de finance, joseph, being and subjectivity

7/31/2019 De Finance, Joseph, Being and Subjectivity

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162

posing flood; for the abundance of the

one has s ever ed i t f rom its r ea l l ink

with the other.

Similarly, if through the character

and the fate of his country, a writer's

senses have been consi tently a aulred

by the vas t pre ure of a s ingle i ue,

it is not difficult for him to 10 eight,

for a time, of the connection between

the disaster which threatens to reduce

him and the wider context and condi-

tion of w hich his dis as te r i but the

c le ar est e xa mp le . T he e gr o i n t he

U nite d tate. s ym bolise s a n e ruial

c ondition of Man, not m er ely in hi

urgent need to correct a social injusuce

through powers of law, but also in his

nee d to e mbar k upon a definiuon of

himself as man in the world of m n.

C R O SS C U R RE N TS

For the third of his worlds th" ' e World

La which he tS condemned by th If h .. . II e a c to IS s'p'rlt ~s t e world of men. lIe

share In thetr. community. What he

c nnot escape rs the essential need

find meaning for his. destiny, and eve~

utterance he makes 10 this direction is

an uuerance m ade O n be ha lf of all

men. And hi. re ponsibility to that other

world, hi. ihird world, will be judged

on tonly by the authenticity and power

w ith w hi h his own priva te w or ld is

pre em d, but also by the honesty with

w hi h he inter pr ets the w or ld 01 his

s oc ia l r la tions, hi COU ntry, tha t is ,

for tho e who have no direct experience

of i t, but a re m oved by the pow er of

hi p e h, his judgement and his good

faith.

BE I NG A N D S U B J E C T I VIT Y

SM IS GENEAALLY regarded by

THO'u r h.i I h

ir contemporaries as a p osop yOl .

01 the object. T'his j ud gm en t " n ot.I t foundation. For St. Thomas as

WIt lOUfor Aristotle, scientific knowledge deal

I ith the universal; truth 1 foundon Y 'W I _only in what is true for all. Being, the

Iis that which docs not depend onrea.my subjective dispo ition , on my good

leasure, but tha t w hich hold. true f or

~thers as well a s f or m ys elf. Being is

"out there," confronting my thought,

opposing itself to it. ve n if Thomi uconcede ihat thought doe not ex, tout-

sideof being-for thought, as, oncrete

activity of the mind, is being-still they

maintain a subtle difference, it seems,

between thought, con idered a pure in-

teriority, and the being which confronts

it a nd w hich i t is i ts f unction to r e -

produce within itsell. I na w or d, the

order O f being is t I ,e o r de r o f objuls,

and the subje t enter into the domain

01 being only in olar as it i. capable

of being transformed into an object. In

it' intimate depths, in the ab of its

incommunicable and ineffable ubjec-

'ivity, the subject con tillite a domain

into which the mClaphy ician- peci:tlist

of being that he is-cannot ente.r.

One of the characteristics of contem-

porary thought, on the. contrary, is the

ever-increasing importtlnce accorded to

the subj,,/ as such. By subjeCt we do

not mean merely (as in the 1tems de-

riving [rom the Cogito) 1a thinking mil-

J O SE P H D E F I NA N C E

[ect, always in peril either of being dis-

solved into its own representations or

of being volatilized into an abstract

f unction 01 s ynthes is . W e m ea n the

human existent, which is not content

with thinking but which wills and acts

and seeks and doubts and suffers, gnaw-

ed by ares and anxieties-the existent

which is itse l / and not this or that other,which is irreplaceable in the solitude 01

it l ib er ty an d in th e un iquen ess of i ts

vocation and of its destiny. It is the sub-

jee r thus understood which no w emergesas the cen ter of philosophical preoccu-

pation in 0 many modern thinkers.

his brings along with it a whole new

In ific, tion 0 value. Truth, formerly

identified with the universal and the ob-

je uve, now tends to become the priv-

ile ge of ubjec tivicy. 'What is true is

above all what i [rue fo r me. "There is

o I y one truth," Ber gs on use d to s a y.

"Each man has his own truth:' replies

Karl Jaspers. For truth is authentically

truth only if it i incorporated into our

own being. But Our truest being is not

that pall of us which can be exposed

to everyone, which belongs to the pub-

lic domain alid which others can know

a well r better than oursclves. Authen-

tic existence belongs lO what is strictly

my OWIl} to what is accessible to no oth-e r c o ns c .i O ll sn e s s a v e m y o w n . "Subjec

l.b'il is the truth."\! From this derives

the jmpol"lance accorded to authenticity.

The impol"lant thing is no longer how

l conform oneself by thought to an im-

personal and objective .befng. What

o unLS is how to be myself, how t o e x

press fully my subjectivity in my own

life, instead 01 losing myself in the amor-

phOUS a nd a nonymous . ma ss of the

"they," that is, of the eXIStent reduced

to its objective surface.

Father Joseph d. F in an ce , . ]. i a

prOfessoyof phi losophy at Th e Gr


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16 4

It would be [utile to deny or minimize

the deepening that the e new currents

have brought to philosophical thought.

to the advantage even cl those who op-

pose them. It is no longer pos ible today

to deny their right[ul place to the value

of interiority and of subjectivity, to all

that makes the individual properly uni-

que. True, the problem e r individual-

ity does not dale [rom yesterday.

Scholastic should be Ie s tempted to [or-

get this than a ny ne else . B Ul, when

traditional philosophy did treat o[ the

individual, it speculated about it as an

object and expre ed i, elf in term prop-

er to an object. The sui jecLivity hid-

den within remained outside o( i hori~

z on . F Ur lh er mo re , i n n I TI ct ap hy its

haunted by the memory oC Platoni m,

where ,he inclividual al peared a noth-

i ng b ut a limitation of a n lde a, how

could subjectivity ever have ucceeded

i~winning full recognition {or iupo i-lIve a nd o ri gi na l v al li e? I n ny velH)no one can deny that the mystery o[ ,he

"j" i n i ts u n iq u en e S : .H I I IrlY (eriOll

depths has never been app,eciated s

k eenly a s in Our o wn d n YJ o r . i( it h:) I

this appreciation ha had s arcely any

repercussions in philosophy. (Exception

m us t be m ade her e f or t . Augustine

and Pascal.) It was undeniably bener,-

clal that a reaction ShOll1d se t i n t o

fo~ce ~IS to recognize lhe illlponan e of

thIS dimension of the re.il.

The consequence, howe,"er. is tnecapable. If being include not only the

object as such but also and even more

so th.c subject in its very subjec:tivil)!,

and If, on the other han I, traditiona.l

philosophy-tO be more specific. Tholll-

ISHc philosophy-considers being only

ll1 the m anne r of a n objec t, the n we

~uSl conclude that this philo,ophy is

lllcapabJe o[ molding itsel[ to all ti,e

Conto~lrs o( the real and capturjng all

the nchne" of heing \VI,at 1 I'. .. s nc.lestIn belllg elude, it. If this be the case,

C R O S S C U R R E NT S

f w ha t v al ue a rc i ts co ns, .

IrUCtions' D

t lese such as the doctrin I . 0COact d

potency, the pr inciple of c au I . a n

'

.1 salty etcw lIC I a re no doubt valid [ I .,

I . or t" Worldc objects, still preserve tl .'e" trudvalue when applied to t l d . I

f. i e o ma tn

o subject a such) In orh. . er wordrr this charge be true, d es not SIs,

. I c 101".u c o nt o og y t urn o ut t o b e" . .. m e re ly a

r glona! ontology. and would not theau m pt to aplly i t unive rs all .

, Y Involven enatn : flattening out" oC reality?

TIII:IIA I, .F.NC i s a serious one. It

m us t be f ~ cd squarely and calmly.

T he USt s te p' to ma ke dea r ts _ I I exact

~mpo, t: Th.c tCrm "objcetive" carries with

It a peJoratl\'c onn ta,ion today Th . . I S i j

dtle m g d par t. we f e ci , to the ae .

