dare to ask: negotiating when it matters, texas enterprise speaker series, march 28, 2012

Dare to Ask!

Negotiating When it Matters

Emily T. AmanatullahAssistant Professor of Management

The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business

Gender Disparities Still Exist

Women’s advancement 14.1% Fortune 500 Corporate Officers 16.1% Fortune 500 Board seats 3.6% Fortune 500 CEO’s

Women’s financial compensation Wage gap = 76.6% 7.6% of Fortune 500 top earners were women

Gender & Negotiations

Conflicting empirical evidence for the effect of gender on negotiations (for review, Kray & Thompson, 2005) Situational variation is important

Focus on distributive negotiations Women are less competitive than men (Walters,

Stulmacher, & Meyer, 1998)

Women agree to worse outcomes than men (Stulmacher & Walters, 1999)

Social Constraints

Traditional gender roles Feminine = communality, caring, helpfulness

(Chapman, 1975; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 2002) Masculine = independence, self-reliance,

assertiveness (Moore, 1984; Schein, 2001)

Gender roles as social norms (Eagly, 1987) Descriptive norms – “how women are”

Perceived average or typical behavior for the gender Expectations are anchored on the perceived average

Injunctive norms – “how women should be” Standard for gender-appropriate behavior in a situation Violators of standard are socially sanctioned Prescriptive & Proscriptive components

Backlash Effect Managerial effectiveness (and distributive

negotiation tactics) strongly associated with masculine characteristics Independence, Assertiveness, Self-confidence, etc. Inconsistency with feminine gender roles

1: Women assumed to have less leadership potential than men

Likeable but incompetent (Eagly & Karau, 2002) Based on descriptive function of gender norms

2: Women who do demonstrate leadership are socially punished for violating gender norms

Competent but unlikeable (Eagly et al., 1992; Heilman, 2001, et al., 2004)

Based on injunctive function of gender norms

Advocacy Advocacy Context (Bowles, Babcock & McGinn,

2005; Wade 2001) Self: Negotiating on one’s own behalf Other: Negotiating on behalf of another

Other-advocacy moderates (in)congruence of female gender role with value claiming negotiation tactics Self: Assertive tactics ≠ Female gender role

Perceived as self-interested and agentic Other: Assertive tactics = Female gender role

Women traditionally other-advocates (Wade, 2001) Women more comfortable wielding power for others (Miller,

1991)

Your Data:Comparing Advocacy Contexts

Self-Advocacy Other-Advocacy2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4

FrequencyComfortSuccess

No

t at

all

Ext

rem

ely

Outline of Studies Effect on Outcomes

Pilot Study – Salary negotiation exercise

Psychological Mechanisms Behavior of Targets

Study 1 – Conflict resolution style preference Study 2 – Concessionary behavior during

negotiation mediated by fear of backlash Behavior of Perceivers

Study 3 – Social Backlash Study 4 – Replication of Backlash

Pilot Study: Method 56 upper-level managers (80% male)

Simulated salary negotiation Manipulated advocacy in new hire role

New hire negotiating own salary Substitute filling in due to scheduling conflict

For control, hiring manager always male Wide zone of possible agreements from

$108K to $133K

Pilot Study: Results

113

115

117

119

121

123

125

127

129

131

133

Self Other

Advocacy Context

Sa

lary

($

th

ou

sa

nd

s)

Male

Female

Study 1: Method 115 Executive MBAs (74% male) Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument

The innovation Focusing the questions on conflicts in which respondents

were Self- vs. Other-advocacy Distributive Index = Competing – Accommodating

Recent large-sample study found women score lower on competing than men at all organizational levels (Thomas et al. 2006) Does other-advocacy moderate this effect?

Study 1: Results

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Advocacy Context

Dis

trib

uti

ve In

dex

Male

Female

Self Other

Your Data:Negotiation Self-Efficacy

Distrib

utive

Self

-Effi

cacy

Inte

grat

ive S

elf-E

ffica

cy30354045505560657075

Self-AdvocacyOther-Advocacy

Co

nfi

den

ce i

n N

ego

tiat

ion

Ab

ilit

y

Study 2: Method 59 subjects (53% male) Computerized negotiation experiment

Same counterpart for each subject Computer-simulated male counterpart Hiring manager always same male

Gender made salient with digital photos Presented counterparts with side by side photos

Dependent variable Concessionary behavior

Mediating variable Fear of anticipated backlash

2-item measure (r = .91) “How much do you think you can reasonably ask for without

causing the hiring manager… …to perceive you to be a pushy person?” …to punish you for being too demanding?”

