DECLARATION OF PAUL S. HUDSON

I, Paul S. Hudson, declare as follows:

1. I have been a member of the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory (ARAC) since 1993. FAA ARAC deals with safety regulations and consists of representatives of all major aviation stakeholders. I have represented the traveling public and general public on behalf of Public Citizen, Aviation Consumer Action Project, and now FlyersRights.org (also known as Flyers Rights Education Fund), the largest airline passenger organization with about 60,000 members/supporters.

2. In the 1990s I was a member of ARAC's Emergency Evacuation Issue Group (also known as the Occupant Safety Issue Group or Subcommittee) during the time it studied whether full scale evacuation testing should continue to be required by the FAA. This subcommittee, after extensive debate, did not approve abandonment of full scale testing, but the FAA did so anyway. The Administrator has the authority under 14 CFR § 25.803(c) to allow simulation or partial demonstrations.

3. I have been a frequent airline passenger on a variety of airliners for over 30 years, normally in economy or coach class, weigh about 200 lbs., am 6 feet tall, and am 71 years old. I have incurred some painful conditions as a result of the steady shrinkage of seats and passenger space, and have witnessed the massive increase in overweight or obese, tall, passengers needing wheelchairs, children, infants, elderly passengers, and animals in passenger cabins that now represent about 80% of passengers on a typical US airliner. I have also witnessed the increased age of flight attendants and the reduction in the number of flight attendants to passenger ratio.

4. I have a B.S. degree from the University of Michigan, a law degree, and have as a lawyer represented airline passengers in court cases, administrative proceedings and in Congressional testimonies since 1990. I have authored articles in professional journals and general interest media publications on airline passenger safety, security, and consumer rights, and am frequently contacted as an expert by the media and others interested in aviation safety, security or consumer issues.

5. As such I am personally and professionally familiar with the issues and matters contained in this declaration, which I make in response and opposition to a Declaration of Jeffrey C. Gardlin dated June 21', 2018 and filed on July 3, 2018 in Docket No. FAA-2015-4011.

6. My responses below reference individual numbered points made in the Gardlin declaration.

7. Gardlin #8: This does not make it clear whether evacuation demonstrations have failed, or whether demonstrations were re-administered on an airplane model to reflect the changing passenger demographics. Mr. Gardlin has witnessed demonstrations for 18 models of aircraft, but according to the public record, at least 27 models of aircraft have been tested. According to the information provided, the most recent full scale demonstration that Mr. Gardlin has witnessed occurred as early as 1999, and possibly as early as 1986.

The top 10 aircraft models in use by U.S. fleet are listed below, along with whether the model has been tested in a full-scale evacuation demonstration:

Boeing 737-800: (never tested) Boeing 737-700: (never tested) Airbus 320: (last tested in 1987) Boeing 757-200: (last tested in 1982) Bombardier CRJ200: (never tested) Airbus 319: (never tested) Bombardier CRJ700: (never tested) Airbus 321: (never tested) Bombardier CRJ900: (never tested) Boeing 737-900ER: (never tested)

Source: http://www.fi-aeroweb.com/US-Commercial-Aircraft-Fleet.html

The aircraft models that have been tested in the last 20 years represent 13.11% of aircraft in use by U.S. fleets in 2016.

8. Gardlin #9: This is pure conjecture without citation. Evacuation demonstrations that have been conducted do not realistically represent the size, age, or infirmity of modern passengers, nor that there will be debris in the seat-back pocket or in the row.

9. Gardlin #10: This is more conjecture. If queues form in the aisles, passengers must wait to attempt to get out of their seat and row. This is a cumulative rather than simultaneous effect.

The FAA studies show that it takes longer for older and heavier passengers to exit.1 It takes an average of 1.6-2.0 seconds for males with a waist size over 40 to leave through an overwing exit, but only 1.0 to 1.3 seconds for males with a waist size under 32. Males

1 Access to Egress III, Figures 20-21.

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53-65 years old take 1.6 to 2.1 seconds to exit, while males 18-42 take between 1.1 and 1.5 seconds.