.eptCcl. meaning t hi w or d h a s t ak e n on

,n o,d,,~ary l"ng~,age. Jt calls up at once

the notiOn f tllll/g, in the most opaque

e ns e of th ter n" ~ a r ea li ty which Ia n g' t hold of a nd han I le bec ause it

i nti ,e ly in f , ont of me a nd outs ide

or m e. in e 1 a m n m i nv ol ve d i n it

it intclligibil ity i jndependelll o[ me:

and anyonc el e in Illy place would see

it ju l :u 1 d BUl this very univer-

5{l.lilY. nthi h cems to guarantee the

Ll'ULh of our kl low le Ige, i s , 011 the can

lrllry. ju t ,,-lUll constitutes , it s !tmita

lion :md its in urablc superficiality; ror

il proves lh~u all I penetrate to in the

b ei n i n q ue t io n i w ha t i t y ie ld s u p

lO a ll orncr s " ,nd not the pre cious

c or e o[ i ts intim ate ingular ity. N od ou bt , w he n i t i a queSlion o[ things,

in the s lr i tense o[ 1l1aterial things,

lhis is of no gre at moment. A mere

lhing as such has no del th, no interior-

i ty. T o kn w i t a ording to the m ode

o[ a n objec t is to know it t r uly. or! a t

least, to know it ins of ar a s the knowl-

edge of it interests us. But it is quite

other wise whe n we are dealing with

persons, wi th subiects. To understa~d

them in t he m a nn er o f an object is to

reality to mi,understand them.

JOSEPH PI fIN .. . .NC I

If Thomism, ulere!ore, when it aflinns

thbeing is the obJetl of the intellect,

at d bito

interpret the ,...'or 0 J ec t in\V e re

h.s narroW sense, it could n or e c ap e

th

' reproach of depriving being of itst e f .existential dimension! 0 rurnmg II

urely and simply into an e enee. For

;he object or thing, as deprived of its

interiority and capable of being taken

possession of by anyone a t a ll , i prop-

erly the e ss ence a s s uc h. ( he wor d

thing, res, remark St. Thoma. dcsig-nates a being considered according to

its essence-De Veri/ate, q. I , a. 1. )

A t this point it should be nOt d ulat

the Thomistic terminology, Ie pite it

precision, remains very nexible. he

word obitct, a mo ng o th er. t ak e o n a

lessrigid meaning for it th, n for our

contemporaries. The object of knowl-

Edgemeans whatever knowledge alt, in

in any way whatsoever. But thi reply

is not yet a de qua, e. M et. ph i i nOt

just any kind or knowledge. It is ra

donal knowledge, proceeding by way of

toncepts. Now the con cpt i objc(/i'fc.

in the proper sense of the term. To sp k

of a c on e ptua l knowledg of being

seemsto imply tha t S tlbje tivit m u t

he excluded definitely from itj gra p.

Let us admit it: the objection would

be very telling j[ being had to bc i tu-

" ed, without f ur ther qua lifi t ion,

~mongthe "sepamted f nns' (XCo>p",na)

m the highest heaven of b tranion.

~Ut against 311lhenlic ThOllli ITl 'we be-

heve this difficult is inoperati,'e. Be -Ing , for a Thomist. is not t.he last degi e

~ the ascending series o( uni,ers.'ll . It

IS not an abstraction, at least not in lhe

same sense as other uni\'e~i;lls. Instead

of exduding all differentiating notes

{r~m.Uscomprehension, it absorbs lhem

Wlthm it Th. . ey arc a11 om:>.in d tI,ere-In, nOt only . .. In a \'lrlual manner andmsofar as th . . .b,' '. elr OpposItion allows orne

baSICSimilarity to :subsist between themlit actually d ' aCCOr mg to their reality

165

a dif fe re nc es , a lthough vague ly a nd

confusedly. In other words, the idea of

being expresses in beings not only that

which the y a ll have in c omm on but

also that by which each one is incom-municably itself,

This thesis of Ca jetan seems at first

approach disconcerting. But it demands

acceptance, it seems, once we admit thatthese differences, considered as "formal-

ly" as one wi hes, are not nothing and

that there is no middle ground between

nothillg and something. Since they are

something. ince they are real. these dil-

rcrcntiating nOleS, down to their ulti

mate irreducible singularity, a re a ll ex-

pre c d in the ide a of being. T he lat-

ter pr e ll" i t e l[ to us , a cc or dingly. a s

signifying the communioll 0 1 singulars

in tlleir very sillglllarity.

Now t.her i no reason whi h obliges

u to con ider these elilCerences only un

der ule ir obje t ive a spe L Everything

i n\ ll le u r :i ll he r lO inchlde a.1l the

dellth of th ir ubjec tivity. a ll that is

unique, irreplaceable, and in omm.uni.

c:lble in the On ci usness of Ollr ego "nd

in the e " er i o[ Ollr libe rty. I t is i ll l-

1'0 ible '0 refll e the vallie o[ being to

the I IbjC t ive di t i" ctivene o[ e a ch

one [ll. ~I Y on i us ne s of m yse lf

-1I0t a lh knowledge o r il particular

obj ct ",h ielt h. ppen, to be me, btlt as

t he ab l Ul el i n omffillni able presence

of the ' ') '' -i5 nOt nothing. ] " a e ns e

C\' nj

it i c\'erylhing, sin e the \Ini-

, e , o r ob je ct s e xi st s (o r m e o nl y

through it. I", the idea of being must

ll\'e1op wilhin iueJ( the value even of

the Illotinlirmue !lubjcctivity, The "I"

which thinks being, the a ct by whidl

[ think it. the liberty which takes sides

wilh respe t lO i t, a ll tha t is most in

lerior and 1110 t singular in my per-

" " I attitude-all this i being.It follows e,'idently that the idea of

being cannOt be totally obiectified. Not

only C an I nOt j ,ola te i t c om pletely


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166

from the particular determinations of

the beings which confront me, but I

cannot even disengage it fully from the

atmosphere, as it w er e, i n w h ic h i t i s

enveloped by the very act in which I

think it. Neither can I exclude my own

self from the domain of being to con-

sider it as something alien, In other

words, according to the remark and the

terminology of M. Gahriel Marcel, be-

ing is a mystery, that is to say, "a qucs

tion which encroaches on its own data."

It is in those doctrines, Oil the contrary,

where the idea of being is presented as

capable of being isolated from its differ.

ences that being appears far more as a

mere object. There I can stand back ,t

a distance from it. It turns into a prOb-lem, the same author would say_ Reason

is more a t e as e he re , f or being thus

conceived is so much clearer and easier

to handle. But we know well enough

wh at d iff ic u lt ie s a rise wh en we tr y to

apply this strictly objectified and uni-

"ocal I\Otion to reality it elL

IFTHE lOU of being is for us a "mys-

t ery /' t he re c an b e n o q u r i n oE

making it perfectly clear, At the same

tim e we s hould go a s f a r a s we c an in

laying bare its structure. But to ay, a

we have So far, that it incJudes its own

differentiating notes, that it envelop

the very act which thinks it. is to sur

round it with a question mark rather

th,n to s he d l ight on i t . W e m u t la keup at a deeper le"el the problem of ,he

telations between the subject and being,

Being, says 5t. Thomas, is ,he first ob.

ject which falls under the apprehe"sion

o[ the intellect.l~ But being is not an es-

sence abstracted from existence. Genu-

~ne bein~, ens) is the existentJ

and only

IIIfunctlOn o[ it can the possible be con.

ceived; for the possible is that which

the mind,belOg,[lIS I' ..,

. .. mo men t wh en II brings Itat the ve.y, f s by r ef le ction, c annot go onlIlto oell . .

