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De-escalation amid a Total War? An interpretivist-constructivist analysis of Finland´s involvement (or lack

thereof) in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk during the Continuation War

1941-1944

Margarita Sallinen

Thesis, 15 ECTS (hp)

War Studies

Master’s Programme in Politics and War

Spring 2020

Supervisor: Ilmari Käihkö

Word count: 15940

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Abstract

At the beginning of the Continuation War in 1941, Finnish and German troops commenced a gradual

escalation which resulted in swift successive victories against the Soviets. Yet, Finland´s Field

Marshal Mannerheim unexpectedly turned his back on military rationality at Leningrad and Murmansk

despite his knowledge of how vitally strategic the locations were to the Soviet war effort. Leningrad

was encircled by German and Finnish forces and a successful siege was achievable, yet Mannerheim

abruptly discontinued the offensive and chose to assume a stale war lasting until 1944. Likewise,

Mannerheim withheld his troops from cutting off Murmansk Railway. These events beckon important

inquiries regarding Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate during successful offensives in a total war

and presents a conundrum that few have to date examined holistically. As such, this thesis offers an

alternative perspective to the current rational explanations of Finnish warfare in the Continuation War.

This thesis discusses specific social processes of Finnish society that rationalist explanations overlook

and applies the theory of constructivism to identify that normative factors can complement the

prevailing rationalist explanations. This thesis further identifies how the social concepts of identity,

shared culture and knowledge, and the norms of the Finnish people, and its leadership, contributed to

Mannerheim’s decision to disregard military rationality and de-escalate. Lastly, this thesis determines

that norms and ideas matter in war studies and future research should incorporate an interpretivist

approach which contemplates social constructions and norms as alternative explanations in complex,

multi-casual social phenomena like war.

Key words: Constructivism, Continuation War, de-escalation, escalation, Finland,

interpretivism, Mannerheim, total war

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Acknowledgements I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor Ilmari Käihkö for

the time he gave me during the planning and writing of this thesis. Without his patience,

guidance and encouragement this thesis would not have been accomplished.

I also wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supportive and loving fiancé, Michael Daw,

for always standing by my side.

Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis in honour of my late father, Tauno Sallinen who was

born in Finland. Dad, this is for you.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6

1.1. Research question ............................................................................................................ 7

1.2. Previous research ............................................................................................................ 8

2. Theory .................................................................................................................................. 10

2.1. Constructivism .............................................................................................................. 10

2.1.1. Key principles of constructivism ............................................................................ 11

2.1.2. Key concepts of constructivism ............................................................................. 11

2.2. Limitations – constructivism ......................................................................................... 12

2.3. Escalation and Total War .............................................................................................. 13

3. Methodological considerations ............................................................................................ 14

3.1. Interpretivism ................................................................................................................ 14

3.2. Limitations – methodology ........................................................................................... 15

3.3. Method .......................................................................................................................... 16

3.4. Limitations – method .................................................................................................... 17

3.5. Ethics ............................................................................................................................. 17

4. Empirical results ................................................................................................................... 18

4.1. Background ................................................................................................................... 18

4.2. The escalation begins – 15 months of “peace” ............................................................. 19

4.3. Finland joins the Continuation War .............................................................................. 20

4.4. Leningrad ...................................................................................................................... 22

4.5. Murmansk ...................................................................................................................... 22

4.6. Germany’s war aims ...................................................................................................... 25

4.7. Finland’s war aims ........................................................................................................ 26

5. Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 27

5.1. Shared knowledge, ideas and culture ............................................................................ 27

5.2. Norms ............................................................................................................................ 28

5.2.1. The lack of shared political norms with Nazi Germany ......................................... 28

5.2.2. Lack of common war aims ..................................................................................... 30

5.2.3. Values – public opinion on the war changed ......................................................... 31

5.2.4. Moral norms ........................................................................................................... 32

5.2.5. Battle fatigue .......................................................................................................... 32

5.3. Identity .......................................................................................................................... 34

5.4. Marshal Gustav Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership ............................................. 35

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6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 39

7. Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 41

8. Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 43

9. Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 46

9.1. Appendix A ................................................................................................................... 46

9.2. Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 47

9.3. Appendix C ................................................................................................................... 48

9.4. Appendix D ................................................................................................................... 49

9.5. Appendix E .................................................................................................................... 50

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1. Introduction

Finland fought as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union shortly after

the Continuation War broke out on 22 June 1941. What began as a German invasion of the

Soviet Union – dubbed Operation Barbarossa – saw its forces pursue two major objectives:

(1) occupy and demolish Leningrad, and (2); cut off the Murmansk Railway and isolate the

port city which possessed great symbolic and strategic importance to the Soviets (Forczyk,

2009, p. 91; Lunde, 2011, p. 62). However, when the Nazis advanced towards Leningrad,

Finland’s Field Marshal Mannerheim ordered Finnish troops to cease their attack, thereby

removing them from directly participating in the Siege of Leningrad. The decision was made

to neither bomb Leningrad nor cut off the Murmansk Railway. Once the Finnish troops had

reclaimed the territory lost to the Soviets during the Winter War – the Winter War was fought

15 months prior to the Continuation War commencing – Finland’s participation as co-

belligerents with Nazi Germany slowly preceded to a “dead end” in 1941-1942. Over the next

one and a half to two years, Finland’s military refrained from engaging in an offensive

strategy and did little to assist the German forces’ attack on the strategically important

locations of Leningrad and Murmansk (Ekberg, 2000, p. 27). This gives rise to a theoretical

puzzle as what started as a successful military operation that followed progressive escalation,

culminated in a sudden de-escalation by Finland’s military leadership. This was despite

military rationality – based on logic and rational thought – suggesting that the Finnish forces

would have enjoyed two successful offensives. To explain this puzzle, several concepts must

be clarified: World War II was a “total war” – a concept with many definitions. Total war is

defined in this thesis as “a theoretical concept, implying the use of all available resources and

weapons in war, and the elimination of all distinctions between military and civilian targets”

(Luttwak, 1991, p. 625). Additionally, the concept of escalation assumes wars experience

“escalation” – defined in this thesis as “an increase in the scope of a given conflict”

(Freedman, 1987, p. 109). Critically, a total war expects total escalation, which does not

appear to hold true in Finland’s case. Researchers have attempted to provide rational

explanations revealing why the Finnish forces discontinued both offensives (Lunde, 2011, p.

70). Rationalism suggests that humans act in material self-interest and relies on material

factors in its analysis for its explanations – such as fire power, tactics, numerical superiority

etc over ideational (Agius, 2019, p. 75). This thesis argues that Mannerheim´s decision

making cannot be explained through rationalism and material factors alone. Additionally, this

thesis argues that a greater appreciation of these events is discovered when incorporating

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normativity and ideational factors in compliance with interpretivism and constructivism,

which complement leading explanations. Can underlying non-rational reasons help explain

Finland’s decision to de-escalate an event which was fought as part of a “total war”?

1.1. Research question

The Second World War is traditionally viewed as a total war. Yet, the Finnish leadership’s

decision to forego from participating in the Siege of Leningrad as co-belligerents with Nazi

Germany, and to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway, seems to challenge this

notion. The exact research question is as follows: How can normative explanations help

explain why the Finnish forces did not continue their military escalation upon reaching

Leningrad and Murmansk, despite possessing the military prerequisites necessary to

succeed? This thesis will seek to delve deeply into Finland’s role in the Continuation War and

attempt to understand why Mannerheim chose not to pursue an offensive war as co-

belligerents with Nazi Germany upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk in 1941. The main

actor studied is Finland, it´s leadership and society, within the time frame of the Continuation

War from 1941 to 1944. To further clarify the research question, the scope of this thesis will

be briefly discussed. Regarding empirics, this thesis will not cover the Soviet’s or Nazi

Germany’s point of view. However, Germany’s war aims, demands and its agreement as co-

belligerents with Finland will be presented to assist the reader to understand Finland and

Germany’s relationship, and the context in which Finland was operating militarily. Regarding

theory, it is not this thesis’ aim to present competing viewpoints on the existing rational

assumptions. Instead, the purpose for choosing constructivism is to provide a complementary

perspective to the rationalist explanations already in existence (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435).

Additionally, it is not this thesis’ intention to argue against existing explanations for Finland’s

decision-making at the time. Further, this thesis assumes Mannerheim decided to de-escalate

and acknowledges it is the author´s interpretation of the solution. Last, this thesis

acknowledges the issues that arise from using words such as “Finland” and the “Finns” or

“Finnish society” etc, and that it points to an assumption of a unitary state/society.

Accordingly, the author of this thesis recognises the problem of condensing a whole society

into “one” being. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, this wordage has been

adopted in several parts for convenience.

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1.2. Previous research

Extensive research already exists on the Second World War, especially regarding the

ideologies of, and the countries they “belonged to” like Nazi Germany and Stalin´s Russia.

Despite Finland playing a pivotal role during World War II, most research concerns the

Winter War. In contrast, the Continuation War – which proceeded across a greater portion of

WWII than the Winter War – and Finland’s participation in it has received significantly less

attention (Lunde,2011, p 2). The scarce research that does concern Finland´s role in the

Continuation War, largely contemplates the traditional material factors in rationalist theory.

Some English examples include, first, Lunde (2011) who primarily focuses on logistical

issues and material factors such as fire power, manpower, Finland’s economy, and the army´s

rational choices and strategic calculations. Second, Jowett (2006) provides an interesting

reading about the organization, tactics and weapons used between 1939-1945. Third, Mann

(2002) has written about the difficulties of conducting warfare in the Arctic due to the terrain

and environmental conditions, which the Finnish and German forces contended with. Fourth,

Krosby (1968) has written about the Continuation War and German, Finnish and Soviet

relations. Krosby also writes about the importance of the Petsamo nickel mines and its

economic importance to all actors involved. Lastly, Vehviläinen (2002) has written

comprehensively about Finland and greatly focuses on Finland’s political affairs and its

foreign policy for the war. In addition to English sources, Erfurth (1950) has published a

comprehensive book about the Continuation War in German called “Der Finnishe Krieg”.

Furthermore, the memoirs of Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (referred to simply

as Mannerheim in this thesis henceforth), the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence

Forces during the Continuation War, is published in various languages including Finnish,

Swedish and English (Lunde, 2011, p. 4). More will be mentioned about the memoirs in 3.4.