10. Gardlin #11: Reportedly, manufacturers fail at these tests on a regular basis, and are allowed to re-attempt the test until the test is successful.

11. Gardlin #12: The maximum number of passengers can be increased by less than 5% and not require a new full scale demonstration.

12. Gardlin #13: While elderly or child passengers will suffer a higher risk of injury, FAA has demonstrated no attempt to simulate the effect of elderly or child passengers in the evacuation demonstration. This could be accomplished with bulky or padded clothing to restrict movement or time allowances.

13. Gardlin #14: The underlying purpose of the 90 second rule is that a passenger suffers a much higher risk of death or injury---due to fire, smoke, water, or explosion--after 90 seconds. The argument that the 90 second requirement is a standard for comparison ignores the fundamental responsibility of ensuring passenger and crewmember safety. There is sparse evidence on the record that the passengers come from the general population.

14. Gardlin #15: Citation needed.

15. Gardlin #16: It is a logical fallacy that just because seat size has not been a corrective action, that seat size does not need to be corrected, or would not improve evacuation time. Gardlin says he is not aware of seat size being the corrective action taken, yet admits that the FAA does not keep detailed records of these demonstrations. A single person's recollection does not suffice when this information is or could be recorded.

16. Gardlin #17: The FAA, outside experts, and the courts cannot study and conduct research on this issue if the relevant records are in the possession of the manufacturers and the manufacturers claim that this information is proprietary.

On the subject of proprietary information, it is unexplained and highly doubtful that information related to the quick and safe evacuation of passengers should be a matter of corporate competition. The FAA, as a safety and health agency, should seek maximum cooperation to achieve maximum safety. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated in its July 2017 remand decision that undisclosed studies do not count.

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Even if it were determined that emergency evacuation test data should be deemed proprietary, it could be released under a routine protective agreement and order to the petitioner and the court. Since the FAA and manufacturers have declined to do so, the implication is that the test data will show the opposite of the contention that shrunken seats and larger passengers have had no effect on emergency evacuation test times.

17. Gardlin #18: The FAA appears to take the manufacturers at their word that the evacuation testing is proprietary. The FAA, as responsible for health and safety, should not allow safety to be harmed by unchallenged claims of proprietary information.

The five released videos are cherry picked, fail to show any passenger exiting an aircraft, and mislead the public. And because the FAA admits to not retaining these records, the videos also mislead the FAA.

Gardlin engages in a strawman argument: Because these videos do not show that a passenger has to climb onto seats, or that it takes 3 to 4 minutes to exit the plane, then it is proven that passengers can exit planes within 90 seconds. Gardlin picks out the least plausible comments in order to support FAA inaction—that it takes 3 to 4 minutes to reach the exit or that one must climb onto a seat to get out—and dismisses them as if that dismisses all of the public's concerns.

18. Gardlin #19: Gardlin is incorrect. Seat width has changed over time.

19. Gardlin #20: This assertion is not logical or backed up by evidence.

How is Mr. Gardlin not aware of all the evacuation tests? As the Senior Technical Specialist for Aircraft Cabin Security and Survivability, he should have detailed records of all evacuation tests conducted by the FAA, if any, and all tests conducted by the manufacturer, including the failed ones. Gardlin should not be relying on mere recollection.

Even on a twin aisle aircraft, more than half the passengers do not have the option to move through rows to a different aisle where the queue is moving faster. Only the middle seats have access to two rows, so all other passengers must wait until a gap in the queue to attempt to get out of the final seat and into the aisle. The assertion that these time delays are simultaneous rather than cumulative would not be credible coming from a member of the public, and would be dangerous coming from a safety expert.

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20. Gardlin #21: More conjecture: That one's approximation that seat pitch is "unlikely" to go below 27 inches does not absolve the FAA's responsibility to set minimum seat pitches. If 27 inches is truly the minimum required to meet to conform with 14 CFR 25.562(c)(8), then the FAA has admitted that seat pitch DOES affect emergency evacuation times. Additionally, this regulation uses a 170 pound anthropomorphic dummy. 170 pounds is just over the 25th percentile of weight for American males over the age of 20 from 2011-2014. In 1978-1980, 170 pounds was approximately the 50th percentile. The 50th percentile with modern data is 189.3 pounds. The average man weighs nearly 200 pounds, and the average woman weighs 168 pounds.2

That Gardlin believes seat pitch below 30 inches to be "not commoe does not allow the agency to refuse to research this area. Gardlin has not explained why seat pitches of 28 or 29 inches pose "practical and regulatory" limiting factors.