1'fy it without seemg IIopen out

to can, ~ultiple offirmations. I cannot af-lOW Jll Ifirm being without affirming myse f

, I being The affirmer, submergedWlt1tn ,

at f irst in his own affirmation, cmerg:s

under the light of reflect.ion. Ia m In

bein" and being is in me. Or, i( one pre

fers,Obeingpresenls itself to me at once

a s t he o bj ec t o f my t ho ug h' a nd a s

tonstitutive of my ubjectil'ity it~elr. If

the idea of being came to me from con

sciousnessand the Cogilo alone, Iwould

be in danger o( remaining locked lip

within my ego. Descarte es.:ape ub

jectivi,m only by discerning, in the mo t

intimate depths o( his eon iou ne ,lhe

liberating presence of the Iden o( 00.Bu t in r e al i lY th er e is n o innate ideaof Goe l other tha n the m Ol'e me nt o(

the mind itself lOword the Absolute,

irhich gives our affirmalion lh ir firm-

ness and our idea or being iu tran-scendence.

B y this presence of the bsolutc with

in m e, my cons iOll ness acquire' 0. firmfoundation and a univer al validity: 3.

validity and a truth for all. , f t oo th

ache cannot be communic~ued, bUl lhe

knowledge that Iha"e o( it, objecLilelyconsLdered, c a n b e . t th e s ame lime

the "I" insetts itself in an order ",ider

t h :n itselE: I am /lot being: I ,m witltinbemg, I share i ll b ei ng . o li ps is '" i

radically excluded. The objecti"e pres

enceof being, lhe Sign of the pre ence

of the Absolule withi" us i indi pen-bl ' '

s a e Inorder to save OUf thought [rom

the asphyxiation o( subjeeti"i m.

Lo?"icallyeven , this objective presenceISpnorBl 'b d', u must It e lssocialed fromthe other d ( .mo e 0 presence, the lIbJec-

167

rive? M us t i t be taken a s suff ic ie nt by

itself to ope n up a ll the depths of be.

i ng ? W e d o n ot think s o. I t is only

through the medium of subjective reo

flection that being reveals its dimension

of interiority, In this light, and in this

light on I)', does it appear as existent in

the Iull ense of the word, Without the

immediate grasp et the ego the idea ctbeing would remain as e mpty a s the

Kantian cmcgories deprived of intui-

tion. The ego in its relation to the Ab-

s o lu te a n d th e u n iv e rs a l thus manifests

it ell O S the datum which underlies the

entire activity et the m ind. W e m us tnOt, however, di lin uish the e go a nd

i t r el at i n t t he A bs ol ut e a s t w e le -

m e" t. which c an be i ola te d. T he e go

i nothing wid, t l t ,hi r elation, which

nlCI'! into i[iIij inlimatc nSliUllion pre

i ' Iy a , go ( a m or e detailc d a na lysis

would bring this out without difficulty) ,"

and lhi rehuion, on its part, is immedi-ately gil'en to me o nl y i n t h e e go , i n

the xperience o( my OWil spiritu,1 ac-

t ivi t .

B ut , i t ma y b c , id , d o s not the ob-

jecti"c pre encc o( bcing imply o( itself

the e xi te nc e o( be ing i" ge ne ", I? Un

d ou bt ed ly i t d o cs. i nc e, a s w e h a ve

s ho wn , i t i i mp o i bl e t o t hi nk b ci ng

without r ef er ring to omc e xistent in

ncl. But lhe point is lhat it is al 0 im

p o i bl e fo r me t o t hi nk a n e xi Sl cn t

other",i e t.han in its relation to the ego.

bje ti,'ely, bei"g presents il el( tom e' thnt which impos es i tse lf on my

arr.rrtlntion, lhnt which I cannOt avoid,

that which is nOl relative to my aprice

or lO m y contingent peculiarities, in a

word, that whidl exislS [or every mjnd,

lor T hought in i ts a bs olutenes s. It

s hould be noted tha t the e latte r c ha r

acte.ris.tic I wh ic h s ee m to eliminate the

point o[ , ' ie w of the e go, a ctua lly in-

c lude i t by tha t ver y ( a ct . T o s ay lha t

being, objectively considered, is that

which docs nOt depend on my ego is to


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168

. I e the ego itsel into the notionwtIOC uc - .of the objective. Besides, what e~pen.

an Ihave of Thought outsIde ol

ence c .the experience of my thought? But It

remains that being, apprehended solely

as object! as correlative to the ego. ~s

lacking in depth. Icannot endow it

with a "third dimension/' so to speak.

except by affirming an act whi h cor-

responds to m y own act of affirmationand which the latter takes up and make

interior to itse)L It is in the act ol the

mind that Itruly grasp the act o[ being.

Now the affirmation can be envisaged

{rom 1\\'0 points oE view: ill itS ubjec-

live reality, as determination o( the ego

and, in the la t analysis, as a modalily

of existence; or in its intentionn} con-

tent, i ts " objec tive being." n ler the

latter aspect the act of existing is pre ent

in the affirmation in somewhat lhe ame

way as the term of motion is pre Cln in

the motion itselL he analysis of judg

ment and oE its objective i"'plicalioll

could. indeed, lead uS to po it an

A bs olute in the order o( e xi tence ,

which grounds the validity o( ollr par-

tial affirmations. Blit this Absolute and

the existences which depend 'llpon. it

w o ul d r e m a in d e pr iv e d o C trUe inlc:rior~

ity [or us, if the ego did not make m::mi

{est a new order of value thut objc live

thought, as such/ is unable to per eive.

In other words, not only is being, prop-

erly speaking, incapable of being rep

resented, of becoming an ob ject} but our

reAection of the affirmation, i[ it topped

short at the intentional content of the

latterl

that is. if it attained to thoughl

e xc lu siv e ly a s t hough t , would delivel' to

us only an existence without depth and}

in the last analysis} a nonexisting exi t

ence,

The latter hypothesis. of course, is un-

thinkable and, ultimately, self-contra'

dictory. First of all, the ego (despite

what some may hold) is not absentlrom

any of its acts, and especially IlOt frOID

c~oss C U R R E N TS

the [udgr rent, which ol its very esseiru'olves a reflection on the bi n e e

. su Ject Sondly, S Ince the r elation to th . ec . I . e ab,o)utlSI as we lave said, conSlitutiv e

. . ,. e of thee go, u IS " "po s ible to gra sp' .. I d It Inallus m il' an depth indepe 1n


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170

e r o b} ec t, h l /m a n r e al it y as the most

pro per ob} ect of our knowledge, we

'would no doubt be giving an unfore-

seen extension to the classic thesis, but

would by no means be distorting i~.

One could even hold that such a pOSI-

tion is more in harmony with the prin-

ciple invoked by St. Thomas himself:

"The potency of a cognitive agent IS

proportioned to the object of its knowl-

edge"-on condition. of course. that It

be expanded a little'

Subject and object, ego and thing,

evidently constitute two very different

types of being. Iexist fo r myse lf ; the

object, as such, exists i'n itsclf But not

only is it a phenomenon relative to my

knowledge of it; it does not truly exist

for its elf. Iappear to myself, precisely

insofar as Ia m a n II as possessing a

value incommensurable with th.H o{mere things; by my thought I ilurodu e

a kind of new dimension into the world;

by my liberty I alll in SOOle manner

cause of myself. It is quite evident thot

this is a way of existing quite dillerent

from that oE a mere thing. (It would

not be to the point to object here that

liberty and thought are on the level of

accidental operation, not of substantial

being. For operation, too} is in the Ofp

der of being, And il the ego we..e nOt

radically diffe ..ent Irom a mere thing in

its profoundest being, how could it be

so in its activity?)The word being. therelore, does nOt

mean exactly the same when applied

to the ego and to a thing. Subject and

thing differ in the mode of their exist-

ing ( in r a ti on e e " en d i) . In the propo-

sitions "I am" and "That is," the verb

undergoes a shift in value; it is colored

by its subject. For the same reason, I

cannot affirm being univocally 01 my-

self and of others. For each subject the

verb in the "I am" has an incommen-

surable value. To attribute existence to

them in a un ivoc al s e ns e would b e t o

CROSS CUllENT!

neglect this originality which [0'.I I' - r rn s one

wu 1t rerr existence, which is th . ,elr VCTlI

eXIStenCe; for to exist both fo .]. ' r myself

and for others, IS to be an l A. - perfect

knowledge, one which would match ', With

com ptete fidelity the consciousne Iss t tateach !ubje~t has 01 himself, would see

the being 1Il each one as differenti dI. 'J- ~uom Wil lin.