Constructivism, as explained below in 2.2., is not a consistent theory. One explanation for

this is that there are many ways to contemplate identity and previous research on

constructivism was conducted by authors with different understandings of social relations and

identity. Furthermore, theoretical research on constructivism already exists but not in

compliance with Finland and its role in the Continuation War. Erik Ringmar is one author

who strongly advocates constructivism and the importance of identity. Ringmar (1996) writes

about the importance of identity as a factor in choosing to go to war, which the author of this

thesis argues is important for historical studies and will be used in this thesis. Ringmar,

however, criticises rational explanations and argues that the reasons to act for the sake of

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identity is more fundamental than interest, for example, which is a rational explanation. As

mentioned in 1.1., this thesis does not seek to compete or create any tension between rational

and constructivist explanations. It is not this thesis; goal to cause any polarization between

these views but rather exhibit complementary perspectives since they are built on different

epistemological assumptions. Furthermore, there are many published works on constructivism

by leading scholar Alexander Wendt. Wendtian constructivism has likely contributed to the

greatest number of debates about state identity and change, and the meaning of anarchy in

international relations – Wendt contends anarchy is not a natural feature and suggests that it is

“what states make of it” (Agius, 2019, p. 88; Wendt, 1992).

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2. Theory

At the heart of any research is a theory. A theory provides the foundation for analysis and

interpretation of results and must therefore be carefully and appropriately chosen. In the

following section, this thesis will highlight two theories used. Constructivism and its

limitations will be discussed first. Escalation Theory and total war will then be presented.

2.1. Constructivism

The research question in this thesis will be approached through the lens of a social science

theory called constructivism. Constructivism can be used to describe both a methodology and

a theory. This thesis differentiates between these two meanings and employs constructivism

as its theoretical approach (Lamont, 2015, p. p.168-169). Constructivism has taken much

inspiration from sociology and offers an alternative school of thought to rational theory. The

term constructivism was created in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf and emphasizes the importance of

seeing the world as social rather than material, which is fundamental to the traditional and

dominant rational theory (Agius, 2019, p. 75). In contrast to constructivism, rationalist theory

suggests knowledge is based on logic and reason, and in war studies is often associated with

the two century-old writings of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his understanding of

war as a rational phenomenon and as a tool to pursue political goals (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 83).

From this, several observations can be made. Constructivism does not disregard rationalism

completely but considers it incomplete since ideas and norms are necessary to produce

meaning for a state’s logic in its pursuits (Zrn & Checkel, 2005, p. 1064). Therefore, this

thesis argues that constructivism and normative factors should be implemented in the case of

Finland in the Continuation War since it provides important insights that rationalism fail to

acknowledge (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435).

Since the late 1980s, constructivism’s influence as an alternative approach to rationalism

in international relations and politics has grown significantly (Agius, 2019, pp. 74-75). When

applied in the context of international relation studies, constructivism is often associated with

political scientist Alexander Wendt. Wendt has provided important work on the meaning of

anarchy from a constructivist point of view in international relations. Constructivism

emphasizes understanding the world from the “inside”, since ideational and normative factors

(together with material factors), shape society; humans understand the world through

experience and meaning making. Hurd (2008, p. 4) writes that “… constructivism suggests

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that material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning

for human life”. To further explain the complex nature of constructivism, three key principles

will be presented. Thereafter, three key concepts will be attached to the principles for

clarification.

2.1.1. Key principles of constructivism

First, human knowledge is constructed rather than given/derived externally. Constructivism

argues that knowledge exists in the human mind and the human world is an artifice rather than

naturally given (Agius, 2019, p. 75, 79). This means that humans constantly learn from new

experiences and construct new knowledge, and their perception of the world is based on

precious knowledge and reflection from new knowledge. People use intuition and past

experiences to make sense of their current experiences. Second, knowledge is socially

constructed, meaning experience and knowledge come from interaction with other people

(Agius, 2019, p. 78). Third, identities are open to revision and change since ideas and norms

can change (Agius, 2019, p. 76, 83). Critically, the identities of states and other actors are not

fixed under constructivist theory. Constructivism contends that “[i]dentities may be hard to

change, but they are not carved in stone” (Wendt, 1999, p. 21). In other words, constructivism

not only shapes, but can also reshape socially constructed reality and norms.

2.1.2. Key concepts of constructivism

Constructivism focuses on the meaning behind social interactions and the importance of

three key concepts: identity, shared culture and norms (Agius, 2019, p. 77. These three

concepts will direct this thesis’ analysis to study the world and how the Finnish people and

state attached meaning to it. Identity conveys who the actors are and in turn, what interests

they have, and these interests inform the actions they choose to take. It argues that shared

beliefs and ideas construct identity through historical processes, and that interests are

therefore guided by identity and can change over time (Agius, 2019, p. 78). This contrasts

with rationalist theory, which claims that a state’s interests and identity is assumed or given

and therefore cannot change. In disagreement, constructivism contends that international

relations and politics ought to be studied through a deep understanding of the actors and how

they operate since identity does not simply occur. Since identities cannot simply exist, they

are formed through collective ideas and culture. Therefore, much of constructivism’s focus is

on intersubjectivity – the shared understandings or “collective memories” of the society – and

emphasizes the importance of relational and social aspects since meanings come from

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interaction. This contrasts with the rational approach which argues that one thing impacts the

other and is called cause and effect, or causality (Agius, 2019, p. 78, 79; Hurd, 2009, p. 3).

Lastly, constructivism emphasizes the importance of norms in shaping an identity, since it is

the collective ideas that produce norms. Norms can define actors and their identities by

constituting part of them and are called constitutive norms. Norms can also serve as a

standard for actors to know how to behave appropriately and are known as regulatory norms

(Agius, 2019, p. 80).

Constructivism is an appropriate theory to use for this thesis since the author desires to

understand to what degree underlying non-rational dimensions including identity, culture and

norms did affect Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate the offensives at Leningrad and

Murmansk.

2.2. Limitations – constructivism

One limitation of constructivism is that it relies on the author’s interpretation of the studied

actors and their observations of their experiences in the war. This can impact the research due

to (unintended) biases. Additionally, rationalist scholars criticize constructivist theory for

failing to be empirically observable and / or tested since concepts such as values and norms

cannot be “seen” (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivist critics also argue that it cannot be said

with total certainty what norms are present, i.e., how can one be certain that norms, and which

norms specifically, affect different actors and their behaviour? A further limitation of

constructivism is that it is not considered a uniform theory due to its diverse views on social

relations, which has given rise to much debate (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivism is divided

into various approaches that differ significantly and have received different labels from

different authors. For example, conventional constructivism (or modern constructivism)

differs from critical constructivism (or radical constructivism). Conventional constructivism

accepts neo-positivist explanations of phenomena to a degree, such as that state identity is

given. Conventional constructivism views constructivism “as a bridge between rationalist and

reflectivist approaches enabling both to benefit from the insights of another” (Agius, 2019, p.

85). Reflectivism is an umbrella term for theories opposing rationalism (Lamont, 2015, p.

170). In contrast, critical constructivists argue this notion cannot be realised since it is

contradictory and problematic (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Another limitation of constructivism is

the criticism that it is not a theory but rather an “approach”. Constructivism has been applied

in some research as a methodology rather than as a theory. Due to the confusion stemming

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from the diverse use of constructivism, the author wants to reiterate that constructivism is the

theory in this thesis.

2.3. Escalation and Total War

The theory of escalation is largely influenced by Clausewitz. In his book “On War”,

Clausewitz suggested that escalation in war is a natural tendency. Escalation theory is largely

under-investigated with most contemporary research focusing on material factors and the

Great Powers (Freedman, 1987, p. 130; Ångström, 2015, p. 3). This is unsurprising since a

large volume of escalation studies have emerged about the dynamics of the Cold War and

thus possess a Nuclear bias and refer to escalation as the transformation of limited nuclear

war to a total nuclear war (Freedman, 1987, p. 146). Further, Clausewitz identifies the

important and related concept of de-escalation. He explains that de-escalation is caused by the

dynamics of “friction” – unforeseen events in warfare and politics. These frictions are

explained using material factors. De-escalation possess a Great Power and Nuclear bias too

and refers to controlling and limiting intensity in a conflict, especially in nuclear warfare

since a full-blown nuclear war would end in disaster (Freedman, 1987, pp. 126-133, 143).

Most contemporary research concerning escalation and de-escalation focuses on material

factors, with few exceptions. One exception is Howard (1979, p. 14) who stresses the

importance of morality and norms in de-escalation theory.

Research in escalation is biased towards Great Powers and is therefore interesting to apply

in this thesis since its case study concerns a small state, Finland. Additionally, it seems that

current theories lack complete legitimacy and fail to complete the puzzle of Mannerheim’s

decisions to de-escalate during the Continuation War. Thus, the inadequacies of the current

research stress the uniqueness of this thesis’ aim; Finland is not considered a Great Power and

its de-escalation occurred prior to the threat of Nuclear Weapons

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3. Methodological considerations

The following section will address the methodological considerations of this thesis. This

includes philosophical beliefs about the nature of the world, how it is made up and how it

shapes research. It concerns the choice of methodology and the questions of ontology and

epistemology. This section will also address the limitations of the chosen methodology –

interpretivism.

3.1. Interpretivism

The methodology chosen for this thesis is compliant with the research paradigm

interpretivism. The knowledge comes “from within” meaning it aims to understand “the

subjective character of the social world” (Risjord, 2014, p. 44). Schwartz-Shea, (2012, p. 2)

explains that interpretivism “focuses on specific, situated meanings and meaning-making

practices of actors in a given context”. The epistemological assumption – how one constitutes

knowledge and how it is justified – in interpretivism is that knowledge is socially constructed

(Risjord, 2014, p. 6). The ontological assumption – what the nature of reality is – is that the

world is socially constructed. Interpretivism focuses on the interpretation of research and aims

to understand it rather than explain it. This complements constructivism (see 2.1), the chosen

theory for this thesis since constructivism is dependent on interpretation. This thesis draws a

distinction between interpretivism and constructivism, which is important to stress since it is

apt to cause confusion at first glance. To elaborate, in this thesis, interpretivism focuses on the

researcher’s interpretation of the research of, for example, actors during a specific time frame

and context. In contrast, constructivism focuses on understanding how meaning is constructed

by the actor and his or her context in the situation being studied, in this case, Finland and its

leadership during the Continuation War.

