dana r. dillon and paolo pasicolan- southeast asia and the war against terrorism

8/3/2019 Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan- Southeast Asia and the War Against Terrorism

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No. 1496 October 23, 2001

Produced by theAsian Studies Center

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This paper, in its entirety, can befound at: www.heritage.org/library/

backgrounder/bg1496.html

SOUTHEAST ASIAANDTHE

WARAGAINST TERRORISM

DANA R. DILLONAND PAOLO PASICOLAN

Having completed the initial wave of air strikeson Afghanistan, the United States has deployedSpecial Forces troops to Central Asia, the front linein Americas war on terrorism. The task is clear: tohunt down Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaedanetwork of terrorists who are responsible for theSeptember 11 attacks as well as other acts of ter-rorism against the United States. However, as Pres-ident George Bush promised before the joint

session of Congress on September 20, Our war onterror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not endthere. It will not end until every terrorist group ofglobal reach has been found, stopped anddefeated.1

Southeast Asia will be another important frontin this war. Home to the largest Muslim nation(Indonesia) and two other countries with groupsthreatening to establish fundamentalist Islamictheocracies (Philippines and Malaysia), Southeast

Asia has a large number of established Muslim

fundamentalist groups sympathetic to Osama binLaden. Thus, the region is both an ideal safe havenfor him and a potential base of operations fromwhich he could launch terrorist counteroffensivesagainst the United States.

In addition, corrupt law enforcement institu-tions, backlogged judicial systems, and inadequate

cooperation among its countries make it difficultto eliminate the various cells that operate in South-east Asia. Moreover, until September 11 there waslittle political will there to commit significant gov-ernment resources to combat terrorism, which hadbeen perceived as alimited, but manage-able state problem.

Nevertheless, unlikeal-Qaedascollabora-tiverelationship withthe Taliban rulingparty and militia in

Afghanistan, SoutheastAsian governmentshave been opposed toterrorist groups andtheir activities fordecades, even if theyhave not always

actively suppressedthem. Therefore,direct U.S. or coalitionintervention could lend credence to bin Ladenscontention that these governments are mere pup-pets of the West, and thereby exacerbate the ter-rorist infection.

1. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001, availableat http//whitehouse.gove/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.


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U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asiashould be designed to help, not hinder, local solu-tions. Washington should work to increase thereach of Southeast Asian governments to combatterrorism by encouraging regional security cooper-ation, beginning with a special session of the

Regional Forum of the Association of South-EastAsian Nations (ASEAN). It also should helpimprove the counterterrorism capabilities of mili-taries in the region through training and equip-ment, developing a robust working relationshipbetween intelligence services, and coordinatingthe efforts of national financial institutions to closeoff funding to the terrorists.

IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY

The biggest obstacle to fighting terrorists in

Southeast Asia is separating the fans in the standsfrom the players on the field. Just because an orga-nization is Islamic and sympathetic to the plight ofPalestinians, Kashmiris, or Afghans does not meanits members are international terrorists. The Presi-dent defined the enemy as any terrorist group ofglobal reach. To be global in reach means eitherhaving an international political agenda incorpo-rating acts of terrorism or receiving funds or assis-tance from international terrorist organizations.

There are more than 200 million Muslims in

Southeast Asia. Three countries, Malaysia, Bruneiand Indonesia, have Muslim majorities, and in theworlds largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, 170 mil-lion people adhere to the Islamic faith. The vastmajority of these people do not support terrorismand are not explicitly anti-American, but they pro-vide fertile ground for al-Qaeda to recruit fighters,raise money, and find safe harbor. The regionsgovernments already oppose terrorism; thus,direct U.S. military action against terrorist groupsin Southeast Asia should be done in concert with

local counterterrorism initiatives so as not to invitean anti-American backlash.

Governments define threats either based ondangers posed to their countrys interests or dan-gers posed to the interests of the regime in power.The United States must be careful not to allow thedefinition of terrorist to become so broad that

authoritarian governments could use it to labeltheir opposition political parties as internationalterrorists. For example, the Malaysian governmenthas arrested 10 people under its Internal Security

Act, but they have yet to be charged with a specificterrorist-related crime. The police claim that these

people are members of a militant Islamic group.Perhaps significantly, at least four of the peoplearrested are from the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party,the largest opposition party to the government ofPrime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.2

In order to avoid becoming mired in the domes-tic political agendas of countries in Southeast Asiawhile combating legitimate global terrorist net-works there, the United States should assist theregions governments in clamping down on groupsthat have a history of using violence and terror to

achieve their political goals. Regardless of thedeclared worthiness of their objectives, kidnap-ping, piracy, and indiscriminate violence againstcivilians are unacceptable means to achieve thosegoals. After all, terrorism does not change theestablished laws of land warfare; neither should awar against it.