Moreover, recent seat proposals known as the "Sky Rider" call for 25 inch pitch, utilizing a slanted cushion. The Gardlin declaration assumes that seat cushions will be parallel to the floor. Additionally, Airbus owns a patent on a bicycle seat design with no seat back.

21. Gardlin #22: Again, the FAA does not provide evidence to back up its assertions, and admits that it does not keep this evidence. Only after the manufacturers waived their proprietary objections to release of short videos was the FAA able to release any videos to the travelling public.

22. Gardlin #23: Gardlin urges us to consider the evolution of certain factors since the 1960s, such as the shape and contour of seats. Yet, the FAA has not considered the evolution of human sizes in that time.

During the 1960s and 1970s, American passengers were shorter and lighter. Advancing through time to the present has resulted in passengers to be taller and heavier while still being allowed to sit in the same sized seat (or smaller). This means that a passenger today has less space to maneuver within a seat row than they did in the 1980s. For a passenger's ability to move, the key metric is the distance between the front of the seat cushion and the back of the passenger, along with the the distance between the back of the seat in front and the front of the passenger, not just the seat pitch.

23. Gardlin #24: The FAA claims it has "no data supporting speculation that seat pitch or seat width increases human panic." But it is well known that overcrowding increases human panic, and FAA studies indicate panic is a statistically significant factor in emergency evacuations. But there is no adjustment or simulation for panic in full scale

2 https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/body-measurements.htm.

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demonstrations, and the fact FAA has no data is not credible because it has real life crash videos and has chosen to do nothing.

24. Gardlin #25: Gardlin states that real-world evacuations show that there was no evidence of evacuation problems. Gardlin proceeds to list seven instances where a plane was evacuated and the number of injuries to demonstrate that the evacuations were relatively safe. Gardlin conveniently neglects to mention how long it took the passengers to exit the aircraft or what the seat pitches were.

For example, the recent Aeromexico crash resulted in no deaths but 87 injuries. The aircraft had 31 inch seat pitch and two-across seating, rather than the three to six across seating or 29 to 30 inch pitch now used by many airlines.

I see no evidence that any of these planes was evacuated within 90 seconds. I believe the FAA should release any video evidence that any of these planes were fully evacuated within 90 seconds, or evidence that any plane has successfully evacuated within 90 seconds.

Gardlin cited seven recent crashes to demonstrate how few passengers were injured, while not citing the seat pitch or the time it took to fully evacuate the plane. Provided below is a table of how many passengers were involved in each crash, compared to the maximum number of passengers allowed on each model of plane. The FAA has apparently accepted evidence that this many passengers have successfully evacuated in under 90 seconds but nearly all instances involve planes that were not fully loaded, giving passengers more time to maneuver in less crowded and stressful conditions.

Model Passengers Involved Maximum Allowed Passengers

B757-200 124 219-239

B737-300 141 149

B767-300 170 290-351

B737-800 165 189

B767-200ER 157 255-290

B777-200 157 440

A321-211 158 220

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25. Gardlin #26: For the reasons explained here in our supporting documents, I hope that the FAA would rely on its expertise and a full collection of transparent data rather than relying on the absence of evidence from panicked real-world passengers.

The absence of evidence that smaller seats and much larger, older, and infirm, passengers does not prove that shrunken seats are safe. The decades-long refusal of FAA to conduct full scale evacuation tests, failure to test even partially for larger passengers, elderly passengers, children, infirm passengers, carry-on baggage (or to make adjustments for them), representing about 80% of passengers, plus failure to keep any detailed records of tests, and failure to challenge aircraft makers claims of proprietary secrecy suggests an abdication to the point of cover up in my opinion.

I declare under penplty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 2. 1 cray of August, 2018

/0 1 Paul S. Hudson

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