Interpretivism focuses on flexibility, contextuality and reflexibility. In relation to

flexibility, an interpretivist research design is usually abductive, i.e., it is conducted using an

open-ended hermeneutic loop that goes back and forth. However, the fixed structure of this

thesis means that conducting a flexible research design is limited. Additionally, most research

designs are compliant with the neo-positivist paradigm, which is built on hypothesis-testing.

Interpretivist research design does not follow (neo)positivism in that it possesses an open-

ended approach which lacks both a formalized hypothesis, random sampling and variables

(Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 3). Accordingly, this thesis will not compose a hypothesis but

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instead investigate a research question that will be answered by understanding the patterns

and underlying values taken from the relevant actors, settings and events of the pertinent time

frame (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 53).

Further, this thesis focuses on contextuality and does not aim to generalize to a large

population the same way a neo-positivist research would. This thesis’ aim is to understand the

implicit case of Finland using an in-depth qualitative analysis to engage with meaning making

of that time and context (Lamont, 2015, p. 46; Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 11). Meaning making

includes understanding motivations, meanings, and feelings (Risjord, 2014, p. 44).

Additionally, interpretivism argues a difference exists between human and non-human

behaviour, and in contrast to neo-positivism, the social and natural world are distinct. This

can be explained by the importance of human consciousness and normativity in the social

world – the social world is partly created by rules, values and norms in human society, which

are highly interconnected and can explain state and individual action. In other words,

interpretivism holds that scientific and social knowledge are separated – this is known as

mind-world dualism. This gives interpretivism the epistemological view of being anti-

naturalist, since it disregards that only natural explanations – the naturalist view of the neo-

positivist paradigm – are correct (Risjord, 2014, p. 8, 53, 54, 155).

Additionally, the methodological consideration and criterion for interpretive research of

reflexivity needs to be addressed. The author recognizes one’s own “presence” in the research

such as one’s own biases, background beliefs and presuppositions. The author acknowledges

this can affect the research and will attempt to appropriately “self-monitor” what is studied

and the understanding produced from one’s own feelings (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5, p. 98;

Risjord, 2014, p. 62). Due to the centrality of reflexivity in this research design, the subjective

features of the researcher must be addressed to provide transparency and epistemological

robustness (Risjord, 2014, p. 59, 62). The author has Finnish and Russian heritage but was

born and raised in Sweden. Accordingly, this thesis is written from a Western point of view.

3.2. Limitations – methodology

Interpretivism is epistemologically anti-naturalist, which is considered a limitation by

some researchers like neo-positivists who apply a methodological paradigm based on

naturalism in their research (Risjord, 2014, p. 43). Neo-positivist scholars argue that humans

are a part of the natural world and should therefore be examined using the same mechanisms

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applied in the natural sciences. The interpretive anti-naturalist approach is considered a

limitation by neo-positivists since interpretivism does not contend that there is only one form

of scientific knowledge (Risjord, 2014, p. 53). Furthermore, interpretivism recognizes that no

method is methodologically unbiased (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5). Hence, it is acknowledged

there are limitations with the chosen methodology since the author of this thesis is “part of the

research”. Since the research is dependent on the author’s interpretation, this thesis cannot

achieve total objectivity due to the unintentional biases spawning from one’s own

experiences, knowledge and background. Another question asked about interpretivism is

whether the norms and values that differ from the authors can be quantified, explained and

predicted (Risjord, 2014 p. 34, 64)? Even if achievable, such a process is fraught with

difficulty and suggests methodological issues will likely arise. For example, how can the

author know what the subject (Finland’s leadership) thought or believed when making

decisions at Leningrad and Murmansk? Lastly, since neo-positivism is the dominant research

paradigm, it is often compared to interpretivism. This causes confusion as both theories rest

on different epistemological and ontological assumptions, and the vocabulary used differ to a

degree.

3.3. Method

Research requires at least one or more tools – described here as a method – to conduct the

investigation (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 4). The chosen methodology in research informs the

method, and since this thesis is based on an interpretive research design, the method used will

be interpretative-qualitative (Risjord, 2014, p. 57). The method for this thesis is a case study

method (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Using Finland, its society and leaderships’ role in the Continuation

War as a case study for this thesis is highly relevant – it complies with the theory of

constructivism, the methodology of interpretivism and aims to deeply understand complex

social phenomena. The material used in this thesis includes various in depth-secondary

sources such as books to complement a primary source – Mannerheim´s memoirs. The

sources used in this thesis are primarily written in Swedish and English but include an

additional German source. This may be of benefit compared to using Finnish sources as it will

mitigate source bias since the sources are written by “outsiders”. Due to source criticism and

subjectivity, analysing memoirs may produce some limitations owing to the trustworthiness of

the text. Despite this, interpretivist research considers memoirs a part of the social setting and

a rich source of information that represents Mannerheim and his experiences at a specific

point in time and is thus of great value (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 111).

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3.4. Limitations – method

Each method used in research has its limitations, biases and sources of error which can be

difficult to detect (Risjord, 2014, p. 16, 24). Accessing certain primary sources for this thesis

is a limitation since archived material and protocols are restricted from public access.

However, this thesis will make use of Mannerheim´s memoirs as a source which is

acknowledged to contain errors – following screening from questions in source criticism and

the four principles of reliability: authenticity, time, dependency and tendency (Thuren, 2019,

p. 12). It is acknowledged Mannerheim´s memoirs were written after the war and are a

political statement. An additional limitation is that the author of this thesis has difficulties

reading the Finnish language, which automatically limits the possibility of using credible

Finnish sources. Furthermore, using a case study method, as opposed to interviewing the

participants, denies the participants the ability to elaborate their interpretations further. Lastly,

methods for analysing data in interpretivist research is different from neo-positivist research

and is viewed as a limitation by neo-positivist scholars (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 21). Rather

than using a quantitative method, neo-positivists favour research that utilises qualitative

analysis in experiments using mathematical models which aim to uncover correlation and

causality (Risjord, 2014, p. 9).

3.5. Ethics

It is the opinion of this thesis’ author that one cannot conduct war studies without

contemplating ethics and engaging in self-reflection and one’s own ethical responsibility.

Every step in the enquiry should be informed by research ethics (Lamont, 2015, p. 61). In

compliance with Woods (2006) and Lamont (2015, p. 58-59), the researcher should keep

ethical guidelines in mind at all times, especially prohibited practices which can be written

out as the principle of “do no harm”, including mental and physical harm. The two most

paramount ethical considerations for this thesis included: (1) human subjects, such as the

victims of war; and, (2) the polarisation in politics as highlighted by the sensitive nature of

current academic debates regarding the Second World War. Furthermore, serious ethical

issues can arise from politics and propaganda, for example, actors can use research as

propaganda, and it is therefore essential to be cognisant of such motivations. Actors will use a

researcher’s declarations for their own purposes, which can have real life consequences

(Käihkö, forthcoming, p. 9).

18

4. Empirical results

This section offers relevant empirical results used to analyse what happened at Leningrad

and Murmansk. A brief background will be presented and then Germany’s war aims will be

explained, followed by Finland’s.

4.1. Background

Finland broke free from Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution in World War I and

declared its independence on 6 December 1917. A civil war closely followed between the

Finnish “Whites”, led by Mannerheim, and the Finnish “Reds”, who were revolutionaries

(Järv, 2006, p. 16). Finland and Germany’s military relations can be traced back to this

period; the Whites turned to the Germans for support who willing backed Finland’s

independence (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 6). The other two wars proceeded close to one another

and took place during World War II. Despite being a “small player”, Finland’s role during the

Second World War was nonetheless pivotal. The first of the two remaining wars – called the

Winter War – began when the Soviets attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. Fortunately

for the Finnish forces, led by Mannerheim again, the Soviets underestimated their fighting

capabilities and consequently had underprepared (Ekberg, 2000, p. 18). However, as the war

progressed, Finland found itself on the verge of collapse and eventually agreed to the Soviet’s

demands and acceded to the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty in March 1940. The terms of

the treaty permitted Finland to maintain its independence but contained numerous other harsh

terms. For example, Finland was required to relinquish approximately ten percent of its vital

agricultural land (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 109). The Finns living in these areas – approximately

12-13% of the Finnish population – were forced also to abandon their homes, the majority of

which were from the Karelian Isthmus (Sandström, 1991, p. 17). Finland agreed to the

Soviet’s terms despite harbouring a strong detest for the stipulations. For a visualisation of the

annexed areas, please see Appendix A. Shortly after, the Soviets started taking actions beyond

the scope of the Moscow Peace Treaty. For example, the Soviets demanded the use of

Finland´s railroad systems to transport its troops. In June-July 1940, the Soviets annexed the

Baltic regions of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Finland began to fear it would be next on

the Soviet agenda. During this time, Finland found itself under constant threat and aggression

from the Soviets. For example, on 14 June 1940, the Soviet’s shot down a civilian airplane,

killing all nine passengers aboard, the majority of which were Finns (Ekberg, 2000, p. 22). To

make matters worse, Finland was isolated from the outside world and not one of its Western

19

Allies, including Sweden, reached out to offer support. While this was occurring, Nazi

Germany had established itself as the only nation that could offer Finland reciprocal

resistance against the Soviets (Lunde, 2011, p. 30; Mann, 2002, pp. 66–67; Vehviläinen,

2002, p. 170).

4.2. The escalation begins – 15 months of “peace”

It is arguable that the escalation in the Continuation War began long before the launch of

Operation Barbarossa. Barbarossa was the code name for the invasion of the Soviet Union

launched by Hitler on 22 June 1941 (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 109; Glantz, 2001, pp. 234–235).

The escalation started during the 15 months of “peace” or, as Brunila et al. (2000, p. 19) calls

it, a cold war – between the Winter War and the Continuation War. Germany had already

factored in Finland’s participation in Operation Barbarossa in December 1940. In May 1941,

the Nazis invited the Finnish leadership to send Finland’s military officers to Germany to

discuss what actions would be taken if the Soviets attacked Finland. Finland´s society and

leadership were exhausted from the Winter War, being isolated from the rest of the world and

their fear of becoming a Soviet state, and thus accepted the Nazi’s invitation (Vehviläinen

2002, pp. 88-89). The Finnish leadership went on to accept the Nazis’ offer of security at the

cost of participating in their planned attack. Their primary motivation stemmed from the

security the German forces offered against the Soviets, who they labelled as the “eternal threat

from the east” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 171). The perceived necessity of self-defence prompted

Finland´s leadership to collaborate with the Germans who possessed one of the strongest

armies of the time. Germany had enjoyed military success from using its blitzkrieg-tactic in

various parts of central Europe. Whereas, the Soviets had performed poorly during the Winter

War and the prediction was that Germany could win a war against the Red Army in only a

couple of months (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 228). During the interim war years,

Germany provided military support to Finland and was the only country selling it military

supplies including weapons. Germany also provided the Finns with additional support such as

food, economic aid and built important transportation links including roads and railways.