Our analysi of the idea of being can

be pushed still further, Further reRee-

lion wO.llld how-this is not the place

to detail how-ahat the affirmation of

m)'sell-in-the-wol'ld is not the adequate

equivalent of myself-within-being. The

being po ited in the latter, more basic

affirmation tnnscend lhat of the uni

verse nnd 01 s ciety. Only an infinite

and ab olme reality can exhaust its vir-

llIalitie . The affimlation of being with-

out qualification, included in everyexis-

lential affinnMion, lhus opens out, at

a leeper le\ el 01 1eflexive analysis, onto

the affirmatioll 01 eing, the affirmation

o f o d. ( It i , wi th ou t d ou bt t he di m

perception oC thi truth which was re-

spon ible, a entury ago, lor the success

[ ontologi 111. It errOl' was to mistake

for n vi ion, even obscure. what w a s

onl)' nn implicil affirmation. Of] better

still perh,p , a transeendel1t,1 condition

of e\-ery affirmation. Today, when the

comro\'ersie have died down and the

problem beeIl mOI'e carefully sifted out,

"'e an nlford to be more equitable in

our e um:ue: "It dated toO much, but

it was noble in itS exce s,")

It i evident that the term being as

u ed in the last named affitmation in-

volve yet another shift in meaning.

The Being in relation to which both

subject and object are aflirmed cannot

exist in the S~lIne way as they do. ~n

reality, if .ubject and object are In-

c1uded within being, God is beyond It.

It i . only Irom an incomplete and pro-

visory point of view that God can be

regarded as an "inferior" of being. We

JOSEr~p~ FIH,lHCE

that there is nothing superior to

jno w The idea of being appears rather

!Inll.kind of perspective on the o:der

a s a . b ei ng s It is turned enurelyof finIte . . God I

dt hem a nd de SI gn ateS on y

to w ar s I I. I a. the mysterious source rom

indIrect y , bthey emanate. It has God e-

whence

hind it, sO to .peak.My self, other selves, things, the Ab-

solute-ali these appear as SO many dif-

ferent types of being which have been

revealed to us by the analy.SIS of the

ideaoEbeing, and SOmany diverse a~r-

mationsinto which the basic affirmauon

unfolds as it passes to full explicitne 5.

Stillother types could be brought out

without difficulty, and this could .er"e

as a basis for a truly rational theory of

catelTories.But whal has. sO far been

sai/is enough to show that the idea Ibeing is far from enjoying a perfect

unity;rather it is pregnanl \\'iLh : 0 : procH-giousdiversity. ItS unity wn due only,

it seems, to its eXLIeme indi t in cl ne .

A fully distinct idea of being would

involve nothing less than the xl1au ti,'e

knowledge of all beings in their unity

as well as in their distinClion, a lnowl~

edgein which the mOSl minute deGlil .

tlle most individual particula.-iue , nd

the most intimate secrets would bc ex

posed in full light nnd grn ped in a

singlelook. Now such an adequate and

concreteidea of being doe indeed exi t.

But it is the Word o[ God. And all the

progress 01 h um an t ho ug ht t en w b UIto one goal: to imitate in the least im

perfect way po sible this inacee ible

ideal.

A SERIOUS DIFFICULTy mu t be facedat this point. Doc nOt the abo"e

analysisend up by doing awn with all

metaphysical knowledge? IIthe affirma-(IOnofb' I', e ln g sp I ts o pe n. o n re Oe ct io n

lthnto.amultiplicity of affirmations is no;eldeaofb" '

n b' ell1g, 111 the last analy i

ot rng b I - 'uta s lea I of dlspara te ideas

171

linked together extrin ically by a word?

If that is so, thCI1 there can be no more

talk of ontology. In all rigor we have

no right to advance beyond the phenom-

enological description of particular exis-

lenL5.1

A a f irs t $ lep toward an answer we

can point out that, if the affirmation

o f b e in g wer e n ot hi ng b ut t he i nd is-

,inctl)' per eived a emblage of [otally

di paraie nffirmation~, the indi rinctne

itself would have no explanation. -or

it i brought about by a n e rra i ng I

the differenti,l el me nt i ll f av or of

orne common e le rn em . r e we to aythat the c mmon element IX I1t i\

mething purely \Ibjecth'e, n mely, th

imihrity, i( n Ot t he i d nl it y. o f I h

nllimling attitude it If? But i thi

sim il il ll d \ " n o ne eh 'a bl i l t h b ei ll

afflflned i I t, lIy diver IIn reality. un

Ie \ II' ar t r du e ur thought to ,mcre ju "t . i ti n o f h I r 1 1 au og-

nith'c (, ultie -whi h would g " ,. in tall t he c vi de n - we .fi u t III int in that

the id a f I; i ng p o 1 1 t 1 1 1 r l'

the unity (:1c ol i t io n. t h t i, 1

i ll u n il y p o' te ri r t t he p ll lr "l it y

i t e l cm en t, b ut a Ull it y wh ic h i ll m e

way I" d Ihi di\" I it l' n d n duf

be)'(>I1d ii_ II Ih r "'ord . the affu m.-

tio n o ( lI bj e t , I ob ject , t .. u nf lei

\\'ilhill the radi ill n f fi rm l li 1 1 , "There

i " An d , be b ei ng th u pr imar il y a I-

fu m o o i nO t a " 'h oi o f " 'h ieh Ih u -

jec'. other wbj CU, Ihin , e t.. arepar i _ Bei ng i p ri or to b ein g b the

p ri "i le ge o f n un co nd it io na l n ee e i t

whi d, l 'C md e i 15 n eg at io n i mp l' u n

tllinl


6/9

172

comes to existence. Being is there, en-

'veloping beings, penetrating them

through and through, linking them to-

gether, coinciding with what is most in-

t im at e i n e a ch o ne , a nd y et a lw ay s

stretching beyond,Thus the affirmation of being appears

to us as animated, like the Stoic Pl1eU-

ma) by a double moven,ent. one [rom

the center towards the periphery and

the other [rom the periphery toward

the center. The unity of being, as it

beco1l1es more distinct and explicit,

orients us to'Nards the multiplicity of

beings; but this multiplicity, no malLer

how real it may be or how sharp the dif-

ferences and oppositions which emerge

within it, can never break. out o[ the

e nv el op in g u ni ty , a nd p oi nt b ac k l .'wards it in turn. The idea o[ bcil'lg im-

plies, accordingly, a tension bClwe n

the one and the many. But it is the

one which is prilllary-

It should further be noted thaI ..he

diverse meanings of the word being nre

not linked together solely by lheir com

man roots in the basic affirmation. Or,

at least, the u nity which resull if n1

the lat ter does not remain extfin ic to

them. There is between one being and

another, between one type o r being al'\d

another, an intrinsic similarity of SlrUC-ture in the midst of their very oppo i

Han. Let us examine in particu13r lhe

case of the ego and o[ the thing,

It should be noted, farst of all, that

the ego cannot eLiminate all objective

aspects. Iexist [or mysel[, b ut i n large

measure, Iexist also lor othe .... They

can see me, hear me, touch me, Ctc.,

and e~en ~\fith r eg ar d t o w hat escapes

them III t lu s way I can communicate to

them by language a knowledO'e which

already extends q u ite far . 'urthermore

I do not gain [ull seU-assurance ex(ep~through the opinion which others have

of .me. The Tradit ional is ts noted this

CROSS CUR"! ~ T S

own eyes, we need to knot thv at weac epted and supported by a r eOUreq IO ur r ea son w ould be in gr ua s.lav e danif everyL!,iIlg around us procl ' ger, aImednon.exlstence- And yet 'he k OUrnow ledof other s r ea ches u only f rom . g e