The majority of indigenous terrorist groups inSoutheast Asia have limited resources to expandtheir fight outside their home countries, and theyare small enough that local governments, with the

requisite political determination, should be able toquash them. The United States can help regionalgovernments to identify domestic terrorist organi-zations with foreign support and it should cooper-ate with them to cut off that support. Finally, theUnited States should make clear that it woulddefend its allies and friends in Southeast Asiaagainst international terrorist attacks.

THE PHILIPPINES AND ABU SAYYAF

As the largest Christian country in Asia with

only a 5 percent Muslim minority, the Philippinesseems like an unlikely incubator of Muslim funda-mentalism. However, the U.S. government hasidentified it as one of over 50 countries fromwhich al-Qaeda operates, demonstrating that it isnot the practice of Islam that is responsible for ter-rorism; rather it is the spread of a perverse political

2. Malaysian Police Detain More Suspected Islamic Militants, Associated Press, October 10, 2001.


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interpretation of Islam. Several organizations inthe Philippines have clearly established links to al-Qaeda, and there is evidence that the events ofSeptember 11 can be traced to them.

The Abu Sayyaf groupan organization

founded by one of bin Ladens lieutenants, JamalKhalifa, and initially led by Abdurajak Janjalani, aFilipino Muslim who fought with bin Laden in

Afghanistanhas been the most active of the ter-rorist organizations operating in the Philippines. Itbegan operations in the early 1990s, staging con-ventional terrorist operations in the southernprovince of Mindanao.

In April 2000, the Abu Sayyaf committed itsmost successful international terrorist under-taking, kidnapping 20 Asian and European

hostages from a Malaysian resort. After monthsof negotiations, a third-party negotiating teamfrom Libya paid a ransom of over $20 millionin order to secure the hostages release.

In May 2001, equipped with more guns, state-of-the-art speedboats, and sophisticated com-munications devices purchased with the ran-som money, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped asecond group of tourists, as well as foreign

journalists covering their story.3 This groupincluded three Americans; one American was

murdered, the other two remain hostages.Many have discounted these kidnap-for-ran-

som incidents in the past two years as the acts of acriminal organization operating under the guise ofMuslim separatism. However, the events of Sep-tember 11 brought greater scrutiny upon the AbuSayyaf and its links to al-Qaeda. Among the stan-dard demands the Abu Sayyaf makes during hos-tage negotiations has been the release of three Arabterrorists, including Ramzi Yousef, who is cur-rently serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for

the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.In 1994 Yousef visited Mindanao to help train

Abu Sayyaf operatives in the use of modern explo-sives. Later that year, he used the Philippines as a

staging area for a dry run of various terrorist sce-narios. For example, to test a new bomb design,

Yousef boarded Philippine Airlines flight 434 fromManila to Tokyo, assembled a bomb in the aircraftlavatory, and left during a stopover.4 Although thepilot was able to make an emergency landing, a

Japanese businessman was killed in the explosion.

Recently rediscovered intelligence reports from1995 reveal that the Abu Sayyaf may have pro-vided logistical support for Ramzi Yousef. In Janu-ary 1995, while investigating a routine apartmentfire, Philippine authorities uncovered the details ofa plan called Operation Bojinka, a blueprint forterrorism that included a plot to kill the Pope aswell as the bombings of 11 unidentified U.S. pas-senger jets.5 More disturbing, however, are revela-tions that Operation Bojinka also included a plan

to hijack a commercial airliner and crash it intothe Central Intelligence Agencys headquarters inLangley, Virginia.

It turned out that the apartment belonged toRamzi Yousef, and that the fire began when abomb exploded prematurely. With the informationprovided by Philippine authorities, the FederalBureau of Investigation was able to arrest Yousef amonth later in Pakistan.

It is likely that, left to its own devices, the AbuSayyaf groups high-profit criminal activities, such

as piracy, kidnapping, and bank robbery, will con-tinue, and that the funds these activities generatecould be shared with al-Qaeda.

RESPONDING TO THE TERRORIST

THREAT

As a borderless crime, terrorism by nature is aninternational problem that requires a solution withan international focus. However, for a global coali-tion against terrorism to succeed, governmentsmust be held accountable for eliminating their

local terrorist threats. The United States shouldhelp governments in Southeast Asia as much asnecessary to win the war on terrorism at its roots.However, any U.S. support must be geared toward

3. Noralyn Mustafa, Sipadan Hostage-Taking: A Year Ago, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2001, p. 18.

4. Frank Connolly, FBI Agents Knew of Plan to Bomb the Pentagon, Sunday Business Post, September 23, 2001.

5. Robert Frank and James Hookway, Abu Sayyaf: The Long Tentacles of Terror, The Wall Street Journal, September 25,2001, p. A12.


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local solutions as well as initiatives to deal with theproblem in the long term. Diplomatic efforts of theU.S. government should encourage the people ofSoutheast Asia to recognize the dangers of terror-ism and to see that only a concerted effort willeradicate this scourge.