Hitler saw value in Finland owing to its strategic geopolitical positioning and his desired

transit rights for German troops through Finland and Norway, which was eventually agreed

upon through a transit agreement (Ekberg, 2000, p. 23; Krosby, 1968, p. 96; Lunde, 2011, p.

30). Finland also established its own SS battalion; the SS – short for Schutzstaffel, which

means protection squad – was an institution of the Nazis that represented its ideology (Dear &

20

Foot, 1995, p. 1044). Additionally, numerous clandestine meetings took place between both

nations in tandem to a steady increase in German troops in Finland’s north.

On 17 June 1941, the German troops stationed in northern Finland began to mobilise.

Finland provided the German army with an additional 475 000 soldiers from its then

population of approximately four million people. The Nazis put Operation Barbarossa into

action on 22 June 1940, which saw roughly three million German troops, 2000 aircrafts and

3500 tanks initiate the offensive by crossing into Soviet territory through Finnish borders

(Mann, 2002, p. 74). Several days later, the Soviets carried out an air offensive against fifteen

locations in southern Finland, which comprised six major cities including Helsinki.

Interestingly, the air offensive was aimed solely at Finnish targets and disregarded German

troops stationed in the north of Finland. It is arguable the Soviets saw the German troops in

Finland as a threat and were responding accordingly (Sandström, 1991, pp. 10–11).

Furthermore, it is likely the Soviet Union was provoked by Finland and its engagements with

the Nazis. The Finnish leadership saw the Soviet attack as an opportunity to repair the damage

suffered during the Winter War. Thus, following the Soviet bombings on 25 June 1941,

Finnish forces launched their offensive against the Red Army, initiating the Continuation War

(Please see Appendix C in conjunction with Appendix B). Mannerheim, who led Finnish

troops in the Finnish Civil War and the Winter War, would assume command of them once

more.

The Finns have labelled this war the Continuation War since it was a continuation of the

Winter War. While some argue that Finland committed an error in joining forces with

Germany, others assert that Finland had no choice. It was a matter of survival for Finland, and

the Finns would have inevitably been drawn into another losing battle against the Soviets

regardless of joining Germany or not (Lunde, 2011, p. 2). Mannerheim already suspected a

Soviet offensive and had asked to mobilise in August 1940, which was prior to establishing

proof that the Soviets were preparing an attack (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 58). It is arguable the

Finns could have fallen victim to the Soviet’s plan in late-1940 had it not been for the

agreements their leadership had reached with Germany.

4.3. Finland joins the Continuation War

In the beginning of the Finnish military campaign and following the commencement of

Operation Barbarossa, the Finnish army obtained military superiority in their local areas of

21

operations and rapidly advanced. The Finnish soldiers were better equipped than during the

Winter War thanks to the weapons received from Germany. Despite suffering many casualties

in terrible and bloody combat, the initial stages of the campaign were considered a triumph

for Finland (Ekberg, 2000, p. 25). By July 1941, the Finnish forces had reclaimed most of the

territories lost during the Winter War in the south of Finland (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). The

Karelian Isthmus had been incorporated into the Finnish war aims in 1941, and the Finnish

military continued to enjoy success as its forces retook the city of Vyborg one month later on

August 29. By September 1, the Finnish troops had reached the pre-Winter War borders

located in the Karelian Isthmus and were now roughly twenty kilometres away from

Leningrad. However, on 9 September 1941, Mannerheim made the decision to halt his troops

advance despite enjoying a highly successful offensive. Up until now, Finland had fought

alongside Germany who were conducting a full-scale total war. The Finnish leadership’s

goals in conducting warfare were, however, not the same as the German’s, even after being

pressured by them. Similarly, Mannerheim never ordered his troops to cut off the Murmansk

Railway, which went against military rationality; the Murmansk Railway was logistically vital

to the Soviet war effort. Initially expected as a war of short duration – many called it the

“summer war” due to the expectation it would be conducted through the summer months of

1941 only – would continue for three more years. The Finnish leadership experienced

difficulties in withdrawing Finland from the war due to the country’s dependence on the

Germans for aid, primarily fuel and grain (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 372). The major turning

point in the war occurred after the German forces failed to capture Stalingrad. Furthermore,

the Finnish population was becoming increasingly resentful towards the war the longer it

went on. In August 1944, Mannerheim was chosen as Finland´s president and would oversee

the truce arrangements with the Soviets. The Continuation War eventually ended in

September 1944 and saw Finland withdraw its forces and create a ceasefire agreement with

the Soviets called the Moscow Armistice. Stalin demanded Finland´s leadership initiate war

against Germany. The Finnish leadership, acting in accordance with the Moscow Armistice,

severed all ties with Germany and agreed to disarm and or expel any German troops that

remained within Finnish borders (Drakenlordh, 2002, p. 98). This resulted in the Finnish

forces escalating warfare against German troops in Finland, which culminated in the Lapland

War.

22

4.4. Leningrad

Leningrad held exceptional value, both symbolically and strategically, for the Soviets.

During the Continuation War, it was a critical objective of the German forces to obtain,

control and demolish. This is clearly demonstrated by the Nazis’ Directive No. 1 which

concerns Leningrad and stated that “the Führer has decided to erase the city of Petersburg

from the face of the earth. We have no interest in the preservation of even a part of the

population of the city” (Forczyk, 2009, p. 11). The German advance occurred on 8 September

1941 and resulted in Leningrad being encircled by Germany’s forces who cut-off all land

supply routes in and out of the city. Once encircled, it was expected that Leningrad would fall

quickly to the German forces’ siege. The Nazis wanted Finnish troops to participate and assist

German troops with the attack via the north of Leningrad (Polvinen, 1969, p. 18). The Finnish

troops had positioned themselves defensively about twenty kilometres north of Leningrad in

the Karelian Isthmus (Please see Appendix D in conjunction with Appendix D). Yet, despite

the predictions that Leningrad would fall swiftly before the spring of 1942, and

notwithstanding the pressure from the Nazis to participate, Mannerheim, in accordance with

the Finnish government, refused the participation of Finnish troops in the siege (Jowett, 2006,

p. 11; Nenye, 2016, p. 11; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 94–95). The Siege of Leningrad lasted

significantly longer than the Nazis had predicted, and it is arguable that after 1942 the siege

made no contribution towards the German troops’ survival or the Soviet´s defeat. The siege

would continue until January 1944 and end with Germany’s forces defeated. From the outset

of the siege, the Finnish leadership continued to de-escalate and refused to provide any

significant assistance. By the end of the war, the Finnish leadership would even refuse to

provide German troops with artillery support (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 95). Finland´s leadership

severed its ties with the Nazis on 2 September 1944, in accordance with the terms of the

Moscow Armistice. The Siege of Leningrad lasted for 900 days and saw more than one

million non-combatants die (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 683).

4.5. Murmansk

The German forces’ primary objectives in North Finland involved cutting off the

Murmansk Railway to isolate the Port of Murmansk. The port provided vital strategic

importance to the Soviet Union since it was ice-free year-round, connected the Soviets to the

rest of the world and enabled the Soviets to receive essential supplies from the U.S. and Great

Britain. The railway was 1,350 kilometres in length and connected Murmansk to Leningrad

23

and provided the Soviets with vital war materials, reinforcements and aid (Erfurth, 1950, p.

47; Lunde, 2011, p. 62; Mann, 2002, p. 70; Nenye, 2016, p. 53). Secondly, Murmansk gave

the Red Army the means to threaten the Petsamo nickel mines, which were important to the

German war effort (Lunde, 2011, p. 65; Mann, 2002, p. 70). Knowing the significance of

these locations, German and Finnish military leaders devised an offensive, dubbed Operation

Silver Fox, to be conducted by their troops stationed in Finnish Lapland. Silver Fox required

the German and Finnish troops to split into three groups and attack from different directions

while simultaneously undertaking separate operations called Reindeer, Platinum Fox and

Arctic Fox (Please see Appendix B in conjunction with Appendix E) German troops would

carry out Reindeer and Platinum Fox with assistance from Finnish soldiers and attack from

the north via Finland and the Norwegian territories it occupied. While Finnish troops would

primarily participate in Operation Arctic Fox and attack from the south (Mann, 2002, p. 69;

Nenye, 2016, p.54). The Finnish troops’ task was assigned to one of their divisions and placed

under German command but was, however, led by the Finnish Major-General Siilasvou

(Mann, 2002, p. 87; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 95–96).

When the Murmansk offensive began on 29 June 1941, the German troops did not expect

much Soviet resistance nor did they account for the difficulties of the terrain, which possessed

innumerable natural and logistical obstacles. Additionally, the majority of German troops

were underprepared as most were raised in urban environments and had never encountered

such wilderness before (Brunila, 1980, p. 94; Erfurth, 1950, p. 48; Mann, 2002, p. 70). In

contrast, the Finnish soldiers were acclimatised to Northern Finland’s harshness and fared

much better than the German troops who found themselves bogged down and unable to

progress with their operations and becoming reliant on successful Finnish advancements. The

Soviet troops were also prepared thanks to the railway which enable them to mobilise

sufficient numbers for their defence (Nenye, 2016, p. 58). The failed advancements at

Murmansk caused Hitler to order all operations to stop at the end of September 1941. Despite

Hitler’s command, the second advancement on the Murmansk Railway began on 1 November

1941, and the Finnish army was initially successful in breaking through the Soviet’s defences.