TI

' Without

iere remains always the inn f 'I .' . er orlresso o ur i nv io la bl e Intimacy wh,verewe

could, srrictly peaking hold ' OUt a l o n eagall1st everyone. But this very' ,mtunaey

would volalilizc into illusion and

being i[ it we,e not laid hold f non. a and,as H. w er e, a uthe ntic ated by ab 1. s o u te

hought-If, there(ore, Iwere not

I

' m),sC [In orne w, Y an object [or t h i s

h ou ght . ev en l h ug h, o f course, it

w on ld n ot k no w m e according to t h e

mode oC an 01 j cl,

ven without appealing to absolute

h u yilt ,,'e would have to maintainlhat . sl lbj thdlY c a n n e ve r divest itself

o[ all objective lr. its, X can never speak

lIL all lh:ac j i n m e; but, no m atter

h ,~ hidden ar lhc deplhs into which

Iplung w ithin mye l[ , Ican alwa)!

ay sOIllClhin ~bout them, It is i r n p o s -

ib l t o iaI.He within rnyseH a zone o(

PUI'C subje tivilY. The "ery fact of iso-

bling it would uff ie c to Lllrll it into

all objecl. ubjeclivi,y is present to u!

o nl y a a ki nd [i mp al pa bl e at mos

phere enveloping obje tifled being,

" the Olher ha"d, lhe object is,b)

deConi,ioIl. 'hal which i o p p o s e d to m e ,. 1 , . . ' it . annot. oppose it elf w me un Ie s it fU'Sl in orne manner asserts it

selL In ou,el' word, it fulfills its func,

tion only lhrollgh the mediaLion of an

nCl by whi h it illserts itsel[ into being,

This is equivalent to saying tbat the

object is , on it part, also LO some degree

a subje t, I can think it only by analOg)

wilh my el f, as a . k in d o E w unter-sub

j,c t. Etylliolo ilsel[ suggests this, Il

O bj< etlllll

evoke rau,er ,he passivity 0 1

a lhing tI,rowu. against mel the Genllan

term CegensUwd indicates dear ly , on

JOSlPH DE FINANCE

, h-c h sta nds up oppo,ile me. 0betog w J '

d (stare 'ista1lal, s"hell) a5SeTt5

s t an u p ,' dl < omething e lse than a me re

as S U1e Y v , st'lte To think the object a

PasSive <

, ' g in itself-and we must do till ,eX IS tlO .

del' pain of taking ",,'ay ItS very ob-un . . ' Ijecti vity and turning jt mto a imp eimmanent corre laLiv e of the su bj e 1-

means, therefore, 10 confer upon il nminimum of subjective deplh: i.e., the

exercise of tha t a ct w hich in cribe in

the order oE exislence. hll5 e"cry be-

ing!in its own way, is a ubject: \'cry

being is a sell-asserti n, a sel[, ffi ma-

tion. M. Sartre is unwilling to allOh!

that what is only "ini!sell" (and not

"lor-itself') be said to nffirm itself; il

just simply is, that's al1.8 But i n t

t o b e precisely to aliiI'm Olle.tlp r

rather, what else is the nffirmalion and

the act of the ,,'ill save lhe rcilenllion

b) the spirit, in its o"'n proper way,

o f the act by which the being i.1 Mela.

physicallyspeaking, both nllirm, lion, "d

act oEwill must be il1lelpret d on lhe

basis o[ the act o{ exi lcncc. ut it i

only through them, and hen e b \Urn

ing bac k to my own I Ibj t i, 'i ly, th. e

this act r eveal s i tsel [ t lnd a l l h ' m e t

grasp its true characu~r,

I E , the re fore , a t a pT cviou tdge 1

our analysis ~nd on a lin Illcwhl.lt

superficial level, sllbject 'l1\d bj t ap-peared to LIS a lWO f or m o[ ~ing e h It

were completely di parate, deeper

analySiShas crncoveTed n lose link be-

:ween them. It is impos>iblc to tllink

he one without conferring upon il to

a greater or less degree the imelligihle

structure of the other.9 A ubJ' 1 which

would b h'. e not 1n but ubje t and an

object which would be nothing hUl ob-

Ject

l

w ould both I i olve into iII u ion

an c n on be T "_ mg_ .,e reasOIl is lbat h e-

lUg, o[ which b'both su Ject and objeCl aTe

t' aspects, tran cend. their oppo ilOnand expres s . U'n es s n ei th es l ~e Inits complete.

e r ac cordn' g to the mode 01

17]

interiority nor according to thtll 01 01.1-

jeclive eomrnunuy. Reing-e.er)' being-

~ at t he me t ime, rhough unequally.

Jncommunicablc and .el[ or nmu ni

rive, It follow that meraphy i , no

mauer ho\,t "objecrivc," I1lU\[ .aIW~l)'\ in-

tude n reflection on Ihe ubjecr, ~nd

hen~e can never I ve ihe Inn r lotallyout 1~le or it ope. ny the return toeXIH~ng. hO\l n 10 be n e,o,ar' in o ,d r

In g"e m ean ing I l he wo rd h ei ng, I

ha,c ,IT ady gra~ped nt Iheir r e II

lI' e , 'a tue o[ ubje t i' ity.

A n, Ie L ,. ri here, r w n tI:uih)' I preading on(1I ;011 r~,

~her lh:n 1,,,,Co~1I0n b)' "h~l I.e h~1

J~'I "d? III , i' l nee in Ih h IlliIIC und f\l3nding of the w rd -h .h . ~lI

I'. a tIl ins;. be idtntif ,e d nt .. II

"'Ieh lib; lhil '1 I il n t. cm Ih 11

IId' " T dinlf eo e h f lr 1.> \I nd , , n, ,1 k

01 lh~ Angeli Ir, eh.lI "hi hill-

hnw I l h b ond (II utli n 01 ,II II ,nil 't l' 10und,'lItlll O[ lh I. InIllU'

nit 1'0 I\od wfluld Il(le '"bl IiI Jl ' II.,,'

I look d [Ilr 'dlh r "111 'id III

'~ ,ll~e 1>I,n 'Ill 01 Ii",ie,.ei n .Inll

1 ' . ' 111 ul.L1".Ilion? 1 1 i ;lIlm 1 i . 1 l I ,i.dent lh.1t lIeh ,I po ilion w\1uld be 'u t

lh Ie" I llhll h-Id Il)' \1\1r \111/m-

pora~1 'or. lh III ;1 i' ,i lInR \, hi heOll\lIlU t '\I Ihin dh be in" lh '

. I I ' . . . 1 " 1 1 1 -'ll IrIctlu ibl illl d ,;1tI' .,t'd..I r. "Inth I till , . illlUioril' il'

II: IIh r ~ it i r, I. n l\ (On'lr.L1 j. 'whi h rounds IHmuniC'"..lbihl!

dlld ?~j u,it. M u t lie ton Iud Idef ml\l" 01' 1 i lion bel" ' 11 tl . ,.. t\,(J

I l' '' 'l lon 1 r i 1101eh tonlr. l bet" n

th III due r,llher t II hardenin t n

( p I S?

Iti qu!c lnl ~ tlldt f' ( lll . .. t o[

)"".'".) I [ r h mi 'l lI 1 1\ p ri ll ' 1,1 "

of. :um11uude and communit bet\\" n

~m . IIlIti,i

nt

In II,milnller

o[ a unh rwl. ilen nOl u

preme I tIb trtI. e nee. h i t1 lhe


7/9

174

thin a being which resists

con trary. at 1 .'being abstracted, conceptualized, obh)ec.

