskyism has never been a major force in general Italian politics, or even on the Italian Left. It has

persisted as an element in the Far Left since before the end of World War II. Both in the 1930s and

during the forty years after the Second World War, it provided important leadership for the

international Trotskyist movement.

48 Letter to the author from Livio Maitan, December 13, 1983

49 Livio Maitan: Some Data on Italian Problems, Intercontinental Press, New York, June 5, 1972, page 651

50 Letter to the author from Livio Maitan, November 14, 1983

51 Intercontinental Press, New York, February 5, 1973, page 115

52 Intercontinental Press, New York, June 21, 1976, page 986

53 Intercontinental Press, New York, May 23, 1977, page 585

54 Letter to the author from Livio Maitan, November 24, 1983

55 Intercontinental Press, New York, May 23, 1977, page 585

56 Letter to the author from Antonio Moscato, September 14, 1983

57 Revista Marxista Latinoamericana, April 1975, page 79

58 Workers Vanguard, New York, January 28, 1977, page 3; see also Lega Trotskista dltalia: Contrappunto lamentevole in basso buffo, Gli Anti-Spartachisti: Il Blocco GLI-WSI-LOB, Genoa, August 1980

59 Letter to the author from Livio Maitan, November 24, 1983

60 Trotskyist Position, Rome, May 1981, pages 2-5

61 Ibid., pages 11-18

62 Spartacist, Italian Edition, September 1975, page 22

63 Spartaco, Milan, February 1981, pages 17-18

64 Lega Trotskista dltalia: Contrappunto lamentevole etc., op. cit., page 3 65 Letter to the author from Livio Maitan, November 24, 1983

[]

Denouement of the Factional Conflict of 1970s

Hansen noted after the Tenth Congress that there had been extensive negotiations between the IMT

and LTF before the meeting to assure its orderly procedure, and that there had also been accord

between the two groups concerning the policy to be followed after the congress. It had been agreed

to suspend further discussion on the issues voted on at the congress for one year, to maintain

discussion in a monthly international discussion bulletin on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, youth

radicalization, the womens movement, the Middle East, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe. It was also agreed to hold the next congress within two years.

Another part of the agreement between the two factions introduced an innovation in the Fourth

International. It gave recognition to the fact that rival sections representing the two factions had come into existence. Although it instructed the IEC to use all its influence to bring about a merger

of these groups, it also provided that at the congress, Fourth Internationalist groups already existing separately were recognized regardless of their size as sympathizing groups; but this

exceptional measure was not to be regarded as a precedent39. The Eleventh Congress did not in fact take place until November 1979. During the intervening

period a number of events transpired which ultimately brought the conflict between the IMT and

LTF to an end, but which also resulted in a substantial split in the United Secretariat.

One relatively minor development following the 1974 World Congress was the breaking away from

USEC of the Third Tendency, which had stood apart from both the IMT and LTF at the congress,

and had been led by an Italian, Roberto Massari. Soon after the Tenth Congress Massari split the

Italian affiliate to form the Lega Comunista. He then took the lead in establishing the Necessary

International Initiative (NII), a kind of opposition to USEC conceived of as having a role similar to that of the Left Opposition to the Comintern in the early 1930s. A Third Tendency faction in

Great Britain, and the Spartacusbund, which had earlier broken away from the German USEC

affiliate, were among the groups participating in the NII40. We have no information concerning how

long the NII continued in existence.

One of the most significant events of the period after the Tenth Congress was a split in the Leninist

Trotskyist Faction which took place in February 1976. At that time several of the Latin American

sections which had been associated with the LTF broke away from it in disagreement with the

LTFs position on the developments in Portugal following the 1974 revolution there. They formed the Bolshevik Tendency. The principal figure of this Tendency was Hugo Bressano, more generally

known by his party name, Nahuel Moreno, the main leader of the Argentine Partido Socialista de

los Trabajadores41. Before the Eleventh Congress, the Bolshevik Tendency was to abandon the

United Secretariat and establish its own separate branch of International Trotskyism.

Meanwhile, in August 1975 the LTF Steering Committee issued a call for the dissolution of both

factions, saying that if there are guarantees for a full, free and democratic discussion, there is no need for a factional structure While ideological tendencies are still called for because of the political differences, there would be no objective need to maintain the factions in order to have the

necessary discussion. This suggestion was turned down at the time by the International Majority Tendency42.

A number of new issues of dispute between the two factions subsequently arose. These included the

attitude to be taken toward the Portuguese Revolution, where the international leadership of the

IMT favored an alliance with the left wing of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and the LTF

urged the Portuguese Trotskyists to have nothing to do with the MFA and to issue a call for a

Socialist-Communist government instead of one dominated by the military.

Another source of disagreement was the relations between the United Secretariat and the Lambertist

international tendency, the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International

(CORQI). CORQI approached the USEC for discussions with a view to the possibility of

reunification of the two groups. The LTF favored such discussions, the IMT opposed them.

Finally, the old organizational issue also was raised. The LTF complained that USEC was attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of various sections to a degree not provided for in the

Statutes of the international organization, and that in some of the European sections it was

beginning to purge leaders of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction43.

However, at a point at which, if previous experiences of the Fourth International were to give any

indication, a complete split between the two factions seemed a possibility if not a likelihood, the

situation suddenly changed. In part, at least, this was due to increasing differences which were

tending to develop within both the IMT and the LTF. In part, too, it was undoubtedly due to a

reassessment by the European leaders of the issue which had been the cause of the original

differences in USEC, the endorsement of guerrilla warfare as the basic strategy of the organization,

at least in Latin America.

In December 1976, the Steering Committee of the IMT published a document of self criticism, the key paragraph of which was the following: At the Ninth World Congress we paid the price for this lack of systematic analysis of the Cuban revolution. On the basis of rapid and hasty

generalizations, we did not clearly oppose the incorrect lessons drawn from the Cuban revolution by

the great majority of the Latin American vanguard. Even though what had really happened in Cuba

provided us the necessary means, we did not adequately combat the ideawhich cost so many deaths and defeats in Latin Americathat a few dozen or a few hundred revolutionaries (no matter how courageous and capable) isolated from the rest of the society could set in motion a historic

process leading to a socialist revolution44. A few months later, in August 1977, the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction

proclaimed the unilateral dissolution of its group. Three months after that, the IMT also dissolved.

Subsequently, leaders of the two groups worked together to draft the major documents for the

Eleventh Congress of the USEC45.

The definitive end of this long controversy came at the Eleventh Congress, with the adoption of a

new resolution on Latin America. It was passed with a vote of ninety-four in favor, eleven against,

3.5 abstentions, and 4.5 not voting46. The key portion of that resolution read, The Fourth International promoted an incorrect political orientation in Latin America for several years As a result of this erroneous line, many of the cadres and parties of the Fourth International were

politically disarmed in face of the widespread, but false, idea that a small group of courageous and

capable revolutionaries could set in motion a process leading to a socialist revolution. The process

of rooting our parties in the working class and oppressed masses was hindered. The line that was

followed led to adventurist actions and losses from our own ranks47.

39 Intercontinental Press, New York, December 23, 1974, page 1722

40 Ibid., page 1754

41 Ibid., page 1765

42 Ibid., page 1772

43 Ibid., page 1802

44 Ibid., page 1802

45 Ibid., page 1814

46 Ibid., page 1816

47 Ibid., page 1720