However, the Finnish forces’ advancement was halted once again due to the German troops’

inability to accomplish their tasks and because Mannerheim refused to send any

reinforcements (Nenye, 2016, p. 16, 62-63) The Finnish troops might have succeeded in

cutting off the Murmansk Railway without help from German troops, but their efforts in

accomplishing this were “half-hearted” at best (Brunila, 1980, p. 95). The lacklustre efforts by

24

the Finnish troops resulted in the loss of 83, roughly one third, of their officers in combat the

following week (Brunila, 1980, p. 95; Erfurth, 1950, p. 74). Despite being under German

command, when Mannerheim discovered this, he became enraged and immediately ordered

the advancement to stop. In fact, Siilasvou had already terminated the advancement before

Mannerheim´s order had time to arrive on 17 November 1941. One last operation comprising

of German and Finnish troops would be proposed and involved severing the Murmansk

Railway in the summer and autumn of 1942. Mannerheim seemed eager to participate and had

previously proposed a winter offensive that would have commenced much earlier on 25

September 1941. Mannerheim argued, however, that the German forces’ successful capture of

Leningrad was an essential precondition for such an operation to commence. Furthermore, on

4 December 1941, Mannerheim wrote to German Field Marshal Keitel that:

The importance of the Murmansk Railway for the Soviet Union´s ability to wage

war is undoubtedly great, not only with respect to the importation of war materials

and food from the U.S. and Great Britain, but also by the morale role it plays as

the main communication route between Russia and its allies. A prompt severing

of this connection is of paramount importance. (Lunde, 2011, p. 217)

After this statement was made, however, Mannerheim cunningly referred to his precondition

that Leningrad must fall before an attack on Murmansk could occur, which had yet to

transpire (Lunde, 2011, p. 217). On 6 December 1941, the situation quickly changed when

Great Britain declared war on Finland, which meant Finland was now officially at war with

two super powers (Meinander, 2017, p. 225). This was also a turning point for Mannerheim

who began to doubt whether the Germany forces could end the war as victors (Erfurth, 1950,

p. 90). The decision to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway proved influential to

the outcome of the war, partly owing to the Soviets’ importation of steel and aluminium but

mostly from the food supplies it received via the port. The port also provided the Red Army

with significant quantities of war materials. Nenye (2016) explains that:

Eventually about one-quarter of all aid that was to reach the Soviet Union arrived

via this route, including 5,218 tanks, 7,411 aircraft, 4,932 anti-tank guns, 4,000

rifles and machine guns, 4,338 radios, 2000 field telephones, 1,803 radar sets, 473

million projectiles, nine torpedo crafts, four submarines, 14 minesweepers, 10

destroyers and a battle ship. (p. 64)

25

On 3 February 1942, Mannerheim and Finland’s President Ryti were now certain that

Germany and its army would collapse at any time. Accordingly, Mannerheim indicated to

Ryti that he would abandon the proposed Murmansk offensive for 1942 due to the risk of

Germany’s forces’ offensive collapsing (Nenye, 2016, p. 17). Mannerheim managed, in a

polite and diplomatic way, to negotiate the Finnish troops´ non-participation in the proposed

operation, basing his decision on political considerations (Järv, 2006, p. 219, Lunde, 2011, p.

224). Unsurprisingly, the proposed offensive was abruptly halted before it began. Thus,

despite coming tantalisingly close, the plan to cut off the Murmansk Railway ended up being

nothing more than a dream for the Nazis (Brunila, 1980, p. 94- 95).

4.6. Germany’s war aims

During World War II, Nazi Germany conducted a total war and its military – one of the

most successful of the time – was already engaging in combat by the time the Continuation

War commenced. Hitler composed Germany´s war aims in Directive 21 – the directive for

Operation Barbarossa. Hitler’s primary aim was the complete destruction of the Soviet Union

and encompassed crippling its economic and military potential. Germany was a totalitarian

state and its war aims are thus clearly specifiable since public opinion presented little bearing

on its creation (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 35; Lunde, 2011, p. 55). Operation Barbarossa was a

voracious war of conquest and destruction. Barbarossa permitted the use of force against both

military and civilian targets, and with great severity. Barbarossa violated international law in

that no German soldiers would be prosecuted at the time for committing war crimes against

Soviet civilians (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 110). The Nazis saw this as an opportunity to wage a

war to fulfil its dream of “Lebensraum”, which included annexing vast areas of land in the

east that belonged to the Soviets, some of which would be given to Germany’s allies (Lunde,

2011, p. 55). “Lebensraum” – means “living space” used by the Nazis to describe their

expansionism in the East and was part of Germany’s war aims in Barbarossa (Dear & Foot,

1995, p. 109, p. 675; (Glantz, 2001, p. 210)). Additionally, the Nazis, in compliance with its

agenda of National Socialism, incorporated the final solution into Germany’s war aims to

annihilate all European Jews (Järv, 2006, pp. 208-2090). The Nazis’ death squads –

Einsatzgruppen – were assigned the task of systematically murdering the Jews, along with

many other targeted groups who were deemed inferior to the Nazis, such as Slavs. Due to the

limited scope of this thesis, the Nazis’ ideology will not be discussed in its entirety. Operation

Barbarossa contained two important goals: (1) capture Leningrad; and, (2) cut off the

26

Murmansk Railway to isolate the port city of Murmansk. Throughout the war, the Nazis

desired an alliance with Finland. Despite exerting considerable pressure on them, Finland’s

leadership did not accept their proposal and the Nazis eventually conceded and agreed to act

as co-belligerents instead (Järv, 2006, p. 221).

4.7. Finland’s war aims

Finland´s war aims are not as ascertainable as Germany’s (Lunde, 2011, p. 55). The Finnish

military’s initial war aims were to reclaim territories lost to the Soviets in the Winter War and

under the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland’s leadership also expressed that the war was waged

against the Bolsheviks (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 142, Järv, 2006, p. 82). Yet, a contradiction

exists in their claim: Finnish forces had advanced into Russian territory which they had no

legitimate claim over, such as Eastern Karelia. To elaborate further, when the old 1939-

borders were retaken, Finland’s leadership began entertaining the idea of “The Greater

Finland”. The concept of “Greater Finland” can be traced back to the Peace of Tartu and was

coined in 1920. This dream, however, became irrelevant when the Soviet Union became a

great power during the 1930s. This idea was awakened nevertheless and came into full bloom

in 1941 upon the commencement of the Continuation War. It is arguable that the Finnish

leadership had possessed expansionist thinking during the Continuation War and may have

contemplated incorporating it into Finland’s war aims. It is possible the Finnish leadership

was prepared to wage war outside of Finland’s 1939 borders – an idea predominately

supported by the far-right. On the one hand, Greater Finland would annex land containing

Finnish-speaking people. On the other hand, it would also include territories which had never

belonged to Finland, such as Eastern Karelia. Even so, there were still two important reasons

for the Finnish leadership to incorporate this goal into their policy: (1) it would be easier to

defend a front further to the east; and, (2) the expectation that the Soviet Union would be

defeated and the Finnish peoples’ desire to unite with their “ethnic brothers over the border”.

(Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 91–92). This goal was almost achieved when most of East Karelia

was occupied by Finnish forces – Finnish soldiers first marched into the city of Petrozavodsk

in the autumn of 1941 and remained there until 1944 (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 247).

27

5. Analysis

This section will assess Finland’s leadership’s decision to de-escalate through an

interpretivist-constructivist analysis. The Finnish peoples’ (1) shared knowledge, ideas and

culture; (2) norms; and (3) the identity of Finland, its people and it´s leadership during the

Continuation War, will now be discussed. This order has been deliberately selected to

demonstrate how shared culture and understandings, and norms, inform and shape identity.

The author intends to stress the point that the findings of the analysis should not be read in

isolation – the three key concepts of constructivism are highly interconnected, inform one

another and often overlap (Agius, 2019, pp. 76-77). For the sake of clarity, however, each

concept will be presented separately. Lastly, due to his influence, Mannerheim (and the

Finnish leadership) and his role in Finland’s decision making will be presented separately.

5.1. Shared knowledge, ideas and culture

Most of the Finnish public supported the war on the condition that it remained defensive

(Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Finnish novelist Väinö Linna, who had served in the war and had

written down his experiences, said: “[f]or many, in its early stages the new war represented a

kind of second round, in which Finland would recover the losses it had incurred in the Winter

War” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Vehviläinen (2002, p. 91) expressed that “[t]he offensive

operations were not necessarily in conflict with the claim of a defensive war as long as they

were aimed at getting back the territory lost in the Peace of Moscow”. In other words, the

Finnish public supported entering the war, especially those who were forced to flee the

annexed lands during the Winter War. The Finnish people wanted to regain their lost lands

and they considered the Soviet’s air offensive as no different from the Soviet’s unprovoked

attack at the beginning of the Winter War. The Finnish people saw hope that together with

one of the largest armies by their side – the Wehrmacht – they would be able to rise and

exhibit a strong defence. Many Finnish people deemed the Treaty of Moscow as unfair and

were prepared for one more defensive battle (Sandström, 1991, pp. 12–14). When the war

broke out, President Ryti told his fellow Finns that it was a defensive war, a “Continuation

War”, which he exclaimed to them via radio (Sandstöm, 1991, p. 61). Since the Winter War

was a defensive war and this was simply the continuation of it, this war must thus be a

defensive war too. When compared to the German forces, Finland’s military was not waging

the “same kind of war”. Wanting to take back “what was once yours”, like Finland’s military

aimed to do and did initially achieve at Karelia, is one thing. However, if Finland’s military

28

did participate alongside Germany’s troops in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk, it would

have been considered an offensive war.

The reason “defensive” is in quotation marks is due to a contradiction with this notion. On

the one hand, Finland’s military was officially waging a defensive war, i.e., the continuation

on the Winter War. On the other hand, evidence exists suggesting the goal of starting the

conflict was to fulfil the idea of a “Greater Finland”, as explained in 4.7. The question

whether the Finnish leadership wanted to restore part of Finland’s identity, i.e., reconnect

with the Finnish speaking people in Eastern Karelia, or if this was an expansionist idea is

beyond the scope of this thesis. The author of this thesis acknowledges that an extensive

debate exists regarding the question of the Greater Finland and is a subject of much

disagreement. However, the Finnish peoples’ reaction to the idea of achieving the Greater

Finland is important to this thesis. To elaborate further, most Finnish people did not want to

initiate war beyond the pre-Winter War borders. The Finnish public demonstrated their

discontent toward the idea of the Greater Finland when Mannerheim had promised, in

accordance with the dream of the “Greater Finland”, to liberate Eastern Karelia. The question

concerning Greater Finland might not seem relevant to Leningrad or Murmansk, yet, a clear

link is observable by the overall lack of support the Finnish population had for the war, since

it was no longer considered defensive. It is arguable that the Finnish leadership would be

justified in annexing East Karelia since most of its population was Finnish speaking. Even so,

the Finnish people were still not pleased with the idea of annexing that land. Hence, it is easy

to comprehend the negative impact an attack on Leningrad or Murmansk would have had on

the Finnish people. If Finnish forces had attacked those locations, Finland would have been at

risk of losing its national unity, something the Finnish leadership recognized after taking East

Karelia. Thus, the shared beliefs of the Finnish people that they should only take back what

was once belonged to Finland is significant. This ties back to Finland’s identity which

contributed to the de-escalations at Leningrad and Murmansk, since both locations were never

a part of the Finnish peoples’ collective knowledge, ideas and culture.