S e d a s we ave.fi d It cannot be gra P ,

u e . b a reflexive return to thesave y' .seen, . d' n t he l as t

act which a ff ir mS I t, a n 1 1 .

. that r adical a ffirroallonanalysis. to ..which underlies all the aeuvtty 01 the

mind and is inseparable from :he ego.

The act 01 existence presents Itself. al

ways as a subjectivity which I c~n t.h~nk

of only in terms of my own .subjeCllvlty.

It is a principle of communIOn, yes~ but

at the same time a principle 01 UnIque'

ness. It is the act by which each bel~g

ff iyms i tself in i ts incommunicable Jn~

~llarity, but alfifl,?s itseU witliin being,

as s ha r in g i n b em g J as hnk.e~ m Us

very singularity with all other SIngulars.

Such is the deeper meaning 01 thethesis which sees in the act of existence

the fonnal principle by which an in

dividual nature become a C onC 1 "e te sub-

ject, incommunicable once and .(or all

(a suppesit) . The theologIcal OflgJn of

this thesis is evident. But history has 01

ready shown us many times how striclly

theological speculations lead to impor

tant progress on the plane of pure phi

losophy. The progress in this case con

sists in bringing out into the open I.he

supremely individualizing role 01 the

act of exist ing.Let us make ourselves clear on Lhis

point. The act of existing, as such, c;:tn,

not play the role 01 individuating prin

ciple. Though limited and distingui hed

in itself-Eor it is in itself a relation to

essence-it is not so by itself-since it is[rom the side of essence that its limita-

tion proceeds. But it is precisely by it

that a being is and posits itself as an

absolute, a co ncrete t ot al it y t hat i s

henceforth incapable of entering as an

element into the structure of anothet

subject. The act of existing imitates, onthe level oE the creature, that selfsuffi

ciency, that completeness, that exclusive-

C R O SS C :U ~ ~EN TS

Act of Exis tence . In the abyss 01' .

Ibl bi .. Its 1[.

rep acea e. su Jecllvlty each "only one"

imJtateS Him "who admits no peer.

Y et i t i s i n t hi s sa me a bys s t h .. at H

meets all other SIngulars. For this b

lute subjectivity in which mine paa ~.rtlClpates is also that in which all other bsu .

J'ects participate. And the more each, . O n e

s ui ves t o b e Hself and to advance to -

wards perfect a..llhenticity, the m o re

also it enters into pro,[ound communion

will' all the ol.hers, SInce it is L 1 le same

Act which is acting in all and commu.

nicatil\g itself to all. It is not, there-

fore, by some illusory renunciation at

beil\g ol\e el tbnl. we bring about the

mcetil\g with al\other, but in a deepen.

il\g o[ one's own selL Nevertheless we

muSt distingui h here between simple

il\dividuality, which belongs to the or

der of nature or e encc, and "ipseit(

or scll1lood, "'hich belongs to the order

of aCl, o{ cxi lit'g. while at lhe s a m e

time being onditioneel by the (onner.

To cli ng t ll bb o, ." ly t o t he former i s

to impri on one elt in one's poverty. To

de cend more deeply into Lhe latter is

to make one ell e"er more open to oth

ers . n e b e orne t ru ly h in ls el f n ot b y

ultivnting originalily for its own sake

but by exi ting more intensely, that is.

by om1l1ining ne's life to higher and

highcr , 'alue ,Thi IDust not be under-

t oo d" t he elb ci ng o f m y ego b efore

some impel' 1\,,1 ideal. II. involve;, on

L 1 le ontrory, an en,inently personal ad

hesion to the OLlrce of all personality.

I 1'001. 01 .self more firmly in existence

in the mea ure in which I turn to w ard s

oel that I find my prope r place, . d " l o o k

u nd er His eye. B ul . I .h lS j Vl ne

which consolidates my being is also that

which permiLS me to see others as true. . the

b ei ng s a ,ub/ects. Essential as IS ., ~ U

p re ence o [ o Lh ers for u s, n o 1 09

more difficult for uS to admit than that

1'tIlearntO

t hey reall y and t fU y exlS .th rs WItha

~OSEPHDE fIN.ANCE

1 disinterested love, only when

s in "re y t he im ag e o f God , po itedI see in them ood W'1l. b 'n " by L ite same G I .[Il el 0 ' .'

h deepening in SubjeClI"'Y'ThUSt e k

. con scio US ol wh at rna 6th becollllfig .

e lv es f ar fr om d o i ng us r n a nd

u s o u r se , It. i s on [he contrary. t e con-isolating us, I, ,,'

. . . 't ho ut whi ch o u r rcl au on wit hd w on w r

ld never go beyond the lOgeothers WOll

fobJ'ective and superfiCIal ommu'

o an . . hnity, The reason, once again, l I [

the act of exisling is at o ne a ~d t he

sametime the principle botho( Incom

municabil ity and o[ communion,

Inversely, essence-we are pe,lking

here evidently of the s;"glliar e .ence

-at the same time that il limit bting

to this particular being and so di,ti~.

guishesit from a l l o the r , pr~'\{;rll .It

selfto us, basically, as Illal WIlICIl, w.llI.

in a being, ca n bt cornmun;cDUd:

"Everyform, precisely a fom,; 010'

municable" (St. Thom"" 1 1 1 I till .. d.

4,q. I, a. 1). Even a pure form, which,

according to SL Thoma, j not l11uhi.

pliable according to its "natllt,ll" be

ing, can be multiplied and c mmunicatedaccording to it "inlention I" be-

ing.":"hchaelily" ub ists only in )It h

ael ; bu t i t can be p re n t i n l he (li d r

at ideasto an infinily 01 mind. Th rt

isindeeda di[erence in the modc ot be

ing. Michaelity in Micltacl i u,e I.l\"of the ac t O f t x is tj ll g ; i n ~briel. in

Raphael, etc., it is the law o( LIle arl

of thinking. B ut i n t he (on nal l in e 0 1

quiddity the identity is absolute. i\nd

It needs must be; olher\\' i se . it w ou 1dnothe Michael that abriel and Raph.

aelwoulelknow (d. the celebraled p.

sageof Kant on the hundred lholers in

hISpocket and in bis idea) _ In ""Ottth e esse . .

blnee IS representable, obJeetifia.

eandth -b' . us commumcable, preci I

ecause It is f' I .be a ase f Imper>onal and

comes a person onl b 'municabl y Y tJ'e lI1come act of exislence.

Perhaps r tbt h d i t i i h

1 7 '

m ll ni ca bi li . od i nc om mu ni loil" 'I

wou ld b e bell er t o d. t in gu i h '''0 l",d.III communi(~tion. I here" the ounnu-

nieauon 0 1 IIh id ' W t IM\ t ju.' tpo en,

,h~t o( net or 01 f o, m, . ,h i, h i . "

ceprible ol I>c:"'~ represerued. M'd rhe,

i anoth r, qui. dillt,tlll, II h,.h "

propcr 10 a t, to hlln. (Wt"' ht-It

t"king LIlt ,elm ~tt in .he ,t t"I'and (orm.,1 n of In"i,,"1 t," IIl,h

dud fr"m ih "" n p f(JfM 'T lint IIIlOtellli.IiI). In a ",~r 11- 1 I. I h " \1>-

",hlle d "',.... mmunl I I II lire

Ih lI1.nll t "I m"d I , 1 ... 111 h I h~

'., ;"u Im;1 I in , "Id Ior I f Ith ll li , pI l u I ' n,lh- IIl.1l1l1 r ib( mu 1('.1 th m

w""ld , IlC.tt I "101 r I dllllll1

ihtd i n illltll " t Ir t th t I nl

.1 p.mi.1 "tl " . 1 . . 1 > 01 11 10 1 " " ,If" "ih d I 1",,1 pI "

n. we h "Id 100 rdlh r 1.10 I r

o( lo'e .nd ill, ,dIn; t

w .ud th othu t rdlll~ t

ter' own p pte iIn. II

?n its Own d count I1d prol n l \: Hh ll l

I II tJ, "I "hi, the Ih I III tI

it II in the rll T ( , t II I'


8/9

176

" I a rt ic il)a tion in the exis t-be a spmtua p . '

I. but of which ihis exist-

ee of anot ier, .e n . uld r athe r be the e xpre SS IO n.ence ","0 b that comnlUThis is what we mean y. .