Lower score indicates greater fear of backlash

Study 2: ResultsAnticipated Backlash

38000

40000

42000

44000

46000

48000

50000

52000

Self Other

Advocacy Context

An

tici

pat

ed B

ackl

ash

Male

Female

Study 2: ResultsConcessionary Behavior

38000

40000

42000

44000

46000

48000

50000

52000

Self Other

Advocacy Context

Ro

un

d 1

Co

un

tero

ffer

Male

Female

Study 2: ResultsMediation

Gender * RoleCounteroffer

(Round 1)

AnticipatedBacklash

β = .45*Backlash only: β = .75***

Combined model: β = .66***

Gender*Role only: β = .45*

Combined model: β = .16

Note: * p < .05; *** p < .001

Study 2: Concessionary Behavior

36000

38000

40000

42000

44000

46000

48000

50000

1 2 3 4 5

Round of Negotiation

Male - Self

Male - Other

Female - Self

Female - Other

Study 3: Method 52 MBA students Salary negotiation exercise

During class focused on value claiming tactics Students encouraged to be aggressive

No differences in salary across gender/role But did self-advocating women suffer backlash at

the cost of financial gain? Asked counterparts how

negative/positive of an impression they formed of their partner after the negotiation (scale from 1 to 7)

Study 3: Results

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

Self Other

Advocacy Context

Imp

ress

ion

Fo

rmed

by

Co

un

terp

art

Male

Female

Study 4: Method 226 undergraduate subjects (50% male)

2 x 2 x 2 Factorial Design Gender of Target: Male or Female Behavior of Target: Assertive or Non-assertive Advocacy Context: Self or Other

Dependent Variable Measured Social Backlash

Study 4: Results

3

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5

Self Other Self Other

Assertive Non-Assertive

So

cia

l Ac

ce

pta

nc

e

Male

Female

Gendered Attributions Double bind: Warmth vs. Competence

Likable & incompetent OR competent & unlikable

Greater nuance in injunctive norms Prescriptive

How men/women “should be” Men – “Competent” Women – “Warm”

Proscriptive How men/women “ought not be”

Men – “Weak” Women – “Dominant”

Arguably greater sanctions for these violations

Follow-up Study: Attributions 532 students Watched video of a negotiation

Hiring manager was static Manipulated Sex, Behavior, Advocacy of Target

Measured Likelihood to backlash against target

Social backlash Leader backlash

Gendered attributions Prescriptions – positive masc/fem attributes Proscriptions – negative masc/fem attributes

(For brevity, results from Female Targets only)

Attribution Study: Results

Assertive Non-Assertive2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

Self-AdvocateOther-Advocate

Ne

ga

tiv

e M

as

cu

lin

e A

ttri

bu

tio

ns

(Do

min

an

t/A

rro

ga

nt)

Attribution Study: Results

Assertive Non-Assertive2.00

2.20

2.40

2.60

2.80

3.00

3.20

3.40

3.60

Self-AdvocateOther-Advocate

Ne

ga

tiv

e F

em

inin

e A

ttri

bu

tio

ns

(We

ak

/Na

ive

)

Negotiating for a group Us-advocacy

What is more salient? Self-interested motives – Inconsistency →

backlash present Other-interested motives – Consistency →

backlash absent

Can a woman avoid social sanctions AND reap financial value IF negotiating for a group to which she belongs?

Us-Advocacy:Your Frequency Data - again

Self-Advocacy Other-Advocacy Us-Advocacy2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4

FrequencyComfortSuccess

No

t at

all

Ext

rem

ely

Follow-up Studies: Us-Advocacy Negotiation vignette

Financial hardships leaves annual bonuses smaller than usual

Subordinate requests larger bonus Manipulated target gender & advocacy (self vs. group)

Post-vignette questionnaire Social backlash: N = 344 (259 MBA + 85 Undergraduate)

Impression formed about target Financial backlash: N = 185 Undergraduate

Likelihood to increase bonus Likelihood to decrease bonus

Results: Social Appraisal

2.50

2.70

2.90

3.10

3.30

3.50

3.70

3.90

Self-advocacy Us-advocacy

So

cial

Acc

epta

nce

Male

Female

Results: No Reward Differences

2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3

3.2

3.4


Lik

eli

ho

od

to

IN

CR

EA

SE

Bo

nu

s

Male

Female

Results: Penalty Levied!

1.5

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.5

2.7

2.9


Lik

elih

oo

d t

o R

ED

UC

E B

on

us

Male

Female

Summary of Findings Self-advocating women

Fear social backlash for behaving assertively And do incur backlash when behaving assertively!

Seen as overly dominant/arrogant Others less likely to want to interact with them

Negotiate less assertively Agree to monetarily worse outcomes

Other-advocating women Do not fear social backlash for assertiveness Negotiate assertively Agree to monetarily better outcomes (for others) BUT…can incur backlash if not assertive enough!

Seen as weak/naïve/gullible Others do not want them as leaders

Take-aways & Remedies Individual-level

Blaming vs. Empowering the Victim Framing of the negotiation

Reframe self-oriented negotiations as other-advocacy

Or as us-advocacy!

Organizational-level Implementation of compensation systems not

dependent on employee self-promotion Objective criteria Peer evaluations

The Female Advantage Women tend to take a more co-operative

approach to negotiations than men. Share information. Take flexible positions. Seek to understand both parties’ goals: Listen!

Women are more likely than men to act as if a negotiation has win/win potential. Don’t suffer from the “mythical fixed-pie bias.” This is especially good for repeated interactions.