5.2. Norms

5.2.1. The lack of shared political norms with Nazi Germany

Suggested previously, Finland’s long-standing underlying norms as a democracy

contributed to its leadership´s decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk. This

section explains that Finland and Germany did not share strong political traditions and had

29

significantly different world views. Finland became a democratic country after declaring

independence in December 1917, after separating from the Soviet Union during the First

World War (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). To explain the norms as a democracy, Finland

enjoyed a strong military cooperation with Germany during the First World War and the

Finnish Civil War too, where Germany advocated Finnish independence. Notwithstanding

this, Finnish-German relations changed over the course of the Second World War. The

Continuation War was a substantial conflict within the Second World War. It extremely

complex and primarily fought as total war that contained numerous actors with differing

interests. The Finnish leadership did not want to ruin relationships with other world players in

the long run, especially nations who shared similar democratic values such as the United

States. Brunila (1980, p. 95) suggests this explains why Finland’s military did not continue its

offensive at the Murmansk Railway despite possessing the capabilities to cut it off

successfully. Brunila argues that the Finnish troops´ “half hearted” efforts were due to the

Finnish leaderships’ hesitation to demonstrate total commitment to this goal, which required

their forces to fight without the Germans and risk aggravating their Western Allies further.

Finland was the only democratic nation who fought alongside the Axis, and Nazism was

not something the Finnish people had much fondness for. Finland’s values, norms and

political dimensions were however agreeable to other Scandinavian and western democracies

(Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). In compliance with Scandinavian policy, Finland sought to

maintain neutrality between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet

Union. This links back to the decision to de-escalation at Leningrad – Leningrad was

strategically and symbolically important for Nazi Germany to conquer, and for the Soviets to

defend. This contributed to a symbolic war of a personal nature that saw a power struggle

between Hitler and Stalin, which Mannerheim likely desired no part of. (Dear & Foot, 1995,

p. 683). Additionally, the Finnish people did not tolerate antisemitism and despite a small

minority of Finns being sympathetic to the Nazis, Nazism never gained a foothold in Finland,

nor did Nazi propaganda succeed there (Sandström, 1991, p. 122). It was previously

suggested that the Finnish leadership chose to act as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany as it

was “the lesser of two evils”. Thus, norms help to explain the Finnish leadership’s decision to

de-escalate during the Continuation War and end its cooperation with the Nazis stemmed

from a lack of shared political and ideological values, i.e., most Finnish people and their

leadership, including Mannerheim, did not support Nazism (Mann, 2002, p. 67). This is

connected to the concept of identity too and how the Finns wanted Finland to be seen by other

30

nations. The Finns’ shared ideas and possessing the norms of a democracy contributed to their

leadership’s decision making as they wanted to be seen in a certain light, i.e., the Finns

wanted to have a neutral identity and not be seen as subscribers of Nazism. This can help

explain why the Finnish leadership chose to avoid being too closely associated with the Nazis

and Nazism.

5.2.2. Lack of common war aims

In addition to lacking shared values, the Finnish government was very clear about waging

war separate to Germany and neither state acceded to a formal treaty. Thus, an alliance was

never officially established between the two nations in the Second World War. Therefore, in

accordance with constructivism, the Finnish leadership changed their view on the war upon

their forces reaching the old pre-Winter War borders. Therefore, participating in the Siege of

Leningrad and cutting off the Murmansk Railway was never a part of the Finnish

government’s true intention, especially since these territories has no connection to Finland.

The author of this thesis acknowledges the current debates about this claim. The argument

suggests, on the one hand, that the Finland entered the war as co-belligerents with Germany

because “they had no choice” and should thus not be considered allies even despite both

nations making numerous military arrangements together. Vehviläinen (2002, p. 170)

suggests that Finland´s decision was heavily influenced by “[t]he Winter War and the Peace

Treaty of Moscow” which “threw Finland into the arms of Germany”. It is arguable that until

the Finns reclaimed their lost territories, they would piggyback on Germany and adhere to the

motto that “the enemy of my enemy if my friend”. On the other hand, some arguments

contend that Finland’s leadership was aware of their role in the war, since they had already

anticipated the Soviets attacking and had prepared to counterattack. This would also give

Finland’s leadership a legitimate reason to start the war and should therefore be considered as

an offensive war waged as allies with Germany, and that the title of co-belligerent was merely

a cover. Regardless of which argument is more convincing, there are factual differences

between both nations war aims that suggests two separate wars were being waged. Finland’s

leadership was clear about being at war with the Soviets for their own reasons and stated that

Finland was never by definition allies with Nazi Germany but instead co-belligerents.

Additionally, the Finnish leadership never signed a treaty to become allies with Germany and

did not endorse Nazism either. The Finnish troops fought under Finnish command too –

Mannerheim. Furthermore, despite the Continuation War taking place during the Second

World War, Finland´s war aims were solely to achieve its objectives and to reclaim its pre-

31

Winter War territories, as discussed in 4.7. In addition, while the Greater Finland idea had

Eastern Karelia in mind – which did not extend beyond the old border – as a Finnish objective

initially, it did not comply with Germany´s war aims to conduct offensives at Leningrad and

Murmansk. Mannerheim also never demonstrated any interest in conducting a total war. For

example, he ordered the Finnish troops to stop short of Leningrad and commenced a

defensive strategy for the remainder of the Continuation War. In short, since no treaty existed

between Nazi Germany and Finland and both nations had different war aims, the Finnish

leadership eventually made the decision to de-escalate. Regarding the Murmansk Railway, it

is arguable that Mannerheim failed to find a valid enough reason to conduct an attack there.

For example, the attack was not even remotely related to Finland’s identity or its war aims

and would have aggravated the Western Allies too (Mann, 2002, p. 70).

5.2.3. Values – public opinion on the war changed

In accordance with constructivism, the sudden shift in the Finland’s war aims shaped and

changed the public opinion and support for the war. This was noticeable within the

democratic nation from when the war was first announced, with its initial aims, and then as

time went on and the Finns opinion of the war began to shift as it progressed and the deaths

started to grow (Sandström, 1991, p. 113). Previously mentioned in 5.1.1., most of the Finnish

government knew that announcing the goal of the Greater Finland and annexing East Karelia,

would be met with discontent by the Finnish people. The announcement to “liberate” East

Karelia by Mannerheim was considered as an embarrassment, especially by the Social

Democrats at the time, who came close to resigning follow the release of this statement.

Despite never knowing if the Finnish leadership would have gone through with the plan, they

understood that such war aims threatened national unity. Additionally, the Finnish leadership

quickly realised that the Finnish peoples´ support for the war and will to fight relied on strong

national unity. Thus, strong national unity was likely only maintainable by strictly adopting

defensive thinking (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). Furthermore, the public opinion on the war

shifted the longer it went on, especially once the public started to comprehend the true nature

of the Nazis and their ideology. Hence, as the war progressed, the Finnish public opinion

became more concerned about what Nazi ideology represented – antisemitism – which

opposed democratic values and was incompatible with a democratic nation like Finland.

Eventually, Finland became a hostile environment for the Nazis. For example, the Finnish

press, despite some censorship, began writing increasingly negatively about the Nazis

involvement in the war (Sandström, 1991, p. 142).

32

5.2.4. Moral norms

Moral norms primarily concern whether killing can be justified (Risjord, 2014, p. 152).

Moral norms emerge from shared beliefs and presents interesting insights for this thesis

regarding the public opinion in Finland at the time of the Continuation War. For example,

would it be morally just for Finnish troops to go beyond the old 1939 boundaries during the

war? Should Finland have had the “expansional thinking” akin to the Soviets and Nazi

Germany? Mannerheim refused direct involvement in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk

even after receiving significant pressure from the Nazis to participate. It is arguable that

Finland´s military was initially indirectly participating in Nazi Germany’s total war, which

meant the distinction between civilian and military targets were removed. However, upon

approaching Leningrad, the Finnish troops likely questioned whether it was morally

justifiable to slaughter civilians, which was a part of the Nazi’s war aims. This is important

since the Finns were fighting for Finland and not for Hitler and Nazi Germany (Ekberg, 2000,

p. 41; Lunde, 2011, p. 187). Furthermore, the war was against Bolshevism and not against the

civilians living in Leningrad. These thoughts are expressed best by Nissen & Molin (1983, p.

158) quote of President Ryti’s rumination of the Roman’s genocide of Carthage that “such

ruins of Carthage shall not remain in history as a deed of the Finns”. This type of thinking

seems to demonstrate that the Finnish leadership did not believe it was morally justifiable to

join Nazi Germany in a total war. Questioning the morality in war also links back to the

importance of identity and could be elaborated when considering Ringmar´s (1996, p. 190)

argument that the story of an actor’s deeds reflects their identity. Taken together with

constructivism, this can help to explain why Finland´s identity and the Finns desire to be

viewed by the outside world a certain way had changed. This seems to suggest that Finland’s

forces initially fought for its identity and its fundamental right to exist, regardless of the costs

involved. Therefore, Finland joined Nazi Germany with the intention of being considered

heroic by the rest of the world, i.e., that the Finns fought for their independence and had

liberated Finland from the Soviets and communism. However, as the dynamics of the war

changed, and Finland existence was no longer in jeopardy, the Finns became concerned with

how the world would see them as actors once the war had ended; The Finns did not want their

country’s story or identity to be associated with Nazism in the future.

5.2.5. Battle fatigue

Whereas the previous sections in the analysis have provided non-rational explanations, this

section combines material factors and normative explanations. Finland’s military did not

33

prepare for a long war and it has been determined that the lack of shared norms contributed to

the decrease in its troop’s psychological preparedness, which in turn contributed to the

decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk. When the war began, the Finnish army

had great confidence since they were fighting alongside Nazi Germany, who possessed one of

the world’s best armies (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 91). The Finns went in with the mindset that it

would be a short war, and this hope burned brightly at the beginning of the Continuation War

when the offensive enjoyed rapid success (Brunila, 1980, p. 85; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 110).