. . of act raised 10 'IS lughestmcatlOD' I 1 .

I' 1 1 is Creation. ( At e as t t us

degree, w uc . 11. h ' he st de gre e wh ic h is ra tl on a Y

IS the Ig . of thei bl t u s T he ro ys te rt esaccess! eO

. , d t he In ca rn at io n p re se nt u sTnmtyanwith incomparably higher Iorms of c~~-

filunication which the mind of man, eIt

to itself, would never have been ab e

10 suspect-)

The deepest relationship between

b' an d God i s n ot o ne o f r esem-

em gs .blance or of dillerence ([or all that I

o[ the or de r of e ss ence . a nd I t. ' the

act of existing which is central 111 any

being; it is this which is th~ [orll1al

term of the creative act). It IS rather

an "existential" relationship, and there

[are one that is strictly speaking impos-

sible 10 def ine. O ne c an do no m or e

than evoke it by suggestion. as that act

by which beings are both made present

and present themselves before God. and

thus at once are distinguished [rom I-llm

a nd tur n tow ar ds H iml adhering to

Him as to the Source on which they de

pend. This relationship. once gra pe I

by the spiritual subject, can [oUow ut

two divergent paths within him, that

of love or of hate, tha t oE c nf, de nt

adoration or oE rebellious pride.

What is more, if the divine Act com-municates itself by calling forth other

acts into existence in its presen e, then

without doubt the lauer n1ust preexist

within it in some manner, But it w uJd

not be a de quate to c once ive this in

terms oE tbe preexistence oE the image

in the model. For the model contains

the image only insofar as the latter re

sembles it, whereas the divine Act, as

the total cause of creatures, must con

tain them according to all that tI,ey are,

hence according 10 their very subjectiv-

ity, i.e., according to the very aspect

C R O SS C U R RE N T!

which opposes them irreducibly to 't.r :rum,self. What else can this mean save that

t he y a re p re e m t o H im i n t he an I,, I. I . . )

manner I II W 'lie1 it IS possible for a n -other, as other, to be present. namely

according to the mode of thought a n d

of love? This does not mean by a love

s om ehow a dded on to the divine Be .

ing. but by a love w hich is this ver y

Being itself; [or, if there were any di;.

uncuon between Love and Being, it

w ould be nec es a ry to put f ir st of a li

into the latte r . 1I tha t had to be P ""

em in the former. The absolute Actof

Existing. preci ely because it precoruain,

within itself all other acts of existence

a cqrding to all their subjective depth,

canl"lot be conceived save as an absolute

L v e. " d i L ov e. " T he m et ap hy ,i "

r existence thus rejoins in its own w a y

the spiritual inLLlition o[ the apostle 01

1 ve.

LET us NOW gather together the r e o

ult o[ ur r ef ie ctiolls. W e have

seen how the affirmation of being. since

it includ s w i l.hin i t sel f the affirmation

ot both subjeet and object. canllot un

fold and clarify itselE without a reflec

t ion upon the s ubje ct. W e have , ee n

how the objec t i t e lE . in order to be

solidly real, in order to assure its own

obj ti"ity, implie a kind of analogous

s ubje etivity tha t I c an know only by

reference to my own. And we. have

shown how the opposition of obJectIvity-subjectivity is founded on the .oppo

, f subl,ctIvsidon o[ e enceeK1Stenc.e; ority in lhe suiue t sense of the word,as

belonging to a subiect properly ,0 c allI expressIoned is nothing e ls e but t 1e ,

, E tI ct of eXlst-wilbin consclOusness 0 le a

. ' pre ss es onin g in ofar as l he l att er an . ' d I . dlVIu,a being the seal of inalienab e III

ality. . d tbeT his is the m om ent to rero

lt1,

I t T homlslur ea de r onc e a nd f or a ll t 13 of es'

is not des ic ca te d philosophY

J O S E Pt l D E f i N A N CE

but that it is on the contrarysences, '

. d entirely towards exlstenCe, to-

Powte . I ' ..

d eIIthe word "existentIa ISm

war 5 e ss . .

d te xist i t would have to be JIl-

di no 'I to

characterize adequately Thorn-\'entec ., ' t llought W e s hall not e mploy I t.IStIC' , .

I.ever precisely because it does exist

lm~ , ..d nOW carries a very special meaning.

an - .r

N o! Thomism is not an eXlstentla IS~.

Bllt it is par excellence the metaphysics

of existence. Through the medium of

all the concepts that inevitably it has

to manipulate-and what else can a hu-

mao science do?-it is the act of exist-

inz that it is aiming at, in the inexhaus-

title richness of all its virtualities (vil.

IU S essendi). But the a ct of e xis ting is

immediately given in the depths of our

subjective lHe; we meet it in the sanc-

tuary where we work Ollt our destiny.

It is in the guise of the ego that exist~

ence reveals itself to us. Hence a meta

physics of existence worthy oE the name

cannot get started without a plunge into

L be depths of s ubje ctivity. A nd this

plunge is necessary not only at the be-

ginning. Metaphysics is in danger of de-

generating into verbalism if it is nOt con

stantly revivified by contact with exist

ence, Unceasingly m uSt w e recharge our

concepts with this savor of being. ,,.rhich

the play oE abstract thought causes 10

evaporate so quickly.

Far [rom requiring. tllerefore, like

scientific thought, the sel[~effacement of

the ego before the universal, the objec~

tive, and the impersonal, metaphysical

thought demands a subjective deepenillg

pushed all the way to ti,e point where

the e go f inds i ts elf ope ning out into

communion with others_ Every solution

of the one and the many will be artifi.

c iaI whic h doe s not r ef er bac k in the

last analysis to this primary fact.

. By means oE such a deepening, Thom-

IStic metaphysics will be able to escape

the reproach [rom which we started,

namely, that it is va lid only f or t i, e

177

world of objects. It is not an adequate

a ns we r to the dif ficulty to point out

tha t the s ubje ct is a ls o objec t. It is,

without doubt, but not in its totality;

for it resists complete conceptualization.

If tha t is true, is i t not to be f ea re d

that in its subjective depths it will es-

cape the laws of objective thought? The

danger is removed if the idea of being!the starting point of metaphysics. nec-

essarily includes an act of reflection, and

on the c ondition, of c ours e, tha t this

perspective does not disappear from view

thereafter. By the same means metaphys-

ics will be protected against mallY of

the distortions and inadequacies which

are an inevitable consequence of a rei-

lied (cllosiste) interpretation of spirit-

ual being. I am thinking, in particular.

o[ the problem oE liberty.

This integration into its philosophy

o[ the domain oE subjectivity in all its

peculiar depth and mystery seems to uSt be one o[ the most urgent tasks which

confronts Thomism today. It is not pos-

sible that the cultivation oE this imen-

sifled awareness of existence in its in~

communicable originality should not

produce repercussions on our idea of be-

ing in the direction of bringing out cer

tain tra its w hich have her etof or e r e

mained in obscurity. On the other hand,

SUdl a method of reOection and deeper

penetration wi]! make it possible for the

notions and principles oE metaphysics to

receive a more adequate expression. 1

the s ys te m of a c t a nd potency . nd theprinciples of sufficient reason or of caus~

a lity m ee t w ith s o m uch oppos ition

and arOuse so luuch repugnance among

OUI" contemporaries, is not one reason

because they have been thought out too

exclusively in terms of schemas based

solely on objects as such?