Specifically, the United States should:

Encourage regional initiatives against ter-rorism. The government of the Philippinesplans to initiate a regional anti-terrorist coali-tion with Malaysia and Indonesiathe threeSoutheast Asian nations that have a history ofdealing with Muslim fundamentalists.

Although the proposal is in the initial planningstages, the coalition would most likely focuson intelligence-sharing, improving maritime

border security, and possibly joint militaryaction against transnational extremist groups.The United States should strongly support thePhilippineled coalition against terrorism.

Although such a coalition should includemany countries committed to eradicating theproblem of terrorism, a core group consistingof the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malay-sia, and Indonesia would give it a solid foun-dation.

Ask ASEAN leaders to call for a special ses-sion of the ASEAN Regional Forum. To fur-ther widen the political base of a regionalcoalition, the United States, the EuropeanUnion (EU), and Japan should raise the issueof terrorism at that special session. For the waron terrorism to succeed, the Forums membersmust make it clear to the people of Southeast

Asias nations that terrorism is morally unac-ceptable and a threat to regional stability thatmust be eliminated. Among the issues theForum should address is a unified no-ransompolicy. Paying off ransoms merely encourages

future acts of terror, as evidenced by the AbuSayyaf cases.

Provide support for counterterrorismthrough financial and military aid. Insteadof paying money to the kidnappers as wasdone in the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping incident in

April 2000, the United States, the EU, andJapan should create a consortiumsimilar tothe Korean peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO)to help fund SoutheastAsian government counterterrorism efforts.Aid should be disbursed in the form of directfunds and in training for military and policepersonnel, possibly in the form of additionalInternational Military Education and Training

(IMET) programs. The United States shouldsend excess defense articles (equipment thatmay be obsolete for the U.S. forces but repre-sent an upgrade for Asian militaries) to govern-ments that are sincerely committed tocombating terrorism.

Ensure that support targets counterterror-ism initiatives. Any financial or military U.S.support must be accompanied by conditions.The United States must be able to verify thatits aid goes directly to counterterrorist initia-

tives and not into the pockets of corrupt mili-tary regimes. The U.S. war on terrorism mustidentify terrorist organizations based on theseverity of their acts, not on their declaredpolitical agenda. Additionally, to avoid compli-cated political entanglements, the UnitedStates must ensure that its financial aid is tem-porary and geared toward facilitating a morepermanent, regionally funded, counterterror-ist organization. Wherever possible, the UnitedStates should reformulate existing military aid

and cooperation for Southeast Asia to refocusprograms on dealing with terrorism.

Increase intelligence-sharing with U.S.allies and friends in Southeast Asia. Wash-ington should work closely with regional gov-ernments in identifying organizations in theregion, beyond the Abu Sayyaf, that could beadded to the State Department list of terroristorganizations with a global reach or fundingfrom international terrorist networks. Groupsshould be listed as terrorists by their actions,

not their political agenda.With a significant secular Muslim populationand established links to Osama bin Ladensnetwork, Southeast Asia offers valuableresources for human intelligence. For example,in Indonesia numerous organizations use ter-ror and violence for political aims, includingsome with contacts to al-Qaeda. The Indone-sian government will be hard pressed to


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address all of them with its limited resources.Many of these groups appear to have largebudgets but undetermined funding sources.

Washington could assist Indonesia, and otherregional governments, in choking off thesefunding sources through closer cooperation inidentifying domestic terrorist organizations.

Use unilateral military action as a lastresort. While the preferred solution is to uselocal governments and local security forces toattack terrorism at its roots, in order to protect

Americans from terrorist acts, Washingtonmust always keep open the option of directmilitary intervention. Should there be a clearand immediate threat to U.S. citizens andproperty that local security forces in Southeast

Asia cannot handle, Washington must be readyto act.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of Indochina, during theCold War indigenous military forces were strong

enough to resist numerous communist insurgen-cies. Today, despite the effects of the 1997 Asianfinancial crisis, governments in the region possesseconomic and military means to fight domesticterrorism that are far superior to those they mar-shaled during the Cold War. Yet the fragility of

some local governments (and in some cases theirculpability) means that direct U.S. military actionmust only be a last resort.

To win the war, Washington must focus onweakening international terrorist networks by cut-ting off their sources of funding. It should alsohelp strengthen the ability of regional govern-ments to suppress terrorists tied in with organiza-tions like al-Qaeda by encouraging increasedregional cooperation in intelligence-sharing andproviding targeted funds, training, and support as

needed.

--Dana R. Dillon is a Senior Policy Analyst forSoutheast Asia, and Paolo Pasicolan is a ResearchAssistant, in the Asian Studies Center at The HeritageFoundation.

dana r. dillon and paolo pasicolan- southeast asia and the war against terrorism

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