Nissen & Molin(1983, p. 157) confirms this and argues that Finland’s army was only

prepared for two months of war. However, as the war progressed, the Finnish leadership

began to realize that it would not end as quickly as predicted. It is arguable that the Finns not

only lost their morale to fight a war with Nazi Germany but that their psychological

preparedness declined upon realising the war would be long too. War takes a toll on mood

and nerves and the relationships between the Finnish soldiers and officers became

increasingly more hostile than during the Winter War. This is not surprising since the Winter

War lasted only three months, whereas the Continuation War continued for three years

(Sandström, 1991, p. 94). It is understandable that the Finnish soldiers may not have been

psychologically prepared to conduct warfare through another harsh winter, especially after

just doing so in the Winter War (Brunila et alt, 2001, p. 149). The spirit invoked by the troops

during the Winter War – the quality known as “sisu” – would need to be mustered once again.

Sisu is strongly rooted in Finland and the Finnish culture and is an underlying norm which

loosely means to be courageous and “have guts” (Paananen, 1992, p. 84). Sisu was achieved

during the Winter War, however, since the Continuation War was not considered a similarly

defensive war, it was less likely the troops would demonstrate sisu. This is likely true if the

Finnish troops were forced to push forward with Nazi Germany’s offensive towards

Leningrad since the same sense of pride would not be kindled.

In addition, many Finnish soldiers died during the initial stages of the war – an estimated

547 Finns died each day, which is a catastrophe for a country of only 4 million people

(Nenye, 2016, p. 148). By 30 September 1942, the number of dead Finnish soldiers almost

doubled the number of deaths in the Winter War. This took a significant toll on the soldiers’

psyche and values, which led to the changes in the war aims (Lunde, 2011, pp. 231-232).

Vehviläinen (2002, p. 95) explains that the reluctance of the Finns to attack Leningrad “was

determined partly by a desire to spare their own troops, but also by political circumspection”.

In other words, the Finnish leadership was not prepared to spill Finnish blood on a war that

34

was outside of the country’s agenda and war aims. The Finns were also fatigued from the

thousands of coffins they received from the frontlines everyday while the war ensued, which

made every day a heavy burden (Sandström, 1991, p. 113). The same is true regarding cutting

off the Murmansk Railway – Finland’s forces were battle fatigued and had little motivation to

conduct a war which they never intended to fight. During the offensives in the north, the harsh

environment had also taken a toll on the Finnish troops’ physical strength and psychological

preparedness to continue with the offensives. The Finnish leadership quickly realised that the

German soldiers were underprepared and uneducated for this type of warfare. The German

troops were consistently unsuccessful in their operations there and the Finnish officers slowly

became victims of an offensive which was not in their nations interest (Brunila, 1980, p. 95;

Sandström, 1991, p. 87). Such failures equally threated to transform into social turmoil in

Finland since morale was not only declining on the frontlines but from within the Finnish

society too (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 236)

5.3. Identity

It was previously determined that identity played an important role in Finland’s

leadership’s decision to de-escalate both offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk to prevent a

future Soviet counterattack. This finding is partly due to reasons of geography and might

appear to be a rational reason for the de-escalation. Yet, a constructivist explanation regarding

the geostrategic position of the countries involved can complement this view by

demonstrating that the Finnish forces sought to protect Finland’s independence/existence, i.e.,

its identity, by salvaging the nation’s future relations with the Soviets. The German troops

could always flee back to Germany, but the Finns would remain neighbours with the much

larger Soviet Union once the war ended (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). Mentioned previously,

Finland had lost the Winter War 15 months prior to the commencement of the Continuation

War. Finland’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the Finns underlaying fear of a retaliation

by their neighbour who had already demonstrated aggressive hostility towards them, makes it

hardly surprising that the Finnish forces chose to abstain from attacking Leningrad and

Murmansk. The Soviets would have likely considered this to be an unforgiving act by the

Finns, due the significance of these locations to them (Järv, 2006, p. 87). Thus, the Finnish

leadership was likely apprehensive that such an act might, from a constructivist point of view,

result in further (avoidable) consequences for their country in the long run. An appreciation

for the situation and how the world is socially constructed enabled the Finns to make sense of

the war and their country’s role in it; Finland and its identity needed to survive in the long run

35

too. Nissen & Molin (1983, p. 164) highlights the Finns mentality at the time, explaining that

“while the outcome of the Russo-German conflict remained uncertain, the Finnish

government maintained its official caution and bore in mind the possibility that Russia would

remain Finland´s neighbour in the future.” Furthermore, Finland’s leadership contemplated

that they would not be victorious in the war – Germany´s forces’ offensives were starting to

fail – and that they would have a better chance of justifying reclaiming Finland’s old borders,

as opposed to justifying initiating an offensive in areas which never belonged to it ((Järv,

2006, p. 88). This can, once again be linked back to Ringmar´s (1996, p. 190) argument that

an actor is influenced by their story, and without a story there cannot be an identity. i.e., by

conducting a defensive war, Finland’s leadership was protecting the country’s identity and

fundamental right to exist, regardless of the costs involved. It is arguable that Finland’s

leadership was attempting to achieve a balance of power with the Soviets by stopping the

offensive close to the old border. To summarize, the role of preserving its (Finland’s) identity

was a significant factor in the Finnish leadership’s decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and

Murmansk.

5.4. Marshal Gustav Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership

Mannerheim (1867-1957) was an essential actor in Finland’s military’s decision-making

and is a key figure to analyse to understand the decision to de-escalate in the Continuation

War (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 116). Mannerheim is described as a strategic actor who was

influenced by social effects, the pursuit of keeping Finland and its identity alive by comparing

costs and benefits. This is a rational explanation, yet, a constructivist view contends that his

behaviour was motivated through social interaction and his understanding of the world. For

example, Mannerheim’s experiences in the Imperial Russian Army, where he spent most of

his military career (1887-1917), meant that he possessed considerable knowledge and

understanding about the Russian mentality and knew how difficult it was to beat Russia in its

territory (Ahlander, 2016, p. 347; Drakenlordh, 2002, p. 98). This raises the question whether

Mannerheim developed respect for Leningrad after having spent much of his career there, as

well as knowing how important the city was to the Soviets (Meinander, 2017, p. 81). This is

in observance with constructivism, which says that the world is socially constructed and

directs this finding to the understanding that “we create the world that we live in and it

influences us as well” (Agius, 2019, p. 75).

36

The initial phases of the Continuation War were positive for Finland’s forces. Mannerheim

enjoyed superior decision making over Finland’s military yet always consulted with President

Ryti. Mannerheim clearly states in his memoirs that the Finnish war aims were to conduct a

defensive war and that the decision to start the Continuation War with Nazi Germany was in

self-defence (Mannerheim, 1954, p. 293,298,299). Divergence in each country´s war aims

meant that the Finnish forces did not fight much once they approached the old borders.

However, once the discussion moved onto the topic of a potential conquest beyond the 1939

border, the attitude towards the war amongst the Finnish population and government began to

shift. One rational explanation for this is that Finland’s economy at the time had struggled to

afford retaining the territories outside of the old borders. This also concerns identity since it

became a threat to the democratic nature of Finland to start a “war of conquest”.

Consequently, the public opinion converted from a will to fight into resistance against the

idea of a “Greater Finland”. Upon realising the public’s reaction to his statement,

Mannerheim insisted it was a “morale booster” for the army and should not be interpreted

literally (Järv, 2006, p. 88; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93).

According to his memoirs, Mannerheim’s decision to de-escalate the offensive at

Leningrad was political. Mannerheim believed that an offensive at Leningrad could be

successful, but in the short run only and would be a political disadvantage too. Mannerheim

comments that an attack on Leningrad would confirm the Soviet’s contention that an

independent Finland was a major threat to its city (Järv, 2006, p. 77; Norrback & Meinander,

1999, p. 233). Mannerheim mentions that such an attack would not be forgiven by the Soviets

when the war ended and makes the point that a counterattack might then be justified by them

(Brunila, 1980, p. 99). He further suggests that the offensive towards East Karelia would not

be considered aggressive by the Soviets compared to an offensive at Leningrad or Murmansk

– Eastern Karelia was not as vital to the Soviets. Mannerheim’s comments further

demonstrate that Finland’s war aims were independent of Nazi Germany’s (Brunila, 1980, p.

99). In fact, despite pressure from the Nazis, Mannerheim and President Ryti had already

decided in August 1941 that they did not want to participate in the Siege of Leningrad

(Nenye, 2016, p. 15).

Mentioned previously in 4.5, cutting of the Murmansk Railway would have had

significant consequences for the Soviet war effort. Prior to the Finnish forces ceasing from

their approach to Murmansk Railway, Mannerheim had become aware that the Western

37

Allies, including Great Britain and the U.S., were pressuring the Finnish leadership to stop the

advancements. The most pressing issues where generated by political factors – the offensive

threatened the U.S. who was sending aid to the Red Army through the Port of Murmansk.

This might have influenced Siilasvou’s decision to discontinue the offensive, although, he

most likely had already been instructed by Mannerheim to do so (Nenye, 2016, p. 64).

Additionally, Mannerheim did not send Siilasvou any reinforcements during the operation,

despite receiving requests. This further highlights the claim that Mannerheim did not identify

with Nazi Germany’s war aims and did not see Murmansk as being vital to Finland´s identity.

As (Nenye, 2016, p. 62) explains, “… the commander-in-chief was of the opinion that the

Germans had to at least be able to handle their own sector of the front”. This demonstrates the

importance of Mannerheim´s ability to think ahead and have extreme self-control in

demanding situations. He was initially asked to be the commander of the German war effort

for Operation Silver Fox but declined. In his memoirs, Mannerheim wrote that he had no

desire to be in command of soldiers he knew nothing about and had no interest in being

subordinate to German leadership (Mannerheim, 1954, pp. 305–306). Mannerheim

understood that German’s forces could not defeat the Soviets with blitzkrieg and especially

not while trying to capture Murmansk during the winter months, which were rapidly

approaching (Mann, 2002, p. 83). This highlights that Mannerheim was, in accordance with

the shared culture and norms of his country and citizens, interested in pursuing Finland´s war

aims only and was not interested in waging two separate wars (Polvinen, 1969, p. 29). At the

beginning of 1942, the Finnish leadership, including Mannerheim, began to doubt if Nazi

Germany could win the war. Mannerheim understood this following the German troops’

failure to accomplish any of their war aims and, as time went by, the increasing likelihood

that they would fail to achieve victory at Stalingrad (Polvinen, 1969, p. 149). Thus, the

Finnish leadership became aware that their expectation of a swift German victory was far

from being realised (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 373; Erfurth, 1950, p. 81).