This adaptation by nO m ea ns in-

volves, it should go without saying, the

setting up of an exterior and artificial

concordance between Thomism and cer


9/9

178

rain present-day currents of th?ught,

nor a mere dressing up of the jradirional

doctrine to bring it into conformny

with the latest mode of the day, nor

even the attempt to discover what St.

Thomas would have said if confronted

with our problems. We have but little

taste for all such Iuturibles- It IS wewho have to answer these problems. and

on our own responsibility. But it seems

to us that Thomism, if we have not

merely learned it superficially but pen

etrated into it deeply, assimilated it per-

sonally and made it part of OU.Town

substance, can be of marvelolls assistance

in working out adequate solution. It

is our belief that by building upon it

and in continuity with it new develop-

mentS and new integrations are po sible

under the stimulus of the new problems

brought up by modern thought. It is

the characteristic of every great doctrinethat it transcends the explicit intenlion

of its authoT. Every work o[ ge"illS is

the bearer of seminal ideas. It has per-

haps been reserved for our l im e L O ex-

ploit to the full the resources of the

Thomistic doctrine of existence.

translated by w. NORRIS CLARKE, 51

NOTES

1 Man y n ua nC t: S w ou ld h :l vC \ 0 be introduecd

bere. Thu.s [he egO of De-5c;J;rt~ is "$Omtthing

which thinks," but it is ;150 "~omethlng whic..hdoubts. whicb conceive" which ~llirmJ, whic;b dCtliet,which wills, which reflJ~, which ~ ginl: :3 111$0ilndsenses" (Deuxieme M;JitdljafJ1 cd. Ad:l.m-T:l.nncrr.

IX, 22).2 Kierkegaud. COlleTf /djng Ururjtntj!ic POslJrfil'l.

(Princeton Univ. Press, 1944), pp. 182S 3.3 "Primo ;l.U[cm in conceptione inteUec;tu.$ co-die

ens" (Sum.. TheaI., I, q. 5, :l., 2); "mud 2unm quod

primo inrclleclus cwu;ipil qUl$i nouuiroum Cl in

quo omnes conceptioncs resolvLl cst eD'" (DI! Vl'f'l

q. 1. < I . . 1).

4 . Set o n r h iJ , po inE th e cI~llem p:l.ges M a ri ll in i n e.xiJlefll'~ d~J Ihe E x is t en t ( ;; Jacquel1!I'41). pp_ H .H. ew York,

(l~, tor CI.:lmple. J. Laporte, l . .4 ronrcie1 8 /,bt,tl (Pm'. 1'47). pp. 178-8Q !lee d (

8 Sum. Thtot . I, q. $4, :I. 7. It would b'pfi:ne to pOint out also, in a ddit ion to the ippt i l-o b je c t, " " h; l il we m iKh t cell the Center 0) e jPtoper

f k I~~ hire erNlCt

o O \l r n ow ~ ,\ fi e ( r e IJml08tdilln pritleepf h our cxhtence

I nd t ri a t o d uc.i du e i t. Ie m:l.Y indeed ipe1k ill

of it, bl,l.E it iJ o b l i, g c :d c o l u p p Oi e it, (or a n myworw . r c l muninJl:lcs. H 1 do not :l.dmit [hat ~certain nru(;CUrCl of e.:UJCtl'lctl is C()m,n'IQn to myinterlOCUtOr s.nd rr'JYRIl'. Hmcc this phHo$Ophy is

Corced to .dmit 'I tbtji, directly contrlLry to itsown affirmationl, Detpitc iu {ormlll i n te n t , e h e p, h i .

lOJOph1 of JlIJpUl cannot r!;Strict itRlf t~ belli?putdy uinentl",l" (L,.l / lhl/o,oplJI, Ii, Mar tm Hel

Jtn,r, louui.nl p. ,,"01).J. P. S:l.ntr:, L1llrll tI If' ".llInt. P:His, pp. ) 10; 4

o Thi, il . . h)e DC'lC~1"LCJpernttdOl,lt a pro~~~

m l lt tt r I ln d . J pi ri t ( K C tot nUl\ple, Lettrt II A o ut 1 6 41 ~d. Ad.ll";.TMnC:(YJ III. 423-2S). But

., . .. f f o u rhe lIuriblJtcd '00 the pnm1t.lVc '-OD U$IOD 0 fthou.8hu what rnUy belongl to the struct

ute0

being Iml. d m10 "Ru lid il\viccm non distlf}guuntur .secu~ u"

quod itllC hllNntl o,uill il\ hoc: ornni :l conVClllunt

(C. Grill., I, (".26).

Notes on other PublicationsT H E P O L I TI C A L -C U L T U R A L S C E N E

The Historian and Character (Cam

bridge). The publication of the inau-

ural lecture of David Know les as Regi-

~s Professor of History at Cambridge is

of prime importa"ce for itS modification

01 the inaugural lecture ("On the Study

of History") of his great predece or,

Lor d Acto n. S uch a r ep l y h as b een

needed, as against the te"de"cy to hold

up Acton, the moral judge, as the proto-

type of "true" Calholic hiSlori al schoo

larship. In his i"augural Acton had said

(italics added) :

History compels us to [aste" 0" abid-ing issues, and rescues uS from lhetemporary and the transient. Politic'and history are inlenvoven, but arenot commensurate. Ours is a domainthat readIes further than oITairs f state, and is not subject to the juri.diction of governments. it is ourfunction to keep in vi.w and to com-mand the movement of ideas, wllichare not the eUecl bill the calise 01publi c event s; and even to allo wsome priority to ecele iastical historyover civil, .. _by reaSOl1 of the groverissues concerned, and t.he vital con e-quences of error ...

He portrayed the duty of Ule historia"

in no uncertain terms:

I exh or t y ou n ev er to d ebase themoral currency Or to lower the w.od-ard of rectitude, but to try others bythe fi~al maxim that govem' yourown lIves, and to suDer no ,nan andno calise to escape the undying pen-alty. which history has Ih. power 10mfllct on wrong, " If we lower ourSla~dard in history we cannot upholdIt In Church Or State.

'c t Something might be said to show that

I. ea s are to be understood also as de-V t c e s whereb y m en try to cop e, as r a-

tional beings, with concrete situations

and that very often historians, whe~

undertaking the role of judges, are ill

the posi tion of condemning medieval

serfs for not plowi"g with tractors. Ideas

and concepts are often merely inade-

quate. Moreover, they "grow," Or are

uans{onned in use.

K no wle' r ep ly g oes to 'he h eart o f

the m alter and f ocus e, u po n " ju dg -

ment" on the perso,,:

There is, indeed, a truth far too oftenignored by historian, which loosens

m""y problem. A ma,,'s characte,-,above all whe" the man is of no com-

mOll mould, c"nnot Ie analyzed bypicki"g lip a" action of a character-istic here and there and tying them

in a bunch. 0 o ne p a s e lhr u ght ime : and itS accidents and rer'llainsHllchal ged. man has free will andhe can, indeed he must, exercise ie.Hi nalUre wil.h lIS characteristiCs re amain l-ecogniza Ie. as do his features,b tll h i aim , h is id eals , h is s en e of values, a"d his directive strength ofwill may have changed entirely".The hi tOria" must recog"ize this,

eve" if it seems '0complicate his task.

Knowle' orrective would appear to be

o"tained further alo"g in his short es-

say:

A life is " ot a b un dle o f acts; i t is a

su:eam. or a landscape; it is the man-ifestation of a si"gle mind and of apel- onality that may grow more de-f or med o r m or e b eautif ul to theend .. _ The whole co"cept of the historian as a judge in a trial is radical-

ly false. if only because a judge byhis very office acquits, he does notpraise and reward .. _ He watches thestream of eventS and the actions ofm en , alld r ecor ds them as b es t h emay, .. The historian is not tryingthe men and women of the past, heis conl.mplating them; he has to seethem as in tr uth they w er e and to

de finance, joseph, being and subjectivity

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