It is likely that Mannerheim acquired new insights over time about the situation and the

actors. Mannerheim was greatly impacted by political decisions and based his military edicts

on them (Lunde, 2011, p. 3). He did not act purely on military rationality, which may indicate

he might have participated in the Siege of Leningrad. However, Mannerheim’s long military

career and love for his country meant he would likely have utilised his experience and acted

on his instinct for Finland’s survival. Mannerheim’s experiences and understanding of the

changing situation in Finland and the war influenced his decision to de-escalate at Leningrad

38

and Murmansk. The importance of maintaining Finland’s identity shaped the national interest

for abstaining from furthering the offensive – this corresponds with constructivism. A total

war against the Soviets was contrary to the Finns’ perception of nation security.

Mannerheim’s recognition of the underlying norms to preserve Finland’s national unity and

identity was so strong that it is arguable his decisions in both offensives were against

Finland’s military self-interest (Risjord, 2014, p. 153). Mannerheim´s understanding of

Finland´s shared culture, beliefs, and ideas, including those that changed throughout the war,

and the importance of keeping Finland’s identity, has greatly influenced this evaluation.

Mannerheim’s influence in the decision to de-escalate is highlighted by the letter he wrote to

Hitler on 2 September 1944, as found in Mannerheim’s (1954) memoirs. Mannerheim

expresses in this letter that most Finns’ opinion on the war was no longer supportive. He

mentions that Finland is a democracy and even if he had a different opinion on the war, he

must acknowledge the peoples wishes. He also mentions the importance of Finland’s identity

and expresses that any additional blood shed will jeopardize the entire nation (Mannerheim,

1954, pp. 365–366). This clearly highlights the importance of public opinion to Mannerheim,

who throughout the war had been exceptionally receptive to the Finns and their opinion on the

war. The decisions to de-escalate at Murmansk and Leningrad appear highly interrelated.

After taking all non-rational reasons – as mentioned in this analysis section – into

consideration, it seems that both decisions overlap and influenced one another. Critically, a

very strong link appears to exist between the Finnish society, their opinions, and the military

leadership under Mannerheim.

39

6. Conclusion

This thesis has investigated whether normative and ideational explanations can help

comprehend the escalatory dimensions and Mannerheim’s decision to de-escalate the Finnish

offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk amid a total war. The research question was

articulated as follows: How can normative explanations help explain why the Finnish forces

discontinued their escalation upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk, despite possessing the

military prerequisites necessary to succeed? The empirical results of this thesis provide

important insights into the Finnish people, their leadership, including Mannerheim, the social

world at the time and how these factors influenced Finland’s leadership’s decision making.

The Finnish army entered the war as a co-belligerent with Nazi Germany and enjoyed early

success in their offensives. Yet, once Finnish forces arrived north of Leningrad, the decision

was made to abruptly de-escalate. The Finnish troops would forgo active participation in the

siege with Germany. Likewise, Finnish troops had the means to cut off the Murmansk

Railway and isolate the strategically important port city of Murmansk, but Mannerheim again

chose to de-escalate. As time went by, the public support in Finland for the ‘defensive’ war

began to decline and the Finnish leadership was compelled to question if it was right to

continue. Existing research has provided explanations for the de-escalation-conundrum by

using rationalist explanations. However, a thorough analysis of a complex question such as a

total war that involves many actors, does not seem to contain a clearly determinable answer to

the research question when applying rational explanations alone. In accordance with

interpretivism and constructivism, this thesis suggests that Mannerheim’s decision to de-

escalate cannot be fully explained using current rational dimensions. Hence, this thesis

suggests that Finland acted partly on normative and ideational reason and stresses the

importance of identity, shared culture, and norms. The norms and shared culture of the Finns

were present at the beginning of the century and were deeply rooted in Finnish society and

helped shape Finland´s identity. As the Continuation War proceeded, however, new norms

emerged in the collective understanding of the Finnish people which re-created their

understanding of the war and Finland’s role in it. The re-creation of the Finnish peoples’

understanding of the war as it progressed proves one of the key principles of constructivism:

identities are not set in stone and can change. The analysis discovered from an interpretivist-

constructivist viewpoint, that the strong urge of Finnish society and its leadership to maintain

Finland’s identity, further elaborates upon the traditional rational views of expansion and

revanche and helps explain why Finland’s forces de-escalated during the Continuation War.

40

Thus, the aim of this thesis was achieved, i.e., to give an alternative view to the “timeless

wisdom” of rational explanations as providing the only explanations in many war studies,

especially in the Continuation War.

41

7. Discussion

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute theoretical and empirical clarity in

Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate the Finnish offensives in the Continuation War by

providing a normative alternative to current rational explanations. At the beginning of the

war, much of the Finnish society possessed a desire for justice and wanted to reclaim the pre-

Winter War borders. Additionally, most of the Finnish society was vociferous anti-

Communists. Both factors contributed to the Finnish government’s decision to initially join

forces with Nazi Germany. This thesis demonstrated that such beliefs and norms were enough

to convince the Finnish population to support the Finnish leaderships’ decision to join the war

as co-belligerent with Germany. It seems both factors were enough to override the ideological

differences the Finns had with the Nazis – at least initially (Meinander, 2017, pp. 223–224)

Accordingly, the results of the analysis demonstrate that Finland´s leaderships’ decision to

join forces with Germany must be read in the context of the time that the decision was made.

When the German forces enjoyed success in the war, the morale and confidence of the Finns

correspondingly increased. However, once public opinion had shifted and the morale, values

and the strive to maintain Finnish identity in the long run was threatened, the Finnish

leadership found itself questioning if Nazi Germany could achieve victory in the war. This

confirms, from a constructivist perspective and from the principle of “open to change”, that

the Finnish leadership’s relationship to the war changed through social processes and from the

declining public support from the home front. Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership were

greatly influenced by the societal changes and Finland’s historical processes, their democratic

values and the public opinion. Hence, as the war progressed, they became increasingly

uninterested in waging a war with a co-belligerent that endorsed national socialism – an

ideology most Finns did not support. Thus, Finland´s leadership and Mannerheim went

against military rationality and de-escalated Finland’s offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk.

This thesis demonstrates that their reasoning can be understood using normative explanations

including identity, culture and norms – the perception of Finland’s, Nazi Germany’s, and the

Soviet Union’s identities and relations changed during the first six months of the Continuation

War. Central normative explanations to Mannerheim’s decisions at Leningrad and Murmansk

where: (1) identity – wanting to avoid a Soviet retaliation, to secure the existence of the state

and the importance of Mannerheim´s underlying norms concerning morals; (2) cultural beliefs

– the Finnish society did not align with Nazism; and, (3) norms – concerning Finland´s

leadership not waging a war alongside Nazi Germany and the morality behind fighting a war

42

that had no connection to Finnish identity. This thesis revealed the unique characteristics of

Finland’s social world during the Continuation War. This thesis’ contribution was made via

an interpretivist-constructivist analysis that complements the existing rational explanations. It

accomplished this by highlighting the role norms play in a puzzle where dominant theories

predicted further escalation by Finland’s military against the Red Army during the

Continuation War.

While appreciating context in compliance with the interpretivist research paradigm in this

thesis and acknowledging every war is unique, five suggestions for future research are

recommended from questions that arose in this thesis’ findings and limitations. First, building

upon the key findings of this thesis, future research should consider examining social and

normative factors when attempting to understand complex phenomena such as war.

Therefore, constructivism can provide an important lens for the interested researcher who

desires to understand the world from perspectives beyond rationale and material factors. This

might be achieved by using the methodology of interpretivism and the theory of

constructivism in other contexts. Second, due to the research limitations regarding time

restraints, accessibility to archives and scope of this thesis, secondary sources were primarily

used throughout this thesis. Further research concerning Finland’s role in the Continuation

War should include archival research and use primary sources such as political statements and

directives to conduct a discourse analysis. Ideally, the primary sources should include Finnish

sources to avoid anything, especially meaning, being lost in translation. Third, to improve the

accuracy of the analysis, future research should investigate how to refer to a society without

doing so in a unitary sense, since a society is not indivisible. Fourth, future research should

question what might have happened if Mannerheim had decided to continue both offensives.

This requires a counter-factual analysis to gauge the outcomes from an absence of Finnish

military de-escalation. Lastly, the key concepts and research question of this thesis, such as

escalation and de-escalation amid an ongoing conflict, should be applied to other complex

scenarios like the case of the Syrian War. Similarly, future research should examine the

importance of norms in decision making affected by public opinion.

43

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9. Appendices

9.1. Appendix A

Note: Swedish map of the ceded territories, as shown in red, of the Moscow Peace Treaty.

The author has outlined the following locations for the reader’s convenience: the port city of

Murmansk, Murmansk Railway, Petsamo, Rybachi Peninsula and Karelian Isthmus. Adapted

from Front rapport Finska vinterkriget 1939-1940 och invasionen av Norge 1940 by A,

Holmström, 2014, by Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibloteks Förlag 2014. Copyright 2014 by

Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Biblioteks Förlag 2014. Reprinted with permission.

47

9.2. Appendix B

Note: Legend – the military symbols for reading the maps in Appendices C, D and E. Adapted

from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T.

Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 10), by V. Nenye,

2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni

Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

48

9.3. Appendix C

Note: Initial stages of Operation Barbarossa 1941. To view the map´s legend, see Appendix

B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter,

T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 38), by V.

Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter,

Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

49

9.4. Appendix D

Note: Initial attacks on the Karelian Isthmus 1941, map showing Leningrad. To view the

map´s legend, see Appendix B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland

Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars

1941-45. (p. 94), by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa

Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

50

9.5. Appendix E

Note. Operation Silver Fox in the north of Finland 1941. To view the map´s legend, see

Appendix B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In

P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 54),

by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter

Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.